

Turkish-US Security Relations 1945-2003:
A Game-Theoretical Analysis of the Institutional Effect

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ABSTRACT

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This study aims to test the relevance of the neo-institutionalist theory in Turkish-US security relations by using a game-theoretical model. If successful, such an undertaking would provide one with tested theoretical generalizations about the place of institutions (in our case, NATO) in Turkish-US security relations, imply policy-making alternatives to remedy the power asymmetry between the two actors, and help pinpoint problematic issues in the bilateral relationship. This study has looked at the salient issues in Turkish-US security relations from 1945 to 2003. Its key findings suggest that NATO as an institution moderates relative gains made by the parties, and this effect is independent from domestic or international structural changes. The power asymmetry between Turkey and US results in an uneven distribution of relative gains that is particularly evident in problematic issues like the Middle East, US military aid to Turkey, and the presence and activities of US forces in Turkey. The findings of this study suggest that further institutionalization would moderate the distribution of relative gains in both issues.

KISA ÖZET

Türk-ABD Güvenlik İlişkileri 1945-2003:
Kurumsal Etkinin Oyun Teorisi Yoluyla Analizi

Mehmet Ali Tuğtan

Bu çalışmanın amacı, yeni-kurumsalcı teorinin işleyişini Türk-ABD güvenlik ilişkileri üzerinden test etmektir. Bu amaçla bir oyun teorisi modeli kullanılmıştır. Başarılı olması halinde, böyle bir araştırma Türk-Amerikan güvenlik ilişkilerinde bir kurum olarak NATO'nun yerini gösterirken, iki ülke arasındaki güç dengesizliğinden doğan sorunların çözümüne yönelik politika alternatiflerine de işaret edecek ve son olarak, ikili ilişkilerdeki sorunlu konuları da ortaya çıkartacaktır. Çalışmanın temel bulguları şu şekilde özetlenebilir: 1945'ten 2003'e Türk-ABD güvenlik ilişkilerindeki önemli konulara bakıldığında NATO, ulusal ya da uluslararası yapısal değişikliklerden bağımsız olarak iki ülke arasındaki görece kazanımları dengeleyen bir işleve sahiptir. Türkiye ve ABD arasındaki güç eşitsizliği, genel olarak tarafların görece kazanımlarının ABD lehine gelişmesine yol açmaktadır. Bu durum; Ortadoğu, ABD askeri yardımı ve Türkiye'deki ABD askeri varlığı gibi sorunlu alanlarda daha da belirginleşmektedir. Bu gibi alanlarda ilişkilerin daha kurumsal bir yapıya kavuşturulması, görece kazanç dengesizliklerini düzeltebilir.

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ABBREVIATIONS

6 ATAF Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force
ACE Allied Command Europe
ADM Atomic Demolition Munitions
AFMED Allied Forces Mediterranean
AIRSOUTH Allied Air Forces Southern Europe
ASALA Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
CENTCOM [United States] Central Command
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
CFE Conventional Forces Europe
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CINSOUTH Commander-in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe
CJTFs Combined Joint Task Forces
CNU Committee of National Union
CYPOL Greek Cypriot Police
DCA Defence Cooperation Agreement
DEA Drug Enforcement Agency
DECA Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement
DP Democratic Party
EOKA *Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston*
ESDI European Security and Defense Identity
EXCOMM Executive Committee of the National Security Council
FMS Foreign Military Sales
FOFA Follow on Forces Attack
ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles
IFOR Implementation Force
IMF International Monetary Fund
INF Intermediate Nuclear Forces
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
JCAG Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDP Justice and Development Party
JP Justice Party

JUSMMAT Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party
LANDSOUTHEAST Allied Land Forces Southeast
MAP Military Assistance Programme
MAP Military Assistance Programs
MCC Military Coordination Center
MEDO Middle East Defense Organization
MLF Multilateral Nuclear Force
MMD Mixed-Manning Demonstration
MP Member of Parliament
MPRI Military Professional Resources Incorporated
MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile
NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NASA National Space Agency
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NIH Not Invented Here
NILU Northern Iraq Liaison Units
NOCFORMED Naval On-Call force Mediterranean
NSC National Security Council
NUP National Unity Party
ODC Office of Defence Cooperation
OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OTH Over-the-Horizon
PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement
PfP Partnership for Peace
PKK *Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan*
PL Public Law
PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization
PNAC Project for the New American Century
PUK Union of Kurdistan
RDF Rapid Deployment Force
RPP Republican Peoples Party

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement
TAF Turkish Armed Forces
TAI Turkish Aerospace Industries
TGNA Turkish Grand National Assembly
TLP Turkish Labor Party
TMT *Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı*
TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UAR United Arab Republic
UN United Nations
UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
UNSC United Nations Security Council
US United States
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU Western European Union
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This study is haunted by Iraq: it started amidst the political and academic confusion after the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) failed to ratify the second government motion on US troop deployment in Turkey on 1 March 2003. It ended in the heated atmosphere of the fall of 2007, when the TGNA approved a government motion that allowed the government to send Turkish troops to Northern Iraq. Between the two events, Turkish-US relations experienced one of its deepest crises. As an academic, I felt that my main contribution to the greater political events of the day would be to help increase the analytical clarity in the field of Turkish-US security relations.

My first task was to look at the literature on Turkish foreign policy in general, and on Turkish-US relations in particular, so that I could discern its strengths and weaknesses, and determine the particular area of my contribution.

The Turkish foreign policy literature is rich in histories of salient issues that are accurately described and chronicled. It gives the reader a complete picture of Turkey's relations with the world in different periods. In fact, most analysts implicitly or explicitly assume this to be their main task. As a result, analysts seek to understand and explain specific issues in Turkish foreign policy, and use theoretical arguments in an eclectic fashion with little regard to theoretical parsimony. This tendency creates a literature that tries to explain one thing through everything else, but does not produce tested theoretical generalizations in a systematic fashion.

The literature on Turkish-US relations too is not rich enough in studies testing generalizations that improve our predictive and explanatory ability. It is valuable, however, as a collection of primary source studies elaborately chronicled and divided into subtitles in

terms of issues. It has two distinctive properties: i) there is little disagreement about the chronology and salience of issues; and ii) it reaches deep into the primary sources on bilateral relations (most US archives are open all the way up to early 1980s). Thus, the literature on Turkish foreign policy in general and on Turkish-US relations in particular can be used as a pool of data to test the contending theories on international relations (For a detailed discussion of the literature, see below).

Given this overall picture, one has three options in terms of contribution to the literature:

- a) Deeper research into primary sources in order to increase factual and historical accuracy;
- b) Construction of a new theoretical paradigm to re-interpret the available empirical data; or
- c) Application of the existing theories to the available empirical data with greater theoretical parsimony and methodological rigor.

I followed the third course of action and used the empirical data compiled by the literature to test the validity of significant theoretical arguments from the theoretical debate of neo-realist and neo-institutionalist schools during the 1990s and aimed to test the relevance of institutions in Turkish-US security relations. The significance of this inquiry stems from the fact that such an examination would help to reveal the relevance of institutions as a component of power in Turkish-US relations.

The research question this study tried to answer is: “Is Turkey better off with the United States on multilateral institutional settings or on a bilateral setting?” Given the power asymmetry between the two actors, the realist school would suggest that the difference is insignificant. The neo-institutionalist school would argue that institutions moderate relative gains and encourage longer term cooperation between actors. An inquiry of the significance of this difference would test the relevance of both the realist and the neo-institutionalist theories in Turkish-US security relations.

The basic hypothesis of this study can be summarized as follows: *ceteris paribus*, Turkey is better off with the United States on multilateral institutional settings than in bilateral ones, because institutions constrain the actions of units in such a way that remedies for power asymmetries between them.

In the aftermath of the 1 March 2003 crisis in Turkish-US relations, testing the validity of the neo-institutionalist argument in terms of Turkish-US security relations is a significant task, since it would provide one with relevant policy-making implications. The findings of such examination could also provide a useful conceptual framework to analyze Turkish foreign policy in general. Finally, Turkish-US security relations constitute a borderline case where there is evident power asymmetry between the actors, and security is a field where the institutional effect is deemed to be the weakest (For an elaboration of the neo-realist and neo-institutionalist theories, see below). As such, it constitutes a valuable support or refutation of the neo-institutionalist argument.

In order to produce meaningful results, I needed a methodology that provides an uninterrupted link from the theory to the research question and from there, to the empirical data. This methodology would help me to distinguish between dependent and independent variables, discern correlations between variables, test and eliminate false hypotheses, and produce tested generalizations. To that end, I tried to create a game-theoretical model where the main issues in Turkish-US security relations in bilateral and multilateral institutional settings can be factored in and a coherent comparison between relations in bilateral and institutional settings could be made. To operationalize the data, I used a model that produced arbitrary utility points for every reciprocal act of cooperation and defection of Turkey and US in a given issue. This procedure allowed for a graphic depiction of cooperation between the two actors on that given issue in terms of absolute and relative gains (This model is elaborated below).

I collected the empirical data from the post-war history of Turkish-US security relations from 1945 to 2003 as it was depicted by the Turkish foreign policy literature. I further divided this era into four periods (1945-1960; 1960-1980; 1980-1990; 1990-2003), and identified a total of thirty-six salient issues as ‘cooperation series’. I divided the cooperation series into two categories: bilateral series and institutional series. Bilateral series were identified as those issues that involved no institutional framework in their resolution. Institutional series were identified as those issues that were resolved within the NATO institutional framework. NATO was chosen because it has been ‘the’ institution that regulated institutional security cooperation between Turkey and US since 1952.

The key findings of this study can be outlined as follows:

First, NATO as an institution moderates relative gains in Turkish-US security relations. This effect can be observed across issues and periods from 1952 to 2003. Theoretically, this supports the neo-institutionalist argument about the relevance, endurance and independence of the institutional effect. However, the findings of this study dispute the neo-institutionalist argument that institutions increase absolute gains by creating longer series of cooperation. In general theoretical terms, both assertions should be treated with caution, since they are derived from a single case study (of Turkish-US security relations).

Secondly, the power asymmetry between Turkey and US results in an uneven distribution of relative gains in US favor. The source of this uneven distribution is more US defection against Turkish cooperation in the bilateral settings. Of the seventeen cases that resulted in no relative gains for either party, seven are institutional. Thus, the theoretical expectations of this study are confirmed by the analysis: *ceteris paribus*, Turkey is better off with the US in multilateral institutional settings, where the institutional effect moderates the power asymmetry between the two.

Finally, the problematic issues in Turkish-US security relations manifest themselves through volatile and uneven distribution of relative gains. There are two problematic issue areas that cut across periods: i) Turkish-US cooperation in the Middle East, and ii) US military aid to and the status and activities of US forces in Turkey. The relative gains in both issues display a scattered pattern, but they are unevenly distributed in US favor. In terms of policy implications, the findings of this study suggests that institutionalizing cooperation in these two issues would moderate relative gains and thereby reduce tensions in Turkish-US relations.

This study will unfold in the following manner: the second chapter outlines the overall picture of mainstream Turkish foreign policy and Turkish-US relations literature and argues for the necessity of a study that combines existing theory with empirical data. It will then set out the main argument along with its theoretical background, and elaborate on the methodology and limitations of this inquiry. Chapters three to six will take up the history of Turkish-US security relations from 1945 to 2003 in four periods (1945-1960; 1960-1980; 1980-1990; 1990-2003) as they are described in the literature. At the end of each chapter, an analysis section will convert the historical data into graphic models that depict given issues of that period as ‘cooperation series’ in terms of absolute and relative gains. Chapter seven will combine the graphics of all periods into a general picture and look at Turkish-US security relations in terms of:

1. The significance or insignificance of NATO as an institution with regard to moderating relative gains and increasing absolute gains in Turkish-US security relations;
2. The validity of the realist argument about the effect of power asymmetry in Turkish-US security relations; and

3. The longer range issues that create the greatest problems for Turkish-US security relations by showing the uneven relative gains distributions in problematic issue areas.

The conclusion will re-iterate the research question, methodology and key findings of this inquiry, and point at the policy implications of these findings.

CHAPTER TWO

ISSUE, METHOD AND THEORY

On Theory in Turkish Foreign Policy Literature

One can categorize the works on Turkish foreign policy under three broad headings: the academic, the political and the journalistic. The academic writings make up most of the syllabi of Turkish Foreign Policy courses in universities and provide the main factual and conceptual material for academic and political debate. The political writings are written mostly by actual or aspiring politicians, former diplomats or academics and other intellectuals who wish to influence the policy making process. These writings provide most of the concepts involved like “The Turkic World from the Wall of China to the Adriatic Sea”, “Turkey’s strategic depth”, “Turkey as a pivotal state”, “the Turkish model” or “active foreign policy”. They use factual data (and in the case of politicians and diplomats, the actual experience) to promote certain arguments that lead to certain policy suggestions¹. The journalistic writings are produced by the leading reporters or columnists who focus on the salient issues of the day. Though they bring insight, they are mostly descriptive and bereft of academic methodology and theoretical rigor. These works provide the bulk of the wider literature for the interested public.

I contend that the main problem of academic work on Turkish foreign policy is its heavy dependency on the political and the journalistic, so much so that the line between academic and journalistic, or political is blurred. This dependency results from the descriptive tendency in Turkish foreign policy analysis. While providing accurate histories of Turkish foreign policy, most authors tend to separate theory and fieldwork, and do not pay due

¹ For the uses and misuses of these concepts, see Şule Kut, “Türkiye’nin Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dış Politikasının Anahatları” in *En Uzun Onyıl*, eds. Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut (İstanbul: Buke, 2000), pp. 43-61.

attention to methodology. As it stands, the literature has amassed considerable data on the different aspects, issues and periods of Turkish foreign policy, but there are very few studies that consistently apply theories of international relations to cases of Turkish foreign policy. This results in a literature with detailed and accurate chronicles of events, which provide the reader with information and facts, but does not produce tested generalizations. To elaborate on this point, one needs to take on the main accounts of Turkish foreign policy.

Main Accounts of Turkish Foreign Policy

The first seminal work on Turkish foreign policy by Gönlübol et al. that was published in 1969 was a historical narrative. It had no chapter or an introduction that outlined the theoretical premises of the authors². For a long time, this book was used as the basic text for undergraduate courses on Turkish foreign policy. The traditional school of Turkish foreign policy writing continued this largely descriptive attitude: most works in this literature have a very short theoretical introduction. The main body of the text consists of a narration of the main issues in Turkish foreign policy in chronological order and under subtitles concerning regions, countries, or international organizations that were involved in these issues.³

The analyses are contemplated at the unit level, and the answers they seek seem readily available through a rather traditional-realist approach. To take two major examples, one can refer to William Hale's *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000* and Baskın Oran's

² Mehmet Gönlübol et al., eds. *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1965)* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1969).

³ As main examples, see Baskın Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 1&2* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001); Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, eds. *En Uzun Onyıl* (İstanbul: Büke, 2000); Faruk Sönmezoğlu, ed. *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1998); Faruk Sönmezoğlu, ed. *Değişen Dünya ve Türkiye* (İstanbul: Bağlam, 1996); Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2006); William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2000); Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War* (London: Hurst&Company, 2003); F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002); Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, eds. *Turkey in World Politics: an Emerging Multiregional Power* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 2002).

seminal edition on Turkish foreign policy⁴. Today, these two texts largely dominate the syllabi of undergraduate courses on Turkish foreign policy.

In their introductory chapters, both texts define Turkey as a ‘middle power’. In the words of William Hale,

The fundamental assumption made here is that modern Turkey, and its predecessor state, the late Ottoman Empire, can be fitted into the international system as a middle power –power being here defined as the ability to oblige other states to take actions which they would otherwise not have taken, and to resist pressure to do so from other states. This power depends on a mixture of the country’s military strength (...) and its economic resources and level of development. [Middle powers] have some ability to resist pressure from more powerful states, and may sometimes be able to influence the policies of weaker ones, (...) but cannot expect to influence global politics more than marginally. Most crucially, they cannot normally fight a successful war against a major power.⁵

The conception of Turkey as a ‘middle power’ in both Hale and Oran seems to have borrowed its definition of power from the traditional realist school as described by Hans J. Morgenthau, who contends that “the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.”⁶ Hale and Oran define power in terms of military strength and economic resources, and assign Turkey the position of a middle power. This approach can be criticized, not only from other theoretical perspectives, but from within traditional realism itself. Although most secondary sources on traditional realism confine traditional realist definition of power to military strength and economic resources, Morgenthau makes the following subtle remark about how to define interest in terms of power:

⁴ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*; Oran ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1.

⁵ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, pp. 1-2. In his introduction “Türk Dış Politikasının Teori ve Pratiği” (Theory and Practice of Turkish Foreign Policy), Baskın Oran follows Hale almost word by word, but unlike Hale, he refers to Raymond Aron. See Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, pp. 29-30.

⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 5.

The kind of interest determining the political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated. (...) The same observations may apply to the concept of power. Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains control of man over man.⁷

Thus, the realism that underlies the main assumptions of Hale and Oran are based on an understanding of traditional realist theory that confines the main sources of power to military strength and economic resources. Other sub-unit variables that can be employed to arrive at a more sophisticated definition of power are omitted.

Other works on Turkish foreign policy do introduce additional variables. These may be ideational, structural, and/or institutional. The way these variables are introduced, however, usually looks very much like “(...) what Michael Banks once called ‘realism-plus-grafted-on-components,’ that is, the tendency of common wisdom in IR to incorporate reasonable insights without keeping track of whether doing so leads to an internal inconsistency”⁸. For example, in his recent book on Turkish foreign policy since World War II, Faruk Sönmezoğlu defines two factors that are of fundamental importance to understanding Turkish foreign policy: the ‘structural’ factor of geography and the behavioral factors of pro-status quo, pro-western and Russia-phobic tendencies. In the same introduction, Sönmezoğlu states that one should look at the international structural variables rather than domestic ones to explain a country’s foreign policy. Thus, Sönmezoğlu comes up with arguments from three different theories that would explain Turkish foreign policy at three different levels of analysis (international structure at structural, geopolitical at unit, and behavioral at sub-unit

⁷ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 9.

⁸ Stefano Guzzini, “Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis,” *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 443-478; p. 448.

levels)⁹. In his book on foreign policy analysis, Sönmezoğlu suggests that foreign policy analysis is by its very nature eclectic: different levels and schools of theory are employed to explain foreign policy decisions at unit (state) level¹⁰. The prevalence of this line of argument in the Turkish foreign policy literature leads to detailed explanations of the same issue by employing a host of arguments from different theories. As a result, the literature is rich in description, but suffers in terms of theoretical parsimony.

Another trend one can observe in the field is the separation of the literature on international relations theory and the literature on the actual cases of Turkish foreign policy. Gönübol, Sönmezoğlu and others have written meticulous volumes on foreign policy analysis¹¹. However, when it comes to analyzing Turkish foreign policy, they do not attempt to apply this in-depth theoretical knowledge. It seems as though scholars well versed in theory consider it as a separate field of scholarly endeavor, and display little theoretical rigor in analyzing Turkish foreign policy. Thus, they feel free to jump from one level or school of theory to the other, introducing additional variables in an *ad hoc* fashion. In most cases, the introduction of additional variables does not seem to emanate from a sophisticated application of realism, or from another theoretical assumption. Mostly, the theoretical assumptions of the scholar are left unstated, and can only be inferred from the general line of argument. Let us return to Oran's Turkish foreign policy edition to clarify this point: Oran has written introductions to each chapter, in which one can easily discern the theoretical conviction of the author that runs through the two volumes of his Turkish foreign policy edition. It draws

⁹ Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, pp. 1-2.

¹⁰ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi* (İstanbul: Filiz Kitapevi, 1995). In his account for choosing the state as the main actor, Sönmezoğlu refers to both the realist literature that recognizes state as the main actor in international relations, but also to critiques of realism which concede the same point (pp. 55-56).

¹¹ Mehmet Gönübol, *Dış Politika: İç Etkenler Açısından Bir Dış Politika İncelemesi* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1969); Sönmezoğlu, *Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi*.

heavily from the world system and hegemony theories, but this fact remains unstated. It is only from the section on *methodology* that we find out that the author believes in the predominance of infrastructural factors over superstructural ones¹². The section titled “The Theory of Turkish Foreign Policy” does not elaborate on the underlying world system theory through which the author seeks to understand and explain Turkish foreign policy in his chapter introductions, but sets forth arguments on the relative influence of culture, history, geo-strategic location, and domestic factors. From there, it goes on to describe Turkey as a middle power in the traditional realist fashion as cited above. Thus, rather than setting out a coherent theoretical background, this section is a collection of arguments drawn from different and incompatible theories on international relations, pretty much like in the case of Sönmezoğlu’s introduction mentioned above.¹³

A typical work of Turkish foreign policy analysis that involves a rather long period and a set of complex issues usually ends up throwing everything in the analysts’ arsenal of explanatory variables at all levels of analysis at a single question¹⁴. The end product of such *ad hoc* theory introduction is a study that claims to explain *one thing* (at unit level) through *everything else*.

¹² Baskın Oran, “Yöntem ve Yaklaşım,” in *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, ed. Oran, pp. 13-14.

¹³ Baskın Oran, “Türk Dış Politikasının Kuramsal Çerçevesi,” in *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, ed. Oran, pp. 20-54.

¹⁴ The end of Cold War has created a general sense of uncertainty, which greatly contributed to this kind of theory abuse. For its reflections on Turkish-American relations, see Serhat Güvenç, “The Rise and Demise of a ‘Strategic Partnership’: In Search of Context for Post-Cold War Turkish-American Relations” (Ph.D. diss., Boğaziçi University, 2003).

The Literature on Turkish-US Relations

The picture is not too different when it comes to the literature on Turkish-US relations. Most of the works that dominate the literature are chronicles of the history of bilateral relations, or an examination of a specific issue.

Discounting notable exceptions like Şuhnaz Yılmaz or Çağrı Erhan¹⁵, who wrote on the earlier periods of bilateral relations, the literature is mostly concentrated on the post-war era where Turkish-American relations gain more content and depth.

In terms of theory application, one can cite Stephen Walt, who has applied theories of alliance formation to the Turkish case (Walt's study was a comparative one covering entire South-West Asia); David Alvarez who applied the theory of bureaucratic politics to Turkish-US relations during World War II, and Richard C. Company who has devoted a brief introduction on alliance theories¹⁶. There are also attempts to explain specific parts of the relationship with different variables: for example, Turkish domestic politics as a variable in Turkish-US relations is treated in the works of Nur Bilge Criss and Ramazan Gözen¹⁷ while the importance of arms transfers in Turkish-American relations is treated by Sezai Orkunt.¹⁸

When one looks at the general accounts of Turkish-US relations, one can discern that the authors widely agree on the preferred chronology and significance of issues. The order of

¹⁵ For an account of Turkish-American relations before the post-war era, see Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "From Strangers to Allies: Turkish-American Relations" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1999); Çağrı Erhan, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2001).

¹⁶ Stephen M. Walt, "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia," *International Organization* 42, no. 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 275-316; David J. Alvarez, *Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: the United States and Turkey, 1943-1946* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1980); Richard C. Company, *Turkey and the United States: the Arms Embargo Period*, (New York: Praeger, 1986).

¹⁷ Nur Bilge Criss, "A Short History of anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case," *Journal of American History* 89, no. 2, (September 2002), pp. 472-484; Ramazan Gözen, "Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri ve Türk Demokrasisi: 'Realist Bağlantı,'" in *Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi: Kimlik, Demokrasi, Güvenlik*, ed. Şaban H. Çalış, İhsan D. Dağı and Ramazan Gözen (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2001), pp. 73-111.

¹⁸ Sezai Orkunt, *Türkiye-ABD Askeri İlişkileri* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1978).

reference starts from the articles and books that cite primary sources (like Fahir Armaoğlu's compilation on Turkish-American relations¹⁹ or Melvyn P. Leffler's work on the foundation of Turkish-American alliance in the 1945-1952 period) or memoirs of retired statesman and diplomats (like former US Ambassador George McGhee), then followed by the classics of given periods, like the much cited *Troubled Alliance* of George S. Harris or *Bridge Across Bosphorus* by Ferenc A. Vali. These works set the framework and chronology of the mainstream literature on Turkish-American relations, and the rest of the literature follow their footsteps. As an example, Nasuh Uslu can be cited as *the* author of the prototypical account of Turkish-American relations since World War Two²⁰: his work follows the mainstream literature order in terms of chronology and events. It is a meticulously written *history* of Turkish-US relations, since there is only the implication of a structural realist analysis, but no theoretical introduction to that effect. Uslu's account of Turkish-American relations is rich with insights and details of Turkish-US bilateral relations, but he tests no theoretical arguments with this data.

Another category one should mention is the editions on Turkish-US relations that consist of articles on different issues of a given period. The Post-Cold War era witnessed an increase in their number. The works of Morton Abramovitz, and Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan are good examples for this category. These editions aim to bring insight to the salient issues of a given period, but the articles do not have a theoretical consistency amongst themselves.²¹

¹⁹ Fahir Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991).

²⁰ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri* (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2000).

²¹ Morton Abramovitz, ed. *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy* (New York: Century foundation Press, 2000); Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, eds. *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004).

Though fewer in number, there are attempts to construct an alternative paradigm. In this latter category, one can mention the work of Burcu Bostanoğlu, who in her volume on the politics of Turkish-American relations, starts from the position of international politics within social sciences. Bostanoğlu then criticizes the realist approach both as an ideological tool of US foreign policy and as a modernist paradigm, which she claims is unable to account for the interaction between theory and life. She proceeds with the elaboration of a critical hegemony theory based on the writings of Cox, and considers three episodes of Turkish-American relations (The Korean War, the Gulf Crisis and Cyprus) as instances of Turkey's positioning within the American hegemonic system²². She concludes that Turkey was trapped by assuming the realist paradigm throughout the Cold War, and lent support to US hegemony willingly (as the instances of Korean War and Gulf Crisis show). The case of Cyprus, however, is considered to be a diversion from the hegemonic line. It has become and remained such a big problem, Bostanoğlu concludes, because Turkish foreign policy is a single-dimensional realist Cold War calculation stuck within the alliance framework²³. After an extensive theoretical literature review, however, Bostanoğlu does not come up with a methodology. The main point Bostanoğlu makes is a critical generalization about the paramount place of realism in Turkish foreign policy formulation. She points at the necessity to understand the hegemonic structure in which Turkey operates voluntarily²⁴, but -as a student of critical theory- she does not offer any empirical means of how to do it. Bostanoğlu reviews the cases of Korean War, Gulf Crisis and Cyprus, and comes up with the conclusion that while in the former two Turkey conformed to the American hegemony, in the latter she did not. In terms of bringing insight to or providing a better understanding of Turkish-US

²² Burcu Bostanoğlu, *Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999), pp. 375-469.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 495-511.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 508.

relations, this conclusion hardly merits the construction of a new theoretical paradigm, since any student of realism would arrive at it without much difficulty. An understanding of American hegemony in terms of its material and cultural aspects does not require a new paradigm, since Morgenthau points out that power “may comprise anything that establishes and maintains control of man over man” (quoted above).

The literature on Turkish foreign policy as it pertains to Turkish-American relations can be depicted as a continuum from pure theory to pure narrative. Along the line, there are only few instances of a combination where a hypothesis is derived from the generalities in the theory, and then tested with the operationalization of case data. The analysts are not interested in producing tested generalizations about Turkish-US relations; they are interested in ‘explaining’ specific events or periods through a multiplicity of variables derived from different levels and often incompatible theories. As mentioned, this approach results in narratives with *ad-hoc* theory components derived from different and incompatible theories applied on a single case. Let us take the “rise of anti-Americanism in the 1960s” as an example to illustrate this point. The literature on Turkish-US relations attributes different causes from different levels of theory to the rise of anti-Americanism in Turkey:

- i) Anti-Americanism rose because the 1961 constitution allowed an atmosphere where leftist arguments could be voiced (the entry of Turkish Labor Party into the parliament);
- ii) Anti-Americanism rose because of the negative effect of the Johnson Letter;
- iii) Anti-Americanism rose because of the fading Soviet threat and the ensuing *détente* between the two opposing blocs;
- iv) Anti-Americanism rose “in rough proportion to the global power projected by the United States”,²⁵

²⁵ Criss, “A Short History of anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case,” p. 472.

- v) Anti-Americanism rose because the Turkish intelligentsia, especially the student movement was inspired by the global protest against US involvement in the Vietnam War;
- vi) Anti-Americanism rose because the interactions between the US personnel and the Turkish officials and civilians became problematic;
- vii) Anti-Americanism rose because the US was suspected of meddling in Turkish politics through covert operations of the CIA.

The arguments can be multiplied, but it is clear from the seven statements above that one can explain a single phenomenon (the rise of anti-Americanism in Turkey in the 1960s) with variables from different levels of analysis and through arguments derived from different theories. Indeed, this is exactly what the literature on Turkish-US relations does. But in the absence of a coherent theoretical and methodological framework, one cannot ascertain the relevance of individual variables and validity of a given argument. The rise of anti-Americanism is once more in the agenda since the 1 March 2003 government motion was rejected by the Turkish parliament. Does the explanation of the rise of anti-Americanism in the 1960s by the literature help one in any way in understanding the current rise of anti-Americanism? Does it render one any predictive ability about the future? The answer is negative, because in order to improve predictive ability, one needs to test the arguments of a theory, so that they do not remain as insights or arguments, but become tested hypotheses. In order to test hypotheses, one has to narrow down the number of variables and devise an internally coherent methodology. In the absence of such methodology, one cannot distinguish between dependent and independent variables, discern correlations between variables, test and eliminate false hypotheses, and thus go beyond insights or informed opinion. Let us return to our example: if one is to use the Turkish foreign policy literature as a guide to explain or predict a given rise of anti-Americanism in Turkey, one needs psychological, sociological, domestic political, bilateral, and international structural factors (and even that may not

suffice: one needs a “Johnson Letter” –hence the wild goose chase for an equivalent of that infamous document after every major crisis in Turkish-US relations).

As it stands, the literature on Turkish-US relations is not rich enough in testing generalizations to improve our predictive and explanatory ability. It is valuable, however, as a collection of primary source studies elaborately chronicled and divided into subtitles in terms of issues. It has two distinctive properties: i) there is little disagreement about the chronology and salience of issues; and ii) it reaches deep into the primary sources on bilateral relations (most US archives are open all the way up into early 1980s). Thus, the literature on Turkish foreign policy in general and on Turkish-US relations in particular can be used as a pool of data to test the contending theories on international relations. To elaborate on this point, an account of the theoretical approach and method of inquiry of this study is in order.

The Theoretical Approach and Method of Inquiry in This Study

The theoretical approach used in this study is empirical in the sense Viotti and Kauppi use the term: It seeks to produce empirically testable hypotheses that are also policy-relevant²⁶.

Epistemologically, it is a product of the belief that “human life can be improved through human action guided by knowledge.”²⁷ The theoretical background that informs this approach to the issue at hand is part of the broader modernist understanding of science. As such, it aims to stand in the middle of the continuum between pure theory and pure narrative. Without offering an alternative paradigm, it will attempt to construct a theoretical and methodological framework that will produce tested generalizations about Turkish-American relations. To that end, one must focus on a research question that has been hitherto left uncovered by the

²⁶ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory* (Allyn and Beacon: London, 1999), p. 5.

²⁷ Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (December 1988), pp. 379-396, p. 380.

literature. Then, one must refer to a specific and relevant theoretical debate to produce hypotheses on that research question.

The research question of this study emanates from the theoretical debate of neo-realist and neo-institutionalist schools during the 1990s and aims to test the relevance of institutions in Turkish-American security relations. The significance of this issue stems from the fact that such an examination would help to reveal the relevance of institutions as a component of power in the sense Morgenthau uses the term. This would both vindicate the neo-institutionalist claim *and* introduce a depth to the realist analysis by recognizing an additional instrument through which states pursue their “interest defined in terms of power”. Thus, the research question of this study can be stated as follows: “Is Turkey better off with the United States on multilateral institutional settings or on a bilateral setting?” Given the power asymmetry between the two actors, the realist school would suggest that the difference is insignificant. An inquiry of the significance of this difference would test the relevance of both the realist and the neo-institutionalist theories in Turkish-US security relations –given the means to conduct this inquiry are internally coherent. To construct such means, I propose to create a model where the main issues in Turkish-American security relations in bilateral and multilateral institutional settings can be factored in and a coherent comparison between bilateral and institutional relations can be made. Before detailing this model, however, one should elaborate on the relationship between the research question and the underlying theoretical convictions.

To begin with, the research question states the level at which the research problem lies: if the question is “Is *Turkey* better off with *the United States* on multilateral institutional settings or on a bilateral setting?” then it is this unit level relationship (between Turkey and United States) that needs explaining.

The question also states where the analyst expects to find the explanatory variable(s): if the question is “Is Turkey better off with the United States on *multilateral institutional settings* or on a *bilateral setting*?” then the explanation is sought in the effect of multilateral institutional settings on the policy behavior of the units in question. The difference between bilateral settings and multilateral institutional settings in terms of explanatory power is the effect of institutions. Finally, the question also states the concept that needs operationalization: if the question is “Is Turkey *better off* with the United States on multilateral institutional settings or on a bilateral setting?” then one needs a certain level of operationalization of “being better off” to provide a meaningful explanation.

The basic hypothesis of this study can be summarized as follows: *ceteris paribus*, Turkey is better off with the United States on multilateral institutional settings than in bilateral ones, because multilateral institutions constrain the actions of units in such a way that remedies for power asymmetries between them. Exploring the effect of international institutions in Turkish American relations is a significant necessity, not only because there is an evident power asymmetry between Turkey and the United States, but also because United States is the hegemonic power of the post-war era. As G. John Ikenberry argues, “At the heart of the Western postwar order is an ongoing trade-off: the United States agrees to operate within an institutionalized political process and, in return, its partners agree to be willing participants.”²⁸

One can argue that the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 has disrupted this very mechanism, but as things stand, we see that the institutional framework still functions. Indeed, Ikenberry was almost prophetic when he said “American leadership and its institutional creations will long outlast the decline of its postwar position of military and economic

²⁸ G. John Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,” *International Security* 23, no. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 43-78, p. 55.

dominance; and it will outlast the foreign policy stumbling of particular administrations.”²⁹ It is therefore a significant task to test the validity of the neo-institutionalist argument in terms of Turkish-US security relations. The findings of such examination may provide a useful conceptual framework to analyze Turkish foreign policy, and can also be used as a meaningful guide in the policy-making process itself.

The ‘Neo-Neo Debate’: the Basic Arguments of Neo-Realist and Neo-institutionalist Theories

The theoretical argument that underlies the hypothesis of this study is derived from the great debate between neo-realism and neo-institutionalism during the 1980s and 1990s³⁰. This discussion had revolved around the basic question: “Do international institutions matter?”³¹

The first decades of the post-war era had been the formative years of international relations as a separate field of study, and had been dominated by the founding fathers of the realist school such as E. H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau and Raymond Aron. Traditional realism sought to explain international relations in terms of inter-state relations. States were assumed to be rational and monolithic actors seeking to survive and enhance their power in an essentially anarchic world as depicted in Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan*. The major critique to this understanding of international relations has been liberal institutionalism, which came in

²⁹ G. John Ikenberry, “The Future of International Leadership,” *Political Science Quarterly* 111, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 385-402, p.386.

³⁰ For an earlier version of this debate, see Stephen D. Krasner, ed. *International Regimes* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983). For a comprehensive compilation, see David Baldwin, ed. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For a very compact summary, see Stanley Hoffman, Robert O. Keohane, and John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future, Part II: International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe,” *International Security* 15, no. 2 (Autumn 1990), pp. 191-199.

³¹ For a specific discussion around this question, see John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter, 1994-1995), pp. 5-49; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutional Theory,” *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer, 1995), pp. 39-51.

the form of functionalist integration theory during the 1940s and early 1950s, followed by neo-functionalist regional integration theory of the 1950s and 1960s, and the interdependence theory during the 1970s³². Liberal institutionalism challenged the basic assumptions of realism about the centrality and cohesion of states as actors, and assumed wider possibilities for international cooperation through institutions. The realist response to this challenge was neo-realism, or structural realism as articulated by Kenneth N. Waltz, which tried to explain international relations as a function of international structure understood in terms of capability distribution³³. 1970s provided both schools of thought with empirical evidence to sustain their positions, and the early 1980s witnessed another liberal institutionalist attack on realism. The new version of liberal institutionalism as articulated by Stephen D. Krasner, Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye and others accepted the basic premises of realism about the centrality of states as actors and the essentially anarchic nature of international relations, but sought to demonstrate the positive effect of international regimes and institutions on international cooperation by alleviating some of the constraining effects of international anarchy³⁴. Thus, both neorealist and neo-institutionalist schools met on the primacy of the state as an actor, and

(...) the systemic use of an economic mode of explanation in IR. This implies both (1) the Waltzian use of market theory and (2) the rational-actor model used in the game-theoretical approach and most prominently by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr's later research program. It [was] on this ground that insights from the traditional realist and liberal traditions [had] been integrated.³⁵

The basic critique of the new brand of liberal institutionalism called 'regime analysis' during the early 1980s is best summarized by Susan Strange, who suggested that regime

³² Joseph M. Grieco, *Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 4.

³³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

³⁴ Joseph M. Grieco, Robert Powell and Duncan Snidal, "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," *The American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (September 1993), pp. 727-743, p. 729.

³⁵ Guzzini, "Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis", p. 444.

analysis was, i) a fad that would fade with little contribution in terms of long term knowledge, ii) imprecise and woolly, iii) value-based, iv) static, and v) narrow-minded and rooted in a state-centric paradigm.³⁶

The neo-realist response to neo-institutionalism during the 1990s suggested that institutions could not be seen as explanatory variables as they are shaped by the prevailing capability distribution, and hence one should look at the structure in order to explain international relations. The neo-realists also suggested that the effect of institutions on inter-state relations were insignificant in the field of security, where relative gains of each actor mattered more than the absolute gains that they may achieve through institutional cooperation.³⁷

In order to explain the institutional effect, another key argument set forth by the neo-realist school was that post-war international institutions were created by the United States in order to perpetuate its hegemony in a more cost-effective manner. The neorealist theory suggests that hegemony is a function of capability distribution, and that the basic reason for the sophisticated institutional cooperation between western powers was the existence of an external threat (the Soviet Union during the Cold War). As that threat disappeared, neo-realists expected the return of balance of power politics and the decline of alliance and cooperation among the western powers.³⁸

As the neo-realists attempted to explain the institutional effect by correlating it with the American hegemony and Soviet threat, the neo-institutionalist claimed that institutions, though their creation may be the result of power relations, have a life of their own and can

³⁶ Susan Strange, "Cave! hic dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in *International Regimes*, ed. Krasner, p. 337.

³⁷ Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism" in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, ed. Baldwin, pp. 116-140; Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions".

³⁸ G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order", *International Security* 23, no 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 43-78, pp. 43-44.

serve as explanatory variables to the extent that they increase international cooperation³⁹.

Institutions, they claimed, moderate risks and increase absolute gains for all actors by creating a more predictable environment. This effect allows all actors to drop the strict vigil that they have to keep towards each other in a classical situation of Hobbesian anarchy, in which there is a constant war of all against all and where commitment to covenants is impossible.

Regimes and institutions have this effect, not because they provide for governmental functions that create the civil society in the Hobbesian model, but because they encourage the actors to change the tactics they normally assume under conditions of anarchy⁴⁰. In the words of G. John Ikenberry,

The institutional structure creates what might be called 'constitutional characteristics' -a structure of institutions and open polities that constrain power and facilitate 'voice opportunities', thereby mitigating the implications of power asymmetries and reducing the opportunities for the leading state to exit or dominate.⁴¹

The Proposed Model of Analysis

As stated above, this study aims to create a model into which one can factor the data on bilateral and multilateral institutional relations between Turkey and the United States. This model should have the analytical property of representing the basic premises of the realist and the neo-institutionalist theories, so that one can test their validity. This means that the model should be able to demonstrate the difference between bilateral and multilateral institutional

³⁹ Stephen D. Krasner, "Regimes and Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables," *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 497-510.

⁴⁰ Robert Keohane, "Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society," in Robert O. Keohane, *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 63-87.

⁴¹ Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order", p. 45.

settings in terms of relative and absolute gains. In order to arrive at such a model, I propose to use a game-theoretical framework.⁴²

In game-theoretic terms, in any situation under anarchy, the order of preference for an actor (A) in its relations with another actor (B) is as follows:⁴³

$$AdBc > AcBc > AcBd^{44}$$

Two important concepts used in this argument are “cooperation” and “defection”. Cooperation means to engage in actions in conjunction with another party in order to obtain a result⁴⁵. The results expected from cooperation may not necessarily be the same for all parties and some of the results may not be desired by all parties. Sometimes, an actor may cooperate in order to achieve the result it desires and suffers the consequences of the undesired results that arise. So, in most acts of cooperation between two or more parties, there is always a multiplicity of results and a relativity of gains. The realist school argues that the question of relativity is more significant in the field of security, because the relative gains in the field of security directly effect the very survival of the actors.⁴⁶

The second concept, defection, is simply the act of non-cooperation. An actor may defect in order to avoid the undesired results of cooperation, or in order to deceive the other party who is still cooperating. This way, the party that defects becomes a free rider for the

⁴² For the relative strengths and weaknesses of using the game-theoretic approach on international cooperation, see Helen Milner, “Review: International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses,” *World Politics* 44, no. 3 (April 1992), pp. 466-496.

⁴³ For an introduction to the basic logical, methodological and philosophical concepts of game theory, see Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis, *Game Theory: A Critical Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995). For an extended debate on the applications of game theory on international cooperation, see: Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic, 1984); Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” and Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory” in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, ed. Baldwin, pp.171-233.

⁴⁴ d: defects; c: cooperates

⁴⁵ For a discussion of the definitions of cooperation, see Milner, “Review: International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses,” pp. 467-470.

⁴⁶ Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” pp. 11-12.


gains obtained while the other party pays the cost. The realist school holds that since international relations are dominated by anarchy, cooperation of the weaker party is usually reciprocated with defection by the stronger party (AcBd) -to rephrase Thucydides, 'the stronger party gets what it wants and the weaker party accepts what it must accept'. Because under conditions of strict anarchy, there is little incentive for the stronger party to keep the balance even so that the relative gains of each side are roughly equal. The realist argument about international relations suggests that actors tend to maximize relative gains, even at the expense of arriving at Pareto-deficient outcomes in terms of absolute gains. This, they claim, is especially so in the field of security where the relative difference between actors are a direct existential advantage.

The neo-institutionalist argument claims that institutional restraints concentrate the outcomes in mutual cooperation (AcBc), because they provide for the predictability that all actors need in the longer run. The price these actors pay in order to sustain this predictability is to forego some of the relative gains they might have acquired by defection. Thus, the institutional effect is to increase absolute gains for all parties but decrease relative gains, especially for the stronger party. In other words, the effect of institutions on inter-state cooperation is producing results that are desired by all and curbing the incentive for the stronger party to defect. This moderates the intensity of rewards and damages for actors in question, but perpetuates cooperation.

One must stress that both schools assume states to be rational egoist actors trying to maximize their gains. While the realist school emphasizes the maximum gains that can be obtained by a given party in a single game, the neo-institutionalist school emphasizes the iteration of games and points at the need for continuing cooperation in order to gain more in the long run.


Thus, according to both theories, in the absence of institutions, the outcomes pile up in either pole of the formula (i.e. AdBc [intense reward for A] or AcBd [intense damage for A]), and cooperation is short-lived.

In graphic terms:



Graph 1 Bilateral relations in the absence of institutions

According to neo-institutionalist theory, however, when one introduces the effect of institutions, the relations between any given two actors would look like this:



Graph 2 Absolute and relative gains in an institutional framework

distribution of relative and absolute gains between Turkey (a middle power) and the US (the hegemon power) should look like Graph 3.

Applying the Theory: Justification, Operationalization and Limits

The selection of Turkish-US security relations to test the neo-institutionalist argument is justified in the sense that it yields a number of significant implications: i) it tests the theory for the main neo-realist challenge based on the primacy of capability distribution; ii) it tests the theory on the argument about the relationship between institutions and hegemony; and iii) it provides a general framework to analyze Turkish-US relations in particular, but also Turkish foreign policy in general. As mentioned at the very beginning, the research question from which this study proceeds is essentially foreign policy focused. I therefore place greater importance at the third possibility of providing a general framework to analyze Turkish foreign policy. Thus, the conclusions of this study will concentrate on the outcomes that are relevant with this question rather than the broader theoretical ones. My research interest aside, it is scientifically improper to produce broader theoretical conclusions from a single case study.

In order to have a meaningful and scientific procedure through which one can use empirical data to test the theory, there has to be some level of operationalization of “being better off” and “distribution of absolute and relative gains”. To that end, this study will use the following procedure: every defection while the other party cooperates will count for two points; every cooperation while the other party cooperates will count for one point and every defection while the other party defects will count for zero arbitrary utility points⁴⁷. This constitutes the core of the matrix model frequently used in the game-theoretical approach. Of

⁴⁷ Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis, *Game Theory: A Critical Introduction*, p. 36.

course, this procedure is bereft of any explanatory power unless the historical nature and interconnectedness of different foreign policy actions are factored into it. This study will use the concept of iteration to do so: in any game-theoretical situation, the decisions of actors involved are influenced by the nature of the game. If it is a one-time only game, i.e. if you can sucker the other party and get away with it, a rational egoist actor would be inclined to do so in order to maximize its gains. But, as it happens, international relations usually entail iterated games where the parties involved tend to use a strategy of tit for tat. This means that an actor is more likely to reciprocate cooperation with cooperation, and defection with defection with a t(+1) time lag where

$$t(1) A_c \Rightarrow t(2) B_c \Rightarrow t(3) A_c \dots^{48}$$

By factoring in the iteration of games using the grade points for defection and cooperation mentioned above, one can have an overall graphic depiction for each series. Let us assume a series X where

$$t(1) A_c t(2) B_c t(3) A_d t(4) B_d$$


The points for actors A and B in this series would be calculated as follows:

Table 1 Calculation of Gains in Series (X)

Time	Actor A	Actor B
T1-T2	1	1
T2-T3	2	0
T3-T4	0	0
Absolute Gains:	3+1=4	
Relative Gains:	2	-2

In graphic terms, the Series (X) can be displayed as

⁴⁸ On the issue of reciprocal and sequential nature of inter-state relations, see Robert Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," *International Organization* 40, no. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 1-27.



Graph 4 Graphic display of Series (X)

In Graph 4, the relative gains in favor of actor A shift the horizontal coordinates of Series (X) towards left (\leftarrow) while relative gains in favor of actor B shift the horizontal axis coordinates of Series (X) towards right (\rightarrow). From Table 1 one can see that the relative gains in Series (X) was two points in favor of actor A –hence the (-2) position of Series (X) in the horizontal axis. The vertical axis measures the absolute gains, i.e. the total gains made by both parties regardless of who took the greater share of that totality. From Table 1 one can see that absolute gains in Series (X) was 4 points –hence the (+4) position of Series (X) in the vertical axis.

As the model proposed above suggests, this study will compile data from the history of Turkish-American security relations and convert it into the aforementioned series. If the procedure of inquiry is correct, one would end up with the following conclusions that either support or falsify the research hypothesis:

a) Both the graphic depiction of the bilateral and the multilateral institutional series will be skewed towards the United States, but the multilateral institutional series will be less so. This result would support the main neo-institutionalist argument on the relevance and function of institutions.

b) Graphic depictions of both bilateral and multilateral institutional series will be skewed towards the United States with little or no difference between them. This result would falsify the neo-institutionalist argument on the relevance and function of institutions.

I suggest examining Turkish-American security relations in four broad periods stretching from 1945 to 2003. I will try to identify series of cooperation in bilateral and institutional security relations in these four periods. To test for the institutional effect, I will distinguish between these series as: i) bilateral and ii) NATO-related. The reason for taking NATO as the main institutional pillar of Turkish-American security relations is obvious: NATO is indisputably *the* multilateral security institution that defines the basic premises of security cooperation within the West, and is of enduring relevance today –that is, if the neo-institutionalist claim is not false. The chosen periods stretch across the post-war history of Turkish-American relations, as can be observed in the table below.

Table 2 Four Periods of Turkish-American Relations

Cooperation against Soviet Union 1945-1960
Cyprus 1960-1980
The Middle East 1980-1990
The Greater Middle East 1990-2003

If the procedure of inquiry and the underlying theoretical argument is correct, one should observe shorter series of cooperation with considerable relative gains for the US in the bilateral issues, and longer series of cooperation with moderate relative gains in NATO-related issues.

In order to identify the series themselves, one should look at the history of Turkish-American relations since World War Two. Using the traditional Turkish foreign policy literature on the history of Turkish-US security relations, one can readily identify the issues of significance and the points of cooperation and contention between the parties. Thus, a series in Turkish-US security relations consists of the reciprocal actions of Turkey and US in order

to accomplish a given goal or solve a given problem. For example, the first series in this study consists of the cooperation between Turkey and US on the issue of Turkish Straits (For a graphic depiction of this series, see below).

In constructing a series, four limitations are required: First, only those actions that have direct bearing on the given issue are counted as an act of cooperation or defection. For example, from a historical point of view, the Truman Doctrine and the US military help to Turkey in 1947-1951 are intractably linked with the Marshall Program and US economic aid to Turkey. However, for the proposed model to work, one has to -artificially- isolate the military aid and assume no link between economic and military aid at the roughly same period. Of course, this is in fact not true. The plausibility of this assumption rests on the determination of the issue that creates the series: the issue that creates the Truman Doctrine series is the need to modernize and strengthen the Turkish army in order to meet a direct Soviet military threat. The Marshall Program is designed to bolster the economy and create a more stable economic and political environment. The goal of the Marshall Program is admittedly related to the broader aim of containing communist expansion, but it has no direct effect on the enhancement of Turkish military capability. Therefore, we can isolate a series of acts of cooperation and defection concerning the specific issue of strengthening the Turkish military against Soviet threat and disregard other acts in the field of economic aid. In logical terms, we can assume a division between acts of military cooperation by actors A and B in a sequence of $t(n)$ and economic cooperation in a sequence of $t(m)$ where the chronological order is

$$t(n), t(m), t(n+1), t(m+1), t(n+2), t(m+2) \dots$$

and identify two separate series of $t(n), t(n+1), t(n+2)$ and $t(m), t(m+1), t(m+2)$ because we assume two separate sequences of reciprocal action where the cooperation or defection of actors A and B in *military relations* is sequenced in terms of $t(n)$, while their cooperation or

defection in *economic relations* is sequenced in terms of $t(m)$. In theoretical terms, this means that this study is relinquishing a major argument of the liberal institutionalist theory, i.e. interdependence and issue linkage. This is a theoretical weakness suffered for a methodological refinement. If the neo-institutionalist argument can be supported in the field of security relations without assuming linkage and interdependence, it would even be stronger evidence for the relevance of institutions.

Secondly, the time periods between reciprocal actions are not constant, sometimes the time lag between $t(n)$ and $t(n+1)$ can be seconds, sometimes several months. One reason for this is related to the first assumption, i.e. the issue-based definition of acts of cooperation and defection. The intervening acts that are not related to the issue are assumed to take place in $t(m)$, a separate time sequence.

This brings us to the third limitation: we have to assume that actions are always reciprocal and sequential, i.e. there can be no such thing as ‘unintentional and/or simultaneous acts of cooperation or defection’. This last assumption seems problematic, but as will be seen, instances of it are rare enough to be ‘assumed away’.⁴⁹

Finally, we have to assume a rough equivalence of benefits. In his “Reciprocity in International Relations”, Keohane seems to refer to the particular problem of this very inquiry:

Although reciprocity clearly entails at least rough equivalence of benefits, in international relations as in personal social relations precise measurement is often impossible. States in reciprocal relationships with one another often do not have identical obligations. How is one to ascertain the relative value of a superpower's pledge to protect an ally from attack, on the one hand, and the ally's willingness to accept stationing of the superpower's troops in its territory, on the other?⁵⁰

⁴⁹ For the plausibility of this assumption, see Robert Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations,” p. 21.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 7.

The answer to this problem is also provided by Keohane:

*Reciprocity refers to exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad.*⁵¹

For the purposes of this study, this means: the points through which relative and absolute gains are calculated do not represent ratio-level utility. They merely correspond to a count of reciprocal acts of cooperation and/or defection, which are *assumed to have* rough equivalence. For example, the act of Turkey receiving military aid from the US in return for accepting a scheme of defense cooperation is represented as:

TR(c), US(c)

In reality, Turkey may be forced to pay greater amounts of money to the spare parts of the equipment that comes with the US aid, but for the purpose of modeling the reciprocal action, this is irrelevant. The equality of the points each party gets (1,1) does not signify an objective material value equality, but a rough subjective value equality of “good for good”.

Having dwelled on the limitations of the methodology, one last word of caution should be spent: the application of this game-theoretical model may be criticized in terms of selection bias and interpretative reading of events. One can take this risk by relying on the overall consensus in the mainstream literature about the salience, content and chronology of issues.

⁵¹ Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations”, p. 8 (italics in the original).

CHAPTER THREE

COOPERATION AGAINST SOVIET UNION 1945-1960

The literature on Turkish-American relations suggests that the post-war years were the first determining period in which Turkey and the United States joined forces against the Soviet threat. There are a number of domestic and structural reasons for the formation of the Turkish-US alliance.

In terms of international structure, these years correspond to the so-called 'Early Cold War' during which the ideological camps were formed around the respective superpowers. For the United States, this period represented the transition from isolation in the Western Hemisphere to undertaking global responsibilities as a global hegemon. The bilateral relations between Turkey and US flourished under the perceived common interest of deterring communist expansion as successive US administrations came to appreciate Turkey's geo-strategic position and her value as a willing participant in the struggle against communist expansion.

For Turkey, this period was the transition from the twenty-seven-year long single party rule to multi-party democracy. Faced with the Soviet demands on the Turkish Straits and the provinces of Kars and Ardahan, Turkey had sought to establish a firm alliance with the West in order to deter Soviet aggression. While both the Republican Peoples Party (RPP) and its successor after the May 1950 elections, the Democratic Party (DP) agreed on the necessity and desirability of alliance with the US against Soviet threat, it was during the decade-long DP rule (1950-1960) that this alliance was deepened and institutionalized. The DP leadership made no secret of their view that Turkish and US interests were identical, and forged a corresponding foreign policy as a steadfast US ally. But before going into that, one

has to look at the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, where the Soviet demands on Turkey urged the RPP government to seek US support.

The Turkish Straits Controversy and the Reasons for US Support to Turkey 1945-1947

The formative phase of Turkish American security relations took place between 1946 and 1952. During the interwar years, Turkey had followed a pro-status-quo policy that carefully balanced the pro-status quo western democracies of Britain and France; the revisionist fascist powers of Germany and Italy; and the communist Soviet Union. Turkey remained neutral during World War Two until the eleventh hour, and joined the allies only to assume a place in the formation of the post-war order.⁵²

After the war, Europe, which had been the centre of the international system for more than two centuries, lost her gravity. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the two superpowers, around which the respective ideological and military blocs of the communist east and the capitalist west would take shape. Europe was in ruins while the Soviet Union had become a superpower. This post-war situation rendered Turkey's former policy of balancing European powers with each other and the Soviet Union untenable. Having lost a quarter of her imperial wealth during the war, Britain was the biggest debtor nation of the world. By 1947, she was to decrease her overseas military presence as well as military and economic assistance to the countries in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, including Turkey.

Simultaneously, Turkey was under Soviet pressure since June 1945. In a meeting with the Turkish ambassador Selim Sarper, Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Molotov had outlined the Soviet demands as follows: modification of the Montreux Treaty in favor of the

⁵² Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1994).

littoral states of the Black Sea (i.e. Soviet Union), consideration of the joint defence of the Straits, and the retro-cession of Kars and Ardahan.⁵³

Since Britain was in no position to serve as a balancing power, Turkey sought American assistance and security guarantees against the Soviet Union. In August 1945, Turkey sent a note to US and Britain, asking them to work towards the preservation of peace in the Straits under American guarantee, and the cessation of Soviet demands.⁵⁴

The decision on the Turkish side to seek western (and particularly American) security assurance against the Soviet threat met with increasing approval on the US side from 1946 onwards, as the wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union was replaced by ideological confrontation and mutual distrust.

In February 1946, the acting head of the US embassy in Moscow, George F. Kennan sent his famous long telegram, warning against the Soviet intentions. In the telegram, which was published in *Foreign Affairs* in July 1947 under the pen name X, Kennan suggested that the United States should follow a policy of containment, since the Soviets would only back down “when strong resistance is encountered at every point,” and that the “avoidance of war would depend on the degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which the Western World can muster.”⁵⁵

Accordingly, the American position on the Soviet demands and Turkish security in general changed from 1946 onwards. The American naval presence in the Mediterranean grew from a modest fleet of one light cruiser and two destroyers by the end of 1945 to an aircraft carrier, three cruisers, eight destroyers and a destroyer tender by December 1946,

⁵³ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 502. The Soviet demand to establish bases for the joint defence of the Straits was only confined to wartime.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 523.

⁵⁵ George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” in *The American Encounter: the United States and the Making of the Modern World: Essays from 75 Years of Foreign Affairs*, eds. Fareed Zakaria and James F. Hoge, Jr. (New York: Basic Books, 1997). Also quoted in David Reynolds, *One World Divisible: a Global History since 1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2000), p. 22.

making it the dominant power in the Mediterranean and the adjacent seas⁵⁶. In April 1946, under the guise of returning the body of Turkey's late ambassador to Washington, Münir Ertegün (who had died some sixteen months ago), US sent the battleship *Missouri* to İstanbul. Built to avenge Pearl Harbor, the ship was one of the largest of its kind, and thus a perfect show of force instrument. The *Missouri* anchored off the Dolmabahçe Palace on the 5 April amidst huge public and official jubilation.⁵⁷ The next day, President Truman stated the importance of the Straits and the Middle East for American strategic and economic interest in his Army Day speech, where warned that "the sovereignty and integrity of the countries in the Near and Middle East must not be threatened by coercion or penetration."⁵⁸ On 7 May 1946, The US erased the Turkish debt from lend-and-lease during the Second World War.

In her dealings with Britain and the United States at the time, Turkey regarded United States as the main potential source of economic, and Britain as the main source of military aid. But soon, the shortcomings of the British would force Turkey to turn increasingly towards United States for military equipment as well.⁵⁹

On 7 August 1946, a note delivered to Dean Acheson by the Soviet Chargé Orekhov outlined the Soviet demands on the revision of the Straits regime because of the gross violations by the German ships during World War Two⁶⁰. The Turkish response to such

⁵⁶ Jonathan Knight, "American Statecraft and the 1946 Black Sea Straits Controversy," *Political Science Quarterly* 90, no. 3 (Autumn 1975), pp. 451-475.

⁵⁷ "Missouri Büyük İlgi ve Sevgile Karşılandı", *Cumhuriyet*, 6 April, 1946. President İsmet İnönü had remarked: "The closer the ships of American navy to us, the better." But the great ship had sailed *alone*, without her escort from the 8th Fleet, because the diplomats in the State Department had thought the presence of the entire fleet would be too provocative.

⁵⁸ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971* (American Enterprise Institute, Hoover Policy Study 2, 1972), pp. 19-20.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁶⁰ John Knight, "American Statecraft and the 1946 Black Sea Straits Controversy," p.459.

Soviet claims was that the violations were minor, and that they emanated from changing ship categories on account of the war.⁶¹

On 15 August 1946, in a meeting in the White House, the Truman administration concluded that the Russian demands “reflected a desire to control and dominate Turkey; that if allowed control of Turkey, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to stop Russia from dominating Greece, Turkey, and the whole Near and Middle East”.⁶²

In August and October 1946, the United States responded to the Soviet notes on the Straits in terms favoring the Turkish position.⁶³ The US reply dated 19 August stated that “attacks or threats of attack against the Straits would clearly be matters of action for the United Nations Security Council.”⁶⁴

By the end of October, the Soviet Union had backed down, and the Montreux regime remained in force. Combined with Soviet withdrawal from Northern Iran earlier that year, this represented a significant reduction in the immediate threat against Turkey. Turkey had achieved her main diplomatic objective of aligning with the US and Britain to balance the Soviet threat, but her demands for extensive military and economic aid were not met: while Turkey had demanded \$500 million from the American Export-Import Bank by April 1946, she received only \$50 million by the end of the year.⁶⁵ Britain, who was supposed to provide military equipment, was about to fare even worse.

⁶¹ Cemal Bırsel, “The Turkish Straits in Light of Recent Turkish-Soviet Russian Correspondence,” *The American Journal of International Law* 41, no. 4 (October 1947), pp. 727-747.

⁶² John Knight, “American Statecraft and the 1946 Black Sea Straits Controversy,” p.454.

⁶³ Baskın Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, pp. 524-528.

⁶⁴ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 22.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

The Truman Doctrine and US Military Aid to Turkey 1947-1949

In February 1947, with the worst winter in more than eighty years paralyzing the industry, the British government decided (among other measures) to terminate all financial assistance to Greece and Turkey and to remove 40,000 British troops from Greece by the end of March.⁶⁶

With the British support gone, the positions of Turkey and especially Greece would be precarious. Turkey still faced Soviet demands and Soviet troop concentrations on her borders, while the royalist Greek government was waging a bitter civil war against communist partisans. The US State Department advised that support for Greece and Turkey was crucial. Thus, in a speech to a joint session of both houses of Congress in March 1947, President Truman declared the US determination “to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”⁶⁷ The “Truman Doctrine” promised a total of \$400 million aid for Greece and Turkey. From this sum, Turkey was to receive \$100 million in military aid.

The conditions for aid to Turkey were outlined in a defense cooperation treaty signed by the parties on 12 July 1947. According to this treaty, Turkey was to use the American equipment and financial aid for the defence of her freedom and independence. In article two of the treaty, the Turkish government pledged to provide any information necessary to the American diplomatic mission about the use of military assistance and the current status and progress of the application of the military assistance program. The members of US media would also have free access to acquire information about the application of the aid program.

⁶⁶ Reynolds, *One World Divisible*, p.28.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 28; also see William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 261.

Article four guaranteed that the equipment could not be re-sold or shared in any shape or form with third parties without prior American approval.⁶⁸

An American mission under General Lunsford Oliver had visited Turkey in May 1947 to ascertain the needs of the Turkish military, and had suggested that Turkey should relieve some of the conscripts held under arms and use the American military aid to modernize her equipment⁶⁹. In 1948, the US Congress included the assistance to Greece and Turkey in the general Foreign Aid Act. Following the Mutual Defence Act of October 1949, the American military aid was coordinated by the Economic Cooperation Administration. Between 1947 and 1949, Turkey received \$152.5 million in military aid, and used it for the modernization of her military equipment and construction of strategic roads. The break-down of the initial \$100 million military aid was as follows:

Table 3 US Military Aid under Truman Doctrine (Figures in USD)⁷⁰

Ground Force	48,500,000
Air Force	26,750,000
Naval Force	14,750,000
Arsenal Improvement	5,000,000
Highway Improvement	5,000,000
Total:	100,000,000

“[Ambassador Wilson's] report urged that a five year assistance program be implemented in order to modernize the armed forces, (...) at an estimated five-year cost of \$500 million”. By 1952, the American military aid amounted to a total of \$400 million.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, pp. 532-534. Also see Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, pp. 37-39. For the full text of the Treaty, see Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, Appendix I, pp. 213-215.

⁶⁹ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 532.

⁷⁰ George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection* (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), p. 43.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, p.42; pp. 534-535.

For the United States, support for Turkey against the Soviet Union was necessary for the containment of communism in general. Assistance to Turkey would provide an example for other nations under communist threat, and reaffirm their faith in the American resolution to ‘protect free nations from communist aggression and subversion’⁷². A more practical reason emanated from Turkey’s geo-strategic position: Turkey guarded the Northern approaches to Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Indeed, the US saw her assistance to Turkey at the time primarily as an investment in the defence of the Middle East⁷³. In the words of George McGhee, the director of Truman Aid to Turkey and Greece, and later US ambassador to Ankara in the early 1950s,

When the United States decided in 1947 to provide Turkey with massive military assistance under the Truman Doctrine and in the early 1950s to help Turkey gain admission to the NATO alliance, the door to a Soviet invasion of the Middle East was slammed shut.⁷⁴

Another reason related to Turkey’s geo-strategic position was her ability to put US airplanes into bombing range of vital Soviet industrial zones. Between 1945 and 1949, the Americans enjoyed nuclear monopoly and based their combat plans on the extensive use of atomic bombs against enemy industrial centres and troop concentrations. The bulk of the Soviet industry and military build-up was between the Ural Mountains and Eastern Europe. Turkey with her location just south of the Black

⁷² James Madison Garrett, *Assistance to Turkey as an Instrument of United States Foreign Policy, With Emphasis on Military Assistance: 1947-1953* (New York: Columbia University, 1961).

⁷³ Marcy Agmon, “Defending the Upper Gulf: Turkey’s Forgotten Partnership,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 21, no. 1 (January 1986), pp. 81-97; Halford L. Hoskins, “Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East,” *The American Political Science Review* 47, no. 1 (March 1953), pp. 188-198.

⁷⁴ McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, Preface, p.xiii.

Sea offered a perfect launch site to strike deep into Soviet territory in the event of a general war.⁷⁵

Finally, US strategic planners suggested that if properly armed and trained the Turkish Army would be able to absorb the initial Soviet attack and tie down large Soviet forces. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, West European countries were in no position to field massive armies. The Turkish troop reserve was a military asset against the Soviet Union.⁷⁶

The Emergence of NATO and the Institutionalization of Turkish-US Security Relations: 1949-1952

From 1949 onwards, NATO became the institutional focus of Turkish-American security relations. The initial approaches of Turkish government met with rejection, because there was difference of opinion among the original founders of the organization. While the United States wished to

incorporate Turkey's forces into NATO, where they would serve as the Middle Eastern anchor to the defence of Europe and contribute to whatever comparable regional organization could be created for an 'Outer' and 'Inner' Middle East defence as well⁷⁷,

Britain insisted that the Turkish forces be connected to a Middle Eastern command under British leadership. Britain, though suffering from the losses of World War Two, still tried to cling on to her sphere of influence in the Middle East. This insistence restrained the

⁷⁵ Melvyn P. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey and NATO, 1945-1952," *The Journal of American History* 71, no. 4 (March 1985), pp. 807-825.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, p. 54.

US options and forced her to act as a deputy of Britain, since, although no longer the great power she pretended to be, Britain was nevertheless America's most important ally.⁷⁸

Meanwhile, the North European members of the alliance feared that membership of Turkey would drag them into a conflict with the Soviet Union as a result of a Middle East contingency⁷⁹. Essentially, they were wary about extending the NATO commitment all the way down to the Middle East and the Caucasian border of the USSR.⁸⁰

From the very beginning, the Turkish government was willing to enter NATO. The main reason for this willingness was to institutionalize American guarantee and aid against the Soviet threat. The leverage Turkey used on the Americans to that end was a staunch refusal to commit her forces for a joint defence plan in the absence of NATO membership. This caused increasing alarm on the American military side as they realized that if Turkey was not admitted to NATO, she could not be relied upon as an ally in time of war, unless directly attacked by the Soviet Union. Thus, in case the Soviets by-passed Turkish territory and traversed North-Western Iran; or attacked Central Europe without making a move against Turkey, the Turkish government could remain neutral in a war unfolding between the US, her West European allies and the Soviet Union. This possibility was increasingly stressed in various US military and intelligence evaluations throughout 1949-1951⁸¹. The Pentagon wished to use the aid program as a lever to bring Turkish defence planning more in line with the overall US strategic plans. In the event of a general war with the Soviet Union, these plans required the mining of the Straits, gradual retreat of the Turkish forces towards the so-called 'İskenderun pocket' (i.e. abandonment of most major Turkish cities to the enemy), and

⁷⁸ Hoskins, "Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East," p. 189.

⁷⁹ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 550.

⁸⁰ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), pp. 116-117.

⁸¹ Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War," pp. 819-820.

subordination of Turkish naval plans to the objectives of the US Mediterranean fleet. The plans also called for the offensive use of Turkish airfields and air assets against Soviet, Bulgarian and Romanian targets⁸². The CIA analyses, which concurred with reports coming from the US Embassy in Turkey, suggested that Turkish officials were angry and disappointed for being rebuffed by NATO. Thus,

It [was] almost certain that Turkey would not fight if not attacked and very probable that the USSR would not immediately attack Turkey. It would be therefore greatly to our national interest considering the money we have spent on her military establishment to have Turkey formally bound to us by mutual defense treaty, to include an engagement for her to go to war in case an attack upon her own territory or upon or through any neighboring contiguous state.⁸³

Throughout 1949 and 1950, Turkish requests to be included in the alliance were declined by the US, however, because both the State Department and the Joint Chiefs thought that the American commitments to Western Europe were simply too big to contemplate additional commitments extending to Southern Europe and the Middle East.⁸⁴ When the US mission chiefs gathered in Istanbul for a conference in November 1949, they “recognized the Soviet threat”, but came to the conclusion that there is “no present need for US association with any regional or mutual defense pacts to assure greater protection against aggression.”⁸⁵

Hence, Turkey’s first two applications made in May and August 1950 were both rejected by the NATO Council. Between the two applications, two major developments took place: Turkey had held her first multi-party elections and the DP came to power after twenty-seven years of single party rule by the RPP. Almost immediately, the Korean War broke out and the new government decided to send a brigade to support the UN action in Korea. Despite

⁸² Leffler, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War,” pp. 819-820.

⁸³ Admiral Connolly to Admiral Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), quoted in Leffner, p. 820.

⁸⁴ Leffner, pp. 819-820.

⁸⁵ McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, p. 67.

opposition claims that sending Turkish troops abroad without prior parliament approval was unconstitutional, Prime Minister Menderes defended the decision stating that “Sending troops along with the other members of the free world was an important opportunity to increase Turkey’s prospects for NATO membership.”⁸⁶

The DP government hoped that sending troops to Korea would establish Turkey as a dependable ally in the fight against communism and bring about their consent for Turkish membership to NATO. In conjunction to this show of solidarity, the DP government stepped up its efforts to gain NATO membership. In August 1950, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs once more approached the US, British and French ambassadors with a request for membership to NATO. At the same time, the Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü stated to the *New York Times* that “Turkish public opinion regarded entry into the North Atlantic Pact as an acid test of the United States interest in Turkey.”⁸⁷

This tactic of showing solidarity on the one hand but implying neutrality if membership would not be forthcoming on the other worked. In September 1950, though the Turkish application was rejected by the NATO Council, both Turkey and Greece were invited by the Defense Committee of the North Atlantic Council to “coordinate their military planning with the appropriate NATO commander.”⁸⁸ This invitation was an attempt to solve the basic dilemma of committing Turkey to Western defense without committing formal treaty guarantees by the West. A month later, Turkey agreed to planning coordination, since it was Turkey who had proposed the formation of a Mediterranean Pact back in July 1948. The planning coordination in the Mediterranean, however, would only be a half-measure and both parties knew it. It was estimated that the Soviet Union, who had successfully tested an atomic

⁸⁶ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 545.

⁸⁷ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 40.

⁸⁸ Leffner, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War,” p. 821.

bomb in 1949, “would reach the capacity to inflict heavy damage to the US by 1954”⁸⁹. The US needed airbases close to the Soviet Union to deliver her nuclear deterrent, and Turkey had the ideal location. But she refused to provide base facilities to US in the absence of full NATO membership.⁹⁰

At the same time, while the DP government was pressing ahead for full membership, an article by the US chief of staff Omar Bradley further complicated the situation. In his article of October 1950 published in the *Reader's Digest*, Bradley had cautioned against committing US troops to conflicts outside the main western defensive perimeter, considering these as local wars. This line of argumentation infuriated the Turks:

The respected newspaper *Cumhuriyet* even exchanged telegrams with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson in an attempt to clarify the American position. *Cumhuriyet*, November 11, 1950, carried the texts of these telegrams. A spokesman for Bradley also explained that the general's meaning had been distorted in condensation and that the United States could not remain a bystander if Turkey were invaded by a “communist” power.⁹¹

The Turkish tactic was bearing fruit. By early 1951, US officials had come to the conclusion that Turkey would be “the cornerstone in any comprehensive scheme for the security of the free world”⁹². On 15 May 1951, US offered her NATO allies to admit both Greece and Turkey to NATO:

The rationale for this decision as leaked to the press was that the Turkish armed forces would fill an otherwise exposed flank, and that without such ties Turkey “possibly could be drawn toward a sort of 'neutralism'” in view of its common border with the USSR.⁹³

⁸⁹ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 548.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp. 41-42.

⁹² Hoskins, “Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East,” p. 191.

⁹³ Harris, p. 42.

One should note that this was exactly the line of argument followed by the Turkish foreign minister Fuat Köprülü in his statement to the *New York Times* on August 1950 (cited above). In the meantime, efforts to take Britain on board were intensified. The British opposed the idea on the grounds that the Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1939 between Turkey, France and Britain contained assurances for Turkish security, and that Turkey belonged to a defence structure in the *Middle East* rather than *Europe* (to which the North Atlantic Treaty specifically referred)⁹⁴. This argument was weak in the face of the facts that: i) Turkey was already tied to France and Britain with the 1939 Treaty -as the British themselves pointed out- and ii) Turkey was already given an associate status and had engaged in joint defence planning with the alliance. The apparent advantage of allowing Turkish membership, on the other hand, was two-fold: making use of the Turkish troop reserve, which would force the Soviets to divert considerable forces from the central front; and availability of Turkish airfields to deliver the American nuclear deterrent into the heart of the Soviet Union⁹⁵. In addition to these considerations, the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces and World War II hero General Eisenhower thought that Turkish and Greek membership would increase the Alliance's influence in the Balkans⁹⁶. Though the British position was weakened under increasing US pressure, they insisted on guarantees that Turkey would play a role in the defense of the Middle East, especially the Suez Canal area. When the Menderes government affirmed that they would be willing to do so, Britain changed her position and supported the Turkish membership.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Hoskins, "Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East", p. 191; Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 117.

⁹⁵ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp. 42-43.

⁹⁶ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 549.

⁹⁷ Harris, p. 43.

In its 16-20 September 1951 meeting in Ottawa, the NATO Council of Ministers invited both Turkey and Greece to become full members of the alliance. The British suggested creating a Middle East Command, which would provide for the defense of Egypt as well, but Turkey objected to the idea of committing to defend territory outside the alliance. In any case, the suggestion was still-born as Egypt herself opposed the notion: “Arab opinion generally registered its unmistakable hostility to joining with Turkey and the Western powers, thus scotching any possibility that the projected command could be formed.”⁹⁸

Both Turkey and Greece became NATO members in 18 February 1952 and their forces were assigned to NATO’s South European Command. Turkish membership to NATO was to form the institutional basis of Turkish-American security relations from this date on.

Results of Turkey’s NATO Membership and the relevant Bilateral Treaties 1952-1955

For Turkey, membership to NATO implied a manifold of consequences: American guarantee against Soviet threat; Western recognition of equality; and continuing military and financial aid to realize military modernization and economic development. For the US, Turkish inclusion to NATO suggested that the short-comings in Turkish cooperation against the Soviet Union were now history. The US would be able to open military installations and station troops on Turkish territory, and Turkish military forces would become part of the integrated NATO command structure. In order to acquire full membership, Turkey had also promised cooperation in the Middle East. At the time, this radical departure from traditional Turkish foreign policy did not bother the Turkish government. In December 1951, foreign minister Köprülü declared to the parliament that Turkish national interests were “identical from every standpoint with the joint interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and

⁹⁸ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 43.

with its geographic and military requirements.”⁹⁹ The leading members of the Menderes government felt that there was an intrinsic likeness between Turks and Americans, and that their country should take America as a model. This led them to believe that in essentially all matters, Turkish and American interests would coincide and they would enjoy American support for the realization of Turkish interests. On the other hand, the Americans overestimated the extent of Turkish support and assumed a free hand in their activities in Turkey.

The command structure of NATO now extended to East Mediterranean and the eastern borders of Turkey. Turkey had earmarked her forces for NATO command in cases of emergencies as stipulated by the alliance treaty¹⁰⁰. She took part in the joint defence planning and other routine alliance activities, held a permanent delegation in the alliance headquarters, sent her officers to train in NATO schools, joined in alliance military exercises and coordinated her logistics and strategy with the other members of the alliance. The Turkish armed forces were assigned to the Commander-in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINSOUTH) in Naples, Italy, with a sub-command for Eastern Mediterranean (LANDSOUTHEAST) in İzmir. The Turkish Air Force was assigned to the Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH). The Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force (6 ATAF) was established in İzmir, which was responsible for the air defence of Greece and Turkey. Following the re-organization of the command structure in early 1953, the Turkish navy came under the Allied Forces Mediterranean (AFMED) headquartered in Malta.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 45.

¹⁰⁰ Turkey had assigned fifteen of her divisions to NATO to be used in cases required by the alliance treaty. Otherwise, these forces were under Turkish command. See Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 119.

¹⁰¹ Veltri, Franco. *AFSOUTH 1951-2004: Over Fifty Years Working for Peace and Stability*. Available [Online]: <http://www.afsouth.nato.int/archives/history.htm> [27 April 2007].

The NATO strategy at the time (1950-1954) was based on the concept of “limited war” and required the land forces to act as the “shield” that would protect the allied territory, and the air force to be the “sword” that would deliver the nuclear counter-strike. The Western European members, who were still in the post-war recovery phase, could field only twenty divisions against a vastly superior Soviet conventional force (some 210 divisions). Hence, the addition of Turkish forces (some twenty-two divisions) was a valuable contribution, provided they could be adequately equipped, trained and supported¹⁰². The ambitious force goals of the alliance (fielding ninety-six divisions, forty of which would be permanently operational) gave Turkey the chance to request ever-increasing amounts of military aid, since the Turkish forces were relatively cheap to maintain¹⁰³, and Turkey viewed herself to be the prime target in any major conflict between the Soviet Union and the West. Of course, until the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and the Turkish logistic infrastructure were upgraded to the desired level, the alliance envisaged a rearguard action by the Turkish army in the face of superior Soviet forces. In the meantime, the US and allied air forces would deliver the nuclear counter-strike. The modernization of the Turkish military and logistics was a two-fold mission of: i) modernizing the large army, and ii) building the roads, storage sites, communications, radar installations, and the airfields. In order to assist with the training of troops and operation of the new equipment, US military and civilian personnel poured into Turkey. US strike aircraft were deployed in jointly operated air bases. US military intelligence units were stationed in electronic intelligence posts. From the very beginning, the main US installations in Turkey had been air force bases and intelligence posts. The most important bases were İncirlik near

¹⁰² Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p.48.

¹⁰³ US General W. H. Arnold stated: “in exchange for each dollar spent in Turkey, America saved three dollars worth of security.” *La République*, 5 May 1952, quoted in Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 126.

Adana and Çiğli near İzmir. During the 1950s, 1/5 of fuel used by the American Sixth Fleet was stored in these bases.¹⁰⁴

The steady increase of US personnel and the establishment of military installations required a series of bilateral treaties to facilitate the presence and activities of US troops on Turkish soil. The most important agreements were: the Mutual Security Agreement (Concluded in January 1952, ratified by the TGNA in March 1954), the Agreement Implementing the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (June 1954), Military Installations Agreement (June 1954), The Tax Exemption Agreement (June 1954), and the Atomic Energy Agreement (June 1955)¹⁰⁵. These agreements were complemented by –often informal– arrangements. In total, ninety-three bilateral agreements were concluded between the parties by 1965¹⁰⁶. The implementation of the Status of Forces and Tax Exemption agreements, along with other informal arrangements, would later cause friction in the relationship. In the early 1950s, however, the cooperation was carried forth without problem.

Cooperation in the Middle East: 1952-1960

In line with the Turkish pledge to play a role in the defense of the Middle East, and the changing US plans for the region, Turkey took part in the efforts to create a regional defense organization. As the US ambassador George McGhee suggested: “Turkey not only became an important guide to us in our relations with the Middle East but was willing to act as intermediary and to exert influence over its former dominions on our behalf.”¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, pp. 56-57.

¹⁰⁵ For the full text of these treaties, see Fahir Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991), pp. 184-240.

¹⁰⁶ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, pp. 555-559. For the original text of the Implementation Agreement of June 1954, see Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, Appendix 2, pp. 217-220.

¹⁰⁷ McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, pp. 91-92.

With the Egyptian refusal of a Middle Eastern Command, by August 1952, the US state department discarded the British proposal and started to work for a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO):

This organization would be sponsored by the United States, Great Britain, France and Turkey, together with Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa. MEDO, consisting essentially of a committee of generals to plan the defenses of the area, would be concerned also with the issues making for instability.¹⁰⁸

With its proposed headquarters in Egypt, it was clear that its western –especially British– sponsors hoped that the organization would eventually attract Egypt as well. The deteriorating relations between the British and Egyptian governments throughout 1952, however, made this eventuality increasingly unlikely. Another handicap for MEDO was the impossibility of creating a framework that united the Arabs and Israel in a common structure against the communist threat. Thus,

Apart from Turkey, which had unqualifiedly cast its lot with the west, the allied powers could count on little aid of any kind from within the area itself, and this at a time when Middle East oil resources had become vital to any plan of free world defense.¹⁰⁹

In May 1953, after speaking with the Turkish officials, US Secretary of State Dulles unveiled his ‘northern tier’ concept. During these negotiations, the Menderes government assured Dulles of continuing Turkish support. Already in February 1953, the Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü “had offered to ‘take positive action’ regarding the Musaddiq and Anglo-Iranian oil crisis.”¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Hoskins, “Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East”, p. 191.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

¹¹⁰ McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, p. 104.

Dulles was impressed by the Menderes governments' pro-allied stance and wanted them to take the lead in the organization of a defense pact that extended the anti-communist containment from Eastern Turkey to the borders of India, linking it up with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) which was formed in September 1954. To that end, a pact consisting of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq and the United Kingdom would be formed. As Dulles had stated:

In the Middle East, a strong regional grouping is not now feasible. In order to assure during peacetime for the United States and its allies the resources (especially oil) and the strategic positions of the area and their denial to the Soviet bloc, the United States should build on Turkey, Pakistan and, if possible, Iran...¹¹¹

The Baghdad Pact was thus formed in February 1955 between Turkey and Iraq. The Pact had an accession clause that enabled Pakistan, Britain and Iran to join in later that year.

From the very beginning, the pact suffered from three deficiencies:

i) It had provoked animosity among the Arabs, especially Egypt and Syria, rather than an urge to join in: "Arab nationalist leaders accused Baghdad of having violated Arab solidarity, for no member of the Arab League was allowed to enter into alliance with non-Arab states"¹¹².

That was the principal reason why even the moderate regimes of Lebanon and Jordan declined to join the pact.

ii) The US, largely for domestic reasons, refused to become a full member. The foreign policy concern was not to alienate Saudi Arabia and Israel, who viewed the pact as hostile.

¹¹¹ *Basic National Security Policy*, NSC 162/2 (approved by the President), 30 October 1953, 37C. Quoted in Agmon, "Defending the Upper Gulf", p. 85.

¹¹² Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 282.

iii) No specific liaison could be established between the Pact and NATO¹¹³. The only formal link between the pact and the organization was the overlapping memberships of Turkey and Britain in both, but no further integration could be achieved.

The Soviet Union successfully used the western involvement in the pact as a propaganda tool to woo the Arab nationalists, especially Egypt and Syria. This provided them with the necessary foothold across the so-called 'northern tier'. In September 1955, Egypt concluded an arms deal with Czechoslovakia, showing that the Soviet Union was ready and willing to provide the Arabs with the weapons they needed to fight against Israel without the reservations of the alternative supplier, the US. The Menderes government was quick to condemn the armament of Syria and Egypt, calling this a dangerous and provocative move on the part of the Soviets. Alas, the actual provocation came from within the alliance: When Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956, France, Britain and Israel planned a surprise attack to restore their interests. The plot was to use an initial Israeli attack across the Sinai Desert as an excuse for an Anglo-French landing on the Canal Zone. Acting with colonial great power impunity, they proceeded with this scheme, leaving their American ally completely in the dark. No longer relevant as a critical junction of the British Empire, the Canal was vital for the traffic of oil. By 1955, two-thirds of Europe's oil passed through it. The Anglo-French-Israeli plot failed as a result of US opposition to the blunt ways of her European allies; the unmistakable Soviet warning and subsequent backing of Egypt; the widespread reaction among world public opinion; and last but not least, the British military short-comings which made it impossible for the conspirators to present the operation as a *fait accompli*. The results of the Crisis, however, dogged the west for much of the following two decades. The British influence in the so-called inner ring of the Middle East (her former area of colonial dominion) declined as Arab nationalist sentiment turned Egyptian leader Nasser

¹¹³ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp. 62-63; McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, p. 160.

into a hero. Her pro-Egyptian stance earned the Soviet Union great credit among the Arabs, especially among the Baathists throughout the Northern rim of the Middle East and North Africa. The implication of increasing Soviet popularity in this region for Turkey was that the Baghdad Pact, devised as a *cordon sanitaire* across the ‘Northern Tier’ was failing in its mission. After the Suez Crisis, there was little prospect for other Arab states to join the Pact and thereby become wedded to the British. To overcome this existential crisis, “The Baghdad Pact powers, with Turkey prominent among them, besought Washington to join the alliance; and other NATO members were also encouraged to join”¹¹⁴.

Meanwhile, the Americans finally realized the hazards of being associated with Britain and France in the eyes of the Arab world. As John Foster Dulles remarked about the implementation of the ensuing Eisenhower Doctrine:

...if Europe, Western Europe, were... part of this plan, then I can say to you it would be absolutely doomed to failure from the beginning... I cannot think of anything which would more surely turn the area over to international communism than for us to try go in there hand-in-hand with the British and French.¹¹⁵

The declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine in January 1957, in which the US pledged to defend Middle Eastern countries threatened by “indirect aggression from international communism”, came in the wake of another declaration in November 1956. Amidst growing Turkish concern over the Soviet military assistance to Syria, the US State Department had publicly affirmed “American determination to assist Turkey in meeting aggression, noting that the United States would regard threats to the territory of the Baghdad Pact members with utmost gravity”¹¹⁶. Indeed, while the Eisenhower Doctrine emphasized indirect aggression, the military planners in the Pentagon thought that “the Turkish conventional strength would

¹¹⁴ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 283.

¹¹⁵ Quoted in Agmon, “Defending the Upper Gulf”, p. 86.

¹¹⁶ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 64.

play an important role in deterring or defending against Soviet aggression in the region”¹¹⁷.

The Turkish requests for increasing US military assistance was met with acceptance in this conjecture, and

(...) in a report by the Joint Strategic plans Committee to the JCS, a supplementary aid program for Turkey was recommended. The Joint Middle East Planning Committee expressed explicit appreciation of the benefits to be derived from forces deployed in eastern Turkey (...) in defensive positions running south-east from Erzurum to Lake Van.¹¹⁸

On 22 March 1957, the US pledged to take part in the work of the Baghdad Pact Military Committee. That same day, Eisenhower’s special advisor, Ambassador James P. Richards was in Ankara. A joint declaration by Turkey and US stated that “it was in the mutual interest of both America and Middle Eastern countries that the region was safe from communist aggression”¹¹⁹. The parties also declared their determination to cooperate against international communism which they viewed as a threat to world peace and security. The Turkish acceptance of the Eisenhower doctrine was thus made public on the very day the US pledged to a deeper involvement in the Baghdad Pact. The result was, as foreseen by the US military planners, increased dependency on Turkish cooperation in order to carry out Middle Eastern contingency plans. This reflected not only on the aid levels, but also necessitated the enlargement of the İncirlik Base only three years after its inception. The base would eventually become the centre stage of the so-called ‘out of area’ operations by the American forces stationed in Turkey, and thereby cause much concern on the Turkish side.

The reaction in the Middle East was mixed: “Only Lebanon and Iraq formally accepted the assistance offered by the United States; Jordan accepted financial aid later, without

¹¹⁷ Agmon, “Defending the Upper Gulf”, p. 87.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 568.

reference to the Eisenhower Doctrine”¹²⁰. The Egyptian and Syrian response was to draw even closer to each other and to the Soviet Union. The increasing Soviet influence in Syria led Turkey to alert her armed forces and increase troop concentration in the border. In September 1957, the Soviet Union accused Turkey of planning an invasion of Syria, and concentrated her troops in the Caucasus region. In October, the US “reiterated her pledge to come to Turkey’s help without delay in the event of attack resulting from Soviet infiltration of Syria”¹²¹. The trend of tense relations among western powers, Arab nationalists, Turkey, the US and Soviet Union led to the unfolding of dramatic events in 1958: On February first, Egypt and Syria announced the union of the two countries under the name United Arab Republic (UAR). “Following quick consultation with Ankara, Iraq and Jordan countered this action on February 12 by establishing their own federation known as the Arab Union”¹²². Turkey and United States backed the Iraqi-Jordanian federation while the Soviet Union supported the UAR. This clear-cut division among pro-western Iraqi government under Prime Minister Nuri as-Said and the Arab nationalist President Nasser of Egypt led to an internal upheaval in Iraq, which upset the entire balance.

The deadly blow to the Baghdad Pact –and thereby to the pro-western Middle East policy of the Menderes government- came with the July 1958 Iraqi revolution. Already in the spring of 1958, civil unrest between the pro-Nasserites supported from Syria and the pro-western government caused concern among the Baghdad Pact members. As President Eisenhower considered the Lebanese government (the only other Arab country that had formally accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine) request for assistance, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri as-Said intended to organize a relief force made up of the Muslim members of the Baghdad

¹²⁰ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 284.

¹²¹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 64.

¹²² Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 284.

Pact, which was about to hold a meeting in İstanbul. President Celal Bayar of Turkey had already promised help to the Lebanese president Camille Chamoun. On 14 July, the Turkish delegation expected the arrival of their guests, but instead received news of a military coup in Iraq. Led by Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif, Arab nationalist “free officers” of the 19th Brigade had deposed and murdered King Faisal II and his Prime Minister Nuri as-Said, and declared Iraq a republic. Simultaneously with the Lebanese crisis and Iraqi Revolution, Jordan was experiencing similar unrest. The pro-western Hashemite Kingdom asked for British help and dissolved its federation with Iraq. These developments clearly indicated the Arab nationalist victory over the pro-western Baghdad Pact. From the very beginning, the Arab nationalists had viewed the Baghdad Pact as a tool of western imperialism and “accused Nuri as-Said of playing into the hands of the Zionists, the arch-enemies of Arabs, by trying to disrupt a united Arab front”¹²³. The events that started with the Suez Crisis of July 1956 culminated in the Iraqi Revolution of July 1958, forfeiting the American –and by extension, Turkish- efforts to create a pro-western, anti-communist cooperation among Arab states. The remaining members of the Baghdad Pact convened in Ankara in the immediate aftermath of the coup and issued a joint declaration “asking for the support of countries interested in the peace, security and stability in the Middle East”¹²⁴. For the Menderes government, the Iraqi coup was a chilling example of an allied regime toppled by anti-western military upheaval. Since December 1957, allegations of a military coup plot had led to the investigation and arrest of nine middle grade military officers in Turkey, and the revolution in Iraq “sharpened Menderes’ fears that revolution might be a contagious disease and spread to his country”¹²⁵.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

¹²⁴ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 569.

¹²⁵ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 65.

To stabilize the situation and avoid further Arab nationalist upheaval, the US responded favorably to the Lebanese government request for assistance. The occasion required the use of the İncirlik base to deploy US troops transferred from bases in Europe, and the Menderes government for the first time allowed the 'out of area' use of the installation. On 15 July, a day after the coup in Iraq, US marines landed in Beirut. Two days later, British paratroopers landed in Amman, the capital city of Jordan. These contingencies were anticipated by US military planners who viewed İncirlik as an ideal storage and staging point in any operation towards Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. On 16 July, amidst reports of Soviet troop maneuvers on the Turkish border, President Eisenhower ordered a flash study, which found that

(...) The gravity of the situation was sufficient to warrant a waiver of regular MAP (Military Assistance Programme) restrictions and requirements. It recommended the provision of increased logistical capability to the Turkish army, particularly those units deployed in south-east Turkey, as well as deployment of US conventional, and possibly, tactical nuclear forces.¹²⁶

In response to growing fears among the member governments, the Baghdad Pact convened in a special meeting in London on 28 July (absent was Iraq, which had not yet formally withdrawn), with the participation of US Secretary of State, Dulles. In the meeting, the parties agreed to cooperate against internal threats and indirect aggression, and called upon the US to join the Pact as a full member. The US refused to do so, but on the insistence of the Shah of Iran, agreed to conclude bilateral treaties with all members on security and defense:

¹²⁶ Reported in memorandum, Director, Joint Staff to the Chairman, JCS, *Possible Action by the US to Strengthen Immediately Military Position of Turkey and Iran*, JCS 1887/478, 22 July 1958, 3559. Quoted in Agmon, "Defending the Upper Gulf", p. 89.

The United States, in the interest of world peace, and pursuant to existing Congressional authorization, agrees to cooperate with the nations making this Declaration for their security and defense, and will promptly enter into agreements designed to give effect to this cooperation.¹²⁷

This pledge led to the signing of the Cooperation Agreement between Turkey and US in March 1959¹²⁸. In the agreement, the US pledged to assist Turkey against direct (i.e. Soviet or Soviet-backed Syrian) and indirect aggression (i.e. internal communist upheaval). This latest agreement between the parties appeared to be redundant, since Turkey was already a member of NATO and thereby protected against aggression. As some opposition MP's and journalists pointed out, however, the NATO membership did not contain protection against indirect threat, and they feared that the Menderes government would use this clause to call for American help in order to remain in power amidst growing opposition in Turkey. Indeed, though the US signed similar treaties with Iran and Pakistan, she did not sign one with Britain¹²⁹.

On 24 March, Iraq formally withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, leaving its name increasingly ironic. Thus, on 21 August the name of the Baghdad Pact was changed to Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The secretariat of the organization had already been transferred from Baghdad to Ankara in the previous October. With the removal of the only Arab member, CENTO was now a pure Northern Tier defensive organization which bound US and Britain to the three countries flanking the southern borders of the Soviet Union. The diverse nature of its members in terms of political goals did not allow it to become a 'little NATO', and the relationship remained a simple one based on mutual expectations: the US and Britain expected Turkey, Iran and Pakistan to follow a pro-western policy, and the latter

¹²⁷ *Documents on International Affairs, 1958*, pp. 369-70, quoted in Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 286.

¹²⁸ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1 p. 569; Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp.67-68.

¹²⁹ Oran, pp. 570-571; Haris, p. 69.

expected US and British military and logistics aid and protection against communist aggression.

Nuclear Weapons on Turkish Soil 1953-1960

As part of Eisenhower's "New Look Strategy", the US administration wanted to develop a nuclear deterrent and deploy it to countries bordering the Soviet Union. This inclination was in line with NATO's "Massive Retaliation Strategy" that had been adopted in November 1954. Massive retaliation called for a nuclear retaliation to any Soviet attack, be it conventional or nuclear. As such, it required the placement of nuclear forces on allied countries adjacent to Soviet Union, including Turkey¹³⁰. Until 1957, this force consisted of bomber aircraft capable of delivering nuclear bombs deep into Soviet territory and they were based in the network of airfields radiating out of İncirlik. In the NATO council meeting in December 1956, Turkey also asked for tactical nuclear weapons which would be operated with a dual key system (between Turkish and US commanders). In time of peace, these weapons would be under the custody of US forces stationed in Turkey. With the successful launch of the Sputnik on 4 October 1957, the anxiety over a "missile gap" between the US and Soviet Union ensued. The ability to launch a satellite into orbit indicated the Soviet Union's capacity to hit US continental targets with Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM's). At the time, the US had not developed ICBM capability, so it was necessary to deploy Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM's) to countries bordering the Soviet Union. Actually, the idea of deploying IRBM's to NATO territory predated the launch of Sputnik: In early 1957, the Eisenhower administration had promised Britain sixty Thor missiles, partly to repair the so-called 'special relationship' between the two countries after

¹³⁰ Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 49.

the Suez Crisis¹³¹. To allay concerns over credibility and deterrence in the wake of the Sputnik launch, the US decided to deploy additional IRBM's (the Jupiters) to allied territory. However, no NATO ally except Britain, Italy and Turkey were willing to risk hosting a nuclear missile site and thus becoming a nuclear target for Soviet reprisals in the event of war. The secret treaty on the introduction of Jupiters to Turkey was signed on 25 October 1959, in Paris. It was, like many other bilateral agreements of the Menderes government with the US, cloaked as a technical cooperation agreement and not submitted to parliament for approval¹³². According to this agreement, fifteen Jupiters would be placed in Turkey:

The missiles would be owned by Turkey; the nuclear warheads would be owned by the United States and in the custody of its forces; the weapons could be launched only on the order of the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe (an American) on the approval of both the American and Turkish governments; and the sites would be manned by soldiers of both nations. It was, in principle, a dual-veto system.¹³³

By accepting the Jupiters despite strong Soviet warnings, Turkey became a direct nuclear target in the event of a nuclear exchange between the US and Soviet Union. Another problem arose from the nature of the Jupiter: originally designed as a land and sea-based IRBM, Jupiters were later transferred to the US Air Force after the Navy opted for the solid fuel Polaris and the Army retained only the shorter range (320 km or less) battlefield missiles. The Air Force already had its own IRBM, the Thor, and treated the Jupiter as NIH (not invented here)¹³⁴. The actual deployment sites of the Jupiters were secret, but the main deployment site was the Çiğli air force base. Given their short range (some 550 km's), the long preparation

¹³¹ Barton J. Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading Jupiters in Turkey?" *Political Science Quarterly* 95, no.1 (Spring 1980), pp. 97-125, p. 98.

¹³² Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 573.

¹³³ Bernstein, p. 99.

¹³⁴ "The Jupiter Missile". *Wikipedia*. Available [Online]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jupiter_missile [11 May 2007].

sequence (fueling the liquid fuel rockets and armament of the warheads), the low accuracy of the missile, and its thin skin (a sniper bullet could render it inoperable), the Jupiters could only be used as a first strike weapon:

“In the event of hostilities, assuming that NATO will not strike the first blow,” a then-secret congressional report warned, “the USSR with its ballistic missile capability logically could be expected to take out these bases on the first attack, which undoubtedly would be a surprise attack.” Put bluntly, the Jupiters would draw, not deter, an attack.¹³⁵

As mentioned, Turkey had already demanded the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on Turkish soil by December 1956. The Turkish willingness to host nuclear weapons in general can be related to the NATO strategy of the time:

Since 1954, NATO command [had] been empowered to use ground-to-ground missiles equipped with tactical nuclear warheads, even against a conventional attack. (...) It has been pointed out that tactical nuclear devices could be usefully deployed in the sparsely inhabited mountain areas of eastern Turkey.¹³⁶

The Turkish authorities were well aware of the fact that in the event of a conventional Soviet attack, the allied plans called for the strategic surrender of large tracts of eastern Turkey. The idea of surrendering territory, and the knowledge that NATO would be forced to give priority of the forward defence of the centre and could spare little force to aid the wings (Turkey being the south-eastern wing) led the Turkish authorities to emphasize the ‘ultimate’ nuclear deterrent. This, they thought, would deter the Soviets from a kind of ‘adventurism on the flanks’.

The main reason for the Turkish government at the time (the Menderes government) to risk a Soviet nuclear strike on a site near İzmir, the third largest city of the country, however,

¹³⁵ Bernstein, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading Jupiters in Turkey?” p. 99.

¹³⁶ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 121.

was more political than military. The missiles were tangible symbols of prestige, which emphasized the crucial role played by Turkey in the alliance, and showed the level of intimacy in Turkish-US relations. The actual deployment of the missiles, however, took place after the Menderes government was ousted by the 27 May 1960 military coup, and by the time they became operational, (June 1962), the US already had Polaris submarines to substitute them. The issue of replacing the Jupiters had to be resolved during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, which left a deep scar on the bilateral relations.

The U2 Spy Planes in İncirlik 1956-1960

Another fall-out of the Sputnik launch had been the intensification of reconnaissance flights over the Soviet territory. The high altitude U2 spy planes were deployed in İncirlik since 1956, and constituted a sensitive and secret utility, because they conducted ‘overflights’ (knowingly violating a country's airspace in order to photograph a particular location) over Soviet territory¹³⁷. Given the high tension of the Cold War, these missions were so sensitive that the U2's were operated by the CIA. The pilots who flew them had to resign from the US Air Force and enter CIA payroll. The deployment of the U2 in İncirlik was therefore secret. Since it flew at 70,000 feet (21,336 m), the U2 was not detectable by radar and immune to anti-aircraft fire or fighter intervention. But in order to maintain that altitude, the airplane had to fly very close to its maximum speed, which was only ten knots (eighteen km/h) short of its stall speed. The pilots referred to this restrictive operational window as coffin corner, since if the aircraft would stall and lose altitude, it would be detected and shot down.

Although the Turkish government was aware of the U2 program and provided for its secrecy through extensive security arrangements around the İncirlik base, there is little

¹³⁷ Francis Powers, *Operation Overflight* (New York: Tower, 1971), p. 41.

evidence whether the Turkish government was aware of the technical difficulties involved and still allowed these rather risky missions to be conducted from bases in Turkey, or considered them as part of the over-all intelligence activity against the Soviet Union and did not know about the risks involved. What we do know is that on May Day 1960, on the eve of a US-Soviet summit in Paris, a U2 took off from İncirlik, landed in Peshawar, Pakistan, took off from there, and entered Soviet airspace where it was shot down by anti-aircraft missiles. Initially, the US denied the incident and released a detailed press release stating that a US aircraft flying a scientific mission for NASA had gone missing North of Turkey. In an attempt to validate the claim, a U2 was painted in NASA colors and shown to the press. In response, the Soviets claimed they shot down a spy plane. Assuming the pilot of the U2, Gary Powers was dead, the US acknowledged losing an aircraft conducting weather experiments over Turkey and ‘gracefully’ conceded that this might be the airplane the Soviets shot down when it ‘strayed into Soviet airspace’. They still denied any intentional overflights. In a long speech to the Supreme Soviet on the next day, 7 May, Khrushchev said, among other things, that the pilot was alive and that the Soviet authorities had recovered parts of the airplane. He also displayed samples of the developed film allegedly taken by camera equipment installed on the plane and charged that Powers had flown out of Peshawar airfield in Pakistan, which was correct, and not out of Turkey, and his landing destination was Bodo airfield in Norway (which was also correct)¹³⁸. The Soviets declared that they would respond to overflights with fighter intervention and anti-aircraft missiles, and consider the bases from which these flights are conducted as ‘priority targets’. They also condemned the countries that allowed the operation of US spy planes. The Turkish ministry of foreign affairs responded that Turkey did not authorize these missions, and could only be held responsible for her own planes. Since the

¹³⁸ “May-July 1960: The U2 Incident”, *FRUS*, 1958-60: East Europe Region, U.S. Department of State X, Part 1, Soviet Union, Office of the Historian. Available [Online]: <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/u2.htm> [04 May 2007].

US had already acknowledged the incident and assumed responsibility, and since the Soviets themselves said that the U2 in question came over Pakistan, there were no further repercussions. The incident, however, called into question the extent of US activities in Turkey and the risks they pose to Turkish security.¹³⁹

Problems Arising From the Application of Bilateral Treaties 1957-1960

The bilateral treaties between Turkey and US during the first half of the 1950s had been concluded in order to facilitate the presence and various activities of US civilian and military personnel in Turkey. Towards the end of 1950s, problems related to specific clauses or interpretation of these clauses started to arise. The first issue was related to the actions of the US personnel:

US military forces (...) enjoyed a number of privileges generally accorded to foreign “visiting forces” under general international law or special agreements. Thus, supervisory or disciplinary authority over such visiting forces in foreign territory is reserved for their own commanding officers.¹⁴⁰

The issue of criminal jurisdiction between Turkish courts and American military service courts was regulated by article seven of the SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) signed by Turkey on August 1952 and approved by the Turkish parliament on March 1954. According to paragraphs two(a) and two(b) of article seven,

a. The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State with

¹³⁹ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 574.

¹⁴⁰ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 138.

respect to offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by the law of the sending State, but not by the law of the receiving State.

b. The authorities of the receiving State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offences, including offences relating to the security of that State, punishable by its law but not by the law of the sending state.¹⁴¹

In short, crimes punishable by the receiving state were to be handled by their courts, while crimes punishable by the sending state by theirs¹⁴². The problem arose on crimes punishable by both states. This instance was regulated by paragraph three of article seven:

1. In case where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules shall apply:

a. The military authorities of the sending State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a member of a force or of a civilian component in relation to

- i. offences solely against the property or security of that State, or offences solely against the person or property of another member of the force or civilian component of that State or of a dependent;
- ii. offences arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty.

b. In the case of any other offence the authorities of the receiving State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.¹⁴³

This paragraph accorded the primacy of jurisdiction over the visiting forces to the sending state. Thus, American military personnel could not be persecuted by Turkish courts when they were “on duty”. SOFA, however, did not specify the criteria of being “on duty”. In July 1956,

¹⁴¹ NATO, *Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces*. Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b510619a.htm> [12 May 2007].

¹⁴² Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 557.

¹⁴³ NATO, *op. cit.*

a bilateral agreement between Turkey and US aimed to clarify this point made things further problematic. According to this agreement, the commanding officer of the person in question would declare if that person were on duty or not. Accordingly, the Turkish Ministry of Justice decreed that the prosecutors' offices would apply to the head of the Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JUSMMAT) to ask for these declarations¹⁴⁴. The abuses of "on duty" status in crimes committed by the US military personnel would cause serious public outcry. In one of the most notorious cases in November 1959,

Lieutenant Colonel Allen I. Morrison ran down a contingent of the Presidential Guard, killing one and injuring several others. Morrison was released to American authorities who certified that he had been on duty at the time of the accident. He was subsequently tried in a US military court, found guilty of negligence, fined \$ 1,200, and restricted from troop command for two years.¹⁴⁵

The issue of official duty status continued to dog the Turkish-US relations, and could not be settled in a mutually satisfactory fashion. The main reason for the conflict was the Turkish sense of losing sovereignty over criminal incidents involving American personnel on the one hand, and the US determination to maintain her forces under same or similar agreements throughout allied territory on the other.

Another issue about the status of US personnel arose from the military postal service and customs exemptions. Especially in the second half of the 1950s, when Turkish imports shrank due falling hard currency revenues, the custom-free goods brought in by the US military personnel created a lucrative black market around the US military bases called 'the American Market'. "In 1959, the predominantly military American population around İzmir was rocked with open scandal over disclosures of large scale black-marketeering"¹⁴⁶. As the

¹⁴⁴ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 557, Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 58.

¹⁴⁵ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 59.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

incidents grew in quantity and seriousness, the US military moved to exercise stricter control over postal delivery in the 1960s. “The Turkish government, however, never acted to exercise customs supervision over the military postal system”¹⁴⁷.

Series of Cooperation in the First Period: 1945-1960

As suggested at the outset, this study aims to distinguish series of bilateral and institutional cooperation in four broad periods. The first period of 1945-1960 is special, since in its initial stage (1945-1952) there is no institutional framework in Turkish-US relations. One can only call issues after 1952 as institutional. The main issues of security cooperation in this period, as outlined in the subtitles of this chapter are:

1. The Turkish Straits Controversy and the Reasons for US Support to Turkey 1945-1947;
2. The Truman Doctrine and US Military Aid to Turkey 1947-1949;
3. Emergence of NATO and the Institutionalization of Turkish-US Security Relations: 1949-1952;
4. Results of Turkey’s NATO Membership and the relevant Bilateral Treaties 1952-1955;
5. Cooperation in the Middle East: 1952-1960;
6. Nuclear Weapons on Turkish Soil 1953-1960;
7. The U2 Spy Planes in İncirlik 1956-1960; and
8. Problems Arising from the Bilateral Treaties 1957-1960

The date of Turkey’s entry into NATO coincides at the middle of this period, so chronologically the first three series are by definition bilateral. Of the five series that took

¹⁴⁷ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 60.

place after Turkey's entry into NATO, two (Bilateral Treaties 1952-1955 and Nuclear Weapons on Turkish Soil 1953-1960) involve NATO institutional rules. Therefore, they are the institutional series of this period. The remaining six are conducted outside NATO regulations, and are therefore considered bilateral series. The relative and absolute gains calculations and their graphic representations of the eight series of cooperation in 1945-1960 period will be presented below.

The Straits Controversy: Series (S)

The main issue during 1945-1947 Straits controversy was US support against Soviet claims over Turkey and the revision of Montreux Treaty. On the US side, one can distinguish three main acts of cooperation:

1. 5 April 1946: The battleship *Missouri* visited İstanbul and President Truman emphasized the importance of the Straits for American strategic and economic interest, and warned that “the sovereignty and integrity of the countries in the Near and Middle East must not be threatened by coercion or penetration.”
2. 7 May 1946: US erased Turkey's wartime lend-and-lease debt; and
3. August and October 1946: US responded to two Soviet notes on the Straits question with replies that favored the Turkish position.


On the Turkish side, while the general trend of liberalizing politics and economy since June 1945 continued apace, Turkey did not engage in security cooperation with the US until the 1947 Truman Doctrine. So, while the US showed tangible support on military and diplomatic fronts during the Straits controversy, Turkey did not reciprocate in kind. Thus, by the end of the Straits controversy, Turkey had achieved her main objectives without offering tangible benefits (rewards) to her counterpart, the US. The Straits series ended by December

1946 when the US, having protected Turkey against Soviet pressure, refused to provide the \$500 million in Ex-im Bank credit, or any substantial military aid to modernize the Turkish army. Thus, the Straits series can be depicted as follows:

Table 4 The Straits Series (Series S) Relative and Absolute Gains Calculation

Time	US	Turkey
April '46 <i>Missouri</i> visits İstanbul	0	2
May '46 lend-lease erased	0	2
Aug.-Oct. '46 US replies to Soviet notes favor Turkish position	0	2
Absolute Gains:	0+6=6	
Relative Gains:	-6	6

In graphic terms, the Series (S) can be depicted as:



Graph 5 Graphic depiction of Straits controversy as series (S)

As explained in chapter one, in this graph (and all following graphs depicting a given series) the right hand side (-->) of the horizontal axis shows Turkish while the left hand side (<--) shows US relative gains. The vertical axis shows absolute gains. Thus, each series are placed on the graph in terms of their relative and absolute gains coordinates.

In series (S) Turkey clearly gains more relative to the US, because while the American side provides diplomatic and military support against the Soviet threat, Turkey does not reciprocate in kind. Thus, while both parties worked together to achieve the common aim of avoiding Soviet domination of the strategically important Turkish Straits (as indicated by six absolute gain points), Turkey did not pay a tangible or comparable price for the support she received.

The Truman Doctrine and US Military Aid to Turkey: Series (T)

In the Truman Doctrine and military aid series, the first initiative comes from the US:

1. March 1947: Regarding the situation in Greece and Turkey to be precarious after the British withdrawal, the US president Truman spoke to both houses of Congress, and proposed a \$500 million military aid to Greece and Turkey, of which \$100 million would be appropriated for Turkey.

In response, Turkey declared its satisfaction with the US plans for military assistance, and the parties signed an agreement outlining the conditions for US military aid to Turkey:

2. July 1947: Turkey and US signed the treaty of defense cooperation where Turkey pledged to: i) provide any information necessary to the American diplomatic mission about the use of military assistance; ii) provide free access to US media to acquire information about the aid program; and iii) not to re-sale or share the American military equipment with third parties without prior US approval.

3. July 1947-1949: prior to the signing of the defense cooperation treaty an American mission under General Lunsford Oliver had visited Turkey in May 1947 and suggested that Turkey should relieve some of its conscripts and use American military aid to modernize the equipment (i.e. buy American equipment). After signing the defense cooperation agreement,

Turkey followed Lunsford’s advice and in return, received \$152.5 million in military aid until 1949.


The Truman Doctrine and US military aid series (Series T) ended when the US refused to consider Turkish membership to the new collective defense creation of the west, NATO, and in response, Turkey refused to align her strategic planning with the US.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for Series (T) can be depicted as follows:

Table 5 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (T)

Time	US	Turkey
March-July 1947: US offers Truman aid, Turkey agrees to conditions	1	1
July 1947-1949 US provides military aid, Turkey adheres to US suggestions about modernization	1	1
June 1949-May 1950 US declines Turkish membership to NATO, Turkey refuses joint strategic planning	0	0
Absolute Gains:	2+2=4	
Relative Gains:	0	0

In graphic terms, Series (T) can be depicted as follows:



Graph 6 Graphic depiction of Truman Doctrine and US military aid as series (T)

Table 5 shows that in series (T), both parties cooperated at each turn. Therefore, the utility points were shared. The series ended when the US declined Turkish membership to NATO and in response, Turkey refused joint strategic planning. Since all utility points were shared equally, neither party enjoyed relative gains. This is why the horizontal coordinates of series (T) is zero. The absolute gains from the mutual cooperation are represented with four utility points. Thus, the vertical coordinates of series (T) is four.

Emergence of NATO and the Institutionalization of Turkish-US Security Relations:

Series (N)

In 1948, during the preparatory phase of the new trans-Atlantic organization, Turkey expressed her wish to join in order to institutionalize continuing American military aid and security guarantee. By 1949, however, NATO was founded and Turkey was not invited as a founding member. In response, Turkey increasingly implied that in the event of a general war between the West and the Soviet Union, she might remain neutral unless directly attacked by the Soviet Union. In line with this position, Turkey refused to align her strategic planning with that of the US. The US refusal to support Turkish entry into NATO and Turkish refusal to align strategic planning in the absence of NATO membership ended the previous series on military cooperation that had started with the inception of the Truman Doctrine in 1947.

The first act of cooperation to achieve Turkish membership came from Turkey:

1. In May 1950, the newly elected Menderes Government decided to send a Turkish brigade to support the US-led UN forces in Korea, stating that “sending troops along with other members of the free world was an important opportunity to increase Turkey’s prospects for NATO membership.”


2. In response, the US changed her position and worked to soften the opposition of other NATO members, especially Great Britain. The first tangible result of this effort was the invitation of both Turkey and Greece by the North Atlantic Council in September 1950 to “coordinate their military planning with the appropriate NATO commander.”
3. In October 1950, Turkey agreed to planning coordination, despite the fact that actual membership was still not in sight.
4. By early 1951, the US officials had come to the conclusion that Turkey would be “the cornerstone in any comprehensive scheme for the security of the free world.” Thus, in May 1951, the US offered her allies to admit both Greece and Turkey into NATO, and worked towards overcoming the British reservation, who insisted that Turkey should play a role in the defense of the Middle East as well.
5. In early fall of 1951, Turkey pledged to play a role in the defense of the Middle East in order to overcome the British reservation and achieve full membership.
6. In September 1951, the NATO Council of Ministers invited Turkey and Greece to become full members of the alliance.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (N) can be depicted as follows:

Table 6 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (N)

Time	US	Turkey
May 1950 Turkey sends troops to Korea	2	0
Sept.-Oct. 1950 Through US suggestion, NATO invites Turkey to joint planning, Turkey agrees	1	1
May-Sept. 1951 US pressure on Great Britain for Turkish membership. Turkey agrees to play a role in Middle East defence, and achieves membership.	1	1
Absolute Gains:	4+2=6	
Relative Gains:	2	-2

In graphic terms, the series (N) can be depicted as:



Graph 7 Graphic depiction of Turkey’s entry into NATO as series (N)

As Table 6 shows, series (N) starts with the Turkish decision to send troops to Korea, for which she receives no tangible reward from the US. This action, while in itself remains unrewarded, triggers a chain of mutual cooperation between the parties. This chain of mutual cooperation results in Turkey’s NATO membership in September 1951. To achieve that objective, however, Turkey makes two important concessions: i) sending a brigade to Korea, and ii) agreeing to play a role in Middle East defense. While the latter pledge serves to break the British opposition and is rewarded with full membership to NATO (a tangible return), the former is not. This is the reason why in Graph 7, the horizontal coordinates of series (N) is (-2), which implies relative gains in favor of the US, while the absolute gains (six points) are represented with the vertical axis coordinates.

Results of Turkey’s NATO Membership and the Relevant Bilateral Treaties: Series (B)

The Turkish entry into NATO resulted in fundamental changes in Turkish military posture, establishment of joint military installations, and deployment of a sizable contingent of US civilian and military personnel on Turkish soil. The series started with Turkey’s formal entry into NATO in 1952, which institutionalized western guarantee against the Soviet threat. This

was followed by the assignment of significant portions of Turkish Armed Forces to relevant NATO commands, conclusion of a series of bilateral treaties, and deployment of US personnel and weapons in Turkey between 1952 and 1955.

1. 1952-53: Turkey entered NATO and acquired Western guarantees. In return, she assigned 20 divisions of her army, her first and third Air Force and her navy to the relevant allied commands controlling Southern Europe and the Mediterranean.

2. 1952-1955: The US started building roads, airfields, other logistic facilities on Turkish soil; deployed strike aircraft and set up electronic intelligence posts; trained Turkish officers and troops; upgraded the arsenal of the Turkish armed forces, especially the air force.


3. 1954: Turkey and the US signed five major bilateral agreements (Mutual Security Agreement, SOFA, Military Installations Agreement, Tax Exemption Agreement, and Atomic Energy Agreement) that facilitated the legal basis for continued US military presence and set out the rules of conduct for US personnel. In time, the privileges arising from these agreements would cause problems in Turkish-American relations, since, although they provided for the continuation of US presence in and support to Turkey, they were not reciprocal (Turkey did not have identical rights and privileges on US soil).

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (B) can be depicted as follows:

Table 7 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (B)

Time	US	Turkey
1952-1953 NATO guarantee, assignment of TAF	1	1
1953-1954 TAF modernized, US deploys personnel	1	1
1954 Bilateral treaties provide US with rights	2	0
Absolute Gains:	4+2=6	
Relative Gains:	2	-2

In graphic terms, series (B) can be depicted as:



Graph 8 Graphic depiction of Turkish-US bilateral treaties as series (B)

As seen in Table 7, the only non-reciprocal action in series (N) is the conclusion of bilateral treaties in 1954, which allowed the US to deploy personnel and build facilities in Turkey while Turkey did not acquire identical rights on American soil. In Graph 8, this situation is represented with the (-2) horizontal coordinate of series (N), while the absolute gains are represented with the vertical coordinate (6).

Cooperation in the Middle East: Series (M)

In order to overcome the British objection to Turkey's NATO membership, and in line with the over-all pro-western policy of the Menderes government, Turkey had pledged to play a role in the defense of the Middle East against communism:

1. Shortly before Turkey and Greece were invited to join NATO, in August 1952, Turkey appeared as one of the co-sponsors of the proposed Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO).
2. With the Egyptian refusal of MEDO, Turkey proceeded to play a vital part in the formation of the US-sponsored 'northern tier' in 1954-1955, a defense pact among Turkey, Great

Britain, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan. To that end, Turkey signed a series of bilateral agreements with Iraq, Iran and Pakistan.

3. Thus, in February 1955, the Baghdad Pact was formed. However, the US –largely for domestic reasons- failed to join the pact.

4. The formation of the Baghdad Pact, coupled with the Suez Crisis in 1956, increased the tensions between Turkey and her Arab nationalist neighbors, notably Syria and Egypt. When Syria received extensive Soviet military support, the US backed Turkey by warning the Soviet Union in November 1956 and affirmed “American determination to assist Turkey in meeting aggression”.

5. Falling short of actual membership in the Baghdad Pact, the US declared the Eisenhower Doctrine, increased her military aid to Turkey, and pledged to take part in the work of the Baghdad Pact Military Committee in March 1957. In return, Turkey formally supported the Eisenhower Doctrine, allowed extension of the İncirlik base as a potential staging area for American operations in the Middle East, and pursued a bellicose policy towards Syria.

6. In September 1957, Turkey alerted her armed forces on the Syrian border and increased troop concentrations. The US backed this move of armed diplomacy by reiterating “her pledge to come to Turkey’s help without delay in the event of attack resulting from Soviet infiltration of Syria”.

7. In February 1958, the tension between the pro-western Iraq and Jordan, and the Arab nationalist regimes of Egypt and Syria came to a head as both pairs of countries declared a federation amongst themselves. Turkey, along with the United States, backed the Iraqi-Jordanian federation while the Soviets backed the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria.

8. In July 1958, as the pro-western Christian government of Lebanon asked for assistance against internal unrest incited by Arab nationalists, Turkey pledged to help. In the meantime, Iraqi prime minister Nuri as-Said was trying to organize a relief force made up of the Muslim

members of the Baghdad Pact. However, On 14 July, as the Turkish government officials awaited their guests for the Baghdad Pact meeting, word came of a military coup in Iraq that ousted the monarchy and killed both King Farouk and his pro-western Prime Minister Nuri as-Said. The coup was initiated by the Arab nationalist “free officers” of the 19th Brigade under Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim, who became head of state of the new regime.

9. In the aftermath of the Iraqi revolution, which spelled disaster for Turkey’s pro-western policy, the US moved in to shore up her allies, first and foremost Lebanon. The occasion required the use of the Incirlik Base to deploy US troops from bases in Europe, and Turkey allowed the use of the facility for a so-called ‘out of area operation’.

10. On 28 July 1958, the members of the Baghdad Pact convened in London and once more called upon the US to become a member. The US refused to do so, and instead signed bilateral security cooperation agreements with the individual Middle Eastern members. For Turkey, this was a redundant agreement save for the clause on cooperation against ‘indirect threats’, since the US had already pledged to support Turkey against aggression as a result of her NATO membership.

11. In March 1959, the name of the Baghdad Pact now consisting of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Great Britain, was changed to Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), under which the parties continued to cooperate in limited terms.


The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (M) can be depicted as follows:

Table 8 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (M)

Time	US	Turkey
1. 1952 Turkey joins MEDO initiative	2	0
2. 1954-1955 Turkey prepares the groundwork for the Baghdad Pact	2	0
3. February 1955 Baghdad Pact signed, US fails to join as member	2	0
4. 1956 Suez Crisis incites Arab Nationalism, tensions between Turkey and Soviet-backed Syria run high. US pledges to support Turkey against Syria	1	1
5. March 1957 US declares Eisenhower Doctrine. Turkey supports it.	1	1

6. Sept. 1957 Turkish tension with Syria. US re-iterates support	1	1
7. Feb. 1958 Both Turkey and US support the Iraqi-Jordanian Arab Union against Egypt and Syria's UAR	1	1
9. July 1958 Lebanon Crisis and Iraqi Revolution. The US uses the İncirlik Base for out-of area operation in Lebanon	2	0
10. July 1958-1959 US shores up her allies by increased security guarantees, Turkey continues her pro-western Middle East policy	1	1
11. March 1958 CENTO formed	1	1
Absolute Gains:	14+6=20	
Relative Gains:	8	-8

In graphic terms, series (M) can be depicted as:



Graph 9 Graphic depiction of Turkish-US cooperation in the Middle East as series (M)

As Table 8 shows, in her cooperation on the Middle East, Turkey engaged in a number of unreciprocated actions. These resulted in a large relative gain for the US, as represented by the (-8) horizontal coordinate of Series (M) in Graph 9. Another effect of Turkey's continued unreciprocated cooperation is the length of the series, which reflects on the absolute gains. In Graph 2.5, this feature is represented by the (20) vertical coordinate of Series (M).

Nuclear Weapons on Turkish Soil 1953-1960: Series (J)

Turkey's membership to NATO required her adaptation to the overall allied military strategy. At the time (1953), this strategy was massive retaliation and called for an all-out nuclear response against a Soviet attack, even if it were a conventional one. With the introduction of the "New Look" strategy by the Eisenhower administration, Turkey felt increasing concern over the possibility of surrendering large tracks of land in an initial conventional Soviet attack. To reduce this possibility, Turkey sought for the deployment of American nuclear weapons on her soil, which would deter a Soviet 'adventurism on the flanks'.

1. In December 1956, Turkey asked for the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons which would be operated with a dual key system. The US responded favorably and these weapons were deployed in the following two years.


2. With the successful launch of Sputnik in October 1957, the anxiety over a "missile gap" between the US and the Soviet Union led the US to deploy intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) on allied soil. Of the NATO members, only Italy, Great Britain and Turkey accepted the deployment of IRBM on their territory. The secret treaty for the deployment of Jupiter IRBM to Turkey was signed in Paris in October 1959.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (J) can be depicted as follows:

Table 9 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (J)

Time	US	Turkey
1956-1958	1	1
1958-1961	1	1
Absolute Gains:	2+2=4	
Relative Gains:	0	0

In graphic terms, series (J) can be depicted as:



Graph 10 Graphic depiction of US nuclear weapons on Turkish soil series (J)

As Table 9 indicates, series (J) consists of two reciprocal acts of cooperation where neither party enjoys relative gains –hence the zero horizontal coordinate of Series (J) in Graph 10. The total absolute gains are represented by the (4) coordinate in the vertical axis.

The U2 Spy Planes in İncirlik 1956-1960: Series (U)

U2 high altitude reconnaissance planes of the US were deployed in the İncirlik base in 1956 and conducted overflights over Soviet territory. By hosting these planes, Turkey took a significant diplomatic risk for no substantial return, since the CIA who operated these planes did not share the information acquired from these flights with the Turkish authorities. After the launch of Sputnik in October 1957, the U2 missions were intensified. The U2 was believed to be immune to fighter intervention, anti-aircraft missiles or even radar detection because of its very high flight altitude. Flying these planes, however, was difficult because of very narrow margins for error. Finally, on May Day 1960, the Soviet anti-aircraft missile technology caught up with the U2's and one of them was shot down over Soviet territory. The incident was first denied by the US, but the Soviets produced not only indisputable evidence of the wreck of the spy plane, but the pilot Francis Powers himself and demanded an apology.

In response, the US took full responsibility and did not disclose the original take off point of the plane (İncirlik). The Soviets could only prove that it came over from Peshawar in Pakistan and could not hold Turkey responsible for the incident. Turkey did not suspend the U2 flights until another such incident in 1965.


1. From 1956 onwards, the US deployed U2 spy planes in İncirlik. Turkey accepted these risky operations to be conducted from her territory, and provided for their continuing secrecy.
2. From 1957 onwards, the U2 missions intensified. Turkey continued to support these missions despite growing risk.
3. In May 1960, a U2 took off from İncirlik, landed in Peshawar Pakistan, and from there entered the Soviet territory, where it was shot down. The US took full responsibility of the incident and did not disclose the original point of take-off. Turkey did not suspend the flights.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (U) can be depicted as follows:

Table 10 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (U)

Time	US	Turkey
1956-1957 Turkey allows U2 flights, cares for their secrecy	2	0
1957-1960 intensified U2 flights after Sputnik.	2	0
May 1960 Powers shot down, US assumes responsibility, Turkey allows continuation of flights	1	1
Absolute Gains:	5+1=6	
Relative Gains:	4	-4

In graphic terms, series (U) can be depicted as:



Graph 11 Graphic depiction of Turkish-US cooperation on U2 flights as series (U)

Turkey allowed the initiation and intensification of U2 flights for no tangible return. These flights provided the US with invaluable intelligence, which she did not share with Turkey.

This situation resulted in relative gains in favor of the US, which is represented by (-4) horizontal coordinate of Series (J) in Graph 11. The total absolute gains are represented by the (5) vertical coordinate.

Problems Arising from the Bilateral Treaties 1957-1960: Series (B2)

The bilateral treaties that established the legal basis for the presence and conduct of US personnel were concluded in the early 1950s. They were fashioned after the standard agreement format signed between the US and other NATO allies. The point of jurisdiction over the criminal acts of US personnel was not clarified enough, so in 1956, a bilateral agreement was signed between Turkey and the US to that end.

1. According to the Agreement on the implementation of SOFA signed in July 1956, the duty status of the US personnel in question would be determined by the declaration of his commanding officer. This gave the US authorities the initiative whether to hand in the suspect to Turkish authorities or not. Turkey accepted these terms and the Turkish Ministry of Justice

decreed that the prosecutors' offices would apply to the head of the JUSMMAT to ask for such declarations.

2. In November 1959, in one of the most notorious of such cases, Lieutenant Colonel Allen I. Morrison ran down a contingent of the Presidential Guard, killing one and injuring several others. Morrison was released to American authorities who certified that he had been on duty at the time of the accident. Morrison was returning from a cocktail party, and the Turkish public was furious over the American military court decision that fined him \$1,200 and restricted from troop command for two years. The Turkish government, however, failed to re-negotiate the agreement in satisfactory fashion.


3. Throughout the second half of 1950s, the US military abused the custom exemptions and brought in custom free American goods (mostly through the military postal service). This created a black market around the US military bases, and caused resentment among the Turkish people. As the incidents grew in quantity and seriousness, the US military imposed stricter controls over the postal deliveries. The Turkish government, however, never acted to exercise customs supervision over the military postal system, and left the custom privileges of the US military personnel intact.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (B2) can be depicted as follows:

Table 11 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (B2)

Time	US	Turkey
1956 Turkey agrees to US determination of duty status	2	0
1957-1960 Abuses of duty status and postal service	2	0
Early 1960s US imposes stricter control on postal service, Turkey allows its continued operation	1	1
Absolute Gains:	5+1=6	
Relative Gains:	4	-4

In graphic terms, series (B2) can be depicted as:




Graph 12 Graphic depiction of problems arising from bilateral treaties as series (B2)

In the application of bilateral treaties, Turkey allows US a free hand in duty status determination and customs free delivery of goods to American personnel. The US abuses both prerogatives, but throughout the second half of 1950s, Turkey does not attempt to re-negotiate the bilateral treaties. This results in relative gains for the US, as represented by the (-4) horizontal coordinate of series (B2).

Overall Evaluation of Cooperation Series in the 1945-1960 Period

As mentioned, this study will use a graphic model in order to test the validity of the neo-institutionalist argument against that of the neo-realist one. The graph below contains all of the eight series of cooperation in the 1945-1960 period.



Legend

S: Straits Controversy; T: Truman Aid; N: Turkish Entry to NATO; B: Bilateral Treaties; M: Middle East; J: Nuclear Weapons; U: U2 Spy Planes; B2: Problems with the Application of Bilateral Treaties

Graph 13 Series of cooperation in 1945-1960 period

In Graph 13, the series of cooperation on non-institutional bilateral issues are marked as red squares, while series of cooperation under the NATO institutional framework are marked as blue triangles. Coinciding series of the same kind are marked with white inside the original color (as in series U and B2). Coinciding series of different kind are marked with bigger red square (bilateral) with blue triangle inside (institutional), as in the case of series J and T.

The bulk of cooperation series (six out of eight) concentrate in the lower-middle part of the spectrum, which indicates short series with low relative and absolute gains for both parties. The longer series of cooperation (Series S and M) yield greater absolute gains *and* greater relative gains. This is an unexpected phenomenon according to both realist and neo-institutionalist theories. The realist claim is that in an essentially anarchic world, series of cooperation (especially in the realm of security) would be short and yield greater relative gains for the stronger party (as vindicated by the majority of short series with relative gains for the US in Graph 13). The neo-institutionalist claim is that the constraining effects of

institutions would compensate for the power asymmetry and help to create longer series of cooperation with low relative gains and high absolute gains. The graph above however, suggests that the two bilateral series of cooperation, Series (S) on the Straits controversy, and Series (M) on the Middle East cooperation, have yielded both the highest absolute *and* relative gains. While Turkey enjoyed high relative gains in the Straits controversy, the US enjoyed high relative gains in the Middle East cooperation.

The other bilateral series are Series (T) involving the Truman aid to Turkey, Series (N) that involves Turkey's entry into NATO, Series (U) concerning the U2 flights, and Series (B2) about the interpretation of the bilateral treaties on the presence of US personnel on Turkish soil. While Series (T) scores in the center of the graph indicating no relative gains for either party, Series (N) scores two points towards the left, indicating moderate relative gains for the US. Series (U) and Series (B2) both score four points towards the left, indicating high relative gains for the US -the second highest after Series (M).

Of the six bilateral series of cooperation in this period, four have yielded high relative gains, three of which are in favor of the US. Thus, the graph above supports the argument that in the absence of institutional constraints, the stronger party tends to acquire greater relative gains, but disputes the argument that series of cooperation that yield uneven gains tend to be short, since the longest series (S and M) are also the ones with most uneven cooperation.

The institutional series of the period are: i) Series (B) about Turkey's adaptation to alliance strategy upon her entry into NATO and the bilateral treaties to establish the presence of the joint military installations and US personnel, and ii) Series (J) about the deployment of nuclear weapons on Turkish soil. Series (B) scores two points towards the left (indicating moderate relative gains for the US), and Series (J) scores at the center, indicating no relative gains for either party. In terms of absolute gains, they remain below the predictions of the

neo-institutionalist argument, since they are on the average at the same level with the other bilateral series clustering around the center, and below the bilateral Series (M), which is also the longest series of cooperation despite the fact that it yields very high relative gains for the US. Thus, the location of the two institutional series at the lower center of the graph supports the claim that institutional constraints moderate relative gains, but disputes the claim that they prolong the series of cooperation and increase absolute gains.

The overall picture of the first period of Turkish-US relations needs to be verified on two aspects:

1. One has to look at more periods involving conjectural change in international system (i.e. Détente, Second Cold War and Post-Cold War) to see if there is a shift in the nature of cooperation series in line with conjectural change.

2. One has to look at more periods involving domestic political change in order to see if cooperation is a function of domestic political dynamics.

If the function of the institution (in this case, NATO) remains the same across periods of international conjectural and domestic political change, then one can verify that the pattern of cooperation is indeed shaped by institutional effect rather than other variables (at systemic or sub-unit levels).

CHAPTER FOUR

CYPRUS 1960-1980

The literature on Turkish foreign policy describes the 1960s and 70s as problematic decades in Turkish-American relations. A number of reasons are cited for this assertion.

Domestically, the 27 May 1960 military coup had ushered in a more democratic environment in Turkey where the left would find greater opportunity to influence foreign policy, especially at public opinion level. At government level, the effects of the 1964 Cyprus Crisis and the Johnson Letter would mark the beginning of a turn in Turkish foreign policy. From this point on, Turkey would seek to diversify her relations and engage in her own rapprochement with the Soviet Union. With the rise of the left in the latter half of the 1960s and the revelation of the Johnson Letter in January 1966, the public opinion would markedly turn against the US.

Internationally, this period is marked by a general rise in anti-Americanism. Because of the American policy to stand by her European allies against third world liberation movements in general, and the corresponding Soviet policy to support these movements, there is a significant shift in the world public opinion about the benign nature of American hegemony. The war in Vietnam, in particular, had created a large anti-war front within and outside America. The Turkish intelligentsia too is effected from this general mood, and the elite consensus on the validity and morality of the American connection would suffer as a result.

Structurally, the détente between the superpowers was another important factor, which allowed Turkey to diversify her relations and obtain increasing Soviet help to compensate for the dwindling American support.

As such, the period of 1960-1979 is a perfect test case for the validity of the arguments of this study, since it allows for the isolation of the institutional effect by changing the other variables (structural, domestic and ideational).

The period started with the 27 May 1960 military coup in Turkey, which ousted the Menderes government that had pursued a vigorous pro-American foreign policy and had established the basic foundations for the presence and continued operation of US forces in Turkey.

27 May 1960 Military Coup in Turkey and Relations with the US

The significant change in Turkish domestic politics came with the military coup against the Menderes government on 27 May 1960. As mentioned the junior officers in the Turkish military had been plotting to overthrow the government for some time (see above). Under increasing economic difficulties, the DP had resorted to oppression of its political opponents using government power. In reaction, the RPP had sharpened its opposition while student demonstrations erupted in major cities in the spring of 1960. The military staged a bloodless coup on 27 May 1960 and a Committee of National Union (CNU) made up of middle ranking officers took over the government. The actual control of the junta was in the hands of these middle ranking officers, but mostly for concerns of legitimacy, they had chosen General Cemal Gürsel –who later became president- as their leader. The CNU closed the DP, arrested President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, all cabinet members as well as the leading figures of DP. The leadership of DP, along with President Bayar were later tried in a special court in the island of Yassıada. President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan were sentenced to death for high treason, misuse of public funds and abrogation of

the constitution. Bayar's sentence was commuted while Menderes, Zorlu and Polatkan were executed, despite expressed US displeasure.

It is interesting to note that while the prime minister, the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of finance were executed, Turkey's foreign policy and financial relations with her western allies, and particularly the US, remained intact¹⁴⁸. Since the 1957 elections, the opposition RPP had been pursuing a rigorous campaign against the government, condemning its economic and domestic political course. But even so, the main foreign policy preferences of the Menderes government were shared by the RPP¹⁴⁹. The officers who had taken over on 27 May shared these preferences as well:

There was evidently no great dispute among the junta members concerning Turkey's role in the world. Their backgrounds having been in military affairs, in the main they accepted the prevailing view within the Turkish armed forces toward the cold war, and they appeared to have confidence that continuing U.S. connection was in Turkey's ultimate interests.¹⁵⁰

At 4 A.M. on the morning of the coup, the spokesman of the CNU, Colonel Alpaslan Türkeş declared in a radio speech that Turkey would remain committed to NATO and CENTO alliances. A copy of this radio address was slipped under the door of the American embassy in Ankara the same day.¹⁵¹

In exchange, the US government recognized the new regime on 30 May. In a press conference on 4 July 1960, Cemal Gürsel reassured the US that Turkey would never default on her debt, but would need American and European assistance in order to continue serving

¹⁴⁸ For the speculation that the US was dispelled with the Menderes government and was actually content with its removal through the 27 May coup, see Çetin Yetkin, *Türkiye'de Askeri Darbeler ve Amerika* (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1985), pp.51-68 and pp. 85-88.

¹⁴⁹ Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," *World Politics* 13, no. 1 (oct. 1960), pp. 19-44.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.86.

¹⁵¹ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 126.

her debt and maintain her economic growth and military posture, which is vital for NATO purposes.¹⁵²

The US recognized the new regime three days later by stating that there was no need for a formal recognition of the new regime, and that the mere act of continuing ‘business as usual’ constitutes recognition. As the US delivered on the understandings made with the previous government and fulfilled her side of the bilateral relations without reservation, it became apparent that the relations with the US would be unimpeded by the military regime – on the caveat that it remained moderate and returned power to civilians within a reasonable period of time.¹⁵³

The members of the junta were divided on the issue of maintaining their hold on the government or returning to civilian rule. At the end, with Cemal Gürsel throwing his weight on the pro-civilian group, a new constituent assembly was elected and the new constitution was approved on July 1961. During the military interlude, two issues became potential points of trouble for Turkish-US relations: the radical views among the younger members of the Junta, who wished to modify the nature of Turkey’s relations with the US (especially the informal bilateral treaties which they felt gave undue privilege to the US), and the execution of Menderes and his ministers. Both, however, caused no drastic alteration in the relations as the junta made no effort to re-negotiate the main framework of bilateral agreements. For her part, the US conducted ‘business as usual’ with the military regime through the trials and executions of Menderes, Polatkan and Zorlu. The junta even received help from NATO to purge the higher ranks of the top-heavy Turkish military: in the summer of 1960, the NATO Supreme Commander General Norstad made a flying visit to Turkey and promised to provide funds for the retiring officers to reduce grievances that the junta sought to avoid. As a result,

¹⁵² Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 681.

¹⁵³ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 87.

the CNU was able to retire some 4,000 field-grade and general officers by August 1960 and offer them retirement bonuses of unprecedented generosity¹⁵⁴.

The relations of the CNU with the US were not perfectly smooth either: upon seizing power, the CNU initiated a negotiation on the sorest aspects of the bilateral agreements, especially the duty status of American personnel. The media whipped up the expectations by citing the Morrison case and the Turkish authorities demanded to obtain the right to decide duty status in criminal cases. The Americans, however, “would not easily surrender this right, which they considered as basic for their worldwide position.”¹⁵⁵ Another aspect of the bilateral treaties was the informal agreements or technical extensions of existing treaties that did not pass parliamentary approval. The CNU abolished most of the informal agreements and the Americans went along with it¹⁵⁶. In return, in June 1961, the Constituent Assembly (which had been working on the new constitution since January 1961) specified that “implementing agreements pursuant to an international agreement... do not require approval by the TGNA”. This formulation permitted the government “to carry out some necessarily secret arrangements of the free world defense system.”¹⁵⁷

The new constitution of 1961 was carried by popular vote in August, and elections were held in October 1961, which ended the military regime and facilitated the return of civilian government under a coalition led by the RPP. Throughout the military rule, the relations with the US actually improved compared to the last two years of the Menderes government.

¹⁵⁴ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 89-90.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

¹⁵⁶ In an interview I made with Colonel (Ret.) Suphi Gürsoytrak, former member of the CNU, he cited the following: “We have found out that the Americans were acting on the basis of a number of ‘verbal understandings’ or informal technical extensions of the bilateral treaties. In order to restrain them, we used to abolish these one by one, and they would not object. But the next day, they would come up with another similar agreement that allowed them to act as they wished. It was an impossible situation.”

¹⁵⁷ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 89.

The amicable nature of the relations continued after transition to civilian rule: upon his return from a state visit to US in November 1961, the Turkish Chief of General Staff Cevdet Sunay had made the following remark:

America is as interested in the formation of the new government in Turkey as we are. In our contacts with the US Department of Defense concerning aid, we were very well received and we have returned with hopeful promises.¹⁵⁸

In August 1962, Vice-president Lyndon B. Johnson visited Turkey and pledged to support the new government through increased US aid. As a result, the US aid to Turkey, which was \$188 million in 1962 increased to \$237 million in 1963¹⁵⁹. The first serious test of the alliance in the new era would come with the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the deployment of Jupiter IRBMs on Turkish soil had been negotiated during the Menderes government, but the actual deployment took place after the 27 May 1960 coup. One should note that neither the NCU, nor the coalition government under İsmet İnönü which took over after the 1961 elections, were less enthusiastic about the deployment¹⁶⁰. On the contrary, by early 1961 it was the US government that was having second thoughts: between February and July 1961, various US documents show that the Kennedy administration was trying to find a way to cancel the Jupiter deployment without annoying Turkey or seeming weak to the Soviets¹⁶¹. The most

¹⁵⁸ Quoted in Çetin Yetkin, *Türkiye'de Askeri Darbeler ve Amerika*, p.68.

¹⁵⁹ Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 60.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 50, footnote 78.

¹⁶¹ Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading Jupiters in Turkey?", pp. 99-101.

feasible alternative would be to deploy a Polaris submarine with sixteen nuclear warheads, which “would be a much better retaliatory force”¹⁶². But the inter-departmental struggles of the US government and the necessities of alliance politics in NATO hindered this deployment: while the Pentagon wished to substitute the Jupiters with the Polaris, the US State Department took more care to keep Turkey satisfied, and the American prestige intact, and their position was supported by SACEUR General Norstad. Evidence suggests that Kennedy himself had let the State Department weigh in on this subject against the Pentagon:

At a March 29 meeting of the NSC, President Kennedy directed that a committee, drawn from the departments of State and Defense and from Central Intelligence Agency, “should review the question of deployment of IRBMs to Turkey and make recommendations to him”. The committee was to be chaired by a representative from the State Department, which, unlike the Defense Department, was not deeply troubled by the provocative nature of the Jupiters and which was likely to serve as a partisan for Turkish interests and resist cancellation of weapons. (...) Kennedy, a knowledgeable leader who understood bureaucratic politics, probably cared more about not offending the Turks than about withholding the Jupiters.¹⁶³

This conscious choice of letting the State Department handle the Jupiter issue resulted in the actual deployment of the missiles by the summer of 1962. In August, Kennedy was concerned about a Soviet counter-deployment to Cuba and this time he shifted the decision-making responsibility from the State Department to the Pentagon. But the missiles had become operational only a month ago and by the time of the Cuban missile crisis, they were still in place.

On the Soviet front, Khrushchev was pre-occupied with the preservation of the socialist regime in Cuba against American intervention:

¹⁶² Bernstein, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading Jupiters in Turkey?” p. 100.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

We were sure that the Americans would never reconcile themselves to the existence of Castro's Cuba. They feared, as much as we hoped, that a Socialist Cuba might become a magnet that would attract other Latin American countries to socialism. Given the continual threat of American interference in the Caribbean, what should our own policy be? (...) We had an obligation to do everything in our power to protect Cuba's existence as a socialist country...¹⁶⁴

During a state visit to Bulgaria in May 1962, Khrushchev came up with the solution to the problem of "establishing a tangible and effective deterrent to American interference in the Caribbean"¹⁶⁵: missiles. One should note the similarity behind US and Soviet reasoning in deploying IRBMs to Turkey and Cuba respectively: in both lines of reasoning, the political notions of tangibility and prestige weigh over military feasibility and -with hindsight, one must say-, common sense. The madness behind the Soviet decision is reflected in Khrushchev's musing about the possible results of a nuclear strike against New York and its relationship to deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba:

I knew the United States could knock out some of our installations, but not all of them. (...) even if one or two big [missiles] were left, we could still hit New York, and there wouldn't be much of New York left. I don't mean to say that everyone in New York would be killed, -not everyone, of course, but an awful lot of people would be wiped out. I don't know how many: that's a matter for our scientists and military personnel to work out. (...) But that's all beside the point. The main thing was that the installation of our missiles in Cuba would, I thought, restrain the United States from precipitous military action against Castro's government.¹⁶⁶

The Soviet government had been protesting the deployment of Jupiters in Turkey. In his mind, Khrushchev had equated them with the existence of missiles in Cuba¹⁶⁷. On 11

¹⁶⁴ Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. Strobe Talbott (London: Sphere Books, 1971), pp. 453-454.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 454.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 455.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 454. Also in p. 456, he states: "We hadn't given the Cubans anything more than the Americans were giving to their allies."

September, the Soviets continued to protest about the Jupiters and mentioned the possibility of “retaliation”¹⁶⁸. By that time, the first shipment of SS-4 MRBMs had already arrived in Cuba.

On October 8th, the Cuban president Dorticos gave a speech at the U.N. General Assembly, noting that “If... we are attacked, we will defend ourselves. I repeat, we have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves; we have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons which we would have preferred not to acquire and which we do not wish to employ.”¹⁶⁹

On 14 October, a U2 reconnaissance plane photographed the Soviet missile sites in San Cristobel in *Pinar del Rio* Province in Western Cuba. Upon seeing the pictures on the morning of 16 October, President Kennedy convened the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM), which produced three options: a surgical strike at missile sites, full scale invasion of Cuba, or a blockade¹⁷⁰. The first two options were supported by the military leadership, but the administration, including Kennedy himself, feared the repercussions of killing Soviet personnel on the ground. On the afternoon of 17 October, Kennedy accepted the Soviet ambassador in the White House, who told him that there were no offensive weapons in Cuba. On the presidents’ desk were the U2 reconnaissance photos of that morning, showing several missiles and missiles sites under construction, and “a CIA report indicating that the missiles in Cuba had an atomic warhead potential of roughly half of the entire Russian ICBM capacity”¹⁷¹.

¹⁶⁸ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 682.

¹⁶⁹ “Cuban Missile Crisis,” *Wikipedia*. Available [online]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_missile_crisis [02 June 2007].

¹⁷⁰ *Cuban Missile Crisis*. Available [online]: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A563852> [02 June 2007].

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

During the next six days, while the US military leadership pressed for a decision to invade Cuba, the administration flirted with the idea of trading the Jupiters in Turkey for the missiles in Cuba:

At an evening meeting [on 21 October], convened by Robert Kennedy, a number of senior government officials agreed, in the words of Abram Chayes, the State Department's legal adviser, "that the Turkish missiles would have to be given up in the end, as the price of settlement."¹⁷²

On Monday, 22 October, President Kennedy announced 'the quarantine' (called so because a blockade is technically an act of war), and demanded the immediate dismantling of the Soviet missiles. No mention of a possible trade with the Jupiters was made, but in the meantime the US government was inquiring about the Turkish reaction through Ambassador Raymond Hare in Ankara:

Would Turkey accede to withdrawal of the Jupiters, (...) if there was some military replacement –possibly deployment of an American-controlled Polaris or establishment of a seaborne, multilateral nuclear force (MLF) within NATO?¹⁷³

On 24 October, Hare replied that the Turks would definitely oppose the dismantling of the Jupiters: "Turkish officials would greatly resent that their interests were being traded off in order to appease an enemy."¹⁷⁴

A report from Thomas Finletter, the NATO ambassador in Paris that same day suggested that Turkey assigned great symbolic value to the Jupiters. Meanwhile, the Turkish President Cemal Gürsel and Prime Minister İsmet İnönü had stated Turkey's full support to

¹⁷² Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading Jupiters in Turkey?" p. 106.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

and solidarity with the US¹⁷⁵. In the TGNA, İnönü announced: “Just as we will ask our allies to fulfill their duties of solidarity when we face a danger, we shall certainly fulfill our own duty when our allies ask us to do so.”¹⁷⁶ The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Feridun Cemal Erkin met with the American ambassador and re-affirmed Turkey’s support, and asked the US government to speed up the deliveries of the F-104 fighter-bombers and resolve the shipment of F-100 bomber spare parts.¹⁷⁷

On the evening of 26 October, two letters arrived to the White House through teletype, both from Khrushchev. The first one, which was much more emotional in tone, suggested the dismantling of Soviet missiles in Cuba in return for a US pledge not to invade the island. The second one, written in more official language, made a parallel between the missiles in Turkey and Cuba. It suggested symmetric withdrawals of US and Soviet missiles from Turkey and Cuba, and symmetric non-invasion pledges¹⁷⁸. As stated above, many senior officials in the US government had already conceded that the dismantling of the Jupiters might be a price of the settlement, but their basic dilemma was how to dismantle them without offending their NATO allies and losing face. They were especially concerned about losing Turkish support and destabilizing the already shaky coalition government in Ankara.¹⁷⁹

As part of his response on 24 October, Ambassador Hare had “reluctantly suggested a secret Soviet-American agreement (without Turkey’s knowledge) and then the prompt dismantling of the missiles”¹⁸⁰.

¹⁷⁵ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 683.

¹⁷⁶ Quoted in Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 128.

¹⁷⁷ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 683.

¹⁷⁸ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 128.

¹⁷⁹ Bernstein, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading Jupiters in Turkey?” p. 107.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

The pressing issue was time: though the US administration was fully aware that leaving Turkey out of the decision-making process and trading the missiles would “injure Turkey, NATO and the United States”¹⁸¹. The Soviets, in the words of President Kennedy, “had made the Turkish proposal in the most difficult possible way.”¹⁸² But the alternative options that would include Turkey and other NATO decision-making bodies would be too time-consuming. Thus, after long discussions in the EXCOMM, the administration decided not to raise the question of withdrawing the Jupiters with the Turkish officials.¹⁸³

On the evening of 27 October, Attorney General Robert Kennedy met with the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in the Justice Department. He delivered President Kennedy’s reply to Khrushchev’s first message –which did not mention a trade between Cuban missiles and Jupiters in Turkey- along with an oral message stating that “there would be an understanding that the missiles would be removed "voluntarily" in the immediate aftermath.”¹⁸⁴

At 9 a.m. on October 28, a new message from Khrushchev was broadcast on Radio Moscow. Khrushchev stated "the Soviet government, in addition to previously issued instructions on the cessation of further work at the building sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you describe as 'offensive' and their crating and return to the Soviet Union." Kennedy immediately responded, calling Khrushchev’s statement "an important and constructive contribution to peace". He continued with a formal letter: "I consider my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out".¹⁸⁵

With the formal letter, Kennedy had approved the oral understanding about the missile trade.

In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the Turkish government praised the US for the

¹⁸¹ Bernstein, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading Jupiters in Turkey?” p. 117.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 118.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 119-121.

¹⁸⁴ “Cuban Missile Crisis,” *Wikipedia*.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

peaceful resolution of the crisis without trading the Jupiters. It became apparent, however, that the Jupiters would be removed in a few months. As mentioned above, Turkey was eager to speed up the F-104 deliveries from the US, and seized the opportunity presented by the removal of Jupiters. In response, “The US agreed to a program of aircraft modernization in consideration for withdrawing the Jupiters”¹⁸⁶. When the Jupiters were dismantled in early 1963, Turkey showed no reaction. The US substituted the nuclear deterrent of the Jupiters by assigning a Polaris submarine to the area.¹⁸⁷

It is an interesting point to note that the Soviets were experiencing similar problems for their part in Cuba. In the words of Nikita Khrushchev:

Almost immediately after the President [Kennedy] and I had exchanged notes at the peak of the crisis, our relations with the United States started to return to normal. Our relations with Cuba, on the other hand, took a sudden turn for the worse. Castro even stopped receiving our ambassador. It seemed that by removing our missiles we had suffered a moral defeat in the eyes of the Cubans.¹⁸⁸

In the long run, a similar effect of ‘moral defeat’ would be experienced in the Turkish-US relations as a result of the Jupiter removal. The exclusion of Turkey during the decision-making process was a sobering reminder that the US could, if her national interest so dictated, acts unilaterally. The real breaking point, however, came with the Johnson Letter of 1964.

Cyprus Problem and the Johnson Letter of 1964

Throughout the 1950s, the question about the fate of the island of Cyprus had transformed from an issue of decolonization into a Turkish-Greek problem. By 1960, this

¹⁸⁶ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 95.

¹⁸⁷ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 684.

¹⁸⁸ Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 460-461.

problem was resolved with the Zurich and London Agreements (signed in February 1959, entered into force August 1960). The Greek and Turkish Cypriots would form the constituent peoples of an independent Republic of Cyprus. The Treaty of Establishment and Structure of the new republic envisaged a power-sharing mechanism with the vice-president being Turkish and 30% representation for Turks in all levels of government. An additional Treaty of Guarantee assigned Turkey, Greece and Britain as the guarantor powers to protect the status-quo on the island.¹⁸⁹

From the onset, this arrangement proved problematic since it was cumbersome and did not satisfy the more radical elements within both societies, especially the Greeks. The first President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios made no secret of the fact that he saw independence as a first step towards *Enosis* (Union with Greece).

The American involvement in the Cyprus issue had started with her role as a facilitator in the Turkish-Greek negotiations in the late 1950s. The US had a two-fold stake in the issue: Avoiding war between two of her allies in NATO's southern flank, and maintaining western military presence in Cyprus via British base rights (which had proven to be crucial during the 1958 Middle East crisis). The US did not wish to see Cyprus as an effective non-aligned independent state either: this would endanger the bases and increase Soviet influence on the Eastern Mediterranean. In his memoir, Andreas Papandreou puts it thus: "the Anglo-American ideal for Cyprus lay somewhere between *enosis* and independence."¹⁹⁰

The arrangement of 1960 collapsed under increasing difficulties of governing the bi-cameral parliamentary system. Problems with separate municipal governments, the formation

¹⁸⁹ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, pp. 245-246. For the texts of the relevant treaties, see Parker T. Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990), Appendix I.

¹⁹⁰ Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint* (Middlesex: Pelican Books, 1973), p.131. Also see Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, pp 217-218.

of the mixed military and police force, and difficulties of effective taxation created a deadlock. When President Makarios offered his thirteen points to curb the Turkish Cypriot power within the system¹⁹¹, the security situation deteriorated rapidly:

On 21 December 1963, a Turkish Cypriot crowd clashed with the plainclothes special constables of Yorgadjis. Almost immediately an organised attack by Greek Cypriot paramilitaries was launched upon Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia and Larnaca. 700 Turkish hostages, including women and children, were taken from the northern suburbs of Nicosia. Nikos Sampson led a group of Greek Cypriot irregulars into the mixed suburb of Omorphita and massacred the Turkish Cypriot population indiscriminately. By 1964, 193 Turkish Cypriots and 133 Greek Cypriots were killed, with a further 209 Turks and 41 Greeks missing, presumed dead. Approximately 20,000 Turkish Cypriots fled their villages to live in enclaves, much of their homes subsequently being looted.¹⁹²

From the onset of intercommunal violence known as the “Bloody Christmas”, the Turkish government applied to the US as an intermediary. On 25 December 1963, two days after the violence broke out; President Cemal Gürsel sent a letter to President Lyndon Johnson, asking him to apply pressure on the Greek Cypriots to stop the massacre and lootings. In response, Johnson expressed his concern over the intercommunal strife and urged President Makarios and Vice-President Küçük to resolve their differences peacefully. However, his tone was markedly impartial: with the elections in the US coming up, Johnson was weary of antagonizing the strong Greek lobby in the US. Thus, much to the disappointment of Turkey, he failed to weigh in on the Turkish side.¹⁹³

In the meantime, Turkey engaged in preparations to intervene militarily as a guarantor power under the Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. The Turkish army was neither trained nor equipped for a large scale amphibious operation. The immediate reaction therefore, was

¹⁹¹ For Makarios’s Thirteen Points, see Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, Appendix II.

¹⁹² “Cyprus Intercommunal Violence”, *Wikipedia*. Available [online]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyprus_Intercommunal_violence#_note-15 [12/06/2007].

¹⁹³ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 685.

restricted to token passes by the Turkish jets over the island on 25 December as “the 650-man Turkish army contingent in Cyprus under the terms of the Treaty of Alliance moved out of its barracks and positioned itself astride the Nicosia-Kyrenia road”¹⁹⁴. As the Turkish Navy units concentrated in the Port of Mersin, President Makarios agreed to the intervention of British troops. This produced a cease-fire in Nicosia, an exchange of hostages, and the establishment of the 'Green Line', a neutral zone between the Greek and Turkish quarters.¹⁹⁵

By the end of January, it was apparent that the British forces that came out of their bases on the island were insufficient to quell the violence, and the Turkish Cypriots who fled their homes were squeezed into enclaves that covered about 5% of the island. By February, the talks between the representatives of the respective communities had failed. On 25 February, the newly elected prime minister of Greece, George Papandreou sent a message to Makarios ensuring him of their support and committed to defend Cyprus militarily against a Turkish intervention: “A war clash between Greece and Turkey would be madness, but if Turkey decides to enter the insane asylum, we shall not hesitate to follow her.”¹⁹⁶

The United States had urged sending a NATO force to Cyprus, a plan accepted by Britain, Turkey and Greece. Makarios, however, adamantly refused to cooperate with NATO and instead demanded action by the United Nations Security Council¹⁹⁷. This attitude seemed to confirm the claim by Fraser Wilkins, the US ambassador in Cyprus, that Makarios had initiated the violence in order to attract UN attention¹⁹⁸. Turkey was reluctant to accept UN intervention, but the US sent Under Secretary George Ball to Ankara and acquired İnönü's

¹⁹⁴ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 107; “The Cyprus Conflict,” *Wikipedia*.

¹⁹⁵ “The Cyprus Conflict”

¹⁹⁶ Quoted in Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint*, p. 133.

¹⁹⁷ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 253.

¹⁹⁸ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, p. 10.

approval¹⁹⁹. On 4 March 1963, the UN established a peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) with its Resolution 186 to stop the violence²⁰⁰. On 13 March, just a day before the first contingent of UNFICYP arrived in the island, the Turkish government sent an official letter to Makarios warning that Turkey would act in order to protect the lives, legal rights and property of the Turkish Cypriots if the violence continued. Three days later, the TGNA authorized the government to send troops to the island²⁰¹. The formation of UNFICYP, however, obliged Turkey to delay military action. Despite the negotiated ceasefire in Nicosia, attacks on the Turkish Cypriot still persisted, particularly in Limmasol. As one of its former members, Dr. Richard Patrick put it; the UNFICYP “could not kill Cypriots to prevent them from killing each other. The force's main deterrent was its presence.”²⁰²

Since the mixed army envisaged by the Constitution did not materialize, and concerned at the possibility of a Turkish invasion, Makarios proceeded to create the Greek Cypriot National Guard. General Grivas, the founder of EOKA, came from mainland Greece to take charge of this army. In April, after a visit by Makarios, the Greek government claimed that the UNSC resolution made the 1960 constitution invalid and started shipping weapons and “volunteers” to the island. In this way, more than 20,000 Greek soldiers joined the newly formed National Guard between April and mid-summer of 1964²⁰³. This development would severely change the military balance of power against the Turkish Cypriots, who were holding out with the 5,000 lightly armed members of the Turkish Resistance Organization (*Türk Mukavemet*

¹⁹⁹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 110.

²⁰⁰ For the full text of UNSC Resolution 186, see Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, Appendix 3, pp. 161-162.

²⁰¹ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 685.

²⁰² Quoted in *Cyprus Conflict*. Available [online]: <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main-%203.html> [12 June 2007].

²⁰³ Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint*, p. 134.

Teşkilatı, TMT). In May 1964, Turkey managed to summon a special session of the NATO Council, but neither the US nor the other allies would stand squarely behind Turkey²⁰⁴. Turkey was growing concerned that the American neutrality and discouragement of Turkish intervention resulted in the steady build-up of Greek forces on the island, which could overrun the flimsy defenses of the Turkish enclaves²⁰⁵. The public opinion in Turkey was outraged by the news of atrocities committed against the Turkish Cypriots, and a growing section of the Turkish Armed Forces was in favor of a military intervention. Against such counsel, the experienced Prime Minister İnönü was weary of the implications of an intervention, and questioned the feasibility of the operation. He “clearly recognized that the Americans would inevitably get wind of Turkish intentions before a landing could be accomplished.”²⁰⁶

At the beginning of June, the Parliament of Cyprus –now controlled solely by Greek Cypriots- approved a bill for general conscription of Greek citizens. This action, combined with the steady stream of ‘volunteers’ from Greece, induced Ankara to start active preparations for intervention. As the preparations went on, “the American ambassador was given warning of the impending military operation”²⁰⁷. At the same time, on 4 June, the Greek government ordered its armed forces to ready and informed US and British ambassadors that war was imminent²⁰⁸. When ambassador Hare reported the situation in Ankara to Washington, President Johnson responded with a letter dated 5 June. On that same day, he sent George Ball of the State Department to Athens to talk to Greek Prime Minister Papandreou to initiate a summit meeting between Turkey and Greece over the Cyprus problem. In this conversation,

Papandreou

²⁰⁴ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 111.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 112.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 113.

²⁰⁷ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 130.

²⁰⁸ Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint*, p. 134.

(...) went on to express his disappointment over Ball's warning that the United States, having intervened several times to prevent Turkish aggression, was no longer in a position to do so. Would the United States sit back and let a NATO member, armed and financed by NATO, attack a NATO ally?²⁰⁹

What Prime Minister Papandreou did not know was that President Johnson had already warned Turkey almost exactly in the lines Papandreou had suggested. By the time Ball was speaking with Papandreou at his home in Kastri, the Turkish Prime Minister İnönü had received the so-called 'Johnson Letter'. This was a harshly written warning (described by Under-secretary George Ball as "the most brutal diplomatic note I have ever seen")²¹⁰ in which the president expressed his concern and dissatisfaction over a unilateral decision for intervention, and reminded the NATO allies pledge not to wage war against each other. He also stated that if a unilateral Turkish intervention to Cyprus brought about a Soviet response, her NATO allies might not protect her:

I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.²¹¹

Johnson then proceeded to remind İnönü of the terms of the 1947 Turkish-US Defense Agreement:

Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. (...) I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

²¹⁰ George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern*, (New York: Norton, 1982).

²¹¹ Quoted in Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 130. The original text of the letter as well as İnönü's reply were printed in the Summer 1966 issue of the *Middle East Journal*, pp. 386-393.

States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.²¹²

The letter concluded with the warning that unless Turkey abandoned her plan for intervention, the president would call for emergency meetings of the NATO Council and of the UNSC, and called upon İnönü to come to Washington for talks with President Johnson in conjunction with the Greek Prime Minister. From the memoir of Andreas Papandreou, who was present with his father during the latter's meeting with George Ball, one concludes that Ball had already informed the Greek Prime Minister of İnönü's positive reply to a summit meeting²¹³. In Ball's memoir, however, there is no indication of a response from İnönü before he arrived in Ankara on 11 June.²¹⁴

The formal reply to the Johnson Letter by İnönü came on 14 June, where he stated: "We have, upon your request, postponed our decision to exercise our right of unilateral action in Cyprus"²¹⁵. The prime minister proceeded to object to the reasoning behind Johnson's warning about possible inaction on the part of NATO in case of a Soviet attack:

If NATO members should start discussing the right or wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist this member should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning.²¹⁶

In his volume on Turkish-American military relations, Admiral (Ret.) Sezai Orkunt describes the effect of the Johnson Letter as follows:

²¹² Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 130.

²¹³ Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint*, p. 135.

²¹⁴ George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern*.

²¹⁵ Quoted in Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 131.

²¹⁶ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 131.

In our age, wars, especially those initiated by the countries of the free world, are not the product of a one man's will. In Turkey too, the decision to go to war depends on the will of the TGNA. This will can only materialize through the weight of national conscience. In such circumstances, if you tell the nation "You cannot use the weapons you took from me, even if you are right in your cause", then the solid blocks of friendship would collapse as if they were shaken by a powerful earthquake. Treaties lose their meaning and effect, and no one worries about their demise.²¹⁷

The effects of the Johnson letter did not, however, immediately live up to George Ball's depiction –"the diplomatic equivalent of an atomic bomb"²¹⁸. According to Ball's memoir, during his visit to Ankara on 11 June, İnönü took him aside for a private conversation:

After the meeting, İnönü took me aside to say that President Johnson's letter had, as he saw it, included "all the juridical thunderbolts that could be assembled. As a result, of course, he committed some errors and said some unjust things. Our foreign office will have to answer the thunderbolts." I interpreted this as reflecting İnönü's desire to warn us not to take their counter-reaction so seriously as to prejudice longer-term relations. We had unquestionably said harsh things to the Turkish government; as a matter of self-respect, they would have to say harsh things back. But we should not let that interfere with the friendship essential to both of us.²¹⁹

By 23 June, İnönü was in Washington for talks with President Johnson on the Cyprus issue. The Greek Prime Minister Papandreou arrived a day later. In line with his pledge to Papandreou, Johnson met with the two leaders separately. In the declaration after İnönü-Johnson meeting, the US accepted the validity of the London-Zurich accords, which constituted the basis of the Turkish thesis. The reason for the American support seems to be the staunch Greek refusal to accept a Greco-Turkish summit in Camp David. In his memoir, Andreas Papandreou describes the pressure on his father by President Lyndon Johnson and other members of the administration:

²¹⁷ Sezai Orkunt, *Türkiye-ABD Askeri İlişkileri*, p.30. For a longer evaluation of the Johnson Letter along these lines, see pp.98-100.

²¹⁸ George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern*.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*

The next evening, we had a dinner at the Greek Ambassador's home. McNamara was sitting between my father and myself. At some point he told my father that the Turks had a powerful Air Force and, if a confrontation were to take place between the two countries, the Turkish planes would literally burn up the Greek countryside. Papandreou was fast on his feet: 'We thank you, Mr. Secretary, for having given Turkey such a powerful Air Force. Allow me to remind you, however, that Turkey neighbors on a country that has a much more powerful Air Force. It is more than likely that this Air Force would be drawn into the conflict were the Turks to attack.'²²⁰

The parties agreed to start talks on the Cyprus issue in Geneva, but despite severe US pressure on the Greek government throughout the summer, Papandreou did not swerve from the line he had committed to with Makarios back in April. This frustrated the Americans who repeatedly warned that there would not be another 'Johnson Letter' to stop Turkish military action.²²¹

On 7 August, Turkish jets bombed Greek Cypriot targets. There was little the Greek government could do to help Makarios, since the Greek Air Force bases were too far away to offer any meaningful air support to the Greek Cypriot National Guard. Meanwhile, Dean Acheson had set up shop in Geneva with Turkish and Greek representatives and forged a plan. The first Acheson plan was presented to the parties on 14 July. It envisaged the union of Cyprus with Greece; a joint military command for Turkey and Greece; a large sovereign Turkish military base in Karpaz; cession of the island of Meis to Turkey; compensation for those Turkish Cypriots who wished to emigrate to Turkey; and cantonization of Cyprus to accommodate minority rights for the Turkish Cypriots²²². The offer was in essence accepted by Turkey. The Greek side had objected to parts of it, but on 12 August, the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios rejected the entire proposal. Acheson continued to negotiate with the representatives and produced a second plan by 20 August. The second version modified some aspects of the

²²⁰ Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint*, p. 137.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-139.

²²² *Ibid.*, also see Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 75; Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 117.

first in favor of the Greek and Greek Cypriot parties and met with Turkish refusal. At one point during the talks on the 26 August, Dean Acheson took aside the Turkish representatives Nihat Erim and General Turgut Sunalp and suggested that if Turkey were to invade the Karpaz area right now, the US would not object, and the whole matter would be settled with a *fait a complis* that involved little bloodshed. Upon receiving this suggestion, İnönü replied that one could not go to war based on an off-the-record suggestion. Thus, by the end of August, the Geneva talks were cancelled without a solution.²²³

The collapse of the Geneva talks did not break the precarious peace that had settled in after the deployment of UNFICYP and the Turkish air strikes at the beginning of August. Because he categorically refused the permanent settlement offers, Makarios was increasingly isolated. Domestically, he was engaged in a power struggle with the commander of the National Guard and the hero of EOKA, General Grivas. Internationally, his role as a leader of the non-aligned movement estranged the US and Europe. The Greek government found it difficult to support his line after the Turkish air strikes made it evident that the US was indeed serious about not stopping Turkey for a second time. In Greece, one of first the casualties of pro-Makarios policies was none other than Andreas Papandreou, who had to resign from his fathers cabinet so that the Greek government could mend fences with the US²²⁴. Thus, Makarios dared not proceed with the complete elimination of the Turkish Cypriots and an uneasy lull in the conflict continued until 1967.

In Turkey, Prime Minister İnönü followed a balanced approach towards the failure of the Geneva talks and the Acheson plans. On the one hand, he expressed his frustration with the Johnson Letter and the US attitude by declaring to his cabinet: “Our friends and our enemies

²²³ Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, pp. 75-76.

²²⁴ Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint*, pp. 140-141.

have joined hands against us”²²⁵. On the other hand, he appreciated the situation of the Johnson administration and the necessity to maintain the alliance. There was severe public criticism about the US role in the Cyprus crisis and widespread demonstrations against the US, but the İnönü government was determined to repair the damage in the bilateral relations. The police halted the demonstrators who threw rocks at the American Embassy, and in September, İnönü reaffirmed his governments’ determination to preserve the NATO ties²²⁶.

Changing NATO Strategy and Turkey: 1962-1970

With Soviet Union approaching nuclear parity by the beginning of 1960s, the incoming Kennedy administration had ordered the seasoned statesman Dean Acheson to review the NATO organization. As a result of Acheson’s review,

A flagging institution was revealed, with low morale and little direction. Acheson saw cracks in the European defence structure, with an over-reliance on nuclear weapons. His report became influential in the move towards the doctrine of flexible response, as espoused by Kennedy's Defence Secretary Robert McNamara. Flexible response required an expansion of European conventional forces to delay nuclear conflict until the last possible moment, a significant shift away from the Eisenhower strategy of massive retaliation.²²⁷

In the May 1961 NATO Summit, the alliance accepted the US sponsored “flexible response” strategy²²⁸. The new strategy had a formidable obstacle in the person of Charles de

²²⁵ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 132.

²²⁶ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 120.

²²⁷ Priest, Andrew. “The Failure of Alliance Politics: The United States, Europe and the NATO Multilateral Force.” *49th Parallel*. Available [online]: <http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue1/priest.htm> [30 June 2007].

²²⁸ Some argue that it was not the Kennedy, but the Eisenhower administration that initiated the passage to flexible response without naming it so from 1957 onwards. For a critical evaluation, see Gavin, Francis J. *The Myth of Flexible Response: American Strategy in Europe During the 1960s*. Available [online]: <http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/faculty/gavin/articles/mofr.pdf> [11 May 07].

Gaule, who sought to gradually withdraw France from her commitment to the integrated NATO command. Indeed, the Defense Planning Committee could only give final approval to Flexible Response Strategy after the French withdrawal in 1967.²²⁹

From the beginning Turkey supported the American initiative, but had her reservations about the actual implementation. Flexible response increased the importance of Turkey's large conventional army and enhanced its prospects of receiving greater military aid, but decreased her geo-strategic significance as a staging area for nuclear counter-strikes against the Russian heartland –the original reason of US presence in the country. Another question was the alliances' tendency to distinguish between the central front and the wings:

(...) They feared that their allies might not join in a non-nuclear conflict that did not appear to threaten more widely shared NATO interests. (...) Yet unable to offer any alternative in its stead, the Turkish leaders saw no option but to go along with the new strategy.²³⁰

This impasse led Turkey to pursue a double-track policy: on the one hand, Turkey tried to take greater part in the nuclear dimension of the alliance politics. Turkey's participation in the Multilateral Force (MLF), her bid for a seat in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, and her inquiries to acquire nuclear mines are related to this first track. On the other hand, Turkey also tried to benefit from the new strategy in order to receive greater military aid and modernize her army, claiming that the aid levels were not sufficient to upgrade TAF to NATO standards.

²²⁹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 149.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

The Multilateral Force (MLF) 1961-1965

In accordance with the changing US nuclear strategy, the US had been committing Polaris nuclear submarines as a part of her nuclear deterrent in Europe. The European allies had long been uneasy about the US monopoly over the control of the nuclear deterrent. In 1960, France under Charles de Gaulle sought to achieve her own independent nuclear capability²³¹. Partly in order to forestall this development, in 1961 President Kennedy urged the formation of a multilateral NATO force (MLF) which would consist of nuclear capable ships with mixed crews from all NATO allies who were willing to participate²³². The force “would comprise some 25 destroyers, each armed with six Polaris missiles under the control of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in NATO, and patrol friendly waters of the North Atlantic and Mediterranean area.”²³³ Turkey, along with five other members, responded positively. The main aim for Turkey was to train personnel on a nuclear ship. The modest contribution on her part (\$50 million) suggested that her crew was to serve in a minor role²³⁴. In June 1964, as part of the Mixed-Manning Demonstration (MMD), Turkish personnel started to serve on board the US destroyer *Biddle*, which was soon re-commissioned as USS *Claude V. Ricketts*. Half the crew comprised of Americans, while the other half came from Britain, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Greece, Turkey and the Netherlands²³⁵. At the practical level, the MMD was a total success: “By the time the ship conducted exercises with the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean during early 1965, it often operated more efficiently than

²³¹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 151.

²³² Andrew Priest, ““In Common Cause”: The NATO Multilateral Force and the Mixed-Manning Demonstration on the USS *Claude V. Ricketts*, 1964-1965”, *The Journal of Military History* 69, no. 3 (July 2005), pp. 759-790.

²³³ Priest, “The Failure of Alliance Politics”.

²³⁴ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 691.

²³⁵ Priest, ““In Common Cause”, p. 761.

other ships in its task group”²³⁶. At political level, however, the European allies did not favor the MLF, which would have significant economic and political cost without a promise of control over the nuclear deterrent:

The US would not allow the placing of nuclear warheads on jointly controlled ships without an American veto and the MLF advocates were being somewhat idealistic if they believed the Europeans would accept a half-baked promise to gain control sometime in the future. To the pro-MLF lobby an American veto appeared to go against the overriding purpose of the force, yet it was difficult to imagine that a deterrent could have all participants with a finger on the trigger or any one member able to veto an attack.²³⁷

By the end of 1964, President Johnson had already issued a National Security Council memorandum to slow down the MLF process. Though a small group in the State Department defended it with zeal, MLF had no support within the US administration or the US Congress. Seeing the staunch French opposition, the other European allies started to turn away from it as well. Turkey, along with Belgium, withdrew from the MMD exercise onboard the USS *Claude V. Ricketts* by January 1965, noting that other NATO members were not taking part. The main reasons of the Turkish decision were attributed to financial costs, but also to the negative impact of the Johnson Letter²³⁸. In any case, by the end of 1965, MLF was completely off the agenda.

The Nuclear Planning Group and Nuclear Mines

The atmosphere of the 1960s was charged with the suspicion from the Johnson Letter, which caused the Turkish government to question the basic nature and validity of the alliance. This

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

²³⁷ Priest, “The Failure of Alliance Politics”.

²³⁸ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 151; Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 691; Priest, “The Failure of Alliance Politics”; Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 220.

only served to increase Turkey's uneasiness about the kind of help she would receive in case of a localized Soviet attack. In 1967, Admiral (ret.) Sezai Orkunt, who had been assigned to NATO Standing Group from 1958 to 1964, wrote: "In the event of an aggression against the wings, NATO will do nothing except to take some diplomatic moves... or send a small force to show its solidarity."²³⁹

The 'small force' Admiral Orkunt was talking about was the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force under the NATO European Command that was to consist of light infantry elements ready to deploy in any threatened area in short notice:

Originally conceived as a means to plug gaps in the NATO central region "Shield" forces with portable tactical nuclear weapons, ACE Mobile Force evolved into a signaling device intended to forestall an escalatory situation with Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces on the northern and southern flanks of NATO.²⁴⁰

Rather than being a deterrent in itself, this force could either serve as a trip-wire to involve the other NATO members in the conflict -as Harris describes it-²⁴¹, or as a "show of solidarity" as Orkunt puts it in somewhat cynical fashion.

To gain greater say on the alliance nuclear strategy, the Turkish General Staff insisted that Turkey be given one of the rotating seats in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group established in December 1966. As soon as this wish was granted, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil declared that Turkey needed "passive nuclear devices". He was referring to nuclear mines -Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM) to be used in the

²³⁹ Sezai Orkunt, *Cumhuriyet*, 30 October 1967. Quoted in Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 121, footnote 10.

²⁴⁰ Sean M. Maloney, "Fire Brigade or Tocsin? NATO's ACE Mobile Force, Flexible Response and the Cold War," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 27, no. 4 (December 2004), pp. 585-613, p. 585.

²⁴¹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 150.

sparsely populated mountain areas in Eastern Turkey²⁴². The drive behind this request is summed up by Harris as follows:

The Turkish military planners evidently hoped that the United States might be willing to relax the system of dual control imposed on the use of all nuclear weapons committed to the alliance because the munitions in question could be used only on Turkish territory, hence could have no offensive capability. Undoubtedly the Turkish General Staff regarded nuclear mines as a last resort against the contingency that the NATO alliance for any reason should fail to commit military force to Turkey's defense in the event of a Soviet attack.²⁴³

In April 1967, the US asked the Turkish General Staff to come up with a detailed plan on the deployment of ADMs. A closer scrutiny of the issue, however, revealed legal and logistical difficulties: the US law did not distinguish between nuclear devices of offensive or defensive purpose, and as such, it would be impossible for the US to surrender the effective control of the devices²⁴⁴. Logistically, in the event of their actual use, the mines required "the evacuation of 3 to 3.5 million people and 10 to 15 million domestic animals"²⁴⁵. By May 1969, Turkey publicly declared that she had withdrawn her request. Like MLF, the episode about the nuclear mines did not bring Turkey closer to her goal of greater control over the nuclear deterrent. On the conventional front, however, she was to achieve greater success.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 152; Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, pp. 121-122.

²⁴³ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 152.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

²⁴⁵ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 122.

Military Aid 1965-1970

By the 1960s, Turkey was maintaining the third largest army in NATO in terms of numbers, and spent an average of 20% of her budget for military expenditure²⁴⁶. With the new NATO strategy, Turkish military modernization gained new urgency since the nuclear deterrent was no longer readily available in the event of a Soviet attack. This could only be achieved through increased mobility, especially in armored units.

In 1965, the Turkish Chief of General Staff Cemal Tural had explained that this required the arrival of M-48 “Patton” tanks and M-113 armored personnel carriers²⁴⁷. According to SIPRI Arms Registers records, Turkey had received 140 M-48’s and 584 M-113’s from the US in 1961-1964. Curiously, the record does not indicate any further deliveries of M-48’s and M-113’s in 1965-1968²⁴⁸. When one looks at the military aid level in terms of money, there was no significant drop in the same period.

From 1964 onwards, the US increasingly offset the lower sums of aid with the transfer of excess defense articles, for which Turkey only paid transportation costs. In 1964-1968, Turkey received \$570 million in military aid and \$58.4 million worth of equipment in the form of excess defense articles²⁴⁹. From 1964 onwards, Germany started to contribute an annual \$15 to 25 million²⁵⁰. These numbers were more or less in line with the pledge made by Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, who had arrived in Ankara on February 1966 to discuss the amount, nature and possible uses of US military aid to Turkey²⁵¹. McNaughton

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 123; Orkunt, *Türkiye-ABD Askeri İlişkileri*, p. 65.

²⁴⁷ Quoted in Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 154, footnote 11.

²⁴⁸ Quoted in Orkunt, *Türkiye-ABD Askeri İlişkileri*, p. 188.

²⁴⁹ See Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, Table 1 US Military Assistance to Turkey, 1948-1971, p. 155.

²⁵⁰ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 124.

²⁵¹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 156.

suggested a military aid package of \$680 million over four years, and urged the Turkish military leaders to give priority to land forces (as stated above, this view was in line with General Cemal Tural's statement of 1965). He promised close naval support by the US Sixth Fleet and US air squadrons to compensate for Turkish navy and air force in the event of crisis.

However, this approach created discomfort in Turkey, since it was believed that the US was building up the Greek Navy and retarding the Turkish one to achieve military balance between her two uneasy allies²⁵². Rather than the amount (an annual average of \$134 million, which was considered less generous compared to past aid level), it was the suggested distribution of the aid that disturbed the Turkish authorities. In the aftermath of the Johnson Letter, Turkey could not rely on the US for the deficiencies in naval or air power in any scenario, let alone one involving Cyprus. Thus, the Turkish military pressed for the attainment of NATO force goals; tried to bargain price reductions to increase the number of units available, and sent the commander of the Navy in September 1966 to Washington to plead his case. In return, the Americans acquiesced to Turkish demands and by 1970 the Turkish military had received not only the new armor for its army, but also the aircraft and four new destroyers.

The arrival of the destroyers was largely the result of American surplus material and the international developments in 1967-1968. In 1964, the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean consisted of four units. By the Six Day War between Arab countries and Israel, it had increased to seventy units. The withdrawal of French forces and the reduction of British presence in the Mediterranean necessitated a major re-organization. Studies were made to increase vigilance in the Mediterranean. As a result, in May 1969, NATO Defense Planning Committee approved the creation of the Naval On-Call force Mediterranean

²⁵² *Ibid.*

(NOCFORMED)²⁵³. Turkey used this opportunity by pointing out that in order to join the On-Call force, she needed a suitable vessel²⁵⁴. Thus, in the fall of 1969, the commander of Turkish Navy made a second visit to Washington and three additional destroyers were conceded to Turkey. The ships were delivered by August 1970. In October that year, US Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird visited Turkey and agreed to provide for new submarines as well. With this addition, the Turkish Navy had met her requirements of modernization by negotiating its way through the McNaughton proposal²⁵⁵. The Turkish military modernization after 1965 was important for two reasons: first, because it took place after the Johnson Letter and in a time of rising anti-Americanism in Turkey (see below). Secondly and more importantly, it took place in a time of rising tensions that had brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war over Cyprus.

Renewed Crisis in Cyprus: 1967

From 1964 to 1967, the Greek government continued to support enosis and sent men and material to beef up the National Guard under Grivas. The Greek position was that the London-Zurich accords were dead, and further negotiations could only be pursued within the framework of *enosis*. In December 1965, the UN General Assembly produced the controversial resolution 2077 that recognized the Greek Cypriot government under Makarios as the legitimate government of the whole island. Archbishop Makarios pursued *enosis*, emboldened by the support of the world community and the apparent military superiority of the National Guard against the lightly armed TMT. He considered the Turkish Cypriots and their leader, Vice-President Fazıl Küçük to be in rebellion against the legitimate government. The Turks

²⁵³ Veltri, *AFSOUTH 1951-2004*.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 159; Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 701.

were locked inside enclaves and deprived of basic necessities, since the Greek Cypriot government controlled the access routes. There were sporadic clashes between the National Guard and TMT. The fragile peace in Cyprus was kept through the vigorous efforts of the UN, US and Britain. While the US government continually warned the Greeks about the impossibility of stopping the Turks for a second time, the Greeks assumed that the US could not afford a war between the two members of NATO and would stop the Turks anyway.²⁵⁶ In April 1967, a military junta took over the government in Greece. This increased the tensions between Archbishop Makarios and General Grivas of the National Guard. While both men wanted *enosis*, Makarios was more concerned about his own political ambitions and took a non-aligned stance in world affairs. Grivas was a man of action and at the age of sixty-nine, he wanted to achieve *enosis* come hell or high water²⁵⁷. It was the reckless and provocative action on the part of the National Guard under Grivas that brought about the November 1967 crisis.

On 15 November, a Greek Cypriot police (CYPOL) patrol reinforced by National Guard units entered the Turkish villages of Boğaziçi and Geçitkale. The area had been tense for months and the UNFICYP representatives had just brokered a deal for the resumption of police patrols by CYPOL. The National Guard provoked TMT into opening fire and used artillery and armored car support to take complete control of the two villages. “By evening, twenty-two Turkish Cypriots were killed, nine wounded, and considerable destruction of Kophinou [Geçitkale] had been accomplished.”²⁵⁸

The Turkish government responded by preparing for a landing, and mobilized the First Army in Thrace to forward positions on the Greek border with artillery and bridge-building equipment. Once more, the Turkish forces started to assemble in the port of Mersin and the

²⁵⁶ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, pp. 14-30; Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 123; Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 257.

²⁵⁷ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, p. 37.

²⁵⁸ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, p. 49.

Turkish Navy sailed for the south. The ominous signs of war between Turkey and Greece were not lost to the US State Department, whose ambassadors in Ankara and Athens were working around the clock to forestall that possibility. By 22 November, President Johnson sent Cyrus Vance (who was known to be his personal trouble-shooter) on a peace mission to Ankara and Athens. When the US ambassador informed the Turkish government of Vance's mission, Vance was already airborne. Though some members of the Turkish government feared that Vance was "Johnson letter in the flesh", the government decided to receive him²⁵⁹. The problem for the Turkish government was that unlike the military junta in Athens, it was a democratically elected government vulnerable to public opinion and factions within the parliament. By that time, there were widespread demonstrations in favor of landing on the island and restoring *status quo ante*. With the Johnson Letter now public knowledge, there was deep-seated mistrust against any US attempt to stop Turkey from using her treaty rights on the island. While Vance was negotiating with the Demirel government in Ankara, there was a student demonstration in the city that resulted in damage to the US information office buildings. Upon the heated protest of the US ambassador Hart, the government took care to avoid further attacks against Americans.²⁶⁰

The shuttle diplomacy by Vance resulted in an agreement (also called the Vance formula) that required both Turkey and Greece to withdraw their forces in Cyprus which were above treaty limits, and the resumption of bilateral talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This was in line with the five point agreement reached by Ambassador Hart and Foreign Minister Çağlayangil before the eruption of 15 November crisis. After heated discussions, the Turkish government agreed –provided the Greek side responded positively in two days.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

²⁶⁰ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, p. 74.

Though the larger public perceived of the Vance formula as another American attempt to steal victory from the Turks, both the Demirel government and the RPP opposition acknowledged Vance's efforts for peace with gratitude²⁶¹. In the end, the 1967 crisis had been resolved with Turkish gain, since the Greek forces that left the island were far more superior in number and firepower. Among the Greek officers who left the island was General Grivas, who had initiated the crisis and had been the most dangerous element within the Greek Cypriot camp. Compared to 1964, Turkey and US had a much better understanding of each other's positions and concerns. Therefore, they were able to engage in more efficient cooperation. The Greco-Turkish agreement on the Vance formula was achieved through this cooperation, which in turn forced Makarios to abandon his strict position. As Hart relates:

[Vance] informed the archbishop flatly that if the agreement were rejected by Cyprus, he estimated the Turks could and would put fifty thousand men ashore on the island within forty-eight hours, along with heavy equipment and complete mastery of the air. As if to emphasize this point, Turkish overflights at low level occurred repeatedly over Makarios's office while Vance was speaking.²⁶²

The biggest difference compared to 1964 was the American recognition that Turkey "could and would" land on the island, and therefore the Turks would be the wrong party for diplomatic pressure to avoid war. Instead of seeing the possibility of Turkish military action as a menace to peace, the US diplomacy used it as a leverage to preserve peace. The 1967 crisis seemed to change the Greek assumption that no matter what, the US would hinder a Turkish military intervention –for a while.

²⁶¹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 124.

²⁶² Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, p. 91.

Problems with Bilateral Treaties and the Conclusion of the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA): 1965-1969

In the political atmosphere of post-Johnson Letter Turkey, there was an increasing demand for the re-negotiation of some aspects of the bilateral treaties with US. Right after the Demirel government came to power in 1965, the RPP joined in the more radical Turkish Labor Party (TLP) in its demand for the revision of the bilateral treaties²⁶³. Some of the grievances arising from these treaties were subject matter of the previous chapter (see above). The main issue was the fact that there were too many verbal commitments, of which even the Turkish General Staff could not find archive information. This largely arose from the American tendency to by-pass bureaucracy through face-to-face dialog. In one such instance in 1964, the head of US aid agency had received the verbal approval of the Head of General Staff for “modifications” in the Pirinçlik Radar Facility in Diyarbakır. When the nature and extent of these modifications were related to the Turkish General Staff, it became apparent that the Americans wished to install an Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar that would be able to track targets over the entire Soviet airspace from the Chinese border to Norway. Obviously, the Soviets would view this as a major provocation, and the political and diplomatic ramifications of erecting the OTH required National Security Council consideration and government approval.²⁶⁴

By 1964,

Fifty-five agreements were concluded relating to the military presence of the United States on Turkish soil. These agreements (...) were known as the bilateral agreements, to distinguish them from the multilateral conventions of NATO. Most of these agreements have never been submitted for approval to the Turkish Parliament or even made public.²⁶⁵

²⁶³ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 160.

²⁶⁴ Orkunt, *Türkiye-ABD Askeri İlişkileri*, pp. 258-259.

²⁶⁵ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 139.

Upon the demand of the Turkish government (which was not so much for a re-negotiation but for the articulation of separate agreements into a single comprehensive document), the parties started negotiations in March 1966. The respective positions of the parties diverged in the following way: The Turkish side wanted to tie the loose ends that arose from verbal understandings and put to record that all American activity should take place within the NATO Pact commitments. They also wished to have prior information and approval authority over a given American activity. Finally, in the immediate aftermath of the Johnson Letter, “the Demirel government desired categorical guarantees that the United States would support Turkey against attack from any quarter for any reason”²⁶⁶. The Americans, on the other hand, did not wish to commit to any blanket guarantee, and wanted to retain as much of their previous privileges as they could. Especially in issues like duty status, which rouse the Turkish public most, they adamantly refused to give up their rights. The American concern was to maintain their forces within a framework of general NATO practices. Thus, the negotiations dragged on for more than three years.

This period witnessed a sharp rise in anti-Americanism in Turkey as student protests against US personnel (especially during the port calls of the US sixth fleet) became commonplace. 1969 was also the twentieth anniversary of the North Atlantic Alliance, and in line with the NATO Treaty, a member had the right to withdraw from it through prior notice. A heated debate ensued about the pros and cons of remaining in the alliance, but resulted in the general opinion that Turkey stood to gain from remaining in NATO. This, however, was conditional upon Turkey’s ability to redress her role within the alliance and a change in the cost-benefit relationship, especially with the US, in Turkey’s favor. It is an irony of history that Ambassador Komer, whose arrival in Ankara created uproar among the left, and whose car was burned by students in Middle East Technical University, was the diplomat to clear the final

²⁶⁶ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 161.

stumbling blocks on the way to the signature of the 1969 DCA²⁶⁷. The agreement recognized Turkish sovereignty over the joint installations and obliged the Americans to duly inform Turkish authorities of any activity they may pursue. The duty status issue remained in the ultimate arbitration of the US, but it was no longer automatic. A separate agreement reached in September 1968 stipulated that the duty status of incriminated US personnel would be sought by the Turkish General Staff from the highest US command in Turkey, and the Turkish General Staff could challenge the duty status decree given by the Americans. But even then, it would be up to the US authorities to deliver American personnel over to Turkish justice²⁶⁸.

The implementation of the consolidated basic agreement, while hardly satisfactory to the anti-American complex, was more acceptable to the moderates and removed the principal reason for the anxiety which grew from the alleged surrender of Turkish sovereignty to the United States.²⁶⁹

Other aspects of grievance, like the black market that arose from the custom-free Army Exchange; the daily nuisances that accompanied the contact of American personnel with Turkish civilians; or the disturbances over protocol between Turkish and American military authorities could not be resolved through a blanket agreement. However, their effect lessened as the US moved its installations and housing to less populated areas or into military compounds and reduced the size of US personnel in Turkey from 24,000 to 16,000 in 1968-1970. The reduction of personnel was part of the global US force re-structuring, but combined with the removal of US offices from central urban areas, it came to be known as “keeping a low profile”²⁷⁰. Another aspect of keeping a low profile was reducing the number of port calls

²⁶⁷ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 163.

²⁶⁸ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, pp. 693-694; Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp. 168-169.

²⁶⁹ Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 141.

²⁷⁰ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 693. Sezai Orkunt remarks that in private, the Turkish General Staff had been kindly urging the Americans to keep a low profile since 1966. Orkunt, *Türkiye-ABD Askeri İlişkileri*, p. 256.

by the Sixth Fleet, whose presence in İstanbul and İzmir met with increasing student protests after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. By 1969, the US authorities decided to reduce the frequency of port calls and chose smaller ports in Southwestern Anatolia for that purpose.²⁷¹

Use of Joint Installations for Non-NATO Purposes

The use of joint installations for non-NATO purposes had been a problem since their inception. The US wanted, and in the course of time had used these installations for transport, intelligence and deployment in Middle East contingencies (like the 1958 Lebanon crisis). Apart from routine NATO activities, operations like the U2 overflights had been conducted from these sites, especially from İncirlik²⁷². These two functions (logistics hub for Middle East operations and staging point for reconnaissance flights) became issues of concern during the 1960s.

In December 1965, an RB-57 reconnaissance plane from İncirlik crashed over international waters of the Black Sea. The Soviets protested these flights as dangerous provocation. As in the case of the U2 incident of May 1960, the US took full responsibility and declared that they had suspended further flights. While after the U2 incident, the Menderes government had allowed the flights to continue, the Demirel government did not allow for the resumption of these flights, despite severe US pressure²⁷³.

The second important crisis was about İncirlik's function as a logistics hub in Middle East operations. During the June 1967 Six Day War between Arabs and Israel, the Turkish

²⁷¹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp. 169-171.

²⁷² Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 227; Orkunt, *Türkiye-ABD Askeri İlişkileri*, p. 253.

²⁷³ Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 228; Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp. 165-166.

government declared that the US could not use İncirlik without prior approval. The opposition pressed for a declaration that Turkey would not give such permission if the US wanted to use İncirlik to support the Israelis, but the government passed on this demand since such a declaration in the absence of a formal request would be awkward. But Turkey did assure Egypt that she would not allow the US to use the installations in Turkey to intervene in the war. As a result, the Americans could only share intelligence gathered through İncirlik with Israel, but could not provide logistical support from İncirlik to their beleaguered ally²⁷⁴. This attitude emerged more clearly during the October 1969 Lebanon disturbances and September 1970 Palestinian commando insurrection in Jordan. In both cases, the Demirel government openly declared that they would not allow Americans the use of the joint installations to intervene in another country's internal affairs²⁷⁵. In both cases, the Turkish response showed sharp contradiction with the attitude of the Menderes government during the 1950s. The denial of joint installations for non-NATO missions aroused US displeasure, but no tangible reprisal in bilateral relations. It also improved Turkey's stance in the Arab world, which had been tarnished by the pro-western policies of the 1950s.

The Opium Problem 1965-1971

Since 1932, Turkey was one of the signatories of the League of Nations convention on the control of production and sale of narcotics. In the post-war era, she became one of the licit producers of opium. The issue of opium production in Turkey made headlines in the 1960s when the US was threatened by rampant drug abuse as a result of the counter-culture movement and the Vietnam War. "The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs came to the

²⁷⁴ Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 228, footnote 74.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*; Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 166.

conclusion that about 80% of the heroin illicitly introduced to the United States was derived from opium diverted from Turkish production”²⁷⁶. For Turkey, opium poppy production was part of the traditional agriculture for thousands of years. There was a large rural interest group of farmers who made their livelihood from poppy production. The government had no stake in eradicating or combating poppy production, since Turkey at the time had no rampant drug abuse problem. Hence, when the US government first introduced the subject on the agenda in 1965, Prime Minister Ürgüplü (leading a transition government) was unwilling to take far-reaching steps of cooperation. The election of the Demirel government in October 1965 raised hopes among the US authorities, since Demirel seemed more flexible on the subject, provided that the US bears the financial cost of banning production²⁷⁷. At the end, the negotiations produced a Turkish adherence to the Single Convention on Narcotics in 1967, and a program of cultivation restrictions: from 1967 to 1971, the number of provinces where poppy cultivation was allowed reduced from twenty-one to four. In return, the US extended a \$3 million loan in 1968 for the costs of alternative crop research and policing the restrictions²⁷⁸.

In January 1969, the US changed her policy with the incoming Nixon administration that was much more zealous about “fighting the drug problem at its source”. The result was increasing pressure on Turkey to ban all poppy cultivation and opium production. Upon becoming president, Nixon wrote a dramatic letter to Prime Minister Demirel which reminded him of the American help to Turkey in the immediate post-war era. Nixon believed that just like Turkey was under threat back then, now the US was threatened by the rampant drug use, and asked for Turkey’s help to mitigate this threat²⁷⁹. Baskın Oran states that while the opium

²⁷⁶ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 701; Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 192.

²⁷⁷ Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 231.

²⁷⁸ Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 231..; Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp. 192-193.

²⁷⁹ Quoted in Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 231.

diverted from the legal production in Turkey was very small compared to the total consumption in the US at the time, there were three reasons for the increasing US pressure on Turkey:

1. The actual supply of opium in the American market was coming from the so-called “golden triangle” in Indo-China, and was produced by the warlords and other irregular forces loyal to the anti-communist cause. They were armed and trained by US special forces and the CIA, and the drug money financed their operations. So, they could not be indicated or combated as the real source of illegal opium in the US.
2. Nixon wanted to appear to pursue a war on drugs course for reasons of political expediency rather than actually fighting the drug problem. Thus, he was after a quick victory to show for by the time he was nominated for re-election.
3. Turkey was a dependent NATO ally and hence more vulnerable to US pressure. US economic and military aid could be used to achieve an opium ban, which would be the quick and tangible result Nixon sought for.²⁸⁰

The Demirel government was in a precarious situation by 1970, since the rising tide of student protests and violence had forced it to narrow down the scope of constitutional freedoms, and the more conservative wing of his Justice Party (JP) had deserted the party. Thus, Demirel needed every vote to remain in power and for re-election. Poppy farmers of western and central Anatolia were a powerful constituency. In April 1970, the US Under-Secretary of State visited Ankara, and the press reported that he came to negotiate a complete poppy ban. In July 1970, Attorney General John Mitchell testified before the House Ways and Means Committee. “In replying to a question by Representative Charles Vanik, Mitchell had given qualified approval to the concept of economic sanctions in order to shut off opium traffic

²⁸⁰ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 702.

from countries including Turkey”²⁸¹. This development, combined with the previous rumors about Richardson’s visit and various reports by US narcotic officials recommending economic sanctions to achieve a poppy ban, resulted in an uproar in Turkey. The Demirel government declared they would not ban opium production, but did further limit cultivation zones in October 1970. On 19 March 1971, it introduced a licensing decree to control poppy cultivation only a week effectively falling from power. This, however, was too little too late for the Americans who pushed ahead for a complete ban. The new government under Nihat Erim was the product of the 12 March 1971 military intervention that had toppled the Demirel government and clamped down on the leftist protestors and violence in the streets. The Erim government was a technocratic tool with little regard or need for popular vote. As such, it negotiated a poppy ban with the US in return for US pledges to bear the financial burden. By June 1971, poppy cultivation was banned in Turkey. The US pledged to provide \$35 million in financial assistance. In the post-military intervention atmosphere, there was little concrete reaction to this decision, but the picture changed in the following year when the US could only provide \$10 million. Approximately 100,000 farms suffered as a result. By 1973, renewed elections brought a coalition government of RPP under Bülent Ecevit and the National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan. Though they represented largely incompatible ideological creeds, both leaders came with anti-American credentials. In January 1974, the government declared they would lift the opium ban. In response, a number of sanctions were proposed by the US Congress, and the US State Department ordered the US ambassador to “return for consultations”. Undeterred, the Turkish government lifted the poppy cultivation ban on 1 July. While the tensions ran high between the two countries, there was also cooperation: Turkey resorted to US and UN for support in stricter licensing procedures, and the US Drug

²⁸¹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp. 194.

Enforcement Agency (DEA) verified the Turkish licensing controls as satisfactory²⁸². Under the new deal, the US companies bought 80% of the opium produced by the licensed Turkish factories²⁸³. This scheme created a fierce reaction in the US Congress, which sought to impose economic sanctions on Turkey. The suggested sanctions included canceling economic and military aid and an embargo. This proposal, however, was soon overtaken by the events in Cyprus.²⁸⁴

Turkish Landing on Cyprus and the Arms Embargo: 1974-1979

After the 1967 crisis was averted through intensive efforts led by Cyrus Vance, the Americans fulfilled their side of the bargain by encouraging inter-communal talks and paying for 40% of the UNFICYP costs. As mentioned, the US had no obvious sympathy for the cause of either party, but did not approve of the non-aligned stance of Archbishop Makarios. During this period, while the junta in Athens started to develop its relationship with the Americans, the relations between Turkey and US were not in best shape because of the poppy cultivation issue. Domestically, the US was undergoing the turmoil of the post-Watergate and Vietnam era. Thus, the State Department under Kissinger missed most of the signs about an impending coup in Cyprus during June and early July 1974.²⁸⁵

Dimitrios Ioannides, who was the new head of the Junta in Athens, was determined to bring about *enosis* as soon as possible. Fearing the consequences of such a step, in early July 1974 Makarios wrote an open letter to the military dictatorship requesting that all Greek

²⁸² Campany, *Turkey and the United States: the Arms Embargo Period*, p. 26.

²⁸³ Anne Applebaum, "Ending an Opium War," *The Washington Post*, 16 January 2007, p. A19.

²⁸⁴ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, pp. 703-704.

²⁸⁵ Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, pp. 244-245.

officers be removed from the island. Ioannides replied by ordering the overthrow of the Archbishop. On 15 July 1974, the National Guard units led by Colonel Nikos Sampson and officers from mainland Greece moved to oust Archbishop Makarios from power. Their initial target was to eliminate the Makarios supporters in general, and the communist AKEL Party in particular.

The US reaction to the coup was a condemnation of the ensuing violence, but there was no obvious condemnation of the military coup *per se*, or solid support for Makarios as the legitimate President²⁸⁶. Indeed, while Makarios was presumed dead during the first day of the coup, it was the Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) who received word of his escape and announced it to the world.

For Turkey, a Greek military takeover bent on *enosis* was completely unacceptable. The coalition government under Ecevit initiated a diplomatic effort to get the UN, the US and Great Britain into line for a joint intervention on the island based on the guarantor status of Turkey and Britain. On 17 July, Kissinger sent a message to Ecevit and urged a negotiated settlement. In his reply, Ecevit told that he would seek the cooperation of Britain in accordance with article four of the Treaty of Guarantee, but would not negotiate with Greece who violated the treaty to begin with. That same day, Ecevit flew to Britain. In a final effort, the US Under-secretary of State Sisco visited Athens and Ankara, but he could not persuade the Greeks of the Turkish determination. Thus, he came to Ankara empty-handed. By the time Ecevit and Sisco were talking, Turkish amphibious landing crafts were on their way to Cyprus.²⁸⁷

The Turkish Armed Forces landed on Cyprus on 20 July. The operation codenamed *Attila* started with airborne and amphibious landings and continued until a ceasefire was introduced on 23 July in line with UNSC Resolution 353. During that time, TAF managed to

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

²⁸⁷ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 743.

secure a sizable beachhead and some of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. That same day, the military junta in Greece and Cyprus collapsed.

With UN and US mediation, the new civilian government in Greece under Karamanlis and the Turkish government resumed negotiations in Geneva on 25 July. Meanwhile, there were sporadic clashes between the Greek Cypriot forces who were trying to entrench around the Turkish beachhead and the TAF who were trying to avoid being pinned down by edging steadily out of it. Two rounds of talks ended without an agreement, and Turkey resumed its offensive (*Attila 2*) on 14 August. By the time a new (and permanent) ceasefire was called, 36% of the island was under the control of the Turkish military. The partition was marked by the United Nations Buffer Zone Cyprus or “green line” running east to west across the island.

For the Americans, the original landing had achieved its purpose and there was no need for Turkey to invade 36% of the island. The US State Department under Kissinger had been understanding towards the Turkish side, and the new President Gerald Ford, who was sworn in during the crisis (9 August), maintained that it was the Greek actions that resulted in the crisis²⁸⁸. As they continued to fight the US Congress that had been trying to introduce sanctions against Turkey, the administration was deeply troubled with what amounted to the collapse of NATO’s southern wing. Shortly after the second Turkish operation, Greece withdrew from the integrated NATO command:

Almost immediately, many of the 240 Greek liaison officers stationed at NATO installations throughout Europe packed their bags and started home. Greece's 35,000-man Third Army pulled back from its NATO-assigned position at Greece's Macedonian frontier with Bulgaria (a Warsaw Pact member) and headed eastward to Thrace and the Turkish border.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁸ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 248.

²⁸⁹ “A Gap in NATO’s Southern Flank”, *Time*, 26 August 1974.

In addition to withdrawing from NATO integrated command, Greece placed the US bases in the country under Greek command, terminated the home-porting rights of the Sixth Fleet and denied the use of the Eleusis Naval Base.²⁹⁰

Thus, at that precarious moment, the priority of the Ford administration was to pick up the pieces of the alliance's southern flank. This required a balancing act: on the one hand, they could not further annoy Greece. On the other hand, they could not succumb to Congress demand for an embargo against Turkey, which would weaken the only force left in NATO's southern flank.²⁹¹

Sanctions against Turkey were already on the Congress agenda because of the opium ban issue. Now, there was the violation of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Mutual Defense Pact of 1959, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. All these violations stemmed from the fact that Turkey had used US weapons and equipment during the operations in Cyprus. From September to December 1974, there was a battle between the Congress who wished to impose an arms embargo on Turkey and the Ford Administration who tried to delay it. In the end, on 18 December 1974, the administration yielded and the president signed Public Law (PL) 93-559, "which suspended all US military aid to Turkey, effective 5 February 1975"²⁹². This included the foreign military sales (FMS) and military assistance programs (MAP). The lifting of the embargo was dependent upon the presidents' conclusion that Turkey had made progress in the solution of the Cyprus problem.²⁹³

²⁹⁰ Fotuos Moustakis, *The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 41.

²⁹¹ For a detailed account, see Richard Haass, "Managing NATO's Weakest Flank: The United States, Greece and Turkey," *ORBIS* (Fall 1986), pp. 457-473.

²⁹² Company, *Turkey and the United States: the Arms Embargo Period*, p. 56.

²⁹³ For the details of the Ford Administrations' battle with the Congress, see Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, pp. 258-261.

When the embargo ensued in February 1975, Turkey threatened, and then went ahead with closing several joint installations and restricting all US activity except those within the scope of NATO. For the Ford administration, this was a complete failure of policy initiated by the Congress. The embargo served no purpose but pleasing the Greek lobby in the US, since it did not facilitate a Greek return to integrated command, or obliged Turkey to withdraw from Cyprus. On the contrary, by 13 February 1975, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was declared. By the 26 February, Turkey announced her withdrawal from NATO winter maneuvers²⁹⁴. Worse was about to come:

On 17 June the Turkish government issued a formal note to the US government that unless aid was resumed in 30 days, the status of US forces in Turkey would be changed. (...) On 24 July the House [of Representatives] rejected Senate Resolution S.846, which would have lifted the embargo. The next day the Turkish government suspended US military activities in Turkey except those at purely NATO facilities, and placed US personnel and bases under “provisional” status.²⁹⁵

Thus, Turkey unilaterally abolished the 1969 DCA effective 26 July. All joint installations passed to Turkish command. The US personnel lost their privileges, including exchange and post services. They were subject to Turkish law and could not travel freely between different sites. The activities of US aircraft were restricted. An invaluable intelligence gathering operation that had been going on since the inception of the listening posts along the Black Sea coast was suspended.²⁹⁶

The Turkish decision to suspend US activities cost the US dearly. As the former NATO Supreme Commander, General Lyman Lemnitzer puts it:

²⁹⁴ Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 262.

²⁹⁵ Campany, *Turkey and the United States: the Arms Embargo Period*, p. 56.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 57; Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 707.

There is *no area in the world* comparable to Turkey as a vital base of intelligence gathering operations against the Warsaw Pact... This *serious loss of vital US intelligence* for more than three years is *extremely damaging to American and NATO interests* because these bases when fully operational are capable of providing valuable and *irreplaceable intelligence coverage for which there is no substitute.*²⁹⁷

Lemnitzer's repeated emphasis on the gravity of the damage and the irreplaceable nature of the Turkish facilities shows the level of US concern over this development. The Turkish government, however, remained adamant.

The 1974 Turkish landing on Cyprus and the subsequent enlargement of the Turkish zone had created three problems for the Turkish-US relations and NATO alliance:

1. The Greek forces had withdrawn from the NATO integrated command;
2. The US embargo on Turkey came in a time when the number of Soviet naval units in the Mediterranean had peaked close to one hundred and maintenance of allied deterrence in the southern wing fell completely on Turkey²⁹⁸; and
3. The Turkish restriction of US activities severely limited intelligence gathering and other operations.

All three problems were linked to the resolution of the Cyprus question, which, despite the resumption of inter-communal talks, was not within sight. The roles had changed on the island: now, the Greek Cypriots wanted a return to the 1960 communal system with extensive rights for what they termed the Turkish minority, while the Turks wanted *de jure* partition of the island with a very weak federal government - "like a veil" as Necmettin Erbakan had put it.²⁹⁹

Eventually, the US administration succeeded in relating the hardships caused by the Turkish restrictions to the Congress. In October 1975, commercial sales to Turkey were

²⁹⁷ Quoted in Company, *Turkey and the United States: the Arms Embargo Period*, p. 57. Italics added.

²⁹⁸ Veltri, *AFSOUTH 1951-2004*.

²⁹⁹ Company, *Turkey and the United States: the Arms Embargo Period*, p. 61; Mehmet Ali Birand, *Diyet* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları), 1985, p. 78.

resumed through PL 94-104. FMS and MAP credits were still banned. Shortly afterwards, Turkey and US started the negotiations of a new Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA), which would replace the now defunct DCA of 1969. The negotiations were concluded by early 1976, and the DECA was signed by Kissinger and Çağlayangil on 26 March. The new agreement confirmed the Turkish authority over the joint installations and confined their activities within the NATO framework (articles two and three). Article four allowed the US application of necessary defensive measures in the intelligence gathering posts, but reiterated the Turkish authority over these facilities. Unlike the DCA of 1969, which was more general in terms, the 1976 DECA stated specific figures for US aid to Turkey. In article nineteen, it stated that the US was to provide Turkey with \$1 billion in military aid over the next four years³⁰⁰. This last issue raised problems, both with Greece who was simultaneously negotiating her own DECA with the Americans, and with the US Congress. When the aid figures for Turkey were revealed, the Greek government withdrew from the negotiations, because the aid offered to Greece was around \$200 million. The Greek condition for the resumption of negotiations was the attainment of a 7/10 ratio in aid to Greece and Turkey, respectively. The Ford administration acceded, and the US-Greek DECA was signed in 1977. But the Congress felt that the administration was trampling their authority by guaranteeing aid levels beyond the annual budget (which has to be approved by the Congress). Thus, the Congress rejected both Turkish and Greek DECAs in 1977. However, there were signs of willingness to lift the embargo: in August 1977, PL 95-92 was approved by the Congress, which allowed \$175 million in FMS to Turkey for the fiscal year 1978. This left only the MAP transfers³⁰¹. The International Security Assistance Act of 1978 “repealed the prohibitions on MAP aid to Turkey and allocated educational FMS and MAP assistance”. The PL 95-384

³⁰⁰ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 708-709; Campany *Turkey and the United States: the Arms Embargo Period*, p. 63.

³⁰¹ Campany, *loc. cit.*

Removes the embargo on arms shipments to Turkey upon the President's certification to Congress that: (1) it is in the interest of the United States and of NATO to resume full military cooperation with Turkey; and (2) the Government of Turkey is acting in good faith to achieve a just and peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem, the early peaceable return of refugees to their homes and properties, continued removal of Turkish military troops from Cyprus, and the early serious resumption of international talks aimed at a just, negotiated settlement.³⁰²

Though the Congress recognized the necessity of Turkey's cooperation for US and NATO interest, it retained the basic link between the resolution of Cyprus question and the continuation of military aid to Turkey. In October 1978, despite the absence of a formally approved DECA, Turkey agreed to change the provisional status of US forces³⁰³. Negotiations on a new DECA resumed in the winter of 1979. There were two major disagreements:

1. The Turkish side wanted the agreement to include: i) a pledge that extends beyond one year, and ii) a detailed list of the equipment to be delivered. The US side objected that the Congress would not approve any pledge beyond the fiscal year, and pointed out that changing circumstances might change the nature and amount of equipment to be delivered. A compromise solution was found to both problems where the US administration pledged "to do their utmost" in attaining the necessary aid levels to Turkey, and experts from both sides would agree on the aid content before the signature of the agreement.

2. The American side wanted to use the installations for out-of-area missions, i.e. beyond NATO framework. This request, came as it did in the heels of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and during the on-going hostage crisis (see below), clearly reflected the American desire to use Turkish facilities for Middle Eastern contingencies. Turkey flatly rejected any such notion. In

³⁰² *A bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act, and for other purposes.* US Congress Library. available [online]: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d095:SN03075:@@@D&summ2=m&> [12 July 2007].

³⁰³ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 710; *Campany Turkey and the United States: the Arms Embargo Period*, p. 63.

the end, the Americans had to drop this demand for the time-being³⁰⁴. The Agreement was signed on 29 March 1980, but could not be ratified in the TGNA. It was only after the 12 September military coup, in November 1980, that the cabinet of the military regime decreed it into law.³⁰⁵

The Middle East Re-visited: The Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Hostage Crisis

The Shah regime in Iran had been a steadfast American ally and a member of CENTO. Internal upheavals throughout 1978 forced the Shah to flee into exile in January 1979. The revolutionary forces were a coalition of the Islamists under Khomeini, the urban middle class and the socialist *Mujahedden Halq*. The forces of Ayetollah Khomeini, who had returned from exile in Paris on 1 February 1979, swept the country within a matter of days. By 11 February, the Islamists had overwhelmed the military units loyal to Shah. A new constitution was carried by popular vote on 11 March, which declared Iran an Islamic Republic. For the rest of the year, a battle for power ensued between the provisional government under Mehdi Bazargan, who represented the more secular-minded urban middle class and Khomeini, who had appointed Bazargan in the first place but now wished to lead the revolution in a radically Islamic new direction.

Throughout this period, the US tried to establish relations with the new regime and find a new *modus vivendi*, but the fatal mistake of the Carter administration came with an apparently humanitarian gesture. On 22 October, the dethroned Shah Reza Pahlavi was accepted to the US for cancer treatment. This caused uproar among the revolutionaries in Tehran, who suspected the Americans were working on a counter-coup pretty much in the lines

³⁰⁴ Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 279.

³⁰⁵ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 712. For the full text of the 1980 DECA, see Company, *Turkey and the United States: the Arms Embargo Period*, Appendix 4.

of their operation against the Mossadegh government in 1953. As a result, a group of students loyal to Khomeini stormed the US embassy in Tehran on 4 November and took the Americans inside hostage. They demanded the US to turn the Shah over to the revolutionary government in Iran, apologize for its interference in the internal affairs of Iran and for the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh, and that Iran's frozen assets in the U.S. be released. What was initially planned as a demonstration for a few hours turned into a stand-off that lasted for 444 days.

The initial Turkish response to the revolution was not hostile: at the beginning of February 1979, the US had sent helicopters with Marine units to Incirlik for any eventuality. The Turkish government allowed the landing of the helicopters, but did not allow the Marines to deploy³⁰⁶. Turkey recognized the new government in Iran on 13 February, only two days after its inception. By March, Iran had withdrawn from CENTO, but even so, in June, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Gündüz Ökçün visited Iran³⁰⁷. Just like the US, Turkey too was probing to see where the new regime was headed, and if a *modus vivendi* could be found. For the US, however, the hostage crisis changed all that.

The American government denounced the hostage taking of US diplomats and citizens in an embassy building as outrageous, but did not show a military response. As the negotiations between the parties dragged on through early 1980, the Carter administration called upon all friendly governments to join in sanctions against Iran. Turkey had already condemned the hostage taking of diplomats as inhuman, but refused to join in sanctions. On 17 April, the US banned oil imports from Iran and suspended travel of US citizens to this country. The US ambassador in Ankara, James W. Spain related the administrations wish for Turkey to follow suit. But Turkey refused to implement similar measures, and left her embassy in Tehran

³⁰⁶ Campany, *Turkey and the United States: the Arms Embargo Period*, p. 59.

³⁰⁷ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 1, p. 805-806.

open³⁰⁸. In June, Turkey rebuffed repeated American requests to use the İncirlik base for a rescue mission. The rescue attempt (Operation Eagle Claw) was conducted by helicopters and airplanes from the Gulf, and ended in disaster. The hostages were released on January 1981, the day the new Reagan administration was sworn in. Throughout this period, the Turkish refusal to join in sanctions or offer the use of İncirlik attracted heavy criticism from the US, but Turkey maintained her course.

The Series of Cooperation in 1960-1980 Period

Within the framework of this study, the most interesting part of the 1960-1980 period is the effect of the change in sub-unit (domestic), ideational and structural variables on the pattern of cooperation. There are two distinct questions: i) How will the changing patterns reflect on the cooperation series in terms of relative and absolute gains in general; and ii) Will they correlate with the institutional effect? If all series (both bilateral and institutional) will shift from their original positions in the 1945-1960 period, one can conclude that the institutions are not independent variables, but are correlated with structural, ideational or domestic ones. If the bilateral series shift, but institutional ones do not, one can conclude that the neo-institutionalist claim for the independence of the institutional effect holds. If there is no visible shift in either the bilateral or the institutional series, then one can question: i) the methodology of this study; ii) the whole literature that claims the 1960s and 1970s were different decades in Turkish-American relations.

There are eleven series of cooperation in this period:

1. 27 May 1960 Military Coup

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 714-715.

2. October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
3. Cyprus Problem and the Johnson Letter of 1964
4. Changing NATO Strategy and Control of Nuclear Weapons
5. US Military Aid to Turkey
6. Renewed Crisis in Cyprus 1967
7. Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) of 1969
8. Use of Joint Installations for Non-NATO Purposes
9. The Opium Problem
10. The Turkish Landing on Cyprus and US Arms Embargo 1974-1979
11. The Middle East Re-visited: The Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Hostage Crisis

Of these series, the changing NATO strategy and its reflection on Turkish-American relations involve issues like MLF, Nuclear Planning Group and nuclear mines that were deliberated within NATO framework and thus can be readily identified as institutional. There is another series which involved NATO in similar fashion: the October 1962 missile crisis, because it involved the overall NATO strategy and nuclear weapons placed on Turkish soil for NATO purposes. Thus, there are two institutional and nine bilateral series in this period. The relative and absolute gains calculations and their graphic representations of these twelve series will be presented below.

27 May 1960 Military Coup (Series MC)

The Turkish Military staged a coup against the increasingly oppressive and unpopular Menderes government on 27 May 1960. The DP leadership was detained; President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, Minister of Finance Polatkan and Minister of Foreign Affairs Zorlu were subsequently put to trial. While Menderes, Polatkan and Zorlu were

found guilty for high treason and executed, the sentence of Bayar was commuted.

Throughout the military rule (1960-1962), the general foreign policy course of Turkey remained intact. The US, while emphasizing the necessity to return to civilian rule as soon as possible, conducted business as usual with the military regime.


1. On 27 May 1960, the military took control of the government. In a radio address that morning, the coup leadership (CNU) declared their commitment to NATO and CENTO alliances.
2. The US government recognized the new regime three days later.
3. In line with the US expectations, the junta paid no heed to the suggestions of its more radical elements for a more non-aligned foreign policy and continued along a pro-western foreign policy course. It also returned power to civilian rule within a reasonable framework of time.
4. The US helped the military regime with the re-structuring of her officer corps and provided funds for the retirement of some 4,000 officers. The US aid to Turkey increased from \$188 million in 1962 to \$237 million in 1963.
5. The military regime raised the issue of modifying the bilateral agreements, but the US objected to the suggested modifications, especially about the status of forces.
6. The military regime executed Menderes, Polatkan and Zorlu, despite expressed US displeasure.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (MC) can be depicted as follows:

Table 12 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (MC)

Time	US	Turkey
May 1960 commitment and recognition	1	1
1960-1962 return to civilian rule and US financial support	1	1
1961-1962 bilateral agreements re-visited and executions	0	0
Absolute Gains:	2+2=4	
Relative Gains:	0	0

In graphic terms, series (MC) can be depicted as:



Graph 14 Graphic depiction of series (MC)

The May 1960 military coup did not radically alter Turkish-US relations. The cooperation between the parties continued, as reflected in Table 12. Though there were points of disagreement, the quid pro quo between the military regime in Turkey and the US resulted in no relative gain for either party. Hence, while series (MC) is horizontally at the point of origin of Graph 14, the absolute gains from the continuing cooperation is represented by the (4) vertical coordinate.

October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (Series C-T)

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the agreement to deploy Jupiter IRBM missiles on Turkish soil was concluded during the Menderes government, but neither the military regime after May 1960 nor the coalition government under İnönü disagreed with this decision. On the contrary, by early 1961 it was the US government that had second thoughts. Nevertheless, in the absence of a tangible substitute, they went ahead with the deployment. The Soviet Union deployed SS-4 IRBM's to Cuba a few months later, and a nuclear stand-off ensued. While Turkey (along with other NATO allies) declared her full support for the US, she adamantly refused the notion of using the Jupiters as a bargaining chip. Thus, the Americans were forced to do so secretly. After the crisis, the US sped up the deliveries of fighter aircraft to Turkey and deployed a Polaris submarine to the area. In return, Turkey showed no reaction to the quiet dismantlement of the Jupiters.


1. After the military coup, both the CNU and the pursuing İnönü government agreed to honor the Jupiter deployment agreement (1960-1961) despite Soviet protests.
2. The US government, though hesitant, went ahead with the deployment in order to retain the trust and goodwill of Turkey (1961-1962).
3. In October 1962, the US found out that the Soviets were deploying SS-4 IRBM's to Cuba. A crisis ensued in which the only option to avoid a nuclear exchange seemed to be withdrawing the Jupiters from Turkey in return for a Soviet withdrawal of SS-4's from Cuba. Though the Turkish government declared her full support for the US, Turkey refused the notion of using the Jupiters as a bargaining chip. Thus, in order to end the crisis, the US did so in secret.
4. After the crisis, while it became evident that the Jupiters would be withdrawn, the US sped up the deliveries of fighter aircraft to Turkey and deployed a Polaris submarine to the area. In return, Turkey showed no reaction and the Jupiters were quietly withdrawn (1963).

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (C-T) can be depicted as follows:

Table 13 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (C-T)

Time	US	Turkey
1960-1962 Turkey and US honor the Jupiter agreement	1	1
October 1962 Turkey refuses trade, US does it in secret	0	0
1963 The US speeds up fighter deliveries and deploys Polaris, Turkey allows Jupiter withdrawal in silence	1	1
Absolute Gains:	2+2=4	
Relative Gains:	0	0

In graphic terms, series (C-T) can be depicted as:



Graph 15 Graphic depiction of series (C-T)

The withdrawal of the Jupiters was a typical tit for tat: first, Turkey agreed to the risky deployment of Jupiters and afterwards, the US proceeded with that deployment in order to retain Turkish goodwill despite her concerns. Then, when Turkey refused the use of Jupiters as a bargaining chip, the US simply did so in secret. The Turkish goodwill was retained by the delivery of additional conventional equipment and the deployment of a Polaris. The absolute gains from the Turkish-US cooperation during this episode is represented in the (4) vertical

coordinate of series (C-T) while the tit for tat that resulted in no relative gain for either party is represented by the (0) horizontal coordinate.

Cyprus Problem and the Johnson Letter of 1964 (Series Jo)

The Cyprus question became an issue of national importance during the latter half of the 1950s. From the onset, the Turkish concern was to avoid encirclement by Greece and to protect the Turkish Cypriots on the island. The US stake in the issue was two-fold: on the one hand, they did not want Cyprus to be an independent state with non-aligned tendencies. On the other hand, they did not want a Greco-Turkish war on the southern wing of NATO. Thus, throughout the late 1950s, the US acted as a facilitator in the negotiations over the fate of Cyprus. The result was the Zurich and London Accords, which created a bi-communal independent state. Turkey was pleased with this arrangement and signed the treaties as one of the three guarantor powers. Neither Greece nor the Greek Cypriots under Makarios were happy: they wished to reduce the Turkish Cypriots to minority status and achieve *enosis*. The bi-communal structure proved unworkable. In response, President Makarios declared a thirteen point amendment to the Constitution, which would curb the Turkish Cypriot political power. The Turkish Cypriots walked out of the parliament under the leadership of Vice-President Fazıl Küçük, and soon afterwards, violence erupted between the two communities on Christmas 1963. From the onset, the Turkish government was concerned about the course of events and asked the US government to act as a mediator. With the looming elections, however, the Johnson administration did not wish to annoy the powerful Greek lobby in the US, and assumed a neutral stance (which, given the severe imbalance between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, worked for the benefit of the Greek side). Disappointed, Turkey proceeded with the preparations for a military intervention. The US initiated the establishment of a NATO force,

but this offer was rebuffed by Makarios. Thus, the Americans helped with the creation of a UN peace-keeping force, UNFICYP in March 1964. To give the UN force a chance, Turkey reluctantly agreed to postpone military action. When the peace-keepers proved ineffective in stopping the Greek Cypriot attacks to the Turkish enclaves, and the special session of NATO in May 1964 refused to support the Turkish cause, Turkey informed the US of an imminent Turkish intervention on the island at the beginning of June. In response, the US President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a very harsh warning to Prime Minister İnönü on 5 June. The so-called Johnson Letter warned Turkey that if her unilateral action results in Soviet reprisals, her NATO allies may not come to her aid. It also reminded the Turkish government that US weapons could not be used for purposes other than those stipulated in the 1947 Defense Cooperation Treaty. This very undiplomatic warning was softened by an invitation to Washington to meet President Johnson in conjunction with Prime Minister Papandreou of Greece. Though deeply shocked and annoyed, the Turkish government submitted to the American ultimatum and aborted the military operation. By 14 June, İnönü responded to the Johnson Letter and agreed to meet with the President. In the ensuing talks in Washington on 23 June, the Americans stood closer to the Turkish position, largely because they were frustrated with the Greek side. The Americans sent Dean Acheson to Geneva and produced a compromise solution. Though the Turkish side agreed to it, the Greek did not. The Americans repeatedly warned the Greeks that there would not be another Johnson Letter to stop the Turks, but to no avail. At the end, Turkish jets bombed Greek Cypriot targets on 7 August, and the Americans showed no sign of discontent for the use of jets provided through US military aid during this operation. The Geneva talks collapsed, but the precarious peace after the Turkish bombings continued under UN observation.

1. The US mediated the Cyprus talks. Turkey signed the London-Zurich Accords (1959-1960)


2. The Bi-communal structure collapsed, violence ensued as a result of Greek attacks. Turkey asked for US pressure on the Greek side, but the US government took a neutral stand (December 1963-January 1964)
3. Turkey proceeded with the preparations of a military intervention, but delayed that because of US efforts to create a NATO and then a UN peace-keeping force (March-May 1964).
4. In a NATO special session in May, the allies refused to support the Turkish cause. The UN peace-keepers could not stop the violence. Thus, in the beginning of June, Turkey informed the US of imminent Turkish military action. The US President Johnson wrote a very harsh letter to Prime Minister İnönü, in which he warned against a possible Soviet reprisal and reminded him of the provisions of the 1947 Defense Cooperation Treaty. He invited İnönü to Washington for meetings in conjunction with the Greek Prime Minister Papandreou (5 June 1964).
5. The Turkish government aborted the military operation. İnönü agreed to go to Washington (14 June).
6. During the Washington meetings, the US was more supportive of the Turkish position. The legendary US diplomat Dean Acheson mediated talks between the parties in Geneva. Turkey agreed with the first Acheson Plan, but the Greek side rejected it. The Americans repeatedly warned the Greeks that a second Johnson Letter to stop another Turkish military intervention would not be forthcoming (July 1964).
7. On 7 August, Turkish jets bombed Greek Cypriot targets, and the US made no objection to the use of American-supplied weapons during this operation. The Geneva Talks collapsed after the second Acheson Plan –along with a verbal offer to “correct” its unpleasant aspects with a military *fait a complis*- was rejected by the Turks, and an uneasy peace ensued (August 1964).

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (Jo) can be depicted as follows:

Table 14 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (Jo)

Time	US	Turkey
1959-1960 US mediates talks, Turkey signs London-Zurich Accords	1	1
December 1963-March 1964 Violence erupts in Cyprus, Turkey asks for US intervention, US remains neutral, Turkey prepares for military action	0	0
March-June 1964 US mediates the establishment of a UN Peace-keeping force, Turkey delays military action	1	1
June 5-14, 1964 Turkey warns US of imminent military action. US responds with the Johnson Letter. Turkey aborts military action.	2	0
June 23-August 1964 US mediates negotiations and takes a more pro-Turkish stance. Turkey agrees to Acheson Plan	1	1
August 7, 1964 Turkish jets bomb Greek Cypriot targets. US does not object	1	1
August 12-27, 1964 Acheson's second plan accommodates Greek objections to the first. Turkey rejects it	0	0
Absolute Gains:	6+4=10	
Relative Gains:	2	-2

In graphic terms, series (Jo) can be depicted as:



Graph 16 Graphic depiction of series (Jo)

The Johnson Letter is widely regarded as a turning point in Turkish-US relations.

Domestic political concerns, combined with diplomatic miscalculation forced the US

administration to take a soft stance on the Greek side during the crisis. The passive US stance led Turkey to prepare for an intervention, and this could only be stopped with the infamous Johnson Letter. The bilateral relations returned to a series of cooperation only after Turkey yielded to US pressure, abort the landing and accept President Johnson's mediation. In return, the US supported the Turkish position and started to pressure the Greek side. The fact that Turkey had to yield to the Johnson Letter and forgo her treaty right with no tangible benefit is represented with the (-2) horizontal coordinate of series (Jo), while the absolute gains from the ensuing cooperation is represented with the (10) vertical coordinate.

Changing NATO Strategy and Control of Nuclear Weapons (Series Nuke)

In 1960, the incoming Kennedy administration ordered a study of NATO by Dean Acheson, which found out that the alliance was suffering from internal dispute and over-reliance on nuclear weapons. Thus, in May 1961 NATO summit, the alliance embraced the new US strategy called "flexible response". Flexible response envisaged a gradual escalation of conflict. Instead of an all-out nuclear retaliation to any and all Soviet infringements, the new strategy called for proportionate responses starting from purely conventional weapons, going through tactical nuclear devices all the way up to strategic nuclear response. It therefore required a significant expansion of European conventional forces. From the beginning, Turkey supported the American initiative. The Turkish government stood to gain from the increasing emphasis on conventional weapons by getting more military aid, but feared that Turkey would lose her importance as a staging area for nuclear counter-strikes, and that the NATO allies would not come to her aid in case of limited Soviet attack on the southern wing.

Therefore, Turkey pursued a two-fold strategy: on the one hand, she tried to have more access and gain greater control over nuclear weapons. On the other hand, she pressured the US to increase military aid to boost the Turkish conventional strength.


1. In May 1961, NATO Summit accepted flexible response. Turkey supported the decision.
2. In the same year, the US sponsored the establishment of MLF. Turkey, along with some other members, joined the new force. In 1964, a Turkish Navy contingent started to serve in the mixed-man demonstration ship *USS Claude V. Ricketts*.
3. The US administration was not ready to relinquish control of nuclear weapons. In the absence of that, the European allies found the MLF exercise useless. By the end of 1964, President Johnson ordered to slow down the MLF process. Turkey, along with Belgium, noted that since other NATO members were not taking part, withdrew from MLF by January 1965.
4. After the failure of the MLF experiment, Turkey sought other means to gain greater say over allied nuclear strategy. In December 1966, Turkey wanted one of the rotating seats in the newly established nuclear planning group of NATO. This wish was granted.
5. At the same time, the Turkish government declared its interest in gaining “passive nuclear devices”, i.e. nuclear mines. In April 1967, the US asked the Turkish General Staff to come up with a detailed plan. But as it turned out, the US law did not distinguish between passive and active devices, and it was therefore impossible for the US Congress to approve an arrangement where Turkey would unilaterally control the trigger of the nuclear mines. Further study also indicated logistical difficulties arising from the need to evacuate millions of people and livestock. Thus, by May 1969, Turkey withdrew her request.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (Nuke) can be depicted as follows:

Table 15 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (Nuke)

Time	US	Turkey
1960-1962 NATO embraces the US sponsored flexible response, Turkey supports the decision	1	1
1962-1964 US sponsors MLF, Turkey joins in	1	1
1964-1965 US is unwilling to relinquish control over nuclear weapons. Turkey withdraws from MLF	0	0
1966 Turkey gains seat in nuclear planning group	1	1
1967-1969 Turkey and US work on the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons, but US does not wish to give unilateral control. Turkey withdraws her request	0	0
Absolute Gains:	3+3=6	
Relative Gains:	0	0

In graphic terms, series (Nuke) can be depicted as:



Graph 17 Graphic depiction of series (Nuke)

When the US tried to introduce the gradual response strategy for NATO, Turkey cooperated despite her hesitations about the implications of this strategy. To allay these concerns, the Turkish attempts to gain greater control over nuclear weapons was met with initial US approval and cooperation. Ultimately, however, the US could not relinquish control over

nuclear weapons, and cooperation on the deployment of additional nuclear weapons on Turkish soil has to be abandoned. This episode results in no relative gain for either party, as indicated by the (0) horizontal coordinate of series (Nuke). The absolute gains are represented by the (6) vertical coordinate.

US Military Aid to Turkey (Series A)

As stated, flexible response strategy placed new emphasis on conventional forces. By 1964, Turkey maintained the third largest army in NATO and spent some 20% of her budget for defense. The American officials deemed increased mobility of land units, especially armored divisions essential for the modernization of the TAF.

1. Thus, when in February 1966, US Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton came to Ankara, he proposed a four year military aid package of \$680 million. The US suggested that this aid be used primarily for the modernization of land forces, and that the US sixth fleet would provide air cover and naval support in the event of war. Turkey, however, was concerned about retarding Turkish naval and aerial capabilities, since in case of a conflict with Greece over Cyprus, one could hardly expect the sixth fleet to support the Turkish war effort. Thus, The Turkish general staff pressed ahead with an agenda to lower the price of individual articles in the aid package to make more room for air force, and the Commander of Turkish Navy went to Washington in September 1966 to plead his case.

2. In the meantime, the international developments favored Turkish position: After the 1967 Six Day war between Israel and Arabs, the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean had increased significantly. Therefore, in May 1969, NATO Defense Planning Group approved the establishment of the Naval On-call Force Mediterranean (NOCFORMED).

3. Turkey indicated that in order to join this force, she needed a suitable vessel.


4. Thus, in the fall of 1969, the Turkish Navy Commander made a second visit to Washington and three additional ships were conceded to Turkey. By August 1970, Turkey had received four new destroyers in four years, and in October that year, U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird visited Turkey and agreed to provide new submarines for the Black Sea Fleet as well. By 1971, Turkey had negotiated her way through the McNaughton proposal and received not only the \$680 million aid to modernize her land forces, but also the necessary articles to modernize her air force and navy.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (A) can be depicted as follows:

Table 16 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (A)

Time	US	Turkey
1966-1969 US offers \$680 million to modernize Turkish Land Forces. Turkey negotiates price reductions and pleads her case for her navy and air force. The US agrees to provide additional articles.	0	2
1969-1970 The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean increases. NATO decides to create NOCFORMED. Turkey participates on the condition of acquiring additional naval units. The US provides them.	1	1
Absolute Gains:	1+3=4	
Relative Gains:	-2	2

In graphic terms, series (A) can be depicted as:



Graph 18 Graphic depiction of series (A)

In 1966-1969, Turkey not only benefited from the promised increases in US military aid as part of gradual response strategy, but also received the necessary units to modernize her navy and air force against the possibility of a clash with Greece over Cyprus. While the US tried to limit the Turkish aerial and naval modernization, the international conjecture forced her to yield. The Turkish relative gain in this episode is represented with the (2) horizontal coordinate of series (A), while the absolute gains are represented with the (4) vertical coordinate.

Renewed Crisis in Cyprus 1967 (Series Vance)

After the uneasy settlement of the 1964 crisis in Cyprus, the UN, US and Britain spent continuous diplomatic effort to prevent bloodshed between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The *status quo* they preserved, however, was drastically in favor of the Greek Cypriots. The Turks were locked inside enclaves and the controversial UN General Assembly resolution 2077 recognized the Greek Cypriot government under Makarios as the legitimate government of the whole island. Makarios pursued enosis and enjoyed the support of mainland Greece in this policy. The military take-over in Greece in 1967 changed the political balance: General Grivas, who commanded the National Guard, was acting in conjunction with the junta in Athens and this threatened the political survival of Makarios. On 15 November 1967, the National Guard provoked violence in the Turkish villages of Boğaziçi and Geçitkale. They proceeded to by-pass the UNFICYP observers at the site and took control of both villages, killing scores of Turkish Cypriots in the process.

1. From 1965 to 1967, Turkey and US cooperated on the maintenance of peace on the island, though the *status quo* was in favor of the Greek side.

2. When the National Guard entered the Turkish villages of Boğaziçi and Geçitkale on 15 November, the Turkish government under Demirel ordered the First Turkish Army in Thrace to forward positions with artillery and bridge-building equipment. The Turkish Navy sailed to south and Turkish forces started to assemble in the Port of Mersin. The US saw the ominous signs of war between the two NATO allies and President Johnson sent his personal envoy Cyrus Vance in a peace mission to Ankara and Athens. Though some members of the Turkish government suspected Vance to be “a Johnson Letter in the flesh”, they decided to receive him.


2. On 22 November, Vance arrived in Ankara and engaged in negotiations. He proposed the withdrawal of Greek and Turkish forces on the island that were introduced illegally and above treaty limits, and the resumption of bilateral talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. After heated discussions, the Turkish government agreed on the condition that the Greek side responded positively in two days. Shuttling to Athens, Vance acquired Greek approval.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (Vance) can be depicted as follows:

Table 17 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (Vance)

Time	US	Turkey
1964-1967 US diplomatic efforts to preserve peace, Turkey cooperates	1	1
15-22 November 1967 Crisis provoked by National Guard. Turkey mobilizes her forces, but President Johnson sends his special envoy Cyrus Vance to mediate. Turkey agrees to receive the mission	1	1
22-25 November 1967 Vance produces a peaceful solution (The Vance Formula). Turkey Agrees on the condition that Vance gets prompt Greek approval. Vance persuades the Greek side to acquiesce.	1	1
Absolute Gains:	3+3=6	
Relative Gains:	0	0

In graphic terms, series (Vance) can be depicted as:



Graph 19 Graphic depiction of series (Vance)

The greatest difference between the 1964 and 1967 crises in Cyprus is that while in the former the US viewed the Turkish military action as a menace to peace and pressured the Turkish side, in the latter she used the possibility of Turkish military action as a lever and pressured the Greek side. This difference is reflected in the fact that there is no relative gain for Turkey or the US in series (Vance) –hence the (0) horizontal coordinate. The absolute gains of averting a Turkish-Greek war and forcing the Greek side to yield is represented with the (6) vertical coordinate.

Defence Cooperation Agreement of 1969 (Series DCA)

After the Johnson Letter of 1964, the opposition in Turkey demanded a re-negotiation of the bilateral treaties with the US. The incoming Demirel government in 1965 wished to articulate the numerous and often informal bilateral understandings in a single treaty.

1. Upon the Turkish request, the US agreed to start negotiations, which commenced in March 1966.
2. The negotiations dragged on for three years, which witnessed a sharp rise in anti-Americanism among the Turkish public, but especially the leftist student movement. During

the negotiations, Turkey wanted to acquire the right to determine duty status; limit US activity strictly within NATO framework, and subject it to prior Turkish approval; and demanded a blanket guarantee from the US against an attack from any quarter for any reason. The US, on the other hand, adamantly refused to give up the right to determine duty status, wished to maintain as free a hand as possible in her activities, and refused to provide a blanket guarantee.

3. In 1969, the parties reached agreement, and the DCA was signed. The agreement confirmed that the joint installations were Turkish property and that the US had to duly inform the Turkish authorities about their activities. The duty status procedures were modified to introduce a Turkish veto by the General Staff, but the right of final decision remained in the US authorities.


4. In 1968-1970, the US also reduced her personnel as part of a world-wide cutback in overseas forces, moved US facilities away from urban areas, reduced port calls to major Turkish towns, and generally kept a low profile. This new arrangement satisfied the moderate mainstream political parties and Turkey kept her ties with the US and NATO intact.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (DCA) can be depicted as follows:

Table 18 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (DCA)

Time	US	Turkey
1966 Turkey requests the articulation of various bilateral treaties in a single document. The US agrees to start negotiations in March 1966	1	1
1966-1969 Negotiations bear no result as Turkish and US positions remain apart. Widespread anti-American student protests and discussions about leaving NATO ensue in Turkey.	0	0
1969 DCA is signed as both parties compromise on their respective positions.	1	1
To reduce the rising tide of anti-Americanism, the US personnel in Turkey keeps a low profile. Mainstream political parties act in favor of keeping the US and NATO alliance intact.	1	1
Absolute Gains:	3+3=6	
Relative Gains:	0	0

In graphic terms, series (DCA) can be depicted as:



Graph 20 Graphic depiction of series (DCA)

The episode on the negotiation of DCA is another typical example of tit for tat: the history of the issue reveals an undue American advantage about the scope of their activities in Turkey, which is reflected in the series (B2) in chapter three (see above). During the DCA series, Turkey tried to regain some of the points lost during the inception of the bilateral treaties in the Menderes era. The US, on the other hand, wished to retain as much of it as possible. The result is a compromise on both sides, which is represented by the (0) horizontal coordinate. The signing of the 1969 DCA and the mutual precautions to peacefully accommodate the US personnel on Turkish soil are reflected as absolute gains represented by the (6) vertical coordinate of series (DCA).

Use of Joint Installations for Non-NATO Purposes (Series Non-NATO)

During the 1950s, the US had used the joint installations, especially Incirlik for reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory and in contingencies in the Middle East. The Menderes government had allowed the risky U2 reconnaissance flights, and when one was shot down in

May 1960, the US had taken full responsibility of the incident. In return, Turkey had allowed the resumption of such flights from İncirlik. But in the changing mood in bilateral relations during the latter half of 1960s, the Demirel government would take a different position.

1. Until 1965, Turkey cooperated with the US about non-NATO use of İncirlik for reconnaissance flights and Middle East contingencies. In return, the US took the fall for the kind of crises that the overflight of Gary Powers in May 1960 had created.

2. In December 1965, an American RB-57 reconnaissance plane from İncirlik crashed over the international waters of the Black Sea. As in the U2 incident, the US took full responsibility against Soviet accusation. But this time, the Turkish government demanded the suspension of reconnaissance flights from İncirlik and did not allow their resumption despite heavy US pressure.


3. The US had also used İncirlik for Middle East contingencies such as the 1958 Lebanon Crisis. But in June 1967 war between Arabs and Israel, the Turkish government assured Egypt that she would not let the US use the İncirlik base to supply the Israeli forces. In October 1969 Lebanon disturbances and the September 1970 Palestinian commando insurrection in Jordan, the Turkish government openly declared that Turkey would not allow the use of İncirlik for a US intervention. This attitude was in sharp contrast with that of the Menderes government a decade ago, but did not bring about any American reprisals. What is more, it improved the Turkish stance in the Arab world that was tarnished by the pro-western Middle East policies of the 1950s.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (Non-NATO) can be depicted as follows:

Table 19 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (Non-NATO)

Time	US	Turkey
1958-1965 Turkey allows non-NATO use of Incirlik for reconnaissance and Middle East contingencies. In case of a crisis like the U2 incident of May 1960, US takes full responsibility	1	1
December 1965-1970 After a US reconnaissance plane crashes over the Black Sea, US takes full responsibility, but this time Turkey suspends further flights	0	2
1967-1970 Turkey denies the use of Incirlik in three Middle East contingencies with no tangible US reaction and improves her stance in the Arab world.	0	2
Absolute Gains:	1+5=6	
Relative Gains:	-4	4

In graphic terms, series (Non-NATO) can be depicted as:



Graph 21 Graphic depiction of series (Non-NATO)

While the signing of the DCA was the result of joint compromise, Turkey managed to reverse the situation in the issue of non-NATO use of joint installations. The US had a relative advantage from the 1950s (see series U and M above) that allowed her to use these installations with no tangible return for Turkey. During the second half of the 1960s, the Demirel government managed to restrict most of the non-NATO activities of US on Turkish soil and paid no tangible price for it. This reversal is a relative gain for Turkey, which is represented by

the (4) horizontal coordinate of the series (Non-NATO). The absolute gains from the continuing cooperation are represented by the (6) vertical coordinate.

The Opium Problem 1965-1971 (Series O)

In the Post-War era, Turkey was one of the licit opium producers by UN approval. In early 1960s, the American government claimed that 80% of the heroin consumed in the US was produced from the illicit opium diverted from the Turkish production. After the Demirel government came to power in 1965, negotiations to limit and control opium production in Turkey ensued.

1. In 1967, Turkey became a signatory of the Single Convention on Narcotics. Demirel government also reduced the number of opium poppy producing provinces from twenty-one to four and introduced a licensing system. The US provided a \$3 million loan for the costs of alternative crop research and policing the restrictions.
2. The Nixon administration that came to power in 1968 proved more zealous and demanded a complete ban of poppy production in Turkey. The facts proved that the illicit production in Turkey was hardly significant in supplying the US heroin consumption. Not wishing to lose the agrarian base of his party, Prime Minister Demirel refused to ban opium production.
3. After the March 1971 military ultimatum, a government of technocrats under Nihat Erim came to power in Turkey. Backed by the army, they had no need for popular support and resumed negotiations with the Americans. This resulted in the opium poppy production ban in 1971. In return, the US pledged \$30 million to finance the costs.
4. By the end of 1972, it was apparent that the costs of the ban to the farmers was much more than anticipated, while the US delivered only \$10 million of the financial aid she had promised. In the meantime, Turkey was emerging from the military interlude and all political parties

running for the elections in 1973 promised to lift the ban. In January 1974, the newly elected coalition government of Bülent Ecevit declared that they were going to lift the opium poppy production ban. In response, the US State department ordered the US ambassador to “return for consultations”. Turkey lifted the ban on the first of July.


5. While the US Congress was furious over the Turkish defiance, the US administration proceeded to cooperate with Turkey for the introduction of stricter licensing controls. The DEA verified the Turkish licensing procedure as satisfactory. Under a deal signed between the two parties, US firms pledged to buy 80% of licit Turkish opium production in return for effective prevention of illicit production.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (O) can be depicted as follows:

Table 20 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (O)

Time	US	Turkey
1965-1968 Turkey agrees to limit opium poppy production and adheres to Single convention on Narcotics. In return, the US provides financial assistance	1	1
1968-1971 The incoming Nixon administration demands complete ban. Turkey refuses to comply.	0	0
After the March 1971 military ultimatum, the technocratic government of Nihat Erim signs an opium ban agreement with the US in return for \$30 million in financial aid.	1	1
1972-July 1974 The ban costs more than anticipated. The US fails to deliver the promised amount of financial aid. The newly elected coalition government of Ecevit lifts the ban.	0	0
While lifting the ban in defiance of US warnings, Turkey cooperates with the US government in effective licensing and sale of licit production. The DEA verifies licensing procedures as satisfactory and US firms pledge to buy 80% of the licit production.	1	1
Absolute Gains:	3+3=6	
Relative Gains:	0	0

In graphic terms, series (O) can be depicted as:



Graph 22 Graphic depiction of series (O)

The literature treats the issue of opium ban as a sore point in Turkish-American relations. Diplomatically, it is a tough game in which both parties push each other to the limit of their respective positions. Underneath this tough game, however, there is an ongoing series of cooperation based on mutual compromise. The mutual nature of this cooperation results in no relative gain for either party (hence the (0) horizontal coordinate of the series) but allows for the eventual continuation of licit Turkish opium production under US guarantee.

The Turkish Landing on Cyprus and US Arms Embargo 1974-1979 (Series Embargo)

After the Vance mission saved the precarious peace on the island in 1967, Turkey refrained from an aggressive policy on Cyprus while the US funded 40% of the UNFICYP costs. Like the crisis of 1967, the crisis of 1974 too resulted from an internal clash in the Greek camp. On 15 July 1974, the National Guard under the command of Colonel Nikos Sampson and other officers from mainland Greece staged a coup and removed archbishop Makarios from power. A Greek military coup ordered by the junta in Athens and bent on enosis was completely unacceptable to Turkey.

1. The US condemned the coup but did not produce an effort even remotely resembling that of Cyrus Vance in 1967. Turkey proceeded to consult with Britain as the third guarantor power over Cyprus while US Under-Secretary of State Sisco went to Athens to persuade the Greek junta. By 19 July, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit came back from Britain and Sisco from Athens. Both men met in Ankara. They were both empty-handed since Britain refused to participate in a military intervention and the Greek junta refused to restore the civilian government in Cyprus. Thus, on 20 July 1974, the Turkish Armed Forces landed on Cyprus.
2. After securing a beachhead, the Turkish forces abided by the UNSC Resolution 353 and a ceasefire ensued. The juntas in both mainland Greece and in Cyprus had fallen as a result of Turkish military action, and the US was sympathetic to the Turkish cause. The parties started negotiations in Geneva on 25 July.
3. The Geneva talks resulted in failure as the positions had now shifted: Turkey wanted a de jure federation but a de facto separation of the island. As a result, on 14 August, the Turkish Army resumed the offensive and took over 36% of Cyprus. The Americans did not approve of the second operation, which resulted in the withdrawal of Greece from NATO's integrated command and suspension of US base rights in that country. But the US administration did not wish to further weaken NATO's southern wing by imposing an embargo on Turkey either. At the end, however, Congress pressure prevailed and the US declared an arms embargo on Turkey with Public Law 93-559 in December 1974. In response, Turkey cancelled the 1969 DCA in July 1975, changed the status of US forces to "provisional", closed down several US facilities, and restricted US activity in Turkey to solely NATO purposes.
4. While both parties expressed their displeasure over the current state of affairs, the resolution seemed to depend on a breakthrough in the Cyprus issue. However, as time passed, signs of mutual cooperation emerged. In October 1975, commercial sales to Turkey resumed with PL 94-104. Shortly afterwards, Turkey agreed to negotiate and new Defence and Cooperation


Agreement (DECA). The Agreement was signed in March 1976, but was rejected by the US Congress. Still, in August 1977, the Congress approved PL 95-92 and lifted restrictions on FMS credits. Finally, the International Assistance Act of 1978 (PL 95-384) removed the embargo. In return, in October 1978, Turkey agreed to change the provisional status of US forces. Negotiations on a new DECA ensued in early 1979.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (Embargo) can be depicted as follows:

Table 21 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (Embargo)

Time	US	Turkey
July 15-20 1974 Turkey prepares for military action after the Sampson coup. The US fails to produce a diplomatic solution. Turkish forces land on the island. US does not intervene.	0	2
25 July-14 August 1974 Turkish forces abide by the UN imposed ceasefire. US facilitates negotiations between the parties.	1	1
14 August 1974-July 1975 The Geneva Talks fail. Turkish army takes over 36% of Cyprus. US imposes an arms embargo on Turkey. In response, Turkey cancels the 1969 DCA, converts the status of US forces to provisional, and restricts US activities to solely NATO purposes	0	0
October 1975-March 1976 Starting with the commercial sales, the US Congress gradually lifts the embargo restrictions. Turkey agrees to negotiate a new DECA, which is signed in March 1976	1	1
March 1976-October 1978 Though the new DECA is not ratified by the US Congress, PL 95-92 of August 1977 removes further restrictions on arms transfers to Turkey. Finally, the International Assistance Act of 1978 completely removes the embargo. In return, Turkey changes the provisional status of US forces in October 1978.	1	1
Absolute Gains:	3+5=8	
Relative Gains:	-2	2

In graphic terms, series (Embargo) can be depicted as:



Graph 23 Graphic depiction of series (Embargo)

The third episode of the Cyprus crises (the former two being 1964 and 1967) results in Turkish landing on the island. The US efforts to prevent such a landing succeed in 1964 and 1967, but fail in 1974. The reasons of this failure are largely attributed to the domestic turmoil in the US after Watergate and Vietnam, but also to a decade-long Turkish preparation after the Johnson Letter. The reward of this preparation is the relative gain in favor of Turkey as represented by the (2) horizontal coordinate of series (Embargo). Having landed on the island, TAF successfully enlarges its area of control. The US does not approve of this second move, and imposes an arms embargo. Turkey responds by abolishing the 1969 DCA and converting the status of US personnel. In this second phase (from 1975 to 1979), the parties push each other to a compromise where the US finally lifts the embargo without a solution in Cyprus and in return, Turkey changes the duty status of US personnel in the absence of a formally ratified DCA. The absolute gains of this process are represented by the (8) vertical coordinate of series (Embargo).

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Hostage Crisis (Series Iran)

While Turkey and US were negotiating the new DECA in 1979, the Islamic Revolution had changed the regime in Iran. Under Shah Reza Pahlavi, Iran had been a steadfast US ally.


1. Initially, both the US as well as Turkey tried to find a way to live with the new Islamic regime under Khomeini.
2. Soon, however, the Carter administration made a fatal political mistake by accepting the exiled shah to the US for cancer treatment. This triggered the hostage-taking of US citizens and embassy staff in Tehran. The crisis lasted for 444 days, and the US repeatedly asked Turkey to provide the İncirlik base for a rescue operation, but Turkey refused. Turkey also refused to join the sanctions against Iran, despite heavy US criticism.
3. At the end, when the new DECA between Turkey and US was signed by the military government in Turkey after the 12 September 1980 military coup, the Americans had to drop the issue of out-of-area use of joint installations.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (Iran) can be depicted as follows:

Table 22 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (Iran)

Time	US	Turkey
February-November 1979 Both US and Turkey try to establish relations with the Islamic regime	1	1
November 1979-January 1981 The Hostage Crisis. US wants to use İncirlik for rescue operation and calls Turkey to join sanctions against Iran. Turkey refuses. November 1980 New DECA signed, no out of area provisions included	0	2
Absolute Gains:	1+3=4	
Relative Gains:	-2	2

In graphic terms, series (Iran) can be depicted as:




Graph 24 Graphic depiction of series (Iran)

The Turkish and American response to the Iranian Revolution can actually be positioned within the framework of Non-NATO use of military installations. However, there is a time gap between series (Non-NATO) and the revolution in Iran, so this study follows the mainstream literature and treats Iran as a separate series. Even so, series (Iran) follows the pattern of the other Non-NATO issues of the 1960-1980 period: Turkey denies US the non-NATO (or out-of-area) use of the joint installations, not even for a rescue mission for the embassy hostages in Tehran. In addition to that, Turkey refuses to join the sanctions against Iran as well. Even in that context, Turkey manages to sign the 1980 DECA which rules out the non-NATO use of joint installations (like its predecessor 1969 DCA). This situation is reflected in the (2) horizontal coordinate of series (Iran) while the absolute gains are represented by the (4) vertical coordinate.

Overall Evaluation of Cooperation Series in 1960-1980 Period

As mentioned, the 1960-1980 period was different from the previous 1945-1960 period in terms of structural and domestic variables. In order to show that the institutional effect is not

correlated to structural or domestic factors, it is useful to compare the two periods. In graphic terms, the period 1960-1980 can be depicted as:



*Series Vance, O, Nuke, MC, DCA.

Legend
 MC: 27 May 1960 Military Coup; C-T: October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis; Jo: Johnson Letter of 1964; Nuke: Changing NATO Strategy and Control of Nuclear Weapons; A: US Military Aid to Turkey; Vance: Cyprus 1967; DCA: Defence Cooperation Agreement of 1969; Non-NATO: Use of Joint Installations for Non-NATO Purposes; O: The Opium Problem; Embargo: The Turkish Landing on Cyprus and US Arms Embargo; Iran: The Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Hostage Crisis

Graph 25 Series of cooperation in 1960-1980 period

As in Graph 13 that depicted the 1945-1960 period, here too the bilateral series are marked with red squares, and institutional ones with blue triangles. The “*” sign in the graph indicates five coinciding series on coordinates (0/6).

The multiplicity of coinciding series makes this graph difficult to decipher, but even so one can readily identify the difference compared to the previous period of 1945-1960: the number of red squares on the right hand side of the graph suggests that there is a marked shift of relative gains in favor of Turkey. Of the nine bilateral series of cooperation, four (Series Non-NATO, Embargo, A, and Iran) produced relative gains for Turkey. Of the other five bilateral series, four (Series O, DCA, MC, and Vance) produced no relative gains for either party. Only one (Series Jo) produced relative gains for the US. Compared to the 1945-1960

period, this is a complete reversal: of the six bilateral series of that period, only the Straits Series had produced relative gains for Turkey while three of the remaining four series had produced relative gains in favor of the US. If we look at the bilateral series in terms of issues, one can observe that the most significant difference appears in the cooperation about Middle East contingencies. In the 1945-1960 period, the Middle East cooperation series (Series M) had produced the greatest relative gains for the US. In the 1960-1980 period, however, both series of cooperation that involved Middle East Contingencies (Series Non-NATO and Series Iran) have produced relative gains for Turkey. Another significant change is the introduction of the Cyprus issue where Turkey's national interest had at times clashed with the overall US policy. In series involving Cyprus (Series Jo, Vance and Embargo), the passage of time seems to favor Turkey: the first series (Jo) in 1964 produced relative gains in favor of the US; the second series (Vance) in 1967 produced no relative gains for either party; and the third series (Embargo) in 1974 produced relative gains for Turkey. A third important point to mention is that four bilateral series (MC, Vance, DCA and O) have produced no relative gains for either party. In the previous period, only one bilateral series (Series T) had produced no relative gains.

Graph 25 shows that the general power asymmetry between the US and Turkey does not automatically imply a general US advantage in bilateral relations: the changes in domestic, ideational and structural variables (or the so-called conjunctural changes) significantly influence the ability of the parties to prevail in a given issue. This should remind one of the discussion about Turkey's status as a "middle power" in chapter two. It was noted while a crude reading of realism would constrain the elements of power to military and economic might, Morgenthau had insisted on an issue- and context-based definition of power as "anything that establishes and maintains control of man over man". All analysts (of Turkish foreign policy in general and of Turkish-US relations in particular) agree that there is a significant difference in Turkish-US

relations between the 1945-1960 and 1960-1980 periods. As discussed earlier, they have tried to explain this difference by introducing a host of variables from different levels and applying a number of incompatible theories (so-called 'realism plus graft-on components'). The theoretically cumbersome nature of this literature shows that unless variables of domestic, ideational and structural nature are individually isolated within a coherent theoretical framework and with a consistent methodology, it is impossible to produce a set of generalizations about Turkish-US relations. In the absence of such generalizations, every issue in bilateral relations has to be examined within its own merits. In other words, one has to produce a different definition of power for each case. Implicitly, this is what most analysts of Turkish foreign policy seem to do.

There is a more consistent picture when it comes to issues within NATO institutional framework: In both 1945-1960 and 1960-1980 periods, institutional series consistently pile up in the lower centre of the graph. This consistency across periods supports the neo-institutionalist claim that institutions constrain relative gains, but disputes the neo-institutionalist claim that cooperation within institutional frameworks tend to be long and yield greater absolute gains.

The comparison of two periods shows that the bilateral series shift in accordance with conjunctural changes. This makes it difficult for the analyst to produce generalizations that hold across periods without applying more sophisticated theoretical and methodological means. The institutional effect, however, seems to hold its own so far. To verify this claim, one has to look into the remaining two periods (1980-1991 and 1991-2003) in Turkish-US relations. If the bilateral series continue to swing in accordance with conjunctural changes while institutional series remain in the centre of the graph, one can safely conclude that institutions do have a life of their own and should be treated as an independent variable. To this, we now turn.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE MIDDLE EAST 1980-1990

In Turkish-US relations literature, the 1980s are regarded as a return to a closer cooperation reminiscent of the 1950s. Though the domestic and international conditions are different, the two eras have important points in common.

Domestically, this period starts with the 12 September 1980 military coup that re-structured the Turkish polity. Like the ones before it, the military junta of 12 September coup too continued good relations with, and even gave major concessions to the US. The military interlude was followed by the election of Turgut Özal's Motherland Party in a controlled election. Özal, like Menderes, believed in the common interests of Turkey and US, admired the pragmatic and business-minded attitude of the Americans, and aspired to transform the Turks along similar lines³⁰⁹. This attitude was reflected in his handling of foreign policy as well. During the Özal governments between 1983 and 1989, Turkish-American cooperation (especially in the Middle East) returned to its 1950s patterns.

In the US, the 1980s witnessed the rise of the new right under Ronald Reagan. The 1973 OPEC oil crisis and the ensuing stagflation during the latter half of the 1970s had strained the US economy. The competition of European and Japanese economies shook the American self-confidence as the US share in world output fell from a 40% post-war high to 20%. Politically, the Watergate scandal, combined with the post-Vietnam trauma and the revelations of the Pentagon Papers and Church Commission inflicted a deep sense of frustration and apathy among the American people. Both Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, who ruled after Richard Nixon, were characterized as weak, soft and enfeebled. The relative gains made by the Soviet Union throughout the Third World combined with the loss of major allies (like the Shah

³⁰⁹ Nicole and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey* (New York: Overlook Press, 2004), p. 171.

of Iran) completed the picture, which was interpreted by many as the waning of the US hegemony. The new right was a reaction to this grim political, social, economic and international picture, which promised a resurgence of American power.

Structurally, this attempt at US resurgence led to the end of détente between the two superpowers, and the first half of the 1980s witnessed the so-called Second Cold War. However, the increasingly tense relations between the Soviet Union and US took a dramatic turn after Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and introduced his reform policies of economic re-structuring and political openness in the Soviet system. A major aspect of Gorbachev reforms entailed an end to arms race and ideological confrontation with the west. By the end of 1980s, these policies would lead to the end of Cold War and the unraveling of the communist bloc –first in her satellites in Eastern Europe, then in the Soviet Union herself.

The 1980-1991 period started with the 12 September military coup in Turkey, which introduced a major turn in economic, domestic and foreign policy.

Turkish-US Relations During the Military Regime: 1980-1983

The main aim of the junta, which took over the government in the early hours of 12 September 1980, was to restore order after four years of anarchy. To that end, they closed down all political parties and associations, arrested and detained their leaders, and then proceeded to eliminate the liberties secured by the 1961 constitution.

The National Security Council (NSC) was made up of the four generals who commanded the coup. It was led by the Chief of Staff Kenan Evren, who declared himself head of state, and ruled by decree. Martial law was introduced, followed by censorship of the press, summary arrests, torture, military court trials, and the execution of fifty people from different affiliations (eighteen from the radical left, eight from the radical right, one ASALA member

and twenty-three non-political offenders)³¹⁰. The coup crushed the labor movement and destroyed judicial and academic autonomy. By the time the military rule ended in 1983, Turkish politics was firmly under military vestige through the arrangements in the 1982 constitution, which was approved by a staggering 91.3% affirmative vote. Of course, opposition to the military-sponsored draft was not allowed³¹¹. This result also transferred the coup leader Kenan Evren to presidency form seven years. The soldiers were determined to go through with their social engineering experiment: in the 1983 elections, which were supposed to be a transition to civilian rule, the NSC vetoed scores of candidates from other parties and openly pointed at the Nationalist Democracy Party of Turgut Sunalp (himself a retired general). In this atmosphere, Turgut Özal's Motherland Party won the elections with 43% of the votes, because, of the available candidates, Motherland seemed the most 'civilian'. Its leader, Turgut Özal was America's choice to carry out the Washington Consensus in Turkey: indeed, he had been the architect of the January 1980 economic reform program, which was the first major step towards liberalizing the Turkish economy. After the coup, he was 'suggested' to the military regime by the Americans to run the stumbling Turkish economy. Once a member of the Ulusu government which worked under the auspices of the NSC, Özal demanded the integration of the Ministries of Finance, Economy and Treasury, turning them into one super-ministry under his control. He then proceeded to implement the IMF and US-sponsored economic program³¹². The program led to the liberalization, deregulation and integration of Turkish economy to the world market.

³¹⁰ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 20.

³¹¹ Considering the "yes" votes were white, the "no" votes were blue, the envelopes used in the ballots were semi-transparent, and a soldier stood watch on the ballot box, the result should not be a great surprise. For a tragic-comic perspective on the censorship of the military era, see Hasan Cemal's memoir, *Tank Sesiyile Uyanmak: 12 Eylül Günlüğü* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985). For a detailed narrative of the era, see Mehmet Ali Birand, *12 Eylül Saat: 04:00* (İstanbul: Karacan Yayınları, 1984).

³¹² Emin Çölaşan, *12 Eylül Özal Ekonomisinin Perde Arkası* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1984).

Throughout this episode, the military regime maintained good relations with the US, and gave major concessions held back by successive governments in the 1970s. This was largely due to Turkey's increasing need for economic and diplomatic support, but also because of the skillful American diplomacy which took advantage of the weaknesses of the military regime.

The US Reaction to the Military Coup: "Our Boys Have Done it!"

The spirit of cooperation between the leadership of the junta and the US actually preceded the coup: just as the commander of Air Force, General Muhsin Batur had visited the US before the 12 March 1971 military intervention, so did General Tahsin Şahinkaya before 12 September. The military informed JUSMMAT two hours before moving in, and the US President Carter was briefed by CIA's Paul Henze about the coup with the following words: "our boys have done it!"³¹³ Carter was in the opera, watching Bizet's *Carmen*. He merely thanked Henze without requiring further details and continued to enjoy the performance³¹⁴. As after the 1960 and 1971 coups, the junta immediately declared Turkey's continuing loyalty to NATO. The American diplomatic reaction to the coup was mild: while expressing concern for the overthrow of a democratically elected government, the US was understanding the anarchic political and economic conditions that led to the military take-over, and urged the military regime through its embassy in Ankara to restore civilian rule as soon as possible³¹⁵. This was a generous diplomatic stance considering the much harsher European reaction.

³¹³ Quoted in Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası*, 2, p. 38.

³¹⁴ Birand, *12 Eylül Saat: 04:00*, p. 8.

³¹⁵ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 2, pp. 38-39.

After heated deliberations, the NSC decided to appoint Ret. Admiral Bülent Ulusu, the former commander of the Turkish Navy to form a government on 21 September. As mentioned, this government would work under the auspices of the NSC and provide a sense of normalcy. During the organization of the military regime, two important appointments took place: Turgut Özal was named as Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economics, and General Haydar Saltık, who had been running the Chief of Staff's relations with NATO, was named as the General Secretary of NSC. These two key positions were now filled by people known to and trusted by the Americans. The advantages of having like-minded people in the military regime would soon become apparent. Unlike Europe, the US made little criticism of the human rights violations of the military regime and continued to support the Turkish economic program.

The Rogers Plan and the Greek Re-integration to NATO Command

As mentioned above, Greece had withdrawn from NATO's integrated command after Turkey's second operation in August 1974 (see above). The Greek withdrawal had three principle reasons: i) there was a general anti-NATO and anti-American feeling among the Greek people due to American support to the junta between 1967 and 1974; ii) there was also the belief that NATO and/or the US could have restrained the second Turkish operation; and iii) the Greek military wanted to re-assign its forces under national command against the "Turkish threat". This required that they be relieved of integrated NATO command.³¹⁶

Once civilian rule was firmly established by the Karamanlis government, the anti-American feelings in Greece subsided. By 1977, Greece had realized the hazards of losing the

³¹⁶ Ufuk Güldemir, *Kanat Operasyonu* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1985), p. 103.

allied command and control over the Aegean to Turkey, and wanted to return, but it was too late:

(...) on 30 June 1978, the Commanders of Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe and the Sixth Allied Air Force, both U.S. officers, were replaced in Izmir by colleagues of the hosting nation.³¹⁷

Successive Turkish governments vetoed the Greek return on the North Atlantic Council and demanded that Greece negotiate the command and control of the Aegean with Turkey before re-entering.³¹⁸

By late 1980, domestic political developments in Greece worried American and NATO officials as Andreas Papandreou's Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) was headed for an election victory. Papandreou assumed an anti-American rhetoric and pledged to leave NATO all together. The Americans feared irreparable damage to NATO's southern wing in a time when Soviet activity in the region was especially high. Fortunate for them, their concern was shared by Kenan Evren. On 17 October, Supreme Allied Commander General Rogers visited Ankara and told Evren that unless something was done, Greece would be lost to the allied cause. Evren admitted to the possibility, but replied: if Turkey lifted her veto, how could one make the Greeks negotiate the Aegean command and control issue? In a rare moment of diplomatic daring, Rogers pledged his "soldiers honor": if Turkey allowed the Greek re-integration to NATO command, Rogers would make sure the Greek government negotiated the Aegean command and control issue with Turkey.³¹⁹

On 20 October, NATO Defense Planning Council gathered in Brussels and approved the Greek return to alliance's military command. The strongman of the Turkish military regime

³¹⁷ Veltri, *AFSOUTH 1951-2004*.

³¹⁸ Güldemir, *Kanat Operasyonu*, p. 104.

³¹⁹ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, pp. 40-41.

Evren had accepted the Rogers offer. The deal was concluded so secretly that even Turkey's permanent representative to NATO, Ambassador Osman Olcay wasn't in the know, so he had to call Ankara during the Brussels meeting and confirm the situation³²⁰. The Rogers plan was a four point agreement whereby Turkey approved the Greek return and the transfer of command and control coordination to NATO. Since there was no Greek representative present, the parts about Greece conducting negotiations with Turkey on the Aegean command and control after her return to NATO were legally null and void. In fact, soon after Turkey fulfilled her part of the bargain and allowed Greek re-entry, Papandreou's PASOK won the elections in Greece. General Rogers failed to persuade the new Greek government, and the Aegean command and control issue remained unresolved. Thus, Turkey lost an important diplomatic leverage over Evren's faith on General Rogers' soldiers honor.³²¹

The Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and Turkey

Another important issue in Turkish-US relations during the military interlude was the changing situation in the Middle East. After the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the American policy of relying on the close cooperation of Iran and Saudi Arabia no longer worked. The invasion of Afghanistan had brought the Soviet Union less than 500 km from the Gulf region, which was vital for the oil supply of the west. Thus, in his State of the Union address on 23 January 1980, President Carter had declared that

Three basic developments have helped to shape our challenges: the steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders; the overwhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East; and the press of social and religious and economic and political change in the many nations of the developing world, exemplified by the

³²⁰ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 43.

³²¹ *Ibid.*

revolution in Iran. (...) Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.³²²

In line with the Carter Doctrine, the US sought to increase her ability of power projection to the Middle East. Since the region was crawling with political forces hostile to US military presence, the US strategists came up with the idea of keeping the US soldiers at home, ready to fly in on a no-notice basis. The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDF) was established in MacDill air Base in Tampa, Florida. Some 200,000 soldiers from different services were assigned to its command. In case of an emergency in the Middle East, the RDF would fly in and either stop the developing threat on its tracks or act as a trip-wire to deter the aggressor³²³. To do that, however, they had to pre-position equipment, ammunition and other material in the region so that when the soldiers arrived, they had combat capability. It was thought that providing storage facilities rather than bases to US would be politically easier for the countries involved.³²⁴

Throughout 1980, the US negotiated the establishment of such pre-positioning storage sites with the countries in the region. They achieved varying degree of success as some countries like Egypt allowed pre-positioning as well as 'bare base' exercises, while others did not. The main problem with the RDF approach was the logistics and infrastructure required to support large numbers of troops if they ever had to deploy in the region. Turkey with her membership in NATO, extensive logistics and infrastructure and 'reliable' military government, was an ideal candidate. Indeed, though the 1970s had been turbulent times in

³²² Carter, Jimmy. *State of the Union Address*, 23 January 1980. Available [Online]: <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml> [04 June 2007].

³²³ Joe Stork, "The Carter Doctrine and US Bases in the Middle East," *MERIP Reports*, no. 90 (September 1980), pp. 3-14.

³²⁴ İlhan Uzgel, "Çevik Kuvvet" in *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, ed. Oran, p. 46.

Turkish-US relations, by 1980 Turkey was still the cornerstone of US plans to defend Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East:

There are 5000 US personnel in Turkey, mostly stationed in six major installations. Incirlik Airbase near Adana in the southeast, has the most forward deployed land-based American aircraft in the Eastern Mediterranean that are capable of launching a tactical nuclear strike. (...) Its potential role in the Middle East hostilities is only limited by the reluctance of Turkish governments (...). The other major installations in Turkey include Sinop (electronic intelligence on the Black Sea), Pirinlik (long range radar and communications complex, near Diyarbakir in the southeast), Golbasi (seismic detection unit near Ankara), Iskenderun and Yumurtalik (storage site for 20% of the Sixth Fleet fuel and other supplies), and Izmir (NATO area command, 6th Allied Tactical Air Force headquarters).³²⁵

As the list above indicates, Turkey by far had the most enhanced military infrastructure to meet the needs of the RDF. The early 1980s was an opportune moment for the US: the military regime was shunned by Europe and needed US political and financial assistance. Its key positions were held by people who were known to and trusted by the Americans. The leader of the junta Kenan Evren had already shown great flexibility by ratifying the DECA and allowing the Greek return to allied integrated command. Thus, by the beginning of 1981, US officials started their overtures to ascertain the Turkish position on allowing the RDF.

The initial Turkish response to US requests of hosting RDF facilities was negative. On his Washington visit in June 1981, the Defense Minister Haluk Bayülken, and in a speech on September, Minister of Foreign Affairs İlder Türkmen had stated that “the defense of the Gulf belongs to states in the Gulf”³²⁶. Türkmen’s speech coincided with the Ankara visit of Kuwait’s Emir Seikh Cabir Al Ahmet Al Sabah, during which a series of defense cooperation options including military training, sales and investment were negotiated.³²⁷

³²⁵ Stork, “The Carter Doctrine and US Bases in the Middle East,” p. 7.

³²⁶ Ufuk Güldemir, *Çevik Kuvvetin Gölgesinde* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1987), p. 134. Also quoted in Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 45.

³²⁷ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 125.

While Turkey shared the American concern over the Soviet encroachment into the Middle East, the main reason for her hesitation was the possibility of US using the RDF in a regional conflict (especially one involving Israel and the Arabs). In that case, Turkey would be in a difficult position in the eyes of the Arab world as the staging platform of the Zionists. To overcome these concerns, Turkey wanted to make sure that RDF remained within the NATO framework and acted only upon the decision of the North Atlantic Council. Indeed, the December 1980 Defense Planning Committee meeting of the alliance noted the US contingency plans for RDF deployment in Southwest Asia, and

Ministers of nations concerned affirmed the intention of their countries to provide host nation support to facilitate the reception and employment of reinforcement forces. Ministers recognized that the developing situation would entail a suitable division of labour within NATO.³²⁸

With this approval, Turkey had already pledged to support deployments deliberated within NATO framework. In January 1981, the US had already assigned the RDF to SACEUR command and showed her intention to make this a NATO project³²⁹.

The incoming Reagan administration had expanded the scope of the Carter Doctrine and the RDF concept³³⁰. Strategists like Albert Wohlstetter (who was the mentor of Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and Zalmay Khalilzad) had a much more comprehensive view of America's Middle East policy and the role Turkey should play in it. This view would later become the Greater Middle East project. In the early 1980s, however, the basic US demand from Turkey was the pre-positioning and deployment facilities for the RDF.

³²⁸ NATO. *NATO Defense Planning Committee Ministerial Communique*, Brussels 10-12 December 1980. Available [online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c801209a.htm> [17 May 2007].

³²⁹ Uzgel, "Çevik Kuvvet" in *Türk Dış Politikası* 2, ed. Oran, p. 46.

³³⁰ Fareed Zakaria, "The Reagan Strategy of Containment," *Political Science Quarterly* 105, no. 3 (Autumn 1990), pp. 373-395.

Throughout 1981 and 1982, the US pressure on Turkey to host RDF facilities intensified. By December 1981, US Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger visited Ankara. In this visit, a High Level Defense Cooperation Council to discuss the mutual defense needs and the status of US bases in Turkey was established. Turkish Defense Minister Ümit Haluk, deputy Chief of Staff Necdet Öztorun and Richard Perle, then US Assistant Secretary of Defense of the Reagan administration, participated in its first meeting on 27 April 1982. In October 1982, William Casey became the first CIA director to visit Ankara.

The intensive US pressure and lobbying paid off in November 1982: General Necdet Öztorun and Richard Perle met in Brussels and signed a Memorandum of Understanding, where Turkey approved the enlargement of ten US bases in Turkey and the construction of two new ones in Batman and Muş. Turkey also accepted the pre-positioning of material, but subject to Turkish approval. The main Turkish concern about possible out of area use of these bases was met with article 1 which prohibited the out of area use of the US bases in question³³¹. By giving the right for pre-positioning, however, Turkey had laid down the foundation of her cooperation during the Gulf War in 1990-1991.

‘The Özal’ Era

As mentioned, Turgut Özal first served in the military government as the chosen person of the US and IMF to implement the Washington consensus in Turkey. As such, he enjoyed American support. Along with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, he was regarded as a new right politician: he was a devout Muslim with a conservative agenda, but his economic views were liberal. This combination made him the ideal candidate to lead Turkey in her cooperation with the US on the Middle East, since the US wanted to create a so-called ‘green belt’ of mild Islamic regimes as an antidote to radical Islam, Arab nationalism and

³³¹ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, pp. 47-48.

communism. Turkey under Özal had an important role to play in this scheme of things. Özal shared the new right antipathy towards communism, and became a willing participant of the second Cold War. However, with the softening of superpower relations after Gorbachev, he opened up trade and diplomatic channels to the Soviet Union.

The Özal government inherited a set of good beginnings in terms of Turkish-US relations. The thorny issues of DECA, Greek re-entry to NATO command, and the RDF requests were all dealt with by the military regime. There were, however, still issues to be settled. First and foremost was the role US expected Turkey to play in the Middle East. During the first Özal government, there would be intensive cooperation in this context. A second question was Cyprus and Turkish-Greek relations. The PASOK government in Athens had defined Turkey as number one security threat and was pursuing a bellicose policy. In Cyprus, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was declared on November 1983 – shortly before the military turned over power to the newly elected Özal government. This deeply angered the Greek side. In the following years, they tried to force the US to punish Turkey. The US too was concerned about this fundamental development that could lead to the permanent division of the island. The US didn't recognize TRNC and dissuaded Pakistan and Bangladesh who were inclined to do so³³². A third problem was the terms of the security relations as outlined in DECA, because Turkey felt that the American side failed to meet Turkish expectations in terms of military aid and trade relations. A fourth problem was the increasing pressure on the US Congress about Armenian genocide claims and the Kurdish question in connection with minority and human rights in Turkey. These two issues too, reflected on the US military aid levels and terms.

³³² Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 61.

Middle East Cooperation 1983-1989

As mentioned above, at the beginning of the 1980s, the Middle East once more emerged as a hotspot of superpower rivalry. The western economies depended on the unhindered oil supply from the region, and the US felt obliged to counter two main threats: radical Islam and Soviet encroachment. American strategists viewed a moderate Sunni Islam as an antidote to both radical Islam represented by the Iranian Revolution and communism³³³. Thus, throughout the early 1980s, the US encouraged her allies in the region to forge closer ties and present a united front of moderate Sunni Islam against Iran and the Soviet Union. Turkey was the only secular democratic Muslim country in the region, and the only NATO member. As in the 1950s, these unique properties placed her to an important position in the American plans for the Middle East.

On the Turkish side, both the military regime and the Özal government were willing to play the part envisaged by the Americans. There were a number of reasons for this: After the military coup, Turkey's relations with Europe suffered from European criticism of human rights violations. The US was the only country within the western camp that had been more understanding about 'the necessities of the martial law'. The Turkish economy was in a balance of payments crisis. Direct American economic aid as well as support through the IMF was vital for the success of the new economic program launched in January 1980³³⁴. Though there was little political affinity or personal affection between them, Özal and Evren agreed on the argument that Turkey should pursue a closely pro-American policy in order to increase her standing in the world and solve her political and economic problems.

³³³ Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 393.

³³⁴ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası*. 2, p. 50.

The Americans believed that Turkey could serve three functions: i) Hosting facilities for the RDF (discussed above); ii) Military and economic cooperation with the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia; and iii) Engaging in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in order to break the isolation of Egypt and encourage a moderate Sunni pro-western agenda.³³⁵

The Turkish military cooperation with the Gulf states Kuwait and Saudi Arabia go back to the September 1981 visit of Kuwait's Emir Sheikh Cabir al Ahmet al Sabah. In March 1982, Kenan Evren returned the visit and the parties agreed on military cooperation in three aspects: training, sales and joint investments. Similar ventures were negotiated with Saudi Arabia as well. In February 1984, Kenan Evren visited Saudi Arabia and the parties signed a military training and cooperation treaty³³⁶. This treaty included cadet exchange between military schools, construction of certain military facilities in Saudi Arabia, and know-how support by Turkish experts. In July 1984, Turkish F-4 and F-104 pilots went to the Mushayt Airbase on the Yemeni border of Saudi Arabia and started training Saudi pilots. In September 1984, a Saudi military delegation visited Turkey and allegedly discussed a joint venture to produce chemicals of military use with German and US participation.³³⁷

In line with her economic and military opening to the Middle East, Turkey also paid high regard to the OIC meetings. In January 1984, Turkey was represented at presidential level by Kenan Evren in the Casablanca Summit of the organization. In these meetings, Turkey i) supported the moderate and conservative Sunni agenda; ii) encouraged the re-integration of Egypt; iii) improved bilateral relations, especially trade relations; and iv) lobbied for diplomatic representation and recognition of TRNC. Turkey succeeded in the former three of

³³⁵ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası*. 2, pp. 44-45.

³³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 125-126.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

her activities. Throughout 1980s, OIC supported a conservative anti-revolutionary stance; Egypt returned to the organization in March 1984 (a month after US Marines pulled out of Beirut); and Turkey's trade relations with Middle Eastern countries increased both in volume and variety. However, the organization extended only limited recognition to TRNC.³³⁸

Throughout this period, the US aid levels to Turkey increased steadily: In 1980, the US had provided \$208 million in FMS credit and \$198 million in economic aid to Turkey (\$406 million in total). By the end of the military era in 1983, the level of military aid went up to \$400 million (\$110 million of which was in grants), and economic aid was up to \$245 million (\$645 million in total). By 1985, military aid was up to \$700 million. With the addition of \$185 in economic aid, the year 1985 represented the pinnacle of US aid to Turkey with a total of \$885 million³³⁹. Thus, it can be said that while Turkey made significant concessions in her Middle East policy (among others like the Rogers plan), she achieved her goal of receiving increasing US aid in return. Though the amount and conditions of aid was a point of disagreement in bilateral relations (see below), the fact remains that the US aid to Turkey doubled between 1980 and 1985.

Another side benefit of opening up to the Middle East was the increasing trade volume with Middle Eastern countries, so much so that after the August 1981 deal that allowed for the barter of oil with commodity exports, Iraq became the second largest trading partner of Turkey after Germany. This development was in line with the US policy of supporting Iraq against Iran and keeping the war between the two at balance.

The only aspect of US Middle East policy that Turkey failed to support in the early 1980s was cooperation with Israel. From 1974 onwards, Turkey had pursued a pro-Arab

³³⁸ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası*. 2, p. 128.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 54; Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 395.

policy while maintaining diplomatic ties with Israel³⁴⁰. Turkey had acted in solidarity with the Arabs throughout the annexation of Golan Heights and East Jerusalem in July 1980. After the military coup and in line with the pro-US tilt in Turkey's Middle policy, Turkey tried to engage in closer cooperation with Israel, but could not do so. The main reason was Israel's belligerent policy in a time when Turkey engaged with the Arab world. Both the US policy of encouraging a united Sunni front and Turkey's need for diplomatic support in the Cyprus issue dictated a pro-Arab stance. One should add an economic dimension to this picture as well: Turkey's exports to the Middle East increased by 44% between 1978 and 1982 mostly because of Turkey's need for oil. At the same time, her exports to Israel increased a mere one percent³⁴¹. However, there were early signs of the cooperation between the two countries that would ensue in the 1990s: when Israel invaded Lebanon and the Israeli Army entered the Bekaa Valley in 1982, Turkish officials joined in an operation where the camps of Armenian terrorist groups ASALA and JCAG were wiped out³⁴². By 1988, Turkey once more had to choose between Muslim solidarity and prospective alliance with Israel and chose the former. In November 1988, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) declared the Palestinian statehood. Turkey recognized it the same day (before Arab countries like Egypt and Jordan)³⁴³.

In general, one can conclude that there was a marked shift in Turkey's cooperation with the US in the Middle East: as in the 1950s, the domestic and international conjecture had once more intensified Turkish-American cooperation in the region. There were other issue areas where Turkey would maintain her policies from the previous period.

³⁴⁰ Süha Bölükbaşı, "Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 1 (Autumn 1999), pp. 21-35, p. 27.

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

³⁴² Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 2, pp. 150-151.

³⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

Turkish-Greek Relations, Cyprus and the US: 1982-1986

As mentioned above, the Rogers plan resulted in the loss of an important leverage over Greece, where the incoming PASOK government under Andreas Papandreou pursued a bellicose policy towards Turkey. Papandreou had been forced to resign from his fathers' cabinet after the 1967 crisis to please the US. His anti-American and anti-NATO rhetoric had created great concern among US officials. Turkey lifted her veto to Greek re-integration on October 1980, and talk between Turkey and Greece on the Aegean command and control started in Athens in December. In March 1981, a second meeting to conclude technical preparations was held in Ankara. However, after the landslide PASOK victory in the October 1981 election, the new Greek Prime Minister Papandreou declared that there could be no negotiations between Greece and Turkey, who threatened Greek sovereignty in the Aegean³⁴⁴. Thus, the Rogers Plan came to nothing.

Despite the flaming rhetoric, Papandreou did not radically alter Greek foreign policy and Greece remained in NATO. This was one of the domestic prices Papandreou had to pay in order to appease the President and founder of post-1974 democracy, Constantine Karamanlis. To justify this political expediency, Papandreou stated that the "Turkish threat" required Greece to remain in NATO.³⁴⁵

By 1983, Turkish-Greek relations were tense. Greece had forfeited the Rogers plan, and Papandreou refused bilateral negotiations and wanted to increase Greek territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 miles, but could not do so since Turkey regarded it as *casus belli*. In this atmosphere, two important developments took place: in September 1983, Greece tried to

³⁴⁴ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 2, p. 105.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

include the Island of Limni into the NATO exercise scheme in the Aegean. Two months later, the TRNC was declared.

Turkey objected to the Greek initiative on Limni by stating that the island is supposed to be demilitarized in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne. Greece had already militarized Aegean islands after the 1974 Turkish landing on Cyprus. By including Limni in the exercise scheme as a headquarter base, NATO would rubberstamp this illegal move. When NATO refused to include Limni, Greece declared that her armed forces would no longer join NATO exercises.

In the crisis over the militarization of Limni, the American attitude was negative. Turkey expected NATO to respect the de-militarized status of Limni as defined by international treaties. However, US officials had already designed the island as a forward deployment area for their forces in the event of war. Thus, they requested Turkey to be more lenient. In November 1984, NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington declared the 'neutrality' of NATO over the Limni issue. In December 1984, the Defense Planning Committee approved the country chapters for the next year without the inclusion of Greek and Turkish forces because the parties vetoed each other. While Turkey declared that she would continue joining NATO exercises and uphold her obligations, Greece refused to join NATO exercises. Throughout this process, the US did not pressure Greece, but Turkey. Moreover, she signed a bases treaty with Greece where she pledged to protect the 7/10 ratio in military aid to Greece and Turkey. By May 1986, the US by-passed the Turkish opposition and signed a bilateral treaty with Greece which provided basing rights to US planes at Limni in the event of a crisis.³⁴⁶

In Cyprus, the 1977 talks between Makarios and Denktaş had produced a set of guidelines which were as follows:

³⁴⁶ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, pp. 75-76.

1) Cyprus will be an independent, nonaligned, bicomunal federal republic; 2) territory under control of each administration will be addressed in light of economic viability, productivity, and property rights; 3) principles such as freedom of movement, settlement, and property will be discussed; and 4) powers and functions of the central federal government would safeguard the unity of the country.³⁴⁷

In 1979, Vassiliu Kyprianou who became Greek Cypriot president upon Makarios' death met with Denктаş and the parties agreed to negotiate on the basis of 1977 guidelines, but the ensuing talks did not produce a permanent settlement. Events took a new turn as the PASOK government in Athens decided to internationalize the Cyprus question. On 13 May 1983 the UN General Assembly accepted the resolution 37/253 prepared by a group of non-aligned states (Algeria, Guiana, India, Mali, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia) and supported by the Greek Cypriots³⁴⁸. The general tone of the resolution favored the Greek Cypriot position, but operative paragraphs 8 and 15 (which were accepted by a separate vote) were of greater concern to the Turkish side. While paragraph 8 "Demands the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus", paragraph 15 reads as follows:

(...) Reiterates its recommendation that the Security Council should examine the question of the implementation, within a specified time-frame, of its relevant resolutions and consider and adopt thereafter, if necessary, all appropriate and practical measures under the Charter of the United Nations for ensuring the speedy and effective implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus.³⁴⁹

In response, the Turkish Cypriot parliament declared their right to self-determination on 17 June. The parties on the island continued their negotiations until fall through the goodwill

³⁴⁷ Migdalovitz, Carol. "Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations". *Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief 89140*, 3 December 1996. Available [online]: <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/89-140.htm> [17 July 2007].

³⁴⁸ Sönmezoğlu, II. *Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 427.

³⁴⁹ *UN General Assembly Resolution 37/253*, 13 May 1983. Available [online]: <http://www.un.int/cyprus/Res37253GA.htm> [18 September 2007].

offices of the UN Secretary General Perez De Cuellar, but there was no breakthrough. At the end, the Turkish Cypriots decided to declare the TRNC. Along with the international situation cited above, there were domestic factors behind this decision: the leftist parties were steadily gaining ground against the National Unity Party (NUP) that supported President Denktaş. The 1976 constitution of the Turkish federal state prohibited Denktaş from serving a third term. Both the military regime in mainland Turkey and Denktaş supporters feared a collaboration of the Turkish Cypriot left with the Greek Cypriot socialists under AKEL. Thus, the declaration of independence served to prolong the NUP government and Denktaş presidency for another two decades and barred alternative approaches from the left.³⁵⁰

The American reaction to the TRNC was negative, but not strong. Department of State had expressed its dissent to the decision that would lead to the creation of a separate sovereignty, and called upon other states not to recognize the new state. In a radio interview in November 2001, the first Turkish ambassador to TRNC, İnal Batu had suggested that the Americans knew about the declaration beforehand and the Turkish side expected the US to recognize the new state. He stated: “we assumed that the base we would give to the Americans in Geçitkale would speed up the recognition”³⁵¹. This explains the seemingly mixed US reaction: though she expressed concern about the Turkish Cypriot independence and dissuaded Bangladesh and Pakistan from recognition, the US did not use her formidable leverage over Turkey to roll back the TRNC. While voting in favor of the UNSC Resolution 541, she abstained in the vote of Resolution 550 that was written in a much harsher language (Res. 550 was introduced after Turkey and TRNC established diplomatic relations by appointing ambassadors)³⁵².

³⁵⁰ Melek Firat, “KKTC’nin İlanı: Tepkiler ve Tartışmalar” in *Türk Dış Politikası* 2, Oran, ed. p. 108.

³⁵¹ Hasan Hastürer, “Herkes Gerekli Dersi Çıkartıyor mu?” *Kıbrıs Gazetesi*, 15 November 2006.

³⁵² Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 400.

As in the embargo period, there was a marked difference in the attitude of the Congress and the Administration: in March 1984, the Congress reduced the aid to Turkey by \$120 million and subjected its use to Turkey's compliance in the form of handing over Maraş and Magosa to UN administration. In his statement on the situation in Cyprus on 8 May 1984, President Reagan summarized the goodwill measures proposed by the Turkish side on January and the diplomatic progress made on the basis of these measures. He then remarked:

(..) less than 2 months ago, Secretary Shultz wrote leaders of the Congress to caution that cuts in the Turkish assistance program could risk endangering this progress. Unfortunately, important NATO-related funding for Turkey was nonetheless cut in committee, no doubt in the mistaken hope that this would somehow stimulate progress on Cyprus. As a result, diplomatic efforts quickly ground to a halt.

(...) I understand the frustration in the Congress and elsewhere about the need for progress. Indeed, I believe the time has come to try a new and more positive approach. Rather than punishing Turkey, let us focus constructive energy on ways of encouraging the parties on Cyprus itself, for it is here, ultimately, that differences must be resolved.³⁵³

To substantiate his strategy of encouraging the parties, Reagan offered to create a “special Cyprus peace and reconstruction fund of up to \$250 million”, which would be endowed when a “fair and equitable solution acceptable to both parties on Cyprus is reached, or substantial progress is made toward that end”³⁵⁴. Thus, while the Congress cut \$120 million from the Turkish aid, the Reagan administration made sure that the mistakes of the embargo period were not repeated. This approach worked as the Turkish side returned to the inter-communal negotiations under the auspices of UN Secretary General and followed up with the confidence building measures that they had introduced on January 1984.

³⁵³ Reagan, Ronald. *Statement on the Situation in Cyprus*, 08 May 1984. Available [online]: <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/50884c.htm> [18 September 2007].

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

The Armenian Genocide Claims and Turkish-US Relations 1984-1989

During the first half of the 1980s, the Armenian diaspora continued their efforts to promote the Armenian genocide claims through ASALA and JCAG terrorism against Turkish diplomats and other targets. However, this tactic proved ineffective. After Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the organization lost its vital training and logistics base. PLO withdrew its support and passed over the names and other details of many ASALA operatives to the French intelligence. The western states sympathetic to the Armenian cause withdrew their support after the Orly Airport attack on 15 July 1983, because it was an indiscriminate bombing attack in which eight people were killed and several others were injured. The French authorities promptly arrested those involved, and more importantly, the Turkish secret service received a green light to go ahead and eliminate ASALA and JCAG targets worldwide. By the end of 1984, ASALA was riddled with internal strife and ceased to be an effective force³⁵⁵. In the meantime, the Armenian Diaspora assumed a new tactic of politicizing the genocide claim by using their lobbying power in their respective countries of settlement and in international fora. The Armenian lobby in the United States joined forces with the Greek lobby to that effect. The first attempt to induce the US Congress into recognizing the Armenian claims came on September 1984, where the House of Representatives approved a resolution to recognize the 24 April as "Man's Inhumanity to Man day". The origin of this resolution goes back to 9 April 1975 Congress Joint Resolution 148, which

Authorizes the President to designate April 24, 1975, as "National Day of Remembrance of Man's Inhumanity to Man" for remembrance of all the victims

³⁵⁵ Soner Yalçın and Doğan Yurdakul, *Reis: Gladio'nun Türk Tetikçisi* (Doğan Kitapçılık, July 2003), pp. 191-200.

of genocide, especially those of Armenian ancestry who succumbed to the genocide perpetrated in 1915.³⁵⁶

But this time, it was proposed in conjunction with a motion in the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate. This motion called for the creation of principles that would guide US foreign policy in order to avoid “a repetition of deeds like the Armenian genocide”.³⁵⁷

The Özal government viewed these developments with concern, but regarded them as part of the US domestic political struggle for the upcoming elections. In June 1985, the Armenian resolution was put to general vote in Congress, but it was refused. In April 1987, the Armenian lobby tried once more and managed to bring a proposal to the House of Representatives Floor. This time, Turkey reacted by calling back her ambassador to Washington, Şükrü Elekdağ to Ankara ‘for consultations’. President Evren postponed his trip to Washington for May 1987. In August 1987, the US Congress refused to carry out a vote on the proposal on procedural grounds.

Two years later, the issue re-surfaced as yet another Armenian genocide resolution proposal passed the Senate Justice Committee. This time, American aerial operations in Turkey were curtailed, and the Ankara government threatened to take more drastic action if the Senate adopted the resolution. The State Department intervened to show how serious the situation was by recalling Ambassador Morton Abramowitz from Ankara for consultations, because Turkey had banned F-16 flights from İncirlik, and threatened to cancel the DECA in 1990. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to engage the Jewish lobby as well as US business community (especially the aerospace industry) on Turkey’s behalf. At the end, the proposal was filibustered on Senate floor by Senator Robert Byrd. In response, Turkey removed the

³⁵⁶ US Congress. *Joint resolution to designate April 24, 1975, as National Day of Remembrance of Man's Inhumanity to Man*. US Library of Congress. Available [online]: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d094:1:./temp/~bdmLBz:@@L&summ2=m&/bss/d094query.html> [18 September 2007].

³⁵⁷ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 62.

restrictions on US bases in Turkey. But as soon as she did so, on 24 April 1990, President Bush made a formal written statement:

Drawing attention to the long, enduring relationship between the United States and the Armenian people, the president noted that their faith, strength, and resilience had withstood the tragic earthquake of 1988 and "most prominently, the terrible massacres suffered in 1915-23 at the hands of the rulers of the Ottoman Empire." While Bush avoided use of the term genocide, he judged the "terrible massacres" to be a "crime against humanity," and he called on all peoples to observe the seventy-fifth anniversary on 24 April as a day of remembrance "for the more than a million Armenian people who were victims."³⁵⁸

Thus, while the US administration delivered on its promise to defeat the Armenian genocide remembrance proposal, the president appeased the Armenian lobby by describing the events of 1915 as genocide but in name.

Renewal of DECA and US Military Aid 1985-1989

The 1980s (like the 1950s) had been a period in which Turkey received increasing amounts of US aid. The international conjuncture of the Second Cold War and the developments in the Middle East worked in Turkey's favor in terms of justifying the much needed US economic and military aid. The novelty of the 1980s as opposed to 1950s was the Turkish emphasis on "trade rather than aid". In 1980, Turkish imports from the US were \$442 million while Turkish exports to US were \$127 million. By 1990, the figures were \$2.1 billion and \$971 million, respectively. In other words, during the 1980s, the ratio of Turkish imports from US to Turkish exports to US increased from ¼ to ½. However, US resistance to opening the US market to Turkish products (especially textiles) barred further progress³⁵⁹. As mentioned above, the US

³⁵⁸ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, pp. 63-64. Also see Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Narrative of Power*, book excerpt available [online]: <http://www.genocide1915.info/research/view.asp?ID=7> [17October 2007].

³⁵⁹ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*. See Table "Türkiye-ABD Ticareti (1980-1989)" in p. 69.

aid to Turkey increased from 1980 onwards and reached a peak in 1985. This was largely a reflection of the US support to the domestic political and economic transformation of Turkey as well as her pro-western foreign policy, especially in conjunction with the Middle East. The year 1985 was a turning point in all these aspects: in the second half of the 1980s, the IMF-sponsored Turkish economic model started to stall. The Cold War draw to a close as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union. US and Turkish interests ceased to converge as Turkey opted to support the PLO statehood against continuing US backing of Israel. The immediate reflection of these developments was seen in the amount and conditions of US military and economic aid: from the 1985 peak of \$885 million total, US aid to Turkey dropped to \$734 million in 1986, followed by \$590-522-560 and 512 million for the years 1987-1990³⁶⁰. The same trend could be observed in military grant aid:

Table 23: US Arms and Aid to Turkey Fiscal Years 1980-1989

Fiscal Year	Arms imports	Grant Aid	Direct Loans
1980	\$136 million	\$202.9 million	\$0
1981	\$109 million	\$250 million	\$0
1982	\$197.6 million	\$343 million	\$0
1983	\$155.1 million	\$290 million	\$0
1984	\$327.4 million	\$585 million	\$0
1985	\$423.4 million	\$485 million	\$0
1986	\$303.7 million	\$409.4 million	\$0
1987	\$332.9 million	\$177.9 million	\$0
1988	\$735.5 million	\$156 million	\$178 million
1989	\$961.8 million	\$340.7 million	\$90 million

Source: Federation of American Scientists. Available [online]: http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/turkey_fmchart.htm [13 September 2007].

In conjunction with the leveling of aid amounts, the ratio of grants to total aid dropped steadily.

Despite the efforts of the Administration to the contrary, the US Congress maintained the 7/10

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, see Table "ABD Askeri ve Ekonomik Yardımı 1980-1990" in p. 54. Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 395 provides slightly different figures.

ratio and demanded progress in Cyprus as a pre-condition. These negative developments came in a time when Turgut Özal needed increasing financial support to maintain economic growth and pursue populist spending in order to fend off his old rivals who returned to the political scene after the 1986 referendum. At the same time, the Turkish military needed modern equipment to replace the old as well as to compensate for the embargo years. In order to improve the aid conditions, Turkey used the leverage of DECA renewal and restrictions on US activities in Turkish bases.

The five year duration of the 1980 DECA expired in December 1985. In line with the agreement, Turkey gave a note to the US stating that she would like to negotiate outstanding issues before the renewal. The Turkish aim was to use the renewal of DECA as a bargaining chip to increase US aid. In September 1985, Prime Minister Özal had said: “If I’m providing the bases, I can demand increased trade”³⁶¹. The basic Turkish demands were: acceleration of TAF modernization; conclusion of a treaty that designates exact aid figures to remove the Congress obstacles; removal of preconditions to aid (Cyprus and 7/10 ratio); a forgiveness clause for Turkey’s FMS debt; cooperation in defense industry; assistance in lobbying in US Congress; and increased trade (especially removal of textile quotas)³⁶².

The tactic of using DECA as leverage, however, backfired: In September 1986, the US Congress cut the amount of US aid and advised the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus. In February 1987, the Congress further cut the Turkish aid by \$200 million, and demanded Turkey not to use it in Cyprus. That same year, the US administration refused to erase the FMS credit debt of Turkey through a forgiveness clause, despite the fact that a similar arrangement was made for Egypt and Israel³⁶³. Meanwhile, the DECA negotiations stalled as the US

³⁶¹ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, pp. 55-56.

³⁶² *Ibid.*, also quoted in Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 396.

³⁶³ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, pp. 54-55. As of 30 September 1997, Turkey had \$3.954 billion in outstanding and undispersed military loans from the U.S. See *US Arms and Aid to Turkey*.

administration only 'promised to achieve the desired amounts of aid' and pledged defense industry cooperation. Other Turkish demands were not met. In response, Turkey tried a different negotiation tactic and produced a new (and more technical/material) shopping list. This time, the focus was on increased military and economic cooperation through defense procurements of the US. On 16 March 1987, the US Secretary of State George P. Schultz and Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mesut Yılmaz exchanged a side-letter that prolonged DECA until 1990. In this letter, the US Administration pledged to meet the mutually agreed aid levels and do its utmost to prevail over Congress. However, the American constitutional system rendered this pledge null and void since the ultimate decision on the annual international assistance acts rested with the Congress. Thus, in practice the DECA of 1980 was renewed with the same conditions. Added to the side-letter was a secret protocol that envisaged the replacement of the F-4 Phantoms in İncirlik with the more advanced F-16's, modernization of US bases and provision of Konya as a training area for US aircraft in Turkey. In return, the US would grant forty F-4's to Turkish Air Force, procure a certain amount of its military needs from Turkey, and grant all of the \$100 million of economic and 320\$ million of the \$490 million military aid³⁶⁴. The relations soured as the Congress cut the proposed aid to Turkey for FY 1988 by 40% and re-introduced the Cyprus condition. In response, Özal government suspended the side-letter and slowed down the FMS debt payments. But as mentioned above, by 1988 Özal needed the Americans more than he had bargained for: in February 1988, the side-letter and the appending secret protocol were approved by his cabinet³⁶⁵.

The only positive gain for Turkey in terms of defense cooperation in the latter part of the 1980s was the fruition of the F-16 project: in February 1987, production started in the

³⁶⁴ Ufuk Güldemir, *Texas-Malatya* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1991, pp. 152-166), also quoted in *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, ed. Oran, p. 57.

³⁶⁵ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 58.

Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI). TAI was a joint investment between the Turkish government and the US aerospace company General Dynamics. While the majority share of TAI (51%) belonged to Turkey, the patents and technology was American. The Peace Onyx I project delivered 160 aircraft between 1987 and 1995, and significantly enhanced the power of Turkish Air Force by replacing the aging F-104's and F-5's. In the 1990s, TAI would diversify its production, engage in export as well as research and development³⁶⁶. Thus, one can say that the US did deliver on her pledge of defense industry cooperation.

Changing NATO Strategy and Replacement of Nuclear Weapons on Turkish Soil

As mentioned, the first half of the 1980s was termed as the Second Cold War and Turkey (both under military regime and Özal governments) pursued a close cooperation with the US to counter the perceived increase in the Soviet threat. Of course, the Second Cold War had repercussions on NATO strategy as well. Three distinct issues came to the fore within this context: the changes in the application of flexible response; the out-of-area question; and the deployment of advanced short range missiles on allied territory. While the former one was related to General Rogers' "Follow on Forces Attack" (FOFA) concept and was more relevant to members in the central front (notably West Germany), the latter two did have implications for Turkish-US relations. The question of out-of area operations was already discussed under RDF.

In its October 1983 Montebello meeting, Nuclear Planning Group of the alliance resolved to remove 1,400 short range nuclear warheads from the central front³⁶⁷. To remedy

³⁶⁶ *TAI History*. Available [online]: http://www.tai.com.tr/en_menu2.aspx?node=142&menu_id=7&id=142&img=tai_ana_ust-profil.swf [10 June 2007].

³⁶⁷ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 72; also see NATO. *The Montebello Decision, Annex to the Final Communiqué of the Autumn Ministerial Meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group*. Montebello, Canada,

for the removal of these warheads, NATO strategists suggested strengthening the nuclear capability in the wings. In April 1985, SACEUR General Rogers came to Ankara. Rogers proposed the removal of the older Honest John tactical short range missiles in Turkey their replacement with the longer range (400 km) Lance II's, and increasing the number of nuclear warheads in Turkey³⁶⁸. Considering Turkey's long term passion for nuclear weapons, it seems odd that Turkey refused both suggestions in a time of harmonious relations with the US. One of the main reasons for this was the developing economic relations with the Soviet Union. Another reason was the concern that short range (400 km) Lance II missiles would render Turkey a nuclear battlefield and reduce allied interest in the modernization of conventional forces³⁶⁹. The pace of the dissolution of the Cold War would overtake such notions as Gorbachev reforms unraveled the Eastern Bloc. By 1987, NATO and Warsaw Pact concluded the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty which removed all US and Soviet intermediate nuclear forces from Europe. The issue of nuclear race would soon become history. By 1989, the communist regimes in Eastern Europe were collapsing and the nuclear or conventional capability of the Turkish military was no longer a concern for her NATO allies. These developments reflected on the US aid levels at the end of 1980s as the interest rate of FMS credits rose to market levels and the grant portions became minimal. Thus, while Turkey avoided confrontation with the Soviet Union by rejecting the Lance II deployment, this did not reflect on the modernization of her conventional forces.³⁷⁰

(27 October 1983), NATO On-line Library. Available [online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c831027a.htm>. [10 June 2007].

³⁶⁸ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, pp. 72-73.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁰ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 74.

Series of Cooperation 1980-1990 Period

Compared to the previous period of 1960-1980, the 1980-1990 period witnessed a radical change in both domestic and international structural variables. When one recalls the discussion above, it was stated: if the bilateral series continue to swing in accordance with conjectural changes while institutional series remain in the centre of the graph, one can safely conclude that institutions do have a life of their own and should be treated as an independent variable. The graphic depiction of series of cooperation in 1980-1990 will support or falsify this argument.

There are eight series of cooperation in this period:

1. The US Reaction to the Military Coup;
2. The Rogers Plan and the Greek Re-integration to NATO Command;
3. The Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and Turkey;
4. Middle East Cooperation 1983-1989;
5. Turkish-Greek Relations, Cyprus and the US: 1982-1986;
6. The Armenian Genocide Claims;
7. Renewal of DECA and US Military Aid 1985-1989; and
8. Changing NATO Strategy and Replacement of Nuclear Weapons on Turkish Soil.

Of these eight series, the last one is readily identifiable as institutional. Another series involving NATO is the RDF, because it merges with the out-of-area question and Turkey uses the NATO leverage to limit unilateral US activity towards the Middle East from bases in Turkey. The Rogers Plan is a *bilateral* rather than an institutional series, because it is based on the agreement of two generals (a junta leader and the SACEUR), and as such it eliminates Turkey's institutional leverage through bilateral channels. Thus, there are six bilateral and two

institutional series in this period. The graphic representations of these series are presented below.

The US Reaction to the Military Coup (Series S12)

The spirit of cooperation between the leadership of the junta and the US actually preceded the coup: just as the commander of Air Force, Muhsin Batur had visited the US before the 12 March 1971 military intervention, so did Tahsin Şahinkaya before 12 September 1980. The military informed JUSMMAT two hours before moving in, and the US President Carter was briefed by CIA's Paul Henze about the coup with the following words: "our boys have done it!" As after the 1960 and 1971 coups, the junta immediately declared Turkey's continuing loyalty to NATO. The American diplomatic reaction to the coup was mild. During the organization of the military regime, two important appointments took place: Turgut Özal was named as Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Economics, and General Haydar Saltık, who had been running the Chief of Staff's relations with NATO, was named as the General Secretary of NSC. These two key positions were filled by people known to and trusted by the Americans.


1. The Turkish military informed the US about the impending military coup and reassured her of Turkey's continuing loyalty to the western alliance. The US gave a mild diplomatic reaction to the coup.
2. The military leadership appointed people known to and trusted by the Americans to key positions. Especially, the economy was entrusted to Turgut Özal. The US continued to support the Turkish economic program and made little criticism of the human rights violations during the military regime.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (S12) can be depicted as follows:

Table 24 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (S12)

Time	US	Turkey
Sept. 1980 TAF stages coup, informs US and pledges loyalty to alliance. US diplomatic reaction is mild.	1	1
1980-1983 The NSC appoints people trusted by the Americans to key positions. The US remains silent about human rights abuses and continues to support the Turkish economic program.	1	1
Absolute Gains:	2+2=4	
Relative Gains:	0	0

In graphic terms, series (S12) can be depicted as:



Graph 26 Graphic depiction of series (S12)

Series (S12) shows the mutual understanding and converge of interest between the Turkish military regime and the US. Many reasons like the international conjecture of the Second Cold War can be attributed to this. The result is a win-win situation for the US (who needed a more cooperative regime in Turkey), and the Turkish military (who needed economic and diplomatic support to sustain itself).

The Rogers Plan and the Greek Re-integration to NATO Command (Series R)


Greece had withdrawn from NATO's integrated command after Turkey's second operation in August 1974. Once civilian rule was firmly established by the Karamanlis government, the anti-American feelings in Greece subsided. By 1977, Greece had realized the hazards of losing the allied command and control over the Aegean to Turkey, and wanted to return. Successive Turkish governments vetoed the Greek return on the North Atlantic Council and demanded that Greece negotiate the command and control of the Aegean with Turkey before re-entering. By late 1980, domestic political developments in Greece worried American and NATO officials as Andreas Papandreou's PASOK was headed for an election victory. Papandreou assumed an anti-American rhetoric and pledged to leave NATO all together. The Americans feared irreparable damage to NATO's southern wing. On 17 October, Supreme Allied Commander General Rogers visited Ankara and told Evren that unless something was done, Greece would be lost to the allied cause. To allay Turkish concerns about Greek cooperation in return for lifting the veto, Rogers pledged his "soldiers honor": if Turkey allowed the Greek re-integration to NATO command, Rogers would make sure the Greek government negotiated the Aegean command and control issue with Turkey. On 20 October, NATO Defense Planning Council gathered in Brussels and approved the Greek return to alliance's military command. The strongman of the Turkish military regime Evren had accepted the Rogers offer. Soon after Turkey fulfilled her part of the bargain and allowed Greek re-entry, Papandreou's PASOK won the elections in Greece. General Rogers failed to persuade the new Greek government, and the Aegean command and control issue remained unresolved. Thus, Turkey lost an important diplomatic leverage over Evren's faith on General Rogers' soldiers honor.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (R) can be depicted as follows:

Table 25 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (R)

Time	US	Turkey
1977-Oct. 1980 Greece wants to return to NATO, Turkey vetoes it despite US pressure.	0	0
Oct. 1980 - 1981 Rogers Plan accepted by Evren. Greece return to NATO, but Rogers fails to persuade Greek government to negotiate Aegean command and control.	2	0
Absolute Gains:	2+0=2	
Relative Gains:	2	0

In graphic terms, series (R) can be depicted as:



Graph 27 Graphic depiction of series (R)

Series (R) looks like a typical case of non-iterated game where the stronger party persuades the weaker one to forgo its veto power and then suckers it by non-cooperation. Once the veto is lifted, there is no way of turning back, and thus ‘the strong gets what it wants and the weak accept what it must accept’.

The Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and Turkey (Series RDF)

In line with the Carter Doctrine, the US sought to increase her ability of power projection to the Middle East. Since the region was crawling with political forces hostile to US military presence, the US strategists came up with the idea of keeping the US soldiers at home, ready to fly in on a no-notice basis. The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDF) was established in MacDill air Base in Tampa, Florida. Some 200,000 soldiers from different services were assigned to its command. In case of an emergency in the Middle East, the RDF would fly in and either stop the developing threat on its tracks or act as a trip-wire to deter the aggressor. To do that, however, they had to pre-position equipment, ammunition and other material in the region so that when the soldiers arrived, they had combat capability. The main problem with the RDF approach was the logistics and infrastructure required to support large numbers of troops if they ever had to deploy in the region. Turkey with her membership in NATO, extensive logistics and infrastructure and 'reliable' military government, was an ideal candidate.

1. By the beginning of 1981, US officials started their overtures to ascertain the Turkish position on allowing the RDF. The initial Turkish response to US requests of hosting RDF facilities was negative. On his Washington visit in June 1981, the Defense Minister Haluk Bayülken, and in a speech in September, Minister of Foreign Affairs İltar Türkmen had stated that "the defense of the Gulf belongs to states in the Gulf". Turkey wanted to make sure that RDF remained within the NATO framework and acted only upon the decision of the North Atlantic Council.

2. Turkey had already pledged to support deployments deliberated within NATO framework. In January 1981, the US assigned the RDF to SACEUR command and showed her intention to make this a NATO project.


3. The incoming Reagan administration had expanded the scope of the Carter Doctrine and the RDF concept. Strategists like Albert Wohlstetter (who was the mentor of Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and Zalmay Khalilzad) had a much more comprehensive view of America’s Middle East policy and the role Turkey should play in it. Throughout 1981 and 1982, the US pressure on Turkey to host RDF facilities intensified. The intensive US pressure and lobbying paid off in November 1982: General Necdet Öztörün and Richard Perle met in Brussels and signed a Memorandum of Understanding, where Turkey approved the enlargement of ten US bases in Turkey and the construction of two new ones in Batman and Muş. Turkey also accepted the pre-positioning of material, but subject to Turkish approval. The main Turkish concern about possible out of area use of these bases was met with article 1 which prohibited the out of area use of the US bases in question.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (RDF) can be depicted as follows:

Table 26 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (RDF)

Time	US	Turkey
1980-1981 US proposes RDF and wants pre-positioning sites from Turkey. Turkey refuses and wants to limit RDF to NATO.	0	0
1981 Turkey pledges to support RDF in NATO. US assigns RDF to SACEUR.	1	1
1981-1982 Intensive US pressure on Turkey. Turkey accepts pre-positioning, US accepts limitation to NATO.	1	1
Absolute Gains:	2+2=4	
Relative Gains:	0	0

In graphic terms, series (RDF) can be depicted as:



Graph 28 Graphic depiction of series (RDF)

Series (RDF) represents a major turn in the trend of Middle East series. Whereas the relative gains of Middle East series in the 1960-1980 period were in Turkey's favor, the US achieves balance with the series (RDF) in the early 1980s.

Middle East Cooperation 1983-1989 (Series ME 80s)

Throughout the early 1980s, the US encouraged her allies in the region to forge closer ties and present a united front of moderate Sunni Islam against Iran and the Soviet Union. Turkey was the only secular democratic Muslim country in the region, and the only NATO member. As in the 1950s, these unique properties placed her to an important position in the American plans for the Middle East. On the Turkish side, both the military regime and the Özal government were willing to play the part envisaged by the Americans. The Americans believed that Turkey could serve three functions: i) Hosting facilities for the RDF (discussed above); ii) Military and economic cooperation with the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia; and iii) Engaging in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in order to break the isolation of Egypt and encourage a moderate Sunni pro-western agenda.


1. From September 1981 onwards, Turkey engaged in a series of military cooperation with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This entailed joint investments, military training and sales.
2. In line with her economic and military opening to the Middle East, Turkey also paid high regard to the OIC meetings. In January 1984, Turkey was represented at presidential level by Kenan Evren in the Casablanca Summit of the organization. In these meetings, Turkey i) supported the moderate and conservative Sunni agenda; ii) encouraged the re-integration of Egypt; iii) improved bilateral relations, especially trade relations; and iv) lobbied for diplomatic representation and recognition of TRNC. Turkey succeeded in the former three of her activities. Throughout 1980s, OIC supported a conservative anti-revolutionary stance; Egypt returned to the organization in March 1984, and Turkey's trade relations with Middle Eastern countries increased both in volume and variety. However, the organization extended only limited recognition to TRNC.
3. Throughout this period, the US aid levels to Turkey increased steadily: In 1980, the US had provided \$208 million in FMS credit and \$198 million in economic aid to Turkey (\$406 million in total). By the end of the military era in 1983, the level of military aid went up to \$400 million (\$110 million of which was in grants), and economic aid was up to \$245 million (\$645 million in total). By 1985, military aid was up to \$700 million. With the addition of \$185 in economic aid, the year 1985 represented the pinnacle of US aid to Turkey with a total of \$885 million.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (ME 80s) can be depicted as follows:

Table 27 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (ME 80s)

Time	US	Turkey
1981-1984 Turkey engages in military cooperation with the Gulf States. US provides financial support.	1	1
1984-1989 Turkey lobbies for re-integration of Egypt, supports the conservative Sunni agenda and improves trade relations with the Middle East.	2	0
Absolute Gains:	3+1=4	
Relative Gains:	2	-2

In graphic terms, series (ME 80s) can be depicted as:



Graph 29 Graphic depiction of series (ME 80s)

The shift in Middle East series becomes more apparent in Series (ME 80s) as the relative gains turn to US favor (as was the case in the 1950s). While Turkey supports the US Middle East policy in various platforms, she receives military aid in return, but cannot further her other causes like the recognition of TRNC.

Turkish-Greek Relations, Cyprus and the US: 1982-1986 (Series TGC)

By 1983, Turkish-Greek relations were tense. Greece had forfeited the Rogers plan, and Papandreou refused bilateral negotiations and wanted to increase Greek territorial waters in

the Aegean to twelve miles, but could not do so since Turkey regarded it as *casus belli*. In this atmosphere, two important developments took place:

1. In September 1983, Greece tried to include the Island of Limni into the NATO exercise scheme in the Aegean. Turkey objected to this initiative by stating that Limni is supposed to be demilitarized in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne. Greece had already militarized Aegean islands after the 1974 Turkish landing on Cyprus. By including Limni in the exercise scheme as a headquarter base, NATO would rubberstamp this illegal move. When NATO refused to include Limni, Greece declared that her armed forces would no longer join NATO exercises. Throughout this process, the US did not pressure Greece, but Turkey. Moreover, she signed a bases treaty with Greece where she pledged to protect the 7/10 ratio in military aid to Greece and Turkey. By May 1986, the US by-passed the Turkish opposition and signed a bilateral treaty with Greece which provided basing rights to US planes at Limni in the event of a crisis.

2. The Turkish Cypriot parliament declared their right to self-determination on 17 June. The parties on the island continued their negotiations until fall through the goodwill offices of the UN Secretary General Perez De Cuellar, but there was no breakthrough. At the end, the Turkish Cypriots decided to declare the TRNC. The American reaction to the TRNC was negative, but not strong. Department of State had expressed its dissent to the decision that would lead to the creation of a separate sovereignty, and called upon other states not to recognize the new state. Though she expressed concern about the Turkish Cypriot independence and dissuaded Bangladesh and Pakistan from recognition, the US did not use her formidable leverage over Turkey to roll back the TRNC.

3. In March 1984, the Congress reduced the aid to Turkey by \$120 million and subjected its use to Turkey's compliance in the form of handing over Maraş and Magosa to UN administration. The Reagan administration pursued a different and more positive approach


and offered to create a “special Cyprus peace and reconstruction fund of up to \$250 million”, which would be endowed when a “fair and equitable solution acceptable to both parties on Cyprus is reached, or substantial progress is made toward that end”. Thus, while the Congress cut \$120 million from the Turkish aid, the Reagan administration made sure that the mistakes of the embargo period were not repeated.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (TGC) can be depicted as follows:

Table 28 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (TGC)

Time	US	Turkey
1983-1985 Greece wants to include Limni in NATO exercise plan. Turkey vetoes, NATO declares neutrality. US supports NATO position signs treaty with Greece.	2	0
1983-1984 TRNC declared. US response negative but not strong. Congress cuts Turkish aid, but administration induces positive measures to facilitate negotiations. Turkish side returns to negotiations.	1	1
Absolute Gains:	3+1=4	
Relative Gains:	2	-2

In graphic terms, series (TGC) can be depicted as:



Graph 30 Graphic Depiction of Series (TGC)

Series (TGC) displays a turning point in Turkish position: as in the Middle East, relative gains turned to US. The main reason was Turkey's inability to react to US-Greek treaty on the use of Limni.

The Armenian Genocide Claims (Series Ar)

During the first half of the 1980s, the Armenian Diaspora continued their efforts to promote the Armenian genocide claims through ASALA and JCAG terrorism against Turkish diplomats and other targets. However, this tactic proved ineffective. After a series of bloody attacks involving civilians, the Turkish secret service received a green light to go ahead and eliminate ASALA and JCAG targets worldwide. By the end of 1984, ASALA was riddled with internal strife and ceased to be an effective force. In the meantime, the Armenian Diaspora assumed a new tactic of politicizing the genocide claim by using their lobbying power in their respective countries of settlement and in international fora. The Armenian lobby in the United States joined forces with the Greek lobby to that effect.

1. The first attempt to induce the US Congress into recognizing the Armenian claims came on September 1984, where the House of Representatives approved a resolution to recognize the 24 April as "Man's Inhumanity to Man day". The resolution was proposed in conjunction with a motion in the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate which called for the creation of principles that would guide US foreign policy in order to avoid "a repetition of deeds like the Armenian genocide".

2. The Özal government viewed these developments with concern, but regarded them as part of the US domestic political struggle for the upcoming elections. In June 1985, the Armenian resolution was put to general vote in Congress, but it was refused. In April 1987, the Armenian lobby tried once more and managed to bring a proposal to the House of Representatives Floor.

This time, Turkey reacted by calling back her ambassador to Washington, Şükrü Elekdağ to Ankara ‘for consultations’. President Evren postponed his trip to Washington for May 1987.

3. In August 1987, the US Congress refused to carry out a vote on the proposal on procedural grounds.

4. Two years later, the issue re-surfaced as yet another Armenian genocide resolution proposal passed the Senate Justice Committee. This time, American aerial operations in Turkey were curtailed, and the Ankara government threatened to take more drastic action if the Senate adopted the resolution. The State Department intervened to show how serious the situation was by recalling Ambassador Morton Abramowitz from Ankara for consultations, because Turkey had banned F-16 flights from İncirlik, and threatened to cancel the DECA in 1990. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to engage the Jewish lobby as well as US business community (especially the aerospace industry) on Turkey’s behalf. At the end, the proposal was filibustered on Senate floor by Senator Robert Byrd. In response, Turkey removed the restrictions on US bases in Turkey.

4. On 24 April 1990, President Bush made a formal written statement describing the events of 1915 as a genocide but in name and calling upon all people to commemorate the victims on 24 April.


The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (Ar) can be depicted as follows:

(see following page)

Table 29 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (Ar)

Time	US	Turkey
1984-1987 The Armenian Lobby repeatedly introduces genocide resolutions to US Congress. Turkey reacts, resolutions are voted down.	1	1
1989 Another resolution on Senate. Turkey curtails US activity. Administration intervenes on Turkey's behalf and resolution is defeated once more.	1	1
24 April 1989 Turkey removes restrictions on US activities. President Bush makes written statement calling the events of 1915 a genocide but in name	2	0
Absolute Gains:	4+2=6	
Relative Gains:	2	-2

In graphic terms, series (Ar) can be depicted as:



Graph 31 Graphic depiction of series (Ar)

Series (Ar) represents a new issue in Turkish-American relations, which would time and again re-surface. It is largely a public diplomacy problem with major international implications. Turkey's failure in the public diplomacy front costs her in the so-called 'high politics' as the Armenian Diaspora and western states use the genocide claim as a leverage on Turkey. In series (Ar), this situation is reflected with the relative gain of the US.

Renewal of DECA and US Military Aid 1985-1989 (Series DECA 80s)

US aid to Turkey increased from 1980 onwards and reached a peak in 1985. This was largely a reflection of the US support to the domestic political and economic transformation of Turkey as well as her pro-western foreign policy, especially in conjunction with the Middle East. The year 1985 was a turning point in all these aspects: in the second half of the 1980s, the IMF-sponsored Turkish economic model started to stall. The Cold War drew to a close as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union. US and Turkish interests ceased to converge as Turkey opted to support the PLO statehood against continuing US backing of Israel. The immediate reflection of these developments was seen in the amount and conditions of US military and economic aid: from the 1985 peak of \$885 million total, US aid to Turkey dropped to \$734 million in 1986, followed by \$590-522-560 and 512 million for the years 1987-1990. The same trend could be observed in military grant aid. In conjunction with the leveling of aid amounts, the ratio of grants to total aid dropped steadily. Despite the efforts of the Administration to the contrary, the US Congress maintained the 7/10 ratio and demanded progress in Cyprus as a pre-condition.

1. The five year duration of the 1980 DECA expired in December 1985. In line with the agreement, Turkey gave a note to the US stating that she would like to negotiate outstanding issues before the renewal. The Turkish aim was to use the renewal of DECA as a bargaining chip to increase US aid.

2. The tactic of using DECA as leverage, however, backfired: In September 1986, the US Congress cut the amount of US aid and advised the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus. In February 1987, the Congress further cut the Turkish aid by \$200 million, and demanded Turkey not to use it in Cyprus. That same year, the US administration refused to erase the FMS credit debt of Turkey through a forgiveness clause, despite the fact that a

similar arrangement was made for Egypt and Israel. Meanwhile, the DECA negotiations stalled as the US administration only ‘promised to achieve the desired amounts of aid’ and pledged defense industry cooperation. Other Turkish demands were not met.

3. On 16 March 1987, the US Secretary of State George P. Schultz and Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mesut Yılmaz exchanged a side-letter that prolonged DECA until 1990. In this letter, the US Administration pledged to meet the mutually agreed aid levels and do its utmost to prevail over Congress. However, the American constitutional system rendered this pledge null and void since the ultimate decision on the annual international assistance acts rested with the Congress. Thus, in practice the DECA of 1980 was renewed with the same conditions.

4. Added to the side-letter was a secret protocol that envisaged the replacement of the F-4 Phantoms in İncirlik with the more advanced F-16’s, modernization of US bases and provision of Konya as a training area for US aircraft in Turkey. In return, the US would grant forty F-4’s to Turkish Air Force, procure a certain amount of its military needs from Turkey, and grant all of the \$100 million of economic and 320\$ million of the \$490 million military aid.


5. The relations soured as the Congress cut the proposed aid to Turkey for FY 1988 by 40% and re-introduced the Cyprus condition. In response, Özal government suspended the side-letter and slowed down the FMS debt payments. But in February 1988, the side-letter and the appending secret protocol were approved. Throughout this period, the US administration kept its promise to cooperate in defense industry and by November 1987, the first sample of F-16 fighters was produced by the Turkish-American joint venture TAI.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (DECA 80s) can be depicted as follows:

Table 30 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (DECA 80s)

Time	US	Turkey
1985-1987 Turkey tries to use renewal of DECA to increase aid levels and remove trade barriers. US refuses Turkish demands, but still by 1987 DECA is prolonged	2	0
Turkey signs a secret protocol to enhance US military activities in Turkey, and is promised increasing aid in return. However, US Congress cuts Turkish aid. Turkey approves the protocol.	2	0
Absolute Gains:	4+0=4	
Relative Gains:	4	-4

In graphic terms, series (DECA 80s) can be depicted as:



Graph 32 Graphic depiction of series (DECA 80s)

In the 1980s, the Turkish tactic of using defense cooperation agreement as a leverage to increase US aid did not work. In the previous chapter, we had seen that the Demirel government had used the DCA negotiations in the latter half of the 1960s to that effect. The reasons for the failure of Özal government can be attributed to both bilateral and international structural reasons. Whatever the cause, the result is a series with considerable relative gain for the US.

Changing NATO Strategy and Replacement of Nuclear Weapons on Turkish Soil

(Series Lance)


The Second Cold War had repercussions on NATO strategy. Three distinct issues came to the fore within this context: the changes in the application of flexible response; the out-of-area question; and the deployment of advanced short range missiles on allied territory. In its October 1983 Montebello meeting, Nuclear Planning Group of the alliance resolved to remove 1,400 short range nuclear warheads from the central front. To remedy for the removal of these warheads, NATO strategists suggested strengthening the nuclear capability in the wings. In April 1985, SACEUR General Rogers came to Ankara. Rogers proposed the removal of the older Honest John tactical short range missiles in Turkey their replacement with the longer range (400 km) Lance II's, and increasing the number of nuclear warheads in Turkey. Turkey refused both suggestions. One of the main reasons for this was the developing economic relations with the Soviet Union. Another reason was the concern that short range (400 km) Lance II missiles would render Turkey a nuclear battlefield and reduce allied interest in the modernization of conventional forces.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (Lance) can be depicted as follows:

Table 31 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (Lance)

Time	US	Turkey
October 1983 NATO NPG resolves to remove 1,400 nuclear warheads from the central front. Turkey and US vote in favor.	1	1
April 1985 SACEUR Rogers comes to Ankara and proposes deployment of Lance II on Turkish soil. Turkey refuses. Lance II are not deployed, but this does not reflect on conventional force modernization of TAF.	0	0
Absolute Gains:	1+1=2	
Relative Gains:	0	0

In graphic terms, series (Lance) can be depicted as:



Graph 33 Graphic depiction of series (Lance)


If one considers the lengthy Turkish efforts to induce the deployment of nuclear weapons on Turkish soil during the 1950s and 1960s, the outcome of Series (Lance) seems odd. The explanation should be sought in the changing international conjecture as well as the growing awareness of the implications of such deployments. Indeed, many European countries had opposed the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles on their soil in the same period. Throughout the 1980s, Turkey supported the US strategy on NATO fora: she supported the Reagan Administration in its Second Cold War, and she supported the Bush administration in the dissolution of the Cold War. Thus, her refusal of Lance II deployment sticks out as a rare moment of dissent in the Turkish-US cooperation in NATO. Still, it resulted in no relative gain as the dissolution of the Cold War overtook Cold War mentality.

Overall Evaluation of Cooperation Series in 1980-1990 Period

The literature describes the 1980s as a period of harmonious relations and close cooperation with the US, reminiscent of the 1950s. The implication of such close bilateral

cooperation “reminiscent of the 1950s” is a period of greater relative gains for the US, since this was the picture in the graphic representation of the 1950s. If the neo-institutionalist claim about the effect of institutions is correct, however, institutional cooperation should not be effected by the shift of relative gains in favor of the US.

In graphic terms, the period 1960-1980 can be depicted as:



Legend
 S12: September 12 Military Coup; R: The Rogers Plan; RDF: The Rapid Deployment Force; ME 80s: Middle East Cooperation 1983-1989; TGC: Turkish-Greek Relations and Cyprus; Ar: The Armenian Genocide Claims; DECA 80s: Renewal of DECA and US Military Aid; Lance: Changing NATO Strategy and Replacement of Nuclear Weapons on Turkish Soil.

Graph 34 Series of cooperation in 1980-1990 period

Graph 34 suggests that compared to the previous period of 1960-1980, the 1980-1990 period was a reversal of fortunes in terms of relative gains in bilateral series. While Turkey enjoyed relative gains in four bilateral series of the 1960-1980 period, in the 1980-1990 period, she enjoys in none. The US, however, fares much better: while she had enjoyed relative gains in only one series of the 1960-1980 period, in the 1980-1990 period she enjoys relative gains in five series (Series DECA, ME 80s, TGC, R, and T). Again, this is the result of domestic and international structural changes (the so-called conjectural changes).

In terms of institutional series, Graph 34 supports the main assumption of the neo-institutionalist theory about the effect of institutions: though the relative gains in five of the

six bilateral cooperation series are in US favor, the institutional series (Series RDF and Lance) remain in the centre of the graph, indicating no relative gains for either party. A comparison of the three periods studied thus far (1945-1960, 1960-1980 and 1980-1990) shows that the relative gains in bilateral series shift in accordance with domestic, bilateral and international structural factors while the institutional series remain in the lower centre of the graph. As in the previous two periods, the lower-centre position of institutional series supports one major neo-institutionalist claim while falsifying another: it supports the argument that the effect of institutions moderate relative gains, but it falsifies the argument that institutional series of cooperation tend to be long and yield greater absolute gains. Provided that the methodology of this study is internally coherent and/or the literature on Turkish-US relations is more or less descriptive of the field, one can conclude the following:

1. Institutions (in our case, NATO) do have a life of their own as their effect on interstate relations (in our case, Turkish-US security relations) remain constant through variations in domestic, structural and ideational variables.
2. As the neo-institutionalist theory suggests, institutions moderate relative gains.
3. Contrary to the neo-institutionalist argument, institutions do not necessarily produce longer series of cooperation and greater absolute gains.

In order to verify these conclusions, one has to check if the life and effect of institutions are in correlation with the international structure. Indeed, this has been a major point of contention in the neo-neo debate throughout the 1990s. Both parties had produced evidence to support their respective claims. In order to test the neo-institutionalist claim about the enduring nature of the institutional effect, one has to look at periods across structural change. In the scope of this study, this requires us to look into the so-called 'Post War Era'.

CHAPTER SIX

THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST 1990-2003

So far, the chapter introductions of this study proceeded from domestic to international structural features of the period in question. The significance of structural changes in the international system requires an exception for the 1990-2003 period, because these changes had deep-seated effects on: i) Turkish and US domestic and foreign policy; and ii) the mission and strategy of NATO. Thus, an outline of the structural changes in the international system is in order.

Structurally, the 1990s were dubbed as ‘the Post-Cold War decade’. This was a time when “the transition to a “new world order” has been underway (...). No new world order emerged in the proper sense of the word”³⁷¹. The collapse of communism resulted in the shattering of the familiar and predictable bi-polar structure and opened up new possibilities as well as sources of concern. For a time, the western alliance seemed to have lost its purpose.

Between 1990 and 1991, NATO engaged in a soul-searching process. Discussions over its relevance in the new era resulted in the new strategic concept of 1991. Also called the Rome Strategic Concept, this document emphasized uncertainties of the new era as the primary threat and envisaged the gradual transformation of NATO from a collective defense organization into a collective security organization³⁷². The main reason for this transformation was the withering away of the massive, monolithic and direct threat emanating from the Warsaw Pact. The risks of the new era were described in paragraph 8 of the strategic concept as “multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and

³⁷¹ Güvenç, “The Rise and Demise of a ‘Strategic Partnership’”, p. 19.

³⁷² NATO. *The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, Rome. Available [online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b911108a.htm> [01 September 2007].

assess”³⁷³. While the threat from the Warsaw Pact was direct (i.e. conventional or nuclear attack to allied territory), the new threats were indirect (terrorism, ethnic and civil wars, organized crime, economic instability outside allied territory). This new situation required the alliance to intervene in out-of-area contingencies in order to meet these indirect threats at their source. Thus, the long-debated question of out-of-area intervention was resolved. Though it never became part of official NATO doctrine, it was evident that the alliance no longer made a defensive distinction between in-and-out-of-area. Another role of NATO was to lead the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the West. Throughout the 1990s, NATO successfully integrated the former Soviet satellites into the western security community. NATO also served as a forum of security dialog between the Russian Federation and the West through the formation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Finally, NATO was the platform on which the EU and US bargained for the formation of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Thus, in the Post-Cold War era, there were significant changes in the structure and functions of the alliance.³⁷⁴

In Turkish domestic politics, the early 1990s marked the end of the relatively stable post-military coup era, which bore the stamp of Turgut Özal. After his ascension to Presidency in 1989, his Motherland Party hung on to government for another two years, but conceded defeat in the November 1991 elections. The incoming coalition government of True Path Party led by Özal’s master/nemesis Süleyman Demirel and Social Democratic Peoples Party under Erdal İnönü was the first of a long series. The coalitions era lasted from November 1991 until the definitive Justice and Development Party victory in November 2002 elections. Between 1990 and 1997, eleven ministers of foreign affairs took office and held it

³⁷³ NATO. *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*.

³⁷⁴ Mustafa Türkeş, “Doksanlı Yıllarda NATO’nun Öncelikleri ve Türkiye” in *En Uzun Onyıl*, eds. Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, pp. 193-217.

an average of eight months³⁷⁵. This frequent change in the political leadership of foreign policy led to an increasing influence of the military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy in a time when Turkey was going through significant episodes in her relations with the US. After the DSP-led coalitions came to power in 1997, stability in political leadership was restored under the ministry of İsmail Cem.

The literature on Turkish foreign policy seems to be in agreement about the depiction of the 1990s as “the longest decade” of Turkish foreign policy, because the structural changes had such a profound effect on the context in which foreign policy is conducted³⁷⁶.

Economically, the era witnessed a series of economic crises in 1994, 1999, 2000, and finally 2001. These crises were the results of populism and massive corruption, and they led to skyrocketing inflation rates, public debts and devaluation of the Turkish Lira. Their remedy was sought in IMF recipes, which stabilized the economy and structured the foreign debt, but did not alter the flawed economic system in a fundamental way. In the 1990s, the fragile economy became another limitation on the conduct of Turkish foreign policy.

In the US, the victory of the Cold War triggered a search for new strategies to maintain US hegemony at a minimum cost³⁷⁷. Economically, the driving force behind US policy was two-fold: on the one hand, the US wished to maintain her primacy against the European and Pacific blocs. On the other hand, the US wished to enlarge and deepen the ongoing globalization process. Politically, the US aimed to solidify the democratic transition of the former communist bloc and the third world. Militarily, the US had two objectives: to maintain her superiority by impeding the emergence of a so-called ‘peer competitor’, and to meet the

³⁷⁵ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 239.

³⁷⁶ Also the title of their work, Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, eds. *En Uzun Onyıl*, Foreword, p. 9.

³⁷⁷ For an outline of these discussions, see: Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, pp. 244-251 and Güvenç, “The Rise and Demise of a ‘Strategic Partnership’”, Chapter 1, pp. 19-27.

aforementioned ‘indirect threats’³⁷⁸. These aims required the support of allies and recognition of the US as a benign power³⁷⁹. The US foreign policy of the era pursued these goals with varying degrees of success.

In domestic politics, the Democrats came to power in 1992 after eleven years of Republican dominance. The main domestic concern of the Clinton administration was to heal the wounds of ‘Reaganomics’ by focusing on the long-neglected social security and employment; reduce budget deficit; and encourage the booming information sector to complete the transition of the US into the information age³⁸⁰. This agenda required lower defense spending –swords into plowshares. This requirement converged with the institutionalist/Wilsonian trend of the Clinton administration that encouraged the formation of an international institutional structure to deal with the spontaneous indirect threats. Thus, the role of international institutions increased during the 1990s. In the emerging institutional structure, two institutions played an important role: i) the UN as a legitimization forum and ii) NATO as a ready-made military ‘teeth’ that acted on behalf of the international community.

In this new era, Turkey continued to be a significant part of US plans in the Middle East, but added to this were the Balkans and the former Soviet territory (the Caucasus, Black Sea and Central Asia). Another area of cooperation was Turkey’s quest for EU membership, in which she received considerable US support. Some issues like Cyprus, Turkish-Greek conflicts in the Aegean, status of US forces and scope of US activities in Turkey continued to strain the bilateral relations. Added to these was the growing Turkish concern about the creation of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq as a result of US policy towards that country.

³⁷⁸ For a colorful discussion of US military strategy in the Post-cold War era, see Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 2005), chapters 1-3.

³⁷⁹ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 247.

³⁸⁰ For a detailed account of the economic goals of the Clinton administration and his critique of New Rights ‘supply side economics’, see Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York: Random House, 2001), *passim*.

Indeed, during the 1980s the Kurdish question was part of the human rights debate between the US Congress and Turkey, but in the 1990s its regionalization turned it to a major issue in bilateral relations.

Turkish-US Cooperation in the Middle East

Turkish-US Cooperation during the Gulf War

The new era started with the Gulf War of 1990-1991. The developments during and after this conflict heralded the “New World Order”. On 2 August 1990 Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Kuwait. The initial shock quickly turned into a flurry of action as the West led by the US threatened to use force unless Iraqi forces pulled out of the oil-rich Kingdom. The UNSC produced a series of resolutions starting with Res. 660 of 2 August, which demanded Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The following UNSC Resolutions initiated an embargo and authorized the use of force unless Iraq complied.

Turkey immediately fell in with the coalition forces building up against Iraq. On 7 August, Turkey closed down the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline. As president, Turgut Özal still retained his control over the Motherland government under Yıldırım Akbulut and therefore had an extraordinary influence over foreign policy making. Indeed, using his personal contacts with President Bush, he tried to become one of the leaders of the coalition. He believed that Turkey should play an active role in the operation against Iraq and ‘sit at the table’ when the war was over. His motto was “bet one in order to gain three”³⁸¹. Thus, he tried to override the traditions and bureaucracy of the ever-cautious ministry of foreign affairs, overcome the opposition of the Armed Forces, and pushed for the highest possible level of involvement.

³⁸¹Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 2, p. 254.

The Americans had three basic demands from Turkey: use of bases in Turkey for air strikes against Iraq; deployment of TAF to the Iraqi border to detract from Saddam's forces in the south; and Turkish troop contribution to the coalition forces amassing in Saudi Arabia. After a six months long stand off, the international coalition composed of thirty-six countries acted against Iraq on 17 January 1991 (two days after the UNSC 678 deadline). After a month long air campaign which effectively destroyed Iraqi ability to make war, a sweeping ground operation drove the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. In this process, Turkey complied with the relevant UN resolutions on embargo, allowed the use of bases in Turkey for air strikes, and shifted 180,000 troops of her Second Army to the Iraqi border.³⁸²

Despite Özal's efforts, the Armed Forces and opposition within the ranks of his own party adamantly refused to contribute troops to the coalition. His arrogant personal style that by-passed the traditional chain of authority led to the resignation of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Bozer on 11 October 1990, followed by Minister of Defense Sefa Giray on October 18. His relentless pressure to join the coalition forces in Saudi Arabia resulted in the resignation of the Chief of General Staff Necip Torumtay on 3 December.³⁸³

In September 1990, Özal visited Washington and stated the rewards he expected for Turkey's cooperation: i) financial compensation of Turkey's damages as a result of joining the embargo; ii) an increase in US textile quotas for Turkey; iii) support for the modernization of Turkish Armed Forces, and iv) support for Turkey's bid in EC (EU) membership. The important point to mention is that there was no formal agreement, exchange of letters, or even a declaration that would bind the American side, because Özal believed this to be an issue of personal trust and contact between himself and the American President. Indeed, during his

³⁸² Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 255.

³⁸³ Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 544; Meliha B. Altunışık, "Güvenlik Kıskançlık Türkiye-Ortadoğu İlişkileri" in *En Uzun Onyıl*, eds. Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, pp. 321-344; p. 322.

negotiations with President Bush, Özal had left out even the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Bozer, although his counterpart, Secretary of State Baker was present.³⁸⁴

After the war, it was soon apparent that the expected rewards would not be forthcoming: the Americans did increase the textile quota by \$150 million, and the Turkish Defense Fund provided by the US, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait did compensate Turkey with some \$4 billion. But this was a very small amount compared to approximately \$30 billion loss of Turkey as a result of the embargo³⁸⁵. The only consolation was a significant increase in the grant portion of US military and economic aid in the years 1991 and 1992 (\$500 and \$475 million respectively)³⁸⁶. Instead of rewards, the turmoil in Iraq encouraged by the US would bring more and more trouble.

Northern Iraq and Turkish-US Relations: 1991-1998

In the closing days of the ground attack, coalition forces cornered the elite Republican Guard of Saddam Hussein in the north of Kuwait City... And they let them go. The stated goal of coalition attack (Operation Desert Storm) was to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, and the coalition never envisaged an invasion of Iraq proper. Nevertheless, the expectation was that after the war, an internal uprising of the Shiite in the south and Kurds in the north would bring Saddam's regime to an end. In light of this expectation, it seemed weird for the Americans to spare Saddam the only force he can use against these uprisings. In his work on the US manipulation of the Kurds by the US, Turan Yavuz claims that this was deliberate: the decision to keep the integrity of Iraq was made at the end of August in a boat meeting

³⁸⁴ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 29.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 258; Altunışık "Güvenlik Kıskançlık Türkiye-Ortadoğu İlişkileri", p. 327.

³⁸⁶ For US economic and military aid figures in 1991-1997, see Table "ABD Askeri ve Ekonomik Yardımı (1991-1997)" in Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 285.

between President Bush and his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft³⁸⁷. The Sunni Arab allies within the coalition, especially Saudi Arabia had concerns about Iranian influence over the Shiite population in the south if the collapse of Saddam regime resulted in the division of Iraq.

As expected, shortly after the ceasefire in late February 1991, the Shiite and Kurds in Iraq were in revolt. However, the Republican Guard successfully (and brutally) quelled these uprisings. As a result, approximately 1.5 million Kurds fled towards Turkish and Iranian borders. Initially, Turkey refused to open her borders to some 500,000 refugees and requested western help. As the plight of the refugees stuck on the mountains between Turkey and Iraq made headlines, President Özal called President Bush and proposed the establishment of a safe haven on the flatlands inside Iraqi territory. On 2 April the Turkish and French representatives sent letters to the UN Security Council to that effect. On 5 April, the UN Security Council produced Resolution 688, which appealed to all member states to contribute to the humanitarian efforts to ease the suffering of the Kurdish refugees³⁸⁸. Shortly afterwards, the US started an airlift campaign to deliver much needed aid to the area. On 10 April, the no-fly zone over thirty-sixth parallel was declared and the refugees started to settle in the safe haven around the northern city of Zaho. A joint force of US, France, Britain and Turkey assumed the protection of the refugees under “Operation Provide Comfort”. The ground forces headquartered in the Turkish town of Silopi at the Iraqi border. The air squadrons patrolling the no-fly zone were based in İncirlik. The first operation ended in mid-July as all refugees returned to Northern Iraq and the second stage (Operation Provide Comfort II)

³⁸⁷ Turan Yavuz, *İkinci Dünya Savaşından Körfez Savaşına ABD'nin Kürt Kartı* (İstanbul: AD Kitapçılık, 1998), pp.20-24.

³⁸⁸ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 260-261. For the full text of Res. 688, see UN. *Resolution 688 (1991)*. Available [online]: <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0688.htm> [20 September 2007].

ensued³⁸⁹. This second stage (also known as Operation Poised Hammer after the codename of the joint force) proved more troublesome for Turkey.

In Turkey, the cabinet approved the deployment of the joint force on 12 July. While allowing the use of bases in Batman and İncirlik for a non-NATO purpose, Turkey joined the operation with her own contingent and insisted that the Turkish commander be at the same rank and status of the task force commander. The weapons transferred for the operation would be under Turkish inspection. The duration of approval would be extended every six months (which implies that the Turkish authorities at the time thought of this as a limited exercise). Indeed, in September, the ground forces withdrew on Turkey's request and the Poised Hammer consisted of some seventy-seven airplanes and helicopters based in Pirinçlik and İncirlik, along with a military coordination center (MCC) in Zaho.³⁹⁰

The main Turkish concern about the activities of Poised Hammer was two-fold: firstly, the presence of the multi-national force was accompanied by a host of 'NGO's of dubious nature. The Turkish authorities feared these to be intelligence outfits operating under the guise of humanitarian aid. Secondly, allegations of allied helicopters carrying equipment and munitions to PKK as well as providing medical evacuation and aid for wounded terrorists infuriated the Turkish authorities; so much so that by 1992, Chief of General Staff Doğan Güreş ordered Turkish forces to open fire on all (including allied) helicopters and planes engaged in such activities. The presence of Poised Hammer was a dilemma for Turkey, because on the one hand, it prevented a humanitarian crisis by protecting the Kurdish population of Iraq from the repression of Saddam. On the other hand, it created a power vacuum in which the PKK could operate freely. Turkey was unable to terminate the Poised Hammer, which was a key feature of US containment policy towards Iraq. Thus, successive

³⁸⁹ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 2, p. 261.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

Turkish governments tried to fill the power vacuum it had created. To that end, Turkey engaged in:

1. Cross-border operations into Northern Iraq to strike at PKK camps, and
2. Cooperation with the Peshmerga leaders, neighboring countries and Saddam himself against PKK.

These policies bore contradictory results as well: cooperation with the Kurdish leaders Celal Talabani and Mesut Barzani led to the creation of a state-like entity in Northern Iraq which Turkey feared would constitute ‘a bad example’ for her own Kurdish population³⁹¹. Cross-border operations and cooperation with Saddam and neighboring countries hampered the authority of the Kurdish leaders and attracted western, particularly American criticism.

Initially, Turkey under Özal’s presidency tried to induce Peshmerga cooperation. In July 1992, Turgut Özal invited Mesut Barzani of Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Celal Talabani of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) to Ankara. These two figures were the leaders of the main political forces and tribes in Northern Iraq. They engaged in top level negotiations with the Turkish authorities and Turkey provided them with diplomatic passports. Their parties opened up representations in Ankara. Turkey also helped them with basic infrastructure in the region and provided a lifeline of trade through her borders³⁹². In return, the Peshmerga helped TAF in its operations against the PKK. Turkey had already conducted two operations against PKK targets in Northern Iraq in August and October 1991³⁹³.

However, the policy of cooperation with the Peshmerga soon led to the first steps towards the formation of a Kurdish state: In July 1992, KDP and PUK established a ‘local’ government.

³⁹¹ Baskın Oran, “Türkiye’nin Kuzey Irak Politikası” in *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, ed. Oran, p. 268.

³⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 263.

³⁹³ Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 546.

In September, they formed a local police force and initiated the creation of a military force³⁹⁴. On 4 October 1992, elections were carried out and a Kurdish Parliament was formed in Erbil. This parliament declared the Kurdish Federal State in Iraq. Turkey did not recognize this entity and regarded it as threat to regional stability. That same month, TAF engaged in a large scale operation against PKK in Northern Iraq. Though KDP units supported the operation, the Turkish warning message against the formation of a Kurdish state was clear. In November, Turkey convened a conference of neighboring states with Syria and Iran, in which the three countries declared their commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq. These conferences continued until 1994³⁹⁵. From 1993 onwards, Turkey started to re-establish her economic and diplomatic links with Baghdad.

1993 was a fateful year in terms of domestic dynamics in Turkey: a series of assassinations, ‘accidents’ and ‘natural deaths’ of dubious nature resulted in a radical shift in the balance of power.

On 17 January 1993, Commander of Turkish Gendarmerie Forces, General Eşref Bitlis died in a plane crash. Bitlis had publicly criticized the operations of Poised Hammer, which he believed led to the formation of a Kurdish state. The American embassy had repeatedly complained about his vocal criticism to the Turkish government. On 17 December 1991, US planes attached to the Poised Hammer mission patrolling the no-fly zone had harassed and force-landed his helicopter during a scheduled flight to the Iraqi city of Selahaddin.

A week later, journalist Uğur Mumcu was killed outside his home with a bomb planted in his car. Mumcu had been working on the connections of Abdullah Öcalan with the Turkish intelligence before establishing the PKK. His death remained unsolved and invited large-scale speculation.

³⁹⁴ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 2, p. 264.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*; Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 550.

On 17 April, Turgut Özal died of heart attack. He had been working on the draft of a new constitution, which he meant to be a new social contract to solve the Kurdish question.

On 2 July thirty-five attendants of the *Pir Sultan Abdal* Festivities in Sivas were besieged in the *Madımak* Hotel and burned to death by an agitated crowd of fundamentalist fanatics. Three days later, PKK attacked the small village of Başbağlar in the eastern city of Erzincan and executed thirty-five civilians. The identical number of deaths in these two incidents led to the speculation that Başbağlar was a payback for Sivas. However, it looked more like the continuation of a provocation series to radicalize the Turkish political scene: after Özal's death, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel was elected to presidency and Tansu Çiller took over the leadership of the True Path Party. Sivas and Başbağlar took place only a week after Çiller assumed power as the new prime minister of the True Path-led coalition government. Çiller's response to the rising tide of PKK terror and alarming signs of civil conflict was to give a free hand to the military, security and intelligence units to root out the sources of this problem through military means³⁹⁶. This reflected on Turkish foreign policy as well.

By 1994, there was a visible shift in Turkish policy towards Iraq: Turkey had been lobbying for the easing of economic embargo against Iraq and by the end of 1993 Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline was re-opened. In early 1994, Turkey re-opened the Habur border gate to Iraq. In May 1994, the revenues from the trade across Habur led to internal fighting between KDP and PUK. For Turkey, this conflict had its pros and cons: on the one hand, it stemmed the rising trend towards a Kurdish state and gave Turkey the leverage to use one group against the other to enlist their support against the PKK. On the other hand, the internal fighting reduced both groups ability to deal with the PKK and allowed it greater freedom of movement in the area. For the US, KDP-PUK conflict spelled disaster: firstly, these groups were part of

³⁹⁶ Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 547.

the opposition against the Saddam regime. Within the parameters of US policy, they were supposed to be fighting with Saddam, not each other. Secondly, to enlist support against their rivals, they cooperated with regional actors (PUK with Iran and Syria, KDP with Turkey and Saddam himself, both with PKK). This led to results that were contradictory to US policy for the region. As a countermeasure, the US convened the parties in Dublin in August 1995 to resolve their differences. Turkey joined in this conference as an observer and insisted that an agreement between the parties should involve Turkey's security concerns. The Dublin process resulted in failure as fighting between KDP and PUK continued unabated. By the end of 1995, PUK had enlisted the support of Iran who had sent some 10,000 troops (The Badr Brigades) to the area and was cooperating with the PKK. In response, Turkey forged a coalition of opportunity between herself, KDP, and Saddam. In August 1996, PUK had gained control of Erbil. The Iraqi forces in conjunction with KDP launched a counter-attack and routed the PUK forces. Simultaneously, TAF entered from the north and hit PKK targets. The advance of Iraqi forces into Erbil disrupted the entire US intelligence operation in Northern Iraq as she was forced to evacuate some 6700 people and transfer them to the US base in island of Guam. These were mostly Peshmerga working for the CIA. The US had to use Incirlik for the evacuation, which Turkey allowed. The MCC was also moved from Zaho to Silopi.

For Turkey, this was an opportunity to gain the initiative in the region: by October 1996, Turkey invited the parties to Ankara. Turkish, British and American officials joined in the meetings. Turkey also insisted on the representation of Turcomans, who were a friendly force in the region. In December, the new coalition government led by Welfare Party declared radical changes in the status of Poised Hammer: The MCC was to stay in Silopi, the duration of missions and weapons to be carried by the allied planes was subject to Turkish approval,

and the rules of engagement were restricted to self-defense. To highlight these changes, the name of the Operation was also changed from Poised Hammer to Northern Watch.³⁹⁷

The Ankara process was dominated by Turkey and continued until May 1997. Four meetings were held during this time. It had replaced the Dublin process and constituted a blow to American designs about the region.

To add to this process, the containment of Iraq in general was failing as well: in October 1997, Saddam fired the UN weapons inspectors accusing them with espionage for the US. While permanent members of the UN Security Council France, Russia and China tried to find a diplomatic solution, Iraq remained adamant and demanded the prosecution of the US weapons inspector Richard Butler.

In the meantime, the domestic pressure on the Clinton government to change its policy towards Iraq was mounting. On 26 January 1998, President Clinton received a letter from the neo-conservative think-tank Project for the New American Century (PNAC). The letter stated:

We are writing you because we are convinced that current American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and that we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War. In your upcoming State of the Union Address, you have an opportunity to chart a clear and determined course for meeting this threat. We urge you to seize that opportunity, and to enunciate a new strategy that would secure the interests of the U.S. and our friends and allies around the world. That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power. We stand ready to offer our full support in this difficult but necessary endeavor.³⁹⁸

The signatories included future Bush administration members like Donald Rumsfeld, Richard L. Armitage, Paul Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad, Richard Perle as well as prominent intellectuals like Robert Kagan and Francis Fukuyama. It carried the full weight of the arms and oil industries and defined Clinton's policy towards Iraq as a failure. It also urged him to

³⁹⁷ Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 550; Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2* p. 266.

³⁹⁸ Project for a New American Century. *Letter to President Clinton*. Available [online]: <http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm> [10 September 2007].

initiate a policy change from containment of Saddam to his removal. From 1998 onwards, signs of such change would become apparent. On 28 January, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright started a week long tour of Europe and the Middle East to marshal support against Saddam. Her trip did not include a stop in Ankara. In response, the Turkish government decided to send Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem to Baghdad during the Fest of Ramadan at the beginning of February. The US immediately sent a diplomatic and a military delegation to Turkey on the second of February for consultations.

Throughout 1998 and 1999, the Clinton administration continued to pressure Saddam and tried to ensure Turkish support for the military option. However, the actual operation would be conducted by the Bush administration in 2003 (see below).

Turkey and Dual Containment

The policy of Dual Containment aimed to isolate and coerce Iran and Iraq into cooperation and integration with the international system. Its aspects about Iraq were much harsher and included economic sanctions, the no-fly zone, weapons inspections and punitive attacks against military installations. Its aspects about Iran were more diplomatic and economic in nature. Turkey as an American ally with borders to both countries played a key role in the application of Dual Containment. Turkey's involvement was three-fold: as a host to military units that patrolled the no-fly zone in Iraq (discussed above); as a barrier to trade between these countries and Europe; and as an American ally in the political fora of the Muslim world.

In economic terms, dual containment consisted of embargo against Iraq and trade restrictions against Iran. The embargo against Iraq stemmed from relevant UNSC Resolutions during and after the Gulf Crisis. Initially, Turkey had voluntarily abided by them. As discussed above, in the aftermath of the war the ongoing embargo started to hurt the Turkish economy and Turkey tried to re-establish trade with Iraq. The most important aspect of this

effort was Turkish lobbying to allow Iraqi oil transfers through Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline. In April 1996, the UNSC Resolution 986 initiated the oil for food program. With Turkish insistence, 60% of the 1.5 million barrel a-day Iraqi oil was transferred through Kirkuk-Yumurtalık, which provided Turkey with \$500,000. However, this was a small amount compared to the full capacity of the pipeline.

Diplomatically, Turkey changed her position towards Iraq in the course of the 1990s. Starting the decade as an enthusiastic supporter of the Gulf War coalition, Turkey slowly but surely increased her cooperation with Saddam in matters concerning the integrity of Iraq, especially Northern Iraq. As noted, by 1996 Turkey supported the Saddam-Barzani alliance against PUK and PKK. In the year 2000, Turkey restored her diplomatic representation in Baghdad to ambassador level. A trade delegation visited Iraq and prepared the groundwork for a trade agreement. Turkey also sent humanitarian aid for the Iraqi population suffering as a result of the decade-long embargo.

With regard to Iran, the trade restrictions were not sanctioned by the UN, but the US Administration and Congress. In April 1995, a total embargo on dealings with Iran by US companies was imposed by US president Clinton. Trade with the US, which had been growing after the Iran-Iraq war ended abruptly. The next year, on 18 June 1996, the US Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (also known after its sponsor as the D'Amato Act) which threatened even non-US countries making large investments (more than \$40 million) in oil or natural gas industries of Iran or Libya³⁹⁹. The act was denounced by the European Union as null and void, but its most flagrant violation came from Turkey: a week after President Clinton signed the D'Amato Act into law, Turkey under the Welfare Party-led coalition of Necmettin Erbakan signed a \$22 billion natural gas deal with Iran, which turned

³⁹⁹ US Congressional Record. Available [online]: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_cr/h960618b.htm [11 September 2007].

Iran into the second largest natural gas supplier of Turkey after Russia. The Turkish government claimed that the deal did not violate the D'Amato Act:

“The sanctions ban investments in Iran. We're not going to invest in Iran. This is only a trade agreement,” Turkish government spokesman Abdullah Gul told reporters. “The two countries will build their own sides of the natural gas pipeline.”⁴⁰⁰

However the Turkish side interpreted the deal, the Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani regarded it as a major triumph over US efforts to isolate Iran –so did the Americans.⁴⁰¹

Diplomatically, Turkish cooperation in the Dual Containment towards Iran was more forthcoming. This was largely because of the ideological clash between the Shiite Islamic Republic of Iran and the Sunni secular Republic of Turkey. Both countries blamed each other with supporting opposition groups against their respective regimes. Iran supported the PKK as well as Islamic terrorist groups. Turkish police claimed Iranian involvement in high profile assassinations like Çetin Emeç and Uğur Mumcu. For her part, Iran criticized the Turkish-Israeli alignment and supported Syria. She also accused Turkey for tolerating the activities of the Mujahedeen Halq on her territory. Turkey shared the US concern about the increasing Iranian stockpile of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles. These points of disagreement led to Turkish support of Dual Containment in the diplomatic front. Though Erbakan had made his first foreign trip to Tehran, and Rafsanjani returned the visit in December 1996, the relations became tense in February 1997. The Iranian ambassador Bagheri criticized the Turkish-Israeli relations in anti-semitic terms during the Al-Kuds Meeting organized by the Welfare-held Sincan municipality in Ankara. In response, Turkey withdrew her ambassador to Tehran. At the end of the month, the Erbakan government fell

⁴⁰⁰ CNN World News. 12 August 1996. “Turkey, Iran sign Major Gas Deal.” Available [online]: <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9608/12/iran.turkey/> [12 September 2007].

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*

from power. The new government under Mesut Yılmaz restored diplomatic relations and did not cancel the gas deal made by Erbakan. In July 1999, the Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit (who took over from Mesut Yılmaz) made a statement supportive of the university students in Tehran who occupied their university campus in protest of the Islamic regime. Iran accused Turkey and US with sponsoring the anti-regime student movement.⁴⁰²

Turkish-Israeli Alignment

The first signs of Turkish-Israeli military cooperation were seen in the early 1980s, but the pro-Arab Turkish foreign policy of the time and the belligerent Israeli strategy did not allow its fruition to concrete cooperation. In the mid-1990s, both impediments were removed as Turkey had problematic relations with her Arab neighbors and Israel was committed to the Oslo Peace Process⁴⁰³. For Turkey, there were three reasons to seek Israeli cooperation:

1. Turkey was subjected to a veiled arms embargo by the US and Europe in a time of increasing PKK threat and needed new sources for weapons procurement;
2. Turkey was concerned about the Greek-Syrian cooperation that encircled her in the Eastern Mediterranean (the famous two-and-a half war scenario); and
3. Turkey needed the support of the Jewish lobby against the Armenian and Greek lobbies in the US Congress.

For the US, the alignment of two pro-American non-Arab countries in the region served multiple purposes. The protection of the Israeli state against the Arab pledge to destroy it had always been at the centre of US policy towards Israel. The commitment of Israel to the US-sponsored peace process made it easier for the US to encourage Turkey (along other friendly

⁴⁰² Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 2, p. 561.

⁴⁰³ Bölükbaşı, "Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View," *passim*.

powers like Jordan and Egypt) to forge closer ties with that country. For the US administration, increasing weapons trade between Turkey and Israel was a cost-effective way around the Congress where human rights activism, Armenian and Greek lobbies were influential in blocking military aid to Turkey. This reduced the costs of aiding Israeli defense by providing a customer for its defense products. It also helped to check the Baathist Syria and other radical anti-American elements in the region.⁴⁰⁴

The first steps towards forging closer ties came in 1990 as Turkey restored ambassadorial rank to its representation in Tel-Aviv. In December 1991, both the Palestinian and Israeli representations in Ankara were upgraded to ambassador level. In the following year, which marked the five hundred year anniversary of the Jewish emigration to Ottoman Turkey from Spain, a host of cultural events and diplomatic visits led to a warm atmosphere between the two countries. In November 1992, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin visited Israel and signed the Memorandum of Mutual Friendship and Cooperation.⁴⁰⁵

In 1994, Turkish-Israeli diplomatic relations experienced a high tide as Presidents Demirel and Vayzman visited each other, along with Prime Minister Çiller and Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres. The groundwork for cooperation in security, trade and tourism was laid down during these visits, but their fruition came in 1996. In February of that year, the parties signed a Military Training and Cooperation Agreement. Eleven other agreements pursuant to this first one facilitated training for Israeli pilots over Turkish airspace, joint military exercises, weapons procurement deals and cooperation against terrorism.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰⁴ For a detailed account of Turkish-Israeli alignment in the 1990s, see Gencer Özcan, *Türkiye-İsrail İlişkilerinde Dönüşüm: Güvenliğin Ötesi* (İstanbul: TESEV, 2006).

⁴⁰⁵ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 568.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 569-572.

The military cooperation intimidated Syria and led to the resumption of negotiations over the Golan Heights with Israel. It also led to Syria's submission during the Öcalan crisis with Turkey. Most importantly for Turkey, the Israeli intelligence provided support in the capture of Öcalan. Jordan joined the *Reliant Mermaid* Naval exercise in early 1998 conducted by Turkey, Israel and US. Thus, the military cooperation between Turkey and Israel served the purpose of US designs for the region in these and other examples.

Military cooperation was accompanied with a free trade agreement in 1996 (effective from May 1997). In May 1998, an Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed during Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz's visit to Israel. This agreement facilitated the sale of Turkish textile products to US via Israel and helped to increase the trade volume between the two countries up to \$900 million (a ten-fold increase in less than a decade).⁴⁰⁷

Overall, the Turkish-Israeli alignment followed a parallel course to the US-sponsored peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. As the peace process collapsed after the year 2000, Turkey resumed a more balanced policy towards Israel. The cooperation (especially its military aspects) had attracted the hostility of the Arab world from the very beginning: During the summit of OIC in Tehran in December 1997, Turkey was criticized for her cordial relationship with Israel as hostile to Arab and Muslim world by leaders like Rafsanjani (who had signed a \$22 billion gas deal with Turkey a year ago), Husni Mubarak (who had signed the Camp David Peace Accords with Israel back in 1977 and supported the Oslo Process), and Hafiz Al-Asad (who was conducting negotiations with Israel on the Golan Heights). This was a time reminiscent of the 1950s when the Arab world had united in condemning the pro-US policies of the Menderes government⁴⁰⁸. There was a crucial difference though: while in the 1950s, the Arab nationalists had enjoyed Soviet support, now

⁴⁰⁷ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* 2, p. 573.

⁴⁰⁸ Bölükbaşı, "Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View", p. 21.

they too had to co-exist with the only remaining superpower, US. The Arab reaction to Turkish-Israeli alignment did not lead to concrete losses for Turkey, because it had the American blessing. During the capture of Öcalan, the US worked in conjunction with Israel to help Turkey. Important parts of the military technology sold by Israel were in fact US products transferred to that country. In the absence of a superpower patron, the Arab world lacked the military hardware to challenge the combined military power of Israel and Turkey backed by the US. This enabled Turkey to pursue her goals in the Middle East (against PKK, Syria, Iran and the Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq) without much opposition. Cooperation with Israel also enlisted the support of the Jewish lobby in the US Congress against Armenian and Greek lobbies.

Turkish-US Security Cooperation in the Balkans

The Balkans had been an area where Turkish and American interests and policies were in near perfect harmony during the Post-Cold War decade. The reasons for this were manifold: the US was new to the region as an outside power and needed to enlist Turkish support for her designs in the Balkans⁴⁰⁹. The US could not depend on Greece, another NATO ally in the region, because the Greek interests and policies did not coincide with the American ones. Whereas Greece supported the Serbs in the Yugoslav wars of dissolution; had border and ethnic minority problems with Albanians and Macedonians; and had little sympathy for the plight of Bosnian Muslims, the US supported the Bosnians, Croats, Macedonians and Albanians. Turkey supported the same side largely for historical and cultural affinity with the Muslim populations of the Balkans –*realpolitik* would dictate Turkey to support the pro-integrity party led by the Serbs. Indeed, initially, both Turkey and the US declared that they were for the preservation of Yugoslavia. Throughout 1991, the focus of the US was firmly in

⁴⁰⁹ İlhan Uzgel, “Doksanlarda Türkiye İçin Bir İşbirliği ve Rekabet Alanı Olarak Balkanlar” in *En Uzun Onyıl*, eds. Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, pp. 393-435, p. 398.

the post-Gulf War developments in Iraq, and she regarded the ensuing crisis in Yugoslavia as a European problem. By 1992, it was too late for keeping Yugoslavian territorial integrity as Slovenes and Croats gained independence and the Bosnians reluctantly followed suit.

The dissolution of Yugoslavia brought with it a host of problems:

1. New and very fragile states came into being. These new states had problems within and amongst themselves, as well as with the already existing powers of the region.
2. Serbian nationalists under Milosevic tried to forge a greater Serbia by using the Serbian minorities in the neighboring former members of the Yugoslav Federation. This would lead to the drawn out bloody war in Bosnia.
3. The events leading up to the dissolution clearly showed the disharmony between the former European ‘great powers’: Russia, France and Britain supported the Serbian pro-integrity party; Germany, the Holy See, Austria and Italy supported the Croats and Slovenes; Turkey and the US supported the Albanians, Macedonians and Bosnian Muslims. The Balkans looked like a time warp that threw international politics back by a century.

In its first year in office, the domestic focus of the Clinton administration led it to continue the Bush policy of regarding the Yugoslav crisis as a European matter. But soon, the deepening human tragedy in the Bosnian war required the US to assume the initiative. Though the Balkans had no significant natural resource, the drawn out conflict produced a host of indirect threats like organized crime, human trafficking, ethnic cleansing and regional economic instability. By the end of 1993 it was evident that the arms embargo imposed by UNSC Resolution 713, the EU-led negotiations and the UN peace-keeping force on the ground (UNPROFOR) served to prolong rather than stop the war in Bosnia. At this point, Turkey lobbied for the so-called “lift and strike” policy to end the war and the suffering of Bosnians. By early 1994, the Clinton administration too was supporting the “lift and strike”

option. Both parties had been secretly providing the Bosnians with weapons despite the arms embargo. In March 1994, a federation between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats was forged in Washington. Both Turkey and the US used indirect means to strengthen the Croat and Muslim forces. By the end of 1994, the new Bosnian Muslim-Croat army was on the offensive. In early 1995, NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions combined with the international pressure and resulted in the Dayton peace talks between the parties. Dayton was a US plan to keep Bosnia as an entity under NATO security guarantee and EU administrative control between Serbs and the Croat-Muslim Federation.

Though it was a bitter pill for the Bosnian Muslims as well, Turkey supported the Dayton Accords. Turkey also provided ground troops for the Implementation Force (IFOR). In the aftermath of the war, Turkey joined the “Train and Equip Program” to build and strengthen the new Bosnian Army along with the US. Retired Turkish officers went to Bosnia to work with the American firm Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) in the training of the Bosnians.⁴¹⁰

The Turkish military cooperation was forthcoming in other Balkan contingencies as well: Throughout the 1990s, Turkey worked to strengthen the Albanian and Macedonian armies in conjunction with deepening US relations with these countries⁴¹¹. Turkey also took part in the UN Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) that replaced UNPROFOR in Macedonia on March 1995. By 1998, Yugoslavia was once more at the brink of civil war because of the Kosovo question. As the diplomatic efforts of the international contact group failed, the US proposed NATO sanctioned air strikes against Serbia. Turkey joined the air strikes with a squadron of F-16’s and opened up her airbases in Thrace to US planes and

⁴¹⁰ Uzgel, “Doksanlarda Türkiye İçin Bir İşbirliği ve Rekabet Alanı Olarak Balkanlar,” pp. 401-402.

⁴¹¹ Serhat Güvenç, “TSK’nın Sınır Ötesi Girişim Yetenekleri: Ulusal Güvenlik Politikasında Yeni Boyut” in *En Uzun Onyıl*, eds. Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, pp. 131-160; pp. 149-151.

ground crew⁴¹². After the military-technical agreement that provided for Serbian acceptance of the Rambouillet Accords, Turkey joined the Kosovo peace-keeping force KFOR as well. Turkish participation in the Kosovo campaign attracted criticism from Russia and Greece who drew parallels with the situation of Kosovar Albanians and Kurds. However, the US remained silent about such comparisons and continued to support Turkey in her policy against the PKK. In fact, the leader of PKK Abdullah Öcalan was captured with a joint Turkish-US operation in February 1999 –a month before the two countries joined forces in NATO air strikes against Serbia for her actions in Kosovo.

Throughout 1990s Turkey continued to complement the US policy of integrating the fragile Balkan states into the US-led international system. Her contribution was largely military and diplomatic in nature. In return, Turkey gained allies against Greece, increased her military experience in international peace keeping missions and enjoyed US support in her policy of defending the existence of Muslim populations in the Balkans.

Turkish-US Cooperation in Central Asia and the Caucasus

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a new region hitherto concealed within the vast Soviet Empire emerged. Central Asia consisted of fragile states rich in oil and natural gas resources. It was a crucial geo-strategic region between Russia, Middle East, China and India. It was important both as a gateway between the Far East and West and as a source of natural gas and oil. The region was also a source of potential trouble with its fragile state structure, inter-border disputes, ethnic strife, dysfunctional post-Soviet economy and radical Islamic elements.

⁴¹² Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 276.

The US had three aims for Central Asia: domination of energy sources and routes; keeping Russian resurgence, Chinese incursion and Iranian influence in check; and integration of the Central Asian states into the international system under US tutelage. All three aims coincided with Turkey's interests in the region, and the US needed Turkey for their realization. Thus, Americans encouraged Turkey to engage with 'the Turkic world from the Great Wall of China to the Adriatic Sea'. For Turkey, the emerging Turkic world was an opportunity to diversify her relations, increase her international significance as a bridge between east and west, and form an economic and military community to support her national aims. Indeed, Turkey recognized the independence of these countries and immediately established diplomatic relations at ambassador level⁴¹³. She organized regular summits of the Turkic World to establish closer political and economic cooperation. However, her economic, political and military power was insufficient to forge such a community in the face of Russian influence and Iranian rivalry. Thus, acting as a proxy to the US designs about the region provided Turkey with US support in investment (especially in terms of Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline project), diplomatic initiative and economic leverage.

The interests of Turkey and US were not always identical either: While Turkey supported Azerbaijan the Azeri-Armenian conflict, the US pursued a more pro-Armenian policy. In the implementation of the CFE treaty, the US requested Turkey to tolerate the Russian demands at modification. Actually, the core of Turkish-US discord arose from their view of Russia: For Turkey, Russia was a rival in her projects on Central Asia. For the US, toleration of Russian resurgence in the Near Abroad after 1993 was a price she had to pay in order to keep Russia within the fold and illicit her cooperation for NATO enlargement in Europe. Thus, Turkey did not receive US support in her competition with Russia over Central Asia and Caucasus in the mid-1990s. In time, a *modus vivendi* was achieved through

⁴¹³ İdil Tuncer, "Rusya Federasyonu'nun Yeni Güvenlik Doktrini: Yakın Çevre ve Türkiye" in *En Uzun Onyıl*, eds. Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, pp. 435-460, p. 447.

recognition and accommodation of Russian interests and moderation of Turkish ambitions in line with her limited resources. Moderation of Turkish ambitions was also the result of her realization that the countries of the region did not wish to exchange one big brother (Russia) with another (Turkey). Thus, in the latter part of the 1990s, Turkey focused on more realistic projects based on mutual gain.

Turkish-American security cooperation in Central Asia formed around NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. From 1994 onwards, Turkey provided military training for Central Asian members of PfP. In 1997, Turkey and US conducted joint exercises with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia⁴¹⁴. In the Caucasus, Turkey provided military training and equipment for Azerbaijan and Georgia, and supported the anchoring of these countries to the west. Her influence was again limited in the face of Russian objections, but by the end of 1990s, both countries had forged closer ties with the west.

Economically, the core of Turkish-US cooperation in the region was the realization of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. From 1995 onwards, the US supported the construction of this project. In October 1998, the Ankara Declaration was signed with between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This declaration identified the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline as the main line to carry Caspian oil to the west. US support for the declaration increased the feasibility of the project. Indeed, in November 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul, the agreement for the construction of Baku-Ceyhan was signed in the presence of US President Bill Clinton. By April 2000, the US Exim Bank declared her support for the construction⁴¹⁵. The step-by-step realization of the Baku-Ceyhan line represented the gradual shift in US policy from supporting a host of alternatives to commitment to Baku-Ceyhan

⁴¹⁴ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 280.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 281-282.

project. This commitment allowed Turkey to overcome Russian objections and establish herself an energy hub.

Formation of a New European Security Architecture and Turkish-US Cooperation

In the 1990s, the US defined her main objective about Turkey as ‘anchoring Turkey to the west’. An important aspect of this policy was to keep Turkey within the institutional framework of Western economic, political and military alliances. Turkish establishment too shared this fundamental view. During the Cold War, NATO membership had performed this function to the satisfaction of both parties.

With the end of the Cold War, the deepening European political and economic integration was accompanied by attempts at creating a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Turkey did not wish to remain outside EU and ESDI, and the US shared her concerns about the replacement of NATO with ESDI’s institutional arm, Western European Union (WEU). Thus, throughout the 1990s, the US supported the Turkish bid for EU membership and cooperated with Turkey in keeping ESDI as the ‘European pillar of NATO’.

Initially, the EU did not possess the military infrastructure and organizational means to implement the Petersberg missions that defined the scope of activity for the emerging European security arm. These missions (declared in Petersberg, Germany in 1992) included peace-keeping and implementation, humanitarian missions and crisis prevention. By 1993, the WEU had taken steps towards building up such capacity: a planning cell for WEU operations was established, along with the Satellite Centre in Torrejon, Spain, inaugurated in April 1993. Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) were designated. To meet US (and by extension, Turkish) concerns, cooperation between the Western European Union and NATO became progressively more intensive and frequent. On 21 May 1992, the Council of the WEU held its

first formal meeting with the North Atlantic Council at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Subsequently, the Secretary General of the WEU regularly attended ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council, and the NATO Secretary General likewise participated in WEU ministerial meetings. The North Atlantic and WEU Councils began to meet four times a year. A Security Agreement was agreed between NATO and WEU to facilitate the exchange of classified information. Other examples of enhanced practical cooperation included WEU access to NATO's integrated communications system on the basis of a NATO-WEU Memorandum of Understanding; and regular consultations between the secretariats and military staffs of both organizations.

In January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels, the sixteen member countries of the alliance gave their full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) which would 'strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance'. They expressed their support for strengthening this European pillar of the alliance through the Western European Union, which was being developed as the defence component of the EU. In order to avoid duplication of capabilities, NATO agreed to make its collective assets available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, "for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy"⁴¹⁶. The alliance also endorsed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) as a means of facilitating contingency operations. The concept was to be implemented in a manner that provided 'separable but not separate' military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU and would respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security. At the same time, they also reaffirmed that the Alliance remained the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of allies under the Washington Treaty. This formulation

⁴¹⁶ NATO. *Implementation of the St. Petersburg Tasks*. Available [online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [21 September 2007].

met the US 3-D criteria coined by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: no Duplication, no De-coupling, no Discrimination. These criteria also met the Turkish concerns over being excluded from the new European Security Architecture. However, in the latter half of the 1990s Turkish concerns over the developing ESDI increased.

In the 1997 Luxembourg summit, the EU slammed the door on Turkey's face as she was not listed as a candidate for membership in the enlargement process. In the May 1998 St. Malo meeting, Britain and France agreed to create a European army capable of conducting the peace-keeping and implementation missions without NATO resources. By 1999, the EU decided to integrate the WEU into the second pillar of EU. This decision effectively removed the NATO (and thereby Turkish) veto over possible EU military operations. In the meantime, the EU had accepted the Greek Cypriot bid for full membership and was critical of continued Turkish military presence on the island. The EU was also critical of Turkish policy towards the Kurdish question and the human rights violations that accompanied the low intensity conflict between TAF and PKK. For Turkey, the possibility of EU increasing its military capability to the point of replacing NATO in the European continent meant complete exclusion from the European security system and eventual confrontation with the EU military policy in a hotspot like Cyprus or the Aegean. Another possibility was increasing EU pressure on the handling of the Kurdish question. Thus, Turkey moved closer to the US and requested her support for inclusion in the enlargement of the EU. In the run-up to the December 1999 Helsinki Summit of the EU, the US intensively lobbied for Turkey's acceptance as a candidate.

In April 1999, the new NATO strategic concept was forged in the Washington summit of the alliance. Turkey insisted on the inclusion of the following in paragraph 17:

The European Union has taken important decisions and given a further impetus to its efforts to strengthen its security and defence dimension. This process will have

implications for the entire Alliance, and all European Allies should be involved in it, building on arrangements developed by NATO and the WEU.⁴¹⁷

The US supported the Turkish position, but neither party was in a position to stop the gradual development of European military capability. In June, the EU decided to facilitate the use of NATO resources for ESDI purposes without prior consultation with non-member states. Thus, for Turkey, inclusion in the EU enlargement process became a security question as well. Turkey reacted to this proposal by threatening to veto the use of NATO resources by WEU. In the year 2000 Feira summit, the EU proposed a consultation mechanism between the fifteen EU members and the six non-EU members of NATO. This proposal did not satisfy Turkey as it did not include the non-members into the strategic planning and policy debate. In the June 2000 Brussels summit of NATO, Turkey required the EU to obtain NATO approval each time it wished to use NATO resources. The US supported the Turkish position, but essentially was content with the consultation mechanism offered at Feira⁴¹⁸. Still, Turkish objections continued into the early 2000s and became a bargaining chip in her candidacy process as well.

US Military Aid to Turkey in the 1990s

In the US military aid of the 1990s, the Cold War era grants and low interest rate credits came to an end. In 1989, the US stopped the Military Assistance Program and replaced it with new channels like the Pentagon's Foreign Military Financing Program, the Economic Support Fund and the cascading program (transfer of excess articles as a result of CFE). After 1992, grant portions of military aid were discontinued. Turkey was able to replace some of her military hardware like the aging M48 tanks with newer ones through cascading, but the main Turkish concern was to create faster, smaller units with greater fire power which could operate under diverse conditions. This was largely the result of the lessons from the Gulf War.

⁴¹⁷ NATO. *The Alliances Strategic Concept*. 24 April 1999. Available [online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> [21 August 2007].

⁴¹⁸ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, pp. 314-317.

Turkey wished to transform her military from a territorial defense hulk into a modern force capable of forward defense, low intensity conflict and peace-implementation outside her own borders⁴¹⁹. Though Turkey had diversified her sources of weapons procurement, the US remained as her primary supplier. Moreover, the US was the only available source of the advanced military technology required to meet the demands of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs.

The US approach to Turkish military modernization had a positive and a negative dimension: on the positive side, the US wished to see Turkey as a capable ally in the post-Cold War contingencies of crisis prevention, peace-keeping and peace implementation missions. On the negative side, she did not wish to provide Turkey with too much military prowess that would upset the regional balance against Greece. There were also increasing criticism in the US Congress over human rights violations in low intensity conflict against the PKK and the continuing military presence of Turkey in Cyprus. Generally, the US administration accommodated the first two goals and tried to strike a balance between arming Turkey enough to keep her as a capable ally, but not enough to turn her into a regional power. The US Congress was on the negative side of the equation with its cuts and conditions on Turkish aid. Throughout the 1990s Turkey spent an average of \$5 billion in defense⁴²⁰. Weapons procurement from the US (with the exception of 1995 and 1996) hovered around \$900 million. In the mid-1990s, there was a veiled embargo against Turkey and procurement from the US had dropped by half (\$536 and \$547 million for 1995 and 1996). This sudden drop was largely related with the efforts of the Greek and Armenian lobbies in the Congress, the Kardak crisis that brought Turkey to the brink of war with Greece, and Turkey's increasingly assertive policies in Northern Iraq (see above). However, by 1997, the US arms

⁴¹⁹ Güvenç, "TSK'nın Sınır Ötesi Girişim Yetenekleri...", p. 132.

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

sales to Turkey peaked with \$1.27 billion⁴²¹. This shows the basic US dilemma about military aid to Turkey: while the US wished to see Turkey as a security producer in the triangle of Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, she did not want Turkey to use her increasing military might in the pursuit of her national interests that did not coincide with the American ones.

The Invasion of Iraq 1998-2003

The greatest conflict of interest in Turkish-American relations arose after 1998 as the US decided to abandon containment of Saddam Hussein and go for regime change. As in the case of containment, the US needed Turkish support to implement the policy of regime change.

In November 1998, US Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited Ankara. He was accompanied by CENTCOM commander General Anthony Zinni and SACEUR General Wesley Clark. This high profile delegation had brought a message from President Clinton, which declared the US policy shift to regime change and mentioned the possibility of introducing US ground forces to achieve that goal. Clinton expected the full support of Turkey as a reliable ally of the US. In response, Turkish President Süleyman Demirel stated his concerns about the instability that may ensue and recalled the refugee crisis that hit Turkey after the Gulf War. He even suggested that the Americans could support a palace coup within Saddam's inner circle and thereby eliminate him⁴²². Turkish concerns centered on the possibility of disintegration of Iraq as a result of US invasion. This would lead to the formation of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq and create hotbeds of terrorist activity. It would also cost Turkey economically. To allay Turkish concerns, the US suggested that they could

⁴²¹ Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası 2*, p. 287.

⁴²² Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitap Evi, 2004), pp. 15-17.

help Turkey with the capture of Abdullah Öcalan. In the meantime, on 15 December Turkey approved the use of İncirlik airbase for Operation Desert Fox, in which US and British planes struck at Iraqi targets suspected of chemical weapons storage and production. Planes patrolling the no-fly zone had frequently opened fire on Iraqi anti-aircraft sites within the context of self-defense, but this operation could not be legitimized in such manner since it was pre-meditated. The government related its concern to the US embassy, but did not restrict or ban US flights from İncirlik. One of the reasons was the continuing US support for the capture of Abdullah Öcalan. On 16 January 1999, Öcalan was captured in Kenya after leaving the Greek embassy in Nairobi. By August, imprisoned Öcalan had declared unilateral ceasefire for the PKK and ordered his armed units out of Turkish territory. Thus, at long last Turkey's bloody struggle with the PKK seemed to be at an end –thanks to US support.

The year 1999 was in many aspects a zenith in Turkish-US relations: in January, Abdullah Öcalan was captured. In the process, the US had supported the Turkish armed diplomacy towards Syria and provided intelligence support during the chase across Europe, Russia and finally Africa. In the following months, the US support for Turkish EU candidacy was crowned in the December 1999 Helsinki EU summit which included Turkey into the list of candidate states. This constituted a radical turn in EU policy helped by US lobbying on behalf of Turkey. In November 1999, President Clinton came to Turkey to attend the OSCE summit and spoke to the TGNA (and became the first ever US President to do so). Here, he stated that the shape of the coming century would in no small measure depend on the choices made by the Turkish people and defined Turkey as a bridge to the next century with its ability to bring together different cultures⁴²³. His speech was interrupted twelve times with the applause coming from all MP's across the floor. During the OSCE meeting, the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline Agreement was also signed.

⁴²³ Bill Clinton, "Remarks to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 15 November 1999," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 35, no. 46 (22 November 1999), pp. 2381-2385.

In November 2000 elections, the Democrats lost to the Republicans under George W. Bush, who came to office with a neo-conservative agenda. In itself, his victory over the Democratic candidate Al Gore was viewed positively by Turkey since the Democrats were more sensitive to human rights issues and the pressures of the ethnic lobbies. The new Bush administration did not initiate sweeping changes in US foreign policy as it was focused on the domestic agenda of tax cuts throughout its first months in early 2001. In Turkey, a massive economic crisis shattered the economy and forced Turkey to abandon the pegged exchange regime, devalue the Lira by 40%, and engage in a new stand-by agreement with the IMF. The new Minister of Economics, Kemal Derviş sought US and European support to structure the Turkish foreign debt. By early fall, there were still concerns about the immediate future of Turkish economy.

One event changed everything: on 11 September 2001, airplanes hijacked by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network struck them at the World Trade Centre Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. The massive destruction of the attacks was broadcast live by TV stations across the world and people watched in horror as the giant WTC towers collapsed. The attacks had killed more than 3,000 people. The initial shock of the event was soon replaced by a storm of activity as the US prepared to strike back. The Bush Administration immediately identified its first target as the Al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and the radical Islamic Taliban regime hosting them. There was global support and sympathy for the US: NATO declared its solidarity and activated article 5, which obliged all members to support the US against aggression. Turkey declared its full cooperation for the US operations. Indeed, on 21 September, Turkey approved the US request to use Turkish airspace and airfields for the transfer of munitions and other equipment. On 5 October, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called President Sezer to inform about the imminent operation against Afghanistan and asked for Turkey's continued support. The next day, the US invited a liaison officer from

TAF to the CENTCOM Headquarters in Tampa, Florida. The US also wanted troop contribution for the post-war operations. By December, the US and British forces had invaded Afghanistan, and Turkey sent her troops to the NATO-led international peace-keeping force. In the coming years, Turkey would assume the command of the NATO force twice.

While the US and British forces bombed the Taliban targets in Afghanistan in late November 2001, plans for the next target were already discussed in Washington: Iraq. Throughout December 2001 and early months of 2002, the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and CENTCOM Commander Tommy Franks painstakingly worked on the revision of Op Plan 1003, which “outlined an attack and invasion of Iraq designed to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein”⁴²⁴. In January 2002, Prime Minister Ecevit visited Washington. Here, President Bush and Vice-President Cheney warned him about the coming invasion if diplomatic means bore no result, and asked for Turkish support. In response, Ecevit stated the known Turkish concerns about the integrity of Iraq, a possible refugee flow and economic damages. He also warned that if the disintegration of Iraq became inevitable, Turkey would not accept the inclusion of Mosul and Kerkuk into the Kurdish-controlled zone⁴²⁵. Shortly after Ecevit spoke to Bush, on 29 January, the American President declared Iraq, Iran and North Korea as constituting “an axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of the world” in his State of the Union Address⁴²⁶. On the first of February, Ecevit wrote a letter to Saddam Hussein and strongly urged him to comply with the UN weapons inspections. A week later, Saddam’s seven pages long reply arrived. He remained defiant about weapons inspections and even condemned Turkish cross-border operations and hosting of the Northern Watch.⁴²⁷

⁴²⁴ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (London: Pocket Books, 2004), p. 36.

⁴²⁵ Yetkin, *Tezkere*, pp.39-40.

⁴²⁶ Bush, George W. 29 January 2002. *The President's State of the Union Address*. Available [online]: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> [21 October 2007].

⁴²⁷ Yetkin, *Tezkere*, pp.41-42.

In March 2002, Vice-President Cheney was in Ankara as part of a Middle East tour to marshal support for the coming Iraqi invasion. In his meeting with Prime Minister Ecevit, Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem, and Head of Chief of General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, Cheney declared in no uncertain terms that the US was going to use force to topple Saddam Hussein and expected Turkish support. He also hinted that the concrete US demands would be soon forthcoming⁴²⁸. In the summer of 2002, Turkey allowed the passage of US Northern Iraq Liaison Units (NILU) to gather intelligence in Iraq. These units would look for evidence of a concealed WMD program and establish contact with the friendly local forces⁴²⁹. During that spring and early summer, the foreign affairs bureaucracy, the military staff and intelligence establishment conducted a series of meetings to establish Turkey's so-called 'red lines': no formation of a Kurdish state; preservation of the status of Musul and Kirkuk; protection of the Turcoman as a constituting people in the post-Saddam era.

The concrete US demands from Turkey for the invasion of Iraq came in the fall of 2002. In September 2002, the Office of Defence Cooperation (ODC) in Ankara related a message to the Turkish General Staff: The Americans demanded "full and complete cooperation". They wanted to deploy land, air and naval units on Turkish territory, and required the use of several bases and facilities. On 20 October 2002 an American military delegation including Generals Tommy Franks of CENTCOM and SACEUR Joseph Ralston was in Ankara with detailed operational plans. The US wanted a blanket approval for transit flights, use of airfields and railroads as well as a number of ports. She also wanted to deploy some 60,000 troops in Turkish territory that would attack Iraq from the North. In return for Turkish cooperation, the US pledged to protect the integrity of Iraq; act in conjunction with TAF which would be allowed to enter Northern Iraq with the US troops; and financial

⁴²⁸ Yetkin, *Tezkere*, p. 44.

⁴²⁹ Mesut Taştekin, "Türk Dış Politikasında 2003 Irak Savaşı" in *II. Körfez Savaşı*, eds. Mehmet Şahin and Mesut Taştekin (Ankara: Platin, 2006), p. 265.

assistance to compensate for the economic losses resulting from the war⁴³⁰. The Ecevit government was headed for an election it was bound to lose, and did not wish to commit to a definite deal. Besides, deployment of foreign troops required TGNA approval.

In November 2002 elections, the decade-long era of coalitions ended with a landslide JDP victory. The new government was formed by Abdullah Gül, because the leader of JDP Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was banned from running for office and hence was not a member of the parliament. Still, in early December Erdoğan was invited to Washington to engage in official visits. Once there, Erdoğan was subjected to high level protocol and spoke to President Bush. During this visit, Erdoğan refrained from making definite promises, but implied that Turkish support would have the price of financial assistance and more advocacy for her EU membership⁴³¹. Back home, the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy and military staff were reeling with the realization of the magnitude of US demands. In its December meeting, the National Security Council advised the government to wait for the report of UN weapons inspectors on 27 January 2003.

When it became evident that the US would strike even in the absence of a UN Resolution to authorize the use of force, the parties engaged in intensive negotiations. In early February, the government decided to divide the motions about Iraq and introduced the first one on 6 February. This first motion asked TGNA approval for preliminary work and construction on the facilities which would be used by the Americans. The approval of the first motion gave the US a deceiving signal and led her to believe that full Turkish cooperation would be forthcoming. In reality, though the TGNA had approved the first motion, there were significant points of contention between the parties: the US wanted to keep the TAF movement in Northern Iraq subject to her own control while demanding complete freedom for her own forces. The Americans also wanted to distribute heavy weapons to the Kurdish

⁴³⁰ Mustafa Balbay, *Irak Bataklığında Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri* (İstanbul: Çağ Basım Yayın, 2004), pp. 20-31.

⁴³¹ Taştekin, "Türk Dış Politikasında 2003 Irak Savaşı," pp. 266-267.

groups in the region and the parties could not agree on a satisfactory control mechanism for the retrieval of these weapons. The financial aspect of the bargaining was described by the US with the derogatory term 'horse trade'. This annoyed the Turkish side who reminded the Americans about the costs of an operation without Turkish support. In response, the Americans threatened to abandon the entire Northern Front idea.

By the beginning of March, the parties experienced a serious miscommunication. While the US regarded Turkish hesitations as a bargaining tactic, Turkey believed the Americans had no 'plan B' that did not require Turkish participation. On the first of March, the JDP government brought the second motion to allow US troop deployment on Turkish soil to the TGNA. The parliament failed to approve the motion because the yes votes were three short of the required 267. This failure known as the '*Tezkere* Incident' led to one of the deepest crises in the history of Turkish-US relations. In two weeks, the US started with her operation against Iraq. Though Turkey provided her airspace and allowed the use of joint installations in support of the operation, this was far less than expected, and led to complete US disregard of Turkey's 'red lines' outlined above. After the invasion, the US proceeded to enhance the Kurdish authority in Northern Iraq and bar TAF cross-border operations into the region. In July 2003 Suleymania incident, US troops arrested the members of the Turkish Special Forces liaison team. From 2003 onwards, PKK activity in the region increased. Despite assurances to the contrary, the US gradually accepted a federal solution to post-Saddam Iraq, which brought about the possibility of an independent Kurdish state.

Series of Cooperation 1990-2003

The Post-Cold War period diversified the issues in Turkish-US relations. Though the essence of cooperation remained security, the changes in the international structure led to the transformation of the context in which security cooperation took place. These changes also

transformed the core institution in Turkish-US security cooperation, NATO. During the 1990s, NATO assumed collective security missions beyond the territory of its members. The analysis of this period will provide useful hints about the independence of institutional effect from the changes in structure: if structural changes lead to a shift in the institutional series, one can conclude that the institutional effect is correlated with the structure. However, if there is no change in the position of institutional series, this would support the argument that institutions have a life of their own.

There are nine series of cooperation studied in the 1990-2003 period:

1. Turkish-US Cooperation during the Gulf War;
2. Northern Iraq and Turkish-US Relations: 1991-1998;
3. Turkey and Dual Containment;
4. Turkish-Israeli Alignment;
5. Turkish-US Security Cooperation in the Balkans;
6. Turkish-US Cooperation in Central Asia and the Caucasus;
7. Formation of a New European Security Architecture and Turkish-US Cooperation;
8. US Military Aid to Turkey in the 1990s; and
9. The Invasion of Iraq 1998-2003.

Of these series, “Turkish-US Cooperation in the Balkans” and “the Formation of a New Security Architecture” are considered institutional, because both involve cooperation within the framework of NATO. Turkish participation in the Balkan contingencies took place through NATO operations towards that region. The Turkish position towards the ESDI was shaped on NATO forum. Thus, in the analysis below, these two series will be defined as institutional while the remaining seven series will be considered bilateral.

Turkish-US Cooperation during the Gulf War (Series G)

On 2 August 1990 Saddam Hussein's Iraq invaded Kuwait. The initial shock quickly turned into a flurry of action as the West led by the US threatened to use force unless Iraqi forces pulled out of the oil-rich Kingdom. The UNSC produced a series of resolutions starting with Res. 660 of 2 August, which demanded Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait; initiated an embargo and authorized the use of force unless Iraq complied.

1. Turkey immediately fell in with the coalition forces building up against Iraq. On 7 August, Turkey closed down the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline. The Americans had three basic demands from Turkey: use of bases in Turkey for air strikes against Iraq; deployment of TAF to the Iraqi border to detract from Saddam's forces in the south; and Turkish troop contribution to the coalition forces amassing in Saudi Arabia. After a month long air campaign which effectively destroyed Iraqi ability to make war, a sweeping ground operation drove the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. In this process, Turkey complied with the relevant UN resolutions on embargo, allowed the use of bases in Turkey for air strikes, and shifted 180,000 troops of her Second Army to the Iraqi border. Despite Özal's efforts, the Armed Forces and opposition within the ranks of his own party adamantly refused to contribute troops to the coalition.
2. After the war, it was soon apparent that the expected rewards would not be forthcoming: the Americans did increase the textile quota by \$150 million, and the Turkish Defense Fund provided by the US, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait did compensate Turkey with some \$4 billion. But this was a very small amount compared to approximately \$30 billion loss of Turkey as a result of the embargo. The only consolation was a significant increase in the grant portion of US


military and economic aid in the years 1991 and 1992 (\$500 and \$475 million respectively).

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (G) can be depicted as follows:

Table 32 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (G)

Time	US	Turkey
August 1990 Iraq invades Kuwait. US forms coalition, Turkey joins the sanctions.	1	1
September 1990-January 1991 US demands use of Turkish bases and airspace for the attack against Iraq, Turkey provides.	1	1
January-February 1991 Operation Desert Storm. Coalition air strikes to Iraq from bases in Turkey. Iraq defeated.	1	1
February 1991-1993 Turkey expects financial compensation as promised, the US fails to deliver but continues to use Turkish bases for operations in Iraq.	2	0
Absolute Gains:	5+3=8	
Relative Gains:	2	-2

In graphic terms, series (G) can be depicted as:



Graph 35 Graphic depiction of series (G)

Turkish-US cooperation during the Gulf War aimed to achieve the expulsion of Saddam's forces from Kuwait. The US demanded the use of Turkish bases and airspace to that end. Turkey complied with the US demands in every aspect except providing troops (which was not militarily necessary). However, after the war the US failed to deliver in her promises for Turkish cooperation. The relative gains in favor of the US in Graph 35 represent this failure. As such, it shows that relatively, Turkey did 'bet one' but could not 'gain three'.

Northern Iraq and Turkish-US Relations: 1991-1998 (Series NI)

Shortly after the ceasefire in late February 1991, the Shiite and Kurds in Iraq were in revolt. However, the Iraqi Republican Guard quelled these uprisings. As a result, approximately 1.5 million Kurds fled towards Turkish and Iranian borders. Initially, Turkey refused to open her borders to some 500,000 refugees and requested western help. President Özal called President Bush and proposed the establishment of a safe haven on the flatlands inside Iraqi territory. On April 2 the Turkish and French representatives sent letters to the UN Security Council to that effect.

1. On 5 April, the UN Security Council produced Resolution 688, which appealed to all member states to contribute to the humanitarian efforts to ease the suffering of the Kurdish refugees.
2. Shortly afterwards, the US started an airlift campaign to deliver much needed aid to the area. On 10 April, the no-fly zone over 36th parallel was declared and the refugees started to settle in the safe haven around the northern city of Zaho. A joint force of US, France, Britain and Turkey assumed the protection of the refugees under "Operation Provide Comfort".

3. The first operation ended in mid-July as all refugees returned to Northern Iraq and the second stage (Operation Provide Comfort II) ensued (also known as Operation Poised Hammer after the codename of the joint force).
4. The presence of Poised Hammer was a dilemma for Turkey, because on the one hand, it prevented a humanitarian crisis and protected the Kurdish population of Iraq from the repression of Saddam. On the other hand, it created a power vacuum in which the PKK could operate freely.
5. Initially, Turkey under Özal's presidency tried to induce Peshmerga cooperation to fill the authority vacuum in the region. However, the policy of cooperation with the Peshmerga soon led to the first steps towards the formation of a Kurdish state. In November, Turkey convened a conference of neighboring states with Syria and Iran, in which the three countries declared their commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq. These conferences continued until 1994. From 1993 onwards, Turkey started to re-establish her economic and diplomatic links with Baghdad. This was a move contrary to US policy of isolating and containing Saddam. By 1994, there was a visible shift in Turkish policy towards Iraq: Turkey had been lobbying for the easing of economic embargo against Iraq and by the end of 1993 Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline was re-opened. In early 1994, Turkey re-opened the Habur border gate to Iraq.
6. In May 1994, the division of revenues from the trade across Habur led to internal fighting between KDP and PUK. As a countermeasure, the US convened the parties in Dublin in August 1995 to resolve their differences. Turkey joined in this conference as an observer and insisted that an agreement between the parties should involve Turkey's security concerns.
7. In August 1996, PUK had gained control of Erbil. The Iraqi forces in conjunction with KDP launched a counter-attack and routed the PUK forces. Simultaneously, TAF

entered from the north and hit PKK targets. The advance of Iraqi forces into Erbil disrupted the US intelligence operation in Northern Iraq. She was forced to evacuate some 6,700 people and transfer them to the US base in island of Guam. These were mostly Peshmerga working for the CIA. The US had to use Incirlik for the evacuation, which Turkey allowed. The MCC was also moved from Zaho to Silopi.


8. For Turkey, this was an opportunity to gain the initiative in the region: by October 1996, Turkey invited the parties to Ankara. Turkish, British and American officials joined in the meetings. Turkey also insisted on the representation of Turcomans, who were a friendly force in the region. In December, the new coalition government led by Welfare Party declared radical changes in the status of Poised Hammer: The MCC was to stay in Silopi, the duration of missions and weapons to be carried by the allied planes was subject to Turkish approval, and the rules of engagement were restricted to self-defense. To highlight these changes, the name of the Operation was also changed from Poised Hammer to Northern Watch. The Ankara process was dominated by Turkey and continued until May 1997. It had replaced the Dublin process and constituted a blow to American designs about the region.
9. On 28 January, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright started a week long tour of Europe and the Middle East to marshal support against Saddam. Her trip did not include a stop in Ankara. In response, the Turkish government decided to send Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem to Baghdad during the Fest of Ramadan at the beginning of February. From 1998 onwards, the US overrode Ankara and gathered the parties in Washington.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (NI) can be depicted as follows:

Table 33 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (NI)

Time	US	Turkey
April-July 1991 Refugee crisis. Turkey requests help, US delivers. Safe havens created with Provide Comfort. Refugees return.	1	1
July 1991-1993 Second stage Poised Hammer creates power vacuum. Allegations of US aid to PKK. Still, Turkey conforms to US policy and tries to cooperate with local Kurdish leaders. This leads to formation of Kurdish state.	2	0
1993-1994 Turkey changes policy. Diplomatic and economic links with Baghdad re-established.	0	0
1994-1996 Internal fighting between Kurdish groups. Turkey continues to host Poised Hammer and joins Dublin Process initiated by the Americans.	1	1
1996 Turkey cooperates with KDP and Saddam against PKK and PUK. Saddam's advance disrupts the US intelligence operations in the region.	0	2
1996-1998 Ankara process. Turkey retains initiative and changes the status of Poised Hammer, turning it into Northern Watch.	0	2
1998 US policy shifts towards regime change, initiates Washington process. Turkey continues to host Northern Watch.	2	0
Absolute Gains:	6+6=12	
Relative Gains:	0	0

In graphic terms, series (NI) can be depicted as:



Graph 36 Graphic depiction of series (NI)

The Turkish-US cooperation in Northern Iraq constituted a crucial aspect of containing the Saddam regime during the 1990s. It's downside for Turkey was the power vacuum in Northern Iraq, in which the PKK operated freely and a nascent Kurdish state took shape. While supporting the US policy of containment, Turkey engaged in a series of countermeasures to avoid the negative consequences of this cooperation. By 1998, containment in terms of Northern Iraq was successful, and Turkey had avoided the formation of a Kurdish state and militarily defeated the PKK. Thus, Graph 5.2 is a fair representation of this situation.

Turkey and Dual Containment (Series DC)

The policy of Dual Containment aimed to isolate and coerce Iran and Iraq into cooperation and integration with the international system. Turkey played a key role in the application of this policy.

1. In economic terms, dual containment consisted of embargo against Iraq and trade restrictions against Iran. The embargo against Iraq stemmed from relevant UNSC Resolutions during and after the Gulf Crisis. Initially, Turkey had voluntarily abided by them.
2. In the aftermath of the war, the ongoing embargo started to hurt the Turkish economy and Turkey tried to re-establish trade with Iraq. The most important aspect of this effort was Turkish lobbying to allow Iraqi oil transfers through Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline. In April 1996, the UNSC Resolution 986 initiated the oil for food program. However, this was a small amount compared to the full capacity of the pipeline.
3. Diplomatically, Turkey changed her position towards Iraq in the course of the 1990s. By 1996 Turkey supported the Saddam-Barzani alliance against PUK and PKK. In the year 2000, Turkey restored her diplomatic representation in Baghdad to ambassador

level. A trade delegation visited Iraq and prepared the groundwork for a trade agreement. Turkey also sent humanitarian aid for the Iraqi population suffering as a result of the decade-long embargo.

4. With regard to Iran, the trade restrictions were not sanctioned by the UN, but the US Administration and Congress. In April 1995, a total embargo on dealings with Iran by US companies was imposed by US president Clinton. The next year, on 18 June 1996, the US Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions act (also known after its sponsor as the D'Amato act) which threatened even non-US countries making large investments (more than \$40 million) in oil or natural gas industries of Iran or Libya. A week after President Clinton signed the D'Amato act into law, Turkey under the Welfare Party-led coalition of Necmettin Erbakan signed a \$22 billion natural gas deal with Iran, which turned Iran into the second largest natural gas supplier of Turkey after Russia.
5. Diplomatically, Turkish cooperation in the Dual Containment towards Iran was more forthcoming. This was largely because of the ideological clash between the Shiite Islamic Republic and the Sunni secular western ally. Both countries blamed each other with supporting opposition groups.


The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (DC) can be depicted as follows:

(see following page)

Table 34 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (DC)

Time	US	Turkey
1991-1993 Sanctions to Iraq. Turkey abides by the embargo	1	1
1993-1996 Sanctions hurt Turkish economy. US fails to deliver compensation	2	0
1996-1998 Turkey cooperates with KDP and Saddam, initiates Ankara process, re-establishes links with Baghdad, signs natural gas deal with Iran. US supports Oil for Food program but is insufficient to meet Turkish damages	0	2
1998-2000 US shifts to regime change. Turkey restores representation in Baghdad to ambassador level	0	0
Absolute Gains:	3+3=6	
Relative Gains:	0	0

In graphic terms, series (DC) can be depicted as:



Graph 37 Graphic depiction of series (DC)

Turkish cooperation in Dual Containment was mixed at best. While generally supporting the policy, Turkey abandoned it when her national interests so required. Graph 5.3 depicts this situation where the Turkish support for the policy and her defections cancel each other out in terms of relative gains.

Turkish-Israeli Alignment (Series Is)

For Turkey, there were three reasons to seek Israeli cooperation:

1. Turkey was subjected to a veiled arms embargo by the US and Europe in a time of increasing PKK threat and needed new sources for weapons procurement;
2. Turkey was concerned about the Greek-Syrian cooperation that encircled her in the Eastern Mediterranean (the famous two-and a half war scenario); and
3. Turkey needed the support of the Jewish lobby against the Armenian and Greek lobbies in the US Congress.

For the US, the alignment of two pro-American non-Arab countries in the region served multiple purposes. The protection of the Israeli state against the Arab pledge to destroy it had always been at the centre of US policy towards Israel. The commitment of Israel to the US-sponsored peace process made it easier for the US to encourage Turkey (along other friendly powers like Jordan and Egypt) to forge closer ties with that country. For the US administration, increasing weapons trade between Turkey and Israel was a cost-effective way around the Congress where human rights activism, Armenian and Greek lobbies were influential in blocking military aid to Turkey. It also reduced the costs of aiding Israeli defense by providing a customer to its defense products. It helped to check the Ba'athist Syria and other radical anti-American elements in the region.

1. In December 1991, both the Palestinian and Israeli representations in Ankara were upgraded to ambassador level. In November 1992, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin visited Israel and signed the Memorandum of Mutual Friendship and Cooperation.
2. In 1994, Turkish-Israeli diplomatic relations experienced a high tide as Presidents Demirel and Vayzman visited each other, along with Prime Minister Çiller and Israeli

Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres. The groundwork for cooperation in security, trade and tourism was laid down during these visits, but their fruition came in 1996. In February of that year, the parties signed a Military Training and Cooperation Agreement. Eleven other agreements pursuant to this first one facilitated training for Israeli pilots over Turkish airspace, joint military exercises, weapons procurement deals and cooperation against terrorism.


3. The military cooperation intimidated Syria and led to the resumption of negotiations over the Golan Heights with Israel. It also led to Syria's submission during the Öcalan crisis with Turkey. Most importantly for Turkey, the Israeli intelligence provided support in the capture of Öcalan. Jordan joined the *Reliant Mermaid* naval exercise in early 1998. Thus, the military cooperation between Turkey and Israel served the purpose of US designs for the region in these and other examples.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (Is) can be depicted as follows:

Table 35 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (Is)

Time	US	Turkey
1991-1992 Initial contacts. Diplomatic contacts up to ambassador level. Memorandum of Understanding signed.	1	1
1994-1996 High level state visits. Groundwork for security cooperation laid down.	1	1
1996-1998 Military cooperation deal signed. Alignment intimidates Syria, co-opts Jordan. Reliant Mermaid conducted.	1	1
1998-2000 Öcalan crisis. Israel and US help with the capture.	1	1
Absolute Gains:	4+4=8	
Relative Gains:	0	0

In graphic terms, series (Is) can be depicted as:



Graph 38 Graphic Depiction of Series (Is)

Series (Is) is the result of fruitful cooperation between Turkey and Israel. The US was indirectly a beneficiary of its results. In terms of relative gains, it has rewarded all parties concerned in satisfactory fashion. As such, it is a good example of a win-win situation. Thus, while achieving high absolute gains, it produced no relative gain for either party.

Turkish-US Security Cooperation in the Balkans (Series B)

The Balkans had been an area where Turkish and American interests and policies were in near perfect harmony. The reasons for this were manifold: the US was new to the region as an outside power and needed to enlist Turkish support for her designs in the Balkans

1. In its first year in office, the domestic focus of the Clinton administration led it to continue the Bush policy of regarding the Yugoslav crisis as a European matter. But soon, the deepening human tragedy in the Bosnian war led to the assumption of the initiative.

2. Turkey lobbied for the so-called “lift and strike” policy to end the war and the suffering of Bosnians. By early 1994, the Clinton administration too was supporting the lift and strike option. Both parties had been secretly providing the Bosnians with weapons despite the arms embargo. In March 1994, the Bosnian-Croat Federation was forged in Washington. Both Turkey and the US used indirect means to strengthen the Croat and Bosniac forces.

3. In early 1995, NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions combined with the international pressure and resulted in the Dayton peace talks between the parties. Dayton was a US plan to keep Bosnia as an entity under NATO security guarantee and EU administrative control between Serbs and the Croat-Muslim Federation. Turkey had joined the NATO air strikes and supported the Dayton Accords. Turkey also provided ground troops for the Implementation Force (IFOR). In the aftermath of the war, Turkey took part in the “Train and Equip Program” to build and strengthen the new Bosnian army along with the US.

4. The Turkish military cooperation was forthcoming in other Balkan contingencies as well: Throughout the 1990s, Turkey worked to strengthen the Albanian and Macedonian armies in conjunction with deepening US relations with these countries. Turkey also took part in the UN Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) that replaced UNPROFOR in Macedonia in March 1995.


5. By 1998, Yugoslavia was once more at the brink of civil war because of the Kosovo question. As the diplomatic efforts of the international contact group failed, the US proposed NATO sanctioned air strikes against Serbia. Turkey joined the air strikes with a squadron of F-16's and opened up her airbases in Thrace to US planes and ground crew. After the military-technical agreement that provided for Serbian acceptance of the Rambouillet Accords, Turkey joined the Kosovo peace-keeping force KFOR as well. Turkish participation in the Kosovo campaign attracted criticism from Russia and Greece who drew parallels with the situation of Kosovar Albanians and Kurds. The US remained silent about such comparisons and continued to support Turkey in her policy against the PKK. The leader of PKK Abdullah Öcalan was captured with a joint Turkish-US operation in February 1999 –a month before the two countries joined forces in NATO air strikes against Serbia for her actions in Kosovo.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (B) can be depicted as follows:

Table 36 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (B)

Time	US	Turkey
1993-1994 US and Turkish policy towards Bosnia converge. Both countries supply weapons to Bosnians and promote lift and strike	1	1
1994-1995 Turkey and US work to forge the Bosnian-Croat Federation, join in NATO air strikes against Serb targets	1	1
1995 Dayton signed, Turkey and US take part in “train and equip”.	1	1
1995-1998 Turkish-US cooperation in strengthening Albanian and Macedonian armies. Turkey takes part in UNPREDEP.	1	1
1998-1999 Kosovo Crisis. Turkey supports Kosovar Albanians with the US, takes part in NATO air strikes. US continues to support Turkey against PKK despite comparisons between Kosovo and Kurdish questions	1	1
Absolute Gains:	5+5=10	
Relative Gains:	0	0

In graphic terms, series (B) can be depicted as:



Graph 39 Graphic depiction of series (B)

Turkish-US cooperation in the Balkans had been the result of near-perfect harmony of interests. Both parties needed each other to achieve their aims in the region. The series (B) represents the success of this cooperation in terms of very high absolute gains. The mutually beneficent nature of the cooperation is seen in the even distribution of relative gains.

Turkish-US Cooperation in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Series CAC)

The US had three aims for Central Asia: domination of energy sources and routes; keeping Russian resurgence, Chinese incursion and Iranian influence in check; and integration of the Central Asian states into the international system under US tutelage. All three aims coincided with Turkey's interests in the region, and the US needed Turkey for their realization. For Turkey, the emerging Turkic world was an opportunity to diversify her relations, increase her international significance as a bridge between east and west, and form an economic and military community to support her national aims.

1. Turkey recognized the independence of these countries and immediately established diplomatic relations at ambassador level. She organized regular summits of the Turkic World to establish closer political and economic cooperation. However, her economic, political and military power was insufficient to forge such a community in the face of Russian influence and Iranian rivalry. Thus, acting as a proxy to the US designs about the region provided Turkey with US support in investment.

2. The interests of Turkey and US were not always identical either: While Turkey supported Azerbaijan the Azeri-Armenian conflict, the US pursued a more pro-Armenian policy. In the implementation of the CFE treaty, the US requested Turkey to tolerate the Russian demands at modification. Actually, the core of Turkish-US discord arose from their view of Russia: For Turkey, Russia was a rival in her projects on Central Asia. For the US, toleration of Russian

resurgence in the Near Abroad after 1993 was a price she had to pay in order to keep Russia within the fold and illicit her cooperation for NATO enlargement in Europe. Thus, Turkey did not receive US support in her competition with Russia over Central Asia and Caucasus in the mid-1990s. In time, a *modus vivendi* was achieved through recognition and accommodation of Russian interests and moderation of Turkish ambitions in line with her limited resources.

3. Turkish-American security cooperation in Central Asia formed around NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. From 1994 onwards, Turkey provided military training for Central Asian members of PfP. In 1997, Turkey and US conducted joint exercises with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. In the Caucasus, Turkey provided military training and equipment for Azerbaijan and Georgia, and supported the anchoring of these countries to the west. Her influence was again limited in the face of Russian objections, but by the end of 1990s, both countries had forged closer ties with the west.


4. Economically, the core of Turkish-US cooperation in the region was the realization of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. From 1995 onwards, the US supported the construction of this project. In October 1998, the Ankara Declaration was signed with between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This declaration identified the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline as the main line to carry Caspian oil to the west. US support for the declaration increased the feasibility of the project. In November 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul, the agreement for the construction of Baku-Ceyhan was signed in the presence of US President Bill Clinton. By April 2000, the US Exim Bank declared her support for the construction.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (CAC) can be depicted as follows:

Table 37 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (CAC)

Time	US	Turkey
1991-1993 Turkey recognizes CAC states, organizes regular summits, establishes economic ties. US supports Turkish initiatives.	1	1
1993-1997 Russia declares near abroad doctrine. US fails to support Turkey. Turkey loses influence and curtails her ambitions.	0	0
1997-1999 <i>modus vivendi</i> with Russia reached. US supports Baku-Ceyhan, Turkey takes part in PfP exercises.	1	1
1999-2000 Baku-Ceyhan agreement signed. US supports construction.	1	1
Absolute Gains:	3+3=6	
Relative Gains:	0	0

In graphic terms, series (CAC) can be depicted as:



Graph 40 Graphic depiction of series (CAC)

Turkish-US cooperation in CAC region was the result of converging interests. However, unlike the Balkans, the presence of Russia prohibited the achievement of all desired results and forced both parties to compromise. This is reflected in the absolute gains that are lower than series (B). Still, the even distribution of relative gains suggests that these achievements were mutually beneficial for both parties.

Formation of a New European Security Architecture and Turkish-US Cooperation
(Series ESDI)

In the 1990s, the US defined her main objective about Turkey as ‘anchoring Turkey to the west’. An important aspect of this policy was to keep Turkey within the institutional framework of Western economic, political and military alliances. Turkish establishment too shared this fundamental view. During the Cold War, NATO membership had performed this function to the satisfaction of both parties. With the end of the Cold War, the deepening European political and economic integration was accompanied by attempts at creating a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Throughout the 1990s, the US supported the Turkish bid for EU membership and cooperated with Turkey in keeping ESDI as the ‘European pillar of NATO’.

1. Initially, the EU did not possess the military infrastructure and organizational means to implement the Petersberg missions that defined the scope of activity for the emerging European security arm. These missions (declared in Petersberg, Germany in 1992) included peace-keeping and implementation, humanitarian missions and crisis prevention. By 1993, the WEU had taken steps towards building up such capacity.
2. To meet US (and by extension, Turkish) concerns, cooperation between the Western European Union and NATO became progressively more intensive and frequent.
3. On January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels, the sixteen member countries of the alliance gave their full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) which would ‘strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance’. The alliance also endorsed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) as a means of facilitating contingency operations. The concept was to be implemented in a manner that provided ‘separable but not separate’ military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU and would respond to European requirements and

contribute to Alliance security. This formulation met the US 3-D criteria coined by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: no Duplication, no De-coupling, no Discrimination. These criteria also met the Turkish concerns over being excluded from the new European Security Architecture.

4. In the 1997 Luxembourg summit, the EU slammed the door on Turkey's face as she was not listed as a candidate for membership in the enlargement process. In the May 1998 St. Malo meeting, Britain and France agreed to create a European army capable of conducting the peace-keeping and implementation missions without NATO resources. By 1999, the EU decided to integrate the WEU into the second pillar of EU. This decision effectively removed the NATO (and thereby Turkish) veto over possible EU military operations. For Turkey, the possibility of EU increasing its military capability to the point of replacing NATO in the European continent meant complete exclusion from the European security system and eventual confrontation with the EU military policy in a hotspot like Cyprus or the Aegean. Another possibility was increasing EU pressure on the handling of the Kurdish question. Thus, Turkey moved closer to the US and requested her support for inclusion in the enlargement of the EU. In the run-up to the December 1999 Helsinki Summit of the EU, the US intensively lobbied for Turkey's acceptance as a candidate.
5. The US supported the Turkish position, but neither party was in a position to stop the gradual development of European military capability. In June 1999, EU decided to facilitate the use of NATO resources for ESDI purposes without prior consultation with non-member states. Turkey reacted to this proposal by threatening to veto the use of NATO resources by WEU. In the year 2000 Feira summit, the EU proposed a consultation mechanism between the fifteen EU members and the 6 non-EU members of NATO. This proposal did not satisfy Turkey as it did not include the non-members


into the strategic planning and policy debate. In the June 2000 Brussels summit of NATO, Turkey required the EU to obtain NATO approval each time it wished to use NATO resources. The US supported the Turkish position, but essentially was content with the consultation mechanism offered at Feira. Still, Turkish objections continued into the early 2000s and became a bargaining chip in her candidacy process as well.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (ESDI) can be depicted as follows:

Table 38 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (ESDI)

Time	US	Turkey
1992-1994 WEU re-activated. Turkey and US cooperate to keep WEU under as 'the European pillar of NATO'	1	1
1994-1997 ESDI defined as European pillar of NATO, CJTF concept approved by NAC. US and Turkey agree on 3D principle	1	1
1997-1999 Turkey excluded from EU enlargement. Closer Turkish-US cooperation for Turkish candidacy.	1	1
1999-2000 ESDI becomes more independent from NATO. US fails to support Turkish position about EU utilization of NATO resources. Turkey holds her veto.	0	0
Absolute Gains:	3+3=6	
Relative Gains:	0	0

In graphic terms, series (ESDI) can be depicted as:



Graph 41 Graphic depiction of series (ESDI)

Turkish and US interests converged in keeping NATO as the essential security institution of the west. However, throughout the 1990s, the EU gradually moved towards an independent security identity. Turkish-US cooperation to forestall this development succeeded in keeping it as 'the European pillar of NATO', but failed to integrate Turkey herself into the decision-making mechanisms of that pillar.

US Military Aid to Turkey in the 1990s (Series MA)

In the US military aid of the 1990s, the Cold War era grants and low interest rate credits came to an end.

1. In 1989, the US stopped the Military Assistance Program and replaced it with new channels like the Pentagon's Foreign Military Financing Program, the Economic Support Fund and the cascading program (transfer of excess articles as a result of CFE). Grants were discontinued after 1992. Turkey was able to replace some of her military hardware like the aging M48 tanks with newer ones through cascading, but she wished to transform her military into a modern force capable of forward defense, low intensity conflict and peace-implementation outside her own borders.

2. The US approach to Turkish military modernization had a positive and a negative dimension: on the positive side, the US wished to see Turkey as a capable ally in the post-Cold War contingencies of crisis prevention, peace-keeping and peace implementation missions. On the negative side, she did not wish to provide Turkey with too much military prowess that would upset the regional balance against Greece.

3. Throughout the 1990s Turkish weapons procurement from the US (with the exception of 1995 and 1996) hovered around \$900 million. In the mid-1990s, there was a veiled embargo against Turkey and procurement from the US had dropped by half (\$536 and \$547 million for 1995 and 1996). This sudden drop was largely related with the efforts of the Greek and

Armenian lobbies in the Congress, the Kardak crisis that brought Turkey to the brink of war with Greece, and Turkey’s increasingly assertive policies in Northern Iraq.


4. However, by 1997, the US arms sales to Turkey peaked with \$1.27 billion. This shows the basic US dilemma about military aid to Turkey: while the US wished to see Turkey as a security producer in the triangle of Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, she did not want Turkey to use her increasing military might in the pursuit of her national interests that did not coincide with the American ones.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (MA) can be depicted as follows:

Table 39 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (MA)

Time	US	Turkey
1989-1992 US ends MAP and discontinues grants.	2	0
1992-1995 cascading, FMS and ESF supply Turkey with new weaponry	1	1
1995-1997 Veiled embargo. Turkey diversifies procurement sources	0	0
1997-2000 US delivers new weapons systems. Turkey resumes procurement from US sources.	1	1
Absolute Gains:	4+2=6	
Relative Gains:	2	-2

In graphic terms, series (MA) can be depicted as:



Graph 42 Graphic depiction of series (MA)

US military aid to Turkey was a problematic issue in the 1990s. The end of the Cold War brought both positive (cascading) and negative (end of grants and MAP) features. Overall, the US wanted to check Turkish ambitions by limiting her arms supply. In response, Turkey tried to diversify her resources, but achieved limited success as her military infrastructure was based on US made equipment. Thus, the slight relative gain in series (MA) for the US represents the US success in her endeavor to control Turkish military capacity. The absolute gains show the mutually beneficent process of Turkish military modernization through US support in the same process.

The Invasion of Iraq 1998-2003 Series (Tez)

The greatest conflict of interest in Turkish-American relations arose after 1998 as the US decided to abandon containment of Saddam Hussein and go for regime change. As in the case of containment, the US needed Turkish support to implement the policy of regime change.

1. In November 1998, US Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited Ankara and brought a message from President Clinton. The message declared the US policy shift to regime change and mentioned the possibility of introducing US ground forces to achieve that end. Clinton expected the full support of Turkey as a reliable ally of the US. Turkish officials were concerned about the possibility of disintegration of Iraq as a result of US invasion. This would lead to the formation of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq and create hotbeds of terrorist activity. It would also cost Turkey economically.

2. To allay Turkish concerns, the US suggested that they could help Turkey with the capture of Abdullah Öcalan. In the meantime, on 15 December Turkey approved the use of İncirlik airbase for Operation Desert Fox, in which US and British planes struck at Iraqi targets suspected of chemical weapons storage and production.

3. On 16 January 1999, Öcalan was captured in Kenya after leaving the Greek embassy in Nairobi. By August, imprisoned Öcalan had declared unilateral ceasefire for the PKK and ordered his armed units out of Turkish territory.

4. On 11 September 2001, airplanes hijacked by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network struck them at the World Trade Centre Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. The Bush Administration immediately identified its first target as the Al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and the radical Islamic Taliban regime hosting them. Turkey declared its full cooperation for the US operations. On 21 September, Turkey approved the US request to use Turkish airspace and airfields for the transfer of munitions and other equipment. On 5 October, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called President Sezer to inform about the imminent operation against Afghanistan and asked for Turkey's continued support. The next day, the US invited a liaison officer from TAF to the CENTCOM Headquarters in Tampa, Florida. The US also wanted troop contribution for the post-war operations. By December, the US and British forces had invaded Afghanistan, and Turkey sent her troops to the NATO-led international peace-keeping force. In the coming years, Turkey would assume the command of the NATO force twice.

5. The next US target was Iraq. In January 2002, Prime Minister Ecevit visited Washington. Here, President Bush and Vice-President Cheney warned him about the coming invasion if diplomatic means bore no result, and asked for Turkish support. In response, Ecevit stated the known Turkish concerns about the integrity of Iraq, a possible refugee flow and economic damages. He also warned that if the disintegration of Iraq became inevitable, Turkey would not accept the inclusion of Mosul and Kerkuk into the Kurdish-controlled zone. In March 2002, Vice-President Cheney was in Ankara as part of a Middle East tour to marshal support for the coming Iraqi invasion. In his meeting with Prime Minister Ecevit, Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem, and Head of Chief of General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, Cheney declared

in no uncertain terms that the US was going to use force to topple Saddam Hussein and expected Turkish support. He also hinted that the concrete US demands would be soon forthcoming. In the summer of 2002, Turkey allowed the passage of US Northern Iraq Liaison Units (NILU) to gather intelligence in Iraq.

6. During that spring and early summer, the foreign affairs bureaucracy, the military staff and intelligence establishment conducted a series of meetings to establish Turkey's so-called 'red lines': no formation of a Kurdish state; preservation of the status of Mosul and Kirkuk; protection of the Turcoman as a constituting people in the post-Saddam era.

7. In September 2002, the Americans demanded "full and complete cooperation". They wanted to deploy land, air and naval units on Turkish territory, and required the use of several bases and facilities. On 20 October 2002 an American military delegation including Generals Tommy Franks of CENTCOM and SACEUR Joseph Ralston was in Ankara with detailed operational plans. The US wanted a blanket approval for transit flights, use of airfields and railroads as well as a number of ports. She also wanted to deploy some 60,000 troops in Turkish territory that would attack Iraq from the North. In return for Turkish cooperation, the US pledged to protect the integrity of Iraq; act in conjunction with TAF which would be allowed to enter Northern Iraq with the US troops; financial assistance to compensate for the economic losses resulting from the war.

8. In early December the leader of the new government party JDP, Tayyip Erdoğan was invited to Washington to engage in official visits. During this visit, Erdoğan refrained from making definite promises, but implied that Turkish support would have the price of financial assistance and more advocacy for her EU membership.

9. In early February, the government decided to divide the motions about Iraq and introduced the first one on 6 February. Though the TGNA had approved the first motion about preliminary work on bases and other facilities, there were significant points of contention


between the parties. By the beginning of March, the parties experienced a serious miscommunication. While the US regarded Turkish hesitations as a bargaining tactic, Turkey believed the Americans had no ‘plan B’ that did not require Turkish participation. On March first, the JDP government brought the second motion to allow US troop deployment on Turkish soil to the TGNA. The parliament failed to approve the motion because the yes votes were three short of the required 267. Though Turkey provided her airspace and allowed the use of joint installations in support of the operation, this was far less than the US had expected, and led to complete US disregard of Turkey’s ‘red lines’.

The relative and absolute gains calculation for the series (Tez) can be depicted as follows:

Table 40 Relative and Absolute Gains in Series (Tez)

Time	US	Turkey
1998-2001 US shifts to regime change and asks for Turkish support. Turkey allows use of Incirlik for Desert Fox. US support against PKK, Öcalan captured.	1	1
2001-2002 September 11 and aftermath. US strikes at Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Turkey provides full support and receives US financial aid to solve her economic crisis.	1	1
September 2002- March 2003 Turkish-US negotiations over cooperation in the invasion of Iraq. Turkey allows passage of NILU and preliminary work with the first government motion. US invests in Turkish bases and infrastructure, and promises financial aid for cooperation.	1	1
March 2003 TGNA fails to approve second motion. US invades Iraq.	0	0
2003 - ... US tramples Turkish red lines, Turkey fails to respond	2	0
Absolute Gains:	5+3=8	
Relative Gains:	2	-2

In graphic terms, series (Tez) can be depicted as:




Graph 43 Graphic depiction of series (Tez)

The invasion of Iraq and the developments in its aftermath represents one of the deepest crises in Turkish-US relations. The main cause of this crisis is the incompatibility of Turkish and US interests in this issue. Though Turkey tried to protect her interests and cooperate with the US at the same time, ultimately she failed to do so. Thus, the Americans proceeded to carry out their designs for Iraq in disregard of Turkey's concerns.

Overall Evaluation of Cooperation Series in 1990-2003 Period

The 1990-2003 period was the Post-Cold War era in which significant changes in international structure created new possibilities and problems in Turkish-US relations. Below is the overall graphic representation of the series of cooperation in this period.

(See following page)



Legend:
 G: Turkish-US Cooperation during the Gulf War; NI: Northern Iraq and Turkish-US Relations: 1991-1998;
 DC: Turkey and Dual Containment; Is: Turkish-Israeli Alignment; B: Turkish-US Security Cooperation in the Balkans;
 CAC: Turkish-US Cooperation in Central Asia and the Caucasus; ESDI: Formation of a New European Security Architecture and Turkish-US Cooperation;
 MA: US Military Aid to Turkey in the 1990s;
 Tez: The Invasion of Iraq 1998-2003.

Graph 44 Series of cooperation in 1990-2003 period

Graph 44 suggests that in terms of relative gains, the 1990-2003 period was more balanced compared to the previous period of 1980-1990. While four bilateral series (Series NI, DC, Is and CAC) produced no relative gains for either party, three bilateral series (Series G, MA and Tez) produced moderate relative gains for the US.

As in the previous three periods, the bilateral series of cooperation continue their shift across the graph in accordance with domestic and structural factors. In the 1990-2003 period, four bilateral series concentrated at the vertical axis. The other three show slight relative gains in favor of the US. Compared to the previous period of 1980-1990, this is actually an improvement for Turkey. Even so, the weight of series on the left-hand side of the graph signifies a period with relative gains in favor of US.

Again, as in the previous periods, the most volatile issue in Turkish-US relations remained the Middle East. Of the five series (Series G, NI, DC, Is and Tez) related to this area, two produced relative gains in favor of the US, and three produced no relative gains for either party. One must stress once again that the relative gains measured in this study merely correspond to counts of reciprocity, and not to objective material value. Even so, the findings

of this study suggest that the greatest problem in Turkish-US bilateral relations is their cooperation (or lack of cooperation) in the Middle East.

The institutional series (Series B and ESDI) remain in the centre of the graph. Unlike in the previous three periods, however, they yield high absolute gains (ten and six respectively). This may be the effect of the changes in the international system that transformed the structure, missions and membership composition of NATO. Alternatively it can be issue-related since Series B on the Balkans that produced ten points in absolute terms involves a host of bilateral engagements as well. One cannot propose an argument in the absence of further periods for comparison. However, the central position of the institutional series in all four periods under study represents a strong support for the core neo-institutionalist argument about the moderating effect of institutions in terms of relative gains. It also represents strong support for the independence of this effect from international structural changes, since it continues to operate in the Post-Cold War era. Of course, all these arguments are only supported within the context of Turkish-US engagements in NATO. As mentioned in the section on methodology, it would be scientifically improper to make broader theoretical generalizations from a single case. This point will be elaborated in the following chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE INSTITUTIONAL EFFECT, POWER ASYMMETRY AND PROBLEMS IN TURKISH-US SECURITY RELATIONS

Thus far, this study has compiled the history of Turkish-US security relations from the literature and used this data to identify the bilateral and institutional series of cooperation in four broad periods stretching from 1945 to 2003. There has been an overall analysis of each period at the end of the relevant chapters (See above). This chapter aims to integrate these analyses and produce generalizations about Turkish-US security relations in terms of:

1. The significance or insignificance of NATO as an institution with regard to moderating relative gains and increasing absolute gains;
2. The validity of the realist argument about the effect of power asymmetry in Turkish-US security relations; and
3. The longer range issues that create the greatest problems for Turkish-US security relations by showing the uneven relative gains distributions in problematic issue areas.

Assuming that this study has more or less covered the literature in terms of salient issues in Turkish-US security relations, and assuming that the method of inquiry is internally coherent, its results should leave little room for selection bias and therefore support or falsify a number of arguments with strong evidence. It should be emphasized that there is a 'ladder of strength', as it were, in the support or refutations of this analysis: the closer and more relevant an argument to Turkish-US security relations, the stronger the conclusions; the more distant and general the argument, the weaker the conclusions. This qualification is a result of the number of cases studied: in terms of Turkish-US security relations, this study is almost exhaustive. In terms of more general and theoretical arguments about the role of institutions in international relations, this study is confined to the effect of NATO on Turkish-US security relations. Therefore, while its conclusions about Turkish-US security relations can be


generalized with more confidence (again, given the method of inquiry is internally coherent and the literature it used is more or less accurate), its conclusions about the greater theoretical debate between neo-realism and neo-institutionalism can only be used as one of many cases that should be studied before arriving at a tested generalization.

The following sections will elaborate on the implications of this study in terms of the three issues listed above (the institutional effect; validity of realist argument about the results of power asymmetry; and problem areas in Turkish-US security relations).

Implications in Terms of the Institutional Effect

As noted at the beginning, the neo-neo debate of the 1990s centred on the question of the effect of international institutions. The neo-realists had undermined the role of institutions, especially in the field of security where relative gains provided actors with existential advantage. They also suggested the correlation of the institutional effect with the international structure and predicted its withering away in the Post-Cold War era. The neo-institutionalists had argued for the significance, endurance and independence of the institutional effect. The findings of this study support the neo-institutionalist claim about the moderating effect of institutions in terms of relative gains, because the institutional series of all four periods under consideration are located at the centre of the graphs that show the distribution of relative and absolute gains in Turkish-US security relations. This central position indicates low relative gains for both parties. In terms of Turkish-US security relations, this shows that NATO has consistently moderated the relative gains and this effect was not correlated with the changes in capability distribution in the international system across periods stretching from 1952 (Turkish entry to NATO) to 2003. Thus, the consistency of moderate relative gains in institutional series across periods supports the assumption that institutions (in our case,

NATO) should be treated as an independent variable that moderates relative gains in bilateral security relations (in our case, between Turkey and US). To better demonstrate this situation, Graph 45 presents a compilation of all institutional series in Turkish-US security relations from 1952 to 2003.



* Series J, C-T, RDF

Legend:
 Bilateral: Bilateral Treaties 1952-1955; J: Nuclear Weapons (Jupiters); C-T: October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis; Nukes: Changing NATO Strategy and Control of Nuclear Weapons; RDF: The Rapid Deployment Force; Lance: Replacement of Nuclear Weapons on Turkish Soil; ESDI: Formation of a New European Security Architecture and Turkish-US Cooperation; B: Turkish-US Security Cooperation in the Balkans


Graph 45 Institutional series of cooperation 1952-2003

Graph 45 shows that with the exception of the series Bilateral, which provided a moderate relative gain for the US, all institutional series are located at the centre of the graph. This indicates that in these series, there was no relative gain for either party in terms of the count of reciprocal acts of cooperation or defection. Of course, one should emphasize once more that counts of reciprocal acts used in this study do not correspond to objective material value. Hence, their equality does not mean equality in objective material gains. However, given the assumption that reciprocal acts of cooperation have rough equivalence, their equality suggests that the NATO institutional framework does moderate relative gains in Turkish-US security relations.

While supporting the neo-institutionalist argument about the moderating effect of institutions in relative gains, the results of this study disputes the neo-institutionalist argument that institutional frameworks encourage parties to reciprocate cooperation with cooperation and lead to longer series with greater absolute gains. With the exception of the Turkish-US cooperation in the Balkans during the 1990's (series B), the institutional series consistently appear at the *lower* centre of the graph. This indicates that, while NATO moderates relative gains in Turkish-US security relations, it does not lead to longer series of cooperation and thus greater absolute gains. Within the premises of this study, one can only speculate about the reasons of this situation, because a more confident assessment would require multiple case studies that show similar results. Therefore, outside the realm of Turkish-US security relations in NATO, this refutation of the neo-institutionalist argument on the positive effect of institutions in terms of absolute gains should be treated with caution. Still, one can say with relative confidence that in Turkish-US security relations, the institutional framework of NATO does not lead to longer series of cooperation with greater absolute gains.


Implications about the Effect of Power Asymmetry in Turkish-US Security Relations

At the end-of-period assessments in chapters three to five, one can observe a shift in the distribution of relative gains in Turkish-US security relations in accordance with conjectural (domestic or international structural) changes. However, a general look at the four periods under study supports the neo-realist claim about the preponderance of power asymmetry in determining the distribution of relative gains in bilateral relations: with the exception of the 1960-1980 period, the distribution of relative gains in Turkish-US security relations favors the US. Graph 46 below demonstrates this to be the case from 1945 to 2003:




Graph 46 Series of cooperation 1945-2003

To ease the reading of the above graph, some bilateral series concentrated at the centre are omitted. The names of the individual series are also left out, since they are irrelevant to the argument. In Graph 46, while there is a concentration of series at the centre, it can also be seen that series resulting in US relative gains are considerably more than those on the Turkish side: among the thirty six series treated in this study, seventeen resulted in no relative gains for either party. Fourteen resulted in US and five resulted in Turkish relative gains. To better demonstrate this situation, one should revert to the graphic representation in chapter two above. There, it was stated that in the relations between actors A and B, allowing for power asymmetry in favor of actor B should result in a graph that reveals more instances of AcBd. The corresponding picture was shown in Graph 3, which is reproduced as Graph 47 below: (See following page)



Graph 47 Allowing for power asymmetry in favor of actor B

If we convert Graph 46 along the lines of Graph 47, the result would look like this:



Graph 48 The results of power asymmetry in Turkish-US security relations in terms of relative gains

Graph 48 shows that the realist assumption about the effect of power asymmetry in terms of relative gains holds in Turkish-US security relations: the majority of cases with US relative gains means more instances of US defection against continued Turkish cooperation. This uneven distribution of relative gains also constitutes a verification of the internal coherence of the Turkish foreign policy literature, from which the data used in this study has been

compiled. As mentioned, the seminal works in Turkish foreign policy literature are usually based on realist theoretical premises, and consider Turkey to be a middle power. The results of this study (given the analysis here itself is internally coherent) shows the consistency between the theoretical premise and factual narrative in the literature.

The resemblance of Graphs 3 and 48 supports the theoretical assumptions made at the beginning of this study, because firstly (as discussed above) the realist argument about the results of power asymmetry are verified by the comparative majority of cases in US favor. Secondly, of the seventeen cases that resulted in no relative gains for either party, seven are institutional. Thus, the theoretical assumptions of this study about the effect of institutions in an asymmetric relationship are verified as well. In general terms, this conclusion supports the later brand of neo-institutionalism that concedes the primacy of states as actors in international relations and accepts the basic condition of anarchy among them, but claims that institutions have a moderating effect on relative gains and therefore encourage cooperation. Of course, one should once more emphasize that the study of Turkish-US security relations alone one cannot provide confident support for such a general argument. However, in terms of Turkish-US security relations, this result supports the argument that NATO serves as a balancing factor in the distribution of relative gains between the two parties. One can safely assume that in the absence of NATO, the distribution of relative gains in Turkish-US security relations would be much more uneven in US favor.

Implications about the Problem Areas in Turkish-US Security Relations

The data compiled in this study allows us to produce a general picture of Turkish-US security relations. As mentioned at the outset, one of the main aims of this study is to produce generalizations that are also policy relevant. As shown above, one can use this data to produce generalizations about the effect of NATO as an institution and about the results of power

asymmetry with regard to the distribution of relative gains. One can also use this picture to single out the problem areas in Turkish-US security relations by looking at longer range issues that extend across periods. Those issues in which one can observe an uneven distribution or radical shifts of relative gains can be identified as the problem areas in the bilateral relationship.

One can identify two long range issues in Turkish-US security relations that display radical shifts and/or an uneven distribution of relative gains across periods:

1. Turkish-US cooperation in the Middle East, and
2. US Military Aid and US Forces in Turkey

The following sub-sections will take on these two problem areas.


Turkish-US Cooperation in the Middle East

The Middle East has been one of the main areas of cooperation in Turkish-US security relations. From the very beginning, the US always regarded her security assistance to Turkey as an investment in the defence of the Middle East. She has consistently viewed Turkey as a valuable ally in the Muslim world and requested her support to further her interests among Muslim countries. When it came to military interventions to the Middle East, the US came up with a range of demands from Turkey varying from mere free passage to use of bases, logistics facilities and actual Turkish military participation.

From the early 1950s onwards, Turkish governments responded to these demands with different degrees of enthusiasm: During the 1950s, Turkey remained a willing partner of the application of US Middle East policy. In the 1960s and 1970s, the tables had turned and for most of the time, Turkey denied access to bases and withheld her support from US operations in the region. The 1980s saw another reversal of policy as Turkey joined in the Middle

Eastern part of the Second Cold War strategy. The 1990s presented a mixed picture: Turkey tried to keep in line with the overall US policy *and* balance its negative results at the same time. Finally, the early 2000s witnessed one of the deepest crises in Turkish-US relations as a result of the Tezkere Incident of 1 March 2003.

The changes of fortune in the Turkish-US cooperation in the Middle East was reflected in the distribution of relative gains. Graph 49 below presents this situation:



Graph 49 Turkish-US cooperation in the Middle East 1952-2003

The first thing one should mention when looking at this graph is the scattered disposition of the series. This suggests radical shifts in the distribution of relative gains from one series to the next, and across periods. Overall, the effect of power asymmetry can be observed in this graph as well: of the seven series presented here, only one resulted in no relative gains. While two series resulted in Turkish, four resulted in US favor.

Among the thirty six series studied in this work, the longest series in terms of absolute gains, and also the most uneven one in terms of relative gains, was the result of Turkish-US cooperation in the Middle East from 1952 to 1960. As mentioned, Turkey had been a willing participant of US Middle East policy during the 1950's. At the time, the rigid atmosphere of

the Early Cold War had encouraged Turkey to be a staunch ally of the west, and the Menderes government largely ignored the negative results of Turkish cooperation in the Middle East.


Both series that resulted in Turkish relative gains belong to the 1960-1980 period where successive Turkish governments denied US access to facilities in Turkey for Middle East contingencies and tried to forge closer ties with the Arab world. This was largely the result of more national interest-based policies that went along with the deepening of the Cyprus problem on the one hand, and the possibilities created by the ensuing détente on the other. In the 1980's, Turkey once more became a willing partner in US Middle East policy and involved in the Arab world on America's behalf. The Turkish enthusiasm once again resulted in greater relative gain for the US. In the 1990's, Turkey tried to balance her national interests and the negative results of her cooperation with the US, especially in terms of Iraq. Ultimately, she failed to do so. The reflection of this situation is the two Middle East-related series in this period (Gulf War and Tezkere), which produced more relative gains for the US (see above).

In light of the findings of this study, one can suggest the following:

1. The uneven distribution of relative gains that result from Turkish-US cooperation in the Middle East is a reflection of power asymmetry between the two actors. For Turkey, the volatile nature of Turkish-US cooperation in the Middle East involves serious security risks, and forces her to counter-balance with occasional defections (as in the late 1970s and mid-1990s). These defections in turn create trouble in the Turkish-US alliance.
2. The conclusions of this study support the argument about the moderating effect of NATO as an institution in terms of relative gains in Turkish-US security relations. Thus, one can safely assume that institutionalizing Middle East cooperation would moderate the US relative gains in this area. This would reduce the security risks Turkey has to run in order to perpetuate her alliance with the US.

US Military Aid and US Forces in Turkey

Another area where uneven distribution of relative gains are a reflection of problems in bilateral cooperation involves the US military aid to Turkey and the presence and activities of US forces since the late 1940s. Graph 6.5 below demonstrates the series involving these issues from 1954 to 2003.



Graph 50 Military aid and US forces in Turkey 1947-2003

The series in Graph 50 too display a scattered pattern. Of the eight series displayed in this graph, only two (Truman Aid and RDF) resulted in no relative gains for either party. Four resulted in US and two resulted in Turkish relative gains. This indicates: i) the problematic nature of military aid since its inception; and ii) the dilemmas of hosting permanent foreign bases on ones own territory. These two points should be elaborated on, respectively.

By supplying military aid, the US has tried to strengthen the Turkish military in order to create a reliable and competent ally that would help further her interests. Turkey, on the other hand, tried to use this military power to further her own national interest as well. Thus, in any given situation, three possibilities occur:

a) The interests of the parties coincide, and there are little or no relative gains for either party.

b) The US succeeds in constraining Turkish employment of armed force within the framework of her own agenda, and the relative gains appear on the American side.

c) Turkey succeeds in using the American military aid to further her own national goals that are not shared by the US, and the relative gains appear on the Turkish side.

When one looks at the series displayed in Graph 50, one would recognize that the distribution of relative gains confirms this pattern.

A similar game can be discerned about the presence and activities of US forces in Turkey: the US deploys these forces (in Turkey and other parts of the globe) to carry out her global strategy and to preserve her hegemony. Turkey hosts them for her own national interests that coincide with her alliance with the West. To the extent these respective interests coincide, there is little or no relative gain for either party. Throughout the Cold War, the framework of mutually shared interests was delineated by relevant NATO treaties and decisions. Problems occurred when the US tried to use her forces or basing rights in Turkey for purposes outside this framework (informal bilateral treaties, out-of-area operations to Middle East, U2 overflights, RDF), or when Turkey exercised her control over the US activities as a bargaining tactic to attain other goals (increased military aid, retaliation to US arms embargo, more trade). Thus, as in the case of military aid, the presence and activities of US forces in Turkey create three possibilities:

a) The US forces in Turkey serve mutually shared interests and there is no relative gain for either party;

b) The US succeeds in using her basing rights and forces in Turkey beyond the framework of mutually shared interests and acquires relative gains; or

c) Turkey restricts US basing rights and activities as a bargaining chip or retaliation and acquires relative gains.

In Graph 50 the positions of individual series support the assumption that institutional frameworks moderate relative gains: while bilateral cases are scattered across the graph, institutional series on NATO Bilateral Treaties and RDF are closer to the centre. Thus, one can suggest that further institutionalization of US military aid and presence of US forces in Turkey would moderate relative gains for both parties and thereby reduce the tensions in bilateral relations.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

The main aim of this study has been to produce tested generalizations through which one can understand, explain and predict the future course of Turkish-US security relations. To do so, it has applied the arguments of the neo-institutionalist theory to discern the effect of NATO as an institution in Turkish-US security relations from 1945 to 2003. If properly conducted, such an undertaking is a necessary and significant contribution to the Turkish foreign policy literature. The Turkish foreign policy literature is rich in histories of salient issues that are accurately described and chronicled. It gives the reader a complete picture of Turkey's relations with the world in different periods. In fact, most analysts implicitly or explicitly assume this to be their main task. As a result, the arguments through which analysts seek to understand and explain Turkish foreign policy are assembled in an eclectic fashion with little regard for theoretical parsimony. The typical Turkish foreign policy analysis tries to explain one thing through everything else, employing different and often incompatible arguments derived from different theories and levels of analysis. The picture is not too different when one looks at the literature on Turkish-US relations: in a continuum from pure theory to pure fieldwork, there are only few examples that systematically try to combine the two ends.

Given this overall picture, one has three options in terms of contribution to the literature:

- a) Deeper research into primary sources in order to increase factual and historical accuracy;
- b) Construction of a new theoretical paradigm to re-interpret the available empirical data; or
- c) Application of the existing theories to the available empirical data with greater theoretical parsimony and methodological rigor.

As mentioned, examples of the first course of action abound in the literature. The second option of constructing a new paradigm is only feasible if the existing theories consistently fail to explain significant phenomena in the field. Looking at the literature, one can see that as yet, this is not the case. Thus, this study followed the third course of action and used the empirical data compiled by the literature to test the validity of significant theoretical arguments from the so-called 'neo-neo debate' of the 1990s.

Attempting to combine existing theory and empirical data in the literature is a risky endeavor, because it depends on the accuracy of the existing empirical data in the literature; the internal coherence of theory, and above all, methodology. The relevance and significance of the findings of this study rest upon these three pillars.

The post-war Turkish-US relations are well-documented, and there is a widely shared agreement among the experts of the field regarding periodization, chronology and salience of issues. The chosen theory for this work (neo-institutionalism) has been thoroughly discussed and refined during the 1990's. Its relative strengths and weaknesses are more or less defined. Thus, the first two pillars on which this study rests seem secure. This leaves one with the question of methodology: in order to produce coherent results, one needs a methodology that provides an uninterrupted link from the research question to the theory, and from there, to the empirical data.

The research question this study has tried to tackle was: "Is Turkey better off with the United States on multilateral institutional settings or on a bilateral setting?"

It was argued that *ceteris paribus*, Turkey is better off with the United States in multilateral institutional settings, where the institutional effect would moderate the power asymmetry between the two. This argument was derived from the neo-institutionalist theory that assumed the significance, endurance and independence of the institutional effect in moderating relative gains and increasing absolute gains. Set against the neo-institutional

school was the neo-realist theory that argued for the insignificance of the institutional effect (especially in security relations where relative gains provide the actors with existential advantage). This theoretical debate is relevant and significant in terms of Turkish foreign policy, because firstly, the controversy between the neo-institutionalist and neo-realist schools can best be tested in a case study that involves two actors with a significant power asymmetry and in the borderline field of security, where the neo-realists assume their positions of strength. Secondly, the Turkish foreign policy literature acknowledges the power asymmetry between Turkey and the US, and describes Turkey as a ‘middle power’. The depiction of Turkey as a middle power rests on the relative economic and military strength of the country, and brings with it a range of implications for the policy-making process. By looking at the effect of institutions, one can either support the validity of these implications, or suggest alternative courses of action.

To test the neo-institutionalist argument, this study looked at the post-war history of Turkish-US security relations from 1945 to 2003 as it was depicted by the Turkish foreign policy literature. This era was further divided into four periods (1945-1960; 1960-1980; 1980-1990; 1990-2003), in which a total of thirty six salient issues were identified as ‘cooperation series’.

The cooperation series produced through this procedure were divided into two categories: bilateral series and institutional series. Bilateral series were identified as those issues that involved no institutional framework in their resolution. Institutional series were identified as those issues that were resolved within the NATO institutional framework. NATO was chosen because it has been ‘the’ institution that regulated institutional security cooperation between Turkey and US since 1952.

The resulting picture that combined all series of cooperation from 1945 to 2003 allows one to support or falsify a number of generalizations with varying degrees of confidence.

Chapter seven elaborates on these findings (see above). To re-state the key points:

1. NATO as an institution moderates relative gains in Turkish-US security relations. This effect can be observed across issues and periods from 1952 to 2003. Theoretically, this supports the neo-institutionalist argument about the relevance, endurance and independence of the institutional effect. However, the findings of this study dispute the neo-institutionalist argument that institutions increase absolute gains by creating longer series of cooperation. In general theoretical terms, both assertions should be treated with caution, since they are derived from a single case study (of Turkish-US security relations).

2. The power asymmetry between Turkey and US results in an uneven distribution of relative gains in US favor. The source of this uneven distribution is more US defection against Turkish cooperation in the bilateral settings. Of the seventeen cases that resulted in no relative gains for either party, seven are institutional. Thus, the theoretical expectations of this study are confirmed by the analysis: *ceteris paribus*, Turkey is better off with the US in multilateral institutional settings, where the institutional effect moderates the power asymmetry between the two.

3. The problematic issues in Turkish-US security relations manifest themselves through volatile and uneven distribution of relative gains. There are two problematic issue areas that cut across periods: i) Turkish-US cooperation in the Middle East, and ii) US military aid to and the status and activities of US forces in Turkey. The relative gains in both issues display a scattered pattern, but they are unevenly distributed in US favor. In terms of policy implications, the findings of this study suggests that institutionalizing cooperation in these two issues would moderate relative gains and thereby reduce tensions in Turkish-US relations.

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