

Immanuel Kant's Philosophical-Anthropological Approach to
International Relations: Freedom, Equality and Human Rights
Within Constitutional and International Legality

Dissertation submitted to the Institute of
Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Political Science

by
Feridun Hadi SİNİRLİOĞLU

Bogazici University Library



Boğaziçi University

June 1996

VITA

Feridun Hadi Sinirlioğlu

Born on January 30, 1956, in Görele, Giresun. Received his B.A. from the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University in 1978. He started his graduate studies in political science at Boğaziçi University in 1980 and completed the Ph.D comprehensive examinations in December 1982.

In 1982, he entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He served in Ankara at the Ministry between 1982-1985; at the Turkish embassies in the Hague (1985-1988) and Beirut (1988-1990); as private adviser to the deputy undersecretary for political affairs (1990-1991) and as private adviser in the cabinet of the undersecretary of the Ministry (1991-1992). In 1992, he was posted to the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations. He is currently counsellor at the same Mission in New York. He is married and has two sons. He is fluent in English and German.

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE: CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OR
 PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

CHAPTER TWO: PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

CHAPTER THREE: UNIVERSAL LAWS OF MORALITY

CHAPTER FOUR: TOWARDS A UNIVERSAL HUMAN
 COMMUNITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM WITH A
 COSMOPOLITAN INTENT

CHAPTER FIVE: UNIVERSALIZATION OF POLITICS

CONCLUSION: A NEW THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

CHRONOLOGY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABSTRACT

This dissertation attempts to challenge the axiomatic separation and isolation of the international from the domestic politics through the medium of Kant. In this context, the "republican constitutionalism with a cosmopolitan intent" appears as the underlying concept.

In a critical dialogue with Kant, this study tries to show why his position with respect to the "international relations" is directly locked into his critical philosophy as a whole. Thus, it demonstrates that Kant's approach to "international relations" provides us with a theoretical framework which considers "domestic" as well as "international" as interdependent parts of a cosmopolitan whole.

The praxis-oriented, forward-looking conception of history together with a theoretical humanism lays down the foundations for a novel approach to the international relations theory, which combines morality with legality through politics.

ÖZET

Bu tez, uluslararası politikanın iç politikadan aksiyomatik ayrılığını ve yalıtılmışlığını Kant aracılığıyla sorgulamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, "kozmpoliten yönelimli cumhuriyetçi anayasalcılık", belirleyici kavram olarak dikkat çekmektedir.

Bu çalışma, Kant'la eleştirel bir diyalog içinde, Kant'ın "uluslararası ilişkiler" yaklaşımının niçin doğrudan "eleştirel felsefe"nin bütünü içinde değerlendirilmesi gerektiğini göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Kant'ın "uluslararası ilişkiler"e yaklaşımı bize, "iç" ve "uluslararası"nı dikkate alan teorik bir çerçeve sunmaktadır.

Kant'ın praksis-yönelimli, geleceğe-dönük tarih anlayışı, kuramsal bir hümanizma ile birlikte, uluslararası ilişkiler teorisinde, moralite ile legaliteyi siyaset yoluyla biraraya getiren yeni ve farklı bir anlayışın inşasına imkan tanımaktadır.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply indebted to several people in the completion of this work. To my adviser, Dr. Taha Parla, I owe the largest debt of gratitude. I learned a great deal from him, more than from any other teacher I have had. Dr. Parla provided me with inspiration, support, guidance and confidence before I began this dissertation, and during its composition.

Many friends offered generously of their time. In this context, Şule and Gün played a very special role during the past fourteen years. They have resolutely insisted that I should finish what we began together. Furthermore, they provided essential help in the final stages.

My sons Cem and Can deserve special thanks for their patience. Their moral support and encouragement throughout was invaluable.

Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to my best friend, my wife Ayşe, who cares for me more than I care for myself.

ABBREVIATIONS

CPR	Critique of Pure Reason
CPrR	Critique of Practical Reason
CJ	Critique of Judgement
IUH	Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose
WE	An Answer to the question: What is Enlightenment
GMM	Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
WO	What is Orientation in Thinking
CON	Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History
TP	On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice
RLR	Religion within the limits of Reason Alone
PP	Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch
MM	The Metaphysics of Morals
CF	The Conflict of Faculties
APV	Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View
LE	Lectures on Ethics

INTRODUCTION

"Kant is a nodal point in modern philosophy. His work contains as many possibilities as life itself... It remains a source of boundless inspirations."

Karl Jaspers, *Kant*

The traditional dualism of realism and idealism continues to be described as *"the most useful distinction"* for categorizing the theories of international relations. (1) The traditions, represented by these categories are tied to the works of Machiavelli and Hobbes for *"realism"*, and to the work of Kant for *"idealism"*. (2) Thus Machiavelli and Hobbes become archetypal realists and Kant an archetypal idealist. There are, of course, other suggestions leading to similar classifications. They simply use different labels to define and categorize the same *"epistemological dualism"*. (3) Hence, although many different terms are introduced to identify the *"opposing*

traditions" of the international relations theory, in reality, the false antinomy of realism and idealism prevails.

Realism is the determinant element in this equation. For it defines itself with and against *"idealism"*. By declaring the vision of the *"idealists"* as chimaera (4) and rejecting it, the *"realists"* volunteer to limit themselves to understanding the world as it is, thus ending up as defenders of the status quo. It is the axiomatic separation of *"domestic"* and *"international"* politics that establishes the epistemological foundation of *"realism"*. Based on this common premise, the *"realists"* consider the international politics merely as relations between sovereign states. Consequently, the *"realists"* do not deal in any way with the questions regarding the nature of states and the relevance of the domestic to the international. To them, the international relations in Hobbesian terms is a realm where all is in war against all, or with a Machiavellian rendition, a realm where there is no room for morality. As Rosenberg has put it:

"There is a sleight of hand being practised in the repetitive and apparently compulsive realist self-definition in contrast to idealism. Certainly,

in rehearsing this 'Great Debate', opposing lists of assumptions are duly presented: there is the marshalling of 'is' against 'ought', and power against morality; but what remain covert... are those premisses given by the fact that the 'Great Debate' has always been fundamentally a policy debate." (6)

Thus, the concepts of power and national interest appear as determinants in constructing the realist theoretical framework. "Realpolitik", "power politics", "raison d'etat" and "balance of power" are terms which are frequently used as analytical tools for explaining -and at the same time for justifying- the empirical reality. Necessity not freedom, survival not progress are considered (7) to be the "realistic" starting points for understanding -yet again justifying and legitimizing- the really existing international politics. (8)

More than anyone else, it is the name of Kant that has been taken as a point of orientation by the realists. They use Kant as a negative image for their self-definition and place on him such diverse labels as "utopian (9)", "revolutionist (10)", "idealist (11)" and "optimist (12)". All these readings of Kant are misleading. The reasons could

be that Kant's text reflecting his direct engagement in "international relations", is more often symbolically mentioned than actually read. Here the phrase "symbolically mentioned" requires clarification. What it means is that, the famous treatise on *Perpetual Peace*, which is the only work where the philosopher "explicitly" deals with "the theory of international relations", is usually read without putting it in the context of his whole philosophy. This approach leads to one-dimensional interpretations and misrepresentations. In this context, E. H. Carr's reference to Kant within his definition of the traditional dualism as a confrontation between the houses of "realism" and "utopianism" merits close attention.

In his *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, Carr mentions Kant's name on two occasions. First, in the second Chapter where he lays down the theoretical foundations of "the science of international politics." There he quotes the following passage from the *First Critique*:

"(Reason, says Kant, must approach nature) not... in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply

questions which he himself thinks fit to propose."

(13)

After this basic Kantian description of man's autonomy and freedom Carr concludes:

"Political thought is itself a form of political action. Political science is the science not only of what is, but of what ought to be... Mature thought combines purpose with observation and analysis. Utopia and reality are thus the two facets of political science... All healthy human action, and therefore all healthy human thought must establish a balance between utopia and reality, between free will and determinism." (14)

So far so good. Carr, in search of a solution to the antinomy between theory and practice, between free will and determinism, rightfully turns to Kant. In this respect, his theoretical framework is based by and large on Kant's epistemology. However, when we shift to Chapter 3, Kant's name comes back again as one of the originators of utopianism. It is the Chapter which deals with "The Utopian Background and The Foundations of Utopianism". Here Carr's reference to Kant is related to his "political theory". After citing Abbe de Saint-Pierre as an earlier proponent for a league of nations, he continues:

"Both Rousseau and Kant argued that, since wars were waged by princes in their own interest and not in that of their peoples, there would be no wars under a republican form of government. In this sense, they anticipated the view that public opinion, if allowed to make itself effective, would suffice to prevent war. In the nineteenth century, this view won widespread approval in Europe, and took on the specifically rationalist colour proper to the doctrine that the holding of the right moral beliefs and the performance of the right actions can be assured by process of reasoning." (15)

This sketchy and distorted form of Kant interpretation has become a recurrent theme, a leitmotif in the "theories of international relations". The equation of (or rather reduction to) Kant's philosophical conception and construction of perpetual peace with the "utilitarian belief" in the infallibility of public opinion creates nothing but confusion. It does not do justice to Kant, because no assessment of his concept of "perpetual peace" can be adequate unless it is done within the context of his moral and political philosophy.

The second example for Kant interpretation as a negative image of realism, which I would like to mention here, is Martin Wight (Hedley Bull follows

him and appropriates his "triad" with slight modifications.) He describes Kant in his "triad" as the revolutionary theorist of international relations as opposed to realists (Machiavelli) and rationalists (Grotius). Wight's definition of "revolutionist" is based on the assumption that Kant wishes to see the transformation of the international system into something else. This looks like a more accurate way of Kant reading. However, he concludes that Kant's goal is not realistic and cannot be attained. (16) Thus, a more accurate characterization of Kant ends up exactly with Carr's conclusion, i.e., in his approach to international relations Kant is a utopian. We should not be surprised, because they both share the same epistemological premises, namely, that of realism.

Reading Kant from the perspective of realism can and should be traced back to Hegel. Hegel's "relativist particularism" represents exactly the opposite what Kant defends and stands for. At the turn of the 18th/19th century, with the intervention of Hegel (Herder, Fichte and Schelling also played their parts) the Kantian project of transcendental universalism was abandoned. Hegel localized Kant's universalist moralism (or moral universalism) and

redefined it as "*Sittlichkeit*". As Taylor states, according to Hegel, "*Sittlichkeit*" means the moral obligation that one has to an ongoing community of which he is part. (17) In Hegel's own words, "the state" is "the ethical (*sittliche*) universe". Thus, the moral universalism and/or universalist moralism of Kant has been Germanized.

Hegel sees "the state" as "the actuality of the ethical idea". "It is ethical mind qua the substantial will manifest and revealed to itself, knowing and thinking itself, accomplishing what it knows and in so far as it knows it." (18) "The nation state is mind in its substantive rationality and immediate actuality and therefore the absolute power on earth... There is no praetor to judge between states." (19) I know it is not right to quote phrases taken out of context. But, what I am citing here are paradigmatic judgements: each one of them contains opposition to Kant's political and moral philosophy and each one of them were strongly influential on the nationalist-realist political philosophies of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Hegelian version of Kant reading culminates in the preface of *Philosophy of Right*, where Hegel, without explicitly referring to the name of Kant, but clearly taking him as a point of orientation,

lays down the epistemological foundations of "relativist realism":

"What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational.. To comprehend what is, this is the task of philosophy, because what is, is reason. Whatever happens, every individual is a child of his time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts. It is just absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it is to fancy that an individual can overleap his own age, jump over Rhodes. If his theory really goes beyond the world as it is and builds an ideal one as it ought to be, that world exists indeed, but only in his opinions, an unsubstantial element where anything you please may, in fancy, be built." (20)

Hegel was wrong. In the following pages I will try to explain why and how a particular individual jumped over Rhodes and overleapt his own age; why and how Kantian (political) philosophy transcended its contemporary world.

Before starting to draw the theoretical-methodological boundaries of this work, I should like to clarify my position with respect to two recent interpretations of Kant within the context of international relations theory, which aim to bypass

and go beyond the framework of realism/idealism opposition.

The first example is Andrew Linklater. He has written two books in which he tries to construct an alternative theoretical framework to the traditional theories of international relations. In his first book *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations* (21), he explores the possibility for a new theory of international relations by reading Kant, Hegel, Marx through the medium of Habermas. He challenges domestic/international as well as morality/politics dichotomies. Inspired by Habermas, he claims to improve both on realism and idealism by historicising the realm of international politics.

His second book *Beyond Realism and Marxism* (22) develops an argument for the synthesis of realist and Marxist perspectives of international relations in an alternative theory which will go beyond them. Again Habermas is his source of inspiration. Following Habermas' footsteps, Linklater suggests that the new critical theory of international relations should preserve the idea of universal standards (moral universalization) without becoming a-historical or utopian in its analysis. He also

remains committed to the Kantian philosophy of history, i.e. history as progress.

Both attempts are promising in identifying the problems, but disappointing in their proposed solutions. The reason for this is the impossible attempt to bring the irreconcilable epistemologies of Kant (transcendental universalism) and Hegel (relativist particularism) into agreement.

The second example is Chris Brown's book on *International Relations Theory*. (23) In that book we observe a more useful classification attempt. Brown constructs a conceptual framework by drawing a distinction between "cosmopolitanism" and "communitarian" as opposing tendencies, and suggests the organization of the international relations theory around these two poles. Setting out from this conceptualization, he argues that the most elaborate and explicit theorizing of cosmopolitanism is to be found in the works of Kant. He further describes utilitarianism and Marxism as alternative sources of cosmopolitanism. Consequently, Kant together with Bentham and Marx is assumed to be the cosmopolitan theorist of international relations.

In Brown's classification, "communitarian" is taken as an antonym of cosmopolitanism. He cites Hegel as the chief exponent of communitarian

international theory. Within this context references are also made to Herder, Fichte and Mill as proponents of communitarian theory. Following his presentation of cosmopolitan/communitarian divide (based on a spatialized categorization, it implies the nation-state/international society opposition), Brown qualifies his position and asserts that he is dealing with two frameworks within which theories can be sited, rather than two theories as such. Brown's new dualism is, in many aspects, more useful and functional than the traditional one between realism and idealism. However, it is merely descriptive and suffers from certain flaws in its analysis of Kantian political philosophy. The problem arises when he limits himself to the boundaries of the "theory of international relations". Hence, the basic epistemological assumption of the traditional dualism comes back to the surface again, namely, the separation of domestic and international politics.

Synopsis of The Argument

The primary purpose of this study is to challenge the axiomatic separation and isolation of the international from the domestic (national)

politics through the medium of Kant. In my critical dialogue with Kant, I will try to show why his position with respect to the "international relations" is directly locked into his critical philosophy as a whole. The central argument of this work is based on the following theses:

a) Kant offers us a theoretical humanism which can also be read as a philosophical anthropology.

b) Kant's forward-looking, future-oriented philosophy of history with its emphasis on progress for the better lays down the foundations of his moral and political philosophy.

c) Kant's conception of freedom, equality and autonomy on the one hand, and the universal human community on the other, determines his approach to domestic as well as international politics, which he sees as interdependent parts of a cosmopolitan whole.

d) Kant's insistence on a "republican constitutionalism with a cosmopolitan intent" establishes the connecting point between moral universalism and human freedom, and thus combines morality with legality through politics.

e) The definition of Kant's mostly recurring themes of "republican constitutionalism" and "perpetual peace" on the basis of "persons as ends"

implies a political philosophy towards universalization of politics, and transcends the domestic/international divide.

To develop my argument, I will apply a methodology of close examination and textual analysis of Kant's works. In addition, I will also engage in a selective and critical reading of the secondary works on Kant's political thought, and will try to come to terms with these different interpretations.

In the first Chapter, I will analyze Kant's "theoretical humanism" with a special attention to his "epistemology" and "philosophical anthropology". The texts which will be examined in this Chapter are, *Critique of Pure Reason*, *Critique of Practical Reason*, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* and the first part of *The Conflict of Faculties*. It is no accident that these texts are grouped together. I will try to explain the logic behind the selection of these texts as an interrelated reading material. In contrast to this interconnected reading, I will attempt to explain why the dialectic of man and the human community occupies a central position in Kant's thought.

I open the second Chapter with a close inspection of the treatise on *Idea for a Universal*

History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose. I will argue that this Kantian essay of 1784 is the primer and central text which informs all his subsequent "moral and political writings". I will claim that "history of future times" appears to be the underlying concept for understanding his approach to politics. I will then compare this text of 1784 with the *Critique of Teleological Judgement* and the second part of *The Conflict of Faculties* in order to demonstrate the interrelationship between "freedom", "history of future times" and "politics". In this respect, it is also necessary to refer to the differences between Herder and Kant. I will show that in his reviews of Herder's *Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind* and *in Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History*, Kant further clarifies his own approach to history and politics. In my reading, I will seek to prove that Kant's future-oriented history conception is a philosophical justification of man's right to political freedom.

In Chapter Three, I will apply close inspection to the following texts: *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and *The Doctrine of Virtue* (This book constitutes the second part of *The Metaphysics of Morals*). The aim of this Chapter

will be to reconstruct Kant's moral philosophy with a view to politics.

In Chapter Four, I will engage in a critical reading of the treatise on "*Perpetual Peace*". I will read this Kantian text together with the peace projects of Abbe de St. Pierre, Rousseau and Bentham, and try to underline its unique characteristic.

In Chapter Five, I will take up Kant's essays on *What is Enlightenment*, and *On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice*, together with the *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, the *Rechtslehre* (the second part of the *Metaphysics of Morals*) and the first part of *Critique of Judgement*. I will analyze these texts through the medium of Habermas. By doing this, I will argue for a new theoretical framework to be developed on the basis of the concept of "*universalization of politics*".

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

- 1) Joerg Martin Gabriel, *Worldviews and Theories of International Relations*, St. Martin Press, New York, 1994, p.11.
- 2) I do not intend to overlook the existence of different classifications which refer to other names as well. However, most of them cite all of these names, and all of them Kant.
- 3) R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge University Press, London 1993, p.XII.
- 4) Charles Taylor, *Hegel*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975, p.449.
- 5) Kimberly Hutchings, *Kant, Critique and Politics*, Routledge, London, 1996, p.152.
- 6) Justin Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society*, Verso, London, 1994, p.29. For a critical evaluation of Carr's, Morgenthau's and Waltz's realism see ch.1, pp.9-38.
- 7) For a useful account of realism/idealism polarization in the theory of international relations see Martin Griffiths, *Realism, Idealism and International Politics*, Routledge, London, 1992.

Griffith develops his argument by engaging in a critical analysis of "three grand theorists" of international politics -Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Hedley Bull.

8) R.N. Berki, *On Political Realism*, J.M. Dent and Sons, London, 1981. Berki argues can be traced back to the antinomy between necessity and freedom.

9) E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis*, McMillan, London, 1981.

10) Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, Holmes & Meier, New York, 1994.

11) Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, McMillan, London 1977.

12) Ian Clark, *Reform and Resistance in the International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980. Clark's identification of Rousseau with a "tradition of despair" and Kant with a "tradition of optimism" is a typical recent echo of the opposition between realism and idealism.

13) Carr, p.3.

14) *ibid*, pp.5,10-11.

15) *ibid*, p.25.

16) Wight, pp.xi-xii.

17) Taylor, p.376. "Sittlichkeit" is translated into English as "ethical life". Taylor rightfully

claims that this translation does not reflect the actual meaning of this German word.

18) G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, translated by T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, p.155.

19) *ibid*, pp.212-213.

20) *ibid*, pp.11-12.

21) Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, Macmillan, London, 1982.

22) Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism Critical Theory and International Relations*, Macmillan, London, 1990.

23) Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory, New Normative Approaches*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1992.

CHAPTER ONE

CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OR
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

"... Kant defines reason as nothing other than universal reason, envisioned as the chorus of the voices of 'everybody.' His epistemological model thus is intrinsically political... Consequently, reason is transformed from the capacity to execute definition-based syllogisms into the practise of expressing the 'volonte generale'."

Willi Goetschel, Constituting Critique

- I -

In this Chapter, I will seek to uncover the practical implications of Kant's "critical enterprise" and try to reconstruct it as a philosophical anthropology. The texts which will be examined for this purpose are *Critique of Pure*

Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View and the first part of *The Conflict of Faculties*. These texts are closely connected to one another, make reference to one another and together comprise the outline of the Kantian epistemic framework.

Kant's Critical Philosophy is both a theoretical and practical project, which far from having come to an end, still awaits its realization.

(1) It represents a radical shift in epistemology with a theoretical as well as practical agenda. At the very top of this agenda lies a "theoretical humanism" introducing a new conceptual framework for understanding (and changing) the dialectical relationship between man and the world; man and the universal human community. Freedom and the (moral) dignity of humanity emerge as the defining concepts of this philosophical intervention in the "public sphere".

The Kantian "revolution in thinking" (2) occurred at a time when the eighteenth-century thought, divided between rationalism and empiricism, was in a state of crisis. Kant's critical dialogue, especially, with Rousseau and Hume played a decisive role in the preparation of his creative move to find a way out of this impasse. It was a simple but

radical move: by reformulating the subject-object relationship he delimited the boundaries of the theoretical (pure) and practical reason. The result was the emancipation of the epistemological subject. (3) In Kant's own words:

"The old philosophy assigned to man an entirely incorrect standpoint in the world by making him into a machine within it, a machine which as such was meant to be wholly dependent on the world or on external things and circumstances; in this way it made man an all but passive part of the world. -Now the critique of Reason has appeared and allotted man a thoroughly active existence in the world. Man himself is the original maker of all his representations and concepts, and ought to be the sole author of all his actions." (5)

In this brilliant summary of his "epistemological break" with the past, Kant underlines the real potential of man, that is, man has the power to change (and to create) his own world. This lays down the theoretical groundwork on which theory and practice can be brought together. With his practical reason, man has the autonomy to transform the "is" into the "ought". This capacity gives man his distinctive and unique character: he is a free agent who acts with a sense of purpose.

Kant's formulation is sketched out as follows: "(The free will and the moral person of humanity) guarantee us a specific characteristic that belongs only to man and distinguish him from all the rest of nature: morality, which makes us independent and free beings and which is itself, in turn, based on this freedom". (6)

What are the practical (political) consequences of this theoretical intervention? How can Kant's "critical turn" be interpreted in terms of political theory? Or, could it be read in that way? Is there a "Politics of Critique" hidden within the *First Critique*. Hans Saner's approach to these questions is highly original. (7) Although at the beginning of his book on *Kant's Road from War to Peace: Conflict and Unity*, he states that "Kant's political ideas are located at the periphery of his work", (8), he nevertheless presents a notably innovative reading particularly of the *First Critique*, in which he argues that political thought is "the heart of Kant's philosophizing". (9) Beginning with a Kantian phrase, "the way to peace", Saner asserts: "He (Kant) starts politics moving, advances it, and sets its goal." (10) In other words, all political action should and could aim at change for the better. Saner goes on: "'Way to

Peace' is a figure of speech that encompasses the 'war/peace' dualism, which in turn points to such other dualisms as... diversity/unity and difference/identity." (11) Setting out from these dualisms, he constructs Kant's politics as a march from war to peace, from diversity to unity, i.e., as a search for peace and unity through freedom and reason. The weakness of Saner's interpretation lies in his strength. The stronger part of his reading emerges with particular clarity in his handling of the *First Critique*, the weaker part with his underestimation of Kant's writings on philosophy of history and moral/political theory. Therefore, although he clarifies the politics of Kant's "revolution in thinking", he fails to show how Kant's epistemology is connected to his moral/political theory, and thus leads us to a philosophical anthropology. Let us close this parenthesis here and turn to the *Critique of Pure Reason* in order to analyze the epistemological foundations of Kant's moral/political theory. As we will see this will bring us to the dialectic between man and universal human community.

- II -

In the preface to the first edition (1781) of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant delineates his theoretical-political agenda and gives "Critique" an explicitly political meaning:

"Our age is, in a special degree, the age of criticism (Kritik), and to criticism everything must submit. Religion through its sanctity, and law-giving through its majesty, may seek to exempt themselves from it. But they then awaken just suspicion, and cannot claim the sincere respect which reason accords only to that which has been able to sustain the test of free and open examination." (12) This is clearly a political intervention in philosophical practice. Worldly and religious authorities are also subjugated to reason and asked to withstand reason's (men's) free and public trial. Rousseau's footprints are visible here.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant does not cite Rousseau's name at all. Hume, Locke, and Hobbes, on the other hand, are the frequently mentioned names in this text. However, on closer

scrutiny we can find Rousseau (12) as a dominant figure hidden within the *"First Critique"*. This is not a surprise, because, Rousseau has played a central role in Kant's intellectual and philosophical development. Kant admits this fact on many occasions. He even calls Rousseau as the *"Newton of the Moral World"*, and the *"restorer of the rights of humanity"*. The most famous passage in this regard, however, appears in the *Bemerkungen in den Beobachtungen ueber das Gefuehl des Schoenen und Erhabenen*.

"I, myself, am by inclination a seeker after knowledge; I thirst for it and well know the eager restlessness of the desire to know more and the satisfaction that comes with every step forward. There was a time when I thought this alone could be equivalent to the honour of humanity, and I despised the common herd who know nothing. Rousseau set me right. This blind sense of superiority (prejudice) vanished. I am learning to honour men and should regard myself as far more useless than an ordinary working man did I do not believe that this 'Betrachtung' (philosophizing) might lend value to all others and help them establish the rights of humanity". (16)

Kant's own testimony clearly indicates how Rousseau helped him to broaden his conception of man. Let us now continue to search Rousseau's footsteps in the *First Critique*.

The Preface to the Second Edition places "volonte generale" above philosophical practise. Kant states: "... the Schools (of philosophy) have been brought to recognize that they can lay no claim to higher and fuller insight in a matter of universal human concern than that which is equally within the reach of the great mass of men (ever to be held by us in the highest esteem)..." (17) In this quotation, Rousseau's decisive influence on Kant is explicit and there is no need for further clarification.

Later in the Chapter entitled "The Discipline of Pure Reason in Respect of its Polemical Employment" we come across a political metaphor reflecting a new conception of reason (man) which will be elaborated in the treatises on *What is Enlightenment?* (1784) and *What is Orientation in Thinking?* (1786), that is, "the free and public use of reason". (18) By placing speech, criticism and communication at the center of reasoning, and hence of the possibility of freedom, Kant starts developing his conception of the dialectic between

man and human community. He states: "Reason must in all its undertakings subject itself to criticism; should it limit freedom of criticism by any prohibitions, it must harm itself, drawing upon itself a damaging suspicion. Nothing is so important through its usefulness, nothing is so sacred, that it may be exempted from this searching examination, which knows not respect for persons. Reason depends on this freedom for its very existence." (19)

In the midst of Kant epistemological project, the realm of the political emerges as a determining element. Kant, then, continues: "For reason has no dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the agreement of free citizens, of whom each one must be permitted to express, without let or hindrance, his objections or even his veto." (20)

With this implicit reference to Rousseau, Kant delineates the dialectic between epistemology and political theory. (21) In this context, philosophical practise is nothing but the study of man and human community; or, in Kant's own words, "philosophy is in reality nothing other than a practical knowledge of men". (22) Kant elaborates this view with utmost clarity in the first part of *The Conflict of the Faculties*:

"I have learned from the Critique of Pure Reason that philosophy is not a science of representations, concepts and Ideas, or a science of all the sciences, or anything else of this sort. It is rather a science of man, of his representations, thoughts and actions: it should present all the components of man both as he is and as he should (ought to) be -that is, in terms both of his natural functions and of his relations of morality and freedom". (23)

It is in line with this reasoning that I have tried to uncover the profound and lasting effects of Rousseau on Kant's work. As it was also stated by van de Pitte (24), what Kant gained from Rousseau was the awareness that the attainment of knowledge is not an end in itself; that all aspects of philosophy must be directed toward the comprehension of the moral nature of man; that the dignity and worth of man is a sufficient basis for moral convictions, and thus that, in general, moral or practical or political philosophy takes precedence over theoretical. In the Critique of Pure Reason itself, the ultimate end of human reason is "no other than the whole vocation of man, and the philosophy which deals with it is entitled moral philosophy". (25)

According to Kant, the idea of a moral world has objective reality, as being an object of pure reason in its practical employment, that is, as a 'corpus mysticum' of the rational beings in it, so far as the free will of each being is, under moral laws, in complete systematic unity with itself and with the freedom of every other. (26) The logical inference from this is that moral philosophy is philosophical anthropology in the broad sense working out the whole vocation of man. *"Or it follows upon a pure philosophical conception of men for it would be impossible to work out the whole vocation of men until such a conception had been established"*. (27)

To put the matter briefly, the Critique of Pure Reason lays down the groundwork on which *"man's freedom"* or *"autonomy of politics"* can be founded. This brings us to the common goal of humanity which, even before the *"critical period"*, is defined as the attainment of a universal civil society of world-citizens. Before concluding my reading of the First Critique, I should like to underline that reason, to Kant, is nothing other than universal reason in which everyone has his say. (28) The following passage from the *Transcendental Dialectic* informs

all of Kant's subsequent writings pertaining to political/moral theory:

"A constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others -I do not speak of the greatest happiness, for this will follow of itself- is at any rate a necessary idea, which must be taken as fundamental not only in first projecting a constitution but in all its laws. For at the start we are required to abstract from the actually existing hindrances, which, it may be, do not arise unavoidably out of human nature, but rather are due to a quite remediable cause, the neglect of the pure ideas in the making of the laws. Nothing, indeed, can be more injurious, or more unworthy of a philosopher, than the vulgar appeal to so-called adverse experience. Such experience would never have existed at all, if at the proper time those institutions had been established in accordance with ideas, and if ideas had not been displaced by crude conceptions which, just because they have been derived from experience, have nullified all good intentions. The more legislation and government are brought into harmony with the above idea, the rarer would punishments become, and it is therefore quite

rational to maintain (as Plato does) that in a perfect state, no punishments whatsoever would be required. This perfect state may never, indeed, come into being; none the less this does not affect the rightfulness of the idea, which, in order to bring legal organization of mankind ever nearer to its greatest possible perfection, advances this maximum as an archetype. For what the highest degree may be at which mankind may have to come to a stand, and how great a gulf may still have to be left between the idea and its realization, are questions which no one can, or ought to, answer. For the issue depends on freedom; and it is in the power of freedom to pass beyond and every specified limit." (29)

Thus, Kant bridges the gap between (political) theory and practice. In Kantian "*Fragestellung*", Politics is the "*Praxis*", the constant search for the betterment of the universal human community through freedom.

- III -

Central to Kant's Second Critique is the concept of moral freedom. In the First Critique, by lifting up (*aufheben*) the knowledge and delimiting

the theoretical reason Kant opens up room for morality. (30) His primary concern was to reconcile freedom with the principle of causality: in this sense, Kant's conception of freedom excludes acting merely out of our desires. He thinks that only in acting morally, that we are acting freely. Furthermore, the conflict between natural necessity and freedom is rejected as a false antinomy. Thus, we are told that, happiness alone cannot be an end, the dignity of humanity requires that man should prove to be worthy of happiness.

Accordingly, Kant argues that there is in man a principle which impels him to aspire ceaselessly towards a higher state, qualitatively different from his present one; and that present day man (for Kant, man in general) is limited and cannot attain this unconditioned. (31) Lucien Goldmann claims that by developing these ideas Kant lays down the philosophical foundations for the most profound and radical critique ever made of bourgeois man. (32) There is nothing wrong with this historicization attempt. It corresponds to reality. Nevertheless, Goldmann's interpretation overlooks the undeniably transcendental dimension in Kant's conception of man and history which goes beyond spatio-temporal constraints.

In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant tells us, all things in nature, including human beings, behave in accordance with laws. As Beck summarizes, "Only a rational being can have or act according to a conception of laws. A falling body, for instance, 'obeys' Galileo's law in the sense of merely illustrating it; but man, as a being endowed with consciousness and reason, can govern his behaviour by his conception of this law. By his knowledge of Galileo's law, he may decide whether it is safe to jump from a certain height, and (if his 'will' is strong enough) may thereby overcome his fear of doing so. Such a conception of law is possible only to a rational being; and we say that a man acts voluntarily when his conception of law, and not his momentary impulses, governs his behavior... The Second Critique is a critical examination of will understood in this sense, as practical reason, reason applied in conduct. And its main thesis is that though practical reason generally has an impulsive component or motive, which it more or less successfully guides by maxims and rules of experience, it is also possible for a man's reason to guide his behaviour without the motive force springing from variable, subjective impulses directed to the gaining of pleasure. Such a reason

provides not just the long-range control of impulses but, as pure practical reason, it can provide also the motives and set the ends of action. The law conceived by reason in this capacity is not empirical law of nature, or of human nature as learned in psychology, but it is the moral law, and the imperative to obey it is a categorical imperative, not hypothetical and contingent upon the actual presence of a given impulse". (33)

What Kant develops here is the structure of human experience, or more simply, the a priori principles of human nature. This directly relates to the fourth of the famous Kantian questions, that is, "what is man?" and implies a philosophical anthropology. Again, the dialectic of man and universe, men and human community lies in the center. Indeed, the fundamental law of practical reason reads:

"So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle establishing universal law". (34) Kant follows up this idea very eloquently in the conclusion of the *Second Critique*:

"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens

above me and the moral law within me... I see them before me, and I associate them directly with the consciousness of my own existence... The former view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my importance as an animal creature, which must give back to the planet (a mere speck in the universe) the matter from which it came, the matter which is for a little time provided with vital force, we know not how. The latter, on the contrary, infinitely raises my worth as that of an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law reveals a life independent of all animality and even of the whole world of sense -at least so far as it may be inferred from the purposive destination assigned to my existence by this law, a destination which is not restricted to the conditions and limits of this life but reaches into the infinite". (35)

Kant tells us that the power we have to overcome our finiteness is embodied in the dignity of humanity, i.e., in the moral law within us. This law can secure the basis for universal human solidarity. It can direct us to the progress of the humankind for the better. As a matter of fact, moral understanding arises through participation (not objectivity); this, in turn, means political action in the broad sense.

- IV -

Before moving to the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, I should like to touch upon, in passing, two pre-critical writings of Kant, namely, the *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (1764) and the essay *On the Different Races of Men*" (1775, revised 1777).

Schiller, in a letter to Goethe, describes the "*Observations*" as an anthropological exposition. (36) Besides, it is at the same time a text where the Rousseauian influence has become apparent for the first time. In the "*Remarks*" to the *Observations* Kant gives a direct testimony to this and states that participation of all men are necessary to the progress of humankind. The *Observations* itself ends with an implicit reference to Rousseau's *Emile* and assigns education -a new one which has to be rescued from old illusions- a central role for the elevation of the moral feeling in the breast of every young world-citizen. (37) The *Observations* further speaks about the "*dignity of human nature*" as the ground of "*universal esteem*". (38) As Goldwaith indicates, this dignity of human nature unifies all mankind, being common to all, and provides the underlying

unity beneath the great diversity, which Kant, the observer notes. (39) Man's dignity is the ground of the judgements that man himself is sublime. With this Rousseauian turn, Kant starts to develop a moral subjectivism which should not and cannot be confused with the "reductionist" hedonism and egoism of "classical liberal theory" stretching from Hobbes and Locke to utilitarianism. The "*summum bonum*" is no longer tied merely to "human desiring", it is rather the creation of an enlightened humanity to be freed from its self-imposed immaturity. This critique of empiricist, consequentialist liberalism opens up the perspective for a "philosophical liberalism" and "theoretical humanism". (40)

In the essay *On Different Races*, Kant lays down the biological basis for his anthropology: "All men on the whole earth belong to one and the same race, because they can produce children with each other.. Man was destined for all climates and all kinds of lands." (41) The biological unity of the human race is, according to Kant, dynamic and flexible. It is also compatible with diversity of traits and characteristics. As Despland puts it, the final end of the human race is described by Kant, in this essay, as the pursuit of the unity of mankind and the occupation of the entire planet. To Kant, "the

biological unity has a purpose and anticipates the ideal community of ends which is prescribed by morality. Mankind is one and cosmopolitan by nature and destiny (and that both in the physical - biological and geographical- sense and in the political sense)". (42) Consequently, the ultimate aim of men is set as a ceaseless struggle for a universal political (moral) unity, even if there is no guarantee for the development of mankind into a cosmopolitan whole. As we will see later on, this theme will be frequently repeated in the post-critical political writings of Kant.

- V -

"Anthropology", says Kant in a letter to C.F. Staudlin (1793), "is a subject on which I have lectured for over twenty years." Indeed, his interest in the study of man in all its aspects is well-known. In the same letter he refers to the plan he prescribed for himself a long time ago which calls for an examination of the field of pure philosophy with a view to solving three problems:

- "1) What can I know?;
- 2) What ought I do?;
- 3) What may I hope?" (43)

After these three questions he immediately poses a fourth question : "*A Fourth question ought to follow finally: What is man?*" (44) This last question is related to Anthropology. In the *Logic*, Kant is more specific and explicit. He cites there the same four questions to which "*the field of philosophy in the cosmopolitan sense may be reduced*" (45) Kant, then, makes the following comment on these questions: "*The first question is answered by metaphysics, the second by morals, the third by religion, and the fourth by anthropology. In the end, all may be reckoned to anthropology, since the first three questions relate to the fourth.*" (46)

Thus, as he himself emphasizes, Kant assigns a central role in philosophy to the study of man, his representations and actions from a cosmopolitan perspective. To him, the nature of man must possess some generic nature if it is to be called human at all. However, he does not deny in any way the diversity of humankind. He only insists on proving that cultural pluralism should and could not prevent moral universalism. The potential of a common humanity is within us, inherent in the capacity of universal human communication and cannot be renounced.

Let us now trace these ideas in the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. In the preface to the *Anthropology*, Kant makes a distinction between a physiological and a pragmatic point of view for studying the knowledge of man (anthropology)- at the same time it is a knowledge of world, because man is his own final end in the world. Physiological knowledge of man is then depicted as the investigation of what nature makes of man; pragmatic, what man as a free agent makes, can and should make of himself. The pragmatic is further clarified as the knowledge of man as a citizen of the world. (47) Immediately after these definitions, Kant presents a framework which also implies the compatibility of theory and practice. He says: "... to know the world and to know one's way about in the world are rather removed in meaning, since in the first case we only understand the play we have witnessed, while in the second we have participated in it". (48) What Kant would like to say here is that man is not a passive object but an active subject of the world. In order to understand men's representations and actions, the focus of attention should be placed on the process and progress towards the future.

Under the Chapter entitled "Egoism", Kant further clarifies his conception of man with respect to the atomistic individualism and economic reductionism of the (from Locke, Hume to the utilitarians) eudaemonists: "From the day a human being begins to speak in terms of 'I', he brings forth his beloved self wherever he can, and egoism progresses incessantly. He may not show it (for the egoism of others check him); but it progresses secretly, at least, so that his apparent self-abnegation and specious modesty will give him a better chance of being highly esteemed by others." (49)

Rousseau's influence is clear in this quotation. On close inspection we can identify the Rousseauian concepts of "amour de soi" and "amour propre" hidden in this passage. Kant goes on:

"Finally, the moral egoist is a man who limits all ends to himself, sees no use in anything except what is useful to him and, as a eudaemonist, locates the supreme determining ground of his will merely in utility and his own happiness, not in the thought of responsibility (duty). For all other man also forms his own different concept of what he considers happiness, it is precisely egoism that results... So, all eudaemonists are practical egoists." (50)

The criticism of "eudaemonism" -it can also be called "economic reductionism"- is a central argument of Kant's moral/political theory. He constructs his moral universalism on the basis of this criticism. Kant goes on:

"The opposite of egoism can be only pluralism, that is, the attitude of not being occupied with oneself as the whole world, but regarding and conducting oneself as a citizen of the world." (51)

This is the underlying argument of Kant's philosophy. The emphasis throughout this philosophy has been on man as a member of society and universal human community. The question whether the "I" as a thinking being, has reason to admit the existence of a whole of other beings beyond his existence, forming a community with him is a philosophical question (52), which occupies a central place in Kant's critical system as a whole. Kant sees the dialectical interaction between man and human community as a key to the progress of humankind.

In addition, the aim of every step in the cultural progress is also defined as man's education to free himself from the tutelage for which he himself is responsible. As Gregor puts it, *"Man's cultural progress, through the development of the arts and sciences and especially of social*

relations, is explained (in the *Anthropology* by Kant) as nature's education of the human race, its preparation for entry into a universal civil society of world-citizens". (53) Consequently, the philosophical anthropology is situated within Kant's philosophy of history, which I will take up in the next Chapter.

- VI -

In this Chapter I sought to uncover Kant's "theoretical humanism" with particular reference to his "epistemology" and "philosophical anthropology". As a result of my readings of Kant's relevant works, the following six important points need to be underlined:

1) Kant's critical intervention in epistemology has an intrinsically political meaning.

2) Throughout Kant's critical project the emphasis is on man's ability to change (and to create) the world -the human community- and the incompatibility of theory and practise is rejected.

3) The emancipated epistemological subject is nothing other than the "citizen of the world" who has the ultimate aim to develop mankind into a cosmopolitan whole.

4) Starting out from Rousseau's moral and social theory and his conception of human dignity, Kant presents a powerful criticism of the epistemological presuppositions of the eudaemonistic, atomistic and economic-reductionist version of liberalism. (54)

5) Spatio-temporal limitations on mankind (as human species) are rejected on the basis of moral universalism without renouncing cultural diversity and pluralism.

6) Critique implies "*Praxis*"; i.e., making rather than writing history -history of the future, not of the past- through universal political action.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1) Willi Goetschel, *Constituting Critique*, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1994, p.6.

2) In the preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant describes his Copernican Revolution with the following words:

"Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given. We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus' primary hypothesis (mit den ersten gedanken des Kopernikus). Failing of satisfactory progress in explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved round the

spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator revolve and the stars remain at rest. A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics, as regards the intuition of objects. If intuition must conform to the constitution of the objects, I do not see how we could know anything of the latter a priori; but if the object (as object of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such possibility." CPR, B-XVI-XVII. This famous quotation is interpreted by Walter Kaufmann as an anti-Copernican revolution. Kaufmann maintains: "Kant reversed Copernicus' stunning blow to human self-esteem. Before Copernicus the Western World had believed that man was at the center of the universe and that the sun revolved around on our earth. Copernicus' doctrine involved what Freud liked to call a 'cosmological mortification' of man's self-love. A generation earlier, Nietzsche had remarked: Since Copernicus man seems to have got himself on an inclined plane; now he is slipping faster and faster away from the center into -what? into nothingness? into a penetrating sense of his nothingness? Students of Kant are thought that he sought to counter David Hume's skepticism or positivism- or nihilism. But

Kant's immense impact is inseparable from his success in also countering the nihilism that had developed in the wake of Copernicus. He restored man to the center of the world and actually accorded even greater importance to man than the Book of Genesis had done." Walter Kaufmann, *Goethe, Kant and Hegel, Discovering the Mind*, Volume 1, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1980, pp.87-88. For a similar approach, see Yirmiahu Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1980, p.132. Although both Kaufmann and Yovel share the same comment, they used it for different purposes. Kaufmann's reading is nothing but a polemical variation of Nietzsche's approach to Kant. Yovel, on the other hand, tries to combine Kant's "humanism" with his "philosophy of history".

3) I have borrowed this definition from Goetschel, *ibid*, p.5.

4) It is necessary to mention that Kant uses the German word "Mensch" which is unlike "man", neither feminine nor masculine but neutral.

5) *CF*, pp.127-129. For an alternative translation of this quotation see Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p.186.

6) CF, p.133.

7) Hans Saner, *Kant's Political Thought*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1973. The original German title reflects the content of this book much better: *Kant's Weg vom Krieg zum Frieden*, Vol I: *Widerstreit und Einheit: Wege zu Kant's politischem Denken*.

8) *ibid*, p.1.

9) *ibid*, p.3.

10) *ibid*, p.3.

11) *ibid*, p.4.

12) CPR, A-XIf.

13) During his pre-Critical period Kant studied Rousseau with great admiration and interest. Rousseau's influence on Kant is well-founded. See, Ernst Cassirer, "Kant and Rousseau", in *Rousseau, Kant, Goethe*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1970.

14) Cited in Patrick Riley, *Kant's Political Thought*, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, NJ, 1983, p.7.

15) Cited in Cassirer, *ibid*, p.13.

16) Immanuel Kant, *Bemerkungen in den Beobachtungen ueber das Gefuehl des Schoenen und Erhabenen*, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1995, p.38. I have quoted with slight modification the English translation

cited in Karl Jaspers, *Kant*, Harcourt Brace Company, New York, 1962, p.5

17) CPR, B-XXXIII.

18) Hans Reiss, *Kant's Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp.235-249. Reiss explains: "Kant's essay on 'What is orientation in Thinking?' provides an introduction to his critical philosophy and shows how his discussion of the theoretical use of reason, as argued in detail in the 'First Critique' and in the 'Prolegomena' necessarily leads on to the practical use of reason as defined in his writings on ethics (for instance in the Second Critique and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals), which in turn provide the foundation of his political writings... (According to Kant) reason must not be subjected to any laws except those which it imposes on itself. Political freedom is imperative for the free use of reason, because we need to communicate our arguments and findings to others and have them criticized by them. Without the public use of reason we cannot orientate our thinking properly. The essay thus shows how, in Kant's view, epistemology and ethics are closely interlinked with politics as well as how, in his opinion, rational enquiry and moral conduct can be practised properly

only in a society governed according to principles of politics based on the Idea of freedom. In other words, Kant's theory of politics, as this essay shows, is not an unimportant appendix to his critical philosophy, but a necessary consequence of it."

I should like to quote from this Kantian essay the following passage in extenso, for it is the most telling example in the history of political theories on 'freedom of thought' combined with a powerful defense of reason against the criticisms of "the romantics and irrationalists." Given the post-modernist criticism of enlightenment and reason, Kant's admonition is as relevant today as it was then (I will elaborate on this point later in the conclusion). Kant states: "Men of intellectual ability and breadth of mind! I venerate your talents and cherish your human feelings. But have you also fully considered what you are doing, and what your attacks on reason are likely to lead to? You doubtless wish that 'freedom of thought' should remain inviolate; for without it, even the free flights of your genius would soon come to an end. Let us consider what must naturally become of this freedom of thought if a procedure such as you have initiated should become generally accepted.

"Opposition to freedom of thought comes firstly from civil coercion. We do admittedly say that, whereas a higher authority may deprive us of freedom of speech or of writing, it cannot deprive us of freedom of thought. But how much and how accurately would we think if we did not think, so to speak, in community with others to whom we communicate our thoughts and who communicate their thoughts to us! We may therefore conclude that the same external constraint which deprives people of the freedom to communicate their thoughts in public also removes their freedom of thought, the one treasure which remains to us amidst all the burdens of civil life, and which alone offers us a means of overcoming all the evils of this condition.

"Secondly, freedom of thought is also used to denote the opposite of that moral constraint whereby some citizens, without the use of external force, set themselves up as the guardians of others in religious matters, and succeed in outlawing all rational enquiry -not by argument, but by prescribing articles of faith backed up by a nervous fear of the dangers of independent investigation, impressing these articles from an early stage on the minds of those concerned.

"Thirdly, freedom of thought also signifies the subjection of reason to no laws other than those which it imposes on itself; and its opposite is the maxim of the lawless use of reason (in order that it may, as the genius imagines, see further than it does when restricted by laws). Naturally enough, the result of this is that, if reason does not wish to be subject to the law which it imposes on itself, it must bow beneath the yoke of laws which someone else imposes upon it; for nothing -not even the greatest absurdity- can continue to operate for long without some kind of law. Thus, the inevitable result of self-confessed lawlessness in thinking (i.e. of emancipation from the restrictions of reason) is this: freedom of thought is thereby ultimately forfeited and, since the fault lies not with misfortune, for example, but with genuine presumption, this freedom is in the true sense of the word thrown away.

"The sequence of events is roughly as follows. The genius is at first delighted with its daring flights, having cast aside the thread by which reason formerly guided it. It soon captivates others in turn with its authoritative pronouncements and great expectations, and now appears to have set itself up on a throne on which slow and ponderous

reason looked so out of place; nevertheless, it still continues to use language of reason. It then adopts the maxim that the supreme legislation of reason is invalid, a maxim which we ordinary mortals describe as zealotry (the German word Kant uses is "Schwaermerei" which can also be translated into English as "fanaticism", but which those favorite of benevolent nature describe as illumination. Meanwhile, a confusion of tongues must soon arise among them, for while reason alone can issue instructions which are valid for everyone, each individual now follows his own inspiration. The ultimate consequence of all this is that inner inspirations are inevitably transformed into facts confirmed by external evidence, and traditions which were originally freely chosen eventually become binding documents; in a word, the complete subjugation of reason to facts -i.e. superstition- must ensue, for this at least can be reduced to a legal form so that peace can then be restored.

"But since human reason nevertheless continues to strive for freedom, the first use which it makes of its long unaccustomed liberty, once it has broken its bonds, must degenerate into misuse, into a presumptuous confidence in the independence of its own powers from every restriction, and into a

conviction of the sole authority of speculative reason which accepts only what can be justified on objective grounds and by dogmatic conviction, but brashly dismisses everything else. Now the maxim of the independence of reason from its own need (i.e. the renunciation of rational belief) is called unbelief. But this is not the same thing as unbelief in the historical sense, for it is impossible to think of the latter as intentional and hence to imagine that those who espouse it are responsible for their action (for everyone must believe a fact, so long as it is sufficiently well attested, just as much as a mathematical demonstration, whether they wish to or not). On the contrary, it is a rational unbelief, an undesirable state of mind which first deprives the moral laws of all their power to motivate the heart, and eventually even deprives them of all authority, so giving rise to the attitude known as libertinism (i.e. the principle of no longer acknowledging any duty). At this point, the authorities intervene to ensure that civil affairs are not themselves plunged into complete disorder; and since they regard the most expeditious and forceful measures as the most appropriate, they may even abolish freedom of thought altogether and make thought itself, like

other professions, subject to laws of the land. Hence freedom of thought, if it tries to act independently even of the laws of reason, eventually destroys itself.

"Friends of the human race and of all that it holds most sacred! Accept whatever seems most credible to you after careful and honest examination, whether it is a matter of facts or of rational arguments; but do not deny reason that prerogative which makes it the greatest good on earth, namely its right to be the ultimate touchstone of truth. If you fail in this respect, you will be unworthy of this freedom and will surely forfeit it; and you will bring the same misfortune down upon those other guiltless souls who would otherwise have been inclined to employ their freedom lawfully and hence in a manner conducive to the world's best interests!". Reiss, *ibid*, pp.247-249.

19) *ibid*, B-766.

20) *ibid*, B-767.

21) Goetschel, p.139.

22) cited in Jaspers, p.8.

23) *CF*, p.127.

24) Frederick van de Pitte, "Kant as Philosophical Anthropologist", in *Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress*, ed. by Lewis White

Beck, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland, 1972, p.577.

25) CPR, B-868.

26) *ibid*, B-836.

27) van de Pitte, p.579.

28) CPR, B-780.

29) *ibid*, B-374.

30) *ibid*, p.B-XXX

31) Lucien Goldmann, *Kant*, NLB, London, 1971, p.131.

32) *ibid*, p.131.

33) CPR, pp.xi-xii.

34) *ibid*, p.30.

35) *ibid*, p.166.

36) Goetschel, p.59.

37) CF, p.116.

38) *ibid*, p.60.

39) *ibid*, p.11.

40) Richard L. Velkley, "The Crisis of the End of Reason in Kant's Philosophy"; in *Kant and Political Philosophy*, ed. by Ronald Beiner and William James Booth, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1993, p.83.

41) Cited in Michel Despland, *Kant on History and Religion*, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 1973, p.21.

42) *ibid*, p.21.

43) Arnulf Zweig, *Immanuel Kant, Philosophical Correspondence (1759-1799)*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967, p.205.

44) *ibid.* p.205. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* only the first three questions are posed, see CPR, B-833.

45) cited in Goldmann, p.130.

46) *ibid*, p.130.

47) APV, p.3.

48) *ibid*, p.4.

49) *ibid*, p.10.

50) *ibid*, p.11.

51) *ibid*, p.12.

52) *ibid*, p.12.

53) *ibid*, p.1.

54) Taylor describes Kant's position as a revolution of radical freedom: "Moral freedom must mean being able to decide against all inclinations for the sake of the morally right. This more radical view of course rejected at the same time a utilitarian definition of morality, the morally right could not be determined by happiness and therefore by desire... The main figure in this revolution of radical freedom is without question Immanuel Kant. Rousseau in some ways foreshadowed the idea, but Kant's was the formulation, that of a

*giant among philosophers, which imposed itself, then
and still today."* Taylor, p.29.

CHAPTER TWO

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

"The Idea for a Universal History in a Cosmopolitan Perspective is a terse, incandescent manifesto for a world order still to be constructed, and a world history yet to be written. If there is a single prophetic vision of the political agenda now apparently unfolding before us two centuries later, it is this."

Perry Anderson, A Zone of Engagement

- I -

The most common objection to Kant is based on the following interpretation: critical philosophy is "ahistorical" particularly in its construction of freedom and morality. (1) This almost generic criticism against the "Critical Project" has

repeatedly been voiced by many Kant "interpreters" over the past twohundred years. Herder's and - especially- Hegel's influence on the succeeding generations in this connection have been decisive. Hence, Kant has been criticized mainly for disregarding the (past) history -the tradition in the broad sense- in his conception of man's freedom and morality. This is a bad reading of Kant. It overlooks the fact that Kant does have a philosophy of history and that he deliberately opts for a future-oriented one. As Yovel points out, to Kant, *"history is the domain in which action is supposed to create a progressive synthesis between the moral demands of reason and the actual world of experience."* (2)

The second most common misunderstanding in Kant's interpretations within the context of history relates to his position with regard to *"empiricism"*. As we have seen in the previous Chapter, Kant recognizes the potential of man as an active part of the world, i.e., man, as a free agent endowed with reason and morality can change and reshape his own world in accordance with a moral and rational goal. Here, the emphasis on action and change is clearly in conformity with the spirit of the Age of *Enlightenment*. However, Kant also adopted a strong

critical stance toward the struggle between empiricism and rationalism. He renounced their claim to unqualified truth. In this respect, Kant's criticism, especially, against "*empiricism*" is at times considered to be an opposition to the progressive "*Zeitgeist*" of the eighteenth-century. The reason for this misinterpretation could be the identification of empiricism (since it was the rising epistemological project) with the spirit of the Age. This view does not do justice to Kant at all. First of all, Kant never rejected empiricism and the "*scientific method*" in themselves, but only criticized their direct application to the study of man and society. He was against skepticism and dogmatism, but not against rationalism and empiricism per se. By drawing the boundaries of theoretical and practical reason, he renounced Hume's conception of philosophy as an "*empirical science of man*" to be conducted merely by the methods of the natural sciences. The emphasis on "*merely*" is important, for Kant fully approves the proper use of "*empiricism*" within the delimited domain of theoretical reason. He has never lost his deep interest in the scientific progress. Therefore, his criticism of the "*Enlightenment*" is completely from within and he always remained a true

but critical exponent of his age. In a famous formulation Kant himself puts it as follows:

"If it is asked whether we at present live in an enlightened age, the answer is: No, but we do live in an age of enlightenment. As things are at present, we still have a long way to go... But we do have distinct indications that the way is now being cleared for men to work freely in this direction, and that the obstacles to universal enlightenment, to man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity, are gradually, becoming fewer."

(3)

The Enlightenment is thus conceived not as a mechanistic vehicle of progress but as a turning point in history representing a new principle that "henceforth endows history with a conscious rational direction". (4) Consequently, philosophy of history could now be substituted for, or equated with a progressive political philosophy. (5) It is in this sense that, the philosophy of history appears to be an important connecting link between Kant's epistemology and moral/political theory. Indeed, this is also the case chronologically, because right after the *First Critique* (1781) and the *Prolegomena* (1783) he published his essay on *Idea for Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* (1784). Kant

presents in this text a synopsis of all his fundamental arguments on man and human community, which he will further develop in his later moral and political writings. Let me examine now this primer text of his philosophy of history closely.

- II -

Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose consists of a preambular part and nine propositions with explanatory remarks.

In the preambular part, Kant first outlines the general framework of his conception of history: "History ... allows us to hope that, if it examines the free exercise of the human will on a larger scale, it will be able to discover a regular progression among freely willed actions. In the same way, we may hope that what strikes us in the actions of individuals as confused and fortuitous may be recognized, in the history of the entire species, as a steadily advancing but slow development of man's original capacities." (6)

Kant is exploring here the possibility of finding a regularity in the history in which the hope for progress -to change the society and the world for the better- can be grounded. He develops his argument by explaining why this is not an easy task. He asserts that, since men behave neither purely with instincts like animals, nor act yet like rational citizens of the world in accordance with

some agreed-on plan, the search for finding a regularity in man's history would not result in success. Furthermore, Kant states that with few exceptions here and there, we observe nothing other than childish vanity, malice and destructiveness in man's actions. Therefore, the hope for progress cannot be grounded in the ends of individual man and even entire nations, because they seek only subjective and selfish ends, often in opposition to one another. Nevertheless, the present condition of humanity should not lead us to despair and pessimism. But how can we prevent such an outcome? Kant puts forward the following solution:

"The only way out for the philosopher, since he can not assume that mankind follows any rational purpose of its own in its collective actions, is ... to attempt to discover a purpose in nature behind this senseless course of human events, and decide whether it is after all possible to formulate a history in terms of a definite plan of nature for creatures who act without a plan of their own." (7)

Starting with Fichte (8) many interpreters have maintained that this formulation is in contradiction with the theoretical - epistemological framework of the *First Critique*. (9) They have asserted that Kant's "Idea of a providential design

of nature" implies the "determination of history by something other than the free and transforming activity of man". (10) They see in Kantian text of 1784 a tension between a mechanistic and a voluntarist conception of history, that is, between natural causality (necessity) and free will (freedom). These claims are totally groundless for the following reasons:

First, contrary to Hegel's "cunning of reason", Kant's reference to "purpose in or design of nature" reflects merely a "hypothesis or conducting thread for the philosopher's reflection (and never a dogmatic truth)" (11). Indeed, there is a fundamental difference between Kant's philosophy of history and Hegelian "realism" or "historicism". Hegel attempts to construct "an objective or scientific interpretation of history" through the medium of state (the absolute truth in the World). In contrast to this, what Kant says in this text is that he -the philosopher- will try to ascribe a definite plan (of nature) to the historical drama in its various aspects. He is not claiming to discover the absolute truth, but simply attempting to identify a common objective which is worth pursuing. Consequently, "nature" speaks throughout the essay mostly on behalf of the "philosopher -

historian." In other words, seeking a purpose in nature for mankind's history as a whole is merely an "Idea", a simple *"guiding principle of reason"* for the philosopher's reflection on history. On the other hand, it is also clear from the text that the philosopher who is trying to discover *"purpose in nature"* is not content at all with the past and present condition of human actions. Kant (nature) therefore seeks to ground the hope for change for the better -for the accomplishment of the ultimate goal of humanity, that is, unity of humankind through freedom- in the future. Hence, *"when Kant speaks of nature's purpose for man, he is thinking of what man as a free agent ought to become -moral, law-abiding, peace loving-"* in order to secure the ground for progress of humanity. (12) He does not aim in any way at constructing a Hegelian type of *"end of history"* concept. Therefore, Luc Ferry's argument that Fichte's conception of history is fully open (the history of freedom acting) as opposed to Kant's philosophy of history -which he thinks lead us to Hegel's theory of *"cunning of reason"*- is untenable, for it confuses Kant with Hegel. In fact, Ferry himself, is aware of the weakness of his position and says that he *"of course does not mean to reduce Kantianism to an embryonic*

Hegelianism and that Kant in his conception of history consistently differs from Hegel." (13) However, saying is one thing, doing is another. Despite his safeguard clause, he does exactly what he claims he will not do. As a result (or better for the sake) of his reading, Fichte is transformed by Ferry into a "revolutionary" and Kant is confused with Hegel.

Second, the term "nature" is also used to refer to man's natural capacities or his natural environment. In this context, it means simply the external world which is completely explicable through mechanical causality. This meaning becomes more explicit in the first and second propositions of the *Idea for a Universal History*. Here, Kant states that "all natural capacities of a creature are destined sooner or later to be developed completely and in conformity with an end." "In man as the only rational creature on earth", Kant continues, "those natural capacities which are directed towards the use of his reason are such that they could be fully developed in the species, but not in the individual." (14) In the explanatory remark to the second proposition, Kant further clarifies his position: "... then it will require a long, perhaps uncalculated series of generations,

each passing on its enlightenment to the next, before the germs implanted by nature in our species can be developed to that degree which corresponds to nature's original intentions (to Kant it is the attainment of the cosmopolitan goal based on moral universalism)." (15) And now comes the crucial part: "... the point of time at which this degree of development is reached must be the goal of man's aspirations (at least an idea in his mind), or else his natural capacities would necessarily appear by and large to be purposeless and wasted." (16) The emphasis on "the goal of man's aspirations" provides a synoptic clue to the central argument of Kant's moral/political philosophy. This goal is actually also inherent in the title of this essay, namely, the attainment of a universal civil society through "praxis". This view will be further elaborated in the *Critique of Teleological Judgement*.

As van der Linden puts it, failure to distinguish between these two conceptions of nature leads to the common misunderstanding that Kant's conception of history defended in the essay *Idea for a Universal History* is mechanistic and deterministic. (17) The reason for this misinterpretation is that one looks at Kant through Hegelian eyes. I will return to this problem when I

take up the *Critique of Judgement* where Kant develops his ideas on "purposiveness or teleology" more clearly.

Let us now continue with the text of 1784. The third proposition, if it is read together with the second, reflects on the fact that "although history is marked by progress, the very need for progress indicates that history represents man's limitations no less than his capacities." (18) Man is a rational being who is mortal as individual, but immortal as species. This ontological weakness (and limitation) implies that it is man's fate to be a historical being. Man's potentials as a being endowed with "reason, and freedom of will based upon reason" can be fully developed and actualized only through a long historical process:

"What remains disconcerting about all this is firstly, that the earlier generations seem to perform their laborious tasks only for the sake of the later ones, so as to prepare for them a further stage from which they can raise still higher the structure intended by nature; and secondly, that only the later generations will in fact have the good fortune to inhabit the building on which a whole series of their forefathers ... had worked without themselves being able to share in the

happiness they were preparing. But no matter how puzzling this may be, it will appear as necessary as it is puzzling if we simply assume that one animal species was intended to have reason, and that, as a class of rational beings who are mortal as individuals, but immortal as a species, it was still meant to develop its capacities completely." (19)

Kant's view in this passage anticipates Feuerbach's concept of species-being as a key characterization of man which was also adopted and further developed by Marx. (20) The grounding of the hope for progress of humanity or with a Marxian rendition the hope for human emancipation in the species indicates that "the free development of the potential inherent in mankind requires the individual to think and act as a member of a universal human community." (21)

The second point which Kant makes in the third proposition relates to the physical weakness of man. For Kant, Nature willed that man should produce everything beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence entirely out of himself, and that he participate in no happiness or perfection other than what he himself, independently of instinct, has created by his own reason. His "instinctual poverty" and physical weakness would be a stimulus

for man to escape from his natural limitations and his natural isolation. And, the ensuing affirmation of free rationality leads to self-esteem and makes man "worthy of life and well-being." In this connection, Cassirer's comment is worth mentioning: "It was not a drive toward society originally implanted in man but rather need that founded the first societal groupings, and need further formed one of the essential conditions for erecting and consolidating a social structure." (22)

Thus, the limited rational being, who is the agent of history as a species-being, appears as a social-being who has the power that can shape his world, and may subject even nature to his will. The fourth proposition reads as follows:

"The means which nature employs to bring about the development of innate capacities is that of antagonism within society, in so far as this antagonism becomes in the long run the cause of a law-governed social order." (23)

Kant, then, explains that by "antagonism" he means "the unsocial sociability of men, i.e., their tendency to come together in society, coupled, however with a continual resistance which constantly threatens to break up the society." This formulation represents Kant's break with Rousseau's social

theory; or rather (through a critical reading) a reversal and reformulation of Rousseau's basic assumptions on "state of nature" and on "social contract". As Cassirer points out, "while Rousseau sees all man's history as a fall from the condition of innocence and happiness in which man lived before he entered into society, to Kant the idea of such an original state of nature appears utopian if taken as a fact, and ambiguous and unclear if regarded as a moral ideal." (24) In clear contrast to Rousseau's conception of state of nature as a golden age of humanity, Kant maintains that "man feels in society more like a man", because "he feels able to develop his natural capacities." (25) In his *Reflexionen*, he puts it more directly: "Man is made (created) for society." (26) (However, Kant, at the same time, admits that "what Rousseau intends is not that man should go back to the state of nature but he should look back at it." (27)) In his essay entitled *Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History* (1786) Kant further elaborates his view of transition from the state of nature to society: "Man's emergence from that paradise which reason represents to him as the first abode of his species was nothing other than his transition from a rude and purely animal existence to a state of humanity,

from the leading-strings of instinct to the guidance of reason -in a word, from the guardianship of nature to the state of freedom." (28)

The other inclination of man, i.e, to live as an individual in resistance to others, "drives him to seek status among his fellows whom he cannot bear yet cannot bear to leave." (29) Rousseau's negative concept of "amour propre" is thus reconstructed by Kant and transformed into a positive one. (30)

The tension between the two opposing tendencies of men, that is, "unsocial sociability", establishes the foundations of any social order. (31) Kant states:

"Then the first true steps are taken from barbarism to culture, which in fact consists in the social worthiness of man. All man's talents are now gradually developed, his taste cultivated, and by a continued process of enlightenment, a beginning is made towards establishing a way of thinking which can with time transform the primitive natural capacity for moral discrimination into definite practical principles; and thus a pathologically enforced agreement into a society is finally transformed into a moral whole. Without these characteristics of unsociability (far from admirable in themselves) which cause the resistance

inevitably encountered by each individual as he furthers his self-seeking pretensions, man would live an Arcadian, pastoral existence of perfect concord, self-sufficiency and mutual love. But all human talents would remain hidden forever in a dormant state, and men, as good-natured as the sheep they tended, would scarcely render their existence more valuable than that of their animals. The end for which they were created, their rational nature, would be an unfilled void. Nature should thus be thanked for fostering incompatibility, enviously competitive vanity, and insatiable desires for possession and even power. Without these desires, all the excellent natural capacities of humanity would never be roused to develop." (32)

The irony expressed in this passage is obvious. Kant, of course, does not celebrate here the asocial qualities, the competition, the insatiable desires for possession or even power in themselves (they are far from admirable), but only recognizes the fact that "the evil itself can become the source of good in the course and progress of history; thus out of discord (mutual antagonism) alone can true, self-confident moral harmony emerge." (33) The wryness of Kant's language in the explication of the fourth proposition is often missed, as if Kant were engaged

in a justification of natural necessity in human actions. (34) This is a mistake. Kant starts out from an observation that the past history cannot be justified in terms of morality and tries to render history a meaning that fits best with the hope for a better future. For him, the return to pre-cultural simple life of the state of nature contradicts the demands of moral law. He sets forth that, only with the affirmation of reason and culture and through the realization of moral society will we be able to eliminate man's most dislikable characteristics, such as his aspiration for power and competitive vanity, which are springing from his unsocial sociability. The longing for simple life will only mean the affirmation of laziness, i.e., inertia. Therefore, he thinks that men could attain their ultimate goal (unity of mankind in an ideal moral world) only within society by improving it through their actions. By rejecting the view that our golden age is in our pre-cultural past, Kant defends the primacy of praxis (politics), that is, human action toward the progress of humanity and for the (moral) betterment of the world. His view can be reconstructed in this way: since we can think of an ideal moral world sometime in the future in which the laws of nature would conform to the moral law,

we could and therefore should act in accordance with this goal. Thus the concern with history is a practical/political concern with the future: the establishment of a moral society and action toward this ideal. *"The predicament of humankind cannot be overcome by the vain attempt to return to pre-history; rather, the problem of history has to be solved by moving forward to rational history. The affirmation of free rationality and, hence, the spirit of the Enlightenment is a major step in this direction."* (35)

As we have seen in the last Chapter, with his *First Critique*, Kant attempted to place moral philosophy (theoretical humanism) upon a firm epistemological foundation. In line with this objective, what Kant seeks to achieve with his philosophy of history is the further strengthening of this foundation. The solution he offers is the realization of a civil society under the rule of law, guaranteeing freedom for all. The fifth proposition states:

"The greatest problem for the human species, the solution of which nature compels him to seek, is that of attaining a civil society which can administer justice universally." (36)

For Kant, this "society" should not only have the greatest freedom, and therefore a continual antagonism among its members, but also the most precise specification and preservation of the limits of this freedom in order that it can co-exist with the freedom of others. (37) Kant goes on and explains how and on what basis this civil freedom can be secured. Thus, the highest (political) task for humankind is defined as the establishment of a society in which freedom under external laws would be combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, in other words, the establishment of a perfectly just civil constitution. (38)

This brings us to the heart of Kant's political philosophy: an authority -the state- is needed to restrain the mutual antagonism between man and man within civil society. But it should be designed in such a way that it would not cause the suppression or elimination of individuality or the unsociability of man, for *"all the culture and art which adorn humankind and the finest social order man creates are fruits of this unsociability."* (39) What Kant implicitly indicates here is the tension between civil society and state. This tension constitutes a problem which has to be solved. And, the solution

Kant offers is the establishment of a perfectly just civil constitution guaranteeing freedom for all. The fact that Kant recognizes (before Hegel) the problematic relationship between (and separation of) state and civil society is often missed. (40) This is the reason why, starting with Herder, many interpreters misunderstand the sixth proposition and draw unfair conclusions from it. They try to describe Kant as a defender of the Prussian paternalistic "*Obrigkeitsstaat*." In reality, there is a sharp difference between Kant's argument and Herder's inference (Herder is not alone in this misrepresentation, many interpreters followed in his footsteps during the course of the past twohundred years.) Kant argues exactly for the opposite view. The sixth proposition reads as follows:

"The problem is the most difficult and the last to be solved by the human species. The difficulty (which the very idea of this problem clearly presents) is this: if he lives among others of his own species, man is an animal who needs a master."
(41)

The word "master" (Herr) means here "civil authority". (42) The question Kant poses in this proposition is directly related to the previous proposition. Man, "as a rational being, desires a

law which impose limits on the freedom of all", but "he is still misled by his self-seeking animal inclinations into exempting himself from the law where he can." Hence, the problem of enforcement of external (positive) law emerges. This problem calls for a solution. It is for this reason that, man "requires a master (it should be read as a government or sovereign) to break his self-will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free." (43) In other words, the enforcement of positive laws necessitates a coercive power. But who will have the authority to exert these coercive powers on men? In Kant's own words: "But where is to find such a master?" (44) The answer itself creates a problem: "Nowhere else but in the human species. But this master, (then), will also be an animal who needs a master." (45) This remark suggests that, man's rule or domination over others of his kind creates a disheartening, unjust and unacceptable situation. To overcome this problem is, to Kant, "the most difficult of all tasks, and a perfect solution is impossible." (46) However, this should not lead us to stop our struggle for a perfectly just civil constitution, for only such a constitution can limit the civil authority within the boundaries of law.

The search for a perfectly just constitution is a regulative idea, setting an infinitive political task for humanity. Therefore, the emphasis is again on the primacy of praxis. Kant proceeds with the following observation: *"A further reason why this task must be the last to be accomplished is that man needs for it a correct conception of the nature of a possible constitution, great experience tested in many affairs of the world, and above all else a good will prepared to accept the findings of this experience."* (47) As this quotation indicates, Kant offers *"the approximation to self-mastery"* as a solution to the problem arising from *"the ruler and the ruled relationship."* (48)

On the other hand, the establishment of a perfectly just civil constitution is a problem which concerns humankind as a whole and therefore calls for universal political action. The next three propositions elaborate this point. In this context, the seventh proposition points to the dialectic between constitutional and international legality. Kant writes:

"The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external relationship with other states,

and cannot be solved unless the latter is solved."

(49)

Kant then applies the notion of unsociability to the international relations. His description resembles the Hobbesian conception of state of nature as a state of war: "The same unsociability which forced man to do so (der Anordnung eines gemeinen Wesens) gives rise in turn to a situation whereby each commonwealth, in its external relations (i.e. as a state in relation to other states), is in a position of unrestricted freedom." (50)

Following up this argument Kant asserts that calm and security even at the level of international relations, is to be established through the inevitable antagonism. Kant's next step is the definition of war as the international parallel to domestic antagonism:

"Wars, tense and unremitting military preparations, and the resultant distress which every state must eventually feel within itself, even in the midst of peace -these are the means by which nature drives nations to make initially imperfect attempts, but finally, after many devastations, upheavals and even complete inner exhaustion of their powers, to take the step which reason could have suggested to them even without so many sad

experiences- that of abandoning a lawless state of savagery and entering a federation of peoples (The original German word 'Volkerbund' which literally means 'federation of peoples' is also translated into English as 'league of nations' (51) in which every state, even the smallest, could expect to derive its security and rights not from its own power or its own legal judgement, but solely from this great federation (Foedus Amphictyonum), from a united power and, the law-governed decision of a united will." (52)

In this passage, Kant attempts to deal with the following question: how can the establishment of an international legal order be achieved? His answer provides us with two alternatives: either nations would be forced (by nature) to establish law-governed external relations as a result of mutual antagonism and after "many devastations and even complete inner exhaustion", or, it should be created through universal rational action (the step to be taken could have been suggested by reason without so many sad experiences). Contrary to the claims of various commentators, Kant does not aim in any way to justify conflict and war. (It is again reading Kant through Hegelian lenses. (53) He only recognizes them as empirical realities. There is no

doubt that their existence creates a problem. However, this problem should not lead us to despair. With this in mind, he defends the view that the political goal of history could not be attained until the elimination of war and conflict. But how could this be possible? The answer Kant implies is a creative one: war and conflict will be eliminated through themselves. In other words, to Kant, war is a great evil, but it is self-destructive and hence, will bring us peace. Yet, this is not his final answer. Men can also realize this goal -i.e., the elimination of war- much earlier if they act with the consciousness that it can be realized. As Yovel rightly points out, *"for conflict and war to overcome themselves ... a revolution must take place both internationally and within the state, for by definition the grounding principle of political life must be converted from mutual antagonism to its opposite mutual recognition."* (54)

Kant makes some other insightful observations and suggestions under the seventh proposition. He severely criticizes military expenditure and armaments as dangerous obstacles before the progress of humanity. He also denounces the political culture and situation of his time: *"Until the last step to a union of states is taken, which is the*

half-way mark in the development of mankind, human nature must suffer the cruelest hardships under the guise of external well-being; and Rousseau was not far wrong in preferring the state of savages, so long, that is, as the last stage to which the human race must climb is not attained." (55) He goes on with his denunciation:

"We are cultivated to a high degree by art and science. We are civilized to the point of excess in all kinds of social courtesies and proprieties. But we are still a long way from the point where we could consider ourselves morally mature." (56) This ethical poverty, he concludes, has to be overcome.

The eight proposition follows up the previous one:

"The history of human race as a whole can be regarded as the realization of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally -and for this purpose also externally- perfect political constitution as the only possible condition within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely." (57)

In the explanatory remarks to this proposition, Kant sums up his conception of history with direct reference to politics. He begins by outlining the basic theoretical framework of his "critical

project." He, then, establishes the connecting points between his Critical Philosophy and Philosophy of History. Consequently, we are told that with the observation of the empirical reality we can understand only a small part of history, "for this cycle of events seems to take so long a time to complete, that the small part of it traversed by mankind up till now does not allow us to determine with certainty the shape of the whole cycle, and the relation of its parts to the whole." (58) To sustain his argument he summarizes the example of "Copernican Revolution" which he will develop three years later in the preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The view that we can transcend the empirical reality by setting goals to ourselves is further clarified:

"Nevertheless, human nature is such that it cannot be indifferent even to the most remote epoch which may eventually affect our species, so long as this epoch can be expected with certainty. And in the present case, it is especially hard to be indifferent, for it appears that we might by our own rational projects accelerate the coming of this period which will be so welcome to our descendants." (59)

In other words, the ideas that history is moving forward toward the better; that humanity is constantly progressing are ideas that are springing from the human nature. Therefore, through rational political action, we can accelerate the realization of our expectations in the future. It is precisely for this reason that grounding of hope in a future-oriented historical reconstruction is important and should be seen as a moral and political task. To secure a firm foundation for his thesis, Kant begins to analyze his own age and tries to find the signs which will strengthen our hopes for the betterment of humanity. In this respect, Kant emphasizes one such indication not yet mentioned: the increase in commerce both within and between states. He observes that the emergence of capitalism as a global phenomenon is leading to a gradual interdependence between states. Kant asserts: *"Furthermore, civil freedom can no longer be so easily infringed without disadvantage to all trades and industries, and especially to commerce, in the event of which the state's power in its external relations will also decline. But this freedom is gradually increasing. If the citizen is deterred from seeking his personal welfare in any way he chooses which is consistent with the freedom of*

others, the vitality of business in general and hence also the strength of the whole are held in check. For this reason, restrictions placed upon personal activities are increasingly relaxed, and general freedom of religion is granted. And thus, although folly and caprice creep in at times, enlightenment gradually arises." (60) In a word, the rise of capitalism creates not only an economic but also a political interdependence. Kant goes on:

"And in addition, the effects which an upheaval in any state produces upon all the others in our continent, where all are so closely linked by trade, are so perceptible that these other states are forced by their own insecurity to offer themselves as arbiters, albeit without legal authority, so that they indirectly prepare the way for a great political body of the future, without precedent in the past. Although this political body exists for the present only in the roughest of outlines, it nonetheless seems as if a feeling is beginning to stir in all its members, each of which has an interest in maintaining the whole." (61)

In this truly prophetic passage Kant anticipates the future history of Europe. We all know now that "the great political body of the future" (European Union) could have been founded

only 173 years later. To be fair to Kant, it should also be added here that his political thought cannot be limited within the context of a nation or a region. As Gallie puts it, *"he is mankind's first naturally global thinker."* (62) Kant's concluding remarks under the eighth proposition demonstrates very clearly that his vision is not limited within the boundaries of Europe:

"And this encourages the hope that, after many revolutions, with all their transforming effects, the highest purpose of nature, a universal cosmopolitan existence, will at least be realized as the matrix within which all the original capacities of the human race may develop." (63)

Thus, we arrive at the ninth and last proposition where Kant sums up the central arguments of his essay. He states:

"A philosophical attempt to work out a universal history of the world in accordance with a plan of nature aimed at a perfect civil union of mankind, must be regarded as possible and even as capable of furthering the purpose of nature itself." (64)

First, Kant develops a model based on the history of Europe. In a footnote to the explication of this proposition, he further clarifies his

position with respect to his own continent and explains the reason why he thinks Europe plays a special role within the context of universal history. The reason he gives us is that he conceives Europe as the dominant center of the world civilization (economy and politics). The history of the peoples who live in the periphery and outside this center can begin only from the time at which they enter it. As Kant puts it: *"We shall discover a regular process of improvement in the political constitutions of our continent (which will probably legislate eventually for all other continents)"* (65) It may sound euro-centrist, but, nevertheless, we cannot deny the fact that it reflects the empirical reality which we have been experiencing for the past twohundred years.

On the other hand, Kant emphasizes here once again that his attempt to discover a purpose in nature behind the course of human actions is merely an idea which is designed *"to serve as a guide to us in representing an otherwise planless aggregate of human actions as conforming, at least when considered as a whole, to a system"* (66) Such a conception of history would enable us in explaining human affairs, in prophesying future political changes, in preparing the grounds for greater hopes.

It will open up comforting prospect of a future in which the common destiny of humanity can be fulfilled on earth. If we do not reflect on, and act toward a goal in which we can ground our hopes for progress and betterment of humanity, we may be driven to despair and even pessimism. As Knippenberg observes, "without some hope that one's deeds will have an enduring impact on the world, no one would engage in political activity except for very narrowly and immediately selfish ends." (67) The philosopher's primary aim is to avoid such an outcome. Kant concludes his essay by stressing that future generations will value the history of our times "from the point of view of what interests them, i.e., the positive and negative achievements of peoples and governments in relation to the cosmopolitan goal." (68)

Kant's conception of history as outlined in *Universal History* could be reconstructed as follows:

a) "Approximation" to a cosmopolitan goal - self-mastery and a perfect civil union of mankind - appears to be a key concept and suggests "primacy of praxis".

b) The dialectical relationship between domestic and international politics; between constitutional and international legality implies

universalization of political action toward a cosmopolitan existence.

c) Man's ability to set a goal for himself and act in accordance with this goal indicates the compatibility of theory and practice.

Let me now take up the "*Critique of Judgement*" where Kant expands his forward-looking, praxis-oriented view of history and links it more clearly to his moral philosophy.

- III -

In the *Critique of Teleological Judgement* (second part of the *Critique of Judgement*) from paragraph 82 to 86 Kant revisits his ideas on history. However, what he does there is more than a repetition of earlier views. Through a distinction between the ultimate end of nature and the final end of creation Kant opens up a new perspective which further clarifies his position with respect to his future-oriented conception of history. What is the importance of this new perspective? I will try to answer this question by examining the text of the paragraphs 82-86.

In paragraph 82, in anticipation of his remarks in the following paragraph, Kant defines man as the

one and only being upon earth who can, by his reason, make out of an aggregate of purposively formed things a system of purposes. (69) In other words, through his free will and by using his reason man can make his own world. In the next paragraph he follows up this argument and delineates man's place within nature: "... to make us estimate man as not merely a physical end, such as all organized beings are, but as the being upon this earth who is the ultimate end of nature, and the one in relation to whom all other natural things constitute a system of ends." (70) However, the question is still open what the end is for man himself of his connection with nature. Kant answers: "If this end is something which must be found in man himself, it must either be of such a kind that man himself may be satisfied by means of nature and its beneficence, or else it is the aptitude and skill for all manner of ends for which he may employ nature both external and internal. The former end of nature would be the happiness of man, the latter his culture." (71)

Kant, states several reasons to explain why happiness -though may be an end as such- is not the ultimate end of nature (Happiness is a conception of man and man's idea of happiness changes very often). Kant, then, takes up again man's capacity for

setting purposes for himself. In this context, he argues: "As the single being upon earth that possesses understanding, and, consequently, a capacity for setting before himself ends of his deliberate choice, man is certainly titular lord of nature, and, supposing we regard nature as a teleological system, he is born to be its ultimate end. But this always on the terms that he has the intelligence and the will to give to it and to himself such a reference to ends as can be self-sufficing independently of nature, and, consequently, a final end. Such an end, however, must not be sought in nature." (72) It follows that culture must be the ultimate end of nature. Culture is "what nature can supply for the purpose of preparing man for what he himself must do in order to be final end." Kant adds: "The production in a rational being of an aptitude for any ends whatever of his own choosing, consequently of the aptitude of a being in his freedom, is culture. Hence, it is only culture then can be the ultimate end which we have cause to attribute to nature in respect of the human race." (73)

Kant begins his discussion of culture with a distinction between the culture of skill and the culture of discipline. As van der Linden observes:

"The distinction refers to two different ways in which man can develop his aptitude to set and realize all kind of ends: the culture of skill is positive in character, as it involves man's increasing capacity to use his natural and social environment for his own purposes -skill, then, encompasses man's technical and pragmatic dispositions-, whereas the culture of discipline is negative in character, consisting of freeing the will from the despotism of desires, which, left to themselves, render man incapable of even choosing."
(74)

At the outset of his description of culture of skill Kant declares that skill can hardly be developed in the human race otherwise than by means of inequality among men. (75) The majority of man work in mechanical jobs which do not require any special skills, and live at the level of minimum subsistence in order to provide "the necessities of life for the ease and convenience of others." (76) Thus, Kant introduces a new element which was not present in the *Universal History*, namely, division of labour. This move expands his conception of the driving forces of progress. As Yovel observes, "progress is achieved not only through war and competition (mutual antagonism of unsocial

sociability) but also through exploitation and social stratification." (77) The immediate result of social stratification and exploitation is that they "keep the masses in a state of oppression, with hard work and little enjoyment." (78) But this situation gradually changes, because the "leisure-time elite or the exploiting classes" create knowledge and enlightened ideas and advance art and science. (79) Thus, they -though unintentionally and slowly- contribute to the "self-abolition of exploitation, for the new ideas spread out to the oppressed classes (through education), making them discover their own humanity and equal status with their oppressors." (80) However, when culture transforms into luxury "misfortune increase equally on both sides. With the lower classes they arise by force from without, with the upper from seeds of discontent." (81) (Kant's remark here is clearly influenced by Rousseau and, at the same time, by the French Revolution. I will get back to this later, when I take up Kant's stance toward the French Revolution.) "Yet this splendid misery", i.e., culture of inequality, according to Kant, is, nevertheless "connected with the development of natural tendencies in the human race." (82) Kant at this point offers us a political solution

reminiscent of the *Universal History*: the establishment of a "constitution regulating the mutual relations of men" in such a way that "the abuse of freedom by individuals striving one against another is opposed by a lawful authority centered in a whole, called a civil community." (84)

As Yovel comments: "Instead of the present regime, in which the freedom of each is considered as exclusive of that of the others and stabilization is possible only by institutionalizing the victory of the strong (inequality), a civil society will rise, embodying in its constitution the principle of mutual recognition by all parties -lower and higher classes- of each other's equality in freedom." (84) However, a political solution at the domestic level is not sufficient. It has to be complemented at the international level with a cosmopolitan whole. Kant, then, repeats his line of argument with respect to war as it was described before in *Universal History*.

The next paragraph is related to the distinction between ultimate end of nature and final end of creation. Within the framework of the "*First Critique*" this distinction corresponds to the dualism of noumenon and phenomenon. Therefore, the

theme is familiar, only the context in which Kant develops it is new.

At the beginning of this paragraph Kant defines "final end" as "an end that does not require any other end as condition of its possibility." (85) And setting out from his conception that man is both a noumenal and a phenomenal being, Kant asserts: "He is the only natural creature whose peculiar objective characterization is nevertheless such as to enable us to recognize in him a supersensible faculty -his freedom- and to perceive both the law of the casualty and the object of freedom which that faculty is able to set before itself as the highest end -the supreme good in the world." (86)

He goes on and poses the following question: For what end does man exist? (87) The answer he provides us is this: "Man is the final end of creation. For without man the chain of mutually subordinated ends would have no ultimate point of attachment. Only in man, and only in him as the individual being to whom the moral law applies, do we find unconditional legislation in respect of ends. This legislation, therefore, is what alone qualify him to be a final end to which entire nature is teleologically subordinated." (88)

With this move, Kant establishes the connecting link between his philosophy of history and moral philosophy. Man is the final end not as he is, but by virtue of what ought to become and bring about. Kant's own formulation, *"Only as a moral being man can be a final end of creation."* Hence, moral action (the good will) is needed to accomplish the ultimate end in nature, that is, a perfect civil union of mankind. And moral action requires *"good will"*. Kant defines it as follows: *"A good will is that whereby man's existence can alone possess an absolute worth, and in relation to which the existence of the world can have a final end."* (89) (I will take up Kant's moral writings in the next chapter and will inspect the notion of good will there more closely. Therefore, I will not enter into detail here.)

What is the significance of these passages from the point of view of Kant's conception of history and politics (both domestic and international). In response to this question, the following points need to be stressed:

a) Exploitation and social stratification appear as driving forces of cultural progress (culture is used here in the broad sense), i.e., they are historical categories.

b) However, culture is not an end in itself (only the ultimate end of nature).

c) Therefore, cultural progress can only prepare man for moral progress, i.e., for what he himself must do in order to be the final end.

d) Thus, cultural progress opens up the historical perspective toward the ideal moral world community, where conflict will make place for solidarity, and mutual freedom will be realized through respect for all persons as ends. (90)

e) This connecting point between the given world (empirical reality) and man as possessor of free will is established through "*purposiveness*", i.e., nature has a purposive structure and man as free agent has purposes. (91)

f) History of future times is yet to be made through conscious and purposeful universal human action. (92)

- IV -

As we have seen, in the conclusion of *Universal History*, Kant draws a marked contrast between philosophical history with a cosmopolitan purpose (*Geschichte*) and history conceived and composed purely empirically (*Historie*). History, in the first sense, is the future of human community, and also the investigation of the past (and present) from the perspective of a hoped-for (cosmopolitan) future which is to be created by common (universal) action. (94) The empirical history or the complex details on how "*each age composes its history now*" must, according to Kant, "*naturally cause concern to everyone*". However, the future generations will value it only from the point of view of what interests them, namely, the positive and negative achievements of governments in relation to the cosmopolitan goal. (94) Five years later after this essay was published, Kant found such a value in the French Revolution: For him, it was a "*positive achievement*", an indication of moral progress. As a result, his writings on the Revolution combines "*Historie*" with "*Geschichte*". The "*event*" (Revolution) itself is considered to be a sign of "*approximation*" to the "*realization of Geschichte*"

or an empirical proof for the compatibility of theory and practice. Therefore, in order to complete the examination of Kant's views on history, it is necessary, even imperative, to consider his stance toward the French Revolution as well. I will try to do this by analyzing his essay *An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?* (95)

Kant opens up the introductory part of this essay by making it clear that he seeks to know a part of human history, which is drawn not from past but future times. It is, therefore, a predictive history. He also underlines that he will deal with the question whether the human race is constantly progressing, on the basis of moral rather than natural history of men. Consequently, the subject matter is not human species (*singulorum*), but the totality of men (*universorum*) united socially on earth and apportioned into peoples. (96) The conceptual distinction he draws here by contrast to his earlier essay on *Universal History* has to be noted. The reason for this is that this essay, as distinguished from the earlier one, is an attempt to ground theory in practice.

In the second section, Kant poses an ironical question which is reminiscent of the *First Critique*:

"How is history a priori possible?" (97) In a cynical response to this question, he strongly criticizes the injustices and wrong-doings of the rulers and governments and implies that revolution is the likely outcome of the increasing repression of the people. (98) He also warns the German "politicians who are frightened of a possible spread of revolutionary ideas from France to Germany and states that they themselves are responsible for their own fears." In this respect, the parallels drawn between this section and paragraph 83 of the *Critique of Judgement* is clearly discernible.

In the third section, Kant cites three models for making predictions about the future:

- a) the terroristic conception of human history (religious-doomsday);
- b) the eudaemonistic conception of human history (utilitarian) and;
- c) the abderitic hypothesis (sisyphus legend).

The first model is based on the assumption that a process of deterioration cannot go forever; and; that a world has to be created anew after the present world has been completely destroyed. The second model assumes that the proportion of good and evil inherent in human nature remains constant and cannot be changed. Kant questions this assumption

and claims that it is in contradiction with the eudaemonists' ideas on constant progress. The last hypothesis maintains that man moves toward the better only to fall later back to evil. Kant argues that this circular model reduces mankind to the unconscious animal species. In the end Kant rejects each of these models. (99)

In the fourth section, Kant repeats a familiar theme, i.e., "*the problem of progress cannot be solved directly through experience.*" (100) After reiterating his famous example of "*Copernican Revolution*", he asserts: "*(If at a certain moment we observe that humanity) is moving backwards, and in an accelerated fall into baseness, even then there is no reason for despair or giving up hope that we are just about to reach the turning point (punctum flexus contrarii) at which our affairs will take a new turn for the better, by virtue of the moral disposition of our race.*" (101)

This means that if we base our reflections and actions merely on empirical realities, we may not be able to make progress for the better. As I have tried to demonstrate, this view is almost the Leitmotive of Kant's "*Critical Project*" as a whole.

He concludes the fourth section by enunciating that to defend the thesis of a general improvement

of mankind, all that is needed is "to attribute to man an inherent and unalterably good, albeit limited, will." (102) The French Revolution is to be considered as a historical sign that man has such will.

However, before pointing out his argument in relation to the French Revolution, Kant prepares the ground for it in the fifth section by remarking that predictive history of the human race must nevertheless be connected to some sort of experience.

"There must be some experience in the human race which, as an event, points to the disposition and capacity of the human race to be the cause and (since this should be the act of a being endowed with freedom) the author of its own progress for the better... Therefore, an event must be sought which points to the existence of such a cause and to its effectiveness in the human race, undetermined with regard to time, and which would allow progress toward the better to be concluded as an inevitable consequence." (103)

However, this event should not in itself be considered "as the cause of progress in history but only as a rough indication, a historical sign demonstrating the tendency of the human race viewed

in its entirety, that is, not seen as a (sum of individuals..., but rather as divided into peoples and states (as it is encountered on earth)". (104)

Here, Kant is clearly pointing to the French Revolution. It is seen as an event demonstrating the tendency of human race in its entirety. Indeed, the Revolution entered into the stage of history with universal claims, with a political agenda transcending the national boundaries, and contributed to the universalization of politics. Even the radical expressions of national sovereignty and the revolutionary conception of patriotism, paradoxical as it may sound, were rooted in universalistic categories and principles. (105) The equation of man with citizen in the "*Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens of 1789*" indicated for the first time in human history to a universal right to politics. (106) For all these reasons Kant believed that through this Revolution theory was transformed into practice. He regarded it as a historical sign with universal (political/moral) implications.

Thus, we arrive at the most important and famous section, that is, section six, where Kant directly deals with "*an event of his time which demonstrates and proves this* (Kant is referring to

the previous section) moral tendency of the human race", i.e., the French Revolution. Kant states:

"This event consists neither in momentous deeds nor misdeeds committed by men whereby what was great among men is made small or what small is made great, nor in ancient splendid political structures which vanish as if by magic while others come forth in their place as if from the depths of the earth. No, nothing of the sort. It is simply the mode of thinking of the spectators which reveals itself publicly in this game of great transformations, and manifests such a universal yet disinterested (uneigennützig) sympathy (Theilnehmung) for the players on one side against those on the other, even at the risk that this partiality could become very disadvantageous for them if discovered. Owing to its universality, this mode of thinking demonstrates a character of the human race at large and all at once; owing to its disinterestedness, a moral character of humanity, at least in its predisposition, a character which not only permits people to hope for progress toward the better, but is already itself progress in so far as its capacity is sufficient for the present." (107)

Let me, at the outset, put this passage in its historical context. We know from Kant's

correspondence that this essay was written sometime in 1795. It must first be recalled that until April of that year, Prussia was in war with France. The initial phase of the Coalition Wars against France came to an end only in April 1795 with the conclusion of the Peace of Basel between Prussia and France, and the young French Republic, thus, was recognized in accordance with international law. Second, most of the original supporters of the Revolution in Germany, got frightened because of the Jacobin terror and joined the opposition. Despite all these developments and the risks involved, Kant did not change his positive judgement on the Revolution and its great importance for humanity as a whole. (108) Among those few supporters left in Germany, Kant was the most resolute and clear voice in favour of the Revolution. Let me close this parenthesis here and return to the text.

In the passage I have quoted, the emphasis is on the role of the "universal yet disinterested sympathy (*allgemein und doch eigennutzige Teilnehmung*) of the spectators in the game of great transformations". In other words, Kant places the world public opinion at the center of his argument. The existence of a world public opinion and its sympathy for the Revolution substantiate the moral

character of humanity and enable us to ground the hope for progress toward the better in this event. Through the publicly voiced sympathy of the world public opinion the Revolution becomes a universal political action. Kant says:

"The Revolution of a gifted people which we have seen unfolding in our day may succeed or it may fail; it may be filled with misery and atrocities to the point that a sensible man, were he boldly to hope to execute it successfully the second time, would never resolve to make the experiment at such cost -this Revolution, I say, nonetheless finds in the hearts of all spectators (who are not engaged in this game themselves) a wishful participation that borders closely on enthusiasm, the very expression of which is fraught with danger; this sympathy, therefore, can have no other cause than a moral disposition in the human race." (109)

It is clear that, for Kant, the real meaning of the Revolution lies in the wishful participation of all "the spectators". Through their enthusiasm the Revolution gains its universal character. This, in turn, proves the moral disposition in the human race. Therefore, the success or failure of this particular event is no longer important. Kant points out:

"The moral cause which is at work here is composed of two elements. Firstly, there is the right of every people to give itself a civil constitution of the kind that it sees fit, without interference from other powers. And secondly, once it is accepted that the only intrinsically rightful and morally good constitution which a people can have is by its very nature disposed to avoid wars of aggression (i.e. that the only possible constitution is a republican one, at least in its conception), there is the aim, which is also a duty, of submitting to those conditions by which war, the source of all evils and moral corruption, can be prevented. If this aim is recognized, the human race, for all its frailty, has a negative guarantee that it will progressively improve or at least that it will not be disturbed in its progress." (110)

Kant introduces here "the right of peoples to self-determination" and "the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs." At first sight, there seems to be a problem in this, i.e., a contradiction with the universalistic "Weltanschauung". But, on close inspection, Kant's intention becomes fairly clear: to defend the Revolution from the attacks of the external reactionary forces. In a footnote to this paragraph

he elaborates on this point. On the other hand, he also clarifies his position with respect to self-determination by stating that the constitution to be chosen should be intrinsically rightful and morally good, i.e., a republican one. In other words, the scope of self-determination is delimited by Kant within republican constitutionalism.

Then comes Kant's famous claim: by its disposition to avoid wars of aggression, the republican (today it should read as democratic) constitution will contribute to the prevention of war. Therefore, the increase in the number of republican states, according to Kant, will help prepare the ground for the accomplishment of a lasting international peace and security. (111) However, this is not the final point in his argument. Kant adds that such a peace will only be a negative guarantee for mankind's progress. As we know from *Universal History* the positive guarantee can only be secured with the creation of a perfect civic union of mankind. Kant continues:

"All this, along with the passion or enthusiasm with which men embrace the cause of goodness (although the former cannot be entirely applauded, since all passion as such is blameworthy), gives historical support for the following assertion,

which is of considerable anthropological significance: true enthusiasm is always directed exclusively towards the ideal, particularly towards that which is purely moral (such as the concept of right) and it cannot be coupled with selfish interests. No monetary rewards could inspire the opponents of the revolutionaries with that zeal and greatness of soul which the concept of right could alone produce in them, and even the old military aristocracy's concept of honour (which is analogous to enthusiasm) vanished before the arms of those who had fixed their gaze on the rights of the people to which they belonged, and who regarded themselves as its guardians. And then the external public of spectators sympathized with their exaltation, without the slightest intention of actively participating in their affairs." (112)

"The realization of a moral ideal" is the key concept here. (113) The revolutionary action with a moral cause and the enthusiastic international support for it will establish the foundations for hope for progress toward the better. As Yovel observes: "Liberty, equality, and fraternity became political values that could be institutionalized in the government itself instead of being just an abstract ideal. This reinforced Kant's faith that

consciousness of rational imperatives (the Enlightenment) ultimately leads to their becoming a real political force." (114)

Indeed, in the seventh section, Kant defines the French Revolution as a phenomenon of the evolution of a constitution in accordance with natural law. Hence, he sees it as a departure point from which the future history, the universalization of politics starts:

"Now, I claim to be able to predict to the human race -even without prophetic insight- according to the aspects and omens of our day, the attainment of this goal. That is, I predict its progress toward the better which, from now on, turn out to be no longer completely retrogressive. For such phenomenon in human history can never be forgotten, because it has revealed a tendency and faculty in human nature for improvement such that no politician, affecting wisdom, might have conjured out of the course of things hitherto existing, and one which nature and freedom alone, united in the human race in conformity with inner principles of right, could have promised. But so far as time is concerned, it can promise this only indefinitely and as a contingent event." (115)

This means that an irreversible process has started with the Revolution. The ideas which are now universalized through it can from now on never be forgotten and therefore they will eventually be internalized by all the peoples of the world. Kant goes on:

"But even if the intended object behind the event we have described were not to be achieved, for the present, or if a people's revolution or constitutional reform were ultimately to fail, or if, after the latter had lasted for a certain time, everything were to be brought back onto its original course (as politicians now claim to prophesy), our own philosophical prediction still loses none of its force. For the event in question is too momentous, too ultimately interwoven with the interests of humanity and too widespread in its influence upon all parts of the world for peoples not to be reminded of it when favourable circumstances present themselves, and to rise up and make renewed attempts of the same kind as before. After all, since it is such an important concern of the human race, the intended constitution must, at some time or another finally reach that degree of stability which the lessons of repeated experience will not fail to instil into the hearts of everyone." (116)

Kant concludes this section by arguing that the thesis on constant progress of humanity for the better is now tenable even within the theoretical context. He adds: "*And if one considers not only the events which may happen within a particular nation, but also their repercussions upon all the peoples of the earth which might gradually begin to participate in them, a view opens up into the unbounded future.*" (117)

In the next section, Kant repeats his view that the actualization of the ideal of a republican (democratic) constitution will, at the same time, provide "*a means of ending of all wars.*" Yet, with regard to lasting international peace, he avoids any shallow optimism by stating that its attainment requires a laborious process, innumerable wars and conflicts. It is clear from this that we could attain this goal, according to Kant, only through struggle and work. Therefore, it is difficult to understand why Kojève, for example, argues that Kant fails to talk about "*struggle and work*" which are the most striking instances of purposive freedom. (118) This, and other similar views (Fichte and Ferry among others) derive from a misinterpretation of the essay on *Universal History*, i.e., reading it as a mechanistic and deterministic history

conception. But Kant neither there nor anywhere else says something which can sustain these misreadings.

In the remaining sections, Kant defines once again the attainment of a cosmopolitan society as the ultimate goal for humanity. However, he does not deny the fact that there are great difficulties and obstacles ahead, -"many revolutions"; "innumerable wars and conflicts"-. Yet, there is still solid ground for hope for two reasons: first, the emergence of a world economy through the rise of capitalism, and second, the universalization of politics through the French Revolution. As a result, a new perspective opens up into unbounded future. Hence, we may assume even on empirical grounds a (political) goal in history toward a civil union of mankind. The "approximation" to this goal requires, first and foremost, a universal human action based on reason. (Reason should be read here as practical reason, that is conscious political and moral action.)

The political agenda for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is thus set. The political consciousness of the masses which was first actualized through the French Revolution spreads all over the World and has been universalized. However,

the cosmopolitan spirit of the eighteenth-century has been lost in the course of 19th and 20th centuries in theory as well as in practice. The reason why this happened can be examined by re-assessing the debate between Kant and Herder. (119) Now, I will try to do this.

- V -

The stark contrast between Kant's moral universalism and Herder's cultural particularism brings out two entirely different conceptions of history. Having examined Kant's approach, I will try to concentrate my attention upon Herder's main theses on the philosophy of history in order to uncover the (theoretical and political) significance of their epistemological and conceptual differences.

The starting-point of Herder's conception of man (singular as well as plural) can be reduced to his emphasis on "*difference*", i.e., his belief that every activity, situation, historical period, culture or civilization possess a unique character of its own. (12) He renounces "*similarity*" and declares that "*each thing only resembles itself*". (121) The idea that each image of humanity is

unique in itself, that is, my humanity is something unique, not equivalent to yours, lies in the heart of Herder's thinking. For him, *"each man has his own measure, as it were an accord peculiar to him of all his feelings to each other"*. (122) As Taylor observes, the idea here is not just that men are different, but rather that the differences appear as determinants and take on moral importance. (123)

Consequently, Herder believes not merely in the multiplicity, but in the incommensurability, of the values of different cultures and societies. Men should live in natural units, that is, societies united by a common culture. (124) Hence, belonging to a group or culture considered to be the means of individual development. And, the most important group, he thinks, is *"das Volk"*. The individual can receive his full justification as a member of some *"Volk"*. *"Every nation"*, Herder says, *"is one people, having its own national form as well as its own language"*. (125) Tradition and language, -i.e. *Volksgeist*-, not an abstract conception of reason, define and determine man. Reason, therefore, according to Herder, is a historical phenomenon which is closely connected with language, and language itself is in turn linked to tradition. (126)

In fact, Herder's principal law of history is this: "Everywhere on our Earth, whatever could be has been, according to the situation and wants of the place, the circumstances and occasions of times, and the native or generated character of the people." (127) The active human powers is a result of the limitations imposed by space and time. "Time, place and national character alone, in short the general cooperation of active powers in their most determinate individuality", he asserts, "govern all the events that happen among mankind." He goes on and develops his argument as follows: "Active human powers are the springs of human history... man's figure, education, and mode of thinking are thus genetic... Hence, that striking national character, which, deeply imprinted on the most ancient people, is unequivocally displayed in all their operations on the Earth. As a mineral water derives its component parts, its operative powers, and its taste from the soil through which it flows; so the ancient character of nations arose from the family features, the climate, the way of life and education, the early actions and employments, that were peculiar to them. The manners of the fathers took deep root, and became the internal prototype of the race. The mode of thinking of the Jews, which

is best known to us from their writings and actions, may serve as an example: In the land of their fathers, and in the midst of other nations, they remain as they were; and even when mixed with other people they may be distinguished for some generations downward. It was, and it is the same with all the nations of antiquity; Egyptians, Chinese, Arabs, Hindoos, etc. The more secluded they lived... the more their character was confirmed; so that, if every one of these nations had remained in its place, the Earth might have been considered as a garden, where in one spot one human national plant, in another, another, bloomed in its proper figure and nature..." (127)

In other words, the growth of each culture is simply a result of the right people being in the right place at the right time. Cultures have developed, each in its own way, without being fixed by universal laws. History is not the reward of men but of the social groups with common tradition and language. Kinship, social solidarity, nationhood (Volkstum) is expressed through language. Since men think in words, Herder believes that language determines men and makes them a nation. As Herder himself puts it: "Has a nation anything more precious than the language of its fathers? In it

dwell its entire world of tradition, history, religion, principles of existence; its whole heart and soul." (128) His linguistic patriotism has at times a radical tone: "I am able to stammer with immense effort in the words of a foreign language; its spirit will evade me... imitation is a terrible curse: human nature is not identical in different parts of the world... the world of things and sounds are different... what then we must do? We must seek to be ourselves. Let us be characteristic of our nation, language and scene... I cry to my German brothers... the remnants of all genuine folk-songs are rolling into the abyss of oblivion... the night of so-called culture is devouring all about it like a cancer... We speak the words of strangers and they wean us from our own thought... The Germans should know themselves, understand their place and respect their role in cosmos, in time and in space." (129)

These ideas -the subordination of reason and intellect to nationalism; uncritical faith and belief in tradition- exerted immense influence upon succeeding generations in Germany. Herder's attacks on nationalism and universal moralism based on transcendental nationality "have stimulated particularism, nationalism and literary, religious

and political irrationalism." (130) As one of his interpreters explains, "he is the father of related notions of cultural nationalism, historicism and "Volksgeist", one of the leaders of romantic revolt against mainstream enlightenment." (131) Yet, with his critical stance toward state (131) and his rejection of authoritarian government, he is considered to be a defender of civic humanism as well as pluralism. (132) However, these views seems to me untenable. The reason is that there is a sharp contrast between the intellectual and political implications of Herder's thought and the inferences of some of his commentators. It is true that the fusion of nationalism with an absolute state is Hegel's (Fichte has also contributed to it) invention, and Herder is in this respect innocent. (133) But, with his criticism of constitutionalism and fascination of cultural nations Herder prepared the ground for the nineteenth-century nationalism. In this context, Berlin tries to protect Herder's intellectual legacy by contending that the nationalism Herder defends was never political but merely cultural (134) Berlin is right in his judgement, but wrong with his conclusion. In my opinion, it is precisely this what makes Herder's political thought problematic, for cultural

nationalism stimulates at the political level the growth of ethnic and xenophobic nationalism. The nation-state in Germany was built on these ideas rather than on universal, constitutional principles defended by Kant. (The struggle between these two standpoints goes on even today.)

On the other hand, Herder's stance toward cosmopolitanism was also critical. He despises the concept of *"the citizen of the world"* whose devotion to humanity he considers to be wholly abstract: *"The savage who loves himself, his wife and his child, with quiet joy, and in his modest way works for the good of his tribe as for his own... is in my view more genuine than that human ghost, the refined citizen of the world, who, burning with love for all his fellow ghosts, loves a chimera. The savage in his poor hut has room for any stranger... the saturated heart of the idle cosmopolitan is a home for no one."* (135) Hegel, later, came up with almost identical views which are worth mentioning here. At the end of *Natural Law*, Hegel condemns *"the shapelessness of (Kant's) cosmopolitanism"* and *"the void of the Rights of Man, or the like void of a league of nations or a world republic"* in which one finds only *"abstractions and formalism filled with exactly the opposite of ethical vitality."*

(136) For Herder as well as for Hegel, moral universalism is empty abstraction and the concrete and real ethical value lies in the customs and traditions of particular nations. (Hegel took one more step and placed the Kantian concept of duty within national ethical context.) This special emphasis on particularistic identities is in clear opposition to Kant's views. Its implication is a philosophy of history grounded essentially in the past (tradition) and is exactly the opposite of Kant's conception of history. (137) Furthermore, according to the central assumption of Herder's philosophy of history, "reality admits no *a priori* laws". Paradoxical as it may seem, Herder is "empiricist" and "realist" in matters of epistemology.

Such fundamental conceptual and methodological differences cannot be bridged. Kant strongly criticized Herder's views through the three reviews he published on Herder's *Ideas on the Philosophy of History of Mankind*. The points Kant makes in his *Reviews on Herder*, are logical inferences from his own views on history. Therefore, I do not need to examine them here in detail. But two of them deserve particular attention: First, he rejects, as expected from him, the principle of "*tout comme chez*

nous" which Herder places in the center of his thinking. By correcting Herder's misconception of his phrase *"man is an animal who needs a master"*, he further clarifies his position with respect to this formulation and states that he, too, considers this fact as evil and reiterates his solution to this problem: *"But what if the true end of providence were not this shadowy image of happiness which each individual creates for himself, but the ever continuing and growing activity and culture which are thereby set in motion, and whose highest possible expression can only be the product of a political constitution based on concepts of human rights, and consequently an achievement of human beings themselves?"* (138) Thus, against Herder's *"natural unit, the cultural nation"*, Kant offers his alternative *"political constitution based on human rights"* and created through human (political) action, i.e., against cultural and historical relativism he presents a praxis-oriented, forward-looking history (*Wirkungsgeschichte*). The continuing significance and relevance of this *"theoretical and political debate"* in our times is obvious. I will return to this later in chapter five.

Before concluding this chapter, I should like to quote as an example two paragraphs from *Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie und Historiographie* which reflects Kant's position with regard to nationalism and which can, I believe, also be read as a critic of Herder:

"It has not, at least up to the present, been in keeping with the German character that people should chatter about national pride. It is indeed an accomplishment of that character not to have such a pride and even rather to recognize the merits of other peoples than its own."

"On the German national spirit. Because it is the design of Providence that peoples should not be combined, but that by a force of repulsion they should enter into conflict with one another, national pride and hatred are necessary to separate the nations. That is why a people loves its own country before others, whether from religion, believing that all others such as the Jews and the Turks are accused, or because it attributes to itself the monopoly of intelligence, all others being in its eyes incompetent or ignorant, or of courage, believing that all should fear it, or of liberty, believing that all others are slaves. Governments love this folly. This is the mechanism

of world organization which instinctively binds us and separates us. Reason, however, prescribes to us this law: that the instincts, since they are blind, direct the animal part of us, but must be replaced by the maxims of reason. That is why this national folly must be routed out and replaced by patriotism and cosmopolitanism" (139)

Kant's call for a consciousness of the citizen of the world which does not exclude constitutional patriotism or vice versa, is as relevant, today, as ever.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

- 1) Friedrich Meinecke, "Die Entstehung des Historismus" in Werke, Bd.3, Muenchen 1959, p.288; see also L.Landgrebe, "Die Geschichte im Denken Kants", in *Phaenomenologie und Geschichte*, Darmstadt, 1968, p.46: "es ist eine seit langem feststehende Meinung, dass Kants Philosophie 'ungeschichtlich' sei und dass er speziell in seiner Geschichtsphilosophie auf dem Boden der Aufklaerung und ihres Vernunftoptimismus stehengeblieben waere."
- 2) Yovel, p.6.
- 3) Reiss, *WE*, p.58.
- 4) Yovel, p.153.
- 5) Hannah Arendt, *Lecture's on Kant's Political Philosophy*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1989, p.8.
- 6) Reiss, *IUH*, p.41.
- 7) *ibid*, *IUH*, p.42.
- 8) Johann Gotlieb Fichte, *Beitraege zur Berichtigung der Urteile des Publikums ueber die Franzoesische Revolution*, in *Schriften zur Revolution*, Ullstein, Frankfurt, 1973.

9) For a recent version of this Luc Ferry, *The System of Philosophies of History*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992; See also, Alexis Philonenko, *Theorie et Praxis dans la Pensee Morale et Politique de Kant et de Fichte en 1793*, Vrin, Paris, 1968. Fichte's vacillations in his intellectual life are well-known. Therefore, the "young" Fichte is usually distinguished from the "old" one. *Beitraege* belongs to the period marked as "young Fichte".

10) Ferry, pp.100-101.

11) *ibid*, p.29.

12) Riley, p.120.

13) Ferry, p.29.

14) Reiss, *IUH*, p.42.

15) *ibid*, p.43.

16) *ibid*, p.43.

17) Henricus van der Linden, *Kantian Ethics and Socialism*, unpublished dissertation, Washington University, Department of Philosophy, 1985, p.124.

18) Yovel, p.144.

19) Reiss, *IUH*, p.44.

20) See, Lucio Coletti, ed. *K. Marx: Early Writings*, Harmondsworth, 1976; see also, *The German Ideology*, C.J. Arthur, ed., International Publishers, New York, 1970, pp.7-9, and p.122.

- 21) *ibid*, p.7.
- 22) Ernst Cassirer, *Kant's Life and Thought*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1981, p.224.
- 23) Reiss, *IUH*, p.44.
- 24) Cassirer, p.223.
- 25) Reiss, *IUH*, p.44.
- 26) Immanuel Kant, *Ausgewaehlte Reflexionen aus dem Nachlass zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie und Historiographie*, in *Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie*, Reclam, Stuttgart, 1974. p.226.
- 27) *ibid*, p.233.
- 28) Reiss, *CON*, p.226.
- 29) *ibid*, p.44.
- 30) Kant further elaborates his positive conception of "amour propre" in his essay *Radical Evil (First Book of Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone)*:
"The predisposition to humanity can be brought under the general title of a self-love which is physical and yet compares (for which reason is required); that is to say, we judge ourselves happy or unhappy only by making comparison with others. Out of this self-love springs the inclination to acquire worth in the opinion of others. This is originally a desire merely for equality, to allow no one superiority above oneself, bound up with a constant

care lest others strive to attain such superiority; but from this arises gradually the unjustifiable craving to win it for oneself over others. Upon the twin stem of jealousy and rivalry may be grafted great vices of secret and open animosity against all whom we look upon as not belonging to us." Kant, then, maintains that culture springs from this rivalry. See Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1960, p.22.

31) Yovel's comment on the novel character of Kant's position with respect to "social contract theory" merits close attention: "Kant uses, indeed, the language of a 'state of law' established by 'contract'. He has read Hobbes, and Locke, and has been influenced by Rousseau. But Kant does not see the foundation of political life in the wish to regulate physical needs or promote utilitarian interests. Men do not live in societies in order to protect their lives, divide labour, ensure property, or pursue happiness. The foundation of the society and the state lies in man's unsocial sociability, that is, in a certain propensity that inheres in his very nature as a rational being. Man senses that only in relating to others within society will he be able to assert his free subjectivity... As a free

subject, man needs the confrontation with another free subjectivity, from which he will secure recognition and esteem, whom he will rival, and whom he might also recognize eventually as his equal... The conflict (mutual antagonism among men) is not utilitarian. It does not occur because men have conflicting material interests (although it may assume this shape), but fundamentally because they are subjects endowed with consciousness and will, each trying to subject the other to his own will. This pure assertion of self is the actual meaning of selfishness rather than the natural inclination to survive and promote happiness, we have here an inclination that surpasses nature, the inclination to impose one's personal will upon (others)."

Yovel, *ibid*, pp.148-149

32) Reiss, *IUH*, pp.44-45. I have slightly modified Reiss's translation.

33) Cassirer, p.225.

34) Kant's thesis on the mutual antagonism implanted in the human species by nature as the motor of social and historical progress is defined by some interpreters as "the cunning of nature". This term, first used by Eric Weil in his *Problemes Kantians* (Paris, 1963) is intentionally reminiscent of Hegel's "cunning of reason" and creates nothing

but confusion, for it connotates a convergence of views between Hegel's and Kant's history conceptions.

35) van der Linden, p.134.

36) Reiss, p.45.

37) *ibid*, *IUH*, p.45.

38) *ibid*, *IUH*, p.46-47.

39) *ibid*, *IUH*, p.46.

40) Like many other political theorists in the 17th and 18th century (e.g. Locke, Rousseau) Kant, too, defines civil society in contrast to the state of nature. But differs from them by his claim that man can gain his human character only within society; and by his rejection of the abstraction of individuality before and outside of society. For him, the transition from state of nature to civil society is a "transition from a purely animal existence to a state of humanity.", Reiss, *ibid*, *CON*, p.226.

41) Reiss, *IUH*, p.46.

42) In *Conjectures*, Kant is more explicit on this point: "So long as the nations of nomadic herdsman, who recognize only God as their master, continued to swarm around the city-dwellers and farmers, who are governed by a human master or civil authority.." Reiss, *CON*, p.230. The original German words used

in this sentence are "Herr" and "Obrigkeit". Obrigkeit can be translated into English as "authorities" or "government". However, Obrigkeitsstaat has a special meaning emanating from the German history and means authoritarian state. This has nothing to do with Kant's use of the word "Obrigkeit".

43) Reiss, *IUH*, p.46.

44) *ibid*, *IUH*, p.46.

45) *ibid*, *IUH*, p.46.

46) *ibid*, *IUH*, p.46.

47) *ibid*, *IUH*, p.47.

48) I would like to mention two typical examples for misreading (especially) the fifth and sixth propositions. Ferry, pp.10-108, and Isaiah Berlin, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, Vintage Book, New York, 1990.

49) Reiss, *IUH*, p.47.

50) *ibid*, *IUH*, p.47.

51) See, Lewis White Beck, ed., *Kant on History*, The Bobb-Merril Company, New York, 1963, p.19.

52) Reiss, *IUH*, p.47.

53) Hegel is the one who sublimates and justifies war: "War has the higher significance that by its agency -the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabilization of finite

institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so also corruption in nations, would be the product of prolonged, let alone 'perpetual', peace."

"Philosophy of Right", *ibid*, p.210.

54) Yovel, p.153.

55) Beck, *IUH*, p.21.

56) Reiss, *IUH*, p.49.

57) *ibid*, p.50.

58) *ibid*, p.50.

59) *ibid*, p.50.

60) *ibid*, pp.50-51; elsewhere, namely in "Conjectures", Kant reiterates this view and points to the correlation between the development of Capitalism and the rise of political liberties: "For even now, the risk of war is the only thing which keeps despotism in check, because a state must now have wealth before it can be powerful, and there can be no wealth-producing activity without freedom. In a poor nation, this lack of wealth must be compensated for by widespread efforts to preserve commonwealth, and this is again impossible unless the nation feels that such efforts can be freely made." *ibid*, *CON*, p.231.

61) *ibid*, *IUH*, p.51.

- 62) W. B. Gallie, "Kant's View of Politics", in *Philosophy*-54, 1979, p.21.
- 63) *ibid*, *IUH*, p.51.
- 64) *ibid*, *IUH*, p.51.
- 65) *ibid*, *IUH*, p.52.
- 66) *ibid*, *IUH*, p.52.
- 67) Joseph M. Knippenberg, "The Politics of Kant's Philosophy", in Beiner and Booth, p.161.
- 68) *ibid*, *IUH*, p.53.
- 69) *CJ*, p.88.
- 70) *ibid*, p.92.
- 71) *ibid*, p.92.
- 72) *ibid*, p.93-94.
- 73) *ibid*, p.94.
- 74) van der Linden, p.175.
- 75) *CJ*, p.95.
- 76) *ibid*, p.95.
- 77) Yovel, p.182.
- 78) *CJ*, p.95.
- 79) *ibid*, p.95.
- 80) Yovel, p.182.
- 81) *CJ*, p.95.
- 82) *ibid*.
- 83) *ibid*, p.96.
- 84) Yovel, p.183.
- 85) *CJ*, p.98.

86) *ibid*, p.99.

87) *ibid*.

88) *ibid*, p.100.

89) *ibid*, p.109.

90) Yovel, p.151.

91) Alexandre Kojève, *Kant*, Gallimard, Paris, 1973, p.98, cited in Riley, p.140.

92) Gerhardt's account of Kant's political philosophy as a praxis-philosophy is worth mentioning here. His comment is equally valid for Kant's philosophy of history. He states: "(In Kant's *Politischer Philosophie*) liegt ein Modell vor, das mit der gaengigen Arbeitsteilung zwischen Theorie und Praxis nicht zur Deckung kommt. (Kant fuehre vor), dass die Politische Philosophie nicht in Begrueendungen fuer Ideen und Modelle zu entwickeln hat, sondern sie muss sich auch zu den Bedingungen der Realisierung ihrer normativen Erwartungen aeussern." Volker Gerhard, "Die republikanische Verfassung: Kant's Staatstheorie vor dem Hintergrund der Franzoesischen Revolution", in *Deutscher Idealismus und Franzoesische Revolution* (Vortraege, gehalten April/Mai/Juni 1987), Shriften aus dem Karl-Marx-Haus Trier 37, Trier 1988, p.48.

93) Goldman, p.212, see also Yovel, pp. 240-244, 249-250.

94) Reiss, *IUH*, p.53.

95) The text was published by Kant in 1798 as the second part of *The Conflict of Faculties*. However, some correspondence between Kant and his publisher shows that it was written in 1795. Throughout my reading of this essay, I will refer either to Robert Anchor's or Hans Reiss' translations whenever and wherever I believe which one reflects the German original text better. Also, when it becomes necessary, I am not refraining from making modifications.

96) Reiss, p.177

97) *CF*, p.143; Reiss, p.177

98) However his position is ambiguous. He implicitly advises the governments to change their attitudes to prevent any prospective revolution.

99) *CF* , pp.145-147; Reiss, pp.179-180.

100) *CF* , pp.145-147; Reiss, pp.179-180.

101) *CF* , p.149; Reiss, p.180.

102) *CF* , p.151; Reiss, p.181.

103) *CF* , p.151; Reiss, p.181.

104) *CF* , p.151; Reiss, p.181.

105) Balibar's observation on the "*Declaration of Rights of 1789*" indicates the internally as well as externally universalist character of the revolution. He writes: "... the unitary simplicity of the

Declaration of Rights represents, in the field of ideas, or rather of words -of words that immediately escaped the control of their authors- the real social complexity of the French Revolution: the fact that the Revolution, from the beginning, is not, is already no longer a 'bourgeois revolution', but a revolution made jointly by the bourgeoisie and the people or the nonbourgeois masses, in an ongoing relation of alliance and confrontation. The Revolution is immediately grappling with its own internal contestation, without which it would not even exist, and always chasing after the unity of its opposites." E. Balibar, *Masses, Classes, Ideas*, Routledge, New York & London, 1994, p.44.

106) Article 4 of the revolutionary constitution of 1793 even gives to all those, who are residing at least for one year in France, full political rights (Jurgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe", in *Theorizing Citizenship*, ed, Ronald Beiner, SUNY Press, New York, 1995). And the French Constitution of 1795 is, according to Joseph de Maistre, a mere 'academic exercise'. He criticized it by arguing that "a constitution which is made for all nations is made for none." For him, it must grow out of the particular circumstances and character of a nation,

at a particular time, at a particular place. This universalism-particularism debate was also at the top of the political agenda at the turn of 18th/19th century in Germany. The latter view dominated philosophy and politics in Germany in the 19th century. Cited in Berlin, p.164.

107) *CF*, p.153; Reiss, p.182.

108) Goldmann, p.220.

109) *CF*, p.153; Reiss, p.182.

110) *CF*, *ibid*, pp.153-155; Reiss, pp.182-183

111) For a recent discussion of Kant's argument on the correlation between republican (democratic) constitution and peace, see Michael W. Doyle, *Liberalism and International Relations*, in Beiner and Booth, pp.173-203. Contrary to his claim, Doyle's position is not Kantian but utilitarian. As an example for critiques of Doyle's position from a "realist" perspective, see *International Security*, Vol.19, No.2, 1994.

112) *CF*, pp.155-157; Reiss, p.183.

113) On the other hand, the most controversial and problematic issue within Kant's political philosophy, that is, the denial of the right to revolution (rebellion), also appears in a footnote to this paragraph. Kant's ambivalence concerning revolution should be considered against the

historical background where Kant wrote his political writings. The context where this problem emerges in *The Conflict of Faculties* is this:

"A being endowed with freedom in the consciousness of his superiority over the irrational animal, can and should therefore, according to the formal principle of his will, demand no other government for the people to which he belongs than one in which the people are co-legislative; that is, the right of men who are supposed to obey (law) must necessarily precede all regard for well-being, and this right is a blessing that is exalted above all utilitarian values and one upon which no government, however beneficent it may persistently be permitted to infringe. But this right is still always only an Idea of which the realization is restricted to the condition of accord of its means with the morality which the people may not transgress; and this may not come to pass through revolution which is always unjust." CF, p.157; Reiss, pp.183-184.

114) Yovel, p.167.

115) CF, p.159; Reiss, p.184.

116) CF, p.159; Reiss, p.85.

117) CF, p.161; Reiss, p.185.

118) Cited in Riley, p.140.

119) Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) was contemporaneous to Kant. He studied under Kant at Konigsberg University, but also deeply influenced by G. Hamann. The first part of Herder's *Ideas Toward a Philosophy of the History of Man* was published in the same year (1784) as Kant's essay, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*. Herder's work is considered to be an early expression of Romanticism. He was also influential on the "Sturm und Drang" movement.

120) Isaiah Berlin, *Vico and Herder*, The Hogarth Press, London, 1976, p.145.

121) *ibid*, p.164.

122) Johann Gottfried Herder, "*Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*", in Bernard Suphan, *Herders Saemtliche Werke*, Berlin, 1891, Bd.XIII, p.231, cited in Taylor, p.16.

123) Taylor, p.16.

124) Berlin, p.153.

125) Johann Gottfried Herder, *Reflections on the Philosophy of History of Mankind*, trans. Frank E. Manuel, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968, p.135.

126) Reiss, p.198. Herder puts it in the following way: "Both in theory and in practice, reason is merely something acquired and learned." As Reiss

explains, Herder, in the German original text, is exploiting the etymological relationship between the words "Vernunft" and "vernehmen", *ibid*, p.282.

127) Herder, trans. Manuel, pp.159-160.

128) Cited in Berlin, p.165.

129) Cited in Berlin, pp.179-180.

130) *ibid*, p.146.

131) *ibid*, p.145.

132) see F.M. Barnard, *Self-Direction and Political Legitimacy: Rousseau and Herder*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988; and Berlin, *ibid*.

133) For Herder's influence on Hegel, see Taylor, *ibid*. Taylor's claim that Hegel represents the continuity from Herder to Kant through his fusion of Herder's theory of expressivism and Kant's theory of radical freedom is, in my opinion, untenable, because Hegel's conception of state as an absolute body cancels individual freedom. Therefore, in my view, the continuity is solely from Herder to Hegel, and Kant has no place in it. However, Fichte, especially as the author of *Science of Rights* and *Addresses to the German Nation* stands right in the middle of the line of continuity from Herder to Hegel.

134) Berlin, p.181.

135) *ibid*, p.178.

136) Steven B. Smith, *Hegel's Critique of Liberalism*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992, p.75.

137) I am perfectly aware of the fact that there are considerable differences between Herder's and Hegel's history conceptions. For instance, unlike Hegel, Herder does not say anywhere that "*the ethical health of peoples is preserved through war*" or he does not describe international relations as a state of war. But these details are not important, his insistence of "*difference*" and "*cultural nationalism*" brings him on the same line with Hegel.

138) Reiss, p.219.

139) Cited in Goldmann, p.26.

CHAPTER THREE

UNIVERSAL LAWS OF MORALITY

"Do not act as an I, in the empirical sense, but as the I of mankind, in the ideal sense. Regard to your own person as well as any other not in the physical, racial or narrowly historical terms of individual existence, but exclusively as an embodiment of the eternal, world-historical idea of mankind."

Hermann Cohen, *Reason and Hope*

- I -

Kant's moral theory provides the guiding principles for universal human action (approximation) towards the ideal of a "perfect civil union of mankind", and in this sense, I will argue that, it can be reconstructed as a praxis-philosophy. Indeed, as we have seen in the

preceding chapters, "primacy of practical reason" (1) is the central argument of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" as a whole; and, consequently, "primacy of praxis" is the determining ground of his *Philosophy of History*. The aim of this Chapter is, therefore, to offer a critical reading of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* based on these premises. Where and if necessary, I will also pay close attention to the *Metaphysical Principles of Virtue* (the second part of *The Metaphysics of Morals*).

Before going on to my examination of the *Groundwork*, I should like to quote the following passages from Kant's *Lectures on Ethics*, which, I believe, sustain my approach to his moral philosophy:

"The universal end of mankind is the highest moral perfection. If we all so ordered our conduct that it should be in harmony with the universal end of mankind, the highest perfection would be attained. We must each of us, therefore, endeavour to guide our conduct to this end; each of us must make such a contribution of his own that if all contributed similarly the result would be perfection." (2)

Since we live in an imperfect world, how plausible is this call for moral betterment? Kant immediately recognizes this problem and frames it as follows: *"If we look at the most enlightened portion of the world, we see the various states armed to the teeth, sharpening their weapons in time of peace the one against the other. The consequences of this are that they block our approach to the universal end of perfection. Abbe de St. Pierre has proposed that a senate of nations should be formed. If this proposal were carried out it would be a great step forward, for the time now occupied by each nation in providing for its own security could then be employed for the advancement of mankind"*. (3)

Thus, the obstacles before moral progress is defined in political terms, that is, to overcome them requires the search for peace and its institutional prerequisites. (4) And, as we know from the previous chapter, the road to peace is determined by the dialectical relationship between constitutional and international politics. Accordingly, the moral task for humanity is the realization of a (international) civil society under the rule of law, guaranteeing freedom and equality for all. Human rights and dignity appear here as the connecting links between constitutional

and international legality. (4) In this respect, human identity, as the underlying concept of Kant's moral philosophy, combines morality with legality through politics. On this ground, Kant's moral Philosophy also offers a powerful renunciation of utilitarian liberalism (6) as well as that of Machiavellian realpolitik. Hence, it implies a "philosophical liberalism/civic humanism" on the basis of "persons as ends".

- II -

As in his theoretical philosophy, in his moral Philosophy Kant is concerned to show how something is possible, -in this case moral action. He begins to develop his argument by explicating the concept of a rational being:

"Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the power to act in accordance with his conception of laws -that is, in accordance with principles- and only so has he a will. Since the derivation of actions from law requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason." (7)

As a rational being who possess free will, man experiences an internal conflict between his reason and his desires. However, if he is aware of his rationality he cannot choose to believe that the moral law is not binding upon us. Yet, "being rational" and "being conscious of rationality" are two different things. Therefore, there are situations that man may not want to obey the moral law; he may prefer -in fact, often- to satisfy his desires. For this reason, the moral law appears to us as imperatives. In Kant's own words: "*The conception of a objective principle so far as this principle is necessitating for a will is called a command (of reason), and the formula of this command is called an imperative.*" (8) There are two kinds of imperatives; hypothetical and categorical. Kant elaborates:

"Hypothetical imperatives declare a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something else that one wills (or that one may will). A categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to further end." (9) Kant goes on: "Hence all imperatives are formula for determining an action which is necessary in accordance with the principle

of a will in some sense good. If the action would be good solely as a means to something else, the imperative is hypothetical; if the action is represented as good in itself and therefore as necessary, in virtue of its principle, for a will which of itself accords with reason, then the imperative is categorical." (10)

Kant presents in the *Groundwork* six different formulas of the categorical imperative. Since they are different expressions of one-and-the-same moral law, we can regroup them under three headings. (11)

Formula 1 - the Formula of Autonomy or of Universal Law: "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." (12)

Formula 2 - the Formula of Respect for the Dignity of Persons: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, always as an end and never as a means only." (13)

Formula 3 - the Formula of Legislation for a Moral Community: "All maxims that proceed from our own making of law ought to harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature." (14)

Before starting with my analysis, it is necessary to summarize Kant's definition of the notions of "duty" and "maxim".

As Paton puts it, "under human conditions, where we have to struggle against unruly impulses and desires, a good will is manifested in acting for the sake of duty." (15) Hence, in order to understand human goodness, we should examine the concept of duty. Kant describes duty through three propositions, which in the end can be reduced to one. In a word, duty is man's ability to act against his inclinations or self-interests. With this definition of duty, the consequentialist approach of the utilitarian liberalism judging and evaluating our actions only by their results is rejected by Kant.

Kant's application of the notion of "maxim" reads as follows: "A maxim is a subjective principle of action and must be distinguished from an objective principle - namely, a practical law. The former contains a practical rule determined by reason in accordance with the conditions of the subject (often his ignorance or again his inclinations): it is thus a principle on which the subject acts. A law, on the other hand, is an objective principle valid for every rational being; and it is a principle on which he ought to act - that is, an imperative." (16)

Now, I can start with my analysis of the three formulas of the categorical imperative.

All of these formulas can be read as an alternative to the "*utilitarian Weltanschauung*." They suggest that man, as a rational being, has the capacity (reason) to act also on principles. That is to say, acting merely on inclinations or self-interests is not the defining characteristic of being a man. In *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue* he is more explicit and claims that human dignity requires that we should act toward our own perfection and at the same time for the happiness of others. (17) For Kant, these are ends which are at the same time duties. However, this does not mean that Kant is denying the existence of vices. On the contrary, he is perfectly aware of this fact. In *Principles of Virtue*, while reiterating his concept of "*unsocial sociability*" he indicates both sides of the coin, namely virtues and vices. (18) The tension between virtues and vices is explained in that work on the basis of the concept of "*unsocial sociability*". Since "*man is a being intended for society*" (19), Kant asserts that this tension can be overcome through legality. To put it differently, the existence of vices cannot and should not compel us to abandon moral (virtuous) action. The

"realist" paradigm is mistaken exactly on this point, i.e., by putting the emphasis merely on the negative side of the "empirical reality". They overlook man's ability to transform the world (the human community) in light of his moral/political ideal.

Let us return here to the *Groundwork*. The second formula reflects a radical rejection of the "utilitarian liberalism". In the explanatory remarks to this formula, after describing the conflict between subjective and objective ends, Kant states: "Rational beings... are called persons because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves -that is, as something which ought not to be used merely as a means- and consequently imposes to that extent a limit on all arbitrary treatment of them (and is an object of reverence). Persons, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence as an object of our actions has a value for us; they are objective ends -that is, things whose existence is in itself an end, and indeed an end such that in its place we can put no other end to which they should serve simply as means; for unless this is so, nothing at all of absolute value would be found anywhere." (20)

As Riley rightfully observes, the rights of man are better grounded in this formula of "persons as ends in themselves than in the arguments of any other political philosopher." (21) According to Goldmann, this formula represents a categorical and radical rejection of existing society with its atomistic individualism and formulates the framework for any future humanism. (22) And, it calls that our actions be compatible with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. (23) Goldmann concludes his reading of this formula with the following words: "Moreover, and no less radically it lays the foundations for any true humanism establishing the only supreme value upon which all our judgements must be based. That supreme value is humanity in the person of each individual man - not just the individual, as in rationalism, nor just the totalities in its different forms (God, state, nation, class), as in all the romantic and intuitionist doctrines, but the human totality, the community embracing the whole of humanity and its expression in the human person." (24)

The third formula is directly related to the first and second. In this formula the influence of Rousseau is again visible. As Schneewind explains: "Kant's attribution of autonomy to every normal

human being was a radical break with prevailing views of the moral capacity of ordinary people. The natural law theorists whose work was influential throughout the seventeenth and much of the eighteenth centuries did not on the whole think that most people could know, without being told, everything that morality requires of them... Through Rousseau Kant was convinced that everyone must have the capacity to be a self-governing moral agent, and that it is this characteristic that gives each person a special kind of value and dignity"

(25) Indeed, in the social contract Rousseau calls for the creation of a society in which each member accepts to be governed by the dictates of the "general will", a will representing every individual's truest and deepest aims and directed always at the good of the whole. The general will should have to be able to overcome the inclinations and desires for private goods. Rousseau claims that "the impulse of appetite alone is slavery, and obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself is freedom" (26)

Unlike previous thinkers' reference to God or Nature as the lawgiver, Rousseau contends that man makes his law and thus creates the foundation for a free and just social order. This approach to morality has been appropriated by Kant.

Consequently, in the third formula, Kant indicates that the notion of the will as universally "legislative" in terms of objective ends leads to the idea of a "kingdom of ends". He describes this realm as "a systematic union of different rational beings under common laws." (27) According to Kant, "a rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member, when, although he makes its universal laws, he is also himself subject to these laws." Kant goes on and adds: "He belongs to it as sovereign, when as the maker of laws he is himself subject to the will of no other." (28)

In such a kingdom of ends, Kant continues, everything has either a price or a dignity. If it has a price, it can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; if it is exalted above all price - but has an intrinsic value- than it has dignity. Humanity so far as it is capable of morality, Kant states, is the only thing which has dignity. And, he concludes by remarking that autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature. (29)

In *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*, Kant recapitulates his explication to the third formula in a more explicit way: "Humanity itself is a dignity, for man can be used by no one (neither by others nor even by himself) merely as a means, but

must always be used at the same time as an end. And precisely therein consists his dignity (personality), whereby he raises himself above all other beings in the world, which are not men and can, accordingly, be used - consequently, above all things. Even as he therefore cannot give himself away for a price (which would conflict with the duty of self-esteem), so can he likewise not act counter to the equally necessary self-esteem of others as men, i.e., he is bound to give practical acknowledgement to the dignity of humanity in every other man. Consequently, there rests upon him a duty regarding the respect which must necessarily be shown to every other man." (30)

Kant's moral theory inheres a criticism of the existing society. It's strength lies precisely therein, which his critics, from Hegel onwards, see as a weakness, namely, its Universalist character. It could be argued about this or that have some internal contradictions, but universalism was Kant's "deliberate mistake". Once we recognize Kant's ultimate goal as the approximation to a "perfect civil union of mankind", then it is no longer difficult to understand Kant's purpose in constructing his moral theory as an attempt to uncover the common values which binds men to each

other regardless of the cultural surrounding in which they live in their immediate communities. It is a moral theory seeking to embrace no less than humanity as a whole. Does it succeed to accomplish it's self-imposed objective? Yes, and no. Yes, because it opens a new avenue which can be further explored, i.e., we may depart from this starting-point and try to go beyond. No, because as is, its abstract structure constitutes a problem. However, if it is read together with his political philosophy or philosophy of history, the moral theory has the potential to overcome its own problems. As Habermas rightly states: *"What moral theory can do and should be trusted to do is clarify the universal of our moral institutions, and thereby to refute value-skepticism."* (31)

In the next chapter I will seek to establish the connecting links between Kant's moral and political theories.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1) CPrR, p.119. As van der Linden observes "practical reason views the world both in its natural and human dimensions as a field for the expression and realization of moral ideal, and it holds, moreover, that our ultimate purpose and satisfaction is to be found in the transformative activity directed towards this ideal." van der Linden, p.13.

2) LE, p.252.

3) *ibid.*

4) van der Linden, p.4.

5) "Man has fundamental rights... if that right is necessary to protect his dignity, or his standing as equally entitled to concern and respect... Dignity presupposes that treating a man (in such a way) that is consistent with recognizing him as a full member of the (universal) human community." Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977, pp.198-199.

6) See Judith Shklar, *Ordinary Vices*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984, pp.233-238; and, also John

Rawls's, "The Right and the Good Contrasted", a chapter from *A Theory of Justice*, in Michael Sandel, ed., *Liberalism and its Critics*, New York University Press, 1984, p.37.

7) *GMM*, p.412.

8) *ibid*, p.413.

9) *ibid*, p.414.

10) *ibid*.

11) I am following here Roger J. Sullivan's approach. See Roger J. Sullivan, *An Introduction to Kant's Ethics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p.29.

12) *GMM*, p.421.

13) *ibid*, p.429.

14) *ibid*, p.436.

15) *ibid*, p.18.

16) *ibid*, p.421.

17) *MPV*, pp.386-389; p.398.

18) *MPV*, p.471.

19) *ibid*.

20) *GMM*, p.428.

21) Riley, p.38.

22) Goldmann, p.176.

23) *GMM*, p.429.

24) Goldmann, p.177.

- 25) J.B. Schneewind, "Autonomy, Obligation and Virtue: An Overview of Kant's Moral Philosophy", in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp.311-312
- 26) J. J. Rousseau, *Social Contract*, trans. Judith R. Masters, St. Martin Press, New York, 1978, p.58
- 27) *GMM*, p.433.
- 28) *ibid.*
- 29) *ibid*, pp.434-436.
- 30) *MPV*, p.462.
- 31) Jurgen Habermas, "Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?", in Beiner & Booth, p.332.

CHAPTER FOUR

TOWARDS A UNIVERSAL HUMAN COMMUNITY:
CONSTITUTIONALISM WITH A
COSMOPOLITAN INTENT

*"He called it Utopia, a Greek word
meaning there is no such place"*

Quevedo (1)

*"Whereas recognition of the inherent
dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of
the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the
world..."*

Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Preamble.

- I -

As the preceding chapters have shown, the
approximation to a "perfect civil union of mankind"

and "perpetual peace" appears to be the underlying concept in Kantian praxis-oriented philosophy of history and moral universalism... In the treatise on *Perpetual Peace* Kant attempts to place this concept into a political as well as legal/institutional context. In other words, Kant seeks there to combine morality with legality through politics. This chapter, therefore, aims at a closer understanding of the central arguments of this treatise. It will also seek to demonstrate the distinctiveness -the unique characteristic- of Kant's approach to peace by comparing it with the other "peace projects" of the eighteenth-century, that is, those of Abbe de St.Pierre, Rousseau and Bentham.

Before proceeding with my examination of the relevant texts, I should like to say a few words about the historical background. Three international peace treaties are somewhat related to these peace projects of the eighteenth century. Let me briefly mention them and delineate their relevance: First, the Westphalia Peace Treaty of 1648 which is taken to mark the beginning of the international system as a universe composed of sovereign territorial states. (2) Second, the Peace Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 which is generally

remembered as the first occasion on which the establishment of a balance of power in Europe appears as an explicit aim of peace settlement. (3) Abbe de St.Pierre attended the Utrecht Peace Conference as a member of the French Delegation. He published his *Project of Perpetual Peace* first in 1712 and then in its final form during this Conference in 1713. This work went through several revised and enlarged editions and finally became quite famous, if sometimes as the object of Voltaire's and Frederick the Great's jokes. (5) Later, St.Pierre's *Project of Perpetual Peace* was rewritten with abbreviations, additions and modifications by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau published his version first only as the abstract of St.Pierre's work, in 1761. The edition which included Rousseau's modifications and criticism in its final form appeared in 1782, six years after his death. The last "peace project" before Kant wrote his own essay on this subject came from Jeremy Bentham. Bentham wrote his *Plan for a Universal Perpetual Peace* between 1786-1789.

All of these three projects were practical proposals without theoretical depth. Rousseau's work contains some insights, which might be described, to a certain extent, as theoretical.

Kant's essay on *Perpetual Peace*, on the other hand, was a theoretical work with practical/political implications. It was written immediately after the conclusion of the Peace of Basel between France and Prussia, which marked the end of the first phase of the Coalition Wars against the revolutionary France.

(5) The recognition of the new regime of France through the Treaty of Basel fostered Kant's optimism for the betterment and progress of humanity. The reason is that Kant bases his hopes for peace on the grounds of republican constitutionalism with a cosmopolitan intent. After these brief remarks on the historical context, let me now move on to the texts of the "peace-projects".

- II -

Abbe de St.Pierre's *Peace Project* consists of five fundamental articles. (6) In the introductory part, St.Pierre gives the reasons for which the "Christian Powers of Europe" should sign these five articles of general alliance. (7) He asserts that it is very unwise to assume that treaties made or to be made will always be observed, if there will not be a united body which can ensure their enforcement. In his own words: "Usually treaties are merely

collections of mutual promises. But we have, so far, no permanent society sufficiently powerful and sufficiently interested in the exemption of these promises. Each of the parties can with impunity exempt himself from the observance of them, according, as he finds it, to his interest to observe them or not to observe them. So that, without a general alliance, there is no complete security for the duration of peace." (8) St. Pierre, then, asserts that it is necessary to form such an alliance, a permanent and lasting society. He takes the German Diet as a model for this European Union. (9)

The first article proposes the signing of a fundamental treaty comprising in five articles among the nineteen Christian Powers of Europe and its associates with the aim to prevent civil and foreign wars. In a word, it is a proposal to preserve the status quo. With this treaty "a permanent system of arbitration of the European Republic" will be established. (10)

The second article elaborates the first and stipulates that nineteen European sovereigns are each to nominate a delegate with alternates. Large and small states are to have equal representation. The 19 delegates or plenipotentiaries are to

constitute the Senate or Congress of Peace, which is to sit permanently at Utrecht or elsewhere. To secure the independence, the Congress' (Diet) president is to change each week. (11) The common expenses of the *"European Republic"* such as common defense will be fixed by a majority vote.

The third article relates first to the obligatory mediation as a means of settlement of disputes. In event of the failure of mediation, an award or arbitration becomes necessary through voting. It is to be rendered by the Congress of Peace, which thus becomes above all, a tribunal, a permanent and compulsory Court of Arbitration. (12)

The fourth article is the most important one. It attributes coercive powers to the Grand Alliance for the enforcement of its joint decisions: It states: *"If any of the allies refuse to carry out the decisions of the Grand Alliance, make preparations for war, attempt to make treaties inconsistent with the European Association, take up arms to resist or attack, or in short conduct hostilities against an ally, then the grand alliance shall put him to the ban of Europe as an enemy, and shall arm and proceed against him offensively, until he has carried out the said decisions or rulings, and given security to repair the injury caused by*

war, and to repay the cost of the war, or even the cost of preparations for war on the part of each of the allies." (13)

This article anticipates the modern nations of "sanctions" and "collective security" as embodied in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

The last article states the legislative power of the European Association which will be carried out in the Diet by a plurality of votes casted by the delegates upon the instructions from their respective governments. It also stipulates that the five articles themselves could only be amended with the "unanimous consent of all the Confederates." (14)

Abbe de St.Pierre's peace project ends here. St.Pierre's peace project obviously vacillates between a true federation of independent sovereignties and a modified medieval Respublica Christiana. (15) In 1715 Leibniz commented on this peace project with the following words: "I have seen something of the plan of de St.Pierre for the maintenance of an everlasting peace in Europe. It reminds me of a motto on a grave, *pax perpetua*; the dead fight not; but the living are of another temper and the most powerful have little respect for courts." (17) However, despite this humorous, if

grim comment, Leibniz took him seriously enough to write his own essay on peace. So did Rouseeau.

- III -

Rousseau's *A Project of Perpetual Peace*, although essentially a revised version of St.Pierre's work, still merits close attention. Redressed in Rousseau's attractive style, St.Pierre's ideas began to exercise directly or indirectly an influence on philosophical thought and on practical politics. Kant, for instance, in most of his references to Abbe de St.Pierre's work also cited Rousseau's name.

Rousseau, in his *Perpetual Peace*, to a certain extent in anticipation of Kant, refers to the dialectical relationship between "internal constitution" and "foreign relations". (18) Rousseau further states that "mankind by gathering itself into groups, has become its own enemy." (19) "We are each of us in the civil state with our fellow citizens" he continues "and in the state of nature with the rest of the world" (20) He also says that therefore, the governments "spent more care to resist other powers than to perfect its own institutions." (21) According to Rousseau, the

solution to get rid of these contradictions could be by a confederative form of government which will become formidable abroad by reason of its power and could enforce its laws rigorously. Rousseau presents this solution as the only possible way of restraining equally subjects, rulers and foreigners.

(22) Rousseau, then, following St.Pierre, reviews historical examples of confederations starting with the ancient Greek Amphictyonic Council moving on to the Germanic Body, the Swiss League and the States General. (23)

He goes on and mentions Christianity as a common ground on which Europe can be united. In addition to Christianity, common literature, customs and commerce are cited as the basis for a prospective European Union. But he also admits that there are divisions, dissensions, usurpations, rebellions, wars among the peoples of Europe, because the European powers are in a state of war towards each other. Therefore, "*there are only passing truces rather than true peace*" in Europe.

(24) The "*balance of power*", which he accepts as a fact, is for him, nevertheless, an absurd way of keeping the status quo. If one of the powers breaks it, it re-establishes itself. If it is so, Rousseau asks, why should one insist on it, and not attempt

on a consciously created peace. (25) He then introduces his idea about the establishment of a general league, a durable confederation. "All its members must be placed in such a mutual state of dependence that not one of them alone may be in a position to resist all of the others." (26) This will be a "great armed league always ready to prevent those who undertake to destroy or resist it". (27) After this introduction Rousseau summarizes his views as follows:

"The above survey leads inevitably to three conclusions. The first is, that with the exception of the Turks, there exists among the peoples of Europe a social relation, imperfect, but closer than the loose and general bonds of humanity; the second is, that the imperfection of this society makes the condition of those who compare it worse than if there were no society at all amongst them. The third is, that these primitive ties which render this society harmful, at the same time render it easy to perfect; so that all its members might discover their happiness in that which at present causes their misery and change the state of war which exists amongst them into a perpetual peace." (28)

"Through reason", Rousseau claims, "this great work, which began by chance, can be brought to perfection." (29) In the remaining part of this essay, Rousseau reiterates, although in somewhat revised form, basically the five fundamental articles of St.Pierre with its explications.

In order to convince the sovereigns to accept entering the proposed Confederation Rousseau again repeats St.Pierre's arguments. In this context, he spells out phrases which sharply contradicts with his own political theory: "As to the dependence which each one will be under to the common tribunal, it is very clear that it will diminish none of the rights of sovereignty, but on the contrary will strengthen them, and will make them more assured by article three, which guarantees to each one not only his territory against all foreign invasion, but also his authority against all rebellion by his subjects. The princes accordingly will be none the less absolute, and their crowns will be all the more secure, so that in submitting their disputes to the judgement of the Diet as among equals..." (30)

However, later in his criticism of St.Pierre's project entitled *Judgement on Perpetual Peace*, Rousseau modifies this view by remarking: "Let anyone judge from these two fundamental maxims how

princes might take a proposal which directly clashes with one and is scarcely more favourable to the other. For anyone can see that with the establishment of this European Diet the government of each state is fixed as rigidly as its frontiers; and that no prince can be guaranteed against the revolt of his subjects unless at the same time the subjects are guaranteed against the tyranny of the prince; on no other terms could the institution be maintained. Now, I ask whether there is a single sovereign in the world who, thus restrained forever from engaging in his most cherished schemes, would bear without indignation the mere idea of seeing himself forced to be just, not only to foreigners, but even to his own subjects." (31)

Rousseau's main criticism against St. Pierre is that his peace project lacks the means for its execution. Rousseau believes that the success of such a project cannot only be dependent on the consent of the sovereigns. It is not "a question of persuading but compelling", and, "instead of writing books", Rousseau remarks wryly; "you will have to raise troops". (32) He therefore asserts with the same ironical tone that so long there will be another Henry IV and Sully appear, the Perpetual

Peace will remain as a dream. Rousseau closes his book with the following words:

"There is no prospect of federative leagues being established otherwise than by revolutions, and on this assumption which all of us would venture to say whether this European League is more to be desired or feared? It might perhaps do more harm all of a sudden than it could prevent for centuries." (33) In a word, use of force is the only way to attain peace.

Thus, as Carter puts it: "Rousseau appears as a reluctant realist. Reluctant both because he could not abandon the belief that war is a moral problem to which a solution ought to be sought, and because he remains convinced of the moral imperative for action in pursuit of rationally determined end, wherever this is possible." (34) With a certain caveat, Rousseau is close to Kant here. However, on the whole, he too, approaches peace as from a Eurocentrist perspective, and, in this context, lacks the comprehensiveness of Kant's vision.

- IV -

Jeremy Bentham's *Principles of International Law* comprises four essays:

- 1) Objects of International Law
- 2) Subjects, or the Personal Extent of the Dominion of the Laws
- 3) War, considered in respect of its Causes and Consequences
- 4) A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace.

Before going on to his peace plan, it is important to note that it was Bentham who first coined the term "*International Law*" in order to establish "a distinction between the mutual transactions of sovereigns as such and laws calculated for internal government", a distinction which has never been definitely made in any previous work on the subject. (35)

A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace is a utilitarian and legalistic approach to international relations. Bentham bases his plan upon two fundamental principles, both of which he

regards essential for the maintenance of peace among nations:

"1) The reduction and fixation of the forces of the several states which composed the European Concert, or, in other words, disarmament.

2) The emancipation of the colonial dependencies of each state." (35) This emancipation was in harmony with Bentham's deep conviction that colonies, besides being a source of constant conflict between nations, were of a little or no utility to their mother country. (36)

The Plan consists of fourteen propositions. Five of them are framed as recommendations to Great Britain. He, then, states that the same five propositions are also true for France. The propositions stipulates:

"I. That it is not the interest of Great Britain to have any foreign dependencies,

II. That it is not the interest of Great Britain to have any treaty of alliance, offensive or defensive, with any other power whatsoever,

III. That it is not the interest of Great Britain to have any treaty, with any power whatsoever, for the purpose of possessing any advantage whatsoever in point of trade, to the exclusion of any other nation whatsoever,

IV. That it is not the interest of Great Britain to keep up any naval force beyond what may be sufficient to defend its commerce against pirates,

V. That it is not the interest of Great Britain to keep on foot any regulations whatsoever of distant preparation for the augmentation or maintenance of its naval force, such as the Navigation Act, bounties on the Greenland trade, and other trades regarded as nurseries for seamen." (37)

What we have here are technical/practical advises to governments. The pragmatists vision of utilitarianism is apparent in this text. Bentham, unlike other peace project designers of the eighteenth-century, is talking directly about the interests of two particular states, -i.e. France and Great Britain, the two great colonial powers of his own time-, which he considers to be capable of securing the "European" (and as a result international) peace, if they themselves agree on a plan.

In the ensuing four propositions, he develops his argument on the establishment of a general and permanent pacification for all Europe on the basis of an agreement to be concluded between France and Great Britain.

The twelfth proposition is related to world disarmament. As a first step, Bentham proposes the conclusion of force reduction and limitation treaties on perpetual basis. (38)

As a natural corollary to the maintenance of peace, Bentham suggests in the thirteenth proposition, the establishment of an "International Court of Judicature" for the settlement of disputes between several states. It is to be noted that he is of the opinion that such a tribunal *"should not be armed with coercive powers"*. In this proposition Bentham also favours the formation of a common legislature between states. This view has an explicit St.Pierrerian ring. *"Such a Congress or Diet might be constituted"*, he states, *"by each power sending two deputies to the place of meeting."*

(40) The proceedings of this Congress were to be all public, and its powers would consist "a) in recording its resolutions on all matter affecting the relations between the states; b) in causing those resolutions to be circulated among its members; c) in placing under the ban of Europe any state which, after the lapse of a reasonable time, would refuse to conform itself to the Congress' decrees." (41) Bentham believes in public opinion as the most effective instrument for the sanction of

the Congress' resolutions and, therefore, calls for the securing of the freedom of press in every state. However, under this proposition Bentham also refers to "*the mass of the people*" as the part most exposed to be led away by prejudices and implies that the public opinion should be shaped through press. (42)

The last proposition I use for transparency in foreign negotiations and for the publication of all treaties.

All of these three peace projects base their epistemological assumptions on the ground of domestic/international divide. They all accept in practice as well as in theory the indispensability of the states as the "*sole actors*" in the "*international*" relations. It was Kant who opened up a new perspective which made it possible to look at the problem of peace from a different angle. Let me explain why Kant's approach was novel and different.

- V -

Kant's version of *Perpetual Peace* reveals its distinctive character right at its title which reads as follows: *Zum Ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer*

Entwurf. Let me try to unpack and contextualize this title.

First, it has to be noted that most of the English translations do not pay attention to the preposition "*zum*", which in my opinion has a special meaning here, especially if we place it into the context of Kant's philosophy of history. The English equivalent of "*zum*" would be "to" or "towards". "*Zum*" connotes a process, i.e. the concept of "*approximation*". Hence, it suggests "praxis"-oriented conception of history. Second, the subtitle "*ein philosophischer Entwurf*" implies the theoretical framework within which Kant intends to approach the problem. In other words, Kant attempts here to construct his philosophy of history and moral universalism on the grounds of politics.

The main body of Kant's text takes on the form of the peace treaties of his time with preliminary, definitive and even secret articles. Furthermore, two supplements and a two-part appendix are attached to the text through which Kant attempts to elaborate on his conception of "*perpetual peace*" theoretically.

The first section comprises six preliminary articles which read as follows:

"1) No conclusion of peace shall be considered valid as such if it was made with a secret reservation of the material for a future war.

2) No independently existing state, whether it be large or small, may be acquired by another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift.

3) Standing armies (*miles perpetuus*) will gradually be abolished altogether.

4) No national debt shall be contracted in connection with the external affairs of the state.

5) No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state.

6) No state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of peace. Such acts would include the employment of assassins (*percussores*) or poisoners (*venefici*), breach of agreements, the instigation of treason (*perduellio*) within the enemy state, etc." (43)

These articles define a set of preliminary rules which should be applied in the absence of "perpetual peace". However, they are constructed in such a way that would prepare the ground for a move forwards to the "perpetual peace". The third preliminary article is in this context particularly important for it calls for a gradual but complete

disarmament. The moral argument Kant uses here is this: "*The hiring of men to kill or to be killed seems to mean using them as mere machines and instruments in the hand of someone else (the state), which cannot be reconciled with the rights of man in one's own person*". (44) However, this does not mean that Kant rules out all the military training, including those with purely defensive character. On the contrary, his approach suggests a distinction between "wars of aggression" and defensive wars, and implicitly affirms the concept of just war. In his own words: "*It is quite a different matter if the citizens undertake military training from time to time in order to secure themselves and their fatherland against attacks from outside*." (45) That is to say, Kant recognizes the evil character of war, but does not despair as does Rousseau, and develops his argument for the gradual elimination of war on the basis of the views outlined in his *Universal History*. The preliminary articles taken together contain principles such as open diplomacy, non-aggression, self-determination, non-intervention, the delineation of lawful means of making war, disarmament, which are today reflected in the Charter of the United Nations. (46) Yet, the

radically novel character of the essay lies in the remaining parts.

The second section opens up with a brief introduction to the three definitive articles. This part, brief as it may be, includes one of the central arguments of this essay. Kant states that "a state of peace has to be instituted, for a suspension of hostilities is not in itself a guarantee of peace" (47). Accordingly, the institutions which will secure a lasting peace has to be established through human action based on "rational belief". In a footnote he lays down the foundations for all the three definitive articles:

"Thus the postulate on which all the following articles are based is that all men who can at all influence one another must adhere to some kind of civil constitution. But any legal constitution, as far as the persons who live under it are concerned, will conform to one of the three following types:

1) a constitution based on the civil right of individuals within a nation (*ius civitatis*)

2) a constitution based on the international right of states in their relationships with one another (*ius gentium*)

3) a constitution based on cosmopolitan right, in so far as individuals and states,

coexisting in an external relationship of mutual influences, may be regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind (*ius cosmopoliticum*). This classification with respect to the idea of a perpetual peace, is not arbitrary, but necessary." (48)

After this comprehensive way of conceptualization of the rights of men as well as nations, the first definitive article emphasizes Kant's conception of "republican constitution": The freedom of all members of a society as men; the principle of the dependence of everyone upon a single common legislation as subjects; and the principle of legal equality for everyone as citizens are delineated as the founding principles of such a constitution. For Kant, the most remarkable thing of this constitution is that it is the only political structure which is derived from the idea of an original contract. Kant grounds his hope for a perpetual peace first and foremost on the establishment of such a Republican Constitution with a representative form of government.

Kant's position here has been mistakenly reduced by many commentators to the view that "the public, if it has the opportunity to express its opinion freely, will prevent war." (49) However, his

argument is much more comprehensive than this "free public opinion can prevent war" approach. Kant aims at the solution of a question which even today continues to dominate the theory as well as practice of "domestic" and "international" politics; that is, despite divisive and particularistic tendencies how collective betterment of humanity can be established? Kant begins his answer by stating that "the linguistic and religious differences" "may certainly occasion mutual hatred and provide pretexts for wars" (50) But he does not despair and adds: "But as culture grows and men gradually move towards greater agreement over their principles, they lead to mutual understanding and peace." (51)

In other words, cultural differences can no longer create a problem if men agree on certain principles which transcend the divisive tendencies. The republican constitution, according to Kant, provides the groundwork for our common action in that direction. I will return to this in the next chapter.

The second definitive article proposes the establishment of a federation of peoples (*Voelkerbund*). Kant, then clarifies his position and spells out that he does not mean by this an international state. The reason he gives for this

is that since he is considering the rights of nations such a single world state would be a contradiction. The federation he proposes is, therefore, to be formed among a group of separate states. However, towards the end of his explication to the second definitive article, he refers to a world republic as "a positive idea". It is only because of the present conception of international right, Kant thinks that the nations are rejecting in *hypothesi* what is true in *thesi*. According to Kant, the proposed federation is therefore a negative substitute for the positive idea. (52)

The third definitive article is about the cosmopolitan right which shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality. He introduces the concept of "*the right to the earth surface which the human race shares in common*". (53) Under this article we also come across a prophetic passage:

"The peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere. The idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right transforming it into a universal

right of humanity. Only under this condition can we flatter ourselves that we are continually advancing towards a perpetual peace." (54)

Thus, Kant's conception of "perpetual peace" radically differs from all the other peace projects. By enumerating political, international and cosmopolitan rights, Kant defines man together with the state as the subject of a universal public law which transcends national boundaries. In the Appendix he elaborates on this by stating that "the rights of men must be held sacred" and that "there can be no half measures here". "Politics", in this context "must bend before right." (55) Consequently, "a true system of politics cannot... take a single step without first paying tribute to morality." (56) In a word, morality and legality should have to be combined through politics. Kant believes that this can be achieved at the "domestic" level through a civil society which can administer justice universally (republican state) and at the international level "through a federative association of states whose sole intention is to eliminate war." (57)

Elsewhere, in the concluding passages of the *Rechtslehre*, Kant gives us a remarkable summary of this view and also combines his moral universalism

and praxis-oriented philosophy of history on the basis of the concept of "perpetual peace". Kant states: "Moral-practical reason within us pronounces the following irresistible veto: There shall be no war, either between individual human beings in the state of nature, or between separate states, which although internally law-governed, still live in a lawless condition in their external relationships with one another. For war is not the way in which anyone should pursue his rights. Thus it is no longer a question of whether perpetual peace is really possible or not, or whether we are not perhaps mistaken in our theoretical judgement if we assume that it is. On the contrary, we must simply act as if it could really come about (which is perhaps impossible), and turn our efforts towards realising it and towards establishing that constitution which seems most suitable for this purpose (perhaps that of republicanism in all states, individually and collectively). By working towards this end, we may hope to terminate the disastrous practice of war, which up till now has been the main object to which all states, without exception, have accommodated their internal institutions. And even if the fulfilment of this pacific intention were forever to remain a pious

hope, we should still not be deceiving ourselves if we made it our maxim to work unceasingly towards it, for it is our duty to do so. To assume, on the other hand, that the moral law within us might be misleading, would give rise to execrable wish to dispense with all reason and to regard ourselves, along with our principles, as subject to the same mechanism of nature as the other animal species. It can indeed be said that this task of establishing a universal and lasting peace is not just a part of the theory of right within the limits of pure reason, but its entire ultimate purpose." (58) This brings us to the concept of universalization of politics, which I will take up in the next chapter.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

- 1) Cited in Jorge Luis Borges, *The Book of Sand*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1986, p.64.
- 2) Stephen D. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia" in *International Security*, Winter 1995/96, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp.115-151. (The territorial states were transformed into nation-states when the initially universal ideals of the French Revolution was "particularized" on "ethno-cultural" grounds during the course of the nineteenth-century. I will return to this in the next chapter.)
- 3) Rosenberg, p. 39.
- 4) Riley, p.123; In fact even Kant, while praising the good intentions of St.Pierre, also underlined in his essay on *Theory and Practice*" (1793) these negative references to the Abbe's work and stated that his ideas were ridiculed by statesmen and by heads of state as pedantic, childish and academic. Reiss, p.92.
- 5) Kurt Borries, *Kant als Politiker*, Verlag von Felix Meiner, Leipzig, p.200.

- 6) Abbe de St. Pierre, *A Shorter Project for Perpetual Peace*, in *"Peace Projects of the Eighteenth Century"*, ed. M.C.Jacob, Garland Publishing Inc., New York - London, 1974, pp.15-31, and pp.53-57.
- 7) *ibid*, p.15.
- 8) *ibid*, p.22.
- 9) *ibid*, p.24.
- 10) *ibid*, p.53.
- 11) *ibid*, p.55.
- 12) *ibid*.
- 13) *ibid*, pp.55-56.
- 14) *ibid*, p.56.
- 15) F.H.Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1963, p.20
- 16) Riley, p.125.
- 17) Jacob, p.8.
- 18) *ibid*, p.5.
- 19) *ibid*, p.7.
- 20) *ibid*.
- 21) *ibid*, p.5.
- 22) *ibid*. p.7.
- 23) *ibid*, p.9.
- 24) *ibid*, p.21.
- 25) *ibid*, pp.27-29
- 26) *ibid*, p.39.

- 27) *ibid.*
- 28) *ibid*, p.41.
- 29) *ibid.*
- 30) *ibid*, p.75.
- 31) *ibid*, p.103.
- 32) *ibid*, p.113.
- 33) *ibid*, p.131.
- 34) Christine Jane Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War*, Garland Publishing, Inc., New York - London, 1987, pp.211-212
- 35) Jeremy Bentham, *A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace*, in Jacob (ed.), *ibid*, p.3
- 36) *ibid*, p.11.
- 37) *ibid*, p.12.
- 38) *ibid*, p.22.
- 39) *ibid*, p.20-21.
- 40) *ibid*, p.30.
- 41) *ibid*, p.7 and p.30.
- 42) *ibid*, p.27.
- 43) Reiss, *PP*, pp.93-97
- 44) *ibid.* p. 95
- 45) *ibid.*
- 46) Brown, p.34; for a useful analysis of Kant's political thought in comparison with the UN Charter, see C. J. Friedrich, *Inevitable Peace*, Greenwood Press Publishers, New York, 1969.

47) Reiss, *PP*, p.98.

48) *ibid*, pp.98-99.

49) This view can be traced back to Spinoza. In his *Theological-Political Treatise* he states: "Although a council composed of a great number of citizens will necessarily include ignorant men, it is nonetheless certain that ... the majority of this assembly will never want to wage war but will always love and pursue peace." (Cited in Balibar, p. 22).

50) Reiss, *PP*, pp.113-114.

51) *ibid*, p.114; in a footnote Kant clarifies his position with respect to "religious differences" as follows: "Religious differences-an odd expression! As if we were to speak of different moralities. There may certainly be different historical confessions ... And, there may be different religious books (different faiths) ... but there can only be one religion which is valid for all men and at all times. Thus the different confessions can scarcely be more than the vehicles of religion; these are fortuituous, and may vary with differences in time or place." (*ibid*.)

52) *ibid*, pp.102-105.

53) *ibid*, p.106.

54) *ibid*, pp.107-108.

55) *ibid*, p.125.

56) *ibid.*

57) *ibid*, p.129.

58) Reiss, *MM*, p.174.

CHAPTER FIVE

UNIVERSALIZATION OF POLITICS

*"Wer immer strebend sich bemueht, den
koennen wir erloesen"*

Faust

- I -

The central question Kant deals with in his moral/political theory appears to be, as pointed out before, the approximation towards a perfect civil union of mankind. Consequently, Kant's primary aim is the study of human praxis, i.e., the compatibility of theory and practice. Kant's answer is simple: The moral/political goal men set for themselves might contradict with the empirical reality, but this does not necessarily mean that it is unrealizable. As long as this goal has a reality as an object of reason, men can and will continue to act for its realization. In other words, the problem

is related to our "judgement". Kant establishes the connecting link between theory and practice on the basis of the concept of reflective judgement. Kant asserts: "If the universal (the rule, principle, or law) is given, then the judgement which subsumes the particular under it is determinant... If, however, only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, then the judgement is simply reflective... The reflective judgement which is compelled to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal, stands, therefore, in need of a principle. This principle it cannot barrow from experience... "(1) Thus, judgement "makes possible the transition from the realm of the concept of nature (which is teleologically estimated) to that of the concept of freedom (and morality's objective ends)".(2) From this Kant's argument proceeds to set forth that man can create his own world according to purposive rational/moral principles which can be universalized.

As Beiner observes, "(for Kant) the activity of judging is inherently social... I never judge only for myself for the act of judging always implies a commitment to communicate my judgement; that is, judgement is rendered with a view to persuading others of its validity". (3) Under

paragraph 40 of the Critique of Judgement Kant explains: "By the name *sensus communis* is to be understood the idea of a public sense, i.e. a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of everyone else, in order, as it were, to weight its judgement with the collective reason of mankind... This is accomplished by weighing the judgement, not so much with actual, as rather with the merely possible, judgements of others, and by putting ourselves in the position of everyone else, as the result of a mere abstraction from the limitations which contingently affect our own estimate".(4)

Kant refers to three "maxims of common human understanding: 1) to think for oneself; 2) to think from the standpoint of everyone else; 3) always to think consistently."(5) Kant describes the first one as the "maxim of a never passive reason". Passivity here means submission to "prejudice", and to the greatest of all prejudices, that is, superstition. Hence, to think oneself is emancipation from all prejudices, which is called enlightenment.(6) Elsewhere, "enlightenment" is defined as "man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity."(7) Kant goes on: "Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of

another. The immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: *Sapere aude!* Have courage to use your own understanding!"(8) For this, all that needed is, freedom; and freedom in this context is freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters.

This alone, Kant claims "can bring enlightenment among men."(9) Thus, the first maxim is linked to the second one, which is called "the maxim of enlarged thought".(10) One can only be "a man of enlarged mind", the argument goes on, "if he detaches himself from the subjective personal conditions of his judgement, which cramp the minds of so many others, and reflects upon his own judgement from a universal standpoint (which he can only determine by shifting his ground to the standpoint of others)."(11) Kant, then, introduces the concepts of "*sensus communis*" and "*universal communicability*". In this context what we need to admit is that "the impulse to society is natural to mankind, and that it, i.e. sociability, is a property essential to the requirements of man as a creature intended for society, and one, therefore, that belongs to humanity."(12) Consequently, "a

regard to universal communicability is a thing which everyone expects and requires from everyone else, just as if it were part of an original compact dictated by humanity itself." (13)

The right to universal communication, or as Reiner puts it, "the right freely to submit one's judgements for public testing before a society of world citizens, is not dispensable but is utterly necessary for freedom progress and enlightenment." (14) This is the only way that we can free ourselves from all our prejudices, including the one of cultural particularism, and can develop a sense of shared destiny of humanity.

Kant's own formulation is worth repeating here: If "men gradually move towards greater agreement over their principles, they lead to mutual understanding and peace." (15) The French Revolution, as explained before, was considered by Kant, within this context. That is to say, as an event laying down the foundations of a constitutionalism with a cosmopolitan intent which, in turn, lead to the universalization of politics.

- II -

However, in the course of the nineteenth century, as indicated before, this trend was reversed. The cultural relativism and historicism in theory, ethno-nationalism in practice brought out a negative universalism, i.e. the universalization of cultural particularism. The "rights of man and citizen" as uniting and universal principles were subsumed to the "rights of nations". The positive universalist origins of "republican constitutionalism" disappeared. The history of nineteenth-century German political and philosophical life is telling example of this transformation. The line of continuity from Herder, via Fichte to Hegel reflects this very clearly. Fichte in his *Addresses to the German Nation*, Hegel in his *Philosophy of Right* concretized (and thus particularized) Kant's universalist morality. The following passage from Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* reflects the change in the climate of opinion: "The state in its constitution must permeate all relationships within the state. Napoleon for instance, wished to give the Spaniards a constitution a priori, but the project turned out

badly enough. A constitution is not just something manufactured; it is the work of centuries, it is the idea, the consciousness of rationality so far as that consciousness is developed in a particular nation. No constitution, therefore, is just the creation of its subjects. What Napoleon gave the Spaniards was more rational than what they had before, and yet they recoiled from it as from something alien, because they were not yet educated up to its level. A nation's constitution must embody its feelings for its rights and its position, otherwise there may be a constitution there in an external way, but it is meaningless and valueless."

(16)

The political consciousness is thus made into a "historical category". In other words, it has been claimed that the principles of the French Revolution cannot be universally applicable. Every nation should continue its historical development in its own way. Hence, the political identity can only be pronounced within national identity.

This development resulted in Germany as the combination of Herder's cultural nation with Hegel's absolute state, and thus reproduced the Prussian "Obrigkeitsstaat" in the form of German nation-state. (17)

As Bartelson observes: "...the precarious identity of state and nation, as well as their mutual reification, is carried out through a dialectic of conflict that is present in political texts as well as in the historical relations between them, and with a sublimation of otherness... The dialectic of conflict establishes identity out of difference, sameness out of otherness..."(18)

The sublimation of difference determines even today the theoretical and practical agenda of "domestic" as well as "international" politics. Also, the new rights that are being claimed, on behalf of radical democracy, appear to be the emphasized expression of differences, no longer the rights which can be universalized.(19)

In this context, as Habermas rightly indicates, "the politics of neo-conservatism and the philosophical implications of what is known as postmodernism" are linked to each other.(20) They both define themselves against "Enlightenment" and Kantian moral universalism. The emphasis on difference, including marginalized ones, and on the past history, is leading us backwards to the revival of irrationalism and cultural particularism as dominant ideologies, not a solution to the problem of "homogeneization". This problem is not created by

the unfinished projects of moral universalism and Enlightenment. On the contrary, it emerged as a result of particularized universalism or universalized particularism, for they subsumed the universalization of politics. Thus, the possibility of counterbalancing the globalization of economy disappeared.

Kant offers us a theoretical framework within which we can explore an answer to the following question: "where is the dividing-line between a stress on the multiplicity of cultures that enlarges our sense of humanity, and one that dissolves it?" (21) Kant's proposed solution is a praxis-oriented, forward looking philosophy of history and moral universalism.

As Habermas observes: "Only within the constitutional framework of a democratic legal system can different ways of life coexist equally. These must, however, overlap within a common political culture, which again implies an impulse to open these ways of life to others. Only democratic citizenship can prepare the way for a condition of world citizenship which does not close itself off within particularistic biases, and which accepts a worldwide form of political communication... In the context of the French Revolution, Kant speculated on

the role of the participating public. He identified a world public sphere, which today will become a political reality for the first time with the new relations of global communication. Even the superpowers must recognize worldwide protests... The arrival of world citizenship is no longer merely a phantom, though we are still far from achieving it. State citizenship and world citizenship form a continuum that already shows itself, at least, in outline form.(22) He is right, but it should also be added that active universalization of politics is a Kantian duty which still remains to be achieved to replace the passive universalization of politics based merely on technological development (in Kantian terms "cultural development").

The dialectic of globalization and fragmentation cannot be understood within the context of domestic/international divide. I have attempted to show that the problem of global politics vs. particular cultural identities can be solved on the basis of Kant's civic humanism and philosophical liberalism; i.e. constitutionalism with a cosmopolitan intent through active universalization of political activity. Human rights conventions and global environmental accords are preliminary steps in this direction, which inspire a

greater sense of engagement in a shared global destiny for the human species. The Kantian vision for a multiplicity of democratic constitutional entities based on solidarity of humankind is a project yet to be constructed.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

- 1) *CJ*, p.20.
- 2) Cited in Riley, p.68.
- 3) Ronald Beiner, "Hannah Arendt on Judging", in Arendt, p.119.
- 4) *CJ*, p.151. I am following here Beiner's analysis.
- 5) *ibid*, p.152.
- 6) *ibid*.
- 7) Reiss, *WE*, p.54.
- 8) *ibid*.
- 9) *ibid*, p.55.
- 10) *CJ*, *ibid*, p.153.
- 11) *ibid*.
- 12) *ibid*, p.155.
- 13) *ibid*.
- 14) Arendt, p.123.
- 15) Reiss, *PP*, p.114.
- 16) Hegel, pp.286-287.
- 17) For a useful account of this transformation see Friedrich Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, trans. Felix Gilbert, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 1970.

18) Bartelson, p.211

19) See Chantal Mouffe, "Radical Democracy: Modern or Post-Modern?", in *The Return of the Political*, Verso, London, 1993, p.13; also Taylor, *ibid.*

20) Jürgen Habermas, *The New Conservatism*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992, p.xxi.

21) Perry Anderson, *A Zone of Engagement*, Verso, London, 1992, p.247.

22) Jürgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe", in *Theorizing Citizenship*, ed. Ronald Beiner, SUNY Press, New York, 1995, p.279.

CONCLUSION

A NEW THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this study, I have attempted to challenge the traditional dualism of realism/idealism, and the divide of domestic/international politics through the medium of Kant. It is now time to take stock of the overall result and to ask whether we could formulate a new theoretical framework by reconstructing Kant's political philosophy.

My answer to this question comes as no surprise: The Kantian praxis-oriented philosophy of history and civic humanism provide us with the necessary conceptual mechanisms to accomplish such a theoretical task. The fundamental theoretical/practical problem which we have to deal with today is inherent in the dialectic of moral universalism and cultural particularism. How can we achieve a moral universalism without renouncing cultural diversity and pluralism? As the preceeding pages sought to demonstrate, Kant's political/moral theory adresses itself directly to this question.

a) At the epistemological level, Kant offers us a theoretical humanism which can also be read as a philosophical anthropology.

b) Kant's forward-looking philosophy of history lays down the foundations of his political philosophy. The concept of "history of future times" articulates theory with practice, and the hope for progress towards the better is grounded in the category of human species.

c) Kant's conception of freedom, equality, and autonomy on the one hand, and the universal human community on the other, determines his moral theory. His moral universalism or universalist moralism framed on the basis of "persons as ends" suggests a philosophical liberalism as opposed to the utilitarian liberalism.

d) Kant's view of a "republican constitutionalism with a cosmopolitan intent" establishes the connecting link between moral universalism and human freedom, and thus combines morality with legality through politics.

e) Kant's political philosophy indicates a theoretical conceptual framework within which the false antinomy of "moral universalism" and "cultural particularism" could be transcended.

In this context, Kantian concepts of "universal communicability", "perpetual peace", and "persons as ends" imply a political theory towards the universalization of political activity without rejecting the multiplicity of cultures, and goes beyond the domestic/international divide.

CHRONOLOGY

Kant's Life and Publications

- 1724 Immanuel Kant born on April 22
- 1728 Lambert born
- 1729 Lessing born
- 1729 Mendelssohn born
- 1730 Hamann born
- 1732 Kant enters the Fridericianum,
an academy in Koenigsberg
- 1735 Kant's brother Johann Heinrich
born
- 1737 Kant's mother dies
- 1740 Kant matriculates at the
University of Koenigsberg
- 1740-47 Studies mainly physics and
philosophy at the University of
Koenigsberg
- 1740 Frederick II. ascends the Throne
- 1740 Feder born
- 1742 Garve born
- 1744 Herder born
- 1746 Kant's father dies

- 1746 Kant's first publication:
*Gedanken von der wahren
 Schaetzung der lebendigen
 Kraefte*
 (Thoughts on the True
 Measurement of Living Forces)
- 1747-54 Employed as domestic tutor in
 provincial households
- 1749 Goethe born
- 1751 M. Knutzen dies
- 1754 Christian Wolff dies
- 1754 Kant returns to Koenigsberg
- 1755 Kant takes his degree with the
 treaties *De Igne* and qualifies
 as a university lecturer with
 his treatise, *Principior
 primorum cognitionis
 metaphysicae nova dilucidatio.*
- 1755 *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und
 Theorie des Himmels* (General
 History and Theory of the
 Heavens)
- 1756 Disputation on the treatise
Monadologia physica
- 1756-63 Seven years war. The Russians in
 Koenigsberg

- 1756 Three small essays in the
Koenigsberger Nachrichten on
earthquakes (Evoked by the
Lisbon earthquake of 1755)
- 1756 New notes in elucidation of the
Theory of the Winds.
- 1757 Outline and Announcement of a
course of Lectures on Physical
Geography, with a brief
supplementary consideration of
the question whether the west
winds in our locality are moist
because of having passed over a
broad stretch of sea.
- 1758 New Scientific Conception of
Motion and Rest
- 1758 Unsuccessful application for
professorship in Koenigsberg
- 1759 Some Tentative Considerations of
Optimism
- 1759 Schiller born
- 1762 Fichte born
- 1762 Publication of Rousseau's *Emile*
and *Contrat Social*
- 1762 *Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der*
vier syllogistischen Figuren

erwiesen. (False Subtlety of the
Four Syllogistic Figures
Demonstrated)

1762 Herder attends Kant's lectures.
Begins reading Rousseau.

1762 *Der einzig moegliche
Beweisgrund zu einer
demonstration vom Dasein Gottes*
(The Only Possible Basis for a
Demonstration of the Existence
of God)

1762 *Untersuchung ueber die
Deutlichkeit der
Grundsaeetze der Natuerlichen
Theologie und Moral.*
(Researches on the Distinctness
of the Principles of Natural
Theology and Morals).
(*Preisschrift der Berliner
Akademie*, printed in 1764)

1763 *Versuch, den Begriff der
negativen Groessen
in die Weltweisheit einzufuehren*
(Attempt to Introduce the
Concept of Negative Quantities
into Philosophy).

- 1763 F.A. Schultz dies
- 1764 *Versuch ueber die Krankheiten
des Kopfes*
(Essay on the Diseases of the
Head.) (Koenigsberger Ztg.)
- 1764 *Beobachtungen ueber das Gefuehl
des Schoenen und
Erhabenen.* (Observations on the
Feeling of the Beautiful and the
Sublime).
- 1765 Information on the Plan of his
Lectures.
- 1766 *Traeume eines Geistersehers,
erlaeutert durch
Traeume der Metaphysik* (Dreams
of a Spirit-Seer, etc.).
- 1766 Kant takes up assistant-
librarianship in the
royal palace.
- 1766 Gottsched dies.
- 1768 *Von dem ersten Grunde des
Unterschieds der
Gegenden im Raum* (On the
Fundamental Reason for the
Difference of Localities in
Space). (Koenigsberger Nachr.)

- 1769 Declines offer of professorship
at the university of Erlangen
- 1770 Declines offer of professorship
at the university in Jena.
Appointed professor of Logic and
Metaphysics at the university of
Koenigsberg. Inaugural
dissertation, *On the Forms and
Principles of the Sensible and
Intelligible World.*
- 1770 (Holbach) *Systeme de la nature.*
- 1772 21 February Letter to M. Herz
containing an initial indication
of the main idea of the *Critique
of Pure Reason.* Gives up
librarianship.
- 1772 First partition of Poland
between Russia and Prussia
- 1775 *Von den verschiedenen Rassen des
Menschen Ankuendigung der
Vorlesungen ueber physische
Geographie).* (On the Different
Races of Men.)
- 1776 *Ueber das Dessauer
Philanthropie.*
(Koenigsberger Ztg.)

- 1776 North American Declaration of Independence.
- 1776 Hume dies.
- 1778 Voltaire dies.
- 1778 Rousseau dies.
- 1778 Appointed member of the Senate of the University.
- 1780 Joseph II. ascends the throne.
- 1781 Lessing dies.
- 1781 *Kritik der reinen Vernunft.*
(Critique of Pure Reason.)
- 1783 *Prolegomena zu einer jeden kuenftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten koennen.* (Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphysics, etc.)
- 1784 *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in der weltbuergerlichen Absicht.*
(Ideas for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose.)
- 1784 *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklaerung?*
(An answer to the question: "What is Enlightenment")

- 1785 Reviews of Herder's "*Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit.*"
(*Jenaische Literaturzeitung*)
- 1785 *Ueber Vulkane im Monde.* (On
Volcanoes in the
Moon).
- 1785 *Von der Unrechtmässigkeit des
Buechernachdrucks* (On the
Illegality of Literary Piracy).
- 1785 *Bestimmung des Begriffs einer
Menschenrasse*
(Determination of the Concept of
a Race of Men).
- 1785 *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der
Sitten*
(Groundwork of the Metaphysics
of Morals).
- 1786 *Mutmasslicher Anfang der
Menschengeschichte.*
(Presumable Origin of Human
History).
(*Berliner Monatsschrift*)
- 1786 *Was heisst sich im Denken
orientieren ?* (What
is Orientation in Thinking ?)

(Berliner Monatsschrift)

1786 *Metaphysische Anfangsgruende der
Naturwissenschaften*

(Metaphysical Rudiments of the
Natural Sciences.)

1786 Appointed vice-chancellor of the
university.

Appointed member of the Berlin
Academy of Sciences.

1786 Frederick the Great dies,
Frederick William
II. ascends the throne.

1787 *Critique of Pure Reason*, second
edition.

1788 *Ueber den Gebrauch
teleologischer Prinzipien
in der Philosophie* (On the Use
of Teleological Principles in
Philosophy). (Deutsch. Merk.)

1788 *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*
(Critique of Practical Reason)

1789 French Revolution

1790 *Ueber Philosophie ueberhaupt
(erste Einleitung zur Kritik des
Urteils)*. (On Philosophy in
General)

- 1790 *Ueber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine aeltere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll*
(On a Discovery by which, etc.)
(Against Eberhard)
- 1790 *Ueber Schwaermerei und die Mittel dagegen*
(On Gushing and the Means for its Prevention).
- 1790 *Kritik der Urteilskraft*
(Critique of Judgement) Fichte seeks Kant's acquaintance
- 1791 *Ueber das Misslingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee* (On the Failure of all Philosophical Attempts in Theodicy). (Berl. Mon.)
- 1792 *Vom radikalen Boesen* (On Radical Evil) (Berl. Mon.)
- 1792 The continuation of the foregoing articles is prohibited by the Berlin censorship.

- 1793 *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen
der blossen
Vernunft (Religion within the
Bounds of Mere Reason)*
- 1793 *Ueber den Gemeinspruch. Das mag
in der Theorie richtig sein,
taugt aber nicht fuer die Praxis
(Berl. Mon.)*
- 1794 *Etwas ueber den Einfluss des
Mondes auf die
Witterung (On the Influence of
the Moon on the Weather).
(Berl. Mon.)*
- 1794 *Das Ende aller Dinge. (The End
of all Things). (Berl. Mon.)*
- 1794 *Appointed Member of the St.
Petersburg Academy of Sciences.*
- 1794 *Cabinet order of the of the King
and Kant's promise to write
nothing more on religion.*
- 1795 *Peace of Basel.*
- 1796 *Kant discontinues his lectures.*
- 1796 *Von einem neuerdings erhobenen,
vornehmen Ton*

- in der Philosophie* (On a Recent Aristocratic Tone in Philosophy) (Berl. Mon.)
- 1796 Announcement of the approaching completion of a tract on Universal Peace in Philosophy:
- 1797 *Metaphysik der Sitten*
(Metaphysics of Morals)
- 1797 *Ueber ein vermeintliches Recht aus Menschenliebe zu luegen.*
(On a Supposed Right to Lie out of Love for Humanity)
- 1797 Frederick William II. dies and is succeeded by Frederick William III.
Woellner dismissed.
- 1798 *Ueber die Buchmacherei. Zwei Briefe an Fr. Nicolai* (On Bookmaking. Two Letters to Fr. Nicolai)
- 1798 *Der Streit der Fakultaeten.*
(The Conflict of Faculties).
- 1798 *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht.*

- (Anthropology from a Pragmatic
Point of View)
- 1799 Writes against the philosophy of
Fichte.
- 1800 *Logic*, edited by Jaesche.
- 1802 *Physical Geography*, edited by
Rink.
- 1803 *Pedagogy*, edited by Rink.
- 1804 *On the Prize Question of the
Berlin Academy:
What Real Progress has
Metaphysics made in Germany,
since the Times of Leibnitz and
Wolff ?* Edited by Rink.
- 1804 Kant dies on February 12.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

KANT'S WORKS

Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, trans. John T. Goldthwait, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1981.

Bemerkungen in den 'Beobachtungen ueber das Gefuehl des Schoenen und Erhabenen', ed. Marie Rischmueller, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1991.

Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, St.Martin's Press, New York, 1965.

Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck, Macmillan, New York, 1989.

Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973.

Prolegomena, trans. Paul Carus, Open Court Publishing Co., 1994.

Kant on History, ed. Lewis White Beck, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis / New York, 1963.

Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss and trans. H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Ausgewaehlte Reflexionen aus dem Nachlass zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie und Historiographie, in *Immanuel Kant - Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie*, ed. Manfred Riedel, Reclam, Stuttgart, 1974.

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1964.

Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1960.

Immanuel Kant Ethical Philosophy: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals - Metaphysical Principles of Virtue with 'On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns, trans. James W. Ellington,

Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis/Cambridge,
1994.

The Conflict of the Faculties, trans. Mary J.
Gregor, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and
London, 1992.

Anthropology form a Pragmatic Point of View, trans.
Mary J. Gregor, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1974.

Lecture on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield, Hackett,
Indianapolis, 1980.

*Immanuel Kant, Philosophical Correspondence (1759-
1799)*, ed. Arnulf Zweig, The University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1967, p.205.

SECONDARY WORKS

Abbe de St. Pierre, *A Shorter Project for Perpetual
Peace*, in "*Peace Projects of the Eighteenth
Century*", ed. M.C.Jacob, Garland Publishing Inc.,
New York - London, 1974.

Anderson, Perry, *A Zone of Engagement*, Verso, London,
1992.

Arendt, Hannah, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1989.

Balibar, Etienne, *Masses, Classes, Ideas*, Routledge, New York & London, 1994.

Barnard, F. M., *Self-Direction and Political Legitimacy: Rousseau and Herder*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988.

Bartelson, Jens, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995.

Beiner, Ronald, "Hannah Arendt on Judging", in Hannah Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Philosophy*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1989.

Beiner, R., ed., *Theorizing Citizenship*, SUNY Press, New York, 1995.

Beiner, R. and Booth R. J., eds, *Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1993.

Berki, R. N., *On Political Realism*, J.M. Dent and Sons, London, 1981.

Berlin, Isaiah, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, Vintage Book, New York, 1990.

Berlin, Isaiah, *Vico and Herder*, The Hogarth Press, London, 1976.

Borries, Kurt, *Kant als Politiker*, Verlag von Felix Meiner, Leipzig, 1928.

Brown, Chris, *International Relations Theory, New Normative Approaches*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1992.

Bull, Hedley, *The Anarchical Society*, Mc Millan, London 1977.

Carr, E. H., *The Twenty Years Crisis*, McMillan, London, 1981.

Carter, Christine Jane, *Rousseau and the Problem of War*, Garland Publishing, Inc., New York-London, 1987.

Cassirer, Ernst, *Rousseau, Kant, Goethe*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1970.

Cassirer, Ernst, *Kant's Life and Thought*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1981.

Clark, Ian, *Reform and Resistance in the International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980.

Cohen, Hermann, *Reason and Hope*, trans. Eva Jospe, W. W. Norton, New York, 1971.

Coletti, Lucio, ed. *K. Marx: Early Writings*, Harmondsworth, 1976.

Despland, Michel, *Kant on History and Religion*, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 1973.

Doyle, Michael W., *Liberalism and International Relations*, in Beiner and Booth, *Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1993.

Dworkin, Ronald, *Taking Rights Seriously*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977.

Fichte, Johann Gotlieb, "Beitraege zur Berichtigung der Urteile des Publikums ueber die Franzoesische Revolution, in Schriften zur Revolution", Ullstein, Frankfurt, 1973.

Ferry, Luc, *The System of Philosophies of History*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992.

Friedrich, C. J., *Inevitable Peace*, Greenwood Press Publishers, New York, 1969.

Gabriel, Juerg Martin, *Worldviews and Theories of International Relations*, St. Martin Press, New York, 1994.

Gallie, W. B., "Kant's View of Politics", in *Philosophy*-54, 1979.

Gerhard, Volker, "Die republikanische Verfassung. Kant's Staatstheorie vor dem Hintergrund der Franzoesischen Revolution", in *Deutscher Idealismus und Franzoesische Revolution* (Vortraege, gehalten April/Mai/Juni 1987), Schriften aus dem Karl-Marx-Haus Trier 37, Trier 1988.

Goetschel, Willi, *Constituting Critique*, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1994.

Goldmann, Lucien, *Kant*, NLB, London, 1971.

Griffiths, Martin, *Realism, Idealism and International Politics*, Routledge, London, 1992.

Jürgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe", in *Theorizing Citizenship*, ed. Ronald Beiner, SUNY Press, 1995.

Jürgen Habermas, *The New Conservatism*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992.

Jürgen Habermas, "Morality and Ethical Life; Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?", in Beiner and Booth, eds, *Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1993.

Hegel, G. W. F., *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, London, 1967.

Herder, Johann Gottfried, *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, in Bernard Suphan, *Herders Saemtliche Werke*, Berlin, 1891, Bd.XIII.

Herder, Johann Gottfried, *Reflections on the Philosophy of History of Mankind*, trans. Frank E. Manuel, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968.

Hinsley, F. H., *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1963.

Hutchings, Kimberly, *Kant, Critique and Politics*, Routledge, London, 1996.

Jaspers, Karl, *Kant*, Harcourt Brace Company, New York, 1962.

Kaufmann, Walter, *Goethe, Kant and Hegel: Discovering the Mind*, Volume 1, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1980.

Knippenberg, Joseph M., *The Politics of Kant's Philosophy*, in Beiner and Booth, eds, *Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1993.

Alexandre Kojève, *Kant*, Gallimard, Paris, 1973.

Krasner, Stephen D., "Compromising Westphalia" in *International Security*, Winter 1995/96, Vol. 20, No.3.

Landgrebe, L., *Die Geschichte im Denken Kants*", in, *"Phaenomenologie und Geschichte*, Darmstadt, 1968.

van der Linden, Henricus, *"Kantian Ethics and Socialism"*, unpublished dissertation, Washington University, Department of Philosophy, 1985.

Linklater, Andrew, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, Macmillan, London, 1982.

Linklater, Andrew, *Beyond Realism and Marxism Critical Theory and International Relations*, Macmillan, London, 1990.

Marx, Karl, *The German Ideology*, C.J. Arthur, ed., International Publishers, New York, 1970.

Meinecke, Friedrich, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, trans. Felix Gilbert, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 1970.

Meinecke, Friedrich, *Die Entstehung des Historismus*, in *Werke*, Bd.3, Muenchen 1959.

Mouffe, Chantal, "Radical Democracy: Modern or Post-Modern?", in *The Return of the Political*, Verso, London, 1993.

Philonenko, Alexis, *Theorie et Praxis dans la Pensee Morale et Politique de Kant et de Fichte en 1793*, Vrin, Paris, 1968.

Frederick van de Pitte, "Kant as Philosophical Anthropologist", in "Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress", ed. by Lewis White Beck, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland, 1972.

Rawls, John, "The Right and the Good Contrasted", from *A Theory of Justice*, in Michael Sandel, ed., "Liberalism and its Critics", New York University Press, 1984.

Riley, Patrick, *Kant's Political Thought*, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, NJ, 1983.

Rosenberg, Justin, *The Empire of Civil Society*, Verso, London, 1994.

Rousseau, J. J., *Social Contract*, trans. Judith R. Masters, St. Martin Press, New York, 1978.

Saner, Hans, *Kant's Political Thought*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1973.

J.B. Schneewind, "Autonomy, Obligation and Virtue: An Overview of Kant's Moral Philosophy", in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.

Shklar, Judith, *Ordinary Vices*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984.

Smith, Steven B., *Hegel's Critique of Liberalism*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992.

Sullivan, Roger J., *An Introduction to Kant's Ethics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.

Taylor, Charles, *Hegel*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975.

Velkley, Richard L., "The Crisis of the End of Reason in Kant's Philosophy", in Beiner and Booth, eds, *Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1993.

Walker, R. B. J., *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge University Press, London 1993.

Wight, Martin, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, Holmes & Meier, New York, 1994.

Yovel, Yirmiahu, *Kant and the Philosophy of History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1980.