

Militarism, Capitalism and the State:
Putting the Military in its Place in Turkey

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To Bahar,

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ABSTRACT

Militarism, Capitalism and the State:
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by

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This dissertation's overriding objectives are to theoretically come to terms with and to empirically expose the complex forms of articulation between militarism and capitalism in Turkey. Following a critical evaluation of theoretical approaches to the complex relationship among militarism, capitalism, and the state, it first lays out a non-reductionist theory to analyze state-class relations, which is indispensable for the analysis of the militarization of state forms. Drawing on Gramsci, Poulantzas, and Jessop, I propose a Marxist theoretical framework which conceptualizes the state as a social relation, recognizes its constitutive impact on the formation of class relations, and which analyzes the class struggles through the concepts of hegemonic projects and accumulation strategies. Secondly, I critically evaluate the prevailing state-centric modes of analysis of the state and the military in Turkey. Then, I focus on two phenomenal forms of articulation between militarism and capitalism. I analyze the militarization of state form through the case study of the May 27 Coup. I argue that the militarization process was organically embedded in capitalist power relations. The military intervention was both constrained by and constitutive of capitalist class relations and capitalist hegemonic projects. Lastly, I analyze the militarization of the capitalist economy through a specific form of military-industrial complex whereby the military becomes an economic actor. Through the study of military capital (OYAK), I expose how the military has historically become embedded in class power relations and accumulation strategies. I also underline the high military expenditures and war industry as a factor further accelerating the militarization of the economy.

KISA ÖZET

Militarizm, Kapitalizm ve Devlet: Türkiye’de Orduyu Yerli Yerine Koymak

İsmet Akça

Bu tezin temel hedefleri, Türkiye’de militarizm ile kapitalizmin eklemlenmesinin ampirik biçimlerini sunmak ve bu biçimlerin analizi için teorik bir çerçeve önermek. Bu bağlamda, militarizm, kapitalizm ve devlet arasındaki ilişkilere dair farklı teorik yaklaşımların eleştirel bir değerlendirmesi üzerinden, devlet biçimlerinin militarizasyonunun analizi için elzem olan devlet-sınıf ilişkilerine dair bir kuramsal çerçeve oluşturulmaya çalışılıyor. Gramsci, Poulantzas ve Jessop’tan hareketle geliştirilen indirgemeci olmayan bu kuramsal çerçeveye göre, devleti hem bir toplumsal ilişki olarak görmenin hem de sınıf ilişkilerinin oluşumundaki kurucu etkisini tanımının gereğine işaret ediliyor. Ayrıca, sınıfları ve sınıflararası mücadelelerin hegemonya projeleri ve birikim stratejileri kavramları üzerinden analizi öneriliyor. İkinci olarak, Türkiye’de devlet ve ordu analizlerinde hakim olan devlet-merkezci yaklaşım eleştirel olarak değerlendiriliyor. Teorik tartışmanın ardından, militarizm ile kapitalizm eklemlenmesinin iki değişik formuna bakılıyor. İlk olarak, devlet biçiminin militarizasyonu 27 Mayıs darbesi örneği üzerinden analiz ediliyor. Militarizasyon sürecinin organik bir biçimde kapitalist güç ilişkileri içinde olduğu iddia ediliyor. Buna göre askeri darbe hem kapitalist sınıf ilişkileri ve hegemonya projeleri tarafından sınırlandırılmış hem de bunlar üzerinden kurucu bir rol oynamıştır. Son olarak ise, kapitalist ekonominin militarizasyonu, ordunun doğrudan bir iktisadi aktör olarak var olduğu nevi şahsına münhasır bir askeri-sınai kompleks formu üzerinden analiz ediliyor. Askeri sermaye (OYAK) olgusunun analizi aracılığıyla, ordunun tarihsel olarak nasıl sınıf ilişkileri ve birikim stratejileri ile organik bir biçimde içiçe geçtiği tartışılıyor. Ayrıca, yüksek askeri harcamaların ve gelişen savaş sanayiinin kapitalist ekonominin militarizasyonunu derinleştiren ek faktörler olarak altı çiziliyor.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
ANAP	Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)
AP	Justice Party (Adalet Partisi)
AYİM	High Military Administrative Court (Askeri Yüksek İdare Mahkemesi)
BA	Bureaucratic Authoritarianism
DP	Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti)
HP	Freedom Party (Hürriyet Partisi)
ISI	Import Substituting Industrialization
İYAK	Mutual Assistance Foundation for Workers (İşçi Yardımlaşma Kurumu)
MBK	National Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi)
MEYAK	Mutual Assistance Foundation for Government Officials (Memur Yardımlaşma Kurumu)
MÜSİAD	The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği)
OYAK	Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Foundation (Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu)
CHP	Republican People Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
CKMP	Republican Peasant Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi)
DPT	State Planning Office (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı)
SSDF	Defense Industry Support Fund (Savunma Sanayi Destekleme Fonu)
SSEs	State Economic Enterprises (Kamu İktisadi Teşekkülleri)
SSM	Undersecretariat of Defense Industry (Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı)
TEMAD	The Association of Retired Non-Commissioned Officers of Turkey (Türkiye Emekli Astsubaylar Derneği)
TOBB	Union of Chambers of Trade, Commerce, Industry and Commercial Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği)
TSK	Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri)
TSKGV	Foundation for Strengthening Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerini Güçlendirme Vakfı)
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (Türkiye Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği)

INTRODUCTION: PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEMATIC(S)

Any study of the political power processes and structures in Turkey during the Republican era would not fail to notice the frequent recourse to and the relative weight of the authoritarian modes of governance and forms of state in which the military and/or praetorian militarism have occupied a central place. It is conventionally acknowledged by scholars from different traditions that the processes of modern capitalist state formation historically paved the ground for a *potential* shift of weight from inward-oriented to outward-oriented militarism in many capitalist social formations, according to which the military ceased to be less and less directly concerned with the question of internal social-political order in a way to cede its place to the police. Militarism as a technique of power was to an important extent replaced by other administrative, political, and social power techniques (see Giddens, 1985; Mann, 1993). It is also equally well-acknowledged fact that the power of the military in Turkey (also in many other capitalist societies) has not been regulated and organized within such parameters in the course of its capitalist development. Various forms of domestic militarism, from open military regime to national security state form, from the use of military violence to the ideological-cultural forms of militarism, have been a permanent feature of modern Turkish politics. Militarization permeated in varying degrees all life spheres, from the political to the economic, from the juridical to the cultural. Modern Turkish history has been a fertile soil for the emergence of diverse phenomenal forms of militarism, which I define as a technique of power and rule, such as the dominance of the military as an institutional actor in the political structure, the use of (or the threat of) organized physical coercion (violence) by the state, the securitization of politics, the military-industrial complex, and cultural/ideological militarism. In **Ch. I-1**, I briefly presented a

taxonomy of the main phenomenal forms of militarism, at the end of which I formulated my own definition: “Militarism is a technique of power in governing social cleavages and disciplining social/political forces in a conflictual social process in which the use of physical coercion (or simply the threat to use it) is backed by the related political, legal, ideological, economic regulations at the heart of which lies the military as a socio-political actor”.

What are the phenomenal forms and mechanisms of militarization of socio-political and socio-economic power relations? What is the reason behind the recurrent militarization of political processes and structures? Why did militarism as a power technique continue to be influential in governing internal socio-political cleavages? Which analytical-theoretical framework would be more productive for the analysis of militarist practices? To what extent are the causes of inward-oriented militarism rooted in the capitalist social relations of production? Are militarist practices, both in terms of their emergence and impacts, autonomous from or embedded in class power relations? May binary oppositions such as state-society, military-civil, center-periphery capture the social and political power relations that constitute and are constituted by militarism? These have been some of the immediate guiding questions for my research.

This dissertation emerged out of the intersection of an intellectual-academic problematic and an ethico-political concern. While it is a product of dissatisfaction with the prevailing modes of analysis of the state and the military (and militarism) in Turkey, it is also guided by the observation that the influential presence of the military in Turkish socio-political and socio-economic spaces and the recurrence of militarist forms of political governance form an important obstacle for formal and substantial democratization. This is so, I contend, not only because the military (re)produces its own

autonomous power vis-à-vis an undifferentiated civilian sphere, as the liberal-democratic approach to civil-military relations would put the issue, but also because it constitutes as well as is constituted by class-based power relations in the process of capitalist social change.

The neglect of *the capitalist face of militarism* in the bulk of studies on the military and militarism in Turkey forms the underlying concern of this work. On the one hand, the militarization of political power relations and processes is analyzed independently from class relations and struggles in the existing literature; on the other hand, the immediately economic forms of militarism, i.e. the intrusion of the military into the capitalist economy, are not taken into consideration in the conventional analyses. Hence, the overriding objective of this dissertation is to theoretically come to terms with and to empirically expose the complex historical forms of articulation between capitalism, the state and militarism in a specific social formation, namely Turkey. Yet, as this task by nature requires a theoretical elaboration on capitalism, the state and militarism, a critique of the prevailing theoretical/analytical approaches in order to pave the ground for an alternative form of explanation has been an equally important concern and objective of my work. Specifically, the ontological and theoretical questions clustered around the relation between the political and the economic moments of the relations of production and around the relation between the state and the classes deserved a special attention. That is why critical literature surveys occupy a considerable part of the work.

It is often the case that the order of problematic-formation and the order of written presentation are different. So it is in this dissertation too. In this introductory chapter, which aims at presenting the problematic(s) traversing the thesis, I will first of

all focus on the critical evaluation of the forms of analysis of the military and the state in Turkey, to which “Chapter II” is devoted. Secondly, I will turn back to “Chapter I” in which I critically evaluate the existing theoretical approaches used in the analysis of the state and militarism in modern capitalist societies.

The order of my reasoning has been as follows. First, I started by critically mapping the literature on the military in Turkey, in the course of which I have argued that the dominant analytical approaches overlook the capitalist character of militarism in Turkey and explain the militarization of political processes and state forms on the basis of binary oppositions such as state-society, center-periphery, and bureaucracy-bourgeoisie. As a result, both the military and the state are conceived as being above social classes. In addition, the few Marxist works, which aim at overcoming this shortcoming, lean towards instrumentalist and functionalist forms of explanation whereby the active, constitutive role of the military is not recognized (**Ch. II-2**). Secondly, because I think that this dominant mode of analysis originates from and is conditioned by the now hegemonic statist approach to the Turkish state, which treats the latter as an entity and/or subject standing outside and above the society, I have critically and at length discussed the main tenets of this hegemonic discourse (**Ch. II-1**). Finally, to the extent that my critique of the literature on the military and the state in Turkey focuses on the way the state and its relationship to class relations in a capitalist society is conceptualized, I have devoted a comprehensive part of the dissertation to critically evaluate different theoretical approaches around the nexus of militarism-capitalism-state. As it becomes imperative to have an apt theory of state-class relations for a proper analysis of the militarization of political processes and state forms, my critical evaluation of the existing literature on the militarization of political processes put at its

center the way the state is conceptualized and moves ahead towards establishing a non-reductionist, non-instrumentalist, and non-functionalist Marxist theory of capitalist state **(Ch. I)**.

During Republican history, two military interventions occurred in 1960 and 1980, lasting for almost 1.5 and 3 years respectively. Two National Security Council decisions in the form of ultimatums to the civilian political power occurred in 1971 and 1997. As a result of the first one, an almost two years of above-party technocratic rule under the supervision of the military were in place. The second caused a governmental change. Out of the 64 years between 1923 and 1987, almost 26 were spent under the rule of martial law in different provinces of the country. By 2003, the south eastern region of the country, wherein a “low intensity internal war” continued for almost 16 years, had been ruled under the state of emergency for the last 24 years (Üskül, 1997; 2003). The military interventions were followed by the restructuring of the political, constitutional, administrative, and socio-economic orders by the military rule, which paved the ground for the continuation of militarization under the succeeding civilian governments. These were also eager to keep or unwilling to change the then existing socio-economic and socio-political institutional regulations. The National Security State, whose institutional capacities have been gradually increased as to be able to survey and discipline the parliamentary political processes in the last 45 years, deepened the securitization and militarization of political relations. There is no need to add that there are other formal and informal mechanisms of intervention by the military elites under the civilian parliamentary political regimes. Briefly, extraordinary modes of rule have become the ordinary mode in Turkish history.

The preponderance of such a “permanent coup regime” (İnsel, 1997b) has resulted in an inflation of both scholarly and journalistic works on Turkish military. Yet, a substantial part of those studies are limited to the mere description of either the development of events on the political scene and/or the juridical-administrative-institutional mechanisms and ideological sources of the military’s power at the expense of the underlying social power relations whose analysis would require theoretically-informed empirical studies. As I place my own work within the perspective of political sociology, my literature survey on the Turkish military focuses on the works that set up to explain (not merely describe) the underlying social power relations upon, in and through which the militarization of socio-political and socio-economic relations have taken place. In this respect, I have defined three main approaches, namely conservative-liberal statist, critical statist, and Marxist.¹ I underlined that the first two were the most influential ones. While the former group rationalizes and legitimizes the military interventions as necessary acts in order to save and restore the democratic regime which civilian political forces brought into a crisis; the second group criticizes, from a left democratic position, the militarist practices as one of the most important obstacles for the development of a formal and substantial democracy. Yet, in a very striking way, those writers having contradictory normative standpoints share the same mode of explanation, the same conceptual categories, and briefly the same analytical framework, namely statism. They both explain the militarization of political processes by the ongoing presence of a trans-societal state subjectified in the state elites (military and civilian bureaucracy) and political elites independently dominating the whole society regardless of the class divisions. To put it in other words, militarism is analyzed as the

¹ For a detailed discussion and references see **Ch. II-2**.

outcome of a struggle between autonomous state elites and societal forces, including the dominant classes. As politics is reduced to intra-elite conflicts within “a monist center” which renders “all civil societal elements into virtually impotent entities” (Heper, 1994a: 18), it is the intra-elite struggle either between state elites and civilian politicians and/or between the state elites and the weak-passive bourgeoisie that gives rise to military interventions. In either case, societal forces do not penetrate state power; the dominant elite group (the military in this case) is not circumscribed by any social power relations. Accordingly, the military elites’ discursive and non-discursive practices are interpreted as acts to maintain and increase their own power and/or the interests of the state at the expense of and independently from all social class forces and interests. The actions of the military and the state are taken to be autonomous from class forces and class relations. The military interventions are analyzed as attempts at curbing rather than manufacturing political class hegemony, at distorting or impeding rather than constituting and guaranteeing the capitalist economic development.

Hence, concerning the analysis of the underlying axis of social-political conflict during the militarization processes, conservative-liberal statism and critical statism do not differ from each other in the sense that they both exclude the capitalist accumulation process and the class power relations from their analysis. The relevance of this neglect is that this common analytical framework reproduces the self-legitimizing discourse of the military. The discursive power and/or ideological legitimacy of the military in Turkey depends upon its ability to make hegemonic and normalize its self-image and self-presentation: that the military is the promoter and guardian of the Republic and democracy; and that it is an autonomous and neutral instance in the sense of being above-classes, above politics, above particularistic interests, so as to be able to represent

the nation and the state as the representative of the general interest. In that sense, conservative-liberal statism falls short of developing a critical analysis of militarism; quite on the contrary, it reproduces both of these two ideological representations. What is more striking is that the critical statist approach also reproduces the second ideological representation (being above classes), even though it is decisively critical of the first one (being democratic). This reproduction works through two main constituents of its analysis. First, as I explained above, it defines the main axis of the conflict as between the state actors and social forces regardless of the class divisions within the society. Secondly, it reduces the actual existence of the military and the state to their own discursive self-representation. Compared to conservative-liberal statism, the critical statist approach enjoys a potential analytical superiority. That is, it successfully exposes the militarist institutionalization of the state and the dominant governmental rationality based on *the discourse of "reason of state"*, according to which the state is deemed to be an entity and a subject which exists outside society and whose source of legitimacy lies in the state per se. Yet, this potential analytical superiority turns out to be an analytical weakness to the extent that it fails to distinguish between the discourse, institutions and material practices.² Instead of taking this discourse of "reason of state" as mainly corresponding to "the state as an idea", which by no means analytically consumes up the analysis of "the state as a social relation" and of "the state as an institutional ensemble", it lumps the actual reality of the state into its discourse. In other words, it takes the way the state is represented in a specific power discourse as if it is its actual form of

² Following Bob Jessop, I analytically differentiate between practices, institutions, and discourses. It is an analytical distinction and not an ontological one, which is necessary for each of them have differential causal effects in real-concrete instances. As Jessop (2001b) warns, "In distinguishing between discourses, institutions, and material practices, I am not trying to deny the materiality of discourses nor suggesting that institutions or material practices are non-discursive. I am simply noting that not all discourses are translated into institutions and material practices with emergent properties that are reducible to the content of these discourses".

existence. This discourse also corresponds to that of the military as a praetorian force since the latter identifies itself with such a state and presents itself as being outside and above the social cleavages. Instead of conceiving the state and the military in an intermingled relation with society, the critical statist approach externalizes the state power and the power of the military from power relations within society. As a result, it produces a reifying effect to the extent that it breaks the relationality both between the militarist and capitalist institutionalizations of the state, and between the power discourse of the military and the social relational nature of its actual practices which have class-differential impacts.

I argue that this statist mode of explanation dominating the works on the military is rooted in the specific way the Turkish state is conceptualized and analyzed in the broader literature on state-society relations in Turkey (see **Ch. II-1**). The post-1980 period has witnessed the rise of a state-centric (in analytical terms) but anti-statist (in normative terms) discourse, which has become hegemonic in academic and public milieus (Yalman, 2002a). Conventionally known as the “strong state tradition” (Heper, 1985), this hegemonic approach to the state is based on a series of arguments about Ottoman-Turkish history, produced by scholars from diverse theoretical and political traditions.³ The studies analyzing the state in its relationship with society, classes, and with the capitalist economy have converged around the same analytical narrative about the Turkish state and historical transformation, even though there are obvious

³ Even though it is hard to classify each work by a correspondence to only one theoretical approach, in order to give a sense of the richness of the theoretical frameworks, one may nevertheless cite those working from within the different currents of modernization theory such as Heper (1985; 1992), Kazancıgil (1981), Sunar (1974), Mardin (1969; 1973; 1992b), from within critical institutionalism such as Buğra (1994a; 1994b), Öniş (1999), from within a left Weberian approach such as Insel (1996), Insel and Aktar (1985-87), and from within Marxian theory such as Keyder (1987; 1993b). No doubt, these are only the prominent references; a more comprehensive discussion comprising the full list of references may be found in Ch. II-1.

differences on many particular issues. Their common standpoint is that Ottoman-Turkish history is marked by a *peculiar historical continuity* incarnated in a “strong state-weak society tradition”. The state, either reified as a subject in itself or personified in state elites (civil and military bureaucracy), acts as an independent actor against and regardless of the will and demands of social actors within (civil) society. It is pictured like an omnipotent subject dominating the whole society regardless of the social class cleavages and the power relations within the so-called societal sphere. The problematic nature of the argument stems from the assertion that the state elites have been dominating not only over the popular classes but also the dominant ones, specifically the bourgeoisie.

This hegemonic mode of analysis is state-centric in analytical terms because it takes the state as an entity in itself existing in a relation of exteriority to the society, the economy, and the classes. In other words, the binary oppositions such as state-society, state-economy/market, state-classes, which are discursive and institutional separations constructed in actual historical processes and which are constitutive of the capitalist mode of production, are taken to have quasi-ontological existences. The boundaries between these allegedly separate spheres of existence, which are in fact under permanent construction and reconstruction in conflictual social processes, are taken as defined once and for all. In addition, the state practices are formulated as the independent variable which explains all social and political outcomes but which does not need to be explained.

It would not be astonishing to underline that this mode of conceptualization of the state is not specific to Turkish historiography since it was part of a theoretical move that emerged as a response to instrumentalist and functionalist Marxist theories of state

in the mid-1980s under the rubric of “bringing the state back in”.⁴ Even though one does not always find direct references to those state-centric theorists, the prominent studies on the Ottoman-Turkish state nevertheless fit in well with the same problematic: analyzing the state as an entity clearly differentiated from the society and as an autonomous subject capable of taking measures in pursuit of its own, quite distinctive, interests. In the words of Jessop (2001b: 4), the state-centered theorists argue that “the state is a force in its own right”, “state activities and impact are easily explained in terms of its own distinctive properties as an administrative or repressive organ”, and they emphasize “state managers’ ability to exercise power independently of (and even in the face of resistance from) non-state forces”. In his discussion of the statist paradigm, Michael Mann (1993: 48-53) usefully differentiates between two variants of the statist approach to the state, namely “true elitism” and “institutional statism”. Both of these emphasize the autonomy of state power, albeit in quite different versions. *Elitist theory* emphasizes “the distributive power of state elites *over* society.” States or state elites are seen as actors in their own right having their own particular interests. *Institutional statism*, in its turn, emphasizes a structural autonomy rooted not in the particular interests of the state elites but in “the autonomous logic of definite political institutions”. “This is ‘state power’ though rarely ‘elite power’...This theory would predict less that state elites dominate civil society actors and more that all actors are constrained by existing political institutions” (Mann, 1993: 52). I found this distinction useful because the institutionalist moment can be successfully articulated to a Marxist theory of capitalist state which would primarily treat the state as a social relation inscribed into the institutional

⁴ For some prominent works from within this theoretical approach see Skocpol (1985), Evans et. al. (1985), Nordlinger (1987), Migdal (1987; 1988), Stepan (1988; 2001). For critical evaluations of this theoretical approach see Jessop (2001b), Cammack (1989), Mitchell (1991).

materiality of the state.⁵ Meanwhile, there is no doubt that elitist and institutionalist versions of statism need not to be mutually exclusive. However, even in the case of scholars that successfully articulate them, the elitist theory keeps its decisive weight in the *sui generis* way the statist scholars understand the state's autonomous power. Theda Skocpol, the prominent scholar of this approach, is an excellent figure in that sense. The subjectivist reading of the state, which reduces the state to a decision-maker subject whose actions are not determined or circumscribed by social forces or are even realized despite those forces, is best epitomized in the following definition of Theda Skocpol (1985: 9):

States conceived as organizations claiming control over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society. This is what is usually meant by "state autonomy". Unless such independent goal formulation occurs, there is little need to talk about states as important actors". Hence, the term refers to "the 'capacities' of states to implement official goals, especially *over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances*. (Italics are mine).

It is the elitist theory version rather than institutional statism that has been influential in the analysis of state-society relation in Turkey. Accordingly, the state either as a subject in itself or incarnated in the subjectivity of the bureaucracy as an autonomous actor acts independently from and against the social forces, including the dominant classes. As a result, neither the institutional architecture of the state nor the practices of state managers have been constrained, conditioned or constituted by class power relations.

The claim about the weakness of the bourgeoisie and its dependence on the state stands at the heart of this statist reading. The representation of the state *above* and *outside* the society results in arguing that the contentions between a powerful

⁵ See for instance Poulantzas (1978), Jessop (1990; 2001), Corrigan and Sayer (1985), Neocleous (1996), Wood (1996).

bureaucracy and a weak bourgeoisie has been more determinant than intra-class and inter-class relations, even in cases where the latter is integrated into the analysis. The bourgeoisie is cast as a dependent, passive and dominated actor, unable to organize and pursue its own class interests vis-à-vis the powerful state actors. This weakness is asserted at two moments of class relations. Accordingly, the bourgeoisie is said to be powerless and subjugated both in terms of the formation of accumulation strategies (economic development strategies) and in terms of establishing its own political-ideological hegemony.

The degree of the imputed weakness of the bourgeoisie vis-à-vis the state actors and the form of its relationship with the state managers differ according to the boldness of the statist argument. In the extreme versions, the state elites are pictured as totally unwilling to govern in favor of the bourgeoisie and by taking into account the demands of the bourgeoisie. There has been no sharing of interest between the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie, the argument goes, and the accumulation strategies are in fact formulated for maintaining the state's own interests (Heper, 1985; 1991a; İnsel, 1996). In more balanced accounts, the dependency and the weakness argument continues to be determinant, but this time, the bourgeoisie becomes the dependent ally of the bureaucracy in the power bloc. Even though the accumulation strategies do not now disfavor the bourgeoisie, it nevertheless continues to be a passive receiver of the benefits and to be at the mercy of state and/or political elites (Buğra 1994a; 1994b; Öniş, 1999; Keyder, 1987; 1988b).

According to the statist reading, the dependency of the bourgeoisie on the state and the essentially conflictual rather than consensual nature of the bureaucracy-bourgeoisie relationship are also reflected in the non-autonomization of the economy

and the market from the interventions of the state. It is argued that the main motive behind the state interventions in the economy has primarily been to preserve “the survival of the state” (*devletin bekası*) and/or the domination of the state over (civil) society rather than to promote capitalist accumulation and manufacture capitalist class hegemony (Heper, 1991a; İnsel, 1996). Even though those scholars writing from a critical institutionalist perspective theoretically recognize the constitutive role of state intervention in the making of “the economy”, “the market”, and the developmental strategies, they nevertheless underline the distortive impact of the Turkish state on economic development and bourgeois class formation. The failure of developmental strategies and the dysfunctions of capital accumulation process as well as the alleged lack of bourgeois hegemony are explained by state practices and state capacities, by the inability of the state actors to establish the proper institutional settings (Buğra, 1998; 1994a; Öniş, 1999; Barkey, 1990; İnsel, 1996: 259-260), to put it in institutionalist-statist terms, by the lack of “embedded autonomy” (Evans, 1995) or “infrastructural power” (Mann, 1984b). This state-centric institutional foundationalism takes the institutional architecture of the state and/or the practices of the state managers as the explanatory variable rather than what needs to be explained because it theoretically rules out to conceive “the state as a social relation”. Hence, state power, state capacity and state practices cease to be the outcome of previous intra- and/or inter-class struggles and compromises. The vantage point of their problematic continues to be “the diminishing of the dependency of the bourgeoisie on the state and to consolidate its social position as a dominant class” (Buğra, 1995: 36). The working assumption underlying this problematic is that the bourgeoisie could not become a dominant class in a proper sense, it could not develop as “a self-confident bourgeoisie which could be regarded as enjoying a

hegemonic position” (Buğra, 1998: 523), it could not initiate its own economic-political class project to the extent that the bourgeoisie has been “a class which historically owes its existence and social legitimacy largely to its relations with the state” (Buğra, 1994b: 235), as if it could have been otherwise in any real-concrete historical process.

The idea of the dependency of the bourgeoisie on the state and its inability to become autonomous has been the guiding problematic concerning the class relations at the political-hegemonic moment too. Accordingly, it is contended that the main symptom of the weakness and dependency of the bourgeoisie at the political-hegemonic moment is that it could not play its proper historical role in the course of the capitalist modernization process, namely the establishment of a liberal-democratic social and political order. Based on an ahistorical and essentialist reasoning on the relation between the classes and their ideologies, the liberal-democratic ideology is taken to be the genuine political ideology of the bourgeoisie and the only authentic, if not, possible form of class hegemony. Hence, any other ideological-political discourse such as nationalism or populism is evaluated as the symptom of the lack of bourgeois hegemony rather than its very expression. In this vein, the dominance of nationalist-organicist ideological discourses and of authoritarian state forms over the liberal-democratic ones, is explained by the weakness and marginality of the bourgeoisie vis-à-vis the state elites in Turkey (Keyder, 1987; 1993a; 2003; Buğra, 1994a: 31, 232, 254; Heper, 1985: 51; 1991a: 15). Hence, the argument logically goes, if the bourgeoisie, which could not constitute itself as a self-conscious class-subject acting politically in its own collective interests, had to comply with authoritarian-statist solutions, the root cause is its dominated position vis-à-vis a pre-capitalist dominant force, the bureaucracy in the Turkish case. In other words, this is not because it is politically active but because it is either weak or in a false

consciousness that the bourgeoisie could not bear its genuine political project (liberal democracy) and instead opted for nationalist-authoritarian developmentalist path essentially belonging to and consolidating the power of the state elites. In this vein, the authoritarian forms of state result from pre- or non-bourgeois social relations, if they are not simply pre-capitalist and pre-modern remnants.⁶

Behind this idea of the dependency of the Turkish bourgeoisie on the state lies an idealist (and explicitly or implicitly economic) conceptualization of the history of capitalism whereby the economy and/or the classes exist as separate entities outside the state/the political. A highly abstracted version of the history of European capitalism is taken as the ideal and normal route to capitalist modernization whereby the bourgeoisie develops independently from political power relations and outside the political sphere. This mythical thought about the bourgeoisie corresponds to an *occidental* reading of European history to the extent that the specificity of the Ottoman-Turkish social change is compared to a highly abstracted and idealized model of European capitalist development, to an “imaginary Europe”. Once the state and classes or the relations of production and the relations of domination are conceptualized in a philosophy of external relation, (Marxist or liberal versions of) the instrumentalist conceptualization of the state become to be taken as the proper mode of real bourgeois politics. An instrumentalist conceptualization of the relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie, in which one of them dominates the other, necessarily imagines the bourgeoisie as weak and passive vis-à-vis the state elites unless the bourgeoisie does not one-sidedly *dictate* its interests to the passive, neutral bureaucratic technicians. Hence,

⁶ Such an historiographical fallacy is not specific to the Turkish case. For a useful critique of the German case see Blackburn and Eley (1984), Eley (1997). For a more detailed discussion on the issue of political hegemony see **Ch. II-1-d**.

the history of Turkey becomes a zero-sum struggle between the state (the bureaucracy) and the bourgeoisie, as a result of which the problematic of the autonomization of the bourgeoisie from the state becomes dominant in analytical and normative terms.⁷ In consequence, the constitutive presence of the state within the relations *of* production is overlooked in this philosophy of external relations. This problematic obscures the fact that in any historical model of capitalism, the issue is *not* whether the state is constitutive of relations of production, whether nor classes are formed in and through the state, *nor* whether the state intervenes (or not) in the capitalist economy. The question at hand should be through what forms of state and what forms of state intervention the class relations on the one hand and “the market” and “the economy” as forms of capitalist relations of production on the other hand are constituted. Yet, the picturing of the Turkish state and its interventions in the economy as historically being antithetical to the proper development of capitalist relations of production and to the establishment of political hegemony of the bourgeoisie results in an *orientalist* trap to the extent that the “strong state thesis” works like a *deus ex machina* that explains everything (the *explanan*) but does not need to be explained (the *explanandum*). This self-orientalizing understanding, according to which *the dependency of the Turkish bourgeoisie on the state* and *the strong state’s continuously distorting impact on the development of capitalism* are recognized as the *specifica differentia* of the class formation in Turkey (Yalman, 2002a), produces a form of historicist essentialism.⁸

Coming back to the literature on the militarization of political processes and state forms in Turkey, the few marxist interpretations (see **Ch. II-2-c**), which undertake to

⁷ For various works based on the problematic of the autonomization of the bourgeoisie from the state see Keyder (1987), Sunar (1974), Heper (1985), Mardin (1994a).

⁸ On orientalism see Said (1979) and Turner (2001), on self-orientalization see Dirlik (1997)

develop a critique of the statist paradigm by breaking with the dualisms between the economic and the political moments of the relations of production, between the state and the classes, reproduces either instrumentalist or structuro-functionalist kind of reductionisms. Instead of theoretically and empirically exposing the actual mediations between the political and the economic moments of the relations of production, which would be a contingent outcome of open-ended historical processes, they opt for either instrumentalist explanation whereby the state is treated as an instrument to be possessed by a class or class fraction; or for structuro-functionalist account whereby the capitalist class nature of the state and the militarization is functionally derived from the objective necessities of capital accumulation conceived as a subjectless objective process. Briefly, they fall short of conceptualizing and analyzing the constitutive role of the state and of the military in capitalist relations of production.

To sum up, all these approaches (statist, instrumentalist and structuro-functionalist) are unable to treat the state in “an empirically open-ended manner so as to come to terms with the relational and historical character of social reality” (Yalman, 1997: 86; see also Sayer, 1987; Corrigan et. al., 1980; Poulantzas, 1978; Jessop, 1990 and 2001). They all overlook the fact that neither the capitalist class nor state managers are structurally in a position to know and form the ideal strategy for a relatively stable “expanded accumulation of capital” because of the institutional separation of the political and the economic in the capitalist mode of production. Because of this structural institutional separation, the rationality of the capitalist order is a consequence of the three sided conflicts among capitalist class (and its fractions), state managers, and the working class (and its fractions) (Block, 1987: 16, 52). The externalization of the relation between the state and classes on the one hand, the attempts at bridging them by

reductionist or derivationist methods on the other hand undermine the possibility of analyzing the making of class power in capitalist social formations, which occurs in a process of manufacturing hegemony in and through statal and societal sites.

The search for a theory of the modern capitalist state, which would recognize the internality of the state/the political to the capitalist relations of production (i.e. class relations), yet at the same time would give the opportunity of conceptualizing this relationality in an empirically open-ended manner without falling into reductionist or derivationist forms of explanations as it is the case with instrumentalist and capital-logic structuro-functional approaches, has been my guiding problematic throughout the **first chapter** of this study. As I already emphasized, the conceptualization of the state is important because it conditions both the way militarism is analyzed and the form of relationship, if there is any, between militarism and capitalism. Hence, I preferred to discuss Marxist theories of state by specifically focusing on those works dealing with militarization processes. I generally picked up one strong representative of the theoretical position that I want to deal with. Two questions intermingled in this discussion: 1) What makes the modern state function in such a way as to serve the expanded reproduction of capital as a social relation and to constitute the political power of the bourgeoisie? 2) Which forms of militarism as a technique of power are used for establishing capitalist class hegemony and to what extent? Even though the chapter mainly focuses on Marxist theories of the state, it also extensively discusses other theoretical approaches and explanatory frameworks through which modern militarism is analyzed. In that sense, the chapter also aims at fulfilling a comprehensive literature review.

The critical evaluation of the existing theoretical approaches to militarism brings to the fore a questionable assertion appropriated and shared, albeit to varying degrees and in different ways, by different approaches ranging from early evolutionist currents to modernization theories, from Marxist analyses of capitalism at a certain level of abstraction to the critical institutionalist approaches. It is argued that since with the advent of capitalism, the use of militarism has receded from the relations *in* production and the legitimate monopoly of the use of violence is conferred upon the state as an institutionally differentiated instance, capitalism may be said to be inherently antithetical to militarism and/or the root causes of modern militarism are to be found in either the remnants of pre-capitalist social relations and institutions and/or non-economic institutions and actors such as the state or the inter-state system.⁹ However, such reasoning would be possible only when social relations of production and their capitalist form are conceptualized in an economistic manner, in a way that would externalize the state. Once capitalism is attributed to an existence only within somehow self-containing and self-regulating economic sphere, then it may *ipso facto* be mystified as non-militarist by definition. Hence, the ongoing presence of militarism could be attributed to the allegedly “non-capitalist” spheres and their actors, especially the state.

In order to avoid such a theoretical fallacy, an ontology that would not externalize the state and the relations of production, the state and the class relations would be necessary for an empirically open-ended way of analyzing the relation between militarism and capitalism in modern capitalist societies. Yet, to theoretically assess the internality of the state to the capitalist class relations, which is a necessary

⁹ See the related discussion in **Ch. I-2, I-3-b, I-4**. For representative examples from different theoretical approaches see Spencer (1923), Durkheim (1958), Schumpeter (1955), Lasswell (1941), Janowitz (1977), Huntington (1957; 1968), Anderson (1979), Mann (1984a), Giddens (1985; 1994).

ontological premise for a non-reductionist, non-economist analysis of state-class relations in capitalist social formations, would not surely be enough to argue that all militarist practices are rooted in capitalist social relations. Rather, it would be a minimum but necessary conceptualization for clearing the ground for searching the ways and forms in which militarist practices are articulated to capitalist social relations. In addition, the assertion of this internal relation would be necessary but not enough to conceptualize how this necessary but contingent mediation between the state and classes are constructed in actual historical processes.

The discussion in **Chapter I-3-c** lays out how in fact a Marxist theory of capitalist relations of production should be and has been based on the philosophy of internal relations according to which the so-called extra-economic elements such as the state, the politics, the law, the ideology are internally constitutive of the capitalist class relations in so far as in their absence the capitalist mode of production would not be possible. They always have a constitutive presence in the relations of production and their reproduction. In that sense, the 'economic' and the 'political' are discrete forms of capitalist social relations of production. Unless we see the unity (social relations of production, i.e. class relations) in this separation (of the economic and the political), we would be caught up in the fetishized categorization produced by the capitalist social relations themselves. The institutional separation of the economic and the political, and the emergence of the modern state as a separate instance cannot be taken for granted as an ontological reality. This specific form of the state, i.e. its separation from the immediate process of relations *in* production, is itself a historical artifact peculiar to capitalism. The apparent institutional separation of the state from the economy is constantly constructed and reconstructed in actual social processes. In other words, the

institutional separation of the political and the economic, which is constitutive of capitalism, should not be interpreted that they are externally related spheres with their own distinct realities.¹⁰ The theoretical puzzle is to come to terms with the actual processes in and through which the unity between the political and the economic moments of the relations of production, which is inevitable for the expanded reproduction of capital, is manufactured while at the same acknowledging the effect of their apparent institutional separation.

However, the fact that the expanded reproduction of capital as a social relation objectively needs the intervention of, and hence is internally related to, state power (in one form or another) for regulating the capital accumulation process and the related political class power relations, does not mean that this objective necessity will necessarily and automatically realize itself. In fact, the very form of the modern capitalist state problematicizes its function. In the words of Jessop (1990: 144-145):

The basic problem confronting any Marxist account of the complex relations between the rule of capital and the modern state is to be found in the very form of the state in capitalist society. For it is not constituted as a private organ of the dominant class but as an impersonal public authority and, in so far as it has definite formal channels of representation and accountability, they are typically tied to more or less developed notions of popular rather than class sovereignty. This obviously raises the question of how capital could be said to enjoy political class domination where the state is constituted as a formally impartial, class-neutral authority, is institutionally separate from the productive core of the capitalist economy and operates in terms of a political calculus which is quite different from the 'profit-and-loss' accounting of market forces.

Yet, the instrumentalist and structuro-functionalist theories of the capitalist state¹¹ overlook the question of how the form of capitalist state renders its function problematic. They also fail to develop adequate theoretical tools to analyze political

¹⁰ For Marxist theoretical and historical assessments of such conceptualization see Sayer (1987); Poulantzas (1978); Jessop (1990; 2002) Corrigan (1980); Corrigan and Sayer (1985); Corrigan, Ramsay, Sayer (1980); Neocleous (1996); Marsden (1992); Ollman (1993; 1976); Geras (1973); Colletti (1974); Read (2002); Holloway and Picciotto (1978a); Graham-Gibson (1997).

¹¹ For critical evaluations of such approaches see Jessop (1982; 1990); Carnoy (1984); Aronowitz and Bratsis (2002).

technologies and political class relations as well as to conceptualize the mediating mechanism to construct the actual unity of the economic and political forms of capitalist relation, which is contingent upon historical and social practices emanating from power relations among social actors. On the other hand, the attempts to break with reductionist, economist, and instrumentalist theories may result in breaking up the internality between the relations of production and relations of domination by not only state-centric theoreticians but also by some Marxist scholars (see **Ch. I-3-e-1,2,3; Ch. I-4**).

It is one of the main arguments of this thesis that one can overcome these theoretical problems by following the continuum formed by the ideas of Gramsci-Poulantzas- Jessop (**Ch. I-3-e-4,5**) through which a relational theory of modern capitalist state is developed. In accordance with this theoretical line, the *modern capitalist state* is neither an instrument / a thing to be possessed nor a unified subject acting in one way or another. It should rather be conceived both *as a social relation* (the condensation of relations of forces) and *as an institutional ensemble* (institutional materiality of the state). The state is

a form-determined condensation of class relations, a relationship of forces, or more precisely the material condensation of such a relationship among classes and class fractions...The establishment of the State's policy must be seen as the result of the class contradictions inscribed in the very structure of the State (Poulantzas, 2000: 128-132).

Hence, state power must be investigated in terms of the complex interaction between the 'institutional materiality' of the state apparatus (its form) and the balance of forces involved in political action as the overdetermining level of class struggle (social relations). State power can only be assessed relationally; state as such has no power, it has only a set of institutional capacities and liabilities which mediate that power. The power of the state is the power of the forces acting in and through the state. The state is primarily a site of strategy, a site where strategies of various social forces are elaborated.

These forces include state managers as well as class forces and (class relevant) social forces emanating from different societalization processes which are active within society and which are inscribed into the institutional materiality of the state. (Jessop, 1990: 260-261, 267-270; 1982: 191). Particular forms of state, which are the crystallizations of past strategies and previous social struggles, privilege some strategies and actors over others through the mechanism of “strategic selectivity”. This theoretical conceptualization incorporates “institutional statism” to the extent that it acknowledges that “states institutionalize present social conflicts, but institutionalized historic conflicts then exert considerable power over new conflicts -from state as passive place...to state not quite as actor but as active place” (Mann, 1993: 52). Yet, it emphasizes the primacy of social relations over institutions in the sense that the institutional architecture of the state and the powers embedded in this institutional structure result from social struggles be it class-based or class-relevant.

Having recognized that the internality of the state/the political to the relations of production means that classes are always formed in and through the state, this theoretical approach also offers a panacea to functionalist and instrumentalist reductionisms through the concept of hegemony. The concept of hegemony is developed as an analytical tool to analyze the contingent formation of the unity of the economic, the political and the ideological moments of capitalist relations of production. Gramsci conceived class relations not merely as economic-corporate relations but also as political-hegemonic relations. It is through hegemonic politics that class relations are constituted, lived, and experienced. It is through the concept of hegemony that he paves the way to analyze class relations in their different moments and to analyze various techniques of bourgeois form of rule. Gramsci’s importance lies in his simultaneous

focus on the class power relations, their different institutional sites, and various techniques of power. Jessop, who draws on Gramsci, developed the concept of *hegemonic projects* through the mediation of which the contingent unity between the “political” and “economic” forms of capitalist relations of production is realized. Hegemonic projects, which include an accumulation strategy and specific state projects, fulfill the function of getting the consent and/or compliance of the masses and of unifying the class fractions within the power bloc in the name of specific capitalist development projects. Moreover, the restructuring of the institutional architecture of the state in such way as to strategically select hegemonic class power has been an integral part of hegemonic projects. The latter, which aim at establishing a certain capitalist rationality, are always the contingent outcome of economic-corporate and political-hegemonic contentions and compromises among and within the dominant classes, the subordinated classes, and state managers. In that sense, hegemony is always a process under constant (re)production and challenges.

It is central to this thesis that the above discussion of state-class relations in capitalist social formation in general and in Turkey in particular forms a productive and useful theoretical framework in and through which a social relational analysis of the military as an institutional actor and of militarism as a technique of power may be developed. In that sense, this study is not another work focusing on solely the military and its various sources of power; but an attempt at analyzing the actual processes whereby this power is used in a relational and historical way. In doing this, I think that establishing a dialogical relation with and developing an immanent critique of both critical statist, who explore the specific mechanisms of militarism in a way detaching them from class relations of power, and Marxists, who explore the capitalist nature of

militarism without exposing the mediating links, may be possible by an analysis based on the process of “manufacturing hegemony”. In that sense, this work may also be seen as part of a group of studies, which has been using different interpretations of neo-Gramscian analysis in various research areas of Turkish social and political life. In that sense, it should be read as an initial attempt of applying such a theoretical framework to the analysis of the military and militarism in Turkey.¹²

My assertion is that the military’s discursive and non-discursive practices and militarism as a technique of power are embedded in broader capitalist social power relations. My approach is neither to subsume under nor to reduce into each other capitalism and militarism. Rather I look for the historical-empirical nodal points whereby as two distinct phenomena, capitalism and militarism intertwined and became each other’s condition of being. In other words, I focus on *a double process: the ‘capitalization’ of militarism and the militarization of capitalism.*

The remaining two chapters (Chps. III and IV) of this work focus on the two empirical forms of the articulation of militarism and capitalism in Turkey. **Chapter III** is concerned with exposing how the military interventions and the subsequent militarized state forms have historically been a phenomenal form of the capitalization of militarism and militarization of capitalism in Turkey. The chapter analyzes the capitalist face of this form of militarism (i.e. the militarization of political power relations and form of state) by taking the first military intervention in 1960 as a case to apply the theoretical framework proposed here. This chapter may be seen as a reinterpretation of the militarization process culminating in the May 27 military coup. Given the limits of

¹² For some such studies see Yalman (1997; 2002a), Özkazanç (1998a; 1998b), Tünay (1993), Yazar (1998), Arat-Koç (1990), Yeğen (2002), Çelik (2002), Erdoğan (1998), Dursun (2002-03). I should yet note that my approach is different from those who reduce the analysis of hegemony to mere ideological/discursive practices and who breaks the relations between the classes and the hegemony.

this dissertation, I focused on only one of the military interventions instead of covering a much longer historical period marked by the permanency of militarism. The reason to choose the May 27 coup as a case study is that it poses more of a challenge than the subsequent coups in exposing the capitalist class nature of the coup and in arguing that the militarist practices of the period were not above capitalist class relations. This is so for two main reasons. Firstly, it is easier and more common for hegemonic statist paradigm to argue that class actors and relations were not yet determinant in this earlier period of capitalist development because of the lower levels of economic, political, and organizational capacity and power of the Turkish bourgeoisie. Hence, it is easier to argue for the aptness of an analysis based on center-periphery, state-society, state elites versus societal forces binary oppositions. Secondly, the reformist stance of the military regime and of the nationalist developmentalism adopted by the military officers of the period, for some of whom it could take the form of an allegedly anti-capitalist and anti-communist statist paradigm, has paved the ground for interpreting the coup as either bureaucratic restoration or bureaucratic reformism which is constituted independently of class power relations, if not antithetical to the class power. The reformist stance and nationalist developmentalist project which attributed to the state an active role in planned economic development could easily raise doubts about the class nature of the coup among both leftist-oppositional political-intellectual currents and the ranks of the capitalist class. Hence, it is a more challenging case when dealing with state-centric explanations of militarism. I will contend that on the one hand the militarized state power was constrained by and formed through the process of hegemonic class struggles, and on the other hand the military regime also actively contributed to the constitution of a new capitalist hegemonic project thereby instituting the political power of the

bourgeoisie. Finally, **Chapter IV** includes the analysis of another form of capitalization of militarism that I call “military capital”. The first military intervention in 1960 was also interesting from the point of view that it established a new and *sui generis* form of articulation between militarism and capitalism, whereby the military has become an economic actor within the capitalist economy. As this face of the military, through which the military has become a collective capitalist group by founding its own holding-like economic organization, is a so far neglected area of study not only in the literature on Turkey but in the general literature on military and militarism, this part of study, which covers the period from 1961 to 2005, has drawn mainly on primary resources. I underline that the phenomenon of military capital has been another actual mediating link between militarism and capitalism, another phenomenal form of capitalization of militarism.

CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL APPROACHES ON THE NEXUS OF
MILITARISM-CAPITALISM-STATE

1. Conceptualizing Militarism as a Technique of Power

Any scholar who has the intention of using the term “militarism” has to deal with the manifold definitions of the concept. In his work delineating the genealogy of the idea of militarism, Stargardt (1994: 13-14) argues that “because militarism is a rhetorical rather than a rigorous theoretical concept, it is intimately connected to the intentions, programmes, strategies and propaganda of political actors”. I may agree with that point of view with two reservations. First, “militarism” is open to hegemonic struggles over how to define this concept as much as other social scientific analytical/theoretical categories. None of them can be detached from social power relations. Second, this hegemonic struggle over the concept is itself a limited one, in so far as militarism is not an absolutely but a relatively empty signifier. This last point paves the way for using “militarism” not only as a political / rhetorical tool but also as an analytical / theoretical concept. Although the term militarism is a multifaceted concept, and it is not an absolutely fixed signifier, it is possible to define diverse forms and manifestations of militarism. In this section, I will deal with the question of the definition of militarism. What is meant by the term “militarism”? What are its different uses? What phenomenal forms does it take? After having presented its different uses, I will formulate my own definition of the concept.

Militarism is generally defined either as the active and direct participation of the military in politics under different forms and through different channels; or as a concept

related to war and war preparation. The definition in the *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* (Radway, 1968) brings together these two points: “militarism is a doctrine or system that values war and accords primacy in state and society to the armed forces. It exalts a function –the application of violence- and an institutional structure – the military establishment. It implies both a *policy* orientation and a *power* relationship”.¹³ If we analytically divide this definition, we see that militarism has to do with 1) a method of policing (the use of violence) 2) the institutional actor of this method, namely the military which is embedded 3) in broader power relations between social and political actors.

War / war preparation and the active role of the military in social and political life had been common phenomena, but it was only in the modern period that a critical political concern about these two phenomena emerged. As a concept belonging to the modern capitalist era, the term militarism started to be publicly used in the 1860s, during a period of rearmament and state building in Europe. Militarism entered into the political and the intellectual discourse in order to protest the strengthening of the domestic power of the state in both France and Prussia. In the popular usage, the terms such as absolutism, the military state, military domination, Caesarism and corporatism and newer ones such as military economy, military system, and militarism were all used in a

¹³ A quick survey of main dictionaries exposes this dual use of the term. *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*: “militarism is an attitude toward public affairs which conceives war and the preparation for war as the chief instruments of foreign policy and the highest form of public service”. *Oxford English Dictionary*: “The spirit and tendencies of the professional soldier; the prevalence of military sentiment and ideals among a people; the tendency to regard military efficiency as the paramount interest of the state”; in 1933, added “The political conditions characterized by the predominance of the military class in government or administration”. *Grand Larousse*: “exaggerated preponderance of the military element in a nation; a political system which bases itself upon the army; sentiment, doctrine of those who favor this preponderance of the army”. *Dizionario Enciclopedico Italiano*: “the prevalence, in a state or class, of a military spirit”. *Brockhaus*: “the predominance of military forms, thought patterns and objectives in state, politics and society”. *The Encyclopedia Americana*: “the policy of giving exceptional emphasis to military preparedness, exalting military virtues and relying on force in international relations” (See Berghahn, 1981: 2-3).

loosely interchangeable way (Stargardt, 1994: 19, 22). Amidst this conceptual nebula, the term started to connote, as one of its most influential scholars remarks, “a domination of the military man over the civilian, an undue preponderance of military demands, an emphasis on military considerations, spirit, ideals, and scales of value, in the life of states” (Vagts, 1959: 14).

The literature on militarism that I will critically evaluate in the subsequent sections exposes at least five main manifestations of modern militarism. Indeed, each scholar who attempts to define militarism includes in its definition more than one of the phenomenal forms of militarism. Hence, the distinction below remains analytical rather than being essential. In social reality, we find several manifestations of militarism as articulated into each other in concrete historical cases. For instance, militarism as war-making and war preparation cannot exist as detached from either a militarist ideology (and/or militarized ideologies) or military expenditures and war industry. Similarly, praetorian militarism, i.e. military intervention in political and social life, cannot be possible without the existence of militarized ideologies that offer a kind of legitimacy, without a political discourse that securitizes a range of social and political issues or without the use (or the threat to use) of coercion and violence in most cases.

The *first* form of militarism is also the most studied one: *The dominance of the military as an institutional actor in the political structure*, the propensity of the military to intervene in the political and social life of a country through different formal and informal mechanisms (military coups, military governments, militarized state structures etc.). Here the point is that the military is not under civilian control in its interventions but it rather acts as an autonomous actor. As the more manifest form of militarism, this

has been the main focus of the whole civil-military relations literature.¹⁴ According to Johnson (1962b: 91), militarism denotes “the domination of the military men over the civilian, the undue emphasis upon military demands or any transcendence by the armed forces of ‘true military purposes’”. This form of militarism is also conceptualized as praetorianism. Therefore, I will henceforth refer to this as “*praetorian militarism*”. The classical definition of praetorianism as defined by Frederick Mundell Watkin in the 1933 edition of the *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* is used for historical situations in which “the military class of a given society exercises independent political power within it by virtue of an actual or threatened use of force” (quoted in Perlmutter, 1977: 89). Similarly Perlmutter (1977: 93), after having differentiated between historical and modern praetorianism, defines the modern praetorian state as one in which “the military tends to intervene in the government and has the potential to dominate the executive” (see also Nordlinger, 1977: 2).

Secondly, although militarism cannot be merely equated to the role of physical force, it would not be wrong to argue that it frequently reveals itself in the *use of organized physical coercion (violence) by the state, or the threat to use them*. While coercion may have non-violent forms such as ideological, legal, economic etc., violence as a specific form of coercion in which physical force is used seems to be central to militarism. In that sense, “militarism is the organization of physical force by the State, so as to be able to compel the members of another state, or some members of the military State itself, to act against their will” (Hobson, 1998: 19). Militarism as the use of physical coercion can be inward- or outward-oriented (Liebknecht, 1973; Giddens, 1985; Mann, 1993). It should be noted that the use or the threat to use physical coercion

¹⁴ See for instance Huntington (1957; 1968), Finer (1962), Halpern (1963), Janowitz (1977), Johnson (1962a), and for a more recent collection Koonings and Kruijff (2002).

in the regulation of internal social and political cleavages does not need to be realized under praetorian regimes. The civilian control of the military does not form an absolute impediment to the use of such militarist methods, for a civilian government per se may have recourse to the use of military force as a way of dealing with social problems.

The *third* form of militarism, *war and preparation for war*, comes to the fore when the use of violence is oriented to an equally organized form of violence. With the capacity of modern states to establish a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence, warfare has become mainly an inter-state phenomenon. However, as this monopoly is never absolute, and is challenged by different social forces who attempt to organize the physical coercion, warfare is not exclusively an outward-oriented and inter-state phenomenon, but includes internal warfare (civil wars) too.¹⁵ The analysis of the war and war preparation as social processes paved the way for an understanding of war not merely as a military-technical problem but as a multifaceted social phenomenon. Causes of war; particular characteristics of war and war preparation processes; their differential impacts upon different classes and social groups; the historically intimate relationship between war-making and state-making, nation-building, and citizen-making; the relation between war-making process and social struggles for extending democratic citizenship rights; all these have been among the main traits that are brought under scrutiny in the context of debates on militarism.¹⁶

¹⁵ “Wars arise, in the modern world, from both conflicts between states and conflicts involving states and other social forces – often national groupings which aspire to statehood, but also class-based political movements which challenge the existing form of state” (Shaw and Creighton, 1987: 7)

¹⁶ Since the concept of militarism started to be used publicly, war and war preparation have been treated as one of its most manifest forms, and have been subject to analysis by different theoretical approaches. During the reemergence of the discussions on militarism in the last 30 years, militarism has been more and more understood as war and war preparation, especially in the works of scholars who focus on the historical experience of the advanced capitalist societies (Europe, U.S. etc.). One of the main reasons for this usage has been the idea that outward-oriented militarism has to a large extent replaced inward-

War and war preparation is intimately related to a *fourth* essential form of militarism: *military expenditures and war industry*.¹⁷ With the industrialization of warfare in the industrial capitalist social formations, military expenditures and industries producing the means of destruction have become extremely important in the militarization process. How military expenditures affect the capitalist accumulation process; what their differential impacts upon different social classes are; how and by whom they will be financed; what the relationship of military expenditures and war industry to economic growth and technological development is have been among the prominent issues not only for the scholars focusing on specifically economic structures of militarism but also for social and political struggles.

There is no doubt that militarism is at the same time an ideology. What Vagts (1959: 17) called as the “militarism of moods and opinions” corresponds to the *fifth* form of militarism, which can be called as *cultural/ideological militarism*. Ben-Eliezer (1998: 1, 7) defines “cultural militarism”¹⁸ as “the viewpoint that the military way, meaning organized violence, is the desirable and preferable way to resolvethe optimal solution for” the social and political problems, and “military politics is its concrete realization in decision-making processes”. In that sense, militarism either as an ideology in itself or by militarizing other political ideologies legitimizes the use of physical coercion and the related power techniques in governing social and political relations. Ben-Eliezer emphasizes the primacy of the cultural/ideological form as constituting the

oriented militarism. For the works debating militarism as war and war preparation see for instance Mann (1988a), Shaw (1984), Tilly (1985; 1990), Creighton and Shaw (1987), Gillis (1989), Porter (1994).

¹⁷ It is a huge area of study, part of which will be occasionally covered in the following pages.

¹⁸ Ben-Eliezer (1998: 10-13) differentiates praetorianism from militarism by defining the first one as “the seizure of power by the army and by supporting elements”, and argues that they “are not necessarily mutually conditional”. In other words, there may be excellent cases where militarism exists even in the lack of praetorianism.

essence of militarism since “militarism comes into being only when the use of military force acquires legitimation, ... is routinized and institutionalized within society”. Accordingly, he emphasizes the primacy of “the subjective interpretation”, and argues that during the course of time “militaristic view of reality ... embodied in methods and practices, was transformed into a substantive and a comprehensive structure of society”. In other words, militarism as a specific view of reality “alters reality” itself (Ben-Eliezer, 1998: 7-8, x-xi). Leaving aside, for the moment, the question of ontological primacy of any moment of social reality (be it economic, political, ideological, cultural...), if there is any, it should be noted that each militarist practice is dependent upon a militarist and/or militarized ideology. In that sense, militarism is produced through different ideological and cultural processes. In modern periods, the military functioned as an ideological apparatus through compulsory military service. The military became a school for making a nation composed of disciplined citizens, for producing disciplined and docile working bodies necessary for capitalist production processes. In this militarization process, while the military became a school for the nation through the compulsory military service, the school itself contributed to the formation of militarized national identities.¹⁹ That is the reason why Vagts (1959: 41) identified the standing armies in peace time as the most militaristic institution.

Securitization stands as a mechanism deserving a specific attention in the militarization of the political relations. Buzan et.al. (1998: 23-24) defines securitization as treating the public questions as “an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure”. Securitization is a way of (‘re-politicization’ through) depoliticization and technocratization of some

¹⁹ See for instance Altunay (2004a), Weber (1976), Ben-Eliezer (1998).

par excellence political and public problems. In that sense, securitization is the politics of being above politics. The *national security* discourse together with its socio-political and socio-economic institutional structures has been one of the main mechanisms of *militarization through securitization* in the age of modern nation-states. National security discourse paves the way for militarizing the state structure and political regime while at the same time preserving the appearance of parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. In her book entitled *The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy*, Jennifer Schirmer (1998: 4) asks: “Is a democracy that is thoroughly penetrated by national security concepts and practices indeed as ‘stable’ and ‘nonviolent’ as contended?”, and she continues by pointing out that so little has been written on how the national security doctrine “actually becomes an integral part of *traditional, democratic, and legal* structures and discourse, such that coups d’état may be needed only in the form of rumor, and states of emergency need no longer be declared for official lawlessness to be rife”.

I should make three remarks on my classification of the manifestations of modern militarism. First, to be sure, the above is not an exhaustive list, and several other forms of militarism or its other aspects in relation to different social, political, cultural, and economic phenomenon may be added. My aim has been to reveal the *main* forms of militarism in the modern period, and from this point of view, it can be argued that it is a well encompassing list. Second, these different manifestations of militarism are not to be found in pure forms in concrete social formations, they are generally articulated to each other, each form is the condition of being for another form. Its different aspects, be it economic, political, ideological, cannot be detached from each other, as the social reality itself cannot be divided into such ontological spheres. Militarism is a social process that

traverses the cultural-ideological, political and economic moments of the social reality. Militarism has different forms of appearance at different moments of social life. Third, the strategy of attributing militarism to one of the poles of binary oppositions such as military-civilian, state-civil society, according to which the second pole is treated as being non-militarist by definition, collapses in the face of several forms of militarism. For these main forms of militarism are the products of, and have an impact on, social processes crosscutting these binary spheres. Militarism is not simply a product of the military sphere, or of the state structures and elites; rather it traverses the so-called military and civilian spheres, state and civil society, and political, economic, cultural, ideological moments of social life.

Having presented the main forms of modern militarism, and made these remarks, can we develop an inclusive definition? *Militarization* is defined by Michael Geyer (1989: 79) as “the contradictory and tense social [material and discursive] process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of *violence*”. The material aspect involves the labor and resources allocated to military purposes, including shaping other institutions around militaristic goals. The discursive aspect refers to a shift in societal beliefs and values in such a way to legitimize the use of organized force, the organization and the status of the military, and the military expenditures. It is a tense process since it can create conflicts between different elite groups (those who benefit from this process and those who do not), between women and men, or between different classes who bear different costs of militarism (Lutz and Nonini, 1999: 90-91). The emphasis on civil society should be read as that militarism is produced not only within the institutional setting of the state as conventionally argued but also of civil society. In other words, two different institutional settings of modern capitalist social formations

(state and civil society) are arenas of social power relations, and of militarism. However, this definition lacks the functional aspect of militarism: what functions does militarism serve? What does militarization aim at? To answer broadly, militarism is a technique of power, a way of dealing with social, economic, ideological and/or political problems. To bring all these together, we can elaborate and extend Geyer's definition in the following way: Militarism is a technique of power in governing social cleavages and disciplining social/political forces in a conflictual social process in which the use of physical coercion (or simply the threat to use it) is backed by the related political, legal, ideological, economic regulations at the heart of which lies the military as a socio-political actor. The degree of civilian supremacy makes it possible to differentiate between praetorian and non-praetorian forms of militarism, rather than between the existence and non-existence of militarism.

Once militarism is defined as above, the next problematic can be formulated as the place of militarism in modern capitalist social formations. In the next section, through a symptomatic reading of the literature, I will develop a critical evaluation of the existing analytical and theoretical frameworks used in the analysis of militarism. I will follow the tracks of my own problematic, namely the relation between capitalism and militarism. Did militarism continue to exist under capitalism? What specific forms militarism has taken in capitalist social formations? How much has it been a result of the capitalist social relations, and how much has it had effects in the configuration of capitalist power relations? To what extent do capitalist accumulation and social relations of production reproduce militarism? What role, if any, does militarism play in the regulation of capitalist accumulation and social class relations?

In the next sections, I will critically elaborate on diverse theoretical approaches problematicizing the relationship between militarism, capitalism and state in modern social formations.

2. The Liberal Fantasy: Militarism-free Capitalism

In his critical analysis of the militarization of Europe between 1914 and 1945, Michael Geyer points out how the dichotomy between the (professionalized) military and civilian spheres, which, for the liberals, had been the guarantee against militarism, collapsed since militarization traversed those boundaries and it had “originated in civil society, instead of being imposed on it”. He also adds that, within the limits of the liberal paradigm, “militarism was systematically associated with everyone and everything except the core constituencies of industrial society. Only outsiders and outcasts were ‘militarists’” (Geyer, 1989: 69). In other words, the actual processes of militarization crosscut the so called civil-military, civil society-state, the (capitalist) ‘market’/the ‘economy’-the political/the state boundaries upon which liberal paradigm is based. I will argue that the discursive and practical construction of a series of such binary oppositions lies behind this liberal fantasy of militarism-free capitalism. In each of these binary oppositions, while militarism, coercion, violence are attributed to the second pole, the second one is treated by definition as their counterparts (civilianism, freedom, pacifism), hence as the antidote of all the previous illnesses.

From the earlier liberal accounts which announced the withering away of militarism with the development of capitalism to the later approaches which try to explain the somewhat continuing existence of militarism (under different forms) with reference to the so-called non-capitalist elements and relations, they all work within

these binary oppositions created by capitalist social relations per se. Indeed, these binary oppositions are not merely theoretical hallucinations or ideological fictions. They are materialized in specific institutional settings, having specific effects on the way capitalist social relations are constituted. On the other hand, the very existence of these institutional separations and their specific conceptualization has the effect of masking the real proceeding of capitalist social relations. For capitalist social relations are constituted through all these different institutional settings. The liberal paradigms that discursively produce and reproduce these binary oppositions turn these institutionally separated realms into independent ontological spheres of specific kind of social relations. Coming back to the issue militarism, once these spheres are defined as having already established essences, as having independent ontological realities, it becomes possible to sever the links between militarism and capitalism, each belonging to only one of these spheres. Discursive construction of such essentially separated spheres impedes exploring the nature of the relationship between militarism and capitalism through a real historical analysis.

2-a Early Evolutionist Approaches

Classical social theory on militarism in the 19th century was marked by the liberal assumption that with the advent of capitalist industrialization not only the military-dominated state structures would give way to representative parliamentary regimes, but also war would be relegated to the dustbin of history. This “*optimistic theory of pacific capitalism*” (Mann, 1984a: 25) was stamped by the evolutionist view of history, according to which “societies inexorably develop towards some end-state of

increasing adaptation to environmental or material conditions”.²⁰ This optimistic interpretation was a product of a relatively peaceful episode of European history in terms of inter-state wars and of a historical period marked by rapid industrialization. The argument was that either the military power would become unnecessary hence abolished totally, or at least it would certainly be closely and effectively controlled by civilian ruling forces. The latter would keep the right to use military power only in exceptional cases and in accordance with the principles of the rule of law. Hence, the main problematic of this liberal position has been the civilian control of the military, as a result of which the derivative analysis on militarism, have been based on the discursive and practical-institutional separation between civilian and military spheres. This binary opposition has also been corresponding to a more encompassing one, namely civil society versus the state. The idea behind the liberal thought that has used the civilian versus military opposition has been to protect civil society from the state, the sphere of freedom from the sphere of coercion.

The liberal argument about the pacific and non-coercive nature of the modern capitalist society proceeded at two levels, seemingly separated in accordance with the liberal theory: the political and the economic. At the ‘political’ level, the argument was that a political constitutional regime based on representative government freed from the militarist/coercive ways of political control would be established. The modern state was to be limited in its scope of action, civil society and/or private sphere (including family, identity, and class relations) would be defended against state interventions, and in this vein, the professionalized army of the modern state would no longer intervene in civilian

²⁰ Following Erik Olin Wright I differentiate evolutionism (defined above) from an evolutionary theory. The latter implies that “there is some process, however weak and sporadic, which imparts a directionality to movements from one form to another, but there is no claim that societies have needs or teleologically driven tendencies towards achieving some final state” (quoted in Callinicos, 2000: 104-105)

issues; neither in political nor in civil society. Besides, it would limit itself with its specific profession: the protection of the country. Accordingly, once state's and its institutions' scope of action was limited, and the civil society and the capitalist economy were inherently non-coercive and non-militarist, liberalism would be opposed to all kinds of authoritarianism and militarism.

At the 'economic' level, the argumentation was based on the impact of industrialization, free trade and economic development, all supposedly being the antidotes of militarist use of force. What was anticipated was, to use Saint Simon's phrase, one of the ardent supporters of this argument, "a harmonious society of industrial producers in which military power would be superfluous" (quoted in Berghahn, 1981: 9)

In classical political economy, the causes and the unlikely future of militarism equated with war were discussed in terms of cost-benefit analysis. According to Adam Smith, wars were occurring because nations estimated that potential gains would exceed the costs, and with the deepening of economic development war's positive payoff would cease while at the same time the opportunity costs of the conflict would grow. While, according to Smith, war-making was seen as an event breaking the accumulation of capital, or at least slowing down its pace, according to David Ricardo, war and war preparation processes produced distress in trade, changed the nature of employments, and in such periods much fixed capital was unemployed. However, as economies would move through the stages of development, war would become less and less profitable and more and more costly. Nations becoming richer were no more inclined to engage in offensive conflict (see Goodwin, 1991). As a German left-liberal, Eduard Löwenthal argued in 1870 that new tax burdens stimulated by the rising military expenditures had led to mass poverty and reduced the labor productivity. As an ardent defender of laissez-

faire, the remedy to the pathological impact of militarism on the economy was free trade, which was supposed to be antithetical to war and use of coercion (see Stargardt, 1994: 22).

One of the most prominent examples of this militarism-free capitalism argument is Herbert Spencer (1923: 557-584). Working within a synthesis of the liberal tradition and social Darwinism, he draws a distinction between militant society and industrial society based on the presence/absence of coercion. According to Spencer, with the transition from the militant society into the industrial one, “the non-coercive regulating system begins to show itself as industry flourishes unchecked by war”. The militant society is guided by a compulsory cooperation based on coercive discipline, a despotic central power, unlimited political control of personal conduct. It is a warrior society in which centralized control and absolute subordination dominates, and the members exist for the benefit of the whole and not the whole for the benefit of its members. Duty rather than liberty predominates. Whereas in the industrial type of society, there arises the doctrine that the will of the citizens is supreme, a democratic or representative central power is present, a duty to resist irresponsible government or the excesses of the responsible government should be well established. All of these traits originate in “those relations of individuals implied by industrial activities ... all trading transactions, whether between masters and workmen ...are effected by free exchange” and voluntary cooperation. Hence, Spencer argues, with the economic development, wars become less frequent. In this industrial society, people “living in peace and brotherly love with one another ... recognize the right of property in the fullest sense of the word”. Spencer, like the other liberal thinkers of the period, defined the capitalist social system as inherently pacific. Even though he was complaining about the high level of militarization of his

period; in his point of view, it was a retrogressive transformation from the industrial society to the militant one. In other words, the binary conceptual framework was still standing there: the industrial society being inherently non-coercive, while the pre-industrial (read it as pre-capitalist) society being militaristic.

Another influential figure of nineteenth century social science, Emile Durkheim who is critical of the liberal thought on many aspects, nevertheless kept the same binary opposition according to which the new industrial society was in no need of a social regulation based on coercion, force, and war. Durkheim (1933; 1958), who dealt with the contradictions of the modern industrial society, argued that the development of organic solidarity specific to modern industrial society would solve the contradictions between individual and state, and among different socio-economic groups. In that process, the State would incorporate with its organic society through the corporations, and the moral existence of the individual would be realized only through the State. According to him, war was a factor that was undermining the individual rights and organic solidarity, and strengthening a “strongly entrenched authority”, that is “the State”. The disciplinary nature of the war was attributing to the State such an authority, through which the State could intervene in the spheres of life that it should remain alien. Yet with the advent of modern industrial society based on organic solidarity, war and the use of coercion in regulating the social relations would become less common and would fade away.

War has not yet entirely gone out and there are still threats of international rivalry: so the State, even to-day, still has to preserve a measure of its former prerogatives. But here, in war, we have only something of *an anomalous survival*, and gradually the last traces of it are bound to be wiped out.... If each State had as its chief aim, not to expand, or to lengthen its borders, but to set its own house in order and to make the widest appeal to its members for a moral life on an even higher level, then all discrepancy between national and human morals would be excluded (Durkheim, 1958: 53, 74; *italics are mine*).

Hence, once again the social relations of industrial capitalist society are depicted as essentially non-militarist, and all the militarist tendencies in such societies are attributed to the State and its activities as something external to social power relations of industrial capitalism. However, as Durkheimian sociology is based on the reconciliation of liberal oppositions such as individual-society, state-society, he argues that with the development of the “organic state” specific to industrial capitalist society militarism would wither away, for the state would become the perfect representative of the peaceful, power-free, conflict-free industrial society.

Writing in the 1930s against the Marxist analyses of imperialism,²¹ Schumpeter has been another ardent defender of the thesis of capitalist industrialism being essentially peaceful and pacific. Moreover, he reproduced in the body of his thought all the antinomies of liberal thought. He argues that there is nothing inherently militarist in capitalism, and whatever form of militarism exists in capitalist industrial societies is nothing but the products of the pre-capitalist elements, especially that of the state. According to Schumpeter, imperialism and militarism are “atavistic”, “surviving features from earlier ages”, they “stem from the living conditions, not of the present, but of the past...from past rather than present relations of production”. “Capitalism is by nature anti-imperialist”, and if there are imperialist tendencies in capitalist societies these are “alien elements, carried into the world of capitalism from the outside, supported by non-capitalist factors in modern life”. With the emergence of a new social

²¹ It may be argued that, especially drawing some special uses of the concept, imperialism needs not to be militarist, since it merely denotes the expansion of capitalism, be it through merely economic processes or through the use of military force and coercion. For the moment, it is sufficient to remark that Schumpeter uses the term imperialism as the “forcible geographic expansion” through the use of physical force (war), or the threat to use it.

structure, namely capitalist industrial one, imperialism and militarism tend to disappear (Schumpeter, 1955: 73, 94, 97, 65).

Why capitalism is inherently anti-militarist and anti-imperialist? To answer this question, Schumpeter refers to a list of factors, whose historical validity is under serious doubt: That “within the competitive system of capitalism, people use their energies mainly for economic activities, not for war and conquest; “where free trade prevails, *no* class has an interest in forcible expansion as such”, and there would be conflicts neither between nations nor among the classes; the development of methods for preventing war such as peaceful settlement of disputes among states; philosophical radicalism and peace parties; that war cannot be publicly defended even by the ruling classes since peace is an end in itself; that the industrial worker is vigorously anti-imperialist (Schumpeter, 1955: 69, 75-76, 70-72).

Schumpeter is well aware that, historically speaking, imperialism continued under capitalism too. He underlines how monopolist domestic cartels and trusts together with high finance benefit from a protectionist policy, control over markets through military force and conquest of colonies, hence from an aggressive economic and foreign policy including imperialist wars (Schumpeter, 1955: 79, 82-85). Yet this monopoly capitalism “does *not* grow from the inherent laws of capitalist development”. Although capitalism leads to large scale production, this does not end up automatically with monopolist trusts and cartels. The latter is the products of the protective tariffs, which “do not automatically grow from the competitive system” nor from “capitalism” but from “the political action”. Tariffs rose out of “the financial interests of the monarchy”. In early capitalist period, the commercial and manufacturing bourgeoisie was dependent on the sovereign against the feudal powers, which resulted in the continuance of “pre-

capitalist methods”; and the stamp of autocracy entered into the industrial age (Schumpeter, 1955: 88-91). Schumpeter argues that even in those days (1930s) the politics, the ideology, the social life, were under the great influence of feudalism.

While the bourgeoisie can assert its interests everywhere, it “rules” only in exceptional circumstances...It did not take over from the sovereign the state as an abstract form of power. The state remained a special social power, confronting the bourgeoisie. It is in the *state* that the bourgeoisie with its interests seeks refuge, protection against external and even domestic enemies. The bourgeoisie seeks to win over the state for itself, and in return serves the state and state interests that are different from its own (Schumpeter, 1955: 92-93).

The legacy of this process is that imperialist absolutism, which is “in the interests of the autocracy and against those of the bourgeoisie”, has dominated both the economic policies and the ideological orientations of the bourgeoisie.²² Likewise, militarism too, understood by Schumpeter as praetorianism, i.e. “the military circles becoming a political power”, “is rooted in the autocratic state” since according to “the ‘pure’ capitalist mode of life, the bourgeois is unwarlike”. If the European bourgeoisie had had the necessary power, he argues, it would surely abolish the army, but not having it, it searched for ways in which “the army might be useful” for itself. The reason for the inclination of the bourgeoisie towards militarism is tied up to “his ‘artificial’ economic situation and ...his submission to the sovereign” (Schumpeter, 1955: 92-96).

Delinking militarism from capitalism was so dominant in the liberal critics of militarism that even when the connection between imperialism and militarism was depicted, capitalism was left outside the analysis. One of the exemplars of this position is American liberal Joseph D. Miller. Miller who was highly critical of the “reactionary nature of the military spirit” and of militarism which had a corrupting influence on

²² This interpretation of ‘feudalization of the bourgeoisie’ is a quite widely appropriated one in the discussions of militarism at the end of 19th century and during the 20th century see Berghahn (1981: 17), and Stargardt (1994: 78).

society, was warning in 1900 that American political system was also becoming exposed to militarism. Criticizing the U.S.'s militarist policy towards the Philippines as originating from the drive for empire and resulting in the militarization of republican life, he was in a way establishing the link between 19th century imperialism and militarism, but staying reluctant to connect these two phenomena to American capitalism (see Berghahn, 1981: 18).

Similarly, Harold Lasswell (1941) was preserving the opposition of militarism versus civilianism (of modern industrial capitalism) under the conceptual scheme of "garrison state versus business state". Writing at the beginning of the Second World War, he was pointing out to a trend "away from the dominance of the specialist on bargaining, who is the businessman, and toward the supremacy of the soldier....the specialist on violence". Contrary to the optimistic liberal evaluations, this time the reasoning was in the inverse direction, it is the garrison state that would destroy the business state and civilianism. However, the general theoretical framework was the same, he was working within the same binary opposition military versus civil, and the cause and source of militarism was again the military sphere. The business state (read it as the capitalist social relations and capitalist state) was supposed to be inherently pacifistic in an idealistic conceptualization, and whatever form of militarism emerged in the historical process it had nothing to do with business relations and business state.

To recapitulate the problematic nature of these early evolutionist accounts of militarism, the argument was that capitalism is not necessarily militarist, or more strongly, it is by nature anti- or non-militarist. Earlier theories argued that, with the advent of capitalism, militarism either in the form of war making and war preparation or in the form of praetorianism would fade away. Later theories, which had to explain the

ongoing militarism in capitalist social formations, defined the non-capitalist elements such as pre-capitalist social relations and institutions and/or non-economic institutions or actors as the root causes of militarism. In any case, these approaches were not based on any vigorous historical analysis, and were promoting an ahistorical and idealistic conceptualization of capitalism. This idealistic fiction of capitalism takes the latter as a merely 'economic' system and relation; and ontologically divides the social reality into self-containing spheres (economy, politics/state, ideology and so on). Once capitalism is attributed to an existence only within somehow self-containing and self-regulating economic sphere, the real capitalist social relations of production that were crosscutting these separated spheres were mystified as ontologically non-militarist and non-coercive. Hence the ongoing presence of militarism could be attributed to the allegedly "non-capitalist" spheres and their actors, especially the state.

However, the collapse of this liberal fantasy of non-militarist capitalism reveals itself even in the lines of its own proponents. Schumpeter writes that "nationalism and militarism, while not creatures of capitalism, become 'capitalized' and in the end draw their best energies from capitalism. Capitalism involves them in its workings and thereby keeps them alive, politically as well as economically" (Schumpeter, 1955: 96). While the first part of this quotation refers to the process of how militarism as a phenomenon predating capitalism has gained a specific form under the capitalist social relations, the second part admits that capitalism itself has and may become dependent on militarism, not in its ideally abstracted model but in its real social and historical existence. However, this relationality continued to be neglected or masked by the succeeding modernization theories.

2-b Modernization Theory: From Progressive-Reformist to Order-Keeping Militarism

The post-World War II period witnessed the rise of civil-military relations literature, whose theoretical framework was determined by modernization theory (ideology). In fact, both modernization theory and civil-military relations literature closely corresponded to the requirements of US-led restructuring of capitalist world system and of cold war anti-communism. Structural-functional theoretical schema of “social system” theorists such as Talcott Parsons, Gabriel Almond, David Easton which focused on socio-economic and socio-political dysfunctions and disequilibrium problems were conservatively concerned with the question of orderly development. Based on ahistorical ideal types of traditional and modern societies and positivist scientism, development theories adopted a Eurocentric and teleological vision of social change whereby a smooth and linear process towards economic growth, stable democracy and cultural change is supposed to recur in non-western geographies. Industrialization, market economy and relations, modern homoeconomicus, individualization, nation-state-building, nation-building, national integration through political socialization, formal-procedural liberal democracy; they are all deemed as good and positive in themselves, normatively desirable ends of “the end of history”. In so far as the concept of development and all that it includes is systematically used as being analytically “neutral” and normatively positive, the modernization/development theories have functioned more as ideologies constituting and masking social and political power relations, new forms of inequality and domination underlying the capitalist modernization process.²³

²³ For some useful and critical overviews of modernization theory see Tipps (1973), Taylor (1979), Randall and Theobald (1985), Crush (1995).

Early modernization theory was marked by an evolutionary optimism according to which economic development would bring western type stable democracies and civilian supremacy over the military. In a sense, it reproduced 19th century optimist theory of militarism (see Lipset, 1959; Almond and Coleman: 1960). However, the ongoing presence of the military as a strong political actor, of militarism as a technique of power very soon challenged this optimism. The first way of dealing with this challenge was to praise the military officers of transitional societies as a modernisatrice force. Unlike early evolutionists of 19th century, the military was no longer seen as antithetical to the capitalist-industrial development. It was praised as the only modern and coherent institution, as the pioneering of economic and political development (Janowitz: 1977; Johnson: 1962a; Halpern: 1963). Indeed, these theories were part of the constitution of the military forces in so-called modernizing societies as the privileged actor to establish a capitalist social and political order.

In the preface to Johnson (1962a), Hans Speier, the then chairman of the research council of the RAND Corporation, exposes their main concerns very openly:

In many of the new states that have emerged in the recent era of de-colonization the military plays a vital role. As a revolutionary force they have contributed to the disintegration of traditional political order; as a stabilizing force they have kept some countries from falling prey to Communist rule; as a modernizing force they have been champions of middle-class aspirations or of popular demands for social change and have provided administrative and technological skills to the civilian sector of countries in which such skills are scarce (in Johnson, 1962a: v).

The guiding questions of this approach were as following:

Is it true, as we have always supposed that any encroachment of the military into civilian rule is a blow to liberal government and civil liberties? Or is it possible that military rule can, in fact, establish the necessary basis for the growth of effective representative institutions? Have events reached such a state in parts of Asia that we should welcome army rule as the least odious of possible developments and probably the only effective counterforce to communism (Pauker, 1959).

For instance, Janowitz (1977: 77) was concerned with two questions: first, “what characteristics of the military establishment facilitate its involvement in domestic politics?” second, “what are the capacities of the military to supply effective political leadership for a new nation striving for rapid economic development and social modernization?” Similarly Pye (1962: 70) was differentiating between the militaries marked by “administrative incompetence, inaction, and authoritarian, if not reactionary values” and those “committed to progress and the task of modernizing transitional societies ... facilitating the processes of industrial and political development”. The military-civilian binary opposition has been discursively constructed as two ideal types. Whereas, the military officers were supposed to have “a rational outlook”, to be doted with “modern technical and administrative skills and values”, to be attached to “meritocracy” and to “national mission beyond regional, parochial or economic interests”, the civilian politics has been constructed as being marked by “corruption, nepotism and bribery” (Halpern, 1962: 286, 300; Pye, 1962 75, 76; Johnson, 1962b: 121, 127). The roles attributed to military on the road to modernization were many: acculturation of traditional societies through the shift from the particularistic relationships of traditional life to the impersonal and universalistic relationships of an industrialized society; technical and professional training; citizen-making and the construction of the national identity through the military service; sometimes direct services in the process of industrial development; to contribute to the development of infrastructure (roads, communications, opening schools and hospitals) (Pye, 1962: 80-86; Lieuwen, 1962: 148-149; Johnson, 1962b: 108; Shils, 1962: 8, 31, 60). “Tutelary democracy” rather than liberal democracy and civilian supremacy would be acceptable

and even suitable for modernizing societies²⁴ in so far as the military would function as a modernisatrice force.

To put it briefly, the military officers were sanctified as benevolent modernizers of a modernization process which was supposed to occur in a social vacuum. The critique to be raised is a simple one: even though some modernizing practices of the militaries in semi-peripheral social formations may not be empirically wrong, to analyze the modernization process in a way totally detached from social power relations underlying those practices cannot provide an explanation and cannot go beyond a limited description. It is in that sense that the pseudo-scientific modernization theory turns out to be a modernization ideology constituting capitalist social power relations.

The politicization of new social groups, the rise of class politics as a result of post-war capitalist transformation process corresponded within modernization theory to a shift of concern with order-keeping militarism. There is no doubt that the most important figure of modernization theory in civil-military relations literature has been Samuel P. Huntington. His analysis of praetorianism is still influential in enframing many analyses of military interventions. Huntington's main concern has been "what pattern of civil-military relations will best maintain the security of the American nation". Based on the ontology of national security and the threats to it, the national security is taken as "a functional imperative" (Huntington, 1957: 2-3).²⁵ His model is based on the

²⁴ For instance Shils (1962: 59, 65) wrote that "tutelary democracy is a variant of political democracy that recommends itself to the elites of the new states because it is more authoritative than political democracy and also because the institution of public opinion and the civil order do not seem qualified to carry the burden which political democracy would impose on them". The tutelary democracy offers "a more realistic settlement with the slowly tractable realities of the traditional societies of the new states". It has also been argued that the military has been the guarantee of the stability, and "if the armed forces had remained neutral ... unruly civilian elements would have made Latin America more unstable" (Lieuwen, 1962: 132, 149).

²⁵ This ontology reveals itself as "the permanency of insecurity and the inevitability of war ... the magnitude and immediacy of the security threats". This ontological status of insecurity (hence national

internal/external dualism. Inside the US, Huntingtonian model seems to have a liberal concern, namely the establishment of civilian control over the military and de-politicizing the military on issues other than purely military aspects of national security. In that sense, the professionalization of the armies, i.e. the specialization of the militaries in external defense at the expense of the use of force for the maintenance of internal order, is the necessary condition of what Huntington calls “objective civilian control”.²⁶ The assumption that civilian control over the armies would end militarism in modern societies was closely related to the shift from an inward- to an outward-oriented militarism. The binary opposition between internal, which is marked by civilian control over the military, peaceful social relations and external as the realm of war and of the military has been constitutive of US outward-oriented geopolitical militarism. It is thanks to this dualism that Huntington can articulate a liberal model based on civilian control over the military inside the US with an imperialist-militarist one outside the US.²⁷ However, the establishment of relatively pacifist forms of internal governance and militarist-imperialist forms of external governance are two sides of the coin, they cannot be disconnected from each other since the internal and external are the two relational spheres which continuously constitute and transform each other.

In fact, this complementary duality can be detected in Huntington’s own works too. Whereas in *Soldier and State* he seems to be the bearer of a liberal project, in

security) is legitimized first by reference to an unchanging human nature according to which “man is selfish... Man has elements of goodness, strength, and reason, but he is also evil, weak, and irrational”, “conflicting human interests and the use of violence to further those interests ... [are] rooted in the permanent biological and psychological nature of men”. And secondly he refers to the claim that “competition among the states is continuous” (Huntington, 1957: 2-3, 62-63, 65-66).

²⁶ Huntington contrasts “subjective civilian control” wherein the military power is controlled by one of the competing civilian groups for maximizing its own particular civilian power to “objective civilian control” whereby a complete and general civilian control is established on the military by “militarizing the military”, i.e. by totally silencing the military on issues other than their profession: purely military aspects of the external defense of the country (see Huntington, 1957: 80-89).

²⁷ On how the dichotomy of inside/outside has been constitutive of US imperial state and its related forms of militarism see Akça and Balta (2004).

Political Order in Changing Societies, the work which most influenced the civil-military relations literature, the military power in peripheral social formations is praised as the guardian of social order. Huntington's analysis of praetorianism in non-western societies has also corresponded to the shift in modernization theory from a concern with the process of 'modernization' (the process of transformation into capitalist and pluralist parliamentary regimes) to a concern with political decay and/or the maintenance of social and political order. According to Huntington (1968: 7-8), "the primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order. Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order. Authority has to exist before it can be limited". His concern was no longer "political development" but "political decay", a concept which "retains all the normative and teleological content of the concept of 'political development, only expressed as its *opposite*'" (Leys, 1982: 334).

The concept of "praetorianism" occupies a central place in Huntington's analysis of military authoritarianism. However, praetorianism has been transformed into a conservative non-critical term through a semantic enlargement. Huntington rightly emphasizes that military intervention in politics cannot be analyzed primarily with reference to the internal structure of the military or the social background of the officers. Rather, it is the political and institutional structure of the society that should be brought under scrutiny. In doing this, praetorianism which, in its narrow sense, refers to "the intervention of military in politics" starts to refer to a general politicization process. In other words, not specific power relations per se but the very fact of the politicization of social actors have been questioned by Huntington for giving way to military interventions. Not military intervention per se but politicization of social actors which is condemned as being praetorian. Military intervention is taken as the characteristic of the

praetorian societies and polities in which not only the military but all sorts of social forces such as labor unions, businessmen, clergy, and universities politicize. Military interventions are nothing but “a specific manifestation of the general politicization of social forces and institutions”. Huntington’s specific complaint about this politicization is “the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political action”. Praetorian polities emerge out of the contradiction between “low levels of institutionalization and high levels of participation”. Praetorianisation may occur in different types of societies in which a newly emergent social group struggles for political participation: from oligarchical to middle-class phase and to radical and mass societies. In this latter case, the urban working class and rural peasantry are the social forces who push for greater participation and democratization, and to the extent that intermediary institutional mechanisms lack, he argues, radical praetorianism turns out to mass praetorianism rather than into a participant society (Huntington, 1968: 193-198; 21; 87-91). Hence, unless their radical potential is subsumed and domesticated, the participation of previously excluded social groups poses a great challenge for existing relations of domination. It is this possibility which pushes the military to play an active role. “In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is radical; in the middle class world, he is a participant and arbiter; in the mass society, he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order” (Huntington, 1968: 221). Huntington praises the military’s greater capacity for generating order in a radical praetorian society. His anti-democratic stance leads him to compare the politicization of the military with that of other social actors as if these were categorically same. Hence, he argues, even though military intervention may be “more dramatic, more dangerous”, it may yet be “potentially more productive than intervention by other social forces”.

Unlike the politicization of other social actors, he continues, “military intervention, which many people consider to be the source of the evil in a praetorian society, may also be the source of the cure.”²⁸

Despite his conservative, anti-democratic conceptual toolbox and normative positioning, I may contend that there is a kernel of truth in Huntingtonian narrative. It is not rare that conservative thinkers’ writings reveal the class character of social power relations, albeit they do not cast their narrative in class terms. The following quotation from Huntington is meaningful: “They are thus, in a sense, the door-keepers in the expansion of political participation in a praetorian society: their historical role is to open the door to the middle class and to close it on the lower class” (Huntington, 1968: 221-222). The conservative class reflex may be very educative in revealing class power relations. I think this is such a case. However, it should be noted that when Huntington refers to classes, they are not considered as “the products (let alone the makers) of determinate historical relations of production. They appear as empirically ‘given’ universal categories...They are no more than occupational or socioeconomic aggregates, mere reservoirs of potentially ‘participant’ *individuals*”. The classes are conceptualized in “a wholly ahistorical, unanchored, empiricist way”. The classes in the modernization theory à la Huntington exist “as forms in which the *masses* threaten the maintenance of *order*” (Leys, 1982: 345-346).

²⁸ See Huntington (1968: 239-240). See also this quotation: “In many societies the opportunity the military have for political creativity may be the last real chance for political institutionalization short of the totalitarian road. If the military fail to seize that opportunity, the broadening of participation transforms the society into a mass praetorian system. In such a system the opportunity to create political institutions passes from the military, the apostles of order, to those other middle-class leaders who are the apostles of revolution” (Huntington quoted in Berghahn, 1981: 79).

Neither relations of production nor relations of domination appear in Huntington's (mis)use of class term. There is no doubt that Huntington severs the link between modern militarism and capitalist social transformation. For Huntington, it is the lack and not the existence of capitalist modernization which causes praetorianism. As much as his conceptual framework is based on the system's functional requirements, the antagonistic struggles among collective actors on the differential control of the means of production, domination and coercion are systematically excluded from the analysis. Because of the systemic neglect of those power relations, he moves to a culturalist stand. As Mouzelis (1986: 186-187) notes, to the question of why "political institutionalization" and/or the "art of association", which has a very central place in Huntingtonian explanation, is weak, his answer is culturalist:

[a political culture] marked by suspicion, jealousy and latent and actual hostility towards everyone who is not member of the family...These characteristics are found in many cultures, their most extensive manifestations perhaps being in the Arab world and in Latin America (Huntington: 1968: 28).²⁹

Hence instead of problematicizing the social power relations inscribed in the political institutions of restrictive political/social control mechanisms, he finds refuge in culturalism. It is the lack of western type cultural values that characterize the ongoing presence of militarism in the last instance. This culturalist bias also gives the opportunity of orientalizing militarism. As far as militarism is equated/reduced to praetorianism and discussed within the problematic of civil-military relations, other modern (and non-praetorian) forms of militarism and social power relations in and through which militarism takes place are deproblematicized. As much as modernization theories have been founded on the binary opposition of civil versus military and they have been

²⁹ For another culturalist explanation see Finer (1962), who is grading the culture from low to high one in a way totally detaching the political culture from social and political relations constituting it.

concerned with the military's interventions to the so-called civilian sphere, the production of militarism within civil society per se and/or militarist practices crosscutting the civil-military boundary could not be problematicized.

3. Marxist Attempts at Reestablishing the Link: The Militarism of Capitalism

While liberal approaches severed any link between militarism and capitalism, Marxian approaches aimed at breaking this dualism by exploring the militaristic tendencies in the historical development of capitalist social relations of production. In other words, Marxist approaches searched the roots of modern militarism in capitalist social relations of production.

We should, first of all, remark that militarism has not been a rigorously analyzed concept in Marx's and Engels' writings. Unlike the subsequent Marxian literature, they used the concept of 'militarism' in a very restricted way, and only occasionally, in their mostly journalistic articles.³⁰ They equated militarism with the impending war on the continent, with reference to massive scale of armaments. Additionally, the changing institutional structure of the militaries, and this latter's impact on the class struggles were also touched upon. However, their writings were very restricted in their ambitions; they never attempted to develop a specific theory of modern militarism. However, the limited use of the concept does not mean that its several forms defined above have not been discussed by Marx and Engels. For instance Engels' analysis in the *Role of Force in History*, Marx's analysis of the primitive accumulation revealing how the physical coercion played an essential role in that process, or again Marx's analysis of a coup d'Etat in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, and of the subsequent

³⁰ See Stargardt (1994). The fact that the *Dictionary of Marxist Thought* edited by Tom Bottomore (2001) does not include the concept of militarism can be taken as reflective of this underdeveloped nature of the concept in Marx and Engels.

transformation of the Bonapartist regime into a praetorian one, all of these can be taken as clues as to how “militarism” was conceptualized and analyzed by Marx and Engels.

Marxist debates on militarism intensified towards the end of the 19th century and during the period of world wars. The use of military force for disciplining working class in a period of intensifying class struggles; the role of militarism in state formation; increasing competition between capitalist states for colonial and imperial domination; ever deepening race of armament culminating in two world wars; the cultural and ideological colonization of civil society by militarism in a historical period of permanent war preparation; all of these factors brought the concept of militarism to the agenda of Marxist thinkers and socialist politics.

Marxian analyses of militarism can be classified under three categories. The *first* thread is closely related to Marxist state theory. The concern has been the organization and function of military coercion within the institutional structure of modern capitalist state, and the extent to which and the state forms under which militarism as a technique of power has been used in governing social class relations. The *second* line of analysis has been theories of imperialism. Here, the roots of militarism understood as war-making have been searched in the historical developments of international capitalist economy. The *third* strand of analysis has been the functionality of military expenditures and war industry for capitalist accumulation process conceived as an abstracted economic process. I will briefly summarize the last two forms of analysis and then jump into the first one which is more relevant for the analysis of militarism in Turkey.

3-a Imperialist Militarism and Militarism as a Province of Accumulation

In conventional Marxist uses, militarism generally corresponded to outward-oriented militarism, i.e. to war and war preparation. The main reason for this is that in European capitalist societies, the functional differentiation between the military as the apparatus specialized in outward-oriented use of force and the police as the apparatus of inward-oriented use of force have been established. While for liberal (see above) and statist/institutionalist approaches (see below), imperialism and militarism resulted from the inter-state system; Marxist analyses of imperialism were concerned with exploring how both imperialism and militarism were rooted in capitalism.

Early Marxist theories of imperialism³¹ were developed in order to analyze the geographical expansion of Euro American capitalism on a worldwide scale during the second-half of the 19th century which culminated in two world wars. Their concern was, *pace* liberal and left-liberal arguments of the age, to show that ‘the internal dynamics of capitalist economy’ were at the root cause of imperialism and militarism. Lenin (1939) and Bukharin (1972), drawing on Hilferding’s analysis of ‘finance capital’, analyzed how monopolist concentration of capital, the rise of finance capital (the merging of bank capital with industrial capital), the competitive formation of international capitalist monopolies in search of exporting capital resulted in the territorial division of the world by their respective nation-states. This inter-imperialist rivalry *necessarily* led to militarism and the First World War. In other words, they established “*a causal necessity*” between the internal dynamics of capitalism and militarism.³²

³¹ For a critical survey of marxist theories of imperialism see Brewer (1980).

³² Lenin criticized especially late Kautsky’s arguments about the politically contingent nature of imperialism and militarism. Kautsky’s position on imperialism had shifted in due time from economic determinism according to which military competition for markets and colonies was “a safety-valve to siphon off overproduction” to a disaggregated and politically contingent interpretation of militarism according to which not the systemic requirements of capitalist economy per se but the intra- and inter-class political power relations were determinant in militarist policies. This meant that militarism culminating in war was just one (not the only one) of the possible forms of governing inter-imperialist

No doubt, these early theories of imperialism represented a progress in the sense that they questioned the way in which imperialist militarism could not be conceived independently of capitalist social relations. The militarist policies of pre-war and inter-war periods could not be analyzed without an analysis of capitalist imperialism resulting from the competition among national bourgeoisies. However, their economic reading of capitalism led them to neglecting the investigation not only of the constitutive role of the state and political power relations and of the specific processes of militarism but also the impact of intra- and inter-class struggles in explaining the “contingent necessity”³³ of war as an outcome. These elements became mere appendages of ‘economic’ class relations. These early theories implicitly or explicitly assumed a kind of instrumentalist relation whereby monopoly capital merged with the state. They neither problematized the nature and mechanisms of the relation between this fraction of bourgeoisie on the one hand and the state and the military on the other, nor analyzed the implications of imperialist militarism in the institutional structuring of state and in internal class relations. Indeed, it may be contended that early theories of imperialism shared with liberal and institutionalist approaches an ontological position according to which state and capitalism (capital accumulation and/or class relations) were conceived as externally related into each other, and capitalism was conceived as being merely an economic system. The end result of this philosophy of external relations for Marxist account of imperialism has been the automatic derivation of militarism from imperialist capitalism.

rivalry, and that not all fractions of bourgeoisie would equally support and benefit from militarism (Kautsky, 1990: 87-104; Stargardt, 1994: 79-87).

³³ This concept implies in ontological terms “the non-necessary interaction of different causal chains to produce a definite outcome whose own necessity originates only in and through the contingent coming together of these causal chains in a definite context”. While necessity refers to “*determinacy in the real world*”, contingent is concerned with “*theoretical indeterminability*” (Jessop, 1990: 11-12)

However, the later Marxist theories of imperialism attempted at overcoming these theoretical problems. In the post-World War II period, Marxist theories of imperialism focused particularly on US imperialism (Baran and Sweezy, 1973; Sweezy, Baran, Magdoff, 1975). If these theories rejected any causal necessity between imperialism and war, they nevertheless justly emphasized the interrelations between capitalist imperialism and militarism, and revealed the integral role of the worldwide dispersion of the US military forces in the working of capitalist-imperialist hegemony of U.S. More recent theories of imperialism (Poulantzas 1979a; Harvey, 2003; Panitch and Leys, 2003) have moved away from reductionist, subsumptionist and functionalist ways of analysis in favor of recognizing the integrity of the political and economic forms of capitalist social relations of production. The relations between capitalism, imperialism and militarism have been conceived as being problematic, contradictory, and dialectic rather than functional and one-sided. A disaggregated analysis of class power relations at the economic-corporate and political moments has become the base for understanding both the concrete-historical causes and effects of capitalist imperialism and militarism.

A very influential and more economistic Marxist way of conceptualizing the relation between capitalism and militarism is the functionalist problematicization of military expenditures, war industry and capitalism. According to this line of analysis, with the industrialization of warfare in modern capitalist societies, militarism, which played different roles in the history of capital (from primitive accumulation to imperialist expansion of Euro American capitalism), has also become a specific “province of accumulation”. Various Marxists³⁴ underlined how high military

³⁴ The relation between military expenditures, war industry and capitalism form a huge and controversial subfield of study, which is full of contentions not only among different theoretical approaches such as classical and neoclassical economy, Keynesian and Marxists but also among various marxist positions too.

expenditures and the new sector of “means of destruction” became a mechanism to deal with the valorization problem of capitalism (which corresponds to the incapacity of capitalism to absorb the surplus capital in the new cycles of capital accumulation). Accordingly, the sector of destruction goods creates a highly profitable reinvestment opportunity for the over-accumulated capital. A larger part of total surplus value is kept for capitalization at the expense of the working class since the military expenditures are supposed to be financed out of the worker’s wages through the mechanism of indirect taxation. In addition, the state-sponsored technological innovations are supposed to have spin-off effects over other sectors. Neo-Marxist accounts of “military Keynesianism” assessed that military expenditures and the “permanent arms economy” are used by the state as a countercyclical fiscal policy to impede economic recession, to promote economic growth, and to deal with unemployment. Even though these macro-economic theoretical assessments through which militarism as a province of accumulation is conceptualized in function of the systemic requirements of capitalism are contested in specific historical and empirical researches, it should be noted that this line of analysis provide “guiding threads” for the analysis of a specific form (albeit an economic one) of the relation between militarism and capitalism. However, I will propose (here and below in the related section on Turkey) that rather than a systemic-functionalist analysis of this form of militarism, an alternative disaggregate perspective³⁵ that takes into account the intra- and inter-class struggles and the state’s institutional power would be more relevant in understanding the causes and the differential impacts of this form of militarism.

For a discussion of these various approaches see Serfati (1995); for marxist approaches see Luxemburg (2003: 434-447), Mandel (1975: 274-309), Rowthorn (1985), Baran and Sweezy (1973), Kidron (1967; 1968), Griffin, Devine, Wallace (1982), O’Connor (1973), Lo (1975).

³⁵ For an approach that analyzes military expenditures and war industry from a perspective that conceives capital accumulation as an inherently power relations between not only different fractions but also different capital groups (holding companies) see Bichler and Nitzan (1996), Nitzan and Bichler (1995; 1996), Nitzan (1998).

Accordingly, the military-industrial complex will be conceived as “a separate and independent class fraction” (Harris, 2003).

3-b Pacific Nature of Capitalism? Or Evolutionist Strand within Marxism?

Even though it has been Marxists who attempted at exploring the specific militarist tendencies of capitalism, one may also find in Marx and Marxists the idea of the relatively ‘pacific’ nature of the capitalist mode of production, especially with respect to the previous modes of production. The argument is that, unlike the previous modes of production, the surplus can be extracted from the direct producers without necessarily having recourse to the use of physical coercion. Militarism, which has been largely moved to the province of the institutional setting of the state, is treated as antithetical to capitalism. In this subsection, I will argue that such Marxist arguments are valid only at a certain level of abstraction at which capitalism has been conceptualized in an ‘economistic’ way. Even though they capture a certain historical reality, an analysis of either capitalism or the relation between capitalism and militarism cannot be consumed up at such a level of analysis.

Marxist historian Perry Anderson, in his work on the transitional absolutist state, represents an excellent and well refined version of this argument. According to Anderson (1979: 31-33), in feudal type of societies agricultural productivity was stagnant and trade was very limited, territorial expansion through war was the most effective way of increasing surplus extraction, which made the feudal ruling class militarist by definition. The absolutist state too, a state form of the transitional period, reflected this “archaic rationality” that “does not correspond to a capitalist rationality: it represents a swollen memory of the medieval functions of war”. While the climate of

Absolutism was marked by international armed conflict “such calendars are foreign to capital, although ...it eventually contributed to them”.³⁶

All modes of production in class societies prior to capitalism extract surplus labour from the immediate producers by means of extra-economic coercion. Capitalism is the first mode of production in history in which the means whereby the surplus is pumped out of the direct producer is ‘purely’ economic in form - the wage contract... All other previous modes of exploitation operate through *extra-economic* sanctions – kin, customary, religious, legal or political. It is therefore on principle impossible to read them off from economic relations as such. The ‘superstructures’ of kinship, religion, law or the state necessarily enter into the constitutive structure of the mode of production in pre-capitalist social formations. They intervene *directly* in the ‘internal’ nexus of surplus extraction, where in capitalist social formations, the first in history to separate the economy as a formally self-contained order; they provide by contrast its ‘external’ preconditions (Anderson, 1979: 403-404).

There is no doubt that this passage captures a real novelty of the capitalist mode of production, an important contrast between capitalism and previous modes of production.

Marx also underlined how in the pre-capitalist modes of production, the various factors conceptualized in the capitalist age as “superstructural” were constitutive of the social relations of production.³⁷ The use of physical coercion was among one of the most important ‘superstructural’ elements constitutive of the production relations. However, in the capitalist mode of production, the *immediate* process of production has been freed from the use of physical force. In capitalism, it is the “dull economic compulsion” rather than direct use of physical force that is the main mechanism of surplus extraction. Marx

³⁶ Another example of this widely shared view, which seems in a sense consonant with the liberal fantasy of militarism-free capitalism, can be found in Bernstein, according to whom militaristic institutions were a legacy of the feudal-monarchical period. Similarly in the orthodox Marxist debate on German and Japanese militarism, this latter has been depicted as a pre-modern, pre-industrial, pre-capitalist recalcitrance, and the issue has been discussed within the problematic of the transition from an agrarian-feudal structure to an industrial-capitalist society (see Berghahn, 1981: 23, 49-64).

³⁷ See for instance Marx in *Capital volume I*: “The Middle Ages dominated by Catholicism... Athens and Rome dominated by politics...One thing is clear: The Middle Ages could not live on Catholicism, nor could the Ancient world on politics. On the contrary, it is the manner in which they gained their livelihood which explains why in one case politics, in the other case Catholicism, played the chief part” (Marx, 1990: 176). Similarly in *Capital volume III* and in *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, he underlines the role of “the relations of domination and servitude” in pre-capitalist modes of production, and how “surplus-labor can only be extorted by other than economic pressure, whatever the form assumed may be” (see Poulantzas, 1973: 29-30). Similarly, Sayer (1987: 66, 72), drawing on Marx, shows how the use of military force was one of the constitutive elements of the relations of production in Ancient Greek and Roman community, and in feudalism.

wrote in *Grundrisse* that “under capital, the *association* of workers is not compelled by direct physical force or by forced labor, corvée labor, slave labor; it is compelled by the fact that the conditions of production are another’s property” (quoted in Draper, 1977: 242). And in *Capital volume I*:

The silent compulsion of economic relations sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker. Direct extra-economic force is still of course used, but only in *exceptional cases*. In the ordinary run of things, the worker can be left to the ‘natural laws of production’ (Marx, 1990: 899; *italics are mine*).

The argument is that capitalist mode of production reproduces itself through “the blind operation of the law of value”, of the hidden laws of expanded reproduction. In the capitalist mode of production, the process of social reproduction and the appropriation of the surplus product are based upon the principle of formally/seemingly equal exchange between individuals owning different commodities. The commodification of labor power, once the direct producers are detached from the means of production, is the necessary prerequisite. While at the level of appearances labor power freely disposed by the workers is exchanged for a wage, during the production process this labor power produces the surplus value which is appropriated by the ruling class according to the norms of so called “equal exchange”. The anarchic, particularistic nature of the capitalist mode of production expressed in the competition among the particular capital owners is the driving force behind the fact that the capitalist process of expanded reproduction is a process of accumulation, i.e. the permanent transformation of surplus-value into capital (understood as a social relation).³⁸

³⁸ It is impossible here to give even a relatively satisfying account of the workings and the necessary categories of the capital as a social relation at a certain level of abstraction, what Marx developed in the three volumes of *Capital*. For a very detailed discussion see Harvey (1999), and for a brief summary see Jessop (2002: 11-22).

In order that relations *in* production³⁹ appear formally as free and equal relations among free individuals, the immediate process of production needs to be devoid of the use of and control over the physical means of force.⁴⁰ In fact, the specific form of modern state claiming legitimate monopoly of the means of violence is internally related to capitalist relations of production. Such a type of state would not be possible in the absence of capitalist relations of production, and the latter would not proceed in the way that it does in the absence of such a state. Hence, in the capitalist mode of production, the force should move to the province of the state which manifests itself as the representative of the general interest, as the illusory community to which everyone, so argued, participates as equal and free citizens. The authority to produce binding rules and the legitimate monopoly of violence to back it up are transferred to this seemingly neutral instance. Hence Marx's following definition: "the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of society" (Marx, 1990: 915).

Once the legitimate monopoly of the use of violence is conferred upon the state, it may be (or is) argued that militarism is rooted in the state's actions rather than in capitalist social relations. Our discussion of Marxist approach may so far appear as supporting this argument. However, this whole interpretation would be possible with the

³⁹ It is useful to differentiate between relations *in* production and relations *of* production. It is an analytical distinction rather than an ontological one. While the former refers to the working relations between classes within a productive entity such as factory or office, i.e. merely economic forms of relations of production, the latter denotes all forms of production relations, having economic, political and ideological moments (Jessop, 1990: 81). In that sense, we can maintain that the former (relations in production) is part of the second (relations of production).

⁴⁰ "The form which exploitation takes under capitalism does not depend on the direct use of force but primarily on the dull compulsion of uncomprehended laws of reproduction. Indeed, the form of the appropriation of the surplus product in capitalism requires that relations of force should be abstracted from the immediate process of production and located in an instance standing apart from the direct producers. Thus, both logically and historically, the establishment of the capitalist process of production is accompanied by the abstraction of relations of force from the immediate process of production, thus constituting discrete 'political' and 'economic' spheres" (Holloway and Picciotto, 1978b: 24). See also Hirsch (1978: 60-67), Kaldor (1982: 263-264), Wood (1996: 19-48), Poulantzas (1973: 21, 152, 227-228; 1978: 87-88) among others.

presupposition that social relations of production and their capitalist form are conceptualized in an economistic manner, in a way that would externalize the political and the state. This philosophy of external relations may in fact be a pre-supposed mechanism of obscuring the specific form(s) of violence in modern capitalist societies. Can the apparent separation between the state/the political and the economy be taken as the separateness of the state from the capitalist social relations of production? To put it otherwise, can capitalist social relations of production be defined merely with reference to the 'economic' sphere, as independently from the political sphere and the state? If not, what is the role of militarism as defined above in the constitution and regulation of the capitalist social relations? And what forms of militarism are constituted by capitalist social relations of production within the institutional settings of state and civil society, state and economy? Let me first focus on the problematic of externality of the state.

3-c Interlude: How to Conceptualize Relations of Production and the State? Against the Philosophy of External Relations⁴¹

The discussion of the relation between militarism and capitalism brings us immediately to elaborate on how to conceptualize the state and capitalist relations of production. In modern capitalist societies, militarism has become to an important extent, albeit not exclusively, an attribute of the state. However, the state is often conceptualized as externally related to the realm of relations of production which is conceived in an economistic and reductionist way. Above, we have seen how extra-

⁴¹ The philosophy of external relations is an ontological position which treats the analytical distinctions drawn between objects of study (such as the state, the civil society, the economy; the base- superstructure; the forces and relations of production) in the methodological process of abstraction as if they are ontologically distinct concrete entities having intrinsic qualities; as if the boundaries between things are given in the nature of reality; as if they are already constituted essences entering into external relations with each other; as if they remain unchanged essentially unchanged after having entered into relation . Contrary to this, an ontological position, which gives primacy to social relations, treats the economic, the political, and the ideological as forms of social relations, rejecting at the same time the idea that they are mere forms of manifestation of an essential level (see Ollman, 1993; 1976; Sayer, 1987; Geras, 1973).

economic elements were internally constitutive of the relations of production in pre-capitalist modes of production. Is it different in the capitalist mode of production? I will argue that the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ are discrete forms of capitalist social relations of production. Unless we see the unity (social relations of production) in this separation (of the economic and the political), we would be caught up in the fetishized categorization produced by the capitalist social relations themselves.

The state (or the ‘political’) and the ‘economy’ are conventionally conceptualized as ontologically two distinct spheres, ontologically two separate and distinct realities, which are only externally related. This philosophy of external relations is reproduced by some Marxist approaches that define the ‘base’, the relations of production as consisting merely of economic relations, whereas the concepts of “mode of production” and “relations of production” are developed by Marx for a critique of the apparent separability of these spheres.

According to conventional Marxism, the base-superstructure model corresponds to the distinction between the material/the economic and the political/the juridical/the ideological. The mode of production, i.e. the base, has been construed as the relation between forces and relations of production. In the technologically determinist accounts,⁴² the emphasis has been put upon the contradiction between forces and relations of production, and the primacy is given to the former. Productive forces, which include means of production and labor power, both explain and force to change the relations of production conceived as the economic relations and the property relations. As to the superstructural elements, they are all non-economic institutions such as law, state, and politics. Even when this technologically determinist account has been

⁴² For its best account see Cohen (2001).

justifiably criticized by underlining the primacy of the relations of production, this latter has been still equated by ‘economic’ relations, in a way that construes the superstructural elements as merely externally and contingently related to the relations of production.

In fact, the originality of Marx’s project lies in exposing the internal relations between the material, the social, and the ideal, and not in reversing the direction of causality among them. For Marx, *production* has never been merely an economic phenomenon. The starting point for historical materialism is the production of real life denoted by the concept of mode of production which includes the men-men and men-nature relations. Production and mode of production captured not merely the production of things but also the production of social relations and subjectivities.⁴³ The concept of relations of production has been constructed as a category that would overcome the above-mentioned apparent separation between the political and the economic, which is itself a historical product of capitalist relations of production.

I contend that Sayer (1987) and Poulantzas (1978), among others, perfectly capture the status of this concept. If the relational and historical nature of social reality is

⁴³ I think that at the beginning of *German Ideology* Marx exposes this point. His historical analysis is based upon the following “real presuppositions” of the human history. The starting points are “real individuals, together with their actions and their material conditions of life”. The existence of living human individuals, their physical organization, and their relationship to the nature are basic premises of human history. The production of the means to satisfy their basic needs, the production of new needs, the reproduction of themselves (relationship between man and woman, the familial relationship, and the subsequent new social relationship under new forms of collectivity), consciousness and the language as “the real, practical consciousness”, all these elements are constitutive of the production of real life. They are depicted as simultaneous moments not subsequent stages, as internally related elements not externally related independent factors. See (Marx, 1994a: 123-129). In his critic of economist Marxism, Colletti perfectly exposes this point: “The so-called ‘economic sphere’ – which in Marx had embraced both the production of *things* and the production (objectification) of *ideas*; production and intersubjective communication; material production and the production of social relations (for Marx, the relation between man and nature was also a relationship between man and man, and vice versa) – was now seen as *one isolated factor*, separated from the other ‘moments’ and thereby emptied of any effective *socio-historical* content, representing on the contrary, an antecedent sphere, prior to any human mediation. *Social* production is thus transformed into ‘production’ *techniques...*” (Colletti, 1974: 65).

the basic premise of historical materialism, the social relations in constant formation and transformation need to be conceptualized in a similar way. It was through the dialectical ontology and the philosophy of internal relations that Marx could overcome this difficulty. He did not see the world in an atomistic fashion but rather understood each analytical particular in a relational way. So Marx never substantially defined his key categories such as relations of production or forces of production.⁴⁴ Marx's trans-historical categories acquire substantive definition only from the particular historical contexts to which they are applied. In other words, conceptual categories such as relations and forces of production are "necessarily empirically open-ended ...and multi-referential" (Sayer, 1987: 19-22).

Once this is established, the identification of productive forces with the material, and the conflation of relations of production with merely economic relations need to be problematicized. In Marx's works, productive forces denote things, ideas and relations at the same time, rather than being merely material characteristics of the things.⁴⁵ As to the relations of production, the duality of base and superstructure should be deconstructed since the so-called superstructural elements are essential relations of production. The relations of production are "all those relations between people, in whose absence they would not be producing in that particular way" (Sayer, 1987: 75). In any empirical instance, the economic structure cannot be conceivable apart from the legal, moral, and political relationships of men. Hence, we cannot assign some social relations to the

⁴⁴ Bertell Ollman (1976) convincingly argues that the lack of "fixed, cut-to-measure, once and for all applicable definitions" is the logical and necessary result of Marx's dialectical ontology, and that is why "Marx's words are like bats: one can see in them both birds and mice".

⁴⁵ To reduce productive forces merely to the material characteristics of the objects would be a perfect example of fetishism in the sense that "properties which things acquire ...in a specific set of social relations are mistakenly seen as inhering in, and explained by, the material qualities of those objects" (Sayer, 1987: 44).

base/economic structure and others to the superstructure a priori. To conceive the social ensemble as composed of such naturally and essentially defined levels or instances which are autonomous from each other would mean to legitimize the alleged autonomy, self-sufficiency and auto-reproduction of the economy. While the traditional-mechanistic conception of the State based on a “topological representation of ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’” regard superstructural elements as mere appendages or reflections of the economy; structuralist ontology turns them “into substances” constant throughout various modes of production (Poulantzas, 1978: 16-17). Hence the state, the political, the law, the ideological are essential relations of production in so far as in their absence the capitalist mode of production would not be possible. They always have “a constitutive presence in the relations of production and their reproduction” (Poulantzas, 1978: 18, 29; Sayer, 1987: 109-110; Corrigan, 1980: xxiii-xxiv). It should be noted, however, that this constitutive presence does not mean that all ideological, political and cultural elements are part and constitutive of relations of production, but rather some of them. Otherwise it would result in subsuming all social relations under relations of production.

What is superstructural then if law, politics, state are also essential relations of production, i.e. part of the base? Marx’s distinction between base and superstructure corresponds to the distinction between the social being and social consciousness; it is not a model of independent or relatively autonomous spheres, levels or instances. The superstructure is just “the ‘ideal’ form in which the totality of ‘material’ relations which make up the ‘base’ are manifested to consciousness, not a substantially separable order of reality at all” (Sayer, 1987: 84). Superstructures are social forms of consciousness. Marx’s critic of idealism was not that social consciousness does not have an effect or it

is totally caused by social being. But rather, he denied the very separability of the ideal and the material, or to put it better the ideal and the social. In other words, Marx criticized both the separability of the so called superstructural elements (law, politics, state) from the relations of production, and the separability of the social consciousness from the social being, hence of the base from the superstructure. Both the base (social being and its relations under different forms, be it economic, juridical, political) and the superstructure (social consciousness as one of the attributes of the social being) are denied causal primacy because their very separability is denied. A linear causality cannot be defended in this kind of relationality. Hence, what is mystifying is not the existence of different forms of social relations materialized in the institutional settings of state, civil society, economy. The reality of the organs, institutions, actors and of their practices in these institutional settings is not denied. These differentiations (state-economy, state-civil society) are real ones, but “falsely conceptualized”. Their ideologicity (the mystification) lies in their appearance of real independence, what is superstructural is the ideal appearance of having an independent existence (Sayer, 1987: 91, 111; Marsden, 1992).

Let me now turn to explain how this long interlude which makes some conceptual clarifications is related to the analysis of the relationship between capitalism and militarism. The arguments about essentially the non-militarist nature of capitalism are endorsed by two interrelated arguments: first, with the development of capitalist mode of production, militarism has become an attribute of the state; second, the state itself is an ontologically different sphere, independent from the capitalist relations of production. In that sense, in modern times, the workings of capitalism may appear as exterior to militarism, whose continued existence can only be attributed to the state.

However, such a reading misses the difference between “capitalism thought as a mode of production and capitalism thought as an economy”. While the former includes a totality of complex factors such as the state, law, and ideology as essential relations of capitalist production, the second lapses into an economism defined as “the guarantee of the adequacy of the economy to its own reproduction without the necessary implication of other factors, or elements, such as the state, ideology, law, or subjectivity” (Read, 2002: 39; see also Corrigan, Ramsay, Sayer, 1980: 15; Graham-Gibson, 1997). The institutional separateness of the economy is not unreal, but the problem starts when one substitutes the economic forms of relations for capitalist relations of production.

The separation of the economic and the political, and the emergence of the state as a separate instance cannot be taken for granted as an ontological reality. This specific form of the state, i.e. its separation from the immediate process of relations *in* production, is itself a historical fact produced by capitalism. Capitalist relations of production are dependent upon direct and indirect extra-economic mechanisms, for there is no such thing as a self-regulating economy. The economic cannot be “a cause without cause” (Jessop, 1990: 80-85). The capitalist form of appropriation of surplus labor cannot be merely realized and reproduced without political regulation and intervention. Hence, the state or the political is itself internally related to the social relations of production. To the extent that capitalist relations of production cannot be conceived independently of the state, the form of modern state either cannot be analyzed independently from capitalist relations of production. Both Marxist and non-Marxist scholars of the modern state have emphasized that the modern form of the state as the modern bourgeois form of class rule is in a certain way related to capitalist mode of

production.⁴⁶ However, this does not eliminate the specific problematic of how the modern form of state, i.e. the bourgeois form of rule which is based on the institutional separation of the economic and the political, functions as a way to constitute the political hegemony of capitalist class and to serve the expanded reproduction of capital accumulation. To put it in the words of Jessop (1990: 144-145):

The basic problem confronting any Marxist account of the complex relations between the rule of capital and the modern state is to be found in the very form of the state in capitalist society. For it is not constituted as a private organ of the dominant class but as an impersonal public authority and, in so far as it has definite formal channels of representation and accountability, they are typically tied to more or less developed notions of popular rather than class sovereignty. This obviously raises the question of how capital could be said to enjoy political class domination where the state is constituted as a formally impartial, class-neutral authority, is institutionally separate from the productive core of the capitalist economy and operates in terms of a political calculus which is quite different from the ‘profit-and-loss’ accounting of market forces.

This has been the main problematic of subsequent Marxist theories of state. To the extent that the state is ontologically internal rather than external to capitalism which cannot be conceived as a merely economic regulation within a self-regulating economic sphere, the expanded reproduction of capital relation objectively needs the intervention of the state (in one form or another) for regulating the capital accumulation process and the related political class power relations. However, this does not mean that this objective necessity will realize itself automatically. The actual unity of the economic and political forms of capitalist relation is contingent upon historical and social practices emanating from power relations among social actors. The theoretical approach through which this contingent unity between “the economic” and “the political” is analyzed also affect the kind of relationality that Marxists established between capitalism and militarism to the extent that modern militarism has been a source of power largely monopolized by the modern state. It is only upon specific historical and empirical

⁴⁶ See for instance Poulantzas (1973; 1978), Corrigan and Sayer (1985), Jessop (1982; 1990; 2002), Holloway and Picciotto (1978a), Giddens (1985), Mann (1986; 1993).

scrutiny that one can decide upon whether, how, and to what extent forms of militarism, be it produced either in the institutional settings of state or civil society, becomes related to capitalist relations of production. Only through a historical analysis that we can decide whether and/or to what extent capitalism produces and becomes dependent on militarism as a technique of power. There is no inherent, ontological exclusivity between capitalism and state (hence militarism). However, we may not assert a functional complementary relation between them. In order to assess the articulation of militarism and capitalism, one should historically and empirically establish the actual mediations through which the militarization of political power relations and state forms are both constituted by and constitute the capitalist power relations at their political and/or economic moments. Hence, an analysis of the relationship between capitalism and militarism necessitates an adequate theory of state in capitalist society. The subsequent subsection will overview various Marxist approaches with a claim to explain the militarization of state forms, each being based on a specific theory of capitalist state which also determines the form of relation they establish between capitalism and militarism. These two intermingled problematics, the relationship between capitalism and state, and capitalism and militarism, form the rest of this part.

3-d From Primitive Accumulation to Bonapartism: Capitalist Militarism According to Marx

At a certain level of abstraction, Marx(ists) tend(s) to emphasize the peculiarity of capitalism as a mode of production which does not directly and internally need the use of physical coercion. Meanwhile to the extent that Marx(ist)'s analyses moved from higher levels of abstraction to more concrete historical analysis of capitalist social

relations of production, the historical modes of articulation between militarism and capitalism could be detected, albeit not fully investigated.

Once Marx moved from higher levels of abstraction to more concrete historical analyses, he could explore the role of physical coercion in the capitalist societalization process. For instance, while his analysis of the process of primitive accumulation underlined the internality of state power (including its military might) in relations of production, his analysis of Bonapartism as an exceptional state form was an analysis of militarization of capitalist state. These two cases reveal how the working of capitalism historically (not logically) may and did become dependent on militarism and how the existence of specific forms of militarism can neither be reduced to nor conceived independently from capitalism.

The importance of Marx's theory of *primitive accumulation* does not lay merely in the fact that it exposes how the military force was effectively used during the birth of capitalism. It is also a perfect example of how, in specific historical analysis, Marx conceptualizes capitalism not merely as an economic relation, but as a social relation in which law, state, physical force, subjectivities are internally related to the relations of production. It is indeed such a conceptualization that opens up the possibility to criticize arguments about the pacific nature of capitalism conceived in an economistic manner.

Marx criticizes political economy for its blindness to the violence that constituted the capitalist mode of production:

...conquests, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part. In the tender annals of political economy, the idyllic reigns from time immemorial...the methods of primitive accumulation are anything but idyllic (Marx, 1990: 874).

Primitive accumulation is marked by the intermingling of violence and law. He focuses on how the expropriation of the peasants, the creation of a free and rightless class of

proletarians, their forcible transformation into wage-laborers, and increasing degree of their exploitation in order to accelerate capital accumulation were produced in a process whereby “bloody legislation”, “British army”, “police methods” were the main mechanisms. In addition, the primitive accumulation process was marked by an outward-oriented militarism: colonialism, conquest and plunder of India and Africa, and commercial wars of the European nations.

Be it law, military force, police force, what Marx emphasizes is that the methods used during the primitive accumulation employ the power of the state, “the concentrated and organized force of society”, and the use of physical force (as a form of militarism) was influential among them. Marx writes: “force is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power” (Marx, 1990: 916). However, he also insistently notes that the methods of primitive accumulation are exceptional. The integrality of the use of force to the social relations of production has been seen as a transitory phenomenon. Marx sees primitive accumulation as preceding capitalist accumulation: “an accumulation which is not the result of the capitalist mode of production but its point of departure” (Marx, 1990: 873).

However, to argue that the methods mentioned in primitive accumulation belong to the pre-history of capitalist mode of production would be a fallacy, even if sometimes shared by Marx, the fallacy of denying the role of the process of abstraction in Marx’s method.⁴⁷ It is true that Marx’s analysis in *Capital* is based upon certain assumptions, certain abstractions. This is understandable since *Capital* is a critique of the ideology of

⁴⁷ For the importance of abstraction for Marx’s method see Ollman (1976: 61-69; 2003: 59-112). The problem arises when one substitutes theoretical guiding threads obtained in the process of abstraction for the analysis of real historical processes. This is what Sayer (1987) calls “the violence of abstraction”. That does not mean that analyses done through certain processes of abstraction do not reveal or correspond to real, historical social process of capitalism, but rather that they investigate some faces of the capitalist social relations, each time moving to a different vantage point in order to investigate a new face internally related to the previous ones.

the political economy, rather than a fully-fledged historical analysis. Marx essentially shows how even in the case of expanded reproduction which is assumed to happen under conditions of “peace, property, equality”, the capital relation and the capital accumulation process understood as social relations would produce not a harmonious society but social inequalities and social crises. Marx fulfills this critique by developing critical analytical categories through which social relations (and specifically their economic phenomenal forms) in which we live can be analyzed. The analysis at a certain level of abstraction may have the effect of analyzing capitalism as a closed system. However, each time that Marx moved from a critique of ideology to specific historical analysis, as it is the case with the sections on the working day, factory legislation, primitive accumulation, not to mention critical analyses on the political state in early political writings or direct historical analysis such as *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, he underlined the internality of the state with its legal, administrative, and coercive apparatuses to the relations of production, to the capitalism’s class relations. It is as a result of this philosophy of internal relations underlying Marx’s theory of capitalism that rethinking primitive accumulation and its mechanisms not as a phenomenon belonging to an “original stage” but as a continuous and persistent phenomenon has become possible.⁴⁸ It is again up to specific historical analysis to decide whether and how far during the course of capitalist development, inward and/or outward oriented militarism as a power technique has taken place among the

⁴⁸ For instance Harvey (2003: 137-182) underlines the continuity and persistence of the methods of primitive accumulation within the long historical geography of capitalism, and proposes the term “accumulation by dispossession” in order to overcome the problem of attributing these methods to the “pre-history” of capitalism. From a different ontological standpoint, Read (2002) uses primitive accumulation in order to develop a non-economistic and non-teleological theory of capitalism. See also De Angelis (2001), Perelman (2001), and Bonefeld (2001).

mechanisms of accumulation by dispossession and of the capitalist social relations in broader terms.

Once an economistic conceptualization of relations of production is rejected in favor of the internality of state and politics to the relations of production, we should explore how Marxist theories of state analyze or may be useful in analyzing militarism as a technique of power. This poses a twofold problematic: theorizing the relationship between state and class relations in capitalism; and exploring the relationship between militarism as a technique of state power and capitalist social relations.

Marxist theories of state are criticized for ignoring and/or underestimating the militarist and war-making face of modern state (Mann, 1984a; Shaw, 1984). In fact, there is a partial truth in this critic. In as much as the techniques of power in the arsenal of modern state have been a concern, various Marxist writers focused on ideology, law, material concessions within a bourgeois democratic parliamentary form of state. Physical coercion, the use of military force, and various forms of militarism have been barely mentioned. They were just methods of power strange to normal ways of governing of capitalist state. They were taken as a last resort in dealing with social cleavages. It is whenever the social struggles intensify, whenever and wherever the working class attacks the foundations of its exploitation which are rooted in capitalist property relations and in the relations of production, and when the perception of threat increases that democratic forms of governance based on rule of law and ideology become inconvenient for the ruling class. In such cases of crisis, more authoritarian forms emerge (Draper, 1977: 263; Hirsch, 1978: 64-65; Jessop, 1990: 342). It is in the period of crisis that the locus of the bourgeois power structure shifts from ideology to violence. "Coercion becomes both *determinant and dominant* in the supreme crisis, and

the army inevitably occupies the front of the stage in any class struggle” (Anderson, 1977: 44).

In that sense, the analysis of the specific state form that Marx called *Bonapartism*⁴⁹ has formed an entry point for subsequent Marxist analyses of ‘militarism’. Bonapartism was the prototype of a state form in which the military and the use of military might was determinant. In the case of Bonapartism, militarism as a state form is analyzed within the processes of social class relations. The analysis of the Bonapartist coup d’état in France is discussed with direct reference to the bankruptcy of bourgeois liberalism, “the collapse of bourgeois rule, demise of the constitutional or parliamentary republic”; hence as a deviation from the genuine bourgeois form of political rule. In other words, Bonapartist state form is deemed to be exceptionality. Why is this so?

For Marx, the peculiarity of capitalist social relations of production is the institutional separation of the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ (the state). I explained how this formal, institutional separation is rooted in capitalist relations of production. The formation of this modern state and the formation of formally separated spheres of civil society (and economy) and state are the products of “one and same historical process”.⁵⁰ This separation is essential to the capitalist type of state, whatever be its form,

⁴⁹ For a rich and comprehensive discussion of Bonapartism, and its Bismarckian extension in Germany see Draper (1977). It should be noted that Marx himself did not analyze Bonapartism under the rubric of militarism, and it was only at later stages of Bonapartism that he shifted his analysis to that of praetorianism. Yet, in so far as it was the analysis of a coup d’état, of a state form established by this coup and of its transformation into a praetorian regime, it does perfectly fit, taken into account the subsequent conceptualizations of militarism in the literature, our discussion of militarism in capitalist social formations.

⁵⁰ As early as 1843 Marx writes: “But the completion of the state’s idealism was at the same time the completion of civil society’s materialism... The *constitution of the political state* and the dissolution of civil society into independent *individuals* ... are completed in *one and the same act*” (Marx, 1994b: 48-49; see also Marx, 1994c, 1994d). For an excellent discussion of the historicalness of the modern state as a specific bourgeois form of rule see Sayer (1990).

democratic or authoritarian.⁵¹ However, Marx, who captured very insightfully the essentiality of this separation for modern bourgeois form of rule, accepted its (bourgeois) liberal-democratic modality as the normal form at the expense of more authoritarian forms. It is through the parliamentary form that the bourgeoisie organizes its ‘political power’, hence its overall social power. His critique took the democratic form of the “political state” with its rule of law, its equal citizenship, and its rights to participation through parliamentary organs as a given and focused how this “political emancipation” is itself problematic since it is masking its twin: the egoist individualization and all forms of exploitation, domination, and alienation in civil society.⁵²

However, such a critique cannot consume all possible shells of bourgeois rule. *First* of all, the bourgeoisie cannot be essentially defined as the bearer of the liberal democratic project. Indeed, the bourgeois democratic form has been historically established despite the bourgeoisie, not because of it, since the bourgeoisie has been reluctant in adopting democratic reforms and in extending democratic rights to the working classes.⁵³ This democratic form of rule has been contingent upon specific configuration of social power relations. *Secondly*, Marx, influenced by the bourgeois democratic revolution against older dominant classes, could not realize how indeed the executive and the administrative organs of the state could become more important than

⁵¹ Following Poulantzas (1973: 147-153, 308-317) I define “type of state” as a concept denoting capitalist state in general whose differential aspect is its institutional separation, and forms of state as a subcategory to define different modalities that the capitalist type of state and this institutional separation take and which reflect themselves in the relative primacy of the executive or legislative within the state apparatus.

⁵² The best account is in Marx (1994b).

⁵³ See Therborn (1977), Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992), Huber and Stephens (1999). Marx’s attribution to the bourgeoisie the liberal democratic political project was a premature move, since just after the bourgeoisie shifted the balance of class power against the feudal classes; it sided with anti-democratic forces against the democratic demands of the working and middle classes. What he criticized in the liberal theory was not historically established once and for all; and although Marx realized that in its specific historical analysis of class struggles, he in an unfortunate way continued to see the parliamentary democratic form as the genuine bourgeois form.

the parliamentary organs in due historical process. Hence, even state forms dominated by the executive and administrative organs can be perfect forms of bourgeois rule.⁵⁴

Bonapartism is the case where Marx confronts the limits of the argument that parliamentary democratic form is the best possible shell for bourgeois rule. On the other hand, he still continues to conceptualize any form of state other than bourgeois democratic form as an exception. For Marx, this exceptionality reflects itself in the institutional structuring of the state as the primacy of the executive over the legislative, of the bureaucratic-administrative apparatus over the parliament. This is also the main formal-institutional characteristic of the Bonapartist form of state. In that sense, Bonapartism is marked by “the subordination of parliament to the executive, society to the state...and by the increasing state repression” (Marx, 1996: 117, 68).⁵⁵

How did this militarized form of state based on “the shameless, bare-faced rule of sword and cross”, “the predominance of the army” (Marx, 1996: 34, 122) emerge? What are specific social power relations that led to this state form? Marx’s answer is that of the balance of class power. It is in a historical conjuncture in which the bourgeoisie can no longer rule through parliamentary and constitutional mechanisms because of the working class counter-hegemonic attack,⁵⁶ and the working class could not establish its own hegemony yet that Bonapartist coup d’état and the subsequent state form become

⁵⁴ Indeed with the historical development of capitalism, the modern capitalist state departed from this ideal liberal-democratic form of state. Its administrative capacities developed enormously in response to social struggles and in order to control social and political forces by penetrating civil society (Neocleous, 1996; Giddens, 1985; Mann, 1993). This transformation of classical parliamentary democratic form of state is such substantial that after 1970s “authoritarian statism” characterized by a shift in the locus of power from the legislative to the executive, a functional decline in the role of parties, an important curtailment of formal liberties has become the normal form of capitalist state see Poulantzas (1978).

⁵⁵ While this shift in the locus of power is interpreted as the subordination of the society, Marx has in mind the dominated classes of the society since it is through the parliament and not the state apparatus that the working class could represent itself politically. This was consonant with one of the main demands of the working class movement of the age, that of the acceptance of the universal suffrage.

⁵⁶ “In answer to the *coup de main* of February 1848 we have the *coup de tête* of December 1851” (Marx, 1996: 34)

the only possible form. The key to Bonapartism is that the bourgeoisie, in order to preserve its social (economic) power gives away its political power (parliamentary regime). Meanwhile, Marx insistently stresses that Bonaparte's vocation is that of "safeguarding 'bourgeois order'". Even though Bonaparte positions himself against the middle class' political and literary power, "because he protects its material power, he generates its public, its political power anew" (Marx, 1996: 124). In other words, it is the impossibility of the expanded reproduction of the bourgeoisie through parliamentary and constitutional republic because of the challenge of the working class that the militarization of the governing methods enters into the stage. To the extent that this exceptional form of state constitutes and reproduces the bourgeois social order, for Marx the Bonapartist state could not be conceived as being equally above all social classes.

However, there is no doubt that Marx also pointed to the tendency of the autonomization of state and bureaucracy. The state achieved independence with respect to society in a way not yet challenging the reproduction of the bourgeois order. But it is because Marx sees the genuine bourgeois form of rule as parliamentary democracy that he, somewhat hesitantly, emphasizes the widening gap between the bourgeoisie and the state apparatus. But Marx again explains the social class basis of this autonomization. Besides the reproduction of the bourgeois order, this regime represents another class emanating from a non-capitalist mode of production. State power is not suspended in mid-air. Bonaparte represents a class, "indeed the most numerous class in French society, the *small holding peasants*": a class which does "not form a class" because their mode of production forces them into an isolated social existence, and they form no community, no national linkage, no political organization (Marx, 1996: 116-117). To sum up, neither the military as a political actor nor Bonapartism as a militarized state

form were independent from broader social power relations. The practices of the military leading to Bonapartism were embedded in class power relations.

It was only later on that Marx noted how Bonapartist regime was transformed into the “rule of the praetorians”. This transition meant that the bonds connecting Bonapartism to different social classes (bourgeoisie, small peasantry) had vanished altogether. Now, *praetorianism*, this most manifest form of militarism, in the sense of military’s being above all sectional interests for the sake of its own interests become dominant. The military no longer rules in the name of a class but in its own name.

...the rule of the naked sword is proclaimed in most unmistakable terms, and Bonaparte wants France to clearly understand that the imperial rule does rest not on her will but on 600,000 bayonets... Under the second Empire the interest of the army itself is to predominate. The army is no longer to maintain the rule of one part of the people over another part of the people. The army is to maintain its own rule, personated by its own dynasty, over the French people in general. It is to represent the *State* in antagonism to the *society*. It must not be imagined that Bonaparte is not aware of the dangerous character of the experiment he tries. In proclaiming himself the chief of the Pretorians, he declares every Pretorian chief his competitor (Marx, 1986: 464-465).

In as much as Marx insisted that the genuine bourgeois political rule was parliamentary democracy, he analyzed Bonapartism (hence militarism) as an exceptional form of rule of bourgeoisie and the subsequent regime of praetorianism as the end of bourgeois rule. He did not problematicize the integrality of “*exceptionalism*” to modern forms of power. Even though he was well aware that militarism was a technique of power even under the civilian bourgeois republic since, after the French revolution, the regimes under the rule of different classes (be it peasantry, the great landed property, or the bourgeoisie), all rested upon the force of the military or state of siege;⁵⁷ he did not conceptualize the role of militarism in the fabrication of bourgeois order.

3-e Subsequent Marxist Analyses of Militarized State Forms

⁵⁷ See (Marx, 1986: 465) (Marx , 1996: 46)

As a result of the militarization of state structures on the eve of the First World War, an increasing political and intellectual interest in militarism emerged among Marxist thinkers. Among them, *Liebknecht*, the author of *Militarism and Anti-Militarism*, deserves special attention since he not only focused on the causes but also on the specific mechanisms of militarism, or to use his own words on “its origins and nature, its methods and effects”. Liebknecht (1973), writing against modernist-optimist Marxists such as Bernstein who were arguing that militarism was a legacy of the past, underlined that militarism as a multiform and many-sided phenomenon is deeply rooted in the structure of class-divided social orders, and capitalism, like every other class-divided social order, developed its own special variety of militarism. His peculiarity lied in the fact that while acknowledging the impossibility of analyzing militarism as detached from wider social power relations of capitalism, he also recognized that militarism could not be reduced to capitalism and had its own autonomous effects on social power relations.⁵⁸

Having differentiated between repressive apparatuses and ideological apparatuses, Liebknecht followed a tradition which placed physical coercion at the center of the state in a way that in the last instance physical force was decisive in every social relation of power and in institutional structure of the state. In a period where outward-oriented militarism was on the agenda of Marxists, he analyzed how militarism was also an inward-oriented power technique in disciplining the working class. As a result, he differentiated between “militarism against the internal enemy” and “militarism against the external enemy”. Using plenty of evidence from different European

⁵⁸ “Even if it is true that contemporary militarism “is nothing more than a manifestation of our capitalist society, it is nevertheless a manifestation which has become almost independent and very nearly an end in itself” (Liebknecht, 1973: ch. 3).

countries, he empirically elaborated on several methods of “militarism against internal enemy”. The latter’s principal concern was “protecting the prevailing social order”, “supporting capitalism”, and “hindering the development of class-consciousness”. Disciplining working bodies under soldier uniforms, the compulsory use of soldiers as agricultural workers and as strike breakers, the use of military force against strikes, militarization of state structure in face of political class struggle were among the main mechanisms (Liebknecht, 1973: ch. 4). He also noted that mechanisms and processes of militarism were crosscutting the institutional settings of state and civil society by showing how civil society itself was contaminated with “a network of militaristic and semi-militaristic institutions” and how “militarist spirit and militarist conception of life” penetrated public and private institutions from education system to central and municipal administration, from press to church. Liebknecht also paved the way to explore the interconnections between force and consent, a couplet which would be for a longtime conceptualized as being in an inverse relation with each other. He was pointing out how the threat of coercion was also built on a consent manufactured in the institutional settings of state and civil society.⁵⁹ However, despite of its important contributions, the lack of a coherent theory of capitalist state and class relations formed the limits of Liebknecht’s analysis. These limits expressed themselves mainly in the fact that Liebknecht conceived of military’s practices and militarism as being essentially functional for the reproduction of capitalist order rather than as constitutive in the formation of that order.

⁵⁹ That is why he interpreted militarism as seemingly being “at the same time democratic and despotic, enlightened and machine-like, at the same time to serve the nation and to be its enemy” (Liebknecht, 1973).

Subsequent Marxists did not add much on the road opened by Liebknecht in the sense of analyzing specific mechanisms and processes of militarism. From Engels (1886) to Lenin (1932), several Marxists underlined that the monopoly of legitimate violence is the main characteristic of the modern capitalist state. The repressive apparatuses were conceived as the hard nucleus of the state. However, it has merely been assumed and asserted that the state was an organ of class repression and the coercive face of the modern capitalist state has been *overemphasized but understudied*. Indeed, this neglect has been to an important extent a result of a long lasting general lack of interest in the state and its theorization, which was in turn an outcome of the economistic conceptualization of capitalism. For instance, to the extent that *Lenin* focused on the state in *State and Revolution*, by state power he understood either the repressive apparatus and/or the parliamentary apparatus. The militarist aspect of the state came to the front unfortunately only in his analysis of imperialism and simply as an epiphenomenon (see above). Instead he focused on a critique of parliamentary democracy, following Marx's emphasis on the specifically democratic nature of bourgeois rule. This concern, which was a response to the arguments in favor of parliamentary democracy in the Second International, missed the analysis not only of increasingly coercive face of modern capitalist state in a process of militarization but also of the development of "political administration" at the expense of parliamentary organs as a state mechanism of governing the cleavages of civil society.

In terms of forms of militarism, Marxist theories have mainly remained within the problematic of Marx's analysis of Bonapartism, namely the explanation of the rise of a militarized state form as an exceptional form of bourgeois rule. In that sense, the analyses of militarized state forms cannot be evaluated without their respective (implicit

or explicit) theories of state since the way the capitalist state is conceptualized also determined the form of relationality they establish between capitalism and militarism. For the moment, rather than attempting at presenting the huge and rich area of Marxist debates on theories of capitalist state in its full details,⁶⁰ I will discuss the main characteristics of those approaches that are explicitly or implicitly appropriated in the works on praetorian forms militarism.

1: Instrumentalism and Reductionism in Middle Class Coup Analyses

The instrumentalist theory of state, which cannot be exclusively attributed to Marxist thought, is characterized by the assumption that the state is a thing to be possessed and/or a neutral instrument to be used by social classes or class fractions to promote their own immediate economic interests at the expense of other classes and social forces. The class backgrounds and class affiliations of the personnel of the state and/or the control of the key positions in the state apparatus by dominant classes or class fractions is often taken as the explanatory factor for the immediate control of the state.⁶¹ Such an approach reduces the state into an instrument of a class subject often conceived in an economistic manner as being constituted in a relation of externality to the state. The instrumentalist conceptualization is also blind to different state forms, forms of state intervention, institutional structure of state, political struggles, and non-mechanistic and problematic nature of political class formation.

The instrumentalist reading of state-class relations echoed in attempts at explaining the establishment of militarized state forms too. In these explanations not

⁶⁰ Though I will elaborate more on Marxist theories of state on my way to clarify my own position, the readers may refer to the following works that critically covers the area. Jessop (1982; 1990); Carnoy (1984); Aronowitz and Bratsis (2002).

⁶¹ For general characteristics of instrumentalist approach see Jessop (1990: 27-28, 145-146), Das (1996: 28-31); for particular representations of this approach see early imperialism theories that I mentioned above, the theory of "state monopoly capitalism" (see in Jessop, 1982: 32-77), and partially Miliband (1969).

only the state but also the military is conceived as a passive instrument in the hands of (internal or foreign) bourgeoisie or middle classes. Nun's (1967; 1976) analysis of middle-class military-coup in Latin America can be used as a representative case. While Nun's intention to contextualize the military intervention within broader social power relations in a process of capitalist development is justifiable, he obviously lacks the necessary conceptual tools to analyze these power relations. He argues that the armed forces played an instrumental role for the middle class⁶² in the sense of representing that class and compensating "for its inability to establish itself as a well-integrated hegemonic group". This "responsibility of protecting the middle class" is first realized in the form of the support for obtaining political recognition from the oligarchy under this latter's hegemony; and later on under the form of the protection and consolidation of their power vis-à-vis the rural and urban working classes. In other words, the weak middle class with a low level of "institutional cohesion and articulateness" establishes its dominance by "the instrumental role of the military" since "the armed forces became one of the few important institutions controlled by the middle class". Although Nun himself acknowledges that "the class situation of the officer corps [cannot] entirely explain its political behavior" (Nun, 1967: 73), the only evidence for the military to play such an instrumentalist role and/or to be controlled by the middle class remains the class origins of the officer corps which are recruited from middle classes.

Albeit not from a Marxian standpoint, Halpern (1962; 1963) too analyzes the political and social practices of the military in Middle Eastern cases by reference to their middle class origins. By the term "new middle class", he means, unlike Nun, not the

⁶² Even though the term of 'middle class' corresponds in Nun's analysis to the bourgeoisie, he prefers to use this term to underline the intermediary position of this class between feudal landowning class and urban and rural working classes.

possessor of productive private property (merchants and small manufacturers, self-employed, etc) but salaried people either within the government or business enterprises (managers, administrators, teachers, engineers, journalists, scientists, lawyers, or army officers). According to Halpern, in cases where modern capitalist economy has not developed yet and modern bureaucratic state formation has reached a certain level, the control over the state rather than the property relations and the ownership of property is more defining of social relations. Hence, rather than being a socio-economic class, the power of the new middle class stems from its position within the state structure, its control of “the machinery of a modernizing state”.⁶³ In an historical situation where “landowners and a bourgeoisie of middlemen and traders” are declining, and workers and peasants are not politically active yet, not only the politics is limited to the new middle class actors, but also “the army has become the principal political actor and instrument of a new middle class” (Halpern, 1963: 51-55, 59, 62-63; Halpern, 1962: 279-281, 286, 289). It is again by virtue of its ‘class origins’, of its being part and “the instrument of the new middle class” praised by Halpern “as the principal revolutionary – and potentially stabilizing- force” that the military intervenes (Halpern, 1962: 253, 258).

The *first* problematic aspect of this approach is the instrumentalist conceptualization of state (and of its repressive apparatus). As Jessop (1990: 146) notes, the instrumentalist approach “ignores all the effects of state forms on the process of representation and the ways in which the interests of capital can be affected and redefined through changes in the state system and/or through shifts in the balance of

⁶³ Among other characteristics which forms the new middle class as an independent force Halpern cites the followings: it is freer from traditional bonds and better equipped to manipulate armies and voluntary organizations; it is one of the largest social groups; it is more cohesive, more self-conscious than other classes; it is capable of mobilizing mass support; its political, economic and social actions are decisive in determining the role of other classes in the course of social change (Halpern, 1963: 59).

political forces". The implication of the instrumentalist approach that is implicitly or explicitly adopted in these middle class coup analyses is their reduction of state institutions if not also the state elites (such as the military ones) to mere instruments in the hands of a middle class. The instrumentalist approach also ignores the hegemonic aspect of class power relations since it exclusively focuses on the relationship between the dominant fraction of the power bloc and the state apparatus. Neither the intra-class conflicts within the power bloc nor the practices of manufacturing hegemony over the dominated classes are problematicized.

The *second* point of criticism concerns their adoption of the economic reductionist type of class analysis. Especially in Nun's case, class politics is reduced to objective "economic" class position/location since there is no account of political and ideological class practices and struggles. In other words, Nun's analysis is marked by an economistic conceptualization of classes and capitalist social power relations whereby class positions are assumed enough for talking about class formation and class struggles. His position corresponds to structure→agency type of reductionism.⁶⁴ We do not see the mechanisms and processes through which class formation and struggles occur or through which the military becomes embedded in and/or the main bearer of specific class projects. Even though Halpern's non-marxist class analysis seems to integrate ideological and political practices of the military (as developmentalist-nationalist modernizers), his non-relational conceptualization of class concept not only describes the new middle class (of which the military is a part) as the sole social actor struggling

⁶⁴ See Mouzelis (1990: 169-172). In this type of reductionism, political class practices are explained in terms of the objective class structure, as the direct effect of this latter. In other words, the social process through which class relations are experienced and lived, and class struggles took place are totally undermined.

in a social vacuum, but also uncritically detaches the military's politico-ideological process from capitalist social power relations.

2: O'Donnell's Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Structural-Functionalism or Impasse at the Level of Accumulation Strategies?

There is no doubt that the theory of bureaucratic-authoritarianism (BA), developed first by Guillermo O'Donnell in the mid-1970s on the basis of Latin American experiences, has been the most influential one within Marxian approaches to militarism as a state form. The theory of BA as developed by O'Donnell (1979a; 1979b; 1977; 1978; 1988) was initially an attempt to criticize the main argument of the then hegemonic modernization theory, according to which economic development would bring political development, i.e. parliamentary democracy. In that sense, his initial concern was to expose the interconnections between South American situations of high modernization and bureaucratic-authoritarianism. Indeed, the coexistence of industrial/economic development and militarist authoritarianism had already been recognized, albeit in a non-critical way, within modernization theory itself (see for instance Huntington in Ch. I-2-b). The originality of O'Donnell, in that sense, was rather his attempt at explaining the rise, social impact, dynamics, and internal contradictions of bureaucratic-authoritarian form of state in terms of its "close and systematic relationship with the structure and change patterns of a particular type of capitalism".⁶⁵ Hence, beyond being a mere critique of modernization theory/ideology, it was an attempt at

⁶⁵ See O'Donnell (1978: 5). In fact, O'Donnell's conceptual framework shifted in due time. While at the beginning he was caught within the conceptual horizon of modernization theory (modernization, economic and political development, social differentiation, political pluralization and activation of political actors, differentiation-integration gap, mass praetorianism, modern versus traditional sectors, inter-industry cleavage), later on he shifted to a more marxian conceptual framework (capital accumulation process and political class struggles). Compare for instance O'Donnell (1979a) with O'Donnell (1979b; 1988).

analyzing the relationality between economic and political forms of capitalist social relations, between capitalist development and forms of state and/or forms of regime.

He distinguished the bureaucratic-authoritarian state from other forms of authoritarianism⁶⁶ by emphasizing the following characteristics of the former: 1) the domination of a class structure subordinated to a highly oligopolized and transnationalized bourgeoisie dominating the deepening process of capitalist industrialization; 2) economic exclusion of the popular sector (because of the specific mode of accumulation); 3) political exclusion of the previously active popular sector through coercive means and/or vertical (corporatist) controls; 4) the militarization of state structure by the decisive weight of the coercive bodies in the institutional setting, especially the centrality of the military; 5) the suppression of citizenship, the liquidation of the institutions of political democracy, closing the democratic channels of access to the government for popular classes, and prohibiting any appeals to the population as *pueblo* and as class; 6) Depoliticization in the name of technocratization of politics through which social and political issues are reduced to technical issues (O'Donnell, 1978: 6; 1979b: 292-293, 309-310; 1988: 31-32).

O'Donnell's analytical framework for explaining the rise of BA is based on the interrelations of three factors among which the first two are determinant: industrialization strategies and their crisis; popular political struggles and forms of political alliances; state institutions and state elites' practices. From the point of view of

⁶⁶ O'Donnell (1988: 33) differentiates between four forms of authoritarianism: Latin America's traditional forms of authoritarianism, the more or less authoritarian forms of populism, fascism, and bureaucratic authoritarianism. In the first category, an oligarchy allied to sections of transnational capital pursuing an accumulation strategy based on the export of primary products dominates mainly politically inactivated subordinate classes whose working class component is small. The second category corresponds to an accumulation regime based on inward-oriented industrialization strategy bringing into an alliance nationalist and anti-oligarchic fractions of capital, transnational production capital, various middle sectors, and politically incorporated popular sector. Lastly, fascism is differentiated by being based on a more genuinely national bourgeoisie whose class project is led by a party, movement and/or leader.

this latter factor, one of the points of superiority of O'Donnell's analysis over instrumentalist analysis, is that he did not treat the military as an instrument or as a homogenous entity but rather as a political actor, while at the same time focusing on both the specific internal cleavages within the military and their relation to the broader social and political cleavages and struggles (O'Donnell, 1979a: 143, 153-159). Such an approach is meaningful in the sense that it does not treat the military-institution and military officers as omnipotent political actors acting in a social and political vacuum. Indeed, it can be contended that O'Donnell follows Poulantzasian proposition that the social cleavages are (re)produced within the military itself.⁶⁷

The following summary of his explanatory line, I may say, is not more "violent" than any other attempt at generalizing any rich bulk of study. It is an analysis of the crisis of dependent capitalist development and the subsequent rise of a specific form of authoritarian regime. According to O'Donnell, the period preceding the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarianism was marked by the easy phase of ISI (the production of simple and durable consumer goods) and the related populist alliance based on industrial bourgeoisie, middle classes, and rural and urban working classes. In as much as the economic development was successful through a specific industrialization strategy, it is argued, a populist alliance which is supposed to be democratic in terms of both income distribution and autonomous economic-corporate and political organization and activities of the popular classes was possible. However, with the crisis of industrialization due to the inherent limits of the model (foreign exchange crisis due to the dependency on the import of intermediary and investment goods necessitating the

⁶⁷ While O'Donnell emphasized the importance of such an approach to the military from his earliest work it was in his later works that he integrated the particular cleavages within the military and their interconnections with broader class cleavages into his historical and empirical analysis.

deepening of industrial structure) the contradiction between the requirements of deepening industrialization and popular political struggles emerged. In other words, the end of populism and the dissolution of the populist coalition were “tied closely to the exhaustion of the possibilities of ‘easy’ horizontal industrial growth”. The previous social changes had already caused social differentiation, increased politicization of the popular sector, and sharpened inter-industry cleavages. In such “a period of mass praetorianism” à la Huntington, “a populist system could not produce the needed changes” in the production structure. Hence, “bureaucratic-authoritarianism arises from an overwhelming political defeat of the popular sector and its allies” (O’Donnell, 1979a; 1979b; 1978).

O’Donnell’s analysis of BA triggered an immense discussion during which it has been criticized from several standpoints. We can differentiate between two different orders of critique, one related to the concrete historical and empirical analyses, the other related to the theoretical and methodological assumptions and framework of the model. An evaluation of the first order of criticisms would necessitate a historical comparative analysis, which is not included in the scope of this dissertation. As I am mainly concerned in this chapter with theoretical frameworks for analyzing the relationship among state, capitalism and militarism, I will essentially focus on the critics of the second order. Meanwhile, historical and empirical aspects will be touched firstly since they have repercussions on more theoretical aspects too.

Many critiques are based on subjecting bureaucratic-authoritarianism to empirical testing in search of a single regime type corresponding to a specific stage of industrial development (Malloy, 1977; Collier, 1979a; Remmer and Merckx, 1982). From the point of view of the historical and empirical appropriateness, the most

debatable aspect has been the periodization of industrialization strategies before and after the establishment of BA regimes, and of the corresponding forms of political system. In that sense, the argument about the deepening of ISI is empirically falsified for several cases by proving that the industrialization strategy varied over time and countries. It has been argued that in cases initially analyzed by O'Donnell (Brazil and Argentina in 1960s) either the deepening of industrialization had already started long before the establishment of BA regimes and/or deepening was not a concern of BA regimes and its promoters (see Serra, 1979; Kaufman, 1979; Hirschman, 1979). On the other hand, it is argued, the qualitatively different aspect of the military regimes of 1970s (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay) were rooted in the qualitative differences of economic crisis (neoliberal restructuring rather than deepening of ISI). Accordingly, these "neoconservative regimes" should be conceived as part of a global crisis of capitalism in advanced industrial countries (crisis of the state, ungovernability, demand overload etc.). In that sense, O'Donnell's attempt at seeing the problem of authoritarianism in linear terms as an accentuation or deepening of already existing features of BA (such as the level of threat) has been criticized as being blind to the different nature of the new militarist authoritarianism of the 1970s (see Schamis, 1991).

Another line of historical-empirical critique is related to the forms of politics supposed to correspond to specific stages of industrialization. In that sense, it is contended that, the crisis of easy phase of ISI has been regulated by different forms of regime: in Peru through a commitment to substantial reform, in Mexico by no change in the form of regime, in the Venezuelan and Colombian cases by the survival of democracies (Hirschman, 1979, Cammack, 1985). Similarly, another critic was related to the issue of populism. Firstly, uses of populism ended up with abuses of the concept

since it has been marked with conceptual ambiguities. It tended to denote, or it has been left undefined whether it corresponds to forms of state, forms of regime, or form of politics. It seems plausible to argue that it is mainly used as a form of politics. However, in this case, its uses as an analytical tool for periodization become problematic. For the equation of populism with easy phase of ISI in O'Donnell's model has been criticized for ignoring the fact that either the so-called populist form of politics existed in Latin America under both democratic and authoritarian forms of regime or populism was dominant through different class coalitions in different phases of industrialization (Laclau, 1977; Kaufman, 1979; Collier, 1979b; Yalman, 1985). While the first point questions the use of populism as a criterion of historical periodization in so far as it is blind to different forms of state; the second point undermines attempts at matching it with specific stages of capitalist development. Additionally, populism was not a coherent political system in the sense that it in no way corresponded to a broad coalition without internal conflicts. Rather it was "often a narrow, fragile, unstable coalition. Incorporating periods were commonly brief, and excluding periods often quickly followed" (Collier, 1979b: 372-374).

In his analysis of capitalism and authoritarianism in Latin America, Cammack (1985: 13) underlines the need for "theoretically informed accounts of particular cases, respecting their internal logic, specific dynamics, and unique patterns of causality: not as an alternative to comparative analysis, but as the only basis on which it can proceed". It is on this aspect of theoretical framework of O'Donnell that I want to return now. It should be first noted that his theoretical position has been an eclectic one varying over time. As I noted above, while starting with the conceptual framework of modernization theory O'Donnell gradually shifted to a Marxian conceptual framework. The one-sided

focus of the critics on the industrialization aspect of his approach echoed at a more theoretical level as the critique of “economistic structural-functionalism” (see Mouzelis, 1986).⁶⁸ This critique of functionalism originates from the assumption that the rise of BA regime is explained simply by reference to the changing structural and functional requirements of industrial capitalism. The above critics concerning the issue of “deepening industrialization” implicitly or explicitly appropriate this line of critique. However, functionalist explanation could be no problematic in so far as the real-concrete and/or empirical mediations were established. For instance, to show that the military perceived the need of deepening industrialization would be such a move. Beside this, it should be noted that O’Donnell’s position cannot be seen as “structuralist type of reductionism”.⁶⁹ He never argued that BA as a form of state and/or regime is directly produced by the requirements of capitalist industrialization through “a direct cause-to-effect relationship”. He is just delineating the structural constraints⁷⁰ put by this process since he always emphasized the mediation of intra-class struggles and popular political struggles. Concerning this issue, I contend that the problematic aspect of O’Donnell is twofold: one related to a lack of conceptual tools to analyze different ‘causal mechanisms’, the other related to his underdeveloped conceptual framework. To start

⁶⁸ It is in that sense that O’Donnell’s approach has been criticized as reproducing Marxist “capital logic school” which functionally derivates state form from economic categories of capital accumulation. For the best example of this approach see Holloway and Picciotto (1978a), for a critical evaluation see Jessop (1982: 78-141).

⁶⁹ One form of structuralist type of reductionism, the relevant one at this point, is “structure→structure reductionism” whereby it is asserted that “the institutional features of the political system are derived from, or reduced to, economic structural constraints, or to the ‘laws of motion’ of the capitalist mode of production”. If one leaves aside its crudest form (epiphenomenalist/reflectionist one), the most common mechanism is functionalism (establishing functional linkages between the economic and political instances) (Mouzelis, 1990: 162-168).

⁷⁰ I do not think that O’Donnell’s position was a determinist one. See for instance: “Given a previous history of mass praetorianism, it is *likely* –when the political system changes- that there will be an authoritarian imposition of new ‘rules’ by the coalition that succeeds in gaining the governmental power” (O’Donnell, 1979a: 146; emphasis is mine). He uses Weberian concept of “elective affinity” which denotes for O’Donnell (1978: 3) “a strong but undetermined likelihood (before implanting it [bureaucratic-authoritarian state]) that still leaves room for purposeful political action”.

with the first, what I mean is that even though O'Donnell does not promote a too direct cause to effect relationship between the requirements of industrialization and forms of state and/or regime, he does not have the necessary conceptual tools for defining specific and different effects of these 'structural-functional' constraints.⁷¹ The concept of "elective affinity" remains a *deus ex machina*. In concrete analyses, we do not see how it is operationalized; how, to what extent and in what ways the structural-functional constraints have their own effects remain undetermined. The second problematic nature is his oscillation between two concepts: industrialization and capital accumulation. Even though later on he used the term capital accumulation, O'Donnell's analysis is based on the concept of industrialization and its stages. However, whereas "capital accumulation refers to the expansion of capitalist social relations through the transformation of surplus value to new constant and variable capital" the industrialization focus on factors such as insufficient capital, constraints on technology, the size of internal market etc. (Canak, 1984: 19). This is not to deny that industrialization strategies do not have a place in accumulation process. Rather, capital (and capital accumulation) is before else a social relation. It is a process of class formation and conflict, and cannot be reduced to the question of industrialization. To give an example, it is because capital accumulation is substituted by industrialization strategy that O'Donnell becomes open to criticisms concerning the non-correspondence of stages of industrialization and authoritarian forms of state. To sum up, O'Donnell's approach is less straightforward than many critics who one-sidedly focus on his analysis of industrialization stages assume. Despite the

⁷¹ For instance the following three mechanisms proposed by Erik Olin Wright (1985: 29-30) may be mentioned. *Limitation* is the mechanism through which "one element imposes limits of possible variation on another"; *selection* is the mechanism through which "one element imposes narrower limits of variation on another element within a range of already established broader limits"; and *transformation* is the mechanism through which "a practice by social actors (individuals or organizations of various sorts) transforms a given element within the constraints of limitations and selections".

ambiguities about the mechanisms of structural-functional constraints, his approach cannot be readily discarded for being structuralist-functionalist type of reductionism. Indeed, I will argue that its essential ambiguities and shortcomings lie in his attempts at analyzing political class relations and capitalist state.

O'Donnell did not have a well established theory of state and politics. This is why despite his double focus on both capitalist industrialization and within-class relations among different fractions of capitalist class on the one hand and popular political struggles and political mechanisms and ideologies to subsume these struggles, this second aspect remained underdeveloped both theoretically and empirically. His successive weak attempts at defining some theoretical propositions on capitalist state and introducing Marxian conceptual tools for analyzing class relations and state in capitalist social formations remained rather eclectic. From an earlier Weberian formal-institutional conceptualization of state⁷², he shifted, in his successive works, to an allegedly Marxist theory of capitalist state. His assertion that “BA is a type of capitalist state” leads him to make some theoretical propositions concerning the state. Even though not referred explicitly, broadly speaking a Poulantzasian impact can be discerned. Legitimately rejecting attempts that reduce the state to state apparatuses, he underlines the social relational aspect of the state. Hence, the state has been conceptualized as “a social relationship of domination...rooted principally in the class structure and capitalist relations of production”. In that sense, even though the state, which is objectified (and reified) as a set of institutions backed by the monopoly of the means of coercion and apparently standing above society, enjoys a formal appearance of

⁷² The state comprises “the set of organizations and relationships that claims the character of the ‘public’ as opposed to the ‘private’ on a territorially limited area. This also envisages a generalized conformity of the population concerning provisions of the state and backing it with control of the means of physical coercion” (O'Donnell, 1978: 32)

representing the general interest of a community through its institutional separation, the state should indeed be analyzed from and within civil society, with specific reference to class power relations. Besides the coercive nature of the state, he seems also interested in the production of consensus through three principal political mediations: nation, citizenship, and people (*pueblo* or *lo popular*). It is by reference to these three “external referents” that the state appears as the instance of general interest (O’Donnell, 1979b: 286-291; 1988: 1-11). I think that even though these are some necessary premises for an apt theory of capitalist state, they are too general characteristics that do not lead us far away in concrete historical analyses unless they are not far more developed theoretically.

O’Donnell seems to conceive the state as a social relation of domination but he does not have the necessary conceptual framework to analyze political power relations. His analysis of class relations remain at the economic-corporate moment. In his latest work on BA in Argentina, he is well delineating the struggle within the power bloc, the struggle among different fractions of capitalist class concerning accumulation strategies. However, he does not attempt to explore what kind of hegemonic struggles at the political moment take place, what are the competing hegemonic projects through which class struggles occur. What is the role of three elements he mention (nation, citizenship, *pueblo*) in the articulation of national-popular hegemonic projects? To put briefly, he misses the fact that modern politics is about hegemony. Given these theoretical shortcomings in theorizing political class relations, which is indispensable if one conceives the state as a social relation, it is not surprising that the state ceases to be a social relation, and he easily shifts to structuralist-functionalist conceptualization of state whereby the state as “as a capitalist state” not as “a state of bourgeoisie” is deemed to be “the guarantor and organizer of the capitalist relations of production, and not of the

immediate interests of the bourgeoisie” “by providing elements necessary to their ‘normal’, unchallenged reproduction” (O’Donnell, 1988: 1-2). “BA’s capitalist character does not stem from the will of social actors but from its objective condition as the support of a social order that presupposes the continuous reproduction of society qua capitalist... It supports and defends the most basic and long term interests of this class” (1988: 190-191). Another eclectic attempt by O’Donnell, which may mislead the reader to believe that the focus of his analyses go beyond the mere economic-corporate moment, is to introduce Gramscian concepts in order to differentiate between different forms of crisis. In that sense, he distinguished many forms of crisis such as crisis of government, crisis of regime, crisis of accumulation, crisis of social domination (crisis of state and hegemony) (O’Donnell, 1988: 24-31). Meanwhile, on the one hand, the bulk of his analysis is based on the crisis of accumulation, and, given the lack of conceptual/theoretical tools; other forms of crisis are barely analyzed rather assessed in a limited fashion. On the other hand, these forms of crisis are operationalized in quantitative rather than qualitative terms. Even though at the introductory chapter, he attempts to define characteristics of different forms of crisis (see O’Donnell, 1988: 22-31), during the course of the analysis he merely differentiate them by reference to the level of threat. Hence for instance, as I indicated above, the qualitatively different nature of the crisis and the subsequent authoritarian forms of state is merely analyzed in terms of escalating levels of threat.

3: The Politicist-Structuralism of Mouzelis

An attempt to overcome various forms of economistic-reductionist approaches and/or shortcomings of Marxism in the analysis of political power relations, which marked, to a varying degree, both instrumentalist middle class coup and bureaucratic-authoritarian analyses of peripheral militarism, is Nicos Mouzelis' politicist structuralism. Mouzelis builds his position upon a critique of various types of reductionism⁷³ within diverse Marxist approaches. He argues that "in the absence of conceptual tools specific to the political level, any attempt to avoid reductionism necessarily leads to an empiricist, *ad hoc* treatment of the political realm as an area of social life lending itself to only conjunctural analysis" (Mouzelis, 1986: 202). Drawing on structuralist theory, he undertakes to develop "a regional theory of the political"⁷⁴ in juxtaposition to that of the economic. His project is an attempt of bringing together Marx's political economy and Weber's political sociology in order to grasp "the importance of not only the means production but also the means of administration, coercion and so on" (Mouzelis, 1986: 217; 1990: 16). He also claims to develop a balanced structure-agency (or system integration-social integration in terms of non-marxist social science) account of the political whereby the contradictions and incompatibilities between institutionalized structures and major actors' political

⁷³ Mouzelis (1990: 6) defines reductionism as "the methodologically illegitimate practice which consists of dealing with a certain order of phenomena in such a way that their possible distinctiveness and internal dynamic is ignored or under-emphasized in a aprioristic fashion". In that sense, he criticizes various Marxist analyses for reducing the political to the economic, which caused a weakness and poorness in developing conceptual tools specific to the sphere of politics. He differentiates between four types of reductionism whereby the first and the second correspond to voluntaristic variants of reductionism; and the other two to structuralist variants: 1) agent→agent (economic agents over political agents) 2) agent→structure (economic agents over political structures) 3) (economic) structure→political agents 4) (economic) structure→political structures (Mouzelis, 1990: 157-177).

⁷⁴ Such an approach is first and most ambitiously developed by early Poulantzas (1973).

strategies, projects, and struggles will be integrated into the analysis (Mouzelis, 1986: 217, 257; 1990: 62-65).

Mouzelis' structuralism leads him to sever the political and the economic as two different self-contained spheres, as "two interrelated wholes portraying different logics and different rhythms or tempi of historical change" (Mouzelis, 1990: 129).⁷⁵ He extracts from historical materialism the three key analytical concepts, namely technology-appropriation-ideology, which, he contends, Marx applied only to the realm of the economy/production. He then defines the technological, the appropriative and the ideological as constitutive elements of all major institutional spheres such as the economy, the polity, and the cultural (Mouzelis, 1990: 79-80). Confining the concept of mode of production to the economic sphere, he argues that the political system has its own institutional structures, its own reproductive requirements and proposes the concept of "mode of domination" as an isomorphic one to "mode of production". According to Mouzelis,

So if a dominant mode of production designates the major productive forces or technologies, and the manner of their control (relations of production), a mode of political domination can designate the major political technologies of domination (types of means of administration, types of party political apparatuses, techniques of political indoctrination, techniques of political coercion, and so on), and the main institutionalized ways in which such political technologies are controlled (that is, the *relations* of domination) (Mouzelis, 1986: 204; see also 1990: 73-79).

A mode of domination refers to a specific type of production, the production of political power. If relations of production form the structural basis for the formation of exploiting

⁷⁵ It should be noted that according to Mouzelis the separation of the economic and the political is not ontological but specific to capitalism. "The idea of the economy and the polity entailing specific and distinct technological, appropriative and ideological dimensions can make sense in societies where there is a clear differentiation between the economy and polity (that is, to capitalist societies)" (Mouzelis, 1990: 92). Nevertheless, as I will underline below, his structuralism lack the conceptual tools that link these two spheres.

and exploited classes, relations of domination play the same role for the formation of politically dominant and dominated groups. While in the case of exploiters-exploited, the antagonism is about the surplus labor to be extracted, in the case of dominating-dominated groups, it is over the consent or compliance to be extracted (Mouzelis, 1986: 204; 1990: 66-67). In this theoretical schema, *political technologies* (or forces of domination) refer “to the intricate means by which the state not only imposes order, but also extracts resources and mobilizes or demobilizes those under its jurisdiction”. In that sense, Foucault’s micro-technologies of surveillance should be read as complementary to Weber’s means of administration and coercion. Types of state administrative or military apparatuses, techniques of taxation, of national accounting, of mass mobilization; techniques of bringing into political arena those who were excluded such as populist or clientelistic forms of political incorporation; those are all part of political technologies. As to the *relations of domination*, they point to the manner in which politico-military technologies are controlled, the institutionalized ways of regulating the political division of labor, the distribution of power between dominant and dominated groups (Mouzelis, 1990: 51, 66). The importance for Mouzelis of severing the economic and the political as two different structural orders lies in being able to identify specific systemic contradictions and social struggles related to the appropriation and control not of the means of production but of the means of domination (Mouzelis, 1990: 65-66).

According to the author, unlike the European experiences wherein liberal-democratic mode of domination (Western mode of parliamentary domination characterized by integrative relations of domination) prevails, the semi-peripheral/peripheral mode of domination is characterized by incorporative relations of

domination.⁷⁶ Having assumed an idealistic account of two modes of political domination (namely liberal and authoritarian ones) corresponding to advanced and semi-peripheral capitalist social formations, he argues that, in the latter cases, political developments do not merely reflect class struggles but, on the contrary, political struggles shape and constitute in fundamental ways class and other interests in civil society. In this type of social formations, since economically dominant classes are passive creatures of politically or militarily dominant groups and the state plays an exceptionally central role given the absence (or weakness) of civil society and social classes, the struggles and contradictions within the politico-military sphere and the reproduction requirements of the polity seem more crucial for understanding overall social transformation. To put it in other words, “struggles over the means of domination are more important than struggles over the means of production” (Mouzelis, 1986: 206; 1990: 75, 93-95, 97). In these social formations, Mouzelis argues, military has played a key role in establishing and maintaining the incorporative/exclusionist character of the relations of domination. Beyond being the ultimate guarantor of bourgeois order as within any capitalist formation, it directly monitors the parliamentary system and intervenes through veto power in the political decision-making process. This is where lies, according to Mouzelis, the main cause of military interventions in semi-peripheral societies. The military does not intervene in politics merely or even primarily in order to safeguard capitalist interests, nor because of military officers’ middle-class origin.

⁷⁶ Integrative relations of domination correspond to horizontal/non-personalistic mechanisms of inclusion on the basis of autonomously organized collective organizations within a strengthened civil society that is more resilient to state manipulation. Such a civil society is a site of hegemonizing bourgeois order rather than a threat to this latter. Vertical incorporative modes of inclusion correspond to vertical/populistic mobilization of the lower classes through clientelistic political organizations and/or by charismatic leaders whereby not only the elements of civil society such as trade unions, voluntary organization but also should be autonomous ideological apparatus such as mass media and higher education. Those vertical modes of incorporation are also supplemented by selective political exclusion (Mouzelis, 1986: 127-133).

Rather, the army has intervened in order to safeguard its own power interests which transcend economic-corporate type of concerns such as salaries or military expenditures. Those interests are directly related to the preservation of a specific mode of domination, of a specific political structure in which the military plays a dominant role. It is the absence or weakness of a civil society with autonomously constituted class organizations that paves the way for the military to play such a dominant role (Mouzelis, 1986: 97-98, 171-172, 180).

Mouzelis applies this theoretical framework to the analysis of militarism in the semi-periphery, with a specific focus on Argentina, Chile and Greece. He explains the militarization of state structures in different historical periods by emphasizing the structural contradictions of the prevailing mode of domination. For instance, the central role of the military in semi-peripheral social formations has been attributed to pre-capitalist and pre-industrial modern state formation. Mouzelis takes as a point of reference a very idealistic type of European capitalist social transformation whereby the transformation of relations of production and the formation of social classes preceded that of modern state formation. He contrasts this model with those of late industrializing countries whereby, he argues, because the 19th century modern state formation occurred in a pre-capitalist and pre-industrial historical setting and because of the absence of an autonomous civil society and social classes, the mode of domination rather than the mode of production has been determinant. In that sense, a quasi-patrimonial authoritarian state apparatus controlled civil society interests and associations in a vertical, incorporative manner; and particularistic and clientelistic politics persisted at the expense of a well-functioning parliamentary democracy (Mouzelis, 1990: 98-99). Mouzelis' structuralism is so determinant that the externally relatedness of the economy

and the polity is taken valid not only for pre-capitalist but also capitalist periods. For Mouzelis argues that even after capitalism as a mode of production became dominant following industrialization process in 1920s-30s, still the logic of mode of domination prevailed. It was not industrialists that shaped state structure and policies, but the state for its own purposes both constituted and controlled not only industrial capitalists but also industrial proletariat. Hence, in a historical setting where “conservative/oligarchic forces” could not forge a broad popular base, and given “the determinant role of the state”, the military intervened as “the ultimate guarantor of a restrictive system of rule based on institutionalized fraud and incorporative mechanisms of domination” (Mouzelis, 1990: 118-138; 1986: 100, 107, 112).

Mouzelis deals with militarization of state structures in a more advanced stage of capitalist development too, namely during the period of ISI. The economic development and accumulation crisis enters into the picture as a factor setting some structural limits on the political level. The peculiarity of semi-peripheral capitalism, which is expressed in the more restricted and uneven character of capitalist industrialization,⁷⁷ form an obstacle to the autonomous collective organization of the working classes and a less favorable social structure for integrative modes of working class inclusion. On the other hand, however, the relative importance of a large and well-organized middle class and the existence of relatively strong civilian forces impede an irreversible military domination (Mouzelis, 1986: 123-126). In due course of capitalist development, an accumulation versus distribution contradiction is coupled with an analogous

⁷⁷ This means that the industry developed in breadth rather than in depth, and the overall economy has more disjointed and disarticulated character. Hence, capitalist mode of production coexists with a very large simple commodity sector in primarily artisanal activities, and heterogeneity of productive structures dominates. It is this economic structure which lies behind the limited numerical strength of industrial workforce (Mouzelis, 1986: 118-120, 249, 254).

contradiction on the political level: between high political mobilization and prevailing incorporative/exclusionist modes of political control. In fact, Mouzelis' narrative at that point is very similar to Huntingtonian mass praetorianism, which was also adopted by O'Donnell. However, the difference of his position lies in the fact that the military does not react as an outsider order-keeping force. Instead, it is par excellence the political power position of the military which is challenged since a challenge to prevailing relations of domination means a challenge to the military as one of the major monitors of the incorporative/exclusionists system of controls. In other words, the threat from below was felt strongly by the military. Mouzelis plainly argues that neither domestic civilian groups⁷⁸ nor external agencies played the major role; the major impetus came from within the army and was directly linked to the threat that the growing political mobilization posed to its dominance within the prevailing exclusionist/incorporative relations of domination under guided parliamentary regime (Mouzelis, 1986: 129-131, 145-149).

Before jumping into a critical evaluation of Mouzelis, it should be noted that his diagnosis about the relative poverty of Marxist theory in the analysis of political power relations, which is exacerbated by various forms of reductionism, touches a real problem. In that sense, his concern to integrate relations of domination and political technologies/techniques of power into Marxist analysis is very meaningful. However, the way he proceeds with this task is problematic in several senses. To begin with, the very basic theoretical premises of his politicist structuralism need to be questioned. The

⁷⁸ Mouzelis argues that, in his three case studies, even though many groups contributed in various ways to dictatorial outcome, the major momentum for military intervention has always come from within the armed forces. For instance, in Greece, neither more open parliamentary regime posed substantial danger for the bourgeoisie, nor the conservative parties of the Right wanted to opt for a dictatorial solution. In the case of Argentina, although civilian groups did little to prevent the military intervention no pre-arranged civil-military alliance existed. It was only in case of Chile that right wing forces' contribution was massive and decisive (Mouzelis, 1986: 141, 158, 170).

structuralism leads him to sever the economic and the political as two externally related and self-contained spheres. He reduces the conceptual toolbox of historical materialism into mere economic categories, which produces another type of reductionism. The mode of production in general and capitalism in particular, and class relations, are all encapsulated into the economic sphere. For Mouzelis, relations of production and relations of domination correspond respectively to two different set of social relations and social actors (exploiter-exploited classes and dominant-dominated social groups) (Mouzelis, 1990: 14, 17, 66), which establishes a mutually exclusive relation between social classes and political power relations.⁷⁹ In other words, the constitutive presence of the state and political power relations in relations of production and class formation are totally neglected. However, as Wood (1996: 25) notes, “relations of production are...presented in their *political* aspect, that aspect in which they are actually *contested*, as relations of domination, as rights of property, as the power to organize and govern production and appropriation”. Hence, the attribution to the concept of “mode of domination” an ontological status equal to that of “mode of production” reproduces “economism”.

The dualism between mode of production and mode of domination in Mouzelis is used in an orientalist way whereby ideal-typical and abstract models of European capitalism and semi-peripheral capitalism are substituted for complex and contradictory social and historical processes. According to Mouzelis, in semi-peripheral social formations, economically dominant classes are created by politically dominant groups and state practices; political developments do not reflect class power relations; state

⁷⁹ According to Mouzelis, to recognize à la Poulantzas that class practices are determined by the complex articulation of economic, political, ideological relations is too far stretching the concept of class (Mouzelis, 1990: 210-211)

policies or the logic of domination hinder capitalist development; whereas in European capitalist model, state policies reflect class interests, economically dominant classes are constituted independently from state practices. In that sense, civil society as the domain of hegemony is dominant in advanced capitalist societies, state as the domain of coercion dominates in semi-peripheral societies. This purely ideal-typical and essentialist European model does not hold historically since not only the state and the political has always been constitutive of relations of production, class formations and civil society formation,⁸⁰ but also varying combinations of power techniques (hegemony + coercion) are used in every modern capitalist social formations in different historical periods. Because of these essentialist and ideal-typical categories, even when, in historical-empirical analysis, Mouzelis observes the constitutive nature of the political and state in semi-peripheral societies, he merely discards this as an anomaly, a deviation from an ideal capitalist model. Despite his critical stance towards forms of reductionism, Mouzelis takes the reflective relationship as the only possible form of relationship between classes/relations of production and relations of political domination. However, to differentiate “between ‘organic’ and ‘merely reflective’ connections” between the political and the economic” (Wood, 1985: 22) opens the possibility to go beyond “a mechanical and linear causality founded ...on the metaphysics of origins” (Poulantzas, 1978: 46). Recognizing the organic relations between the political and the economic moments of relations of production and/or class relations would neither refrain one from developing specific conceptual tools for analyzing political power relations nor to reduce all social relations and political power relations into relations of production and class

⁸⁰ Mouzelis’ ideal example in that sense is England. For empirical studies which underline how state power has been constitutive of class relations and civil society in this ideal-capitalism see Neocleous (1996) Corrigan and Sayer (1985), Corrigan, Sayer, Ramsay (1980), Thompson (1963).

relations but rather to recognize that in any empirical instance and historical analysis some relations of domination are constituent of the former. This also gives us the opportunity of not reifying relations of domination by delinking them from social relations of production.

If state power and political power relations are always constitutive of social relations of production, the question to be asked and answered is not why state power is constitutive in peripheral social formations and not in advanced capitalist ones but what form of state power, which combination of power technologies become constitutive in different social formations; and to explain why this is so.

Mouzelis' structuralist bias also forms an obstacle for theorizing hegemonic political struggles among social and political actors. Even though he claims to combine "a systemic perspective (the contradictions/incompatibilities between institutionalized parts of the political system) and a collective action perspective (the major actors' political strategies, projects, and struggles) (Mouzelis, 1986: 217, 257; 1990: 62), in fact, he is exclusively concerned with reproduction requirements of a specific mode of domination. For instance, military interventions are not explained in a relational way, in terms of processes of social and political struggles. He merely refers to increasing political mobilization but does not conceptualize either competing socio-political projects nor political strategies and struggles. Rather, the militarization of political processes is explained by the reproduction requirements of the prevailing mode of domination, in which the military occupies an essential role. Meanwhile, the central role of the military within incorporative/exclusionist mode of domination is merely asserted rather than exposed. The only mechanism that he mentions is veto power of the military, but how and to what extent this veto power is actually used in maintaining the prevailing

mode of domination remains unexplored. In other words, he does not explore the specific mechanisms of militarism as a technique of power.

Mouzelis (1990: 75) does neither really explore a question he himself asks: “the extent to which politically or militarily powerful groups are strong enough to primarily pursue their own interests rather than those of economically and culturally dominant groups”. To put it in another way, are the incorporative/exclusionist mode of domination or the military’s practices within a specific mode of domination class-neutral and above-classes? Or the practices of state elites including the military may be constitutive of capitalist class relations. I contend that in as much as he is looking for a reflective relation between two externally related spheres (and their relations and actors) he is unable to deal with this question in any real sense. There is no doubt that the military’s practices cannot be conceived in an instrumental way, as being a passive instrument of a social class. However, the conceptualization of relations of production and relations of domination as externally related self-contained spheres and the lack of any conceptual tool to theorize the relation between “mode of production” and “mode of domination” impedes us from exploring how a specific hegemonic class project may have been constructed by different social and political actors, in different institutional settings (civil society and/or state), and through different techniques of power (consent, coercion). In so far as one does not conceive the state/the political as one of the institutional settings in and through which classes are formed, one cannot ask in an empirically-open manner whether or not the military’s practices may indeed be constitutive of capitalist social relations of production. As a result of which, any truly empirical-historical investigation of the relationship between capitalism and militarism would be theoretically rendered impossible.

4: Gramsci on Hegemony and Coercion

Even though Mouzelis' politicist structuralism is productive in the sense that he underlines that an analysis of militarism should take into account relations of domination and different forms and techniques of bourgeois rule, he falls short of conceptualizing political class relations and the integrality of the relations of domination to the relations of production. Gramsci dealt with the same problematic of conceptualizing political power relations in modern capitalist societies. His originality lies in that he rejected both economist conceptualizations of capitalism and politicist conceptualizations of the political. He is concerned with conceptualizing the contingent "formation of the historical bloc in terms of the actual unity of infrastructure and superstructure" (Buci-Glucksmann, 1979: 222) of the political-ideological and the economic.⁸¹ Gramsci has opened an important boulevard in the analysis of political power relations in modern capitalist societies by developing the concept of hegemony as an analytical tool to analyze the contingent formation of the unity of the economic, the political and the ideological moments of capitalist relations of production.

Gramsci conceived of class relations not merely as economic relations but also as political relations. It is through hegemonic politics that class relations are constituted, lived, and experienced. It is through the concept of hegemony that he paves the way to analyze class relations in their different moments and to analyze various techniques of the bourgeois form of rule. Gramsci's main concern has been the analysis of relations of force, and he defined three "*moments or levels*" of "*relations of forces*". The *first*, the one Gramsci merely mentioned without developing what it exactly meant, is linked to

⁸¹ "...the conception of *historical bloc* in which precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, though this distinction between form and content has purely didactic value, since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form, and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces" (Gramsci, 1999: 377).

the structure, which he equates with “the level of development of the material forces of production” and the related structure of production relations from where emerge “various social classes”. The *second*, where Gramsci’s originality lies, is “the relation of political forces; in other words, an evaluation of the degree of homogeneity, self-awareness, and organization attained by the various social classes”. This moment is subdivided into three moments of collective political consciousness, which “imply each other reciprocally”: the first is the *economic-corporate* level, corresponding to a collectivity based on professional groups; at the second moment collective identity is formed among all members of a social class, but still mainly in the purely economic field and the State and the political is integrated only in terms of gaining politico-judicial equality; the third moment “transcends the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too. This is the most *purely political* phase ... creating the *hegemony* of the fundamental social group”. Finally comes the third moment, that of “the relation of military forces”, of politico-military relations (Gramsci, 1999: 180-185).

Gramsci’s importance lies in his simultaneous focus on class power relations, their different institutional sites, and various techniques of power. His theoretical discussion is based on a series of concept couplets: coercion and consent, domination and hegemony, state and civil society. Following Machiavelli’s metaphor of Centaur-half-animal and half-human, he sees “a dual perspective in political action”: “force and consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilization” (Gramsci, 1990: 170). While coercion/domination and consent/hegemony correspond to techniques or modalities of power, state and civil society are best captured on the base of their

different settings of apparatuses and institutions.⁸² As the metaphor of Centaur itself implies, the two poles of those techniques of power always existed together, though the question of the nature of their relation and of their corresponding institutional site remained a controversy for Gramsci's interpreters.

It is commonly acknowledged that Gramsci's uses of these concepts and their inter-relationships in deciphering bourgeois form of rule varied over time (Buci-Glucksmann, 1980; Anderson, 1977; Mouffe, 1979a; Neocleous, 1996: 33-46). Gramsci first establishes a relationship of contrast between state and civil society, whereby coercion and domination belong to the sphere of state, and consent and hegemony to that of civil society (**model 1**). Here, the state is conceptualized in a narrow sense of "the governmental-coercive apparatus" and/or "the coercive and punitive force of juridical regulation of a country". He also contrasts "domination with intellectual and moral leadership", domination with hegemony (Gramsci, 1990: 12, 57, 61, 263, 265, 267; see also Anderson, 1977: 21-22, 26-27; Buci-Glucksmann, 1980: 91; Neocleous, 1996: 41).

However, Gramsci was well aware that such a narrower conceptualization of the state was obsolete in face of post-1848 developments whereby "modern political technique became totally transformed"⁸³ not only in the institutional site of the state but also of the civil society, having now a complex nature and interrelation. Hence, he moved to an expanded concept of the state: the "integral state", the "ethical state"

⁸² This does not mean that Gramsci's conceptualization of state and civil society was institutionalist. As Buci-Glucksmann (1980: 48) notes "Gramsci avoids the stumbling-blocks of a Weberian institutionalism (primacy of institutions over practices), for the hegemonic apparatuses is intersected by the primacy of the class struggle". He always emphasized the primacy of social practices and struggles over institutions, while not neglecting the differential impact of various state apparatuses and civil society institutions on the social struggles.

⁸³ Gramsci notes: "after the expansion of parliamentarism and of the associative systems of union and party, and the growth in the formation of vast State and 'private' bureaucracies (i.e. politico-private, belonging to parties and trade unions); and after the transformations which took place in the organization of the forces of order in the wide sense - i.e. not only the public service designed for the repression of crime, but the totality of forces organised by the State and by private individuals to safeguard the political and economic domination of the ruling classes" (Gramsci, 1999: 220-221)

(**model 2**). This move is also a critique of the liberal representation of the state as “a politico-juridical organization in the narrow sense”, “as *veilleur de nuit*” “whose functions are limited to the safeguarding of public order and of respect for the laws”, a state that does not intervene in neither the economy nor the civil society: a state that never existed in reality (Gramsci, 1990: 261).

Gramsci’s expansion of the concept of state is two fold. First, he notes that “in politics the error occurs as a result of an inaccurate understanding of what the State (in its integral meaning: dictatorship + hegemony) really is” (Gramsci, 1990: 239). This means that the State has hegemonic apparatuses producing consent besides its coercive apparatuses and practices. In other words, it does not have merely a restrictive and repressive power but also a “productive”, constitutive one (**model 2a**). This constitutive role is played in the economic field by the “interventionist state” and social policy. On the other hand, the “ethical state” (the “cultural state”) functions as an educator creating “a new type or level of civilisation”, it refers “to the autonomous, educative and moral activity of the secular state”. The expansion of state apparatus does not mean however that the exclusive site of hegemony is the state, quite on the contrary in civil society too there are specific hegemonic apparatuses, “a multitude of other so-called private initiatives and activities” (Gramsci, 1990: 247, 258, 260, 262). By this move, Gramsci captures the emergence of specific state apparatuses producing/constituting bourgeois hegemony based on the active consent of the masses. Through these new apparatuses, which have emerged in a process of social class struggles, state power penetrates now into civil society. However, Gramsci still keeps the distinction between civil society and state, as two different institutional sites producing class rule and having differential impact on social struggles.

There is a second move whereby Gramsci starts to conflate civil society and state⁸⁴ (**model 2b**). At first sight, it seems that Gramsci's formulation of the expanded state is based on the distinction between political society and civil society; and coercion and hegemony correspond to these two spheres respectively: "State=political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion (Gramsci, 1990: 263). However, he readily collapses civil society into the state. He asks: "But what does that signify if not that by 'State' should be understood not only the apparatus of government, but also the 'private' apparatus of 'hegemony' or civil society?" He states: "civil society- which is 'State' too, indeed is the State itself", or "in actual reality civil society and the State are one and the same" (Gramsci, 1990: 261, 160). The danger with such an expanded concept of state that dissolves all types of organizations and institutions and all forms of rule into one and same category is that "it becomes impossible to distinguish between the differential functioning of institutions of domination...to theorize the differences between the kind of domination found in state apparatuses and the kind of domination found in, say, the family or Church. On the other hand, if one conceptualizes civil society as subsumed under the state then it *becomes impossible to theorize the process of penetration of civil society by the state*" (Neocleous, 1996: 45).⁸⁵ In fact, by this move (i.e. model 2b) Gramsci just aimed at exposing how the specific class rule of bourgeoisie, the bourgeois structures of power,

⁸⁴ While Perry Anderson (1977: 13, 31-34) analyzes this move as two different modalities according to which first "the state encompasses civil society", then "the state is identical with civil society", Neocleous (1996: 38) justly notes that indeed the first one includes the second too.

⁸⁵ It is exactly the same fault that Althusser makes by its concept of "ideological state apparatuses" through which all types of associations are subsumed as state apparatuses (Althusser, 1971: 127-186). As Perry Anderson (1977: 35-36) notes, "the *boundaries* of the State are not a matter of indifference to Marxist theory...the term 'civil society' remains a necessary *practico-indicative* concept, to designate all those institutions and mechanisms outside the boundaries of the State system proper. In other words, its function is to draw an indispensable *line of demarcation* within the politico-ideological superstructures of capitalism...To blur them is, in fact, to misunderstand the specific role and efficacy of the superstructures *outside* the State within bourgeois democracy".

pace liberal arguments, were crosscutting the sites of state and civil society, each contributing to the bourgeois class rule in a precise way. To use Gramsci's own words, "the historical unity of the ruling classes is realised in the State....But it would be wrong to think that this unity is simply juridical and political...the fundamental historical unity, concretely, results from *the organic relations between State or political society and 'civil society'*" (Gramsci, 1999: 52, italics are mine). In addition, this too much expanded concept of state was developed in order to conceptualize the increasing constitutive role of the state in the course of capitalist social development. However, the "model 2a" had already captured and conceptualized the expanded state without subsuming different sites of bourgeois rule into each other. Hence, the "model 2a" is more productive in theoretical terms.

This much is enough for state and civil society. Then what is the role of coercion and consent, domination and hegemony in Gramscian framework? In "model 1", these couples have been theorized as contrasted to each other (coercion/domination versus consent/hegemony), and each belonging to a specific site. However, the expansion of the state concept also resulted in an expanded concept of hegemony. In connection with "model 2b", Gramsci, in some cases in a very problematic way, denied the differentiation between these concepts: "Hegemony and dictatorship are indistinguishable, force and consent are simply equivalent; one cannot distinguish political society from civil society" (Gramsci, 1990: 271).

In fact, both uses are as much problematic as their related models of state-civil society relations. In fact, Gramsci on the one hand differentiated these concepts from each other, but on the other hand, he underlined how they were in actual reality always intertwined into each other (in a way very compatible with the model 2a). Jessop (1982:

149; 1990: 51) very effectively summarizes Gramsci's definition of hegemony and domination as follows: while domination involves "the use of a coercive apparatus to bring the mass of people into conformity and compliance with the requirements of a specific mode of production ... hegemony involves the successful mobilisation and reproduction of the 'active consent' of dominated groups by the ruling class through their exercise of intellectual, moral, and political leadership".⁸⁶ I contend that Gramsci identified hegemony and domination as two modes of class rule in capitalist social formations. He also underlined that, in a way very consonant with his metaphor of Centaur, they were always intertwined into each other and each of them included both consent and coercion. He argued that while hegemony can be (indeed should be) established even before the attainment of governmental power, when in power a social group both dominates and continue to be hegemonic (Gramsci: 1999: 57-58; Buci-Glucksmann: 1980: 62). On the other hand, Gramsci expanded his concept of hegemony in a way that would include both consent and coercion. "The 'normal' exercise of hegemony on the now classical terrain of the parliamentary regime is characterized by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent" (Gramsci, 1990: 80). However, "from the moment hegemony becomes simply the backing for violence, or even worse, is only obtained by violence...this hegemony is in fact no longer assured" (Buci-Glucksmann, 1980: 56). This should be extended to the conceptualization of domination too, although neither Gramsci nor his interpreters attempted it. Domination too, like hegemony,

⁸⁶ It should be noted that Gramsci explicitly emphasizes that hegemony includes also concessions of an economic-corporate kind that cannot touch the essential: "though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic" (Gramsci, 1990: 161, 263).

incorporates both coercion and consent. As Neocleous (1996: 42)⁸⁷ notes “the question of hegemony is not about coercion *or* consent, but about coercion *and* consent”. The same goes for domination too. But it is their relative weight that determines whether the form of class rule is domination or hegemony.

What does Gramsci tell us about coercive mode of class rule, about the role of military and militarism? As Anderson (1977: 49) notes, “where Machiavelli had effectively collapsed consent into coercion, in Gramsci coercion was progressively eclipsed by consent”. This is understandable given that Gramsci represents a shift in Marxist theory away from seeing the state as an essentially repressive/coercive apparatus towards focusing on other modern techniques of power used to establish class rule. According to Gramsci (1990: 263), “it is possible to imagine the coercive element of the State withering away by degrees, as ever-more conspicuous elements of regulated society (or ethical State or civil society) make their appearance”. It was in the periods of “hegemonic crisis, organic crisis”⁸⁸ that “constraint in ever less disguised and indirect forms, culminating in outright police measures and *coups d'état*” replaces “spontaneity” of hegemony” (Gramsci, 1990: 61, 12, 210). Gramsci’s analysis of *Caesarism* echoed that of Marx’s analysis of Bonapartism. Drawing upon the cases of Greece and Spain, he

⁸⁷ Neocleous unjustly criticizes Gramsci for that he failed to figure out the unity of coercion and consent in class rule and for that focusing too much on the issue of coercion-consent runs the danger of relegating the class nature of struggle for domination (Neocleous, 1996: 42-43). However, for Gramsci coercion and consent was not a question of either or, as we noted. On the other hand, Gramsci always underlined that it was classes that are hegemonic and class practices and struggles have always ontological primacy over either consent-coercion or their respective apparatuses/institutions, as Neocleous himself admits (see also Jessop, 1982: 147; Buci-Glucksmann, 1980: 48). I guess it is Neocleous who misses the possibility and necessity of discussing both class struggles and the mechanisms of power such as coercion and consent. Taking the issue of coercion-consent as irrelevant in face of the primacy of class struggles would be neglecting the differential impact of the relative weight of diverse techniques of power on the organization and struggle of working class itself.

⁸⁸ An organic crisis is always a crisis “affecting the state and its hegemonic apparatuses”, invading the sum total of superstructures (state and civil society in Gramsci’s uses). It includes an economic crisis, but is not limited to that. It initially presents itself in the form of a crisis of political representation, reinforcing the relative power of civil or military bureaucracy, paralyzing the apparatus producing consent. See Gramsci (1999: 184, 210, 275-76) and Buci-Glucksmann (1980: 72, 95-99)

defined military government as a “parenthesis between two constitutional governments”, coming “into action publicly when ‘legality’ is in danger” when “the mechanism of normal democracy, i.e. parliamentarism” collapses in a historical condition of equilibrium of the conflicting urban classes (Gramsci, 1990: 61, 215-223). Indeed, he was well aware that the concrete modalities of military government could not be exhausted without undertaking concrete historical analysis.

The relevance of Gramscian theoretical framework lies in that by conceiving of political class relations as a struggle for hegemony, one can go beyond economistic conceptualizations of class relations while at the same time incorporating relations and techniques of domination into the analysis of class relations. In that sense, the Gramscian conceptualization of class-state relation paves the way for investigating in an empirically open-ended manner whether the use of militarism as technique of power is related to the class-based political power relations. Secondly, his focus on relations of force paves the way of bringing into analysis non-class forces such as the military. The fact that the military’s practices are analyzed in a non-instrumentalist manner does not impede one to focus on their relationality with class relations. Indeed, Gramscian framework offers some general theoretical concepts which may be used in an empirically open-ended manner in specific historical analyses. Lastly, his non-dichotomous conceptualization of coercion and hegemony may be productive for analyzing how, as Liebknecht already noted, militarism as a technique of power is legitimized through hegemonic practices. The co-existence of hegemonic and coercive techniques of power in any historical-empirical instance may help to analyze the concrete forms articulation between militarism and class hegemony/domination.

5: From Poulantzas to Jessop via Gramsci: Towards a Relational Theory of State

In this section, I will delineate the Marxist theories of state developed by Poulantzas and Jessop who worked, developed, and deepened the path opened by Gramsci. By the end of this section, I will have outlined the theoretical framework for analyzing the capitalist state and the class power relations, which is indispensable for analyzing the relation between militarism and capitalism.

It is widely acknowledged that Poulantzas is the most important figure of Marxist theories of state. I have already drawn on him in my ontological conceptualization of relations of production and state/politics. Unlike other Marxists, Poulantzas both focused on militarization of state structures in exceptional forms of capitalist state and underlined the constitutive role of the legitimate monopoly of violence in normal forms of bourgeois rule. In order to be able to grasp the way Poulantzas conceives the modes of relationality between militaristic face of modern state and capitalism, we should first of all grasp his theory of capitalist state.

In *Political Power and Social Classes*, Poulantzas joined a neo-Gramscian analysis of class struggles with an Althusserian structuralism (see Jessop, 1982: 156). The impact of the latter was the recognition of the existence of ontologically separated spheres of economy, politics, and ideology. This made both possible and necessary to develop a “regional theory”⁸⁹ of the political independently from the ‘economic’ sphere. This flirtation with Althusserianism resulted in assigning structuro-functionalist roles to the capitalist state. The latter is supposed to function as “the factor of cohesion between the levels of a social formation”, to have an inherent institutional and class unity

⁸⁹ Poulantzas distinguishes between general theory, regional theories and particular theories. The first is the analysis of the pure mode of productions; the second is the theory of autonomous levels/instances; and the last is the analysis of the particular social formations (Poulantzas, 1973: 18).

reflecting its role of unity vis-à-vis the instances; and to function as such to organize the dominant classes within the power bloc and disorganize the dominated classes (see Poulantzas, 1973).

However, late Poulantzas moved away from the structuralist ontology and epistemology. He openly rejected not only any form of technicism and economism but also the whole structuralist ontology by arguing that the social ensemble should not be conceived of as composed of essentially and naturally autonomous instances or levels, which would result in legitimizing “the autonomy, self-sufficiency and self-reproduction of the economy”. He underlined the presence of political and ideological relations within the relations of production:

These relations [political and ideological] neither represent simple additions to already existing relations of production, nor do they merely react upon them in the mode of absolute exteriority or temporal sequence. They are themselves present in the constitution of the relations of production, in ways that vary with each mode of production...It is precisely because politico-ideological relations are already present in the actual constitution of the relations of production that they play such an essential role in their reproduction; that is also why the process of production and exploitation involves reproduction of the relations of politico-ideological domination and subordination. This elementary datum is at the root of the State's presence in the constitution and reproduction of the relations of production... (Poulantzas, 2000: 26-27)

This philosophy of internal relations leads him to criticize two forms of analyses of state according to which the state is either a subject or a thing (an instrument). Seen as a thing in the instrumentalist approach, “the State is a passive, or even neutral, tool which is so completely manipulated by one class or fraction. Conceived as a Subject, the State enjoys an absolute autonomy that refers to its will as the supposedly rationalizing instance of civil society” (Poulantzas, 2000: 129, 12-15). They are both based on and reproduce the same fault: to conceive the relation between the state and social classes as a relation of exteriority, as if there is a relation between two entities in face of each other. Either the state or the dominant classes (and fractions) subordinate the other one.

Hence, classes are conceived as acting on the state from exterior through a series of influences. “In this external relation, State and dominant classes are always considered as intrinsic entities ‘confronting’ or ‘facing’ each other” (Poulantzas, 2000: 131). Such an approach is an impediment for analyzing not only the constitutive role of the state but also the internal contradictions of the state.

Starting from such an ontological position, Poulantzas conceives the *capitalist state* both as an *institutional ensemble* (institutional materiality of the state) and as a *relation* (the condensation of relations of forces). Unlike statist/institutionalist theories that take the state and its institutions as an ontological given, Poulantzas underlines how the institutional materiality and formal characteristics of the modern capitalist state are rooted in capitalist relations of production and social division of labor. The separation of the direct producer from the means and object of labor within the labor process itself, and the relative institutional separation of the state from relations *in* production constitute the organizing principle of the peculiar institutions and diverse apparatuses (its juridical system and courts; army and police, its centralized administration and bureaucracy; its representative institutions such as universal suffrage, parliament) of modern capitalist state. The latter is a representative, national-popular class state (Poulantzas, 2000: 49-120; 1973).⁹⁰ However, this relationality is not a structuro-functionalist one. This relatively autonomous institutional materiality of the state results from the class relations and struggles (including political-ideological forms). State is “a form-determined condensation of class relations, a relationship of forces, or more precisely the material condensation of such a relationship among classes and class

⁹⁰ The guiding question for Poulantzas is a very legitimate one: “Why, in general, does the bourgeoisie seek to maintain its domination by having recourse precisely to the national-popular state -to the modern representative State with all its characteristics institutions?” (Poulantzas, 2000: 12, 49)

fractions” (Poulantzas, 2000: 128-129, 136). However, this does not mean that the state is reducible to the relationship of forces. A change in the class relationship of forces does not find expression in the State in a direct and immediate fashion. To the extent that states do not have a metaphysical unity, the class contradictions are internal to the state, and the contradictions of the State are internal to social classes. “The establishment of the State’s policy must be seen as the result of the class contradictions inscribed in the very structure of the State” (Poulantzas, 2000: 130-132). The internal relationality of state’s institutional structure to the capitalist relations of production means also its internal relationality to class relations and struggles, including political domination and political struggle. To analyze the mode in which the class struggle, and especially political struggle and domination, are inscribed into the institutional structure of the State is necessary for explaining the differential forms and precise historical transformations of the State.

Within this theoretical framework, Poulantzas acknowledges that one of the main institutional characteristics of the modern capitalist state is “the legitimate monopoly of organized physical repression”. The modern capitalist state’s monopoly of violence is legitimized as “constitutionalized violence” in the sense that it is subject to “the normative regulation of the state based on right”, and it is exercised within the limits of the constitution and the law. It is also legitimized by the fact that it is exercised by a state which is presented in its immediate appearance as a “public” institution corresponding to “the general interest of the nation-people”. However, for Poulantzas, this does not mean the non-intervention of state repression in capitalist social relations of production. He criticizes the illusory opposition between law and violence in the sense that law is an integral part of the repressive order and of the organization of violence in

every modern capitalist state. It is the law which “institutes the practical terrain and object of violence”. “Law organizes the conditions for physical repression, designating its modalities and structuring the devices by means of which it is exercised. In this sense, law is *the code of organized public violence*”. Poulantzas deals with both the underestimation of the role of physical repression and the conception of power whereby the couplet repression-ideology (coercion-consent) constitutes a zero-sum relation according to which more consent corresponds to less violence; or any contraction of physical violence in the functioning and maintenance of power would mean an increase in the consent-based mechanisms of power.⁹¹ Not only state-monopolized physical violence permanently underlies and is the presupposition of various techniques, mechanisms and institutions of the capitalist state power; but it also comes to the front in the supreme terror of war, the conjunctures of intensified class struggles and in exceptional state forms (Poulantzas, 1973: 225-228; 2000: 76-82).

While Poulantzas theoretically recognized the internality of ‘military might’ to capitalist techniques of power, he did not undertake any historical research on the way and mechanisms through which militarism proceeds under normal bourgeois rule. It is in his analysis of military dictatorships as an exceptional state form that he engaged into a specific historical analysis of the interconnections between capitalism and militarism.

Poulantzas differentiates between normal and exceptional forms of capitalist state. Normal forms of state are based on the representative democratic institutions whereby the hegemony of dominant classes is mainly based on the moment of consent and backed by that of constitutionalized violence. Exceptional state forms are characterized by a dominance of the moment of coercion, by an increased use of

⁹¹ In fact, our interpretation of Gramsci and Poulantzas’ position on this point are similar despite the fact that Poulantzas misinterprets Gramsci by reducing him to the model 1 (Poulantzas, 1973: 226).

physical repression backed by the related ideological mobilization and certain material concessions, and by the elimination or paralysis of democratic institutions and autonomous organizations of dominated classes.

Poulantzas describes the institutional materiality of exceptional states by a series of modifications. *First*, the relations between the repressive apparatus and the ideological apparatuses are reorganized in favor of the former, and the power center in the state apparatus shifts to repressive branch or apparatus. An increased role of physical repression is legitimized by a particular intervention of ideology in an environment in which the ideological apparatuses lose their formal autonomy. This restructuring may even cause a modification in the principal aspect of a repressive apparatus (for instance military becoming an ideological apparatus). *Second*, there are modifications in the juridical system: law no longer regulates but *arbitrariness* reigns; the law no longer forms a limit to the exercise of power. *Third*, the modifications relating to the suspension of the electoral principle mean that methods of representation and class organization are changed. Following a crisis of party representation, the role of the political parties is either shifted onto other state apparatuses or it is replaced by one party-system. Autonomous organizations of dominated classes are eliminated. *Fourth*, the degree of bureaucratization increases (Poulantzas, 1979b: 313-330, 1975: 97).

As we noted Poulantzas rightly argues that all power relations and struggles (not just class power) are always materialized in (state and non-state) apparatuses. It should also be noted that, for Poulantzas, struggles always have primacy over the apparatuses or institutions despite the fact that these apparatuses play a constitutive role in class formation and struggles. In that sense, militarism as a state form, which is “a *crisis* form of the capitalist state”, results from the changing relations of class power. The necessity

of reorganizing the hegemony of the dominant classes in a conjuncture of political crisis brings about the institutional restructuring of the state. He analyzes how class power relations and struggles between the dominant and dominated classes are reproduced within the state apparatuses and caused a restructuring of state form: first the emergence of military dictatorships, and then re-transition to a “bourgeois democratic form”. Poulantzas criticizes those who argue that in exceptional forms of state, the military governs according to its own specific interests by dominating even the dominant classes. Rather, the military, which is circumscribed and constrained by class power relations, acts as “the real political party of the bourgeoisie”. He analyzes the formation of different fractions of capitalist class within the limits set by the imperialist world economy and by focusing on the relations within the power bloc and between the dominant and dominated classes, he analyzes how class contradictions are reflected in state apparatuses and the military apparatus. The internal contradictions of the military both reflect and reproduce class contradictions. But the reflection and reproduction of class contradictions within the army is not a smooth process, it is rather mediated through specific cliques contradictions, corporatist interests and diverse privileges (See Poulantzas, 1975).

It should be noted that Poulantzas’ analysis of state forms, including military dictatorships, is rather far away from empirically fulfilling the promises of his own theory of capitalist state. Poulantzas’ important contribution to Marxist theory of the state is integrating institutional analysis with that of class power relations. Based upon a critique of instrumentalist and subjectivist conceptualizations of the state, he explains how relations of production and the state; class relations and the state are internally related to each other. They both have a constitutive presence in each other. This

internality is exposed by Poulantzas not merely in terms of structuralist arguments (how the specific form of modern capitalist state acquired this form due to the specificity of capitalist mode of production) but more decisively in terms of the contingent political class struggles. This is why the state should be conceived as the site of social and political power relations. However, the theoretical possibilities he himself opens up are not fully consumed in his empirical analyses in which the relationality between classes and institutional materiality of the state frequently falls into a structuro-functionalist mode of explanation. The reason for this is that, despite his theoretical assessments on the forms of state and political regime, on the power bloc and hegemony, the analysis of class relations and struggles at their political-hegemonic moment are not theoretically well elaborated. Poulantzas did not develop theoretical-conceptual tools for the analysis of specific class projects through which political power relations are inscribed into the institutional materiality of the state. Unless these mediums are theorized, this relation of internality would always bear the risk of falling into a structuro-functionalist trap. A second point relates to the conceptualization of state power. Even though he acknowledges the constitutive/active role of the modern state, he does not explain how this active role is played. As it is obvious that the state as such is not a unified subject and/or actor, one needs to theoretically focus on multiple state actors. In as much as the state is not a black box merely transmitting social and political power relations, one should include into the picture the role played by various state actors who are responsible of managing state institutions. How are institutional capabilities of the state stored? What is the active/constitutive role of state managers, albeit constrained by broader social-political power relations, in real-concrete historical process? These questions remain unanswered in Poulantzas.

Bob Jessop (1982; 1990; 2002) who has developed and articulated the legacy of Gramsci and Poulantzas into a non-determinist “weak theory of state”⁹² is helpful at this conjuncture. Like Poulantzas, he takes the formal-institutional definition of the modern capitalist state as a starting point: “an impersonal, formally class neutral, public authority with a constitutionalized monopoly of violence”, “a distinct ensemble of *institutions* and organizations whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively *binding decisions* on the members of a society in the name of their common interest and *general will*” (see Jessop, 1990: 13, 342, 355). However this typical form of the modern state “actually problematizes its overall functionality for capital accumulation and political class domination”. Because of the apparent institutional separation of the state and the economy, there is no guarantee that political outcomes will serve the needs of capital (Jessop, 2002: 41). It is this contingency rooted in the form of modern state that, in one sense, urges to see the state as a social relation à la Poulantzas. Hence, state power must be investigated in terms of the complex interaction between the so-called ‘institutional materiality’ of the state apparatus (its form) and the balance of forces involved in political action as the overdetermining level of class struggle (social relations). State power can only be assessed relationally; state as such has no power, it has only a set of institutional capacities and liabilities which mediate that power. The power of the state is the power of the forces acting in and through the state. The state is a site of strategy, a site where strategies of various social forces are elaborated. These forces include state managers as well as class forces and (class

⁹² A general analytic or a suitable ‘weak theory’ as opposed to a deterministic, ‘strong’ theory” offers a useful set of theoretical guidelines or orientations which would inform a Marxist analysis without trying to explain everything in a deterministic manner (Jessop, 1990: 264).

relevant) social forces emanating from different societalization⁹³ processes which are active within society and which are inscribed into the institutional materiality of the state. (Jessop, 1990: 260-261, 267-270; 1982: 191). In order to analyze social-political strategies through which political power relations take place, Jessop proposes three forms of projects which can be fruitfully interpreted as the mediums through which class struggles for hegemony are conducted and inscribed into the institutional materiality of the state: accumulation strategies, hegemonic projects, and state projects.

“An *accumulation strategy* defines a specific economic ‘growth model’ complete with its various extra-economic preconditions and also outlines a general strategy appropriate to its realization”. Successful accumulation strategies unify different fractions of capital under the hegemony of one fraction. Economic hegemony is different from economic domination in that one fraction obtains consent from various fractions of the capitalist class rather than imposing its own economic-corporate interests on other fractions. The fact that there are competing accumulation strategies, albeit conditioned and constrained by the existing regime of accumulation which is itself a resultant of previous competing accumulation strategies, rules out arguments about the necessary logic of capital accumulation and opens up the possibility of thinking about alternative logics of capital (Jessop, 1990: 198-206, 156-159, 259, 311, 354; 1982: 225-226).

In discussing Gramsci, I emphasized that the very particularity of modern politics is its hegemonic aspect. Class relations at the political moment are based on competing political projects with a claim to represent the general interest, with a claim to

⁹³ Societalization means that within society there are various social processes, be it based on class, gender, cultural identity etc., in and through which ‘society effects’ are produced. Even though different societalizations and their specific forms of social relations are articulated into each other in concrete-empirical instance; class forces cannot consume all forms of power relations inscribed in the state (see Jessop, 1990: 4-7, 13; 1982: 119).

hegemony. According to Jessop, hegemony involves “the interpellation and organization of different ‘class-relevant’ (but not necessarily class-conscious) forces under the ‘political, intellectual and moral leadership’ of a particular class (or class fraction)”. Such a leadership is exercised through national-popular projects because the modern capitalist state is constituted as an impersonal public authority rather than as a private organ of the dominant class. The state has formal channels of representation and accountability, and they are tied to more or less developed notions of popular rather than class sovereignty. *Hegemonic projects* are national-popular programs of action that manufacture and mobilize the active consent and support of the subordinate social forces as well as the unity of the power bloc (i.e. the dominant classes) in pursuit of the long-term interests of the hegemonic class. A specific hegemonic project bears a claim to resolve “the abstract problem of conflicts between particular interests and the general interest”. To the extent that hegemony also requires material concessions to subordinated social forces and that it is the hegemony of a social class, it is conditioned and limited by the accumulation process (Jessop, 1990: 207-215, 346, 42, 144-145, 161, 181, 185). By the same token, even though they should not be analytically reduced and subsumed into each other, a hegemonic project should always involve an accumulation strategy and an accumulation strategy cannot be applied without a hegemonic project.

However, hegemony is never absolute and complete. No hegemonic project can represent the general interest, the nation and/or the people in a class-divided society. Hegemony is always “incomplete and partially fixed” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985); hence open to contestation. As Geoff Eley (1980: 269) notes, hegemony “is not to be understood simply as political or cultural ‘domination’, a terrain of politics and culture somehow ultimately at the free disposition of the ruling bloc”,

Rather, hegemony is to be conceived as a conjuncturely specific set of fluctuating class *relations*, permeating all levels of social and economic life, capable of decay and of sustaining damage, and requiring a constant political and ideological labour for its renewal and reproduction. Hegemony is not a fixed and immutable *condition* ...but is an institutionally negotiable *process* in which the social and political forces of contest, breakdown and transformation are constantly in play” ... [Hegemony is] “a *process* of class relations in which concrete and determinate struggles for cultural, economic and political power or jurisdiction represent the decisive terrain of specific historical analysis.

Hegemony convenes a number of areas which are separately analyzed in the existing historiography; for example, “the state and civil society as *organizing* instances of social life; the *political* constitution of class relations; and the historical and conjuncturely *specificity* of the content of politics itself” (Eley, 1980: 269).

Such a conceptualization of hegemony as an open-ended process is also in accordance with the Marxist theoretical approach that conceives “the class as a process and relationship”, as the process of class formation. In his seminal work E. P. Thompson (1963: 9) underlines that he does not see “class as a ‘structure’, nor even as a ‘category’, but as something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) in human relationships” and yet that “the class experience is largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born –or enter involuntarily”. Interpreting on this E. M. Wood (1996: 79-81) rightly stresses that, *pace* his critics, Thompson does not see “structures *as against* processes” but he sees “structured processes”. Yet, she continues, “the main burden of a Marxist theory must be less on identifying class ‘locations’ than on explaining processes of class formation”. The latter emerge and develop “as men and women *live* their productive relations and *experience* their determinate situations, within the *ensemble* of the social relations”. It is in that sense that Poulantzas and others’s important assertion that classes are formed in and through the state gains a meaning. It is also in and through the processes of political-hegemonic struggles, contentions, compromises, complinaces that classes are formed.

As class hegemony and hegemonic class project need to organize the institutional materiality of the state, i.e. the state form, in a specific way that would institutionalize the accumulation strategy and that would be inscribed by and constitute the political class hegemony, Jessop proposes a third concept for the analysis of the state as a social relation: *state projects*. To the extent that state apparatuses do not have an inherent substantive unity (Poulantzas, Jessop, and below see Mann) and/or their unity is contingent upon specific social and political practices, state projects are conceptualized as the source of state effects. “The state practices and projects define the boundaries of the state system and endow it with a degree of internal unity”. This contingent unity of state apparatuses is produced within the state system through various state discourses (reason of state being one of them), “specific operational procedures, means of coordination and guiding purposes”. It is through state discourses and projects that institutional building-blocks of the state acquire an organizational unity and cohesiveness of purpose during “the never-ending and ever-renewed process of state formation” (Jessop, 1990: 7-9, 346, 351-353). In that sense, the state “as an idea” (Abrams, 1988) and/or the state “as a discourse” (Mitchell, 1991), which are produced by complex practices in order to construct a boundary between state and society, are to be seen as integral parts of the specific hegemonic projects. Hence, the boundaries between state and society are not ontological but constructed, hence changing according to different state projects required by hegemonic projects.⁹⁴

⁹⁴ In criticizing the statist approach, Jessop (1990: 287) warns that “If one posits the need to choose between the state and society as the independent variable in social analysis, one implies that both exist as independent entities which are fully constituted, internally coherent and mutually exclusive, and that the one always unilaterally determines the other. This would reify and absolutize what is really an emergent, partial, unstable and variable social distinction and also ignore how the adequacy of an explanation depends on the explanandum”.

Hence, the state is a site of strategic relations embodied in specific strategies “pursued by specific forces to advance specific interests over a given time horizon”. “We should always seek to trace the circulation of power through wider and more complex sets of social relations both within or beyond the state” (Jessop, 2002: 41). Particular forms of state, which are the crystallizations of past strategies and previous social struggles, privilege some strategies and actors over others through the mechanism of “strategic selectivity”.⁹⁵ As such the state as an institutional ensemble is the field, albeit not the exclusive one, wherein accumulation strategies, hegemonic projects and state projects are forged and struggled by various social and political actors. This approach breaks with all theoretical approaches that treat the state as an instrument or functional mechanism for the reproduction of capitalist accumulation. “State power is capitalist to the extent that it creates, maintains or restores the conditions necessary for capital accumulation in a given situation. It is non-capitalist to the extent that these conditions are not realized. This view radically displaces our theoretical focus from the search for guarantees that the state apparatus and its functions are necessarily capitalist in all aspects to a concern with the many and varied contingent effects of state power on accumulation in specific conjunctures” (Jessop, 1990: 354). Hence, it is through the mediation of “hegemonic projects” that the contingent unity between the “political” and “economic” forms of capitalist relations of production is realized. Hegemonic projects, which aim at establishing a certain capitalist rationality, are always the outcome of

⁹⁵ “By strategic selectivity, I understand the ways in which the state considered as a social ensemble has a specific, differential impact on the ability of various political forces to pursue particular interests and strategies in specific spatio-temporal contexts through their access to and/or control over given state capacities – capacities that always depend for their effectiveness on links to forces and power that exist and operate beyond the state’s formal boundaries” (Jessop, 2002: 40).

political-hegemonic contentions and compromises among and within the dominant classes, the subordinated classes, and state managers.

To reiterate the relevance of this theoretical discussion for the analysis of militarism, I should state that such a theoretical approach to the relations between capitalism, class, and state will form the general framework through which militarism as a technique of power and the active practices of the military elites will be inserted within broader social power relations by which they are constrained and of which they are constitutive.

However, despite their efforts to integrate the institutional materiality of the state into their analyses, Marxist theories have been reluctant to focus on the coercive, militarist aspect of the modern state. This is why I turn next to critical institutionalist approaches which specifically problematized and historically analyzed the militarist face of modern states. My aim is to explore the ways in which some conceptual tools and historical insights of critical institutionalist may be integrated into a relational theory of modern state.

4. Communicating with Critical Institutionalism: Giddens and Mann on Militarism, Capitalism and the Modern State

Marxist theories of state have been mainly concerned with the social (class) basis of the state, with social power relations that produce state form and that constraint the institutionally materialized state power. After having criticized the instrumentalist and structuralist-functionalist accounts of the capitalist state, I argued that the advantage of Gramscian-Marxist relational theory of state is to see the state as a form-determined social relation constructed and reconstructed through hegemonic class struggles. Despite the fact that Marxists have recently more and more focused on the institutional aspects,

specific power mechanisms, and forms of modern capitalist state, these aspects have remained rather (at least historically if not theoretically) understudied and/or mainly limited to the economic and legal-ideological apparatuses of capitalist state. Especially, the militarist institutionalization of the modern capitalist state could barely attract the attention of Marxist theories of state.

The rise of what I call “critical institutionalist”⁹⁶ theory of state is based on a critique of the lack of an analysis of the formal characteristics of the modern nation-state in Marxian analysis. Among these formal-institutional characteristics of modern state, the militaristic face of the modern state has occupied an important place. Drawing on Weber’s legacy, many authors brought the issue of the “monopoly of violence” at the center of the definition of modern state. Weber (1958: 78) defined modern state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory”. He also underlined the domination aspect of the state, a point which is generally omitted when Weber’s definition is mentioned. For Weber, “the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence”. Weber was well aware that “force is certainly not the normal or the only means of the state...but force is a means specific to the state”.⁹⁷

Besides Weber, there was also another nineteenth century intellectual tradition which placed the military power and warfare at the center of state theory. According to one of the representative of this conservative militarist tradition of state theory, namely

⁹⁶ Institutional approach has been influential in various social science disciplines in the last quarter. For useful overviews see Jessop (2001), Hall and Taylor (1996), Remmer (1997), Peters (1999).

⁹⁷ In a more widened definition of state, Weber (1978: 56) includes the administrative and legal order, and citizenship. He also emphasizes that it is only in modern times that the concept of the state has reached its full development.

Otto Hintze, “all state organization is military organization, organization of war”. Inter-state (and inter-nation) conflicts are deemed to be more important than internal social power relations. Hence, the state should be conceived on the basis of not economic and social relations but the necessities of defense. This inter-state and war-making aspect of the state is taken as the source of irreducible autonomy of modern state vis-à-vis social forces. Against the optimistic theory of militarism, it is argued that militaristic and industrial types of society are not antagonistic but rather they would blend into each other. It is a tradition which saw the problem of militarism primarily with reference to the state which is taken “as an abstract entity divorced from society” (See Berghahn, 1981: 14-16, 105, 111; Hall, 1984).

This line of analysis has recently been reappropriated by sui-generis neo-Weberian theoreticians in a way that has produced illuminating effects in understanding modern militarism. However, it should be noted that they differ from the above mentioned militarist theory of state in that they do not equate state power merely to military power and organization. The general argument of this neo-Weberian approach is that militarism, which, with the advent of industrial capitalist societies, ceases to be a method of regulating internal social and political relations, takes the form of an inter-state phenomenon. The use of violence is no longer a primordial technique of power in social control, and political regimes and state structures in which the military as an institution occupies a central place fade away with the development of non-coercive methods of governance. As a result of this historical process, mainly drawn from the European experience, militarism becomes merely equated with war and war preparation. In that sense, as opposed to Marxist theories, it is argued that the nation-state and inter-state system rather than capitalism is the key to understand modern militarism. Below I

will focus on two influential figures, namely Anthony Giddens and Michael Mann, whose contributions to social theory and state theories go beyond the contours of discussions on militarism.

4-a The Critical Institutionalism of Anthony Giddens

Anthony Giddens criticizes the classical liberal and Marxist social theory for their “lack of a systematic interpretation of the rise of the territorially bounded nation-state and its association with military power” (Giddens, 1985: 26). According to Giddens, modern societies and states should be analyzed with reference to three institutional dimensions which cannot be analytically reduced to each other even though they contingently co-evolved in Europe. “Capitalist society is a ‘society’ only because it is also a nation-state ... such a state form ...depends... upon conjunctions of capitalism, industrialism and certain administrative apparatuses of government ...and they constitute three distinct ‘*organizational clusters*’” (Giddens, 1985: 141; see also 1994: 55-73). While Marxist theories conceived modern capitalist state as a social relation, Giddens’ neo-Weberian definition is based on the formal-institutional structure: “the nation-state, which exists in a complex of other nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries, its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence” (Giddens, 1985: 125).

Giddens contrasts modern states with traditional ones. Like Marxists, he draws the genesis of a specified military institution back to the emergence of class-divided social formations. The fact that traditional states had limited administrative authority and that their claim to the monopoly of the means of violence was limited meant that government in the sense of “regularized administration of the overall territory of the

state” did not exist in traditional states. The main link connecting the state with the population was the taxation through the use force. In pre-modern class-divided societies “open class struggle is generally very sporadic” and given that surveillance techniques were not developed, they were governed through the use of violence, military power was central in sustaining system integration (Giddens, 1985: 51-60; 1981:130, 163-4).

However, with the development of modern absolutist and nation-states and especially with the concentration of the administrative resources in this process, the army ceased to be the main organ for the preservation of internal order. He argues that, in contrast to previous class-divided societies and traditional states, in modern societies and institutions “the sanction of the use of violence is quite indirect and attenuated” (Giddens, 1985: 26, 16). This was the process called “the internal pacification”. This process included three complementary aspects. The *first* is “the eradication of violence, and the capability to use the means of violence, from the labour contract” and production process. The *second* is the shift from manifest use of violence to the pervasive use of administrative power in the sanctioning capacities of the state. The result has been the *third* aspect, i.e. the shift from inward-oriented to outward-oriented militarism, accompanied with the increasing monopoly of violence on the part of the state. In this process, while the military withdrew from direct participation in internal affairs, it concentrated its power towards other states (Giddens, 1985: 188-192).

The main social transformations behind the internal pacification were twofold: the specific nature of industrial capitalism and the development of administrative power under the absolutist and nation-state forms through a process in which war and war preparation was the main stimulus. Giddens (1985: 131-136, 143) defines capitalism as a form of economic enterprise mainly characterized by the expanded process of

commodification (commodity production), especially the commodification of labor power. Following Marx(ists), he underlines how with capitalism the use of physical force is excluded from relations *in* production: “The fact that the worker has to sell his or her labor to an employer in order to gain a living ... replaces, Marx stresses, the various admixtures of bondage and the threat of the use of violence characteristic of traditional states”. In industrial capitalism, he argues, “the dominant class does not have and require direct access to the means of violence to sustain their rule”. The separation of the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ in capitalism is the driving cause behind this.

Giddens also asks the question of what happened to the means of violence, a question that Marx never asked, he claims, once the means of violence are extruded from the labor relations. He then explores the role of military power within state’s power techniques, a point which is not aptly problematicized by Marxists. His answer is that modern state relies more on his administrative power⁹⁸ than its military power. The infrastructural transformations caused by industrial capitalism especially in the spheres of transportation, communication, information storage resulted in the expansion of administrative power and reach of the modern state to penetrate day to day activities of the population (Giddens: 1985: 172-192). War and preparations for war were one of the most important stimuli for the concentration of administrative resources and fiscal reorganization, hence of the state formation (both absolutist state and nation-state).⁹⁹

⁹⁸ According to Giddens, administrative power is the general characteristic of the modern nation-state, pace Foucault, disciplinary power is just a sub-type of administrative power. While the disciplinary power works through “enforced sequestration” in institutions such as asylum and prison wherein individuals are kept entirely sequestered from the outside, the typical institutions of administrative power such as school and work-place control only part of the day of individuals (Giddens, 1985: 184-186).

⁹⁹ The relationship between war-making and state-making have been explored by various authors. See for instance Tilly (1985; 1990), Shaw (1984), Porter (1994), Mann (1988). Giddens himself underlines three sets of military development: technological changes in armaments, administrative power within the armed forces, and development of European naval strength. He even argues that “technological changes affecting warfare were more important than changes in techniques of production”, and continues that the modern

Modes of surveillance became a key feature both of economic organizations and the state. Despite the fact that class struggles had now become a chronic feature of capitalist production, they were regulated mostly by surveillance rather than violence, and military power was no longer central for system integration (Giddens, 1985: 159, 160, 191).

According to Giddens, at the same time that class relations are started to be regulated by “a mixture of ‘dull economic compulsion’ and surveillance techniques of labor management”, in other words, once a “demilitarized system of production” which excludes the use of force has been established, and modern states relied more and more on their administrative power, the professionalized standing army emerged. The specialization of the military power in external warfare was a result of the functional differentiation between “surveillance” and “war-making”. The maintenance of order relied more on surveillance and policing of the routine activities, and this is done by specialized agencies other than the armed forces. Hence, in modern nation-states the fact that military holds political power becomes an unlikely exception since military power is no longer a necessity for internal social and political control, which also means that the military can no longer act in isolation neither from the political power nor from the industrial productive structure (Giddens, 1985: 187, 227-228). However, this internal pacification does not mean the elimination of militarism from modern scene. What happens is “not the decline of war but a concentration of military power ‘pointing outwards’ towards other states in the nation-state system” (Giddens, 1985: 192). Pacification and militarism are two sides of the same historical process. Militarism now results from inter-state conflicts rather than social (class) cleavages. In his approach,

administrative power was first pioneered within the military organization, and then spread to the state apparatus and other modern organizations. For instance, according to Giddens, Taylorism had become well established in the military sphere long before than in industrial production (Giddens, 1985: 103-113).

militarism is no doubt influenced by “capitalistic mechanisms” but in no way primarily “an expression of the global involvements of capitalist enterprise”. This outward oriented militarism is a result of the relations between nation-states within the world inter-state system. He underlines the relation between capitalist development and industrialization of war. However, he argues, militarism under the form of military expenditures and arms industry does not form a counter evidence for the argument about declining relative importance of military power in modern societies, and they are not a result of systemic or particular capitalist interests but rather of “the political involvements of nation-states within the global nation-state system”.¹⁰⁰

How then Giddens explains the ongoing presence of inward-oriented militarism in several semi-peripheral modern societies? One factor, he argues, is the underdevelopment of “dull economic compulsion” in these states due to “their peripheral involvement of capitalism historically with the use of unfree labor”. This explains why in certain modern states the use of force continued to play a more direct role in the relations *in* production (Giddens, 1985: 191). However, this form of militarism is less important than militarism as a technique of power in the arsenal of state, the use of militarism as a governing strategy. Hence how and why military elites become dominant in state structures and/or how and why the monopoly of violence is used to sustain administrative power in the process of governing? Giddens’ answer to those questions reminds that of professionalization argument of liberal-modernization theories. He argues that to the extent that industrialization is advanced, the military becomes a

¹⁰⁰ He argues that despite increasing military expenditures their share within GNP or total government expenditures are small. The so-called military-industrial complex does not dominate the economy since neither political nor economic power holders feel themselves compelled to be subordinated to the production needs of war industry (Giddens, 1985: 245-249, 254, 226).

distinct professional group dependent upon productive and administrative resources which they cannot directly control. But how even in the advanced stages of industrialization militarism may still be influential in governing internal social cleavages? His answer refers to the institutional capacity of the state rather than to social power relations: “the structural basis for the existence of military governments in Third World states is their relative lack of development of internal administrative co-ordination ... most such states lack the degree of centralized administrative integration” (Giddens, 1985: 250-251). Let’s speak Giddens himself how he positions himself vis-à-vis “optimistic theory of militarism”:

There is thus some substance ... to the nineteenth century thesis of the replacement of military societies by ones based upon industrialism or economic exchange relations more generally. The more highly industrialized a state is, and the more unified its administrative system, the less it tends to be the case either that production for military ends predominates over other sectors, or that direct military rule can be sustained save in short-term periods (Giddens, 1985: 254).

In fact, when compared with pre-modern types of state, the fact that the use of military power in governing social cleavages, in internal social control has diminished is acknowledged to varying degrees by liberal-modernist, Marxists, and critical institutionalists. However, despite the fact that there is a kernel of truth in such a historical interpretation, it is based on very broad historical generalizations. It is indifferent to sub-periods within the long history of modern capitalism. It dismisses how the changing power relations in different sub-periods of capitalism result in changes in the internal structure and form of state and in shifts concerning power techniques. Historically and empirically more detailed analyses would prove that internal pacification is more historically contingent rather than a structural character of modern capitalist society. Not only that the establishment of administrative power over a territory and of monopoly of legitimate violence is never a finished project but rather a

continuous process of reproduction; but also, depending upon the balance of social forces, domestic militarism is used spatially and temporally besides other power techniques. In other words the development of surveillance techniques and administrative power does not once and for all rule out domestic militarism. For instance, in a more careful empirical analysis, Michael Mann (see below) explains how domestic militarism continued to be used as internal social control mechanism until post-second world war period.

Martin Shaw (1989: 141) criticizes Giddens for downplaying diverse forms of “class, industrial, racial, criminal or personal violence” and for that “he identifies violence very narrowly with organized crime, armed fighting and killing” (Shaw, 1989: 141). Even though Giddens (1985: 192) is well aware of the other forms of violence under modern nation-state such as violence applied in the police stations and operations, in prisons, he insists that these are not publicly displayed but used surreptitiously. He also dismisses paramilitarization of police forces, their increasing use of paramilitary violence in serious social disturbances by simply arguing that the distinction between the military and police is a “material expression” of internal pacification.

The restriction of militarism to the use of violence leads Giddens to neglect the dominance of ideological and cultural militarism and the repercussions of outward oriented militarism. Giddens underestimates the implications and problems which outward-pointing war-making and war preparation can pose for internal social order: a specific kind of militarization with its military-industrial sector, industrialization of total war,¹⁰¹ popular militarism. “Moreover, the concentrated external military power ...

¹⁰¹ It was total in a double sense, because technology-intensive weaponry enabled total killing and destruction and because high capacity of states to control and survey over societies made possible the mobilization of all kind sources, economic, ideological etc. (Shaw, 1991: 20)

required ... extreme societal mobilization [and] states sometimes used this to divert popular energies from class issues” (Shaw, 1991: 18-22; Mann, 1988b).

Last but not least, Giddens’ theory of state exclusively focuses on institutions at the expense of social relations and practices. One-sided concern with the state as an institutional ensemble and with specific power mechanisms and capacities of modern state totally neglects the relational nature of power. Even though for Giddens (1985: 7-16) power is theoretically entailed in action (strategies and counter-strategies of power) and it is structured into institutions; social and political practices of collective actors are not problematicized. He does not consider questions of hegemony, political class relations, how class interests are politically formed in the strategic terrain of the state. The fact that state is not analyzed as a social relation results from an “institutional foundationalism” which take institutions as the *explanans* (what explains) rather than *explanandum* (what needs to be explained). He dismisses the constitutive nature of social practices in favor of the institutions conceived as independently from social relations and practices. More generally, there is no account of how the state and capitalism are connected, how they are articulated (Jessop, 1989). How the institutional materiality of modern state that Giddens discusses in a very productive way is related to capitalist social relations of production? This lack reveals itself in the argument that outward-pointing militarism result not from capitalist power relations but from inter-state conflicts. This totally delinks external state and capitalism within the theoretical horizon of philosophy of external relations. He does not deal with the capitalist imperialism-militarism nexus.

4-b The Relational-Institutional Materialism of Michael Mann

Michael Mann not only qualifies the critical institutionalist arguments on modern militarism by a careful historical-empirical analysis, he also brings together, I contend, relational and institutionalist conceptualizations of state under his own middle range theory of “*organizational materialism*”. According to Mann, “*societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power*”. He defines four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military, and political.¹⁰² They are conceived as organizations, institutional means of attaining human goals. In concrete-historical contexts, these four power sources are always entwined, they do not exist in pure form, and “their interactions change one another’s inner shapes as well as their outward trajectories” (Mann, 1993: 36, 52, 2, 6-10; 1986: 1, 22-32).

States are only one of these four major types of power network. Mann acknowledges in consonance with Marxist theory that the modern state is “an arena, a place” of social struggles. Even though class struggles have an important impact in his analysis of modern power relations, he criticizes Marxist theory for having neglected ideological, military, political and geopolitical power relations. In pre-modern periods the class structure was only segmental and latent whereas modern classes are extensive, which means that they began to predominate in power relations. In a very similar way to Gramsci’s moments of class relations; he differentiates three different levels of class power relations. The first two are asymmetric (only the dominant class is extensively organized) and symmetric (both classes are organized) class formations, respectively; the third form is the “political class” which appears when the class is organized to

¹⁰² *Ideological power* relates to the need of meaning in life, to share norms and values, and to participate in aesthetic and ritual practices. It commands through persuasion, a claim to truth. *Economic power* is based on the extraction, transformation, distribution, and consumption of natural resources. Ownership or control of the means of production, distribution, and exchange form the basis of class power relations. *Military power* is the social organization of physical force. *Political power* relates to territorial and centralized regulation; and it means state power.

control the state (Mann, 1993: 7-8, 25-28). We already discussed how in Marxist theory, classes and class relations (and relations of production) should be conceived in a non-economistic fashion, in a way that would include political, ideological and cultural relations that become historically-empirically indispensable for the actual existence for class relations. Mann argues for the same line of argument even though he totally dismisses the possibility of this move within Marxist theory which he condemns as being economically reductionist. Mann criticizes all forms of reductionism (economic, political, and military) since in their actual existence modes of production, classes, and states, they all depend on “broader social experience”. Mann explicitly announces that “economic power relations –that is, modes of production and classes as actual historical entities and forces- cannot ‘constitute themselves’ without the intervention of ideological, military and political organizations. The same obviously applies in reverse to states and political elites”. He continues, “I do not see classes as pure, defined only in terms of relations to the means of production...pure classes never organize major social change...Where whole class movements emerge, they are impure, their force contributed by noneconomic as well as economic power networks” (Mann, 1993: 516, 28, 233).

As to the state, he analyses it as an institutional ensemble differentiated from (civil) society. However, “civil societies were always entwined with states –and they became more so during the nineteenth century” (Mann, 1993: 42, Mann, 1984b). The state does not have distinct means of power; it uses the combination of various sources of power within civil society (economic, ideological, and military).

We discussed how Poulantzas and Jessop defined the state as an institutionally materialized form of condensation of social power relations, and how many Marxists

emphasized the constitutive role of state for relations of production, and its strategic (or structural) selectivity in social struggles. Even though Mann does not fully acknowledge these steps in Marxist theory, his position is a very similar one. “States institutionalize present social conflicts, but institutionalized historic conflicts then exert considerable power over new conflicts –from state as a passive place (as in Marxian or pluralist theory) to state not quite as actor (as in true elitism) but as active place” (Mann, 1993: 52). It is by virtue of its being “an active place”, “a different socio-spatial organization” that it cannot be reduced to social groups within civil society. “The state, unlike the principal power actors of civil society, is territorially bounded and centralized”. It is the utility (for both dominant power groups and society in general) of territorial centralization that is the main source of state autonomy. Hence, states can be treated as “*actors*, in the person of state elites, with a will to power”. In their actual existence “states are *both* place and actor” (Mann, 1984b; 1993: 46, 61). However, the actor-likeness of the state does not mean that it is a unified subject in its own. Like Poulantzas and Jessop, Mann argues that the state has no essential, inherent unity. Rather, it is a “polymorphous power network” (Mann, 1993: 53, 56, 75). Hence, one cannot talk of state as a unified subject; the actorness of the state is necessarily plural; there are plural state actors/elites whose unification around a specific “state project” is contingent.

In fact, the active role of the state lies, for Mann, in its institutional materiality rather than in its elites. He states that this active role can be theorized by two different approaches. The first one is elite theory according to which state elites have a dominant power *over* civil society. Mann dismisses this line of argument by arguing that this can be applied only to the most authoritarian and dictatorial states. The second approach is

institutional statism. Instead of arguing that state elites dominate civil society actors he argues that all actors are constrained by existing political institutions, the state.

Improving on Weber's definition, he then gives an institutionalist definition of the state: "1.The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel 2.embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a center, to cover a 3.territorially demarcated area over which it exercises 4.some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some organized physical force". But the modern state also includes relations between this center and territory, between state and civil society actors which have constraining impacts on state practices (Mann, 1993: 55, 61-64). This relational aspect of the state reflects itself in two forms of state power too: despotic and infrastructural. *Despotic power* is the distributive power¹⁰³ of state elites over civil society whereby it includes "the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups". *Infrastructural power* corresponds to "the institutional capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm"; "this is collective power through society". Through its infrastructural power, the state penetrates its territories by law and administration in order to centrally coordinate the activities of civil society (Mann, 1993: 56-57, 59; 1984b: 188-189). This is what Charles Tilly (1990: 103-117) calls "direct rule": "unmediated intervention in the lives of local communities, households, and productive enterprises". According to Mann, states in capitalist democracies are "despotically weak" but "infrastructurally strong". While modern capitalist states penetrates everyday life, they are at the same time less autonomous since state and political elites are to an important extent controlled by civil

¹⁰³ Mann defines distributive power as the power of one actor within a social relationship who carries out his own will despite resistance (Mann, 1986: 6-7).

society groups (Mann, 1984b: 190). In fact, these two forms of power closely resemble Gramscian differentiation between domination and hegemony. It should also be noted that just like Gramsci argued that coercion and consent are complementary of each other, Mann also warns that increasing infrastructural power does not necessarily increase or reduce distributive, despotic power (Mann, 1993: 59). Hence, even if he defines two ideal types of state power, he leaves theoretically open that in specific empirical instances it is the mixture of despotic and infrastructural powers that is at work.

Mann conceptualizes the polymorphous character of modern state as different crystallizations of state among which capitalist, militarist, representative, and national crystallizations have been decisive in understanding modern state. In that sense, the formation of modern states corresponded to a contradictory social process toward the maturation of capitalist economic relations, toward greater representation, toward intensifying national centralization, and toward professionalizing and bureaucratizing state militarism (Mann, 1993: 75-87). How then he discusses the relationality between capitalism and militarism? Just like many scholars of militarism, Mann too differentiates between *geopolitical militarism*¹⁰⁴ and *domestic militarism* (foreign and domestic repression) (Mann, 1993: 86). Even though he acknowledges that the use of militarism as a technique of power did not disappear suddenly in modern times and continued to be used under different forms as a mechanism of social control; he nevertheless emphasizes that it was geopolitical militarism which has been decisive and this latter has resulted from inter-state relations rather than from capitalist power relations.

¹⁰⁴ Elsewhere he defines militarism as “an attitude and a set of institutions which regard war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity” (Mann, 1984a: 25). This definition results from his belief in the preponderance of geopolitical militarism in modern times.

As we have already discussed above different scholars from different theoretical currents were agreeing that in modern societies, the techniques of power shifted from the use of repression, violence and coercion to routinized policing, internal discipline, and surveillance and/or “dull economic compulsion” replaced the use of coercion and violence in the production process, which meant that violence extensively receded from class relations. Although Mann agrees with this argument that in modern Western societies, repression is a method of social control and regulation less and less resorted to, he argues that this has been finally and quasi-fully achieved only in the second half of the twentieth century after the development of “political and social citizenship and of the institutional conciliation of labor relations”. He nevertheless differentiates between different forms of the use of military might in internal social control in order to differentiate modern domestic militarism from that of pre-modern uses. He defines *four levels of domestic repression*. At the lowest one, public order is mainly established by “*conciliation, arbitration, and persuasion alone*”, without any repression. But as no state can be entirely pacific, one should move to other levels where the use of repression and violence increases. The second level corresponds to *policing* in the modern sense whereby the police as a special institution with “a disciplined force possessing only simple weapons” combat crime and disorder. The third level is the one of riots, demonstrations in which case military and paramilitary forces were called in “for a show of force”. Finally, if these methods did not work, then it is resorted to “full scale military repression” by regular troops. This is also an expression of the failure of establishing routinized order. While between 1600 and 1800 third and fourth levels of repression were decisive, during the nineteenth century, with the gradual development of municipal, regional and national police forces, armies were removed from the third

level, and specialized in the fourth one. Hence, rather than the total substitution of military repression by surveillance techniques or dull economic compulsion, domestic militarism remained in place under its three forms (“presence, show, and violence”) together with the development of new police and paramilitary forces under a new division of labor according to which each coped with different ascending levels of threat to order (Mann, 1993: 405-412).

Despite the fact that he recognizes the ongoing presence of domestic militarism, he argues that not only there was a gradual shift towards geopolitical militarism; but also, even in periods of frequent use of domestic militarism, it was indeed geopolitical militarism, which has been caused by inter-state conflicts, that had most causal effect on the development of modern state and capitalism. Mann discards both the optimistic theory of pacific capitalism and that of militaristic capitalism. Although militarism is a central phenomenon of the modern society, he argues, capitalism and militarism are only contingently connected, and militarism originates from geopolitical structure, which is older than capitalism. Militarism is necessary not for capitalism but for the multi-state system: “Militarism is largely the province of ... the state. Capitalism arrived so late on this scene” and did not bring much change concerning geopolitical origins of modern militarism (1984a: 28-29, 31-38). Mann defines capitalism by the commodity production, private possession of the means of production, and free labor separated from the means of production (Mann, 1993: 23-24; 1984a: 36-37) and departing from this theoretically abstracted definition he argues that capitalism does not necessitate militarism by definition. However, Mann himself is well aware that neither capitalist mode of production nor capitalist class relations can exist in pure forms (as defined at a certain level of abstraction) in their actual existence (see Mann, 1993: 28, 233, 516).

Hence, once he shift to a historical understanding of capitalism he starts to recognize cases where capitalism presupposes militarism: first, to offer the military force in order to back up the political regulation which will establish the set of universal rules necessary for commodity production; second, expropriation by military force in order to establish private possession of the means of production and the full separation of labor. Yet, the argument goes; these two functional requirements did not cause a higher level of militarism than preceding historical social formations, and once capitalism has been institutionalized it has needed relatively little maintenance by force. In other words, class militarism, which is not specific to capitalism but to all class-based societies, has become less evident in capitalism (Mann, 1984a).

In his historical-empirical analyses, Mann shows how up to 1815 military and economic power sources have been dominant, only to recede their place to political and economic sources of power in the nineteenth century. During this whole period, causal determination flew first from military/political power relations to economic ones; then secondly from economic power relations to the state. This was the spiral of war-making, fiscal and manpower pressures, politicization of social forces and the development of citizenship rights. The growth of state expenditure (1688-1815) was due to warfare, and to the extent that military power was used for internal repression this was mostly due to rising taxes in order to finance wars. Hence, the growth of modern state is explained “primarily not in domestic terms but in terms of geopolitical relations of violence”, and the growth of state finances was overwhelmingly due to military and geopolitical rather than economic and domestic factors. Class relations were shaped by inter-state geopolitical relations; merchant and landlord capitalists became dependent on an already

existing state system because of their need of state regulation (see Mann, 1986: 483-490; 511-516; 1993: 221-226; see also Tilly, 1990; 1985).

During the long nineteenth century, two important big transformations happened: firstly, state functions shifted from the traditional military one to three enlarged civilian roles (new material and symbolic communications infrastructure, increasing state intervention in the economy, modern forms of social welfare); secondly, states became largely bureaucratized (first in their military then in their civilian administration). The result has been a relative decline in the role of the military which started to become a distinct body more professional and bureaucratized and insulated from civil society (Mann, 1993: 394-395, 504-516). Despite the quantitative and qualitative gradual recession of militarist crystallization in modern states, Mann did not neglect the possibility of more militarized path of capitalist development as the authoritarian national capitalism of Germany embodies (Mann, 1993: 306-326). According to Mann, when confronted with working class movements, four main strategies mixing varying degrees of capitalism, militarism, and representation have been adopted: 1) autocratic militarism wherein workers are denied citizenship and repressed (Tsarist Russia); 2) capitalist-liberal militarism whereby citizenship is highly uneven, individual civil and political citizenships are institutionalized but collective civil rights are restricted, and selective repression is applied (USA); 3) liberal-reformist incorporation in which liberal democracy extended gradually; there was reluctance to deploy domestic militarism (Britain, Netherlands, Belgium, France) 4) semi-authoritarian incorporation divide and rule strategies are backed up by moderated militarism in the form of ritual displays of force (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Japan) (Mann, 1993: 682-683).

Like Giddens, however, Mann is relatively silent in explaining the ongoing and overwhelming presence of domestic militarism in several “non-European” social formations. The reason, Mann argues, of the continuing domestic militarism in several third world countries is due to under- or non- development of political and social citizenship in these countries, whereas the minor contribution of the institutionalization of labor relations to demilitarization is linked to the more narrow development of industrialization (Mann, 1993: 406). Yet why political and social citizenship remained under-developed in those countries still begs explanation.

CHAPTER II
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO
THE STATE, CLASSES AND MILITARY IN TURKEY

Both the military's political-ideological practices and the use of militarism as a technique of power need to be analyzed within the context of the processes of broader social power relations. What needs to be problematicized should not be restricted to the mere problematic of civil-military relations but rather should consist of the analysis of forms of power relations which are constitutive of militarism and of which militarism is constitutive. In as much as it is necessary not to conflate the military and the state, it is also necessary to develop a relational analysis of the military as an institutional actor and of militarism as a technique of power. Such a relational analysis should involve the complex analysis of (a) power relations among diverse (class-based or class-relevant) social forces, (b) the constitutive role of those relations for the formation of the state as an institutional ensemble, (c) the internal-institutional structuring of the state (d) the military's place within various state forms and the relative weight of militarism among various techniques of power (e) the constitutive role of state (legal, ideological, coercive) practices for the social relations of production and state's selective impact on the mentioned social power relations.

This suggests the need for a theoretical framework on state, capitalism, and society, or on what is conventionally called "state-society relations". In the first subsection of this chapter, I will focus on the dominant reading of state-society relations in Turkey, which defines the general framework and horizon within which militarist

practices are generally analyzed. This dominant mode of analysis of the state in Turkey obscures the capitalist character of social power relations which constitute and structure the form and institutional materiality of the state and treats the state as an entity outside and above the social power relations. Conceiving the state as an entity in itself has a reifying effect which makes theoretically impossible to analyze the state and the militarization of political processes and structures in relation to broader social power relations. Through a critical evaluation of the analytical discourses on state and military consecutively, I will prepare the ground for an alternative analysis of the forms of articulation between militarism and capitalist state.

1. Questioning the Hegemony of the Statist Approach

Intellectual-academic and political discourses on “restructuring the state” occupy a central place in the public discussions in Turkey. The “state question” is on the agenda of various political-intellectual currents. At first sight, this may not seem astonishing given that the state as an institutional ensemble with its sources of power is the most important site of social power relations and has also been a central object of study in social sciences. However, what makes this concern with the state problematic is the specific way the state in Turkey is conceptualized.

The post-1980 period has witnessed the rise of a state-centric but anti-statist hegemonic discourse. Through a form of mythical thought on the state, the state in Turkey is analyzed as an entity in itself standing outside and above society and as an omnipotent subject dominating over an undifferentiated conception of society rather than a form of social relation. Formulated as a “strong state tradition”, this autonomous state argument has been dominating the scholarly works and public discourses on “state-

society relations” in the post-1980 period. This specific form of analysis of the state also resonated with neoliberal and liberal-democratic political positions, both of which overlook the capitalist class crystallization of the state in Turkey.¹ According to Yalman, this prevailing scholarly and public discourse on the state is a “dissident but hegemonic”² discourse. It is dissident because it is critical of the prevailing forms of state and political power as it defines them. It is hegemonic because its own way of seeing and conceptualizing the state power and the main axis of political conflict (namely between a strong state subjectified in Kemalist state elites versus a weak (civil) society including even the dominant social classes) silences other ways of seeing and conceptualizing the social-political power relations. This hegemony has been working out through silencing and excluding class power relations from political analysis in a historical process of neoliberal restructuring of capitalism in Turkey.

What constitutes the content of this “strong and autonomous state tradition” argument? A series of arguments about Ottoman-Turkish historical transformation has

¹ Even though neoliberal and liberal-democratic positions need not to be mutually exclusive, they are neither analytically nor politically subsumable. Neoliberal political discourse’ anti-statism targets the Keynesian-National Welfare state and the populist-developmental state and aims at restructuring the state in accordance with the new accumulation strategy and hegemonic project. The state is criticized for being antithetical to market-based individual freedoms. Neoliberal political position defends the minimal state and favors the market as the site of freedom. As to the liberal-democratic position, it justifiably questions the prevalence of authoritarian forms of state and techniques of governance. It criticizes statist-nationalist power discourse based on the idea of “state reason” and of an organic and homogeneous society, on the coercive and repressive legal-institutional-political structure. Against the so-called “strong state tradition”, this position proposes the development of civil society, public sphere, and implicitly (if not explicitly) market economy as the sites of freedom. However, to the extent that both conceptualize the state and society as two ontologically distinct entities, they fetishize the state as the site of power and the civil society as the site of freedom rather than as different sites of social struggles. As a result, they de-problematicize social relational nature of state power and silences class power relations by taking state versus society relation as the main axis of power relation. For a work that analyses the variants of anti-statist discourses as quest for hegemony see Erdoğan and Üstüner (2002)

² It is dissident to the extent that “its statism is justified by its stridently anti-state call for an intellectual realignment in which the acceptance of market liberalism would be at the heart of a new public consensus. And it would be hegemonic to the extent that its conceptual categories, as Max Weber put it, would have a meaning in the minds of individual persons, partly as something actually existing, partly as something with normative authority so that they have a powerful, often decisive, causal influence on the course of their actions” Yalman (2002a: 23). I should remark that Galip Yalman’s works have been very inspirational for me since I adopt the same basic ontological premises for the analysis of state-class relations and for the critique of the dominant statist paradigm.

been produced in an intermingled way by scholars from diverse theoretical and political traditions such as modernization theory, neo-Weberian approach, critical institutionalism, and some currents within Marxian theory. Even though they expose differences and even incompatibilities concerning the details and the interpretations of specific events, they converge in the same problematic and answer. The general standpoint is that Ottoman-Turkish history is marked by a *peculiar historical continuity* incarnated in a “strong state - weak society tradition”. In this narrative, the state, either reified as a subject in itself or personified in state elites (civil and military bureaucracy), acts as an independent actor against and regardless of the will of social actors within civil society. The state is deemed to be indifferent to social actors and their demands, their implicit or explicit (organized or unorganized, formal or informal) resistances and contestations. To use Poulantzian terminology, the institutional materiality of the state does not bear, it is argued, the marks of social power relations and struggles. According to this narrative, this state tradition has impeded both the development of capitalism, market, and economy as autonomous spheres and the establishment of bourgeois political hegemony. The main tenet of this peculiarity argument is the failure of the bourgeoisie to play its proper historical role of establishing liberal democracy because of its weakness vis-à-vis the state and the bureaucracy. It is contended that in the lack of a civil society and autonomously organized social classes and groups, politics has been restrained to intra-elite politics, to a struggle by state elites as the bearer of their own social-political project against various social classes and social groups. Similarly, the political parties, which are the most influential and important organizational actors of specific hegemonic projects, are analyzed as independently from class power relations. In some cases, class relations and politics are deemed totally non-relevant for

understanding power relations in Turkey. In some other cases, to the extent that classes and class analysis enter into the picture, bourgeoisie is cast as a dependent, passive and dominated actor, unable to organize and pursue its class interests vis-à-vis the bureaucracy as the politically dominant actor. As a result, the changes in the institutional materiality of the state apparatus, if analyzed at all, and in the forms of state and political regime have been explained by reference to the will of “state actors” rather than as a result of the complex web of capitalist power relations within and between social classes, between various state actors and social classes.

1-a The (Mis)Use of Patrimonialism Analysis

The root of the strong and autonomous state tradition is generally traced back to Ottoman patrimonialism. Ottoman social structure has long been a subject of controversy among historians and historical sociologists.³ This unresolved debate, however, seems to have reached an impasse. Weberian concept of patrimonialism, enthusiastically appropriated by modernization theorists, has gained a hegemonic status in a way that would also cover the arguments of the proponents of “Asiatic mode of production” within the Marxian intellectual tradition. As in Weber’s use⁴, the analysis of patrimonialism was functional for explaining the deviation of the Ottoman Empire from

³ The debate was mainly between the proponents of feudalism and Asiatic mode of production. The debate about the Ottoman social structure and the dominant mode of production during the 1960s and 1970s was frequently guided and sometimes even eclipsed by immediate political motivations rather than scholarly considerations. For a brief but critical and useful evaluation of the debate see Faroqhi (1991a). For some representative works in favor of the feudalism argument see Bertay (1989), Boran (1970) among others; and in favor of the “Asiatic mode of production” argument see Divitçioğlu (1981), Küçükömer (1994), İslamoğlu and Keyder (1987) among others. One may easily say that the second argument has become hegemonic in due course, especially in the post-1980 period.

⁴ For Weber’s analysis of patrimonialism as contrasted to feudalism see Weber (1978: 1006-1110). However, it should be noted that Weber’s analysis also points out several commonalities and inter-transitivity between feudal and patrimonial social structures for he seems to use patrimonialism as a main category with two sub-categories: patrimonialism/sultanism and patrimonialism/feudalism. Hence, one may contend that Weber seems to be more aware of the limits of an ideal-typical category than most of the scholars of Ottoman history.

the path of feudal Europe which gave rise to capitalism. Patrimonialism is not merely used to denote a specific form of political domination (or a specific type of state) but a whole social structure. In that sense, Ottoman patrimonialism is implicitly or explicitly analyzed together with a specific mode of production, namely Asiatic mode of production, in which a relatively centralized imperial state stands as the surplus appropriating actor in an agricultural economy. Hence, the Ottoman Empire is contrasted to feudal Europe wherein the relations of surplus appropriation is between the serfs who are tied to the land and the feudal lords who enjoy autonomy from central authority and contractually recognized property rights. As to the Ottoman Empire, the argument runs, the surplus appropriation is between an independent peasantry and a tax-collecting centralized patrimonial bureaucracy functioning in the name of the Sultan who is the sole and ‘absolute’ owner of land. Unlike feudal Europe where a hereditary aristocracy enjoyed jurisdiction and property rights, in the classical Ottoman social structure, private property was an exception. The social control mechanisms were more centralized in the sense that the patrimonial ruling class (*askeri*) governed through a centralized patrimonial bureaucracy composed of *kalemiyye*, *seyfiyye*, and *ulema*, which formed the “despotic and infra-structural powers” of the patrimonial state over the *reaya* (peasants, merchants etc.).⁵

⁵ Ottoman patrimonial empire was based on a mixture of infrastructural and despotic power, in Michael Mann’s terms. Agricultural production was controlled by the *timar* system which was based on the lands whose usufruct rights are delivered to independent peasants under the control of armed functionaries, *sipahis*, whose responsibility is to guarantee agricultural production, to collect taxes, to control peasant population, and to supply soldiers in times of war. On the other hand, the *ulema* controlled the access to educational and cultural services and regulated property and family law. The military-economic and ideological mechanisms were the sources of social control. However, following Mann, it should be noted that even though Ottoman Empire’s infrastructural power was more centralized and developed than other pre-modern state types, compared to modern national states it was still highly limited. For the classical Ottoman social and political structure in pre-capitalist/pre-modern period see Timur (1979: 123-215), Göçek (1999: 53-88); for an analysis based on Mann’s historical sociology see Jacoby (2004: 29-37).

This “strong state” incarnated as a patrimonial state is depicted as the impediment to economic development, hence to the development of ‘capitalist market economy’. Regardless of its capacity and the limits of its infrastructural power, it is contended that the state controlled all kind of economic activities, from agricultural production to commercial activities in the cities. Accordingly, unlike the mercantilist policies of European states, the “patrimonial-redistributive Ottoman state” did not contribute to the development of commerce, market economy, hence of capital accumulation; on the contrary, it prevented the emergence of an “autonomous market economy” and an “independent merchant class”. This Weberian form of authority is supposed to represent a case whereby the state is itself the source of power rather than being embedded in and/or having basis in social relations of production and social power relations (Mardin, 1969: 261-262; 1973: 172; Heper, 1985: 21-47; 1992: 171-177; Sunar, 1974: 5, 17, 56; 2004a; İnsel, 1996: 57-99, İnsel and Aktar, 1985-87: 32). Instead of conceiving the mode of production and social relations of production in their totality, including their political, ideological, economic moments, this approach severs the link between various moments of a mode of production. Hence, it becomes possible to argue that politics and not the economy, political power relations rather than class relations are determinant as if social relations of production are merely economic relations, as if the state/the political is external to the relations of production. Another suggestion is that the relation between state and society is not based, unlike the European experience, on a consensual and legally enforced social contract. The alleged absence of intermediary agents and of the “civil society” as an autonomous area of social relations, which is explained by the decisiveness of the state to inhibit the development of autonomous peripheral social forces, state-society relation is pictured as one of absolute control of

the center over the periphery. Hence, social struggles or social power relations are reduced to the center-periphery dichotomy (Mardin, 1969; 1973; Heper, 1980; 1985; Sunar, 1974: 3-6; Sunar and Sayarı, 1986: 166-168; Insel 1996: 86).

Given the limits of this dissertation, I am not concerned with the historical accuracy of patrimonialism analysis, nor do I argue that the description of various aspects of the social-political structure of the Ottoman Empire in those works does not hold at all. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the strong state argument emanating from patrimonialism, Asiatic mode of production, and oriental despotism analyses have not gone unchallenged by historians even for the early modern periods of the Empire.⁶ In addition, a theoretical fallacy arises from the use of the category of “patrimonialism”. *First* of all, as Yalman (1997: 111-112) points out, “if the Ottoman-Turkish state was one of the historical examples of such arbitrary rule which inspired Weber to construct his ideal-type of patrimonial domination, then, it would be a contradiction in terms to single out the social formation in question as an example of high stateness on the basis of a centralized, differentiated set of institutions. For patrimonial rule was distinguished first and foremost by the *absence* of such a ‘bureaucratic separation’ of the ‘private’ and the ‘official’ sphere”. *Secondly*, patrimonialism is not a useful category for distinguishing the Western absolutist political structures and forms from those of the East. The features of patrimonialism as an ideal-typical category are also common features of European absolutism. For instance, “the lack of differentiation between means of administration and appropriation” is a common feature of patrimonial and

⁶ For instance, Faroqhi (1991a; 1991b) argues that the Ottoman state of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has more similarities than divergences with centralized, late-feudal states in Europe; that social transformation (such as the development of private property forms) was generated by internal dynamics rather than mere external impulses; and that class tensions were not absent in Ottoman social structure before the incorporation into world capitalist economy. For a similar analysis of the early modern state formation and its internal dynamics in the Ottoman Empire see Abou-El-Haj (2000).

European absolutist forms of state, and the development of capitalism was not, historically speaking, necessarily due to the bureaucratic-rational state but rather accelerated under the traditional state structures (see Corrigan and Sayer, 1985). *Thirdly*, to evaluate the history of classical pre-modern Ottoman social structure from the vantage point of modern capitalist categories is simply anachronistic and a-historical. The formal-institutional separations of the state-the economy, the state-the market, the political-the economic, the state-the civil society are used as if they are trans-historical separations whereas in fact they are historically specific to modern capitalist social formations (see Wood, 1996; Sayer, 1987; 1990) . As Dinler (2003: 24) reveals in her comprehensive critique of the “strong state tradition” thesis, there is a systematic confusion or ambiguity about the periods in comparison. The classical-ideal Ottoman patrimonial social-political structure is compared with feudal Europe, European absolutist state, and capitalist social and political structures at the same time.

Having noted those points of critique, I should state that what I problematize is how “this patrimonial state tradition”, whereby the state is conceived as an entity and/or subject standing outside and above society, has been extended to define and determine the succeeding state forms which emerged during the capitalist modernization process from the late nineteenth century onwards. All the successive reforms for reordering the institutional structure and the form of the state are interpreted in terms of the reproduction of the classical relations of domination in favor of the bureaucracy and ‘the state’. All succeeding state interventions in the economy are interpreted as obstructing an ideal-type market economy. Finally both are pictured as factors inhibiting the establishment of bourgeois hegemony. Those changes in the institutional structure and

forms of state are sometimes taken as determined by a centuries-old state tradition⁷ or by a historically unfolding essential power relation between a series of binary oppositions: bureaucracy and social forces (especially the bourgeoisie), center and periphery, state and (civil) society.

Even though it is often acknowledged that the historical developments in the last two century of the Ottoman Empire corresponded to the dissolution of the preexisting mode of production and social structure as a result of the incorporation into the world capitalist economy and the peripheralization of Ottoman Empire,⁸ many authors continued to interpret the social, political, military and economic reform policies as resulting from the will of a bureaucracy who wants to preserve its privileged position both within the relations of production and the relations of domination against a rising bourgeoisie, or to put it in a different conceptualization, as “the desire to strengthen the centre” against the peripheral social forces (see Keyder, 1987: 75-77, 96; 1988a: 159, 161; Sunar, 2004a: 26, 30; Jacoby, 2004: 43; Heper, 1985: 37; Mardin, 1973). Whereas non-critical modernization theorists interpreted the reforms restructuring the socio-economic and politico-administrative structures as positive steps taken by benevolent modernizers rather than as constituting modern capitalist forms of power relations and techniques(see Lewis, 1968); many in the statist tradition took them as the reflection of

⁷ For an extreme case see Başkaya (2000) who argues that the contemporary authoritarian state institutions, practices, and discourses, including their militarized forms, are rooted in a state tradition unchanged since the Ottoman Empire. Patrimonialism is used not as a characteristic of a specific and historical ‘type of state’ in a specific historical period, but it becomes a trans-historical characteristic of the state in Ottoman-Turkish history. According to İnel (1996: 43-44), patrimonialism connotes a structural characteristic of the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic. “Patrimonialism survived the six hundred years of Ottoman history under various colors, finally permeated into the tissue of Turkish state, and became a reflex sited in its subconsciousness. That is why, in recent Turkish history, the discourse of patrimonialism reveals itself in periods of profound crisis and expresses itself as a startled act producing a state order for a while and as an obligatory return to basic values, i.e. to Kemalism”. No doubt, patrimonialism does not continue its traditional discourse but unfolds itself under the discourses of “westernization”, “republicanism, laicism, and nationalism”.

⁸ For the economic, political and sociological aspects of this peripheralization process see Pamuk (1994; 1999), Kasaba (1993), Keyder (1987: 25-48), Sunar (1974: 12-58).

the will to power of a bureaucratic class for preserving its old dominant position in a transitional historical period rather than as the formation of modern capitalist form of social relations in the spheres of economy, state, law, education, and so on. Both the modern state formation and its constitutive role for capitalism, which form “one and the same process” in Marx’s words, have become, in this interpretation, factors inhibiting the development of capitalist market economy and the capitalist hegemony.

1-b The problematic of the non-autonomization of the economy and the market

Within the intellectual horizon of this statist approach, the capitalist social relations *of* production are supposed to develop independently from state practices in the image of an ideal liberal conception of capitalism as a market economy. Thus, the state is perceived as a factor first impeding the development of capitalist relations of production during the Ottoman Empire, and then distorting, if not still blocking, the capitalist development. The non-autonomization of the economy and the market from the interventions of the state is taken as one of the symptoms of this distortion. Despite the changing institutional structure of the state through successive politico-administrative reforms and the development of a new economic structure based on private property, modern taxation system and similar institutionalizations, the socio-economic structure is said to bear the marks of patrimonial ‘economy’, to be neo-patrimonial and far from being strongly capitalist or a market society (İnsel and Aktar, 1985-87: 29; Insel, 1996: 147-155; Mardin, 1994a: 200; see also Keyder, 1987: 127; Sunar, 2004a: 30). Even when it is recognized that “the economy” has been increasingly separated from the state, it is boldly remarked that “yet the state continued to be the

dominant structure” (Sunar, 1974a: 14).⁹ To the extent that the relations *of* production have been reduced to the economic relations within an idealized market economy as a self-regulating entity, even authors like İnsel, who is one of the most prominent critics of economism/economist reductionism,¹⁰ has treated the role of state practices destined to constitute ‘the capitalist economy’ as an Ottoman-Turkish aberration. This peculiarity, which is explained by the strong state tradition, is supposed to undermine the possibility of “conceiving the economy as an autonomous sphere determining its own destiny”. Hence, the argument goes, the main motive behind the state interventions in the economy has primarily been to preserve “the survival of the state” (*devletin bekası*) and/or the domination of the state over (civil) society rather than to promote capitalist accumulation, capitalist social development and to manufacture class-based power relations (see İnsel, 1996: 14, 47, 63 *inter alia*).¹¹

⁹ According to Sunar (2004a: 7, 13, 30) “Ottoman state ceased to be redistributive without becoming a capitalist market economy”. At most, it became a transitional peripheral formation, “an articulated combination of capitalist market and redistributive patrimonialism”. A peculiar combination of “a capitalist rationality” and “patrimonial logic” dominated over the actions of the state and commercial groups. For “the relatively free development of market economics and market society” and for “the gradual transfer of state power from the bureaucratic to entrepreneurial control” one should wait the 1950s.

¹⁰ For his useful and sophisticated critique of economism see İnsel (2000). İnsel (1996: 55, 104) criticizes and wants to discard the marxist conception of ‘mode of production’ for being technologist; he also criticizes those economist approaches who reduces ‘capital’ and ‘class struggles’ to the economy, which is fair enough. However, he, at the same time, rules out any non-economistic Marxist conceptualization of those concepts in the way we tried to construct in the first part of this dissertation.

¹¹ In fact, there is a continuous tension in İnsel’s mentioned book between an implicit economism and an explicit anti-economism. The implicit economism reveals itself in moments where state interventions in the economy are interpreted as an abnormality in comparison to an ideal type of “market society” or “economy society”. The whole book is guided with the question why Ottoman-Turkish society could not become a full economy/market society as if such a thing is possible and has been a reality in the European path of capitalist development. At such decisive moments, İnsel unintentionally substitutes the social imaginary of the liberal-bourgeois thought for the social reality itself. This fallacy is rooted in the fact that he reduces the social reality into social imaginary, which is part but only part of the social reality. For instance, he justifiably delineates the dominance of statist-organicist power discourse but discards the possibility that this specific discourse was in fact constitutive of a capitalist hegemonic project. He fails to see that the interventions by the state which are legitimized and hegemonized by such a discourse were not necessarily antithetical to the development of capitalist relations *of* production. Similarly, he justly exposes how Etatism was not merely an economic development strategy but also a mode of political domination; but he treats these two moments as ontologically separate and antagonistic rationalities as if

The normative and analytical social imaginary appropriated by liberal adherents of this intellectual line is formulated as follows: “There could be no development without a market economy, and no market economy without an independent civil society” (Sunar, 1974: 10). A liberal imaginary which takes the economy/market and the state/political as ontologically two self-regulating and distinct entities underlies this approach. The regulating principle is an ideal liberal model according to which a thorough capitalist transition should have been based on the dissolution of the privileged status of state apparatus. This is why Keyder (1987: 75) asks “Would it have been possible to achieve a capitalist transition while the state apparatus protected its privileged status?” Hence, the state’s constitutive presence within the relations *of* production is overlooked and capitalist relations of production are supposed to be made in a process whereby ‘the economy’ is being separated from other social, political, cultural practices. The fact that state power is internally constitutive of the “market economy”, which is *one* of the forms of capitalist relations *of* production, is also overlooked. The liberal ideological representation of ‘the market’ and/or ‘the economy’, even when normatively rejected, is taken as something actually existing (or which existed in the liberal age of capitalism) rather than as a specific perception and presentation of social reality within a specific power discourse. In as much as they do not problematize the construction of the idea of the autonomous market mechanism and/or economic sphere with their own rules of reproduction and take them as given, they contribute to the ideological horizon of bourgeoisie. As Yalman (1997: 92) underlines, “rather than problematizing the mental construct of an ‘autonomous’ market economy, it had been accorded the status of an ‘objective’ reality, in as much as it

any regime of accumulation or accumulation strategy can exist independently from a related mode of regulation or a hegemonic project in any real-concrete instance.

fulfilled a political and/or ideological function in regards to the aspirations of both the nascent bourgeoisie and the petty commodity producers”.

What needs to be problematized is how indeed such a separation between the state and the economy, the political and the economic has been constitutive of capitalist power relations. Following Timothy Mitchell (1999), I contend that “we must take the elusiveness of the boundary between state and society,¹² not as a problem of conceptual precision but as a clue to the nature of the phenomenon...We need to examine the political processes through which the uncertain yet powerful distinction between state and society is produced”. In a more recent study, Mitchell (2002) analyzes how “the idea of the economy” emerged between the 1930s and 1950s, “meaning the totality of monetarized exchanges within a defined space” and the “mechanism of market exchange” based on “a self-contained and self-regulating structure or mechanism”. He explores how the production of these artifacts (economy, market) is a technique of power constituting a specific power relation. In any historical analysis, those abstractions (the market or the economy as self-regulating entities) collapse, for the economy or the market is always dependent, in each specific concrete instance, upon its so-called exterior: the politics, the state, the law, the political, the culture (see also Graham-Gibson, 1997). This is what gives the validity to our argument about the internality of ideological cultural, political, legal factors to the relations *of* production.

There is nothing astonishing in the fact that liberal social theorists adopt this liberal imaginary. What is striking is that it has been appropriated by some radical social theorists whose intellectual roots lie in Marxian and critical social theories. For instance, this liberal imaginary is explicitly stated in Keyder’s latest work too. From a liberal

¹² As Mitchell himself notes, the replacement of state-society couple by state-economy, state-market couples do not invalidate the main concern expressed in this quotation.

vantage point, Keyder reconstructs the Ottoman-Turkish history as a continuous struggle between nationalist-organicist-statist and liberal forms of politics. In his revisionist narrative, in which the nineteenth century Ottoman history is now narrated as a process of liberalization, the Empire as a liberal and multicultural form of polity provides an ideal model and political alternative for the current global neoliberal capitalism.¹³ Leaving aside the issue of historical accurateness of this gradual liberalization narrative, what needs to be problematicized is the idealization of this liberalization process. The establishment of the rule of property is an example of how this non-critical liberal position masks the real political power relations that constitute the so-called liberal institutions. Keyder explicitly appropriates the liberal standpoint according to which property rights form the basis and the premise of citizenship rights that protect the individual against the state. They are also guarantees of the rule of law and of a predictable legal and political milieu as contrasted to the arbitrary rule of the state (Keyder, 2003: 107). However, once the establishment of the rule of property is abstracted from the social struggles or the latter is reduced to an intra-elite struggle in a supposedly weak society, “the history of private property is rather silent on the

¹³ For a critical evaluation of Keyder’s latest work see Özbek (2003) who reveals the problematic nature of his liberal political vantage point and the implications of this normative position on his historiographical narrative. Whereas in his earlier studies Keyder defined the whole nineteenth century by the ongoing dominance of the despotic state emanating from the Asiatic mode of production, now he rejects the idea of an unchanging state tradition and relegates it to the pre-*Tanzimat* period and interprets the following period until 1910 (when the Committee of Union and Progress shifted to authoritarian-nationalist mode of governance) as a process of liberal-capitalist modernization (Keyder, 2003: 110, 185 *inter alia*). He also attributes an increasing role to his privileged social actor, namely the bourgeoisie. While, in his previous work, the only subject of change, namely the non-Muslim bourgeoisie, did play the card of inter-state competition instead of changing the Empire (Keyder, 1987: 77), in his latest work, Keyder started to argue that the non-Muslim bourgeoisie mainly aimed at transforming the empire into a liberal, constitutional modern state (Keyder, 2003: 42-44, 106-110 *inter alia*). Such interpretation of the nineteenth century of Ottoman social change as one of gradual liberal-capitalist modernization, as a transition to a capitalist market economy is not peculiar to Keyder (for a previous example see Sunar, 1974). Even though such a reading seems to be more sensitive to social change and to its internal dynamics and actors, in as much as this process of liberal-capitalist modernization is idealized in a comparison with organicist-nationalist capitalist development, it masks the contradictory social nature and power relations of this historical process, hence it reproduces the postulates of non-critical modernization theories.

conditions that produced it and the precedents incorporated in it". In other words, it has little to say how private property was actually constituted, since the actual process whereby private property is constituted should bring to the fore "questions of power, discipline, coercion, and dispossession". The analysis of such an actual process would reveal that, *pace* the liberal arguments, the state with its despotic and infrastructural powers, its arbitrary rule, and its powers of exception is constitutive of capitalist property relations.¹⁴ Otherwise, an abstracted version of the history of the rule of property reifies the property as a relation between a person and thing by abstracting it from the web of power relations that constitute it. On the other hand, it obscures the fact that the state, the law, the coercion have been constitutive of the so called market economy order. It also silences the way in which the social struggles among many actors in that process are inscribed in the institutional materiality of the state.¹⁵

1-c Autonomous State? Dominant Bureaucracy?

The conception of the state as an independent entity in itself standing outside the society is the central assumption of the hegemonic statist approach to the state. It becomes more authoritative on the issue of the relation between the state and the social forces. The main sub-argument of this hegemonic discourse is that the state has been autonomous or even independent from the social forces, including the dominant class and class fractions. This sub-argument is more decisive for my problematicization of the articulation of militarism, capitalism, and the state because it generally defines the

¹⁴ The preceding quotations are from Mitchell (2002: 57, 77). For an analysis of the actual processes through which the rule of property has been established in Egypt see Mitchell (2002: 54-79).

¹⁵ İslamoğlu (2001) offers an excellent example of such an approach for the analysis of 1858 Land Code of the Ottoman Empire. Her analysis also challenges the image of Ottoman-Turkish state as an independent entity which is not responsive to the social struggles and demands.

framework within which the militarization of political processes and structures are analyzed as I shall discuss.

Before discussing the argument for the Turkish case, I will briefly give a theoretical background for the state autonomy discussion. Following Michael Mann (1993: 44-52), I will differentiate between two variants of statist approach to state theory, namely elitist theory (sometimes called statism or managerialism) and “institutional statism”. Both emphasize the autonomy of state power, albeit in quite different versions. *Elitist theory* emphasizes “the distributive power of state elites *over* society.” States or state elites are seen as actors in their own right having their own particular interests. This subjectivist reading of the state, which reduces the state to a decision-maker subject whose actions are not determined or circumscribed by social forces or are even realized despite those forces, is best epitomized in the following definition of Theda Skocpol (1985: 9):

States conceived as organizations claiming control over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society. This is what is usually meant by “state autonomy”. Unless such independent goal formulation occurs, there is little need to talk about states as important actors”. Hence, the term refers to “the ‘capacities’ of states to implement official goals, especially *over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances*. (Italics are mine).

Institutional statism, in its turn, emphasizes a structural autonomy rooted not in the particular interests of the state elites but in the historical peculiarity of the modern state structure.¹⁶ “This is ‘state power’ though rarely ‘elite power’...This theory would

¹⁶ Elitist and institutionalist versions of statism need not be always mutually exclusive. Skocpol (1985) is a good example for she also integrates the institutional materiality of the state into her theory. In that sense, she emphasizes both the *capacities of state* to implement specific projects and the Tocquevillian unintentional selective effects of state’s institutional structures on social actors. Meanwhile, the elitist strand of her argument remains the determinant factor of her statist approach. Even though she calls for the analysis of state-society interrelations, her understanding of autonomy excludes the societal elements despite the fact that in her concrete analyses of cases of autonomous state action she paradoxically has to admit, *pace* herself, that social forces always penetrate the state, which undermines her subjectivist account of state autonomy (for this last point see Mitchell, 1991: 86-89). For another example of the

predict less that state elites dominate civil society actors and more that all actors are constrained by existing political institutions” which resulted from the previous social-political struggles. This second form of analysis is the point of convergence between the sui-generis neo-Weberian theory of Mann and the neo-Marxist analyses of state upon which I founded my own theoretical position in the first part of the dissertation. The former acknowledges that “states institutionalize present social conflicts, but institutionalized historic conflicts then exert considerable power over new conflicts - from state as passive place...to state not quite as actor but as active place” (Mann, 1993: 52). In a similar vein, the latter recognizes the institutional materiality of the state and its active, constitutive role in capitalist power relations (Poulantzas, 1978; Jessop, 1990, 2001; Corrigan and Sayer, 1985; Neocleous, 1996; Wood, 1996). To put it otherwise, on the one hand, such an approach incorporates the analysis of the institutional structuring of the state apparatus, state capacities to implement particular hegemonic projects, the specific mechanisms and rationalities of governing. On the other hand, it asserts that the formation of institutional structuring of the state and the powers embedded in this institutional structure result from diverse social struggles, be it class-based or class-relevant. Hence, every form of state both embodies previous social struggles and selects specific balance of forces. *How, in what direction, to what extent, and for what purposes the power embedded in state institutions is to be used is contingent upon the social-political struggles.*

In Turkey, it is the elitist theory version rather than institutional statism that has been influential in the analysis of state-society relation. According to this approach, the

subjectivist statism see Nordlinger (1987). For an insightful mid-position from a Marxist standpoint see Block (1987) who recognizes that state managers are self-interested maximizers in pursuit of power, prestige and wealth but that this is contingently limited by particular patterns of class relations.

state, either as a subject in itself or incarnated in the subjectivity of the bureaucracy as an autonomous actor, acts independently from and against the social forces, including the dominant classes. Neither the institutional materiality of the state nor the state elites (mainly the civil and military bureaucracy) have been circumscribed by social power relations. This perception of a state *above* and *outside* of society results in arguing that the state practices have not been responsive to social-political struggles. The main axis of conflict is said to be between a powerful bureaucracy as the dominant social force and a weak bourgeoisie as the rising counter-hegemonic force.

The bureaucracy is conceptualized either as an autonomous status group having its own corporate interests (Heper, 1985) or as “a surplus-receiving class” (Keyder, 1987: 26, 29). To start with the second, the identification of the Ottoman patrimonial *bureaucracy as the surplus expropriating class* in the Asiatic mode of production has been used as an explanatory variable for the historical process of capitalist modernization and state formation too. For instance, according to Keyder (1987: 75-77), even in the late Ottoman period, the “governing class” sought to keep the classical social structure based on “small property land ownership” and “the dominant protected social relation between the bureaucracy and the independent peasantry”. The Young Turk attempt at social change, he argues, reproduced the strong state tradition as a result of which “the political apparatus would not be totally responsive to capitalist needs...An autonomous state class established tutelage over bourgeoning capitalist interests”. Although he recognizes the qualitative change from the patrimonial to modern bureaucracy under the successive administrative and political reforms during the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, he insists that the bureaucracy continued to be the dominant class vis-à-vis the rising bourgeoisie against whom it struggled: “the

social project of the bureaucracy, implicit or declared, whether of a transformationist or a restorationist nature, would necessarily oppose the system definition implied in capitalist integration and mercantile activity". Hence, even the modern bureaucracy continued to be a "state class" and "the organic intelligentsia of their own class" (Keyder, 1988b: 192, 193; 1998: 32). "The peculiar status of the bureaucracy as a ruling class" continued even during the early Republican period. Although coalitions and collaborations took place in some historical periods, the relation between the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie is treated as one of contradiction and struggle over the control of state apparatus and economic surplus. By 1929, he argues, "the bureaucratic faction in power had emerged victorious from the intra-class struggle" against the bourgeoisie, and started at "transforming the economic system such that its own position within it would conform to that envisaged in the Young Turk project". In this inevitable coalition between the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy during the early Republican era, the latter hold the upper hand: "the bourgeoisie was allowed to privately control portions of the economy only while it obeyed the rules of its association with the bureaucracy" (Keyder, 1987: 96, 125; 1994: 44). It is contended that, at least until the 1950s, if not until nowadays, a (metaphorically patrimonial) state-centered social structure dominated, the bureaucracy continued to be the dominant class or social strata, it was never reduced to "the accommodating role of state managers", the economy did not become capitalist in character, the entrepreneurial model of bourgeoisie did not develop (Keyder, 1987: 124, 127; see also Sunar, 2004a: 30; İnel, 1996: 221-222, 230).¹⁷

¹⁷ It should be noted that according to Keyder (1987: 127), after 1950, the bureaucracy's autonomy became to be dependent upon the accumulation model and intra-bourgeois balances rather than to its status as a class. It is in that sense that he evaluates the autonomy of the bureaucracy during the ISI period between 1960 and 1980. However, he still continues to interpret the relation between the bureaucracy and bourgeoisie as one of contention rather than collaboration. Hence, the bourgeoisie, he argues, was still reluctant and unable to challenge the power of the bureaucracy (see Keyder 1998: 32-33).

Sometimes, it is also contended that even if the bourgeoisie started to play a significant role in terms of economic power in the post-1945 period, it did not appear as an influential actor at the political-ideological stage until the post-1980 period (see Keyder, 2003: 142 and Göle, 1994 as examples from two different theoretical traditions).

Leaving aside, for the moment, the accuracy of this argument for the classical Ottoman social structure, the concept of “bureaucracy as a class”/“state class”¹⁸ is marked by a theoretical inconsistency, especially when extended to the periods of capitalist modernization. Keyder, who continues to identify Young Turk-Republican bureaucracy as a class-in and for-itself, jumps from the class structure of a pre-capitalist social structure to that of a capitalist one without much bothering to expose the specific mechanisms through which the bureaucracy continues to extract the surplus product. This results from the “lack of an analysis of the *anatomy of social classes*”, as Boratav (1993) notes. In “a consistent conceptual framework”, the class analysis should be based on but cannot be reduced to some basic structural properties. In the words of Erik Olin Wright (1985: 34), “classes are *relational*, those relations are *antagonistic*, those antagonisms are rooted in *exploitation*, and exploitation is based on the social relations

¹⁸ The category of “state class” has been subject to a long controversy. According to Waterbury (1991), “the state bourgeoisie consists of those top-level managers and technocrats who are in direct control of the assets owned fully or partially by the state”. It also corresponds to the new middle class mentioned by Halpern (see Part 1), and in several cases includes top echelons of civilian and military bureaucracy. With the mentioned control capacity, this social group is supposed to function as a social class appropriating the surplus-value for its own accumulation ends. This category is often used with reference to a specific “mode of production”: state capitalism. However, as Dupuy and Truchil (1979) notes, this concept is unjustifiably used to denominate *both capitalist societies* where private capital ownership, production and extraction of surplus-value dominate but exist together with a public sector in a specific division of labor in favor of capitalist relations of production *and social(ist)* formations where the principal means of production are owned and the process of exploitation is controlled by the state. The misuse of the concept overlooks the fact that in the process of capitalist development the state has started to play a greater role in the social services, infrastructural activities and production activities not only in late industrializing countries but also in European advanced capitalist countries. However, in such social formations, “the state sector does not represent an autonomous accumulating unit and the state bureaucrats have not transformed themselves into a new capitalist class”. Waterbury notes that the so-called state bourgeoisie does not exist as a class-for-itself for it does not have a collective strategy of reproduction. It should also be added that it is hard to talk about state bourgeoisie as a class-in-itself since the capacity to control production does not mean that they accumulate wealth for their own private ends.

of *production*". Following Boratav (1993:130-133; 1995: 9-10, 25-59), one may differentiate between "*primary relations of production*, which are based on extracting the surplus product from direct producers by specific mechanisms and *secondary relations of distribution*, which correspond to the redistribution of the surplus product through market or non-market mechanisms among social groups/strata (class fractions - industrial, financial, commercial capital- and/or intermediate social strata -bureaucracy, self-employed professionals etc.-). Boratav justly criticizes Keyder for neglecting the fact that the bureaucracy of the twentieth century Ottoman-Turkish society does not correspond to any of the three observable relations of production.¹⁹ Hence, it is theoretically inconsistent to consider the bureaucracy as a social class directly extracting the surplus from the peasantry. In the early years of the Republic, the bureaucracy had already become "a salaried group within a modernized state structure". Another point is that Keyder's definition of bureaucracy as a class-for-itself is problematic too. It is now widely acknowledged within Marxist theory that class structure/class position (class-in-itself) entails little about class formation and class struggle (class-for-itself) (see Wright, 1985; Poulantzas, 1979a: 13-35; Thompson, 1963; Przeworski, 1985). "Classes are not given by any objective positions because they constitute effects of struggles... Class struggles are neither epiphenomenal, nor free from determination. They are structured by the totality of economic, political, and ideological relations... Political class struggle is a struggle about class before it is a struggle among classes" (Przeworski, 1985: 66-67, 71). Hence, although a structural definition of class and a class map are necessary for any class analysis, the analysis of the complex process of class formation and struggle is the

¹⁹ These are capitalist (the working class vs. the bourgeoisie), semi-feudal (landless tenant farmers vs. landlords), and petty commodity production (market-oriented peasantry vs. merchants/moneylenders). For a comprehensive map of class structure see Boratav (1995: 29).

sine qua non of a class-based analysis of political power relations. Keyder remains silent on the class formation process of bureaucracy, which produces a strong deficiency for his argument of the bureaucracy as a class having a distinct political project.²⁰ Hence, the unity of the bureaucracy and of the state apparatus, which contingently results from struggles among specific state projects, is taken as given in an essentialist supposition.

However, to expose the impossibility or inconsistency of such a class analysis does not rule out automatically all the arguments about the existence of the bureaucracy as an independent and dominant actor having its own social-political project and about the decisiveness of the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy in modern Turkish history. The same argument may be cast in “*elite*” or “*status group*” terms too. In fact, in his later writings, Keyder (1998) himself started to use interchangeably “state class” and “state elites” terms. The bulk of the social science literature on state-society relations in Turkey, which is inspired by Weberian and modernization theories, casts its analysis in non-class terms yet still asserts the same argument. It is unhesitatingly accepted that that the state elites remained independent from social power groups and the alleged conflict between the bureaucracy and bourgeoisie remained the determinant axis of power relations in Turkey. It is asserted that “the state continued to be an apparatus dominated by the bureaucracy” and the main conflicts have been “intra-bureaucratic” rather than “inter-class” (Sunar, 2004a: 26). Once the officialdom is defined as the ruling group or class, the politics becomes an arena of intra-elite conflict devoid of any social content. The parts and actors of these intra-elite struggles are named differently from one author to the other: to cite few of them; between “the public bureaucracy and the

²⁰ In his latest work, Keyder (2003: 195-197) raises this question about the unity of state elites in the context of state autonomy necessary for the developmental state, however, he does not extend this self-critique to the argument of “bureaucracy-class”. It should also be noted that Keyder does not offer any clear-cut definition of the bureaucracy, hence which social strata are included in this term remains ambiguous.

rising entrepreneurial groups” (Heper, 1976: 487); between the traditional state elites and the new entrepreneurial class (Mardin, 1992c: 116-117); the state elites versus social and economic elites (Kazancıgil, 1981); statist-elitist bureaucrats versus traditionalist-liberals (Kongar, 1985), between the “bureaucratic” and “counter-bureaucratic” elites (Akarlı, 1975).

The theory of center-periphery provides another theoretical framework to construct state and society as self-contained and externally related entities and (re)produce the main arguments of the hegemonic statist approach. The center-periphery paradigm reduces all struggles in the Ottoman-Turkish history into a struggle between a center (strong state) and periphery (weak society) and denies the existence of class-based power relations. Unlike European state formation, it is contended, whereby forces of the periphery (the feudal nobility, the cities, the burghers, industrial labor) have been integrated into the center in a process of successive and multiple confrontations and co-optations; in the Ottoman-Turkish history, the major confrontation has been one-dimensional, namely between center and periphery, (Mardin, 1973; Heper, 1980; 1985; Kongar, 1985). The force and radicalness of the argument lies in that this conflict is supposed to have determined the political power relations not only in pre-modern and pre-capitalist periods of Ottoman Empire but also during the whole course of capitalist modernization process.²¹ How these free floater terms are defined? According to Mardin (1994b: 275), “the center stands for the core of legitimacy that enabled the Ottoman state function as well as for the central bureaucratic apparatus that this state was able to use to

²¹ For instance Mardin (1973: 170) writes that “until recently, the confrontation between center and periphery was the most important social cleavage underlying Turkish politics and one that seemed to have survived more than a century of modernization”. Or Heper (1976: 487; 1985): “Although, during recent years, the territorial and cultural cleavages in the Turkish polity tend to be replaced by functional (or class) cleavages, it would be difficult to claim that the traditional center-periphery gap has been completely bridged”. For a more cautious argument see İnel (1996: 86).

keep it together; whereas the periphery denotes the social sphere and institutions and geographical sphere that live separately from but in a loose integration with the center". According to Metin Heper (1985: 72, 93-97; 1998: 46), who is the most prominent scholar of the "strong state tradition" argument, the locus of the center and/or the state is located by different elite groups but decisively not permeated by social forces and social classes: the Sultan and bureaucracy occupied this place in the Ottoman Empire; the civilian bureaucracy during the early republican period; by 1961, the military considered the civil bureaucracy as the "co-loci of the state", however the civil bureaucratic elite remained dominant until 1973 after when the civil bureaucracy was relegated to a secondary role; after 1980 the military has become the principal loci of the state. As to the intra-elite struggles, it has been between state elites-political elites (1950s), leftist elites-rightist elites (1960-80) and secular elites-Islamist elites (post-1980 period) in a chronological order.

Theoretically speaking, "center" and "periphery" are ambiguous concepts which are not conceptually well-defined.²² They do not correspond to any real-concrete entities or relations. They are far from grasping the complexity of social power relations. Neither the "center" can denote the complexities of the state as an institutional ensemble, as a social relation or as an idea. Nor the "periphery" can consume the complex web of power relations in the societal sphere. In their use for the Turkish case, their content has been fixed in order to conceptualize the alleged struggle between (secularist, nationalist, Kemalist) state elites and various social forces such as social groups whose ideologies and identities are based on interpretations of religion, conservative-liberal political

²² Saybaşılı (1992: 27) also indicates the ambiguity of the "center" concept. He justly asks whether the center denotes "the political power", "any power in the sense of government", "bureaucracy", "the military section of the bureaucracy", some "civilians" or "elites". It is also not clear how this concept is distinguished from that of "the state".

currents, pro-market and liberal bourgeoisie, the working class and so on. Hence, the periphery becomes a catch-all concept devoid of any explanatory power. It includes many antagonistic and/or conflictual social relations as if they are by definition part of the periphery in opposition to the center. What I propose is to take this couple, or better to say the very construction of this binary opposition, as elements of a specific power discourse rather than analytical tools. These two free floating concepts are hegemonized in a specific power discourse. If all projects of hegemony, all power discourses are at the same time a struggle over how to define the main axis of political conflict, they are all based on the mechanism of “enframing”. Enframing corresponds to a power mechanism through which “a variety of modern practices ... seem to resolve the world’s shifting complexity into two simple and distinct dimensions” or to “constructing a world that appears to consist not of a complex of social practices but of a binary order”.²³ Hence, I contend that constructing “the center” and “the periphery” as two separated entities/spheres with their own (not well defined) rules and logics is itself an act of hegemony. On the one hand, it enframes the political confrontation to one dimension; on the other hand, it excludes from the scene other forms of social and political power relations, specifically the class-based power relations. By producing a series of externalities, it obscures how in fact center and periphery are constitutive of each other, how in fact different power discourses and hegemonic projects have been produced in

²³ “The apparent existence of such unphysical frameworks or structures is precisely the effect introduced by modern mechanisms of power and it is through this elusive yet powerful effect that modern systems of domination are maintained”. See Mitchell (1990: 566, 561; 1991: 94; 1988: ch 2). Though I find revealing Mitchell’s deconstruction of these binary oppositions, his post-structuralist position refrains him from analyzing the state as a social relation and the selective impact of the institutional materiality of the state. He exclusively takes the state as an idea or a discourse and explores the discursive and non-discursive mechanisms/practices that produce such binary distinctions. He perfectly discloses how the construction of such binary artefacts are essential to modern techniques of power and he exposes the multiplicity of social and political struggles and actors. But he does not bother to show how those multiple struggles are articulated into each other to form specific hegemonic projects for which the mentioned binary oppositions are central, he is nor interested in the class nature of those hegemonic projects.

social processes transgressing the so called centre and periphery distinctions. In other words, the center-periphery framework rules out by definition the possibility of explaining any collaboration between political and societal actors, any possibility for a hegemonic project that would bring together the so-called central and peripheral forces.²⁴

1-d State and Bourgeoisie: Beyond the Weakness and Dependency Problematic

The sharpness of the argument about the domination of the state elites over the social forces stems from the assertion that the state elites dominated not only over the dominated classes but also the dominant ones. This is directly related to the argument about the weakness of the bourgeoisie vis-à-vis the state elites. It is argued that the state elites governed despite the demands of the bourgeoisie, without taking into account the demands of the bourgeoisie. Hence, according to this reading, the institutional structure of the state and policy outcomes results from the will to power of bureaucratic and political elites and/or the struggle between the bureaucratic-political elites and the bourgeoisie. Not only the subaltern classes and social groups but also the dominant ones are portrayed as incapable to inscribe their demands into the institutional materiality of the state. This weakness is asserted at two moments of class relations: at the economic-corporate or better to say at the level of accumulation strategies (economic development models), and that of political-hegemonic moment relating to the forms of polity and state.

²⁴ In fact, there are many cases in which those forces which are ascribed to either centre or periphery exist in fact as articulated into each other. The centre-periphery paradigm overlooks the periods of collaborations between the bureaucracy and social classes (for example the collaboration between landed classes, merchant bourgeoisie and bureaucracy to give an example for the most challenging historical period, the early republican); the periods in which liberal economic policies have been adopted by central bureaucracies (the most explicit one being the post-1980 period); the periods in which religious discourse has been articulated into the state official ideology (from the mid-1970s on wards); the strong support by the so-called peripheral forces to the military interventions. The examples may be multiplied.

1: The Bourgeoisie and the Formation of Accumulation Strategies

According to the hegemonic statist reading, the bureaucratic elite not only did not support business groups but also hindered their development. Neither the state elites nor political elites have been responsive to the demands of economic groups (Heper, 1985: 101; 1976: 495). It is contended that “in Turkey, there was no sharing of interests between the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie”. Even though economic development has become a concern for the State elites from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, the argument goes, this concern “did not persuade the State elites of the necessity of forming organic links with civil society elements. The state continued to act without any allies in civil society” (Heper, 1991a: 20, 14). To put it otherwise, “the Turkish state had a considerable degree of autonomy...the business community was far from being able to dictate its choices on policymakers” (Buğra, 1994a: 103). Hence, the accumulation strategies were initiated by the political and bureaucratic elites in way that would increase and/or consolidate the state elites’ own interests either at the expense of bourgeoisie’s demands and interests (especially, during the national economy project of late Ottoman-early Republican periods and Etatist period) or in a coalition with the bourgeoisie as the dependent ally (Etatist and ISI periods) (İnsel, 1996; Heper, 1985; Keyder, 1987: 109; 1988b: 197).

The dominant mode of interest representation is given as a case supporting the “weak bourgeoisie” argument. Metin Heper (1991a; 1991b) argues that in societies with strong state tradition such as France and Turkey, neither pluralism, which “requires a government basically responsive to civil society”, nor neo-corporatism, which “necessitates a harmonious relationship between the State and civil society” may be encountered. What is determinant is monism and regulation from above, a monologue of

the state elites. To the extent that the state needed the consultation of business groups, it did so via state-regulated and state-controlled semi-public associations, namely industrial and commercial chambers.²⁵ In most of the times, it is argued, particularistic, clientelistic and personalistic relations between the businessmen and politics replaced the institutional-organizational relations as the state did not let autonomous, voluntary organizations to interfere in the process of policy-making and the business organizations could not have an impact on economic decision-making. This has been the case despite the development of voluntary businessmen organizations with an objective “to take part in the social and economy policy process” (see also Buğra, 1994a: 256-257 *inter alia*; 1998: 526).

Even though the complex issue of modes of interest representation is beyond the scope of this thesis, it may be said that the exclusive emphasis on the domination of clientelistic-particularistic relations between the political elites and the capitalist class overlooks the fact that the interest organization and representation have been far from unified and homogeneous in modern Turkish history. As Bianchi (1984) notes, Turkish associational life has brought together the pluralist network of private voluntary associations and the corporatist network of semiofficial compulsory associations. And the dominant mode of interest intermediation oscillated between statist and societal forms of corporatism.²⁶ The relative weight of these types and of different strategies for

²⁵ On industrial and commercial chambers see Öncü (1980), Saybaşılı (1976a; 1976b).

²⁶ I should first note that any discussion of corporatism or mode of interest intermediation should in fact be relational in the sense that it should take into account the working class and the bourgeoisie together to the extent that it is essentially a technique of regulating class power relations. Those focusing on state-bourgeoisie relations generally disregard this point. The differentiation between statist and societal forms of corporatism belongs to Schmitter (1974) and is based on the degree to which interest-based associations are subordinated to the state. In (liberal) societal corporatism (or neo-corporatism), which emerges out of the decay of advanced pluralism, associations emerge spontaneously, have considerable autonomy, and themselves penetrate the state, whereas (authoritarian) state corporatism is characterized by associations that are created by, dependent upon, and penetrated by the state. On the other hand, these two types have

governing the relations between social classes changed as different accumulation strategies, hegemonic projects, and modes of political domination varied over time as a result of intra- and inter-class struggles. There is no doubt that the form of interest representation always has important effects on power relations between classes and class fractions (on their capacity of organization, on their degree of political influence etc.). Even if one accepts that state corporatism and/or particularistic-clientelistic modes of interest intermediation have been more influential as it is conventionally acknowledged by statist-institutionalist scholars, the fact remains that neither the accumulation strategies adopted in different periods nor state corporatist form of interest intermediation between state managers and bourgeoisie did not challenge the class interests of the bourgeoisie. What is paradoxical is that even though it is acknowledged that the capital groups have benefited from these particularistic-clientelistic relations, “the rent-seeking activity in an interventionist environment of this particular type”, and the discretionary legal changes and political interventions, they are still interpreted as distorting the class interests or consolidating the weakness of the bourgeoisie and its dependency on the state (Buğra, 1994a: 120-121, 135-136; 1995: 36-37).

It is possible to argue that even though the particularistic-clientelistic relations between the bourgeoisie and the state managers favor the economic-corporate interests of capitalist class, the state corporatism as the dominant form of interest representation impedes the class interests to be actively represented at the political-hegemonic level. For example, according to Buğra, unless the bourgeoisie develops a form of pluralist or societal-(neo)corporatist model of interest representation, it is unable to become “a class

also been qualified by others according to the relative importance of coercive-repressive, co-optative (support seeking), and inductive (organizational and policy benefits) techniques since they are always used in mixture. See Bianchi (1984: 28, 138-139, 143, 377-397).

for itself". She argues that even though the bourgeoisie has acquired a special position in policy formation and implementation in the post-1980 Turkey, the situation is more similar to South Korean and Japan cases wherein "an unequal partnership between the strong and highly autonomous state and the state-dependent big conglomerates" excluded the working class (Buğra, 1994b: 253; 1994a: 262). One should ask why the exclusion of labor from policy formulation and implementation should be read as the incapacity of the bourgeoisie to become a class for itself rather than quite on the contrary, and why despite the active role played by capitalist class in policy formulation and implementation, the relation between the state and the bourgeoisie is still depicted as one of friction, dependency and weakness-strongness. In other words, there is neither a theoretical nor a historical base for restricting the class-for-itself activities to pluralist or neo-corporatist forms of interest representation unless one works with an ideal model.

In fact, the "passive bourgeoisie" argument would be a misgeneralization since there are wide evidences that capitalist class interests have actively participated in the formulation of diverse accumulation strategies. To give some examples, the "national economy" project of the post-1908 period was supported by the nascent Muslim-Turkish commercial bourgeoisie represented in the chambers of commerce (see Toprak, 1995). Similarly, it is very well documented how in the 1923 Economic Congress, wherein the economic development project of the 1920s was formed, the representatives of commercial bourgeoisie and big landowners actively defended and inscribed their interests in the subsequent accumulation strategy, and there was a collaboration rather than a confrontation between state managers and businessmen in terms of accumulation strategy (see Ökçün, 1971; Tezel, 1994: 148-152; Boratav, 1982: 12-18). Even the Etatist project of 1930s, which could potentially be the most challenging accumulation

strategy was pro-private sector and despite some points of disagreement, the private sector of the period supported the model since the interventions for regulating the economy mainly favored private capital accumulation. The business circles were active in shaping the *form* of Etatism and the governments of the period had to take into account their critiques and demands (Tekeli and İlkin, 1982; Boratav, 1982; Tezel, 1994: 248-257; Altıparmak, 2002).²⁷ Similarly, during the ISI-based capitalist development period too, the diverse economic-corporate interests of the bourgeoisie were such decisive that it was the lack of autonomy of the state because of the excessive interest group pressures by fractions of the bourgeoisie that has been hold responsible for the incapacity of the state to deal with the contradictions of ISI. In fact, the few exceptional scholarly works that have taken into account the intra-class struggles between fractions of the bourgeoisie are full of evidences for the assertion that various changes in policy outcomes, which were supposed to form state-originated uncertainties for the economy, in fact resulted from the intra-class struggles in which the corporatist and voluntary

²⁷ See also Buğra (1994a: 101-112). She acknowledges that the businessmen of the period were in favor of state interventions and regulations. One may also find evidences for the activeness of the businessmen in Buğra's own work, *pace* her own interpretations. The most statist part of the Etatist policies, namely price controls were proposed by the businessmen themselves. Similarly the much mentioned policies about restricting the competition and preventing the overproduction, which are supposed to represent anti-industrialist lean of the State elites, were supported by the businessmen. The contention was over the rights and privileges accorded to the given sectors not on the Etatist project as a whole. In fact, elsewhere even Buğra (1991) herself admits that compared to the post-1980 neoliberal period "the *étatist* era was probably more favourable to the development of a self-confident business community". However, she continues to emphasize the continuity in state-business relations in terms of state challenges for the business community, state causing insecurity and uncertainty in the private sector. Let me give another example from the Etatist period, a period in which the state is supposed to have the greatest autonomy of all the periods and the bourgeoisie exists in its most weakest stage. The businessmen (the National Union of Insutrialists) resisted the termination of the privileges concerning tariff exemptions given to industrialists, which resulted in the replacement of the minister of economy by a more 'liberal' one. Even though the new minister continued to implement the Etatist project, he was symbolically successful in calming the private sector's fears. Such evidences about the active role played by businessmen organizations in the formulation of economic policy in different historical periods may be multiplied (see Buğra, 1994a: 39, 116-117, 126, 128-130, 134-135).

business organizations were active in shaping, circumscribing, and challenging various policy attempts.²⁸

The above paragraph does not claim that there was no friction or conflict between the capitalist class and bureaucratic-political elites. It just indicates, *pace* statist arguments, that the bourgeoisie has not been weak and passive in the policy formulation processes. Quite on the contrary, it was enough active to circumscribe and (re)orient state policies. Actually, to assume a non-frictional, perfect relation of cooperation between the capitalists and political elites in a functionalist manner would be both theoretically and historically misleading for all capitalist social formations. As we noted earlier, the apparent institutional separation between the economic and the political, which is a structural characteristic of capitalist relations *of* production, problematizes such a functional assumption unless one exposes the mediating link: the contingent formulation of specific accumulation strategies as hegemonic projects in a process of struggles and compromises among the capitalist class, the working class, and the state managers.

However, one of the most important guiding problematics of the dominant historiography on state-bourgeoisie relation in Turkey, namely *the dependency of the Turkish bourgeoisie on the state*, makes impossible to grasp the relation between the state and classes in a non-instrumentalist and non-functionalist manner. Be it from a liberal-pluralist approach (Heper, 1985), from a critical-institutionalist one (Buğra, 1994; Öniş, 1999; İnsel, 1996) or from a class-theoretical one (Keyder, 1987), there is

²⁸ For such evidences see Barkey (1990), Öncü (1980), Saybaşılı (1976a; 1976b), Göker (2006). Unless the intra-class conflicts and struggles are integrated into the analysis, the statist arguments and their empirical evidences are most of the times misleading since each accumulation strategy adopted by policy-makers (hence state practices) would favor some fractions of capital over others. And this would push some fractions of capital to be critical of the existing accumulation strategies.

one decisive assumption underlying their intellectual horizon and common problematic: the dependency of the Turkish bourgeoisie on the state. This assertion is so hegemonic that it is recognized as the *specifica differentia* of the class formation in Turkey, if not in most late developing countries. This externalization of the relation between the state and classes undermines the possibility of analyzing the construction of class power in capitalist social formations as a process of manufacturing hegemonic projects in and through statal and societal sites.

The liberal-pluralist approach takes the state and the classes as ontologically two distinct entities only externally related into each other. This relation of externality between the state and classes also turns out to be a relation of instrumentality whereby the theoretical postulate that classes have always been formed in and through the state is downplayed. Behind this idea of dependency of Turkish bourgeoisie on the state lies an idealist conceptualization of European history whereby the economy and the classes, which are conceptualized in an economistic fashion, exist as separate entities outside the state. For instance, Heper (1985: 100) contends that in Western experience, even though the absolutist state helped the emergence of bourgeoisie (entrepreneurial middle classes), then the state ceased to be constitutive of class relations, and transformed itself first into an arbitrator then into a positive state, into “an instrumental body with a technical expertise”. Whereas in Turkey, “the State could not be seen as a ‘helpless victim of interests’, for the Turkish State’s autonomy and ability to act on its own initiative could not be denied” (Heper, 1991a: 17-18; 1991b: 167). The dominance of bureaucracy is characterized by “a willingness to act as a policy-initiator and/or policy-maker rather than as a policy-implementer” (Heper, 1985: 72). The “moderate transcendentalist” Turkish state practices are judged from the vantage point of an ideal class-state relation

according to which the state is conceived as a black box to transmit the societal demands formed outside the state to policy implementers. Public policy should be “an outcome of a detached aggregation of interests” (Heper, 1985: 51). Hence, instrumentalist conceptualization of the state is deemed to be the proper mode of a real bourgeois politics. This liberal-pluralist contention is also shared by the well-known “marxist instrumentalism”. This fantasy of an instrumentalist relationship between state and bourgeoisie, in which one of them dominates the other, necessarily imagines the bourgeoisie as weak and passive vis-à-vis the state elites unless the bourgeoisie does not one-sidedly *dictate* its interests to the passive, neutral bureaucratic technicians. Hence, the history of Turkey becomes a zero-sum struggle between the state (the bureaucracy) and the bourgeoisie, normatively guided by the problematic of the autonomization of the bourgeoisie as a class from the state.²⁹ As a result, the constitutive presence of the state within the relations *of* production is overlooked in this philosophy of external relation. This problematic obscures the fact that in any historical model of capitalism, the issue is not whether the state is constitutive of relations of production or whether classes are formed in and through the state or whether the state intervenes (or not) in the economy. The question at hand should be through what forms of state, what forms of state intervention class relations, “the market” and “the economy” as forms of capitalist relations of production are constituted.

As to *the critical institutionalist* approach, it seems to theoretically recognize the constitutive role of state intervention in the formation of a capitalist economy and accumulation strategies. However, it also underlines that the state-bourgeoisie relation in Turkey is marked by a historical continuity whereby the bourgeoisie has been dependent

²⁹ For various works based on the problematic of the autonomization of the bourgeoisie from the state see Keyder (1987), Sunar (1974), Heper (1985), Mardin (1994a).

on the state and the state has been responsible for the dysfunctions of developmental projects/accumulation strategies. Hence, the vantage point of their problematic has also been “the diminishing of the dependency of the bourgeoisie on the state and to consolidate its social position as a dominant class” (Buğra, 1995: 36). The working assumption underlying this problematic is that the bourgeoisie could not become a dominant class in a proper sense, it could not initiate its own economic-political class project, and it has been subjugated to those of the state actors. The bourgeoisie which has been “a class which historically owes its existence and social legitimacy largely to its relations with the state” (Buğra, 1994b: 235), as if it could have been otherwise in somewhere else,³⁰ could not develop as “a self-confident bourgeoisie which could be regarded as enjoying a hegemonic position” due to the existence of the Turkish state as a source of uncertainty for the bourgeoisie (Buğra, 1998: 523). However, what differentiates critical institutionalism from instrumentalism is that this distorted impact of the State arises not because of state intervention per se but from a specific form of state intervention, which, it is contended, has been historically “market repressing” rather than “market augmenting” in Turkey. The failures of accumulation strategies are explained by state practices and state capacities. The statist-institutionalists blame the

³⁰ One of the main supportive arguments for this original sin of state-createdness is that the Turkish bourgeoisie was not emerged on the basis of “a tradition of wealth and social status” such as big landownership. Rather former small merchants and civil servants became the would-be capitalists as a class to be created by the strong state (Buğra, 1994b: 235-238; Keyder, 1994; İnel, 1996: 119). This idea still supposes that a previous tradition of wealth and social status such as big landownership could have established outside of and independently from political power. Or the making of bourgeoisie could have happened without the active presence of state power. Similarly, the much mentioned organic relations between the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie at the individual level is said to form an obstacle for bourgeoisie’s autonomy from the state. There is no doubt that any study of bourgeois class formation should acknowledge that in Turkey, the higher echelons of the bureaucracy have been one of the social sources from which the bourgeoisie emerged. However, this process of class formation has been one of “bourgeoisification of those people” rather than a continuity in “bureaucratization”. To interpret this specific process of bourgeois-class formation as a dependency relation presumes a bourgeoisie with a will to break the ties with the state whereas in fact it was a specific form of enjoying state power for the establishment of capitalist social relations of production.

Turkish state for not having been properly and sufficiently autonomous to discipline the economic-corporate interests of capitalist groups in the economy and for having produced uncertainties in the economic life (Buğra, 1991: 152; 1998: 523; 1994a; Öniş, 1999; Barkey, 1990; İnel, 1996: 259-260). To put it in institutionalist terms, the lack of “embedded autonomy” (Evans, 1995) or “infrastructural power” (Mann, 1984b) is held responsible for the failure of economic policies.

Before discussing the theoretical implications of the critical institutionalism, let me open a parenthesis in order to expose what types of distorting State practices are advanced. Two types of state-originated uncertainty are mentioned: the first is “the social coordinates of business activity and the boundaries of legitimate domain of intervention”; the second pertains to “the frequent and discretionary changes in the direction of economic policy”. The practices of the state managers and political elites are defined as the root cause of this “government-induced uncertainty about the parameters of the economy”. It is contended that “the legal and bureaucratic mechanisms” failed “to introduce an element of stability in state-business relations”. This failure has been reflected in the lack of “a rule-bound, autonomous bureaucracy and a set of clearly defined legal principles that could not be violated by the political authority” and in “the unsettled and unstable character of the bureaucratic apparatus” (Buğra, 1994a: 23, 96, 156-159, 163, 223). According to this line of argument, this also caused a specific bourgeois-class identity, the self-perception of which is marked by *firstly*, “a lack of confidence about the legitimacy of activities carried out in pursuit of pecuniary gain” as a result of which they feel obliged to justify their economic activities by social and cultural activities; *secondly*, “a lack of confidence about the inviolability of private property rights”; *thirdly*, “a certain sense of impotence to influence the direction of

economic, social and political change”; *fourthly*, “lack of efforts to develop any institutionalized form of consultation with bureaucrats and politicians” (Buğra, 1991: 153-154).³¹ Hence, all of these factors form, according to this argument, a great obstacle for “a healthy development of the national economy” and induce the businessmen to “avoid long-term investment projects, and instead seek easy and quick ways of making high profits”.

This also impedes, the argument runs, the development of an ideal type “risk-taking and imaginative entrepreneurship”, of a class independent from the state. It is often repeated that the unusual protections in the form of state patronage, monopoly opportunities make the bourgeoisie dependent on the state. For instance, the fact that “Turkish industrialists are not threatened by, but welcome state intervention in the form of state subsidies and the protection they receive in exploiting a limited market” (Sunar, 1974: 112) is interpreted as an anomaly compared to an ideal Schumpeterian type “risk taking and innovative” bourgeoisie and as a source of dependency to the state (Buğra, 1994a: 214-219; 1991: 158). By conceiving the state and the economy as separately existing entities, the Turkish entrepreneur class is depicted as exploiting state

³¹ There is no doubt that this subjectivist perception should be taken into account as a factor actually existing since it influences the actions of this class. However, it should be noted that this anti-statist stance and perception cannot be extended in an unproblematic way to the whole modern Turkish history. Rather than representing the totality of the actual reality, it should be critically analysed as part of a specific power discourse developed in the post-1980 period. On the other hand, various factors interpreted as causing a dependency relation between the bourgeoisie and the state are open to criticism. I have already touched the third and fourth points above and argued that despite the lack of institutionally well-established model of interest representation, the bourgeoisie has been active in the formulation and implementation of accumulation strategies. The first point should not be read as something peculiar to Turkey, it was common for the centuries-long class formation in Europe too, and the efforts to legitimize the profits may be read as an effort not vis-à-vis the state but the dominated classes, hence as a search for hegemony (see Wallerstein, 1995: 170, 173). As to the inviolability of property rights, such claims are hard to be supported by historical evidences. In fact, even Buğra, who emphasizes that there has existed an ambiguity concerning property rights, a “weakness of the legal basis of property” (Buğra, 1991: 159; 1994: 165-166) had to admit that “the fear of systemic change has never become a reality in Turkey” (Buğra, 1994b: 236). The Wealth Levy of the Second World War period, which is often used as a supportive case (Heper, 1976: 488; Buğra, 1994: 114-116), was in fact, as it is well-known, not a threat for the Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie and its property rights but rather an act of Turkification of the bourgeoisie (see Aktar, 1996) and a specific form of primitive accumulation.

opportunities rather than market opportunities as it should be the case with an ideal entrepreneurship model. In other words, the Turkish bourgeoisie has been rent-seeking rather than profit-making, hence dependent on the state (Buğra, 1994a: 187; Heper, 1985: 102; 1976: 496; İlkin, 1991). The problem with this point is the way the bourgeoisie is conceptualized. Unless one works with an ideal concept of bourgeoisie, rent-seeking would not be treated as an anomalie. As Wallerstein (1995) notes, the above contention about rent-seeking is one of the ahistorical mystifications about the bourgeoisie, and the problem is rooted in the imaginations about how capitalism works. He underlines that, *pace* classical economists, rent has not been the anti-thesis of profit, it was its incarnation. Every capitalist searches for transforming profit into rent, and this latter needs always political power to be allocated. Thus, he discards the well-established claim that in capitalism economic sphere is autonomous from political sphere as a simply wrong.

Coming back to the issue of theoretical relevances and inconsistencies, to the extent that critical institutionalists are concerned with the institutional materiality of the state, they contribute to our understanding of capitalist state as an active place circumscribing the social power relations. However, their institutionalist ontology takes the institutions as the foundational explanatory factor with a “primary causal power” rather than as an entry point to mediate between different levels of analysis. Hence, this “institutional foundationalism”, which “tends to delink processes extrinsic to institutions or lump them into institutions” (Göker, 2006), explain the success or failures of accumulation strategies in terms of the state power and capacity. This state-centric institutional foundationalism takes the institutional materiality of the state as an explanatory variable rather than what needs to be explained because it theoretically rules

out to conceive “the state as a social relation”. State power, state capacity and state practices cease to be the outcome of previous intra- and/or inter-class struggles and compromises. They also cease to be treated as an active place having “strategic selectivity” on the field of class power relations. Hence, the state is reified as an entity existing in itself. The limits of institutionalist-statism lie in the fact that they explain all policy formulation and change by the institutional structure, state tradition and/or state-political actors rather than social struggles which are inscribed in the state’s institutional materiality. As a result of this reification, all dysfunctions, uncertainties, instabilities and unpredictabilities of the process of capitalist development are mainly attributed to the political-state sources; whereas all the so-called non-state sites and actors such as the market and the businessmen are depicted as the victims of this process. However, an alternative theoretical framework of explanation that focuses on intra- and inter-class struggles may pave the way for explaining the lack of “embedded autonomy” by the unwillingness of the bourgeoisie to move beyond its particularistic economic-corporatist interests despite attempts of the bureaucratic elites to formulate its interests at the political-hegemonic moment. Hence, the activeness rather than passiveness, the power rather than the weakness of the bourgeoisie may also come to the fore. As such, one may keep the importance of the problematic of “embedded autonomy” or “relative autonomy” for the expanded reproduction of capitalism while bringing in the class practices as an alternative explanatory factor.

Once the Turkish state is a priori presented as antithetical to capitalism, this brings to the fore a specific type of essentialist reductionism. If economist structuro-functionalism assumes that the state in capitalist society always functions as a promoter of capitalist accumulation in an automatic way because the state is supposed to act as a

collective capitalist group; the statist-institutional reductionism pretends that the Turkish state always functions as an impediment to, as a distorting factor for capitalist development and class hegemony. This corresponds to an *orientalist* trap, for the state becomes the unchanging key explanatory variable for all the failures of a proper way of capitalist development. The “strong state thesis” works like a *deus ex machina* that explains everything (the *explanan*) but does not need to be explained (the *explanandum*). The *explanandum* (the state) and the *explanan* (the state) overlap in a tautological way. As Yalman (1997: 90) notes,

It becomes the *specifica differentia* of the Ottoman-Turkish social formation...From a methodological point of view; it fulfills a function analogous to that of Islam within the Orientalist problematic, since its treatment as an independent variable seems to be justified because of its perception as a phenomenon pervading almost all aspects of life.

In other words, the existing forms of state and state intervention in the capitalist economy are taken as the *explanan*, but the question of why we have a specific form of state and state intervention is explained either by the will and practices of the state managers or by the ongoing political tradition according to which civil societal actors, social classes, the bourgeoisie are all powerless and helpless vis-à-vis this dominant state.

In fact, both structuro-functionalist and statist-institutionalist reductionisms neglect the fact that neither the capitalist class nor state managers are structurally in a position to know and form the ideal strategy for a relatively stable “expanded accumulation of capital”. Rather, the rationality of the capitalist order is a consequence of the three sided conflicts among capitalist class (and its fractions), state managers, and the working class (and its fractions) (Block, 1987: 16, 52). Hence, both approaches are unable to treat the state in “an empirically open-ended manner so as to come to terms with the relational and historical character of social reality” (Yalman, 1997: 86; see also

Sayer, 1987; Corrigan et. al., 1980; Poulantzas, 1978; Jessop, 1990 and 2001). A strategic-relational approach (Jessop, 1990; 2002) to the state would be a panacea to such statist essentialism. The capitalist state will be conceived as an institutional site wherein social and political forces, which act within certain structural and institutional constraints produced by the previous struggles, struggle among themselves through hegemonic projects (including specific accumulation strategies).

2: Waiting for Godot: Political Class Hegemony

The assertion that the bourgeoisie could not become the hegemonic class because of its dependence on the state is also questionable from the vantage point of the problematic of manufacturing political class hegemony. I underlined above that explaining all the failures of developmental projects in terms of the incapacity and unwillingness of the state elites to respond to and to establish an embedded relation with the bourgeoisie is open to challenge because it assumes that the bourgeoisie, if consulted in a proper way, would act in consonance with the long-term requirements of capitalist developmental projects. This line of explanation is also challengeable in terms of its failure to read the political practices of state managers and political elites as attempts to forge hegemonic projects that would establish the political-hegemonic power of the bourgeoisie. However, such an interpretation would only be possible upon the theoretical postulation that hegemonic power of the dominant class is not constructed by non-state actors (bourgeoisie) in non-state sites (businessmen organizations in civil society), but rather hegemony and hegemonic projects are produced in the sites of state and civil society in a contingent and contradictory process whereby different social and political actors actively participate. Hence, the analysis of political-hegemonic power of the capitalist class cannot be consumed up merely at the level of interest representation

by business organizations but should take into account the practices of political parties and state actors.³² The state sphere/the political sphere is perfectly the site of political hegemony production. Yet, the state-centric paradigm totally omits the possibility that political-ideological practices of political and state elites may be constructing such a political class hegemony. Instead, for instance Heper argues that political parties have very weak linkages with social groups and they are autonomous from the economically significant civil societal groups. Hence, according to Heper, a party-centered polity in which political parties are autonomous from social groups replaces bourgeois politics in Turkey. In other words, politics is analyzed as an intra-elite process delinked from social basis (Heper, 1985: 98-100, 104, 150). However, this position cannot explain how the political parties achieve to get the consent and support of the dominated classes in an electoral parliamentary regime if not by forging hegemonic discourses and projects. Theoretically speaking, this approach cannot grasp the constitutive role of political parties as the agents of hegemonic projects in political class relations, for they theorize the political sphere as an instrumental black box to transmit class demands formed somewhere outside the political sphere. An autonomous civil society is taken as the genuine/original site of bourgeois politics.

Once one breaks with the philosophy of external relations which conceives the relation between the classes and the state, between civil society and the state as a zero-sum relation of power, then the process of hegemony construction and the constitutive role of state and political actors in this process may be captured. This is how and why,

³² For instance, Heper (1985: 88, 104) complains about the lack of bourgeoisie-as-public, by which he refers to “members of civil society who are able to transcend their private concerns, and to elaborate a public opinion on matters of general interest”. This is perfectly the political-hegemonic moment of class relations, and it may also be read as a critique of the unwillingness of bourgeois organizations in civil society (not their non-existence) to move from the economic-corporate to political-hegemonic moment of class interest formation in Gramscian terms. However, Heper fails to grasp that this moment cannot be analyzed merely by business interest organizations within a separated civil society.

for instance, *pace* the statist paradigm, Yalman (1997; 2002a) convincingly argues that the developmental strategies (Etatism, planned developmentalism, and market) pursued by the political actors in different periods were at the same time forged as hegemonic projects to construct a Gramscian historical bloc aiming at inducing the bourgeoisie to transcend its economic-corporate interests in favor of its political hegemony. Conceived as such, the state and political actors cease to be actors dominating over the bourgeoisie and become actors attempting to manufacture capitalist class hegemony. However, to the extent that those national-popular hegemonic projects have been based on an organicist-nationalist political discourse emphasizing the general-national interest, the statist interpreted them as a challenge to the class power of the bourgeoisie rather than establishing its class power. This is why, for instance, according to Buğra (1994a: 50; 1998: 526) the fact that the social status and legitimacy of the businessmen have been largely relied on “the national developmental project undertaken by the political authority” since the businessmen has “to convince political authorities of his desire and ability to serve the state through entrepreneurial acitivity” was an expression of the dependency of the bourgeoisie. Similarly, the fact that the business organizations were expected to serve the general-national interest rather than to represent particular interests or that they have used national-popular discourse and they still have to avoid using words such as “*class, interest, or lobbying*” have been interpreted as the domination of the state (as the representant of the general interest) over the bourgeoisie (as the representant of a particular interest) (Buğra, 1994a: 31, 232, 254; Heper, 1985: 51; 1991a: 15). Or the moralist elements articulated in the economic discourses of state managers were interpreted as the continuation of patrimonial economic rationality as opposed to capitalist market rationality (İnsel, 1996: 133, 141; Heper, 1985: 87) as if the

capitalist relations of production does not need a moral discourse. In fact, capitalism is not just an economy but a set of social forms of life morally regulated by the state. In Durkheimian terms, the state is a “*conscience collective*”, the organ of moral discipline. But the moral disciplin by the state is not neutrally about integrating society. It is about enforcing hegemonic rule.³³ Hence, neither the rhetoric of classless society of the organicist-nationalist political discourse nor its repressive and exclusionary³⁴ character should be thought as antithetical to bourgeois class hegemony.

This assertion about the non-hegemonic position of the bourgeoisie is rooted in another myth about the bourgeoisie. It is contended that the main symptom of the weakness of the bourgeoisie at the political-hegemonic moment is that it could not play its proper historical role in the course of capitalist modernization process: the establishment of a liberal-democratic social and political order. Accordingly, “the principal factor defining Turkey’s ideological universe has been the absence of a contesting bourgeoisie” (Keyder, 1987: 198). For this line of argument, Çağlar Keyder’s works have been the most powerful and influential ones concerning the analysis of state-bourgeoisie relation. Acknowledging first of all the richness and wideness of his research areas and theoretical sources,³⁵ it would be fair enough to argue that his guiding

³³ See Corrigan and Sayer, (1985). This is also what Gramsci (1999: 258-262) calls “the ethical state” as part of hegemony manufacturing technique.

³⁴ Following Gramsci, I differentiate between expansive and repressive (passive revolution, transformism) versions of hegemony. The difference lies in that the latter represses the autonomous organization and struggle of subordinated classes, especially at the political-ideological moment, and is reluctant to sacrifice short-term economic-corporate interests. It involves the reorganization of social relations while neutralizing popular initiatives. In other words, at worst, it leans to domination, at best, to a “two nations hegemonic project” aiming at a “limited hegemony concerned to mobilize the support of strategically significant sectors of the population”. The expansive hegemony searches for “the *active* support of a substantial majority of the popular masses... through a combination of material and symbolic rewards”. See Gramsci (1999: 106-114), Jessop (1990: 207-214), Mouffe (1979b: 182-183).

³⁵ Keyder’s works cover a wide range of interrelated research areas such as state-class relations in dependent capitalist development; peasant studies; globalization, nation-state and modernization; nationalism and identity questions; urban sociology; social history to cite some of them. In his different

problematic may be formulated by the following question: “Why the bourgeois ideology could not rise?”³⁶ Following Barrington Moore’s seminal work in the field, according to whom the democratic route to modern society has been mainly the creation of the bourgeoisie;³⁷ Keyder’s (1987; 2003) answer emphasizes the non-autonomization of the weak bourgeoisie from the yoke of the strong state, the tutelage of the bureaucracy, and the trade-off the bourgeoisie made in favor of its economic interests (“market freedoms”) at the expense of political ones (“political democracy”). Hence, the dominance of nationalist-authoritarian political-ideological forms over the liberal-democratic ones is explained by the weakness and marginality of the bourgeoisie vis-à-vis the state elites. Just as the case with Moore’s path of “conservative revolution from above”, this nationalist-authoritarian path is taken to be capitalist but not bourgeois, “a capitalist development without a corresponding bourgeois transformation” (Keyder, 1987: 199). According to Keyder (2003: 121-139), this has been a characteristic of dependent capitalist development and/or south European model of modernization as opposed to an ideal north European model of liberal capitalist modernization. As a result of some historical-structural features of Ottoman-Turkish capitalist modernization³⁸ and

works, he is nourished by various theoretical approaches such as Marxian class analysis, world system theory, regulation theory, critical modernization theory, Marxist and institutionalist theories of state

³⁶ This is the title of the last chapter of the Turkish version of his seminal work, *State and Class in Turkey*. In the original text, the title is worded as “The Impossible Rise of Bourgeois Ideology” (Keyder, 1993a and 1987).

³⁷ Moore (1993) defines three routes to the modern world: the democratic route of *bourgeois* revolution (England, United States and France), which combined capitalism and parliamentary democracy; conservative revolution from above (Germany, Japan), still a capitalist path but with reactionary political forms culminating in fascism; and the communist route of peasant revolutions (Russia, China). Beside the agrarian social origins (the commercialized and subsequently autonomized landowning class), the existence of an autonomous bourgeois class strong enough to fight the social forces of the ancient regime at the political-ideological level has been the decisive difference of the democratic route. To put it in Moore’s (1993: 418) famous formula, “no bourgeois, no democracy”.

³⁸ These are the non-existence of big landowners and the dominance of petty producers in the agriculture, the existence of a strong and autonomous state mechanism and the expulsion of non-Muslim bourgeoisie, which had emerged autonomously from the state and adopted economic and political liberalism in the pre-first world war period (Keyder, 1987; 2003: 142).

under the unfavorable conditions of the world system, the nationalist-authoritarian developmentalist path substituted bourgeoisie's genuine political project, namely liberal democracy. As a result of this essentialist and mythical conceptualization of the bourgeoisie, the nationalist-collectivist political discourse is either depicted as non-bourgeois ideology belonging to the state and political elites or when it is acknowledged in concrete historical analyses that the bourgeoisie could develop under the aegis of authoritarian state forms and ideologies, the bourgeoisie is treated as being in false consciousness. The adoption of inward-oriented national developmentalism as "the dominant tendency in economic policy also worked toward inducing the bourgeoisie to passivity... Thus, there was no desire on the part of the bourgeoisie to challenge the normative concerns of the bureaucracy; they were robbed of their imputed revolutionary will despite their economic success" (Keyder, 1987: 199). Hence, any ideological-political discourse other than political liberalism is evaluated as the symptom of the lack of bourgeois hegemony rather than its very expression (see Keyder, 1993b: 47-48, 155). For instance, populist national developmentalism is defined "as the counterpart to an absent liberalism" (Keyder, 1987: 202) which should be the genuine bourgeois ideology. "From the point of view of a bourgeoisie come of age", the dominant ideological discourse based on "nationalist development and national solidarity... contradicted the strict rules of capitalist rationality" and it is only after 1980, "in economic liberalism imposed from above, the bourgeoisie grasped the promise of ideological hegemony" (Keyder, 1987: 226; 1993b: 41; 2003: 178-179). Similarly, populism as the peripheral counterpart of social democracy was a product of "historical conditions in which the bourgeoisie did not have the capacity to establish its hegemony" and it was "the instrument of a strong state to solidify its own position" (Keyder, 2003: 175; 1998: 33).

This essentialist reading of the relation between a social class and its ideology relation is problematic from three interrelated points. *Firstly*, it categorically and ahistorically rejects the fact that nationalism or populism may be a hegemonic form of bourgeois ideology. *Secondly*, it establishes an antinomy between liberalism and nationalism whereas in actual reality the ideological discourses that manufacture bourgeois hegemony incarnate diverse forms of their articulation.³⁹ Such an approach totally neglects the fact that modern bourgeois power is based on two interconnected mechanisms: individualizing and totalizing (Poulantzas, 1978). Corrigan and Sayer (1985: 4-5, 191-200), in their analysis of English state formation, exposes how “state formation is a totalizing project, representing people as members of a particular community-an illusory community...epitomized as the nation”, at the same time that the modern state individualizes people as citizens, voters, taxpayers, consumers and so on. As they note, “the ‘illusory community’ of the bourgeois state is always represented as a national community”. The moral regulation, the legitimation of bourgeois class power has been through cultural forms of nationalism. It is by speaking in the name of the nation that the bourgeoisie organizes its social power and sustain an appearance of being above particular class interests. It is through the culturally constructed nation that “bourgeois transformations (economic, political, cultural, moral) could operate” (see

³⁹ Keyder (1993b: 9-49) reduces the whole modern capitalist history to the contradiction between *nationalism* as the ideology and political logic of the state-forming elites, which obtained the consent of peoples in search of a protective identity against the ravages of liberal-individualist capitalism and *liberalism* as the economic logic of capitalists. In that sense, nationalism is depicted as an ideology at odd with the forces of capitalism understood as an economic form, as a transitional phenomena which marked the world history between the two real, liberal capitalist episodes (between the First World War and the neo-liberal globalization period). This historicization of nationalism and nation-state is at the center of Keyder’s political project which is based on the transition from nationalist-collectivist authoritarian modernization from above to liberal democratic project based on the civic citizenship and the rule of law. The problematic nature of this political project is surely not its important critique of nationalism but its uncritical adoption of liberalism and its attempt at severing the organic relation between bourgeois hegemony and nationalism. I should note that I do not conceive this relation in the sense that the bourgeoisie as a class-subject created nationalism, but this latter is both a product of the process of class struggles and it has constituted the political class hegemony of the bourgeoisie (see Poulantzas, 1978).

also Poulantzas, 1978; Corrigan, Ramsay, Sayer, 1980: 12-13). By saying this, I do not intend to neglect the differences between liberal-democratic and organicist-ethnicist forms of nationalism nor to reduce the analysis of nationalism to mere class relations. My intent is rather to indicate the actual-historical forms of articulation between liberalism and nationalism, which are supposed to be antithetical in Keyder's historical narrative, and to underline the relationality between nationalism and class-based power relations, a part of story which is almost totally neglected in discussions on nationalism in Turkey. There is no doubt that the ethnicist-organicist form of nationalism caused severe humanitarian problems concerning cultural identity questions in the course of Turkish history; however, the necessary concern with identity questions should not exclude the analysis of class dimension of nationalist ideology or the articulation of class and identity questions in actual social processes.

Last but no least, this essentialist reading severs the link between authoritarian political forms and the bourgeois class power. The lack of democracy and the dominance of authoritarian state forms are explained by the weakness of the bourgeoisie, which could not constitute itself as self-conscious class-subject acting politically in its own collective interests. Hence, if bourgeoisie has been in submission to authoritarian solutions, this is not because it is politically active but because it is either weak or in a false consciousness. In this vein, the authoritarian forms of state result from pre- or non-bourgeois social relations, if not pre-capitalist and pre-modern remnants. Such an interpretation is based on an ideal image of the bourgeoisie which is produced from within an ideal narrative of early capitalist countries such as England and France. In this highly abstracted narrative, the bourgeoisie as the rising middle class becomes a class-for-itself that struggles against and overthrows the dominant social force of the *ancien*

régime in order to establish modern democratic representative form of state. Such a reading reproduces a Marxist version of the teleological modernization argument, according to which with the advent of capitalist economy and the development of the bourgeoisie, the liberal democratic forms of polity will eventually replace all authoritarian forms. This mythical thought about the bourgeoisie results from an *occidental* reading of European history to the extent that the specificity of the Ottoman-Turkish social change is compared to a highly abstracted and idealized model of European capitalist development, to an “imaginary Europe”. Let me take a long but symptomatic quotation from Heper (1976: 485-486) in order to expose how orientalist-occidental abstractations work:

The organic development begins with (1) a change in economic activities leading first to (2) the emergence of a new force in society, the bourgeoisie, and then, through the cooperation of this new interest with the ruler, to (3) the establishment of the centralized state with a royal bureaucracy. Later, the bourgeoisie extends its power still further, and a constitutional government becomes established. In the process, the earlier royal bureaucracy is transformed into a public bureaucracy, and rendered responsive to the major social groups in the polity. In Western Europe, this cycle was completed during the second part of the nineteenth century.

In the induced change pattern the initial impetus for change does not come from the bourgeoisie. Induced development evinces, in order of time, (1) an outside stimulus, usually coming from an overwhelming power; (2) the emergence of a leader (or leaders) who seek to elevate their nation to a position of like power; (3) the creation of a new bureaucracy and a change in the political structure; (4) economic change, planned and in part executed by the central government, and (5) the emergence of a middle class followed by a variety of further expressions of collective economic interests.

According to this ideal narrative, which conceptualizes state and classes in a philosophy of external relation, “while in the West the burghers developed into self-made capitalists, the economic middle classes in Ottoman-Turkish society lived at the margins of the polity” (Heper, 1976: 492). The guiding supposition is that there is an ideal and normal route to capitalist modernization, as exemplified in British and/or French paths, whereby the bourgeoisie develops independently from political power relations and outside the political sphere. Yet this bourgeois paradigm does not fit any real historical

capitalist modernization process. Nevertheless, any other path of capitalist development is labeled as a deviation from a genuine bourgeois transformation, and the history of capitalist social change becomes “a history of the absences” focusing on “what the local bourgeoisie is not rather than on what it is” (Turner, 2001: 129-130; Evans, 1982: 212-213; Blackburn and Eley, 1984: 10-11). According to this narrative, the peculiarity of the alternative historical paths lie in the fact that the bourgeoisie did not fight but rather compromised with and became subordinated to the old dominant class, it had deficiencies in the political behaviour, and it did not assert its own genuine values. This alleged political incompetence of the bourgeoisie manifested in the lack of political liberalism is read as “incomplete” or “failed” bourgeois revolutions. However, as Blackburn and Eley (1984: 11) warn, “ideal types lose their value when they become merely routine, self-evident assumptions”. Hence, once the bourgeois social transformations are judged in the mirror of an ideal path, every historical case becomes a deviant case. Not only late late-capitalizing countries such as Turkey, or late-capitalizing ones such as Germany, but also the cradle of capitalism, England also are discussed in such terms. Hence, the resulting social transformation has been everything but *embourgeoisement*: “aristocratization of the bourgeoisie” (England); “feudalization of the bourgeoisie” (Germany); “bureaucratization of the bourgeoisie” (Turkey).⁴⁰

The state-centric theoretical approaches fail to distinguish between liberalism, democracy, and the bourgeoisie. In a series of essentialist assumptions, the bourgeois

⁴⁰ In the British case, scholars such as Perry Anderson and Tom Nairn analyzed the English route to industrial capitalism as a peculiar one since the bourgeoisie did not overthrow the aristocracy from political power as it should be the case for any bourgeois revolution. To use Anderson’s words, “the aristocracy became- and remained- the vanguard of the bourgeoisie”, and the bourgeoisie has been the passive actor of this alliance. For a critical evaluation of the discussions on the British case see Neocleous (1996: 92-98). For a critical discussion of the German case see Blackburn and Eley (1984) and Eley (1997).

hegemony is reduced to liberalism, and this latter to democracy. A series of conceptual slippages makes “the connotative continuum of bourgeoisie=liberalism=democracy into an implied causal chain”. However, bourgeois aspirations in modern capitalist history, “including their liberal forms, usually took an exclusionary *antidemocratic* turn ...and they were no less bourgeois for that”. How far liberalism will be adopted and how far it will be articulated to democracy has been contingent upon specific-historical configurations of social and political power relations, “in which the mobilization and independent dynamism of subordinate classes like the peasantry, small property-owners, and the working class played an important, possibly even decisive role” (Eley, 1997: 87; Blackbourn and Eley, 1984: 18-19).

My point is neither to neglect the historical differences in capitalist modernization processes and the different political outcomes (liberal-democratic or authoritarian) nor underestimate the prevalence of authoritarian and anti-democratic forms of political power in Turkey. It is rather to clear the way for an alternative way of explanation that would recognize that there is nothing inherently anti-bourgeois in authoritarian state forms. It may well be the case that (civil or military) authoritarianism is established not despite the political power of the bourgeoisie but in order to establish it. Authoritarian forms of politics and ideology manufactures the bourgeoisie’s social and political hegemony to the extent they secure the conditions of expanded reproduction of capitalism, the political unity of dominant class fractions, the ideological legitimation of dominant class power, of getting the consent of the people through discursive and non-discursive mechanisms (Blackbourn and Eley, 1984).

As I will discuss in the following sub-section, the state-centric analysis tends to explain the dominance of authoritarianism and militarism in Turkey by the incapacity of

the bourgeoisie to overthrow the bureaucracy as the dominant class. The state-centric paradigm continues to depict the bourgeoisie as the would-be privileged actor of democratization once it gains its autonomy from the yoke of the bureaucracy and the state.⁴¹ Despite the fact that bourgeois democratic state form has been historically established despite the bourgeoisie, which has been reluctant in adopting democratic reforms and in extending democratic rights to the working classes,⁴² a progressive role is essentially assigned to the bourgeoisie. However, once the bourgeoisie does not act in actual historical process as the progressive democratic force and instead supports authoritarian and militarist techniques of governance, this is explained by its allegedly dominated position vis-à-vis a pre-capitalist dominant force, the bureaucracy in the Turkish case.⁴³

The state-centric approach to the state is so obsessed with the alleged bureaucracy-bourgeoisie conflict that the bourgeoisie as a class ceases to be a *relational* category or is conceptualized as a relation of distribution rather than of production. Only the struggle within the power bloc is taken into account and the subaltern groups, their

⁴¹ Keyder conceives the bourgeoisie as a social class that should reach “an independent position from the state, which would make it enjoy the potential of the market and form a civil society organized as a web of autonomous organizations”. Without such a bourgeoisie, the potential for “the society to free itself from the state” would be impossible and democratization would not be actualized (Keyder, 2003: 117; 1993b: 136-157).

⁴² See Therborn (1977), Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992), Huber and Stephens (1999).

⁴³ Let me give an example from Keyder. In an article dated 1978, he argues that parliamentary democracy was strong enough in Turkey for there not to be a new military intervention. The support for this argument has been the specific class structure of the country: the lack of a pre-capitalist dominant class (the big landowning class) and the dominance of small peasantry. Hence, as militarist authoritarianism could be rooted only in the continuing power of a non-bourgeois, pre-industrial force and given the lack of such a force in Turkey, the political power of the bourgeoisie, i.e. political democracy could have been established. However, two years later the most bloody and fascisant military intervention occurred. In his auto-critique in the 1990s, Keyder shifted to a new position. Now, it was the weakness of the bourgeoisie vis-à-vis the bureaucracy-the state elites, the political incapacity of the bourgeoisie, or the dominance of another pre-capitalist remnant, the bureaucracy, which caused military-centered authoritarianism (compare Keyder, 1978 and 1993b: 142). In other words, when the teleological contention about the bourgeoisie as the forerunner of democracy fails, a non-capitalist and non-bourgeois explanation works as a *deus ex machina*. I should note that in Keyder (1987), the author uses a marxist framework to explain the military intervention which is explained in terms of the crisis of accumulation strategy and restructuring of capitalism.

demands, their formal-informal ways of struggle and their capacity to inscribe their demands, albeit in a hegemonized way, to the institutional materiality of the state are totally undermined: they are silenced.⁴⁴ However, as Cardoso and Faletto write in their *Dependent Development in Latin America*,

Dependent development occurs through frictions, agreements, and alliances between the state and business enterprises. But this type of development also occurs because both state and business pursue policies that create markets based on concentration of income and social exclusion of most of the population...The conflicts between the state and big business are not as antagonistic as the contradictions between the dominant classes and the people (quoted in Yalman, 2004: 1-2).

The omission of inter-class power relations in the statist narrative of state-society relations in modern Turkish history is more radical in Weberian culturalist strand, according to which culture-based cleavages rather than class relations have been determinant in social and political power relations in modern Turkey (Mardin, 1973; 1992c; Heper, 1985). If classical class analysis is marked by an economist reductionism because it excludes the cultural-ideological processes; this Weberian culturalism represents a culturalist reductionism. They both share the same shortcoming. They are theoretically closed to investigate the specific ways in which identity and class relations are articulated and have been constitutive of each other. To the extent that they both severed what is organically related in real historical processes they had the effect of reifying social relations *of* production.⁴⁵

In fact, in actual political processes, the Turkish power bloc has been more aware of the possible and actual importance of popular challenges than state-centric scholars

⁴⁴ It is quite interesting that Keyder's seminal work is entitled in its original English version "State and Class", class in singular. This is because he omits the dominated classes (peasantry and working class) from the history of class power relations upon the assertion that they were not politically organized and that "it was either the bureaucracy or groups within the bourgeoisie who, through their conflict, defined the parameters of state policies, administrative forms and the political regime" (Keyder, 1987: 4).

⁴⁵ See Dirlik (1997) on the implications of culturalism in social sciences for legitimating the capitalist relations of domination; and on the reification effect see Sayer (1987).

admit. Once one recognizes that classes are formed in and through the state, one should also make a move away from approaches which presuppose that the working class is already constituted before the state acts on it. It is because of the reality of inter-class conflicts that the dominant classes use various strategies and techniques for incorporating and governing the dominated classes. The process of incorporation and governing is of “a class *in struggle* rather than a supine body”, struggles which need not to be politically radical and revolutionary. The state is constitutive in the making of classes, not only of bourgeoisie but also of working classes, at the same time that it is constituted by class power relations. It is in this contradictory process of working class making that the working class takes place in producing “the real structures which then enslave it” (see Neocleous, 1996: 98, 105-106). It is in this sense that class struggles are inscribed in the institutional materiality of the state, and that the state should be conceived as a social relation. That is why, the militarization of political processes and structures should focus on the inter-class power relations and the strategies of governing the dominated classes at least as much as on the bureaucracy-bourgeoisie relation.

2. Analytical Approaches to Praetorian Militarism

In the previous section, I made a critical evaluation of the hegemonic statist approach to the state in Turkey. Its key point is that it treats the state as a quasi omnipotent and uncircumscribed subject above and outside the social relations of power, especially class relations. As it is the case with Theda Skocpol’s “autonomous state paradigm” (and also with the approach that Michael Mann calls ‘distributive power’), the hegemonic statist paradigm equates the autonomous state action to the capacity and power of the (civil and military) bureaucracy to formulate and implement policies

independently from and even against powerful social groups and classes. Skocpol (1985: 9) refers to the works that deal with militarized state forms as “extreme instances of autonomous state action” whereby “strategic elites use military force to take control of an entire national state and then employ bureaucratic means to enforce reformist or revolutionary changes from above”. Skocpol claims that such autonomous state actions were not peculiar to exceptional state forms but also exist in liberal, democratic constitutional polities. I shall use a reverse strategy. I will argue that even the state of those extreme instances is circumscribed by and is not above social relations *of* production and class power relations, needless to say not in the instrumentalist sense. I will also argue that for a theoretical approach recognizing the constitutive presence of the apparently autonomous capitalist state in the relations *of* production, a theoretical point that Skocpol’s statist ontology misses, the actions of the state elites would not be autonomous in the Skocpolian sense unless they challenge the capitalist relations of production or the power of dominant class.⁴⁶ In that sense, the militarized state forms are challenging cases for dealing with the hegemonic statist approach to the state in Turkey which systematically denies the *capitalist* aspect of state power and militarism.

⁴⁶ I should once again note that the term state autonomy is used in the sense Skocpol ascribes to it, autonomy from social interests and pressures, especially from dominant classes. Otherwise, the state in capitalist mode of production always enjoys a structural autonomy due to the specific institutional separation between the political and the economic in capitalism, which problematizes any functional or instrumentalist analysis. This apparent separation is integral to the capitalist relations *of* production, which means that this specific *type of state* has a constitutive presence in the relations *of* production. However, it is only by exposing the mediating links between the political and the economic at empirical level that one may prove the *capitalist* nature of state practices, and it is only by empirically demonstrating “the ‘class noncorrespondence’, that is, instances in which state officials directly and systematically transgress the interests of the economically dominant class(es)” (Steinmetz, 1997: 264) that one may prove the autonomy of the state from capitalist interests. The class correspondance does not mean that class actors unidirectionally dictate their interests to the allegedly neutral and passive state managers. It is rather related, as I contend, to the constitution of a class hegemonic project (accumulation strategy being its part) which result from an ongoing process of struggles and compromises among capitalist class, working class, and state managers. The use of state power by a power bloc would be capitalist to the extent that it creates the conditions for capital accumulation and establishes the political power of the capitalist class.

There is no doubt that the influential presence of the military has been one of the most salient aspects of Turkish political life. The recurrence of military-centered authoritarian forms of political governance forms an important obstacle for formal and substantial democratization. The military elites are one of the most important actors which have actively shaped socio-political power relations, processes and structures. It is also quite explicit that in most instances the military acts independently from civilian control and intervenes to the political processes through diverse mechanisms. This bare observation, which is widely shared in academic and public ‘milieus’, brings to the fore the centrality of following questions: What are the phenomenal forms and mechanisms of militarization of socio-political power relations? What is the reason behind the recurrent militarization of political processes and structures? Why militarism as a power technique continued to be influential in governing internal social cleavages? Which analytical-theoretical framework would be more productive for the analysis of militarist practices? In an article on the dominant role of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy in the state and society in Pakistan, Hamza Alavi (1990: 21) formulates his research questions in the following terms: “Is it an entity that stands outside and above society? Does it subordinate the state and society to its own ends and if so, what objectives does it pursue?” I am also concerned with similar questions: Are militarist practices, both in terms of their emergence and impacts, autonomous from class power relations? May binary oppositions such as state-society, military-civil, center-periphery capture the social and political power relations that constitute and are constituted by militarism?

In this subsection, I will critically overview the explanations for militarization of political processes and state structure in Turkey. I will argue that the capitalist character of militarization processes is systematically overlooked. My aim is to break with this

dissociation between militarism and capitalism produced in much of the concerned literature. I will also discuss theoretical antinomies of few works that attempted at establishing the connection between militarism and capitalism.

The role of the military in politics has been a much studied issue. The ongoing presence of inward-oriented militarism and the lack of civilian control over the military have resulted in an inflation of both scholarly and journalistic works on Turkish military. Meanwhile, an important part of those studies are guided by a descriptive-empiricist orientation which does not go beyond cumulating the factual developments or enumerating various (social, economic, political, ideological-cultural) factors in an unrelational way as the root causes of militarism.⁴⁷ Such works produce a chronological narrative on a single unilinear time scale.⁴⁸ Even though they may be rich in terms of factual data, they are not “theoretically informed empirical studies”. They usually confine themselves into the “political scene” at the expense of underlying social power relations to which the “theatricality of modern political scene” is inherently attached.⁴⁹ Another group of study may be called descriptive-institutionalist. They are very valuable in the sense that they critically describe the juridical-political institutional mechanisms

⁴⁷ Most of non scholarly works by journalists and researchers may be grouped under this category. See for instance İba (1998, 1999), Birand et.al. (1999), Akpınar (2001). Meanwhile, an important part of scholarly works are also empiricist. They offer a factual narrative restrained to the political scene. The fact that they may be rich in terms of factual data does not challenge the assertion that their analytical and explanatory value is negligible. They generally proceed within the paradigm of civil-military relations without systematically analyzing the social power relations within which militarist practices are embedded. See for instance, Hale (1988; 1996), Öztürk (1993), Özdağ (1991), Örs (1996), Evin (1994), Demirel (2003), Karabelias (2000), Lombardi (1997).

⁴⁸ “A chronology typically provides a simple narrative explanation for what occurs by identifying a single temporal series of actions and events” (Jessop, 2003).

⁴⁹ Here, I follow Jessop’s commentary on Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, according to which the coup d’état is analysed in terms of four closely interwoven objects of inquiry. a) *the political scene*, i.e. “the visible but nonetheless ‘imaginery’ world of everyday politics as acted out before the general public through the open and declared action of more or less well organized social forces” b) *the social content of the politics*, i.e. the class struggle not in the sense of “abstract, eternal, and idealized interests that are attached to pre-given classes” but “the concrete-complex articulation of the economic and extra-economic conditions for expanded reproduction of specific class relations” c) the transformation of the *institutional architecture of the state* and the wider political system d) the interconnected movements of local, national, and international economy (Jessop, 2003).

and structures of militarism. However, they are not concerned with the analysis of social and political power relations in which militarist practices are embedded, they critical expose the institutional and juridico-political sources of power of the military.⁵⁰

There is also a third group of study composed of the explanatory works on militarism from the perspectives of political sociology and historical sociology. In most such studies focusing on this inward-oriented praetorian form of militarism, the hegemonic ‘statist approach to the state’, which treats the latter as an entity standing above social forces, has formed the explanatory framework. Militarist practices have been explained by the existence of a strong state tradition subjectified in military and civilian bureaucracy independently dominating over the social forces. Militarism is analyzed as the outcome of a struggle between autonomous state elites and societal forces, including the dominant classes. In an attempt to classify those explanatory works on the military interventions in Turkey according to their analytical-theoretical standpoints, I will differentiate between statist approach (conservative-liberal statism and critical statism as its two variants) and Marxist approach (its instrumentalist and structuro-functionalist versions).

2-a Conservative-Liberal Statism

The line I call conservative-liberal statism works mainly within the confines of modernization theory and corresponds to conservative-liberal political position. It is statist at analytical-theoretical plane, and shares all the sub-arguments constituting “statist hegemony” I discussed above. It explains and evaluates the state-society relations and the militarist practices in terms of the ongoing presence of a strong state

⁵⁰ For such important studies see for instance Özdemir (1989), Üskül (1997), Akgüner (1983), Doğru (1998), Yazıcı (1997), Şen (1996), Birand (1986; 1991).

dominating over civil societal forces. It is conservative at normative ethico-political plane for it rationalizes and legitimizes the military interventions as necessary intervals made by the military in order to save and restore the democratic regime which civilian political forces brought into a crisis.

At the analytical level, this current of statist paradigm evaluates military interventions as restorative attempts. It explains the militarization of political structures and processes by the everlasting influence of the strong state tradition⁵¹ according to which state power dominated over civil societal forces including the dominant classes, impeded the proper development of market economy and forces, and obstructed the political hegemony of the bourgeoisie. As the politics is reduced to intra-elite conflicts within a monist center which renders “all civil societal elements into virtually impotent entities” (Heper, 1994a: 18), it is the intra-elite struggle either between state elites and civilian politicians and/or between the state elites and the weak-passive bourgeoisie that gives rise to military interventions. In either case, societal forces do not penetrate state power; the dominant elite group (the military in this case) is not circumscribed by any social power relations. The state ceases to be a social relation and becomes an instrument of the dominant elite group. As a result, militarism becomes a power technique for governing the intra-elite struggle rather than social power relations. Within the conceptual horizon of center-periphery paradigm, the military interventions in 1960

⁵¹ An extremely ahistorical and trans-historical essentialist element, which is used as a cliché, is the militarist state tradition. Military’s preponderant role is not uncommonly traced back to Ottoman social structure, to military-nation and military-state tradition. According to this mythical thought, the Ottoman-Turkish state has always been a warrior-state not only in pre-modern, pre-capitalist periods but also under modern capitalist state. Hence, militarism of modern capitalist state is explained in terms of a trans-historical tradition. For the best example of this tradition see Bozdemir (1982), for some other examples that refer to this idea see Heper and Güney (1996: 619) Güney (2002), Karabelias (2000), Jerkins (2001: 10). This has the effect of naturalizing what is historically constructed. For an excellent critique that exposes how the myth of the military-nation and warrior-state is manufactured as part of a power discourse see Altınay (2004a).

and 1971 are interpreted as an outcome of the cleavage between “the center, identified with the preservation of a static order and the periphery, the real party of movement” (Mardin, 1973: 186). These military interventions are interpreted as a revanchist case by the (civil and military) bureaucracy who was challenged by the emergent bourgeoisie and its political representatives. The determinant social power relations underlying the militarization process is a power struggle between the two middle class groups, namely “the bureaucratic middle class and economic middle class”. These military coups are supposed to be done for maintaining or enhancing the prestige of the state, they are definitely not attempts at manufacturing the power of a class or at restructuring the social and political structures for major economic and social changes. During the militarization of political processes and structures, the guardian bureaucrats act against the economic groups or at least they are not responsive to them (Heper, 1976: 489, 495; Karpat, 1970; Frey, 1965: 38).

As the allegedly passive bourgeoisie and class-based cleavages do not generally appear in political processes and all social classes in the civil society are powerless, it is more often the intra-elite contradiction between state elites and political elites that explain the militarization of state structures. In this vein, according to Metin Heper, the prominent figure of statist paradigm, the military interventions are “an attempt by Kemalist bureaucratic center to restore its hegemony...in the absence of an aristocracy or a bourgeoisie-as-public that would have exercised a moderating influence” (Heper, 1985: 87-88). Hence, political power relations are pictured as totally detached from social classes, they are social contentless, and politics is a mere play between elite groups on the *political scene*. In constructing their political projects and discourses, the political elites are insensitive to social demands and social power relations, they are not

concerned with obtaining the consent of popular masses, and their ideological and political adversaries are the state elites. In this asocial political arena, the statist military elites intervene in order to restore Kemalism, which, they suppose, is threatened by populist politicians trying “to substitute national will for Atatürkism” (Heper, 1987: 162; 1994a: 18-19). With a more detailed look, other elite fractions’ role in the militarization process is recognized. It is argued that whereas the military interventions in 1960 and 1971 were persecuted in alliance with civilian state elites, the coup in 1980 is executed “without having any partners among the intelligentsia, the civil bureaucracy, or the professional community...the military appeared as an isolated stratum rather than as part of the country’s elite coalition” (Evin 1994: 39; see also Heper 1985: 94-97; Karpat, 1988). Whichever elite group arises dominant from this intra-elite struggle, the loser is always the civil society which is undifferentiated in class terms. Neither class politics nor bourgeois politics enter into the picture. Albeit writing from a different theoretical framework, the following quotation from Nilüfer Göle is revealing in that sense: “Every attempt on the part of civil societal elements to free themselves from the domination of the state had led to repression by the state...The military interventions of 1960-61, 1971-73, and 1980-83 can in fact be perceived as state reactions against the ‘unhealthy’ autonomization and differentiation of economic, political and cultural groups” (Göle, 1994: 213-214; see also Heper, 1994a: 18). The class-based social cleavages, which are constitutive of and constituted by militarism, lose their particular appearance at the political scene since they are solved under the category of civil society. In addition, because these interpretations theoretically fail to notice that the class power at the political-hegemonic moment is manufactured by political and state actors besides the business actors, they interpret the militarization processes as being against the

bourgeoisie. Hence, the possibility that these were attempts at establishing political hegemony of the bourgeoisie, sometimes despite the bourgeoisie's economic-corporate resistances, is theoretically ruled out.

At the normative plane, this approach combines two apparently contradictory claims. On the one hand, their (neo)liberal stance pushes them to an anti-statist state-centric analysis which criticizes the strong state as an impediment for the market economy to develop and bourgeois politics to flourish. On the other hand, their conservative stance makes them an apologist of the military elites as the guardian of the social order. It legitimizes the military interventions by combining arguments from two strands of modernization theory (progressive-reformist and order keeping militarisms).

Firstly, in line with early modernization theory which privileges the Third World militaries as the forerunner of modernization and democratization, it praises the Turkish military as a modernizing force⁵² allegedly affiliated to political modernization and democratic regime. The evolutionist modernization argument is reproduced in those works by picturing the Republican history as “a cautious but steady progress in democratization. This evolution was punctuated, however, by three military interventions, but these were brief; they aimed at restructuring Turkish politics so as to bring about a viable system of democracy” (Heper, 1994a: 13; see also Heper and Güney, 1996: 620; 2000: 636-637; Hale, 1988; 1996: 242). The military did not aim a

⁵² The modernist military argument is widely and uncritically shared by mainstream modernization theorists. For the Turkish case see Rustow (1959; 1970), Lerner and Robinson (1960), Turan (1997) besides other more recent references to be cited below. The problematic aspect of this argument, as I already noted in Part I, is not that the mentioned modernizing practices do not match discursive and sometimes practical reality. It is rather, the fact that these discursive and non-discursive modernizing practices are detached from social power relations as if modernization is a conflict-free process and as if this modernizing discourse is not a power discourse to legitimize the power of the military and the capitalist modernization project. For an article criticizing the ahistorical and reifying character of this argument which ascribes a democratic essence to the Turkish military regardless of its discursive and non-discursive practices in different historical periods see Kuyuş (1999).

long lasting authoritarian regime, and even the 1982 constitution prepared by the military regime of the most repressive coup of Turkish history incorporates “the principles necessary for an orderly, liberal, and democratic state”. Each and every military intervention had “the ultimate purpose of safeguarding the secular-democratic state” and aimed at “a democratic reconsolidation rather than a regime breakdown” (Dodd, 1994: 180; Heper, 1985: 125, 128, 151; Heper and Güney, 2000: 636; Karaosmanoğlu, 1994: 125). In more cautious interpretations, the military still intend to restore the parliamentary democracy while at the same time keeping important exit guarantees (Özbudun, 2000: 24; see also Sunar and Sayarı, 1986).

Secondly, in consonance with modernization arguments à la Huntington (1968) and Janowitz (1977), it legitimizes the military interventions by blaming the ‘over-politicization’ of social forces and the incapacity of civilian institutions and actors. It is “the failure of the civilian mechanism rather than the military” (Heper, 1985: 83, 84), “intense elite polarization and the intransigent attitudes of mainstream politicians” (Özbudun, 2000: 9, 7), the incapacity and the reluctance of political elites to cooperate and compromise in face of increasing socio-political fragmentation and polarization (Sunar and Sayarı, 1986) that form the root cause of the military interventions. To continue with Heper, it is the irresponsibility of political elites that pushes the military to “rationalize politics and democracy”. Following Sartori’s differentiation, his analysis focuses on the tension between the horizontal and vertical dimensions of democracy.⁵³ According to Heper, a “healthy and viable democracy” should be based on a balance between these two aspects, between state elites and political elites. If the strong state

⁵³ The horizontal dimension is based on *responsiveness* to social demands and corresponds to individualism and participation aspects of liberal democracy. The vertical dimension is based on *responsibility* and corresponds to the state aspect of democracy which pursues the long-term interests of the community (Heper, 1992: 170).

tradition as a structural factor is an impediment for the development of horizontal dimension, it is the reluctance of irresponsible political elites to internalize “the role of responsible state elite” that opens the way for military intervention. The military intervenes in order “to clear up the mess made of it all by immoderate, self-seeking and short-sighted politicians”. If the military shifts from a liberal democratic model to the ruler type of praetorian model for a brief period, it is in order to “create conditions for a better functioning democracy”.⁵⁴ Hence, “the only way to prevent the Turkish army from intervention is to govern the country efficiently and in accordance with the constitution and the letter of the Kemalist reforms” (Heper, 1985: 84). In other words, the civilian political forces are criticized for not having shared the military’s ideological-political concerns. The concept of democracy adopted by Heper is problematic in terms of its two poles and bears an internal contradiction. As Özman and Coşar (2001: 90-93) underlines, the problems internal to formal liberal democracy such as the social (class) and cultural (identity) dimensions of democratic participation are repressed in favor of the individual representation and formal-institutional-procedural aspects of democracy. On the one hand, liberal democracy is idealized as the best possible form, on the other hand, it does not problematicize the elitist nature of “rational democracy”, which should be problematic from the point of view the anti-statist critique of the ‘strong state’ approach and from the normative stance of liberal democracy. It downplays the fact that

⁵⁴ See Heper (1985; chps. 5-6; 1987; 1992; 1994a; 1994b; 1998), Heper and Güney (1996; 2000). In fact the dichotomy between liberal-democratic and ruler praetorian models is problematic in terms of the first pole too. Liberal democratic model corresponds to a situation in which the military is differentiated from but subordinated to the civilian power, and it is highly professionalized and depoliticized. There is no doubt that the civilian control over the military is the sine qua non for a democratic regime. However, it is the necessary but not sufficient criteria for a non-militarist democratic regime. The liberal paradigm based on civilian control over the armed forces is blind to possible forms of militarism that may exist even under a liberal-democratic model: the use of military force, emergency situation, and martial law by civilian political actors; outward-oriented militarism and its inward-oriented repercussions at the cultural-ideological and political-institutional levels.

the intervention of the military in politics is anti-democratic in both substantial and procedural terms.

In fact, one may think that searching the causes of militarism not only in the military sphere but also in the so-called civilian sphere fits well with my critique of the civil-military binary opposition as an impediment to critically understanding the process of militarization. However, the conservative-liberal statism ceases to problematicize the production of militarism, be it in civilian or military spheres. Its complaint is about why the civilian actors could not be “militaristic” enough in the sense of sharing the military’s concerns rather than how the societal and political actors actively participated to the manufacturing of militarization process. It abuses the argument about “the crisis of civilian governability” in order to legitimize militarism as the military also does. Furthermore, it does not explain the causes of this governability crisis which are rooted in class power relations; it is not concerned with the nature of social power relations which marked the process of militarization. Rather, it restricts its explanation to the political sphere in its narrow sense, to the intra-elite struggles. In that sense, this line of argumentation is very similar to the conservative theories of crisis which have revived in the post-mid-1970s period, according to which the excess of democratic participation of social forces and the resulting response of political parties for their short-term political gains caused the ungovernability problem. The solution was a retreat from democratic politics and depoliticization of social and economic spheres. As Offe (2001) notes, by restraining the crisis into the narrow political scene the conservative theories of crisis masked the underlying class struggle between the political claims of capital and labor,

between their different strategies of reproduction.⁵⁵ In the Turkish case, the question why politicians did not collaborate in a period of crisis situation is answered either by personalistic ambitions or by the impact of “strong state tradition” on political culture. Even though the emphasis on political processes rather than on structural-functional causes has the superiority of relativizing the inevitability of military intervention (see Sunar and Sayarı, 1986; Özbudun, 2000), the politics is broke up from social power relations, especially class-based ones. Hence, politics is conceived as a self-contained sphere.

To take the discourse produced by the military itself as representing the whole actual reality rather than as part of this reality and as a power discourse may be called subjectivist empiricism and/or conservative realism. In that sense, conservative-liberal statism adopts the viewpoint of the military. It reproduces the self-legitimizing discourse of the military on two main points: that the military supports democracy, that the military is a neutral arbiter above social cleavages. It reproduces the discursive power of the military by using the military’s own conceptualization about itself. It appropriates the military’s concept of “rational democracy” as a necessary component of a normative conceptualization of democracy. However, the concept of rational democracy corresponds to the technocratization of politics, and democracy becomes an administrative process of technical-‘rational’ decision-making. It also takes as a fact value the military’s pretension that it is above social classes, political cleavages. In this approach, the military is treated as a neutral arbiter above classes which intervenes in order to reestablish the democratic procedure. Hence, they (re)produce another cliché about the military. For instance Güney (2002: 164) argues that the military never entered

⁵⁵ For a brief but explanatory summary of conservative and critical theories of crisis see Held (1998: 240-253)

into an alliance with a political party, social group or class in none of the three interventions. Or according to Heper (1985: 83, 126), the Turkish military has a tradition of neutrality unlike the bureaucratic authoritarianism in Latin America, it is above and outside the politics.

2-b Critical Statism

The approach I call critical statist is produced from a left democratic position. It is critical for it criticizes the militarist practices as one of the most important obstacles for the development of a formal and substantial democracy. It is statist in theoretical-analytical terms, albeit anti-statist in normative political stance, because it implicitly or explicitly shares many of the assertions of the hegemonic ‘strong state tradition’ paradigm. Its analytical statism corresponds, to use Mann’s categories, to the institutionalist and elitist versions of state-centric approach to the state. Its recourse to the institutionalist analysis comes to the fore mainly when it focuses on the military, and it remains limited to the “militarist crystallization of the state”. The reason for this ‘limited institutionalist approach’ is that it exclusively focuses on “militarist and nationalist crystallizations of the state” at the expense of “capitalist crystallization of the state”. Moreover, it conceives the state in Turkey as an entity outside and above social classes and relations. Within the parameters of this ‘limited institutionalism’, similar to those works I called descriptive-institutionalist; the critical statist approach brilliantly exposes the institutional, juridico-political, and ideological sources of militarization. It critically exposes power sources of the military and the institutional architecture of the militarized state form. It focuses on various forms of military intervention in politics and on their diverse institutional, legal-constitutional and ideological-discursive

mechanisms.⁵⁶ In addition, in accordance with elitist theory of state, critical statism treats the state as “an institutional ensemble” controlled by the state elites, among them specifically by the military, who dominate over societal forces and interests. The state elites have a “distributive power over civil society”, and they are concerned with increasing their own power at the expense of all social forces and interests.

The concept of *praetorianism* stands at the center of critical statist approach.⁵⁷ The analysis starts by a justifiable observation about “the permanence of authoritarianism in the Republican history”. “Authoritarianism corresponds to impersonal political systems in which the power of political center is *not constrained* by counter-powers to be considered equally legitimate; in which the political authority enjoys the authority to intervene in the society on the basis of a worldly but *trans-societal* source of power” (İnsel, 1999: 146, italics are mine). The defining feature of authoritarianism in Turkey is its praetorian nature. It is a “praetorian state”. Drawing on Perlmutter’s (1977) definition of praetorianism, the praetorian state is the authoritarian

⁵⁶ For such important studies, in addition to the references in footnote 52, on the institutional and juridico-political sources of power see Bayramoğlu (2004), Cizre Sakallıoğlu (1997), on the ideological-discursive sources of power see Cizre (2002), Altınay (2004b), Bora (2004).

⁵⁷ The analysis based on praetorianism is also used by conservative-liberal authors. Hale (1996) is the best known example. Working within the military-civilian binary opposition, it focuses on the form of military rule. Drawing on Nordlinger (1977), praetorianism refers “to a situation in which military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force”. In that sense, praetorianism is the opposite of “the principle of civilian control”. Three main non-praetorian models are differentiated. The traditional(-aristocratic) model, in which there is no differentiation between the civilian and the military; the liberal model of civilian control, in which the role of the military elites is constrained to an advisory function on national security, they are subordinated to civilian authority; the totalitarian-penetration model, in which civilian governors obtain loyalty and obedience by penetrating the armed forces by political ideas and political personnel. The three sub-types of praetorian regimes are moderator (exercising a veto power without taking control of the government), guardian (overthrowing a civilian government, retaining governmental power for a brief period of two to four years, and maintaining the status-quo), and ruler (not only controlling the government but also dominating the regime, bringing about basic changes in the distribution of power in socio-political and socio-economic spheres). According to Hale (1996), who categorizes the sub-periods of Turkish history according to this classification, Turkey has experienced all of the types but the ruler praetorianism.

regime at whose center stands the military.⁵⁸ The political regime in Turkey has been “a tutelary regime in which the praetorian force is the dominant power group”. Here, the praetorian force’s defining feature is that it intervenes in order to consolidate, reinstitute or increase its own power and interests. “It exists for itself; it sees itself as a social class”. It acts as a class and/or a party (İnsel, 2004: 45; 1999: 160, 164; 2001; 1997a; Laçiner, 2004: 23). The praetorian force perceives itself as the only force to protect the state, and by sanctifying the state it attributes to itself a base of legitimacy outside the society. State power becomes a trans-societal power (İnsel, 1999: 161; 1996: 258). In this line of argument, the political crises in Turkey are explained by the public contention between praetorian forces identified with the state and parliamentary political forces. The crisis is rooted in the specific nature of the state controlled by state elites. A force within the state defines itself as the real proprietor of the state and uses state power embedded in “this institutional ensemble” for its own interests. It is organized in “internal state whereas external state may be penetrated by social forces”.⁵⁹ The real causes of the political crisis are the state, which is conceived as an entity independent from social power relations, and this praetorian force which colonizes the state by identifying itself with the state (İnsel, 1997a).

This praetorian authoritarianism corresponds to a specific “mode of governance” which “controls, surveys, and manipulates the political authority” within the parameters of “a permanent coup regime or martial democracy” (İnsel, 1997a: 75, 78; 1997b; 1999: 148, 161). At this point, it may be said that the dominant mode of governance in Turkey

⁵⁸ Other possible central forces in authoritarianism are state bureaucracy, market elites, and technocratic elites (İnsel, 1999: 147).

⁵⁹ This last assertion remains vague unless the specific policy issues and areas under the competence of internal and external states are specified. We don’t see what constitute the internal and external states, how they are articulated; upon which social relations they are institutionalized.

corresponds to one of two modes of modern governmentality used by Foucauldians, namely *reason of state*.⁶⁰ Reason of state and liberalism are defined as two main forms of modern governmentality in Foucauldian literature. In the “reason of state” paradigm, the principles of the state are immanent in the state itself. In historical-practical terms, it is embodied in science of police, Cameralism, and mercantilism. There is an identification between state and society; the government defines itself “as being ‘of all and of each’ for the purposes of secular security and prosperity”. It equates “the happiness of its individual subjects with the state’s strength”. This mode of rule acts on the governed not only on the basis of general laws but “by the means of specific, detailed regulation and decree”. To the extent that it is based on “detailed and continuous control” Foucault calls it “a permanent coup d’état” (Gordon, 1991: 8-14). In such a mode of rule, “the survival of the state” becomes the main concern of the politics regardless of any moral and legal limitation or societal preferences. This allegedly omnipotent and omnipresent “sacred state” and its interests dominate over all social and economic interests. The source of legitimacy is not located in society but in the state itself; the state is legitimate simply by virtue of being the state for the state is an end in itself (Sancar, 2004).

⁶⁰ I should note that the critical statist approach does not refer to Foucault’s conceptual framework at any point. It may not be Foucauldian given that Foucault rejects state-centered theory by claiming that it attributes “essential properties and propensities to the state” and conceives the state in the limited field of juridical sovereignty and institutional architecture. Because of his acceptance of a specific conception of state as the only possible state theory, he proposes to focus on “practices of government” in the long term trajectory of “governmentalization of the state” rather than “*etatization* of society”. His “macrophysics of power” is based on the analysis of different rationalities of government. Governmentality, which is “the conduct of conduct”, is “a form of activity aiming to observe, monitor, shape, and control the conduct of persons”. The doctrines of reason of state are the starting point of early modern governmentality (seventeenth century onwards). The emergence of “reason of state” shifts “the seat of political reason from prince to the state”, and “the principles of government are no longer part of and subordinated to the divine, cosmo-theological order of the world”. However, the reason of state paradigm remains as a continuation, a reproduction of pre-modern conception of power in early modern times, for the sovereign state just replaces the sovereign monarch. On governmentality see Gordon (1991); on the theoretical antinomies of having rejected state theory see Neocleous (1996: 57-87).

The rule by “reason of state” is contrasted to liberalism as the mature form of modern governmentality. Liberal governmentality has two facets: limited government based on the constitutional rule, representative government, the separation of powers, and the rule of law as guarantees of individual liberties in non-state sites and on the civil society as the site of subjects of responsibility, freedom, autonomy and choice. The liberal government rule by acting upon such subjects through shaping and utilizing their freedom; freedom and autonomy becomes the basis of the liberal rule. If totalizing and individuation are two main techniques of modern power, it may be said that the rule based on “reason of state” is mainly based on “totalizing” whereas liberalism on “individuating”. Or if “the police state posited an immediate identity between the state and ‘the whole body of civil society’; twentieth-century government postulates not an identity but an isomorphism”, which would be based on “necessary state action and state inaction” (Gordon, 1991). Liberal governmentality techniques consciously attempts to mobilize agencies, bodies, and groups in civil society in a way that they would be consonant with the liberal rule. “Liberalism differs from earlier systems of police in that it models its own interventions on the regulations and values it uncovers through a knowledge of civil society and the agencies of civil society” (Dean, 2002: 45). If policing is a concern for a good public order, liberalism is also a new form of police which “employs techniques and agencies located within civil society rather than merely issuing regulations...The liberal fear of governing too much is not so much a fear that population is being governed too much but that the state is doing too much of the governing” (Dean, 2002: 42).

However, this description of liberal governmentality does not mean that liberal governmentality does not contain authoritarian measures; quite on the contrary, as

Marxists and feminists have noted alongside Foucauldians, both at the level of government practices and social practices within civil society, liberalism also relies on authoritarian mentalities, practices and techniques (see Dean, 2002). Additionally, these are not mutually exclusive paradigms of rule since in concrete historical instances they have been articulated into each other even if their relative weight has differed. They both use individuating and totalizing mechanisms but with different emphasis. Additionally, these two paradigms of modern power (reason of state and liberalism) both crosscut the state-civil society binary opposition; they both shape these two spheres but according to different rationalities.

To come back to the literature on Turkish case, if conservative-liberal statist reify the state as an entity in itself from the vantage point of liberalism without however acknowledging the latter as a form of power; the democratic ethico-political position of critical statist continues to analyze the state as an entity in itself but also criticizes it from the vantage point of “the rule of law”.⁶¹ However, the critical statist also continue to reify the state in so far as they argue that the Turkish state has been an entity standing above social power relations and processes. This is what İnel’s means by defining praetorian authoritarianism as a “worldly but trans-societal source of power”. Instead of conceiving the state and the military in an intermingled relation with society, it externalizes state power (and also the power of the military) and social relations. The state ceases to be a social relation, or to put it in a more definite way, its relationality is restricted either to an intra-elite struggle or to the struggle between state elites and

⁶¹ An excellent study on theoretical and empirical aspects of the contradiction between reason of state and state of law is Sancar (2004). He conceptualizes the state of law as the restriction of state power by law. However, he also underlines that state of law may not be equated to “legality”, which would mean to legitimize every state as a state of law, but should be based in its integral meaning on substantial human rights. See also Keyman (2000-01) on the contradiction between rule of law and reason of state.

society. In that sense, the military interventions are explained as “a reaction of state bureaucracy against the social forces of the market economy in order to restore its own power in the social hierarchy”. They are responses to “the economically strengthening Turkish bourgeoisie’s attempts to become a partner in socio-political power”. The military aims at reestablishing the bureaucracy’s (especially its military wing’s) position as the sole source of legitimacy by obstructing the mobilization of social forces (İnsel, 1999: 155; 1996: 199-200; Laçiner, 2004: 22). In another version, in which the political process is still conceived as a struggle between elite fractions, the main axis of political conflict within which the military’s practices are embedded is now “intellectual/bureaucratic elites versus people/society”. The military interventions are interpreted as “the traditional reaction of the military to the process of emancipation of Turkish society” (Kayalı, 2000: 29, 36). The critical point in this reading is that different class positions of these social forces do not matter for the analysis of militarism. The military has been depicted as independent from the overall social relations; it is above society and social classes.

The critical statist approach, which focuses on the military’s “reason of state” discourse and on the institutional structure of militarist face of the state, overlooks the class relevance of the military’s discourse and the institutional materiality of the militarized state. To start with the “reason of state” discourse, to the extent that the discursive self-understanding and self-evidence of praetorian authoritarianism (the discourse of ‘reason of state’) is taken as representing the actual practical reality rather than a part of social reality; it lumps institutions and practices into discourse.⁶² For

⁶² It may be useful to requote Jessop (2001b) on this point: “In distinguishing between discourses, institutions, and material practices, I am not trying to deny the materiality of discourses nor suggesting that institutions or material practices are non-discursive. I am simply noting that not all discourses are

instance, Cizre-Sakallıoğlu (1997: 154), who focuses on the political autonomy of the Turkish military, rejects to interpret

the nature of the military's autonomy as a reflection of and a response to broader social cleavages, both economic and social" because "the ultimate justification for the military's political predominance rests on its 'guardianship of the national interest'...Because of the republic's obsessive anxiety in maintaining national unity in the face of divisive forces,...the Turkish army has really not taken openly partisan positions. Similar to those Brazilian officers from the middle class who perceived themselves as classless soldiers promoting the national interest, the Turkish military has historically shown itself to have sufficient freedom to make and change civilian allies⁶³ in line with its self-perceived image of being above social dissensus, party politics, and particular interests.

Cizre-Sakallıoğlu (1993: 14; 1997; and Cizre, 2002) is justly critical of instrumentalist conceptualization of the military and class relation and justly underlines the necessity of analyzing how the military produces the discourse of "being above social classes and above politics" by identifying itself as "the guardian of the national interest". It is also understandable that the military, not only discursively but also to some extent practically too, refrains from being explicitly identified with particularistic interests in day-to-day politics. However, she interprets these hegemonic discursive and non-discursive practices as efforts to legitimize *only* the military's own economic-corporate and/or political-hegemonic interests. However, what I want to underline is that military's own interests also overlap, coincide with economic-corporate and political-hegemonic capitalist interests too. It is because of this that the militarist practices are also constitutive of political class hegemony. Meanwhile, as she does not move to a non-instrumentalist conceptualization of (the state and) the military and class relations, she does not expose how the military's practices under the discourse of being above classes

translated into institutions and material practices with emergent properties that are reducible to the content of these discourses".

⁶³ She cites CHP and state-centered intellectuals for the military intervention in 1960, and more narrowly, a small group of technocrats and politicians for the military intervention in 1971 and 1980.

contribute to the formation of class hegemony, not as an instrument of the capitalist class but as an independent actor sharing the same conception of social-political order.⁶⁴

I think this is a good example of lumping the practical reality into discourse. Hence, an exclusive focus on “the state as an idea/discourse” runs the risk of unintentionally reproducing the “idea of the state” as being above class power relations, which is the very discursive base of the military. In fact, the discourse of praetorian authoritarianism, which presents the state and the military as being above social cleavages and particularisms and representing the general interest, is a specific way of hegemony manufacturing. To the extent that the form of modern capitalist state is structured in “national-popular non-class terms” and that the legitimacy of the national-popular state is based on the “apparent” exclusion of class relations from its form and its discourse, the modern capitalist state claims to represent the general interest of the nation/people. So does the military by identifying itself with the nation and the state. As we argued before, this is what gives political class relations its characteristic feature, namely that the class politics is about developing national-popular hegemonic projects. To the extent that the military unjustifiably but successfully identifies itself with “the state” and “the nation”, it also discursively identifies itself with an (apparently neutral)

⁶⁴ In most times, the claim that the military has been above social classes is based on an economist conceptualization of relations *of* production, whereby class relation is conceived as a mere economic relation. Let me use a long quotation on the coup d'état of 1980: “It is also difficult to substantiate the claim that the defense of clearly identifiable class interests (such as that of landholders, bourgeoisie, or middle classes) was the key motive for the military to consider military intervention (1). Undoubtedly, preserving the political order that was the basis of the capitalist regime was the most important reason for intervention (2). But this does not mean that the military contemplated the possibility of takeover for the protection of a particular class interest *within* that order (3), though policies they followed in power inevitably favored some classes (4)” (Demirel, 2003: 260-261; the numbering belongs to me). It is quite interesting that in fact the paragraph argues at the same time that the military intervention has been constituted by (2) and constitutive of capitalist class power (4) and that the military intervention does not establish any class power (1 and 3). See also Şaylan (1988) who makes the same assertion of “being above classes” by defining the military as a Bonapartist force.

state standing outside and above society. In fact, the military itself manufactures such a discourse of being above classes, above social cleavages.

On the other hand, the class power relations which are inscribed in the institutional materiality of the state are also neglected because of the exclusive focus on the militarist crystallization of the state. As I noted, this approach critically analyses the militarist crystallization of the state but in a way detached from other crystallizations of the state (especially capitalist one). However, in each military intervention, the military regimes have also re-institutionalized the capitalist crystallization of the state within the parameters of a hegemonic class project. In other words, it reconfigured the relations of forces to the extent that the institutional materiality of each state form has a “strategic selectivity” on social and political forces. It strengthens some forces over others.

What is striking in such studies on the military is that military and society are conceptualized in a relation of exteriority. The military is conceived as an almost “omnipotent actor” standing *above*, *apart* and *outside* society. The military’s and militarist practices are evaluated within a linear narrative whereby the military intervenes in social and political life mainly for solidifying and increasing its own autonomy and power sources. It reminds Mouzelis’ argument that the military intervenes in order to reproduce its privileged position within the relations of domination; however, the articulation of the relations of domination with relations of production is left unquestioned. Hence, the power relation under scrutiny becomes one between the military and an undifferentiated civilian realm as if the military’s practices are against the whole society, all social forces. Such a paradigm reduces and subsumes the active and potential antagonisms and struggles within the so-called civilian realm or society

upon which militarist practices have indeed differential impacts and by which they are circumscribed.

My position is not to deny the fact that the military has economic-corporate and political-hegemonic interests of its own, that it is a class-like social group for itself, or that in each military intervention it increases its own sources of power.⁶⁵ I rather contend that it is the very autonomy, the very existence of the military as an actor for itself that makes it more embedded in social and political power relations despite its hegemonic discourse of being above power groups and representing the nation. Hence, one should qualify this autonomy. What is at stake is an “embedded autonomy”. In that sense, the military is not outside or above the society but within society. I also contend that the militarist practices have a capitalist nature which begs an explanation but that the class nature of militarist practices cannot be analyzed by an instrumentalist theoretical approach to the state and the military.

There is no doubt that militarist practices increase the autonomy and power of the military. However, this cannot fully explain and consume the meaning of militarist practices. Militarism does not just reproduce itself; it is also constitutive and productive in the sense that it manufactures and constitutes specific social orders through specific hegemonic projects. Militarism is not merely a negative, restrictive technique of power but rather a productive one. Through political and ideological practices it also attempts to construct specific social orders, social subjects, and social relations. The repetitiveness of discursive elements constantly used in military’s discourse (“Kemalism”, “the discourse of guardianship”, “the survival of the state”, “the reason of state”, “state interests” etc.) should be evaluated according to their articulation within

⁶⁵ Insel and Bayramoğlu (2004) is an excellent collection which analyzes the various spheres in which the military enjoys an autonomous power independently from civilian control.

diverse hegemonic discourses and hegemonic projects of which militarism is constitutive and by which it is constituted.⁶⁶ Hence, militarism has a selective and differential impact upon power relations among social classes and other class-relevant social groups. The military's broader interests are not detached from social power relations, especially from class power relations. It is in that sense that both civilian- and military-originated militarist practices need to be analyzed and explained in a relational way, by being put in its place within social power relations. To the extent that the militarist practices are interpreted as originating from a strong state tradition and to the extent they are encapsulated within the frontiers of military (versus civil) and state (versus society) spheres, the actual processes of militarization crosscutting those boundaries are silenced.

2-c Marxist Explanations

Lastly, I will treat the Marxist approaches to the analysis of the military interventions. The few Marxist analyses are mainly concerned with establishing the relationality between state and capitalism, between the military power and class power. They attempted to give an explanation of military interventions with specific emphasis on their capitalist nature. If one leaves aside the crude instrumentalist approach, which merely treats the military as a passive instrument of a dominant class or class fraction dominating over all other social forces, one may differentiate two approaches that interpret military interventions within the capitalist development process. Their differentiation is based on their analysis of capitalist process and their mode of

⁶⁶ For an exception in that regard see Dursun (2002-03) who analyses the symbolic economy of military interventions through a Zizekian discourse analysis. It is a revealing analysis but is limited to the discursive practices and the social relational dimension of discursive practice is overlooked.

explanation of state's capitalist nature. They both emphasize the mode of accumulation and intra- and inter-class struggles but with different emphasis.

The first may be called *capital-theoretical structuro-functionalist approach*, which is inclined to explain the military interventions in terms of systemic requirements of modes of accumulation. The state theory which predominates in this approach is *capital-logic* school (Holloway and Picciotto, 1978a; Gülalp, 1993: 45-90). Accordingly, the capitalist nature of the state in capitalist societies is structuro-functionally derived from the idea that the apparently separated state is internally related to capitalism, it is the political moment of capitalist mode of production. The capitalist feature of the state is functionally derived from the economic categories of capital accumulation conceived as a subjectless objective process. This approach does not acknowledge that the very form of the state in capitalist society (its apparent separation from the economic) may problematicize its function and argues that the laws of capital accumulation objectively trace the limit of state's autonomy. Hence, the argument runs, the Turkish state has not been above classes, it acted in consonance with "the laws of capital accumulation in each stage of development" (Gülalp, 1993: 29). The different outcomes of each military intervention, despite their same legitimating ideology (Kemalism), may be explained by the crisis of the preexisting developmental (-accumulation) model (Gülalp, 1993: 28-29). Despite its assertion about the internal-organic connectedness of political and economic moments of capitalist mode of production, it privileges the economic moment as the explanatory variable, hence reproduces a kind of economism: "crisis in development models are followed by political crises, and changes in the political power are not the causes but the results of the changes in economic policies". "Whatever be their political-ideological lines", the "objective conditions of the economic crisis" (mode of

accumulation) defines the policy outcomes. In this schema, the military interventions are necessarily acts for restructuring the capital accumulation process. In this sense, the intervention of 27 May 1960 functionally established the transition to the ISI-regime in conformity with the demands of the metropolises of the world capitalist system, whereas the military intervention in 12 March 1971 was an early and unsuccessful attempt to shift to export-oriented accumulation strategy, which would be realized by the military intervention in 1980 (Gülalp, 1993: 35-44). This account is a distorted version of “bureaucratic-authoritarianism approach” to the extent that it reduces the emergence of military regimes to the objective requirements of capital accumulation process irrespective of the contingent struggles among social forces. It does not recognize the contingency of possible accumulation strategies or of alternative hegemonic projects. Even though it is literally recognized that the economic transition (the restructuring of the mode of accumulation) and the political transition (the restructuring of the power bloc) are concurrent and that it is mediated by the class struggles and alliances (Gülalp, 1993: 43-44) at political-hegemonic moment, these struggles are never problematized or exposed. The political-hegemonic struggles have any causal effect but are mere functional mediations which anyway obey the objective requirements of the “Capital”. It resonates within a “structuralist type of reductionism” whereby structural constraints are transformed into “a direct cause-to-effect relationship”.

The *class-theoretical* Marxist approaches also interpret the occurrence of military interventions as acts of overcoming the crisis of accumulation, but they also attempt to focus on the mediating role of class struggles, on the changing configuration of class forces, and the ideologico-political class practices in different periods. Accordingly, the historical significance of the military interventions lie in the

restructuring of the configuration of class forces in order to adapt the economic and political structures to the needs of a new regime of capital accumulation. In that sense, it is critical of the statist approaches which reduce the meaning of military interventions into mere restorationist attempts and recognize their transformatory nature. The military interventions are explained either by the intra-class conflict between the different fractions of bourgeoisie (27 May 1960) or by inter-class struggles between the bourgeoisie and the working class (12 September 1980) in a process overdetermined by the accumulation regimes dominant in world-capitalist economy.⁶⁷ For instance, the military intervention in 27 May 1960 is explained in terms of the nascent industrial bourgeoisie, which is frustrated with the preexisting accumulation regime favoring the commercial and agricultural fractions and with an emerging spontaneous and arbitrary protectionism incapable of restructuring the institutional structure of the state in line with the inward-oriented industry-based accumulation strategy. In that sense,

the crucial cleavage obtained between the petty bourgeoisie in the towns and the countryside, small capital, and the trading bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the manufacturing bourgeoisie on the other...The reflection of this division at the ideological level was the conflict between a petty bourgeois market ideology of seventeenth century vintage, and a bourgeois ideology more appropriate to the period of industrial development in the post-war world (Keyder, 1987: 143).

The manufacturing bourgeoisie leading an urban coalition composed of the military and civilian bureaucracy, the intelligentsia and university students, and the working class as a passive supporter was the dominant and determinant force in the process of the transition from a predominantly agrarian and commercial process of capital accumulation to industry-based accumulation regime (Keyder, 1987; Savran, 1987;

⁶⁷ Leaving aside their slight differences I may cite Savran (1987; 1992; 2002), Taylan (1984), Keyder (1987), Ahmad (1985), Belge (1976). See also Öncü (2003), who claims to develop a Gramscian analysis of the state in Turkey but who falls short in that respect and reproduces a version of class-theoretical analysis. For a non-marxist class-based account of the military interventions see Sunar (2004b). Please also note that Taylan (1984) and Savran (1987) are English and Turkish versions of the same article.

2002; Taylan, 1984; Sunar, 1994; 2004b). Hence, it is commonly recognized that in a historical conjuncture in which bureaucratic reformism fit with the ascendancy of the industrial bourgeoisie, the coup in 1960 paved the way for a new accumulation regime:

The historical meaning of the military intervention of 27 May is the adaptation of the political and legal superstructure to the transition from the agricultural/commercial accumulation regime to the industrial capital accumulation (Savran, 1987: 140; 2002: 11; Taylan, 1984: 12-13).

What was achieved unwittingly...was in fact no less than laying the foundations for a new model of accumulation, with its social policy, political balances and administrative mechanisms... (Keyder, 1987: 144).

The military attempted to replace the electoral alignment of popular-clientelistic groups forged in 1950 with an urban, productivist coalition forged among the opponents and dissidents of patronage (Sunar, 1994: 101).

As to the following coup in 12 September 1980 (and also 12 March), it is explained as a combined outcome of accumulation crisis and inter-class struggle. The dominant mode of explanation is a replication of O'Donnell's paradigm of "bureaucratic authoritarianism". The period preceding the military intervention in 1980 is defined by a national developmentalist hegemonic project based on an inward-oriented accumulation regime marked by import-substituting industrialization and a populist distributional alliance functionally serving the accumulation strategy. However, the crisis of accumulation, which was rooted in the internal contradictions of ISI-based development strategy, was an outcome of the contradiction between the low growth of exports and the rapid growth of imports resulting in the unavailability of foreign exchange and in the declining import capacity. The economic crisis and the end of economic growth made impossible to maintain the populist coalition in terms of material redistribution, which resulted in a political crisis to be resolved by the military (Keyder, 1987; 1993b; Taylan, 1984; Savran, 1987).

I think this mode of explanation is very important for framing the general social-historical context within which militarist practices occurred.⁶⁸ However, it has also some shortcomings to the extent that it mainly focuses on the accumulation strategy and barely touches the conflictual process of hegemonic practices in the construction of hegemonic project at political-ideological moment. In this paradigm, the success of hegemony becomes totally dependent on the success of accumulation strategy; and before the crisis of accumulation occurs (end of 1970s), the struggles at the political-hegemonic moment of class relations do not enter into the picture. In other words, it is assumed that until the accumulation crisis explodes, there is a fixed, conflict-ridden, and immutable condition of political hegemony, and the economic-corporate and political-hegemonic challenges appear only after the accumulation crisis.⁶⁹ This is why, for instance, Keyder (1987: 160, 165, 195) asserts that before the economic crisis, populism could contain political class conflict through mechanisms based on the material redistribution in a way to be functional for the needs of accumulation model and the allowance of “a degree of organization and contestation”, and that the capitalists in ISI sectors, which “captured the rent of import-substituting industrialization” was willing to continue this populist coalition “as long as it did not threaten its profits”. In fact, Keyder is well aware that the ISI industrialists would feel threatened and call for more authoritarian measures when

⁶⁸ It should be noted that Keyder’s works (1987; 1993b) stand as more important and influential than other cited works in terms of its comprehensiveness at the level of empirical and theoretical argumentation.

⁶⁹ “The break-up of the social coalition which sustained the ISI strategy occurred because of the crises brought about by the same foreign exchange constraint. In other words, the dormant conflict implicit in the alliance was not triggered by an intensification of the internal antagonistic situation: social crisis followed upon the economic crisis of the system” (Keyder, 1987: 165). “The crisis was triggered by the growing difficulty of balancing the external account, which in itself was a reflection of the world-wide crisis... Without imported inputs and technology the economy could no longer be reproduced. Problems in securing inputs translated into obstacles in maintaining the material conditions of production. Through a chain of causation from reduced use of capacity, to declining profits, and declining investment in manufacturing, economic growth stopped, unveiling various shades of social conflict. Without growth, social pay-offs could not be continued, and tensions which had been harbored within the rapid transformation of the society gained new dimensions” (Keyder, 1987: 196).

the working class struggle would become political and begin to question the labor process.⁷⁰ However, Keyder's approach, which often leans to economist-functionalist account of class relations, overlooks the fact that in Turkey, the inter-class struggle gained a political face in the early 1960s long before the accumulation crisis, and the capitalist class was not easy going even in terms of economic-corporate demands of the working class. Hence, these two decades were "a period of protracted class conflict, despite the fact that they were, at the same time, a period of relative economic prosperity and relatively high rates of economic growth" (Yalman, 2002a: 35). In other words, the populist-developmental hegemony of the bourgeoisie was permanently contested by intra- and inter-class struggles, and the bourgeoisie continuously felt threatened by the working class (Yalman, 2002b: 37; Buğra, 1994: 133, 138-139).⁷¹ Although in a more thorough class-theoretical analysis, Savran (1987; 1992; 2002) has been corrective in the sense of recognizing the primacy of inter-class struggle in the crisis of capitalism, he reproduced a kind of instrumentalist conceptualization of state power and military power: "The military dictatorship instituted by the 12 September 1980 coup...acted as the united front of the bourgeoisie in order to crush both the workers' and the socialist movement" (Savran, 2002, 15).

Most important shortcoming of these Marxist analyses be it from an economist-functionalist perspective or from a class-theoretical instrumentalist perspective has been their silence upon the military's specific practices. This is partly understandable since those few works were on the general political economy and capitalist development in

⁷⁰ "While temporary reductions in profitability may be tolerated, disruptions in labor discipline may cause capital to react by forcing state managers to abandon their apparent neutrality in favor of disciplining the labor force" (Keyder, 1987: 165).

⁷¹ As I noted above, in the previous sub-section, Keyder's analysis excludes the dominated classes (working class and peasantry) from his narrative upon the claim that they were not decisive in political power relations. He is focused on within power bloc relations

Turkey rather than specifically on militarism. They treat the military as a passive instrument or actor that enter into the stage in case of emergency. The military is like an absentee savior of the capitalist accumulation process or class political power; it appears at the moment of the intervention then disappears from the scene. We do not see the processes, mechanisms, practices through which the military constitute the capitalist class power and capitalist expanded reproduction. Nor the cleavages, contentions and compromises during the military regimes are explored. The military officers are deemed as passive, and the capitalist nature of militarist practices are functionally or instrumentally assumed instead of being proved by exposing the mediations, i.e. the military's ideological, political, economic practices. The lack of a specific focus on military's practices in the processes of militarization of capitalism and capitalization of militarism necessarily ends up interpreting the military interventions as signifiers of "the ensuing absence of political and ideological hegemony of the bourgeoisie" and "the political impotence of the Turkish bourgeoisie" (Taylan, 1984: 40-41; Savran, 1987: 154-155, 158) instead of exploring the ways in which militarist practices, which cannot be reduced to the use of violence, manufacture the consent for specific capitalist hegemonic projects.

I think that establishing a dialogical relation between critical statist, who explore the specific mechanisms of militarism in a way detaching them from class relations of power, and Marxists, who explore the capitalist nature of militarism without exposing the mediating links, may be possible by an analysis based on "manufacturing hegemony": the construction of hegemonic class projects in the different socio-political sites, by diverse social-political actors, by a combination of various techniques of power (from coercion to consent). To what extent the military's discursive and non-discursive

practices resulted from hegemonic crises and then contributed into forging class hegemonic projects is up to historical analysis. In the remaining chapters, I will explore the forms of articulation between militarism and capitalism. My approach is neither to subsume under nor to reduce into each other capitalism and militarism. Rather, I look for the nodal points and specific mechanisms whereby capitalism and militarism become interdependent, intertwined, and each other's condition of being in Turkish history. In other words, I focus on a double process of the "capitalization of militarism" and the "militarization of capitalism".

CHAPTER III

HEGEMONIC PROJECTS, CLASS STRUGGLES, AND MILITARISM:

THE CASE OF THE MAY 27 COUP

Any study of the political power structure of Turkey during the Republican era notes the permanency or the decisive weight of the authoritarian mode of governance in which the military and/or praetorian militarism has occupied a central place. The power of the military has not been regulated within the parameters of the liberal mode of governance whereby inward-oriented militarism is replaced by “outward-oriented” or “geopolitical” militarism. Various forms of domestic militarism, from the open military regimes to national security state form, from the use of military violence to the ideological-cultural forms of militarism, have been a permanent feature of modern Turkish politics.

This military-centered authoritarian mode of governance is commonly explained, as I discussed in chapter II-2, by a struggle between the trans-societal state personified in civil and military bureaucracy and society regardless of class divisions. Accordingly, the predominant state tradition unfolds in different historical-social contexts in order to reestablish the power of the state and/or the state elites. Even though I recognize that a certain *habitus* of governing has been formed in the course of years, it does not per se explain how and why in different historical-social contexts the military actively regulates and manufactures social-political power relations and this authoritarian political tradition is reproduced anew. Nor does it explain the social class nature of domestic militarism in so far as it treats the state as an entity in and for itself, outside and

above social relations of production. Such a conceptualization of the state reduces the actual reality of the state into the state discourse whose self-presentation is class-neutral. The complex web of class-based/biased political struggles through which this interventionist tradition is reproduced anew (each time with differential impacts on class power relations) is subsumed under the struggles between binary oppositions such as state-society, center-periphery, and bureaucracy-bourgeoisie. As a result, the capitalist face of the state and of the militarist practices is overlooked. I will argue in this chapter that the permanency of domestic militarism as a mode of governing internal power relations, *pace* evolutionist-modernist arguments and some critical institutionalists like Giddens, was not something caused by the backwardness of capitalism. Nor it was a result of the state and state elites guided to dominate over an undifferentiated (civil) society, as the hegemonic statist approach contends in Turkey. Rather, it was closely related to the capitalist development process and the related economic-corporate and political-hegemonic class power relations.

How may one assess the capitalist nature of militarist practices without establishing an instrumentalist or functionalist relation? The fact that the military has an autonomous political power it occasionally mobilizes independently from civilian political authorities does not mean that the military is a trans-societal actor whose ideological, political preferences and/or corporate interests are formed in a social vacuum. Quite on the contrary, the military elites are politically socialized within the context of broader social-political power relations. That is why we should conceive the military within (not above or outside) society. The struggles for class hegemony between different historical blocs are important in order to analyze the process of militarization. Nevertheless, the military is not a mere instrument of the forces existing and struggling

outside society. It rather actively shapes the social-political struggles between different social blocs. In other words, its role is not merely reactive but also proactive. Therefore, a non-instrumentalist and non-functionalist reading of the capitalist nature of militarist practices needs to be based on the military's own deeds, its discursive and non-discursive practices as well as the broader political-hegemonic class struggles. The actual practices of the military both shape and are shaped by capitalist power relations among the social blocs with competing hegemonic projects and accumulation strategies. Hence, my explanation of the militarization of class-based political power relations will focus *first* on the historical process of the formation of different hegemonic class projects under the social atmosphere of which the military elites are politically socialized. *Secondly*, the practices of the military during its stage in power will be evaluated in terms of its position during the construction of capitalist hegemonic projects in a contentious political process. In doing this, the restructuring of the institutional structure of the state by the military regime will deserve special attention in order to show how the state as an institutional ensemble strategically selects some social forces over others.

As any attempt to forge a hegemonic project should both constitute the unity of the power bloc (Poulantzas) and manufacture the consent and/or compliance of the dominated classes through various mechanisms (Gramsci, Jessop), the subsequent analysis of political-hegemonic class struggles will situate the military in relation to the power bloc and dominated classes. Such an approach will pave the way for analyzing militarism as mode of governance which is not limited solely to the use of crude violence but brings together, to put in Gramscian and Mann's terms respectively, the coercion and consent, the despotic power and the infrastructural power. Hence, the

understanding of hegemonic practices of the military, the way in which it relates itself with specific historical social blocs through an active participation in the manufacturing of hegemonic projects is an important clue for understanding how militarism normalizes itself as a possible form of governance and how militarism is rooted in and performed by the civil societal forces.

The analysis of the militarization process leading to the first military intervention in 1960 is closely related to the analysis of the crisis of DP's (Democrat Party) hegemonic project and the subsequent political-hegemonic confrontation between two competing alternative hegemonic projects.¹ As DP's hegemony was forged against the CHP's mono-party rule during which the social base of the state had been very restrictive despite attempts to expand it, I will first interpret the class power relations and the place of militarism during this period in order to get a sense of the earlier legacy. Then, I will analyze the DP period in terms of a transition from populist-developmental hegemony to populist authoritarianism, which, together with the next subsection focusing on the emergence of an alternative hegemonic project, formed the historical background of the coup. The last subsection is reserved to the discursive and non-discursive practices of the military regime and to establish the capitalist face of militarism through a non-instrumentalist and non-functionalist approach to the state-class relations.

¹ I will differentiate between alternative and counter hegemonic projects. An alternative hegemonic project is still a capitalist hegemonic project and try to constitute a new historical bloc within the parameters of the capitalist mode of production and under the leadership of a dominant class and/or class fraction, whereas a counter-hegemonic project is an attempt to challenge capitalist class hegemony under the leadership of a dominated class.

1. Etatism as a Passive Revolution

The capitalist transition process after the late Ottoman period, which restructured the socio-economic and socio-political structure, may be defined as *a passive revolution*.² This restricted form of hegemony was based on the exclusion, non-mobilization and disciplining of the dominated classes under an authoritarian state form and political regime. Whereas the exclusivist nature of the class rule under the mono-party regime is conventionally recognized by critical scholars as a revolution and/or modernization from above, the bureaucratic rather than class nature of the power bloc, the state form and the state practices has been underlined by the hegemonic statist approach.³ The adoption of Etatism in the wake of the post-1929 world-economic crisis has also been interpreted as yet another moment of the domination of the bureaucracy over the forces of civil society and economy. However, despite the existence of some contentions over the form of Etatist economic policy between the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie of the period, it was formulated as complementary rather than antagonistic to the private sector; and the bourgeoisie of the period generally supported Etatism.⁴

² For Gramsci, passive revolution signified a politics of transition to and/or restructuring of capitalism whereby the “statization of politics” dominated over the “socialization of politics” in the hegemony-building process and any potential impact of popular initiative is curbed. It excludes the dominated social classes from the institutional materiality of the state and searches to gain their passive consent through limited reform attempts. See Buci-Glucksmann (1979) in addition to footnote 37 in chapter 3.

³ For the thesis of revolution and/or modernization from above see Trimberger (1978), Keyder (1987), Sunar (1974). These critical analyses tend to overemphasize the bureaucratic nature and underemphasize the bourgeois class nature of the power bloc. They lean to underline the autonomy of the bureaucracy from the dominant classes, to explain the power of the bureaucracy in terms of the continuation of pre-capitalist power structure rather than within the parameters of capitalist development. As a result, the contradiction between bureaucracy and bourgeoisie is overemphasized at the expense of inter-class power relations. See Savran (1992) for a rather exceptional interpretation of Turkish passive revolution as a form of bourgeois class rule typical of most cases of late-capitalist development.

⁴ The contentious points between the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie were related neither to interventionism nor to protectionism but to the boundaries of the legitimate domain of private enterprise Buğra (1994a: 106). Even though there were left currents of thought, such as the journal *Kadro*, that interpreted Etatism as an anti-capitalist third way of development project, they always remained marginal and outside the inner circle of the regime (see Güllap, 1987). As Yalman (2002b) notes, Etatism as an economic development strategy was perceived by the policy-makers of the period only as a conjunctural means to achieve the ideal of organic society rather than as an end in itself. Moreover as Owen and Pamuk

Etatism, which denoted both “a strategy of state-led economic development” and “a signifier of an organic conception of society”, was an attempt to forge a capitalist hegemonic project with a claim to unify the power bloc, to represent the dominant class interests as the general interest, and hence to get the consent of the masses. “Put in terms of the Gramscian problematic...the state-led economic development strategy was intended by the state elites concerned, to function as a hegemonic project in constructing a ‘historic bloc’, as the members of the embryonic entrepreneurial class were urged to transcend their economic-corporative interests”. In other words, it was an attempt to constitute the Gramscian “integral state” (Yalman, 1997: 127-128, 130; 2002a). Having the European history of class struggle in mind, the solidarist-organicist political discourse of Etatism and nationalist-populism was mainly concerned with class politics: preventing the potential, if not actual, class conflict by rejecting the very existence of classes.⁵ The denial of class politics was perfectly a form of class politics. The solidarist-nationalist discourse aimed at passively incorporating the dominated classes into the national-popular will through a solidarist ideology as an alternative to the individualism of liberalism and class struggle of Marxism. However, the attempts to manufacture and

(1998: 18-19) underline, the state invested in sectors that the bourgeoisie would not be able to invest and the contribution of the state sector to the industrialization remained modest in the 1930s. The total number of active state enterprises in industry and mining did not exceed 20 percent on the eve of the Second World War. By 1938, total employment in manufacturing, utilities, and mining was about 10 percent of the labor force, and only 11 percent of this amount or about 1 percent of total employment was in state enterprises. Approximately 75 percent of employment in manufacturing was provided by small-scale private enterprises. By investing in large, expansive projects in intermediate goods, the state economic sector actually helped the development of private enterprise in the manufacturing of final goods for the consumer. See also Tekeli and İlkin (1982), Boratav (1982), Gülaıp (1987), Altıparmak (2002). In other words, the anti-labor and pro-industrial development strategy of Etatism would favor private capital formation in small-scale manufacturing sector rather than the corporate interests of an autonomous bureaucracy-cum-class.

⁵ The organicist-solidarist and populist political discourse of the period which denied the existence of social class divisions in the name of national-popular unity is well documented and commonly acknowledged. See Parla (1993a), Toprak (1995b), Tekeli and Şaylan (1978). As Parla (1993a: 7-8) indicates, corporatism as an organicist political thought and ideology has been dominating the public philosophy and various political ideologies in Turkey. It has been an integral component of the succeeding hegemonic discourses attempting at making invisible the class nature of the political power in Turkey.

mobilize the *passive* (rather than active) consent of the dominated classes in order to become “hegemonic” could not be much successful. As a result, the form of class rule leaned to domination instead of hegemony, and coercion prevailed over consent. The reasons for the failure of this hegemonic attempt lie in both economic-social policies; and the ideological-cultural practices. *First of all*, it lacked the material concessions necessary for hegemony. The nationalist-populism of the Etatist period was repressive rather than redistributive towards both the workers and the peasants. “The mono-party period was a period in which the authoritarian state party constituted the conditions of capital accumulation by providing a disciplined and cheap labor force to the national bourgeoisie” (Parla, 1993a: 217). It both legally banned the organization of labor and depressed wages during the Etatist period in order to increase the pace of capital accumulation.⁶ The years of the Second World War during which martial law was in force, the socio-economic conditions of urban working classes in public and private sectors worsened. In addition to the legal bans and deteriorating wages, laws such as “National Protection Law” (Milli Korunma Kanunu”, 1940) forced workers to compulsory labor (see Güzel, 1998). Similarly, despite the populist and peasantist discourses of the period, the agricultural sector lost its previous importance of providing export earnings in the world market and assumed the function of financing the Etatist industrialization. The socio-economic position of the small peasantry worsened because of the transfer of agricultural surplus to the urban-industrial sector through unfavorable

⁶ Despite the domination of solidarist-corporatist thought at the discursive level, the actual practice of the regime ruled out a systematic corporatist arrangement, which would necessitate the foundation of labor organizations for the interest intermediation, in favor of a repressive and authoritarian strategy that legally banned labor organization and labor union activity (see Makal, 2002; Yavuz, 1998; Gülmez, 1995: 161-202). In addition, the wages were depressed in order to support the industrial development and private capital accumulation: “Despite the considerable growth in the urban sector during the 1930s, real wages did not exceed their levels of 1914” (Owen and Pamuk, 1998: 19).

terms of trade (low prices for agricultural products and high prices for inputs and consumption goods) and high taxes. As a strategy of protection, the small peasantry had to work harder in order to produce more by cultivating more land. The emergency measures of the World War II period did nothing but deteriorate the socio-economic conditions of the peasantry in order to secure the regular provisioning of the urban areas and the military. The use of different forms of coercion such as taxation in kind, forced deliveries at below-market prices, compulsory labor in mines and industry, and the oppression of the gendarmerie totally alienated the small and middle peasantry from the regime (see Owen and Pamuk, 1998: 22-24; Keyder and Birtek, 1983; Pamuk, 1991). While the urban and rural working classes turned against the single party regime as a result of the increasing income inequalities, the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie as well as the middle farmers and large landowners (the market-oriented producers in the countryside) benefited from the high prices, the black markets, stockpiling, and profiteering, and the pace of capital accumulation rapidly increased (Owen and Pamuk, 1998: 25-26; Buğra, 1994a: 52-54).

Secondly, the cultural-ideological practices of the CHP were also too much exclusivist to establish hegemony over the masses. Like any hegemonic attempt, Kemalism also attempted to define, to construct, and to represent the people. However, its populism, which is formulated in the expression “for the people, despite the people”, was based on an authoritarian and tutelary elite-mass relationship bolstering a tension between the officialdom and the people while oppressing class-based cleavages. Similarly, the nationalist discourse and national identity construction efforts of the regime could not incorporate the peasant majority of the population. As CHP “struggled against all the ‘particularisms’, the nation it tried to construct increasingly lost its

reference points and became empty of meaning...It was at pains to come up with reference points for ‘nation’ or ‘people’ that would resonate with the popular culture or with the concrete experiences of people in Turkey...‘Nation’ had only the state as a reference point” (Arat-Koç, 1990: 138-139). Hence, Kemalist regime could not overcome the cultural gap between the power bloc and the dominated classes.⁷

The central place of military and militarism within the mode of domination in the early Republican period cannot be captured by the paradigm of civil-military relations because the share of a common political-ideological view by the military and civilian components of the ruling elite de-problematized the civilian control issue during the mono-party period despite the establishment of the military’s institutional autonomy in this period.⁸ The military functioned both as a coercive and ideological apparatus under the auspice and control of the political power. The militarist methods of governing social-political cleavages such as the actual use of military force and the declaration of martial laws were extensively used in the elimination of rival political elites, in the establishment of single party regime, in the suppression of internal revolts and resistances to the formation of the modern centralized nation-state, and in policing the

⁷ There has been formed a rich body of works on the cultural-ideological practices of early Republican period. To cite some of them; for a study underlying “the passive revolution” nature of CHP’s hegemonic attempts through the example of People Houses see Ahıska (1998), on the ethnicist-culturalist limits of nationalism and citizenship see (Yıldız, 2001) and Üstel (2004), respectively. For two comprehensive collections on Kemalism and nationalism in Turkey see İnsel (2002) and Bora (2003). I do not argue that Kemalist hegemonic project was totally unsuccessful and had no social basis. It could establish organic links with the urban middle-classes but not with the urban and rural dominated classes. Nor I do argue that the non-hegemonic position of Kemalist nationalist ideology in early Republican period may be extended as to be valid for the whole Republican history.

⁸ See Bayramoğlu (2004: 59-75) on the autonomization of the military within the state structure and centralization of decision-making within the military according to the parameters of “a war model of governance” in a way to be competent in internal and external politics. The political discourse based on internal and external enemies, the construction of the differentiation between the spheres of state and political, and the securitization of politics were essential to the militarization of political governance mechanisms in this period. On the political events of the period from the perspective of the military-politics relation see Özdağ (1991) and Hale (1996). On the importance attributed to the military as the guardian of the regime in the party programs and the speeches of Atatürk see Parla (1997: 164-178).

majority rural population.⁹ The under-developedness of the state's "administrative power", in the sense used by Giddens (see chp. I-4-a), bolstered the function of the military as an ideological apparatus through compulsory military service (Şen, 1996). The nationalist ideological socialization of the population and the transmission of the principles of the Kemalist regime was an essential part of the military service. The disciplinary practices of the military constituted the subjectivities of the male population in such a way as to establish what Foucault calls "the relation of docility-utility": "Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience)" (quoted in Altınay, 2004: 63). The political aspect of disciplining included both individuating and totalizing mechanisms of modern power. On the one hand, it created obedient, docile individuals, on the other hand, it "provided a model for thinking about the whole nation as a unified body" (Ibid.: 68). The military experience was also used to "increase the economic utility of a soldier beyond the barracks" (Ibid.: 65), to create productive/industrious bodies that capitalist mode of production needs. For this, the military instructed modern agricultural techniques of production and gave technical-professional seminars to the peasants, which were supposed to produce the economic surplus to be transferred into industry under the Etatist hegemonic project (Şen 1996 113-123, 134-137).

2. Democrat Party Period: From Developmentalist-Populist Hegemony to Populist Authoritarianism

DP built its hegemonic project upon the ravages of Etatism and the subsequent war time policies. As I stated above, the dominated classes (the small peasantry and the urban working classes) were increasingly estranged from the regime as a result of both

⁹ See Tunçay (1999), Tokluoğlu-Cesur, (1995), Üskül (1997: 77-99).

Etatist and war time policies. Moreover, the commercial bourgeoisie and the large landowners, who had benefited from the war time policies, also gradually moved away from the ruling party.¹⁰ The DP, which was founded in January 1946, unified this multi-class social opposition under a new hegemonic project.

Within the theoretical framework of hegemonic statist approach, the rise of DP to power has been celebrated as the victory of peripheral forces over the centre, of the market over the state. In that sense, it signified the rise of the bourgeoisie to political power in a process in which it dethroned the bureaucracy, its allegedly century-old opponent.¹¹ This reading over-emphasizes the economic liberalism and the pro-market discourse of the DP and the bourgeoisie of the period as the triumph of the market over the state and as an absolute anti-statist, anti-bureaucratist stance. Yet, “the anti-elitist and/or anti-statist discourse of the Democrat Party could be much better understood as being instrumental in the development of a new hegemonic project which attempted to

¹⁰ The alienation of the dominant classes was partly related to CHP’s occasional recourse to a disciplinary discourse vis-à-vis the dominant classes in order to set a control on profiteering and speculating activities during the war time; and it was mainly CHP’s post-war attempts at appeasing the rural social discontent and vague messages about the future of Etatism that triggered this alienation. In terms of the first factor, even though the Wealth Levy of 1942 and National Protection Law of 1940 in fact favored the rapid capital accumulation of the Muslim bourgeoisie, they nevertheless raised a certain suspicion among the bourgeoisie about the limits of state intervention (see Buğra, 1994a: 111-117 and Keyder, 1987: 111-114). The early post-war steps consolidated this suspicion and alienated the dominant classes. Firstly, in order to gain the political consent of the small peasantry, in 1945 CHP passed the bill of the Land Distribution Law of 1946 whose seventeenth clause gave the government the right to redistribute large private lands too. Actually that would never happen. The person chosen for the implementation of the Law was a big landowner (Cavit Oral, the Minister of Agriculture) and the Law would be used essentially by DP to distribute state owned lands. Nevertheless, this Law triggered the opposition of the large landowners and caused the foundation of DP (Keyder and Pamuk, 1984-85; Balta, 2002). Similarly, another stillborn project was the 1946 development plan in the preparation of which the radical Etatist Kadro movement had played important roles. This plan which supported the continuation of Etatism in the post-war period also sharpened the unrest of the commercial and manufacturing bourgeoisie (Buğra, 1994a: 118).

¹¹ It is worth quoting at length from Keyder: “By any measure the Democrat Party’s accession to power in 1950 constituted a fundamental break in Turkish history. For the first time a popular electorate expressed its political choice and voted against a statist tradition several centuries old. Paternalism, control from the centre, and reformism from above were decisively rejected while the market (and capitalism) were given free reign...The bourgeoisie, however, was politically the most conscious party in the populist mobilisation. It was aware that the new era heralded its political and ideological domination at the expense of the bureaucracy and its awkward attempts to propagate a statist system under a nationalist ideology...Nevertheless, it was this battle which signalled the transition from capitalism under bureaucratic tutelage to capitalism based much more solidly on market mechanisms” (Keyder, 1987: 124).

link various particularistic interests under the leadership of an emerging bourgeoisie which had no intention of weakening its ties to the state” (Yalman, 2002a: 34).

The vantage point of the bourgeoisie in the aftermath of the war was openly declared in the Economic Congress held in İstanbul in 1948,¹² which was also indicative of the active stance of the bourgeoisie in exerting pressure on economic policy-making process. While it is beyond discussion that the bourgeoisie openly demanded the retreat of the state from sectors that were the exclusive domain of the public sector during the Etatist period and wanted the remaining state-owned enterprises to function according to the precept of market prices, it was not totally against state intervention and regulation. It favored the redefinition of the form of state intervention. Accordingly, the state would invest in sectors into which the private sector was not able (because it lacks the necessary amount of capital) or willing (because it is not profitable) to invest. Moreover, the Congress also criticized the liberalization of foreign trade regime which would deteriorate the balance of payments and the productive capacity of the country, and favored a more protectionist trade regime in order to protect domestic manufacturers.¹³ However, within the parameters of the post-war US-led restructuring of the world economic order, the successive post-war governments and the bourgeoisie had to leave aside the national industrial development project in favor of the agriculture-based export-oriented development model under an open trade regime which was supported by the American economic and military aid. The foreign economic and military aids under the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine together with the favorable international terms

¹² The Economic Congress of 1948 was organized by the İstanbul Merchants Association and supported by various other organizations such as the İstanbul Chamber of Industry and Commerce, the Turkish Economists Association, the Turkish Economy Foundation, and the İstanbul District Industrial Association.

¹³ See Karpat (1996: 242-243), Türkay (1994), Yalman (1997: 137-142).

of trade for Turkish agricultural export products seduced the successive governments and the bourgeoisie to a form of articulation with world capitalist economy via an agriculture-led accumulation strategy (Turgut, 1991: 137-143).

In fact, this redefinition of State's role in the economy could easily be adopted by CHP, for which Etatism as an economic development model was an *ad hoc* policy adopted under specific historical conditions. By 1950, there was not a significant difference between CHP and DP in terms of accumulation strategy since both parties campaigned for the liberalization of the economy. Under the new international conjuncture and the opposition of the dominant classes represented in DP, CHP had already adopted and started to implement most of the economic liberalization policies between 1946 and 1950.¹⁴ This was also discernible in the continuity of economic policies under CHP and DP governments between 1946 and 1953.¹⁵ However, as part of its power strategy, DP continued to strongly criticize CHP for showing little respect for private entrepreneurship and politically and ideologically reconstructed the relationship between the state and business as one of hostility under the CHP rule.

The great success of DP compared to CHP was its ability to actively forge a hegemonic project to implement this new accumulation strategy. In other words, both CHP and DP adopted the same accumulation strategy but it was only DP which could

¹⁴ For instance, the liberalization of the foreign trade regime started in 1946; one year later, the first encouragement law of foreign direct investment passed; the 1947 Economic Development Plan of Turkey (*Türkiye İktisadi Kalkınma Planı*) put more emphasis on the agricultural sector and the integration of Turkey into the world economy; in the 1947 Convention of the party, CHP redefined the principle of Etatism in its program and adopted a more liberal conception of Etatism whereby the state activity was confined to the fields for which the private sector's capital was insufficient or in sectors which provided no profit for private capital (Karpas, 1996: 244-246; Buğra, 1994a: 118-119). The relative liberalization attempt by CHP was not confined to the economic issues. For example, the party also relaxed its definition of secularism in defence of DP's ideological mobilization on the basis of religious discourse. See Toprak (1990: 247-248).

¹⁵ The economic development model of this period was based on a new form of articulation with the world capitalist economy through an open trade regime, export of agricultural products, and an investment strategy prioritizing the agricultural sector, the infrastructure and the construction sector (see Boratav, 1987: 73-84).

articulate it to the discontent of the subaltern classes. Populism was the ideological-political form of this hegemonic class project,¹⁶ and it corresponded to the success of organizing various social classes, class fractions, and social groups under the category of people against the power bloc. DP constructed the power bloc as composed of the strong state elites which did not establish organic relations with the nation/the people. On the other hand, DP articulated the discontent of the peasantry, the working classes, and the urban and rural petty bourgeois groups to the interests of the commercial bourgeoisie and large landowners (the dominant capitalist fractions) and the small manufacturing bourgeoisie through a populist-developmental hegemonic project which brought these antagonistic classes under the people/the popular bloc. As such, it could establish the hegemony of the dominant classes by presenting them as if they are part of the popular bloc.¹⁷

The populist-developmental political discourse of DP articulated such ideological elements as economic development and progress, political liberalization,

¹⁶ Following early Laclau (1977), I use populism as a specific form of hegemonic class project. In this use, populism is not merely a redistributionist policy but a specific form of politics that constructs an antagonistic relation between the people and the power bloc through the ideological interpellations of the agents as the *people* and material concessions to the dominated classes. “*It is a popular-democratic struggle in so far as it is addressed as people in an antagonistic relationship to dominant/power bloc*” (107). Laclau recognizes the specificity and autonomy of the “people-power bloc contradiction” as analytically distinct from class contradiction but also underlines that every contradiction is overdetermined by class struggle. The intelligibility of people versus power bloc contradiction depends on the ensemble of political and ideological relations of domination and not merely on the relations of production (108). But as every contradiction is overdetermined by class struggle “popular-democratic ideologies are never separate from but always articulated with class ideological discourses”. “*Class struggle at the ideological level consists in the attempt to articulate popular-democratic interpellations...The popular-democratic interpellation not only has no precise class content, but is the domain of ideological class struggle par excellence*” (108-109, see also 114). In this reading of populism through the Gramscian problematic of hegemony, “the dominant class hegemony is founded through the articulation into its class discourse of non-class contradictions and interpellations and through the absorption of contents forming part of the ideological and political discourses of dominated classes” (161-162). For a similar interpretation see also Jessop (1980).

¹⁷ Eroğul (2003) is an empirically very rich monograph on DP. Bora (2005) and Demirel (2005) are two valuable sources that expose the political discourse of DP. Arat-Koç (1990) is an extremely useful analysis of DP’s discursive and non-discursive practices from the theoretical perspective of a Gramscian analysis of hegemony with specific focus on the peasantry.

pro-Westernist nationalism, and the relaxation of cultural modernism together with the use of religious symbolism in a way to be contrasted to the bureaucratic-elitist, Etatist, and secularist aspects of the previous hegemonic project. During its stage in opposition, DP successfully mobilized the rhetoric of liberal-democracy against the tutelary-authoritarianism of CHP. It convincingly emphasized the democratic political rights and freedoms, the superiority of the national will, and the democratic capacity of the nation (see Bora, 2005: 486-489). Thanks to this democratic rhetoric, which also included the defense of rights of strike and unionization, DP could extend its hegemony to the working class before the election of 1950, though to be gradually lost soon after the election.¹⁸ Meanwhile, the key to DP's hegemony was its success to establish an organic relation with the peasant majority of the population.¹⁹ The consent of the peasant majority was manufactured through two interrelated discourses: centralizing the productive capacity of the agriculture as the main source of economic development as opposed to CHP's state-led industry-based strategy and the recognition of the peasant majority as mature and capable of making political choices as opposed to CHP's tutelary approach that saw the people as an ignorant mass to be educated. In terms of economic policy, after the long period of single party rule during which the peasantry had borne

¹⁸ After a long period of repression and impoverishment under Etatism and World War years, CHP attempted to get the support of the working class by abolishing the prohibition on founding class-based associations in 1946. This resulted in flourishing of unions with which by two socialist parties (Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi and Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi) quickly established organic relations. This alarmed CHP which still conceived the unions as profession-based economic-corporate organizations within the confines of corporatist thought. The CHP government closed down the unions and socialist parties through a decision of martial law commander, prepared the Law of Unions (1947) which was based on an authoritarian organicist conception of trade union, which restricted their activities, organizations and which did not recognize the right of collective agreement and strike. Finally, CHP founded the Workers Bureau (İşçi Bürosu) and started to found unions organically affiliated to itself (see Güzel, 1996: 147-162). During this period, DP ardently supported the right to strike and collective bargaining in the parliament and public opinion by arguing that the Turkish working class was nationalist, a liable actor, and not a subversive force (see Gülmez, 1995: 257-262). The hegemony of DP was so extensive that even the illegal communist party (TKP) supported DP in the 1950 elections.

¹⁹ "In 1950, out of a population of 20 million, 80 percent lived in the countryside – the great majority being small producers" (Keyder, 1987: 118).

the costs of the industrialization and had had a negative experience with the state, DP's pro-market anti-statist developmentalist discourse could win the hearts of the peasantry.²⁰ In terms of political participation, the concept of national will (*milli irade*), which was central in DP's discourse as a counterpart to elitist-tutelary notion of popular will of CHP, functioned as a new claim to represent the nation which was now pictured as politically mature enough.

In fact, when the difference between “the politics of electoral support” and “the politics of governmental power” (Jessop et. al., 1984: 33) is seriously taken into account, the rhetorical dimension and the limits of anti-statist, pro-market, and liberal-democratic discourse of DP becomes evident. The political anti-statism of DP was in any sense challenging the trans-societal, mythical, and transcendental conceptualization of the state. DP carefully distinguished between the State and those managing the state apparatus (the bureaucratic and political elites); it severely criticized the latter while at the same time exalting the former as the class-neutral organic representative of the nation. In that sense, DP's claim was to actualize the organic integration of the nation with its state through the mediation of the party (see Demirel, 2005: 508; Bora, 2005: 489-490). The solidarist-organicist discourse also continued but now under a new form. Instead of denying the existence of social classes, DP now recognized the existence of social classes but rejected the class struggle by arguing that economic development would also bring social harmony.²¹

²⁰ As Keyder (1987: 118-119) notes, “the overwhelming majority of the population were petty producers who might well be expected to subscribe to the ideals of ‘simple market society’”. Moreover, not only the big landowners and rural merchants but also small peasantry had already started to enjoy the benefits of the agriculture-led development model in the post-war recovery years between 1946 and 1950.

²¹ The following quotation from Fuat Köprülü, one of the four founders of DP, summarizes well the new position. “We accept that there are social classes; that they have special interests and that if not regulated these interests may contradict each other. We find its useful and necessary for various classes in modern society to organize themselves for work and activity in professional organizations, trade unions, and

The populist hegemony was far from being, even at its inception and heydays, participatory and democratic. The shift to multiparty politics did not change the authoritarian form of state in the sense that the balance of class forces as inscribed into the institutional materiality of the state remained unchanged (Yalman, 2002a: 33). DP did not undertake significant reforms to restructure the state apparatus and endorsed authoritarianism which did not let the dominated classes to found their autonomous economic and political organizations. Instead, DP's strategy towards the dominated classes was based on their passive incorporation as voters and on offering economic-corporate material concessions through clientelistic mechanisms. DP limited the active subject-ness of the peasantry to being a voter-subject (Bora, 2005: 488). If the particularistic and partisan redistributionist policy based on patron-client relations formed the material concessions part of the hegemony, the use of religious symbolism functioned as an instrument of cultural-ideological bridge between the dominant and dominated classes.²² The authoritarian face of DP's populist hegemony became evident as early as the beginning of the 1950s, especially in its relations with the urban working class. The peculiar organicist discourse of DP which prioritized both the economic development and the integration of the state and the nation in the body of DP easily slipped to an anti-working class discourse and practice, denying the right to strike as

cooperatives...However...the view that the social classes have irreconcilable interests and have to be in conflict with each other is, in our opinion an outdated and baseless one...We believe that it is possible to harmonize the interests of various classes and strata in the framework of national unity and general interests through the principles of social justice and cooperation" (quoted in Arat-Koç, 1990: 175)

²² As Sunar (2004b) underlines, populism and patronage were the political techniques and state-assisted agrarian capitalism was the base of DP's hegemonic project. On patronage and clientelism in Turkey see also Sayarı (1977). The use of religious symbolism by DP is a perfect case of constructing and articulating non-class contradictions to the dominant class hegemonic project (see above fn. 7). On the careful use of religion by DP as a political technology of social control within the confines of a developmentalist-capitalist paradigm see Bora (2005: 495-498) and Cizre-Sakallıoğlu (1996: 236-238).

senseless in an underdeveloped country.²³ Yet, DP could maintain its hegemony over the working class for a while by various political techniques such as economic-corporate benefits through legal regulations bringing social policy reforms (such as minimum wage, paid weekends, health service, housing provisions, working conditions, reforms of social security etc.) and relatively positive distribution of income; the imposition of strict administrative controls and constraints over the trade unions; and the centralization of unions under Türk-İş in order to control labor (Koç, 1998: 43-47). Hence, the pattern may be called an inclusionary form of state corporatism (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1992: 714-717). Thus, DP's populism could be seen as yet another form of passive revolution, which is more inclusionary than that pursued by CHP but far from being a genuine democratic expanded hegemony. Nevertheless, the authoritarianism of DP's hegemonic project would become more salient in the second half of 1950s.

The maintenance of hegemony over the dominated classes was closely related to the success of the accumulation strategy. The alleged economic liberalism of DP was not an unfettered and unregulated logic of market dynamic. As Sunar (1994: 95) underlines, "all populist projects, of whatever variety, entail the intervention of the state for their consolidation. The distributive policies on which the formation of populist coalitions and constituencies depend require an interventionist state". Even though the state form of intervention in the economy differed in the two sub-periods of DP rule (1950-53 and

²³ DP, which had ardently defended the right to strike, actually never legalized this demand. Once in power, Menderes was saying to those reminding him of the right to strike: "Leave aside this absurdity, can there be strike in Turkey? Let the economic development to take place first, we will then think about this issue" (Ahmad, 2005: 134). Later on, he even returned to a discourse denying the existence of social classes by arguing that "the Turkish society was not yet divided into classes or subjugated to domestic industrial exploitation" (Bora, 2005: 502). Similarly the Minister of Labor said in 1956 that "Why we did not legalize the right to strike up to now? Because we did not have yet a developed industry, which is necessary for strike. Ours is an infant industry. We could not kill it." (Mahiroğulları, 2005: 73). In addition, anti-communism and anti-leftism also were an integral part of DP's discourse (Bora, 2005: 504-505).

1954-60), the state actively constituted the economy. Until 1954, the agriculture-based development strategy of the DP was successful in terms of economic growth.²⁴ The main reasons of the agriculture-led economic growth were the increase in the cultivated land as a result of the distribution of state-owned lands; the mechanization of agriculture financed by the Marshall Plan aid thanks to which the farmers were given favorable credits to buy tractors; improving external terms of trade caused by the rising demand for agricultural products under the world conjuncture marked by post-World War II conditions and Korean War; and finally good weather conditions. These policies also served to strengthen the prevailing agricultural class structure based on small peasantry while at the same time serving the interests of the big landowners. The state actively intervened through the distribution of lands and cheap credits, through the infrastructural investments (mainly roads) in order to ease the commercialization and marketization of agricultural products (Singer, 1977: 197-239; Owen and Pamuk, 1998: 106-107; Keyder, 1987: 126-133). The high rates of economic growth were accompanied by a relative prosperity for all social groups including the urban working classes and the small peasantry whose real income ameliorated between 1946 and 1953 (Boratav, 1987: 80-84).

By 1954, the temporary economic development was reversed due to the end of the Korean War that caused a decline in world prices of agricultural products, the disappearance of favorable weather conditions, and the limits in the expansion of cultivated areas. The immediate effect was increasing foreign trade deficits and deteriorating balance of payments. The agricultural producers were hit severely by this trend since “in 1954 agricultural output and exports decreased by 15 percent and per

²⁴ The average annual rate of growth of GNP was 8.7 percent for the period 1947-1953, then it decreased to 4 percent in the period 1954-1962 (Owen and Pamuk, 1998: 107).

capita income by 11 percent” (Keyder, 1987: 133). The class composition of the existing hegemonic project and the ideological commitment to the promises of economic development led DP to pursue an expansionist economic policy inducing economic growth at the expense of inflationary financing and macro-economic instability. DP’s response to the economic crisis has been twofold: assisting agricultural production by state subsidies and shifting to a protectionist trade policy bringing in an unintended and unplanned import-substituting industrialization. DP subsidized the agricultural sector through agricultural credits, support programs at the cost of high inflation and budgetary deficits until the end of the decade (Boratav, 1987: 88; Turgut, 1991: 168-185; Owen and Pamuk, 1998: 108).

The real dynamic effect of the crisis of agriculture-led accumulation strategy has been the acceleration of industrial development and the subsequent change in the class structure: the strengthening of the industrial fraction of the bourgeoisie and the increasing number of urban working class. In order to govern trade deficits and the crisis of balance of payments, DP shifted to a more interventionist and protectionist policy based on quantitative restrictions on imports, overvalued exchange rate, controls on the use of foreign exchange, more emphasis on state owned enterprises and state investments. This meant an unintentional, *de facto* return to ISI in which the domestic industry started to produce non-durable/light consumer goods for the domestic market. Thus, protection and inflation induced the bourgeoisie to make industrial investments and served to increase the profits of the private industry in the short-term.²⁵ Even though

²⁵ See Turgut (1991), Boratav (1987). One of the signs of the profitability of the manufacturing sector was the increasing rates of investment in the private sector, which showed an average increase of 13.8 percent annually for the 1950-1959 period (Tüzün, 1999: 161).

the annual rate of growth slightly increased in the post-1954 period, the relative weight of manufacturing industry radically increased.²⁶

The industrialization also meant working class formation: between 1950 and 1960, the number of workers in industrial plants of more than ten workers almost doubled, and the number of workers subjected to the Labor Law almost tripled.²⁷ The industrial development was also assisted by cheap credits to the private sector and by large public investments in sectors such as sugar, textiles, cement, iron and steel, and electricity, some of which functioned as supplier of cheap inputs for the private manufacturing sector and as source of high profits through government contracts.²⁸ However, large state investments, which resulted from an uncoordinated and unplanned investment policy, were marked by the problems of overproduction and excess capacity and resulted in increasing budget deficits (see Singer, 1977: 254-320).

The change of power relations within the power bloc in the second half 1950s brought into the scene an intra-class conflict. This period witnessed the rise of the contradiction between the export interests (export-oriented merchants and agricultural producers) and the rising ISI coalition composed of private manufacturing capital and importers of industrial inputs; and also a contradiction between the import merchants

²⁶ The annual rates of growth for manufacturing industry and agriculture were 6.5 and 11.5 percent for 1947-1953 and 7.6 and 2.1 for 1954-1962, respectively (Owen and Pamuk, 1998: 109).

²⁷ It was 162.857 in 1950 and 323.399 in 1960. The growth was equally discernible in public and private entrepreneurs, and the performance of the private sector was considerable. While at the beginning of the decade, the number of workers were almost equal in public and private sectors (76.031 and 86.826, respectively), by the end of decade the number in the private sector was 50 percent higher than that of the public sector (126.175 and 197.224) (Singer, 1977: 295). The number of workers subject to the Labor Law was higher since the latter comprised those working in plants with less than ten workers. The number was 373.961 in 1950 and 824.881 in 1960 (Mahiroğulları, 2005: 95).

²⁸ On the increase of loans given by the Industrial Development Bank see Singer (1977: 258). It should be underlined that state economic investments increased during the DP period despite the privatization discourse of DP. The reason for this was the unwillingness of the private sector to take over the large public-owned enterprises since investment in light consumer goods was still more profitable. (Buğra, 1994a: 123). In other words, the anti-economic statism of DP was more of a discursive strategy, which was nevertheless supported by the private capital .

and industrialists over the distribution of import licenses since import was very profitable under the conditions of overvalued exchange rate (see Öncü, 1980: 464-467; Göker, 2006). Nevertheless, until 1958, DP could continue to reconcile the conflicting intra-class interests through inflationary growth policies. The business community, which was not passively subordinated to the economic policies *pace* statist arguments, was rather content with and supporting DP's growth-oriented economic policies even though the macro economic instability and the unplanned nature of the industrial development was an object of criticism.²⁹ However, the balance of payment and foreign exchange crisis worsened by 1958, and DP had to implement IMF stabilization program.³⁰ The deepening macro economic crisis meant the end of this rather impossible form of intra-class reconciliation. As a result, the intra-class conflict sharpened. The ISI-oriented bloc became estranged from the DP which was paralyzed by the prevailing export-oriented interests and hence unable to re-articulate a new hegemonic project and

²⁹ For instance, the İstanbul Merchants Association opposed any suggestion to slow down the economic growth in the name of curbing the inflation and supported the increase of industrial investments (see Özden, 2004: 33). Similarly, in 1953, İstanbul Chamber of Industry supported the restrictive import regime which had been taken in consultation with them. In a report dated 1956, İstanbul Chamber of Commerce supported the growth-oriented policies and rejected the devaluation instead of which they proposed taxation of agricultural earnings and incomes from real estate speculations, selective controls on bank credits so as to allocate them to productive purposes, the preparation of an investment plan. Those suggestions were reflecting the concerns of ISI bloc (both the importers and manufacturing bourgeoisie) (see Yalman, 1997: 151-157) and they would be implemented by the military regime. It should be noted that given the powerful position of the landowning class in the power bloc, DP's earlier attempt at introducing a modest increase in the land tax in 1955 failed following the opposition of the landowners (see Özbudun, 1966: 19).

³⁰ DP had never been willing to implement such a stabilization program which would bring a contractionary monetary and fiscal policy, hence slowing down inflationist economic growth in the short-term. Until 1958, the business circles also constrained the government for rejecting a devaluation that would stop the economic growth. However, towards the end of the decade, the international agencies made the stabilization program the precondition of foreign credits. The stabilization program brought a selectively protectionist foreign trade regime and required the foundation of a planning agency in order to restructure the state apparatus in line with an inward-oriented accumulation strategy which was also serving the interests of the internationalization of productive capital (see Güllalp, 1993: 35; Turgut, 1991: 183-185)

to restructure the state apparatus in line with the new accumulation strategy.³¹ As a result, neither the ISI nor the export-oriented blocs were satisfied with the current economic structure (see Göker, 2006), which was indicative of the incapacity of DP to unify the power bloc. To put it in other words, it was not the indifference of state and/or political elites to capitalist class' demands, as would suggest the statist paradigm, but the existence of pressures for reform by different class fractions in line with their own economic-corporate interests that undermined the hegemonic capacity of the state vis-à-vis the power bloc.

If the hegemony of DP failed in terms of its function of unifying the power bloc towards the end of the decade, it had started to shatter much earlier vis-à-vis the rising urban middle classes and working class. In other words, the partial crisis of hegemony was not an automatic result of the crisis of accumulation though it certainly included it. The inherent authoritarian tendencies of the populist hegemonic project sharpened in the course of the 1950s, which culminated in an open authoritarianism. The protracted political crisis in addition to the economic crisis in the second half of the 1950s was a symptom of the gradually deepening dysfunction between the accumulation strategy and hegemonic project. The hegemonic capacity of DP contracted to the extent that it responded to the criticisms of the newly formed urban social groups through authoritarianism.

The post-1954 period was marked by the increasing authoritarianism of DP vis-à-vis the opposition party, the press, the intellectuals, the university, and the working

³¹ For instance, according to Menderes, planning was a communist method. However, the preparation of a development plan and the establishment of a planning agency were also imposed by international agencies after 1957, as a result of which DP government had to start the necessary preparations under the guidance J. Koopman. When the coup arrived, the preparatory works were not finished yet. And most strikingly, while the preparation of the plan was going behind the doors, DP was publicly defending its anti-plan stance (see Avcioğlu, 1973: 768; Eroğul, 2003: 147-148).

class. Through a series of legal changes and regulations, DP brought restrictions upon electoral politics, the autonomy of the universities and judiciary. It abolished the job security of the high officials, of the members of high judiciary, and of university members. It curbed the freedom of press, thought and expression through increasingly harsh measures including prison penalties. The sphere of politics was restricted through a series of coercive arrangements such as the ban on deputy candidates to change their political parties in the next elections, the ban on open air meetings of political parties in times other than the election periods, the ban of politics for university professors. Towards the end of the period, the DP government even had recourse to police measures in order to impede the political activities of the opposition party. DP so much abused the anti-communist rhetoric, which it had always used, that at the end, even the legal opposition party (CHP) was blamed for being communist.³² This authoritarianism was at the same time populist to the extent that it relied on the discourse of the national will and could preserve its hegemony on the peasant majority. It constructed an authoritarian chain of equivalence between the electoral/parliamentary majority, national will, and democracy in such a way that, for instance, any checks and balances within the parameters of the rule of law was rejected as an attempt to limit the national will.³³ It blamed the intelligentsia, who criticized DP's economic policies and its anti-democratic and arbitrary rule for undermining the rule of law, as a reflection of "intellectual despotism". Similarly, DP used military and police forces against the student protests

³² Eroğul (2003) is an important source on the political developments and authoritarian measures during the DP period (see especially 164-169, 189, 191-196, 238-239).

³³ For instance, in response to the demands about the independence of the judiciary Menderes argued that the parliament represented all the forces, and in a country like Turkey in which there was no class divisions and the government represented the nation rather than a specific class as it is the case in Western countries, the independence of the judiciary would mean the violation of the national will (see Demirel, 2005: 505).

which were far from being radical leftist but rather in line with nationalist-developmental capitalist hegemony.

DP also estranged urban lower classes, i.e. the working class which had developed in the 1950s and the lower rank civil servants. The latter was subjected to a process of proletarianisation during the years of high inflation.³⁴ As to the working class, the already fragile hegemony of DP over the working class which was nevertheless kept alive through economic-corporate concessions and corporatist control mechanisms up to a certain point, was lost with the diminishing possibility for a redistributionist policy and with the increasing authoritarianism of DP in a period in which the working class inclined to support CHP, which started to defend the right to strike after 1953. I explained above how DP resisted the demands for the right to strike which was seen as central to spread collective bargaining by the union leaders of the period. The reason for this rejection was the will of DP to protect manufacturing industry. To the extent that the union leaders established organic relations with CHP, DP accused Türk-İş for doing politics, increased financial pressure on the unions, and increased its repression on the union leaders with CHP leaning. It did not let the unions to publicly support some deputy candidates in the 1954 elections, and later on closed down several unions upon the claim that they meddled into the politics (see Mahiroğulları, 2005: 118-120). Hence, the authoritarianism of DP was such that it even repressed a trade union such as Türk-İş which always claimed to be nationalist, statist, and above politics.

³⁴ The tax system also put the main burden of public expenditures on salaried personnel. According to an exceptional study on the income of the officials by Korkut Boratav, between 1950-1965 the income of the officials decreased by half. The civil servants were the social strata whose relative income deteriorated the most while the parity rate in the distribution of national income was 4.158 for salaried officials (memurlar), it decreased to 2.416 in 1965. (The parity rate indicates how much or less a specific social group gets from the national income per capita being equal to 1). See Şaylan (1994: 85-86; quoting from Korkut Boratav, "1950-65 Döneminde Tarım Dışındaki Emekçi Gruplar Açısından Gelir Dağılımındaki Değişiklikler", Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, cilt XXIV, no. 1).

Finally, DP's relations with the military had also worsened during the course of 1950s. Even though DP did not hesitate to have recourse to militarist methods such as the declaration of martial laws and use of military force for policing the street protests, militarism was not a central political technology for DP, which, quite on the contrary, was critical of the independent power of the military. DP's strategy for appeasing and neutralizing a possible military opposition to its coming to and stay in power was incorporating high ranking retired generals into the ranks of the party and the nomination of those names closer to the party to the higher echelons of the military once they got the political power (see Eroğul, 2003: 100, Mazıcı, 1989: 131). However, DP's strategy of establishing good relations with high ranking generals, did not refrain the politicization of lower and middle rank officers who would prepare the coup of 27 May. The causes of the discontent of the lower-middle ranking officers were generally attached to their worsening socio-economic situations under inflationary policies, to their institutional-corporate interests pertaining to the military reform demands about the modernization of the military apparatuses, which would disqualify older generations (Ahmad, 2005: 19-20, 149-152; Hale, 1996: 92-94). However, these were not the real dynamics leading to the preparation of the coup. Instead, it was the political discontent with the failure of DP to realize the economic development within a balanced social and political order, as it would become more evident once the military seized the power.

Hence, in the second half of 1950s, an urban oppositional bloc composed of industrial bourgeoisie, the urban lower and middle classes, the intelligentsia, and the military had already emerged. However, their unity was not an automatic outcome and had to be manufactured around a new hegemonic project.

3. Manufacturing the New Hegemonic Project

The second half of the 1950s was both a period of the crisis of DP's hegemony, which shifted from a populist hegemony to a populist authoritarianism, and of the rise of a new hegemonic project based on the articulation of democratic state, rule of law, planned capitalist economic development and social justice. Starting mid-1950s, the seeds of this new hegemonic project were sown at both intellectual and political planes in different social sites by different social actors. In that sense, the most influential review of the period *Forum*, the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi-HP*) which was founded by the dissident deputies within DP and later joined CHP; and finally CHP as the most powerful actor of this new hegemonic project.

At the intellectual plane the critiques toward DP policies was forged in the pages of *Forum*, the most influential review of the period.³⁵ The writers, who were mainly young academicians and university professors of the period who were discontented with the anti-intellectualist and anti-democratic practices of DP and who were heavily influenced by the post-World War II democratic-welfare state model. Despite the existence of people whose future political-intellectual engagements would differ, the review represented an almost coherent political-intellectual line based on the liberal-democratic polity, developmentalist-welfare state, and planned inward-oriented industrial development. Even though *Forum* defined its position as “liberal-socialist” (Forum, 1956b: 2), it would be better to define it as “social liberal with important social

³⁵ It was published twice a month. The founders were Bahri Savcı, Osman Okyar, Bedii Feyzioğlu, Aydın Yalçın, Turhan Feyzioğlu, Turan Güneş, Nilüfer Yalçın, Bülent Ecevit, Kemal Salih, and Nejat Tunçsiper. The contributors included people from different political positions such as Doğan Avcıoğlu, Mümtaz Soysal, Sadun Aren, Coşkun Kırca, Münci Kapani, Şerif Mardin. The importance of the review lie in that it shaped the hegemonic project of the military intervention both in terms of its intellectual-moral hegemony in the pre-coup period and in terms of the leading figures of the review who openly supported and directly assumed important roles under the military regime. Several writers of the review who had also previously participated in the active political life at the ranks of Freedom Party and CHP (see below), were active in the preparation of the 1961 Constitution and the State Planning Organization, the two main hegemonic apparatuses of the military regime.

democratic tones”. The *Forum* writers reinterpreted and/or reconstructed the tradition of Kemalism as a progressive modernization project with a mainly liberal orientation, and attempted to articulate their social liberalism to Kemalism.³⁶ Their political liberalism was based on the defense of individual and collective rights and freedoms, for the lack and violation of which they harshly criticized DP’s escalating authoritarianism. The liberal democratic state, the principle of political pluralism, the rule of law, the importance of the Constitution, the necessity of a Constitutional Court, the constitutionality of the political power, the importance of the principle of the separation of forces, the independence of the judiciary, the individual as well as collective rights and freedoms were the main themes systematically defended in *Forum*.³⁷

Consistent with the international intellectual hegemony of the period, the classical political rights were treated in relation to the social rights, to “the social content of liberties”. According to the *Forum* writers, not social class power relations but underdevelopment was the main socio-political question. The root cause of the social inequalities and injustices lay in the economic underdevelopment of Turkey which would be overcome by state planning and regulation.. The economic development of an underdeveloped country such as Turkey in which the lack of private capital and resources was the greatest impediment for the development, could only be solved by the planning and state regulation which had become an undeniable feature of economic governance even in the developed world. Hence, DP was criticized for running the economy according to the principles of the 19th century classical liberalism while at the same time having recourse to an unplanned state interventionism because of the

³⁶ See for example *Forum* (1956a). For an article interpreting *Forum* as a Kemalist-Liberal synthesis see Eriş (2005). However, I should note that the dominant “moment of this articulation” is social liberalism.

³⁷ For articles on these issues see Savcı (1956), Feyzioğlu (1954), Yalçın (1954), *Forum* (1955; 1956a; 1956b).

impossibility of governing the economy in terms of classical liberalism. The rational planning that would replace the particularistically and clientelistically “politicized” economic-decision making process was the key to dealing with the social inequalities and social disturbances and to the co-evolution of economic and social development. However, planning and state regulation was not in any sense anti- or outside-capitalism. They also carefully distinguished the state intervention into the economy and the planning from Etatism and totalitarianism. The state would intervene in the economy in order to make the free market mechanism work healthily. Private entrepreneurship and private property would be the basis of this model. Yet, these terms had no longer their 19th century liberal meaning and had acquired a social welfare content. They were critical of the Etatism-Liberalism dichotomy which had enframed the political and intellectual debates in Turkey and argued for a model that would articulate free market economy, state regulation and social justice. Their ideal model was the “social welfare state of the Scandinavian and Britain model”. The regulation of the macro-economy by the state, the foundation of a planning center, economic development through a model of import-substituting industrialization were the *sine qua non* of their model.³⁸

To sum up, *Forum* established a moral-ideological hegemony for the new hegemonic project favoring the industrial bourgeoisie and that would be implemented by the military regime. Their support to the 27 May military regime is an open declaration of the close relation between the two actors, the intellectuals and the military, of the new social bloc represented in this new hegemonic project: “The Revolution of 27 May should be understood as the expression of the resistance of the majority of the nation

³⁸ For articles on planning see Okyar (1954a; 1954b; 1955a; 1955b; 1955c; 1957) and Yalçın (1955; 1956a; 1956b; 1956c; 1956d; 1957), *Forum* (1956c).

against the oppression, economic and social injustice ...rather than a military movement” (Forum, 1962: 4).³⁹

However, this intellectual-moral hegemony also needed to be translated into the political hegemony. In that sense, two parties, Freedom Party (Hürriyet Partisi, HP) and CHP are worth focusing on. The *Forum* writers actively participated in the politics at the rank of these two parties which merged in 1959.⁴⁰ The HP was not successful in terms of electoral success but had important impacts on the public opinion and CHP of the late 1950s. The HP was founded by the 28 dissident deputies of DP in December 1955.⁴¹ The line of the party can be summarized as a synthesis of political freedom and planned economic development.⁴² In the foundation declaration, the objectives of the party were cited as the establishment of democracy and human rights; the development of a realist, scientific and planned approach concerning the economic policies, the realization of a sound economic development together with a sound monetary policy (Hürriyet Partisi, 1956a). The political liberalization and democratization had a central place in the party program too.⁴³ In that sense, the party positioned itself as part the “national front of democracy” (Hürriyet Partisi, 1956c)

³⁹ For such other articles in *Forum* within the month following the coup see Ak Devrim (1960: 161-178).

⁴⁰ The review openly supported HP during the course of the 1957 elections (see for example Forum, 1957; 1958). Many writers of the review such as Muammer Aksoy, Münci Kapanı, Aydın Yalçın, Şerif Mardin were active in HP whereas many of them such as Turhan Feyzioğlu, Osman Okyar, Coşkun Kırca, Turan Güneş, and Bülent Ecevit would be influential figures of CHP.

⁴¹ The founders were from the liberal wing of DP which was critical of the anti-democratic policies of DP towards the press and the universities. The party suddenly became the main opposition party in the parliament until the 1957 elections in which HP could get only 3.8 percent of the votes. Then, HP decided to join CHP on 24 November 1958. A detailed analysis of the emergence, discourse, organization, electoral practices of the party can be found in my unpublished paper (Akça: 1998). For published brief articles see Ergin (1985), Özçetin and Demirci (2005).

⁴² The dissident deputies declared the reason of their resignation as “the impossibility to realize free and democratic principals, which is an issue beyond the party cleavages, within the DP though these had been inscribed in the party program” (Cumhuriyet, 19 October 1955). H. Cindoruk, the then president of the youth branches of the DP, who also resigned, stated that “the welfare can and should be realized not to the expense of freedoms but just with the freedoms” (Cumhuriyet, 23 October 1955).

⁴³ The articles concerning the political democratization were as follows: the support for democracy as a regime wherein the free discussion of issues will be realized by the participation of citizens (ar.2), human

In terms of accumulation strategy, the party was critical of the Etatism-Liberalism dichotomy and favored rational economic planning.⁴⁴ According to the articles 50-51 of the party program (Hürriyet Partisi, 1956b), the economic model of the party was based on the private property, the protection of economic liberties of individuals, the realization of social justice, the priority of the private entrepreneurship while accepting the guidance of the State the entrepreneurship of which would be needed in the sectors that was naturally requiring it or within which the private entrepreneurship had not yet taken place". Planning was at the core of the party program. HP carefully underlined that planning does not mean necessarily Etatism and by consequence communism as it was suggested by Menderes. A form of planning within a liberal economy as different from Etatism was defined as a necessary element for the coordination of economic issues and the realization of development (Hürriyet Partisi, 1957; 1956a; 1958a). The idea of planning had such a central place that just before the elections of 1957, the party even prepared a five years development plan entitled "The Way of Freedom and Welfare"⁴⁵ in which they were proposing both short-term stabilization and long-term development programs. Concerning short-term macro-economic policies, HP criticized DP for having followed inflationist policy based on

rights and freedoms (ar.3), changes in Election Law in order to adopt proportional representation (ar.4), the establishment of a second assembly (ar.5), the realization of the neutrality of the President of Republic (ar.6), guaranteeing the freedoms of political parties (ar.7), the foundation of Constitution Court (ar.8), scientific, administrative and financial "constitutional autonomy" of the universities (ar.9), freedoms of press (ar.10), the right to found professional organizations for officers, workers and employers (ar.11), the rights of unionization, strike and collective bargaining (articles 103, 105, 106), the independence of the judiciary power (ar.14), fairly enough salaries for the officials, retirees (ar.20) and military officers (ar. 27) (Hürriyet Partisi, 1956b). Please note that approximately all of these points were realized and recognized in the 1961 constitution prepared under the military regime.

⁴⁴ Prof. F. Çelikbaş was defining the economic program of the new party as follows: "It will be wrong to adopt old-fashioned doctrines such as liberalism or Etatism which are devoid of scientific validity. We will adopt a planned economic and financial policy in the light of modern science and as it is the case in the backward countries" (Cumhuriyet, 12 December 1955).

⁴⁵ The plan was prepared by Feridun Ergin, Ekrem Alican, Enver Güreli, Fethi Çelikbaş (all deputies), Aydın Yalçın and Osman Okyar (the two prominent writers of *Forum*) (Cumhuriyet, 29 September 1957).

loose financial and credit policies, budget deficits, state owned enterprises' deficits, foreign trade subsidies, and subsidies for agricultural goods. Hence, the party was emphasizing the necessity of a coherent financial policy for development. Concerning the long-term policies, they criticized mainly the investment policies: "investments in domains such as construction, railroads, public works rather in sectors producing goods are one of the factors that causes the lack of balance in the Turkish economy...although the "public works" are needed it is wrong to curb the investments in the sectors directly productive such as industry and agriculture" (Hürriyet Partisi, 1958a). According to HP, the DP policies could not change the structure of the economy which was still agrarian, a structure which was typical of the underdeveloped countries. HP formulated an urban/industry-based development project rather than rural/agriculture-based one. Urbanization and industrialization were the main ways for abolishing the backward economic structure based on villages and agriculture whereby the share of industry and service sectors was low in the national income and production (Hürriyet Partisi, 1958b). Industrial investments would be financed mainly by two sources: national savings and foreign capital. In addition they were also anticipating the protection of industry via "the abolition of or changes in taxes that raise the costs and prevent industrial investments, the reevaluation and redefinition of custom regime and trade treaties in conformity with the industrial interests, the planning of the allocation of foreign exchange for the import of machinery, intermediary and primary goods in order to feed the needs of several industrial branches (Hürriyet Partisi, 1956b).

Despite its electoral failure, the real impact of the HP should be sought elsewhere. After HP joined the CHP in 24 November 1958, the new ideas brought by the HP gave a new dynamism to the CHP and accelerated the move of CHP to its new

political discourse articulating planned economic development, social welfare and justice, and political democracy. When the military intervention came in 1960, CHP had already become the political representative of the new hegemonic project bringing together an urban-based coalition composed of the industrial bourgeoisie, the working class, the intellectuals, the urban middle classes, also the military officers under this new hegemonic project.

CHP started to move into a center-left position in the second half of the 1950s and to establish organic relations with the urban middle classes and the working class. The period between roughly 1955 and 1965 was a gradual move towards a left populist party. This move is tractable in the programmatic change at each party congress which included to realize the necessary constitutional changes in order to guarantee political liberties, legal protection for opposition parties, independence for the judiciary, the recognition of the right to strike, and economic planning (see Kili, 1976). However, the ideological rejuvenation of the party gained its real momentum just before the elections of 1957 when young and influential figures of the intelligentsia of the period joined the party.⁴⁶ “The Proclamation of Primary Aims” (İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi), which was accepted at the 14th Congress of the party,⁴⁷ was the most mature document of the new CHP of the late 1950s. The document envisaged the reedition of the Constitution in a way to establish “a state order based on modern democracy, popular sovereignty, rule of law, social justice and security” (Kili, 1976: 161). The document declared that the Constitution should recognize the freedom of opinion and expression, the freedom of

⁴⁶ For instance Turhan Feyzioğlu, Doğan Avcıoğlu, Bülent Ecevit, Coşkun Kırca were among them. The party founded the Research Bureau in order to conduct researches on economic, social and political issues. It was directed by Prof. Osman Okyar, Turhan Feyzioğlu and Bülent Ecevit. See Ahmad (1977: 116). Please note that all the names mentioned were prominent writers of Forum.

⁴⁷ Please note that this Congress occurred on 14 January 1960 just after two months HP joined CHP.

press, the freedom of religion and conscience, the freedom of public gathering and association, the foundation of a Court of Constitution, the independence of the judiciary the right of unionization and to strike, the planned development (Kili, 1976: 162-163, 133).

As a result of this restructuring, CHP became the political representative of the urban-based social bloc which was dissatisfied with the DP policies and unified by a new hegemonic project. This new social bloc was composed of the industrial bourgeoisie, urban working class, military and civil bureaucracy, urban middle classes, the intelligentsia, and the students. The increasing electoral success of CHP after the middle of the decade was tied to its ability to construct and represent this new historical bloc.⁴⁸ The questions of whether CHP had reached its electoral limits in a social structure wherein the majority of the population was formed by the petty producers in the agricultural sector over whom the hegemony of DP was not challenged, and whether without the military intervention CHP could have won the next election can only be answered speculatively. What may be definitively said is that when the coup arrived, there was a balance of forces between the two social blocs with alternative capitalist hegemonic projects, and the military regime was an active constituent of one of these hegemonic class projects and it was not in anyway above classes.

4. The Military in Power: Constituting a Capitalist Hegemonic Project

On May, 27 1960, the lower and middle rank military officers acting outside the chain of command made a coup d'Etat and overthrew the civilian DP government. The first military coup in 1960 has been the most discussed one in analytical and normative

⁴⁸ The percentage of the CHP's share of total votes in the general elections was 39 in 1950, 35 in 1954, and 40.82 in 1957. As to the DP' votes, they were declining from 56.61 percent in 1954 to 47.7 percent in 1957.

terms because it constituted a more or less democratic-welfare state form. The relatively progressive and integrative aspect of the hegemonic project that was institutionalized by the military regime produced an illusionary normative stance about the progressiveness of the military. Analyzed as a petty-bourgeois radicalism and/or progressive middle class coup, the 27 May raised some positive attitudes even among the ranks of socialists and communists.⁴⁹

Within the hegemonic statist paradigm of state-society relation, it is analyzed as a reaction of the bureaucratic elites of the center to the so-called peripheral forces and/or as the revival of Kemalist ideology (Kalaycıoğlu, 1998; Mardin, 1973; Heper, 1985; Kayalı, 2000). However, this approach can grasp neither the transformatory nature of the military power, nor its class character and nor the peculiar ideological articulation of Kemalism within a new capitalist hegemonic project.⁵⁰ The statist reading overstresses the autonomous nature of the military regime and overlooks the fact that the social bloc behind the coup was crosscutting the binary oppositions of state-civil society and center-periphery and that the military power was embedded in and constrained by various class interests. In that sense, the state was a site of social struggle rather than an autonomous subject.

On the other hand, Marxist and non-marxist class theoretical approaches justly diagnose the multi-class social bloc behind the coup and emphasize the transformatory rather than restorationist impact of the military intervention in terms of establishing a new political order. Hence, they undermine the simplified dichotomy of paradigms based on binary categories. Yet, while some of them underline the leading role of the

⁴⁹ For the positive reactions of the leftists see Aydınöğlü (1992: 30-37).

⁵⁰ Dursun (2002-03) rightly underlines that Kemalism-Atatürkçülük itself becomes an empty signifier to be hegemonized in different chains of articulation of ideological elements.

emerging industrial bourgeoisie in order to expose the class nature of the coup (Savran, 1987; Öncü, 2003; Sunar, 2004b; Keyder, 1987), others underline the preponderant role of the new middle class (composed mainly of officers, civil servants, and intelligentsia as defined by Manfred Halpern) in preparing a progressive-reformist coup (Daldal, 2004; Özbudun, 1966). In fact, the category of the new middle class coup is not too different from the statist paradigm in the sense of attributing an autonomous role to the bureaucratic strata. Yet, whereas some proponents of the new middle class coup recognize the capitalist nature of the coup as resulting mainly from the autonomous initiative of the moderate wing of the military (Daldal, 2004; Özbudun, 1966), some others, who emphasize the pioneering role of the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia, interpret the coup as constituting a non-capitalist independent development path (Avcioğlu, 1973).⁵¹ In fact, both groups remain trapped within the instrumentalist problematic of state-class relations, which is based on the philosophy of external relations, and overlook the fact that classes and hegemonic class projects are formed in and through the state. The former line establishes an instrumentalist relationship between the dominant class fraction (industrial bourgeoisie) and the military/the state and assumes a non-frictional process of class control of the state apparatus without bothering much about exposing the empirical and/or theoretical mechanisms of this control. The latter line, which reproduces the theory of progressive middle class coup as developed by modernization theorists such as Huntington and Halperin (see ch. 2.), still establishes an instrumentalist relationship between yet another force within the power bloc and the state. As a result, the instrumentalist relation between a class and the state is

⁵¹ This line is best represented in the weekly journal YÖN, which was very influential during the 1960s which embraced the 27 May movement as a progressive non-capitalist independent path of development. See Daldal (2004).

substituted for the very process of the construction of a hegemonic class project which mediates between the economic and political moments of class power.

The instrumentalist paradigm misses the following point. What gives the capitalist class character to the political rule under the military regime is the contingent construction of a hegemonic project, which would articulate the different interests within the power bloc and between the power bloc and the dominated classes. It is also because of the instrumentalist conceptualization that the seemingly “progressive” reforms of the military regime are explained by the reformist will of the new middle class (i.e. autonomous bureaucrats, military officers with lower and middle class origins, and the intelligentsia) and/or as being functional for the accumulation strategy of the industrial bourgeoisie (Keyder, 1987: 148; Daldal, 2004: 83-84; Özbudun, 1966: 3, 26; Savran, 198) rather than as an attempt to forge an expanded hegemony, as a form of hegemonic class politics which is mainly motivated to prevent class struggle from emerging. Moreover, this was not an outcome of intra-elite politics and/or merely intra-class politics but rather results from a process in which class-based political reasoning was decisive and the working class was beyond being passive. Finally, the following analysis is based on the idea that what gives its class character to a hegemonic project is not which social actor of the hegemonic bloc is at the front of the political-ideological battleground but rather whose social and political power it establishes. The following quotation from McLennan is meaningful in that sense:

Do not ask, Marx seems to be urging, about the ‘truth’ or virtue of necessary ‘belongingness’ of the sets of dominant ideas that circulate in society; rather ask about how these ideals facilitate relations of class power, investigate how they come to be accepted as true, see how they rationalize strategies of groups or institutions, and show how they can lead to the establishment of particular mechanisms of (capitalist) social control (McLennan, “Four Sins”, *New Left Review*, 216, 1996 quoted in Yalman, 1997: 250)

In that sense, the new middle class argument misses the fact that even though the military officers and the intelligentsia were at the front of the political-ideological battleground, the hegemonic project they forged was not establishing their own political-hegemonic power but that of the capitalist class.

It is commonly asserted that the coup makers did not have a detailed and commonly shared program (Akyaz, 2002: 132; Aydemir, 2000: 7; Ahmad, 2005: 153), they were not organically related to civilian intellectuals (Kayalı, 2000: 70), or there was not an organic formation among the oppositional social forces before 27 May (Aydınoglu, 1992: 27) There is nothing astonishing that a previously well-prepared political program lacked since the coup preparation, whose initial seeds go back to 1953, was run by illegal and secret small groups of mainly low and middle rank officers.⁵² Nevertheless, this does not rule out that the military intervention and the subsequent military regime were not formed in a social vacuum and independently from social and political forces. The fact that the coup-makers were politicized within a specific historical conjuncture marked by two competing capitalist hegemonic projects, among which the military was not neutral, was to be reflected in the post-coup practices of the military regime.

The military power was embedded in specific class power relations. However, this embeddedness cannot be solely attributed to previous struggles. The class character of the military regime also needs to be drawn from the actual practices of the military power, which, I will contend, institutionalized a capitalist hegemonic project, the main parameters of which had partly been manufactured in the pre-coup period. However, this hegemonic task was not fixed and immutable in a functionalist and/or instrumentalist

⁵² On the process of the organization of the coup and the formation of secret military groups see Akyaz (2002: 88-119).

manner but it was rather “an institutionally negotiable *process* in which the social and political forces of contest, breakdown and transformation are constantly in play” (Eley and Nield, 1980: 269).

The coup makers organized themselves as the National Unity Committee (MBK), which would stay in power until 15 October 1961, and installed a military-civilian government.⁵³ As it would become evident in a short time, the MBK was not a homogeneous body. The main line of division was between the radicals, who planned a longer military rule in order to radically restructure the political and social structure in line with an Etatist-collectivist third way (Turkish) model of development and the moderates, who were eager to return to civilian parliamentary regime after having institutionalized and constitutionalized the state apparatus in line with a socially-oriented capitalist developmentalist path as it was forged by the CHP.⁵⁴ This conflict soon became public, especially because the leader of the coup, General Cemal Gürsel, opted for a relatively quick return to civilian parliamentary regime. This path was also urged by CHP and the business circles, and supported by moderate members of the MBK who thought that CHP would become the dominant party and would realize the project of 27 May. No doubt, for the generals of the MBK, the reestablishment of the military

⁵³ For the full list of the MBK members see Ahmad and Ahmad (1976: 218). There were 5 generals, 9 colonels, 6 lieutenant colonels, 11 Majors, 7 captains; which means that lower and middle rank officers were dominant (Akyaz, 2002: 136). Three cabinets were formed under the military regime, and they were formed mainly by civilians (the first in 28 May 1960, the second in 3 September 1960, and the third in 5 January 1961). See Ahmad and Ahmad (1976: 215, 222, 227).

⁵⁴ On the division between moderates and radicals see Akyaz (2002: 140-148), Vaner (1990), and Mazıcı (2002: 565-566). First hand retrospective views of MBK members on this split may be found in Kili (1998: 117-123). The radical group was not homogenous either. According to an estimated classification based on their future orientations, there were proto-fascist radical nationalists (A. Türkeş, M. Özdağ), proponents of a socialist-nationalist junta (C. Madanoğlu, S. Kahraman, K. Kaplan, M. Ataklı, N. Esin), parliamentary socialists (M. Karan to become TIP member), pro-CHP bureaucratic reformers (O. Erkanlı, O. Kabibay, İ. Solmazer). The list should not be taken as decisive, but it gives a sense of the heterogeneousness of the radicals. An important point to be underlined is that the left-oriented radicals' understanding of the social power relations was not class-based nor they were calling for a political mobilization of the lower classes. Rather, they were guided by the idea of national economic development under the state's leading role which would erase the class divisions and realize the national integration.

hierarchy was also an urgent concern. This cleavage was then solved in favor of the moderate group by the expulsion of 14 radicals from the MBK after five months of the coup and before the foundation of the Constituent Assembly and the adoption of constitutional reforms.⁵⁵

There were many other immediate signs of the relationship between the military regime and the newly forming hegemonic bloc which enthusiastically welcomed the military intervention. For instance, the students, which had already engaged in street protests in the months preceding the coup, actively supported the coup by public demonstrations.⁵⁶ Similarly, the press ardently supported the coup by declaring it as an action on behalf of freedom and liberties, by the military as the representative of the nation, against the corrupt dictatorial regime of Menderes.⁵⁷ The biggest working class organization (Türk-İş) held an extraordinary meeting in which the military intervention was warmly welcomed and the pro-DP leader of the union was discharged and replaced by a pro-CHP leader (Mahiroğulları, 2005: 127; Koç, 1998: 61). CHP's support was decisive in underlying the legitimacy of the military intervention but cautious in the sense that the party leadership was sensitive about not to be too much identified with the coup in such a way as to be harmful to the party in the next normal elections and in the

⁵⁵ For the expulsion event, which was on 13.11.1960, see Akyaz (2002: 145-148). As I noted in the previous footnote, the 14 radicals had different political viewpoints but all shared the idea that a longer military rule was necessary for establishing a third-way, collectivist social order. It should also be noted that besides their political views, the possibility of a coup within the coup was also an important factor for the expulsion operation.

⁵⁶ The day after the coup, the students of the Faculties of Political Sciences, Law, and Medicine organized demonstrations in support of the military. On 4 June 1960, a meeting called "Gratitude to the Turkish Military" (Türk Ordusuna Minnet ve Şükran Mitingi). See Mazıcı (1989: 93-94). For the students of the period the 27 May represented their fight for freedom and liberty against the DP despotism. For two publications prepared and collected in the name of student organizations see Gencer (1960; 1961).

⁵⁷ The discourse produced in the press is worth of analyzing from the point of view of cultural/ideological militarism which normalizes the role of the military in political processes. Yet, for reason of space I do not expose it. While the positive reactions may partly be explained by the authoritarianism of DP power, it is essentially significant in terms of the lack of the problematic of militarism itself for the intelligentsia of the period. For a rich collection of newspaper news and articles in the month following the coup see Ak Devrim (1960). For a selective exposition of the reaction of press to the coup see Mazıcı (1989: 156-163).

sense that CHP, as a political party whose existence depended on the working of electoral parliamentary system, wanted the return to the electoral regime as soon as possible.⁵⁸

The social embeddedness of the military regime into the new hegemonic social bloc was also reflected in the composition of the constituent assembly. The Constituent Assembly was composed of the MBK and the House of Representatives on the basis of mainly corporatist and secondarily a narrow territorial principles of representation” (Parla, 1993b: 128). It had an “elitist character” (Tanör, 1996: 281). The members of the latter were either elected by electoral colleges as representatives of provinces (75) or directly appointed by the MBK (18), the Head of the State (10), the political parties (only CHP (49) and CKMP (25) -total 74) and various professional organizations including the bar (6), the juridical organs (12), the press (12), the universities (12), the trade unions (6), the chambers of commerce and industry (10), the corporation of traders and artisans (6), the teachers’ organization (6), the agricultural organizations (6), the youth (1), the association of old combatants (2). The members of the cabinet (22) were also members of the House of Representatives.⁵⁹ Despite its discursive attempts to represent the national-popular will, the Constituent Assembly was actually far from accomplishing such a representative task since the strongest party of the country (DP) was left outside. As Dođru (1998: 85-103) underlines, the Constituent Assembly membership was tied to be in compliance with the legitimating discourse of the military

⁵⁸ The circular letter of İnönü send to all the party organs on 20 June 1960 is reflecting this position. For the full text see (Kili, 1976: 136-137). However, CHP would not be much successful in differentiating itself from the military regime to the extent that it was its socio-economic and socio-political reform demands that would be implemented. In other words, even if there was not an organic relation between the coup makers and the CHP, the latter was inspirational and influential in the course of events before and after the coup. This point is also underlined by the MBK members in their retrospective evaluations. See in Kili (1998: 118, 155, 196, 204).

⁵⁹ The figures between parentheses are the number of members. For more details on the Constituent Assembly see Parla (1993b: 127-129) and Dođru (1998: 89-100).

regime, and this was realized through some checks and controls mechanisms. In addition, CHP had an overwhelming power in the Constituent Assembly since 63 out of 75 members to be elected as provincial representatives had or would have organic relations with CHP in addition to the party's own quota.⁶⁰

I may now turn to the discursive and non-discursive practices of the military regime which are to be taken as the main mediating link between the military regime and the new hegemonic project. How the military explained the causes of the revolution is important in order to understand the perspective and concerns of the military. How was the military intervention legitimated? What was the hegemonic discourse of the military regime? How was it related to the capitalist hegemonic project?

The military's discursive strategy was to disarticulate DP's claim to represent the national-popular will, the general interest and to rearticulate a new claim to hegemony. The immediate official declarations were emphasizing the crisis of democracy, the social polarization, the dictatorship of one party, the violation of the Constitution as the causes of the coup, announced the neutrality and above-party feature of the coup, and promised the establishment of the rule of law, the preparation of a new constitution, the making of elections as soon as possible.⁶¹ In an official document the causes of the Revolution were cited as follows:

- 1.The establishment of a partisan government and the suspension of the rule of law;
- 2.An unplanned policy of investment, and abuses; 3.Inflationist fiscal policy and high

⁶⁰ Kayalı (2000: 81) also argues that 200 members of the Constituent Assembly was from CHP. It is probable that there war many pro-CHP persons among the representatives of professional organizations. Yet, one should not think that pro-CHP members of the Constituent Assembly was homogeneous in terms of political-ideological orinetation, as it would become apparent during the discussion of the Constitution. For the full list of the names in the House of Representatives see Toplu (1976: 58-65).

⁶¹ The text read by Colonel Türkeş from radio, the communication no 13 by Gürsel, and the Law no 1 dated 12.06.2000 are such official documents, see Dođru (1998: 19-23).

cost-of-living; 4.Pressures on intellectual life and press freedom; 5.The establishment of one party dictatorship and the loss of legitimacy of the Parliament.⁶²

Hence, the first step of the discursive strategy of the military regime was based on exposing the deviation of DP from democracy and the rule of law, the (alleged) neutrality and impartiality, the general interest. The failure in realizing the economic development together with social and political order was the key to the military's disturbance, in whose view it was mainly this failure of orderly development which undermined and consumed the legitimacy of DP.⁶³

Nothing was more reflective of this hegemonic practice of disarticulation than the legitimating discourse prepared by the university professors. Even though the military did not have a preconceived political plan, they knew well to which social forces to turn. The day after the coup, the military regime announced that the new Constitution would be prepared by a commission composed of university professors who were contacted the day of the coup. The commission's first report (*İlim Heyeti Raporu*, dated 28 May) was interesting in terms of the legitimating discourse of the coup.

The political power which should represent the conception of the State, law, justice, morality, public interest and public service and should protect public interests had for months, even years, lost its character, and had become a material force representing personal power and ambition and class (zümre) interests. The power of the state, which

⁶² *ESASLAR (İnkılap Hakkında Yapılacak Konuşmalar İçin)*, Ankara, 1960 quoted in Akyaz (2002: 77). For some other publications attempting to legitimate the military intervention see Gencer (1960; 1961), Tansel (1960), Karal (1960).

⁶³ There is ample evidence that DP' economic and social policies which failed in realizing the national integration were a primordial concern for the coup makers. For instance, according to Major Erkanlı, the DP "dragged the country into disaster in the economic and social fields... An unreasonable consumption began. In 10 years we became one of the poorest nations in the world. This and similar reasons prepared the platform of the 27 May evolution... A definite balance must be established between capital and labor". Or according to Captain Özdağ, under the DP rule "our market was a colonial bazaar... The development effort remained no more than an absurd fantasy". According to Lieutenant Colonel Kaplan, "the corruption in the country ...and the social decay which was going on at great speed were veiled and concealed by a policy of greed based on group domination under the guise of economic development". For 19 out of 20 MBK members, social justice and/or land reform were one of the most important problems of the country. These statements are based on the interviews done with the MBK members in 1960. The original source is Cevat F. Başkut, Yaşar Kemal, and Ecvet Güresin (1960), Interviews with Members of Turkey's National Unity Committee, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. My quotations are from Özbudun (1966: 20-21).

before else should be a social power bound by law ...lost all its moral ties with its army, with its courts and the bar, with its officials...with its universities, and with its press which represents public opinion, and with all its other social institutions and forces...In such circumstances, the army, the administration and all forms of other State institutions lost their fundamental characteristic of representing the conception of the State and the quality of being a factor of balance among the institutions mentioned above.⁶⁴

These words bring to the mind Gramsci's assertion that a crisis of hegemony is always a crisis of the state. The report was emphasizing that DP had lost its reliability concerning its hegemonic claim to represent the general interest, which was reflected in the state's loosing its ability to represent the national-popular interest, to give the effect of a neutral public instance. To put it in other words, the state had become too instrumental so as not to be able to be hegemonic. Here, the point is not to what extent this discourse reflects the actual reality per se, but it is important as the construction of this reality in a process of persuasion for hegemony: to disarticulate the claim to national-popular will of DP and to reconstruct, manufacture a new claim to represent the national-popular will.

The next step was to rearticulate a new hegemonic project. Even if the MBK did not have a thorough political program, it declared its main opinions in the document entitled "The Instruction of the National Unity Committee and the Principal Opinions of the National Unity Committee on the Country's Problems", which was announced to the public opinion on 10 September 1960.⁶⁵

-The establishment of a democratic state based on the rule of law and on the rational procedures and norms; the preparation of a constitution and an election law; the abrogation of anti-democratic laws.

-An industrial development in line with "a balanced Etatism that brings together intervention and guidance by way of encouragement and help". The state should run economic and industrial enterprises directly related to the big public services; the existing state-owned enterprises should be restructured; the state should play an important and active economic role in mobilizing

⁶⁴ For the full text of the report see Tansel (1960: 17-20); for the english version of the quotations used here see Ahmad (1977: 162-163). The commission also proposed the establishment of "a provisional government", the preparation of a new constitution based on "human rights and freedoms" on a "democratic basis and on principles of right and justice", and the preparation of an election law.

⁶⁵ "Milli Birlik Komitesi Direktifi. Milli Birlik Komitesi'nin Memleket Meseleleri Hakkında Temel Görüşleri", *Resmî Gazete*, no: 10605, 16.09.1960 reprinted in Kili (1998: 271-279).

national resources; state economic investments should be run within the parameters of a general economic plan and program. It is necessary to found a planning organization for conducting these investments into areas which are more effective for the national development.

-Non-intervention to the free activity of the private entrepreneurship. The latter should be encouraged to participate in the economic development in a way to be consonant with the general economic development and the objectives guiding public investments.

-“Not to create economic conditions conducive to make illegitimate profits. In the use of economic resources all citizens should have equal rights and it is essential to hinder all kinds of monopolization (*inhisar*) and exploitation (*istismar*)”.

-To follow a balanced policy of money and credit; to establish justice in the tax system and to raise taxes to a necessary level for the development; to make necessary regulations for foreign capital and foreign aids.

-To prepare land and agricultural reforms on the basis of respecting the norms of private property; to contribute to the development of villages.

-To increase the capacity of employment by industrial investments.

-To revise the social rights of the workers: “the question of the right of strike should be carefully considered”.

-The need of lodgment should no longer be a commercial issue.

-Modernization and reorganization of the armed forces; the amelioration of social -economic status of the military officers.

-The development of the national education.

-The development of public works and transportation in line with economic rationality.

-The recognition of the freedom of religion and conscience together with the non-politicization of religion.

These items almost exactly corresponded to the new hegemonic project that had started to be constructed before the coup. The military regime was now consolidating this new hegemonic attempt. It was based on the articulation of democratic state based on the rule of law and civil, political, and social rights; the realization of capitalist development under the guidance of state planning but with full respect to private sector in a way to establish social justice and social harmony between the classes. The accumulation strategy of this hegemonic project corresponded to inward-oriented capital accumulation based on import substituting industrialization.

What was the relationship between the power bloc and the military regime? The hegemonic project based on the planned industrial development was forged so as to unify the power bloc under the leadership of the industrial bourgeoisie. However, this does not mean that the bourgeoisie automatically welcomed this hegemonic project in all its aspects with equally active support. The ISI-oriented fraction of the bourgeoisie,

which was critical of DP yet unwilling to radically break up with the government on the eve of the coup,⁶⁶ easily turned to support planned industrial developmentalism of the military regime yet in a very precautionary way: it aimed to stamp its own seal on planned development. Even though the military regime was not in anyway challenging the social and political power of the bourgeoisie, some attempts at curbing the narrow economic-corporate interests in favor of the political-hegemonic interests of the bourgeoisie caused disturbances among the bourgeoisie about the policy tendencies of the military rule. For instance, once in power the military regime immediately froze the banking operations and overhauled credit allocations (30 May 1960), took under its control the operations (i.e. agricultural credits) of Ziraat Bankası (18 June 1960), stopped public industrial projects (September 1960), and announced that it is against all forms of illegitimate profits, monopolization and exploitation (18 September 1960) (see Rozaliyev, 1970: 96-100). The reason behind these decisions was to restructure the use of sources in a “rational and planned rather than partisan and inflationary” way. In other words, these steps, which were sometimes wrongly interpreted as a stance against the big, monopolist bourgeoisie (Rozaliyev, 1970: 95, 118; Sertel, 1969: 132), corresponded to an attempt to move beyond the economic-corporate moment of the process of class formation.

Yet, the non-monolithic structure of MBK in which the radical group was exposing anti-businessmen attitudes also aggravated such disturbances. The bourgeoisie of the period, far from being passive and powerless, made pressures on the military government in order to guarantee the continuation of the capitalist social order and to

⁶⁶ See Buğra (1994a: 130). This unwillingness was also due to the DP’s authoritarian control of the chambers’ governing organs through legal arrangements.

make sure of the pro-capitalist class stance of the military regime.⁶⁷ As a result, in order to appease such disturbances of the capitalist class, the program of the military regime was openly declaring that it is not against businessmen.⁶⁸ On 23 June 1960, the military government released new credits for industrialists and exporters (Mazıcı, 1989: 96). On 30 September 1960, the Governor of Istanbul, General Refik Tulga, announced that the regime was positive vis-à-vis the merchants and businessmen and guaranteed that the accounts of businessmen would not be controlled without a legal permission and there would not be a wealth declaration. Similarly one day later, the minister of industry of the second cabinet, Şahap Kocatopçu who would become the president of TUSİAD between 1984 and 1985, also appeased the businessmen on the stance of the military power (Ahmad and Ahmad, 1976: 223). An important sign of the MBK stance in favor of the industrial bourgeoisie was the abolishment the decision-making councils of chambers of commerce and industry and then to appoint two prominent industrialists (Koç and Eczacıbaşı) to the Istanbul Chamber of Industry as president and vice-president (Sönmez 1987: 168-9).⁶⁹ Another sign of pro-capitalist stance of the military regime was its declaration that it was not against foreign capital.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ In June 1960, the business circles of İstanbul sent a telegraph to the government and on 30 June 1960, the industrialists met with the governor of Istanbul. The bourgeoisie was pressing for necessary stabilization reforms for reestablishing “the normal order” while at the same time urging the release of credits (Rozaliyev, 1970: 123-4). In June 1960, industrialists from Ankara also communicated their concerns about the credit scarcity to the Minister of Trade, who warned the businessmen about the credit scandals and the inflationary impact of the credits (Cumhuriyet, 30.7.1960 cited in Göker, 2006).

⁶⁸ “The government is very sensitive to private capital, it will take all the measures in order to support and develop it” (Türkiye İktisat Gazetesi, 15, 22.07.1960 quoted in Rozaliyev, 1970: 99). On 4 July 1960, Gürsel addressed representatives of bankers, businessmen, and trade unions to assure them that “we are not a Government of revolution, but a Government of reform, and we are provisional” (Ahmad, 1977: 271).

⁶⁹ As Saybaşı (1976a) indicates, this act was very important given that it was the Law no 2 following the law no 1, which had abolished the constitution. It was important because it aimed to curb the power of the pro-DP commercial bourgeoisie in favour of the industrial bourgeoisie, which had always felt underrepresented in chambers compared to its economic power.

⁷⁰ The military regime announced in the coup declaration that it was loyal to the previous international commitments. Later on, they explained this stance by their fear of a US intervention based on the 1959 agreement (see in Kili, 1998: 111-112, 150, 181). In July 1960, MBK reactivated The Commission for the Encouragement and Evaluation of Investments by Foreign Capital in order to make sure that profit transfer

Actually, the constitutive engagement of the military regime with the new accumulation strategy and hegemonic project may be best delineated in the process of restructuring the institutional materiality of the state. As Buci-Glucksmann (1980: 47-68) argues, hegemony is always established through specific hegemonic apparatuses. In this case, the State Planning Organization (DPT) and the Constitution were designed to be the hegemonic apparatuses. If DPT was supposed to constitute the unity of the power bloc and to get the consent of the dominated classes for the new accumulation strategy; the Constitution was to lay the ground for an expanded democratic hegemony by recognizing to the opposing forces the right to organize as an autonomous political force for the first time in modern Turkish history. The central tenet of this hegemonic project was that the planned capitalist development would also bring social justice and harmony, and this would happen under a democratic state form.

The State Planning Organization (DPT), which was one of the main pillars of the new hegemonic project, was founded on September 30, 1960 (Law no. 91), only four months after the coup d'Etat and prior to the foundation of the Constituent Assembly. The existence of a general consensus on the necessity of planning among the intelligentsia, the bourgeoisie and the international institutions in the pre-coup period, did not mean a lack of contentions about the content and form of planning. There were two proposals submitted to the council of ministers and MBK. The first one, prepared by Şefik İnan,⁷¹ was against an imperative planning and an autonomous technocratic planning agency. The proposal assigned a coordinating role for the DPT and the

was free for foreign capital. With the Law no 13, MBK ordered the Ministry of Finance to let free the operations of foreign capital (Rozaliyev, 1970: 112-113).

⁷¹ He was the Minister of State under the National Unity Committee rule. He resigned when his draft bill was rejected. Though he was elected into the Constituent Assembly as one of the representatives of CHP, he was also the most ardent critic of the Constitution's articles on social state, planning, and workers rights.

planners, and placed more emphasis on specialized committees that would be dominated by the representatives of the the private sector. The second one, prepared by young experts under the supervision of colonel Şinasi Orel,⁷² gave a relative autonomy to the planning institution yet restricted its role vis-à-vis the private sector to being indicative. In addition, it included both an Economic Council, composed of the representatives of societal forces (private sector, the trade unions, and universities), and a High Planning Council that would bring together the cabinet members and the bureaucrats. This model was closer to the developmentalist state with an embedded autonomy. The MBK, which discussed the two proposals at length, accepted the Orel proposal, yet also made some alterations. Firstly, the MBK eliminated the Economic Council for fear of being colonized by vested economic-corporate interests (both of the bourgeoisie and the working class). Secondly, it increased the numbers of politicians so as to be equal to that of bureaucrats in the High Planning Council, which meant the establishment of a balance between technical and political responsibility.⁷³

The idea and apparatus of planning was supposed to play two functions. First of all, it would regulate the capital accumulation process in a way that rational planning of investments would bring macroeconomic stability and sustainable economic growth. As a result, different fractions of the capitalist class would be unified under the hegemony of the industrial bourgeoisie. Moreover, it was also designed to function so as to get the consent of the popular classes. The national economic development was conceived to be

⁷² These experts were working with the Dutch experts Prof. Tinbergen and his assistant Koopman for preparing a plan when the coup arrived. It was the radical-rightist prominent figure of the coup, Alpaslan Türkeş, who demanded Orel to play this role. In fact, both of them had in mind a totally independent planning agency with an exceptional authority. However, the experts who prepared for the bill were more in favor of a capitalist type of planning agency.

⁷³ On the process of the foundation of DPT and the ongoing contentions see Milor (1990), Özden (2004), Göker (2006).

in favor of the dominated classes by improving their living conditions.⁷⁴ This is why planning was also thought as a formula for social justice, and “social planning” was thought as inseparable from economic planning (Ahmad, 1977: 271). As Yalman (2002a: 36) underlines, “there was also a deliberate emphasis on the idea of planning as a necessary instrument to utilize the scarce resources in a rational manner for the common good”. In that sense, it was in the idea and apparatus of planning that the attempt to establish hegemony was institutionalized.

Yet, this does not mean that the Turkish bourgeoisie was ready and willing to accept either such a relatively autonomous developmentalist state or such an expanded hegemony based on the idea of social justice. Even though the embedded relationship with the bourgeoisie was anticipated through the mediations of the national colloquiums and the ad hoc Special Commissions, the strategy of the bourgeoisie was to reject this form of collaboration. The process until the mid-1960s was marked by successive attempts at curbing the autonomy of the planning agency and subjugating the initial objectives of planning to the economic-corporate interests of the bourgeoisie. On three issues, the bourgeoisie attacked the original strategy of planning. The first was the issue of financing. In order to raise the revenues for the development projects, the military regime undertook new tax regulations (law no 192 on corporate tax and law no 193 income tax; January 1961), which included the taxation of the agricultural revenues of large and middle-sized farmers, an increase in the corporate tax and in the tax of land and real estate. Furthermore, in order to be able to prevent the high tax evasion, the

⁷⁴ The article 41 of the Constitution, headed “The Regulation of Economic and Social Life”, is revealing in that sense. “Economic and social life shall be regulated in a manner consistent with justice, and the principle of full employment, with the objective of assuring for everyone a standard of living befitting human dignity. It is the duty of the State to encourage economic, social and cultural development by democratic processes and for this purpose to enhance national savings, to give priority to those investments which promote public welfare, and to draw up development projects”.

military regime also inaugurated a wealth declaration (Özbudun, 1966: 23-25; Sertel, 1969: 120, 151-153). The reaction of the ISI-bloc to the tax reform attempts of the military regime was decisive.⁷⁵ As a result of this opposition from the bourgeoisie, the military government had to postpone the new tax laws until after the elections in order to be discussed in a commission composed of university professors, foreign specialists, and businessmen. The minister of finance (Kemal Kurdaş) had to announce that the tax laws will be reconsidered, in fact, the tax rates on the revenues of labor would be increased more than that of the bourgeoisie, the tax burden on industrial investments and profits was very low, and their attempt was not to raise the tax burden of the private capital but rather to stop tax evasion (Rozaliyev, 1970: 126). Briefly, the tax reform was stillborn. The second issue was the reform of state economic enterprises (SEEs). The planners of the military regime attempted to cease the functioning of SEEs as a provider of cheap intermediary sources to the private sector by introducing a price policy more conform to market criteria. The reform of SEEs was also conceived by the planners as a mechanism to realize the objectives of the planned economic development, as a result of which they would serve “the expanded accumulation of capital rather than individual capitalist interests”. Yet, the lobbying pressures of the bourgeoisie forced the succeeding coalition governments to give up this reform too (see Milor, 1990). Finally, the issue of land reform, which was the only strategy to get the consent of the peasantry to the new

⁷⁵ Rozaliyev (1970: 125) refers to news and articles in *Türkiye İktisat Gazetesi* and a TOBB’s brochure for exposing how the businessmen severely criticized the new tax reforms by arguing that increasing tax rates would decrease the investment capacity of the private sector and would scare the foreign capital. The landed interests and the Union of Chambers claimed that the taxation of agriculture would have negative effects on agricultural production because the farmers would leave their land uncultivated. It would also encourage the taxpayers to evade paying the tax, thus causing many social and moral problems (see Özden, 2004: 65-66). Industrialists and exporters organized in the chambers severely criticized the tax reforms, and the big landowners even came to Ankara to protest the proposal (see *Cumhuriyet*, 18 and 31 January, 2 February as cited in Göker, 2006).

hegemonic project, was opposed by both landed interests and the businessmen organized under TOBB. This process of contention over the form and the content of the planning continued until towards the end of 1960s, as a result of which the initially envisaged relative autonomy of the social and economic planning was curbed and the planning was reinstitutionalized in a way to serve the individual capitalist interests and to curb the power of the working class and autonomous developmentalist bureaucrats to penetrate the state.⁷⁶

In fact, as Yalman (1997: 160) underlines, the anxiety of the bourgeoisie about the planned socio-economic development was related to the misgiving that “it seemed to pave the ground for the creation of a counter hegemonic strategy”. Even though it was openly declared that “planning is not a doctrine but a technique...and may also support a private regime, a regime of private capital and property”⁷⁷ and social planning was debated in the MBK meetings as a factor to protect the national integrity against the divisive currents, the bourgeoisie was rather unwilling to and anxious about making this move to establish an expanded political hegemony based on the idea of social justice.⁷⁸

The Constitution was the other main apparatus of the hegemonic project of 27 May regime. Its importance lied in that it restructured the state apparatus in congruence with the new capitalist hegemonic project which expected to articulate capitalist economic development, social justice, and democratic rights. The 1961 Constitution,

⁷⁶ For a detailed account of this contentious process see Batur (1998), Göker (2006), and Özden (2004).

⁷⁷ See İsmet Giritli in T.C. Temsilciler Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi Anayasa, Cilt 1, s. 377 (B: 34 30.3.1961 O: 1).

⁷⁸ The following quotation from TOBB, *Kalkınma Planı Hakkında Özel Sektörün Görüş ve Dilekleri* (1962: 7) is revealing in that sense: “We must confine and clarify the expression “social justice” repeated more than once in the plan, which is open to different interpretations. The socialists and the adherents of the “welfare state” mostly use this expression in the following meanings: the redistribution of the wealth, preventing the entrepreneurs from profiting, the confiscation of the major part or the whole of their incomes, the distribution of the existing resources without considering either ethical or economic criteria on an equal basis among individuals. The plan must plainly express our rejection to such a social understanding” (quoted in Özden, 2004: 71).

which is a product of an extraordinary historical situation and political regime, paradoxically incorporated both democratic and militarist tones. In other words, the 1961 constitution was Janus-faced. Here, I will not enter into a comprehensive analysis of the process of preparation, the structure or the content of the Constitution,⁷⁹ but underline its basic aspects. To start with, there is no doubt that the 1961 Constitution is marked by two main deficits of democracy. First of all, it was prepared under a military regime, by a Constituent Assembly whose nature was far from being based on democratic legitimacy and representation.⁸⁰ Secondly, the militarization of the state structure was further instituted by the Constitution which started with a fiction identifying the military and the nation and which made the military bureaucracy the third head of the executive, founded the National Security Council for surveying and monitoring the civil parliamentary regime, rendered the Chief of General Staff responsible to the prime minister instead of the Minister of National Defense, and saw the seeds of a double-headed judiciary system (Parla 1993b: 24, 79-89, 106-112; Tanör, 1996: 304-305). The foundation of the Senate as an elite upper house, in which the MBK members were granted a seat for life, was to function as another organ to check and balance the parliamentary majority.

⁷⁹ For two such analyses see Parla (1993b) and Tanör (1996). While they both acknowledge democratic and anti-democratic faces of the constitution, the former emphasizes the militarist and anti-democratic nature of the constitution, the latter put emphasis on its democratic content in terms of rights and freedoms.

⁸⁰ See Parla (1993b: 24-26) and Tanör (1996: 284). The Constitution was prepared by the Commission of Constitution. The latter also included left-oriented Kemalist intelligentsia which would formulate a Kemalist-socialist political ideology in the post-1960 period. To cite some names from the Commission Muammer Aksoy, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Doğan Avcıoğlu, Münici Kapanı, Ragıp Sarıca, Bahri Savcı, Mümtaz Soysal, Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu. For the full list see Toplu (1976: 74-75). It should be noted that within the Constituent Assembly, the House of Representatives was more decisive in giving the final form to the Constitution. The rejection of the citation of “nationalism” among the essential qualities of the state is an interesting case in that respect, since the House resisted the demands of the MBK on that issue. For the whole discussions on this issue see Toplu (1976).

It is also conventionally acknowledged by both its proponents and critics that the 1961 Constitution more or less instituted the civil, political, and social rights and freedoms too.⁸¹ In addition, the foundation of the Constitutional Court and the High Administrative Court together with the establishment of the autonomy of the universities and state radio and television were institutions of check and balance over the powers of the parliamentary majority as much as democratic organs through which social groups and even small political parties could penetrate the state and turn it into a site of social struggle. The law of election which brought a proportional electoral system also opened up the state (as a site of social relation) to the impact of subordinated social forces. It is this aspect of the Constitution together with its peculiar emphasis on the social-welfare nature of the state and its recognition of the collective rights of the workers that instituted it as a hegemonic apparatus to get the active consent of the working class. Hence, my concern will be revealing how these welfarist and democratic features of the Constitution were indeed motivated/guided by the logic of (the prevention of) class struggle and of establishing hegemony over the working class. As such I hope to show that one needs not to give functionalist (serving the capital accumulation model) or instrumentalist (serving the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie) accounts of these features nor to exalt or underestimate them as anti-capitalist petty-bourgeois radicalism. Instead, social and relatively democratic nature of the Constitution prepared under the military regime should be read as corresponding to the political-hegemonic moment of class formation to the extent that classes are formed in and through the state. If it was the

⁸¹ See Parla (1993b: 37-59) and Tanör (1996: 287-292) for a categorized discussion of the rights and freedoms. As Parla (1993b) underlines by comparing the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions, the rights are not vis-à-vis the state but the society; the individual not the state is at the center; personal rights are protected rather than limited; social and economic rights are organized on the principle of social statism rather than administrative statism; political rights promote political participation rather than administrative tutelage.

non-presence of a counter-hegemonic working class movement (not the lack of a class movement at all) that paved the ground for the democratic-welfarist hegemonic attempt, it would be the rise of such a working class movement with political-hegemonic claims that would move ahead the militarist face of the state in a very short time of period.

The military regime soon after the coup signaled that it was ready to recognize the collective rights of the working class upon the condition that these rights be used carefully as it was expected from the nationalist and economic-corporatist labor movement of the 1950s.⁸² It is generally argued within the framework of the statist reading that the rights to strike and collective bargaining and other democratic rights and freedoms were given from above without an active social struggle.⁸³ However, it was far from representing the actual reality. I contend that it was the dialectical interaction between the balance and form of class power relations on the one hand and the ruling class strategy on the other hand that gave rise to these rights. First of all, several democratic rights were already on the political agenda of civil societal forces that were politically united around the hegemonic project of CHP. As I explained above, almost all the points of the constitutional reform had already been anticipated by the new

⁸² Two weeks after the intervention, the Minister of Labour of the first government of the military junta, Prof. Cahit Talas announced on 6 June 1960 that unionism would be let free and the right to collective bargaining would be recognized. The minister would add later on 26 June that “but this right should be used carefully” (Ahmad and Ahmad, 1976: 217, 220). Another example is the press meeting of General Gürsel who said that the foundation of a socialist party would be authorized upon the condition that it won’t act with bad intentions (Ahmad and Ahmad, 1976: 217, 220). As a result, the Turkish Workers Party (TİP), which would soon become a socialist party representing the political-hegemonic class interests of labour, could be founded by the union leaders on February, 13 1961 during the military regime.

⁸³ “The precocious success of the Turkish labour movement may only be understood through the world-historical development of social democracy on the one hand, and through the legacy of bureaucratic reformism from above on the other. Our argument emphasizes precisely the ‘fit’ between bureaucratic reformism and the ascendancy of the industrial bourgeoisie... Neither through increasing wage demands nor as a political force was organized labour active during the 1960 transformation... Class struggle specific to the capitalist mode of production was not as yet the mobilizing element in social transformation. The right to unionization, collective bargaining and strikes, obtained by the workers, as a well as the widened domain of social security, emerged as entitlements handed out to workers in accordance with the requirements of the new model of accumulation” (Keyder, 1987: 148-149).

hegemonic historical bloc. In addition, the fact that the labor movement of the 1950s was relatively docile and hegemonized by the nationalist and economist outlook does not rule out that the working class movement was active enough to make demands of economic-corporate kind. In the pre-coup period, the right to strike was already on the top of the labor movement agenda. In addition, Türk-İş decisions in its 5th General Congress, held just after the military coup, are also reflective of the working class activity. The demands, which were also communicated to the military regime, included the constitutional guarantee for workers' rights, the preparation of the laws of collective bargaining and the right to strike and a new law of union, the regulation of the social security rights of the workers by a new law, the freedom of establishing connections with international trade union confederations (MAZICI, 1989: 190; MAHIROĞULLARI, 2005: 127). In addition, there also occurred labor protests under the military regime. For instance, on 15 January 1961, the workers of *İstanbul İşçi Sendikaları Birliği* protested the firing of workers by using slogans claiming the right to strike and planned industrial policy.⁸⁴ The working class activity continued until the enactment of the laws of union, collective bargaining, and strike in 1963 under various forms of protest including influential meetings with the participation of huge numbers (250.000 workers in the Saraçhane meeting in 1961) (GÜZEL, 1996: 195-198). Hence, the military regime and the coup coalition were already constrained by working class demands. As to whether the bourgeoisie of the period supported these new constitutional regulations on the right to unionization, strike and collective bargaining; given the lack of any pro or counter lobby pressures from the bourgeoisie, it is more plausible to think that the bourgeoisie, which would prefer a disciplined and socially controlled labor force, did not feel much of a

33 Ahmad and Ahmad (1976: 228) cite the following slogans: "Grev hakkı istiyoruz", "İşsizlik sigortası olmazsa işçi perişan olur", "Kurucu Meclisten programlı sanayi politikası istiyoruz".

threat from the then existing form and line of the labor movement, even though its uneasiness was expressed by its political representatives in the Constituent Assembly.

Coming back to the issue of how come to terms with the progressive strategy of the military regime, we may still account for the capitalist hegemonic aspect of the reforms in so far as one theoretically acknowledges that the political hegemony of the capitalist class is forged in and through the state. Let me now turn to articulate this idea by focusing on the discussions about the Constitution draft in the House of Representatives. The idea of establishing an expanded hegemony over the dominated classes by articulating economic development, social justice, and political freedoms was also reflected in the introduction of the Constitution, which referred to “human rights and freedoms, national solidarity, social justice, democratic state based on the rule of law and its legal and social basis”. In the House of Representatives, the initial text of introduction, which emphasized “social justice and solidarity”, “political and social democracy” and “liberty and economic development”, was legitimated for reflecting the necessity of articulating freedom and development as contrasted to DP’s understanding of “first development then freedom” (C1: 368, 376, 693).⁸⁵ The Commission report defended the social and economic rights section as a requirement of the synthesis of liberty and development in order “to protect the socially weak groups through economic and social rights”. It is said that “in no country liberalism is absolute nowadays; the principal now is that the state regulates and plans economic life” and that “the development would be realized through democratic and scientific ways” (C1: 7, 23).

However, this hegemonic strategy raised contentions in the discussion of the constitution too. Once again, the possibility of the emergence of a counter hegemonic

⁸⁵ From now on I will refer only to the volume and page numbers when I cite from T.C. Temsilciler Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi Anayasa. All emphases in the quotations are mine.

project that could challenge the political hegemony of the bourgeoisie was the motive behind the critiques which were raised mainly by the members of radical nationalist CMKP and the conservative wind of the CHP. According to the critiques, the role of the private sector in the national development was vague (C1: 370); the section on social and economic rights and the clause on nationalization was against private property rights; the fact that the right of property was cited under the section of economic and social rights instead of essential rights reflected an anti-private property stance; the term “social state was unnecessary in a country which did not solve its problem of production”; the social state was interpreted by many as “socialist state”; and finally all of these points were curbing the private initiative and impeding the economic development and they were not among the foregoing objectives of the 27 May (C1: 388-390, 400, 489-492).

The responses by the spokespersons of the Constitutional Commission were significant in understanding the mentality of governing lying behind the progressive clauses of the Constitution. The social and economic rights were defended in the name of the prevention of the class struggle and the establishment of social-national harmony. It was openly asserted during the discussions that the universal shift from classical democracy to social democracy meant a hegemonic power strategy. For instance Alp Kuran, who was directly selected by the MBK, was saying:

The recognition and realization of these social rights and freedoms has a vital virtue for Turkey: *impeding the development of radical currents... to impede the radical left currents and the infiltration of communism to Turkey...The social rights are an antidote to communism...Today, as yesterday, the survival of the Turkish nation is related to make a Western type democracy work and to recognize social rights and freedoms against the ideology of Marxism and the democracy of Marxism* (C1: 411)

Similarly, Bahri Ersoy, who was one of the six representatives of worker unions, commented on the critiques of social and economic rights as follows:

In the name of the patriotic and nationalist workers of this country, I find these ideas extremely wrong and dangerous for the endurance of social peace between classes in our country and for the future of our economic development...As Turkish workers, we believe that all Turks, whatever their social class identity, should work for the rapid development of the country...*Turkish worker won't let himself to a class struggle...*he does not have any claim on anybody's property and wealth. That is why *we do not lean towards harmful and wrong ideologies such as class struggle, proletarian revolution and dictatorship...*We do not believe in a social justice contrary to human rights. Yes, we do not believe in communism...If they want to erase the threat of communism in this country, they must believe in democratic and social state. (C1: 439-440)

In the Commission report, the article 47 on collective bargaining and unions used the following expression: “workers, in their relation with their employers, in order to ameliorate their economic and social conditions”. Hence, it was recognized that the workers could struggle with their employers in order to improve their economic and social conditions. Yet during the discussions, it was also underlined that this clause banned the political strikes (C1: 25). In other words, the union activities of the working class were anticipated as to be limited to the economic-corporate moment rather than encompassing political-hegemonic claims. The idea was that, to the extent that the working class demands would remain within the limits of economic-corporate demands without making counter-hegemonic claims at the political-hegemonic moment, they could be governed within the parameters of planned and rapid economic development. Hence, the hegemony over the working class could be established.

According to the Commission, the Constitution would let free socialist politics (understood as social democracy) but not a communist one. On all accounts, it is noteworthy that it was an expansion of the political sphere to the dominated classes but within the limits of the capitalist hegemony. For instance, Muammer Aksoy who answered to the critiques in the name of the commission was saying that:

There is no doctrine in this Constitution. Neither the program of any party. There is neither Etatism nor liberalism nor any other “ism”...This is a constitution that makes possible the implementation of all party programs. You can implement both Etatism and liberalism; but you cannot put in practice communism. You can practice socialism

because it is respectful to human rights...Even today's liberalism is social. Today being social is the precondition of being contemporary. *Being social is the real remedy for keeping communism away from the country* (C1: 494)

Similarly, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, who also spoke in the name of the commission, underlined that social state means the enhancement of political democracy with social and economic rights (C1: 505). Aksoy also stated that the social state was prepared as a response to and would be a panacea to “the social question” and “social poverty” that marked the pre-coup period, and he continued:

If the basic needs are not procured, then you end up with fascism or communism. The democracy that want to escape such an end should be a social democracy...If we are contended only with the principles of 1789; then in a meantime we will have to face the struggles for the principals of 1848 and 1948 (C1: 521-523).

Another member of the Commission, Coşkun Kırca who would become a conservative republicanist and support the 12 September intervention, defended the idea of social state in following terms:

The concept of welfare state does not contain any ideological meaning...Welfare state may be realized through “perfect markets” or “social democracy”...In any case, the final aim is the classical freedoms, *to diminish the differences between classes*... (C1: 691)

He also underlines that the only way to reach the ideal of social state in an underdeveloped country like Turkey is the contribution of both labor and capital to industrial production and development. He underlines the importance of the ethos of working, the moral virtue of working and producing (C1: 687).

If the social parts move away from the virtue of work and they struggle with each other instead of working, then we fall into *the trap of class struggle that we try to avoid* (C1: 691).

This nationalist-industrialist-developmental ideology was constructed as the key to class compromise and national harmony in the official legitimating discourse of the military regime. The following quotations from the radio speeches prepared to legitimize the 27 May are noteworthy:

To work, to work hard and to work planned as individual and as the nation”. “27 May Revolution opened work possibilities to all citizens: to work with a respect to law and

order and in the conditions based on justice and equality...to accelerate our planned and programmed works within the spirit of national unity (Ersoy, 1960: 4, 66, 96).

To sum up, those who prepared the 1961 Constitution which brought progressive clauses in terms of democratic and social-welfare rights, were guided to an important extent by the concern of preventing the class struggle. Yet, the hegemonic strategy was totally different from that of Etatism, *pace* restorationist arguments of the statist approach, since the historical bloc in 1960 recognized the existence of social classes but also thought that the undesirable class conflict was not inevitable. In a historical condition in which the working class movement's political outlook was not yet challenging to the hegemonic project at hand, the new hegemonic strategy was based on the idea that a planned economic development respectful of social justice could be run under a relatively democratic state form.

Let me recapitulate my argument about the military intervention of 27 May and its capitalist character. It was not an outcome of a thorough crisis of hegemony since the dominated classes (the peasantry and the working class) were far from challenging the existing capitalist hegemony but of a historical condition of political and accumulation crises in which the alternative hegemonic projects of two social blocs reached a balance of force. I contend that the military intervention was neither a restorative reaction of the state/the center against the so-called peripheral social forces, nor a result of bureaucratic reformism autonomous from class power relations. Yet, I also contend that an instrumentalist or functionalist account cannot explain the capitalist class character of the military regime. In fact, all of these approaches work within a theoretical paradigm which perceives the state and the society, the state and the classes as being externally related, if not as ontologically distinct entities. Instead, the military intervention and the succeeding military regime were embedded in, constrained by, and constitutive of a new

capitalist hegemonic project and hegemonic social bloc. The military was neither a passive instrument of the capitalist class nor an independent actor above social classes. It was rather an actor constitutive of a hegemonic capitalist project which was based on the articulation of planned capitalist economic development, social justice, and political democracy. The specificity of the hegemonic project of 27 May was that it was based on the idea that the class contradictions could be reconciled in a democratic-welfare state. Even though this hegemonic project purported to establishing the political hegemony of the industrial bourgeoisie, this did not mean that the latter was ready to accept all the terms of such an expanded hegemonic project. Hence, as it is the case with all process of hegemony, it was a process of hegemony marked by contentions, comprises, and compliances among social and political actors. In that sense, the military power was not above class relations. Even though the new hegemonic project as formulated by the military regime was closer to a one-nation project,⁸⁶ its inability of getting the consent of the rural masses has an undermining effect, despite the fact that it gave the opportunity to urban working classes to penetrate the state by re-institutionalizing it in a relatively democratic way.

The following two decades would be marked by the gradual recession from this democratic expanded hegemony to the extent that working class movement and the emerging left and student movements started to challenge, or better to say were perceived to challenge, the frontiers of the hegemony. As a result, authoritarianism and

⁸⁶ Jessop (1990: 211) differentiates between one nation and two nations hegemonic projects. Accordingly, “one nation strategies aim at expensive hegemony in which the support of the entire population is mobilized through material concessions and symbolic rewards...In contrast, two nations projects aim at a more limited hegemony concerned to mobilize the support of strategically significant sectors of the population and to pass the costs of the project to other sectors”.

militarism colonized more and more the political sphere in order to discipline the working class.

CHAPTER IV

THE MILITARY'S PRESENCE IN THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY: MILITARY CAPITAL AS A FORM OF ARTICULATION BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND MILITARISM

“The war tactic has produced a miracle...OYAK moves ahead via military principle tested by blood” (Sabah, 23.11.2001).

“The most interesting holding of the world...OYAK's total assets exceeded nine quadrillion” (Hürriyet, 23.11.2001).

“Turkey is too narrow for OYAK” (Akşam, 23.11.2001).

“Turkey will relax if it takes this model as a guiding model” (Star, 23.11.2001).

These were the headlines of daily newspapers in November 2001 when OYAK for the first time announced its annual report to the public opinion in a press meeting. The fact that the military, whose competence should be restricted to a narrowly defined area of external security in a regular liberal-democratic polity, has been owning one of the biggest holding companies has been normalized as much as the other faces of militarism in this country. In this chapter, I will focus on the more directly economic forms of the articulation between militarism and capitalism in Turkey through the phenomenon I call “military capital”. It is an attempt at exploring another face of capitalist militarism in Turkey and at problematicizing what is normalized.

There is no doubt that the history of militarism as a phenomenon precedes capitalism. Meanwhile, it is also equally explicit that militarism has gained a new character in capitalist social formations. One of the most peculiar aspects of the relationship between capitalism and militarism has been the industrialization of war and its articulation to the very process of capital accumulation. As a result, this ‘economic’ form of capitalist militarism has been investigated with special reference to the war industry, military-industrial complexes, defense and military expenditures, and

economics of war and violence.¹ The most concrete form of this integrated relationship between capitalism and militarism is the military-industrial complex of the advanced industrial countries. This structure is based upon the organic relations among the capital groups in arms industry, the military bureaucracy, and scientific and technological research centers. This organic whole is dependent upon high military expenditures.

In several peripheral and semi-peripheral countries, a different and so far neglected form of military-industrial complex has also been established. The peculiarity of this form of the military-industrial complex is that the military acts as a collective capital group and becomes an economic actor at every moment of capital circulation (production, exchange and finance). The military, under different organizational structures, has now become industrialist, merchant, financial investor and rentier. While in the advanced industrial countries the military-industrial complex develops in the war industry, in several peripheral social formations it started within the sectors of production and consumption goods, and it is generally at the latest stages that military capital has engaged in the war industry. In this peripheral type of military-industrial complex, military itself owns businesses and becomes a profit seeking economic actor not only in the industry of destruction goods but also in industries of production and consumption goods. The “military capital”, as I would call it, may be thought as a form of the double process of capitalization of militarism and militarization of capitalism. If the existence of the military as a collective capitalist group in the capitalist economy mainly corresponds to a process of capitalization of militarism; the growth of the war industry enhances the militarization of the economy.

¹ On this form of the relationship between capitalism and militarism see for instance Luxemburg (2003), Baran and Sweezy (1973), Mandel (1975), Melman (1985), Serfati (1995: 1-38), Giddens (1985), Mann (1993; 1984a).

Although the phenomenon of “military capital” is observable in diverse countries, it has not been subject of deeper analysis. Not only the literatures on military-civil relations and military in politics, whose analytical frameworks are generally marked by the separation between the economic and the political, but also the works that deal with the relationship between capitalism and militarism have neglected the phenomenon. Let a theoretical interpretation, even empirical studies are very limited and far from being exhaustive. The phenomenon of military capital exists in diverse countries such as China, Indonesia, Thailand in Asia; Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan and Syria in the Middle East; Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Ecuador, Colombia, Chile, Bolivia in Latin and Central America.² In those countries too, the military organized under the mutual assistance foundation has become an economic actor having investments in industrial, commercial, financial sectors. However, given the limited and narrowly descriptive nature of the existing few works and the impossibility to reach the necessary data, it is not possible to make a comparative analysis. Nevertheless, some information may be useful in order to give a sense. In all these countries, military capital is organized under various forms of pensionary funds which have distinct legal privileges such as tax privileges. The Pakistani case appears as the earliest form; it started in 1953 but accelerated in 1970s. In Pakistan, each of the military forces (army, navy, and air) has its own pensionary fund, hence military holding. In most of the countries it is in 1970s that the military capital either started its journey or accelerated its investment activities. The Central American countries (El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua) are exceptions in the sense that it is in 1990s that the military capital has

² Among the few sources on the subject, I can cite Casas and Brenes (1998) and Aguirre (1999) for Central and Latin America; Cheung (2000) and Mulvenon (2001) for China; Robison (1986) and McCulloch (2000) for Indonesia; Siddiqa-Agha (2000) for Pakistan; Springborg (1989: 107, 111-113) for Egypt. It should be noted that those sources remain descriptive rather than analytical.

gained a momentum even though the pensionary fund was established long before. The sectors of investment are as broad as covering manufacturing industry, mining, agriculture, agricultural-industry, finance, commercial activities, services (from construction to tourism, from radio-TV broadcasting –Thailand, El Salvador, Honduras, Pakistan- to funeral services –El Salvador, Honduras). In Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand, the military holdings own a bank.

1. OYAK: The Military Holding (1960-2005)

Turkey forms one of the earliest and no doubt the most developed example of the phenomenon of military capital. The military's entrance into the sectors of production and consumption goods started as early as in 1961 through the establishment of OYAK (Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu – Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Foundation), and its entrance to the sector of destruction goods mainly in 1987 via the establishment of TSKGV (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerini Güçlendirme Vakfı – Foundation for Strengthening Turkish Armed Forces). In this chapter, the existence of the Turkish Armed Forces as “a collective capital group in the sectors of production, consumption and destruction goods” will be analyzed as a specific form capitalist militarism.

Even though the history of this specific form of militarization of the economy goes back to forty five years back and it has been mentioned almost in all works on the military, the issue did not attract the interest of the scholars for a long time and besides few exceptions, the phenomenon has not been extensively studied so far.³ This may partly be explained by disinterestedness in the capitalist face of militarism in Turkey. In

³ The most important exception which opens up a research agenda is Parla (1998). For an earlier work, which is a rather limited descriptive account giving a static picture see Bozdemir (1985). For a recent article written from the vantage point of market distorting effects of OYAK see Demir (2005). For some non-scholarly works that treat the subject see Şen (1996), Parlar (1997), Süvari (2000). I also published an earlier and less developed version of this chapter (Akça, 2002).

the mainstream approaches it is generally contended that unlike its counterparts in Latin America, the Turkish military “did not concern itself with social and economic policies” (Heper and Güney, 2000: 651) or paid little interest in economic policy (Jenkins, 2001: 7). Before analyzing the economic development of the military holding within the context of Turkey’s political economy and interpreting its existence in a social relational approach, I will first of all formally describe its legal-administrative structure and fields of activities.

1-a Legal Status and Administrative Structure: Who controls OYAK?

OYAK has been founded by a special law (no. 205)⁴ on 3 January 1961, just after the first military coup in Turkey on 27 May 1960. The law has been adopted by the government of the military power organized in the Committee of National Unity (MBK) before the Constituent Assembly hold its first session (6 January 1961) and before the new constitution of 1961 was accepted. This special law defines the legal status, the administrative structure, the members, the financial sources, the activities of social security and social assistances, the range of economic investments, and the legal exemptions of the Foundation.

The legal status of OYAK is cross-cutting private and public laws. According to the article 1 of its special law, OYAK is defined as “a financially and administratively autonomous legal person subject to the verdicts of private law” and “affiliated to the Ministry of National Defense”. On the other hand, article 37 reads that “all assets, earnings and accounts of the foundation are to be treated as state property, and any party causing damage to OYAK property will be treated as having damaged state property”.

⁴ See Resmi Gazete, 09.01.1961, no. 10702. For the full text see also <http://www.oyak.com.tr>. The bill of law (no 202, 13.10.1960) has been proposed by two members of the MBK, Muzaffer Yurdakuler and Kadri Kaplan (Yılmaz, 1989; Aslan, 1993: 91).

According to law professor Ejder Yılmaz, who also worked as a consultant lawyer in OYAK, this article, which is placed under the head of “the exemptions of the Foundation”, means that “the assets of the foundation are non-distrainable” (Yılmaz, 1991: 51). Another important clause relating to the legal exemptions is about tax exemptions. OYAK also enjoys all kind of tax exemptions at the level of the Foundation (not at the level of affiliated companies). OYAK is exempt from corporation tax, all the revenues of the fund are exempt from turnover tax (gider vergisi), the collection of the members’ fees is exempt from income tax, all the transactions of the fund is exempt from the state stamp tax, all the donations for the fund are exempt from income tax and from inheritance and transition taxes (article 35), and disbursements to members are not taxed. As will be underlined below, these tax exemptions have been a factor in the rapid economic growth of the military holding.

From these articles pertaining to its legal status, it needs to be underlined that in its relationship with third parties OYAK is subject to the private law, so that it may be able to run its economic activities easily; and that the Foundation is at the same time a legal person under public law since it possesses several public rights, competences, and privileges. Its public character in juridical terms is recognized especially in its conflicts with the members. This is also emphasized by the decisions of “High Military Administrative Court” (AYİM). In one case on “the unconstitutionality of not paying dividends for the ex-members”, the Court decided that in the contentions between the members and the Foundation concerning the legal social services are under the competence of AYİM. In another case on “the unconstitutionality of compulsory membership”, the court again decided that “OYAK is a special public institution...it is only in its relationship with third parties that the private law is valid”. It is also

underlined that “The law-making authority established OYAK as a social assistance organization and did not consider it as an institution to provide commercial gains to its members. It worked in this esprit until now”.⁵ This has been influential especially in contentious members’ claims. In other words, OYAK’s legal status gives the opportunity to enjoy the privileges of both private and public laws.⁶ In its relationship, it is under private law, which gives it the opportunity to run holding-like activities; however, in its relationship with its real constituents (the members) it is under the public law and under the competence of military courts. Hence, members’ critiques and demands are absorbed and subsumed as if these are relations pertaining to military-professional activities. This is paradoxical given the enormous attempts by OYAK directors to deny any organic relation with the Turkish military system.

To explore the composition of the decision-making and executive organs of OYAK is necessary in order to understand who controls the Foundation. Even though these are mixed organs in the sense that there are civilians and army officers, the dominance of the military members is explicit. There are three main organs in the administrative structure of OYAK.

- *Board of Representatives* (article 3): The number of the members of the board of representatives is determined by the ministry of National Defense, being not less than

⁵ See Dergi No:7 Karar Dairesi:AYİM.DrİKrl. Karar Tarihi:08.03.1990 Karar No: 89/7 E.90/4 K. See also Dergi No:15 Karar Dairesi:AYİM.1.D. Karar Tarihi:19.12.2000 Karar No: E.2000/271. The second decision also refers to a decision of “Uyuşmazlık Mahkemesi” (E.1998/2, K.1998/4, 9.2.1998). Yılmaz (1989) also refers to a decision of Court of Cassation (Yargıtay) which approves that the private law is valid only in issues not mentioned in the law no 205.

⁶ On the legal status of OYAK see Yılmaz (1989; 1991), Duran (1982: 320), Bozer (1983: 31-32). During the discussions on the law in the general assembly of MBK, one of the members (Ahmet Yıldız) proposed to use the term “public person” and this was accepted. However, somehow the term did not take place in the law (Yılmaz, 1989: 69). During the course of the years, there has not been substantial change in the special law of OYAK. By an amendment dated 30.06.1996, some voluntary sub-systems (Emekli Maaşı Sistemi, Konut Ön Biriktirim Fonu) have been formed and it is accepted that the years under the status of “temporary member” would be added for those persons who move from “temporary membership” to the “permanent membership”.

50 and not more than 100, considering the number of permanent members in the Forces and in establishments. The members are designated by the Commanders or Superintendents of units and institutions among the permanent members employed in those units and institutions. The board of representatives gathers once every three years under the chairmanship of the Minister of National Defense or the Chief of General Staff and appoints 20 members for the General Assembly.

- *General Assembly* (articles 4-5): It is composed of 40 members among whom only 9 are civilians. It gathers every year under the chairmanship of the Minister of National Defense or the Minister of Finance or the Chief of General Staff.

The civilian members are: the Minister of National Defense, the Minister of Finance, President of the Audit Court, Chairman of the Board of the General Audit, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Banks Union of Turkey, President of the Union of Chambers of Trade, Commerce, Industry and Commercial Exchanges of Turkey, and three persons to be appointed by the minister of National Defense among the distinguished persons in financial and economic fields of the private sector.⁷

The military members are: the chief of General Staff, Commanders of Land Forces, Naval Forces and Air Forces or Their Chiefs of Staff, General Commander of Gendarmerie or his Chief of Staff, 20 members to be appointed by the board of representatives, 6 persons from the staff of the ministry of National Defense or General Staff.⁸

⁷ When one looks at the list of members of the General Assembly in the previous years one observes that besides the two prominent businessmen of Turkey (Vehbi Koç and Kazım Taşkent) selected in 1961, these three persons have always been university professors.

⁸ According to the law, these persons must be Chief of Personnel, Chief of Logistics, Comptroller, Chief of Health Affairs, Chief of Research and Development, Director of Legal Affairs. Once again when one checks the list of previous years one observes that these six persons have always been active military officers.

- *Board of Directors* (articles 7-12): In addition to the General Manager who is considered as a natural member and who has always been a civilian professional manager, it consists of 7 members. Out of 3 members of the Armed Forces to be selected, 2 are selected by the General Assembly among four candidates proposed by the Minister of National Defense and 1 among two candidates proposed by the Chief of General Staff. A special committee⁹ selects the other 4 members, provided that these members possess specialization in the fields of finance, law, banking and insurance. Even though it seems on the paper that the board is composed of 3 military 4 civilian members, since 1976 at least one person among the members elected by the special committee started to be an active military officer. This means that the military members (retired or on active duty) have always formed the majority of this main organ, which is responsible of the whole administration of the Fund and conducts all activities of OYAK. For instance, in 2000, and 2002, the number of military members on the Board of Directors were 7 (3 on active duty, 4 retired) and 6 (3 on active duty, 3 retired) respectively. Currently, there are five military members (3 on active duty, 2 retired).¹⁰ It is needless to say that these military members have always been high rank military officers (the generals). It should also be noted that the president has always been a retired general.

The composition of the decision-making organs is important for clearing up a manufactured ambiguity about the civilian or military character of the Foundation. To

⁹ It is composed of the following civilian members of the General Assembly: the Minister of National Defense, the Minister of Finance, President of the Audit Court, Chairman of the Board of the General Audit, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Banks Union of Turkey, President of the Union of Chambers of Trade, Commerce of Industry and Commercial Exchanges of Turkey.

¹⁰ The members of the current board of directors are Yıldırım Türker (president of the board; retired lieutenant-general), Mustafa Bıyık (major general-gendarmery forces), Kamil Başoğlu (brigadier general), Mehmet Ali Çınar (engineer, rear admiral), Ahmet Taner Candemir (retired judge brigadier general), Lütfi Fikret Tuncek (retired governor), Prof. Dr. Necdet Serin (retired rector), Coşkun Ulusoy (general manager).

break the establishment of any organic relation between the Foundation and the military has become one of the main concerns of OYAK in the post-2001 period, after which date OYAK has become more open to public opinion. The president of the board of directors and the general manager state at every occasion that “OYAK is not a military institution, there are civilians in the administrative boards”, “it runs its activities under the conditions of free market and full competition and it is directed by professional civilians”, “it does not have any organic relation with an institution”, “it is not a part of the military organization”.¹¹ However, as the structure of all key decision-making organs of OYAK discloses, the military members dominate these decision-making organs even if it is true that the affiliated companies are mainly run by civilian professionals. However, after having read the records of the past 40 years, I may contend that these civilian members have no competence or influence in the general assembly.¹²

1-b The Activities of OYAK: Mutual Assistance Fund or Capitalist Holding?

In terms of its activities, OYAK runs three types of activity. It is at the same time an institution of compulsory saving, an additional institution of social security, and a holding company.

First of all, OYAK is *an institution of compulsory saving*. Besides the decision-making organs, the real constituents of OYAK are its members (article 17). There are two types of membership, permanent and temporary. All regular officers, officers on employment contract basis, military employees, non-commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers on employment contract basis, specialist gendarmeries, the

¹¹ For such assertions see Milliyet, 23.11.2001; 26.04.2002; OYAK Faaliyet Raporu 2004: 10; OYAK Dergisi, 2004; Oyak, 2005.

¹² This is also the interpretation of one of the ex-vice general managers of OYAK whom I interviewed. In this interview, she/he also underlined that the civilian professionals in both OYAK headquarters and in the affiliated companies are more decisive in running the economic investment activities.

membered who have taken part in the retirement salary system and their spouses who would like to continue their membership in case that their spouses die are *permanent members* of the Foundation. Expert privates and those officials and employees working in the Ministry of National Defense, General Command of Gendarmery, Oyak and in the companies whose more than 51 % of the capital is owned by Oyak may become permanent members if they wish.¹³ By the end of 2004, OYAK has 222.028 members.¹⁴ Supplementary officers who perform their military service are *temporary members*. In accordance with the article 18 of its special law, 10 percent of the salaries of permanent members, and 5 percent of the salaries of temporary members¹⁵ are cut automatically. It should be noted that OYAK does not use any additional state funds.

Secondly, OYAK is *an additional institution of social security*. OYAK is an additional institution of social security. The military members are also legal members of Emekli Sandığı (Pensionary Fund for state officials) and enjoy its benefits too (see Table 1). The services of OYAK are divided into two categories according to its law: legal benefits and social services. *Legal benefits* include retirement, disablement and death benefits, and are the counterpart of the members' contributions. Among these, the most important item is the retirement benefit and the members are entitled to this benefit only after 10 years membership.¹⁶ In 2003, the retirement benefit composed 80.4 percent of total legal benefits to be paid (Oyak Dergisi, 2004: 30).

¹³ The number of civilian officials within OYAK members is negligible; it was 14.026 in 2000 out of 179.000 total members.

¹⁴ The development of the number of members within years is as follows: in 1961 65.000, in 1970 77.000, in 1990 117.000, in 2000 179.000, in 2002 206.000. From now on when I give time series data I will not cite the multiple references. Unless a specific reference is given, the would be mentioned quantitative data are compiled from primary OYAK sources cited in the bibliography.

¹⁵ Please note that the temporary members are not entitled to the social services and retirement benefit. They may only enjoy disablement and death benefits.

¹⁶ If the membership period is between 3-10 years, the military officer whose relation is broke up with the military gets only the nominal amount of money he contributed without having any right to interest

Table 1 Comparing Emekli Sandığı and OYAK (2004, nominal TL)

	Total Fees Paid to OYAK	OYAK's retirement benefit	Emekli Sandığı retirement benefit
Orgen-1962	6,723,265,675	159,374,319,715	47,242,200,000
Korgen-1966	6,535,015,962	128,240,839,953	46,778,880,000
Tüngen-1967	6,228,497,470	122,776,657,942	43,883,130,000
Tuğgen-1969	6,091,347,209	110,199,554,758	43,188,150,000
Kd.Albay-1973	5,477,102,678	85,079,501,604	39,192,015,000
Kd.Bçvş	3,792,751,066	42,159,383,455	26,937,201,000


Source: OYAK Dergisi, 2004: 76.

The retirement benefit is calculated by applying a certain rate of interest to the members' contributions. The interest rate to be paid varied over the course of years. As the members criticized the insufficiency of the rate of interest defined in the law, new additional categories under the name of "additional aid" (ek yardım, 1969) and "share from profit" (kâra iştirak, 1975) have been invented in order to increase the initial 5% "technical interest" predicted in the law.¹⁷ It is only after 1993 that the interest rate, or more accurately the most important part of it, i.e. "the share from profit" has been adapted to the inflation. But in this system, the rate of interest was still based on the proportion of the contributions of each member and it has been severely criticized by the young members since it was favoring the old members (Oyak Dergisi, 1997: 62). Then, in 1995 the system of "share from profit" has been fixed as the same average rate for all the members. When one compares the interest rates applied by OYAK and the rate inflation during those years, one observes that until 1985 the interest rates rested below the level of inflation, and it is only after the mid 1990s when the "share from profit" has been adapted to the rate of inflation that interest rates have been above the inflation rates

(nema). If the membership lasted less than three years, which is necessarily the case with temporary members, the member has any right on its contributions. In the decision of AYİM, the objections on these issues were rejected on the claim that they have no legal basis. For two examples see Dergi No:13 Karar Dairesi:AYİM.1.D. Karar Tarihi:07.07.1998 Karar No: E. 1998/305 Karar No: K. 1998/691 and Dergi No:14, Karar Dairesi:AYİM.1.D. Karar Tarihi:23.03.1999 Karar No: E.1999/257.

¹⁷ The rate of additional aid was 2 percent in 1970, 5 percent in 1973, 7 percent in 1974, 8 percent in 1978, and 9 percent in 1979. The rate of "share from profit" was 2.55 percent in 1975, 3.9 in 1977, , 6 percent in 1978, 5 percent in 1979, 4.5 percent in 1980, 7 percent in 1981, 10 percent in 1982 (OYAK, 1982: 24).

(see Figure 1). In other words, during a long period of time, the members' contributions had been undervalued and were used as a cheap source of finance for the investment projects of OYAK.



Source: OYAK publications from several years and State Statistics Institute

OYAK also runs some other activities under the name of *social services (or investments for social purposes)*, which are mainly housing credits and loans. While these activities form another source of revenue for the foundation, they are mainly oriented to giving the members long term credits with low level of interest rates. Housing credits can be used only after 15 years of membership and by the end of 2001 approximately 70.500 members could receive a housing credit, which is a very low percentage (35%) even out of the current number of members (193.000 in 2001). On the other hand, as every member has the right to multiple uses of loan after 1.5 year of membership, this has been a more extensively used item of social services. Between 1961 and 2001 members used it two million times.¹⁸ In 2003, 77 percent of total social

¹⁸ The data are definite only for the period 1963-1990 (Özdemir, 1991: 29-30). In this period, 50.689 members used housing credit. The data for the following decade (until 2001) has been calculated approximately on the basis of this period. The interest on loan credits were below the levels of market rates. Between 1961 and 1980, the rate was 6 percent, between 1981 and 1983 7 percent, between 1984 and 1985 9 percent, between 1986 and 1989 12 percent, and in the post-1990 period 20 percent. For

services were loan credits, and only 17.8 percent was house credits. The main purpose of these social services has been to raise the living standards of the military officers up to those levels of upper middle classes. It should be noted that even though the house and loan credits are given with low level of rates, they are still investments that return to OYAK; in other words, they are not totally benevolent, they are a source of revenue for OYAK.

Thirdly, it is beyond doubt that what makes OYAK *sui generis* is its “*profit oriented investments*” as a *holding company*. It is also a self-appropriated definition. It is explicitly written that “OYAK is a social assistance institution that offers its services in an esprit of private company and realize its financial and industrial investments like an holding” (Oyak, 2005; OYAK Dergisi, 2004). In that sense, OYAK functions as a collective capital group running productive, commercial and financial economic activities as much as or even more than being a social security organization.¹⁹ For instance, by the end of 1999, the distribution of the total assets of the Foundation was 43.2 % profit-oriented economic investments (49.1 in 1997 and 46.1 in 1998), 39.7% financial investments (which are also profit-oriented investments), and 17.1 % social services (Oyak Dergisi, 2000: 14). It should be underlined that these economic activities are totally profit-oriented, and OYAK’s assets are not invested in defense industry.

In fact, these holding-like activities have been predicted in its own constituting law. While the other public institutions of social security (SSK, Bağ-Kur, Emekli Sandığı) have been subject to severe restrictions in the profit-oriented investment of

housing credits, the rate was 6 percent until 1970, 5 percent until 1980, 7 percent between 1981 and 1984, 9 percent in 1985, 12 percent between 1986 and 1988, 15 percent in 1989, and 20 percent after 1990 (Özdemir, 1991: 24; Çakarcan, 1991: 45).

¹⁹ As will be discussed below, it has always been the most important complaint of the members.

their funds,²⁰ an unlimited freedom of maneuver has been recognized to OYAK in the management of its funds (article 33). Another comparison may be useful here in order to understand OYAK's privileged position in the eyes of public authorities. OYAK's success story is generally compared to the failure stories of MEYAK (Memur Yardımlaşma Kurumu) and İYAK (İşçi Yardımlaşma Kurumu) (see OYAK, 2005). However, these two institutions, whose foundation became an issue at the beginning of 1970s, did not enjoy the same support from public and political authorities. İYAK never had the public consent for its foundation, and this idea remained on paper. The legal arrangements for MEYAK is done in 1970 with an amendment in the "Law of State Officials" (Devlet Memurları Kanunu), the dues corresponding to 5 percent of the salaries of state officials are started to be cut. However, the actual foundation of MEYAK could not happen in no way, and until 1982, when the military junta decided to repay dues with an interest of 60 percent, they were used as a cheap source for financing public deficits.²¹ To put it in other words, whereas MEYAK's sources is used for public financing; OYAK could use its resources for its own interests.

The centrality of holding-like activities for OYAK may also be derived from the fact that the most important item among OYAK's revenues is its revenues from economic investment activities. In the period 1961-1974, 74 percent of the total budgetary profit of the Foundation originated from their profit-oriented investments. Similarly in 1991, according to the general manager of the time, Nihat Özdemir, approximately 70 percent of the resources of the Foundation were formed by the profits

²⁰ For instance Emekli Sandığı can only invest up to 40% of its funds and can only become shareholders in state owned enterprises, the total value of its immovables must be less than 40% of its funds. In addition, all these activities need the consent of the Ministry of Finance. See Türk (1992: 31-33), Güzel and Okur (1999: 360, 136, 407-408).

²¹ It should be noted that the military officers who are also state officials were kept outside the MEYAK. On this issue see Aziz Çelik, "Devlet Yurttışı Gasp Eder mi?", *Birgün*, 07.04.2005.

from the companies. In 2003, 80 percent of the profit was from “profit oriented investments” (OYAK, 1975: 67; Özdemir, 1991: 39; Oyak Dergisi, 2004: 81).

OYAK’s investments display both horizontal and vertical integration, and though concentrated in the automotive, cement and finance sectors, they have been expanded to several sectors such as construction, food, external trade, tourism, insurance, agro-chemical, energy, and transportation. The number of OYAK’s subsidiaries has displayed an increasing trend over the years and by 2002 reached 40 companies.²² In most of these subsidiaries, OYAK possesses the majority of the shares and controls the decision-making process of these companies. In its affiliated companies OYAK has established organic links through partnerships and joint-ventures with world-wide foreign capital groups such as Renault, Axa, STEAG AG, Goodyear, with the biggest holding groups in Turkey like Koç, Sabancı, Eti, Yaşar, Gama, and also with big state owned enterprises and banks such as Halk Bankası, Ziraat Bankası, SSK (see Table 3).²³ In the general assembly in 2003, the president of the board of directors, retired lieutenant-general Yıldırım Türker was very pride of the fact that “OYAK is a point of attraction and a preferred institution for the foreign capital groups which want to invest in Turkey” (Oyak Dergisi, 2004: 73).

Several of these companies are among the biggest and most profitable industrial corporations of Turkey. According to the reports of “500 Biggest Industrial Corporations of Turkey” published by Istanbul Chamber of Industry, in 1999 12 companies of OYAK, in 2000 8 companies, in 2001, 9 companies, and in 2003 and 2004 9 companies entered

²² The number of affiliated companies was 15 in 1971, 22 in 1978, 24 in 1982 and 25 in 1990, 36 in 2002.

²³ The list of partnerships with big capital groups and public ventures in the past 44 years may be extended to cover Elf (petroleum), Boston National Bank, Yapı Kredi Bankası, Garanti Bankası, Kutlutaş Holding, Alarko Holding, Yaşar Holding, Cerrahoğulları, Lades and Pınar (food), TPAO, Petkim, Aselsan, Emlak Bankası, Türkiye Çimento Sanayii.

this list. In addition, in 2000 and 2001, 5 of the OYAK's subsidiaries and in 2004, 3 of them have been among the 50 most profitable industrial corporations (İSO, 2000-2005).²⁴

OYAK as a capital group, whose total net assets' value increased from \$ 4.871 in 1961 to \$ 2.340 billion (3.323 million YTL) in 2004 (see Figure 2), is among the 5, if not 3, biggest holding companies in Turkey.²⁵ With regard to the profits, OYAK was the third biggest capital group in 1990 and the fourth in 1996, following the other giants of Turkey such as KOÇ, SABANCI and ÇUKUROVA (Ercan, 1997: 174). With regard to the total sales in 2000, OYAK was at the third rank with \$ 4.9 billion, following KOÇ holding (\$ 11.7 billion) and SABANCI holding (\$ 5.6 billion) (Sabah, 23.11.2001). In a recent OYAK meeting, the general manager of OYAK announced the consolidated figures of profitability of the three biggest holding companies in Turkey: OYAK, KOÇ, and SABANCI. According to those figures, OYAK appears as the most profitable holding of the last four years (see Table 2).

**Table 2 Net Profits of OYAK and Other Big Holding Companies
(2001-2004, thousand YTL)**

	OYAK	KOÇ HOLDING	SABANCI HOLDING
2001	+512,638	-448,780	-301,700
2002	354,884	40,648	372,620
2003	611,199	382,122	814,439
2004	743,756	508,494	724,132

Source: OYAK (2005) at <http://www.oyak.com.tr>

²⁴ The companies which are among the biggest 500 industrial ventures have been Oyak-Renault, Goodyear, Adana Çimento, Bolu Çimento, Mardin Çimento, Ünye Çimento, OYSA Çimento, Hektaş, Tam Gıda, Tukaş. OYAK's companies which have been among 50 most profitable industrial ventures have been Oyak-Renault, Adana Çimento, Bolu Çimento, Mardin Çimento.

²⁵ Unfortunately, in Turkey, there is no systematically compiled time series data about the holding companies.



Table 3: OYAK's Subsidiaries (2005)

Company	Sector	OYAK's Share	Other Partners	Their Shares
Oyak-Renault	Automotive Manufacturing	49	Régie Renault	51
Renault-Mais	Automotive Marketing	51	Régie Renault	49
OMSAN*	Transportation	61.6 (100)**		
Good-Year***	Tyre Manufacturing	11.48	Good-Year	52.51
			KOÇ Holding	11.34
ERDEMİR				
Adana Çimento	Cement	57	İMKB	43
OYKA Kağıt Ambalaj	Prod. of Industry Type Sack	75 (100)		
Bolu Çimento	Cement	51	İMKB	49
Mardin Çimento	Cement	51	İMKB	49
Ünye Çimento	Cement	51	NUH Holding	41
			İMKB	8
OYSA Çimento	Cement	41.09	SABANCI Holding (Çimsa)	41.09
			İMKB	17.82
Elazığ Çimento	Cement	35 (70)	GAMA Holding	30
BİRÇİM	Cement	(100)		
OYAK Beton	Concrete	100		
OYAK İnşaat	Construction	75	SSK (Institution of Social Securities) (Public)	25
OYAK Konut	Construction	100		
OYAK Bank	Finance-Banking	100		
OYAK European Finance Plc.	Finance	(100)	OYAK Bank	100
OYAK Portföy Yönetimi A.Ş.	Finance-Securities	(100)	OYAK Bank	60
			OYAK Menkul Değerler	40
OYAK Anker Bank GmbH	Finance-Banking	(100)	OYAK Bank	100
OYAK Yatırım Menkul Değerler	Finance-Securities	(99.44)	Others	0.56
Halk Leasing	Finance-Leasing	39 (46,4)	Halk Bank	46
			Foundation for Workers of Central Bank	5.47
			Foundation for Workers of HalkBank	1.75
			Güven Sigorta	0.38
AXA-OYAK Holding	Insurance	50	AXA	50
Axa-Oyak Hayat Sig.	Insurance	50	AXA	50
Axa-Oyak Sigorta A.Ş.	Insurance	36.2	AXA-OYAK Holding	72.4
			Ziraat Bankası	19.65
			Foundation for Workers of TPAO	7.56
OYAK Emeklilik	Insurance	100		
OYTAŞ	Trade (Import-Export)	99.48		
OYCEM Hispania SL	Trade	(100)		
TUKAŞ	Food	72	İMKB	28
TAM Gıda	Food	29	Eti Holding	61.9
			İslamic Development Bank	6.2
Eti Pazarlama	Food Marketing	26	Eti Holding	58
HEKTAŞ	Agro-Chemical	53	İMKB	43
OYAK Paz.Hizm. Turizm	Tourism	100		
OYAK Savunma ve Güvenlik	Security Services	100		
OYTEK	Technology-Information	99.97	Family Members of Yaşar Holding	0.03
OYAK Enerji	Energy	(100)		
İSKEN	Energy Production	49	STEAG AG	51

* The companies that it owns are OMSAN GMBH, OMSAN SARL, OTTI, OMSAN LOJİSTİK EOOD, OMSAN LOJİSTİK OOO, OMSAN LOGİSTİCA, OMSAN LOJİSTİK MMC, AZER-OMSAN NAKLİYAT MMC, OMFESA LOGİSTİCS. OMSAN control 100 percent of those companies.

** The number in parenthesis indicates the total shares of OYAK's group. It means that the other companies of OYAK group also have shares in this company.

*** OYAK has recently sold its shares.



In 2001, the most severe economic crisis of Turkey happened while at the same time OYAK announced its annual report to the public and its tremendous growth and profits in this year. The general manager of OYAK, Coşkun Ulusoy as a civilian, explained this “miracle success story” by the following militaristic words:

As a matter of fact, the business life is a war. To the extent that the military principles which are tested by the blood for thousand of years are implemented, the possibility to make a mistake is zero (Sabah, 23.11.2001).

If one leaves aside this militaristic rhetoric, how we can explain the tremendous economic growth of OYAK during the course of the years? I think that it may be explained in terms of two different causal factors. One is related to the privileges stemming from the peculiar legal-institutional structure of OYAK. The other is related to the capital accumulation processes and the related class structure in Turkey.

To start with peculiarities of OYAK, the compulsory members’ dues stand as an important source of revenue for OYAK and one of the main reasons behind the development of OYAK into a big holding company. These contributions form a regular and cheap financial source. For instance in 1974 and 1978 the members’ contributions formed 52.8 % and 42.3 % respectively of the cash entrance in these years. In 2003, the members’ dues (164 trillion TL) formed 23 % of the total cash entrances (694 trillion TL). In 1994, members’ contributions formed 17.48% of the net profit of the foundation.²⁶ If one remembers that in a dependent capitalist social formation the lack of capital is generally considered as one of the most important characteristic, this financial source form a big fund and make possible a very high rate of liquid sources. Such a cheap liquid source becomes more important in economic crisis years in terms of both more easily overcoming the crisis and making high profits by investing in financial

²⁶ My calculations are based on the data in OYAK (1975: 35-37; 1979: 39-42); OYAK Dergisi (1995: 38-39; 2004: 81).

markets (see below). Recently, the general manager of OYAK argued that the members' dues are not an important advantage compared to other holding companies given that an approximate amount of money is paid as legal benefit each year.²⁷ Besides the fact that even the data for the last four years reveals that in most of the years there is an excess of revenue, a closer look at the same data for a longer time period reveals that this source of revenue is far from negligible.²⁸ It is an important source of liquidity. For instance, in 1974, members' dues form 52.8 percent of the cash entrance in this year, whereas it is 42.3 percent in 1978. In 1994, dues formed 17.48 percent of the total net profits of OYAK.²⁹ It should also be emphasized that until the mid-1990s, that is about a 35 years, the interest rate paid for the members' dues were below the inflation rate (see figure 1). One should also add the dues paid by supplementary officers who do not enjoy any real benefit. Even though it is not a big amount of money within the total values,³⁰ the illegitimacy of this practice is obvious.

Another item originating from OYAK's peculiar and privileged legal status is tax exemptions (see above). It should be noted that these exemptions are valid only at the

²⁷ The data for 2001-2004 on the cash revenues from dues and cash expenditures for legal benefits are respectively (in million YTL) 75.9-55.6 in 2001, 125-100.9 in 2002, 164.1-156.9 in 2003, 214.5-257.7 in 2004 (OYAK, 2005).

²⁸ The ratio of legal benefits to members' dues between 1987 and 1996 is 48, 69, 37, 29, 26, 42, 51, 64, 68, 61 per cent for each year. The average rate of excess for this decade is 50.5 percent of the annual dues remain at OYAK's caisse as a free source to be invested. The calculations are based on the data in Sevinç (1998: 63) (the main source is cited as "OYAK Genel Müdürlüğü Bütçe Uygulamaları).

²⁹ Calculations are based on data in OYAK (1975: 35-37; 1979: 39-42), Oyak Dergisi (1995: 38-39). The ratio for 1994 is important because it was the year of a big financial crisis, OYAK's profits in this year came mainly from financial investments as will be explained below. Hence, the fact that even in such a year the members' dues form approximately 18 per cent of the profits is relevant.

³⁰ They are entitled only to death and disablement benefits if such injuries happen during their military duties. We do not know the exact amount of money cut from supplementary officers, nor do we know the exact number of supplementary officers for each year. However, during the discussions of the amendment to OYAK law in 1996, the minister of national security, Mahmut Oltan Sungurlu, announced that for that year, the due paid by supplementary officers was 770 million TL for a month and the benefit paid to supplementary officer in case of death or disablement was 675 million TL. The potential number of supplementary officer for a year is about 120.000 (İnsel, 2004: 47). If we suppose that only 20.000 of them are employed as supplementary officers, this would make of 9.24 billion TL for this year. It is a slight portion of the profits in this year, which is 21.6 trillion TL.

level of holding. In other words, all of OYAK's affiliated companies pay their regular taxes, whereas OYAK as "a holding company" is exempt from taxes.³¹ However, given that the holding companies are also exempt from most of taxes, this point has been open to contentions as a recent public discussion between the CEOs of OYAK and Koç holding reveals.³² Then what is the impact of tax exemptions of OYAK? Because the data on the basis of holding companies are not easily available and given the highly technical nature of the issue, it is a difficult question to answer. However, Prof. Dr. Oktay Güvemli, the president of the Association of Professors of Accounting and Financing (Muhasebe ve Finansman Öğretim Üyeleri Bilim ve Araştırma Derneği-MUFAD), estimates that even though the legal exemptions of OYAK is not that much big as it is argued, it nonetheless corresponds to a 20 percent of excess in the balance-sheet (Yeni Şafak, 14.09. 2005). Another specialist in this area whom I consulted asserts that in the final instance, the mentioned tax exemptions do not make a relevant difference on the revenues from affiliated companies whereas they have made about a 30 percent of advantage in the balance sheet on portfolio (financial) investments.³³ As the latter has been the main source of capital accumulation of big holding companies since

³¹ To repeat once again, OYAK is exempt from corporation tax, all the revenues of the fund are exempt from turnover tax (gider vergisi), the collection of the members' fees is exempt from income tax, all the transactions of the fund is exempt from the state stamp tax, all the donations for the fund are exempt from income tax and from inheritance and transition taxes, and disbursements to members are not taxed (article 35).

³² When Ulusoy from OYAK announced that OYAK is the more profitable than Koç and Sabancı in the last four years, Özaydımlı from Koç implied that OYAK is different from regular holding companies because of its legal privileges. To which Ulusoy responded that their tax exemptions are not relevant given that the holding companies are also de jure exempt from several taxes and in practice they pay very little tax. For this discussion see Yeni Şafak, 14.09.2005; Zaman, 14.09.2005; Hürriyet, 20.09.2005; and for the responses of OYAK see the explanations by the general manager Coşkun Ulusoy on OYAK's website.

³³ Until 1986, the double taxation for the holding companies was eliminated, which means that the revenues that the central holding company earned from its affiliated firms were tax exempt. Hence until this date, it may be said, tax advantages of OYAK were not much different from the holding companies. Nevertheless, it should be noted that all of what is said on this issue of tax advantages should better be taken as cautious interpretation for a solid evaluation on this issue would require a technical analysis of the balance sheets of big holding companies and OYAK for different historical periods in which tax regulations varied.

the 1990s, it may be contended that OYAK's tax exemptions have been an important factor in the last 15 years (see below), especially the last four years in which the profitability of OYAK exceeded that of two giants of Turkish economy.

Besides this peculiar legal-institutional privileges, I think that the most important factor is the positioning of OYAK within the class structure of Turkey. It is the most important factor, not may be in the technical sense of the term, but in the sense of social relational relevance of OYAK. The most decisive structural feature of capitalist economy in Turkey is that it is dominated by a limited number of capitalist groups. They are usually organized as holding companies which run their investment activities at every moment of capital circulation. Hence, OYAK's positioning within the big capital groups of Turkey, which are more powerful in defining the course of accumulation strategies in a way that would most benefit themselves, is worth of focusing.

1-c The Trajectory of Military Capital

In this section, I will focus on the development of OYAK under different regimes of accumulation in order to expose how the military through OYAK is deeply embedded into the class structure of Turkish capitalism. I will follow the trajectory of the investments of OYAK in order to have a better a sense of how the military is embedded in the accumulation strategies and the related social relations of power. Before starting to analyze the development of OYAK in two different sub-periods of capitalist accumulation regime, I will first contextualize the emergence of OYAK.

1: Different Rationales Behind the Emergence of OYAK

Since OYAK is an outcome of the military regime of 27 May 1960, the historical-sociological background of the first military coup in 1960 forms the framework to understand the establishment of OYAK. As I explained in the previous

chapter, the military coup in 27 May 1960 was an outcome of the struggle between two historical social blocs organized under different hegemonic projects. The accumulation crisis in the second half of 1950s, the insistence of DP on its rural-based accumulation and development strategy at the cost of high inflation and budgetary deficits, and its recourse to a gradually increasing authoritarianism in a spiral of crisis, critics and coercion gave way to the rise of an alternative hegemonic project organized by a coalition of urban-based social groups. Briefly, the 1960 military intervention was supported by an urban-based coalition dissatisfied with the DP policies: military and civil bureaucracy, industrial bourgeoisie, and developmentalist intelligentsia. Firstly, the inflationary policies impoverished the real earnings of the civilian and military bureaucracy who was also to a large extent bypassed in the decision-making processes. Secondly, DP's authoritarianism alienated intellectuals and students. Last but not least, the emerging industrial bourgeoisie (mainly Istanbul-based capital groups) also started to criticize the agriculture-oriented development strategy and to raise demands in favor of a planned and protectionist industrialization strategy. This nationalist developmentalism based on the import substitution and planning was also appropriated, to different extents and forms, by the intelligentsia, the civilian bureaucracy, and the military officers. The institutional sites of the formation of this new hegemonic project were at the political plane the Hürriyet Partisi (Freedom Party) and then CHP (Republican People Party), and at the intellectual plane the *Forum*, a liberal-developmental review.

This coalition of social forces behind the 27 May 1960 is also reflected in the administrative structure of OYAK. To use the words of Taha Parla, "it is a legal-institutional and decision-making structure that brings into an organic whole (1) the

armed forces, (2) the upper civilian bureaucracy, (3) the peak organizations of big business, commanding/commanded by, we may add, a collective capital consisting of army capital, state capital, and private capital – both national and transnational” (Parla, 1998: 37). This continuum was also discernible at the level of individuals. In the first General Assembly, there were two most prominent businessmen of the period (Vehbi Koç and Kazım Taşkent). In the first board of directors (1961-64), we see such names as Nüzhet Tekül, at that time the president of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry and the general manager of “Bozkurt Mensucat” affiliated to Koç group; Prof. Dr. Osman Okyar, the owner of the review Forum and the under-secretary of the State Planning Organization founded just after the military coup. Later on (1967-69), the most important figure of the Hürriyet Partisi, Prof. Dr. Feridun Ergin too would become a member of the board of directors (OYAK, 1964: 9; OYAK, 1976: 8).

What were the logic(s) behind the establishment of OYAK from the points of view of the above mentioned social forces? The military’s motive was to ameliorate their socio-economic conditions that had deteriorated during the 1950s and to gain a certain kind of autonomy in terms of their own economic conditions. In the reports of the proposal of the law no. 205 and of the Commission of Security and Economy, the reason for the establishment of OYAK has been presented as follows:

After the long years of active duty, the retirement benefits and salaries make possible *only a modest mode of life*, even not enough to buy a small apartment... Under the current regulations, the military officers once retired are not able to live a life *appropriate to their social status*... This proposition of law has been prepared in order to make possible for the members of the military to attain material and spiritual ease through their mutual assistance and their own financial sources...³⁴

³⁴ Quoted from Yılmaz (1989: 67-68). Italics are mine. The evidence from the Committee of National Unity’s General Assembly records underlines the socio-economic dissatisfaction of the military members as one of the most important reasons behind the establishment of OYAK (Parla, 1998: 37-38).

However, it was the specific way of making better the socio-economic status of the military officers that would define the character of OYAK. The records of the discussion of OYAK Law in the general assembly of MBK reveals that holding-like activities were envisaged right from the beginning: “The activity here is not state service...This is an institution which we are founding to organize our own affairs”. “This company shall become a big company of national dimensions” (quoted in Parla, 1998: 38). As I noted above, the founding law, which gives an unlimited freedom of action in terms of investments, was also prepared in such an esprit. Such an economic organization would also be consonant with the nationalist developmentalist imaginary of the military officers. OYAK was perceived and was also legitimized as a new front for the self-attributed modernizing project (and ideology) of the military.

In fact, the possibility that OYAK may become a holding in itself and may be presented as an alternative model to private sector would cause, at the very beginning, some hesitations among the prominent businessmen of the period. They were not against the foundation of mutual assistance foundation for the military officers, but they wanted to be sure that it would be run in a way that would not challenge capitalist private initiative. This hesitating approval of OYAK by businessmen was openly announced in the first general assembly of OYAK (20-21 April 1961), in which the discussions on what type of investment OYAK should undertake were at the center. The military members who were also ideologically engaged to national industrialization were thinking that industrial investments would be more profitable. The military members of the general assembly in coordination with the board of directors had already prepared such an investment strategy report. However, when the report is presented in the general assembly, Kâzım Taşkent criticized severely this plan by saying that “those who prepare

this plan should be in a different conviction”, which meant, according to Özmen (the first general manager of OYAK) “accusing them as a defender of collectivist economy”. Then, Taşkent proposes to invest in three areas: deposits in big banks, state or bank guaranteed bonds, and immovable (Özmen, 2005: 370, 394). Similar suggestions come also from the prominent businessman, Vehbi Koç, who was also the member of the first general assembly of OYAK. He tells in his memories that he made the below recommendations to the foundation (Koç, 1973: 112):

... to buy lands for the construction of houses, but OYAK itself should not enter in the construction sector ... If OYAK wants to enter in the industrial sector, they must become partners and/or buy shares in the project that would be proposed by the Industrial Development Bank and İş Bankası [both public banks]. OYAK should not control the board of directors in any case.

And he continues that:

Some members who took the floor argued that we do these recommendations because we are against the establishment of OYAK and they criticized us severely.

In fact, these critiques were raised by a colonel who argued that the very presence of Koç in the general assembly of OYAK was something wrong since “he is himself a big entrepreneur. But he is a businessman and he is a rival of OYAK which is an economic institution...He will justifiably pursue its own interests” (quoted in Özmen, 2005: 372-373).³⁵ From this discussion we can conclude that the big bourgeoisie of the period had in its mind a different kind of partnership with the military through OYAK. It would prefer to use the financial sources of OYAK for its own investments. The idea that OYAK could become a transitional model for a collectivist-statist economy was disturbing the big businessmen of the period. This perception, although it was not much

³⁵ It seems that this reaction was shared by more radical low and middle rank officers of the period, since the chief of general staff of the period, Cevdet Sunay and the minister of National Defense consoled Vehbi Koç as he narrates in his memories. In fact, there was not any important contention between the generals at the board of directors of OYAK and the businessmen. Later on, the second president of the board of director, Faruk Gürler (the commander of army in 12 March 1971), wanted Özmen to resettle the tension between him and Koç in an altogether dinner (Özmen, 2005: 389).

realistic as future developments would prove, was also fostered by the nationalist-collectivist-developmental ideas in the public opinion of the time, which could also find supporters among the military officers. However, the future developments and the form OYAK has taken would erase this fear in a brief time period. The first attempt to erase this fear was the non-extension of the contract of the general manager Özmen, who was a left-developmental but who was seen as a more radical leftist by businessmen such as Koç.³⁶ To the extent that OYAK showed soon to be a holding-like institution within the parameters of capitalist regimes of accumulation, and it started to share the same structural interests with the big capitalist groups, it became obvious that OYAK would not be a challenge to the power strategy of the bourgeoisie in the middle and long terms, but rather it was a solid form of alliance. The bourgeoisie's early positive stance vis-à-vis OYAK was discernible in the fact that both Koç and Taşkent became partners of OYAK in the automotive sector.³⁷

From the point of view of the civilian economy bureaucracy and the developmentalist intelligentsia of the period, the huge funds that would be collected at OYAK were seen as a remedy to the problem of the lack of capital. This point would become clearer especially after 1970, when despite the bottlenecks of ISI the Turkish third development plan (1973-78) was based on the idea of deepening ISI strategy. The critical issue was to find the necessary sources to finance this kind of ambitious industrialization. Innovating new compulsory social insurance programs such as

³⁶ Özmen had also signed the declaration of YÖN. However, this declaration was far from being a radical socialist declaration; many non-radical developmentalist intellectuals had signed it. Nevertheless, engagement with such a declaration had caused disturbances not only within the board of directors but also within the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey. For the story of how and why Özmen was found as inconvenient by the board of directors see (Özmen, 2005: 353, 364, 390, 394-397).

³⁷ As early as 1962, OYAK became the second minority shareholder in Goodyear together with Koç holding. Similarly, in 1968 Taşkent's Yapı ve Kredi Bankası became a minority shareholder (13 percent) of the OYAK-Renault joint venture. I already cited above other partnerships with the big holding companies of Turkey.

MEYAK (for officials) and İYAK (for workers) were thought as mechanisms for higher rates of savings in order to “narrow the gap between industrial investment targets and available capital resources”. The idea was formulated as “the third sector” besides the private and public. Or within the left populist paradigm of CHP it corresponded to “the people’s sector” as a remedy for financing the industrial investments and as a formula to extend the social basis of capitalist industrialization in a way that would reconcile class conflicts. In this context, OYAK was wrongly thought as the prototype of such a new model because OYAK has always worked like a corporate capitalist group pursuing its own interests rather than the requirements of national economic development.³⁸

2: Inward-Oriented Accumulation Strategy through ISI Policies

OYAK’s first leap in economic growth corresponds to 1961-78 (see figure 2) period in which a relatively successful strategy of import substituting industrialization strategy was implemented in Turkey. The Etatist policies of 1930s and more specifically the ad hoc protectionist policies in the second half of 1950s had already initiated the formation of industrial bourgeoisie whose hegemonic project was established during the military regime of 27 May. However, the conversion of domestic merchant’s capital to an industrial bourgeoisie gained its real momentum in the post-1960 period which was marked by an inward-oriented capital accumulation strategy based on ISI policies. To put it briefly, the ISI is based on the protection of local industrial bourgeoisie from international competition in the name of domestically manufacturing previously imported consumer goods. The ISI policy is thought as a two-stage development model

³⁸ For this strategy of third sector within the context of industrialization strategy see Bianchi (1984: 66-72). For the third sector arguments about OYAK see “Ordu İş Aleminde”, *Yankı*, 11.06.1973; “Kalkınmanın Finansmanı Halk Tasarrufları ve OYAK Örneği”, *Yeni Ortam*, 19.03.1973; “OYAK Türkiye’de Üçüncü Bir Sektör Haline Geldi”, *Yeni Ortam*, 11.06.1973; İlhan Selçuk, “Üçüncü Sektör?”, *Cumhuriyet*, 20.06.1973. On the idea of “people’s sector” see Ölçen (1974) and for a discussion on OYAK as a potential constituent of people’s sector see Soral and Tekeli (1976: 39, 52, 56-57, 65).

whereby first the substitution of simple consumer goods and then the development of intermediate and capital goods industries were anticipated. The suppression of foreign competition and the creation of oligopolistic, if not monopolies, industrial structures convenient to realize high profit margins were among its essential features. The state protected local industrial bourgeoisie by an intermingled mechanism of protection and inducement. The import of consumer goods were impeded by high quotas and tariffs whereas the necessary import of technology, capital goods and intermediate goods were made possible by an exchange rate regulation overvaluing TL and the allocation of foreign exchange by political mechanisms. In addition, subsidies in forms of cheap credit, tax rebates, and advantageous prices for inputs (intermediate goods produced in state owned enterprises) were other mechanisms for accelerating capital accumulation process. It should also be noted that the protectionist ISI strategy was totally in consonance with the accumulation strategy of industrial capital in advanced capitalist countries which was pursuing the strategy of internationalization as a response to overaccumulation crisis.³⁹ It was also in this period that the concentration and centralization of capital gained its real momentum, resulting in the emergence of big capitalist groups, generally organized as holding companies. The increasing monopolization process, which resulted in a noticeable capacity to control the economy, caused one of the main intra-class cleavages of Turkish capitalism, namely the contradiction between Istanbul-based big capitalist groups and small and medium capitalists.⁴⁰

³⁹ On import substituting industrialization strategy see Keyder (1987: 141-196), Barkey (1990), Ercan (2002b).

⁴⁰ On the monopolization process and the emergence of big capitalist groups see Tekeli (1985), Kazgan (1985), Şen (1995), Buğra (1994a: 171-224)

OYAK, just after its establishment, started to invest its huge funds in the sectors into which only big capital groups can enter.⁴¹ Such industrial investments were thought to be both in the interest of OYAK (military officers) and of the general economy of Turkey. The then general manager was saying in *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi* that

In countries with low level of capital, the investments of the money of social security institutions in the industrial sector is the just way of acting. The rates of profit in industrial investments are high because of the lack of capital. Since there is no much competition, it is also a secure way of investing...The average rate of profit in Turkey is not below 30 percent (Özmen and Özdemir, 1962-63: 44).

The same line of thought was repeated in an OYAK publication dated 1968:

The big capital did not form in Turkey yet. The Foundation has millions. This financial source should be used for industrial investments in the sectors anticipated in five years plan instead of land speculation. According to the statistics of Industrial Development Bank of Turkey, the rentability of industrial investments is 27 percent. By investing in industrial sectors, the Foundation will both solve its own problems and contribute to the national development (OYAK Bülteni, 1968 quoted in Özgüden, 1988: 2027).

During the import-substituting industrialization period, OYAK's discourse was emphasizing that "its industrial and economic activities have always been concordant with the 5 years development plans and the sectors defined in these plans" (OYAK, 1976: 1; OYAK Dergisi, 1971: 8). It was a perfect case of articulating the particularistic interests to an allegedly universalistic hegemonic project of the time which was based on planned national developmentalism. Hence, the military became through OYAK a direct participant in the formulation of this hegemonic project under the hegemony of industrial capital of which it formed a part.

⁴¹ At the beginning, there was a brief period of hesitation about the type of investments to be engaged, as it is narrated in the memories of the first general manager. In the first and second year, the board of directors decided to invest in "industrial company's bonds with bank-guarantees" in such sectors as the pharmacology (Squibb), automotive (Verdi Biraderler), rolling mills (Metaş) and in "immovable". It seems that in these early investments OYAK was attractive for its right to import, which was a publicly given competence (Özmen, 2005: 342-345, 371; OYAK 1964; Özmen and Özdemir, 1962-63). The control and licensing of imports was a function of TOBB (Union of Chambers of Trade, Commerce, Industry and Commercial Exchanges of Turkey) whose president was also a legal member of the general assembly of OYAK. The foundation of "Commissaries" (Ordu Pazarları, 1963) also was among the first investment acts of OYAK because of the pressures from the members.

In fact, this discourse of serving the national interest was of course the legitimating ideology of national developmentalism. OYAK did work as a profit-oriented “private” capital group rather than as a state owned enterprise. In the capital accumulation process based on ISI, the sectors defined in the plans are indeed those in which the profit rates are highest thanks to high custom barriers, tax exemptions, credit facilities and other incitement policies. Hence, to invest in these sectors meant before anything else the development of the specific capital group rather than “the development of the nation”. The ISI strategy was based on a division of labor between private and public sectors in favor of the former (Küçük, 1978). According to this division of labor, the public sector’s function would be to complement the private sector by letting the private sector to freely invest in the sectors it would want. Again according to this division of labor, the private sector would be concentrated in the production and sale of the consumption goods while the public sector would produce cheap intermediary goods for the private sector, which would mean a transfer of resources to the private sector. OYAK’s position in this division of labor was that of the private sector, in other words OYAK has been one of the private capital groups which have benefited from all the policies aiming to nourish the big capital groups.

In consonance with the dominant accumulation strategy and the hegemonic project of the time, OYAK’s investments concentrated mainly in the automotive and cement sectors, the two dynamic sectors of ISI. Besides these two locomotive sectors, sectors such as the agro-chemical (Hektaş-1963), insurance (Oyak Sigorta-1967) and food (Tukaş-1968) too have been among the earliest sectors OYAK invested in.⁴²

⁴² In the ISI period OYAK also invested as minority shareholders in public companies in the sectors of petroleum (TPAO-1964, 7.7 %), petro-chemical (Petkim-1965, 20 %), and military electronics sector (Aselsan-1975, 15 %).

OYAK's biggest investments in the automotive and cement sectors have been done at the end of 1960s. One of the investment strategies of OYAK in this initial period has been either the purchase of shares of public companies or going into joint-ventures with them to get the majority share in a later stage. Although OYAK entered in the cement sector as early as 1963 by purchasing the majority shares of a public factory (Çukurova), its establishment of dominance in this sector realized after it decided to construct three cement factories in partnership with a state owned enterprise in 1969 (Bolu, Ünye, Mardin, they started to production in 1974-75). As to the most strategic sector for OYAK in terms of profits, OYAK invested in the automotive sector as early as 1962 by buying some shares of Goodyear. It then started the production of trucks and pick-ups by purchasing the majority shares of a public company (TOE-Turkish Automotive Industries-1963, 86 percent) and founded a sale company (MAT-1964). These two investments were mainly based on selling trucks to Turkish Armed Forces (see Özmen, 2005: 374). The main industrial investment of OYAK has been the joint-venture agreement with Renault (1969, started to production in 1971) after the establishment of a sale and marketing company (MAİS-1967).

During the ISI period the revenues of the foundation mostly originated from the firms in the commercial and service sectors wherein the profit rates were high, not from the production companies. For instance in 1977 while OYAK received from the production companies only 70 million TL, the amount from the sales companies was 267 million TL, and 75 % of this was from MAİS, the sale company in the automotive sector. Behind the protective walls of import substitution, especially through the price making policies, the automotive became the motor sector for OYAK. During the ISI period, "the industry of passenger-cars enjoyed the highest rate of protection (280.2 %)

within the overall manufacturing industry” (Aksoy, 1990: 53). This meant very high profit rates for the two oligopolies in the sector: OYAK and KOÇ holding.

It was the convergence of the multinational strategies, with the state and domestic economic interests that made possible the development of the automotive industry. It was in the mid-1950s that Turkey started automotive assembly industry in order to save foreign exchange while at the same time there was internationalization in the world automotive industry with licensing agreements and joint ventures. In 1964, the First Five Year Plan and the Assembly Industry Regulations aimed at a shift from mere assembly operations to an integrated automotive industry with increasing local production. As a result, a protected and potentially large domestic market attracted new assemblers, and the percentage of imported cars dropped from 98.4 percent in 1967 to 13 percent in 1972 (Eder, 1993: 74, 139-147). In this process, the two big capital groups KOÇ and OYAK entered the sectors through joint ventures with Fiat in 1968 (TOFAŞ) and with Renault in 1969 (OYAK-Renault), respectively. In his comprehensive study on industrialization in Turkey, Barkey (1990: 115, 141), referring to his interview with a former Minister of Finance, argues that OYAK “was induced by this industry’s champions to buy into a Renault car assembly plant”. These two big capitalist groups constituted an oligopolistic market and enjoyed high rents in this sector (see Aksoy, 1990: 54).

The case of automotive sector in the process of 12 March military intervention is interesting in order to understand the relevance of OYAK’s embeddedness in a specific accumulation strategy for consolidating specific class interests. As I explained before, 12 March came after the first crisis of ISI strategy in Turkey. In the midst of balance of payment crisis, growing foreign debt, and high inflation, in 1970, the AP government

adopted an IMF stabilization program which consisted of a drastic devaluation (66%) of TL. The implications for automotive industry were disastrous since it increased the cost of imported parts. In addition, the government issued a new purchase tax on car consumers as well as an additional sale tax. As a result, the sales dropped significantly in 1970 and 1971 and production volumes were far from sufficient for an efficient and scaled production. The AP's motive behind this policy was disciplining the automotive sector by decreasing protectionism and inducing the automotive industry to export-oriented production. This policy package severely hit the automotive industry and the sales suddenly dropped in the following year. However, this caused a major opposition on the part of industrialists dependent on ISI policies. The Financing Law and the devaluation package were interpreted by TOBB as a blow to the assembly industries' essence and, in particular, to the automotive sector (Eder, 1993: 150; Barkey, 1990: 115, 154; Aksoy, 1990: 62). The negative impact of government decisions on the automotive industry and OYAK's profits was also critically mentioned in the general assembly of OYAK (Oyak Dergisi, 1971: 8). Not only the political-hegemonic but also the economic-corporate interests of the military through OYAK were strongly entrenched in ISI policies as much as other big capitalist groups organized under TUSIAD. The two big capitalist groups KOÇ and OYAK had just recently invested in this sector in which the high profits were challenged. 12 March intervention and the subsequent regulations continued the protectionist ISI policies. "The aftermath of the March 12, 1971...signaled the triumph of the import substitution industrialists and most importantly of the automotive firms" (Eder, 1993: 291).⁴³ Hence, the struggle of the big capitalists for their own class interests did not let the government to push for even a limited export-

⁴³ It is interesting that one of the members of the Board of Directors of OYAK, Özer Derbil, became a member of the first Erim government, which was a technocratic cabinet (see Ahmad, 1977: 291).

orientation. It was not per se the state capacity which impeded the rationalization of accumulation strategy, as critical statist explanation has argued, but rather the existence of the struggle of a class fraction which paralyzed the state capacity. In this struggle, the influence of the automotive sector and the military capital was worth of mentioning: as Barkey (1990: 115) assesses, “in the final analysis, this industry’s long term stability and success was assured with the direct involvement of the armed forces”.

The highly oligopolistic structure of the manufacturing industry in Turkey was not specific to the period of ISI, it continued, contrary to the conventional neoliberal arguments, even after the opening of the economy in 1980s. This oligopolistic structure has been an important tool for the big capital in Turkey, for it could maintain high profit rates by mark-up pricing (cost + profit) through which the burden of the increasing cost prices has been reflected upon the consumers (Yeldan, 2001: 79-88).

When we look at OYAK’s share of market in different sectors it becomes explicit that the military has been part of this oligopolistic structure. For instance, in the automotive sector, between 1960-80 OYAK controlled the whole sector together with KOÇ holding, and even after 1980 OYAK’s market share within the sector has been 20 % on the average for the period 1992-2001, and 27.7 % in 2001. The market share of the sale company in 2000 was 23 %. In the production of tires, between 1960 and 1980 the sector has been controlled by three companies (Goodyear, Uniroyal, and Pirelli). In 1971 Goodyear’s share within the total production of tires was 28.8 %, and in 1982 it was 21%. As to the cement sector, by 1976 OYAK’s factories were producing 23 % of the total cement production in the country. This share was 13.4% between 1985 and 1997,

and 18.8 % in 1998. A last example is from the agro-chemical sector, the market share of Hektaş is currently between 18 and 20 %.⁴⁴

To sum up, the military capital was totally embedded to protectionist and oligopolistic structure of Turkish capitalism and shared the same economic-corporate interests with big capitalist groups in Turkey. Even though the big bourgeoisie-the military relation cannot be reduced to this organic relation at the economic-corporate moment, it would be a mistake to ignore this connection which socialized high military officers in the capitalist societalization process. As a result, it would not be wrong to assert that OYAK may have played a transmission belt role to make the military more sensitive to the capital accumulation process and the related intra- and inter-class struggles. For instance, the crisis of accumulation was felt in its full dimensions by OYAK members. The general assembly records indicate that after the mid-1970s but especially in the post-1978 period the speeches of President of the Board of Directors (a retired high ranking general) focused on the sources and dimensions of the economic bottleneck. It was noted that the planned structural transformation of the industry in a way to deepen the ISI by initiating the production of capital goods could not be realized because of foreign exchange crisis, the shortages of energy and raw materials, inflation, the high levels of wages (OYAK, 1978: 15, 17). What was proposed was to initiate the production of capital goods and to induce the export-orientation in order to decrease the financial dependency, and to establish the peace and order in the capital-labor relation (Oyak, 1978: 18; Oyak Dergisi, 1980: 15-16). The rise of wages because of the union

⁴⁴ The sources used in the calculation of OYAK's companies market shares are the sales data published by Association of Automotive Industry and OYAK (2000: 23) for the automotive sector; Oyak Dergisi (1972: 4) and OYAK (1982) for Goodyear; OYAK (1977: 16), Dizdaroğlu (1991: 105) and the data published by The Union of Turkish Cement Producers for the cement sector; and <http://www.hektas.com/html/firma> for Hektaş in agro-chemical industry.

activities as the reason for decreasing profitability was especially emphasized for the automotive sector (OYAK, 1975: 48-49). This would be exactly the project of the 12 September military junta. In 1983, the president of the board of directors, retired major general Hasan Görmüş, would say that:

In the post-12 September 1980 period, our country entered in an era of social peace thanks to the Turkish Armed Forces and our economy is in a process of recovering a healthy structure (Oyak Dergisi, 1983).

3: Post-1980 Neoliberal Restructuring and Financial Accumulation Strategy

The crisis of ISI strategies and the increasing class struggles at the economic-corporate and political-hegemonic moments have come to an end by another military intervention in 1980, supported by the big bourgeoisie who was arguing for the implementation of a stabilization program in the short run and structural adjustment policies in the long run. The military regime (1980-1983) started to implement neoliberal economic policies and to restructure the whole constitutional-legal and political structures by repressively disciplining the working class. After the end of direct military rule in 1983, the successive new right governments continued to implement neoliberal economic policies under the auspices of the authoritarian political structure at the center of which stand the National Security Council controlled by the military members.

The post-1980 period witnessed the domination of two accumulation strategies. The first is the export-oriented capital accumulation, which was the recipe for the crisis of ISI. The apparently successful export-orientation strategy of the 1980s was based on the use of the already existing industrial capacity and the repression of real wages under the restrictive and repressive juridical and political regulation of labor relation by the military regime and subsequent civilian governments. However, as public and private

fixed investments in industrial sector decreased during the decade, what happened was an orientation to export but decisively not an export-oriented industrialization. Besides the support policies such as exchange rate depreciation, credits at preferential rates, tax rebates; the labor cost-reduction by suppressing labor wages through the deregulation of labor markets and repressing labor organizations was the key to export-originated profits. As a result, between 1981 and 1987 while wages were depressed, the profits in manufacturing sectors steadily increased. At the end of 1980s, low wage-based export strategy reached its social-political limits, and due to the reawakening of labor movement and the neo-populist strategy pushed by the electoral process, real wages and terms of trade for agriculture ameliorated in a way to recover the losses during the decade, but only to be lost totally after the financial crisis of 1994. The state could finance this new orientation either through taxation of the capital (which would mean a certain sacrifice in the rate of profits) or through undertaking the responsibility of the cost. Under the pressures from the bourgeoisie, the state opted for the second choice, which opened an era of financial liberalization and increasing public borrowing.

The post-1989 period was marked by what may be called financial accumulation model in which increasing public sector borrowing requirement was financed by financial flows, domestic borrowing with high interest rates. It was also marked by the increasing decisiveness of IMF policies focused on the payment of public debts. The last 15 years have been marked by short periods of economic booms based on short-term financial flows and succeeding financial crises whose severity increased each time, culminating in the most severe economic crisis of the Republican history in 2001. The result of financial crises has been further deteriorating income distribution, increasing unemployment, and worsening macroeconomic performance. Other main policies of

public debt financing have been privatizations and the reduction of social expenditures of state. As to the industrial structure, under the dominance of finance over the real economy, even the firms in industrial sectors turned to invest in financial markets. The export-oriented sectors have been labor intensive industries which are controlled by the small and medium capital in Anatolia and in which wages are suppressed through anti-union politics and flexible production system. In a brief formula, “the management of fiscal debt may be viewed as an income transfer mechanism, transferring income away from wage-labour and the peasantry, to domestic rentiers” (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan, 2000: 489).⁴⁵

The military capital, which itself suffered from the accumulation crisis of the late 1970s, started to pursue an accumulation strategy based on the privatization policies and financial investments, especially in the 1990s. Together with this change of accumulation strategy, the discourse of OYAK has also changed. In concordance with the hegemonic strategy of the time based on the idea of market (see Yalman, 2002a), the military capital now emphasizes the importance of privatization and globalization instead of development plans.⁴⁶

In the post-1980 period, OYAK deepened its vertical and horizontal integration by entering new sectors such as food, construction, transportation, and tourism which were subsidized by government policies. Between 1982 and 1984, OYAK has become share-holder in three more companies in the food sector: Eti, Tam Gıda, and Entaş

⁴⁵ This brief evaluation of the post-1980 dynamics of accumulation and redistribution are based on Yeldan (2001), which is an excellent and the most comprehensive study of the accumulation, redistribution, and economic growth dynamics of the post-1980 Turkey. For the data on the devastating social and economic impacts of successive financial crises see also Sönmez (2002). On the anti-labor politics and practices under neoliberalism see Çam (2002).

⁴⁶ See <http://www.oyak.com.tr/oyak-misyon.html>. The general manager, in its message to the members, is now saying that “to transform OYAK into a globalized and internationally reputed institution is among our purposes” (<http://www.oyak.com.tr/oyak-mesaj.html>).

Tavukçuluk. OYAK's investments in the construction, transportation, and tourism sectors were also motivated by state supports for those sectors. OMSAN, which has been founded in 1978, has specialized in the transportation sector after 1982 which was supported by different mechanisms such as tax exemption and credit facilities. OYAK after entering the construction sector through a partnership with Kutlutaş holding in the end of 1970s founded its own company in 1982. The construction firms, especially those which were investing abroad (especially in Middle East and North Africa) were supported by government subsidies (Sönmez, 1982: 134-136). The reason behind OYAK's showcase investments in tourism sector (İzmir Etap Oteli, 1987 and OYTUR, 1989) was also to make advantage of state supports for the sector.⁴⁷

OYAK also enjoyed specific profit-making mechanisms for powerful capitalist groups. The transfer of the bankrupt companies to the public economic enterprises or making them shareholders in these bankrupt companies, establishing partnerships with public enterprises in order to win public tenders have been among the mechanisms of converting the power into the economic profit. For instance, at the beginning of 1980s OYAK transferred its two bankrupt companies in the automotive sector (TOE and MAT) to a public bank (Ziraat Bankası, 1984). Another public bank (Emlak Bankası) has become shareholder in its four construction companies (Oyak-Kutlutaş Holding) suffering financial crises (1985) (Sönmez, 1987: 252). Again in the construction sector, SSK (Institution of Social Securities) has become shareholder (25 %) in OYAK's construction company.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ For the specific law on the encouragement of tourism see Sönmez (1982: 141-143). The ex vice-general manager of OYAK whom I interviewed also underlined that the investments in tourism sector were for justifying the \$ 14 million that OYAK profited in the context of inducement policies for the sector.

⁴⁸ According to the accord made, SSK would pay OYAK \$ 2.5 million, and all the construction works of SSK would be contracted to OYAK. Besides the contractual procedure, OYAK has siphoned 2 trillion 443 billion TL from SSK by sub-contracting the nine construction projects in 1999 with a 23.24 % reduction.

Nevertheless, the above mentioned sectors have had little impact in the overall investment portfolio of OYAK. In fact, in the post-1980 period too, OYAK's real sector investment portfolio was dominated by the automotive and cement sectors. In 1989 over all profits of the foundation the share of the automotive sector was 66.1 % and that of cement was 16.8 % (Çakıcı, 1991: 56-57). The 1990s were the years of crisis for the Turkish automotive sector. In the mid-1990s the sector and OYAK have restructured its industrial infrastructure and the structure of partnership with foreign companies (1993-94). As a result OYAK-Renault became a base of export of Renault and ranged among the 3 most export-making and the most profitable 4 industrial firms according to ISO data.

Neoliberal privatization policies have been an important strategy for the economic growth of OYAK in this period. OYAK developed its market share in the cement sector in the process of privatization, which was a rent transfer mechanism to the private sector since after the privatization in the cement sector, the productivity of the sector did not change *pace* neoliberal arguments. The studies on privatizations underline the under-pricing and the violation of selling contract conditions as the two main mechanisms of rent transfer to the private sector. The cement sector is the most mentioned sector in exploring these features of privatization (Yeldan, 2001: 164; Boratav et. al., 1998; Zaim and Çakmak, 1994). In 1992, OYAK-Sabancı partnership bought two cement factories, which became later on OYSA. In 1996, this time in partnership with another big group in the sector (GAMA) OYAK bought another cement

Even the president of TİSK (The Confederation of Turkish Employers' Unions), a businessman organization generally more conservative than TÜSİAD, criticized this favoritism for OYAK and argued that if other companies would have the right to enter to SSK tenders, the cost could be reduced by 30 %. For the whole process see Yeni Şafak, 18.06.1999; 19.07.1999; 03.08.1999. It should be noted that the criticism from the president of TİSK was an expression of the in-sector competition.

factory. OYAK's market share was 20 % in 1997 and 23.8 in 1999. By the end of 2005, after the last privatization launch, the market shares in the cement sector, which is a highly oligopolistic sector⁴⁹, is as follows: Sabancı 18 %, OYAK 14.2 %, OYSA (Oyak-Sabancı) 2.8 %. OYAK and Sabancı groups dominate the sector since the third biggest group's (Italcementi) share is only 7.3 % (Sabah, 14.10. 2005). In addition, one of the peculiar characteristics of the sector is the importance of regional monopoly and oligopoly. In that sense, OYAK has an oligopolistic control in four regions of Turkey: in Black Sea; OYAK 52 %, Sabancı 17 %, Lafarge 16 %; in Mediterranean region; OYAK 28 %, Sabancı 26 %; in East Anatolia; Limak 43 %, OYAK 27 %; in Southeastern Anatolia Limak 21 %, Sanko 20 % OYAK 18 % (Sabah, 21.10.2005). The oligopolistic power of OYAK is discernible in the net margin of profit too: while the average rate for 19 cement firms on IMKB (İstanbul Stock Exchange Market) is 27.5 %, it is 37.48 for OYAK's five companies.⁵⁰

In 1990s, the financial sector has been added to the automotive and cement sectors. OYAK entered the financial sector by establishing a securities company (Oyak Menkul Değerler) in 1984, and then in 1990 became shareholder, together with Alarko and Cerrahoğlu holdings, in the First National Boston Bank. Then, it purchased all the shares of the bank in 1993, and changed its name as Oyak Bank in 1996. However, this bank was very small and was not powerful in the sector. The growth of OYAK in the financial sector is a recent phenomenon, the story of which is quite revealing about the

⁴⁹ The oligopolistic structure of the sector is commonly acknowledged. For such assertions on the daily newspapers see Hurşit Güneş, "Uzanların Çimento Fabrikalarının Satışına Dikkat", *Milliyet*, 29.09.2005; Prof.Dr. Aydın Ayaydın, "Çimentoların Satışı Tekelleşme Yaratmamalı", *Sabah*, 11.10.2005 and "Çimento Satışları Tam Gaz Peki Rekabeti Ne Olacak?", *Sabah*, 13.10.2005. This oligopolistic structure of the sector, which causes high prices, also produces a line of conflict between construction firms and cement firms ("Müteahhitlerde Çimento Sıkıntısı", *Radikal*, 22.10.2005)

⁵⁰ The calculation is based on the data published in Güngör Uras, "Çimentoda Fiyat Fabrikanın Değil Pazarın Fiyatı", *Milliyet*, 12.10.2005.

power of OYAK. After the 2001 financial crisis, the state decided to transfer money to the banks whose capital was insufficient. The special commission of the parliament had to define a criterion for deciding which banks would be supported. They decided that the banks whose sector share was higher than 1 % would be saved by the state.⁵¹ This criterion was totally arbitrary, or better to say it was decided politically. Hence, the interpretations about the political manipulation were not much baseless, for if another criterion were defined or even if the sector share were defined as 1.5 %, two banks would not have received money transfer from the state: these were Oyak Bank and the bank of a big media corporation (Akman, 2002: 4).⁵² This was the first step in OYAK's strategy of growth in the financial sector. The second was to buy one of the biggest public banks (Sümerbank)⁵³ of Turkey which was insolvent and taken by public Saving Deposit Insurance Fund. The history of the purchase of Sümerbank was also interesting since according to the president of the board of directors of OYAK, Selçuk Saka (a retired general), "OYAK paid only a symbolic amount for Sümerbank (50 billion TL) and after 4.5 months of activities the profit that would come from the bank would be equal to or more than the profit coming from all other affiliated companies".⁵⁴ This was really the case since the loss of Oyak Bank in 2000 was 8.6 trillion TL, and OYAK announced that they will put 27 trillion TL capitals to the Sümerbank. After the combination of the two banks, the profit for 2001 has been declared as 167 trillion TL

⁵¹ The definition of the sector share as the only criterion was criticized in the newspapers too. See Ruhi Sanyer, "Bankacılıkta Kavga", *Radikal*, 30.12.2001.

⁵² Oyak Bank financial structure was very bad at the time since the rate of bankrupt credits was 12.7 % in Oyak while the average for private banks was 3.9 %, and the profitability rate of Oyak Bank was - 5.3 %, while the sector's average was 1.2 %. See Münir (2001).

⁵³ Please note that four other insolvent banks were combined under Sümerbank.

⁵⁴ Selçuk Saka, "Üyelerle Sohbet" (Conversation with Members), October 2001 and January 2002 (Source: the web site of OYAK). In the last general assembly, the general manager of OYAK also underlined how with the 5 months profits all the losses of ex-Oyak Bank have been compensated (*Oyak Dergisi*, 2004: 77).

(Radikal, 4.9.2001; 10.8.2001; 13.01.2001). This profit was far exceeding the total cost of the bank for OYAK. In other words the fact that privatization is a process of transfer of wealth to the private sector has been once again proved. By purchasing Sümerbank OYAK became one of the five biggest in the banking sector of Turkey. OYAK's position in the financial sector is also complemented by its existence in the insurance sector, especially after the establishment of Axa-Oyak Holding (a joint-venture with the French Axa group) in 1999.

In fact, OYAK started to profit from the financial accumulation model before gaining dominance in the banking sector. After the financial liberalization and deregulation in 1989, the financial mode of accumulation has become dominant in Turkey. This mode of accumulation has been based on lending money with very high interest rates to debt-ridden state. The period following the liberalization of financial markets in 1989 has been the most important years in the development and increase of the total net assets of OYAK (figure 2).⁵⁵ A similar observation is also done in terms of its profitability. According to Demir (2005: 681), the average profitability (balance-sheet profits in constant 1995 dollars) jumped from about \$ 15.75 million for the period 1961-1980 to around \$ 99 million for 1981-2001. More interestingly, the average profitability is more striking for the period following financial liberalization: \$ 165.74 million for the period 1990-2001. These were the years in which OYAK's financial investments surpassed that of real sector investments. According to the data announced by the president of OYAK, in 1960, 1970, and 1980, the share of financial investments and

⁵⁵ The growth rates of OYAK's total net assets in TL between 1989 and 2001 were 123, 88, 98, 315, 155, 102, 87, 330, 213, 75 percent in the successive years.

affiliated companies out of total profit-oriented investments were 4-5 % and 40 %, respectively. It climbed to 17 % and 40 % in 1990 and to 67 % and 40 % in 2000.⁵⁶

OYAK used its high liquid sources in the financial investments and profited from the arbitrage between dollar and TL. Especially in the financial crisis years, OYAK's profit reached peak points. The general manager Coşkun Ulusoy was explaining this situation by saying that "if there is crisis there are also opportunities" (Hürriyet, 23.11.2001). For instance in 1994, which was the year of first big financial crisis of 1990s, 42.6 % of the total profit of the foundation was from financial investments, and 51.8 % from other investments, and financial investments had increased by 315 % compared to the previous year (Oyak Dergisi, 1995: 39). In 1999, the revenues from financial investments were as high as 53.2 % of the total annual revenues, whereas the share of revenues from affiliated companies was 23 %. It should also be added that 25 % of the revenues from affiliated companies was from financial sector following 41.5 % share of the automotive and 27.4 % of the cement sectors (Oyak Dergisi, 2000: 16). Again in 2001, the year of last and biggest financial crisis, 40.7 % of the total profit was from the financial investments and 47.4 % was from other investments (Radikal, 26.04.2002). In addition, if one takes into account the fact that even the revenues of the firms within the manufacturing sector are coming from their non-operational activities (i.e. exchange rate transactions and interest rates),⁵⁷ we can argue that during 1990s the profit from the financial investments has been biggest than the above shares. A comparison between the financial profits from non-operational activities of OYAK-

⁵⁶ Please note that 67 % also includes the financial investments of affiliated companies. See the speech of the president of the board of directors, retired Lieutenant-General Yıldırım Türker in "Oyak İş Ortakları Toplantısı, 7.9.2005, Antalya" as published at <http://www.oyak.com.tr>

⁵⁷ According to the data on 500 biggest real sector companies, the rate of non-operational profits to total profits was 24.1 % in 1985, 33.3 % in 1990, 54.6 % in 1994, 46.5 % in 1995, 87.7 % in 1998, 219 % in 1999, 114.4 % in 2000, and 547 % in 2001 (Yeldan, 2001: 155; ISO, 2002: 52).

owned real sector companies on İstanbul Stock Exchange Market with other non-financial sector companies reveals that “between 1993 and 2003, the median net financial profits to net sales ratio of the seven OYAK firms was on average 300 percent higher than the median in the stock market among 152 firms” (Demir, 2005: 682).

Such a striking profit in the year of the biggest economic crisis of Republican history together with the Coşkun Ulusoy’s statement that “we anticipated the crisis, took our precautions” raised some doubts in the public opinion about whether OYAK was in advance of the devaluation package, which caused a drastic overnight depreciation of the currency, and so transformed its liquid sources to the foreign currency. The statements such of an ex-bureaucrat which was quoted in a weekly journal, *Aksiyon*, aggravated such doubts:

Before the devaluations, the important public and private institutions are informed about the devaluation so that they overcome the crisis without losses. The fact that the economic crisis does not harm everybody equally has become explicit in the case opened by chief public attorney Sabih Kanadoğlu against the ex-president of Central Bank, Gazi Erçel. It is written in the court records that just before the transition to the flexible rate of exchange 5.188 billion dollars were sold to some banks and institutions. It is well known that the total amount of this money is never sold to private sector; an important part of it is always sold to public institutions or institutions close to public (Aksiyon, 08.12.2001).

To sum up, the military capital has pursued the accumulation strategy that caused the biggest economic crisis of the Republican history. The military’s economic-corporate interests were deeply entrenched to financial accumulation strategy. Unlike other fixed income groups, whose socio-economic status severely deteriorated during the last decade, the military officers benefited from the financial accumulation model.

Very recently, OYAK made a new economic investment and solidified its position of being among the three biggest holding companies of Turkey. This golden strike of OYAK has been in the last privatization process in October 2005. OYAK had already announced his interest in two biggest privatizations in 2005: Tüpraş (petroleum)

and Erdemir (iron-steel), the second and third most profitable industrial companies (İSO, 2004; 2005). After Koç holding bought Tüpraş, OYAK bought 46 percent of the third most profitable industrial company of Turkey for a value of \$ 2.77 billion. With this new company OYAK grew 50 %: its total net assets increased from \$ 10.7 billion to \$ 15.4 billion. Erdemir's profit in 2003 was \$ 610 million, which is equal to OYAK's net profit originated by 40 affiliated companies (Sabah, 5-6.10.2005). This privatization has been another wealth transfer from public to the military.

This privatization process has also been interesting in terms of the public discussion it triggered. As I already noted in chapter 3, the public-political discussion in Turkey seem to be hegemonically enframed between nationalist-statist versus neoliberal market discourses. OYAK's last privatization success has also been discussed on this axe. The debate started with OYAK's general manager's statement that event though personally he is in no way against privatizations and the development of private capital in most of the sectors, he is nevertheless against the privatizations of strategic firms such as two nationalist values TÜPRAŞ and ERDEMİR. However, in case of their privatization, he would prefer a local-national capital group, which is reliable in the eyes of people and capable of considering the national interest and , to buy them. The strategic-rhetorical use of nationalism by OYAK's general manager was such impressive that the other local-national consortium (EOGG), which brought several medium-size Anatolian capital groups together, stopped at the last tour of the auction in favor of OYAK. The president of TOBB was saying that "we are happy that ERDEMİR is bought by OYAK which is a national capital group". The nationalist rhetoric was so influential that those social groups opposing the privatization process ceased to protest

the process because that OYAK as a national capital group bought Erdemir.⁵⁸ This nationalist, seemingly anti-neoliberal discourse, which has been supported by nationalist public figures, attracted the reaction of those ultra neoliberal gatekeepers of the mass media. OYAK has been criticized for not being homoeconomicus, for being anti-private sector and anti-privatization.⁵⁹ However, the fictiveness of these critics and the fact that it was just a strategic-rhetorical use of nationalist discourse rather than really representing a nationalist bloc of capital groups would soon become clear. To the question of whether the profitability is less important than national interest the general manager of OYAK responded that “Both firms (Tüpraş and Erdemir) are profitable. We won’t undertake to save Turkey with the money of our members. There is an overlap between the interests of our members and of Turkey.” He also added that OYAK would not buy a firm suffering loss in the name of national interest (Radikal and Hürriyet, 08.09.2005). He also underlined that his nationalist outlook is not conservative in any sense or against foreign capital (Radikal 10.09.2005; Hürriyet, 12.09.2005, 18.10.2005).

⁵⁸ For this privatization process and the subsequent public discussions see the daily newspapers (*Radikal*, *Milliyet*, *Hürriyet*, *Sabah*, *Yeni Şafak*, *Zaman*) between 08.09.2005 and 05.12.2005. For the use of this nationalist rhetoric see the speech of the general manager Coşkun Ulusoy in “Oyak İş Ortakları Toplantısı, 7.9.2005, Antalya” as published at <http://www.oyak.com.tr>. For the influence of nationalist rhetoric see the following quotations. TOBB President Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu: “It is great that the national capital bought OYAK. A foreign flag did not added to the Turkish flag in Erdemir” (Ne güzel ki Erdemir milli sermayede kaldı. Erdemir’de Türk bayrağının yanına başka bayrak gelmedi). The Mayor of Karadeniz Ereğli Halil Posbıyık: “We were waiting a higher price for Erdemir. It is a very cheap price. Our only consolation is that it is sold to OYAK”. (Erdemir’in daha yüksek fiyatla satılmasını bekliyorduk. Kelepir fiyata satıldı. Tek tesellimiz ihaleyi Oyak’ın kazanması) (*Radikal*, *Sabah*, *Milliyet* 05.10.2005). The President of Maden-İş, Hasan Hüseyin Kayabaşı: “We passed through a period of strong privatization winds, and came to those days. As unions we have always been against privatization. We said that ‘we cannot support a system lacking infrastructure’. It passed a lot of time from then on and the infrastructure is ameliorated. We are glad that Erdemir is sold to OYAK”. (Türkiye, özelleştirme rüzgârının hızlı estiği bir dönemden geçti ve bugünlere geldi. Sendikalar olarak, özelleştirmeye hep karşı çıktık. 'Altyapısı olmayan bir sistem içinde bizim olmamız mümkün değildir' dedik. O günden bugüne aradan çok zaman geçti ve altyapı, biraz olsun düzelendi. Erdemir’i OYAK’ın alması bizi memnun etmiştir) (*Radikal*, *Hürriyet* 06.10.2005). In addition, the CHP, the Labor Party (an ultra-nationalist left wing left party) the President of ATO (Ankara Chamber of Trade), who are among the prominent opponents of neoliberal privatization policies, also applauded OYAK (*Zaman* 08.10.2005).

⁵⁹ See for instance Ertuğrul Özkök, “Homo Ekonomikus’un Kimyası”, *Hürriyet*, 16.09.2005; Vahap Munyar, “Bu Kadar Meydan Okudunuz Alamazsanız Ne Yapacaksınız?” and “Ulusoy’u Yabancıların Karşısına Asker mi Dikti?” *Hürriyet*, 08.09.2005 and 12.09.2005; Cüneyt Ülsever, “Coşkun Ulusoy’a Bazı Sorular”, *Hürriyet*, 14.09.2005; “Yabancı Düşmanlığı Sermayeyi Ürküttü”, *Yeni Şafak*, 06.10.2005;

The rhetorical nature of nationalist discourse has become explicit when just after the public auction OYAK announced that it is open to foreign partners in OYAK, and soon it started to deal with ACELOR, a firm that provides the intermediary goods to OYAK-Renault.⁶⁰ The fact that the strategic use of nationalist or neoliberal discourses were not much different from each other when it comes to real policy implementation to be pursued but they are rather different strategies for having a greater part of the pie was clear in the following statement of the executive president of Ereğli Ortak Girişim Grubu (EOGG) Zafer Çağlayan:

It is glad that a national capital bought Erdemir. If a foreign capital group had bought it, there would be great protests and resistances. We had strong information about this. In a sense, the privatizations which should be necessarily realized in our opinion would be blocked. With this result we also overcame such a problem. Turkey should now cease to doubt about the necessity of privatizations (Hürriyet, 06.10.2005).

It is explicit that the conjunctural nationalist discourse of the military capital is just another way of legitimating the neoliberal economic policies such as privatization. In fact, the discourse and practice of the military capital which supports and profits from the neoliberal economic policies of integrating with world capitalist economy, of privatization, of financial accumulation regime perfectly echoes at the policy documents of the military too. In the “Document of National Security Policy”⁶¹ dated 1997, prepared by the military and publicly known as the hidden constitution, it is said that “the efforts for the integration with the world, including privatization policies, should be increased”.⁶² The future accumulation strategy of OYAK is still based upon the privatization and financial investments. They aim to enter or to grow in the dynamic and

⁶⁰ See Radikal 05.10.2005; Milliyet 06 and 16.10.2005. Some columnist in media did not skip to underline the paradox in this attitude. See Mehmet Ocaktan, “Bir Ticari Meta Olarak Ulusalcılık”, *Yeni Şafak*, 07.10.2005; Yalçın Doğan “Ulusalcı Çıkmaz OYAK Eşiğinde”, *Hürriyet*, 07.10.2005.

⁶¹ For the text see Şen (2000: 154-155).

⁶² Such a positive attitude towards the neoliberal privatization policies is also discernible in the publications of the “Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı”. For examples see retired brigadier general Cömert (1998), Kahveci (2002)

profitable sectors of the age such as energy, telecommunications, technology, banking, and national lottery. OYAK is waiting for the privatization of the public companies in these sectors.

1-d Military and Class Relations: Autonomy *or* Embeddedness?

As I discussed in previous chapters, theoretical frameworks using binary oppositions such as state versus society and/or military versus civilian analyze the military independently from the overall social structure, processes and relations. It is commonly asserted that the military is autonomous, above and outside society. It is certainly true that the military in Turkey has a certain “political autonomy” nourished by institutional and ideological mechanisms, which makes it a socio-political actor in and for itself whose discursive and non-discursive practices cannot be reduced to a mere reflective or reactive role. The military actively participates in the constitution of specific social orders. Nevertheless, it is not an omnipotent actor. Its very constitutive role draws it into specific social relations of power, which in turn defines the limits of its power. The autonomy of the military embeds it within social power relations. We should not forget that it is the very social relations and practices among the different social and political actors (the military being one of them) which make possible the current power of the military and that the actual use of this autonomous power defines in turn the relativity of this autonomy. Hence, it is more productive to conceive the military as being not above but within society. Once conceived as such, one may assess how the military’s positioning vis-à-vis different social classes, class fractions, and other social and political groups have differential impacts which cannot be subsumed under the general category of society.

The existence of the military as a collective capitalist group through OYAK, while having contradictory effects on its autonomy, in the last instance, is a very proof of the embeddedness of the military within social power relations. According to Ümit Cizre (2002: 175), “the fact that Turkish Armed Forces has developed capitalist relations and interests through OYAK, is not the cause but the result of a ‘political’ autonomy and potential of intervention... and it cannot respond to the question of how Turkish Armed Forces achieve to be perceived as if it is above ideologies and politics”. There is a big kernel of truth in this interpretation. For the military draws its social legitimacy by identifying itself with a socially undifferentiated nation and with its state, an allegedly neutral public apparatus representing the general interest. However, it is also important to argue that the existence of the military as a capital group is a phenomenon that must be underlined to unmask this ideologically constructed image of the military. Actually, the very existence and practices of OYAK itself draws the military into the center of such socio-political contentions that its image of being above particularisms is questioned. To the extent that this unmasking is realized, in other words to the extent that we display how the military, which presents itself as representing the general interest, is indeed the bearer of particularistic interests and/or is the organic representative of specific particularistic interests, it would be possible to see how the phenomenon of military capital in turn qualifies this political autonomy.

In a sense, we can assert that the existence of the military as a collective capitalist group has contradictory effects: on the one hand, it originates from and increases its corporate autonomous power; on the other hand, it may undermine the legitimating discursive basis of this autonomous power. The contradictory impacts of the phenomenon of military capital can be analyzed at two levels: first at the level of

relations within the military itself, second at the level of broader social relations between the military and other social and political actors. Concerning the relations within the military, at first sight, it is obvious that the impact of OYAK is the “embourgeoisement” of the military officers through different mechanisms of resources allocation. This effect has been strengthened by wage and lodging policies favoring the military officers (see Insel, 2004: 46, 51). The middle and high rank military elites have been steadily drawn into the sterile daily life of the upper middle classes. As a result, the daily life practices of the military officers are detached from the lower classes and integrated to the upper middle classes. Through this process of “embourgeoisement” the ideological-political divisions with class pertinence have been diminished within the military; and the coherence and homogeneity of the military institution have been increased. However, this does not mean a total autonomization of the military from societal groups but rather its autonomization from the lower classes’ concerns by closing itself to their effects while becoming more and more sensitive to the dominant class interests.

On the other hand, the existence of OYAK has also a contradictory effect since it raises new axes of confrontation within the military. These new axes of confrontation are not politico-ideological but have to do with the mere economic interests. The (dis)equilibrium between the social services and economic investments has given way to severe tensions between the lower-middle rank officers who want more resources to be used for social services and the higher rank officers who control the decision-making bodies of OYAK and who want to increase the economic investments and power of the military. The critiques of the members can be summarized under the following headlines:

- The necessity to reedit the law 205 in a way to be convenient with current demands of the members,
- the unconstitutionality of the compulsory membership,
- the cessation of the membership after the retirement of the member, and the resulting impossibility of benefiting from future profits,
- the problem of undervaluing the members' dues, the insufficiency of retirement benefits,
- the dues of supplementary officers (temporary members),
- the insufficiency of social services (house credits and loans),

Such critiques have been raised even at general assembly meetings of diverse years in following critical terms:

--OYAK has become a commercial organization by secondarizing its social services...The insufficiency of housing credits raises uneasiness among the retired members and anxiety among the young ones.

--The Foundation runs its activities independently from the demands of members.

--There is a disconnection between the Foundation and its members.

--Almost all the members have no confidence in this Foundation.

--80 percent of the members are angry with the Foundation, and whenever they find an opportunity and a convenient legal way, they will get back their money from the Foundation.

--The members won't be able to enjoy the benefits of the investments which are initially financed by them and which will become very profitable in the future because of the cessation of the membership on the day of retirement.

--In its current form, the Foundation is far away from being an institution with social purpose and closer to a holding with a commercial purpose investing for future generations. Our members are retired without having a meaningful benefit. The current situation is very negative does not fulfill the expectations of the members.⁶³

The tensions arising from the disequilibrium between holding-like activities and strictly "mutual trust" activities continued even after the interest rate for dues started to be above inflation rates after the second half of 1990s. In 2002, the President of the board of directors, the retired Lieutenant-General Selçuk Saka, had still to calm down such

⁶³ This internal tension can be delineated from following sources: OYAK (1980: 29-31, 115), Yılmaz (1971), Oyak Dergisi (1997: 66-68). Such critiques have also become public in due course for examples see all the following newspaper articles, which quote from the members and which are all reproduced in Aslan (1993: 155-173): Can Pulak, "Kordidor", *Son Havadis Gazetesi*, 14.03.1974; İlhami Soysal, "Neyin Karşılığı", *Yeni Ortam Gazetesi*, 08.04.1974; Recep Ergül, "205 Sayılı Yasa ve OYAK", *Gündem Gazetesi*, 08.08.1974; Tahsin Öztin, "Okurun Köşesi", *Hürriyet*, 06.05.1981; Nail Güreli, "Emeklilerin Hakkı", *Milliyet*, 10.11.1991; "Söz Okurun Köşesi", *Milliyet*, 25.02.1992; Ahmet Vardar, *Sabah*, 25.02.1992; *Milliyet*, 28.05.1992; *Cumhuriyet*, 05.09.1992.

critics by saying that “profit oriented investments do not diminish legal benefits and social services, on the contrary help to develop them”.⁶⁴

After OYAK has become more visible publicly, and its financial success has been praised in the daily newspapers, the latent and silent inside critiques are expressed more and more openly and publicly. The most severe critiques have been raised by the non-commissioned officers, who are organized under the umbrella of TEMAD.⁶⁵ They have organized public protests in different cities once again 30 years later on. They criticize several issues pertaining on their socio-economic status and their unequal professional treatments within the military. The scope of their demands ranges from their level of wages and pensions, their fringe benefits rights to their ‘unequal’ treatments within the military profession. What is striking is that OYAK is at the center of their criticisms and demands. They argue that they do not enjoy OYAK’s opportunities as much as the higher rank officers despite the fact that the non-commissioned officers form $\frac{3}{4}$ of the members. They demand to be employed in the decision-making of organs of OYAK and TSK’s other foundations and in the affiliated companies. According to the general secretary of TEMAD,

55-60 percent of total legal contributions to OYAK belong to the non-commissioned officers...but the civilians, who do not financially contribute to the Foundation, are employed in OYAK and its companies...The non-commissioned officers are not employed in the affiliated companies of OYAK and other TSK foundations. OYAK should cease to be a place where some sections and their relatives are employed (Birgün, 9.6.2004).

The fact that the members after having been retired and received the retirement benefit from OYAK loose all their legal connections, hence any claim on the financial gains of OYAK is one of the most important points of contention. TEMAD members argue that

⁶⁴ “Conversation with Members”, January 2002, http://www.oyak.com.tr/uyelerle_sohbet200201.html.

⁶⁵ TEMAD (Türkiye Emekli Astsubaylar Derneği). On the course of events see Birgün, 9.6./ 16.7/ 19.7/ 29.9./ 3.10/ 8.10/ 17.10/ 22.10 -2004, 9.2.2005; Milliyet 26.10.2005, Radikal 8.10.2004.

the members should continue to receive dividends after their retirement for OYAK's current and future economic power and profits would be an outcome of all past contributions. In this line of argument, TEMAD proposes that "all the members of past 43 years should have an amount of share and vote right on the basis of its contributions; as it is the case in a private company they should become shareholders".⁶⁶ The non-commissioned officers believe that their financial contribution to OYAK is undervalued, and as one member of TEMAD says "The law no 205 robs us of our real rights on OYAK" (Interview, 21.07.2004). Such severe critics have also become public in a major daily newspaper. After OYAK bought ERDEMIR, the industrial giant of Turkey, in the privatization process, a discussion on OYAK started. A columnist from Sabah, Umur Talu, has published a series of critical articles on OYAK. He also published the messages sent to him by non-commissioned and low ranking officers. Let me make some quotations from these messages which may be said to reflect "the return of the oppressed".⁶⁷

--Thank you for your article. This is only a slight part of the story...Please do not write my name, it will make me in trouble.

--It is nice to see that someone writes about this abusive mechanism.

--OYAK's claimed purpose of serving its members is questionable. OYAK is a big and profitable holding but for whom?

--There are even worst stories than you have written. I hope our adventure of Europe ends with a happy end so that the Foundation, which was raised on the shoulders of its members but then crushed them, may reorganize itself.

--OYAK is now a company. We are excluded. It is far away from its essence. I see European Union as a hope. The law does not help us.

--I am a retired lieutenant colonel...The truth is that OYAK's system impales everybody...We need to speak the past 45 years.

--OYAK is for high ranking officers and their children.

--We are not a much discussing society. But in those days we try to enter into European Union, we will stuck at the gate if we do not discuss this explicit exploitation.

⁶⁶ Interview with the president, general secretary, and members of TEMAD in TEMAD's headquarter in Ankara, 21.07.2004. I was also told that in the process of European Union the legitimacy and legality of these claims would be proved, that is why now many retired members accept to participate to "Bağışa Dayalı Emekli Geliri Sistemi" in order to be able to continue a legal connection with the Foundation.

⁶⁷ See Umur Talu's articles in Sabah 6,9, 11, 13, 14, 31 October 2004; 1, 2, 3 November 2005.

Another point of criticism is the claim of unconstitutionality of compulsory membership to OYAK. In fact, these two points already became subject to juridical cases in AYİM. The court decided that neither the compulsory membership nor the end of membership after the retirement of the member is unconstitutional (see footnote 5). Recently, TEMAD members opened a new case at “Ankara Bölge İdare Mahkemesi” and “Ankara 19. Asliye Mahkemesi”. They aim to change the non-payment of dividend after the end of membership and the non-representation of non-commissioned officers at OYAK’s decision-making organs and affiliated companies. However, these courts rejected the case, given that in its relation with members OYAK is legally conceived as a public institution, and the competence of jurisdiction belongs to AYİM (Birgün and Radikal 8.10.2004; Milliyet, 13.10.2005).⁶⁸ Let’s speak the President of TEMAD, Mustafa Erol:

The non-commissioned officers who contribute 60 percent of legal contributions are de facto excluded from board of directors and board of audit...If internal mechanisms of law do not take into consideration our claims we will go to the European Court of Human Rights...It is unlawful, this type of organizations cannot be subjected to a special law. In such organizations based on dues from members the directors are elected by the votes of members who pay dues, in OYAK, they become director by appointment-nomination. In any board of directors of OYAK’s affiliated companies, there is any non-commissioned officer whereas there are retired generals and civilians. It is even decided long before their retirement the generals will take place in which board of director. The non-commissioned officers are also university graduates, and they have all the qualities necessary to take place in board of directors (Milliyet, 13.10.2005).

OYAK’s response to all these critiques and contentions has been to send a warning message saying that “these attitudes are detrimental to OYAK’s moral personality and commercial prestige” (Milliyet, 26.10.2005). The relevance of this contention is that the phenomenon of military capital may also undermine the internal coherence and unity of

⁶⁸ The subjects of the cases opened by OYAK’s members against OYAK at AYİM may also give an idea about the members’ disturbances: compulsory permanent membership, the demand for a retirement salary, the system of voluntary retirement salary, the period of membership necessary for retirement benefit, housing credits and the rate of interest, loan credits, disablement and death benefits.

the military, which are the constitutive features of modern militaries. However, it should be noted that these critics from the members are not oriented to the existence and legitimacy of OYAK, or to put it in other words to the existence of the military as a big capitalist group but have to do with how to use OYAK's resources, how to share the profits.

Meanwhile, the most important axe for evaluating the impacts of the military capital is the relations between the military and other social actors. How we may assess the effects of military capital for the broader social power relations among the military, social classes, and other social and political actors. At this point, the relation between the bourgeoisie and the military stands as the key issue; to put it in other words, the relationship within the power bloc. Has it been a relationship of voluntary cooperation or involuntary acquiescence or continuous conflict of interests? Has it been a unidirectional instrumentalist relationship in the favor of one part? Who benefited from whom? Who has had the upper hand, if any, in this relationship? If there was a mutually benefiting cooperation, one has to ask, using Parla's (1998: 33) words "how long will this honeymoon last?".

Those writing from *conservative-critical statism* tend to underestimate the relation between the military and the bourgeoisie and to sever the link between the military and capitalist social relations of production. This is very consonant with the "militarism-free capitalism argument" of mainstream liberal approaches. For instance, according to Heper (1985: 129) OYAK should be seen as "part of continuing effort on the part of the military to decrease its dependence on civil society, rather than as an evidence of 'organic ties between the military and the bourgeoisie'". Similarly, the (neo)liberal critique of OYAK underlines the distorting effect of the military capital for

the liberal market economy because of the special privileges of OYAK and of the privileged political power of the military and assumes a relation of interest conflict between the military capital and the bourgeoisie.⁶⁹ Even though such extra-privileges have a certain importance, their vantage point of an ideal market economy impede them from developing a relational analysis of the military capital for they reduce capitalism to the economic relations in a market economy by excluding the class power relations from the scene. In that sense, it once more reproduces the idea that in fact capitalism and militarism are antithetical to each other. Militarism is conceived as something external to capitalist market economy, as an external factor distorting its function. Briefly, it misses that capital and capital accumulation are processes of social power relation, and militarism may, contingently upon actual historical processes, play a constitutive role for capitalist class relations. It is the *Marxist writers* that justifiably interpret the military capital as the embeddedness of the military into the capitalist economy and as an organic relation between the bourgeoisie and the military (Savran, 1987: 158; Esen, 1999). However, they did not expose the actual historical mechanisms through which this organic relation was phenomenally lived. In addition, they treat this organic relation as a frictionless process because they treat the bourgeoisie as a homogenous bloc (at least while commenting on OYAK) and they tend overlook the different moments/levels of class relations. As to the *critical statist perspective*, it interprets OYAK as a moment in the formation of the military as “a kind of class for itself, as a closed/introversive social stratum capable of reproducing itself” (İnsel, 2004). But because it conceives the military as outside the social relations power, it misses the fact that class is always a

⁶⁹ For example see Ertuğrul Özkök, “Homo Ekonomikus’un Kimyası”, *Hürriyet*, 16.09.2005; Ege Cansen, “Oyak Kapatılmalıdır”, *Hürriyet*, 17.09.2005.

relational category and it does not problematize how the military becomes embedded into social class relations as a result of this class-like status.

I argue that the relationship between the military capital and the big bourgeoisie has been a symbiotic relationship in which both part has got benefits. There is no doubt that the military as a separate actor has its own economic-corporate and political-hegemonic interests but these interests are not suspended in the air or outside the society, they are articulated into those of other class fractions. The military capital is one of the faces of the military in Turkey. I would not say that the military is a class or there is a separate military class within the class structure of Turkey. It quickly reminds the argument about the state bourgeoisie. However, as I already discussed, a productive use of such a concept would require a social structure or mode of production in which the so-called state bourgeoisie is itself the main surplus extracting class. This is not the case with the military, nor has it been the case for the bureaucracy of the Republican era. What the phenomenon of military capital let us to assess is rather that by virtue of having collective capitalist activities, the military has become a part of a class fraction: the big bourgeoisie, the dominant class fraction in Turkey. One can neither explain all practices of the military by reference to this face nor totally ignore it. It would be the same as arguing that for instance a big holding company (Koç, Sabancı, or another one) has any power of determining the course of class relations and accumulation strategies or it has a determining power to determine the class power relations at every moment (economic-corporate or political hegemonic). It would not be right to argue that because a holding company is owned by the military it has an omnipotent power over every moment of class relations. The weight of OYAK should be assessed for different levels/moments of class relations; from more particularistic to more universalistic

moments (the level of competing firms, of specific sectors, of specific class fractions, of the political-hegemonic). Meanwhile, the fact that the military through one of its institutional organizations has similar structural interests with the dominant fraction of the bourgeoisie has some effects. As I tried to expose, OYAK has become totally embedded within the accumulation processes and the related inter- and intra-class conflicts under different regimes of accumulation. The military capital is a direct part in the processes of restructuring of Turkish capitalism and in the reconfiguration of class relations. To the extent that the military through OYAK has shared similar organic interests with the big holding companies, it could not stay out of the contradictions between the big capital groups and small and medium size enterprises.

For instance, we know that for long years the petty bourgeoisie of the small cities in Anatolia has been anxious about and felt threatened by the existence of army commissaries (*ordu pazarları*), which could import and sell goods below the level of outside market prices. In the mid-1970s, such anxieties have even been expressed in the parliament by Justice Party's Kars deputy (see Aslan, 1993: 155-156; Özmen, 2005: 356-7, 365). Moreover, there is no doubt that there have been sector-based particularistic interest conflicts in which OYAK has been offended by other capital groups. For instance, the critics of OYAK privileged status in SSK's public construction projects by the president of TİSK formed such a case.

As to the big capital organized as holding companies and in TÜSİAD, I did not find any evidence of contention or conflict even on more particularistic interests and economic-corporate issues. This is understandable since OYAK is itself part of the big capitalist groups and generally oligopolistic nature of the sectors they have invested in leave them enough space to keep a symbiotic relationship. May the recent exceptional

contention between the general managers of OYAK and KOÇ holding be an indicator of the emergence and expression of the so far silent disturbances about OYAK? I would not say so, I think what was disturbing for Koç's CEO in this comparison of OYAK and other two biggest holding companies of Turkey (Sabancı and Koç) in terms of their successes during the economic crisis years was that such an unnecessary comparison could harm the public image of its own holding (see footnote 32 above). After all, there has been a symbiotic relationship between big capitalists and OYAK. They supported and profited from the same accumulation strategies: inward-oriented ISI-based accumulation in the period 1960-80 and financial accumulation model in 1990s. During these times, OYAK has been one of the mechanisms for getting the explicit or implicit support of the military for the dominant accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects.

The most recent and striking case of this symbiotic relationship has been the process of 28 February 1997. On the 28 February 1997, the military intervened into politics through National Security Decisions criticizing the anti-laic policies of the Islamist party in government (Refah Partisi). As a result of subsequent pressures from the military, the coalition government in which the Islamist party was the dominant partner had to resign.⁷⁰ In this intervention too, the military was in alliance with social classes and social strata organized as a historical social bloc. The analysis of the complex historical process of the rise of Islamist politics and the cultural-ideological cleavages on the basis of Islamist versus secularist discourses is beyond the scope of this paragraph. What I want to underline is that there was also a class dynamic cast in terms of identity politics behind the move of political Islam and the secularist reaction to it. Political Islam formed a multi-class political movement bringing together small- and

⁷⁰ On the course of the events see Bayramoğlu (2001).

medium-scale, and mostly provincial capitalist class, the peripheral segment of the working class engaged in marginal activities and unable to find secure employment, and professional middle classes under the hegemonic discourse of religiously-oriented cultural project and populist discourse of justice and welfare (Gülalp, 1998; Öniş, 1997). In the growth process of political Islam, the export-oriented Anatolian-based medium-scale industrialists of the post-1980 period established a hegemonic position within this hegemonic social bloc. This Anatolian-based medium-size capital which is organized under MÜSİAD (The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) grew in the post-1980 period in labor-intensive low-wage manufacturing industries and supported Islamist political movement (Refah Partisi) in the 1990s and neo-liberal/neo-conservative AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) in the 2000s in order to be able to enjoy the sources of governmental power and the protection of the state more directly. This fraction of capitalist class opposed itself to mainly İstanbul-based big capital groups (holding companies) which are organized under TÜSİAD, have been integrated with global capitalism, profited from financial accumulation model due to their control of money capital, and historically developed a preferential access to state sources and protection. The restructuring process of capitalism in the post-1980 period has led to “an intensification of the contradictions between the short-term interests of those individual capitalist groups that have attained a certain level of success in the process of internationalization and the interests of the country’s economy at large”. The main axis of intra-class cleavage has been between those two fractions of capitalist class.⁷¹ Dominated by big capital through subcontracting links in manufacturing industry and through the control of the money capital by the big holding companies in the course of

⁷¹ On this intra-class cleavage see Ercan (2002a), on the class organizations of these two fractions of capital see Buğra (1998) and Uğur and Alkan (2000).

financial accumulation regime, this fraction of capitalist class criticized the big capital as rentiers and monopolies dependent on the State. At the politico-ideological battleground, this cleavage is expressed as the conflict between religious and secularist ideologies whose cultural identity dimension enframed the debate and obscured the class dimension. The rise to power of Refah Partisi opened the opportunity for this fraction of capital to move into the position of big capital. The challenging move by this fraction of capitalist class, which has started to become big capital and to appear as an alternative to Istanbul-based capital groups, has become apparent in its ambitions to profit from the privatization process, in its favoring an alternative form of integration with the world capitalist economy using the discourse of “Islam Common Market” other than the integration with European Union project, in its attempt to enter into the sectors previously controlled by big holding companies such as finance, automotive, in its opposition to IMF-backed financial accumulation model, which favored a small number of big capital groups with the capability of controlling the money capital at the expense of small- and medium-scale real sector capital groups. In brief, this new fraction of capital started to be a threat to the big capital of which the military capital was a part. Even the ex-chairman of TOBB was complaining about their exclusion from the foreign trips of the previous government which favored MÜSİAD. Hence, while this new fraction of capital was a challenge at the economic-corporate moment of class relations, its political representative was a challenge at the political-hegemonic moment of class relations. Hence, the 28 February intervention by the military had such a class aspect too. The cleavage on the basis of identity politics, which has its own dynamics, has also overlapped with an intra-class cleavage. This is why for instance TÜSİAD, which started to develop a more democratic orientation under the hegemonic project of

European Union, did not hesitate to support this military intervention and subsequent policy implementation designed to discipline the so-called Islamist capital. In January 1996, TÜSİAD added to its internal regulation that the Association is committed to laicity. In the 28 February process, a court case opened against MÜSİAD for having violated the laicity. The chief of staff released a list of Islamist companies to be boycotted. In the “Document of National Security Policy” (1997) prepared by the military, there were such policy preferences as “the entrance into the European Union”, “the acceleration of privatization policies and of the process of integration with the world economy”, which were the outcome of this economic-corporate and political-hegemonic cleavage.⁷²

One may also wonder whether the European Union (EU) project may lead the big bourgeoisie to adopt a more critical approach to the military capital. Since the 1990s the dominant fraction of the capitalist class in Turkey follows a strategy of integrating with the global capitalism over the integration with European Union. The EU has been forged as a hegemonic project that would realize the further integration of the big capital with global capitalism, the economic stability of the country, and the democratization of the political processes. In that sense, this hegemonic project has the advantage of getting the support of dominated classes and oppressed social groups too. The dominant capitalist fraction in Turkey, the big holding companies organized in TÜSİAD, fully supports this project and almost all of its requirements. However, this same hegemonic project, unlike the previous hegemonic projects which did not challenge the military’s economic and political power, now challenges the position of the military within the

⁷² For the impact of the rise of Islamic capital upon the intra-class power balances and its place in the 28 February process see Şen (2000: 107-123, 154-155; 2002: 51-63, 73-93). On the impact of 28 February on MÜSİAD see Çemrek (2002). On the positioning of two main business organizations on the democracy issue see Öniş and Türem (2001).

mode of domination. In this process, several legal arrangements have done to curb the military's power (see Bayramođlu, 2004). Last year, the economic power of the military, which was so far neglected, entered on the agenda of EU. In a report entitled "EU Turkey Relations with a View to the European Council of December 2004 Draft Opinion", the Economic and Social Committee, which is composed of 222 members representing social groups (businessmen, workers, farmers, cooperatives etc.), problematicized and criticized the economic power of the military through OYAK and military expenditures (its actual preparation and its off-budget resources), and defined this economic power as an area of reform for EU membership. However, following the lobby pressures of OYAK and the head of Istanbul Chamber of Industry (Hüsamettin Kavi), which is also the co-president representing the Turkish part of the Turkey-EU Economic and Social Committee (composed of 18 members from each part), the last draft left out the OYAK phenomenon by deciding that "OYAK is a secondary social security institution similar to those in the European Union; and besides forming its member base, OYAK has no business relationship or financial transfer with the state or the military, it has no organic relationship with the military".⁷³ Hence, the bourgeoisie once more actively kept untouched the military capital. We may guess that there is not much evidence to expect that the big bourgeoisie will in a near future challenge the economic power of the military through OYAK; quite on the contrary, we may assert that this economic-embeddedness may become more and more important key for the historical symbiotic relationship between the military and the big bourgeoisie to the extent that political power of the military would be curtailed.

⁷³ See "OYAK da AB Kriteri Sayıldı", *Referans*, 19.06.2004; "Avrupa OYAK'ta İkna Oldu", *Milliyet*, 09.08.2004; OYAK Dergisi, 2004: 78.

The embeddedness of the military within the accumulation processes and the related inter- and intra-class conflicts as a result of the very existence of the military capital and the increasing public visibility of OYAK in the last years through the tremendous rates of profit, winning of big companies in the privatization process, sharpens the tension between the particularistic practices and the universalistic discourse of the military. To put it other words, this directly capitalistic face of the military in some instances undermines the discursive power of the military: representing itself as the defender of the general interest of the nation and state, manufacturing an image of being above classes and cleavages by identifying itself with a homogenous nation and a neutral state. During the inward-oriented accumulation regime and nationalist development project, the nationalist-developmental discourse of the military capital was easily articulated to the one-nation hegemonic project. To legitimate the economic practices of the military as serving the general interest of the nation was easier and the military did not refrain from identifying itself with OYAK. However, in the neoliberal post-1980 period, where two nations hegemonic project widened the gap between the mode of accumulation regime and the nationalist legitimating discourse, it becomes harder for the military capital to present itself as the representative of the general interest of the whole nation. That is why, OYAK's efforts to sever the link between itself and the military increased in the last years. Because of the more exclusivist nature of neoliberal capitalism, the military keeps away to publicly identify itself with the military holding. The specific mode of integration with the global neoliberal capitalism which undermines the rhetoric of economic nationalism makes harder to articulate the nationalist rhetoric and neoliberal capitalist rationality to which the military capital is deeply embedded. For instance, when OYAK starts to look for foreign partners after

having won Erdemir by a nationalist mobilization, the public doubts and criticisms raise. Such a recent and excellent case occurred on the issue of Armenian question. It is well-known that the denial of Armenian massacre forms one of the red lines of the military and nationalist public opinion. The affiliated company of AXA, the partner of OYAK in the insurance sector in Turkey, accepted to pay indemnities to “the sufferers of Armenian Genocide”. This has been readily read as that one of the partners of OYAK - the military holding company- recognizes the Armenian events “as genocide”. As a result, there emerged harsh critiques from the nationalist public opinion⁷⁴ who called OYAK to cease its partnership with AXA. To quote some of critics is revealing for understanding the tension between economic-corporate interests and political-hegemonic discourse of the military:

If OYAK really pretends to be a nationalist, national capital, it should be able to sacrifice some of its interests. It should cancel the partnership contracts with this insurance company. Unfortunately, some capital groups have nothing to do with the national. What is important for them are their interests and benefits (Kemal Kerinçsiz, member of the board of directors of the Union of Lawyers).

By staying passive OYAK become the accomplice...Partnership is a commercial issue. Turkish nation will survey this. If OYAK does not take steps by itself Turkish nationalists will note this. Up to now we supported OYAK. But otherwise we will freeze all our accounts (The president of the Association of Culture and Tradition).

They pretend to be national and local capital...If they do not take steps they will become accomplice. Otherwise as union we will boycott OYAK and urge our members to cancel their insurance contracts done with Axa-Oyak (The general president of Memur-Sen).

⁷⁴ Among those who raised harsh critiques we see MHP and BBP (two ultra-nationalist party), Union of Lawyers, the President of the Chamber of Commerce of Ankara (a well-known public figure, Sinan Aygün), the Association of Retired Officers of Turkey, the Association of Culture and Tradition, the Chamber of Commerce the President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Zonguldak (Ereğli), Kamu-Sen and Memur-Sen (the nationalist unions organized in the public sector) the leader of İşçi Partisi (a nationalist left party), the president of the “Foundation of the Union of 1968ers”, ex-diplomate of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and current deputy of CHP (a center-left party). For the discussions on the issue and the following quotations see “OYAK’ın Fransız Ortağı Axa’dan Ermenilere Soykırım Tazminatı” and “Fransız Axa OYAK’ı Zor Durumda Bıraktı”, “OYAK AXA ile Yollarını Ayırmalı”, “Ulusalçılar OYAK’ı Uyardı Suça Ortak Olmayın” *Zaman* 14-15-16.10.2005; “Yurtsevelüğün Sigortası Attı”, *Sabah*, 17.10.2005; “Elekdağ’dan OYAK’a AXA’dan Ayrıl Önerisi” and “OYAK AXA’dan Ayrılsa ‘Sermaye İrkçisi’ mi Olacak?”, *Milliyet*, 26-27.10.2005; “OYAK AXA’dan Ayrılmalı”, *Yeni Şafak*, 05.12.2005.

However, if one remembers that such nationalist voices, which called OYAK to cease its partnership with Renault, were raised in 2001 when France Parliament passed a bill recognizing “Armenian Genocide” and that OYAK of course did not make such a move (see *Milliyet*, 13.02.2001), it become obvious that capitalist face of the military will become more public and apparent in due course.

2. Further Militarization of the Capitalist Economy: War Industry and Military Capital (1980-2005)

It is commonly acknowledged that with the development of capitalism the most salient aspect of the relationship between capitalism and militarism has been the industrialization of war and its articulation to the very process of capital accumulation. In that sense, the economic aspects of modern militarism have been investigated with special reference to the war industry, military industrial complexes, defense and military expenditures.⁷⁵ It is in the post-1980 period that the peripheral type of military-industrial complex of Turkey has expanded into the war industry. The steps for the establishment of a local war industry have corresponded to the incursion of the concept and ideology of national security to the economic sphere. However, the specificity of the peripheral type of military-industrial complex, i.e. the existence of the armed forces as a collective capital group, has been determinant in the case of war industry too. Besides the other capital groups, the military capital has been organized under the organizational structure of TSKGV (Foundation for Strengthening Turkish Armed Forces) and has become dominant in the sector.

⁷⁵ See Part I, chapter 2-a.

2-a Military Expenditures under the Neoliberal Warfare State

In Turkey, quite paradoxically, the neoliberal period in which the hegemonic discourse and policy practices was based on downsizing the public sector and cutting the public/governmental expenditures has also witnessed the most ambitious period of the Republican era in terms of military expenditures and investments to war industry. Despite the successively severing financial and economic crises since 1980 (especially after the financial liberalization in 1989), the resource allocation for military expenditures has continued to be an autonomous sphere of decision of the military.

On the issue of military expenditures, the initial questions are who defines the level of military expenditures and/or who the decision-making actors and organs are behind the military budget are easily and unanimously answerable question. The military has been almost independent in this issue from civilian social and political forces during all the Republican era, who were themselves eager to meet the budget demands of the military. In the Republican period, the military budgets prepared by the military are ratified by the parliaments almost without contentious discussions. Whereas the sessions of Plan and Budget Commission of Grand National Assembly are open to the press; the session on military budgets are closed.⁷⁶ Until very recently, the military's revenues, expenditures, and public goods under its control, military procurements and their contracts were exempt from the public control, from the control of the Audit Court. By the constitutional amendments done during 12 March interim military regime, later on the article 160 of the 1982 Constitution, and then law of the Audit Court (no 3162, dated 1985) military procurements and the public goods used by the military have been exempted from the public control. With the 2003 reforms for EU (the 7th package of

⁷⁶ See Murat Yetkin, "Askeri Harcamaya Meclis Yetkisi, Sayıştay Denetimi Yolda", Radikal, 18.06.2003.

reforms), this control has been established at the level of legal regulation upon the condition of request of parliamentary commissions and presidency of the parliament. However, how much this will change the practice of total military control is still a question mark, so far it has not been much promising in the actual practice.⁷⁷ To put it briefly, the military totally controls the process of defining the level and nature of the military expenditures. In appearance the defense expenditures are under the control of Defense Ministry, however in fact the military decides all the details of its budget and then the parliament ratifies it. The same is also valid for DISF, where the general staff decides what they need, how much they will spend etc. At this point, it is worth of quoting at length from an ex minister of defense, Zeki Yavuztürk, which was minister for four years under Özal government:

As a minister of defense you have the competence of signature but you do not know where and for what purposes the money is spent. When you ask about the level of an item of expenditure, they tell you the reason or the motive. But in order to be able to understand this reason, you need civilian experts to work with the militaries. But in the ministry, there is no such personnel appointed by the minister. All the experts are military officers. Now, the institution, which is responsible of the defense, says that this is what I need, as a minister I alone cannot say that why this is too much. Because I do not know. How I can speak about something I do not know. [In the Parliament] we defend the figures. At some point, you trust them. In the final instance, it is an issue of security, may be it is not necessary to know too much details.⁷⁸

A second issue is what the sources and trend of the military expenditures. In Turkey, there are several internal and external, and budgetary and off-budgetary sources of the military expenditures. These are defense budget, SSDF (Defense Industry Support Fund), U.S.A. Military Aid, Firms Credits, German Aid, NATO infrastructure fund, Turkish Defense Fund, Special Allocations, and TSKGV. Among them, the first two are

⁷⁷ See Özdemir (1989: 225-231), İnel (2004: 46-47), Bayramoğlu (2004: 80-81, 85-86, 113-116). The rhetoric of the government programs, be it center-left or center-right governments, of the Republican history remained more or less the same emphasizing the importance of a strong military force for the preservation of internal and external security and order, the necessity of modernizing Turkish Armed Forces at any cost. See T.C. Maliye Bakanlığı (1993: 27-86).

⁷⁸ Interview done by Neşe Düzel, "Bakan Askeri Harcamayı Bilmez", *Radikal*, 20.06.2005.

almost decisive in terms of military expenditures of Turkey. For the period of 1987-2000, 84 % of the military expenditures were from the defense budget, 15 % from SSDF, 1 % from TSKGV. The expenditures for arms and military equipments form 26.7 % of the total (budgetary plus non-budgetary sources) defense expenditures on the average for the period. 54 % of total expenditures for arms procurement and production are from the budget whereas the remaining 44% from the SSDF, and 1.5 % from TSKGV (Günlük-Şenesen, 2002a: 76, 73).⁷⁹

What about the trend of military expenditures in the post-1980 period? The main source of military expenditures in Turkey is the budget which counts for 85% of the defense expenditures. Using the budget data at first sight one can think that the share of defense expenditures within the overall budget has declined in the neoliberal period (Table 4, 1st column). However it would be a misleading interpretation for two reasons. First of all, currently approximately half of the budget in Turkey is allocated to the interest payments of previous internal and external public borrowing. In 1998, transfer payments made about 60 % of total budget expenditures, interest payments on debt formed 40 percent of the budget (Günlük-Şenesen, 2002b: 385). In such a case, it is more apt to look at the consolidated budget (overall budget minus interest payments) (Table 4, 2nd column). In this case, one can discern that despite huge interest payments, the military expenditures have either increased or kept their levels during the period under consideration. Secondly, this is so more openly if one also adds the expenditures

⁷⁹ As noted by the scholars working on military expenditures the access to military expenditures data is most of times rendered difficult for the researchers. As İnsel (2004: 47) notes, the clause of confidentiality for data on some items of defense expenditures has rather a symbolic relevance since such data are available from the international sources. The most reliable source and the most detailed analysis of the military expenditures in Turkey can be found in Günlük-Şenesen (2002a). One may also consult Özer (2001), which is a comprehensive but unpublished study on military expenditures in Turkey. For earlier studies on military expenditures covering the longer periods of Republican history see Sezgin (1997), Özmucur (1996), Candemir (1995).

from the Defense Industry Support Fund (15 % of the total military expenditures, see below), which is an off-budget source of military expenditures. Even when the off-budget sources are not included, it may be asserted that the financial crises (1994; 2000; 2001) during this period did not much affect the military expenditures which kept their average level (16.5 %) despite some minor fluctuations in some years. For instance for the year 1994 (also for 1995), in which a big financial crisis happened, the proportion of defense expenditures over the primary budget has been the maximum of the whole period (17.8 %). Similarly, in 2001 too, the contraction was very minor (Günlük-Şenesen, 2004: 274). This has been so despite the demands from IMF for contracting defense expenditures 2000.⁸⁰ Despite statements from the military that TAF will cancel some military equipment procurement and production projects following the financial crisis of 2001, in a very brief period of time, these projects have been restarted.⁸¹ In terms of nominal military expenditures, the post-1989 period is more remarkable concerning the steady growth (see Table 4, column 1). This growth continued in 2001 and 2002 too: the budgetary defense expenditures increased from 5001 million dollars to 6158 million. By 2002, the level of in-budget military expenditures more than doubled the level of 1980 in terms of million dollars (see also Günlük-Şenesen, 2004: 272-273)

In the discussions on military expenditures, the main pressing questions are the impact of military expenditures on budget deficits and on welfare expenditures. The relevance of this question lies in whether the military expenditures form the sources of budgetary deficits which increased public borrowing requirements and established

⁸⁰ On the IMF demand see Metin Münir, "Silahlara Selam", *Binyıl*, 16.11.2000.

⁸¹ See "23 Katrilyonluk Tasarruf", *Milliyet*, 12.04.2001; "Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Savunma Harcamaları", Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Bilgi Notu 16.03.2001 and 11.04.2001 at <http://www.tsk.mil.tr>. Four months later the prime minister of the period, Ecevit announced that the military projects will restart as soon as the economy recovers in 2002; see "Askerlere Moral", *Radikal*, 02.08.2001, and *Yeni Şafak*, 25.12.2001.

financial accumulation model. In social relational terms, such a positive and determinant relationship would indicate that the winners from military expenditures are same as those winners from financial accumulation model.⁸² However, according to Günlük-Şenesen, (2002a: 25, 29-30; 2002b), we cannot argue that, either internal or external, security expenditures contribute systematically to the primary budget expenditures growth throughout the period. There is any year in which the defense expenditures have been more influential than other items in causing the increase of the budgetary expenditures. Ne, if one leaves a strict-mathematical correlation analysis, it is obvious that the military expenditures siphoned sources that could be used otherwise, for instance in order to diminish budget deficits and interest paymenys. In that sense, as the most salient characteristic of the post-1980 Turkish economy is its debt stock, a comparison between defense expenditures and this debt stock can be revealing. While the total stock of public debt was approximately \$160 billion (82-85 % of GNP) in 2003, which is the end result of the process that began in 1980; in the period 1980-2000 total defense expenditures was \$111 billion, and defense equipment expenditures was \$ 25 billion (for 1981-99). The average proportion of military expenditures to interest payment has been enough high not to be neglected: 51.9 % for total defense expenditures, 14.9 for strictly arms procurement (see table 5, the last column).

⁸² There have been works that argued that the expenditures related to “low intensity war” in south east caused the public deficits hence financial accumulation model. For such a radical assertion see Doğan (1998), for another study that emphasizes such a causal relation see (Başkaya and Leventoğlu, 1999). For a rather cautious study that points to the impact of the war expenditures on public deficits and financial crisis of 1994 see Ekinici (1998: 21). However, it is difficult to define the degree of the impact of war expenditures since the cost of war is unknown publicly. Meanwhile, the cost of the low intensity war in the south east of Turkey (1980s and 1990s) was estimated \$ 65-100 billion for the period 1983-1998 (Radikal, 18.02.1999). The impact of war may be open to contention but that of the total military expenditures, which have been increased mainly because of the modernization project of TAF (see below), is definitely stronger.

As to the issue of trade-off between military expenditures and welfare expenditures, which has been a central theme of the related literature, it is commonly accepted that to make general assertions independent of countries and historical periods is not possible. Quantitative analyses point out that there is no negative trade-off between military expenditures and other public expenditures such as education, health, and general administration expenditures for the post-1980 period (see Günlük-Şenesen 2002b; 2002a: 31). In another study, this non-correlation is justified for education but a negative trade-off is underlined for health expenditures (Yıldırım and Sezgin, 2002). Meanwhile I once again think that it is necessary to move away from the mathematical-quantitative perspective in order to assess the social relational nature of military expenditures. As Yıldırım and Sezgin (2002: 577) explicitly states, “it appears that when government allocates its budget, the main concern is not allocating the funds among the three major components. Instead, military expenditure gets its share first, and then the remaining amount is divided between health and education expenditures”. A more qualitatively-oriented analysis would reveal that although the expenditures for education (around 15-20 % between 1983-1998) and for health (around 3-5 %) in the budget did not decline, and either inclined or kept their average levels, the quality of education and health have been enormously deteriorated, which was also a political project in order to legitimize the privatization of social services.⁸³ Hence, from a public choice approach, which is itself defined in the process of political power relations, one may assert that given the priority given to the military expenditures over the welfare expenditures, the

⁸³ It should be noted that 74 % (for 2000) of education expenditures goes to the salaries (Günlük-Şenesen, 2002a: 29). In other words, the educational system is only reproducing its old and insufficient infrastructure. For deteriorating trend for education and health in financial terms see Sönmez (2000: 57-58). On the ravages of neoliberalism on education see Gök (2004). On the worsening of health services, whose budget share is as low as 3 % see Belek (2001).

post-1980 period correspond to neoliberal warfare state. The peace dividend may be more substantial if public resources are directed towards non-military public expenditures, especially the welfare expenditures.

The differential impact of military expenditures in class terms may also be discerned in responding to the question of who finance the increasing military expenditures. This question is related to the budgetary revenues (taxes) and sources of revenue of the off-budget SSDF. The tax burden of budgetary revenues is unequally distributed among socio-economic groups. First of all, the share of indirect taxes, whose burden is on consumers (lower and middle classes), within the total tax revenues is enormously high in Turkey. It jumped from 38.4 % in 1993 to 68.6 % in 2002.⁸⁴ Secondly, while the corporate tax revenue, which is an indicator of the tax paid by capital, is very low, the burden of income tax is on fixed income groups and workers: for instance workers paid 52.3 % and 37 % of income tax in 1995 and 2001, respectively whereas its share in national income was 22.2 % and 27.9 % for those years (Sönmez, 2002: 56, 62-65). In other words, the burden of financing military expenditures is unequally distributed to lower income groups. The same goes for off-budget SSDF too since its revenues are mainly direct and indirect taxes. To sum up, the military expenditures have been a domain reserved to the military in the way to the militarization of the economy. In addition, the military expenditures do not form a financial burden for the capital-owning groups but rather are financed by the working people and lower income groups through either indirect taxes or revenue taxes.

⁸⁴ Indirect taxes are cut during the consumption of goods. To give some examples onemay cite tax of added value (KDV), fuel consumption taxes, communication tax and so on. To give a comparative sense, the share of indirect taxes in GNP is 11.1 for OECG countries, 11.8 for E.U. and 16.6 for Turkey.

Table 4: Budgetary Allocations of Turkey (1979-2001)

Years	Defense expenditures	Defense expenditures	Education	General Administration	Infrastructure
	In the overall budget	In the primary budget	In the primary budget	In the primary budget	In the primary budget
1979	13.2	13.7			
1980	17.2	17.7			
1981	16.6	17.4			
1982	16.8	17.8			
1983	15.4	16.8	14.3	37.2	23.6
1984	15.3	17.3	14.3	34.9	24.8
1985	15.4	17.6	14.3	31.9	27.2
1986	14.9	17.7	13.8	30.6	28.9
1987	12.7	15.5	14.9	34.0	25.8
1988	11.8	15.4	16.1	35.1	23.2
1989	13.1	16.7	19.7	30.1	21.4
1990	13.3	16.7	23.6	23.9	21.0
1991	12.1	14.8	21.1	29.7	21.2
1992	13.5	16.5	24.0	24.5	20.8
1993	10.9	14.3	21.7	31.4	19.4
1994	11.9	17.8	20.0	32.8	16.1
1995	11.9	17.9	18.4	35.8	15.2
1996	10.1	16.3	17.7	39.1	15.0
1997	10.9	15.2	16.6	42.6	14.2
1998	10.4	17.1	20.5	36.8	13.1
1999	10.1	16.4	19.1	40.6	
2000	9.5	16.8	18.0	37.9	16
2001	7.9	16.1			
Average		16.5			

Source: Günlük-Şensesen (2002a; 2002b)

Table 5: Total⁸⁵ Defense and Defense Equipment Expenditures of Turkey, \$million

Years	Total Defense Expenditures (1)	Total Defense Equipment Exp. (2)	2/1 (%)	1 and 2 in proportion to total tax revenues	1 and 2 in proportion to interest payments
1980	2387			24.7-----	596.8-----
1981	2237	315	14.1	21.1-----3.0	334.7-----47.2
1982	1627	222	13.7	20.6-----2.8	309.2-----42.2
1983	1750	271	15.5	20.8-----3.2	191.0-----29.5
1984	1541	333	21.6	24.4-----5.3	131.1-----28.3
1985	1576	285	18.1	21.8-----3.9	123.6-----22.4
1986	1692	356	21.0	21.4-----4.5	95.9-----10.2
1987	1931	334	17.3	18.8-----3.3	75.3-----13.0
1988	1892	534	28.2	20.2-----5.7	57.8-----16.3
1989	2629	775	29.5	22.5-----6.6	69.6-----20.5
1990	4202	1381	32.9	24.7-----8.1	80.3-----26.4
1991	4980	1187	23.8	23.6-----5.6	77.1-----18.4
1992	5179	1597	30.8	27.2-----8.4	95.6-----29.5
1993	5810	1495	25.7	23.7-----6.1	53.7-----13.8
1994	4217	958	22.7	20.9-----4.8	41.3-----9.4
1995	5136	1199	23.3	22.3-----5.2	42.0-----9.8
1996	5795	1543	26.6	21.1-----5.6	31.7-----8.4
1997	6233	1863	29.9	20.9-----6.2	43.5-----13.0
1998	6570	1501	22.8	19.6-----4.5	29.2-----6.7
1999	8132	1909	23.5	21.3-----5.0	29.5-----6.9
2000	7793			18.5-----	24.0-----
Average	5275	1328	26.7	22.0-----6.0	51.9-----14.9

Source: Günlük-Şensesen (2002a:76, 84)

2-b War Industry and Military Capital (TSKGV): A New Province of Accumulation?

One of the main stimuli behind the post-1980 neoliberal warfare state has been the foundation of “a national defense industry”. Although the intentions of the establishment of “a national defense industry” goes back to the first years of the Republic, after USA’s embargo following the intervention of the Turkish Armed Forces in Cyprus these intentions have been revived. However, the economic crisis during all the second half of 1970s made impossible the realization of these intentions within the existing setting of accumulation regime and political class power relations. The military intervention in 1980 and subsequent militarized state form cleared the ground for this

⁸⁵ This includes budgetary and off-budgetary sources (SSDF + TSKGV).

project. In the post-1980 period, one of the phenomenal forms of the incursion of national security state and ideology to the economic sphere has been the emergence of war industry and a coalition of interest embedded to the production of destruction goods. The establishment of a war industry has been accelerated after 1985 with the announcement of “the modernization project of the armed forces”. At this time, a total expenditure of \$12 billion has been announced for ten years, then in 1996 it has been increased to \$150 billion for 30 years, and lastly in 2000, it has rearranged as \$20 billion for the next 10 years. This so-called modernization program aiming at import substitution in arms production has been the main dynamic raising the military expenditures in the post-1980 period.

The militarization of the economy through the development of war industry co-evolved with specific institutional-legal structuring within the state apparatus. Within the context of this militarization project, the most important legal regulations have been the adoption of the law no. 3238 on 7.11.1985. The objective of the law is formulated as “to constitute a basis for the development of modern defense industry and to modernize the Turkish Armed Forces” (article 1). This law founded the Undersecretariat of Defense Industry (Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı-SSM) and the Defense Industry Support Fund (SSDF).⁸⁶ The law defined three organs. The Defense Industry High Coordination Board is composed of 13 members under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, and it assembles at least twice a year.⁸⁷ The Defense Industry Executive Committee is

⁸⁶ T.C. Resmi Gazete, “Savunma Sanayii Geliştirme ve Destekleme İdaresi Başkanlığının Kurulması ...Hakkında Kanun”, Kanun no 3238, *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, sayı 18927, 13.11.1985. This directorate became later on 30.10.1989 the Undersecretariat (SSM) with a decree-law (no 390) and later on 20.03.1991 with the article 3 of law no 3704. The law no 3238, in which there has been amendments concerning the shares to detracted from specific taxes on 08.08.1995 and 05.09.1996, is decisive.

⁸⁷ These members are Prime Minister, Chief of General Staff, the 4 commanders of forces, State Minister responsible of economic affairs, minister of national defense, minister of external affairs, minister of

composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, and the Minister of National Defense. It is the decision-making organ of the Undersecretariat. The SSDF has been an important financial source of the modernization project for it covered approximately 15 % of the total defense expenditures and 44 % of arms procurement and production in Turkey. The SSDF is exempt from taxes and public control of the Audit Court,⁸⁸ which gives the executive committee a very large scope of manoeuvre. The main revenue sources of SSDF are indirect taxes: as of 1998, 5% of income and corporate taxes, 5% of fuel consumption tax (abolished end of 1998), 10% of taxes levied on the sales of alcoholic beverages and tobacco products (ended up in 2003), 95% of net national lottery revenues, 10% of the revenues of horse race betting, 15% of chance games revenues, 1.8% of the revenues of spor-toto (betting on the soccer games), 3.6% spor-loto (a chance game), 80% of the sales of small arms, and the revenues of the paid military service.

Between 1986 and 2005, a fund of approximately \$ 17 billion has been accumulated in the fund. The share of revenue sources for this period is as follows: income and corporate tax 30 %, transfers from the Minister of National Defense budget 16 %, fuel consumption tax 10 %, foreign credits 9 %, sales of alcoholic beverages and tobacco products 9 %, assets of the fund 8 %, revenue from national lottery 7 %, revenue from all kinds of pari-mutuels 5 %, and 6 percent other sources. The share of the total tax revenues of SSDF within the total tax revenues is 2.37 % on the average for the

finance and customs, minister of industry and commerce, undersecretary of State Planning Organization, and undersecretary of treasury.

⁸⁸ The off-budget funds were an invention of neoliberal Özal governments in order to centralize and depoliticize the use of revenues. The defense industry was such a found, and it was a strategy of coalition-building with the military. The new right ANAP governments of the post-coup period planned to enlarge the scope of civilian politics by constructing such an enclave for the military. On the off-budget funds see Oyan and Aydın (1987) and Oyan, Aydın and Konukman (1991). According to legal regulations within the context of E.U. membership, after 2006 the revenues and expenditures of SSM will be included in the Central Government Budget.

period 1986-2000 (Günlük-Şenesen, 2002a: 47). As to the expenditures for this period, 67 % is spent for arms procurement and production (50 % contract payments, 17 % direct procurement payments). According to Undersecretary Murad Bayar, by 2005, the total value of ongoing projects is more than 20 billion dollars (SSM, 2005: 22, 27, 29).⁸⁹

The impact of war industry is generally discussed in terms of its macro-economic impacts. As I discussed in Part I (ch2-a), the issues under consideration in such an aspect are whether the military expenditures and war industry function as a countercyclical fiscal policy to impede economic recession, to promote economic growth, and to deal with unemployment (briefly military Keynesianism); or whether technological innovations have spin-off effects over other sectors in a way that would increase the competitiveness of the manufacturing industry. In Marxist conceptualization, the discussion is formulated as whether high military expenditures and the new sector of “means of destruction” form a mechanism to deal with the valorization problem of capitalism (which corresponds to the incapacity of capitalism to absorb the surplus capital in new cycles of capital accumulation).

For the Turkish case, it is hard to deal with such questions given the lack of information about the sector and the firms in the sector. Nevertheless, using the available data (see table 6), one may easily assert that the limited scope and size of the military industries rule out arguments about Military Keynesianism or recipe for valorization crisis, which discussions may only be relevant for advanced capitalist countries with high military expenditures such as USA. After all these regulations and policies, the share of defense industry within the total manufacturing industry rapidly increased.

⁸⁹ For the annual details of revenues and expenditures in the period of 1986-2000 see (Günlük-Şenesen, 2002a: 41, 44, 45).

Nevertheless, the war industry's share in the industrial structure still remains minor. According to the undersecretary of defense industry, partially or totally defense related activities form 10% of the total industrial annual turnover, a quarter of this 10% is the core defense industry activities.⁹⁰ Moreover, the percentage of local supply of the demands of TAF is 33 %, which still means the infant nature of the industry. By 2004, the R&D budget of the war industry is only \$ 45 million for Turkey US R&D budget is \$ 63.4 billion, for the European states \$ 10 billion (Küçükseyhan, 2004). The capacity of export is also negligible (see table 6). Even though the proponents of the military-industrial complex generally declare that their aim is to transform the defense industry into the locomotive sector of the economy this seems hard given the existing market control in the world war industry. USA, Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany and China control 85 % of the world defense industry and Turkey whose current share is only 0.2% compete with the all other countries for the rest 15% of the world defense industry.⁹¹ The share of Turkish war industry within the world weapon market of \$ 40 billion is around \$ 250 million (Küçükseyhan, 2004). In addition the limited number of studies on the subject exposes that pace militarist arguments about the positive impact of military expenditures on economic growth, industrial development, and increasing employment studies expose that there is not a positive relation (if not a negative one) between the military expenditures-war industry and economic and industrial development; and the expected spill-over effects are far from realistic (Yıldırım and Sezgin, 2003; Günlük-Şenesen, 2002c; 1995, 1994; Özmucur, 1996).

⁹⁰ See the speech of the undersecretary of the defense industry given at the National Security Academy on 11.06.2002, <http://www.ssm.gov.tr/kurumsal/ssdf.htm>

⁹¹ Ibid.

Table 6 Turnover, Export, R&D Expenditure, and Employment of the War Industry in Turkey (million \$)

Year	Turnover	Export	R&D	Employment
1997	1205	138	34	21600
1998	968.4	80	40.7	16141
1999	1074.6	84.4	41.6	16748
2000	851.8	123.4	43	14062
2001	848.8	134	24.4	-
2002	1062.3	247.7	48.9	-
2003	1301	331.1	58.4	8987

Source: SASAD (2004), 2003 Yılı Savunma Sanayii Faaliyetleri Türkiye Sonuçları

Despite this overall picture, there has been steady progress in the militarization of the Turkish industrial structure. In the post-1980 period, the share of manufacturing sector within the overall fixed capital investments has decreased both in the private and public sectors, and the share of public investments decreased from 11.7% between 1983-87 to 3.5% in 1999 (Yeldan, 2001: 46). However, the war industry has remained an exception. In a conference on the future industrialization strategy of Turkey (dated 1997 and organized by Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade) the defense industry was defined as the sector with priorities (Süvari, 2000: 68). Similarly, a decree entitled “The principles of Turkish Defense Industry Politics and Strategy” and published in 1998 repeated the vision of the development of the “national defense industry” and of its export-orientation. The deepening of defense industry infrastructure and the encouragement of domestic capital are targeted at the same time that the cooperation among domestic firms in order to be able competitive and a productive cooperation with foreign capital are envisaged.⁹² Under such conditions the use of the sources for the war industry means the militarization of the industrial sector, which is already undermined by the neoliberal economic policies. The trio of the militarization process also includes the universities in

⁹² “Türk Savunma Sanayii Politikası ve Stratejisi Esasları”, Karar Sayısı 98/11173, *Resmî Gazete*, Sayı 23378, 20.06.1998.

the name of the promotion of national technology. In 1998, TÜBİTAK founded a specific department to promote the national defense technology. According to SSM (2005: 37), financial support has been provided to 38 research and development projects carried out by industrial (Aselsan, TAI, Roketsan, MKEK, STFA) and research organizations and universities such as TÜBİTAK, İTÜ, ODTÜ, Boğaziçi, Bilkent, and Atatürk. The president of TÜBİTAK-MAM (Marmara Araştırma Merkezi) says that “The aims of the center were to increase the competitiveness of the industry and give technological support to TAF. But the greatest support to our projects comes from the military. They are our best client. The industrialists are not aware of the gains science can bring to them”.⁹³ In other words, the military-university complex is in the process of formation besides the military industrial-complex.

The development of the sector is also displayed in the process of organization of the increasing number of capital groups within the defense industry. By 2004, there are more than 100 firms active in the war industry (Küçükseyhan, 2004). The Association of Defense Industry Manufacturers (SASAD) has been founded in 1990, and the number of its members has increased from 21 in 1991 to 73 in 2004. The association represents the majority of the firms within the sector. Among these 61 firms 10 are affiliated companies of TSKGV (the military capital). The other organization of the sector is Association of Defense Industry (SADER, founded in 1999), which brings together only 7 firms which are totally national. 3 of these 7 firms are affiliated companies of TSKGV. When one looks at the firms which are active in the defense industry one sees that big holdings in Turkey such as Mercedes-Benz, MAN, STFA-Savronik, Alarko, Otokar-Koç, Çukurova-BMC, Sabancı-TEMSA, FNSS-Nurol Holding, Vestel Savunma Sanayii

⁹³ “Bilim Orduya Çalışıyor”, *Radikal*, 08.12.2002. See also Murat Yetkin, “Geleceğe Yatırım Yapmak ve ODTÜ”, *Radikal*, 27.07.2003.

are competing for increasing their shares. The tendency of the big capital groups are also discernible in the fact that the two most important business organizations of the country (TOBB and TÜSİAD) have founded within their organizational structure “Defense Industry Working Groups”.

As I underlined before, instead of searching for a systemic-functionalist analysis of this form of militarism, an alternative disaggregate perspective that would conceive capital accumulation as a process of power relations among capital groups may be more useful in understanding this developing nature of the war industry and the causes and the differential impacts of this form of militarism.⁹⁴ Accordingly, the military-industrial complex will be conceived as “a separate and independent class fraction” (Harris, 2003). To put it differently, the research question may be formulated as which capital groups profit from the war industry. Unfortunately, even though theoretically thinking it is a more productive question in order to understand the differential impact of war industry on the capital accumulation process, an accurate answer to such a question is not possible in the Turkish case because of the lack of necessary data. Nevertheless, within the limits of the data (see table 7)⁹⁵, which may give a sense, some interpretations may be developed. First of all, the war industry forms a specific way of integration with the capitalist world economy. But as Günlük-Şenesen (2002c: 110) notes, “this is a unidirectional integration due to dim export prospects” (see Table 7). Despite all the

⁹⁴ For an approach that analyzes military expenditures and war industry from a perspective that conceives capital accumulation as an inherently power relations between not only different fractions but also different capital groups (holding companies) see Bichler and Nitzan (1996), Nitzan and Bichler (1995; 1996), Nitzan (1998).

⁹⁵ The two associations (SASAD and SADER) in the sector to whom I asked about sectoral and firm-based information either do not have themselves such information or do not want to share it. Similarly, upon my official request of data SSM send me their catalogue (see table 7) which do not fully contain the requested data. This observation about the lack of data is underlined by other researchers too (see for instance, Günlük-Şenesen, 2002c). The table 7 may be read as a complementary attempt to previous such tables in Günlük-Şenesen, 2002c and 1995.

import-substituting efforts, the domestic industry may procure only one third (with an optimistic interpretation) of military procurement demands. Turkey is among the leading arms importing countries. According to SIPRI data for the 1990-99 period Turkey has been second and third leading recipient of major conventional weapons. In the neoliberal period global military industries, which were prone to a crisis of overproduction at the beginning of 1990s, have restructured themselves through mergers and downsizing. They also started to seek out new markets or to create them as a strategy of overcoming the crisis partly caused by the contraction of military budgets in the post-Cold War era. In that sense, Turkey has become an important province of the capital accumulation for the big international companies of the war industry among which firms from US, Israel, and Europe (France, Italy, Germany, and Spain) are the leading ones. In fact, this integration with global economy is quite striking. The nationalist rhetoric of the president of SASAD, retired brigadier general Yılmaz Küçükseyhan, is an interesting new articulation between the national and the global: “Today’s understanding of nationalism and independence is different from that of 1960s. It requires globalization, becoming global. The nationality has taken a new form. You are national to the extent that you are global. An inward-oriented country cannot reach the contemporary level of civilization” (Interview, 22.07.2004, Ankara).⁹⁶

As to the domestic capital groups, the lack of data does not let us to make assertions about the relative importance of war industry for specific capital groups. Nevertheless, a glance at the data on the 500 biggest industrial corporations reveals that war industry has reached a certain level so that each year around 15-20 firms take place

⁹⁶ These words were also used in order to differentiate their understanding from SADER and TSKGV whose nationalism, he argues, is rather old-fashion. He also criticizes TSKGV for using its organic relations with TAF in order to get the arms projects and for not letting the private sector to undertake the sector projects.

among the biggest industrial firms. Even though we cannot assert that the profits from war industry are decisive for the profitability of big holding companies with the power of control the capital accumulation process as it is the case for instance in Israel and partly in US (see fn. 88 above), it may be asserted that the profits in the war industry form an additional area for big companies, especially in periods of crisis and competition. In that sense, the following statement of the general manager of Otokar (Koç Holding) is revealing: “Thanks to the defense industry sales to Ministry of National Defense and foreign military institutions, which forms about 60 percent of our total sales, we did not suffer the contraction of the internal market” (Radikal, 22.04.2001). Similarly, because the war industries generally work on mark-up pricing, the guaranteed profits in the war industry attract various big capital groups. The growth of war industry as a new province of accumulation in turn causes new conflicts or adds new aspects to the existing conflicts among capital groups in competition between each other in order to beat the average rate of profit in order to achieve a differential rate of accumulation.⁹⁷ For instance, one of the challenging moves of the Anatolian capital supporting political Islam in the wake of the military intervention on 28 February 1997 was its ambitions to profit from the war industry projects. It was expressively stated in the process of the 28 February 1997. For instance, after the military announced in 1996 that it will be expended \$ 150 billion for the next 30 years within the context of the modernization of TAF, the then president of MÜSİAD stated that that they will encourage their members to enter into the defense industry and called for privatization of

⁹⁷ To the extent that capital is a social relation and “a crystallization of power” Nitzan proposes to integrate power into the definition of capital. Accordingly, “with the evolution of capitalism, the leading firms are increasingly driven not to maximize their profits but rather to beat the average. Specifically they seek to achieve a differential rate of accumulation –that is, to exceed the average rate of return in the economy.” (Nitzan and Bichler, 1996; Bichler and Nitzan, 1996; Nitzan 1998).

the arm producing public firms. At the same time, the not yet overthrown government of the 28 February process (a coalition between the Islamist Refah Partisi as the big partner and center-right DYP) attempted to contact domestic firms, including MÜSİAD members (Kombassan and Kalyon holdings) while in the Islamist press there were such demands. This move attracted the reaction of the military and a surveillance of the Islamist firms started in order to keep them out the defense sector projects.⁹⁸

As a result, we may assess that despite its relatively modest size the war industry should be taken as a new potential province of accumulation which is siphoning out financial sources from the larger segments of the population, and further militarizing Turkish economy. Meanwhile, there is no doubt that the specificity of this form of militarization of the economy is still the dominant role of the military capital organized under TSKGV.

⁹⁸ For the course of events see *Radikal*, 26.01.1997; “Müsiad’ın gözü silahta...”, *Radikal*, 11.05.1997; “Tankta Yerli Üretim”, *Akit*, 28-30.04.1997; “Savunma Sanayiinde İslami sermayenin önü kesilecek...”, *Hürriyet*, 09.06.1997; Erol Yazar, “Neden Milli Savunma Sanayii”, *Çerçeve*, Sayı 19, 1997. See also Şen (2000: 107-123), Uğur and Alkan (2000: 151-152).

Table 7 Turkey's Arms Projects and Purchases by 2005

Arm Project	Companies	Cost
Wheeled Armored Vehicle	Nurol + Otokar	
Rocket System	Lockheed Martin (US) + MKEK & ENKA	
Radios	Marconi + Has Holding + Cihan El. + Elit El.	
Wheeled Armored Vehicle	Cadillac Cage (US) + Otokar	
Electronic Warfare System	Loral (US) + Mikes (US-TR)	
Mobile Radar	Aydın Yazılım + Thomson-Tekfen	
Ship	Hydraudyne (Netherlands) + FACET (UK) +CEGELEC/FG (UK)	YTL 129.935 billion
Boats	Silingers (France)	FF 1.34 million
Combat Vehicles	FNSS	\$ 330 million
Cherokee Jeep	AOI (Egypt) + Chrysler	\$ 20 million
Electronic Warfare System	Mikes	
Information Systems	Havelsan	
Information Systems	Aselsan+TÜBİTAK+ODTÜ+STU	
Boat	Yonca Onuk JV	
Helicopter	Sikorsky Aircraft (US)	
Aircraft	Socata (France)	
Aircraft	Agusta (Italy) + TAI	
Aircraft	TAI + CASA (Spain)	
Helicopter	Sikorsky (US)	
UAV	GA-AS (US)	
Engine Test Cell	Magnus (Israel)	
Transmission Test Stand	ZFL (Germany)	
Helicopters	Agusta (Italy)	
Helicopters	Sikorsky (US)	\$ 30 million
Helicopters	Eurocopter	Euro 17 million
Helicopters	Lockheed Martin (US) + BAE Sys. (UK) + Aselsan	\$ 153 million
Helicopters	Eurocopter + TAI	\$ 252 million
Information System*	Koç Sistem Bilgi ve İletişim	\$ 6 million
Navigation Pod	Aselsan	
Electronic Warfare System	Aselsan + Mikes	\$ 190.4 million
Missile	Roketsan	\$ 43 million
Ship Combat System	Havelsan + Ayesaş + Yaltes + Milsoft + Vestel	\$ 97.5 million
Helicopter Armour	Büyükmihri Bor Tekn. + Barış Elek.	\$ 0.9 million
Aircraft Systems	Lockheed Martin + TAI	\$ 1.1 billion
Boats	Yonca-Onuk JV	
Air Defense System	Aselsan	\$ 265 million
Tank Modernization	Aselsan	\$ 160 million
Tank Modernization	IMI (Israel) + Aselsan + MKEK	\$ 687.5 million
Helicopter Modernization	TAI	\$ 96 million
Aircraft	EADS-CASA + TAI+Aselsan+Havelsan+KaleKalıp+ Aydın Yazılım	\$ 218.6 million
Helicopter Electronic Warfare	Aselsan	\$ 576 million
Surveillance System	Thales (Netherlands) + Aydın Yazılım	\$ 52.350 million
Satellite Communications	EADS + Aselsan	\$ 110 million
Mine Hunter	Inter. Consortium (Germany, Spain, France, Italy)	\$ 625 million
Boat	Yonca-Onuk JV	\$ 54 million
Aircraft System	Boeing/Northrop (US) + Havelsan, THY, TAI, THY, Aselsan	
Helicopter	Sikorsky (US)	\$ 390 million
Helicopter	Agusta (Italia)	\$ 63 million

Source: Selectively Compiled from SSM (2005) with special focus on projects having information about their cost and companies.

* From then on on going projects (not completed projects)

Table 8: Ranking of Companies in the Defense Industry Sector
According to Production Sales of the 500 Biggest Industrial Firms

TSKGV's Subsidiaries	Rank 1999	Rank 2001	Rank 2003	Rank 2004
Aselsan	45	35	79	79
TAI	159	108	263	345
TEI	254	120	277	311
Havelsan		366	443	
İşbir Elektrik	395			
Netaş	48	90	174	229
Mercedes-Benz Türk A.Ş.	21	20	17	16
Other Companies				
Simko Tic.San. (Siemens-Koç)	37			
Alcatel-Teletaş	55	42	96	165
BMC	78	155	35	29
Otokar (Koç)	100	196	118	111
Hema Endüstri A.Ş.	297	260	168	128
MKEK Genel Müdürlük			75	120
MKEK Mühimatsız (Public)	93	290		
MKEK Fişeksan (Public)	137	300		
MKEK Hurdasan (Public)		433		
Coşkunzöz Metal Form Mak. End.		459		
Kale Kilit ve Kalıp San. A.Ş.		482		409
Kalekalıp Makine ve Kalıp San.		483		
FNSS Savunma Sistemleri A.Ş. (Nurul Holding-United Defense)	138	500	44	193
Petlas Lastik	331			

Source: İSO (2000; 2002; 2004; 2005)

Note: For some companies (Mercedes-Benz, Netaş, Simko, Alcatel-Teletaş, BMC, Otokar, Hema, Petlas), defense industry has only a secondary relevance in terms of their investments and production sales. Unfortunately, the share of the defense industry activities for these companies is not publicly declared.

Although the military's presence within the defense industry goes back to the second half of 1970s, when the foundations of the land, naval and air forces were established, its organization as a holding company with 16 affiliated companies which have partnerships with both foreign and local capital groups dates back to 1987. In this year by the adoption of the law no. 3388 TSKGV has been founded and brought together all the previous foundations of the armed forces. Currently TSKGV has 19 affiliated companies. In 8 of them TSKGV controls the majority of the shares, in other 6 companies TSKGV's shares are between 5 and 45 %, and in other affiliated companies the foundation's share is only symbolic. Among the partners of TSKGV there are, as in the case of OYAK, both big foreign capital groups such as Lockheed Martin, General Electric, Daimler-Chrysler, Northern Telecom; big holdings of Turkey such as STFA, Kutlutaş, Kale Kalıp, Profilo; and public institutions such as Turkish Aeronautical Association, MKEK, Undersecretariat of Defense Industry (see Table 9).

In the constituting law of TSKGV, its aim has been defined as "to contribute to the increase of war capacity of Turkish Armed Forces by developing the national war industry, establishing new branches of defense industry, and purchasing arms". TSKGV is directed by a board cross-cutting the military-civil nexus and composed of the Minister of National Defense, the vice-chief of the General Staff, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense and Undersecretary of Defense Industry.

The main sources of revenue of TSKGV are: donations (according to the law no. 3388, all the donations to the foundation are exempt from taxes and can be deducted from the corporation and income taxes), profits from the affiliated companies, the rent

from the real estates, revenues from the cooperation protocols.⁹⁹ According to the article 6 of the law, TSKGV should use 20% of its revenues for the administrative expenditures and the rest (80%) must be used for the establishment purpose, which means for the investments in the war industry or for the purchase of arms. TSKGV has to inform the Chief of General Staff about the amount of money (80% of its revenues), which will be allocated to the branches of the Armed Forces on the basis of project. However, when one analyzes the revenues and expenditures of the foundation (see Table 10), between 1987 and 1999 only 33% have been allocated to the armed forces branches. It seems that the rest have been invested in the defense sector through the affiliated companies, which increased the power of the military capital in the sector. Between 1987 and 1999 the shares of different sources over the total revenue was as follows: 46.44% from financial investments, 23.44% profits from the affiliated companies and 15.98% from foreign exchange operations. This shows how TSKGV does not limit its investments in the defense sector, and has enjoyed from the financial capital accumulation model just like OYAK.

In a speech given on 3 August 2000 to the members of Aegean Region Chamber of Industry, TSKGV's general manager announced that the total assets of the foundation reached 300 trillion TL (at this time \$446.5 million) and that within ten years TSKGV will do investments in the defense sector approximately worth of \$150 billion.

Although the available data is not satisfactory to define the exact share of TSKGV within the defense sector, in 2001 among the 500 biggest industrial corporations there were 17 companies active in the defense industry, and 6 of these

⁹⁹ These revenues are in appearance "voluntary" donations. The revenues of a certain soccer games, the donations of the Turkish citizens living abroad which they give at the customary gate while entering Turkey, the donations by the agricultural producers in Trabzon when they sell their products to the cooperatives.

companies were affiliations of TSKGV (see Table 8). TSKGV's share within the total sales from production of these 17 defense industry companies is 30.82% if Mercedes-Benz and Netaş are excluded (since TSKGV's share in these companies is only 5%), and 60.11% if these two companies too are included.¹⁰⁰ Again in 2001 among the most profitable 50 industrial companies, the number of TSKGV's affiliated companies was three: TAI (19th), TUSAŞ (31st) and Netaş (41st) (İSO, 2002: 132). Looking at all these data we can argue that the military capital is the dominant actor of the defense industry in Turkey.

This dominant position of the military capital (TSKGV) further supports both the militarization of capitalism and capitalization of militarism in Turkey. On the one hand, the increasing military expenditures and growing war industry militarize greater portions of the economy; on the other hand, the retired and active military officers take increasingly place in the capitalist social relations. These both increases the economic-corporate and political power of the military and of high ranking military officers and further draws the military into the contentious life of economic power relations.

¹⁰⁰ The data on total production sales is from İSO (2002).

Table 9: TSKGV's Subsidiaries (2005)

Company	Sector	TSKGV's Share (%)	Other Partners	Their Shares (%)
Aselsan	Electronic	84.58	Prime Ministry Privatization Administration	0.27
			Axa-Oyak Sigorta A.Ş.	0.12
			On İMKB	15.03
Havelsan	Aero-Electronic	98.9	PROFILO Holding	0.1
			Prime Ministry Privatization Administration	0.1
			TUSAŞ	0.5
			T.H.K. (Turkish Aeronautical Association)	0.5
			GAMA	0.03
			KUTLUTAŞ Holding	0.03
Aspilsan	Military Batteries	97.69		
İşbir Elektrik	Electric-Energy	99.9		
Roketsan	Rocket&Missile Manufacturing	30.5 (50)	Aselsan	15
			KUTLUTAŞ Holding	20
			Havelsan	4.5
			Kale Kalıp	15
			MKEK	15
TUSAŞ*	Aerospace Industry	45	S.S.M. (Undersecretariat of Defence Industries)	55
TAI	Aerospace Industry	54.50	SSM	
			T.H.K. (Turkish Aeronautical Association)	0.1
TEI	Aerospace Engine Industry	3.02 (53.54)	TUSAŞ	50.52
			General Electric International	46.22
			T.H.K. (Turkish Aeronautical Association)	0.24
Mercedes-Benz Türk	Automotive Manufacturing	5	Daimler-Chrysler	55
			Overseas Lending Co.	15
			KOLUMAN Holding	15
			MKEK	10
DİTAŞ	Maritime Trade & Brokering	20	Doğan Holding	50.98
NETAŞ	Telecommunication	15	Northern Telecom	53.13
			On İMKB	31.87
HEAŞ	Aerospace Industry	1.17		
Havelsan Radar	Radar Industry	0.0001 (100)	Havelsan	99.99
Tapasan A. Ş.	Mechanical Electronic	25		
TürkTıpsan	Medical	20		
Mikes		(72)	Aselsan	72
Esdaş				
Ehsim				
STM				

Source: Web sites, publications and brochures of TSKGV and affiliated companies.

Note: The percentages of share within parentheses indicate the total percentage of share owned by the TSKGV group.

*TUSAŞ and TAI merged in 28.04.2005. TAI was in partnership with Lockheed Martin and General Electric, they sold their shares (49 %) to TUSAŞ in 2005.

Table 10: The Revenues and Expenditures of TSKGV (1987-1999, Million TL)

Years	Revenues	Expenditures	Expenditures / Revenues (%)
1987	4.297	3.451	80
1988	47.132	25.570	54
1989	56.723	31.176	55
1990	73.742	38.265	52
1991	90.907	50.355	55
1992	180.468	76.331	42
1993	294.507	70.000	24
1994	966.209	138.000	14
1995	1.725.478	430.000	25
1996	3.171.560	1.279.458	40
1997	5.256.038	1.660.938	32
1998	9.275.216	2.555.600	28
1999	16.534.000	4.200.000	40
Total	31.642.277	10.559.144	33

Source: TSKGV Tanıtım Kataloğu, 1999, pp. 13-14, cited by Özer (2001: 55);

CONCLUSION

The majority of the existing works on the preponderant role of the military in the relations of domination in Turkey explain the processes of militarization on the basis of binary oppositions such as military-civil, state-society, and center-periphery. Accordingly, the main power relation on the basis of which the military interventions are explained is taken to be between the state (elites) and an undifferentiated civilian and/or societal realm. As a result, the actual processes of the manufacturing, normalization, and performing of militarism which are crosscutting those binary oppositions become invisible. Such a paradigm overlooks the active and potential class-based antagonisms and struggles within the so-called civilian realm, society or periphery by which militarist practices are circumscribed, into which they are embedded, and upon which they have differential impacts. In other words, the militarist practices are assumed to be class-neutral in terms of their process of formation and in terms of their constitutive impacts. The aim of this work has been to break, both theoretically and empirically, with this dissociation between militarism and capitalism produced in much of the concerned literature.

In fact, the neglect of the capitalist face of militarism is rooted in the hegemonic state-centric approach to the state-class relations in Turkey, which has also determined the intellectual horizon of those works undertaking to historicize and contextualize the militarist practices. Within the narrative of the state-centric paradigm, the Turkish state, either reified as a subject in itself or personified in state elites (civil and military bureaucracy), is depicted as an independent actor acting against and regardless of the will and demands of social actors within (civil) society, including the bourgeoisie. The Turkish state is said to be irresponsive to the class-based demands and to have mainly

distortive impacts on the course of capitalist economic development and the establishment of the bourgeoisie's political power. As a result, the argument goes, neither the institutional architecture of the state nor the practices of state managers have been circumscribed, conditioned or constituted by class power relations. In addition, the contentions between powerful state elites and a weak bourgeoisie are taken to be more determinant than inter-class and intra-class relations. To the extent that the bourgeoisie is cast as yet weak vis-à-vis and dependent on the state, the autonomization of the bourgeoisie from the state has become the main analytical and normative problematic.

I raised three main theoretical criticisms to this narrative. First, many of its adherents treat the state and the classes in a relation of exteriority whereby the economy and/or the classes exist as separate entities outside the state/the political. The making of classes, specifically of the bourgeoisie, is conceptualized as a process to take place outside the state, within the economy and the (civil) society. The constitutive presence of the state within the relations *of* production and in the making of classes is overlooked in this philosophy of external relation. Secondly, even when the state's constitutive presence is recognized, especially by critical institutionalist writers, it continues to take the state actors and/or institutions as the only explanatory variable to explain policy outcomes whereas the state power itself needs to be explained. Thirdly, overemphasis on the alleged contradiction between the state elites and the bourgeoisie produces a kind of orientalist narrative about the Turkish state as continuously being antithetical and/or detrimental to the bourgeois class hegemony and capitalist economic development.

Drawing on the binary conceptualizations of the state-centric paradigm, the majority of the works on the military conceive the military and the state with which the military identifies itself as an almost "omnipotent actor" standing *above, apart* and

outside the society. The military's and militarist practices are evaluated within a linear narrative whereby the military intervenes in socio-political life as an outsider, and mainly for solidifying or increasing its own autonomy and power within the relations of domination. Yet, the articulation of the relations of domination with the relations of production is left unquestioned in so far as they are treated as relations pertaining to two different social orders of existence.

I do not deny the fact that the military has economic-corporate and political-hegemonic interests of its own, that it has become a class-like social group for itself, or that at each military intervention it increases its own sources of power. Rather, I contend that it is the very autonomy, the very existence of the military as an actor for itself that makes it more embedded in class-based power relations despite its hegemonic discourse of being above classes. Hence, one should qualify this autonomy. What is at stake is an "embedded autonomy". The military is not a trans-societal actor whose ideological, political preferences and/or corporate interests are formed in a social vacuum. Quite on the contrary, the military elites are politically socialized within the context of broader social-political power relations. That is why we should conceive *the military within (not above or outside) society*.

What I underline is that military's own interests have historically overlapped, coincided with the economic-corporate and political-hegemonic capitalist interests. Militarism does not just reproduce itself; its role is not merely reactive but also proactive in the sense that it actively takes place in the struggles for manufacturing and institutionalizing capitalist hegemonic projects and accumulation strategies. In other words, the militarist practices have a capitalist character which begs an explanation. Otherwise, one risks reproducing the hegemonic discourse of the military and the state

elites, according to which both state power and the military are pictured as being above and outside class relations.

The few Marxist works that underline the interconnection between the militarist practices and the capitalist class relations in Turkey generally lean towards instrumentalist or functionalist accounts whereby the military become mere instrument. Yet, it is only through a non-reductionist theory of state-class relations in capitalist social formations that one may give an empirically open-ended account of the historical and relational character of the militarization processes. Hence, the *modern capitalist state* should better be conceived first *as a social relation* (the condensation of relations of forces) and then *as an institutional ensemble* (institutional materiality of the state). State power can only be assessed relationally. The power of the state is the power of the forces acting in and through the state. The state is a site of struggle in which strategies of various social forces are elaborated. These forces include state managers as well as class forces and (class relevant) social forces emanating from different societalization processes. It is by focusing on the process of inter and intra-class struggles marked by contentions, compromises among social and political actors over the formulation of hegemonic projects and accumulation strategies that one may account the social relational aspect of the state.

The military has taken part in political-hegemonic struggles between different historical blocs with a claim to hegemony, not because it is an instrument of class but by virtue of its own political ideological preferences/orientations and its own corporate interests. The actual practices of the military both shape and are shaped by capitalist power relations among the social blocs with competing hegemonic projects and accumulation strategies. Hence, my explanation of the militarization of state form focus

first on the historical process of the formation of different hegemonic class projects in and through which the military elites are politicized. *Secondly*, the discursive and non-discursive practices of the military during its stage in power are evaluated in terms of its position in the construction of capitalist hegemonic projects in a contentious political process. In doing this, the restructuring of the institutional structure of the state by the military regimes, the position of the military vis-à-vis the constituents of the power bloc and the dominated classes, the power relations among them occupy a central place. I also argue that the understanding of the way in which the military relates itself with specific historical social blocs through an active participation in the manufacturing of hegemonic projects is an important clue for understanding how militarism normalizes itself as a possible form of governance and how and why the military gains the active support of some (civil) societal forces.

I use the first military intervention in 1960 as a case study for exposing how the capitalist class character of a military intervention may be explained through a non-instrumentalist and non-functionalist way. The specificity of this case is that it is more challenging for arguing about the capitalist class nature of the coup to the extent that it occurred in a relatively earlier period of capitalist development in Turkey and it adopted some progressive constitutional reforms which recognized civil, political and social rights and freedoms. Hence, the state-centric paradigm has felt itself more comfortable in arguing that class power relations were not decisive in political processes ending up with the military coup, that the state elites and the military was not constrained by class forces so that it could adopt a stance of reformism from above independently of class power relations.

I argued that the military intervention and the succeeding military regime were embedded in, constrained by, and constitutive of a new capitalist hegemonic project and hegemonic social bloc. The military power was embedded in specific class power relations during the period preceding the coup and has been politicized in a historical conjuncture in which two different capitalist historical blocs with two different hegemonic projects were in struggle with each other. In the second half of 1950s, an urban oppositional bloc composed of industrial bourgeoisie, the working class, the urban lower and middle classes, the intelligentsia, and the military were estranged from the DP's authoritarian-populist hegemonic project. However, their unity was not an automatic outcome and had to be manufactured around a new hegemonic project. In that sense, the second half of the 1950s was a period of the rise of a new hegemonic project based on a discourse that articulated the idea(s) of democratic state, rule of law, planned capitalist economic development and social justice.

However, the capitalist nature of the coup cannot be solely attributed to previous struggles even though it is in and through these struggles that the military is politicized. The class character of the military regime also needs to be drawn from the actual practices of the military power, which institutionalized a capitalist hegemonic project, the main parameters of which had partly been manufactured in the pre-coup period. In that sense, the military was neither a passive instrument of the capitalist class nor an independent actor above social classes. It was rather an actor constitutive of a new hegemonic capitalist project which was based on the articulation of planned capitalist economic development, a certain idea(l) of social justice and political democracy.

The constitutive engagement of the military regime with the new accumulation strategy and hegemonic project could be best delineated in the process of restructuring

the institutional materiality of the state, since hegemony is always established through the formation of specific hegemonic apparatuses. In this case, the State Planning Organization (DPT) and the Constitution were designed to be the hegemonic apparatuses. If DPT was supposed to both constitute the unity of the dominant classes within the power bloc under the leadership of the industrial bourgeoisie and to get the consent of the dominated classes for the new hegemonic project; the Constitution was to lay the ground for an expanded hegemony by recognizing some social and political rights. The central tenet of this hegemonic project was that the planned capitalist development would also bring social justice and harmony, and this would happen under a democratic state form. The specificity of the hegemonic project of 27 May was that it was based on the idea that the class contradictions could be reconciled in a relatively democratic-welfare state. Its emphasis on a relatively democratic-welfare state was perfectly a strategy of hegemony to the extent that it was guided by the logic of (the prevention of) class struggle by getting the active consent of the working class by the recognition of some social and political rights which were already on the agenda of labor movement.

Even though this hegemonic project purported to establish the political hegemony of the industrial bourgeoisie, this did not mean that the Turkish bourgeoisie was ready and willing to accept neither such a relatively autonomous developmentalist state nor such an expanded hegemony based on the idea(s) of social justice and political rights. Hence, as it is the case with all process of hegemony construction, it was a process of hegemony marked by contentions, compromises, and compliances among the capitalist class, the working class, and the state elites. In this process of hegemony

construction, the military power was embedded in and constrained by various class interests and the state was a site of social struggle rather than an autonomous subject.

It was not the reformism-from-above of the new middle class and/or the state elites but the lack of a challenging political-hegemonic working class movement (not the lack of a class movement per se) and the then existing balance of class forces that paved the ground for the “democratic-welfarist” hegemonic attempt. In a historical context in which the working class movement political outlook was not yet challenging the hegemonic project at hand, the new hegemonic strategy was based on the idea that a planned economic development respectful of a sense of social justice could be run under a relatively democratic state form.

Yet, the following two decades would be marked by the gradual recession from this expanded hegemony to the extent that the working class movement and the emerging left and student movements started to challenge, or, better said, were perceived to challenge, the frontiers of the hegemony. As a result, authoritarianism and militarism colonized more and more the political sphere in order to discipline the working class. The two decades following the coup was so much marked by an inter-class that militarism as a technique of power was extensively and permanently used to discipline the working class. Even though the post-1960 was a period of successful economic growth and populist income redistribution until the mid-1970s, it was still marked by a constant challenge by the working class to the economic-corporate and political-hegemonic interests of the bourgeoisie and it was far from being a stable hegemony. Militarism was used in the industrial relations (the postponement of the legal strikes on the reason of national security), in the working class protests (the use of military forces in oppressing both legal and illegal working class protests), in monitoring the

parliamentary regime (increasing influence of the National Security Council established by the 1961 Constitution), in policing functions (the repeated declarations of martial law), and finally in restructuring the institutional architecture of the state in a way to strategically disempowering the working class and to empower the bourgeoisie (gradually first during the interim regime of 12 March 1971 and more decisively by the 12 September military coup).

Given the underdeveloped level of Marxist studies on militarism-capitalism articulation, I think that this subsequent period is still open to an analysis similar to the one operationalized for the case of 27 May coup, which would empirically expose the actual use of militarist techniques of power in regulating, disciplining, surveying, and institutionalizing the capitalist class relations. Such an analysis would also pave the way for a historically more dynamic analysis of the changing forms of militarism. My analysis of the 27 May coup focused mainly on the practices of the political and intellectual actors, which constituted capitalist class relations and processes, because of the low level of organizational capacities of class actors and the limited nature of their interest articulation practices. Yet, *pace* statist arguments, neither the bourgeoisie nor the working class was as passive as they are pictured. Instead, they have actively defended their own interests, but mainly at the economic-corporate moment of class relations, and especially at the level of formation of accumulation strategies in the case of bourgeoisie. The period following the May 27 coup is more promising in that sense since besides the political-ideological practices constituting “classes as relations and process”, the economic-corporate and political-hegemonic practices of the class actor are more convenient for empirical research.

The period following the 27 May coup was also interesting in terms of the capitalization of militarism since the military regime established a so far neglected form of military-industrial complex. The peculiarity of this peripheral form of the military-industrial complex is that the military acts as a collective capital group and becomes an economic actor at every moment of capital circulation (production, exchange and finance). The military, under the organizational structure of OYAK, has now become industrialist, merchant, financial investor and rentier. In this peripheral type of military-industrial complex, the military itself owns businesses and becomes a profit-seeking economic actor not only in the industry of destruction goods but also in the industries of production and consumption goods. “Military capital”, as I called it, may be thought as a form of the double process of capitalization of militarism and militarization of capitalism. If the existence of the military as a collective capitalist group in the capitalist economy mainly corresponds to a process of capitalization of militarism; the growth of the war industry enhances the militarization of the economy.

The existence of the military as a collective capitalist group through OYAK, which has become one of the largest holding companies of the country, has been the very proof of the embeddedness of the military within capitalist social power relations. Drawing upon my empirical research on the historical development process and the current situation of “the military holding”, I have argued that the relationship between the military capital and the big bourgeoisie has been a symbiotic relationship in which both parts have got benefits. There is no doubt that the military as a separate actor has its own economic-corporate and political-hegemonic interests but these interests are not suspended in the air or outside the society, they are articulated into those of other class fractions. The military capital is one of the faces of the military in Turkey. What the

phenomenon of military capital allows us to assess is that by virtue of having collective capitalist activities, the military has become part of a class fraction: the big bourgeoisie, the dominant class fraction in Turkey. The fact that the military, through one of its institutional organizations, has common structural interests with the dominant fraction of the bourgeoisie has had some causal effects. As I tried to expose, the military through OYAK has become totally embedded within the accumulation strategies and processes, and the related inter- and intra-class conflicts under different regimes of accumulation. To the extent that the military through OYAK has shared similar organic interests with the big holding companies, there has been a symbiotic relationship between the big capitalists and OYAK. They supported and profited from the same accumulation strategies: inward-oriented ISI-based accumulation in the period 1960-80 and financial accumulation model in 1990s. During these times, OYAK has been one of the mechanisms for getting the explicit or implicit support of the military for the dominant accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects.

If OYAK is an important empirical form of the articulation of capitalism and militarism in Turkey, it is yet a too much expressive and immediate medium of revealing the capitalist class face of the military to the extent it produces effects undermining the discursive power of the military. The embeddedness of the military within the accumulation processes and the related inter- and intra-class conflicts as a result of the very existence of the military capital, and the increasing public visibility of OYAK in the last years through the tremendous rates of profit, winning of big companies in the privatization process, sharpens the tension between the particularistic practices and the universalistic discourse of the military. To put it in other words, this directly capitalistic face of the military undermines in some instances the discursive power of the military:

representing itself as the defender of the general interest of the nation and the state, manufacturing an image of being above classes by identifying itself with an allegedly homogenous nation and neutral state. During the inward-oriented accumulation regime and nationalist development project, the nationalist-developmental discourse of the military capital was easily articulated to the one-nation hegemonic project. To legitimate the economic practices of the military as serving the general interest of the nation was easier and the military did not refrain from identifying itself with OYAK. However, in the neoliberal post-1980 period, where two nations hegemonic project widened the gap between the mode of accumulation regime and the nationalist legitimating discourse, it becomes harder for the military capital to present itself as the representative of the general interest of the whole nation. That is why, OYAK's efforts to sever the link between itself and the military increased in the last years. Because of the more exclusivist nature of neoliberal capitalism, the military keeps away from publicly identifying itself with the military holding (OYAK) which is deeply embedded in crisis and poverty producing neoliberal policies. The specific mode of integration with the global neoliberal capitalism which undermines the rhetoric of economic nationalism makes harder to articulate the nationalist rhetoric and neoliberal capitalist rationality to which the military capital is deeply integrated. It is also because of this effect of unmasking the military's legitimating ideology that working on OYAK was meaningful. It is an important phenomenal form of militarism for developing a critique of its ideological power which normalizes the military as the representative of the nation. In addition, to the extent that the integration of Turkey with the European Union continues, which would force the military to withdraw from some of its traditional areas of control and to lose some of its institutional sources of power, it may be guessed that the military

will become more and more sensitive to keeping its economic power in the capitalist economy. Hence, it may be guessed that the more immediately economic phenomenal forms of militarism, i.e. the economic power of the military through OYAK and the war industries, will occupy more and more the agenda of those anti-militarists concerned about the further demilitarization of social, political, economic relations in Turkey.

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