IN SEARCH OF SUSTAINABLE PEACE:

CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN KOSOVO

AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

JUBJANA VILA

BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY

2019

IN SEARCH OF SUSTAINABLE PEACE:

CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN KOSOVO

AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Thesis submitted to the

Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science and International Relations

by

Jubjana Vila

Boğaziçi University

2019

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Jubjana Vila, certify that

- I am the sole author of this thesis and that I have fully acknowledged and documented in my thesis all sources of ideas and words, including digital resources, which have been produced or published by another person or institution;

- this thesis contains no material that has been submitted or accepted for a degree or diploma in any other educational institution;

- this is a true copy of the thesis approved by my advisor and thesis committee at Boğaziçi University, including final revisions required by them.

Signature..

Date ....08...07...2019...................

ABSTRACT

In Search of Sustainable Peace:

Conflict Transformation in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina

The struggle for the establishment of the sustainable peace continues in some Western Balkan countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. This comparative case study explores the role of intervention process on post-conflict structural transformation and progress toward sustainable peace in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The main objective is to show that the way a conflict is handled might have an important impact on post-conflict environment and progress towards the establishment of sustainable peace. This exploratory research is based on a secondary analysis of existing qualitative data. The findings of this research reveal that there is stable but not sustainable peace in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The main structural problems remain institutionalization of ethnicities in Bosnia-Herzegovina; a limited sovereignty in Kosovo; and lack of a state building culture for both cases. This study suggests the revision of power sharing structure in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the clarification of Kosovo's status as first steps toward positive peace. The importance of this research rests on its criticism to the orientation in conflict resolution towards negative peace and on understanding the long-term (post-conflict) effects of interventions. Overall, it contributes to the literature of conflict studies by trying to uncover the relation between intervention and conflict transformation.

ÖZET

Sürdürülebilir Barış Arayışı:

Kosova'da ve Bosna Hersek'te Çatışmanın Dönüşümü

Sürdürülebilir barışı sağlama mücadelesi, Bosna ve Kosova gibi bazı Batı Balkan ülkelerinde devam ediyor. Bu karşılaştırmalı çalışma, müdahale süreçlerinin çatışma sonrası yapısal dönüşüm ve Kosova ve Bosna'daki sürdürülebilir bir barışa evrilme üzerindeki rolünü araştırıyor. Çalışmanın temel amacı, bir çatışmanın çözüm yönteminin kendi başına çatışma sonrası durum (iklim) üzerinde ve sürdürülebilir barışın tesis edilme sürecinde önemli bir etkisi olabileceğini göstermektir. Araştırma, mevcut nitel verilerin ikincil bir analizine dayanmaktadır. Bu araştırmanın bulgularına göre, Kosova'da ve Bosna'da istikrarlı ancak sürdürülebilir olmayan bir barış durumu söz konusudur. Bunun temelindeki yapısal sorunlar, Bosna'da etnik kökenlerin kurumsallaşmaması; Kosova'da sınırlı bir egemenliğin olması; ve her iki durumda da devlet kurma kültürünün eksikliğidir. Bu çalışma, pozitif barış sürecinin ilk adımları olarak, Bosna'daki güç paylaşım yapısının gözden geçirilmesini ve Kosova'nın statüsünün açıklığa kavuşturulmasını önermektedir. Bu araştırmanın önemi, çatışmanın çözümünde negatif barışa yönelme konusunda getirdiği eleştiri ve müdahalelerinçatışma sonrası uzun vadeli etkilerini göstermesidir. Genel olarak, müdahale ve çatışma dönüşümü arasındaki ilişkiyi ortaya çıkarmaya çalışarak, çatışma araştırmaları literatürüne de katkıda bulunulmuştur.

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME: Jubjana Vila

DEGREES AWARDED

PhD in Political Science and International Relations, 2019, Boğaziçi University

MA in Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2013, Sabanci University

BA in International Relations, 2011, Hacettepe University

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

International Relations; Foreign Policy; Conflict Resolution; Ethnicity and Nationalism; Balkan Politics; EU Politics.

AWARDS AND HONORS

PhD Study Scholarship for Foreign Students, Turkish Government, Turkey

M.A Study Scholarship, Sabanci University, Istanbul/Turkey

PUBLICATIONS

Journal Articles
Vila, J. (2015). Cyprus - From an Argued Past to a Shared Future, *European Journal of Sustainable Development,* 4 (2): 141-154.

Book Chapters
Jusufi, I., Vila J. (2018). Youth Politicization and De-politicization in Contemporary Albania. In T. P. Trost & D. Mandic (Eds), *Beyond Ethnicity: Changing Youth Values in Southeast Europe*. London: Routledge.

Conference Proceedings
Vila, J. (2013). Kin Ethnic Groups Mobilization-Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia, *International Conference on National Question in Central Europe*, Budapest- Hungry.

M.A Thesis
Vila, J. (2013). Kin state's youth, party membership, ideology, and conflict understanding: youth in Albania on ethnic Albanian's conflicts in Kosovo and in Macedonia, Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I owe my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Gün Kut for his continuous guidance and support during this research. His academic advice, trust, patience, and motivation have a huge contribution to the successful conclusion of this thesis. Having Assoc. Prof. Gün Kut, as thesis adviser, has been a great pleasure and an invaluable experience for me.

Secondly, I am very thankful to my thesis committee members, Prof. Hakan Yılmaz and Prof. Gencer Özcan, for their appreciated comments and recommendations that have improved the quality of this thesis. Also, I express my thanks to all the people that have enriched this research with their ideas and suggestions

Next, I would like to thank my family that have been source of strength and motivation for me and I dedicate this thesis to them. I am grateful to my parents and my brother for their love and support in all my pursuits. And special thanks to my husband Egin for being always by my side during this Ph.D. with his love, patience, encouragement, understanding and untired support. Acknowledgements would be incomplete without thanking Ajsa, my baby-girl, for being source of inspiration and for lightening my life during the last one and a half year.

Finally, I thank God for all blessings on me, and I owe my sincere thanks to everyone mentioned above for the continuous love, trust, encouragement, and support.

DEDICATION

To my family….

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

PREFACE

"Say 'no' to peace, if what they mean by peace
is the quiet misery of hunger, the frozen stillness of fear,
the silence of broken spirits, the unborn hopes of the oppressed.
Tell them that peace,
is the shouting of children at play, the babble of tongues set free,
the thunder of dancing feet, and a father's voice singing.
Say 'no' to peace, if what they mean by peace
is a rampart of gleaming missiles, the arming of distant wars,
money at ease in its castle, and grateful poor at the gate.
Tell them that peace
is the hauling down of flags, the forging of guns into ploughs,
the giving of the fields to the landless, and hunger a fading dream."
(Brian Wren, 1986)

As a citizen of a Balkan country, I used to hear a lot about bombings, massacres and

refugee flows from conflicts in this region. However, visiting a conflict area for the first

time made conflict a touchable and live phenomenon for me. Year 2005… first trip to

Kosovo … the wounds of the war could be noted in people's eyes. The destroyed

buildings were a clear physical testimony of what had happened just five years ago in

this territory. As a high school student, not much aware of dynamics and political

repercussions of wars, I could not understand why people need to fight with each other

and what is more precious than life to them. This experience has stirred up curiosity and

interest on understanding conflicts and has a contribution to my orientation to the field

of politics and especially conflict studies.

Year 2012… first study trip to Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) … as a conflict

resolution graduate student. I came across wonderful people that have lived through a

terrifying war. They continue their struggle with the past hoping of a better future for

their country. Visiting different sites within the country and hearing the war stories from

real victims has been a challenging task throughout which you can see how far evilness

can go. "How can your long-life neighbor turn to your enemy?". You can easily witness the dilemma of the people living there. On one hand, I was astonished by the motivation and hope of those people for building a brighter future for their country. On the other hand, the visibility of bullet holes in the buildings after almost two decades since Dayton Peace Accords shows a determination to keep war traces alive. In such context, the task is "how to make possible the coexistence of the old neighbors"!!!

Year 2015… returning to Kosovo after a decade … now as a conflict resolution researcher. My approach to a conflict area and the context had changed. People seem to have started to normalize their lives, buildings were reconstructed, and life looked more colorful. However, some things remain the same: unstable relations among ethnic groups, fear concerning country's future, the unreplaceable role of international actors, and continuing political games.

My personal experience showed that the establishment of sustainable peace remains a crucial task in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo and this study is eager to explore and compare their post-conflict environment.

CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

World politics was shattered by de-colonization, collapse of communism and globalization characterizing the twentieth century. Eastern and Western countries struggled with the challenging effects of the end of Cold War, associated with changes in the structure of the international system, the rise of ethno-nationalism, and consequently the spread of intra state conflicts with ethnic character. For Wolff (2011, p. 162) "ethno-national conflicts are among the most intractable, violent, and destructive forms of conflict, that the societies, states, and the international community have experienced and continues to face". Armed insurgencies for self-determination and large-scale killings spreading from the fields of Balkans to African highlands demonstrate some of the main consequences of ethno-nationalism (Solomon and Matthews, 2001, p. 1). Ethnic conflicts in "Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region of Africa, the Middle East, and the Caucasus causing thousands of lives", millions of displaced persons, ruined economies and even appeared as resistant to solutions (Wolff, 2011, p.163). Quebec and Belgium had less destructive and less violent experience of ethno-national conflicts. But, the case of Northern Ireland shows that sustainable peace can be achieved even in cases of highly destructive conflicts. The struggle for the establishment of the sustainable peace continues in some Western Balkan countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo that have experienced long violent conflicts. Despite the declining level of violent confrontation compared to 1990s, still they remain the most problematic conflicts in this region.

1.1 Problem statement

During the Cold War, the Balkan states were characterized by authoritarian systems and leaders, low levels of economic development, and nationalist ideology that has been used to enhance political power (Gallager, 2003, p.1). The nationalist mind-set of communist regimes led to the suppression of ethnic identities with the purpose of preventing ethnic clashes. However, the election of non-communist governments in four out of six ex-Yugoslavian republics revitalized ethnic differences and triggered self-determinist actions for independence. In such a context, different ethnic groups turned against each other emphasizing their different interests, and incompatible goals and needs. Violent insurgencies for self-determination within ex-Yugoslavia in early 1990s turned Western Balkans to battlefields of ethnic wars. These wars were characterized by brutal violence among ethnic groups that used to live under the umbrella of the same federation. The ex–Yugoslavian republics sharing borders with each other are characterized by multiethnic composition. In such a context, peaceful relations among ethnic groups are crucial for the stability of each country and of the whole region.

While Yugoslavia's dissolution in 1990s led to a smoother process toward independence for Macedonia and Slovenia, it pushed Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo through long bloody wars. Although outside intervention contributed in ending massive violence in these conflicts, only Serbia and Croatia enjoy a stable bilateral agreement. The conflicts in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina remain the most challenging conflicts in the region for more than two decades. Serbia has recognized the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina but not that of Kosovo. Inter-ethnic tensions persist from time to time and the high level of support to ethnic identity politics increases the fear of conflict renewal (O'Loughlin & Tuathail, 2009). Both Kosovo and

Bosnia-Herzegovina have been part of Yugoslavia and both conflicts have emerged in the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In both cases Serbs are at the other front of conflict. Both conflicts passed through all conflict stages and now are in post-conflict stage and classified as protracted ethnic conflicts. Kosovo declared its unilateral independence and Bosnia-Herzegovina became a federal state. The intervention process appears as the main difference between two cases. While intervention just ended direct confrontation in Kosovo, it led to a negotiated peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The achievement of sustainable peace in ethnic conflicts depends firstly on addressing conflict sources and improving relations among the conflicting groups. Otherwise, they remain protracted and can re-emerge. By comparing these two conflicts, this study is aims at shedding light on the relationship among intervention process and post-conflict situation. Examination of this relationship requires a deep understanding of the main conflict sources, interventions process and outcome, and post-conflict environments.

This study also calls for a broader understanding of conflict resolution as a key to successful conflict handling and achievement of sustainable peace. The original understanding of conflict resolution implies ending direct violence, addressing underlying sources of conflict, changing attitudes and conflict structure (Miall, Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse, 1999). However, the current narrow understanding of conflict resolution field as characterized by David Bloomfield (1997) fits mostly to conflict settlement approach. Accordingly, Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse (1999) suggest that conflict settlement means reaching an agreement to cease direct violence without focusing on addressing of underlying sources of conflict. Shifting to such a narrow understanding led to the emergence of conflict settlement, conflict resolution, conflict management, conflict transformation and many others competing approaches.

This study argues that the achievement of sustainable peace requires the implementation of above-mentioned approaches as complementary and not as alternative to each other.

The continuing efforts for establishing sustainable peace in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina highlights the need for understanding the past and its influence on their post-conflict environment. Some scholars argue that the reason behind the failures in resolving ethnic conflicts rests in the orientation of conflict resolution initiatives toward short term effects or outcomes; aiming to end violence and eliminate conflicts (Lederach, 1995; Mu'id, 2003). According to Lederach (1995, p. 22), in conflict resolution efforts "process matters more than the outcome". Based on this argument this study analyses the intervention process in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina to understand its role in post conflict environment.

Conflict transformation approach, criticizing the narrow understanding of conflict resolution, emerged as a new trend in conflict studies to deal with protracted conflicts and how to move them toward sustainable peace. It concentrates more on "changing the structural patterns that cause violence" (Lederach, 2003, p.14). This approach criticizes the idea that the conflict resolution's goal is to have an immediate outcome that is more oriented towards negative peace or just ending violence (Lederach, 2003). Through a combination with conflict settlement and conflict management efforts, conflict transformation aims to ensure sustainable peace in protracted conflicts in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to emphasize that even though conflicts cannot be totally resolved, they can be transformed from mutually harmful into mutually advantageous relations (Lederach, 2003, p. 18). This dissertation focuses on the contribution and potentials of conflict transformation as complementary to conflict resolution and conflict management, in post-conflict environment. Based on a

4

framework that considers structural and relational transformation as the main dimensions of conflict transformation, it focuses on structural transformation in post-conflict Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The aim of this research is to explore the role of intervention process in post-conflict structural transformation in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina in comparative perspective.

1.2   Research question

Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts are selected because they have both emerged in the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia; Serbia is the party at the other front in both cases; they have passed through similar conflict stages and are in the same conflict stage now; violent confrontation stopped as a result of external intervention; both still lack a full sustainable peace and contain the risk of conflict reemergence. An important difference is that while intervention only ended violent confrontation in Kosovo, it resulted in a negotiated peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Based on a proposal for a broader understanding of conflict resolution field, this study suggests that in addition to conflict resolution and management, transformation of ethnic conflicts has a crucial contribution to make in the establishment of sustainable peace among different ethnic groups in long lasting conflicts.

Therefore, conflict transformation appears as a crucial requirement for achieving sustainable peace in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sustainable peace develops once the values of positive peace are established and violence of any form cease to exist. The main task of conflict transformation is to bring positive peace by firstly ending structural violence caused by the social structure or institutions of a society. This study highlights the need for structural transformation as an important step toward the achievement of

5

sustainable peace in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Through a comparison of ethnic conflicts in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the main aim is to address the following questions:

1. What is the relationship between the intervention process and post-conflict structural transformation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo?

2. What is the relationship between post-conflict structural transformation and progress toward sustainable peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo?

Answering the above-mentioned questions would help us to understand the impact of the past conflict resolution initiatives on the progress toward sustainable peace in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

1.3 Aims and objectives

To answer the questions presented above, this study further aims to identify the sources of ethnic conflicts, to analyze intervention process and outcome, to explore its relationship with post-conflict structural transformation and furthermore to explore the relationship between structural transformation and progress toward sustainable peace in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The main objective is to show that the way a conflict is handled might have an important impact on post-conflict environment and progress towards the establishment of sustainable peace. A broader understanding of conflict resolution that focuses on solving the sources of the conflict and not only on ending violence would offer more space for structural transformation after the intervention and would increase the chances for faster progress toward sustainable peace. To achieve its' aims, this study compares Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina cases to examine four main hypotheses:

1. External diplomatic intervention contributed to the institutionalization of ethnicities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2. External military intervention produced a limited sovereignty in Kosovo.

3. Post-intervention overt presence of international actors has hindered the development of a state building culture in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo.

4. There is a positive relationship between post-conflict structural transformation and progress toward sustainable peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo.

1.4 Research methodology

This comparative case study explores the role of intervention process on post-conflict structural transformation and progress toward sustainable peace in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Newman (2006, p. 33) defines an exploratory research as a "research in which the primary purpose is to examine a little understood issue or phenomenon, to develop preliminary ideas and move toward refined research questions by focusing on 'how' or 'what' question". "Most exploratory research uses qualitative data" (Neuman, 2014, p. 39). The study is based on a secondary analysis of existing qualitative data collected from academic journals, books, theses, reports (mainly EU Reports), and indexes (such as Global Peace Index and Positive Peace Index). Qualitative secondary analysis allows for exploration of already collected data with the purpose of addressing new research questions and generating new findings.

The comparative part of the research treats states as unit of analysis. Comparative research is considered as the most effective method in identifying relations between different variables like intervention process, post-conflict structural transformation, and sustainable peace in this study. The process of comparative research

requires the researcher to define the number of cases to be compared, the number of variables, and whether the 'time' factor will be considered or not. Based on the combination of the above-mentioned factors, Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis (1999) have identified five options in comparative method:

> (1) The single case study (either a country, an event or a systemic feature)
>
> (2) The single case study over time (i.e. a historical study or time series analysis)
>
> (3) Two or more cases at a few time intervals (i.e. close universe of discourse)
>
> (4) All cases that are relevant regarding the research question under review
>
> (5) All relevant cases across time and space (e.g. pooled time series analysis) (p. 20)

This is a multiple-steps research. Firstly, a stage-based historical overview of Bosnian and Kosovo conflict is conducted that corresponds to 'the single case study over time' option of Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis (1999). It lays the ground for within case analysis to explain conflict parties and sources, intervention process, and post-conflict structural transformation for each case. Then, 'Two or more cases at a few time intervals' type of comparative method is employed to answer the main research question that rests on the role of intervention process on post-conflict structural transformation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo. This type of comparative method "concerns the 'few' cases alternative and more often than not takes time into account (be it before/after an event – war…)" (Pennings, et al., 1999, p. 20). According to Ragin (1991) "a few(er) cases research design is seen as a 'focused comparison' which is directly derived from research question" (as mentioned in Pennings et al., 1999, p. 20). According to

Druckman (2005, p. 209) this type of comparative research "include case comparison that emphasize matching of cases".

George (1979) divides the procedures of focused comparison study in three main phases: (1) design of research; (2) implementation of case studies; and (3) theoretical implications of the case studies (as mentioned in Druckman, 2005). The design phase consists of five main tasks (as mentioned in Druckman, 2005, p. 210). As a first task, a focused comparison demands the specification of the research problem and theoretical background on that issue. Considering the aim of this research to explore the role of intervention process in the post-conflict structural transformation in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the literature on intervention, conflict transformation with a focus on structural transformation, and sustainable peace is explained.

The second task calls for "identification of independent, intervening and dependent variables that enter into the controlled comparison of cases" (Druckman, 2005, p. 211). In the present study the independent variable is intervention process, and the dependent variable is the post-conflict structural transformation. The role of the intervention process, as independent variable, on post-conflict structural transformation, as dependent variable, is assessed. Then, a further analysis searches for the existence or not of a positive relationship between structural transformation and sustainable peace as the dependent variable.

Third, comes the selection of appropriate cases for comparison. It means a localization of selected cases within same universe or pool of cases. From the pool of cases, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina are selected mainly because: they are protracted ethnic conflicts; have emerged in the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia; have Serbia as the other conflict party; have passed through the same conflict stages and are

9

in post-conflict stage now; have been subject to intervention; lack a full sustainable peace and face the risk of conflict reemergence. The selection of cases based on similarities helps in maintaining comparison controlled.

Fourthly, the causal relations between independent and dependent variables are explored by analyzing the role of intervention process on post conflict structural transformation. For cases under comparison, the intervention process has been different – it started with military intervention in both cases but while in Bosnia military intervention was followed by a peace agreement that established a federation, in Kosovo it led to a unilateral declaration of independence. Apart from the type and outcome of intervention, we also know that the nature, stages and sources of conflict are similar for both cases. Ultimately, the analysis intends to show whether there is a positive relationship among structural transformation and progress toward sustainable peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo.

The last task is to formulate the questions and derive hypothesis to be addressed for each case. As already stated, this research aims to address the following questions:

1. What is the relationship between intervention process and post-conflict structural transformation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo?

2. What is the relationship between post-conflict structural transformation and progress toward sustainable peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo?

Druckman (2005, p. 211) argues that "few Conflict Analysis and Resolution theories are formulated precisely enough to permit rigorous testing". Despite limitations, "focused comparisons can identify various causal patterns that may occur for the events of interest" (Druckman, 2005, p. 211). The key rests on variance among cases: as far as they differ in few independent variables, variation on dependent variables can be

attributed to differences in independent variables (Druckman, 2005). Therefore, this study aims to analyze cases based on the following hypothesis:

1. External diplomatic intervention contributed to the institutionalization of ethnicities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2. External military intervention produced a limited sovereignty in Kosovo.

3. Post-intervention overt presence of international actors has hindered the development of a state building culture in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo.

4. There is a positive relationship between post-conflict structural transformation and progress toward sustainable peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo.

To conclude, this study employs a normative comparative research method that is different from the descriptive one that identifies the similarities and differences but does not undertake a normative assessment.

CHAPTER 2:

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

After the end of the Cold War, ethnic conflicts comprise the main challenge to security

in national and international level for most of the countries and regions in the world

(Gurr, 1993, p. 314). Despite debates on the causes of ethnic conflicts, the existence of

almost 5000 distinct ethnic groups in the world and 90.8 percent of independent states

with multiethnic character show the existence of a high potential for conflicts among

distinct ethnic groups (Davies, 1996, p. 88; Poku, 1996, p. 181). Throughout history a

high number of ethnic conflicts have been going back and forth between peace and

violence. Based on such long-term fluctuations they are labeled as protracted conflicts.

Moving them from extreme violence to sustainable peace has been a challenging issue in

peace and conflict studies. The concept of Conflict Transformation emerged in 1980s as

a response to the need for a new approach to deal with protracted conflicts (Kriesberg,

1989; Curle, 1990; Rupesinghe, 1994; Lederach, 1995b, Galtung, 1996)).

2.1   Ethnicity, protracted conflict and types of peace

2.1.1   Ethnicity and ethnic Group

Peoples and Bailey (2013, p. 409) define "ethnic group as social grouping of people

based on what is perceived as shared ancestry, cultural traditions and history". The term

'ethnicity' - as "the character or quality of an ethnic group" - appears for the first time in

1972 supplement of the Oxford English Dictionary (Glazer & Moynihan, 1975, p. 1). It

is recorded to be used for the first time in 1953 by American Sociologist David Riesman (Glazer & Moynihan, 1975, p. 1). It is linked with the older word 'ethnic' which has its roots in the Greek term 'ethnos' originally meaning pagan but later based on the context has been used to refer to tribe, race, or group (Eriksen, 1993, p. 4). Edwards (1985, p. 6) explains ethnicity as a sense of group identity that can be derived from actual or perceived commonalities including religion, language and race.

The lack of agreement among scholars on its universal meaning has produced a range of approaches and definitions of ethnicity; primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism being the main alternative theoretical approaches (Merera, 2003; Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003; Jenkins, 2008). Ethnicity is defined by primordialists like Geertz (1963) as a 'historic artifact'; as 'birth given' by Cohen (1974); and as a collective identity rooted in historical experience by Esman (1994). Primordialists consider the objective indicators like common history, territory, language, tradition and values as essential elements shaping ethnic identity (Brass, 1991). Moreover, they claim that these indicators are given, fixed, unchangeable and cannot be manipulated (Geertz, 1963; Grosby, 1996). Threats to such primordial indicators might cause violent and long-lasting conflicts (Geertz, 1963).

The instrumentalist approach emerged as a critique of primordialism. Instrumentalists highlight that elite groups and/or individuals, despite their belief in ethnicity, use ethnic identity for pursuing specific economic and/or political ends (Cohen, 1974; Varshney, 2002). As argued by Weber (1978, p.389), ethnic membership facilitates group formation rather than constituting a group; political community is the primary factor that motivates the belief in common ethnicity. So, ethnicity is considered as a social and political construct of subjective factors like conditions and context,

13

serving as an instrument to achieve specific goals. Instrumentalists look upon ethnic identity as flexible and adaptable social transformations (Cohen, 1974).

Social constructivists, different from primordialists, consider ethnicity as a product of historical forces and define ethnic groups as social constructs shaped by historical context (Gellner, 1983; Berman, 1998; Markakis, 1998). As stated by Barth (1969), as the main influential scholar of this approach, ethnic identity can be adapted according to the social context in which ethnic groups interact. Thus, ethnicity is socially constructed, not fixed; it is shaped by subjective factors like beliefs, context and the shared memory of the past (Barth, 1969). Krause and Renwick (1996, p. xii) add that "… identities are constructed and can therefore be deconstructed and reconstructed anew".

Thus, ethnicity and ethnic group are defined by different scholars based on the subjective features of the constructivist and instrumentalist approach (e.g., context, belief, collective psychological factors, shared memory of the past, etc.) and objective features of the primordial approach (e.g., common descent, culture, language, traditions, shared homeland etc.). Based on a combination of different definitions, this study defines an 'ethnic group' as a group with both objective and subjective features, that is identified by itself and the others as a distinct social, political and/or cultural body with its proper collective name. It suggests that existing differences among ethnic groups based on their subjective or objective features, as in case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, might result in ethnic conflict if they are not handled in a proper time and way by internal and external actors.

2.1.2   Ethnic conflict

Conflict is a situation in which at least two actors pursue incompatible goals and ethnic conflict is one among various types of conflicts. The use of the term ethnic conflict has caused confusion because sometimes it described a wide range of intra state conflicts (Brown, 1993). "Ethnic conflict is a dispute about important political, economic, cultural, social, or territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities" that try to maximize their interests (Brown, 1993, p. 5; Poku, 1996). Those believing that ethnicity is a primordial fixed identity, argue that ethnic conflict is based on ancient hatred and is almost impossible to be totally solved and managed (Cordell & Wolff, 2011). In contrast, instrumentalists claim that ethnic conflicts come out of 'greed and grievance' or elite manipulation (Cordell & Wolff, 2011). So, identities shift because they are instrumental (Hardin, 1995). The third view that highlights the social construction of ethnic identities, argues that "ethnic conflict is a product of historical processes" that have established different ethnic identities and hatreds (Green et al., 2003, p. 521).

An important confusion emerges from the idea that ethnic conflict is about ethnic identity; but as Brubaker and Laitin (1998, p. 425) assert, "ethnicity is not the ultimate, irreducible source of violent conflict in such cases". Often conflicts rise once ethnic identity combines with other identities (Solomon & Matthews, 2001). Cordell and Wolff (2010, p. 5) define ethnic conflict as "a type of conflict in which the goals of at least one conflicting party are defined in ethnic terms, and the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions". Hence, it means that it is not the conflict that is ethnic but at least one of the parties in conflict use ethnic identity for mobilization and organization by. It is of crucial importance to highlight that the multiethnic character of a country is

not necessarily a source of violent conflict (Varshney, 2002; Wolff, 2006; Asebe, 2007; Alemayehu, 2009).

The economic, social, and political environment shape the type of interaction among different ethnic groups. The way ethnicity, ethnic identity and ethnic conflict is understood and defined contributes in understanding the determinants of ethnic conflict and in developing strategies for the attainment of sustainable peace. Ethnic conflict does not have one specific source; it comes out of a combination of different causes and factors. The scope and the intensity of the factors leading to ethnic conflicts makes them and their solution even more complex and contribute in defining some of them as protracted conflicts (Solomon and Matthews, 2001). Ethnic conflicts have different features and they should not be considered as a unitary phenomenon (Bercovitch, 2003). While in some of them differences can be handled in a constructive way, others like Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts can turn to protracted conflicts with destructive effects.

2.1.3   Protracted conflicts

The peaceful strategies that might be effective in some conflicts can be quite unhelpful in some others (Bercovitch, 2003). "Conflicts over deep-rooted issues (e.g. identity and human needs) tend to generate more strife and violence and become protracted" (Bercovitch, 2003, para. 3). Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Northern Ireland conflict, India-Pakistan, Kosovo, and Bosnian conflicts are examples of protracted conflicts. Azar's provides the most widely accepted explanation of protracted conflicts as "the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation" (Azar, 1991, p. 93).

Galtung (1996) defines attitude (A), behavior (B) and contradictions (C) as the three pillars of conflict formation triangle named as ABC triangle. Contradictions rise once the groups or individuals realize their goal incompatibility (Galtung, 1996). Goal incompatibility can lead to hatred and negative attitudes and further to violent behavior (Galtung, 1996). Behavior is the most visible part of the conflict. If the process of conflict resolution focuses on addressing violent behavior and disregards contradictions and attitudes it means that the sources of conflict are not eliminated and the risk for conflict reemergence is still present. Protracted conflicts are born in these kinds of situations that explain the cycle of conflicts and violence reemergence even after long periods of peace. The analysis and establishment of sustainable peace in ethnic conflicts in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, become even more essential considering the complexity, danger, and their duration.

2.1.4   Positive, negative and sustainable peace

The literature introduces positive peace and negative peace as two main aspects of peace. Galtung (1996), explains negative peace as the absence of extensive physical violence but presence of potential for violence. On the other hand, positive peace means more than the absence of violence. It refers to addressing the underlying causes of conflict and consequently eliminate conditions that facilitate conflict (Galtung, 1996; Sandole, 2003). Positive peace means "a holistic vision of peace that includes well-being, as well as right and just relationships and structures" (Neufeldt et al., 2006, p. 30).

Arguably, a holistic understanding of protracted ethnic conflicts is needed for examining the interaction among the factors that lead to dangerous ethno-nationalism and violence (Solomon and Matthews, 2001, p. 3). Galtung (1996) highlights the

17

structural, cultural, and direct violence as the main types of violence. He points out the

expansion of the conflict from urgent issues to original problems and asserts that direct

violence is located within structural and cultural violence (Galtung, 1997, p. 10).

Violence deteriorates relations among parties (Pearce, 1997; Paffenholz & Spurk, 2010).

Moreover, if those relations deteriorate because the conflict is not handled in a proper

way then conflict escalates and hope for achieving sustainable peace diminishes

(Francis, 2010). On the other hand, if the conflict is handled properly, conflict

transformation can contribute to the improvement of relations among conflicting parties

and reducing all types of violence (Werhane, 1999).

　　　Pearce (1997, p. 448) argues that the key steps towards the creation of conditions

for sustainable peace include handling present issues and reconstruction of the

structures, relationships and context that caused conflict. Sustainable peace develops

once the values of positive peace are established which means the elimination of

structural, cultural, or physical violence. Conflict transformation, promoting the values

of positive peace, contributes in the achievement of sustainable peace. This study

focuses on structural transformation, as the main theme in conflict transformation

literature, to understand the current situation of protracted ethnic conflicts in Kosovo and

in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2.2　Conflict intervention and sovereignty

2.2.1　Conflict intervention

Intervention is a concept applied to different situation. International relations scholars

use it when a "military action is taken against the will of parties in conflict" (Debiel &

Nuscheler 1996 as mentioned in Schweitzer, 2009, p. 34). Another definition is developed by international law scholars that consider it as "improper interference by an outside power with the territorial integrity or political independence of a state" (Davies, 2003, p. 2-3). Sometimes it may be applied as 'humanitarian intervention' that means "coercive - and in particular military – action again another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state" (The Responsibility to Protect, 2001, p. vii). Schweitzer (2009, p. 35) argues that it is "a normative and practical approach of the politics of the international community to protect human rights and to contain and prevent wars and horrors of wars, using a broad spectrum of means and methods". Crocker (2001, p. 229) defines intervention as a variety of tools and methods by external actors with the aim of handling a conflict.

Diplomatic, military, economic interventions comprise the main types of intervention by international actors. Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999, p. 11) differentiate between coercive and non-coercive strategies of intervention. Military and economic intervention involves coercive strategies and have a negative effect on the conflict longevity (Regan, 2002c; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000). Diplomatic intervention is conducted through non-coercive means and has a stronger influence on terminating the conflict (Regan, Frank & Aydin, 2009). This influence is seen even when diplomatic intervention is combined with the other types of intervention be it military or economic (Regan and Aydin, 2006).

Burrowes (2000) classifies intervention by the nature of parties that intervene (who?); by the nature of intervention's political impact (why?); and by the means through which it is conducted (how?). Third party intervention can be analyzed based on methods of intervention, militarized vs non-militarized, and/or nature of intervention

like unilateral/multilateral, biased/unbiased (Rioux, 2003). In this study, the focus is on types/methods, nature and outcome of intervention in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina where military interventions ended direct violent confrontation. Also, both cases have been subject to diplomatic interventions through different conflict handling approaches. While the diplomatic interventions during conflict brokered Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they failed to produce a similar result in Kosovo. The purpose of analyzing intervention in these conflicts is to understand its role in post conflict structural transformation.

2.2.2   Sovereignty and its limitations

Sovereignty is a very much contested and ambiguous concept. The traditional definition of sovereignty is that "there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere" (Hinsley, 1986, p. 26). Krasner (1999), differentiates among three aspects of sovereignty: international legal sovereignty; Westphalian sovereignty; and domestic sovereignty. The first aspect refers to judicial independence and mutual recognition, the second to the non-intervention of external actors on internal affairs and the third to "to the institutions under which a particular state is governed and their effectiveness" (Krasner, 2004, p. 1077). While the international sovereignty has been respected more universally, the other two aspects of sovereignty have been more limited. Koeth (2012, p. 32) mentions three different forms that limitations of sovereignty can take: "(a) through the presence of international caretakers with executive powers; (b) through the inability to exercise sovereign powers; and (c) through non-recognition on the international stage".

2.3   Main approaches in conflict studies

The theory of peace and conflict distinguish three main levels of conflict: "expressions of violence; the dispute that motivates violence; and the conflict structures which give rise to the disputes" (Auvinien & Kivimakin, 2001, p. 65). Also, the Berghof Glossary on Conflict Transformation (2012, p. 22) identifies three types of responses to violent conflict: an immediate response to stop violence, "a medium-term response to deal with the wounds resulting from violence', and a long one to change the underlying conditions that have led, and may lead again, to violence". The levels of conflict and responses to violent conflict are strongly linked with three main approaches in conflict studies: conflict resolution, conflict management, and conflict transformation. This study focuses on analyzing the long-term response that fits to conflict transformation approach and precisely structural transformation of conflicts. Despite the efforts to differentiate among conflict resolution, conflict management, and conflict transformation, various scholars and practitioners use these terms in different ways and sometime interchangeably (Miall, 2004). For this reason, it is not clear enough whether conflict transformation is used as a synonym or it has some features that differentiate it from conflict management and conflict resolution terms (Miall, 2004). However, the main reason for explaining these three approaches is to show that conflict transformation, as a comprehensive approach, should be employed in conflict settings together with conflict management and resolution to achieve sustainable peace.

2.3.1   Conflict management and conflict resolution

Conflict management considers violent conflict, coming out of differences in values and interests among different communities, as inevitable, irresolvable but manageable

(Miall, 2004). As such, conflict management is an intervention by powerful third parties aiming the achievement of settlements and containment of violence by compromise (Miall, 2004). As stated by Bloomfield and Reilly (1998):

> Conflict management is the positive and constructive handling of difference and divergence. Rather than advocating methods for removing conflict, [it] addresses the more realistic question of managing conflict: how to deal with it in a constructive way, how to bring opposing sides together in a cooperative process, how to design a practical, achievable, cooperative system for the constructive management of difference. (p.18)

In the example of South African conflict, only three measures were taken to manage the conflict: "the arms embargo against the apartheid government; the strong discouragement of ANC violence after 1984; and, the Peace Accord of 1992" (Auvinien & Kivimakin, 2001, p. 66). As shown in this case, the aim of conflict management is to control violence, not to resolve the disputes behind the conflict or the structures that enable these disputes. Therefore, conflict management rather than being a peace strategy, it can contribute to peace by supporting other approaches of dealing with conflict (Auvinien & Kivimakin, 2001).

Auvinien and Kivimakin (2001) emphasize three main problems with conflict management approach. Firstly, controlling the legitimate expression of grievances would be morally wrong if the oppressed perceives the situation as unfair and does not have any alternative way to change it. So, despite their crucial role in state functioning, the existence of order and stability does not guarantee the lack of structural or direct violence and conflict (Rummel, 1994). On the contrary, unfair and violent order has

caused more deaths than disorder. Based on a quantitative analysis, Rummel (1994) finds out that governments have killed 170 million citizens compared to 38 million deaths in civil wars during the twentieth century. Secondly, conflict management is losing ground because technological developments provide means to the violent expression of grievances that cannot be easily contained. Third, the suppression of grievances can be counterproductive because it can lead to destructive explosions in the future. This situation can be easily observed in the case of ex-Yugoslavian republics including Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic differences within Yugoslav Federation were managed through suppression and ideological frames like 'brotherhood and unity'. However, they came to the surface with changes in leadership and context, leading to large scale and long-lasting ethnic conflicts in this area in 1990s. Such cases forward the need for moving beyond conflict management that could not establish positive peace but has sustained grievances and escalated conflicts.

For a long time, conflict resolution has been a trending approach in conflict studies. Conflict resolution argues that people, with the help of third parties, can compromise only on positions and interests but not on fundamental needs (Miall, 2004). According to Azar and Burton (1986, p. 1), it focuses on designing "processes of conflict resolution that appear to be acceptable to parties in dispute and effective in resolving conflict". Moving conflicting parties from zero-sum to win-win solutions fits more to conflict settlement approach rather than the original understanding of conflict resolution. But, current conflicts may need more than restructuring positions and interests and reaching positive-sum outcomes (Miall, 2004); there is a need for exploration beyond the site of conflict and conflict transformation emerged as a new approach to address it.

2.3.2   Conflict transformation approach

The concept of conflict transformation is elaborated by several conflict scholars like Raimo Vayrynen, Louis Kriesberg, Adam Curle, Kumar Rupesinghe, but Paul Lederach and Johan Galtung have the main contributions to this approach. Galtung, Kriesberg, and Chris Mitchell have used the term for nonviolent interventions aiming long-term structural, relational, and cultural changes. As a new terminology in peace and conflict studies, it is still developing and has "accrued a number of meanings, including transformation of individuals, transformation of relationships, and transformation of social systems large and small" (Dukes, 1999, p. 48). Conflicts are not fundamentally bad, but they are crucial agents of change in a society; the main task is not to eliminate but to transform them positively (Miall, 2004; Durand, 2013). For example, if the conflict in Cambodia is considered as a cause of disorder and instability then a rational approach of conflict settlement would be to convince people that their governments have the right to kill as many people as needed, as happened in 1975-1979, to restore the order (Auvinien & Kivimakin, 2001).

If the aim is the establishment of positive peace the focus should be beyond controlling violent behavior and ending violence; beyond reframing positions and win-win settlements (Miall, 2004). The task should be the transformation of all the elements that enables conflict starting with structural ones. Thus, scholars and practitioners agree that conflict transformation calls for moving protracted conflicts beyond conflict resolution – beyond ending direct violence, reaching an agreed settlement or signing a joint acceptable resolution (Mitchel, 2002). As shown in Fig.1, it is more than addressing the behavior through negative peace that ensures only the absence of direct

24

violence; "it seeks positive peace, the end of structural violence for ensuring a long-

lasting peace" (Galtung, 1996).

Fig. 1. Adaptation of Galtung's triangle (Fisher et al., 2000, p.10)

As stated by Mitchell (2002), it is worth considering conflict transformation as a

different and more inclusive approach than others and to dig into what makes it

different. There are different arguments on how it differs from conflict resolution. The

first argument points out the existence of a difference from original to current

understanding of conflict resolution. Mitchel (2002) argues that the initial uses of

conflict resolution term used to include a lot of features that now belong to the

transformative process. For example, in early 1990s, John Burton and Frank Dukes used

to consider conflict resolution process as a process aiming to understand needs and

choices and come up with agreements that would address those needs but also change

the systems and patterns of interaction that cause conflicts (Burton & Dukes, 1990 as

mentioned in Mitchell, 2002). The original practice of conflict resolution was based on

an understanding that "successful resolutions need to bring about major structural

changes in social systems, countries and communities as well as changes in fundamental

25

relationships" (Mitchell, 2002, p. 3). Another group of scholars argue that the corruption

of the resolution concept led to the emergence of transformation concept. Resolution

term started to replace what previously was defined as management and based on

Bloomfield (1997) categorization it belongs to settlement approaches category. In

addition, Bush and Folger (1994) claim that conflict resolution has come to be linked

with the manipulative quest for an agreement that satisfies not only the interests of the

parties in conflict but also third-party interests which means a 'win-win-win' solution in

their words.

Overall, the scholars agree on the existence of a difference between the original

and current understanding of conflict resolution and the proponents of conflict

transformation claim that this new approach means more than management and current

employment of resolution as settlement (Sheehan, 2014). Vayrynen (1991) argues for

conflict transformation against conflict settlement by asserting that:

> The bulk of conflict theory regards the issues, actors and interests as given, and
>
> on that basis makes efforts to find a solution to mitigate or eliminate
>
> contradictions between them. Yet the issues, actors and interests change over
>
> time as consequence of the social, economic and political dynamics of societies.
>
> (p. 4)

Lederach (1995a, p. 201), claims that the term resolution even unintentionally seems to

be oriented toward ending conflicts and does not give enough attention to "deeper

structural, cultural, and long-term relational aspects of conflict". In the Dictionary of

Conflict Resolution, Yarn (1999, p. 121) supports the term of "conflict transformation as

a method of inducing change in parties' relationship through improving mutual

understanding", over conflict resolution term as "change[s] in the characteristics of a conflict". The proponents of conflict transformation approach argue that current understanding of conflict resolution "has failed to establish peace in most recent struggles due to its tendency to over-simply conflicts" (Durand, 2013, p. 15).

In the Encyclopedia of Conflict Resolution, Burgess and Burgess (1997, p. 285-286) mention the existence of at least three ways in which conflict transformation term is employed: (1) to explain changes in parties relationship (Kriesberg, Northrup & Thorson, 1989); (2) to explain transformation of the societies including deep social and political changes (Harrington & Merry, 1988; Burton, 1990); and (3) to explain changes in the individuals character and perceptions (Bush & Folger, 1994). "Conflict transformation is therefore a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict" (Miall, 2004, p. 3). So, it is an approach in the field of conflict studies that aims the transition from violent (structural, cultural, physical) to non-violent behavior (Kriesberg, 2011, p. 59).

Lederach (1995), as one of the leading scholars of this approach, defines conflict transformation as:

> a new set of lenses through which we do not primarily see the setting and the people in it as the problem and the outsider as the answer. Rather, we understand the long-term goal of transformation as validating and building on people and resources within the setting. (p. 212)

This approach emphasizes that the broken relationships, that prolong ethnic conflicts and cause conflict reemergence, can be fixed through conflict transformation. Northrup

(1989) states that transformation can be observed once parties' identities are modified, their relationships redefined, and their perceptions of the self are changed. However, it is important to be aware that these kinds of changes need a long time, because inflexible attitudes and behaviors develop over time in prolonged conflicts (Northrup, 1989). As put by Dudouet (2006, p. 21) conflict transformation is a complex, multidimensional process including "many actors moving from latent and overt violence to structural and cultural peace". It intends to bring about big changes in the structure and relationship between adversaries in conflicts to prevent their reemergence (Lederach, 2003; Kriesberg, 2011). "The empathy, nonviolence, and creativity are vital tools for conflict transformation" (Brand-Jacobsen, 2003, p. 41). This approach is mostly relevant in cases of protracted and asymmetric conflict (Berghof Handbook, 2012). It searches for moving such conflicts to sustainable peace (Miall, 2004; Durand, 2013).

This study, focusing on the transformation of protracted ethnic conflicts in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, supports the argument that current employment of conflict resolution fits more to conflict settlement and that conflict transformation is closer to the original understanding of conflict resolution. It highlights the idea that conflict management, conflict settlement, and conflict transformation do not substitute but they complement each other. Thus, the achievement of sustainable peace rests on the demonstrable combination of the three approaches mentioned above.

2.3.3   Dimensions of conflict transformation

Both theory and practice-oriented knowledge presents a range of concepts and tools that contribute in understanding conflict and developing constructive responses for achieving positive peace (Wehr 1979; Ropers, 2008; Ramsbotham et al. 2011). Most of the conflict

transformation processes start with conflict analysis as a crucial step in understanding

conflicts and addressing them in a peaceful way (Körppen et al., 2008; Ropers, 2008).

Ropers (2008, p. 18) mentions five elements that a comprehensive analysis of the

conflict attempts to identify "(1) conflict parties (2) conflict issues, (3) structural and

contextual features, (4) parties' understanding of the conflict, (5) conflict resolution

preferences and options that supports constructive transformation of the conflict". The

literature is rich on the methods for conflict analysis and mapping, but it lacks

knowledge on how to achieve sustainable peace, in other words on how to transform the

system, structures, and relationships that escalate conflicts (Körppen et al., 2008;

Körppen & Schmelze, 2008). The main discussion develops around what gets

transformed in a conflict transformation process.

Based on different models of conflict analysis, scholars have identified a range of

elements that need to be transformed to move toward sustainable peace. Vayrynen

(1991) mentions four key areas of transformation:

> (1) actor transformation, which means changes within the parties or emergence
>
> of new actors;
>
> (2) issue transformation refers to altering what the conflict is about;
>
> (3) rules/norms transformation redefines the norms within which the parties
>
> interact with each other; and
>
> (4) "structural transformation alludes to changes in the system or the structure
>
> within which the conflict occurs". (p.163)

Miall (2006) adds the context as another area of transformation, highlighting that

changes in conflict context may alter parties' perceptions of conflict situation. For

Kriesberg (1989), conflict transformation includes changes in conflict parties, issues and

the social system in which they operate. According to Lederach (1995), relationships between parties and changes in social system are crucial for transforming conflicts.

Miall (2004) states that the five types of transformation, shown in Fig.2, are linked to different levels of conflict. Context transformation happens in regional and global levels; structural transformation at state/society level; actor transformation at party or elite level; and personal transformation at individual level (Miall, 2004, p. 10). Azar and Galtung point out the linkage of transformation types with different parts of conflict formation (Miall, 2004). While issue, structural, and context transformation influence contradictions among conflicting parties; actor and personal transformation influence their attitudes and behavior; however, all these transformations are interrelated (Miall, 2004). While structural and context transformation occur over a longer period, other types of transformation may occur within a shorter period (Miall, 2004).

type	examples
1. context transformations	change in the international or regional environment
2. structure transformations	change from asymmetric to symmetric relations change in power structures changes of markets of violence
3. actor transformations	changes of leadership changes of goals intra-party change change in party's constituencies changing actors
4. issue transformations	transcendence of contested issues constructive compromise changing issues de-linking or re-linking issues
5. personal/elite transformations	changes of perspective changes of heart changes of will gestures of conciliation

Fig. 2. Dimensions of conflict transformation (Miall, 2004)

Looking with a critical eye to the existing perspectives on 'what gets transformed' is important for developing an analytical framework on how to transform conflicts, where to focus, and how to start this transformation process. Some scholars support the idea that conflicts are transforming all the time from their appearance to escalation to intervention of third parties (Mitchel, 2002). Azar (1990, p. 7), argues that the transformation of "…nonconflictual situations into conflictual ones…" is a change, even though not the desirable one, that can be taken as example of conflict transformation. However, even though all types of changes are important, they are not the kind of changes to which the conflict transformation approach refers. As stated by Mitchel (2002), normal dynamics of conflict should not be confused with its transformation. Changes in the rules/norms within which conflicting parties interact with each other are more related to the normal progress of the conflict through different phases rather than its transformation (Braniff, 2011). Mitchel (2002) and Miall (2007), define even actor and issue changes as normal dynamics of conflict. Even though this study makes a stage-based analysis of the conflict, it does not focus on changes in conflict dynamics but rather on "the reversal of the all negative forms of change that occur within the conflict system itself and to the social system in which the conflict is embedded" (Mitchel, 2002, p. 8). Thus, conflict transformation refers only to positive transformations and not all changes in normal dynamics of the conflict.

Most of the perspectives mentioned above support the approach adopted by Vayrynen (1991) highlighting the prominence of parties, issues, and structures as crucial elements of transformation. Also, a critical overview of Vayrynen's approach to dimensions of conflict transformation reveals some similarities within his dimensions,

31

and prevalence of structural transformation over the other dimensions. Firstly, Braniff (2011) notices an overlap of Vayrynen (1991) definition of structure transformation with that of actor and issue transformation. The "transformation of political actors cannot be understood without analyzing their attitudes towards issues in the conflict" (Braniff, 2011, p. 34). According to Rupesinghe (1995, p. 76-77), structural transformation needs change in attitude and new institutions to deal with the issues. Albin (2005) mentions that most scholars and practitioners support the idea that structure change is necessary and defines structure change as party change (number, identities, interests) and issue change. "Often conflicts are structurally caused by economic, political, identity-based, discursive and other structures which then give rise to concrete disputes..." (Auvinen & Kivimaki, 1996, p. 3). Altering these structures firstly is very important for the transformation of such conflicts. Structural transformation appears as the dimension that links Vayryenen's perspective to the main ideas of other conflict transformation scholars (Mitchel, 2002). Also, as mentioned by Miall (2004), structural transformation fits more to state/society level of conflict that is in the focus of this study.

Structure transformation shows up once more in the discussion on how conflict transformation is different from resolution (employed as settlement). Some conflict transformation proponents consider the commitment of transformation approach to bring major 'structural' change as the main area in which it differs from resolution (Mitchel, 2002, p. 13). Scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution are also aware of the need for some level of structural change to achieve a mutually acceptable solution, but this is not their primary focus. Therefore, while conflict resolution deals with conflicts with a possibility for having some structural change during the resolution process, transformation approach argues that the achievement of sustainable peace depends on

such structural changes (Mitchel, 2002). This study aims to uncover these structural changes in post-conflict Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina and to explore the impact of intervention process on these changes.

2.4   Structural transformation

'Structure' refers to the pattern of relationship among parties in conflict and the social, political and institutional factors that influence their relationship (Miall, 2007, p. 6). Structural transformation "refer to changes in the basic structure of the conflict, that is to the set of actors, their issues, incompatible goals and relationships, or to the society, economy or state within which the conflict is embedded" (Miall, 2004, p.9). According to Dudouet (2006), the drivers of conflict rest on unfair and exploitative structures that need to be reshaped. Curle (1971, p. 6) claims that the level of asymmetry in a conflict is defined by "the extent to which (…) one party to a relationship is able to dominate another".

The transformation of conflicts cannot happen if the asymmetric relations among actors are not addressed (Miall, 2007). Conflicts in West Africa show that conflict transformation efforts would be ineffective if balancing economic interests that fuel conflict are undermined (Dudouet, 2006). As demonstrated on the case of Northern Ireland, the balance of relationship between Protestant majority Catholic minority occurred through a gradual political and economic consolidation of the Republic of Ireland, weakening of the Protestants and the establishment of the Pan-Nationalist coalition (Miall, 2007). In a statistical analysis of ethno-political conflicts, Gurr and Harff (1994), reveal that the main reason leading to political action of 80% of the 233 ethnic groups between 1945 and 1980 were the political and economic deprivation based

on ascriptive features. So, structural transformation becomes mandatory if conflict sources rest in the structure within which the actors engage with one another (Dudouet, 2006). Galtung has developed the term structural violence to describe the institutional violence produced by the system, and Dudouet (2006) argues that cooperation among parties is crucial for designing institutional changes that would omit this type of violence. The development of a power sharing democracy like in Northern Ireland case can be considered as a good example in this regard.

Powersharing and federalism appear as the main democratic institutional designs to deal with conflicts in deeply divided societies. While powersharing aims to increase the participation of minorities in national government, ethnic federalism transfers power to local/regional government (Vorrath, Krebs, & Senn, 2007). The proponents of decentralized structures argue for recognition of ethnic differences as very important to their management (Lijphart, 2004). "Majoritarian attempts to crosscut political ethnic cleavages into irrelevance only suppress them and preserve them as latent sources of tension" (Cohen, 1997, p. 613). Another argument is that accessing state power would soothe the demands of groups in minority position (Gurr, 2000).

On the other side, the critics of decentralized structures, state that it can offer minority groups the sources for nationalist mobilization against central government (Roeder & Rothchild, 2005); can consolidate ethnic divisions (Bunce 2005); and can provide a suitable environment of politicization of ethnic identity (Cornell 2002). Critics are not against representation of minorities but against "locking in divisive national identities in order to enhance the representation of some groups" (Vorrath et al, 2007, p. 14). Decentralized structures would be beneficial in short but not long term. Critics support more integrative forms that would bridge rather that reinforce ethnic

divisions. A more radical solution is partition that would be considered as a last resort solution in case of deep conflict and destroyed trust between parties (Kaufman, 1998). However, redrawing borders seem to be a very challenging task.

The first feature of transformation is the aim for profound changes in conflict situations, going at the center of the problem, addressing conflict causes (Lederach 2003). Protracted ethnic conflicts are complex and a holistic approach is required for addressing them. The field of conflict studies has developed different models and maps for describing the linear or cyclic phases of the conflict (Dudouet, 2006). Considering the complex character of protracted conflicts, scholars and practitioners have identified the need for breaking the conflicts into pieces to make the analysis easier (Lederach 2005, p. 43). Thus, a stage-based analysis of conflict appears as an effective method for better understanding them. In addition, assuming that such a division is important for explaining the impact that developments in one stage might have on the other, this study starts with the analysis of conflict sources in pre-conflict stage, intervention strategies in pre and during conflict stage, and structural transformation in post-conflict stage.

2.5   Conflict stages

Conflicts progress in different ways; most of the conflicts pass through particular conflict stages that can be defined by different methods and criteria. The conflict transformation approach emphasizes that violence (structural, cultural, direct) in a conflict, not the conflict itself is problematic (Francis, 2002). As such, the transformation of conflicts from destructive to constructive ones becomes the goal (Kriesberg 2003). The elimination of any type of violence is an essential condition for the achievement of sustainable and positive peace. Samarasinghe (1999), as shown in

Fig. 3, identifies five stages of conflict based on the level of violence (Thaddeus &
Cuthberg, 2013, p. 337).

Fig. 3. Levels and phases of conflict model (Samarasinghe, 1999)

This study focuses on the presence of any type of violence (direct, structural, cultural)
rather its threshold. Therefore, the stages of conflict are reclassified as Pre-Conflict
Stage that is the stage before the emergence of direct violence; Conflict Stage including
the period from the emergence to the settlement of direct violence; and Post-Conflict
Stage that is the period after the end of direct violence. However, conflict development
path is not unidirectional since sometimes the conflict can move forward or back to
another stage and sometimes it might even skip stages. For example, it might come to
post conflict stage without passing through overt conflict stage like it happened with
nonviolent independence or civil rights movements in India and in US respectively
(Dudouet, 2006). Also, it can move "from violent conflict to post-war reconstruction
through imposed settlements" and then back to pre-conflict stage in case the sources of

36

conflict remain unaddressed (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p. 23). Kosovo and Bosnian conflicts have followed a linear path of development, but they contain the risk of moving back to the pre-conflict stage in case the post-conflict environment is not handled properly.

2.5.1   Pre-conflict stage

Pre-conflict or latent conflict stage is the first stage in the life cycle of a conflict and it might last for a long period until it becomes visible or it cannot become visible at all (Deutsch, 1973). In this stage the structural violence has not come to the behavioral level yet; not necessarily peaceful but stable relations exist among parties that are not aware of structural injustices (Dudouet, 2006). As mentioned by Curle (1971, p. 4) "if in a particular system, one group gains what another loses, there is – even if the loser does not understand what is happening – a structural conflict". In the same way, Paul Wehr (1979) cites Collins' (1975, p. 60) argument that, "social life is above all a struggle for power and status despite the type of structure". Power asymmetry between individuals or groups leads to latent conflict (Wehr, 1979). Some of the main sources of latent conflict include: economic inequality, unequal access to political power, violation of a minority group's needs and rights, differences in status and value, etc. (Eric, 2003). Some of the main measures to contain conflict in this stage include: democratic institutions that can design peaceful spaces for discussing conflicts; efforts towards the construction of a third common identity; facilitation by intermediaries that can contribute in decreasing misunderstandings among parties and addressing them before they progress in negative terms (Eric, 2003).

At the end of this stage the conflict may evolve either into violent or non-violent confrontation. A triggering event might turn latent conflicts to violent confrontation. The efforts in this stage should focus on addressing the structural violence that might turn to violent confrontation if ignored. Conflict becomes visible and "violence only occurs when a conflict is not transformed" (Galtung, 1996, p. 71). Conflicts in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina have moved from latent conflict to violent confrontation. For both cases an analysis of this stage would help to identify the nature and sources of these two conflicts.

2.5.2   Conflict stage

Moving from the first to the second stage there are two possibilities: violent or non-violent confrontation. Proper conflict handling strategies can make the latent conflicts to come to the surface in the form of non-violent confrontation. A non-violent confrontation associated with conjointly agreed settlement would lead to sustainable peace (Francis, 2002). Otherwise, conflict can enter a violent confrontation stage. In this stage the awareness on clashing interests and needs is high; tensions are brought to the surface; relations are unstable; and conflict is obvious (Dudouet, 2006). Violent confrontations are dangerous and if not urgently ended, the conflict might escalate in a destructive way and can become intractable (Kriesberg, 2003). Fisher et al. (2000, p. 5) differentiate among conflict escalation defined as an increase in levels of tension and violence, and conflict intensification as a situation in which a "hidden conflict becomes more visible and open for purposive, nonviolent ends". A violent confrontation can either be won by one party or can move toward stagnation (Francis, 2002). Kriesberg (2005, p. 66-68) labels stagnation as 'institutionalization' and argues that it is essential

in protracted conflicts. According to Zartman (1985), conflict settlement comes once conflict is in a certain level of escalation and parties reexamine the costs of continuing to be in a hurting stalemate situation. Still the type of settlement is important. After stagnation, violent conflicts can move toward agreed settlement, imposed settlement, or still one of the parties can win (Francis, 2002). According to Dudouet (2006, p. 17), conflict is ready to be in the settlement "where behavioral and structural change can be negotiated".

Kosovo and Bosnian conflicts came to the surface in the form of violent confrontation, and the need for both conflict settlement and structural transformation was apparent. As pointed out by Galtung (1996) stopping violent conflict by intervention without transformation increases the likelihood of violence reoccurrence in post conflict stage. Collier et al. (2003) add that conflict settlement without transformation ensures only a negative peace. To test these assertions, the analysis of this stage for Kosovo and for Bosnian conflicts will focus on the intervention process and strategies for each case.

2.5.3   Post-conflict stage

Post-conflict or post-settlement stage is the last stage and the last possibility for achieving sustainable peace before the conflict re-emerges. Reaching a settlement and signing a peace agreement might end violence but is never enough (Loew, 2013). Violence will threaten, if settlements are not combined with proper implementation and conflict transformation efforts, because conflict causes are not addressed yet and peaceful relations among parties not established. The aim of transformation is to rebuild the strong and equitable relations destroyed by fear and distrust (Brahm, 2003). Kriesberg (1998) proposes a context-based settlement, reconciliation activities, and

constructive intervention as key tasks in building peaceful relations and moving to lasting peace. In addition, outside actors might have an important contribution in monitoring settlement implementation and assisting in the construction of a strong civil society during this peace building stage (Brahm, 2003). While reconciliation is considered as an important activity in this stage it is a very complicated and contested term defined either as peaceful coexistence, forgiveness, respect for the other's truth etc. At the same time, it is a long process especially at the individual level rather than group or national level. While some conflicts might come to an end without complete reconciliation and transformation, protracted conflicts need to pass through these processes especially if the parties will need to be in interaction with each other in the future. Otherwise, conflict reemergence might become inevitable.

As argued, violence reemerges in most post-conflict societies because the causes of the conflict are not addressed, and the main aim of conflict transformation is to deal with these causes. Peace building process in this stage aims to transform conflict needs, to give a hand "to overcome the antagonism between the conflict parties and, through altered perceptions and aims of the conflict parties, develop relations that prevent a return to violence" (Miall 2004, p. 4). The aim of peacebuilding is the establishment of positive peace. According to the Agenda for Peace (1992) definition "peacebuilding is a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution building, and political as well as economic transformation (as mentioned in Maiese, 2003, para 4). "Post-conflict peacebuilding was action to identify and support structures which would tend to strengthen and solidify

peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 21). However, the peacebuilding process in most post-war societies is manly driven by external actors.

"Statebuilding has become an important tool to manage conflict and promote development in fragile states emerging from violent conflict" (Tom, 2017, p.52). Statebuilding is "an endogenous process of strengthening the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations" (OECD-DAC, 2008, p. 1). Also, it is "primarily a domestic process that involves local actors, which means that the role of international actors is necessarily limited" (OECD 2011, p. 20). According to Lakhdar Brahimi, the former Special Adviser of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), post-conflict state building aims transformation and not restoration of fragile states to their pre-war situation (2007, p. 5). He considers statebuilding as "the central objective of any peace operation" (Brahimi, 2007: 4). Similarly, Paris and Sisk (2009) argues that considering statebuilding as part of peacebuilding process is very important for the establishment of sustainable peace. They are interrelated processes focusing on achievement of sustainable peace through capable, responsive and legitimate state and peaceful relations within society (Sisk & Wyeth, 2009 as mentioned in OECD, 2011, p.21).

Thus, the main task in this stage is to transform firstly the structures that enable conflicts to prevent their reemergence. Intervention ended large scale and intensity violence in Kosovo and in Bosnia and moved them to post-conflict stage. The analysis of this stage focuses on exploring structural transformation situation in post-conflict Kosovo and Bosnia. Overall, the relationship between intervention process and post-conflict structural transformation in both cases will be further examined throughout this study.

CHAPTER 3:

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

3.1   Historical context

The Illyrians, Greeks, Celts, and Romans had settlements in the Balkan peninsula before the Slavic tribes that arrived in this area in late sixth and beginning of seventh century (Davis, 1996; Osgood, 1995). From that period onward, the western part of this region – which later was called Yugoslavia – turned to a field of ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity. Slavic people were divided into South, East and West Slavs and most of ethnicities that later formed Yugoslavia – Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Bosniaks — were defined as South Slavs.

Serbs started to settle in the northern Albania by the middle of the seventh century AD, and by eleventh century AD, northern Albania and present-day Kosovo, was controlled by Slavs (Vickers, 1998). The rule of Nemanjic dynasty, as the most glorious era for Serbs, lasted between 1166 and 1355 (Vickers, 1998). In 1180, Bosnia became an independent state under rule of Ban Kulin, (Osgood, 1995). Ban Stephen Kotromanic, the successor of Ban Kulin, made Herzegovina part of Bosnia for the first time in 1326 (Malcolm, 1998). His nephew Ban Stephen Tvrtko came to power in 1353 and achieved to take almost all the territories that belong to Bosnia-Herzegovina today (Osgood, 1995).

Religion was an important factor shaping the history of this region since the fourth century when the Roman Empire split into Roman Catholics in the West and Greek Orthodox in the East. South Slavs descended from same ancestors and speak almost similar languages but differ on religious affiliations. Serbs settled in the south

and east embraced Orthodoxy, Croats and Slovenes in the north embraced Catholicism (Sells, 1998). Yugoslavia was inhabited also by non-Slavic groups like Hungarians and Kosovo Albanians.

In June 1389, in the Battle of Kosovo Polje, one of the greatest battles in history, the Ottomans defeated the Serbian Price Lazar and the Balkan army. Because of this victory, the Ottoman Empire started its rule in the Balkans that would last for almost five centuries (Pattas, 2002). It conquered medieval Serbia's territories in 1459 and Bosnia's territories in 1463. By that time, Bosnia was not united with Herzegovina. The total conquest of Bosnia's territories occurred in 1482-1483. Together with the new administrative order, the Ottoman Empire brought Islam, as a new religion, to various groups of Balkan populations. The people under its rule had three options: to convert to Islam and have a better life; not to convert to Islam and be subject to more obligations; or to move out for a better place to live. Mainly Bosniaks and Kosovo Albanians converted to Islam either voluntarily or non-voluntarily. Introduction of Islam led to the emergence of the third and largest ethno-religious group involved in Bosnian conflict (Osgood, 1995). The Ottoman victory at Kosovo Polje together with the death of Prince Lazar eventually turned into a myth of Serbian nationalism against Slavic Muslims (Sells, 1998). This myth started to be used since their first uprising against Ottoman Empire that brought initially in 1817 de-facto and in 1878 de jure independence.

Slovenia and Croatia were ruled by the Habsburg Empire that had an important role in spreading of Catholicism in this area. With their defeat in Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, the Ottoman Empire started to lose territories in the European continent. By the beginning of twentieth century the power of the Ottomans was in decline (Vickers, 1998). Serbia gained independence while Bosnia and Novi Pazar were occupied by

43

Austria-Hungary. The Ottoman Empire lost the Balkan Wars in 1912-1913 and almost all Balkan territories except Eastern Thrace. The Balkan wars resulted in the formation of an independent Albanian state and Kosovo passed under Serbia's control.

After the fall of Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires at the end of the First World War, South Slavs started to focus on their shared past rather than their differences, which, by that time had acquired an ethnic dimension. They established the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918 with the hope that they would be safer if united. After WWI, Bosnia joined the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, renamed as Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. However, this union of South Slavs was fragile due to power struggles among various ethnicities within the Kingdom, especially among Serbs and Croats. As indicated by the name of the Kingdom, there were not provisions for those that were not Serbs or Croats and Bosnia had to align with one or another (Riedlmayer, 1993). The Kingdom of Yugoslavia almost collapsed once the World War II knocked on the door, yet rivalries among South Slavic ethnicities continued even during this period. In 1941 Yugoslavia surrendered to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and what today is Croatia and Bosnia were governed by a Nazi puppet government called the Ustaše. Croat nationalists supported Ustaše against Serbs and the regime committed brutal crimes against Serbs and other groups defined as undesirable by Nazis (Judah, 2011). On the other hand, Serb nationalist established a paramilitary force named Chetniks that expelled or massacred Croats and Bosniaks from the territories they controlled.

Eventually the Partisan Army, led by Josef Tito, emerged as a resistance group to both Ustaše forces and Chetniks, aiming to liberate Yugoslavia and establish a communist state. Tito's forces, with the support of the Allies, triumphed other groups

44

(Judah, 2011). In 1945 the end of Yugoslav Kingdom was proclaimed, and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was established. It constituted of six republics including Slovenia (Catholic Slovenes), Croatia (Catholic Croats), Macedonia (Orthodox Macedonian majority and Muslim Albanian minority), Bosnia-Herzegovina (Muslim Bosniak majority and minorities of Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats), Montenegro (Montenegrins), and Serbia (Orthodox Serbs), and two autonomous regions, Kosovo (Muslim Albanian majority) and Vojvodina (Catholic Hungarian majority) within Serbia. In 1963 together with the introduction of more liberal constitutional reforms, the name of the state changed to Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The population in each of the republics was "territorially and socially intertwined, with significant minorities" (Cooley, 2013, p. 110). While each republic was dominated by a nation (Serb, Croat, Slovene, Montenegrins or Macedonians) Bosnia used to be multinational (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks). Moreover, Muslims of Bosnia were officially considered to be a religious and not a separate national group until 1974 constitutional changes.

Tito struggled to manage ethnic differences and keep Yugoslavia united through an emphasis on 'brotherhood and unity' slogan (Judah, 2011). This policy defined Yugoslav people as equal groups coexisting peacefully in the federation. Looking from inside, the federation seemed to have handled nationalist upheavals, to have guaranteed good living standards, and to be more liberal than other communist countries (Judah, 2011). Tito as president ruled the federation until he died in 1980. Tito's death led to an unclear future for Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The post-Tito situation was marked by an economy mainly dependent on western loans; unaddressed ethnic demands; and a federation that used to function just because Tito's voice counted

45

(Judah, 2011). The constituent republics gained more autonomy and the federation functioned through a rotating presidency.

The breakup of the federation started in late 1980s with the deterioration of relations between Albanian majority and Serb minority in Kosovo. Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic considered the conflict in Kosovo as an asset to advance Serbia's interest and affirm his leadership position within federation. His nationalist speech of 1987 in support of Serbs in Kosovo and his participation and speech in the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1989 comprise two important moments that upset the balance that Tito tried to establish but also prepared the ground for his presidency. So, Tito's communism was replaced with Milosevic's nationalism once he assumed power in 1989. Immediately he abolished the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. In addition, the stage for war opened once he claimed that federation means that nations (ethnicities) and not republics (territories) could secede (Judah, 2011).

The defeat of the idea of a Yugoslav state in 1990 elections, as a result of competing nationalisms, opened the path to violent conflicts within federation (Hayden, 1999). Nationalism became the most noticeable form of political opposition to the socialist federation in a situation of unstable socio-economic climate, weakened central state structures, and increasingly strong republics (Cousens, 2001). In this context, in different republics nationalist parties and leaders came to power and their policies "pointed towards the likelihood of outright secession from the federal Yugoslav state" (Cooley, 2013, p. 111). First, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on 25 June 1991. North Republic of Macedonia followed with declaration of independence in September 1991. Montenegro remained united with Serbia until 2006 when the union broke up peacefully and they became independent states. Slovenia became independent

after a small-scale conflict that did not last long. Croatia however, went through a longer

conflict that was not totally resolved until 1998 when Croatia took control of its

reclaimed lands. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have respectively experienced the

most destructive, bloody, and long-lasting conflicts among the constituents of former

Yugoslav Federation. The stage-based overview and analysis would reveal the

determinants and conflict handling efforts in these two cases.

3.2   Bosnian conflict

3.2.1   Before armed conflict – within Yugoslavia

After WWII, Bosnia-Herzegovina was in worse situation compared to other entities that

formed the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The 1946 Yugoslav Constitution

granted Bosnia-Herzegovina the status of republic. It became one of six constituent

republics of the federation and returned to its pre-1918 borders. The main difference was

that while the other republics had one dominant people, Bosnia-Herzegovina was the

only republic with three dominant peoples that were Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims

(Bosniaks) (Burg & Shoup, 1999; Hayden, 2005). During the first decades of the

federation, Bosnian Serbs and Croats dominated the political life in Bosnai (Karic,

2011). Bosniaks were recognized as a religious and not separate national unit and they

had not decided yet whether to call declare themselves as Serbs or Croats (Malcolm,

1994). The 1948 census offered three options of national identity: 'Muslim Serbs',

'Muslim Croats' or 'Muslims nationally undeclared' (1948 census). The majority of

Bosniaks chose the third option that showed their reluctance to be called Serbs or Croats.

The 1953 census aimed to promote Yugoslav identity, and in this regard the category of

Muslim was removed. Bosniaks had to choose between 'Serbs', 'Croats', and 'Yugoslav, nationally undeclared'. The last option, meaning to be declared as Yugoslavs but not committed to any recognized nation, ended up being the most preferred option for Bosniaks.

In 1960s the state policy towards Muslims changed because of three important reasons. First, was the dismissal of Aleksandar Rankovic, a brutal Serb security chief, from the Yugoslav Central Committee in 1966 (Ramet, 1992). It led to an ease of policies toward non-Serbs and especially Muslims. Second was the decision to shift from an 'integral Yugoslavian' identity towards stronger republican identities (Ramet, 1992). The third reason was the rise of Muslim Communist elites within Bosnia's communist party loyal to Tito's regime (Ramet, 1992). As a result, in 1961 census, 'Muslims (as ethnic belonging)' was added as new category (Irwin, 1984). Secular Muslim elites strived for the development of a Muslim identity into something non-religious or 'Muslim Nationalism' (Izetbegovic, 1990). Starting from 1971 census, Bosniaks had the possibility of declaring themselves as 'Muslims in the sense of nationality' appealing to national rather than religious meaning of Muslim. The recognition of Muslims as a fully equal nation with the other nations of the federation was confirmed by the 1974 Yugoslav constitution demanding equal rights among all nationalities living in its territory. The 1981 census, except other recognized nations of federation, had 'Muslims' and 'Yugoslav' options.

The recognition of Muslims as a nation was not achieved by a religious movement but by the communists and other secularized Muslims who struggled for developing Muslim nationalism (Karic, 2011, p. 84). Therefore, during this period, the development of Muslim identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina took two different trends: as a

movement of secular 'Muslim nationalism' and as a religious movement for the revival of Islamic religion (Irwin, 1984). Some like Alija Izetbegovic worried about the situation of Islam not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but throughout the world and opposed both nationalism and communism (Izetbegovic, 1990). On the other hand, secular Bosniaks were concerned with their underrepresentation in Bosnian government and Bosnia-Herzegovina's lower status within Yugoslavia compared to other republics because of their lack of national unity (Karic, 2011).

Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of the poorest republics of Yugoslavia in 1950s and 1960s with a falling GDP and low rate of economic growth (Karic, 2011). By late 1960s, it recovered economically mainly through the development of military defense industry (Karic, 2011). But still, it was considered underdeveloped compared to the other republics, its GNP per capita being "35 percent below the Yugoslav average in 1981" (Karic, 2011, p. 86). The problematic economic situation led to a substantial level of migration of Bosnian Serbs to Serbia and Bosnian Croats to Croatia. National groups lacked equal access to power and resources, but political activism to address this problem was considered as a threat to undermine national stability and unity. The ideology of 'brotherhood and unity' was used by Tito to manage ethno-nationalism (Donia & Fine, 1994, p. 147-148). The political elite of Bosnia-Herzegovina had an unquestioned loyalty to the federation (Karic, 2011). Also, this elite consisted of people from different ethnic groups who were interested in power positions and not national feelings (Karic, 2011). Moreover, they showed that they lacked power-sharing experience once Yugoslavia collapsed (Burg & Shoup, 1999). Under these circumstances, a growing Muslim population, already recognized as a separate nation, increased the likelihood that they will demand the status of a constituent nation and this

eventuality disturbed the Serb political elites (Burg & Shoup, 1999). In 1983, Belgrade initiated a campaign against 'Islamic fundamentalism' bringing some Muslim intellectuals, including Alija Izetbegovic, to trial (Karic, 2011), thereby strengthening the position of Muslim Communists supporting a secular Muslim identity (Karic, 2011). In late 1980s this pressure spread to the political life. The 1987 financial crisis, high lifestyle and corruption associated with the communist elite dismantled the political leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Malcolm, 1994). The Serb nationalism led by Slobodan Milosevic, and increased ethnic sentiments threatened the relative social cohesion that Bosnia-Herzegovina had achieved during Tito era (Bougarel, 1996). As the Bosnian communist political elite opposed Serb nationalism, social and political instability within the Federation and within Bosnia-Herzegovina by the end of 1980s contributed to the triumph of nationalist parties in first plural elections in 1990.

Ethnic party politics started in Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1990 when the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) were established. Bosnian Serbs left the communist party to join Serb Democratic Party (SDS) led by Radovan Karadzic who later entered an alliance with Milosevic. After winning 1990 elections, these three parties entered a tense coalition that disagreed on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina within the Yugoslav context (Donia & Fine, 1994). Bosnian Muslims and Croats were in favor of the independence that was opposed by Bosnian Serbs opting for remain within Yugoslavia led by Serbs.

In 1991 Bosnian Serbs established a separate parliament. In the absence of Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian parliament approved a memorandum declaring the sovereignty of the republic. The 1991 census showed that Bosniaks were 43%, Serbs

31%, Croats 17%, Yugoslavs 6% and other groups 2% of the total population of 4,377,000 people (Praso, 1996). Once the conflict escalated in Croatia, Bosnian Serb and Croat nationalists started to get armed to be ready in case the Serb-Croat conflict spills over to Bosnia-Herzegovina. By early 1990 Belgrade had already sent weapons to Bosnian Serbs (Glenny, 1996). On September 1991, the UN adopted Resolution 713 on arms embargo to Yugoslavia. UN Security Council, based on Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decided on suspending the delivery of all "weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Council decides otherwise following consultation between the Secretary-General and the Government of Yugoslavia" (S/RES/713, 1991, p.43). By January 1992 Slobodan Milošević sent Bosnian Serb Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina (Cousens, 2001). "In January 1992, the Bosnian Serb parliament established the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Republika Srpska) and declared it part of the Yugoslav federation" (Cooley, 2013, p.113). The referendums for sovereignty and independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina were held respectively on 29 February and 1 March 1992. Bosnian Serbs boycotted the elections causing a decrease of voting turnout to 64% of the electorate. However, 99.7 per cent of the people that voted were in support of independence (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1992). The United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) failed to prevent the outbreak of violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbs responded with armed resistance to the decision of independence and the violent conflict ensued.

3.2.2 Armed conflict – from independence to Dayton

Turkey was one of the first countries that made a pre-referendum recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 February 1992. EU and the US recognized the independence of

51

Bosnia-Herzegovina by 7 April 1992. The armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina followed the declaration and international recognition of the independence opposed by Bosnian Serbs. The Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and Serb paramilitary forces attacked and killed 14 civilians during a multiethnic peace demonstration in Sarajevo on 5 April 1992 (Riedlmayer, 1993; Donia, 2006). At the beginning of the conflict the main parties that engaged in conflict were the Bosnian government forces, and Bosnian Serb forces possessing the strong support of Belgrade (Burg & Shoup, 1999). The aim of Serbian forces was the establishment of an independent Serb state that would join Serbia (Bideleux & Jeffries, 2007). On 22 May 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina was accepted as a full member of the UN. Still, the 1991 arms embargo on ex-Yugoslavian entities continued. This embargo prevented Bosnian government forces from obtaining the needed self-defense means (Riedlmayer, 1993). Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, were not affected by the embargo because they had Serbia's support with arms (Riedlmayer, 1993). In the following period, JNA and Serb paramilitary forces killed large numbers of Bosniaks with the purpose of driving the members of the community out from large areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Riedlmayer, 1993; Gallager, 2001). In the summer of 1992, following the first massacre against civilians in Sarajevo and growing humanitarian crisis, the UN deployed 1100 peacekeeping troops to protect Sarajevo airport and deliver humanitarian aid (Gallager, 2001; Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005). In October 1992, the UN imposed a 'no-fly zone' over Bosnia-Herzegovina. By the end of 1992, Serb forces had taken control of almost all Northern Bosnia and overrun 70% of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory cleansing it from non-Serbian population (Riedlmayer, 1993; Gallager, 2001). The alliance between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, against JNA and the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), broke down by the end of 1992. Lack of

mutual trust, nationalist propaganda, and power struggle brought them to open conflict. Bosnian Croat forces, enjoying the support of nationalist political elite in Croatia, became the third party in conflict in 1993 (Gagnon, 2004). A Bosniak - Croat war, a 'war within war', emerged. The aim of the Croat forces was to take the territorial control of those parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina dominated by Croat population (Gagnon, 2004). Hence, the Bosnian conflict, mainly based on religious differences, turned into to a conflict of all against all between Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats (Campbell, 1998; Mueller, 2000).

In May 1993, the UN Security Council Resolution 824 declared that "Sarajevo, and other such threatened areas, in particular towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, as well as Srebrenica and their surroundings should be treated as safe areas [under UN protection] by all parties concerned" (S/RES/824, 1993, p.2). In addition, NATO accepted to intervene through air in case of attacks against the UN peacekeeping forces. The violence did not come to an end, despite the transformation of the UN peacekeeping mission to an enforcement mission under chapter VII of the UN Charter (Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005). In a deteriorating humanitarian crisis and escalating conflict, at the beginning of 1994, the United States, Turkey and other powerful states started get more actively involved in the settlement of Bosnian crisis. Turkey hosted several meetings between Bosniaks and Croats that contributed in laying the grounds for cooperation and agreement among conflicting parties (Ekinci, 2009). United States together with, Russia, Britain, France and Germany established the 'Contact Group' in April 1994 to negotiate a settlement among Bosnian Serbs and the Bosniak - Croat federation. Also, the deteriorating situation of Croat army and loss of territory under its control; together with the pressure, threats and promises from United States on Croatia contributed in the

achievement of Washington Agreement signed on 18 March 1994 by representatives of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Herzeg-Bosnia, and Croatia. The parties agreed to end fighting and create a Bosniak - Croat federation. By the end of 1994, however, the violence reemerged, and NATO responded by expanding the range for air attacks. In December 1994, a four-month ceasefire was signed with the help of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, but violence reemerged with the expiration of the ceasefire. Bosnian Serbs restarted their attacks on Sarajevo and safe areas and the most fatal consequence of those attacks was the genocide of Srebrenica in July 1995. This genocide, committed in one of the declared 'safe areas', was a failure of UN peacekeeping mission. UN and NATO threatened with expanding air strikes in case of attacks on safe zones (Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005). After a provocation by Serb forces, NATO started a long bombing campaign against Serbian targets in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005).

By the end of the war, there were around 329,000 war loses either dead or missing persons (Praso, 1996). Large numbers of refugees and displaced persons were another consequence of this conflict. Almost half of the population had fled from their pre-war homes including 1,259,000 people in exile outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, and around 600,000 internally displaced persons (Praso, 1996). The population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, after the war, was around 2.9 million that means a 1.6 million net loss of population. In 1995, 44% of remaining population were Bosnians, 34% Serbs, 16% Croats, 4% Yugoslavs and 2% from other groups (Praso, 1996). This shows a 1% decrease in Bosniak population, 1% decrease in Croat population and 3% increase in Serb population compared to 1991 census data. "Bosniaks were absolutely and relatively the greatest victims of the war, with about 218,000 dead or "disappeared" (66% of the total, whereas they made up only 43% of the population), while almost

21,000 Croats were lost, about 83,000 Serbs, about 5,000 Yugoslavs and almost 2,000

others" (Praso, 1996, para 7). The post-war situation was characterized by changes in the

ethnic structure and homogenization of population. Share of Serbs increased from 47.5%

to 89.2% in the territory controlled by the Army Serb Republic (VRS) that comprised

45% of the total territory of the country (Eberhardt, 2015, p. 407). Share of Bosniaks

increased from 56.9% to 74.1 % in the territory controlled by the Army of BiH increased

that comprised 31% of the total territory of the country (Eberhardt, p.406). Share of

Croats increased from 50% to 95.6% in the territory controlled by Croats Defense Army

(HVO) that comprised 24% of the total territory of the country (Eberhardt, p.406).

United States mediation efforts resulted in a settlement agreement and ceasefire

that entered in force in October 1995. The war that started in 1992 came to an end with

Dayton Peace Accords agreed in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995 and signed in Paris on

December 14, 1995. The accord was signed by the Serbian president Slobodan

Milošević, Croatian president Franjo Tuđman and Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović.

The chief negotiator of the agreement, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European

and Canadian affairs Richard Holbrooke, was assisted by EU Special Representative

Carl Bildt and the Russian deputy foreign minister, Igor Ivanov. This agreement

established a new constitution for post war Bosnia-Herzegovina and defined it as a

single confederal state composed of two entities. One entity is the Federation of Bosnia-

Herzegovina that would control 51% of the territory and the other is the Republika

Srpska (RS) with the remaining 49%. Brcko, a condominium of Federation of Bosnia-

Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, was the only issue in the Dayton Peace Accords

which was not finalized. It is a multiethnic district that functions as a local self-

government area. It has been under the administration of the Brcko international

supervisors until 2012 when this supervision was suspended. Meanwhile, EU diplomatic peacekeeping forces have been present in the area since the end of the war.

Each of entities has a president, government, and parliament. The three ethnic groups were defined by the Dayton constitution as 'constituent people' of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Accords, 21 November 1995). Parties agreed on a "rotating three-member presidency and a bicameral parliament" (Cooley, 2013 p. 115). Ethnic quotas would be used to ensure representations of the three ethnic groups at different levels of government and in the civil service (Dayton Peace Accords, 21 November 1995). The Dayton Peace Accords contained eleven annexes among which the first one is related to ceasefire and military matters and the others focus on the civilian elements like giving the right to all displaced people to return to their homes and to regain their properties. Also, it called for the withdrawal of all opposing military forces. The agreement involved provisions for the involvement of international actors Bosnia-Herzegovina's peace building process. The Implementation Force (I-FOR) was a NATO-led multinational peace enforcement force formed in December 1995 with one-year mandate. It took over the responsibility for the implementation of military provisions that before Dayton used to be UN Peacekeeping force UNPROFOR responsibility. The High Representative (HR), under the authority of UN Security Council, was responsible for civilian-based provisions. Dayton Peace Accords that ended the war led to continuous peacekeeping, peacebuilding and state building efforts.

3.2.3   Post- Dayton settlement

The main purpose of Dayton Accords was to end violence. However, signing the agreement is not enough; cooperation among the three entities is needed for the

implementation of the provisions of the agreement and for the state building process.

After the signing of the agreement, sixty thousand NATO-led I-FOR troops were

deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also, the UN established the Office of the High

Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina to monitor the implementation of the agreement

in all aspects (Hall, 1998). In 1996, the first post-war elections were held under the

supervision of international institutions. These elections resulted in increasing the power

of nationalist parties SDS, HDZ and SDA that won most of seats in the parliament. The

three parties were not able to reach consensus on important issues in the parliament of

Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, some political figures of these parties that took seat in

the parliament have been indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal

for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In 1997, I-FOR turned into Stabilization Force (S-FOR)

and was reduced to thirty-one thousand troops. Even though the war had ended, ethnic

cleansing continued, and the process of refugee return was very slow (Akhavan, 1993).

Ethnic cleansing in Bosnian conflict was not only a consequence of conflict but rather a

goal. According to one argument, "to achieve peace among the warring parties, the DPA

process legitimized the results of the ethnic cleansing", by dividing the country into two

mono-ethnic units based on territorial gains achieved during the war (Moratti & Sabic-

El-Rayess, 2009, p. 11). In addition, three constituent groups lacked the will to make

functional the new state institutions (Peric-Zimonjic, 2006).

By the end of 1997, the need for change became immediate; otherwise ethnic

tensions and nationalist parties would draw the country again to war (Moratti & Sabic-

El-Rayess, 2009). An international conference in Bonn extended the powers of the High

Representative by giving him the authority to impose legislation, deal with persons

indicted for war crimes, and dismiss officials that were hindering the implementation of

DPA provisions (Peric-Zimonjic, 2006; BBC, 2012). Between 1998-2006, the successive High Representatives became the most important actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina pushing parties through reforms (Keil & Perry, 2015). The 1998 elections did not bring any change because again the nationalist parties dominated. Changes came with the elections held in 2000 that brought to power more moderate parties that formed the Alliance for Change in the Bosniak-Croat federation. Still, nationalists dominated in the Serb entity (BBC, 2012). In 2002, nationalists won the elections in the federation (BBC, 2012). Until 2002, OSCE used to be responsible for the administration tasks related to elections and parties. After 2002, that responsibility was transferred to a Bosnian commission comprised of equal number of Bosniak, Serb, and Croat members assisted by some international appointees until 2006. In 2003, the EU initiated its first foreign security operation by taking over UN duties (BBC, 2012). Also, in 2004 NATO transferred SFOR duties to EU-led EUFOR with a contingent of 6,000 soldiers that fall to 2,200 in 2008.

The EU initiated the Stabilization and Association talk with Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2005. Ethnic tensions were reinforced in 2006 elections and Republika Srpska voted to remain a separate entity from Bosniak-Croat entity and if not, they threatened with secession (BBC, 2012). The involvement of international actors like UN and EU in Bosnia-Herzegovina and powers of High Representative started to be reduced from 2006. In 2007, Bosnian Serbs opposed the reforms introduced by the international envoy with the argument that such reforms would diminish the influence of Bosnian Serbs and enhance the influence of the other ethnic groups. Crisis was prevented once Serb, Croat, and Bosniak leaders agreed on a range of reforms that were approved by the Parliament by the end of 2007. The International Court of Justice started trials on genocide

accusations brought by Bosnia-Herzegovina against Serbia and Montenegro (BBC, 2012). Even though the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, considered as largest war crimes trial to date, was declared as genocide by The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2007, Serbian leadership was not charged of direct responsibility. This decision of ICJ has been criticized by the Judge Al-Khasawneh (2007), Vice-President of the International Court of Justice, for not reflecting the evidence regarding Serbia's involvement in Srebrenica genocide and even as an obstacle for the peacebuilding efforts in post-war environment.

In June 2008, Bosnia-Herzegovina signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. However, the involvement of the EU and the US could not break the deadlock in constitutional changes in 2009. Even though signing SAA was an important step showing Bosnia-Herzegovina's acceptable progress after the end of the war, failure in making the constitutional reforms asked by European Court of Human Rights led to the suspension of the implementation of the agreement. After 14-month deadlock that started with 2010 presidential and parliamentary elections, Bosniak, Croat and Serb political leaders agreed to form a new central government. The initial optimism on country's progress in reforms that would bring the country a little closer to EU membership did not last long. The ruling coalition was not stable leading to political crisis and reorganization of the cabinet (Freedom House Report on BiH, 2013). In the local elections of October 2012, the nationalist parties prevailed. In May 2014, Bosnia-Herzegovina experienced the worst flooding in modern times leading to a lack of access to clean drinking water for a quarter of the population and evacuation of half-a-million people from their homes. The massive protest in 2013 and in 2014 have been defined as the largest revolt against the Bosnian government since war. They were an expression of

fatigue against the prolonged economic and political instability in the country. Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA) won the general elections of 2014 and the government made EU accession talks a top priority. EU reinitiated its Stabilization and Association Agreement with Bosnia-Herzegovina in March 2015. This signaled that Bosnia-Herzegovina's chances for joining the EU increased but with the condition of carrying the crucial economic and political reforms. This was a positive evaluation for Bosnia-Herzegovina's progress but also brought to focus that a lot more needs to be done before joining the EU. Bosnia-Herzegovina has applied to join the EU since February 2016. In October 2016, Radovan Karadic, the Bosnian Serb President during the war, was convicted by the ICJ for war crimes and genocide to 40 years in prison. In 2017, Ratko Mladic, another former Bosnian Serb military leader, accused of war crimes and genocide in Srebrenica was sentenced to life imprisonment. Recently, ethnic tensions raised again when Milorad Dodik won the Serbian seat on three-member federal presidency in October 2018. He has proposed the secession of Republika Srpska.

International actors like UN and EU have played an important role in conflict settlement and peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, their extensive involvement has been criticized for placing Bosnia-Herzegovina in the situation of an international administered province. As such, despite some improvements, it is considered that "extensive outside imposition failed to establish a functional Bosnian state" (Keil & Perry, 2015, p. 3). The presence of ethnic tensions and possibility of conflict reemergence show that the Dayton Peace Accords was successful in ending direct violence but not in building peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3.3   Kosovo - Serbia conflict

3.3.1   Before armed conflict

Kosovo became part of Kingdom of Yugoslavia under the jurisdiction of Serbia. It was

not recognized as a political and administrative unit until the end of Second World War.

After the establishment of socialist Yugoslavia in 1945, the 1946 Constitution defined

Kosovo as an autonomous region within Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Even

though a separate constitution of allowed a certain amount of self-ruling power to

Kosovo, they were not content with their legal position. The beginning of the Kosovo

conflict can be traced back to this period. The 1948-1960s period is characterized by

Serbian dominance in political and administrative structures in Kosovo and suppression

of Albanian nationalism (Pavlovic, 2009). In 1960s, Serbs started to lose their

prevalence in Kosovo, and Kosovo Albanians started to openly express their

dissatisfaction and even demand for a constitutional republic status during 1968

demonstrations (The Independent Commission on Kosovo, 2000). The establishment of

the University in Pristina, and the placement of Albanians in administration and security

offices were some reforms undertaken to improve Kosovo Albanians' situation (The

Independent Commission on Kosovo, 2000). Still, they were not satisfied because of the

rejection of their claim for republic status. The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution granted the

status of an autonomous province to Kosovo. Under this constitution autonomous

provinces were defined as constituent units of Yugoslavia with the right of direct

participation in federal institutions (Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia, 1974). This status was close to the status of 'republic' or can be categorized

as a de facto republic. However, Kosovo Albanians' demand was a de jure republic. As

such, the discontent with this status that defined them as nationality but not as nation, increased their desire for more rights (Danielson, s.d.). On the other side, Serbs did not accept that status because they considered Kosovo as part of Serbia that should be represented by Serbia (Murati et al., 2002). Tito decided to increase the participation of Kosovo Albanians in governance and gave them the right to use national symbols like flags. However, he did not grant the status of 'republic' fearing Kosovo's secession from Serbia. He tried to maintain peaceful coexistence among Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, and to stay away from policies that would further provoke antagonism among them. During the Tito era, while Kosovo Albanians were unsatisfied because they could not obtain the status of republic, Serbs were opposed to any concessions granted to Kosovo Albanians. This antagonism increased even more after Tito's death in 1980. Immediately clashes occurred between Serb police and Kosovo Albanians demonstrating for a 'Republic' of Kosovo as a constituent nation of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The escalation of tensions and worsening ethnic relations mark the initiation of a period of unstable peace.

In 1980s, Serbs mobilized against the 1974 'anti-Serbian' constitution and sought protection of Serbian minorities in other republics or provinces (Clark, 2000). The Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences published a 'Memorandum' in 1986 attacking the 1974 Constitution and calling for limiting the autonomy of Kosovo (Malcolm, 1998). After this memorandum nationalism became an important political instrument. Slobodan Milosevic, the leader of Serbian Socialist Party, came to power in 1987. He used Kosovo and its historical importance to feed nationalist sentiments and benefited from ethnic grievances to strengthen his political position. Nationalist feelings, suppressed during Tito's rule, led Serbs to call for abolition of the autonomous region

status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The adoption of amendments in 1989 to the 1974 Constitution significantly limited Kosovo's autonomy. By the end of 1980s, the dissolution of Yugoslavia was be inevitable and "different republics within the federation started their struggles for independence" (Meir, 1999; Pattas, 2002; as mentioned in Vila, 2013, p. 25-26). Their autonomy abolished, Kosovo and Vojvodina passed under the direct control of Serbia (Pattas, 2002). Such occurrences led to violent clashes among Serb police forces and Kosovo Albanians and mark the beginning of non-violent resistance movement for independence by Kosovo Albanians in 1991.

The ethnic composition of Kosovo has changed dramatically since 1946 when Albanians constituted only half of the population. By 1991, Albanians constituted 90% of the population of Kosovo. They declared independence with Ibrahim Rugova as the leader of a self-declared republic opposed by the Serbian government (Wolff, 1999). In 1992, Kosovo Albanians led by Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) as the main Albanian political organization, through unofficial elections elected Kosovo's assembly and Rugova as president. Rugova, aware of the threat coming from violence and superiority of Serbian army, struggled for peaceful resistance. Kosovo Albanians, to challenge and oppose Serbian rule, established a parallel government and self-managed economic and social services. The unstable coexistence that characterized the period under Tito's rule was replaced by a hostile coexistence. During "1991-93, Kosovar Albanians and Serbs were living completely separated" and economic situation deteriorated (Jansen, 1999 as mentioned in Vila, 2013, p.26). In such conditions Kosovo Albanians turned from peaceful opposition to revolt and violent actions against Serbian government (Pattas, 2002). Despite the presence of sporadic violence, conflict escalation was mediated somewhat by Kosovo Albanians' obedience to Rugova's peaceful

63

approach. However, this did not last long, and Kosovo entered in an intense violent conflict stage.

3.3.2   Armed conflict - towards 1999 war

The Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995 overlooked the situation in Kosovo, and by 1996 Kosovo Albanians started to question the nonviolent approach of Rugova (Wolff, 1999). In this context, the internal opposition forces started to stand for more assertive tactics. In February 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) that used to function as underground armed group emerged and started a violent insurgency (Wolff, 1999). It took the responsibility of some violent attacks to Serbian police and other targets leading to a large-scale uprising in the following years (Zimmermann, 1999). At the beginning of 1998, Serbian security forces responded to KLA actions and then extended their fight against civilian Albanians. Serbian government declared KLA as a terrorist organization and this was also supported by the United States. Serbian response strengthened the desire of Kosovo Albanians for independence (Wolff, 1999). They shifted their demands for the republic status to quest for full independence.

Kosovo came to the agenda of international politics once the brutality increased and the post-Dayton status quo was threatened. However, it was too late to prevent conflict escalation. The 'Contact Group', by a group of countries (US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) with interest in Balkans, defined Kosovo as an issue of high priority and started to work on it. The EU called for a peace conference in Paris in March 1998 including Kosovo Albanians, Serbs, Russia and United States. However, the lack of consensus among Western powers became an obstacle to a resolution. They were not successful in mediating talks between Rugova and Milosevic, before a further

increase of conflict intensity on both sides (Fischer & Simic, 2015). By the end of the summer of 1998, Serbian forces attacked several villages in Drenica city and managed to push KLA out (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000). On 23 September, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1199 that condemned the violent actions of Serbia in Kosovo and asked Serbia to withdraw from Kosovo (S/RES/1199, 1998)), while Russia and China opposed the use of force against Serbia.

The beginning of 1999 showed that peace was unlikely, and United States and NATO started to renew their military capabilities. Only after a threat for a bombing campaign by NATO, Milosevic agreed for a ceasefire and further formal negotiations between parties. However, it was a short-lived attempt as hostile attacks violating the ceasefire resumed. Kosovo conflict continued to escalate and reached its peak in intensity and threshold of violence in 1999 when the need for intervention to end the violence and atrocities became obvious. NATO became a leading actor in Kosovo intervention. It was a central actor in Rambouillet Conference that started on 6 February 1999, resulting in two rounds of failed negotiations. The main objective of Rambouillet Accords were the reestablishment of Kosovo's autonomy and protection of human rights in the region (S/1999/648, 1999). The Accords proposed the deployment of a NATO military force to monitor the implementation of the provisions of the agreement (S/1999/648, 1999, p. 58). Kosovo Albanians accepted the peace proposal and were ready to remain within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in return for autonomy. FRY rejected the Accords with the argument that it contained provisions for Kosovo's autonomy beyond what was considered as reasonable by FRY government. In the meantime, Serbia continued to intensify violent attacks in Kosovo (NATO, 1999). Richard Holbrook, the U.S. special envoy to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, made a

last attempt to convince Milosevic to end the violence in Kosovo but Milosevic did not step back (Pattas, 2002; Gulyas, 2012). Consequently, Western diplomats left Belgrade and on March 24, 1999 NATO launched air strikes against Serbia (Pattas, 2002; Gulyas, 2012). NATO, for the first time in its history, entered a battle (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000). During the bombing campaign, Serbia continued with ground attacks, but eventually the Milosevic government accepted defeat.

Milosevic accepted to sign the peace plan approved by UN on June 3, 1999 (Wolff, 1999). He removed Serb troops from Kosovo, KLA laid down the arms, KFOR (Kosovo Force) "peacekeeping forces were deployed in Kosovo, and the UN assumed administration of the province" (Wolff, 1999 as mentioned in Vila, 2013, p. 26). Hence, the UN Security Council adopted the Resolution 1244 on June 10, 1999, stating that the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) would grant Kosovo's autonomy within Yugoslavia until there is a final solution to its status (S/RES/1244, 1999)). Practically, this resolution put Kosovo under UN protection.

According to Kosovo Memory Book Database (2015), built in cooperation between Kosovo and Serbian authorities, 10, 317 civilians and 3,218 armed forces, in total 13,535 people were either killed or missing from January 1998 to December 2000. Among civilians 8,676 were Albanians, 1,196 Serbs and 445 from other communities (Kosovo Memory Book Database, 2015). Among armed forces 2,131 members of Kosovo forces, 1,084 members of Serbian forces and 3 members of KFOR (Kosovo Memory Book Database, 2015).

3.3.3 Post 1999 war

After 40 years of communism and 10 years of violence, Kosovo had to build up a democratic and functioning state from nothing (Gulyas, 2012). Kosovo, legally part of Yugoslavia, passed under the control of UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) responsible for the establishment of autonomous institutions before the beginning of Kosovo status negotiations (Weller, 2012). UNMIK had a four-pillar structure including: Pillar I (Humanitarian Affairs) under the responsibility of the UNHCR; Pillar II (Civil Administration), run by the UN itself; Pillar III (Democratization and Institution Building) under the OSCE Mission in Kosovo; and Pillar IV (Economic Reconstruction) (UNSG Report, S/1999/779). Firstly, in December 1999, UNMIK established a Joint Interim Administrative Structure between local actors and UN representatives. Then, in May 2001, it transferred even more power to local actors, through a regulation that launched a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (Stahn, 2001). The constitutional framework focused on power sharing, representation and rights of minorities. Taylor (2005, p. 446) argues that "the [framework] was intended to promote consociationalism".

'Standards before status' policy adopted in 2003, brought the issue of Kosovo's final status to the agenda of the international politics. In December 2003, UN formalized those standards in a document named 'Standards for Kosovo'. It means that before opening the discussions on future status, Kosovo had to fulfill a set of standards including "functioning democratic institutions; the rule of law; freedom of movement; returns and reintegration; economy; property rights; dialogue with Belgrade; and the Kosovo Protection Corps" (Standards for Kosovo, December 2003, para. 13). This policy was operationalized by the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan of March

67

2004. However, with the outbreak of violent actions again in March 2004, the urgency of status finalization emerged (Cooley, 2013). The UN representative reported that "Today's Kosovo is characterized by growing dissatisfaction and frustration" highlighting the need for initiation of status talks (UNSC Report, S/2004/932, p. 3; UNSC Report, S/2005/635). In addition, the initiation of EU integration process for Kosovo would contribute to solution and increase the leverage of EU (UNSC Report, S/2005/635). Martti Ahtisaari, A Finnish politician, UN diplomat and mediator, was appointed as the UN Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo. He introduced the 'Ahtisaari Plan' in February 2007 as a proposal for the settlement of the status of Kosovo. The plan proposed "independence supervised by international community" for Kosovo (UNSC Report, S/2007/168, p.2). Despite several draft resolutions, the UN Security Council discarded the plan formally in July 2007 because of Russia's strong opposition (Hoge, 2007; Tisdall, 2007). The need for the definition of Kosovo's status reemerged because the status quo could not be maintained. Under the leadership of EU, US and Russia, or the "Troika", an important negotiation initiative aiming to develop a status plan that would be acceptable to both Serbia and Kosovo followed (Tisdall, 2007). The "Troika" released a report stating that a range of options had been discussed for Kosovo's status including full or supervised independence, partition, confederate and other ways, but no agreement was reached because the parties stick to their positions (UNSC Report, S/2007/723).

Kosovo stayed under the UN administration until February 17, 2008. After a series of failed negotiations on Kosovo's political status, on 17 February 2008, Kosovo parliament approved the declaration of the independence of Kosovo from Serbia. The EU launched its Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) to support Kosovo with the

establishment of the rule of law and to replace slowly most of the UNMIK functions. In the Declaration of Independence, Kosovo expressed its readiness to implement the 'Ahtisaari Plan' that it had already accepted on April 2007 and called the international community to supervise its implementation. The Assembly of Kosovo considered the implementation of Ahtisaari Plan as a legal obligation and included its provisions in the Constitution of Kosovo. The constitution of Kosovo adopted on 9 April 2008 by the Assembly of Kosovo, was certified by International Civilian Representative (ICR) on April 2 and has entered into force on 15 June 2008. Serbia considered the declaration of independence as an illegal act and asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for a decision on this issue. In 2010, the "International Court of Justice declared that Kosovo's independence did not violate the international general law" (International Court of Justice Reports, 2010, p. 403). Despite, the resistance of Serbia and Russia, many Western powers like US and UK showed their tendency on accepting the independence of Kosovo (Tisdall, 2007). By 2019, 114 countries have recognized the independence of Kosovo and 23 of them are EU member states. Among the EU member states, Spain, Greece, Slovakia, Romania and Cyprus do not recognize the independence of Kosovo.

The partition and declaration of independence has not resolved the ethno-political question in Kosovo. The main problem today rests on the status/situation of Serbian population in Kosovo. They are concentrated in northern Kosovo and mainly in Mitrovica city. They have built their own parallel structures with the support of Belgrade and reject integration with Kosovo authorities in the region (Simonsen, 2004). Starting from 2011, Serbia and Kosovo have been engaged in several talks on how to end their dispute. The Resolution 64/298, adopted in March 2011 by General Assembly of UN,

passed to EU the responsibility for facilitating Serbia-Kosovo dialogue (A/RES/64/298, 2010). The aim of the dialogue is the normalization of relations between parties.

High level dialogues among Kosovo and Serbia, launched by EU, have resulted in a range of agreements. At first the dialogue focused on practical issues like "freedom of movement, recognition of travel documents, car registrations, university diplomas, exchange of civil registry and cadaster records, and customs and trade relations" (Lilyanova, 2016, p. 1). After the initial talks, EU granted Serbia candidate status and launched a study on the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Kosovo (Cooley, 2013). After some interruptions because of domestic dynamics in Kosovo and Serbia, in October 2012 under the facilitation of the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton the dialogue among prime ministers resumed (Lilyanova, 2016). 'The First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations', referred to as the 'Brussels Agreement', was signed on 19th of April 2013 after 10 rounds of negotiations among Kosovo and Serbia since March 2011 (Lilyanova, 2016, p. 2). This 15-points agreement had three main targets: establishing an Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities (ASM) in the north of Kosovo; eliminating the parallel Serbian structures by incorporating the parallel police forces and judicial authorities in the Kosovo system; and promising that neither Belgrade nor Pristina would block the other's progress into the EU path (Lilyanova, 2016). In August 2015, in another round of agreements, Belgrade and Pristina discussed on the implementation of 2013 agreements. They signed four new deals: "on the establishment of an Association/Community of Serbian Municipalities, on energy and telecoms, and on the opening of the Mitrovica Bridge" (Lilyanova, 2016, p. 2).

Recently, Kosovo has reported to the European External Action Service (EEAS) the delay of agreements' implementation and insufficient integration of Serbian parallel structures in Kosovo' system (Lilyanova, 2016). However, some improvements are done in police integration and customs (Lilyanova, 2016). While Kosovo insists on the total elimination of parallel structures as a prerequisite for the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb Municipalities, Serbia keeps those structures active and continues with its non-recognition policy (Lilyanova, 2016). The European Parliament (EP) has developed several resolutions on Kosovo's integration process and EU position. In its latest 2016 resolution, EP called its member states that have not recognized the independence of Kosovo yet to recognize it and to develop a common EU approach towards Kosovo (Lilyanova, 2016). In addition, it advised the opposition in Kosovo "to stop protesting against the EU-brokered deal to give special powers to the Serb minority" (Lilyanova 2016, p. 2). The members of European Parliament appreciated the improvements and positive developments on Kosovo-Serbia relations, and emphasized the full implementation of agreements as a precondition for EU accession of both Kosovo and Serbia (Lilyanova, 2016).

The Train Incident that happened in January 2017 and the arrest of Serbian politician Marko Đfturić visiting Northern Mitrovica in March 2018 mark two recent tensions in Kosovo-Serbia relations. For a long time, the main topic of discussion has been Kosovo Serbs quest for the establishment of the Community of Serb Municipalities (ASM). Recently, the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue was taken over by arbitrary action by Aleksandar Vučić and Hashim Thaçi as the respective presidents of Serbia and Kosovo. In August 2018, they proposed an initiative for correction and redefinition of borders: Northern Kosovo to be part of Serbia and most of Presevo valley to belong to Kosovo.

71

They considered the permanent demarcation of Kosovo-Serbia borders as a solution to the conflict. This proposal has raised a lot of debates: Thaci lacks public and opposition support in Kosovo and analysist argue that the implementation of such an initiative would not solve but create new conflicts.

The post-war period in Kosovo is characterized by peacekeeping efforts, negotiations on the final status of Kosovo, and reconstruction of its social, political and economic life (Cooley, 2013). NATO ended direct violence, but the presence of ethnic tensions show that sustainable peace is not established yet. Serbia has not accepted the independence of Kosovo and there is not common agreement on the status of the Serb community in the North that are challenging the sovereignty of Kosovo. The post-war reconstruction is trusted to actors like EU and UN and political situation is not stable.

CHAPTER 4:

INTERVENTION AND TRANSFORMATION OF BOSNIAN CONFLICT

Bosnia-Herzegovina, positioned at the heart of former Yugoslavia, had a rich culture and three main ethnic groups living together. 1992-1995 marks the years of a bloody conflict among Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Initially, the international actors hesitated to engage: they stood by as the conflict over resources and rights among the three ethnic groups was intensifying leading to violent confrontation within Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory. Shift to violent confrontation led to intervention through peacekeeping missions, arms embargo, loans, bombings, and later through mediation efforts. Violence, crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing characterized the Bosnian conflict. All parties engaged in atrocities against each other. Massacres against Bosnian Muslims, like Srebrenica Genocide, were among the main brutal events in this conflict. Media played an important role in bringing this conflict to the attention of international public opinion and pushing for a solution. The Dayton Peace Accords ended the violent conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina by dividing the country into two entities, namely the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But the new structure did not bring a lasting solution.

4.1   Conflict parties

According to 1991 Census, Bosnia-Herzegovina had a heterogenous population of 4.36 million: 44% of which declared themselves Bosniak ('Muslim'), 31% Serb, 17% Croat, and rest either as Jews, Roma, Albanians or other communities.

Bosniaks were represented by the Bosnian government and army during the conflict. They were led by Alija Izetbegovic, the leader of Stranka Democratske Acije - SDA (Party of Democratic Action) and the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosniaks aimed for the establishment of a multiethnic independent Bosnia-Herzegovina; and opposed 'Greater Serbia' or 'Greater Croatia' plans. Even though they had the sympathy of a greater part of the international actors, they did not get enough help from them to realize their objectives. With United States' mediation efforts, they allied with Bosnian Croats in 1994 against Bosnian Serbs. Compared to Bosnian Serbs, Bosniaks had limited resources and they are considered as the ethnic group that suffered the most during this conflict.

Bosnian Serbs were ethnic Serbs living in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They struggled for the establishment of Republika Srpska (RS) and pursued the ideology of a 'Greater Serbia'. Bosnian Serbs were led by Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Serb Army under the command of Radko Mladic. They opposed Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence from Yugoslavia and the Bosnian government, and they aimed to clean their enclaves from non-Serbs. Bosnian Serbs had the support of Serbia and especially Slobodan Milosevic with Yugoslav National Army in his hand. With this support, they were more powerful and had more resources than Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats.

Bosnian Croats are ethnic Croats living in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were represented by the HDZ-Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine (Croatian Democratic Union of BiH) and Bosnian Croat Army. They wanted the control of the areas mostly populated by Bosnian Croats, mainly the area around Mostar city. They aimed a 'Greater Croatia' and preventing the formation of a 'Greater Serbia'. Their position changed in 1994, when encouraged by their declining power and resources and

United States promises they allied with Bosniaks to create the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnian Croats had the support of Croatian government, mainly President Franjo Tudjman, and the support of Croatian Army.

Overall, a power asymmetry existed among the three groups with Bosnian Serbs being the most powerful group. Also, different from Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Croats had respectively the support of Serbia and Croatia as kin states.

4.2   Conflict sources

Before the outbreak of the ethnic war, Bosnia-Herzegovina used to be symbol of interethnic cooperation and peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups. The revival of the historical hatreds, economic, political, and social uncertainty and rise of nationalist rhetoric in 1980s contributed to the deteriorating of the relations among Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats.

4.2.1   Historical grievances

A primordial explanation of ethnic conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina highlights the ethnic emotions resulting from historical hatreds as an important source of conflict. As stated by the former U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "The hatred between all three groups, the Bosnians and the Serbs and the Croats, is almost unbelievable. It's almost terrifying, and it's centuries old. That really is a problem from the hell" (Friedman, 1993, para 11). According to Elizabeth Drew (1992), the removal of Iron Curtain left the stage to the reemergence of suppressed ethnic hatreds. Contrary to this primordialist approach, there are also indications that historical memories of grievances between these groups did not exist for a long time. It seems, for example, there was no such hatred

75

among Serbs and Croats until the establishment of Yugoslav state in 1918 and World War II atrocities (Zupanov et al. 1996). During World War II, the control of Bosnia-Herzegovina was given to Croatia, a Nazi protectorate at that time (Bugajski, 1994). While the Ustasha regime aligned with some Muslims to murder hundreds of thousands of Serbs, tens of thousands of Muslims were massacred by Serb nationalist 'Chetnik' forces (Bugajski, 1994). Such examples show how recent past can become a source of dissent. However, people from the three ethnic groups have fought side by side as part of Partizani communist forces against Nazi regime (Blagojevic, 2009). As such, the history has witnessed examples of the three ethnic groups fighting both against each other and side by side under different circumstances.

Consequently, historical memories of injustices committed by these groups against each other in the past might have some impact but are not necessarily enough to create serious conflict and to justify the level of violence and atrocities committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As argued by Hodson et al (1994, p. 1535) "Arguments based on primordial hatreds should not be accepted without an examination of the possible structural underpinnings of current animosities". A more straightforward explanation therefore is that with the collapse of the old regime, Bosnia-Herzegovina's political institutions were not able to manage ethnic tensions of various nature anymore. As a result, the manipulation of ethnic feelings by a political elite which was unable to otherwise address the pressing needs of the population in a state of crisis contributed to the emergence of violent confrontation of an ethnic nature.

4.2.2   Competition for political and economic resources

During the communist regime in Yugoslavia "any expression of nationalism, particularly religiously-based, was ruthlessly suppressed: throwing national hatreds into what Misha Glenny calls 'history's deep freeze'" (Roe, 2005, p. 86). The emphasis on the common identity of the socialist Yugoslavia, under the slogan 'Brotherhood and Unity', was one way to discourage the prominence of ethno-national identities. However, that could only suppress but not eliminate one's loyalty to an ethnic group. The federation itself was created along ethnic/national lines and most of ethnic groups identified a republic within the federation as their homeland. However, even though "they received the status of nation (national group) in 1963", Muslims relation with Bosnian territory remained unclear (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p.41). Their quest for independence by early 1990s "can be linked to the unresolved issues of their status as a group during Communism" (Blagojevic, 2009, p. 16).

        With the collapse of communist regime, the Yugoslavian republics including Bosnia-Herzegovina entered the process of democratization. A democratic system is supposed to bring peace among nations, however the process of transition to democracy might bring instability. As stated by Snyder (2000, p.352), "a country's first steps toward democracy spur the development of nationalism and heighten the risk of international war and internal ethnic conflict". In ethnically divided societies, democracy holds the risk of further polarization and competition over group rights and access to resources, as happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Before the war, none of the groups dominated the others – a kind of 'communist consociationalism' (Vejvoda, 1996). After the collapse of communism, efforts to build a democratic political system emerged. In this process, three 'nationalist' parties, each representing one ethnic group, triumphed in

the first pluralist elections in 1990. This result marked the start of an ethno-political competition among these parties, each aiming to shape Bosnia-Herzegovina's future based on their own groups' interest. While Bosnian Serbs wanted Bosnia-Herzegovina to stay part of the remainder of the former Yugoslavia (then under the control of Serbia), Bosniaks and Croats supported the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Yugoslavia.

Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum on Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence in 1992. Only 63.4 per cent of eligible voters used their vote and out of them 99.7 per cent supported Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence that was recognized in April 1992. One month later, Bosnian Serb leaders launched the armed conflict (Bugajski, 1994). There was distrust among ethnic groups as they were suspicious of each other's motives and afraid to leave the access to resources and group rights to the hands of the 'other' group. The political elite played an important role in convincing the ethnic groups that they would be at risk if they did not hold power.

The process of transition to democracy and market economy led to economic crises and high unemployment rates in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Life standards had started to deteriorate before the collapse of communism, but they got even worse once the system collapsed. It led to "a breakdown in routine expectations about the future" and 'growing uncertainty and opportunity' (Woodward, 1997 as cited in Blagojevic, 2009, p. 20). This situation of uncertainty became a tool in the hand of opportunist politicians who turned to ethnic hatred discourse to reinforce 'us' vs 'them' categories under the pretext of protecting their group's interest. As such ethnic groups started to perceive as a threat the power of the other groups, believing that "the other ethnic group(s) would deny them access to already limited resources, thus infringing upon their rights and

ability to lead fulfilling and productive lives" (Blagojevic, 2009, p. 20). Hence, the competition over political and economic resources turned into an inter-ethnic struggle over institutional arrangements of the country. In addition, competition and ethnic intolerance was fueled by the nationalist rhetoric of political elite. This competition and intolerance finally escalated into violent ethnic conflict.

4.2.3   Nationalism

Within the context of chaos and uncertainty created by regime change in Yugoslavia, a nationalist rhetoric based on 'us or them' dilemma was generally embraced by political elites, contributing to the sense of urgency. "The economic, political and social crisis caused a readily mobilizable emotional response" (Blagojevic, 2009, p.18). The manipulation of emotions led to ethnic violence that "was the expression of a politically organized attempt to radically redefining categories of belonging" (Bringa, 2002, p. 194). The primordial argument of historical hatreds was used as a method of political engineering, to justify the goal. Conditions created by the process of regime change made the manipulation of ethnic emotions an easier task (Blagojevic, 2009, p. 19). Arguing that this war "was the plan of Milosevic ignores the conditions that make such leaders possible and popular" (Woodward, 1995, p. 15). The institutional factors are important too. The existence of an "authoritarian political culture in former Yugoslavia enabled nationalist leaders to monopolize the media and to increase the level of intolerance regardless of previously existing tolerance" (Zupanov, 1996, p. 421).

Again, the collapse of communism and the processes of transition to democracy contributed to economic, political, and social insecurity, and uncertainty in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Historical hatreds reinforced conflict potential and provided ground for

reemergence of ethnic grievances. The collapse of communism removed the structures that managed/suppressed ethnic relations. Ethno-political competition defined relations among ethnic groups that were afraid of leaving the control of power and resources to each other. All the above-mentioned factors contributed in creating the grounds and conditions that finally escalated to violent ethnic hostilities. However, throughout the conflict, there have been attempts by different international actors to prevent the emergence and escalation of conflict.

4.3   Intervention

This study develops an argument on the importance of intervention processes in understanding post-conflict environment. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, intervention by several influential international actors occurred in various ways. These actors were at times collaborating with each other to develop common policies through a variety of international institutional settings like UN, EU, Contact Group and NATO. There are instances when they engaged multilaterally in diplomatic and military efforts first to prevent and later to end the conflict. Overall, a range of unsuccessful peace plans failed to prevent the emergence and escalation of violence, which eventually reached the level of genocide. However, the Dayton Peace Accords effectively put an end to this violent confrontation and had an essential role in shaping the post-conflict environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4.3.1   Intervention before 1992-95 war

In early 1990s the UN and the European Community (EC) tried to sustain the unity of former Yugoslavia, and they hesitated to intervene directly in the early conflicts

emerging within the former Socialist Federation. The Arbitration Commission, known as Badinter Commission, established in August 1991 by the Council of Ministers of European Economic Community aimed to provide legal assistance to the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). It assessed the demands for independence of former Yugoslav republics. In 1992, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights released a report "on human rights situation in the territory of former Yugoslavia" was prepared by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights (S/PV.3119, 1992, p. 13). The Badinter Commission (opinion no 3 and no 11) suggested the recognition of independence of Macedonia and Slovenia and suggested a referendum as a precondition in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Pellet, 1992). The Bosnia-Herzegovina referendum held in 1 March 1991, boycotted by Bosnian Serbs, but the majority of participants having voted for independence, opened the way for the Portuguese presidency to propose that the EC should recognize the republic.

Next, the designation of the constitutional arrangements became the main challenge for the new state. On this issue too, the negotiation efforts of the EC continued. The parties were about to reach an agreement in a conference held in Lisbon in February 1992. "The Serbs agreed to respect the existing frontiers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Izetbegovic promised to establish national territorial units within BiH – a Balkanized Switzerland, in effect" (Rigby, 1994, p. 6). However, the details of the agreement, especially the level of autonomy of the national territorial units, were vague. Also, the expectations of the parties from these agreements were far apart: "The Serbs clearly hoped that the cantons would undermine the authority of the government in Sarajevo; Izetbegovic, on the other hand, expected the autonomous provinces to be weak

81

and ineffective" (Rigby, 1994, p. 6). At the end, the EC could not achieve its goal of brokering an agreement that would prevent a violent conflict.

Another important but unsuccessful attempt was the Cutilleiro Plan. It was developed by Jose Cutileiro, a Portuguese diplomat, who lead the EC Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina. This agreement plan was 'The Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Arrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina' containing provisions similar to those discussed in Lisbon but again provisions were not clear. It designed a country composed of three constituent entities each based on a major ethnic identity. The probability for this plan to work was low, considering that ethnic communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina lived intermingled and only few numbers of Bosnia-Herzegovina's cantons were completely inhabited by one of the three communities. Bosnian Muslims opposed the plan claiming that it might bring the breakup of the Bosnian republic (Rigby, 1994). Also, Bosnian Serbs had doubts about this plan: "because there was no attempt to link the proposed national units to a confederal arrangement within Yugoslavia" (Rigby, 1994, p. 7). Even though the EC had made the signing of the agreement a condition for the recognition of the independence, Izetbegovic rejected the agreement. When Bosnia-Herzegovina went on with the declaration of independence, Karadzic declared the formation of a separate Bosnian Serb republic. The EU, the Uni and others recognized the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout 1992. Although further negotiations continued, the countdown to war could not be stopped.

4.3.2   1992-95 war

The violent conflict emerged in full in Spring 1992 between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. In Autumn 1992, half of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory was under Bosnian

Serbs' control. Initially, the international actors like UN hesitated to intervene to stop the bloody war. The Security Council under Resolution 742 authorized the deployment of UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), a peacekeeping body, with no mandate to use force but to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid in war zones (S/RES/743, 1992). Also, it proposed an agreement that would put under its supervision the heavy artillery used in the war (Berdal, Mats and Spyros, 2007). In addition, NATO enforced a no-fly zone over the territory.

The Bosnian war became important due to the high level of violence, its position close to EU, and media exposure. Early attempts to mediate between parties to contain the brutality of the conflict included a multilateral coalition lead by the United States aiming to design and implement a peace plan, but this attempt resulted to be unsuccessful. Bosnian conflict was the subject of the International Conference on Yugoslavia in August 1992, also known as London Conference on former SFRY. It was the "most ambitious international summit on BiH" (Silber & Little, 1996, p. 258). David Owen was the EU negotiator and Cyrus Vance was the UN negotiator for the Bosnian crisis. They developed the Vance-Owen plan that proposed a decentralized state with weak central government and three constituent people (S/25221, 1993). The plan divided Bosnia-Herzegovina in ten cantons and Sarajevo was going to enjoy a special status. A council composed of nine members, three from each nationality, was going to govern the Bosnia-Herzegovina republic. Even though the plan aimed power-sharing by a multi-national government in each canton, it was understood as each canton will be controlled by one nation (Nystuen, 2005). This proposal was accepted by Bosnian Muslims and Croats but refused by Bosnian Serbs. The plan failed and the violence in Bosnian territory continued.

Owen-Stoltenberg plan was another external diplomatic initiative to solve Bosnian conflict. This new plan gave "53% of the territory to Bosnian Serbs, 30% to Bosnian Muslims and 17% to Bosnian Croats" (International Commission on the Balkans, 1996, p. 52). This plan was based on an idea of political and ethnic division of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was supported by Serbs and Croats but rejected by Muslims who asked for some more territorial adjustments (Owen, 2013). For Muslims this plan meant the end of Bosnia-Herzegovina's existence and they were afraid that it will push them to live in a restricted territory. As such, the diplomatic attempts failed again, and the conflict continued to escalate. This plan was revived with the European Union Action Plan, giving 3% more territory to Bosnian Muslims and proposing the relief of sanctions for FRY. Despite the novelties, the modified plan failed again.

The peace establishment efforts and humanitarian aid could not reduce the severity of the conflict. Starting with attacks on UN convoys, the military of Republika Srpska shifted their assaults on safe zones that were under UN responsibility. (Berdal, Mats and Spyros, 2007). UNPROFOR being not successful in mediating the conflict, NATO took responsibility, leading to a shift from peacekeeping to peace enforcement strategy (Berdal, Mats and Spyros, 2007). NATO called Bosnian Serbs troops to withdraw twenty kilometers away from Sarajevo and to hand in their heavy artillery, threatening with air attack in case of noncompliance. Russia and Greece opposed the decision. Bosnian Serbs withdrew only after Russia's proposal that "four hundred Russian soldiers serving for UNPROFOR, hurriedly withdrawn from Croatia, should move to the positions abandoned by Serbs" (Fuchs, 2011, p. 54-55). Russia's diplomatic initiative and military presence attracted even more the attention of the United States. To prevent the establishment of an unsustainable Muslim state in case of breakup of Bosnia-

Herzegovina, United States and Turkey facilitated settlement talks between Bosniaks and Croats. These talks resulted in an agreement on the establishment of the Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994. The agreement was signed in Washington by F. Tuđman and A. Izetbegović under the authority of Bill Clinton. In addition, they signed the Washington Agreement that included the principles of governing this federation.

Another peace plan came from the so-called Contact Group (United States, Russia, Germany, France and Great Britain). According to this plan, Bosnia-Herzegovina was supposed to be divided on ethnic lines with 51% of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory to be allocated to the Bosniak-Croat Federation and 49% to Bosnian Serbs, controlling 70% of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory at that time. Even though an agreement was signed at the end of 1994 between Bosniak-Croat Federation and Bosnian Serbs, it did not bring a permanent solution.

The period of ceasefire during diplomatic efforts was used by the parties to prepare themselves for the restart of violent clashes in April 1995 again. Serbian forces led by Radko Mladic occupied Srebrenica that was one of six safe zones under UN troops protection. UN troops could not prevent the attack and Serbian forces committed large scale massacres against civilians which the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia would later judge as genocide. The failure of UN peacekeeping mission and the worldwide reaction that followed opened the way for direct military intervention after the Srebrenica genocide. In this regard, the UN Rapid Reaction Force was deployed with the aim of peace enforcement and protection of UNPROFOR troops. In August 1995, another massacre happened in a marketplace in Sarajevo. This triggered

a decision by NATO to directly intervene and bomb Bosnian Serb paramilitary positions to help Bosnian Muslim and Croats.

The use of outside military intervention successfully compelled the Bosnian Serbs to sit again to negotiate. In the middle of August 1995, Richard Holbrooke was sent by the U.S. President Bill Clinton to the region with the assignment to achieve a settlement. Holbrooke managed to compel the parties to have a ceasefire agreement and to start peace talks. The President of the Republic of Serbia, the President of Croatia, and the President of Bosnia-Herzegovina met in Dayton on 1st November 1995 to negotiate peace. The US led negotiations and drafted proposals in this NATO - arranged meeting were concluded with signing the Dayton Peace Accords after four years of conflict. The Dayton Peace Accords ended the Bosnian war and set up a new confederated republic. According to the terms of the agreement, the Bosnia-Herzegovina borders would remain the same; Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a unified state as a subject of international law, but internally it would be divided into two politico-administrative units, Bosniak-Croatian Federation (51% of the territory) and the Republic of Serbia (49% of the territory); there would be a new Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution; Sarajevo would be the capital; the UN peace troops would be replaced by IFOR (Implementation Force); elections were to be held within six to nine months after the conclusion of the agreement; freedom of movement within the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be guaranteed for all inhabitants (Dayton Peace A, 1995). The conclusion of the Accord represented an official termination of one of the bloodiest conflicts in the recent past.

As emphasized earlier on different occasions, the Bosnian conflict has been characterized by ethno-political competition for power among three dominant ethnic

groups (Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats). Both Dayton Peace Accords and Bosnian

Constitution aimed to address this competition by establishing a complex structure of

ethnic power sharing. The model of power sharing in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a form of

consociationalism. It recognizes ethnic division within Bosnian society and tries to

manage it by promising equal access to power and political structures to members of

different ethnic groups. As shown in the Table 1, the Dayton Peace Accords ended direct

(behavioral) violence and moved Bosnia-Herzegovina to a situation of negative peace.

However, the achievement of positive peace requires the elimination of the structural

violence as well. Whether the power sharing structure agreed in Dayton has been

successful in ending structural violence in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina needs to be

examined further.

Table 1. Intervention in Bosnian Conflict

	Phase	Nature	Methods	Outcome
Pre - 1992	Pre-Conflict	Multilateral	Diplomatic	Unsuccessful Intervention
1992-1995	Violent Confrontation	Multilateral	Diplomatic Military	Successful Intervention Dayton Peace Accords
After 1995	Post- Conflict	Multilateral	Diplomatic	Negative Peace

4.4   Powersharing, institutionalization of ethnicity or ethnicization of institutions in

        post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Today, even though more than two decades have passed, ethnic tensions persist. Since

its establishment in line with the Dayton Peace Accords, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been

characterized by "instability and a lack of legitimacy" (Gavrić et al., 2013, p. 20). The

three dominant communities have been challenging the political system agreed in Dayton. While Bosniaks identified with Bosnian state and called for strengthening of central institutions, Serbs and Croats hesitated to accept the related Dayton provisions and were eager to push for secession. The total dissolution of Yugoslavia at the beginning of 2000s to some extent convinced Bosnian Serbs and Croats to give up their secession demands (Gavrić et al., 2013). Since then, the discussion shifted from the existence of Bosnian state to power sharing dynamics at state and entity level. This is a positive development in the context of Bosnian conflict, but it highlights the need for a good management of power that appears to be very challenging for a fragile state like Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The political organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a product of Dayton, is an application of 'consociational democracy', a model of power sharing, developed by Arend Lijphart by the end of 1960s. This model aims to ensure stability in an ethnically divided society through ethnic leaders' agreement for joint rule and consensus-based decision making (Lijphart, 1975, p. 99). It is based on four principles: "a grand coalition, proportional representation, segmental autonomy and mutual veto power" (Lijphart, 1979, p.500-5002). Even though this model of political and territorial power sharing among ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the building block of Dayton Peace Accords, its interpretation and implementation require evaluation and revisions. It was considered as the most appropriate way of solving the Bosnian conflict, but it has produced a complex political structure characterized by political deadlock and lack of local ownership. Neither Dayton Accords nor the on-ground presence of international missions, representatives and troops was able to create a peaceful post-war Bosnian state

(Richter, 2009 as mentioned in Gavrić et al., 2013). This situation defines Dayton as a process that needs to be improved.

Eleven annexes of Dayton Peace Accords treated the implementation of the agreement in military and civilian terms. Different international actors have assumed responsibility for ensuring the implementation of the agreement. UN was involved through the International Police Task Force, and the Office of the High Representative as the main body responsible for the civil implementation of the agreement. NATO, through Implementation Force (IFOR), supervised the implementation of military aspects of the agreement. Economy was trusted to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and World Bank. There were also UN and EU agencies dealing with issues of refugee return and protection of human rights. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was assigned for organization of first free elections. Arguably, "it [Dayton] was meant to be a temporary solution, but has remained for 20+ years, with little progress in terms of reform of the constitution or legitimization of the government" (Waller, 2015, p. 21). Bosnia-Herzegovina has limited sovereignty considering that the Office of High Representative has the authority to say the final word concerning most political decisions (Gavrić et al., 2013, p. 20). The international institutions were expected to transfer the power vested in them to Bosnian authorities within the first year of the agreement, but the mandate was extended for two additional years, and in 1997 for an undetermined time (Chandler, 2000, p. 271). International actors like UN, NATO and different EU agencies have dominated Bosnia-Herzegovina's political process. The overt presence of these external actors has hindered local ownership and legitimacy, even though starting from 2006 they "decided it was time for domestic politicians to take responsibility for internal issues" (Gavrić et al., 2013, p. 20).

The political and territorial power-sharing provisions included in the Dayton Peace Accords aimed at meeting the demands of Bosnian Muslims for maintenance of Bosnia-Herzegovina's integrity and those of Serbs and Croats for Bosnia-Herzegovina's partition along ethnic lines. In this regard, the agreement confirmed the unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and divided its territory in two legal entities, the Federation and Republika Srpska (RS) based on dominant ethno-religious identities (Bosniak Muslims and Croats in the Federation and Serbs in RS). Mixing elements of partition and integration has been a very challenging issue. The main institutions of central government include a tripartite presidency, a bi-cameral legislature and a council of ministers. State level institutions are the decision-making body over foreign policy, law enforcement, inter-entity communication, transportation, foreign trade, customs and monetary policy (The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995, Annex 4, Article 3.1). The remaining functions of government are delegated to the entities (The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995, Annex 4, Article 3.3) and furthermore to the cantons in case of Federation.

The agreed model is criticized primary for institutionalization of ethnicities and not promoting interethnic cooperation (Waller, 2015). The "tripartite division is replicated from the national to municipal level and reflects the entrenched ethnic positions adopted during the war and persisting in the post-war environment" (Waller, 2015, p. 18-19). "Such division continues to prevent the establishment of security, political, or socio-economic mechanisms to build trust between ethno-religious groups" (Waller, 2015, p. 20). Rather than contributing in establishing mutual trust, interethnic cooperation, reconciliation and a common Bosnian identity, the institutionalization of ethnic power-sharing on state level has "prevented effective state reconstruction and

nation-building" (Marko, 2005, p.8). Even though the goal has been the establishment of "a single state that encompasses the two entities and three ethno-religious groups", for the moment they remain divided (Waller, 2015, p. 18). "Every aspect of state and society became seen through the ethnic lens" (Marko, 2005, p. 9). The power-sharing institutional arrangements have contributed in preventing the reemergence of violent conflict in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, if the ultimate objective was establishing a state of positive peace based on peaceful coexistence and interethnic cooperation, then it cannot be concluded that this is achieved in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Considering that Bosnian state structure is based on ethnic power sharing, it means that ethnic divisions remain at the center of inter group relations and chances for interethnic cooperation are not high. Hence, Dayton seems to have reaffirmed the lines of ethnic confrontation. Legitimacy of state level institutions is based on the requirement of ethnic proportionality within them (Tzifakis, 2007, p. 86). Each member of collective presidency is elected from the dominant ethnic groups in each entity: Serb member from RS, and Bosniak and Croat members from federation. Hence, the Bosniaks and Croats of RS and Serbs of the Federation are not represented in this institution. As such, Bosnia-Herzegovina's political parties have ethnic rather than civil character, and members from 'other' ethnic groups are not targets of their electoral campaigns. Veto rights granted to ethnic groups in executive and legislative branches reinforces ethno-territorial divisions and further weakens state level decision making power.

Even though the judiciary institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina appear to be more functional compared to the executive and legislative ones, they constitute another example of dysfunctionality in the system (Waller, 2015). The Constitutional Court was the only permanently functioning institution at state level, because there was no veto

power foreseen (Marko, 2005, p. 3). "The rule of law has failed primarily due to the division of the judicial system into three parallel systems presided over by the unaccountable internationals." (Richmond & Franks, 2009, p. 70). According to BTI 2006, "security issues have improved recently due to the shift of the monopoly of physical power held by state organ/s after the top to bottom military reform in 2006 that established The Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the state Ministry of Defense" (as mentioned in Gavrić et al., 2013, p. 18).

Bosnia-Herzegovina has not succeeded in embracing a multi-party system. Nationalist parties continued to operate in post Dayton environment and nationalist rhetoric persisted. "The new state constitution formed in Dayton called for post-war elections (1996) and aimed to create a democratic federation" (Gavrić et al., 2013, p. 20). Elections, under OSCE organization and monitoring, used to be repeated several times in all levels but results highlighted the prominence of nationalist parties like SDA – representing Bosniaks, SDS - representing Serbs, and HDZ - representing Croats. Even though these parties have dominated pre-war and war environment they were re-elected and legitimized. In such a context tensions persisted. A positive development were the general elections of 2000 that were won by non-nationalist parties but "internal differences within the grand coalition still blocked substantial reforms" (Gavrić et al., 2013, p. 21). Starting with 2002 elections, nationalistic parties took the stage again and continue to win elections "as a result of polarization and nationalistic rhetoric during the campaign" (Gavrić et al., 2013, p. 21). The electoral system continues to highlight ethnic differences and turn political elections to power competition among ethnic groups.

There is abundant criticism of the systemic deficiencies. Instead of removing the pre-war political structures, Dayton trusted post-conflict development and reconstruction

to wartime political elite (Zupsevic and Causevic, 2009). Consequently, "the country has been faced with a political status quo reinforced by nationalist politics and with little to no incentive for badly needed reform" (Zupsevic & Causevic, 2009, p.11). The political system designed in Dayton has assumed consensus and cooperation among ethnic groups but does not encourage their leaders in this regard. The structural problems of Dayton Accords helped the political leaders of the ethnic groups to maintain their nationalist agendas and misuse power sharing plans. Their emphasis on ethnic divisions contributes to political deadlock and "indicates that a sense of a multi-ethnic community is a myth or utopian dream" (Richmond & Franks, 2009, p. 66). The political elite is focused on the principle of divide and rule rather than cooperation across ethnic lines that would be in the benefit of Bosnia-Herzegovina state and society (Marko, 2005). They aim to be elected and once elected to work only in the benefit of their own group and even block the work of the main state institutions like Presidency and Parliament for their own or their group's interests (Waller, 2015). As such, these institutions cannot take decisions or adopt laws necessary for Bosnian state's reconstruction (Waller, 2015). Such a paralysis of the political processes has negative consequences in all levels of society in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Dayton Peace Accords established a highly decentralized state, which raises another problematic issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Gavrić et al., 2013). There is power and authority clashes at different levels of government, leading to a weak central government and aggravating ethnic division. Bosnia-Herzegovina's "constitution devolves most governmental authority to the entities" and grants them extensive sovereignty rights and independence from central governance (Zupsevic & Causevic, 2009, p. 10). They resemble to a "state within a state" (Tzifakis, 2007, p. 86). They can

have their own armed forces and establish separate relations with neighbors (The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995, Annex 4, Article 3.2). The division of Bosnia-Herzegovina territory in two entities was considered less complicated than dividing it into three (Tzifakis, 2007, p. 86). However, for Croats such a structure was acceptable only in exchange of considerable decentralization within the federation. The efficiency of the institutions in Bosniak-Croat entity is compromised by provisions for ethnic representation of both ethnic communities (Tzifakis, 2007, p. 86). The federation is even more decentralized, being divided into ten cantons. Due to the lack of agreement among Bosniaks and Croats on national interests the Bosniak-Croat entity transfers most of its authority to these cantons (Zupsevic & Causevic, 2009). Each canton has its government, assembly, constitution and is responsible for "education, culture, "police, energy, tourism, public services, media and social welfare" (Bose, 2002, p. 78-79). Such decentralization becomes an obstacle to the well-functioning of entities along ethnic lines. It limits even more the power of the federation's institutions and makes it susceptible to nationalistic policies (Tzifakis, 2007). On the other side, RS's is a totally centralized entity (Tzifakis, 2007).

In summary, the recognition of entities and their power strengthen the ethno-national division (Marko, 2005). They are not ready to negotiate the transfer of power to state level. Also, the politics of ethnic homogenization within each entity continues. Non-Serbs in RS and Serbs in the Federation almost lack representation in government, judiciary and police. Moreover, the existing legal fragmentation among two entities is reinforced through the extension of barriers to the free movement of people, goods and services (Tzifakis, 2007). This move is against the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina that predicted the creation of a unified market.

Furthermore, "an unclear division of power has prevented transparent decision-making process and effective control of the administration" (Richter, 2009 as mentioned in Gavrić et al., 2013, p. 21). The year 2006 brought new hopes "when representatives of the three major ethnic groups reached an agreement on constitutional reform", but that failed in the parliament (Tzifakis, 2007, p. 20). In the following years respective political elites continued to block any opportunity for comprehensive reform., The "inability to compromise on the functionality of the state" pushed Bosnia-Herzegovina into a political crisis with long lasting effects that are felt even today.

In sum, the main problematic issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the ethnicization of its constitutional system. The constitutional system Bosnia-Herzegovina is based on the equality of ethnic groups rather than the equality of individuals. Originally it recognized Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs – the dominant ethnic groups - as constituent people and citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1994), and people belonging to other communities, under the label 'other', were classified as national minorities that have the status of Bosnian citizens but with limited political rights (Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1994). A Decision on Constituent Peoples in the summer of 2000 brought some crucial changes. "Serbs became constituent peoples in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Bosniaks and Croats became constituent peoples in the Republika Srpska" (Tzifakis, 2007, p. 17). Also, 'others' gained more political rights in entity and cantons level (Tzifakis, 2007). Still in Bosnia-Herzegovina "the constitutional system has provided collective rights to dominant groups, while individual rights and individual identities are secondary" (Tzifakis, 2007, p. 17). Currently, according to Bosnia-Herzegovina's constitution only members from three main ethnic groups can became candidates for

tripartite Presidency and House of Peoples (Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1994). It shows that the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina is based on discrimination against citizens who do not belong to one of the three main ethnic communities that are considered as the building blocks of Bosnia-Herzegovina state. According to The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) this violates the European Convention on Human Rights (ECtHR, 22 December 2009). Even though through years people belonging to other communities have acquired certain rights, they are still second-class citizens from the constitutional perspective.

By conclusion, it can be argued that the Dayton Peace Accords was designed to address the structural sources of Bosnian conflict that have been rooted in competition for power and resources. It was successful in stopping direct violence, but post Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina represents "nothing more than a quasi-protectorate of the international community, with a complex state structure, long decision-making processes, and underdeveloped political culture" (Gavrić et al., 2013, p. 21). Consequently, the overt presence of different international actors like UN and EU institutions and agencies turns out to be an obstacle to local ownership and undermines the political legitimacy of Bosnia-Herzegovina state. The power sharing structure agreed in Dayton has reinforced ethnic divisions and institutionalized ethnicity rather than offering incentives for interethnic cooperation. Ethnic groups have different positions on Bosnia-Herzegovina's future: Bosnian Muslims want more centralization and revision of current system; Bosnian Serbs want to maintain and extend their autonomy, and Bosnian Croats want to establish their own entity. The decentralized system of governance has weakened the central government to the point of incapacity, as "a lack of clarity remained in the division of powers between the entities, cantons and municipalities"

(European Commission, 2016, p. 8). Hence, overt presence of external actors like UN and EU, and the power sharing model have delayed the positive transformation of the structures that manage relations among ethnic groups and consequently hindered the establishment of positive peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

CHAPTER 5:

INTERVENTION AND TRANSFORMATION OF KOSOVO CONFLICT

Within the Former Yugoslavia, the Albanian population used to live as an ethnic minority mostly spread in three republics: Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. The largest Albanian community lived in Kosovo where they constituted the majority (81.6%) of the population compared to Serbs (9.9%) and other ethnic groups (8.5%) according to 1991 census. As such, the Albanian cultural and political activism in Kosovo was most intense. Throughout Tito era, Kosovo Albanians struggled for more rights and status, and in some cases the central government granted some concessions.

However, this stable period came an end for a variety of reasons: Tito's death, the emergence of nationalist ideologies, removal of Kosovo's autonomous status, increasing economic and political uncertainty, and structural changes within Yugoslavia. All these events led to an escalating conflict among ethnic Albanians and Serbs of Kosovo that culminated into the 1998-1999 war. This conflict was no less of a challenge for the different international actors whose negotiation efforts proved to be unsuccessful in preventing the violent clash. Ethnic cleansing and other atrocities in Kosovo resulted in massive human and material cost. NATO's intervention though air attacks on Serbia on March 24, 1999 ended the violent confrontation and laid the ground to the 2008 unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence.

5.1   Conflict parties

The main actors in this conflict were Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs, and Serbia.

Kosovo, one of two autonomous regions of the Yugoslav Federation, was administratively a part of Serbia. As such, Kosovo Albanians saw themselves ruled by a Serb majority dominating the Federation. Kosovo did not have a strong economy, state culture or military. Kosovo Albanians constantly aimed acquiring more rights at first and eventually sought the territorial independence of Kosovo. At the beginning of 1990s, led by the Democratic League of Kosovo, Kosovo nationalists followed a peaceful resistance and established illegal parallel state structures. After 1995, they shifted from peaceful methods of resistance to violent struggle mainly led by Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).

Kosovo Serbs constituted the largest minority ethnic group in Kosovo. They were mainly concentrated in Northern Kosovo but also intermingled with other ethnic groups in other regions as well. They have been opposing Kosovo's independence because they wanted Kosovo to remain an integral part of Serbia where they were a part of the majority, to have more rights, and precedence. They refuse the authority of central Kosovo government and have established their own parallel political structures.

Serbia used to have full control over Kosovo as an autonomous province within the Yugoslav Federation. It was one of the most developed economies of the Federation and a strong military power. The Yugoslav National Army (JNA) was loyal to Serbia. With the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Serbia took control of the rump Yugoslavia and tried to sustain the power structures of former Federation.

5.2 Conflict sources

5.2.1 Historical grievances

Kosovo Albanians and Serbs differed in their interpretations of the history of the Balkans, and this historical dispute has an important impact on their claims on Kosovo's territory. It is argued that "the Serbs call Kosovo the Serbian Jerusalem while the Albanians see it as their Piedmont" (Danopoulos & Chopani, 1997, p. 169-191). The history of Kosovo is considered as essential for both Kosovo Albanians and Serbian national identity. According to one version of history, the causes of Kosovo conflict extend back to the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje. As Vickers argues (1998, p. 15), "The Serbs therefore viewed the collapse of the medieval Serbian state as the central event in their history and found its explanation in the Battle of Kosovo". As a result, Kosovo was lost, and Serbs turned gradually to second class citizens in a province that used to be under their control. This interpretation has contributed to the image of Serb victimization: Serbs portraying themselves as people who has suffered under Muslim domination. Consequently, the political competition for power among the nobility in Serbia culminated into the Kosovo Myth. This myth has been a powerful determinant of Serbian nationalism, first during the struggle for independence from the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, and later as a convenient tool of political expediency in 1980s by nationalist leaders competing to fill the post-Tito power vacuum. Hence, for nationalist Serbs, losing Kosovo meant giving up vital national aspirations.

On the other side, Kosovo Albanians base their claims on Kosovo territory mainly by the argument that they are the majority ethnic group in Kosovo and that they used to live in this territory long before the arrival of Slavs. This argument clashes with

the Serb claim that Albanians came to Kosovo at the end of the seventeenth century (Malcolm, 1998). Demographic transformation of Kosovo has been an important goal of both conflicting parties. Albanians were in majority within the Autonomous Province of Kosovo but in minority within the federation, and Serbs were in the opposite situation. Between 1961 and 1981 Albanian population raised from 67% to 78% of Kosovo's population due to "high birth rate of Albanians and migration of Serbs" to inner parts of Serbia (The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p. 38). Immediately before the 1999 war, Serbs comprised around 10% of the population of Kosovo and after the war (Latawski & Smith, 2003). "In the wake of the Serb exodus following the June 1999 withdrawal of FRY military and police forces, the number of Serbs living in Kosovo may have been cut by as much as three-quarters of its pre-conflict total (Latawski & Smith, 2003, p.6). According to 2006 census, conducted by the Statistical Office of Kosovo (SOK), Albanians comprised 92%, Serbs, 5.3%, and other groups 3.7% of the total population of Kosovo (SOK, 2008, P.7). Affiliation of Kosovo Albanians with Islam religion and Kosovo Serbs with Orthodox Christianity comprise another divisive factor that has contributed in increasing distrust among them.

The violent conflict emerged, not because of the existence of different narratives and identities, but because both groups were ready to resort to violence to achieve their aims. Albanians legitimized their quest for secession on comprising the majority of the population of Kosovo. For Serbs, Albanians "pose a challenge to sovereignty and the survival of the independent Serbian state" (Vaschenko, 2004, p. 24). The existence of ethnic or cultural differences in a society is not always a source of conflict. However, conflict over territorial, political and economic sources in Kosovo would not be so violent in the absence of such differences among conflicting parties.

5.2.2 Nationalism, political and economic dimensions

National identity was another important problem of Yugoslav federation striving to develop a Yugoslav identity. As mentioned by Vickers (1998):

> The national balance was approximately 43 per cent Serbian, 23 per cent Croatian, 8,5 per cent Slovenian, 6 per cent Bosnian Muslim, 5 per cent Macedonian Slavic, and 3,6 per cent Albanian, with the final 14 per cent composed of the minorities. (p. 103)

The communist regime in Yugoslavia was not successful in suppressing nationalism, developing a Yugoslav identity and getting rid of ethnic, religious and other primordial loyalties. "[D]espite the unflagging efforts of central authorities to foster a spirit of Yugoslavism, no more than 10 per cent of the population ever did call itself Yugoslav." (Treadway, 1997, p. 32). Since Albanians were not Slavs, they did not find themselves within this federation of southern Slavs. Ethnic, religious, and language differences of non-Slavs were neglected, and a policy of assimilation was employed toward minorities including Kosovo. Even though people with different ethnic identities used to belong to same classes, ethnic identity prevailed. Suppression of ethnic identities had an opposite effect, leading to ethnic nationalism and republics' eagerness for secession.

The tension among Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo raised even more with the improvement of Kosovo's autonomous status during Tito's regime. Kosovo Albanians were not completely satisfied by the economic, cultural, social and political concessions granted to them in 1960s and 1970s. As Vickers (1998) argues,

> Albanian intellectuals were eager to discover their history and culture, and as a result played a vital part in encouraging Albanians to rediscover their national identity by studying their history, literature and traditions at the new Albanology

faculty of Pristina University. (p. 107)

Their loyalty to Yugoslav Federation decreased as they became more aware of their national identity and increased their assertiveness on their claim that Kosovo should be granted the status of a republic. The 1974 constitution put Serbs and Albanians in conflicting positions. It upgraded the economic, political and social rights of Albanians and put Kosovo to equal status with other entities of the federation even though it was not named a republic. However, Albanians were not satisfied because they did not have the secession right granted only to republics. The issue behind 1981 students' demonstration was the status of Kosovo rather than a struggle for self-determination. On the other side, Serbs argued against the constitution that gave Albanians, at the expense of Serbs, "rights unparalleled by any other minority in the world" (Guzina, 2003, p. 38).

The 1970s and 1980s new wave of nationalism played an important role in Kosovo conflict (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). Disappointment from federation's "political arrangement and nationalistic propaganda became catalysts for the polarization of Kosovo society along ethnic lines" (Vaschenko, 2004, p. 63). The failure of Yugoslav regime became obvious in an atmosphere of political transformation in 1980s. In such a context, the political elites overstated the grievances among Albanians and Serbs by referring to memory and myths. They highlighted the ancient sources of conflict and used ethnic and religious identities for political purposes and gains (Vaschenko, 2004, p. 64). "Incorporation of Kosovo into Serbia in 1912 was one of the bitter memories conjured up in subsequent years" (The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p. 33). On the other side, Serbs considered Kosovo "as the holy place of the Serb nation, the place where the Serbian Army was defeated by the Ottomans in the famous Battle of Fushe Kosove/Kosovo

Polje of June 1389 and the site of many of Serbia's historic churches" (The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p. 33-34).

The communist regime of the federation was losing its ability to keep peaceful relations among ethnic groups and democratic institutions to manage such relations did not exist yet. In such a context the ethnic groups relied to nationalistic leaders promising to serve ethno-national interests. The 'us' vs 'them' culture, lack of willingness to cooperate and Serbian authorities' tendency for solving Kosovo crisis by force led to "the vicious cycle that eventually pulled the region into violence" (Vaschenko, 2000, p. 64). In a demonstration in November 1988 in Belgrade Milosevic declared: "Every nation has a love, which eternally warms its heart. For Serbia, it is Kosovo." (as cited in Judah, 2008, p. 66). As Oberschall (1996) argues, Slobodan Milosevic tried to maintain his political power through by promoting Serbian nationalism and unity. As argued before, the emphasis on Serbian ethnic identity over Yugoslav national identity became a threat to ethnic Albanians' identity in Kosovo and other ethnicities everywhere else in the Federation. Furthermore, media played a crucial role in manipulating and strengthening the in-group out-group animosities by showing ethnic Serbs' sufferings and ignoring the sufferings of caused by Serbs to ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

In June 1989, on the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Milosevic declared to 1 million people: "Six centuries later, again, we are in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles although such things cannot be excluded." (as cited in The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p. 41). Such a move led Serbian assembly to take control of almost every sphere in Kosovo's governance in 1989 and finally removal of Kosovo's autonomy (The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). Cancelation of Kosovo's autonomy laid the ground for rising human

rights abuses and discriminatory government policies aiming to Serbianize Kosovo (The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). Some of these policies were related to language like "the closure of Albanian language newspapers, radio, and television; the closure of the Albanian Institute; and the change of street names from Albanian to Serbian, introduction of a new Serbian curriculum for universities and schools" (The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p. 41).

The situation in Kosovo has been characterized by competition among Serbs and Albanians for domination over each other. Power in one group's hand has been considered as an important weapon for eliminating the other. As such, from time to time Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo used to be either victim or perpetrator. The inability of the communist regime to address the contradicting interests and tensions among Kosovo Albanians and Serbs expanded the political, economic and cultural gap among them.

Kosovo Albanians felt deprived of political participation and representation (Babuna, 2000). Likewise, "Kosovo has been for a long lime the least developed and most backward region during the existence of Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia" (Murati et. al, 2007, p. 50). Kosovo was source of raw materials for the Yugoslav Federation, but it had an underdeveloped industry and was the poorest region in Yugoslavia. The economic problems made Albanians to think that a self-managed economy would have ensured better economic conditions to them. Even though the level of investments and funds for Kosovo increased after 1957, still by 1980 Kosovo's economy was four times less developed than overall Yugoslavia's economy 1980 (Mertus, 1999). The investment rate in Kosovo increased from 39.56% of Federation's fund in 1985 to 53.26 in 1990 (Mertus, 1999). However, it did not change much the life

standard in Kosovo because the focus was on prestigious projects like libraries, monuments rather than on investments to increase employment level (Vaschenko, 2004).

Economic discrimination has had a negative effect on employment rates, wages and living standards of Kosovo Albanians. The level of unemployment "which rose from 18.5 percent in 1971 to 27.5 percent ten years later" and to 40 percent in 1990, was an important problem in Kosovo (Vickers, 1998, p. 189; The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p. 37). The gap among population rate and employment increased tensions among Albanians and Serbs. Serbs occupied the most important positions in government and army. The number of Albanian students raised with time and it was considered as a method of avoiding short run unemployment. However, in long run they were 'unemployed to be' and a source of political tension (The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p. 37). In centrally regulated economies like Yugoslav Federation there is a competition for resources among constituent units. The 1980s political and economic crises raised nationalist debates on resource distribution and tensions among Serbs and Albanians blaming each other for such problems. Kosovo Albanians accused the central government for the economic failure in Kosovo. On the other hand, Serbs blamed Albanian bureaucrats for mismanagement of economy. In addition, Serbia and other entities of the federation opposed the funds of federation accorded to Kosovo's development (The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p. 37).

Overall, the resolution of Kosovo conflict has been a challenging one and the causes of this conflict lie on: historical hatreds, nationalism, political and economic discrimination, etc. Firstly, conflicting parties have different historical claims. Kosovo Albanians assert "their historical ties to the pre-Roman Illyrians and claim to be one of

106

the oldest autochthonous nations in the region by rejecting the Serbian argument that the Albanians settled in Kosovo during the 17th and 18th centuries" after Serbs (Babuna, 2000, p. 77). Also, ethnic Albanians claim that they comprise the majority and not minority in Kosovo, meaning that they had the right for self-determination. Moreover, the memories of hostile past relations have increased the suspicion, fear and enemy image of each other, and ethnic mobilization was perceived as a way of protection or survival (Koppa, 2001). Economic and political discrimination comprise another source of Kosovo conflict. Another important source of conflict was the resurgence of the nationalist ideology with the rise in power of Milosevic in Yugoslavia.

5.3   Intervention

NATO, UN and EU, are the main third parties involved in Kosovo conflict aiming to end violence and solve the conflict (Vila, 2013). As in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the role and approach of different international institutions to Kosovo conflict is very important and needs assessment for a better understanding of the post-conflict environment. Key state actors collaborated within organizations like UN, EU and NATO, with the purpose of developing responses to this conflict. Each of them had their own perceptions and analysis of conflict, history, national interest, domestic constraints and motives, and different approaches to hard and soft methods of intervention (The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). The lack of consistency on methods and nature of response and the orientation of individual states to short term outcomes remain problematic. Also, they have been reluctant to engage or intervene unless their national interest is affected or there is a strong pressure from public (The

Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). As such, there was a high probability of late engagement, as indeed happened with Kosovo.

5.3.1 Before 1998-99 war

Throughout the first half of 1990s SFRY was shattered by struggles for self-determination leading to its dissolution and establishment of FRY by Serbia and Montenegro. During this period Kosovo Albanians continued their struggle through peaceful means even though sometimes they threatened with the use of force to attract international attention (Greenwood, 2002). Kosovo Albanians had established their own parallel unofficial institutions in Kosovo and had boycotted the official ones that were under the control of Serbia. The status of Kosovo as part of Serbia was not questioned because different from other constituent people of the federation, Kosovo Albanians were not considered to have the right of secession to establish an independent state (Greenwood, 2002). The Dayton Peace Accords, that ended violent confrontation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, ignored the case of Kosovo. In the second half of 1990s, Kosovo Albanians turned to violent resistance led by Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).

5.3.2 During 1998-99 war

The high level the violence pushed for external intervention in Kosovo. First, the diplomatic means were employed even though there the chances for diplomacy to triumph were low, considering Milosevic's strategy of oppression and the demands of political (LDK) and military (KLA) forces in Kosovo. With the aim of reaching a negotiated settlement, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted five resolutions. The 1160 resolution, adopted in 1998, condemned violence used by both

Serbs police force and KLA. This resolution put an arms embargo or FRY; expressed commitment to FRY sovereignty and territorial integrity; but called for higher level of autonomy and self-administration for Kosovo (S/RES/1160, 1998). Adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, this resolution implies that the case of Kosovo was a threat to international peace and security (S/RES/1160, 1998).

However, the 1160 resolution could not prevent the escalation of violence that led to another resolution. 1199 resolution, adopted under Chapter VII, openly defined the case of Kosovo as a threat to international peace and security and condemned the violence used by Serbian forces (S/RES/1199, 1998). It called for the establishment of the ceasefire, and asked FRY to end violent assaults, to allow international monitoring in Kosovo and safe return of refugees, and to make progress on dialogue to solve this crisis (S/RES/1199, 1998). Again, the second resolution proved to be unsuccessful and violent confrontation continued to escalate as the parties remained static to their objectives. In this context, North Atlantic Council (NAC), the main political decision-making body of NATO, threatened with ordering air strikes against FRY. Hence, lack of success in diplomatic means opened the path for coercive sanctions.

Diplomacy was employed again before resorting to coercion. The Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement of October 1998 included negotiations on a set of issues like ceasefire, the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo, elections, substantial autonomy for Kosovo and an agreement for the deployment of an OSCE civil mission called Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). It also included a NATO-FRY agreement for air monitoring of Kosovo. These two agreements were successful in somewhat reducing the level of violence and served as a demo of unarmed international monitoring. Their outcomes were acclaimed in UN Security Council Resolution 1203

(1998) that highlighted a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo and the need for its prevention. The situation on the ground among Serbs and Albanians continued to deteriorate and violence escalated again in December 1998. At the beginning of 1999, KVM reported a massacre conducted on 15th of January by FRY soldiers and police in Racak village in Kosovo but Serbs did not allow international investigations (UN doc. S/PRST/1999/2).

The 1999 Rambouillet/ Paris talks between Serb and Albanian authorities were brokered by the Contact Group. The main elements of Rambuouillet talks included a ceasefire and a peace settlement granting a higher level of autonomy to Kosovo. The implementation of the settlement was trusted to the international military presence. The first round of talks led to agreements on a set of issues known as Rambouillet Accords. In second round, Serbian side asked for some fundamental changes in the Accords but meanwhile continued their offences. The Contact Group claimed that they could welcome just technical changes and considered the attitude of Serb authorities as a sign of unwillingness for concluding a negotiated solution. In such a context, they found the continuation of the talks meaningless.

Belgrade ignored the warnings and efforts to end the violent confrontation. Holbrooke's last visit to Belgrade did not brought any positive result. As such, the failure of diplomatic efforts led to the NATO air campaign against Serbia on 24 March 1999. NATO decided to take collective action with the purpose of ending ethnic cleansing and removing Serbian forces from Kosovo. NATO supposed that short air campaign on Belgrade would convince Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet Agreement. But they did not predict that bombings might lead to retaliation and increased attacks on Kosovo Albanians. NATO bombings were countered by Milosevic regime by continued

violent campaign against civilians in Kosovo. This situation pushed NATO to expand the air campaign that increased the probability of civilian causalities that they aimed to avoid. Milosevic capitulated after 79 days of bombing.

The UN Security Council adopted 1244 resolution in June 1999 that removed Serbia's rule in Kosovo, placed Kosovo under UN administration (UNMIK), and authorized a peacekeeping force (KFOR) to ensure the security in the ground (S/RES/1244, 1999). In addition, this resolution opened space for self-governance and for the initiation of a political process of Kosovo's future status facilitated at first by UN and later by EU. Even though the aim was to have some dialogue and agreement among parties, it was not a requirement of the resolution. The status options were not defined. Therefore, from this resolution, independence remained a possibility. Being under an international administration had its benefits and repercussions for Kosovo. While UN helped Kosovo state building, it also hindered the creation of a culture of state building.

Several diplomatic initiatives to end the violent conflict in Kosovo were unsuccessful. The political will of external actors to engage in "diplomatic efforts could only be mobilized after the conflict escalated into full-scale violence" (The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p. 134). "Multiple and divergent agendas and expectations and mixed signals from the international community impeded effective diplomacy" (The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p. 160). Diplomatic negotiations might have been successful had they been employed before the escalation of violent confrontation. Once the threshold and intensity of the conflict increased, negotiations became more difficult. The diplomatic efforts somehow satisfied Kosovo's need for more autonomy. However, Serbia was afraid that such negotiations would lead to independence, which was their red line. Eventually, the UN, EU and

NATO were the main actors that intervened in the conflict. The first two were the main interested parties in solving the problem through negotiated settlements. NATO entered the scene to threaten Serbia with air strikes after delayed and failed diplomatic intervention. Also, opposed to the Bosnian case, in Kosovo there was no any peace settlement after the military intervention brought a ceasefire.

Tensions between Kosovo and Serbia continued after the military intervention that put an end to massive violence. Serbia and other countries like Russia that opposed intervention defined it as illegal and refused to accept the outcomes of the intervention. Kosovo was satisfied with the ceasefire and the end of Serbian rule, but a fully recognized independence remained a goal to be achieved. Intervention led to the withdrawal of Serbian army and police from Kosovo, end of oppression against Kosovo Albanians, and an agreement close to Rambouillet Accord. On the other side, Milosevic remained in power, Kosovo was lost, and Serbian people suffered the economic and civilian consequences of the bombings. As such, NATO intervention stopped the violence but did not solve the long-lasting conflict in Kosovo. The Kosovo's status question remained unresolved. As summarized in Table 2, similar with Bosnia-Herzegovina, post-conflict Kosovo is still in a state of negative peace.

Table 2. Intervention in Kosovo Conflict

	Phase	Nature	Methods	Outcome
Before 1998	Pre-Conflict	Multilateral (UN, EU, Contact Group)	Diplomatic	No Settlement Violence Confrontation
1998-1999	Violent Confrontation	Unilateral (NATO-U.S.)	Military Diplomatic	No Settlement Violent Confrontation Ended
After 1999	Post-Conflict	Multilateral	Diplomatic	Negative Peace

In the post conflict stage, the need for prevention of conflict reemergence, reconstruction and development of Kosovo was apparent. UN took the main responsibility for the political administration of Kosovo through UN Mission in Kosovo (UMNIK) and NATO was the main security provider through KFOR- peacekeeping forces. Under UMNIK, EU was responsible for reconstruction and development issues. Even though it looked like a minor role assigned to EU, its member states were key players in other pillars of UMNIK. The status question, and the social, economic, and political reconstruction, are the main post conflict issues in Kosovo. Addressing these issues would open the path to positive peace among Kosovo Albanians and Serbs.

5.4 Ethnic tensions and challenges to post-conflict Kosovo's governance and sovereignty

In the aftermath of military campaign, Kosovo emerged as a region lacking appropriate institutions of governance and institutional capacity; state legitimacy and territorial integrity; rule of law; problems in ethnic-power sharing and decentralization; nonoperation of public service structures; and a precarious economic situation (UN Doc. S/1999/779). Also, it has been challenged by problems with refugee return, inter-ethnic violence and growing criminal groups and activities (UN Doc. S/1999/779). Even though NATO intervention removed Belgrade's authority over Kosovo, Albanians continued their quest for independence and Kosovo Serbs for remaining within Serbia. After the declaration of independence, Kosovo aimed to achieve recognition by Serbia and dismantling of Serb parallel structures. On the other side, Serbia remained adamant in rejecting Kosovo's independence and aims at securing protection and rights of

113

Kosovo Serbs, which, in turn, refused to acknowledge Kosovo's state legitimacy, autonomy, and even self-determination.

The ambiguity of its political status, lack of universal recognition of its independence, and long-term presence of different UN and EU missions, institutions and agencies in its territory challenged the existence the new Kosovo state. After almost two decades of international supervision and one decade since the declaration of independence the stability in Kosovo continues to be threatened by ethnic tensions and challenges to its government and sovereignty. Challenges come firstly from a divided international response on state and peace building that impedes the effective functioning of Kosovo's institutions; secondly from status ambiguity that limits its sovereignty; and thirdly from the "operation of Serb parallel structures in North Kosovo that undermine territorial integrity and domestic sovereignty" (Vioska, 2011, p. 29). These three challenges are closely related to the three main limitations on sovereignty. Therefore, the imposed democratization has produced a fragile peace in Kosovo (Vioska, 2011, p. 27).

5.4.1   International presence

The international presence has its benefits and consequences in Kosovo's post conflict environment. The main priority was to lay the ground for the achievement of sustainable peace. The main tasks in this regard included establishment of law and order, and construction of a multiethnic society. UN and EU have played an important role in defining the status of Kosovo, and in shaping and strengthening its institutions. As highlighted by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000, p. 9), the Resolution 1244 established "a unique institutional hybrid" meaning that FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) would keep formal sovereignty but international agencies like NATO,

OSCE and EU under UN leadership will deal with the political and economic reconstruction of Kosovo. Under this resolution UN, through the Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK), was responsible for governing Kosovo but the structure and authority of this mission were not defined by the resolution (Vioska, 2011). In such a context the main dilemma was "whether it would exercise sole authority or share power with local institutions" (Zaum, 2007, p. 132).

Kosovo's first government was formed in March 2002. It had limited authority and functioned as an international protectorate under UN administration until 2008. The reorganization of international presence, focusing on stronger EU involvement, followed the approval of the Constitution of Kosovo in June 2008 by its National Assembly. The functions of UN presence in post-independence Kosovo include Prishtina-Belgrade dialogue facilitation; monitoring and reporting of Kosovo-Serbia relations; and "facilitation of Kosovo's engagement in international agreements" (UN Doc. S/2008/354, p. 5). Also, the duties of OSCE shifted from institution building to "early warning and proactive monitoring of local institutions and community rights" (Vioska, 2011, p. 29). EULEX focuses on strengthening law and justice sectors through training and monitoring of institutions belonging to these sectors in Kosovo (EU Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP).

The international presence was thus instrumental in the establishment of negative peace in Kosovo and producing some post-war repercussions. Rather than contributing in building the ground for the establishment of a functional peaceful Kosovo state and society, it has consolidated Kosovo's fragilities. It has its own impact on Kosovo's failure in consolidation of sovereignty; state building and self-governance, and establishment of the rule of law. Kosovo government's authority and independence have

been limited by the long-term presence of international missions and institutions as guarantor of stability. These institutions were supposed "to supervise the status settlement and to gradually pass full governance power to local authorities" (Vioska, 2011, p. 28). But, as stated by Narten (2009, p. 252), "the achievements in promoting local ownership were too frail". Even though the end of 'supervised independence' was declared in September 2012, the international actors continued to be on the ground. Based on EU Council Decision CFSP 2018/856, the mandate of EULEX in Kosovo was reextended until 14 June 2020. This decision points the extensive dependence of Kosovo on external support and its inability to have fully independent structures for managing ethnic relations.

EU has played an important role in facilitating status talks. EU has defined status settlement as a pre-condition for EU accession of Kosovo and Serbia and has used it to bring parties to negotiation table. Kosovo-Belgrade negotiations, starting with the Technical Dialogue (2011-2012), have moved ahead under EU pressure. The 2016 European Commission Report on Kosovo stated that "most agreements from the Technical Dialogue (2011-2012) are now implemented and functioning" (European Commission Report on Kosovo, 2016, p. 33). But, the last European Commission Report on Kosovo (2018, p. 48) highlights that some of these agreements are not implemented yet.

Even though Serbia refuses to recognize 'de jure' the independence of Kosovo, entering in dialogue with Kosovo and the achievement of Brussels Agreement in 2013 shows a 'de facto' recognition. The agreement included 15 points on the normalization of Kosovo-Serbia relations. Almost half of the points in this agreement are related to the formation of the Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities in Kosovo.

Other points focus on issues like regulation of police and security structures; conduct of elections under Kosovo's law; supply of energy and telecommunications. Article 14 of the Brussels Agreement (2013, p.2) focuses on bilateral relations stating that "neither side will block or encourage others to block the other side's progress in their respective EU paths".

According to the last European Commission Report on Kosovo (2018), there has been progress in the implementation of 2013 Brussel Agreement. Agreements on justice, energy and telecom have been concluded. "All former Serbian judicial personnel are now fully integrated into the Kosovo system, as are Kosovo Serb police and civil protection personnel." (European Commission Report on Kosovo, 2018, p. 48). Also, there is a full implementation of justice agreement (European Commission Report on Kosovo, 2018). The domestic political tensions in Kosovo; electoral processes in Serbia; construction in 2016 of Mitrovica wall that was later dismantled slowed down the implementation of the agreement (European Commission Report on Kosovo, 2016; Crisis Group, 2017). However, the situation was recovered "in August 2016 with the start of the work on the Mitrovica/Mitrovicë bridge and freedom of movement" (European Commission Report on Kosovo, 2016). The 2017 train incident; the 2017 arrest of former prime minister of Kosovo Ramush Haradinaj based on Serbian warrant; and assassination of the Kosovo Serb politician Oliver Ivanovic in 2018 were some other events that influenced Kosovo-Serbia dialogue processes and agreement implementation.

One of the most contested issues of Brussels Agreement has been the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities in Kosovo. Even though an agreement is made on 25 August 2015 concerning this issue,

there are problems with its implementation. Its establishment means acceptance of Kosovo's government but also autonomy for municipalities dominated by Kosovo Serbs. Both, the Albanian and Serb population have been skeptical of the establishment of the association. Kosovo Albanians perceive it as a threat to Kosovo's sovereignty since it might lead to partition of the North Kosovo. Also, they fear that Serbia is taking a moderate position because of its interest in joining the EU and that they can change their position after integration. On the other hand, Kosovo Serbs which are not included at all in the dialogue process feel being used by Serbia for its EU aspirations. Likewise, the other excluded communities feel ignored and worried about their rights. The 2018 European Commission Report on Kosovo highlight that Kosovo has made progress on the establishment of the Association by giving "a mandate to the Management Team to start drafting the statute of the Association/Community" (European Commission Report on Kosovo, 2018, p. 48).

The external intervention has contributed on the achievement of negative peace and stability in Kosovo but has not been successful in creating functioning domestic structures that would transform relations among ethnic communities in conflict. Undefined status of Kosovo is perceived as a threat to the security and rights of ethnic communities and has been an obstacle to peacebuilding efforts. While Kosovo leadership considers it as a threat to their independence, Kosovo Serbs fear marginalization and discrimination, and Serbia fear losing Kosovo once and for all. In Kosovo peace has meant continuous presence of different international actors instead of the dreamed autonomy and progress. Kosovo remains a hostage of power politics in the region, 1244 resolution and EU integration process. According to 2018 Human Rights

Watch Report on Kosovo (para. 28) overall, "the process of normalizing relations with Belgrade made limited progress".

5.4.2   Ethnic power sharing and decentralization

Ethnic power-sharing has been considered as the most appropriate mechanism to promote "the integration of all ethnic groups and to avoid partition" of Kosovo (Vioska, 2011, p. 32). It is based on a quota system of representation meaning that some seats in the central and local governance are allocated to minority ethnic groups (Roeder & Rothchild, 2005, p. 31). Securing space for political participation of ethnic minorities was considered as an important step to facilitate their reintegration and encourage ethnic coexistence. The power sharing approach includes the decentralization of power to intermediate and local governments (Vioska, 2011).

After the declaration of independence, decentralization and the establishment of municipalities with Serb majority was considered by inter/national policy makers as an essential method for satisfying Serb community and handling the unsettled status of Kosovo (Deda, 2009, p. 3). The central government that administrates the Republic, parliament and judiciary is dominated by Kosovo Albanians even though there are quotas for minority communities. Municipalities have the control of municipal administration and assembly (Loew, 2013). Decentralization policy was aimed to form municipalities with Serb majorities, and other minorities' interests were hardly considered while designing this policy (Loew, 2013). Kosovo has 37 municipalities, 28 with Albanian majority, 8 with Serb majority and one with Turkish majority. Even though cooperation among local and central governance exist, the competencies of municipalities are undermined by the central government and the political elite that tries

to keep them under control. Hierarchical party structures and the lack of separation of powers within municipalities are some other problems faced at local level (Hajnal/Péteri 2010, p. 42).

In Kosovo twelve municipalities are defined as heterogenous with at least 10% of population belonging to non-majority communities. Ethnic decentralization model has been followed in the case of Serb community, and territorial decentralization model in the case of other non-majority communities (Loew, 2017). Interethnic cooperation exists in structures of heterogeneous municipalities that follow the design of territorial decentralization. These structures have been contributing in conflict transformation through promotion of constructive interethnic cooperation and integration; representation of non-majorities in central governance; and development of moderated political discourses (Loew, 2017). Still, the political elites' pressure on local representatives has been reducing their freedom of action; the ethnic identity salience remains high; the cross-cutting cleavages are undeveloped and political parties continue to be organized along ethnic identity lines (Loew, 2017). Ethnic decentralization has not contributed in conflict transformation in homogeneous municipalities. As in the case of northern provinces of Kosovo, it intensifies ethnic communities' pretentions for self-determination and leads to marginalization of non-majority ethnic communities (Loew, 2017). Decentralization policy can lead to ethnic polarization too. Some Albanians are against decentralization policy because they perceive it as a source of ethnical division of Kosovo's territory that mainly benefits Kosovo Serbs (Tahiri 2010, p. 15). Debates in local structures on issues of high relevance for ethnic identity can be another area of polarization at local level.

5.4.3 Serb parallel structures

The authority of Kosovo's municipalities in the North is undermined by Serb parallel structures. "Although experts notice an improvement in the cooperation and integration among the ethnic communities on the local level, everyday life between the different ethnic individuals is still highly separated and ethnicity remains being the most important social group" (Loew, 2017, p. 22). These structures are supported by Serbia that rejects Kosovo's independence. Rejection and methods of power sharing at local level has slowed down the progress of decentralization process too (Vioska, 2011). Kosovo is characterized by a divided society because of enduring pre-war issues and post-war status related issues. Since it was perceived as an ethnic conflict one of the main goals of international actors was to establish a multiethnic society in Kosovo, but their strategy brought more segregation among Albanians and Serbs.

Despite UNMIK's efforts to build mutual tolerance and respect, it could not prevent the creation of Serb enclaves (Kllokoqi et al., 2008). "Even though the majority of Serbs in Kosovo live outside 'Northern Kosovo' it is the latter that sparks major problems in the country" (Demjaha, 2017, p. 188). North Kosovo is dominated by ethnic Serbs that live in their own enclaves and have established their parallel political structures. These structures have been challenging the authority and legitimacy of central government in this area and impeding the participation and representation of Serb population in Kosovo's central government bodies (Kingston & Spears 2004; Vioska, 2011). Also, because of their common ethnic identity they feel strongly attached and operate under the influence and support of Belgrade. Overall, they seem like 'states within states' and their existence threatens Kosovo's territorial integrity and domestic stability (Kingston and Spears 2004; Vioska, 2011). Clashes in this area have been

producing the worst violence after war but also have fostered the initiation of status talks (ICG Europe Report No 155, 2004). Approaching 20 years since 1998-1999 war, Mitrovica city continues to be "divided between ethnic Serbs, living north of the Ibar river, and ethnic Albanians, south of it" (Xhemaj, 2018). Even though extremely violent clashes did not occur, the city remains tense, international forces deployed and overall situation fragile. "Kosovo police registered 15 cases of inter-ethnic violence between January and August 2017" (Human Rights Watch, Serbia/Kosovo, 2018). The most recent event explaining the tensioned situation is the murder of Oliver Ivanović, a moderate Kosovo Serb politician, in January 2018.

"In his quarterly report on the situation in Kosovo, UN Secretary-General Guterres in May expressed concern about ethno-nationalist sentiments and called on parties to act responsibly to diminish inter-ethnic tensions" (Human Rights Watch, Serbia/Kosovo, 2018). External intervention could not contribute in creating a functioning Kosovo state. Moreover, "The parallel structures legitimize and justify the continuation of the UN presence; likewise, the UN and OSCE presence in the North of Kosovo facilitates the de facto functioning of Serb parallel structures by hindering the exercise of authority by the Kosovo government" (Vioska, 2011, p. 31). A recent effort on demarcation of borders that includes exchange of territories has raised debates on the repercussions of such a policy.

5.4.4   Economy and rule of law

Economic situation is another serious issue in post conflict Kosovo. Economic problems and unemployment are shared by all ethnic communities in Kosovo. The economy is too much dependent on foreign aid, donations and remittances from diaspora. Economic

problems are an obstacle to the achievement of sustainable peace. High level of unemployment is a real challenge for the whole Kosovar society. Some of its consequences in Kosovo are migration, informal economy, and an environment that can lead to social strain and country-wide destabilization (Vioska, 2011, p. 34). The unstable economic situation has aggravated ethnic tensions and decreased trust on state institutions. "The process of economic reform should prioritize welfare and empowerment of the most marginalized" (Richmond 2010, p. 33). Also, the local actors should lead economic development (Richmond 2010). Until now, EU as responsible actor for economic development, has not achieved much in this regard. Especially youth unemployment in an unstable country like Kosovo, can raise tensions.

The judiciary appears to be one of the problematic sectors responsible for Kosovo's deficiencies in the rule of law (Vioska, 2011). "Kosovo's body of applicable laws remains a series of divided areas between UNMIK regulations, laws adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo in accordance with the new Constitution, certain former Yugoslav laws, and the laws of Serbia through Belgrade's parallel Kosovo structures in Kosovo Serb areas, especially in northern Kosovo" (Freedom House Report on Kosovo, 2010, p. 276). The European Commission Report on Kosovo (2016), notices progress on the adoption of amendments to the constitution. However, it argues that Kosovo's justice system is slow, inefficient, suffers from unaccountability of judicial officials, vulnerable to political interference, funding and human resources (European Commission Report on Kosovo, 2016).

Kosovo's peace seems stable but not sustainable. There is no war since 1999 and no large-scale violent confrontation since 2004 riots. However, "the path to sustainable peace is obstructed by fragile governance, fragmented ethnic power-sharing and by the

overlapping and contested international presences that allow the functioning of Serb parallel structures and hold the situation of North Kosovo in limbo" (Vioska, 2011, p. 34). The future of Kosovo will be determined by these obstacles and some important developments that are occurring: the Prishtina – Belgrade dialogue facilitated by EU and UN aiming to define Kosovo- Serbia relations, the status of North Kosovo, and integration of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo society. While Kosovo's leadership has been focused on solving mutual issues on state level; Serbs struggle for determining the status of North Kosovo (either partition or extensive autonomy); and EU aims to reach an agreement between "parties to overcome their differences in order to progress within the European integration agenda" (Vioska, 2011, p. 35).

CHAPTER 6:

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND KOSOVO CONFLICTS COMPARED

The collapse of communism and the processes of transition to democracy constitute the

main structural changes that preceded conflicts within the Yugoslav federation. These

changes contributed to economic, political, and social insecurity, and uncertainty in all

Yugoslav entities including Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Regime change removed

the structures that used to manage ethnic relations and the new democratic structures to

fill this gap were not in place yet. The existing political institutions were not capable of

handling ethnic tensions and the political elite made use of ethnic emotions for their own

ends. Territorial, economic and political factors rest at the core of both conflicts.

Relations among ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo turned to ethno-

political competition for power and resources escalating to harsh violent confrontations

with tragic consequences. Even though the ethnic or cultural differences among

conflicting parties were in fact not the main sources of conflict, at least as catalysts, they

contributed to the severity of these conflicts.

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo continue to work on their social, economic and

political reconstruction after almost three decades since the end of violence. "Third

parties like NATO, UN and EU have been involved in [these conflicts] with the aim of

ending the violence and finding peaceful conflict resolution strategies" (Vila, 2013, p.

27). Yet, the establishment of sustainable peace remains a critical task to be achieved in

both cases. The analysis of the context - the conflict actors, conflict sources, nature and

type of intervention – marks a crucial step for better understanding these conflicts. But

the analysis of post-conflict structural transformation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

Kosovo is also necessary to understand the current situation in both cases. The aim of this chapter is to compare the impact of the developments in the past, in terms of the intervention process, on the current situation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Furthermore, it proposes to analyze and compare their progress toward sustainable peace.

6.1   Intervention and structural transformation

6.1.1.   Intervention

The international actors have played important roles as third parties in Kosovo and in Bosnian conflicts. However, an initial comparison reveals some important differences in the actual processes of intervention. The first difference is related to the timing of intervention. The international actors have been present throughout all conflict stages in Bosnian conflict, but this was not the case with the Kosovo issue. The early warning signals of Kosovo conflict were ignored during Dayton negotiations. The political will for diplomatic intervention emerged after the escalation of the conflict in scale and intensity. This difference in timing for intervention is closely related to the type and outcome of intervention.

There have been military and diplomatic intervention effort for both cases. The diplomatic efforts to prevent the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina were not successful because they did not meet the demands of conflicting parties. However, once the Kosovo entered the agenda of international politics, it was too late for diplomatic intervention. Diplomatic efforts might have been successful in Kosovo had they been employed before the escalation of conflict. Once the threshold and intensity of the conflict

increased, the need for response became immediate and the probability for successful

negotiations diminished. Therefore, diplomatic interventions failed in preventing the

wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo because of different reasons.

Once the violent conflict reached a stalemate, military intervention followed in

both cases. Military intervention was multilateral and resulted in a peace agreement in

the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Dayton Peace Accords aimed to address the

structural sources of Bosnian conflict that have been rooted in competition for power

and resources. On the other hand, unsuccessful late diplomatic intervention opened the

road to the military intervention of NATO in Kosovo. The US-led NATO military

intervention process was conducted without UN Security Council's authorization. Its

legitimacy has been questioned and has contributed to Serbia's resistance to negotiate on

the post-war status of Kosovo. As summarized in Table 3, opposed to Bosnian case, a

negotiated settlement was not achieved after the military intervention in Kosovo.

Kosovo was put under the international administration. After the war both Kosovo and

Bosnia-Herzegovina were in a state of negative peace.

Table 3. Intervention in BiH and in Kosovo

	Pre-Conflict		Violent Confrontation	
	Type	Outcome	Type	Outcome
BiH	Multilateral Diplomatic	Unsuccessful	Multilateral Military Multilateral Diplomatic	Dayton Peace Accords
Kosovo	-	-	Multilateral Diplomatic Military Intervention	No Peace Agreement Kosovo under International Administration

6.1.2. Post-conflict situation

As argued before, third party intervention was successful in ending violent confrontation in both cases, but they produced different post-war dynamics. The Dayton Peace Accords designed a power sharing structure for Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, instead of encouraging interethnic cooperation it resulted in establishing a complex state structure; the overt presence of international actors like UN and EU threatening state's domestic political legitimacy; and ultimately led to the institutionalization of ethnicity. It defined a decentralized system of governance that weakened the central government. Ethnic groups continue to insist on their incompatible positions on Bosnia-Herzegovina's future. In sum, the power sharing structure agreed in Dayton rather than moving parties

 towards a peaceful coexistence, has institutionalized ethnic divisions.

After almost two decades of international supervision and one decade since the declaration of independence, the stability in Kosovo continues to be threatened by ethnic tensions and challenges to its governance and sovereignty. Like in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international presence challenged the new Kosovo state's legitimacy too. The long-term presence of international actors like UN and EU has been hindering the establishment of a state-building culture and effective functioning of Kosovo's institutions. Another challenge for post-conflict Kosovo remains the ambiguity of its political status and the lack of universal and domestic recognition of its sovereignty and independence, as opposed to the Bosnia-Herzegovina case. As summarized in Table 4, while institutionalization of ethnicities is an issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo's existence as a state continues to be challenged.

Table 4. Intervention and Post-Conflict Situation in BiH and in Kosovo

	Type of Intervention	Outcome	Post Conflict Situation
BiH	Military Diplomatic	Dayton Peace Accords	Negative Peace Institutionalization of Ethnicities
Kosovo	Military	Kosovo under International Administration	Negative Peace Limited Sovereignty

This study reveals that: diplomatic intervention contributed to the institutionalization of ethnicities in Bosnia-Herzegovina; military intervention produced a limited sovereignty in Kosovo; and overt international presence after intervention has hindered the development of a state building culture in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo. These results answer the first research question of this study: What is the relationship between the intervention process and post-conflict structural transformation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo? The answer supports the following hypotheses:

1. External diplomatic intervention contributed to the institutionalization of ethnicities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2. External military intervention produced a limited sovereignty in Kosovo.

3. Post-intervention overt presence of international actors has hindered the development of a state building culture in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo.

6.2   Progress toward sustainable peace

The second research question of this study focuses on the relationship between post-conflict structural transformation and progress toward sustainable peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo. The Global Peace Index (GPI) and Positive Peace Index (PPI) are employed to analyze the progress toward sustainable peace for each case. The indicators for GPI and PPI are presented in Table 5 and Table 6 respectively.

Table 5. Global Peace Index Indicators

PILLAR	INDICATOR	No
Ongoing Domestic & International Conflict	Number and duration of internal conflicts	1
	Number of deaths from external organized conflict	2
	Number of deaths from internal organized conflict	3
	Number, duration, and role in external conflicts	4
	Intensity of organized internal conflict	5
	Relations with neighboring countries	6
Societal Safety & Security	Level of perceived criminality in society	7
	Number of refugees and displaced persons as percentage of population	8
	Political instability	9
	Impact of terrorism	10
	Political terror	11
	Number of homicides per 100,000 people	12
	Level of violent crime	13
	Likelihood of violent demonstrations	14
	Number of jailed persons per 100,000 people	15
	Number of internal security officers and police per 100,000 people	16
Militarization	Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP	17
	Number of armed-services personnel per 100,000	18
	Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people	19
	Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as supplier (exports) per 100,000 people	20
	Financial contribution to UN peacekeeping missions	21
	Nuclear and heavy weapons capability	22
	Ease of access to small arms and light weapons	23

Table 6. Positive Peace Index Indicators

PILLAR	INDICATOR	No
Well-functioning Government	Democratic political culture	1
	Government effectiveness	2
	Rule of law	3
Sound Business Environment	Business environment	4
	Economic freedom overall score	5
	GDP per capita	6
Low Levels of Corruption	Factionalized elites	7
	Perceptions of corruption score	8
	Control of corruption	9
High Levels of Human Capital	Secondary school enrolment	10
	Global Innovation Index	11
	Youth Development Index overall score	12
Free Flow of Information	Freedom of the Press Index overall score	13
	Mobile phone subscription rate	14
	World Press Freedom Index overall score	15
Good Relations with Neighbors	Hostility to foreigners	16
	Number of visitors	17
	Regional integration	18
Equitable Distribution of Resources	Inequality-adjusted life expectancy	19
	Social mobility	20
	Poverty gap	21
Acceptance of the Rights of Others	Empowerment Index	22
	Group grievance rating	23
	Gender inequality	24

131

GPI and PPI reports, starting from 2007, are annually produced by the Institute for Economy and Peace with the aim of measuring relative peacefulness of 163 countries. GPI measures negative peace or the absence of direct violence or fear of violence. It is based on an analysis of 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators on three main pillars: ongoing domestic and international conflicts, societal safety and security, and militarization as listed in Table 5. PPI "is the first global, quantitative approach to defining and measuring Positive Peace and is based on the social factors that have strongest statistically significant relationships with the absence of violence" (PPI, 2016, p. 3). As presented in table 6, it is based on an analysis of 24 quantitative indicators in eight pillars: community relations, government transparency, high levels of human capital, free flow of information, equitable distribution of resources, acceptance of the rights of others, sound economic environment, well-functioning government (PPI, 2016).

Based on Global Peace Index (GPI) and Positive Peace Index (PPI) data, positive and negative peace scores for the last five years (2013-2018) for Bosnia-Herzegovina and for Kosovo are presented in Table 7. These data are used to analyze and compare the negative peace and positive peace situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo, and consequently their progress toward sustainable peace. PPI focuses on attitudes, institutions and structures that sustain peace. Higher score means lower level of positive or negative peace. If positive peace is relatively higher than negative peace, a country is said to have a positive peace surplus meaning that it has capacities to move toward higher levels of peacefulness (PPI 2015, p. 34). In case of a positive peace deficit, it lacks those capacities.

132

Table 7. Positive and Negative Peace Scores of BiH and Kosovo

	BiH		Kosovo	
	GPI Score	PPI Score	GPI Score	PPI Score
2013	1.967	no data	1.969	no data
2014	1.902	no data	1.929	no data
2015	1.839	2.955	1.938	2.564
2016	1.915	-	2.022	-
2017	2.035	3.060	2.007	3.610
2018	2.065	3.080	2.078	3.560

The GPI score for Bosnia-Herzegovina has been in decrease from 2013 to 2015 reaching its lowest score in 2015. Despite the progress on negative peace, the PPI score in 2015 is higher than GPI score meaning that negative peace is relatively higher than positive peace producing positive peace deficit. The positive peace deficit corresponds with the victory of nationalist parties in October 2012 local elections and 2013-2014 massive protests against the Bosnian government. They show the prevalence of nationalism and how people organize around ethnic identity in times of instability.

Starting from 2016, the GPI score has been in increase showing a regress on negative peace for Bosnia-Herzegovina. This corresponds to the period of conviction of Karadic and Mladic for war crimes and with the nationalist Milorad Dodik wining the Serbian seat in federal presidency that raised ethnic tensions. In last two years, the positive peace decreased, and positive peace deficit continued to exist but in lower levels. The main positive event in this period has been Bosnia-Herzegovina's application to join the EU and also some reflections on the need for revising Dayton Accords. By the end of 2018, Bosnia-Herzegovina was in regress on positive and negative peace and consequently on sustainable peace. The negative and positive peace situation in Bosnia-

Herzegovina corresponds to the domestic political crisis product of an unstable leadership, problematic socio-economic situation, challenged legitimacy of Bosnian government and the triumph of nationalist parties and rhetoric. All these events show a state of political stalemate in Bosnia-Herzegovina emphasizing ethnic division and aggravating ethnic relations. Therefore, Bosnia-Herzegovina lack progress toward sustainable peace and the potential for conflict reemergence exists.

The lowest GPI score for Kosovo meaning higher level of negative peace has been recorded in 2014 that corresponds to the period after the achievement of Brussels Agreement in 2013. Regress on negative peace started in 2015 followed by highest increase in GPI score in 2016 that corresponds to domestic political tensions and construction of Mitrovica wall. Another increase in GPI score is seen in 2018 after the 2017 train incident; the 2017 arrest of former prime minister of Kosovo Ramush Haradinaj based on Serbian warrant; and assassination of the Kosovo Serb politician Oliver Ivanovic in 2018. Similarly, there is positive peace deficit in 2015, 2017 and 2018 in Kosovo. However, while the negative peace score increased in 2018, the positive peace score and positive peace deficit decreased mainly due to the dialogue mediated by EU but still the scores remain very high. Hence, any event with ethnic connotations has high potential to increase ethnic tensions and intolerance in Kosovo. Like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo is lacking progress toward sustainable peace.

2018 marks the highest GPI scores for both cases which shows regress in negative peace. Comparing across cases and years, negative peace in Kosovo is at a lower level than in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is parallel to the fact that Kosovo's sovereignty and legitimacy is challenged. However, in the last year, Kosovo showed higher progress toward positive peace considering that PPI scores increased in case of

Bosnia-Herzegovina and decreased in case of Kosovo in 2018 compared to 2017. The progress of Kosovo-Serbia dialogue under EU mediation can explain this progress. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite reflections, there are no real steps taken to review the Dayton Accords yet. The positive peace deficit has been decreasing for both cases, but it remains higher in the case of Kosovo. Overall, by the end of 2018, the potentials for moving towards sustainable peace in Kosovo have been lower than in Bosnia-Herzegovina considering higher levels of PPI scores and higher positive peace deficit.

This study infers that in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo, peace is stable but not sustainable. Sustainable peace is possible once the values of positive peace are established through the elimination of structural, cultural, or physical violence. The information presented in the previous chapters suggest that third party intervention ended physical but not structural violence in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This chapter adds some important arguments.

First, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been in regress on positive and negative peace and consequently on sustainable peace which shows that Dayton Peace Accords has failed in establishing sustainable peace in this country. Bosnia-Herzegovina can move toward sustainable peace through reforms but also a revision of the Dayton - established structure. Today, EU accession process appears as the most promising tool for building sustainable peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina since it requires radical political and structural reforms and is the only national objective supported by all three ethnic groups. The EU initiative, launched by Germany and Britain in 2014, promised meaningful progress in EU accession process. Through Reform Agenda they aimed to shift the focus to socioeconomic reform by arguing that long-running debates on political reforms should

not be an obstacle to the progress on socioeconomic reform. According to EU Progress Report of 2016, Bosnia-Herzegovina has made "meaningful progress in the implementation of the Reform Agenda" that was a pre-condition for EU membership application (European Commission, 2016, p. 75). Also, "Cooperation between state-level, entity-level and Brčko district parliaments has improved" (European Commission, 2016, p. 6). Still, nationalist discourse persists, and the political elite have failed to agree on the reforms required for EU integration. On March 2018, pushed by EU's enlargement conditionality of solving disputes, the leaders of three ethnic groups entered discussion on finding ways to improve their relations and increase cooperation but is better to 'wait and see' how productive such discussions will be.

Secondly, that Kosovo has been in regress on negative peace but in slight progress on positive peace that is closely related to the ongoing process of Pristina-Belgrade dialogue. The diverging interests and goals of parties make this dialogue even more challenging. Stability in Kosovo requires the formation of "functioning, democratic state with coherent, legal, and representative political structures", and improvement of relations between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs in Kosovo, cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia (Vioska, 2011, p. 35). All the above-mentioned issues would open the door to EU integration that hopefully will be an assurance for lasting stability.

However, because of relatively low levels of positive peace and high levels of peace deficit, Kosovo has less capacity to move toward sustainable peace than Bosnia-Herzegovina which lacks incentives in this regard. The findings of this study highlight the existence of post-conflict structural problems in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and lacking progress toward sustainable peace. Therefore, it also supports the last

hypothesis that 'There is a positive relationship among post-conflict structural transformation and progress toward sustainable peace in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina'.

CHAPTER 7:

CONCLUDING REMARKS

7.1   Conclusion and discussion

Even though the level of violent confrontation has declined, still the efforts for the
achievement of sustainable peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo continues.
Based on a framework that considers structural and relational transformation as the main
dimensions of conflict transformation, this study intended to find out and compare the
role of intervention process on post-conflict environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in
Kosovo. The results are derived from a detailed analysis for each case of the main
conflict sources; interventions process and outcome; and post-conflict environment,
focusing on structural transformation as the first and most important dimension of
conflict transformation and also progress toward sustainable peace.

Overall, the findings of this study support the following hypotheses:

1. External diplomatic intervention contributed to the institutionalization of ethnicities
    in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2. External military intervention produced a limited sovereignty in Kosovo.

3. Post-intervention overt presence of international actors has hindered the
    development of a state building culture in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo.

4. There is a positive relationship between post-conflict structural transformation and
    progress toward sustainable peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo.

Stability in Kosovo requires the formation of a "functioning, democratic state with
coherent, legal, and representative political structures", improvement of relations
between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs in Kosovo, and cooperation between Kosovo

and Serbia (Vioska, 2011, p. 35). All the above-mentioned issues would open the door to EU integration that hopefully will be an assurance for lasting stability. Bosnia-Herzegovina can move toward sustainable peace through reforms but also through a revision of the Dayton - established structure. Today, EU accession process appears as the most promising tool for building sustainable peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina since it requires political and structural reforms and is the only national objective supported by all three ethnic groups.

This study suggests that in Bosnia-Herzegovina a revision of power sharing structure with the purpose of encouraging inter-ethnic cooperation rather than institutionalization of ethnic differences might bring progress toward sustainable peace. In Kosovo, the clarification of its status would be the first step toward positive peace otherwise parties will remain in their enclaves insisting on their positions. Moreover, there is a need for the development of a state building culture in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Additionally, EU appears as the key actor to contribute to peace and stability in these two cases.

7.2 Limitations and implications

Some limitations might influence the validity and reliability of the present study. "Qualitative research is an interpretative and subjective exercise, and the researcher is intimately involved in the process." (Pope & Mays in Lacey & Luff, 2007, p. 6). Considering that conflict analysis is a subjective activity, the choice of the data can reflect researchers' attitude and indirectly influence the conflict analysis process. Also, in addition to researcher's subjectivity and interpretations, the data used in this study is limited to published sources and is subject to bias. Moreover, the results of this study are

based on an analyses and comparison of only two cases and they are valid only for cases under consideration. As such, this study is not necessarily value free and appropriate for generalizations. Extending this research to a larger pool of cases would increase the reliability of the conclusions reached.

Secondly, the dynamic situation in the ground in Kosovo and Bosnian makes conflict assessment a difficult task at any fixed time point. The rapid changes in conflict context and characteristics can bring new insights and dynamics at any moment.

Lastly, this study examines conflict transformation in post-conflict environment. It focuses on structural transformation as the most important pillar within conflict transformation. However, it does not look at relational transformation. Further studies that consider relational transformation too, would provide a more wholistic picture of conflict transformation in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This study offers important theoretical implications. First, it brings a critical view to the orientation in conflict resolution towards negative peace, and instead, calls for a focus on positive peace. Second, the problems of intervention in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina have been studied even before, but this study goes further in understanding the long-term (post-conflict) effects of interventions. Overall, it contributes to the literature of conflict studies by trying to uncover the relation between intervention and conflict transformation.

Exploring and understanding some pitfalls with intervention has important practical and policy implications. It suggests the need to focus on long-run effects during the intervention process. In addition, it suggests that the overt presence of international actors in post-conflict environment has a negative impact on state-building culture. It means that international actors need to plan an exit strategy that would follow a

140

successful intervention, otherwise the subjects of intervention do not seem to be able to progress beyond a forced ceasefire.

Overall, this study reveals that intervention in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina ended violent confrontation but contributed in the development of some dynamics that inhibit structural transformation and establishment of sustainable peace. There is stable but not sustainable peace in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The main post-conflict structural obstacles remain institutionalization of ethnicities in Bosnia-Herzegovina; a limited sovereignty in Kosovo; and lack of a state building culture for both cases.

REFERENCES

Alemayehu, F. (2009). *Conflict management in the Ethiopian multi-national federation* (Master thesis). European University Center for Peace Studies, Stadtschlaining, Austria.

Asebe, R. (2007). *Ethnicity and inter-ethnic relations. The 'Ethiopian experiment' and the case of the Guji and Gedeo* (M. Phil Thesis). Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tromso, Norway.

Attah-Poku, A. (1996). *The Socio-Cultural Adjustment Question: The Role of Ghanaian Immigrant Ethnic Associations in America.* Brookfield, VT: Avebury.

Augsburger, D. W. (1992). Conflict mediation across cultures: pathways and patterns. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press.

Auvinen, J. & Kivimaki, T. (2001). Conflict transformation in South Africa. *Politikon*, *28*(1), 65-79.

Azar, E. & Burton J. W. (1986). *International conflict resolution: Theory and practice*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner and Wheatsheaf.

Azar, E. (1990). *The management of protracted social conflict: theory and cases.* Aldershot: Dartmouth.

Azar, E. (1991). The analysis and management of protracted social conflict. In J. Volkan, J. Montville, & D. Julius, *The psychodynamics of international relationships* (Vol. 2, pp. 93-120). Lexington, KY: D.C. Heath.

Babuna, A. (2000). The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia: Ethnic identity superseding religion. *Nationalities Papers, 28*(1), 67-92.

Barth, F. (1969). Ethnic groups and boundaries: Introduction. In F. Barth (ed.) *Ethnic groups and boundaries: the social organization of culture difference (pp. 9-38).* Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Bercovitch, J. (2003). Characteristics of intractable conflicts, beyond intractability. In G. Burgess and H. Burgess (Eds.), *Conflict information consortium*. University of Colorado: Boulder. Retrieved on November 8, 2015 from http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/characteristics-ic.

Berdal, M., & Malone, D. (2000). *Greed and grievance: Economic agendas in civil wars.* Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Berghof Glossary on Conflict Transformation (2012), Befghof Foundation. Retrieved on December 20, 2015 from http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Books/Book_Glossary_Chapters_en/glossary_2012_complete.pdf.

Blagojevic, B. (2009). Causes of ethnic conflict: a conceptual framework. *Journal of Global Change and Governance, 3*(1), 1-25.

Bloomfield, D. & Reilly, B. (1998). The changing nature of conflict and conflict management. In P. Harris and B. Reilly (eds.) *Democracy and deep-rooted conflict: options for negotiators* (pp. 7-28). International IDEA, Stockholm. Sweden.

Bougarel, X. (1996). Bosnia-Herzegovina- state and communitarianism. In D. Dyker, & I. Veyvoda (ed.), *Yugoslavia and after: A study in fragmentation, despair and rebirth (pp. 87-115).* London: Longman.

Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. *International Relations*, *11*(3), 201-218.

Brahm, E. (2003). Conflict stages, beyond intractability. In G. Burgess and H. Burgess (Eds.). *Conflict information consortium*. University of Colorado: Boulder. Retrieved on November 2, 2015 from http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/conflict_stages/?nid=1068.

Brahimi, L. (2007). State building in crisis and post-conflict countries. *In 7th global forum on reinventing government, building trust in government* (pp. 26-29). Vienna, Austria. Retrieved on June 20, 2019 from http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan026896.pdf.

Brand-Jacobsen, K. F. (2003). *Toolkit for peacebuilding and conflict transformation in Nepal.* Transcend. Retrieved on October 25, 2015 from http://www.transcend.org.

Brass, P. R. (1991). *Ethnicity and nationalism: Theory and comparison*. New Delhi and Newbury Park: Sage.

Bringa, T. (2002). Averted gaze: genocide in Bosnia-herzegovina, 1992-1995. In A. L. Hinton, *Annihilating difference: the anthropology of genocide (pp 194-228).* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bringa, T. (2004). The peaceful death of Tito and the violent end of Yugoslavia. In J. Borneman, *Death of the father: an anthropology of the end in political authority* (pp. 148-200). New York: Berghahn.

Brown, M. E. (1993). *Ethnic conflict and international security*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Brubaker, R. & Laitin, D. (1998). Ethnic and nationalist violence. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24, 423-452.

Bunce, V. (2005). *Democracy and diversity in the developing world: The American experience with democracy promotion*. Cornell University National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, Washington, D.C.

Burgess, H & Burgess, G. (eds) (1997). *Encyclopedia of conflict resolution*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO Inc.

Bush, R. A. B. & Folger J. P. (1994). *The promise of mediation: Responding to conflict through empowerment and recognition*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Bugajski, J. (1994). *Ethnic politics in Eastern Europe: A guide to nationality policies, organizations, and parties*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

Burrowes, R. J. (2000). Toward a comprehensive typology. In Y. Moser-Puangsuwan and Th. Weber, *Nonviolent intervention across borders. A recurrent Vision (pp. 45-72)*. Honolulu: Spark M. Matsunaga Institute for Peace.

Burton, J. (1990). *Conflict resolution and prevention*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Burg, S. L., & Shoup, P. S. (1999). *The war in Bosnia-herzegovina: Ethnic conflict and international intervention*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Cohen, A. (1974). Introduction: the lesson of ethnicity. In A. Cohen (ed.), *Urban ethnicity (pp. ix-xxiv)*. London: Tavistock.

Cohen, F. S. (1997). Proportional versus majoritarian ethnic conflict management in democracies. *Comparative Political Studies*, *30*(5), 607-630.

Collier, P., Lane Elliot, V., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M. & Sambanis, N. (2003). Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy. *A World Bank policy research report*. Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press.

Cordell, K. & Wolff, S. (2010). *Ethnic conflict: causes, consequences, and responses*. Cambridge & Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Cordell, K. & Wolff, S. (eds) (2011). *Routledge handbook of ethnic conflict*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Cornell, S. E. (2002). Autonomy as a source of conflict: Caucasian conflicts in theoretical perspective. *World Politics*, *54*(2), 245-276.

Crocker, Ch. A. (2001). Intervention: Toward best practices and a holistic view. In Ch. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall (pp. 229-249), *Turbulent peace: The challenges of managing international conflict*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. (1992). *The referendum on independence in Bosnia-Herzegovina: February 29-March 1, 1992*. Washington, DC: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. (1994, 30 March). *Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.* Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo.

Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (1974). *Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*. Belgrade.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/856. (2018, June 8). Amending Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. *Official Journal of the European Union*, Strasbourg. Retrieved 5 3, 2017, from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/joint_action/2008/124/oj

Curle, A. (1971). *Making peace*. London: Tavistock Publications.

Curle, A. (1987). *In the middle: Non-official mediation in violent situations*. New York: Berg.

Curle, A. (1990). *Tools for transformation*. Stroud: Hawthorn Press.

Danopoulos, C. P., & Messas, K. G. (1997). *Crises in the Balkans: Viewes from the participants.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

David, C. (2000). *Bosnia-Herzegovina: Faking democracy after Dayton* (2 ed.). London: Pluto.

Dayton Peace Accords. (1995, November 21). *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovinia*. Dayton. Retrieved January 18, 2019, from https://www.refworld.org/docid/3de495c34.html

Davies, R. (1996). Ethnicity: Inside out or outside in? In J. Krause and N. Renwick, *Identities in international relations* (pp. 79-98). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Deda, I. (2009). *Decentralization in Kosovo I: Municipal elections and the Serb participation*. Prishtina: Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development.

Demjaha, A. (2017). Inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo. *Southeast European University Review, 12*(1), 181-196 .

Deutsch, M. (1973), *The resolution of conflict: Constructive and destructive processes*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Dissenting opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh (2007), Vice-President of the International Court of Justice, Retrieved 24 May 2019 from https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/91/091-20070226-JUD-01-01-EN.pdf.

Donia, R. J. (2006). *Sarajevo: A biography.* London: Hurst & Co.

Donia, R. J., & Fine, J. V. (1994). *Bosnia-Herzegovina: A tradition betrayed.* New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Druckman D. (2005). *Doing research: methods of inquiry for conflict analysis*. London: Sage.

Dudouet, V. (2006). *Transitions from violence to peace: Revisiting analysis and intervention in conflict transformation*. Berghof Report 15. Berlin: Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Dukes, E. F. (1999). Why conflict transformation matters: Three cases. *Peace and Conflict Studies, 6*(2). 7-66.

Durand, L. (2013). *Conflicts in Myanmar: A systemic approach to conflict analysis and transformation*. Retrieved on October 18, 2015 from http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=3809452&fileOId=3809455.

Drew, E. (1992, July 2). Letter from Washington. *The New Yorker*. p. 70. Retrived on July 1, 2018 from https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1992/07/06/letter-from-washington-321.

Eberhardt, P. (2015). *Ethnic groups and population changes in twentieth century Eastern Europe: History, data and analysis* (J. Owsinski Trans.). London/New York: Routledge.

Edwards, J. (1985). *Language, society and identity*. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.

Ekinci, D. (2009). The war in Bosnia-herzegovina and Turkish parliamentary debates (1992- 1995): A constructivist approach. *Uluslararası İlişkiler, 6*(22), 37-60.

The Elbadawi, I. & Sambanis, N. (2000). *External interventions and the duration of civil wars* (Report No. WPS2433). Washington, DC: World Bank.

Eriksen, Th. H. (1993, 2002). *Ethnicity and nationalism: Anthropological perspectives*. London: Pluto Press.

European Commission. (2016). Bosnia-Herzegovina 2016 Report COM (2016) 715 final. *Commission Staff Working Document*. Retrieved on April 21, 2019 from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_bosnia_and_herzegovina.pdf.

European Commission. (2016). Kosovo 2016 Report COM (2016) 715 final. *Commission Staff Working Document*. Retrieved on January 5, 2019 from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_kosovo.pdf.

European Commission. (2018). Kosovo 2018 Report. *Commission Staff Working Document*. Retrieved on January, 5 2019 from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-kosovo-report.pdf.

European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 22 October 2009, Case No. 3572/06, *Paulić* v *Croatia.*

Esman, M. J. (1994). *Ethnic politics*. Ithaka, NY: Cornell University Press.

Fisher, S., Ibrahim A. D., Ludin, J., Smith, R., & Williams, S. (2000). *Working with conflict: Skills and strategies for action*. London: Zed Books.

Fine, J. V. A. (1994). *The late medieval Balkans: Critical survey from the late twelfth century to the Ottoman conquest*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Francis, D. (2002). *People, peace and power: Conflict transformation in action*. London: Pluto Press.

Francis, D. (2010). *From pacification to peacebuilding, a global call to transformation*. London: Pluto Press.

Freedom House. (2013). *Freedom House Report on Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2013*. Retrieved April 21, 2018, from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/bosnia-and-herzegovina

Friedman, T. L. (1993, April 8). Bosnia Reconsidered; Where Candidate Clinton Saw a Challenge The President Sees an Insoluble Quagmire. *New York Times*. Retrieved May 3, 2018, from https://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/08/world/Bosnia-reconsidered-where-candidate-clinton-saw-challenge-president-sees.html

Fuchs, Y. S. (2011). Multilateral Intervention in Intrastate Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of Bosnia Somalia, and Darfur. *CUREJ: College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal*. Retrieved September 6, 2018, from https://repository.upenn.edu/curej

Gallager, T. (2003). *The Balkans after the Cold War: From tyranny to tragedy*. London: Routledge.

Galtung, J. (1969). Conflict as a way of life. In H. Freeman, *Progress in mental health* (pp. 11-33). London: J. & A. Churchill.

Galtung, J. (1996). *Peace by peaceful means: Peace and conflict, development and civilization*. London, UK: SAGE Publications.

Galtung, J. (1997). Conflict life cycles in occident and orient. In P. F. Douglas and K. Bjorkqvist (eds). *Cultural variation in conflict resolution: Alternatives to violence* (pp. 41-49). Hillsdale, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Gavrić, S., Banović, D., & Barreiro, M. (2013). Political system of Bosnia-Herzegovina institutions – actors – processes. *BH politika/BH politics*. Sarajevo: Sarajevo Open Centre.

Geertz, C. (eds). (1963). *Old societies and new states: The quest for modernity in Asia and Africa.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe.

Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Glazer, N., & Moynihan, D. (1975). *Ethnicity, theory and experience.* Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press.

Green, D. P., & Seher, R. L. (2003). What role does prejudice play in ethnic conflict? *Annual Review of Political Science*, *6*(1), 509-531.

Greenwood, C. (2002). Humanitarian intervention: The case of Kosovo. *Finnish Yearbook of Intenwlional Law*, 141-175. Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.

Grosby, S. (eds) (1996). The inexpugnable tie of primordiality. In J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith (ed.) *Ethnicity* (pp. 51-57). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gurr, T. R. (1993). *Minorities at risk: A global view of ethnopolitical conflicts*. Washington, DC: United States Institutes of Peace Press.

Gurr, T. R. (2000). Ethnic warfare on the wane. *Foreign Affairs*, 52-64.

Gurr, T. & Harff, B. (1994). *Ethnic conflict in world politics*. Bounder, CO: Westview Press.

Guzina, D. (2003). Kosovo or Kosova could it be both? The case of interlocking Serbian and Albanian nationalism. In F. Bierber, & Z. Daskalovski, *Understanding the War in Kosovo (pp. 29-49).* Britain: Frank Class Publishers.

Hajnal, G., and Péteri, G. (2010). *Local reform in Kosovo: Final report*. Forum 2015. Retrieved on March 23, 2019 from lgi.osi.hu/cimg/.../Reforma_lokale_n___Kosov___anglisht.pdf.

Hardin, R. (1995). *One for all: The logic of group conflict*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Harrington, Ch. & Merry, S. E. (1988). Ideological production: The making of community mediation. *Law and Society Review, 22*(4), 708-735.

Hinsley, F. H. (1986). *Sovereignty (2nd ed.).* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hodson, R., Sekulic, D., & Massey, G. (1994). National tolerance in the former Yugoslavia. *The American Journal o f Sociology, 99*(6), 1534-1558.

Human Rights Watch. (2018). *Serbia/Kosovo, Events of 2017.* Retrieved on October 16, 2018, from https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/serbia/kosovo.

Hutchinson, J. & Smith, A. D. (1996). *Ethnicity: Oxford reader.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Independent International Commission on Kosovo. (2000). *Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved on January 18, 2018, from www.kosovocommission.org.

International Commission on the Balkans. (1996). *Unfinished Peace.* Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

International Court of Justice Reports. (2010). Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo. *Advisory Opinions.*

International Crisis Group. (2004, April 22). Collapse in Kosovo. *ICG Europe Report No 155.* Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

Irwin, Z. (1984). The islamic revival and the muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. *East European Quarterly, 17,* 437-58.

Izetbegovic, A. (1990). *Islamska deklaracija (Islamic declaration).* Sarajevo, BiH.

Jenkins, R. (2008). *Social identity.* London: Routledge.

Kaufmann, C. D. (1998). When all else fails: Ethnic population transfers and partitions in the twentieth century. *International security*, *23*(2), 120-156.

Karic, M. (2011). Social cleavages, conflict and accommodation in Bosnian political history from the late 19th century until the 1990s. *Bilgi, 22,* 71-97.

Kingston, P., & Spears, I. S. (Eds.). (2004). *States within states: Incipient political entities in the post–cold war era.* Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kllokoqi, S., Ahmeti, B., Konjufca, G., & Murati, V. (2008). The Role of Human and Minority Rights in the Process of Reconstruction and Reconciliation for State and Nation-Building: Kosova. *Human and Minority Rights in the Life Cycle of Ethnic Conflicts.* Bozen-Bolzano: European Academy.

Koeth, W. (2012). Bosnia, Kosovo and the EU: Is Accession possible without full sovereignty? *EIPAScope*, 1, 31-36.

Krasner, S. D. (1999). *Sovereignty: Organized hypocrisy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Krasner, S. D. (2004). Sharing sovereignty: New institutions for collapsed and failing states. *International security*, *29*(2), 85-120.

Krause, J. & Renwick, N. (eds.) (1996). *Introduction in identities in international relations*. Oxford: Macmillan Pressing association with St. Anthony's College.

Kriesberg, L. (1989). Transforming conflicts in the Middle East and Central Europe. In L. Kriesberg, T. Northrup and S. Thorson, (eds), *Intractable conflicts and their transformation* (pp. 109-131). Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Kriesberg, L. (2003). *Constructive conflicts: From escalation to resolution*. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.

Kriesberg, L. (2005). Nature, dynamics, and phases of intractability. In G. Dosi (Ed.), *Grasping the nettle: Analyzing cases of intractable conflict* (pp. 65-98). Washington, DC: USIP Press.

Kriesberg, L. (2011). The state of the art in conflict transformation, *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation,* Berlin: Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Kriesberg, L., Northrup, T. & Thorson, S. (eds) (1989). *Intractable conflicts and their transformation*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Koppa, M. E. (2001). Ethnic albanians in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Between nationality and citizenship. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 7*(4), 37-65.

Körppen, D. & Schmelzle, B. (2008). A systemic approach to conflict transformation: Exploring strengths and limitations. In D. Körppen, B. Schmelzle, and O. Wils (eds), *Berghof handbook for conflict transformation, Dialogue Series, 6*, 5-11.

Körppen, D., Schmelzle, B. &Wils, O. (eds) (2008). Berghof handbook for conflict transformation*, Dialogue Series, 6*, 5-11.

Kosovo Memory Book Database Presentation and Evaluation (2015). Humanitarian Law Center. Retrieved on 6 February 2019 from http://www.kosovomemorybook.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Expert_Evaluation_of_Kosovo_Memory_Book_Database_Prishtina_04_02_2015.pdf.

Laitin, D. (1998). *Identity in formation: The Russian-speaking populations in the Near Abroad.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Latawski, P. C., Smith, M., & Smith, M. A. (2003). *The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lederach, J. P. (1995a). Conflict transformation in protracted internal conflicts: The case for a comprehensive network. In K. Rupesinghe (ed.), *Conflict transformation* (pp. 201-222). New York: St. Martin's Press.

Lederach, J. P. (1995b). *Preparing for peace*. New York: Syracuse University Press.

Lederach, J. P. (2000a). Conflict transformation: A working definition. In C. Schrock-Shenk (ed.), *Mediation and facilitation training manual*. Akron: Mennonite Conciliation Service.

Lederach. J. P. (2003). *The little book of conflict transformation.* Intercourse, PA: Good Books.

Lederach, J. P. (2005). *The moral imagination the art and soul of building peace*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lederach, J. P., Neufeldt, R., & Culbertson, H. (2007). Reflective peacebuilding: A planning, monitoring and learning toolkit. *The Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies,* University of Notre Dame and Catholic Relief Services, Southeast East Asia Regional Office.

Lijphart, A. (1975). The Northern Ireland problem; Cases, theories, and solutions. *British Journal of Political Science, 5*(1), 83-106.

Lijphart, A. (1979). Consociation and federation: Conceptual and empirical links. *Canadian Journal of Political Science, 12*(3), 499-515.

Lilyanova, V. (2016). Serbia and Kosovo: Normalisation of relations. *At a Glance*. European Parliament.

Loew, D. (2013). *Decentralization as a model for conflict transformation: The case of Kosovo* (CCS Working Paper No. 16). Universität Marburg, Marburg: Center for Conflict Studies/Phillipps,

Maiese, M. (2003). Causes of disputes and conflicts. Beyond intractability. G. Burgess and H. Burgess (Eds.). *Conflict Research Consortium*. Boulder, CO: University of Colorado.

Malcolm, N. (1998). *Kosovo: A short history.* New York: New York University Press.

Malcom, N. (1994). *Bosnia: A short history* . New York: New York University Press.

Markakis, J. (1998). The politics of identity: The case of the Gurage in Ethiopia. In M. A. M. Salih, and J. Markakis (ed.), *Ethnicity and the state in Eastern Africa* (pp. 127-146). Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika Institutet.

Marko, J. (2000). Bosnia-Herzegovina – Multi-ethnic or multinational? In Council of Europe (ed.), *Societies in conflict: The contribution of law and democracy to conflict resolution* (pp. 92-118). Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Marko, J. (2005). Post conflict reconstruction through state- and nation-building: The case of Bosnia . *European Diversity and Autonomy Papers – EDAP, 4*. Retrieved May 3, 2018, from http://aei.pitt.edu/6168/1/2005_edap04.pdf

Merera, G. (2003). *Ethiopia: Competing ethnic nationalism and the quest for democracy, 1960- 2000*. Shaker: The Netherlands.

Miall, H. (2004). Conflict transformation: A multi-dimensional task. In A. Austin, M. Fischer, and N. Ropers (eds). *Transforming ethnopolitical conflict: The Berghof Handbook* (pp. 67-90). Berlin: Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Miall, H. (2006). Conflict transformation: A multi-dimensional task. *Berghof handbook for conflict transformation* (pp. 1-20). Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Retrieved on October 3, 2015 from http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/miall_handbook.pdf.

Miall, H. (2007). *Emergent conflict and peaceful change*. Houndmills: Palgrave/ Macmillan.

Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O. & Woodhouse, T. (1999). *Contemporary conflict resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Mitchell, C. R. (2000). *Gestures of conciliation: Factors contributing to successful olive-branches*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Mitchell, Ch. (2002). Beyond resolution: What does conflict transformation actually transform? *Peace and Conflict Studies, 9*(1), 1-23.

Mu'id, O. (2003). *Shortcomings of the conflict resolution field*. Boulder: University of Colorado.

Narten, J. (2009). Dilemmas of promoting 'local ownership': The case of post-war Kosovo. In R. Paris, & T. Sisk, *the dilemmas of state building: Confronting the contradictions of post-war peace operations* (pp. 252-283*).* London/New York: Routledge.

Neufeldt, R., Fast, L., Schreiter, F. R., Starken, F. B., MacLaren, D., Cilliers, J., et al. (2006). *Peacebuilding: A caritas training manual*. Vatican City: Caritas Internationalis.

Neuman, W.L. (2003). *Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches* (5th ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Neuman W. L (2006). *Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches* (6th ed.). Boston: Pearson.

Neuman W. L (2014). *Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches* (7th ed.). Boston: Pearson.

Northrup, T. (1989). The dynamic of identity in personal and social conflict. In T. Northrup and L. Kriesberg (eds.), *Intractable conflicts and their transformation*. Syracuse (pp. 55-82), NY: Syracuse University Press.

Nystuen, G. (2005). *Achieving peace or protecting human rights?: Conflict between norms regarding ethnic discrimination in the Dayton Peace Agreement*. Leiden: NDL: Matinus Nijhoff Publishers.

OECD (2011). Supporting statebuilding in situations of conflict and fragility: Policy Guidance. *DAC Guidelines and Reference Series*, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264074989-en.

Owen, D. (2013). *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Vance/Owen Peace Plan.* Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

O'Loughlin, J. & Tuathail G. Ó. (2009). Accounting for separatist sentiment in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the North Caucasus of Russia: A comparative analysis of survey responses. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 32*(4), 591–615.

Paffenholz, T., & Spurk, C. (2010). A Comprehensive analytical framework. In T. Paffenholz (Ed.), *Civil society & peacebuilding*. Boulder (pp. 65-76), Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner.

Paul, R. (2005). *Ethnic violence and the societal security dilemma.* New York: Routledge.

Paris, R., & Sisk, T. D. (Eds.). (2009). *The dilemmas of statebuilding: Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations*. London/New York: Routledge.

Pearce, J. (1997). Sustainable peacebuilding in the South. *Development in Practice, 7*(4), 438-455.

Pellet, A. (1992). The opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A second breath for the self-determination of peoples. *European Journal of International Law., 3*(1), 178–185. Retrieved May 11, 2018, from http://ejil.org/pdfs/3/1/1175.pdf

Pennings P. Keman H., & Kleinnijenhuis J. (1999). *Doing research in political science: An introduction to comparative methods and statistics*. London: Sage.

Peoples, J., & Bailey, G. (2013). *Humanity: An introduction to cultural anthropology* (10 ed.). Belmont, California: Cengage Learning.

Praso, M. (1996). Demographic consequences of the 1992–95 war. *Bosnia Report. Newsletter of the Alliance to Defend Bosnia-Herzegovina*, No. 16.

Ramet, S. P. (1992). *Nationalism and federalism in Yugoslavia. 1962-1991*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., & Miall, H. (2011). *Contemporary conflict resolution, the prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts*. Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity.

Reimann, C. (2004). Assessing the state-of-the-art in conflict transformation. In *Berghof handbook for conflict transformation* (pp. 1-23). Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Regan, P., R.W. Frank & A. Aydin (2009). Diplomatic interventions and civil war: A new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research 46*(1), 135–146.

Regan, P. (2010). Interventions into civil wars: A retrospective survey with prospective ideas. *Civil Wars 12*(4): 456–76.

Regan, P. & A. Aydin (2006). Diplomacy and other forms of intervention in Civil War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50*(5), 736–56.

Richmond, O. (Ed.). (2010). *Palgrave advances in peacebuilding*. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Richmond, O., & Franks, J. (2009). Between partition and pluralism: the Bosnian jigsaw and an 'ambivalent peace'. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 9*(1), 17–38.

Rigby, A. (1994). Bosnia-Hercegovina: The international response. *Background paperBP-374E*. Canada: Library of Parliament, Parliamentary Research Branch.

Rioux, J. S. (2003). *Third party intervention as conflict management: Case of Africa*. 6th Nordic and 4th Baltic Peace Research Conference, St. Petersburg, Russian Republic.

Ropers, N. (2008). Systemic conflict transformation: Reflections on the conflict and peace process in Sri Lanka. In D. Körppen, B. Schmelzle and O. Wils (eds.), A systemic approach to conflict transformation. Exploring strengths and limitations (pp. 11-41). *Berghof Handbook Dialogue No. 6*, Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Roeder, P. G., & Rothchild, D. (2005). *Sustainable peace: Power and democracy after civil wars.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Rummel, R. (1994). *Death by government*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Rupesinghe, K. (1998). *Civil wars, civil peace*. London: Pluto.

Rupesinghe, K. (1994). *Protracted conflict*. London: McMillan.

Ryan, S. (1990). *Ethnic conflict and international relations*. Brookfield, MA: Dartmouth Pub Co.

Samarasinghe, S., Donaldson, B., & McGinn, C. (1999). *Conflict vulnerability analysis, issues, tools and responses, submitted to USAID*. Arlington, VA: Tulane Institute for International Development.

Sandole, D. J. D. (2003). Typology. In S. Cheldelin, D. Druckman & L. Fast (Eds.), *Conflict: From analysis to intervention* (pp. 39-54*)*. London, UK: Continuum.

Schirch, L. (1999). *Ritual peacebuilding: Creating contexts conducive to conflict transformation* (Ph.D. Dissertation). Fairfax, VA: George Mason University.

Schrire, R. A. (1980). The nature of ethnic identities. In H.W. Van der Merwe and R.A. Schrire (eds), *Race and ethnicity: South African and international perspectives*. Cape Town: David Philip.

Schmid, H. (1968). Peace Research and Politics. *Journal of Peace Research, 3*, 217-232.

Schweitzer, C. (2009). *Strategies of intervention in protracted violent conflicts by civil society actors: The example of interventions in the violent conflicts in the area of former Yugoslavia (*Ph.D. dissertation). Coventry University, UK.

Sells, M. A. (1998). *The bridge betrayed: Religion and genocide in Bosnia.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Siani-Davies, P. (2003). Introduction. International intervention (and non-intervention) in the Balkans. In P. Siani- Davies (ed.), *International intervention in the Balkans since 1995* (pp. 1-31). London/New York: Routledge.

Silber, L., & Little, A. (1996). *Yugoslavia: Death of a nation.* New York: TV books.

Smith. A.D. (1986). The Ethnic Origin of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell.

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (1974). *Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*. Belgrade.

Solomon, H. & Matthews, S. (2001). *Transforming ethnic conflicts*. Pretoria: Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria.

Statistical Office of Kosovo (SOK) (2008). Demographic changes of the Kosovo population 1948-2006, *Series 4: Population Statistics*, K.G.T, Pristine, Kosovo.

Sheehan, I. S. (2014). Conflict transformation as counterinsurgency. *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 26*(1), 121-128.

Tahiri, B. (2010). *Decentralisation and local governance reform: Clear on paper blurred in practice, the case of Kosovo.* Pristina: Kosovo Local Government Institute. Retrieved September 3, 2018, from http://www.fesprishtina.org/wb/media/Publications/2010/KLGI%20Decentralisa

Thaddeus, A. A. & Cuthberg, B. (2013). Decentralize Planning for Pre-Conflict and Post-Conflict Management, Bawku Municipal Assembly, Ghana. *European Scientific Journal, 9*(8), 333-349.

The BiH Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees (MOHRR). (2005). *Comparative analysis on access to rights of refugees and displaced persons add*. BiH: The BiH Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees (MOHRR).

The Responsibility to Protect (2001). *Report of the international commission on intervention and state sovereignty.* International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada. Retrieved on 20 December 2018 from http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.

Tom, P. (2017). *Liberal peace and post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa*. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Thomson, A. (2000). *An introduction to African politics*. London: Routledge.

Thomson, K. (2002). Border crossings and diasporic identities: Media use and leisure practices of an ethnic minority. *Qualitative Sociology, 25* (3), 409–418.

Treadway, J. D. (1997). Of shatter belts and powder kegs: A brief survey of Yugoslav history. In C. P. Danopoulos and K. G. Messas (eds.), *Crises in the Balkans: Views from the participants* (pp. 19-46). Boulder: Westview Press.

Tzifakis, N. (2007). The Bosnian peace process: The power-sharing approach revisited. *Perspectives: The Central European Review of International Affairs, 28*, 85–102.

United Nations General Assembly. (2010). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 9 September 2010. *A/RES/64/298*. United Nations.

United Nations Secretary General. (1993). Report on the Activities of the International Conference on Yugoslavia. *S/25221*. United Nations.

United Nations Secretary General. (2008). *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.* United Nations.

United Nations Security Council. (1992). Resolution 743. *S/RES/743*. United Nations. Retrieved December 3, 2018, from https://undocs.org/S/RES/743(1992).

United Nations Security Council. (1998). Resolution 1160. *S/RES/1160* . United Nations.

United Nations Security Council. (1998). Resolution 1199. *S/RES/1199*. United Nations, adopted 23 September 1998.

United Nations Security Council. (1998). Resolution 1203 . *S/RES/1203*. United Nations.

United Nations Security Council. (1999, 7 June). *Annex: Rambouillet Accords, in Letter From the Permanent Representative of France to United Nations addressed to Secretary General*. United Nations.

United Nations Security Council. (1999). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. *S/1999/779*. United Nations.

United Nations Security Council. (1999, June 10). Resolution 1244. *S/RES/1244*. United Nations.

United Nations Security Council. (1999, 10 June). S/RES/1244. *Resolution 1244*. United Nations.

United Nations Security Council. (1999). Statement by the President of the Security Council. *S/PRST/1999/2*. United Nations.

United Nations Security Council. (2003, December 12). Statement by the President of the Security Council. *S/PRST/2003/26*. United Nations.

United Nations Security Council. (2004, November 30). Letter dated 17 November 2004 from the Secretary-General. *S/2004/932*. United Nations.

United Nations Security Council. (2005). Annex: A comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo, in Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. *S/2005/635*. United Nations.

United Nations Security Council. (2007, 10 December). Letter dated 10 December 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council. *S/2007/723*. United Nations.

United Nations Security Council. (2007, March 26). Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. *S/2007/168*. United Nations.

Väyrynen, R. (1991). To settle or to transform? Perspectives on the resolution of national and international conflicts. In R. Väyrynen (ed.), *New directions in conflict theory: Conflict resolution and conflict transformation* (pp. 1-25). London: Sage.

Väyrynen, R. (1999). From conflict resolution to conflict transformation: A critical view. In Ho-Won Jeong (ed.), *The new agenda for peace research* (pp. 135-160). Brookfield: Ashgate Publishing.

Varshney, A. (2002). *Ethnic conflict and civil life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. New Heaven: Yale University Press.

Vaschenko, V. (2004). *Analysis of the modern inter-ethnic conflict: case study of Kosovo* (M.A thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Vaughan, S. & Tronvoll, K. (2003). *The culture of power in contemporary Ethiopian political life.* Stockholm: Sida.

Vickers, M. (1998). *Between Serb and Albanian: A history of Kosovo.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Vila, J. (2013). *Kin state's youth, party membership, ideology, and conflict understanding: Youth in Albania on ethnic Albanian's conflicts in Kosovo and in Macedonia* (M.A thesis), Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey.

Vioska, G. (2011). The obstacles to sustainable peace and democracy in post-independence Kosovo. *Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security, 1*(2), 25-38.

Vorrath, J., Krebs, L., & Senn, D. (2007). Linking ethnic conflict & democratization: An assessment of four troubled regions. *NewsLetter/National Center of Competence in Research*, *6*, 1-27.

Waller, H. M. (2015). Post-conflict peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina. *Honors Theses and Capstones*. Retrieved May 14, 2018, from https://scholars.unh.edu/honors/235

Weber, Ma. (1978). *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology* (2 vols) G. Roth and C. Wittich (ed.). Berkley, CA: University of California Press.

Wehr, P. (1979*). Conflict regulation.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Wehr, P. (2006). Conflict mapping, Beyond intractability. In G. Burgess and H. Burgess (Eds.), *Conflict information consortium*. University of Colorado: Boulder. Retrieved on October 11, 2015 from http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/conflict-mapping.

Werhane, P. (1999). *Moral imagination and management decision-making*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Wolff, S. (2001). Context and content: Sunningdale and Belfast compared. In R. Wilford (ed.), *Aspects of the Belfast Agreement* (pp. 11-27). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wolff, S. (2006). *Ethnic conflict: A global perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wolff, S. (2011). Consociationalism. In S. Wolff & C. Yakinthou (Eds.), *Conflict management in divided societies: Theories and practice* (pp. 23-56). London: Routledge.

Woodward, S. L. (1995). *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution.

Yarn, D. (eds) (1999). *Dictionary of conflict resolution*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Xhemaj, V. (2018). Tensions as Kosovo police arrest senior Serbian official. *Euractiv*. Retrieved May 10, 2018 from https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/tensions-as-kosovo-police-arrest-senior-serbian-official/

Zaum, D. (2007). *Sovereignty paradox: The norms and politics of international statebuilding*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zartman, W. (1985). *Ripe for resolution: Conflict and intervention in Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Zupsevic, M., & Causevic, F. (2009). *Case study: Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Sarajevo: Centre for Developing Area Studies – McGill University and the World Bank. Retrieved May 22, 2019 from http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01241/WEB/IMAGES/BOSNIAFI.PDF.