

POST-COLD WAR TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS:
THE LIMITS OF COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN EURASIA

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Dissertation Abstract

Fatma Aslı Kelkitli, “Post-Cold War Turkish-Russian Relations: The Limits of Competition and Cooperation in Eurasia”

This dissertation examines post-Cold War Turkish-Russian relations in their political, economic and military aspects. The study, first of all, aims to shed light on the current nature and motives of the relationship, whether it is an example of genuine rapprochement based on common determination and willingness on both sides or a conjectural coupling which drew two states closer due to their discomfort and disappointment with some policies of other actors such as the EU and the USA. Secondly, the dissertation intends to find out to what extent the growing economic relations, especially Turkey’s energy dependence on Russia, contributes to the easing out of political tensions between the two countries. Lastly, the study explores whether the growing economic cooperation and intensifying political dialogue between Turkey and Russia can bring out common outlook and joint policy actions toward the resolution of the regional conflicts in the South Caucasus.

The research based on an analysis of documents concerning the topic along with the in-depth interviews I have conducted with the representatives of the Turkish-Russian business associations and officials in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs demonstrates that Turkey and Russia have been engaged in a deliberate compromise which is strengthened by their ascending economic relations particularly by the increasing and diversifying collaboration in the energy field. However, consolidated economic ties and increasing contacts at the governmental as well as at business and people-to-people levels are not adequate to prevail over the competition and political divergence regarding Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia issues in the South Caucasus.

Tez Özeti

Fatma Aslı Kelkitli, “Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Türk-Rus İlişkileri: Avrasya’da Rekabet ve İşbirliğinin Sınırları”

Bu tez Soğuk Savaş sonrası Türk-Rus ilişkilerini siyasi, ekonomik ve askeri açılardan incelemektedir. Bu çalışma ilk olarak ilişkinin şu anki mahiyet ve saiklerine, her iki taraftaki ortak kararlılık ve isteğe bağlı gerçek bir uzlaşma örneği mi yoksa AB ve ABD gibi diğer aktörlerin bazı politikalarından duydukları rahatsızlık ve hayalkırıklığı nedeniyle iki ülkeyi yaklaştıran konjektürel bir birliktelik mi olduğuna ışık tutmayı amaçlamaktadır. İkinci olarak tez, artan ekonomik ilişkilerin özellikle Türkiye’nin Rusya’ya olan enerji bağımlılığının iki ülke arasındaki siyasi gerilimlerin yatışmasına ne ölçüde katkıda bulunduğunu ortaya çıkarmayı hedeflemektedir. Son olarak çalışma, Türkiye ve Rusya arasındaki artan ekonomik işbirliğinin ve yoğunlaşan siyasal diyalogun Güney Kafkasya’daki bölgesel ihtilafların çözümüne yönelik ortak bir bakış açısı ve hareket tarzı ortaya çıkarıp çıkaramayacağını incelemektedir.

Konuyla ilgili belgelerin incelenmesine ve Türk-Rus iş dernekleri temsilcileri ve Türkiye Dışişleri Bakanlığı görevlileriyle yaptığım derinlemesine mülakatlara dayanan araştırma Türkiye ve Rusya’nın artan ekonomik ilişkilerle, özellikle artan ve çeşitlenen enerji alanındaki işbirliğiyle güçlenen planlı bir uzlaşma içinde olduklarını göstermiştir. Fakat güçlenen ekonomik bağlar ve hem hükümet hem iş dünyası hem de halklar arasındaki artan temaslar Güney Kafkasya’daki Dağlık Karabağ, Güney Osetya ve Abhazya sorunlarıyla ilgili rekabeti ve siyasal farklılığı bertaraf etmeye yetmemiştir.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
BOTAŞ	Petroleum Pipeline Corporation
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
EurAsEc	Eurasian Economic Community
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KGB	Committee for State Security
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
TUSKON	Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey
UN	United Nations
US	United States

USA	United States of America
USRR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the post-Cold War bilateral relationship between Eurasia's two prominent and long-standing actors, Turkey and the Russian Federation, by taking into account regional dynamics as well as the global power struggles that have impact on the Turkish-Russian interaction. My personal and academic interest with the region, coupling with the immediacy and significance of the topic and finally my opinion that the nature and evolution of the Turkish-Russian relationship would have remarkable impact on shaping and structuring of the international politics in this part of the world urged me to select this theme in my study.

Academic studies delving into the dynamics of Turkish-Russian association is of limited number compared to the ones focusing on each country's relations with the USA, the European Union, and the Middle East. Moreover, most of the current literature that deals with the Turkish-Russian intercourse is generated by historians. This study's aim is to contribute to the international relations (IR) literature by applying one particular IR theory to this specific case and testing its viability and validity.

Probing the course of Turkish and Russian rapport is significant due to the fact that these two countries are the most influential and powerful actors in Eurasia by all historical, political, economic and military accounts. For this reason the state of their relationship, its character of being conflictual or cooperational has region-

wide implications, affecting the situation in the Black Sea, South Caucasus and Central Asia and steers the foreign policy formulations of both the regional states and also of the global focuses of power that has interests and stakes in these regions.

Turkey and Russia has a common history of more than five hundred years which was marked by periods of competition, military conflict and cooperation. Comparing the similarities, repetitions as well as differences in the past events will provide us the opportunity to draw up a realistic, thorough and comprehensive account of the present relationship and offer well-founded and befitting projections about the future of the relations. In line with this reasoning, the following pages will sketch a brief historical survey of Turkish-Russian relations starting from imperial times up until the end of the Cold War and will touch upon basic points of disagreement, dispute as well as collaboration between the two countries.

The Legacy of History in Turkish-Russian Relations

The beginning of Turkish-Russian political relations dates back to fifteenth century. It is accepted that the diplomatic intercourse between the Ottoman Empire and the Grand Duchy of Moscow commenced on 31 December 1492 when Ivan III sent a letter to the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II with the intention of informing him of the troubles and wrongdoings that the Russian merchants had to face in their encounters with the Ottoman authorities and requesting the exchange of ambassadors between his country and the Ottoman Empire.¹ The ensuing epoch starting from the closing stages of the 16th century up until the end of the First World War in 1918 witnessed a period of intense rivalry, confrontation and warfare between the two states in which

¹ The full text of the letter can be found in Ali Kemal Meram, *Türk-Rus İlişkileri Tarihi* (Istanbul: Kitapçılık Ticaret Limited Şirketi, 1969), pp. 26-27.

the Russian Empire coveted the Ottoman territories around the Black Sea and in the Balkans and most of the time succeeded in expanding the outreach of its rule in these regions at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.²

The Russian Revolution of 1917, which brought the end of the Czarist Empire and established a socialist state in its place based on Marxist-Leninist ideology proved to be a major milestone in Turkish-Russian relations. The need of a secure southern border as well as a presence of a friendly regime in Turkey which would not be under the control and impact of Western powers and would stay away from engaging in activities that would arouse the Turkish and Muslim communities in Russia against the Bolshevik administration impelled the Soviet Federative Socialist Republics to support the Turkish National Struggle with material and financial means.³ After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the growing positive relationship between Turkey and the Soviet Union was crowned with the 17 December 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality. With the Article 2 of the protocol added to the 1925 agreement on 17 December 1929, both sides declared that they had no secret agreements with one another's land and sea neighbours and proclaimed that they would not enter into negotiations with one another's land and sea neighbours without notifying and obtaining approval of the other party.⁴ On 07 March 1931, a naval supplement was added to the 1925 agreement which stated that neither Turkey nor the Soviet Union would lay down any man-of-war to consolidate its fleet in the Black Sea or in neighbouring seas or would place order for any such

² Turkey and Russia fought thirteen wars against each other throughout history. These battles took place in 1677-1681, 1684-1700, 1711, 1712, 1713, 1736-1739, 1768-1774, 1787-1792, 1806-1812, 1828-1829, 1853-1856, 1877-1878, 1914-1917. For the details of these struggles see Orhan Conker, *Türk Tarihi Üzerinde Bir Deneme: Türk-Rus Savaşları* (Ankara: Sümer Basımevi, 1942), pp. 21-45.

³ Boris B. Potskhveriya, "1920 ve 1930'lu Yıllarda Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri", in *Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde 500 Yıl 1491-1992* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), p.190.

⁴ Kamuran Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1920-1953)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), p.124.

fighting ship in foreign shipyards or would take any measures to increase the current strength of its war fleet in the mentioned seas without notifying the other party within six months.⁵

Turkey supported the Soviet initiatives in international platforms and in this context signed on 04 March 1929, the declaration of adherence to the Litvinov Protocol which renounced war as an instrument of foreign policy ⁶ and the Convention of the Definition of Aggression on 04 July 1933. ⁷ Moreover, in line with the 1929 Protocol, Turkey informed the Soviet Union of its intent of forming a pact with the Balkan states of Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia and demanded the insertion of a reserve clause to the Balkan Entente which stated that under no circumstances Turkey would consider itself obliged to participate in any activity directed against the Soviet Union.⁸ Despite Turkey's attaching of special importance to Soviet views and concerns while formulating its foreign policy in these years, the Soviet Union did not feel the need to let Turkey know in advance its hammering out of non-aggression pacts with France on 29 November 1932 and Italy on 02 September 1933.

Amicable political relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union in interwar years found their reflections in the economic field as well. An exhibition composed

⁵ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Sosyalist Sovyetist Cumhuriyetleri İttihadı Arasında 17.12.1929 Tarihli Ankara Protokolüne Zeyil Olmak Üzere Karadeniz'de ve Karadeniz'e Mucavir Denizlerde Bahri Teslihatın Tahdidi İçin Ankara'da 07.03.1931 Tarihinde İmzalanan Protokol. Available [online]: < <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr>> [09 January 2011].

⁶ The negotiations of the Litvinov Protocol were organized by the Russian diplomat Maxim Litvinov and it was signed on 09.02.1929 in Moscow by Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Soviet Union. See Harbin Milli Siyaset Aleti Olarak Kullanılmaması Hakkında Protokol (Litvinov Protokolü). Available [online]: < <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr>> [09 January 2011].

⁷ The Convention of the Definition of Aggression was again initiated by Litvinov who became the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union in 1930. The agreement was put in place in London with signatures of Czechoslovakia, Romania, Soviet Union, Turkey and Yugoslavia. See Tecavüzün Tarifi Hakkında Türkiye ile Romanya, Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetleri İttihadı, Çekoslovakya ve Yugoslavya Arasında İmzalanan Mukavelename ve 3. Maddenin Lahikası. Available [online]: < <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr>> [09 January 2011].

⁸ Gürün, p.139.

of Soviet industrial products was opened up in Ankara in April 1924. One month later in May 1924, a Turkish-Soviet joint company was established with four hundred thousand rubles of capital. In 1925 Soviet Ruskonbank went into operation in Ankara.⁹ Moscow continued to provide financial and technical aid to Turkey in 1930s. In 1932, at the time of the then Premier İsmet İnönü's visit to the country, the Soviet Union declared that it granted a credit of eight million dollars to Turkey and with Soviet help, first textile factories were set up in Kayseri in 1934 and in Nazilli in 1935.¹⁰

Adorned with self-confidence and assertion after its victory against the Nazi Germany in World War II, the Soviet Union's denunciation of the 1925 Treaty on 19 March 1945 and its demand of Kars and Ardahan provinces besides joint control of the Turkish Straits in addition to the bases at the Turkish Straits on 07 June 1945 for the renewal of the treaty hastened Turkey's integration into the Western political, economic and military structures which in turn engendered a difficult and problem-ridden phase in the Turkish-Russian interaction.

Starting from the negotiations in Montreux in 1936, the Soviet Union hardly made disguise of its demand of joint control and defense of the Turkish Straits. Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Maxim Litvinov offered his Turkish counterpart Tefik Rüştü Aras in June 1936, on the sidelines of the Montreux Conference, to cut a deal for the joint defense of the Straits which the Turkish government declined as the acceptance of such a proposal would mean an

⁹ Mehmet Altan, *Süperler ve Türkiye: Türkiye'de Amerikan ve Sovyet Yatırımları* (İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1986), p.44.

¹⁰ Erel Tellal, "SSCB'yle İlişkiler", in *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, (ed.) Baskın Oran, Volume I, 15. Edition (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), pp. 319-320.

infringement on Turkish sovereignty.¹¹ The matter came to the fore again in September 1939 at the time of Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu's meeting with Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin and Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov in Moscow for the conclusion of a mutual security pact between the two countries.¹² The Soviet side asked for the signing of a hidden protocol between the two states which would close the Turkish Straits to the warships of the non-Black Sea countries and would help the Soviet Union to have a say in the administration of the Straits. After Saraçoğlu rejected these demands, the negotiations for the security agreement also fell flat¹³ and Saraçoğlu returned back to Turkey in October 1939 empty-handed. Molotov mentioned about Russia's desire of a revision in the Montreux Convention at the time of his meeting with German Chancellor Adolf Hitler and Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop on 12-13 November 1940 in Berlin and demanded land, naval and air bases in the area surrounding the Straits in addition to the recognition of the region in the south of Baku and Batum through the direction of Persian Gulf as Russian zone of influence by the Germans in return for Russia's participation to the war on the side of Germany, Italy and Japan.¹⁴ However, this prospective agreement between Russia and the Axis powers did not come to life after Hitler decided to attack Russia in June 1941.

¹¹ Ali Suat Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri 1920-1964* (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1992), p.120.

¹² Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Türk Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi* (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1968), pp. 142-143.

¹³ In the course of Saraçoğlu's sojourn in Moscow, Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the three Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, had also come to Moscow and they all had signed mutual assistance pacts with the Soviet Union in return for provision of air and naval bases to this country and permission of deployment of Soviet troops in these bases. See Rıfki Salim Burçak, *Moskova Görüşmeleri (26 Eylül 1939-16 Ekim 1939) ve Dış Politikamız Üzerindeki Tesirleri* (Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi Basın-Yayın Yüksekokulu Basımevi, 1983), p.94.

¹⁴ Harry N. Howard, "The Turkish Straits After World War II: Problems and Prospects", *Balkan Studies* 11, no.1 (1970), p.36.

Stalin again brought up the matter of Turkish Straits on 10 February 1945 in Yalta and on 22 July 1945 in Potsdam where the victorious powers of the World War II, namely the USA, Britain and the Soviet Union were holding talks for the post-war settlements. He repeated the Soviet Union's desire for a modification in the Montreux Convention. According to the Soviet leader, Turkey, as a small and weak state, needed to not have at its disposal the right to restrict the activities of the Soviet Union concerning the Straits. Moreover, if Turkey wished to enter into an alliance relationship with the Soviet Union it would also have to concede to the return of Kars to Armenia and Ardahan to Georgia.¹⁵

The Soviet Union began to apply severe and intense pressure on Turkey right after the Potsdam Conference. Soviet tanks in Iran and Soviet troop concentrations in Bulgaria were propped up with continuous press and radio attacks on Turkey in the form of publications and broadcasts that voiced Armenian and Georgian claims on north-eastern territories of the country. The appointment of Anton Kochinyan as the Secretary of Kars regional committee of the Communist Party of Armenia and Miha Tskhakaya as the Head of the projected Tao-Klarceti district of Georgia by Stalin in October 1945 added more to Turkey's disquietude and apprehension of the Soviet Union.¹⁶ To make the matters worse, Britain and the USA, the two powers that Turkey could turn to stave off Soviet pressure, seemed to give priority to Soviet concerns and sensitivities despite Turkish efforts on the contrary direction. Britain was languished by the war and was in no condition to confront the Soviet Union on its own. On the other hand, the USA, the successor of Britain as the new hegemon in international affairs, was ambivalent and unwilling to enter into a dispute with

¹⁵ Bilge, p.284.

¹⁶ Jamil Hasanli, "Azerbaijanis' Deportation from Armenia", *Zerkalo*, 19 February 2005 and Alexei Baliyev, "The Great Armenia Plan", *GloboScope*, 18 June 2008.

Moscow for the sake of Turkey. This was probably what the Soviets were counting on while asking for a revision in Montreux regime and territorial concessions from Turkey. There were also rumours in international diplomatic circles that the hidden objective of the Soviet administration was to secure a regime change in Turkey similar to the ones eventuated in Eastern and Central Europe which would bring to power a friendly government in Ankara that would act more in line with the Soviet Union.¹⁷ This argument might have some veracity as Soviet ambassador Lavrishev complained about his predecessor Vinogradov's inaccurate assessment of true capacity of İnönü administration at a dinner reception that took place in Ankara on 07 November 1948.¹⁸

The refusal of the Soviet Union to withdraw its army from Iran, Moscow's backing up of leftist forces in their struggle to overthrow the government in Greece and finally Molotov's demand of a trusteeship over Tripoli to have an outlet in the Mediterranean for Soviet merchant fleet¹⁹ led Britain and the USA to take more heed to the Turkish grievances concerning the expansionist aspirations and designs of the Soviet Union in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. The tide had turned against the Soviets as it would be clearly understood from the American and British attitude adopted during the exchange of notes between the Soviet Union and Turkey on Turkish Straits in 1946. While the Soviet Union proposed the establishment of a new regime in the Straits which would ensure the Soviet participation in the administration and defense of the Straits, both the USA and the British government

¹⁷ Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.269.

¹⁸ Mekki Esen, "Sovyet Siyasetinde Bize Karşı Değişiklik Rivayeti", *Cumhuriyet*, 23 November 1948. Cited in Gencer Özcan, "Turkey's Relations with the Soviet Union (1945-1980)" (Ph.D. diss., Boğaziçi University, 1992), p.74.

¹⁹ Harry N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 233-234.

opposed the Soviet suggestion in their respective notes and underlined that Turkey should continue to be the sole responsible for the control and defense of the Straits.

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When the British government declared on 21 February 1947 that it would no longer extend military and financial aid to Greece and Turkey due its own difficulties by 31 March 1947, the responsibility of taking care of Turkey and Greece was placed on the shoulders of the USA administration after the American Congress approved the President Harry Truman's economic and military aid package to Greece and Turkey on 12 March 1947. In his speech to the Congress, Truman underscored that the maintenance of the national integrity of both Greece and Turkey was crucial for the preservation of order and stability in the Middle East.²¹ It was obvious that Washington had decided to ward off the Soviet onslaughts in the region with economic and military means. Turkey's being recipient of the Marshall Plan, the fund which was set up by the USA for the recovery and reconstruction of post-war Europe in July 1948, and its incorporation into NATO in February 1952 despite the Soviet objections and protests widened the gap between the two countries and the bilateral relationship sank to new lows.

It was the Soviet Union that first attempted to break the ice in its relation with Turkey. On 30 May 1953, two months after the death of Stalin, Moscow notified Ankara of its retraction from territory and base demands against Turkey. This sudden and unexpected change in Moscow's policy toward Turkey arose from the new foreign policy outlook of the new leadership in Kremlin. Recognizing the detrimental impact of Stalin's ambitious and aggressive policies with regard to certain states such

²⁰ Check Harry N. Howard, *The Problem of the Turkish Straits* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 47-68 for all the notes exchanged between USA, Soviet Union, Britain and Turkey on Turkish Straits between November 1945 and October 1946.

²¹ The Truman Doctrine Speech by Harry S. Truman, March 12th 1947. Available [online]: <http://www.famousquotes.me.uk/speeches/Harry_S_Truman> [09 January 2011].

as Yugoslavia, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan on the long-term interests of the Soviet Union in the Balkans and Near East regions, the triumvirate of Malenkov-Molotov-Khrushchev approached to these countries with the aim to repair the damage and normalize the bilateral relations. Moreover, the Soviet Union also put the economic card on the table by promising grants, long-term credit agreements and technical aid to these countries along with the newly independent colonies in Africa and Asia, and developing states in Latin America.²²

It took some time for Turkey to respond to Soviet appeal of reconciliation as Ankara at that time was strictly tied to bloc politics and avoided bilateral rapprochement with the Soviet Union without any general improvement of relations between the East and West in sight. Besides, Ankara along with the USA and Britain had been actively embroiled in formation of alliances in the Balkans and the Middle East with the aim of curbing Soviet influence in these regions. However, after the Menderes government started to encounter financial difficulties in mid-1950s and its loan and credit requests for development projects in Turkey were turned down by Washington, Ankara became more amenable to Soviet economic assistance offers. In this context, the Soviet Union yielded Turkey money and credits with an agreement hammered out in July 1957; and with Soviet assistance, Türkiye İş Bankası founded a glass factory at Çayırova in 1961.²³ Following that an agreement was concluded between the two states on 27 April 1961 on direct rail connections.²⁴

²² The Soviet Union declared in July 1953 at the UN Economic and Social Council for the first time that it was in preparation to participate in programs which were designed to assist developing countries. See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Moscow's Third World Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), p.21.

²³ Tellal, pp. 518-519.

²⁴ Türkiye-Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetleri Birliği Hükümeti Arasında İmzalanan Doğu Demiryolu Nakliyat Sözleşmesi. Available [online]: < <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr> > [09 January 2011].

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the following Cyprus problem with Greece gave rise to Turkey's realization that its national interests and sensitivities might be disregarded or even be expended by the USA when intra-bloc harmony or bipolar stability is at stake. This brought out a more favourable and receptive foreign policy line in Turkey toward Soviet rapprochement overtures. Reciprocal high-level visits started in the early-1960s and the economic-technical-technological cooperation agreements were signed between the two parties. These were accords on telephone, telegraph and radio services, on air transportation and on the construction of a joint dam on Arpaçay (Ahuryan) river on Turkish-Soviet border.²⁵ Furthermore, thanks to the aid of Soviet credits and the company of Soviet advisors, Turkey managed to construct major industrial installations such as the Aliğa Oil Refinery, Seydişehir Aluminium Factory, Bandırma Sulphuric Acid Plant, Artvin Timber Factory, and İskenderun Iron Steel Plant in the 1970s.²⁶ Despite the occasional tides transpired in the last years of the Cold War triggered off by and large because of the reasons of worsening of the inter-bloc relations as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Soviet backing of the declaration of Martial Law in Poland in December 1981 and the USA's rearming program of March 1983, and the military intervention of September 1980 in Turkey, Moscow and Ankara coped to sustain their political and economic association at a steady level in mid 1980s.

²⁵ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetleri Birliği Hükümeti Arasında İmzalanan Telli Telefon İrtibatı Kurulmasına ve Mevcut Radyo-Telgraf Servisine Dair Anlaşma, Türkiye-Sovyet Karma Komisyonu'nun Arpaçay (Ahuryan) Üzerinde Müşterek Bir Baraj İnşası ile İlgili 25.04.1963 Toplantısına Ait Protokol, and Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetleri Birliği Hükümeti Arasında Hava Ulaştırmasına Dair Anlaşma. Available [online]: < <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr> > [10 January 2011].

²⁶ Vladimir I. Danilov, "Some Features of Russian-Turkish Relations in the 1990s", *Perceptions* (Journal of International Affairs) 6, no.4 (December 2001-February 2002), p.61, Aleksandr Lebedev, "Some Observations on the RF President's Visit to Turkey", *International Affairs* 51, no.2 (April 2005), pp. 3-4, and Tellal, p.782.

The Özal government succeeding the military administration in December 1983 had initiated a policy of economic opening to Turkey's near neighbourhood in accordance with its export-oriented growth strategy. Economic interdependence with the neighbours in the Balkans and the Middle East would serve as a mitigating and stabilizing factor in Turkey's difficult and problematic relations with these countries. The Turkish-Soviet relationship had its share of this new outlook in Turkish foreign policy as well and the two countries finalized a natural gas agreement on 18 September 1984, by which the Soviet Union had decided to provide natural gas to Turkey for twenty-five years starting from 1987 in exchange for Turkish products and contracting services.²⁷ This natural gas agreement constituted a landmark in bilateral trade relations. With the contract Turkey started its long term energy partnership with Moscow while in return Turkish goods and services found their way into the large and not so much competitive Soviet market.

On 25 December 1984, three months after the signing of the natural gas agreement between Turkey and the Soviet Union, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolai Tikhonov came to Turkey and he and Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal signed a ten-year program of economic, trade and scientific cooperation between Turkey and the Soviet Union as well as an Agreement on Trade Turnover between the Soviet Union and Turkey for 1986-1990 and Program of Cultural and Scientific Cooperation between Turkey and the Soviet Union for 1985-1986.²⁸

The USA had not liked the idea of the Soviet Union being energy supplier of one of its key allies. A couple of years before in December 1981, the Reagan

²⁷ The Soviet Union had realized similar barter agreements with Algeria and Peru at that time. See Giovanni Graziani, *Gorbachev's Economic Strategy in the Third World* (New York, NY: Praeger, 1990), p.60.

²⁸ Vladimir Lavrov, "Reminiscences of the USSR Ambassador to Turkey", *International Affairs* 51, no.3 (June 2005), pp. 188-189.

administration had opposed to the construction of Yamal pipeline which would carry natural gas from the Yamal peninsula in western Siberia to West Germany, France, and Italy on the grounds that the hard currency the Soviet Union would obtain from the natural gas exports would be channelled into military spending thus would fan its aggressive, oppressive and expansionist tendencies.²⁹ However, these American objections and protests proved to be in vain when Austria, France, Italy and West Germany began to receive natural gas from the Soviet Union in 1984. This development put Turkey at ease while clinching its natural gas deal with Moscow and toned down the criticisms coming from Washington.

Turkey and the Soviet Union took further measures in the last years of the Cold War to boost their economic and commercial relations. A Protocol on Matters of Improvement of Air Traffic in the Airspace above the Black Sea was hammered out on 24 March 1988 which fixed new boundaries of air traffic control areas of Turkey and the Soviet Union.³⁰ On 20 June 1988 the two sides signed an agreement on motor road communication and in line with this agreement a motor service to Turkey's Eastern Anatolia region was commenced via Sarp border which would precipitate the emergence of suitcase trade between the two countries in the coming years. Finally in March 1990 the two countries signed a commercial shipping agreement that was followed by an agreement on cooperation in fisheries in December 1990.³¹

This long-standing Turkish-Russian relationship embodied in periods of war, competition, standoff and cooperation was also echoed in academic studies which looked into the establishment and progress of the bilateral relations. The next section

²⁹ Norman A. Graebner, Richard Dean Burns, Joseph M. Siracusa, *Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev: Revisiting the End of the Cold War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008), p.29.

³⁰ Lavrov, p.192.

³¹ Ibid., p.193.

will look into this literature devoted to the examination of Turkish-Russian relations starting with the early contacts in the fifteenth century up until the current period. The main objective of this part of the study will be to find out how the state of the bilateral association is perceived by various Turkish, Russian and Western scholars and how it is conveyed and reflected in the historical writings and international relations studies carried out by them. The answer to the question of to what extent the current study is different from its predecessors will also be provided at the end of this section.

Literature on Turkish-Russian Relations: Arguments between Fierce Geo-Political Rivalry and Thriving Economic Cooperation

The literature on Turkish-Russian relations can be divided into four groups. Historical studies examining the imperial period which focus on political and diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire as well as the military conflicts and campaigns between the two countries starting from the end of the fifteenth century up until to the beginning of the twentieth century constitute the first group. The works of Francis Rawdon Chesney³², R. Grant Barnwell³³, B.H. Sumner³⁴, Nimet Akdes Kurat³⁵, Edward Michael Fitzgibbon³⁶, Svetlana F.

³² Francis Rawdon Chesney, *The Russo-Turkish Campaigns of 1828 and 1829: With A View of the Present State of Affairs in the East* (New York, NY: Redfield, 1854; Whitefish, MN: Kessinger Publishing, 2007).

³³ R. Grant Barnwell, *The Russo-Turkish War* (Philadelphia, PA: J. E. Potter, 1877).

³⁴ B. H. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1949).

³⁵ Nimet Akdes Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya: XVIII. Yüzyıl Sonundan Kurtuluş Savaşı'na Kadar Türk-Rus İlişkileri (1798-1919)* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1970).

³⁶ Edward Michael Fitzgibbon, "Alexander I and the Near East: The Ottoman Empire in Russia's Foreign Relations, 1801-1807" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1974).

Oreshkova³⁷, Halil İnalçık³⁸, A.P. Novoseltsev³⁹, İlber Ortaylı⁴⁰, Yuluğ Tekin Kurat⁴¹ and B. Ignatyev⁴² are major examples of this category. In some of the historical studies written by Turkish scholars, the imperialist and expansionist nature of Russia is underlined and the Turkish government and Turkish people are warned about the threat coming from North. The books of Orhan Conker⁴³, Yahya Okçu⁴⁴, Haluk Ferden Gürsel⁴⁵, Ali Kemal Meram⁴⁶, Samiha Ayverdi⁴⁷, Süleyman Kocabaş⁴⁸ and Mehmet Saray⁴⁹ and the article of Muharrem Ergin⁵⁰ are leading examples of this genre. Selami Kılıç's *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri'nin Doğuşu*⁵¹ looked into the brief period between December 1917 and March 1918 during which the Ottoman Empire and the new Bolshevik government negotiated and signed the Brest-

³⁷ Svetlana F. Oreshkova, "Rusya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Arasındaki Savaşlar: Sebepleri ve Kimi Tarihi Sonuçları", in *Dünden Bugüne Türkiye ve Rusya: Politik, Ekonomik ve Kültürel İlişkiler*, (eds.) Gülten Kazgan and Natalya Ulçenko (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, Kasım 2003), pp. 17-32.

³⁸ Halil İnalçık, "Osmanlı-Rus İlişkileri 1492-1700", in *Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde 500 Yıl 1491-1992* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), pp. 25-36.

³⁹ A. P. Novoseltsev, "XV. Yüzyıl ile XVI. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Rus-Türk İlişkileri", in *Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde 500 Yıl 1491-1992* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), pp. 73-78.

⁴⁰ İlber Ortaylı, "XVIII. Yüzyıl Türk-Rus İlişkileri", in *Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde 500 Yıl 1491-1992* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), pp. 125-134.

⁴¹ Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, "1878-1919 Arasında Türk-Rus İlişkilerinin Siyasal Anatomisi", in *Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde 500 Yıl 1491-1992* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), pp. 139-145.

⁴² B. Ignatyev, "XIX. Yüzyıl Sonu ile XX. Yüzyıl Başında Rus-Türk İlişkileri (Gerçekleşmeyen Yakınlaşma Tasarıları)", in *Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde 500 Yıl 1491-1992* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), pp. 153-163.

⁴³ Orhan Conker, *Türk Tarihi Üzerinde Bir Deneme: Türk-Rus Savaşları* (Ankara: Sümer Basımevi, 1942).

⁴⁴ Yahya Okçu, *Türk-Rus Mücadelesi Tarihi* (Ankara: Doğuş Matbaası, 1953).

⁴⁵ Haluk Ferden Gürsel, *Tarih Boyunca Türk Rus İlişkileri: Bir Siyasi Tarih İncelemesi* (Istanbul: Ak Yayınları, 1968).

⁴⁶ Ali Kemal Meram, *Türk-Rus İlişkileri Tarihi* (Istanbul: Kitapçılık Ticaret Limited Şirketi, 1969).

⁴⁷ Samiha Ayverdi, *Türk-Rus Münasebetleri ve Muharebeleri* (Istanbul: Turan Neşriyat Yurdu, 1970).

⁴⁸ Süleyman Kocabaş, *Kuzeyden Gelen Tehdit: Tarihte Türk-Rus Mücadelesi* (Istanbul: Vatan Yayınları, Kasım 1989).

⁴⁹ Mehmet Saray, *Türk-Rus Münasebetleri'nin Bir Analizi* (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1998).

⁵⁰ Muharrem Ergin, "Tarih Işığında Türk-Rus Münasebetleri", in *Sovyet Emperyalizmi, Balkanlar ve Türkiye*, (trans.) Nejat Muallimoğlu (Istanbul: Muallimoğlu Yayınları, 1974), pp. 18-36.

⁵¹ Selami Kılıç, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri'nin Doğuşu* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1998).

Litovsk Peace Treaty. There also exist a few works carried out by Turkish and Russian scholars that concentrate on economic and commercial side of the relationship between the two empires. A. D. Novichev⁵²'s book and the articles of M. Nekrasov⁵³, Nikolay G. Kireev⁵⁴ and Haydar Kazgan⁵⁵ are major examples of these kinds of studies.

Second group involves works dealing with the interregnum period, which is considered as the heyday of the relations between the two countries. There exist few studies published in the Soviet Union focusing on this period which underlined the vitality of Soviet diplomatic, military, financial and moral support extended to Turkey in its gaining victory against Greece in the National Struggle. These are Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze's *Türkiye Anıları: Kasım 1921-Ocak 1922*, Semiyon Ivanovich Aralov's *Bir Sovyet Diplomatı'nın Türkiye Hatıraları* and Abdulla Mardanovich Shamsutdinov's "1920-1922 Döneminde Sovyetler Birliği-Türkiye İlişkileri"⁵⁶. It is possible to identify two trends in works produced by Turkish authors examining the Turkish-Soviet relations in the same period. While Yavuz

⁵² A. D. Novichev, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Yarı-Sömürgeleşmesi*, trans. Nabi Dinçer (Ankara: İlkayaz Basımevi, 1979).

⁵³ M. Nekrasov, "XVI. Yüzyılda Rus-Osmanlı Ekonomik İlişkileri", in *Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde 500 Yıl 1491-1992* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), pp. 91-96.

⁵⁴ Nikolay G. Kireev, "XVIII. Yüzyıl Ortalarında Karadeniz'de Rus-Türk Ticaret İlişkileri'nin Kurulması", in *Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde 500 Yıl 1491-1992* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), pp. 115-120.

⁵⁵ Haydar Kazgan, "Tarih Boyunca Osmanlı-Rus Ticareti ve Sanayi Devrimi Ülkelerinin Ticaret Politikaları", in *Dünden Bugüne Türkiye ve Rusya: Politik, Ekonomik ve Kültürel İlişkiler*, (eds.) Gülten Kazgan and Natalya Ulçenko (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, Kasım 2003), pp. 33-44.

⁵⁶ Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze, *Türkiye Anıları: Kasım 1921-Ocak 1922*, trans. Ahmet Ekeş (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1978), Semiyon Ivanovich Aralov, *Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Türkiye Hatıraları*, trans. Hasan Ali Ediz (İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1967) and Abdulla Mardanovich Shamsutdinov, "1920-1922 Döneminde Sovyetler Birliği-Türkiye İlişkileri", in *Bir Karagün Dostluğu: Kurtuluş Savaşı Yıllarında Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri*, trans. A. Hasanoğlu (İstanbul: Bilim Yayınları, 1979).

Aslan's *Mustafa Kemal-M. Frunze Görüşmeleri: Türk-Sovyet İlişkilerinde Zirve*⁵⁷ and Mehmet Bora Perinçek's "Türk-Sovyet İttifakı'nın Stratejik Temelleri" see the improvement of relations as a necessary, strategic, significant and beneficial move whose breakdown in the following years had worked to the detriment of Turkey; Halil İbrahim Karal's *Turkish Relations with Soviet Russia During the National Liberation War of Turkey 1918-1922: A Study in the Diplomacy of the Kemalist Revolution*, Mehmet Saray's *Atatürk'ün Sovyet Politikası*, Saime Yüceer's *Milli Mücadele Yıllarında Ankara-Moskova İlişkileri* and Osman Okyar's *Milli Mücadele Dönemi Türk Sovyet İlişkilerinde Mustafa Kemal (1920-1921)*⁵⁸ pointed out that a true cooperation based on mutual respect was established between Ankara and Moscow only after the Turkish side proved its military capacity at the battlefield in Sakarya on 13 September 1921. These authors also assessed Turkey's rapprochement with Soviets as a tactical manoeuvre to secure the latter's political and economic assistance during the National Struggle. Bülent Okay in a similar way defined the Turkish-Soviet cooperation during National Struggle period as a marriage of convenience in his book *A Clash of Empires: Turkey between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918-1923*⁵⁹, which was driven by both sides' common aim to counterbalance the British influence and designs in Anatolia and in the South Caucasus. Turkey reached out to the Soviets to obtain their military, diplomatic and moral support against the British-backed Greek army in Anatolia whereas the Soviet

⁵⁷ Yavuz Aslan, *Mustafa Kemal-M. Frunze Görüşmeleri: Türk-Sovyet İlişkilerinde Zirve* (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2002), and Mehmet Bora Perinçek, "Türk-Sovyet İttifakının Stratejik Temelleri", in *Bir Millet Uyanıyor*, (yön.) Attila İlhan (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2005), pp. 211-230.

⁵⁸ Halil İbrahim Karal, *Turkish Relations with Soviet Russia During the National Liberation War of Turkey 1918-1922: A Study in the Diplomacy of the Kemalist Revolution* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1967), Mehmet Saray, *Atatürk'ün Sovyet Politikası* (Istanbul: Acar Yayınları, 1987), Saime Yüceer, *Milli Mücadele Yıllarında Ankara-Moskova İlişkileri* (Bursa: Ekin Kitabevi, 1997) and Osman Okyar, *Milli Mücadele Dönemi Türk Sovyet İlişkilerinde Mustafa Kemal (1920-1921)* (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1998).

⁵⁹ Bülent Gökay, *A Clash of Empires: Turkey between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918-1923* (London, United Kingdom: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997).

Union by entering into a close relationship with the nationalist government in Ankara intended to weaken the impact of Britain in the regions adjacent to its southern borders. Another noteworthy work that investigated this epoch was Stefanos Yerasimos' research which was based on Soviet archival documents and examined the period between 1917 and 1923. The book paid attention to the importance of Soviet political and economic aid in achieving victory against the Entente powers.⁶⁰

Third group of studies is composed of works which focus on the relationship between Turkey and the Soviet Union in the Cold War era. Most of the Turkish surveys that aimed to shed light on the Cold War period singled out the Soviet Union's demands of the joint control of the Straits, bases in the surrounding area of the Straits and incorporation of the Turkish cities of Kars and Ardahan into its territory as the main culprit for the deterioration of the relations. According to these studies permanent, stable and healthy relations between Turkey and its large and powerful neighbour is possible only if the Soviet Union abandons its patronizing and meddling attitude toward Turkey and respects the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. Feridun Cemal Erkin's book devoted to Straits question between Turkey and the Soviet Union⁶¹, Rıfki Salim Burçak's book which inquired Turkish-Soviet relations during the II. World War by paying special attention to Saraçoğlu's visit to Moscow in 1939⁶², Kamuran Gürün's study that examines the period between 1919 and 1953⁶³, and finally Ali Suat Bilge's work that

⁶⁰ Stefanos Yerasimos, *Türk Sovyet İlişkileri: Ekim Devrimi'nden Milli Mücadeleye* (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1979).

⁶¹ Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Türk Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi* (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1968).

⁶² Rıfki Salim Burçak, *Moskova Görüşmeleri (26 Eylül 1939-16 Ekim 1939) ve Dış Politikamız Üzerindeki Tesirleri* (Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi Basın-Yayın Yüksekokuulu Basımevi, 1983).

⁶³ Kamuran Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1920-1953)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991).

concentrated on 1920-1964 are prominent examples of this type of inquiries.⁶⁴ It is possible to set apart Melih Aktaş's book *1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türk-Sovyet İlişkilerinde Amerikan Faktörü*⁶⁵ from studies that investigated Turkish-Soviet relations in the Cold War episode as he portrayed the views, policies and interpositions of the USA as the main determinant of the course of the Turkish-Soviet relations rather than the particular foreign policy acts of respective countries vis-à-vis each other during the decade-long administration of the Democrat Party.

Gencer Özcan's dissertation *Turkey's Relations with the Soviet Union (1945-1980)* is a rare epitome of the application of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) theory to the exploration of the dynamics of Turkish-Russian interaction by utilizing systemic and national variables. The study emphasized the Turkish side of the relationship and aimed to find out the main imperatives of the Turkish foreign policy makers whilst formulating and implementing policies toward the Soviet Union in the course of Cold War years. According to Özcan, the direction of Turkish foreign policy towards the Soviet Union was guided by geo-political imperatives, by shifts in the United States' perceptions of the Soviet Union and finally by the economic strains Turkey faced.⁶⁶ The dissertation ended in 1992 and the author claimed that with the Soviet Union out of the picture, Turkey would be in an advantageous position to increase its political and economic cooperation with the newly independent states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia and would find the chance to help them in their adaptation to Western political and economic structures.

⁶⁴ Ali Suat Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri 1920-1964* (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1992).

⁶⁵ Melih Aktaş, *1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türk-Sovyet İlişkilerinde Amerikan Faktörü* (İstanbul: Şema Yayınevi, 2006).

⁶⁶ Gencer Özcan, "Turkey's Relations with the Soviet Union (1945-1980)" (Ph.D. diss., Boğaziçi University, 1992).

Another interesting work is Bülent Gökay's *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991: Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey and Communism*⁶⁷ in which the writer examines the influence and place of Turkish communist movement in relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey. Drawing on the foreign ministry archives of both Russia and United Kingdom as well as secondary resources Gökay reached to the conclusion that despite the continuous political and material support of the Soviet Union provided to the Turkish communists, they never had the efficacy and power to play a decisive role in Turkish domestic politics but was most of the time used by Moscow as a leverage on Turkish national government with the objective of curbing the Western influence in the country.

Studies written in the Soviet Union on Turkey during the Cold War years put the blame of the worsening of the bilateral relationship, without ever mentioning the land and base aspirations of the Soviet Union from Turkey, on the Turkish governments which being under the ideological penetration of the USA was accused of pursuing a foreign policy line that served the interests of the Western imperialist circles. Manvel Arsenovich Gasratyan's "An Outline of Recent History"⁶⁸ and *Turkey in 1960-1963: A Soviet Survey of Domestic Policy*⁶⁹, and *Ekim Devrimi Sonrası Türkiye Tarihi*⁷⁰ published by the Academy of the Sciences of the Soviet Union are the leading examples of these kinds of works.

Western scholars examining the Turkish-Soviet relations during the Cold War do it within the confines of bloc politics and analyze the bilateral relationship as an

⁶⁷ Bülent Gökay, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991: Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey and Communism* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006).

⁶⁸ Manvel Arsenovich Gasratyan, "An Outline of Recent History", in *A Soviet View of Contemporary Turkey* (Moscow: Science Publishing House, 1965), pp. 149-203.

⁶⁹ Manvel Arsenovich Gasratyan, *Turkey in 1960-1963: A Soviet Survey of Domestic Policy* (Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1965).

⁷⁰ SSCB Bilimler Akademisi, *Ekim Devrimi Sonrası Türkiye Tarihi*, trans. A. Hasanoğlu (Istanbul: Bilim Yayınları, 1978).

extension of the Soviet Union's foreign policy in the Middle East. Galia Golan's *Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War Two to Gorbachev*⁷¹ and Olav Fagelund Knudsen's "Did Accommodation Work? Two Soviet Neighbours 1964-88"⁷² are major types of this genre which gave precedence to the views, moves and policies of the Soviet side in the relationship.

The last group of studies is made up of works that investigate the post-Cold War relations between Turkey and the Russian Federation. While scholars adopting realist and/or neo-realist approaches specify the legacy of conflictual history, threat perceptions, and geo-political rivalry as the major factors that shape the post-Cold War intercourse between the two states; those utilizing the guidelines of interdependency theory in their writings pointed out the primacy of the intensifying political dialogue, burgeoning economic ties and increasing significance of the non-state actors in the post-Cold War Turkish-Russian relations.

Defining the relations between Turkey and Russia as one of the keys to future development in south-west Asia, Vladimir Baranovsky⁷³ stated that the nature of the relationship was reminiscent of the long-standing competition in earlier periods and traditional geopolitical considerations would likely to endure in the following years. Victor Panin and Henry Paniev made a similar comment and claimed that the Turkish-Russian competition in the Black Sea, South Caucasus and Central Asia would likely to grow rather than decrease in the years ahead and would bring to mind the fierce geo-political rivalry between the Russian and Ottoman empires during the

⁷¹ Galia Golan, *Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War Two to Gorbachev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁷² Olav Fagelund Knudsen, "Did Accommodation Work? Two Soviet Neighbours 1964-88", *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no.1 (February 1992), pp. 53-69.

⁷³ Vladimir Baranovsky, "Russia and Asia: Challenges and Opportunities for National and International Security", in *Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda*, (ed.) Gennady Chufirin (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 11-32.

nineteenth century.⁷⁴ Victor Nadein-Raevsky⁷⁵ wrote that joint efforts of Turkey and Russia might be crucial to bringing order and stability to Afghanistan and Central Asia despite the fierce rivalry between the two countries regarding pipeline projects and for the entertainment of close ties with the Central Asian states, in addition to the threat directed against Russia by Turkey in the form of providing support to separatist factions in Chechnya.

George Harris⁷⁶ pointed out that despite the existence of common interests toward amicable relations between Turkey and Russia, they would sustain their complex character due to the competition between the two countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

In the view of Vadim Markushin⁷⁷ time changed the style and methods of competition between Turkey and Russia but not its essence. However, despite the ongoing competition between the two states, there was a growing trend of positive interaction especially in the economic sphere which according to Markushin stemmed from the fact that the two countries became more commensurable in their scales.

Dmitri Trenin⁷⁸ claimed that the geopolitical rivalry stemming from suspicion, discomfort, apprehension about each other's policies in the South Caucasus and Central Asia prevailed between Turkey and Russia in spite of the

⁷⁴ Victor Panin and Henry Paniev, "Turkey and Russia", in *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era*, (ed.) İdris Bal (Boca Raton, FL: BrownWalker Press, 2004), pp. 253-267.

⁷⁵ Victor Nadein-Raevsky, "Russian-Turkish Relations", in *Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda*, (ed.) Gennady Chufrin (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 172-180.

⁷⁶ George Harris, "The Russian Federation and Turkey", in *Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey, and Iran*, (eds.) Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Oles M. Smolansky (Amonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 3-25.

⁷⁷ Vadim Markushin, "Russia-Turkey: Doomed to Be Eternal Neighbours", *Perceptions* (Journal of International Affairs) 2, no.1 (March-May 1997), pp. 95-97.

⁷⁸ Dmitri Trenin, "Russia and Turkey: A Cure for Schizophrenia", *Perceptions* (Journal of International Affairs) 2 (June-August 1997), pp. 57-65.

blossoming of economic relations between the two countries. According to Trenin neither Russia nor Turkey had the capacity to be the center of gravity in these regions and within the foreseeable future; they would be aware of this fact and move toward membership to the European Union.

Ali Suat Bilge in his article “An Analysis of Turkish Russian Relations”⁷⁹ stated that country and population size, natural resources, possession of nuclear weapons, and the education of its citizens tilted the balance of power in favour of Russia in its competition with Turkey. This material supremacy of Russia furnished it with the opportunity to act as a global power whereas Turkey at most could pursue regional policies. According to Bilge due to the asymmetry of power between the two states, the responsibility for friendly and mutually favourable relations would be on the shoulders of Russia.

Tahir Tamer Kumkale in his book *Tarihten Günümüze Türk-Rus İlişkileri*⁸⁰ claimed that the geopolitical conditions dictated and necessitated positive, balanced and rational type of association between Turkey and the Russian Federation in the aftermath of the Cold War. However, the author also advised to the Turkish statesmen that they should always keep at the back of their minds the fact of Russia being an imperialist colonial power and should design their Caucasian and Central Asian policies in line with this reality.

Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer stated that Turkey’s threat perception of Russia radically diminished in the post-Cold War period as a result of curtailment in Russia’s size, economic power and military strength. However, in her view despite the impressive achievements realized in economic relations, full normalization

⁷⁹ Ali Suat Bilge, “An Analysis of Turkish-Russian Relations”, *Perceptions* (Journal of International Affairs) 2 (June-August 1997), pp. 1-12.

⁸⁰ Tahir Tamer Kumkale, *Tarihten Günümüze Türk-Rus İlişkileri* (Istanbul: İrfan Yayınevi, 1997).

between the two countries would be possible only after the solution of Chechen and Kurdish problems.⁸¹

Fiona Hill and Ömer Taşpınar, in their article “Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded”⁸² depicted Turkey and Russia as natural rivals and attributed the recent rapprochement between them to the frustration they both felt toward US policies in the Middle East as well as to the personal chemistry between Putin and Erdoğan.

Şener Aktürk in his article “Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002)”⁸³ argued that Turkey’s drastic improvement in terms of potential and actual power vis-à-vis Russia plausibly explained the increase and intensification of Turkish-Russian cooperation after the Cold War. A similar analysis is done by Igor Torbakov⁸⁴ as he sees the dramatic decrease in the threat perceptions on both sides the main reason of the thaw between Turkey and Russia. However, the author does not expect this rapprochement to be long-lasting as it suffers from the loss of strategic outlook, mutual trust and strong cultural bonds.

Natalya Ulçenko focusing on the energy relations between Turkey and Russia contended that the Russian administration resorted to its old policy of solving its political problems with Turkey through expanding economic cooperation. She further pointed out that Turkey’s natural gas dependence on Russia also showed that

⁸¹ Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, “Turkish-Russian Relations: From Adversity to Virtual Rapprochement”, in *Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, (eds.) Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), pp. 92-115 and Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, “Turkish-Russian National Security Interaction at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century”, in *Türkiye-Rusya İlişkilerinde İhtilaflı Konular ve Çözümleri*, (ed.) Gülten Kazgan (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, Ağustos 2008), pp. 109-141.

⁸² Fiona Hill and Ömer Taşpınar, “Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded”, *Survival* 48, no. 1 (Spring 2006), pp. 81-92.

⁸³ Şener Aktürk, “Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002)”, *Turkish Studies* 7, no.3 (September 2006), pp. 337-364.

⁸⁴ Igor Torbakov, “Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations”, *The Jamestown Foundation Occasional Paper*, (October 2007), pp. 1-18.

Russia, which was concerned about not losing such a large market, would be equally dependent on Turkey and hence would be forced to demonstrate understanding toward Turkey's interests.⁸⁵

James Warhola and William Mitchell⁸⁶ gave credit to the robust economic growth both states experienced in the early twenty-first century in explaining the reasons of conciliatory and increasingly cooperative relations between Turkey and Russia. According to the writers popular expectations and pressures for continued economic ascendance gave way to more productive political relations between the two states.

Anıl Gürtuna in his master's thesis named *Turkish-Russian Relations in the Post Soviet Era: From Conflict to Cooperation?*⁸⁷ looked through the bilateral relationship via transnationalism and complex interdependency theories. While the core part of the study dealt with the post-Cold War period, Gürtuna also provided a detailed historical background of Turkish-Russian relationship. The master thesis of Müberra Pirinçci titled *Turkish Russian Relations in the Post-Soviet Era: Limits of Economic Interdependence*⁸⁸ discussed Turkish-Russian economic interaction starting from the imperial period up until the year 2008 around the concept of economic interdependency. In a similar vein, *Çağdaş Türk-Rus İlişkileri Sorunlar ve İşbirliği Alanları (1992-2005)*⁸⁹ co-authored by Oleg Kolobov, Aleksandr Kornilov

⁸⁵ Natalya Ulçenko, "Rusya ve Türkiye'nin Stratejik Güvenliğinin Sağlanmasında Enerji Hammaddeleri İhracat ve İthalatının Rolü", in *Dünden Bugüne Türkiye ve Rusya: Politik, Ekonomik ve Kültürel İlişkiler*, (eds.) Gülten Kazgan and Natalya Ulçenko (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, Kasım 2003), p.190.

⁸⁶ James W. Warhola and William A. Mitchell, "The Warming of Turkish-Russian Relations: Motives and Implications", *Demokratizatsiya* 14, no.1 (Winter 2006), pp. 127-143.

⁸⁷ Anıl Gürtuna, "Turkish-Russian Relations in the Post Soviet Era: From Conflict to Cooperation?" (master's thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2006).

⁸⁸ Müberra Pirinçci, "Turkish Russian Relations in the Post-Soviet Era: Limits of Economic Interdependence" (master's thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2009).

and Fatih Özbay examined the bilateral relationship by paying particular attention to the growing economic collaboration without referring to any theoretical framework.

As explained above studies utilizing the propositions of realist theory constitute the majority of the literature on Turkish-Russian relations and they distinguish the decline of the threat Turkey perceived from the Russian Federation owing to the dramatic reduction in the latter's political, economic and military power at the end of the Cold War, as the main reason of the thaw in the bilateral relationship. However, even with diminished territory and population, failing economy and battered military force, Russia still had the capacity to prevail over Turkey in case of a confrontation between the two. Accordingly, Russia's being a regional heavyweight gave rise to a policy of caution and restraint on the part of the Turkish foreign policy establishment while designing and executing policies regarding the Black Sea, South Caucasus and Central Asia in the post-Cold War period. Moreover, what is striking is the fact that contrary to the realist predicament, Turkish-Russian relations turned into a conciliatory and cooperative character not when Russia suffered from serious political and economic hardships but at a time when the country's economy, prestige in international arena and self-esteem were rising. So the realist theory falls short of capturing the essence of the true nature of the Turkish-Russian relationship in the post-Cold War period therefore complex interdependency theory which provides an analysis of world politics that point out to the co-existence of cooperation and conflict in international affairs will be used as a general framework in this dissertation to scrutinize and throw light on the state of Turkish-Russian relations. Works which utilize the complex interdependency theory to analyze the course and dynamics of the relations between Turkey and Russia in

⁸⁹ Oleg A. Kolobov, Aleksandr A. Kornilov, Fatih Özbay, *Çağdaş Türk-Rus İlişkileri: Sorunlar ve İşbirliği Alanları 1992-2005* (Istanbul: Tasam Yayınları, 2006).

the post-Cold War era overwhelmingly focus solely on the economic ties between the two states. This survey will provide a more comprehensive account by examining also political and security interaction between the two countries. Furthermore, this study, different from the works written by other scholars, allocates considerable space to foreign policy designs and conducts of the two states' in the Balkans, Black Sea and Middle East regions; areas, which are of mutual interest to both countries, yet have been hardly covered in previous studies.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

This study will investigate the post-Cold War Turkish-Russian relations by focusing on the two states' association in the fields of politics, economics and security. It is possible to observe two important changes in the course of Turkish-Russian relations in this era. Firstly, the conflictual and confrontational atmosphere of the early 1990s during which Turkey and Russia occasionally tangled over bilateral and regional matters that is to say accusing each other of supporting the radical separatist forces in each others' territories, squabbling over passage of Russian ships through Turkish Straits and provisions of CFE treaty, siding with different parties of the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Nagorno Karabakh and backing competitive energy projects, evolved into a climate of moderation and compromise at the end of the decade which resulted in toning down of the mutual complaints and harsh criticisms in addition to the planting of the seeds of lasting cooperation between the two states in the energy field. Secondly, the shift from increasing cooperation to multi-dimensional partnership took place in the mid 2000s which was spurred by the rising

economic and commercial ties between the two countries as well as convergent standings in some regional issues.

Throughout the study, three crucial questions will guide my thinking. These are: (1) Is Turkish-Russian rapprochement an example of a genuine cooperation or just a marriage of convenience which emanates from shared disappointment with the US and the EU policies? ; (2) To what extent did the growing economic relations between Turkey and the Russian Federation, especially Turkey's energy dependence on Russia, contribute to the reduction of tension in political matters between the two countries? ; (3) Can the intensified cooperation between Turkey and Russia help to solve, or at least alleviate, the regional conflicts and problems in the South Caucasus?

My tentative answers to these questions make up my hypotheses:

Firstly, although the course of Turkish-Russian relations cannot be evaluated without taking into account the relations of both countries with the EU and USA, the bilateral relationship also has its own distinctive characteristics and dynamics. So, at least from the perspective of Turkey, even if it one day becomes a member of the EU or Turkish authorities manage to reach a compromise with the USA administration in the Middle East, Turkey will always need to pay attention to Russian views and opinions regarding regional issues in the Black Sea, South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Secondly, I argue that increasing and expanding economic ties between Turkey and Russia paved the way for the normalization and improvement of strained political relations between the two countries. Russia's elevation to the status of Turkey's number one energy supplier, Russian tourists'⁹⁰ growing contribution to

⁹⁰ The term "Russian tourist" used in the text encompasses all the citizens of Russian Federation.

Turkey's tourism revenue every year and the mutual investments realized by Turkish and Russian companies in each other's market brought out a favourable atmosphere for soothing and overcoming political divergence and disagreements between the two states.

Lastly I contend that increasing economic cooperation along with growing political interaction between Turkey and Russia can induce convergence in the foreign policy outlook and policies of these states. Such a new situation can initially find its reflection in the South Caucasus through the resolution of the complicated and long-lasting regional problems such as the Nagorno-Karabakh issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as the frictions between Georgia and its secessionist regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

After presenting my research questions and my hypotheses in response to them, I will now proceed with the theoretical framework of the dissertation. Complex interdependency theory will be used to answer the research questions and to test the veracity of the hypotheses in this international relations case study of post-Cold War Turkish-Russian association. In this context, in the following section, firstly contending views on cooperation in international relations theory will be investigated. Then I will explain why the complex interdependency theory was selected to elucidate the nature of the Turkish-Russian relations in the post-Cold War period and how its main propositions that designate the increasing significance of non-state actors in inter-governmental relations, vitality of economic issues for states and the reluctance of the utilization of military measures by industrial states in resolving conflicting with each other have more explaining power than the other theories in revealing the course and underpinnings of political, economic and military relations between Turkey and Russia.

Debates in International Relations Theory on Cooperation

Realism, the most influential theoretical tradition in international relations discipline has quite circumspect and pessimistic views regarding cooperation. According to realist paradigm, in an anarchic international environment where each state is forced to take care of its own survival and welfare, the prospect of collaboration between the states is weak and short term even if it is not impossible. Classical realists, such as E.H. Carr expounds international cooperation as the paradise of the economically strong.⁹¹ For him liberal economic practices such as free trade and removal of protective barriers between the states only work to the advantage of rich and industrialized nations whereas the less developed countries are left to backwardness and impoverishment. Another classical realist Hans Morgenthau also states that only among the dominant powers, there is room for intentional, deliberate and voluntary cooperative agreement. The balance of power mechanism between the great powers acts as a stabilizing factor in the international system and may ensure prolonged periods of peace and tranquillity.⁹²

For Waltz, the founder and most prominent figure of neo-realism, the structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states. The insecurity and uncertainty of each state about the other's future intentions and actions work against

⁹¹ Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1939), p.60.

⁹² Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York, NY: Knopf, 1962), p.167.

their cooperation.⁹³ Grieco also sees cheating and fear about relative gains as major impediments towards international cooperation. So a state declines to join or sharply limits its commitment to a cooperative agreement if it believes that other parties are achieving, or are likely to achieve, relatively greater gains. It will eschew cooperation even though participation in the agreement brings up large absolute gains.⁹⁴

The possibility of dependence on other states for vital interests and the vulnerability it brings about is another major concern for most of the countries. Although Waltz accepts that interdependence in some ways promotes peace by multiplying contacts among states and contributing to mutual understanding, he argues that it also multiplies the occasions for conflicts that may promote resentment and even war. Waltz contends that interdependency has declined during the twentieth century and this trend has conducted to stability.⁹⁵ So, in the final analysis, Waltz claims that states, if they can afford to, shy away from becoming excessively dependent on goods and resources that may be denied to them in crises and wars. They take measures and utilize protective mechanisms to avoid excessive dependence on others.⁹⁶

The representatives of the English School, another variant of realism, put forward a different perspective and argue that despite the anarchical character of the international arena, it is characterized by the formation of not only a system of states, but a society of states. The reputable figure of the English School, Hedley Bull,

⁹³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Theory of International Politics* (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 102-103.

⁹⁴ Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", *International Organization* 42, (1988), p.128.

⁹⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence", in *The International Corporation: A Symposium*, (ed.) Charles P. Kindleberger (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1970), pp. 208-209.

⁹⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Structural Realism after the Cold War", *International Security* 25, no.1 (Summer 2000), p.15.

points out that the absence of a universal government has not been incompatible with international economic interdependence. According to Bull, cooperation between states will be possible if an international society which brings together the different states around common set of rules comes into being. States with certain common interests and to a lesser extent common values will be bounded by certain rules in their dealings with one another, such as that they respect each other's sovereignty, enforce the international agreements and refrain from exercising force against each other. On the other hand, they cooperate in the working of institutions such as the forms of procedures of international law, the machinery of diplomacy and international organizations, and the customs and conventions of law.⁹⁷

Another realist approach, hegemonic stability theory claims that the presence of a single, strongly dominant actor, a "world leader" in international politics which provide certain institutional public goods⁹⁸ gives way to collectively desirable outcomes for all states in the international system. The presence of a hegemon leads to the provision of a stable regime of free trade and although the dominant leader benefits from the situation, smaller states as free riders will gain more.⁹⁹ They bear none of the costs of provision and yet share fully in the benefits. The proponents of hegemonic stability theory argue that the establishment and maintenance of free trade regimes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be attributed to the existence of hegemons, Britain and the United States respectively.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London, United Kingdom: Macmillan, 1977), p.13.

⁹⁸ Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression 1929-1939* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 296-298.

⁹⁹ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.169.

¹⁰⁰ Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), p.57.

These realist approaches were criticized and challenged by liberal international relations theories which question the centrality of the state in international system and stress the importance of international cooperation and international organizations. Democratic or liberal peace theorists contend that trade among states reduces political tensions, prevents the likelihood of war and facilitates cooperation.¹⁰¹ As commerce and foreign investment increase, there are fewer incentives to meet these needs through territorial expansion and foreign conquest. Trade is posited as a more efficient instrument for acquiring products and markets than military expedition.¹⁰² The second argument states that mutual dependence established between two trading partners raises the costs of conflict, thereby diminishing the levels of militarized dispute. Interdependence both raises the economic interest countries have in continuing peaceful exchange and provides a medium of communication that can be useful in preventing or resolving disagreements short of violence.¹⁰³ Such a liberal order would also make a substantial and positive contribution to the maintenance of international security.

The functional and neo-functional theories that were developed in the aftermath of the Second World War offered the establishment of international organizations which were designed to promote common economic and social needs

¹⁰¹ Edward D. Mansfield, *Power, Trade, War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.122.

¹⁰² Jon C. Pevehouse, "Interdependence Theory and the Measurement of International Conflict", *The Journal of Politics* 66, no.1 (February 2004), pp. 248-249, Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce & Conquest in the Modern World* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1986), pp. 31-32 and Richard Rosecrance, "The Obsolescence of Territory", *New Perspectives Quarterly* 12, no.1 (Winter 1995), pp. 44-50.

¹⁰³ Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*, (New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001), p.139, Solomon William Polachek, "Conflict and Trade", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24, no.1 (March 1980), pp. 55-78, John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no.2 (1997), p.288, John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations," *World Politics* 52, no.1 (1999), pp. 1-37 and John R. Oneal, Bruce Russett, Michael L. Berbaum, "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992", *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (2003), pp. 371-393.

among the states and which would also enhance cooperation. The leading advocate of functionalism David Mitrany propounded the creation of separate international bodies with authority over functionally specific fields such as security, transport and communication.¹⁰⁴ They should be executive bodies with autonomous tasks and powers and do some of the same jobs as national governments, only at a different level. This focus on particular functions would encourage international cooperation quickly and effectively and would lead to a peaceful world order.

Mitrany's functionalism was later modified and revised by Ernst Haas who, at the same time the European Coal and Steel Community was formed in 1952, built up a neo-functional theory that combined the method of functionalism with a federalist objective. Haas conceived integration as a process in which "political actors would be persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the national states."¹⁰⁵ Haas claimed that once sector cooperation is attained in one area, the sector imbalance that it causes would create incentives to initiate integration in other areas to counter the imbalances. The integration in the functional areas would eventually lead to political and military spillover.

The 1970s witnessed the emergence of interdependency theory in international relations literature. This approach challenges the two basic assumptions of realist theory. First, it highlights the appearance and growing importance of non-state actors in international politics. These new actors such as international, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and transnational networks pose a significant threat to state sovereignty and

¹⁰⁴ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1943), pp. 70-72.

¹⁰⁵ Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958), p.16.

authority. Second, the development of nuclear weapons made the resort to force in handling international conflicts difficult.¹⁰⁶ This paved the way for the replacement of military issues with the economic, social and ecological ones such as welfare, economic growth, access to energy supplies, trade barriers, currency exchange rates and environmental controls. Realists responded to the interdependency theses by stating that transnational actors have been able to play an important role in world affairs in line with the approval and support of the predominant power, the USA. So a possible decline in the US influence and the rise of hostile powers to the activities of multinational corporations would bring their reign over international economic relations to an end.¹⁰⁷

Another liberal tradition, neo-liberal institutionalism acknowledges the realist premises that states play a major role in international affairs and the absence of a common authority to actualize and enforce binding agreements makes it difficult for them to cooperate with one another. The basic difference between neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists is the latter's contention that cooperation under anarchy is attainable if certain conditions are fulfilled. Collaborative behaviour between states is possible if they pursue a strategy of reciprocity. The balance of exchange not only deters uncooperative actions but also hinders the exploitation of cooperative parties' exploitation by others.¹⁰⁸ The shadow of the future is another effective promoter of cooperation.¹⁰⁹ Actors' willingness to cooperate is influenced by whether they believe that their relationship will continue indefinitely. Repeated interactions make

¹⁰⁶ Edward L. Morse, "Transnational Economic Processes", *International Organization* 25, no.3 (Summer 1971), p.376.

¹⁰⁷ Robert Gilpin, "The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations", *International Organization* 25, no.3 (Summer 1971), p.404.

¹⁰⁸ Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions", *World Politics* 38, (1985), p.104.

¹⁰⁹ Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Co-operation* (London, United Kingdom: Penguin Books, 1990), p.126.

the cooperative outcome more likely. It can be said that this argument is more applicable to economic issues than security ones as defection in security affairs can destroy opponent's ability to retaliate especially if it is exposed to nuclear attack.¹¹⁰ Neo-liberal institutionalists also underline that cooperation tends to be easier in two-player situations where players can identify defectors and focus retaliation on them. Large numbers reduce the feasibility of sanctioning defectors by creating serious collective action problems for states.¹¹¹

Neo-liberal institutionalist theory also interrogates the realist conception of international regimes. For realists, states accept the notion of international regimes out of their own self-interest. They constitute these institutions in order to reach the goals they seek. Regime theorists, on the other hand, claim that once regimes are established they assume a life of their own. They may begin to act with a degree of relative autonomy, and become less dependent on the wills of their sponsors and members.¹¹² Robert Keohane claims that although great powers such as the US exercise enormous influence within international institutions, the policies that emerge from these institutions are different from those that the US would have adopted unilaterally.¹¹³ Furthermore, international regimes and institutions were posited by neo-liberals as solutions to collective problems which would reduce transaction costs, allow states to realize long-term benefits instead of short-term

¹¹⁰ For a similar view see Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Matters", in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, (ed.) David A. Baldwin (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 60-84.

¹¹¹ Axelrod, pp. 94-95.

¹¹² Stephen D. Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables", *International Organization* 36, no.2 (Spring 1982), p.500 and Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State", *International Organization* 40, no.4 (Autumn 1986), p. 760.

¹¹³ Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?", *Foreign Policy* 110 (Spring 1998), p.87.

gains of defection and provide information and a greater degree of transparency to states.¹¹⁴

Another theory of cooperation is epistemic communities theory which was brought forth by Peter Haas. He defines epistemic community as a “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”¹¹⁵ The members of the epistemic communities have a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs and notions of validity and a common policy enterprise. They reduce uncertainty, provide expert information and advance negotiation by coordinating states’ expectations. Although the theory is indicative in terms of elucidating the ways to promote and enhance international cooperation, it lacks of the ability to explain how cooperation is attained in the first place.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, as James K. Sebenius correctly points out, the epistemic community concept cannot clearly explain how epistemic consensus is translated into actual measures of policy coordination through bargaining.¹¹⁷

Marxist and dependency theories of international relations oppose international cooperation on the grounds that it serves to enhance and extend the exploitation at the core of the world political economy. Multinational corporations and international banks that are founded in developing countries by the wealthy

¹¹⁴ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp.88-96.

¹¹⁵ Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination”, in *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*, (ed.) Peter M. Haas (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), p.3.

¹¹⁶ Helen Milner, “Review: International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses”, *World Politics* 44, no.3 (April 1992), pp. 479-480.

¹¹⁷ James K. Sebenius, “Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities”, in *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*, (ed.) Peter M. Haas (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), p.359.

nations are seen as key players in establishing and maintaining dependency relationships. These transnational organizations militate against and corrupt the smooth functioning of domestic politics by allying with the indigenous bourgeoisie.¹¹⁸ Their activities were prompted by the military and economic aid programs of their home countries and ultimately backed by the covert or overt use of force.¹¹⁹ The already weakened bargaining position of the host countries is further deteriorated by the penetration of transnational actors. In the same vein, international institutions are also perceived by dependency theorists as organizations designed to bolster the status-quo, which is the interest of powerful states.

Constructivism sees cooperation as a process of social interaction and learning through which shared understandings of reality are reproduced, identities are transformed and interests are redefined. The formation of the EEC right after the end of the Second World War is frequently mentioned in this sense by the constructivist theorists. Even though selfish national interests were the starting point of the EEC, the process of cooperation led to redefinition and reconstitution of these interests as well as state identities.¹²⁰ It should also be noted that although international cooperation is possible and favourable from the constructivist perspective it is also defined as a slow and incremental process which presupposes that actors that are in engagement do not negatively identify each other.¹²¹

¹¹⁸ Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", *Journal of Peace Research* 8, no.2 (1971), p.250.

¹¹⁹ Peter Evans, *Dependent Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), p.281 and Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley University Press, 1979), pp. 163-164.

¹²⁰ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics", *International Organization* 46, no.2 (Spring 1992), p.418 and John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge", *International Organization* 52, no.4 (Autumn 1998), p.863.

¹²¹ Wendt, p.418.

The feminist theory in international relations points out that states, being interest-driven as well as male and masculine dominated structures, most of the time neglect the grievances of those who are in a disadvantaged position.¹²² Feminism speaks out for those who are on the margins of society and interstate politics¹²³ and aims to transform the current patriarchal international system through establishing counter-hegemonic forms of cooperation, especially by setting up transnational women's organizations which despite scarce resources ensure more access and representation for women than states or other international organizations.

Stating that the post-modern world is of one where state power is diffused both domestically and internationally, states attaching more importance to soft power rather than military conquest, and the non-state actors gaining visibility and primacy; scholars in post-modernist creed favour international cooperation on the grounds that increasing interdependence or mutual vulnerability along with transparency and mutual openness between the states will lead to more secure, stable and prosperous international environment.¹²⁴

Robert Putnam's theory of two-level games underlines the interaction of domestic and international factors in international cooperation. International negotiations between the states take place at two-levels. At the international level (Level I) there is bargaining between the diplomats or leaders of national governments which leads to a tentative agreement. This agreement, however, comes into effect only after it is ratified by the domestic constituents in respective states

¹²² Craig N. Murphy, "Seeing Women, Recognizing Gender, Recasting International Relations", *International Organization* 50, no.3 (Summer 1996), p.529.

¹²³ J. Ann Tickner, "You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists", *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no.4 (December 1997), p.623.

¹²⁴ Robert Cooper, "The Post-Modern State and the World Order", *Demos*, (2003), p.43.

(Level II).¹²⁵ The larger win-sets¹²⁶ make Level I agreements more likely. The size of the win-set depends first of all on the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level II constituents.¹²⁷ There is much more room for international cooperation and agreement regarding issues on which domestic interests are more heterogeneous compared to the ones on which domestic interests are homogeneous. The size of the win-set depends on the Level II political institutions and strategies of the Level I negotiators as well.¹²⁸ Here, Level I negotiators who have diverse and strong democratic pressure groups at home such as political parties, economic organizations, civil society associations are in a more advantageous position in obtaining a favourable deal than the states with autocratic structures in which there exist only a few power groups such as bureaucracy and military. The political standing, prestige and credibility of a chief negotiator in the eyes of its domestic constituents are also other crucial factors in winning ratification of international agreements. The main weakness of Putnam's theory is his assumption that negotiations have bilateral character whereas in international arena there exist most of the time influential third-parties which might have positive or negative impact on realization of an agreement.

Probing the current nature and characteristics of the international system, one can state that there exists room both for anarchy and interdependence. Although the absence of central authority prompts states to adopt self-helping behaviour in their dealings with each other, they are more than ever tightly connected in a globalizing world where we witness the continuous and extensive flow of goods, services, capital

¹²⁵ Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games", *International Organization* 42, no.3 (Summer 1998), pp. 434-436.

¹²⁶ Putnam defines win-set as the sum of all possible results at the Level I. See Putnam, p.437.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.442.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 448-452.

and people across borders which leave its imprint on all the countries involved in the process. In such an interdependent world states, even if they sustain sovereignty, cannot live in an isolated environment but are linked to other states through various channels and their actions and achievement of goals are affected by these other actors' perceptions, expectations and behaviours.¹²⁹

Interdependent relations between the countries do not entirely eliminate the risk of conflict, confrontation and war and it is a reality that wars occur in certain places of the world from time to time but it is a tool less and less utilized especially in the Western world where the economic interdependence between the states are at the highest level. So we encounter both cooperation and conflict in world politics and economic well-being is no less important for states than security.

Another important feature of the current international system is the abundance and increasing significance of the non-state actors such as international organizations, multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations. Despite the realist argument that a decline in the number of international institutions would be observed in the post-Cold War period as a result of the end of the bipolar structure and return to multipolar competition under anarchy, the number of international organizations increased from six hundred in 1980 to over six thousand today¹³⁰ and they play important roles in world politics especially in economic, social and environmental matters.

¹²⁹ Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique", in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, (ed.) David A. Baldwin (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 165.

¹³⁰ Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War", in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, (ed.) David A. Baldwin (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 285 and Helen V. Milner, "Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics: Research Frontiers", in *Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics*, (eds.) Helen V. Milner and Andrew Moravcsik (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), p.6.

In a post-Cold War world where we witness the coexistence of anarchy with cooperation, military conflict with economic interdependence, and states with non-state actors, complex interdependency theory's reflection of this duality in its main arguments equips it with more explanatory power in capturing the essence and current dynamics of international relations environment compared to other competing paradigms. This study will also use complex interdependency theory in order to scrutinize and throw light on the state of post-Cold War Turkish Russian relations. Putnam's theory of two-level games, on the other hand, which could provide rich insight to understand the impact of domestic constituents on the political bargaining between the two states especially prior to signing of natural gas, nuclear power plant and visa-exemption agreements, could not be employed in this study because of the reason that I do not have enough access to Russian constituents to truly examine their impact on the dynamics of post-Cold War Turkish-Russian interaction.

In the coming pages, firstly the concept of interdependence and the main arguments of the complex interdependency theory will be discussed then it will be followed by a section which will elaborate how this theory will be applied to reveal the course of post-Cold War Turkish-Russian relations.

Complex Interdependency Theory: Definition and Main Arguments

Various scholars came up with different definitions of interdependence in 1970s. Edward Morse depicted interdependence as the outcome of specified actions of two or more parties (individuals, governments, corporations, etc.) when the outcome of

these actions are mutually contingent.¹³¹ These parties, then, are interdependent with respect to specific issue areas and not with respect to the whole spectrum of activities. Morse gave the example of Soviet-American relations where two governments were highly interdependent in terms of security arrangements but at the same time totally disengaged in commercial affairs.¹³²

According to Richard Cooper interdependence refers to the sensitivity of economic transactions between two or more nations to economic developments within those nations.¹³³ This definition means that two countries with mutual trade would still experience a low degree of interdependence if the value of that trade were not sensitive to price and income developments in the two countries. On the other hand, two states would be highly interdependent if their transactions were greatly sensitive to economic developments, even if their mutual commerce were initially at a low level.¹³⁴

Kenneth Waltz argues that interdependence entails a relationship that would be costly to break.¹³⁵ It only exists if nations are vulnerable to any interruption in relations. Interdependence was taken as the opportunity cost of disrupting the relationship.

The most coherent and refined conceptualization of interdependence came from Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in 1977 with their book *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. In fact, in this book, the two scholars

¹³¹ Edward L. Morse, *Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1976), p.118.

¹³² Edward L. Morse, "Crisis Diplomacy, Interdependence and the Politics of International Economic Relations", *World Politics* 24 (Spring 1972), p.134.

¹³³ Richard N. Cooper, "Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies", *World Politics* 24, no.2 (January 1972), p.159.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 159-160.

¹³⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence", p.210.

not only provide a sound definition of interdependence but also bring forth the basic assumptions of their complex interdependency approach.

According to Keohane and Nye, interdependence refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries.¹³⁶ Where there are mutual although not necessarily symmetrical costly effects of transactions, there is interdependence. The authors talk about two types of interdependence. The first one is sensitivity interdependence which involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework -that is- how quickly changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great the costly effects are.¹³⁷ The authors here gave the example of the effects of increase in oil prices in 1970s on the economies of the USA, Japan and Western Europe. In sensitivity interdependence the framework remains unchanged and no new policy is devised due to the difficulty in formulating new policies within a short time or commitment to a certain pattern of domestic and international rules.

The vulnerability interdependence is defined as the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face.¹³⁸ In vulnerability interdependence more alternatives are available and different policies are possible. Two states, each import same amount of their oil needs may seem equally sensitive to price rises; but if the first one has the option of switching to other sources at favourable costs while the second one was deprived of such an alternative then the second was the one that was more vulnerable. Likewise, both the USA and the United Kingdom were sensitive to decisions by foreign speculators in the late 1960s under the Bretton Woods system but the USA was the less vulnerable one as it had

¹³⁶ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1977), p.8.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p.12.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p.13.

the power and capacity to formulate a new policy and terminate the Bretton Woods regime on 15 August 1971.

Another important concept that is mentioned in the book is asymmetrical interdependence. The authors' perspective here is similar to views of Albert Hirschman and David Baldwin. Hirschman and Baldwin assert that the one who gains more from an asymmetric relationship is the one that is more dependent. The side with the leverage is not the one with the greatest relative gains, but the one with the least.¹³⁹ Giving relative gains to the other party may be an efficient way of curbing its influence and increasing one's own. Keohane and Nye broach a similar argument by conceiving power in terms of control over resources, or the potential to affect outcomes. Although a less dependent actor in a relationship has mostly the upper hand as changes in the relationship is less costly to that actor than to its partners, this situation does not guarantee that the political resources provided by favourable asymmetries in interdependence will lead to similar patterns of control over outcomes.¹⁴⁰

The "complex interdependency" theory has three main hypotheses each of which can be accepted as a challenge to basic premises of realist theory. The first assumption makes a viable point of the emergence and growing dominance of the non-state actors in world politics. Multiple channels connect societies, including informal ties between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among non-governmental elites; and transnational organizations. These inter-state, trans-governmental, and transnational relations while increasing constraints on some of the states through dependence and

¹³⁹ Albert Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 1969), pp. 18-26 and David A. Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis", *International Organization* 34, no.4 (Autumn 1980), p.504.

¹⁴⁰ Keohane and Nye, p.11.

interdependence also enhance the ability of certain governments to influence others. Furthermore, some of the autonomous or quasi-autonomous transnational organizations maintain private policies which may oppose or impinge on state policies.¹⁴¹

Second premise underscores the absence of hierarchy among issues. Military security does not consistently dominate the agenda.¹⁴² The distinction between domestic and foreign policy is blurred and economic issues such as economic growth, wealth and welfare of the citizens are becoming as significant as concerns associated with security and survival of the state.

Finally, except in matters of life and death, the recourse to force to solve the international disputes especially among industrial nations seems less likely. The destruction capability of nuclear weapons and the popular opposition to prolonged military conflicts in Western democracies made resort to violence less feasible and applicable.¹⁴³

It seems that the objective of Keohane and Nye is not to replace the realist paradigm entirely but to expand upon it. The complex interdependency model pays attention to the fact that the very nature of international relations is changing. The world becomes more entwined due to the developments in transportation, communication and technology, and state-centric model falls short of describing and explaining these dynamics adequately. However, although the authors are convinced that interdependence is increasing, they also acknowledge that high politics of security is not immediately supplanted by economic, social or ecological problems.

¹⁴¹ Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, "Transnational Relations and World Politics", *International Organization* 27, no.1 (1971), p.337.

¹⁴² Keohane and Nye, p.25.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.29.

What is happening is that the international agenda is becoming increasingly lengthy with the addition of new items to the list.

Post-Cold War Turkish-Russian Relations through the Lens of Complex Interdependency Theory

Starting from 2008, the already growing economic cooperation between Turkey and the Russian Federation has risen to new heights, proven by Russia's becoming Turkey's number one trade partner. With trade volume of nearly thirty billion dollars in 2011 Russia turned out to be Turkey's second largest trading partner after Germany in accordance with Moscow's becoming of the chief oil and natural gas supplier of Ankara. Political dialogue is on the rise as well. Reciprocal visits at the presidential, prime-ministerial and ministerial levels have become common occurrences. Even the military cooperation, the weakest link of the bilateral interaction, has demonstrated some revival as Turkey after a long interval decided to buy military equipment from Russia and the navies of the two states participated in joint surveillance operations in the Black Sea.

Post-Cold War Turkish-Russian relations fit closely to the conditions of complex interdependency theory. Energy relations between the two countries carry both the characteristics of sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence. Turkey is sensitive to the natural gas and oil supplies coming from Russia whereas Russia is sensitive to the hard currency it earns from the lucrative Turkish market. Turkey currently receives forty-six percent of its natural gas and fifty percent of its oil from Russian Federation. With regard to the oil supplies Turkey has many alternative source countries such as Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan and this reduces its

vulnerability. However, there exists a different situation concerning natural gas imports; Turkey is the more vulnerable party in this trade-off. If Russia ceases to supply natural gas to Turkey, the country will face serious troubles as it lacks sufficient alternative sources to replace the Russian natural gas. Iran, the second major natural gas provider of Turkey after Russia is not a reliable source country as in preceding years it many times cut off gas supplies to Turkey in the middle of the winter on the basis of domestic consumption priorities, technical problems and explosions in the pipeline. The natural gas export to Turkey from Azerbaijan, Algeria and Nigeria is still in meager amounts and cannot suffice to satisfy Turkey's all energy needs. Moreover, both Algeria and Nigeria are geographically distant states and Turkey pays high transportation costs while purchasing natural gas from these countries. Russia, on the other hand, will be deprived of a high-potential and profitable market if Turkey declines to buy its natural gas but the presence of cash-rich clients in Europe and Asia that are eager to buy Russian natural gas will compensate its losses in the Turkish market.

National governments occupy a significant place in Turkish-Russian relations. Within the last eight years many high-level diplomatic visits actualized between the two countries. Two presidential level, two prime ministerial level and four foreign ministerial level visits from Russia to Turkey took place while Turkish officials carried out three presidential-level, four prime-ministerial level and six foreign ministerial level visits to Russia. In addition to these contacts at the state level, informal ties at economic and people-to-people planes are intensifying as well. Turkish and Russian business people frequently come together in gatherings held by Turkish and Russian business associations and economic cooperation organizations. Furthermore, by 2010 investments realized by Turkish businessmen in Russia have

reached to seven billion dollars whereas investments carried out by Russian entrepreneurs in Turkey have exceeded seven billion dollars. Russian tourists selecting Turkey for their vacations have been rising continuously since the year 2000 and nearly 3.5 million Russian tourists came to Turkey in 2011 recording more than four-fold increase in figures in eleven years. 720 Russian students study in Turkey in return for 484 Turkish students receiving education in Russia¹⁴⁴. Social relations between Turkey and Russia are on the rise as coming to light by the 280,000 marriages realized between the Turkish and Russian citizens.¹⁴⁵ Educational and social links between the two countries are especially important as they decrease suspicion, mistrust and uncertainty and at the same time elicit awareness, break down prejudices stemming from incomplete, impartial and wrong information and develop common bonds between the ordinary people.

There is absence of hierarchy among issues. Military security does not dominate the agenda and economic matters have gained remarkable primacy and prominence in Turkish-Russian relationship. The issues regarding the bilateral trade, mutual investments, and concerns of energy resources on the Turkish side prevail. Turkey aims to reduce its trade deficit to Russia resulting from large amounts of natural gas purchases at high prices from this country by augmenting the number and diversity of Turkish investments in Russian Federation. Furthermore, changing the terms of the Blue Stream gas agreement which obliged Turkey to pay cash for the natural gas it does not use has become another major concern of the Turkish government in its interaction with Russia in recent years. Russia, on the other hand,

¹⁴⁴ See Yurtdışı Eğitim Personeli Rehberi, Personel Görevlendirilen Ülkeler, Rusya Federasyonu Genel Bilgiler. Available [online]: <http://digm.meb.gov.tr/yurtdisigorev/rehber/Rehber_III_rusya.html> [06 June 2011] and Türkiye’de Yabancı Öğrenci Sayısı En Fazla Olan Ülkeler. Available [online]: <http://www.eduder.org/?sayfa=icerik_list&bolum=2&id=9> [06 June 2011].

¹⁴⁵ “Vizenin Kalkması Evliliklerini Patlatacak”, *Akşam*, 16 May 2010.

is interested in expanding and deepening its energy relations with Turkey through selling natural gas, oil and electricity to Turkey in increasing proportions and obtaining the honour of building up the country's first nuclear facility thus consolidating its position as a reliable and indispensable energy supplier in the eyes of the Turkish administration. Russia has also speeded up its policy of laying its capital in different sectors of the Turkish economy in the form of acquisitions and joint ventures. In this regard, Moscow prefers investing in strategic sectors of the Turkish economy such as energy, telecommunications and heavy industry similar to Cold War years.

Turkey and Russia have different in fact in some cases opposite views with regard to some bilateral and regional matters. Russia became the first state to recognize the independence and sovereignty of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia when they declared their liberty from Georgia whereas Turkey has been up to now become the loyal supporter of the sanctity of the borders and territorial integrity of the Georgian state. The situation is reversed in the Balkans. Turkey is one of the earliest recognizers of independent Kosovo in contrast to Russia that still respects the authority and jurisdiction of Serbia over this territory. Furthermore, Turkey and Russia demonstrated divergent standings with regard to matters such as Cyprus and Nagorno Karabakh and stood by the opposite parties in these conflicts. Turkey pursues a pro-Azerbaijani line pertaining to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and opts for a resolution that will reinstate the jurisdiction of Baku in the disputed territory and makes this the primary precondition of a possible reconciliation with Armenia whereas Russia, despite its declaration of following an impartial course by being in an equidistant position of both sides of the conflict, Moscow's past pro-Armenian record regarding the issue coupled with its being

Yerevan's chief arm, military supplies as well as credit supplier erodes the veracity of this claim. Cyprus is another matter of contention between Turkey and Russia. While Turkey supports the Turkish-Cypriots in their struggle to break out of the strict political, economic and cultural isolation they were exposed to, Russia's standing is closer to the views of the Greek Cypriot administration. More importantly, although the two states do not see eye-to-eye in their most thorny and sensitive issue namely the Chechen and the Kurdish separatism and from time to time accuse each other of condoning illegal and subversive activities of extremist and terrorist groups on their respective territories, they are too far away from engaging in a military confrontation even for these serious and vital matters. All these examples verify the complex interdependency hypothesis that in the case of political disagreements between the states which are in an economically interdependent relationship, military force is an instrument that's not contemplated.

Research Design

I am going to apply the case study method in this research and test the complex interdependency theory within the context of post-Cold War Turkish-Russian political, economic and military relations. Therefore, what is being examined in this study as the unit of analysis is post-Cold War Turkish Russian interaction and its political, economic and military dimensions. Agreements hammered out between Turkey and Russia, reciprocal high level visits of the Turkish and Russian statesmen, issues of convergence and divergence pertaining to the regional matters in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Balkans and Middle East will be scrutinized and analyzed in depth and detail with regard to the political relations.

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization as a political and economic regional cooperation mechanism which brought two countries together since its inception, the activities of Joint Economic Commission and Turkish-Russian Business Council that helped to institutionalize the relationship between Turkish and Russian ministers, high-level bureaucrats and business people and the state and extent of Turkish-Russian cooperation in the fields of financial services, trade, investments, energy, construction, transportation and tourism will be analyzed within the context of economic relations between the two countries.

High-level visits between the military officials of Turkey and Russia, Turkey's arm and equipment purchases from Russia, joint military exercises conducted in the Black Sea within the confines of the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force, and the activities of Joint Military Cooperation Committee will be touched upon to lay the basis of bilateral military association.

This study will contribute to the international relations literature by determining whether the propositions of one of its most prominent and influential schools holds true in this particular case of post-Cold War Turkish-Russian relations. Subjecting the predictions of a theory to an empirical test is always a useful endeavour. If these predictions are verified at the end of the research, they will constitute supporting evidence to the existing theory and will beef up its plausibility. If, on the other hand, propositions of the theory are not affirmed, then the scientific path will be opened up for modification, development and further refinement of the theory.

There are three reasons of selection of case study as the research method in this study. First of all, this dissertation examines a contemporary phenomenon, post

Cold Turkish-Russian interaction in a real life situation so case study is a suitable tool for this kind of inquiry.¹⁴⁶

Secondly, in order to understand the background and current dynamics of the complex relationship between Turkey and Russia, detailed, intensive and in-depth investigation is needed which will look into the specific policy preferences of both countries with regard to the various bilateral and regional matters. Case study technique is proper for such an inquiry as it allows for comprehensive analysis and thick description of events.¹⁴⁷

Lastly like most of the case studies this dissertation has temporal boundaries¹⁴⁸ that is to say it probes the Turkish-Russian relations within a specific time frame starting with the end of the Cold War at the beginning of the 1990s and after following a chronological sequence of order, arrives to current date.

In line with the characteristics of case study method, triangulation is employed in this research, which means the utilization of multiple sources of evidence for the confirmation of the emerging findings. I have used two data collection methods: analysis of documents concerning the topic under investigation along with the conduct of in-depth interviews with the people who is both equipped with relevant knowledge and experience about the subject under study and also has access to insider information.

¹⁴⁶ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1984), p.23 and David A. de Vaus, *Research Design in Social Research* (London, United Kingdom: Sage Publications, 2001), pp. 222-223.

¹⁴⁷ John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.49.

¹⁴⁸ W. Lawrence Neuman, *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* (Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2000), p.33 and John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003), p.15.

The main limitation of this study is the author's lack of proficiency in the Russian language. In order to compensate for this shortfall, I extensively resorted to Russian primary and secondary sources written in English and Turkish. Within this framework, web sites of the Russian Presidency, Government of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and Ministry for Economic Development of the Russian Federation were quite helpful as they included English versions of speeches, statements, news conferences, ratifications, official meetings, international visits, press releases of Russian foreign policy makers as well as basic documents on Russian foreign policy. The web page of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Turkey was also useful as it encapsulated valuable information about the political agreements between the two countries and meetings, visits, consultations, and contents of the telephone conversations that took place between the high-level officials of Turkey and Russia. I also made use of books and articles in academic journals written by Russian academics, field specialists and journalists in addition to the memoirs of Russian diplomats who had served in Turkey as secondary sources in order to provide comprehensive, accurate, and insightful account of the Russian side. Furthermore, I utilized to a great extent the web sites of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Official Gazette and State Planning Organization (DPT) as they included official documents in the form of agreements, memorandums of understanding, protocols and joint declarations, press releases and statements.

The expert interviews I carried out with the representatives of the Turkish-Russian business associations and the officials in the Turkish Foreign Ministry who were specialized in Turkish-Russian political and commercial affairs constituted my other primary sources in this research. These interviews were in-depth one-on-one

conversations during which I posed a couple of open-ended questions to the interviewees to draw out their views and opinions pertaining to the Turkish-Russian relations. Interviews with these people were helpful in the sense that they provided up-to-date information with regard to the state of Turkish-Russian interaction, brought out new insights into the topics under study and corroborated my preliminary analyses and findings concerning the nature of the political and economic relations between the two states. When it was not possible to conduct face-to-face interviews due to the participants' remote locations as was the case with representatives from TUSKON's Moscow office and officials that were serving at the Moscow Embassy of Turkey, telephone interviews and e-mail correspondence were realized in order to compensate for this shortcoming.

The author also attempted to conduct interviews with the Russian diplomats and business people with the aim of getting first-hand information about the Russian ideas, views and projections concerning the current outlook and future status of the Turkish-Russian relations but unfortunately failed at the endeavour despite many attempts in this direction and this is another caveat of this research.

Secondary sources such as reports and publications of Turkish ministries and government agencies, statistical data from the Turkish Institute of Statistics, Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service, BOTAŞ, Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK), Central Bank of Turkey, Ministry of Tourism and Culture, Undersecretariat for Maritime Affairs, Undersecretariat of Treasury, and Office of the Commercial Counsellor of Turkish Embassy in Moscow, web sites of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, business reviews, reports prepared by trade organizations and business councils, papers of international

organizations, newspaper and news agency archives and online sources were widely used throughout this dissertation in order to gather data.

Organization of the Study

This dissertation is composed of five chapters. In the introduction part, literature review that gives detailed account of the academic studies conducted pertaining to Turkish-Russian association follows the brief historical background of the Turkish-Russian relations. After presenting my research questions, main hypotheses of the study and summarizing the propositions of the major international relations theories regarding cooperation, I delve into the main arguments of the complex interdependency theory and explain the reasons of my selection of this theory in probing the post-Cold War state of Turkish-Russian interaction in political, economic and security dimensions. This section ends with a description of research design used in the study.

Chapter 2 examines the period starting with the demise of the Soviet Union and the coming out of the Russian Federation as its successor and major heir on to the world stage up until the end of the 1990s, during which Turkey and Russia mostly adopted different views, outlooks and courses of actions concerning regional matters in the Balkans, South Caucasus and Central Asia. This is also a time span which witnessed the augmentation and institutionalization of the economic and commercial bonds between the two countries. For this reason considerable piece of this part is devoted to the detailed examination of the growing cooperation between Russia and Turkey in the fields of bilateral trade, banking, construction, energy and transportation. Furthermore, Turkey's purchase of military hardware from Russia is

scrutinized at the end of the chapter within the framework of the newly-established military relations between the two countries.

Chapter 3 begins with the shift of power in the Russian Presidency from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin and investigates the results and repercussions of this change on Russia's South Caucasus and Central Asian policies. Turkey's attempt to forge closer political and economic ties with Azerbaijan and Georgia and its searching ways of reaching out to Armenia for the settlement of the gruelling issues between the two states as well as Ankara's moderate Central Asian policy aimed at bolstering Turkish investments in the region is analyzed. I also touch on two significant regional matters such as the Kosovo conflict and NATO's eastern expansion. While Russia and Turkey had different standings with respect to the former dispute, their positions seemed to converge on the second issue albeit for different reasons. Bilateral economic relations especially the cooperation in energy sector which acquires a lasting character with the realization of the Blue Stream gas pipeline project is again looked through extensively in this chapter. I complete this section by discussing flourishing military relationship between Turkey and Russia which takes place in the form of foundation of Joint Military Cooperation Committee and the realization of joint drills in the Black Sea.

Chapter 4 throws light to the recent ascension of diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey in addition to the continuing upward trend in economic and commercial affairs. This situation is ascribed to the two states' finding out of common points in issues such as preventing the acquisition of zones of influence of non-littoral states in the Black Sea, integration of Iran and Syria into the international system through diplomatic means and attaining a permanent peace in Israeli-Palestinian conflict despite the ongoing rivalry in the South Caucasus and Central

Asia and the explicit divergence of postures with regard to Cyprus and Kosovo problems. Collaboration in the energy field tightened up through natural gas and oil exports of Russia to Turkey and its building up of Turkey's first nuclear power station plus the increasing mutual investments along with cooperation in construction, tourism and transportation are discussed. The final pages of this chapter also deal with Turkey's buying off military equipment from Russia and the joint operations conducted by the two states in the Black Sea.

In Chapter 5 which is the concluding part of the dissertation I will revisit my research questions and my hypotheses, will make some projections about the possible evolution of Turkish-Russian relations in the coming years, will point out the main limitations of the study and will offer research agenda for researchers and scholars who will study the same topic in the future.

CHAPTER II

COMPETITION AND CONFRONTATION

The 1990s witnessed a period of intense collusion and rivalry between Russia and Turkey. Although after the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, Turkey and the Russian Federation turned over a new leaf in their diplomatic relations by carrying out official visits and concluding political agreements, within a brief period of time their dissensions regarding various bilateral and regional issues came to the surface. Turkey adopted a dynamic and vigorous line of policy in the South Caucasus and Central Asia by trying to export its political and economic system to newly independent states. Russia, on the other hand, declared the doctrine of near abroad which aimed at the resumption of Russia's zone of influence in its former dominions in Eurasia. In addition to the serious bilateral problems such as passage through the Turkish Straits, Russian S-300 missile sales to Greek Cypriots, Russia's eschewing of adopting preventive measures to curb the activities of PKK on its soil and Turkey's sympathetic attitude concerning the Chechen cause, the two sides also differed in their approaches to regional problems such as the CFE treaty, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Bosnian war.

The economic relations between Turkey and Russia in this period recorded an impressive progress despite the tensions in the political atmosphere. This became possible with the growing ties at the business-to-business and people-to-people levels between the two countries. The removal of travel restrictions, along with the rise of unemployment in Russia as a result of limited job opportunities in the nascent private

sector of the country in the post-Soviet period led some Russian citizens to engage in suitcase trade in Turkey, which as a result of liberalization measures taken at the beginning of 1980s, had transformed its economy based on import-substitution to an export-oriented one¹⁴⁹ and had earned a good reputation for manufacturing of textile and consumer products. Turkey's geographical proximity to Russia, the low price of the Turkish goods compared to their equivalents in the Western markets and Turkish government's decision to ease visa requirements first for the citizens of the Soviet Union then for the nationals of the successor states of the Soviet Union made Turkey an attractive destination for Russian suitcase traders. Some of these people also started to visit Turkey as tourists in the following years or recommended their fellow citizens to choose Turkey for their vacations which contributed positively to the developing of social bonds between the two societies whose interaction had been until that period was very limited.

This was also a period when Turkish companies started to invest in the Russian economy especially in banking, construction, retail and consumer goods sectors and reaped the benefits of low competition here when most of the Western businesses stayed away from the Russian market as they did not want to deal with the travails of a transition economy. These early pioneers opened the way for other Turkish entrepreneurs in Russia and they, together with the suitcase traders, acquainted the citizens of Russia with Turkish goods and services.

In this part of the thesis, while the issues of divergence are being investigated, the flourishing of the political, economic and military relations between the two

¹⁴⁹ See Kemal Kirişçi, "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 40 (2009), pp. 43-44 and Kemal Kirişçi and Neslihan Kaptanoğlu, "The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy", *Middle Eastern Studies* 47, no.5 (September 2011), pp. 709-710 for the impact of liberalization measures taken in economics during the prime ministry of Turgut Özal on Turkey's relations with Greece, Russia and Middle Eastern states in the following years.

states will also be touched upon. The economic aspect of the relationship is particularly significant as most of the time in this period, it prevented the further breakdown of the political relations between Ankara and Moscow.

Establishment of Political Relations

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the foundation of the Russian Federation as its successor state, first official visit between the two countries was carried out by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin on 20-22 January 1992.¹⁵⁰ It was followed by the visit of Çetin's counterpart, the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev on 02-04 February 1992. The Treaty on the Principles of Relations between Russia and Turkey that was signed on 25 May 1992 during Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel's official visit to Moscow set out the basic principles of post-Soviet era Turkish-Russian relations. The agreement enjoins the parties to "respect for political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in domestic affairs, equality of rights and mutual interests, refrain from using force or threat to use force in solving problems and resolution of bilateral conflicts through peaceful means".¹⁵¹

Several high level visits took place in the subsequent years. Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin and Prime Minister Tansu Çiller both made visits to Moscow in 1993. The issues on agenda during these meetings were the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tansu Çiller's visit to Moscow in

¹⁵⁰ Ayhan Kamel, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın Bitiminden Günümüze Kadar Türk-Rus İlişkileri", in *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999), p.415.

¹⁵¹ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Arasındaki İlişkilerin Esasları Hakkında Antlaşma. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFFile.aspx > [29 December 2007].

December 1996 as the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister occurred under the shadow of war in Chechnya, Russia's reluctance to restrict the certain PKK activities in its territory and the country's upcoming S-300 missile sales to Greek Cypriot Administration. Still, the two sides managed to conclude a memorandum on cooperation against terrorism on 18 December 1996.¹⁵²

The Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin's visit to Turkey on 15-17 December 1997, which was the first post-Soviet official visit at prime ministerial level, led to a marked improvement in bilateral relations. A natural gas agreement to be known as Blue Stream that would bring the Russian gas to Turkey through an underwater pipeline in the Black Sea was forged. In addition to the natural gas accord, agreements regarding the boost of trade volume to ten billion dollars in 2005, restoration and modernization of Turkish industrial complexes by Russia, construction of power stations¹⁵³, prevention of double taxation,¹⁵⁴ and the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investments were concluded.¹⁵⁵ Chernomyrdin also declared that both Russia and Turkey should leave behind the Chechen and Kurdish issues and concentrate on the establishment of powerful economic ties which would contribute to the normalization of the political relations between the two countries.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵² Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Terörizm ile Mücadele Alanında İşbirliğine İlişkin Memorandum. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFFile.aspx> [29 December 2007].

¹⁵³ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Arasında Ticari, Ekonomik, Sınai ve Bilimsel Teknik İşbirliğinin Geliştirilmesi Hakkında Uzun Vadeli Program. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFFile.aspx> [29 December 2007] and Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Enerji Alanında İşbirliği Anlaşması. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFFile.aspx> [29 December 2007].

¹⁵⁴ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ve Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Gelir Üzerinden Alınan Vergilerde Çifte Vergilendirmeyi Önleme Anlaşması. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFFile.aspx> [29 December 2007].

¹⁵⁵ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ve Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Yatırımların Karşılıklı Teşviki ve Korunmasına İlişkin Anlaşma. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFFile.aspx> [29 December 2007].

¹⁵⁶ *Ayın Tarihi*, 15 December 1997.

Divergence and Rivalry in the South Caucasus and Central Asia

Promotion of the Turkish Model

The disintegration of the Soviet Union had given rise to both relief and caution among decision-making circles in Ankara. On the one hand, Turkey ceased to share a land border with the Russian Federation which was still a formidable actor with its powerful army and nuclear weapons. Besides, with the removal of the Soviet grip from the Balkans, South Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey found the opportunity to permeate into these regions politically, economically and culturally. On the other hand, the end of the Soviet Empire presaged the wane of Turkey's own strategic importance as the southern flank of NATO and raised questions about Turkey's belongingness to Western alliance. Moreover, Turkey also had security concerns emanating from the power vacuum created by the dwindlement of Russian influence.

Further developments vindicated this Turkish apprehension. The European Commission declared on 20 December 1989 that the European Community was not ready to start accession negotiations with Turkey at the moment due to the major changes the Community was undergoing resulting from the third enlargement wave and the entry into force of the Single Act.¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, Turkey's economic difficulties, its political disputes with Greece along with the situation in Cyprus were counted as major factors that made the commencement of accession negotiations less likely in the near future.

¹⁵⁷ Commission of the European Communities, *Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community*, 20 December 1989. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/commission-opinion-on-turkey_s-request-for-accession-to-the-community_-december-20_-1989.en.mfa> [24 August 2011].

The negative opinion of the European Commission with regard to opening of the accession negotiations had come at a time when Turkey was suffering from serious domestic problems. A separatist Kurdish terrorist movement, religious tensions, rampant inflation and high unemployment were severe constraints that Turkish policy makers had to face. This internal and external environment urged the Turkish authorities to search for a new role in the international arena which would restore the country's privileged position in the Cold War period and also allay its internal troubles.

The emergence of new states in the South Caucasus and Central Asia that had close ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural bonds with Turkey was accepted as a window of opportunity which if successfully utilized, could provide the country a new leverage in its dealings with the Western world. So, Turkey was the first state to recognize the independence of these states in 1991¹⁵⁸ and this act was followed by intense efforts to forge close links with the governments of these republics as well as to provide aid to these states in diplomatic, economic, infrastructural, cultural and educational spheres with the purpose of strengthening and expanding Turkey's influence in the region.

The Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) was formed on 27 January 1992, which gave Turkish efforts an official and institutionalized character. TIKA would provide economic, commercial, technical, social, cultural and educational cooperation to these countries through the establishment of government organizations, preparation of legislation, placement of

¹⁵⁸ Ziya Öniş, "Turkey and Post-Soviet States: Potential and Limits of Regional Power Influence", *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 5, no. 2 (June 2001), p.67.

civil servants, provision of assistance in the areas of banking, insurance, international trade, finance and taxation and deployment of experts.¹⁵⁹

In line with the objectives aforementioned, Turkey firstly assisted the acceptance of these states to international institutions such as the UN, OSCE, IMF, World Bank, BSEC and ECO. Turkish Foreign Ministry also organized education programmes and courses for the diplomats coming from these republics.¹⁶⁰

Turkish public and private banks established joint-ventures in the South Caucasus and Central Asia in order to develop banking services in these countries. Ziraat Bank formed partnerships in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Demirbank constituted consortiums in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.¹⁶¹ With the ninety percent participation of Universal Holding, Ege International Bank was founded in Baku. Emlak Bank and Halk Bank both set up joint ventures in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan respectively.¹⁶² Garanti Bankası got involved in trade and project finance activities.

Turkish Eximbank developed credit, guarantee and insurance programs. Turkish institutions such as the Turkish Standards Institute (TSE), Turkish Institute of Statistics and the Centre to Develop and Support Small and Medium Scale Industry (KOSGEB) sent experts and provided training, technical and consultancy services.¹⁶³ Turkish private firms were also active in construction, telecommunications, food processing and textile sectors.

¹⁵⁹ TİKA-Roles and Responsibilities. Available [online]:<
<http://www.tika.gov.tr/EN/Icerik.ASP?ID=345>> [30 December 2007].

¹⁶⁰ Gül Turan and İlter Turan, “Türkiye’nin Diğer Türk Cumhuriyetleriyle İlişkileri”, in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, (ed.) Faruk Sönmezoğlu (Istanbul: DER Yayınları, 2001), p.406.

¹⁶¹ Öner Kabasakal, “Türkiye’nin Türk Cumhuriyetleri ile Ekonomik ve Ticari İlişkileri”, *Avrasya Etütleri* 20 (2002), p.30.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ İdris Bal, *Turkey’s Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Model* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2000), p.82.

Turkey, at the beginning of the 1990s also hastened its endeavours to build up the infrastructure of these countries. In May 1992, direct scheduled flights by Turkish Airlines were started with Baku, Almaty and Tashkent.¹⁶⁴ Later, these flights were extended to Ashgabat and Bishkek. Turkey's Directorate of Post, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) renewed the phone systems of Azerbaijan and Central Asian states. Moreover, Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) through its Avrasya Channel commenced to broadcast TV programmes in Turkish to Azerbaijan and Central Asian states in 1992.¹⁶⁵ TV shows were designed to acquaint people in these countries with Turkish language and culture.

Turkish government attached special importance to educational and cultural domain. Here the main aim was to reduce the cultural and linguistic hegemony of the Russian Federation. Turkey offered staunchly the adoption of Latin alphabet by Azerbaijan and the Central Asian Republics and establishment of Turkish as lingua franca in these countries. In this way, a new elite that would speak Turkish and be exposed to Turkish culture would grow up and this would give Turkey the upper hand in its political and economic competition with Russia in the region. It seems that Turkey is partially successful in this policy. While Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan abstained from switching to Latin alphabet, the first two ones owing to their considerable Russian populations, and Tajikistan, as a result of the prevalence of the Russian influence in the country, the remaining three countries; Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan introduced the Latin alphabet.

Turkey opened up schools and invited students from Turkic republics to attend Turkish high schools and universities by providing them scholarships.

¹⁶⁴ Philip Robins, "Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey's Policy Toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States", *The Middle East Journal* 47, no.4 (Autumn 1993), p.604.

¹⁶⁵ Bal, p.91.

Turcology centers were established at different universities in Central Asia.

Furthermore, Turkey, a country which was prominent with its strict secular standing, sent Korans and other religious books, repaired mosques and constructed new ones, assigned imams to give Islamic education not to lag behind Iran and Saudi Arabia in the region. In the educational field, the activities of Fethullah Gülen congregation, a part of the Nurcu sect in Turkey should be pointed out. His schools outflanked the ones that were inaugurated by the Turkish Ministry of Education.¹⁶⁶ The newspaper of the community *Zaman* (Time) and the monthly magazine *Sızıntı* (Trickle) that are printed in Turkish and local languages are also in circulation throughout the region.

Another political instrument used by Turkey in its efforts to position itself as a powerful and effective player in Azerbaijan and Central Asia was to summon Turkic Summits as the first step of setting up a regional organization to augment political, economic and cultural relations between Turkey and these states and also to include Azerbaijan and Central Asian Republics in an already founded regional cooperation mechanism named ECO to revive and enhance the intra-regional infrastructure, trade and investments by restoring the communication and transportation links among the participating states. The following pages while examining the foundation history, mission and the projects of the Turkic Summits and ECO, will also bring out to what extent Turkey became successful in its initial goals.

The idea of creating some kind of a loose Turkic Union with the participation of Azerbaijan and Turkic states in Central Asia was first put forth by the late Turkish President Turgut Özal in 1992. Özal believed that a Turkish Commonwealth similar

¹⁶⁶ The list of the schools that were opened up by the followers of Fethullah Gülen in Caucasus and Central Asia can be found here: Türk Okulları: Dünyaya Açılan Barış Köprüleri. Available [online]:< http://www.turkokullari.net/index.php?option=com_weblinks&catid=14&Itemid=22> [31 December 2007].

to the British and French models would strengthen the ties of Turkey with these countries and boost Turkey's image and position in the region. First Turkic summit took place in October 1992 in Ankara. Subsequent meetings were held in Istanbul in 1994, in Bishkek in 1995, in Tashkent in 1996, in Astana in 1998, in Baku in 2000, in Istanbul in 2001, in Antalya in 2006, in Nakhichevan in 2009, in Istanbul in 2010 and finally in Almaty in 2011. In addition to the officials from Azerbaijan, Turkey and Central Asian Republics, delegates from the Turkish communities of Bulgaria, China, Greece, Iraq, Kosovo, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, and representatives of the Republic of Northern Cyprus attended to these meetings.

Although Turkey from time to time entertained the ideas of establishing a Turkic Common Market and Turkic Development and Investment Bank or preparing common history books, Central Asian states rejected these proposals. None of them wanted to be part of a Turkey-dominated Commonwealth. Moreover, they considered these kinds of ethnic groupings harmful as they would antagonize other regional actors such as Russia, Iran and China.

The level of institutionalization is still low despite twenty years passed since the convening of the first summit. The permanent secretariat was established rather belatedly in September 2010.¹⁶⁷ No specific agencies were set up to implement regional projects. Summits are not organized on an annual basis and head of the states do not attend them regularly. Despite broad and ambitious agendas, gatherings do not produce concrete results. They have never been able to implement their agreements and declarations fully.

¹⁶⁷ At the Ninth Summit of the Heads of the Turkic Speaking States held on 03 October 2009 in Nakhichevan, it was decided to establish a permanent secretariat in Istanbul in order to institutionalize the cooperation among Turkic states. At the next Summit that took place in Istanbul on 16 September 2010, Turkish Ambassador Halil Akıncı was appointed as the first Secretary General of the Secretariat. See "Declaration of 10th Summit of the Heads of the Turkic Speaking States", Istanbul, 16 September 2010. Available [online]:< <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/common/print.htm>> [18 September 2010].

The Conventions are far from developing mechanisms for resolving or at least defusing the tensions between member states. States of Caspian Basin, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan continue to haggle over the delimitation of the sea and the natural resources that it contains. Furthermore, the standoff between Turkey and Uzbekistan diminished the success and efficiency of the summits to a great extent. Since 1999, Uzbek President Kerimov accuses Turkey of countenancing the Uzbek opposition, especially Muhammed Salih, the leader of the *Erk* (Freedom) party who lives in exile in Norway.¹⁶⁸ Uzbek-Turkish relations further got out of order when Turkey voted in favour of two resolutions against Uzbek government that were set forth in Council of the European Union¹⁶⁹ and United Nations.¹⁷⁰

After the failure of political and economic union projects, Turkey focused its effort on the improvement of economic cooperation especially in the form of common energy projects and mutual investments.¹⁷¹ Scholars from the Turkic World also work on the formation of a common alphabet which will increase communication and cultural exchange among Turkic peoples. Furthermore, of late TRT has declared the opening of a new television channel called *TRT Avaz* which

¹⁶⁸ Bahadır Selim Dilek, “Özbekistan Sancısı”, *Strateji* 3, no.127 (04 December 2006), p.9. Muhammed Salih lived in Turkey from 1993 to 1997. Moreover, after its enforced closure in Tashkent, the movement’s periodical *Erk* had been published in Ankara. See N. I. Petrov, “Political Stability in the Conditions of the Command-Administrative Regime”, in *Central Asia: Political and Economic Challenges in the Post-Soviet Era*, (ed.) Alexei Vassiliev (London, United Kingdom: Sqi Books, 2001), p.93.

¹⁶⁹ In November 2005, the EU announced a partial suspension of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Uzbekistan on the grounds that the latter refused to sanction an independent inquiry into what happened in Andijan in May 2005. An arms embargo was also put in place, whilst a year-long visa ban had been imposed upon twelve Uzbek officials believed to have played a part in the forcible suppression of the Andijan demonstrations. Available [online]: <http://consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/86441.pdf> [01 January 2008].

¹⁷⁰ In November 2006, United Nations Third Committee voted a resolution which condemned Uzbekistan for human rights violations and restrictions on the activities of non-governmental organizations. The resolution was rejected sixty-nine to seventy-four. Available [online]: <<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GE>> [01 January 2008].

¹⁷¹ Igor Torbakov, “Russian Pundits Wary of Ankara’s Revived Geopolitical Ambitions in Eurasia”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no.175 (22 September 2006), p.2.

would broadcast in Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen and Uzbek languages.¹⁷²

This move can be counted as another cultural opening of Turkish state to the Turkic world.

The ECO was established in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey as the successor organization of Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) which operated between 1964 and 1979. In 1992, ECO expanded to ten members with the inclusion of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.¹⁷³ Its purpose is to promote economic, technical and cultural cooperation among the member states. The headquarters of the ECO secretariat is located in Tehran. The organization has been institutionalized aggressively in the past years. There are six directorates, three specified agencies and nine regional institutions that act under the supervision of the general secretariat.¹⁷⁴

As being a regional integration organization, ECO firstly attempted to develop transport and communication infrastructure and enhance trade and investment among the participating states. The rebuilding of transportation links is essential as Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries' road and rail networks were constructed with a northward orientation, towards Russia and Ukraine, while the founding members' transport networks were directed away from the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁵

Directorate of Transport and Communications of ECO focused on launching a

¹⁷² "TRT Avaz Merhaba Dedi", TRT Haber, 21 March 2009. Available [online]: <<http://www.trt.net.tr/haber/HaberDetay.aspx?HaberKodu=6640f875-aaa9-4ae9-9e9b-fe4e0a144379>> [04 April 2009], "Türk Dünyasına Yeni bir Kanal", *Sabah*, 20 March 2009, "Türk Dünyası'na 'Avaz Avaz' Seslenecek", *Anadolu Ajansı*, 21 March 2009, and "TRT Avaz 'Avaz Avaz' Seslenecek", *Sabah*, 22 March 2009.

¹⁷³ Güven Delice, "Orta Asya Ülkeleri ve Bölgesel İşbirliği Girişimleri", *Avrasya Etüdleri* 12, no.27 - 28 (Fall-Winter 2005), p.118.

¹⁷⁴ The Organizational Structure of the Economic Cooperation Organization. Available [online]: <<http://www.ecosecretariat.org/>> [28 August 2011].

¹⁷⁵ Richard Pomfret, "The Economic Cooperation Organization: Current Status and Future Prospects", *Europe-Asia Studies* 49, no.4 (June 1997), p.661.

demonstration container train from Almaty to Istanbul on Trans-Asian Railway route, also to ensure opening of international passenger traffic on Almaty-Tashkent-Tehran-Istanbul route. A Transit Transport Framework Agreement was also signed up to facilitate the movement of goods, luggage and passengers through the respective territories of the ECO members.

Transit Trade and Visa Simplification Agreements were concluded in March 1995. The ECO Trade Agreement of July 2003 called for progressive elimination of non-tariff barriers and rationalization of tariff structures. The ECO Trade and Development Bank was set up on 03 August 2005, by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.¹⁷⁶ It set out its operations by the fourth quarter of 2007. The mission of the bank is to finance intra-regional trade and development projects in the ECO member countries.

Despite its rapid institutionalization and establishment of permanent structures, the ECO lagged far behind its initial objectives. Intra-regional trade is low¹⁷⁷ and the ratification and entry into effect of concluded treaties took place belatedly. Probably the main reason of this lethargy is the lack of interest and commitment on the part of the member states. Turkey mostly directed its energy toward building up other regional groupings such as BSEC and Turkic Summits. Furthermore, Turkey's entrance into a Customs Union zone with the European Union and its endless endeavour to become part of this organization hampered Ankara's genuine involvement in the ECO.

Afghanistan and Tajikistan were immersed in civil war until recently. Azerbaijan does not use the chief transit routes that connect it to Turkey and Iran as they pass through Armenia, over whom Baku imposes an embargo because of the

¹⁷⁶ The Bank in Brief. Available [online]: < http://www.etdb.org/about_etdbinbrief.asp > [05 January 2008].

¹⁷⁷ Intra-regional trade was 7% of the total trade of the members of the ECO in 2010 while the same figure for EU states was 65%. See Numan Hazar, "The Future of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)", *ORSAM Report*, no. 108 (February 2012), pp. 14-15.

disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory and Armenia's occupation of the surrounding lands near Nagorno-Karabakh.¹⁷⁸ Moreover, the ECO was seen by most of the Central Asian countries not as an alternative but supplement to other regional organizations such as CIS and SCO. Iran was the only country that truly dedicated itself to the cultivation of cooperation in ECO. The organization was seen as a significant tool by the Iranian authorities to break out the isolation of the country and augment its influence in the region. However, most of the time, the radical character of the regime led the other member states to put a distance between themselves and Tehran and this situation vitiated Iranian use of ECO as a springboard for its aspirations and designs in Central Asia.

Russia: The Declaration and Execution of the Near Abroad Policy

After the end of the Soviet Empire, the Russian Federation, its biggest and primary inheritor, entered into a period of intense political and economic restructuring. This new epoch brought to power new figures that renounced the belligerent great power status of Russia, suggested cooperation with Europe and the USA and strove for the integration of the country into the international institutions.

In the economic realm the guidelines of free-market economy were taken up. Prices were liberalized and the restrictions on private economic activity were lifted. State owned enterprises were put up on sale. With the help of this shock therapy it was hoped that Russia would have a transparent and well-functioning market economy. However things did not go well as planned. Russians had to swallow the bitter pill of wild capitalism in the form of high prices and inflation, decline in

¹⁷⁸ Edmund Herzig, "Regionalism, Iran and Central Asia", *International Affairs* 80, no.3 (May 2004), p.513.

industrial production plus economic growth, and increase in unemployment and corruption. Besides, the country was unable to obtain the necessary loans and grants from Western economic organizations such as IMF and World Bank which could better its ailing situation.

This disappointment with the West led the Russian policy-makers to hear out the opinions of nationalist and traditionalist factions in the country. These groups reminded the Russian administration of the significance of Eastern dimension of its foreign policy. The government was called upon to show more interest in the South Caucasus and Central Asia where twenty five million Russians lived and important Russian economic interests were at stake. Moreover, improving ties with China, India and Japan was seen as crucial as having a normal and healthy relationship with Europe and the USA.

Against this backdrop, three important documents, the Russian Foreign Policy Concept, the Russian Military Doctrine and Russian National Security Blueprint which were the products of a consensus between the Westernist/Atlanticist and Nationalist/Eurasianist elements in the Russian administration and which delineated the basic contours of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy made public appearances.

The Russian Foreign Policy Concept that was announced in April 1993 portrayed Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia as areas which were historically in Russia's sphere of interest.¹⁷⁹ Russia's primary task would be to bring an end to the military clashes and conflicts in this Near Abroad region, and prevent them from spreading onto Russian territory. The need to ensure the rights and dignities of Russian-speaking populations living in this region was also underlined.

¹⁷⁹ Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Thinking", in *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy*, (eds.) Neil Malcolm and Alex Pravda (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.68.

In Near Abroad, Russia would strive for the maximum possible degree of integration with those states that wished to cooperate. The development of an effective system of collective security, cooperation in strengthening the external borders of the CIS and retention of a military infrastructure in member states were framed as preconditions of a peaceful, secure and stable neighbourhood. Moreover, an establishment of a peacekeeping mechanism which could operate on the basis of a UN or CSCE mandate was proposed.¹⁸⁰

It was clear that the Near Abroad took precedence over Western Europe and the USA in Russian foreign policy circles. Although Western Europe was depicted as Russia's entry to the European political and economic space and the Concept also listed the areas in which Moscow and Washington could cooperate, the document conspicuously pointed out the possibility of a skirmish between Russia and Western world in the offing.¹⁸¹

The Military Doctrine of Russian Federation which was released in November 1993 reiterated the prominence of Near Abroad for Russian interests. According to the document the main danger to the permanence of the country was attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the state and destabilize the internal political situation in Russia plus the existing and potential local wars and armed conflicts that might erupt in regions adjoining the borders of the country.¹⁸² The door also opened to the deployment of Russian forces in conflict zones within joint troops of other states. The suppression of the rights and freedoms of Russian citizens in foreign states and attacks on military installations of the Russian Armed Forces sited

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid, p.69.

¹⁸² The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Available [online]: <<https://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html>> [18 January 2008].

on the territory of the foreign countries were also described as potential sources of external military danger.

The doctrine devoted a separate passage to the possible usage of nuclear weapons against other states. Russia would not employ its nuclear arsenal against any state that did not possess nuclear armament apart from the cases in which an armed attack or invasion against the Russian Federation or its allies was carried out by a state which was in alliance or was involved in joint actions with the country bereft of nuclear armour.¹⁸³

The last document named The National Security Blueprint came out in December 1997 and stressed the emergence of multipolarity in international politics. This claim was characterized by the strengthening of the economic and political positions of a considerable number of states and their integration-oriented associations and by the improvement of mechanisms for multilateral control of international political, economic, financial, and informational processes.¹⁸⁴ Russia, as an influential European-Asian power with national interests in Europe, Near East, Central and South Asia and the Asian and Pacific region would both step up its efforts towards entering into equal partnerships with the states of world community and also implementing an active foreign policy aimed at consolidating the country's position as a great power.

The main components of this foreign policy would be the formation of an integration-oriented association of CIS member states, the development of advanced cooperation with the centers of economic and military might such as the United States, the EU, China, Japan and India and the strengthening of mechanisms of

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Russian National Security Blueprint. Available [online]: <
<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/blueprint.html>> [19 January 2008].

collective management of world political and economic processes in which Russia played an important role.¹⁸⁵ Here the United States Security Council in which Russia had a vetoing power was particularly underlined.

All of the three documents highlighted the importance of CIS for Russian interests and aspirations. With the retreat from the Balkans and Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia were posed as new bastions where the remnants of the last Russian Empire could hold onto. Moreover, the region was replete with rich oil and natural gas reserves and has always been an important market for Russian industrial products. So the Russian Federation starting from 1993, implemented an assertive and interventionist foreign policy in CIS. By providing covert support to the oppositionist and secessionist forces in particular republics and exploiting the presence of large Russian diaspora in some countries, Moscow reinstated its zone of influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. During this period Russia, most of the time, confronted Turkey especially in Transcaucasia¹⁸⁶ as the latter made inroads to this area throughout the 1990s.

The subsequent three sections of the study will elaborate this political and economic competition in Transcaucasia between Turkey and Russia which revealed itself in Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia's military conflicts with its two separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and pipeline rivalry between Ankara and Moscow for the transportation of Caspian natural resources to world markets.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Transcaucasia or Transcaucasus is a geographical term which is used by Russia to depict the South Caucasus region, encompassing the states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Throughout the text both terms will be used interchangeably.

Nagorno-Karabakh War: The Clash of Turkish and Russian Positions

Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the most complex and intractable issues of the South Caucasus region. Apart from the warring parties, regional actors and international institutions were also engaged in the dispute in one way or another. In this part of the study, I will firstly give a brief description of the background, breakout and course of the conflict, and then will take up the alternate stances of Turkish and Russian governments on the problem.

Nagorno-Karabakh was declared an autonomous region within Azerbaijan in 1923 by the Soviet administration. Political and cultural autonomy was granted to the predominantly Armenian population. However, the Armenians never came to terms with the status of the region and occasionally accused the Azerbaijani authorities of economic discrimination, cultural denial and Azeri-biased demographic settlement. By taking advantage of the softening political atmosphere as a result of the glasnost policy of Mikhail Gorbachev, the local Soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh passed a resolution on 20 February 1988, which asked for the transfer of oblast from Azerbaijan to Armenia. On 15 June 1988, the Armenian Soviet declared its approval of Nagorno-Karabakh's call for unification with Yerevan.¹⁸⁷

The Azerbaijani administration had interpreted the resolution as illegal and rejected it on 13 June 1988.¹⁸⁸ According to the Article 78 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution, the boundaries between Union Republics were only altered by mutual

¹⁸⁷ Edmund Herzig, *The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia* (New York, NY: Pinter, 1999), p.13.

¹⁸⁸ Razmik Panossian, "The Irony of Nagorno-Karabakh: Formal Institutions versus Informal Politics", in *Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict*, (eds.) James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), p.144.

agreement of the Republics concerned, subject to ratification by the Supreme Soviet.¹⁸⁹ Moscow was opposed to any territorial changes in the Soviet Union and announced on 18 July 1988 that the Nagorno-Karabakh would stay within the borders of Azerbaijan.¹⁹⁰

Inter-ethnic violence and assaults occurred sporadically throughout the following years. The government in Moscow most of the time stood by the clashes and Russian troops that were sent to the conflict zones chose not to interfere in the fightings. One exception is the January 1990 incidents which were written in the Azerbaijani history as Black January. After midnight on 20 January 1990, with the decree of Gorbachev, Soviet security forces entered in Baku with the aim of “restoring order and preventing pogroms against the Armenians”.¹⁹¹ They killed at least 120 civilians and hundreds were wounded.¹⁹² The Popular Front of Azerbaijan, the nationalist movement which was composed of scholars and intellectuals and headed by Abulfaz Elchibey¹⁹³ was declared as the main culprit of the unrest. Their offices were closed down, their files were confiscated and some of the Movement’s leaders were arrested.

The scrimmages between Azerbaijanis and Armenians over Nagorno-Karabakh turned into a full-fledged war in 1992, right after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan proclaimed its independence on 30

¹⁸⁹ Constitution of Soviet Socialist Republics, 07 October 1977. Available [online]: <<http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77cons03.html>> [23 January 2008].

¹⁹⁰ Ronald Grigor Suny, “On the Road to Independence: Cultural Cohesion and Ethnic Revival in a Multinational Society”, in *Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia*, (ed.) Ronald Grigor Suny (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), p.398.

¹⁹¹ Rashad Shirinov, “Domestic Sources of Russian Foreign Policy and Their Impact on Russia’s Relations with Azerbaijan” (master’s thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2004), p.60.

¹⁹² Herzog, pp.11-12.

¹⁹³ Elchibey was a linguist in Arabian language and literature and had a doctorate degree in history. He was a notable dissident during the Soviet time and was put into prison between 1975 and 1976 on the grounds of disseminating nationalist and anti-communist propaganda.

August 1991.¹⁹⁴ This was followed by the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians' similar announcement on 02 September 1991.¹⁹⁵ This decision was consolidated by the results of a referendum held on 10 December 1991, to which Azerbaijani population of Nagorno-Karabakh rejected to participate. At the end, overwhelming majority of the voters demanded independence and the Nagorno-Karabakh enunciated itself as the sovereign Republic of Karabakh on 06 January 1992.¹⁹⁶ Up to date no country, including Armenia, has recognized this independence decision.

The Nagorno-Karabakh administration based its declaration on Soviet Law of Secession that was passed on 03 April 1990. According to Article 2 of the law, if a Union Republic decided to secede from the Federation, the people resided in autonomous regions were given the right to decide on their state legal status.¹⁹⁷ However this law was defunct according to the Azerbaijan as the Soviet Union had been dissolved on 08 December 1991 with Belavezha Accords.¹⁹⁸ The Azerbaijani government responded to the independence decision by abrogating the autonomous status of the region on 26 November 1991 and putting it under the direct jurisdiction of Baku.¹⁹⁹

A bloody and brutal war which would continue for two years was triggered by the destruction of the Azeri town of Khojaly, which lied between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia by Armenian and Russian contingents in February 1992. The

¹⁹⁴ Emin Arif Şihaliyev, *Kafkasya Jeopolitiğinde Rusya, İran, Türkiye Rekabeti ve Ermeni Faktörü* (Ankara: Naturel Yayıncılık, 2004), pp. 54-55.

¹⁹⁵ Charles van der Leeuw, *Azerbaijan: A Quest for Identity: A Short History* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2000), p.166.

¹⁹⁶ Panossian, p.148.

¹⁹⁷ Concerning the Procedure of Secession of a Soviet Republic from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 03 April 1990. Available [online]: < http://www.pridnestrovie.net/ussr_law.html> [26 January 2008].

¹⁹⁸ Presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed the Belavezha Accords on 08 December 1991 in Belarus which declared the Soviet Union dissolved.

¹⁹⁹ Hakan Kantarcı, *Kısaçtaki Bölge Kafkasya* (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2006), p.76.

American journalist Thomas Goltz who was in Khojaly at the time of the massacre reported that approximately one-thousand Azeris were killed and the remaining ones were forced to evict the region.²⁰⁰

The Nagorno-Karabakh paramilitary units with the help of Armenian and Russian forces won a quick and decisive triumph against the dispersed and unorganized Azerbaijani army. In addition to the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, the seven neighbouring districts²⁰¹ which were made up of Azeris were occupied and residents of these towns that were roughly one million had to flee to Azerbaijan. Armenian forces also managed to capture strategic points such as Lachin and Kelbejar which linked Nagorno-Karabakh directly to Armenia and Fizuli that provided Azerbaijan's access to Nakhichevan.

A cease-fire was brokered by Russia on 12 May 1994 and the political settlement of the conflict was relegated to the OSCE Minsk Group that was co-chaired by the USA, Russia and France.²⁰² The Group has not come up with an arrangement which can lead to the peaceful and permanent solution of the dispute. Azerbaijan's nearly twenty percent of territory is still under control of Armenians and the country shelters thousands of refugees and internally displaced people. Some Azerbaijani officials who are disappointed with the slow progress achieved in the Minsk process have started to talk about regaining of the territories through forceful ways.²⁰³

²⁰⁰ Thomas Goltz, "Letter from Eurasia: The Hidden Russian Hand", *Foreign Policy*, no.92 (Fall 1993), p.100.

²⁰¹ These are Agdam, Fizuli, Jabrail, Kelbejar, Kubatly, Lachin and Zangelan.

²⁰² The other participating states of the Minsk Group are: Belarus, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Turkey.

²⁰³ See "Azerbaijan Warns of War with Armenia", *Daily Times*, 28 November 2007 and "2008 Last Chance to Settle Karabakh Conflict Peacefully, Baku Says", *Panarmenian.Net* 27 December 2007.

Russian policy with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was driven by the country's desire to re-establish its supremacy in Azerbaijan in line with its military and foreign policy doctrines. Azerbaijan possessed rich oil resources and because of its strategic location could act as a buffer zone between the Russian Federation and its historical rivals Iran and Turkey. Russia supported separatist movements in Azerbaijan in order to weaken the regime in Baku and make it more malleable to Russian onslaughts. It has been often cited that the ascendance to power of pro-Turkish and pro-Western Abulfaz Elchibey and his anti-Russian and anti-Iran²⁰⁴ rhetoric engendered Russia's firm backing of Armenians in their struggle with the Azerbaijani authorities. It was true that Elchibey was a fervent Turkish nationalist and dreamed of a close relation with Turkey with whom the Azeris shared common ethnic roots, religion and language. However, Russia, since the first outburst of the war in 1992, when a firm representative of the old order, pro-Russian Ayaz Muttalibov was in power, had already been involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh skirmish on the side of the Armenians. The Russian 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment that had been based in Stepanakert supplied Nagorno-Karabakh forces with artillery, tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Russian mercenaries from the 7th Army in Yerevan and 4th Army in Ganja came to Nagorno-Karabakh to fight against the Azerbaijani army.²⁰⁵ Russia, along with Armenia, had a finger in the carnage of Khojaly.

It can be said that Elchibey's following steps that distanced Azerbaijan from the Russian orbit, rankled Russia further and made it more determined to concoct his

²⁰⁴ Elchibey had claimed that Iran which had a large Azeri population in its southern regions would break up within a short time and Azerbaijan and Iran's southern districts would unite to establish the Great Azerbaijan. See Nazrin Mehdiyeva, "Azerbaijan and its Foreign Policy Dilemma", *Asian Affairs* 34, no.3 (November 2003), pp.271-285 for the impact of Elchibey's pro-Turkish discourse and standing on the formulation and shaping of the Iranian and Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis Azerbaijan.

²⁰⁵ Goltz, p.98.

downfall. After Elchibey became the new Azerbaijani President in June 1992, the Azerbaijani parliament opposed the ratification of the CIS agreement which would place Azerbaijan under the Russian security umbrella. In November 1992, manat, the national currency of Azerbaijan, was issued and the country made plans of leaving the ruble zone.²⁰⁶ Moreover, Elchibey rejected the Russian demands of mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and ordered the departure of Russian troops from Azerbaijan. He negotiated a beneficial oil contract with the major Western oil companies which would help Azerbaijan to transmit its oil to Western markets without Russian interposition.

Russia followed a two-way path to bring Azerbaijan to its knees. Firstly, apart from Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, other small minority groups such as Lezgins and Talyshes were brought to the fore with separatist demands. Lezgins are North Caucasian people whose homeland had been divided between Russia and Azerbaijan. They predominantly live in Dagestan Republic of Russian Federation and Qusar and Khachmaz districts in northern Azerbaijan. In 1990, the Sadval (Unity) movement came into being and called for the unification of Lezgin territories under the flag of Russia. In late 1991, this request turned into the aspiration of an establishment of an independent Lezgin state in Azerbaijani land.²⁰⁷ The Sadval party was banned in Baku whereas it was legalized and financially supported in Moscow.²⁰⁸

Talyshes are a Persian-speaking population that lives in south-eastern part of Azerbaijan, near the Iranian border. Talysh Colonel Alikram Gumbatov proclaimed

²⁰⁶ Audrey L. Altstadt, "Azerbaijan's Struggle Toward Democracy", in *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia*, (eds.) Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 134-135.

²⁰⁷ Hema Kotecha, *Islamic and Ethnic Identities in Azerbaijan: Emerging Trends and Tensions* (Baku, Azerbaijan: OSCE Press, July 2006), p.39.

²⁰⁸ Van der Leeuw, p.20.

the Talysh-Mugam Republic in Lankaran on 21 June 1993.²⁰⁹ The declaration which was seen as a separatist uprising by the Azerbaijani government was quelled in August same year. In addition to Gumbatov, the former Minister of Defense, Rahim Gaziyeu, and Surat Huseinov, Commander of the Azerbaijani forces in Ganja, were active in organizing the Talysh rebellion against the Azerbaijani state. Taking into consideration that these three figures had close association with the Russian secret service KGB, emergence of a Talysh Republic was taken as another Russian way of debilitating the fragile statehood in Azerbaijan.

Secondly, Russia provided covert support to the coup that brought down the Elchibey government thus can also be accused of undermining the international efforts to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The peaceful settlement of this conflict would not only lead to a rapprochement with Azerbaijan and Armenia thus, diminishing their dependence on Russia, but it would also bolster Elchibey's power at home. In May 1993, Armenia and Azerbaijan came close to reach an agreement on resolving the conflict through a plan stipulated the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied zones.²¹⁰ Elchibey was toppled on 17 June 1993 after a revolt spurred by Surat Huseinov.²¹¹ The Karabakh Armenians turned down the proposal just after the collapse of Elchibey administration. Russia, through its garrison in Ganja played a tacit role in Surat Huseinov's mutiny against Elchibey. Heavy weapons and equipment of the Russian army were handed to the Huseinov's men

²⁰⁹ Kotecha, p.33.

²¹⁰ Leila Alieva, "The Institutions, Orientations, and Conduct of Foreign Policy in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan", in *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, (eds.) Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha (Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe, 1995), p.301.

²¹¹ Altstadt, p. 129.

rather than the representative of the Azerbaijani government in contravention to the withdrawal agreement.²¹²

Heydar Aliyev became the Chairman of the National Assembly of Azerbaijan on 24 June 1993, taking on also temporary presidential powers and he replaced Elchibey as President of Azerbaijan in October 1993. After having served several years in KGB, Aliyev had become the Chairman of the Azerbaijani KGB in 1967. Two years later on 14 July 1969 he was selected as First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party.²¹³ Aliyev was further promoted to Politburo membership under Yuri Andropov in 1982. He had to resign from this post in October 1987 when corruption charges were directed against him by Gorbachev. Before he took up the position of presidency, Aliyev was living in seclusion in his home town Nakhichevan. In contrast to idealist, romantic and erratic Elchibey, Aliyev was down-to-earth, shrewd and experienced. Coming from the ranks of the system, he was accustomed to the Russian style of policy and execution. In order to pull itself together politically and militarily, Azerbaijan needed a respite and Aliyev decided that it was only possible if he adopted a conciliatory approach toward Russia.

Aliyev visited Moscow in September 1993 and declared that Azerbaijan would participate to the CIS²¹⁴ and its economic organization. The two countries also signed a mutual defense treaty. Moreover, in order to demonstrate his goodwill to Russian government, Aliyev stated that he would hand over the six mercenaries to Russian courts who had been captured in Azerbaijan and sentenced to death on the grounds of fighting on the side of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh war.²¹⁵ Russia

²¹² Ibid., p.128.

²¹³ Suny, p.379.

²¹⁴ The Azerbaijani parliament adopted the resolution to join the CIS on 20 September 1993.

²¹⁵ Alieva, p.303.

requited Aliyev's favours in a little while. An-hour and half-long interview was conducted with the new President on Russian national television channel and Russian television newscasters started to use the phrase Nagorno-Karabakh rather than Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.²¹⁶ Furthermore, the activities of the Sadval movement in Russia were also suspended.

The biggest concession of the Aliyev regime to Russia was the cancellation of the planned lucrative oil contract that Elchibey had worked out with the Western oil countries. This prospective bid was also alleged as one of the strong motives of Russia in perpetrating a military coup against Elchibey.²¹⁷ Aliyev revised the agreement and included Russia into the deal by transferring ten percent of Azerbaijan's thirty percent oil shares to Russian oil company Lukoil²¹⁸. The firm was granted the right of exploitation of the Azeri, Chirag and Guneshli oilfields. However, in April 2003, Lukoil sold its stake in the contract to Japanese Inpex Southwest Caspian Sea Limited Corporation and exited from the contract.²¹⁹ Taking into account the special relationship between Lukoil and the Russian state, the company's pull-out of the tender was explained by Russia's hostility to Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi Pipeline Project.

Although Aliyev in the first years of his presidency seemed to surrender to the Russian demands, he dragged his feet on allowing Russia to build up military bases on Azerbaijani territory and send Russian peacekeeping forces to Nagorno-

²¹⁶ Goltz., p.116.

²¹⁷ Michael Croissant, *The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications* (London, United Kingdom: Praeger Publishers, 1998), p.91.

²¹⁸ The President of Lukoil was an ethnic Azerbaijani, Vagit Alekperov, who after graduating from the Oil and Gas Institute in Baku and working several years in oil and gas industries at various locations in Soviet Union, moved to Russia to become one of the most wealthiest and powerful oligarchs in this country.

²¹⁹ Faris Ismailzade, *Russia's Energy Interests in Azerbaijan: A Comparative Study of the 1990s and 2000s* (London, United Kingdom: GMB Publishing, 2006), p.27.

Karabakh. By manipulating adeptly the disclosure of Russian arm and equipment deliveries to Armenians during the Nagorno-Karabakh war²²⁰ and the growing interest of American and European oil companies in Azerbaijani petroleum deposits, he managed to contrive a balance between regional actors Russia, Turkey and Iran on the one hand and the USA as a global power on the other hand.

After realizing that Azerbaijan would not show full obedience to its directives, Russia turned to Armenia and put this country to the center of its South Caucasian policy. Armenia with its position as a barrier between Turkey and Azerbaijan became a useful ally for Russian moves in the region. In September 1992, the two countries signed a pact which delegated the patrolling of Turkish and Iranian frontiers to Russian border guards.²²¹ The agreement of March 1995 enabled Russia to keep military bases in Yerevan and Gyumri for twenty-five years.²²² Russia does not pay any rent to the Armenian government for the use of the bases. Moreover, Armenia provides for utilities and day-to-day upkeep.²²³ Armenia and Russia also concluded a treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Security in August 1997, during Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan's visit to Moscow.²²⁴ According to the agreement, if one of the countries came under attack of a third party, then the other side would be obliged to run to the assistance of the side under assailance.

Turkish position concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was clearly in favour of Azerbaijan. This stance stemmed from two main reasons. Firstly,

²²⁰ Lev Rokhlin, Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee revealed on April 2, 1997, illegal arms transfer to Armenia between 1993 and 1996.

²²¹ Joseph R. Masih and Robert O. Krikorian, *Armenia: At the Crossroads* (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999), p.105.

²²² Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (London, United Kingdom: Hurst & Company, 2003), p.169.

²²³ *Kommersant*, 22 May 2007.

²²⁴ Hayri Çapraz, "Rusya'nın Güney Kafkasya Politikası ve Batılı Devletler (1991-2000)", *Avrasya Etüdləri* 29-30 (2006), p.138.

Azerbaijan was more important and valuable for Turkish foreign policy makers compared to Armenia because of the former's close ethnic, religious and cultural ties it entertained with Turkey as well as Baku's being owner of rich energy resources that could be transmitted to international markets through Turkey which would not only provide the country transportation revenue but also would boost Ankara's geostrategical importance. So Turkey became the first country that recognized the independence of Azerbaijan Republic on 09 November 1991 and opened up an embassy in this country on 13 January 1992.²²⁵ The two countries also signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighbourliness on 24 January 1992. The election of Abulfaz Elchibey, the pro-Turkey leader of the Azerbaijani Popular Front, to Azerbaijani Presidency in June 1992 further boosted the relations between two countries.

Secondly, the secessionist demands of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and their resort to military force to attain their objectives was seen by the Turkish officials as a major assault to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.²²⁶ Turkey, which had also been suffering from a separatist movement in its own borders became a natural and firm ally of Azerbaijan and voiced its cause vociferously in international platforms such as the OSCE, UN and the Council of Europe.

Turkey's diplomatic activities did not bear any fruit as the Armenian troops backed by the Russian contingents speeded up their attacks on Azerbaijani targets and captured a big chunk of Azerbaijani territory within a short time. Azerbaijan asked for military officers and equipment to defuse Armenian offensives but was

²²⁵ Alieva, p.296.

²²⁶ See "Statement by Hikmet Çetin at the 48th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 30 September 1993", in *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest* 7, no.33 (Autumn 1993), p.81.

turned down by the Turkish government that shunned from engaging in a military confrontation with Russian Federation. Turkey was too cautious and hesitant and even eschewed from providing humanitarian aid to Azerbaijani civilians who were running away from Armenian forces after the fall of Kelbejar in April 1993.²²⁷

America's standing regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was another reason of Turkish restraint. The US Congress, under the pressure of a powerful and active Armenian lobby, adopted Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act²²⁸ on 24 October 1992 which banned any kind of direct US aid to the Azerbaijani government until it lifted the blockade against Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.²²⁹ Moreover, the USA sent shipments of wheat and kerosene heaters to Armenian people. Up to date US humanitarian and technical aid to Armenia through Freedom Support Act and other assistance programs has nearly equalled 2 billion dollars.²³⁰

After Heydar Aliyev came to power in Azerbaijan, the Azeri-Turkish relations cooled off for a while. Aliyev's appeasing attitude towards Russia and his background as a KGB general led Turkey to approach him with reservation. Aliyev, on the other hand, accused some of the personnel of the Turkish embassy in Baku and some officials of Turkey that were serving in Azerbaijan, of plotting a coup against his administration in March 1995.²³¹ However, the growing Russian demands

²²⁷ Azerbaijani President Elchibey requested Turkish helicopters to evacuate Azerbaijani civilians from Kelbejar but Prime Minister Demirel refused to help on the grounds that this could engender a confrontation with Russia. See Süha Bölükbaşı, "Ankara's Baku-Centered Transcaucasia Policy: Has It Failed?", *Middle East Journal* 51, no.1 (Winter 1997), p.85.

²²⁸ The Freedom Support Act was the main tool used by the US government for giving aid to former Soviet Union countries to facilitate their economic and political stability.

²²⁹ "Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act", *Public Law 102-511* (24 October 1992). On 24 October 2001, the Senate accepted an amendment in the law which provided the President to waive the Section 907. He has done so since 2002.

²³⁰ US Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Armenia, August 2011. Available [online]: < <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5275.htm> > [28 August 2011].

²³¹ The coup had been organized and initiated by Colonel Rovshan Javadovov, the Deputy Minister of Interior and Commander of the Military Police (ONOM). See İrfan Ülkü, *Bağımsızlıktan Sonra Azerbaycan* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2000), pp. 235-256.

of building military bases on Azerbaijan territory and deployment of Russian forces in Azerbaijan, America's propping up of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline route for the transfer of Azerbaijani oil to Western markets and the establishment of intimate relations between Aliyev and the Turkish President Süleyman Demirel led to a thaw in the bilateral relations.

Turkey, at the initial stage of the conflict, had also tried to ameliorate its painful and complex relationship with Armenia. Turkey did not exclude Armenia when it had recognized the independence of Georgia and Central Asian Republics in December 1991. Wheat aid of the EU to Armenia was passed through Turkish soil and the Turkish government signed an electric supply agreement with Armenia.²³² However, this deal was never materialized as a result of intense Azerbaijani objection. After the Armenian occupation of Kelbejar, Turkey joined Azerbaijan in its imposition of an economic blockade on Armenia.

Turkey after the ceasefire in 1994 also expedited its provision of military support to Azerbaijani army in the form of training Azerbaijani soldiers and delivering military equipment and armaments. Azeri officers participate to Partnership for Peace (PfP)²³³ training programs in Turkish military headquarters and war academies. Turkish specialists and instructors frequently visit Azerbaijan to give training to military personnel. Azeri units have also gained field experience by taking part in peacekeeping operations with Turkish army. Thirty-four Azerbaijani soldiers served in KFOR as part of the Turkish Armed Forces and made control of eighteen

²³² Masih and Krikorian, p.70.

²³³ Azerbaijani signed the framework agreement for NATO's Partnership for Peace program on 04 May 1994.

villages of Kosovo.²³⁴ An Azeri platoon of forty-five officers has also been participating in ISAF as part of the Turkish battalion.²³⁵

Russia and Turkey backed up opposite parties in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russia gave its support to Karabakh Armenians as their conflict with Azerbaijan played to the hands of Russia by undermining the unity of Azerbaijani state and bringing it into a compromising line in its relations with Russia. Furthermore, with the outbreak of the hostilities between Armenians and the Azerbaijani army in Nagorno-Karabakh, the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan were tainted to a great extent which gave Russia the opportunity to position itself as a mediator between the two sparring states. Turkey, on the other hand, despite its strong support for the Azerbaijani cause in international platforms did not extend any financial or military aid to the country. The fall of the first democratically elected post-Cold War government of Azerbaijan within a short time of its inauguration to power with a military plot propped up by Moscow further weakened the Turkish position in the region by revealing that Russia was still the decisive actor in Nagorno-Karabakh matter.

Differing Standings in Georgia

Georgia plays a critical role in the South Caucasus region with its strategic location as a transit country. Important oil and gas pipelines and railway systems traverse its territory and the country has direct access to the Black Sea through ports of Batumi,

²³⁴ *Trend News Agency*, 04 March 2008.

²³⁵ Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin İştirak Etmekte Olduğu Harekatlar. Available [online]: < http://www.tsk.mil.tr/4_ULUSLARARASI_ILISKILER/4_6_Turkiyenin_Barisi_Destekleme_Harekatina_Katkilari/konular/Turk_Silahli_%20Kuvvetlerinin_Barisi_Destekleme_Harekatina_Katkilari.htm > [02 March 2008].

Supsa, Poti and Sukhumi. Furthermore, the other Transcaucasian states, Azerbaijan and Armenia rely on Georgia for transportation. Tbilisi also retains a key place in the South Caucasian policies of Moscow and Ankara. Starting from the beginning of 1990s, the two countries have adopted opposite views regarding the future of this small state. While Turkey stressed the territorial integrity of Georgia and the inviolability of its borders, Russia encouraged the separatist aspirations of breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which dragged the country nearly to the verge of disintegration.

Abkhazia was established as a Union Republic of the Soviet Union in 1921 but was incorporated into Georgia by Stalin's decree in 1931.²³⁶ The area is prominent with its warm climate and fertile land. Citrus fruits, tea, tobacco and wine are the major products. Tourism is a significant sector for economy. During the Soviet era, Abkhazia was a holiday resort for the Soviet leaders like Stalin and Khrushchev. Today, many Russian tourists still spend their vacations in this region.

Abkhazian people are ethnically and linguistically different from the Georgians and they were recognized as a national minority in Georgia. However, Abkhaz most of the time complained about the assertion of the Georgian language and culture in Abkhazia and the immigration of Georgians to their land. According to the 1989 census, Abkhaz with a population of 93,000, constituted only eighteen percent of the republic whereas Georgians formed forty-six percent of the total population in Abkhazia.²³⁷ The disagreement between the Abkhaz authority and the Georgian government turned into a military conflict right after the Abkhazian

²³⁶ Okan Mert, *Türkiye'nin Kafkasya Politikası ve Gürcistan* (Istanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2004), p.52.

²³⁷ Monica Duffy Toft, "Multinationality, Regional Institutions, State-Building, and the Failed Transition in Georgia", in *Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict*, (eds.) James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), p.129.

declaration of independence on 23 July 1992. The war ended with a cease-fire agreement in May 1994 that was signed under the mediation of Russian Federation. A CIS peacekeeping force which was overwhelmingly composed of Russian soldiers was sent to Abkhazia to monitor the creation of a demilitarized zone along the banks of the Inguri River that divided Abkhazia from the rest of Georgia.²³⁸

In their struggle with the Georgian military units, the Abkhaz forces received the utmost assistance from the Russian backed Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus²³⁹ that was commanded by Shamil Basayev. There were also allegations that Russian regular forces that stationed at the Gudauta base in Abkhazia gave hand to Abkhaz fighters.²⁴⁰ The Russian aid to the secessionist movement in Abkhazia could be explained as an attempt to intimidate the Shevardnadze administration that was reluctant about Georgia's participation to the CIS and retention of Russian military bases on Georgian soil.²⁴¹

Today, Abkhazia is under complete Russian political and economic influence. It has an open frontier, road and railway connections with Russia. Since 2002, a large part of the Abkhaz population has been acquiring Russian citizenship and passports. Russia also pays retirement pensions and other monetary benefits to Abkhazian people. Russian ruble is the main currency. Moscow also included the secessionist republic into the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympiads.²⁴²

Russian businessmen heavily invest in Abkhazia. A total of thirty-one assets, mainly holiday villas and hotels as well as a wine factory were bought by the

²³⁸ Shireen T. Hunter, "Borders, Conflict and Security in the Caucasus: The Legacy of the Past", *SAIS Review* 26, no.1 (Winter-Spring 2006), p.118.

²³⁹ This entity was made up of Abazas, Chechens, Circassians, Cossacks, Ossetians and Russians.

²⁴⁰ Sebastian Smith, *Allah's Mountains: The Battle for Chechnya* (New York, NY: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2006), p.102.

²⁴¹ Georgia joined in the CIS in December 1993.

²⁴² "Abkhazia Is Included in Sochi Olympic Area", *Regnum*, 26 July 2007.

Russians.²⁴³ The Russian company Almaz has been processing Tkarsheili's granite since 2000. Aromat factory for manufacturing packings was set up by the Russian firm Sinim Gas. Moreover, the Abkhazian part of the new railway Sukhumi-Moscow which was inaugurated in September 2004 was renovated by a Russian company.²⁴⁴

Abkhazia exports most of its crops to Russia. Tangerines, grapes, and persimmons are regularly put to sale in Russian markets. Russia's declaration on 06 March 2008, that it would lift trade, financial and transportation sanctions against Abkhazia which were in use since January 1996 was comforting news for the Abkhazian people in their endeavour to break out of their isolation.²⁴⁵

Turkey involved in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict as a result of the activities of its Abkhaz diaspora. Immigrated to Turkey after the conquest of North Caucasus by Russia in the nineteenth century, Turkish citizens of Abkhaz origin are estimated to be around forty to fifty thousand.²⁴⁶ They organized aid campaigns and rallies in Istanbul and Adapazarı, publicized the issue in the press and Turkish Grand National Assembly and demanded from Turkish President and Minister of Foreign Affairs to take notice of the plight of Abkhaz.²⁴⁷ Two Turks of Abkhazian descent, Atay Çeyişakar and Rahmi Tuna took part in cease-fire meetings which took place on 03 September 1992.²⁴⁸ Moreover, thirty-seven people from Turkey went to

²⁴³ "Moscow Mayor Pledges More Investments in Georgia", *Civil Georgia*, 09 July 2007.

²⁴⁴ Francois Gremy, "Tender Offer for Abkhazia", *Caucas Europe News*, 28 February 2005.

²⁴⁵ "Russia Lifts Sanctions from Abkhazia", *Kommersant*, 08 March 2008.

²⁴⁶ Liana Kvachelia, "Georgia-Abkhazia Conflict: View from Abkhazia". Available [online]: < www.demokratizatsiya.org/Dem%20Archives/DEM%2006-01%20kvachelia.pdf > [09 March 2008].

²⁴⁷ Kafkas Abhazya Dayanışma Komitesi Savaş Sırasındaki Faaliyetler. Available [online]: < <http://www.abhazya.org/komite/faaliyetler.html> > [09 March 2008].

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

Abkhazia to fight on the side of Abkhaz and four of them lost their lives in the war.²⁴⁹

Turkey provided humanitarian aid to Abkhazia but only through Georgian controlled territory. Beginning from October 1994 until June 2009, Turkey contributed to the United Nations Observers Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) which aimed to watch out compliance with the cease-fire between the Georgian government and Abkhaz authorities with military observers.²⁵⁰ Turkey also hosted a conference in Istanbul on 07-09 June 1999 to settle the border problem between the parties.²⁵¹

Turkish businessmen are also engaged in commercial activities in Abkhazia. There exist many restaurants, cafes and bars in Abkhaz land that are operated by Turkish citizens. An Abkhaz-Turkish fishing joint venture was established. Turkish vessels frequently travel to Sukhumi and bring cigarettes, manufactured goods, oil and food products to Abkhazia. Through these ships, timber, coal, metals and citrus fruits are exported to Turkey.²⁵² These ships under Turkish flag are occasionally stopped and fined by the Georgian coast guards in violation of the officially imposed blockade in Abkhazia.²⁵³ Turkish citizens of Abkhaz origin took part in charity

²⁴⁹ Mithat Çelikpala, "From Immigrants to Diaspora: Influence of the North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey", *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no.3 (May 2006), p.433.

²⁵⁰ Georgia-UNOMIG-Facts and Figures. Available [online]: <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unomig/facts.html>> [20 June 2009], see also Fikret Ertan, "UNOMIG Artık Tarih Oldu", *Zaman*, 18 June 2009.

²⁵¹ Turkey's Political Relations with Georgia. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/Caucasus/Georgia/Georgia_Political.htm> [09 March 2008].

²⁵² *The Georgian Times*, 14 February 2007.

²⁵³ "Georgia Fines Turkish Fishing Vessel", *Interfax*, 28 November 2002, Dow Kimbrell, "Georgia Seizes Turkish Ship Off Abkhaz Coast", *RFE/RL*, 13 August 2004, "Cargo from Seized Turkish Ship Delivered to Abkhazia", *RFE/RL*, 02 August 2005, and Alexander Kupatadze, "The Impact of the Rose Revolution on Smuggling Through Abkhazia and South Ossetia", *Insight Turkey* 7, no.4 (October-December 2005), p.71.

activities in Abkhazia as well. Three education institutions and a mosque were built in Sukhumi by the donations of the Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey.²⁵⁴

Although Turkey, most of the time, turned a blind eye to the economic activities of its people in Abkhazia; on 10 August 2007, the Turkish Foreign Ministry warned citizens eager to buy property or invest in Abkhazia and South Ossetia about possible hurdles they might face. Georgia notified Turkey that foreign investments made in these separatist regions without Tbilisi's approval would be considered illegal and businessmen who invested there might face penalties.²⁵⁵ Likewise, the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce desisted from participating to the organization of an international economic forum in Pitsunda, Abkhazia upon the interposition of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²⁵⁶ When it came to choose between the Abkhazian authorities and the Georgian state, the Turkish government always preferred the latter. This was again tested when the visit of Sergey Bagaps, Abkhazia's so-called President's visit to Turkey was called off in October 2007 due to the request of Georgia.²⁵⁷ Although the so-called Foreign Minister of Abkhazia Sergey Şamba and two members of the Abkhazian Parliament, Talih Hotüş and Soner Gogua paid a visit to Turkey in the following months, between 02 and 06 June 2008, they were not received by Turkish officials.²⁵⁸ Two deputies from the Turkish

²⁵⁴ Asbed Kotchikian, "The Perceived Roles of Russia and Turkey in Georgian Foreign Policy", *Insight Turkey* 6, no.2 (April-June 2004), p.42.

²⁵⁵ "Gürcistan'ın Toprakları İçinde Bulunan Abhazya ve Güney Osetya'da Gayrimenkul Edinilmesi Hakkında", Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı Basın Açıklamaları, No.113, 10 Ağustos 2007. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_113---10-agustos-2007_-gurcistan_in-topraklari-icinde-bulunan-abhazya-ve-guney-osetya_da-gayrimenkul-edinilmesi-hk_.tr.mfa> [19 July 2008].

²⁵⁶ Gülşah Durak, "Bizi Ayıran Deniz, Direnen Abhazya", *Cumhuriyet*, 19 July 2008.

²⁵⁷ *Referans*, 20 October 2007.

²⁵⁸ "Abhazya Dışişleri Bakanı Şamba Türkiye'de", *Anka*, 04 June 2008, Muammer Kutlu, "Abhazya Dışişleri Bakanı Türkiye'de", *Cafe Siyaset*, 03 June 2008, and "Abhazya Türkiye'nin Gürcistan Yanlısı Politikasına Kırgın", *İhlas Haber Ajansı*, 04 June 2008.

Parliament Egemen Bağış, and Salih Kapusuz met them separately at informal platforms.²⁵⁹

South Ossetia was an autonomous province in Georgia which was attached to Tbilisi in 1922 under the initiation of Stalin. In that same year, northern part of the region was incorporated into Russia. Later, in 1936, the status of Northern Ossetia was upgraded to an autonomous republic.²⁶⁰ In November 1989, the South Ossetian Supreme Soviet unilaterally exalted the status of the entity to that of an autonomous republic in Georgian state.²⁶¹ The Georgian parliament revoked the decision and abolished the autonomous status of oblast. Fighting broke out in South Ossetia in 1990 and lasted until June 1992. South Ossetians with the help of Russian arms and military hardware managed to drive most of the Georgians out of the region and gained control of large parts of the territory. On 22 June 1992, a cease-fire agreement was hammered out in Sochi between the conflicting parties under the supervision of Russian Federation and in presence of North Ossetian leader and a peacekeeping force which was composed of Russians, Georgians and Ossetians was established.²⁶²

Since the cease-fire treaty South Ossetia like Abkhazia has come under the political and economic dominance of Russian Federation. Moscow provides financial and military-technical support to the breakaway region. Russian ruble is in circulation and South Ossetians are paid Russian pensions.²⁶³ Moreover, most of the population of South Ossetia has been granted Russian citizenship and passports.

²⁵⁹ “Türkiye’den Abhazya Dışişleri Bakanı Geldi Geçti”, 2008 Yılı Kafkas-Abhazya Dayanışma Komitesi Faaliyet Raporu, Available [online]: < <http://www.abhazya.org/faaliyetler/17.html>> [19 July 2008].

²⁶⁰ Hunter, p.119.

²⁶¹ Dov Lynch, *Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004), p.30.

²⁶² Svante E. Cornell, “Religion as a Factor in Caucasian Conflicts”, *Civil Wars* 1, no.3 (Autumn 1998), p.52.

²⁶³ “Russia-North Ossetia Trends in Conflict and Cooperation”, *Fast Update*, 01 August 2007.

Russian state and businessmen make investments in the region. A new road bypassing Georgian-controlled territory was built with Russian money and contractors. Russia's state-owned gas giant, Gazprom, has begun constructing new gas pipelines and infrastructure for the region.²⁶⁴ Russia's major phone company also seemed to be behind the South Ossetia's sole local mobile company Ostelecom.²⁶⁵

The OSCE and the EU sponsored a number of confidence-building programs in the region but these did not contribute much to the settlement of the issue. Georgia declared a South Ossetian Peace Plan on 24 January 2005 at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg which offered broad benefits and incentives to South Ossetian population in the form of implementation of restitution law, rehabilitation of basic infrastructure of the region, aid for businesses to invest in the province, distribution of pensions and reinforcement of Ossetian cultural and ethnic heritage through various celebrations.²⁶⁶ This plan was rejected by the South Ossetian authorities. On 10 May 2007, Administration of the Provisional Administrative Territory Entity was constituted in South Ossetia by the Georgian government.²⁶⁷ This entity which was made of and headed by ethnic Ossetians²⁶⁸ served as a counterweight to the secessionist movement led by Eduard Kokoyev and provided Tbilisi to have a say in the governance of South Ossetia.

²⁶⁴ "Russia Pours Cash into Georgia Rebel Region", *Reuters*, 25 July 2007.

²⁶⁵ Elizaveta Valieva and Irina Kelekhsayeva, "South Ossetia Gets Connected", *Caucasus Reporting Service*, no.418, 07 November 2007.

²⁶⁶ South Ossetian Conflict Resolution Plan, Presented by the Prime Minister of Georgia, H. E. Zurab Hogaideli, at the 575th Special Meeting of the Permanent Council of OSCE, 27 October 2005, pp. 1-4. Available [online]: <http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/16791_en.pdf.html > [15 March 2008].

²⁶⁷ See "Statement Delivered by Ambassador Victor Dolidze at the 666th Meeting of the Permanent Council of OSCE," Vienna, 17 May 2007, p.1. Available [online]: <http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/24559_en.pdf.html > [15 March 2008].

²⁶⁸ The Provincial Administration was headed by Dimitri Sanakoev, the leader of the political movement People of South Ossetia for Peace.

Turkey supported the peace plan proposed by the Georgian government in 2005.²⁶⁹ Furthermore, Turkish government announced that it rejected the independence referendum which was held in November 2006 by the secessionist administration in Georgia.²⁷⁰ Turkey, regarding the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts gave its full weight to the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Georgian state. Ankara also developed bilateral military relations with Tbilisi. The two countries signed the Agreement on Cooperation in Military Fields of Training, Techniques and Science in April 1996 and the Military Training Cooperation Agreement in July 1997. The main purpose of these treaties was to establish and implement military and defense industry cooperation between the signatories. They envisaged the military visits to units, headquarters and institutions, sending observers to exercises, personnel exchange, mutual language courses, academic and on the job trainings, experience, information and technological exchanges.²⁷¹ Moreover, Turkey constructed military training centers in Kodori and Gori and a shooting range outside Tbilisi.²⁷² It also helped the Georgian government with the reconstruction of the Vaziani military base.

The foreign policy line Russia pursued in Georgia in the early years of the post-Cold War period bore resemblance to the strategy it followed in Nagorno-

²⁶⁹ See “Statement by Nabi Şensoy, Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey at the 13th Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council”, Ljubljana, 05 December 2005, p.2. Available [online]: <http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/17282_en.pdf.html > [15 March 2008].

²⁷⁰ See “Statement by Rafet Akgünay, Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey at the 14th Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council”, Brussels, 04 December 2006, p. 2. Available [online]: <http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/22423_en.pdf.html > [15 March 2008].

²⁷¹ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Gürcistan Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında Askeri Alanda Eğitim, Teknik ve Bilimsel İşbirliği Antlaşması and Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Gürcistan Hükümeti Arasında İmzalanan Askeri Eğitim İşbirliği Antlaşması. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFile.aspx> [15 March 2008].

²⁷² F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), pp. 105-106.

Karabakh. Russia lent a hand to the separatist forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia through military and material means to diminish the authority of the Georgian state in these regions and in the end succeeded in obtaining concessions in the form of Georgia's incorporation into the CIS and its acceptance of the legality of the Russian bases in its territory in exchange for Russia's withdrawal of its support from the secessionist entities. Turkey, on the other hand, defended the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia despite the calls in the opposite direction coming from its North Caucasian community. Ankara, similar to Moscow, left open the channels of economic cooperation with Abkhazia but did it different from Russia, within the limits set forth by the Georgian administration.

The Rivalry over Caspian Energy Routes: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project
versus the Northern Pipeline

The Caspian Sea region contains proven oil resources estimated to be between seventeen and forty-four billion barrels and 232 trillion cubic feet natural gas reserves.²⁷³ The reserves are far from being an alternative to the Middle Eastern fossil fuels. Yet they can contribute to a great extent to the diversification of global hydrocarbon resources and even substitute the oil fields of North Sea where the production is in decline.

The landlocked position of the littoral states and their lack of capital and technology to extract, drill and develop oil and gas wells necessitated the invitation of foreign companies to help in exploration and production of energy resources. In addition, export pipelines would need to be constructed to transport oil and gas to

²⁷³ Caspian Sea Region: Survey of Key Oil and Gas Statistics and Forecasts, (July 2006). Available [online]: < http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/images/caspian_balances.pdf > [10 May 2008].

world markets. The situation made transit countries the net beneficiaries of the process as they would take advantage of the pipelines that would cross through their territories by collecting transportation fees, buying crude oil and gas at lower prices and make room for possible bidding opportunities for their local engineering and construction firms.

Turkey and Russia entered into an intense rivalry to host the main export pipeline of the Azeri oil. Turkey proposed a route that started from Baku, passed Georgian capital Tbilisi and reached to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. From there the oil would be loaded onto tankers for onward shipment. Russia suggested the usage of Baku-Novorossiisk pipeline dated from the Soviet times. It traversed Baku, Grozny, Tikhoretsk and reached to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiisk. Russia would then need to utilize the Turkish Straits to ship the oil to Western markets via tankers.

Both pipelines possessed specific pros and cons. The length of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and its passage through mountainous terrain made the pipeline costly to construct. Moreover, Ceyhan was located close to the south-eastern region of Turkey where there was a long lasting PKK originated uneasiness. Nevertheless, Ceyhan terminal had a capacity of 120Mtoe per year and could receive very large crude carriers whereas Novorossiisk could not harbour super tankers.²⁷⁴ Moreover, Ceyhan was operational all year due to the warm climate of the Mediterranean region while Novorossiisk was shut down in the winter as a result of adverse weather conditions. On the other hand Baku-Novorossiisk route was more economic compared to BTC as only twenty-seven km was required for the construction of a

²⁷⁴ International Energy Agency, *Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Turkey 2001 Review* (Paris, France: OECD/IEA Publications, 2001), p.64.

new pipeline.²⁷⁵ However, almost 160 km of the pipeline went through the unstable and war-striven Chechen Republic where there was always the threat of bombs and closure of oil valve due to the embroilments between the Russian administration and Chechen authorities.²⁷⁶

Turkey promoted the construction of the BTC pipeline because of geostrategical, political and environmental reasons not to mention the economic ones. Building a new pipeline would reduce the reliance of Azerbaijan and Central Asian states on Russia as the main route of export to outside world thus would consolidate their independence and sovereignty. Turkey would find a more favourable atmosphere to develop its relations with these Turkic countries. Secondly, the risk of congestion and pollution in the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmara would diminish as the BTC bypassed the Turkish Straits. Finally, the new pipeline would help Turkey to take a noteworthy step towards being a regional hub in Eurasia. Russia, on the other hand, was keen to hold its grip in the South Caucasus and Central Asia and was opposed to the entry of any other actor into the region which it designated as its backyard.

Azerbaijan, the main supplier of the projected pipelines, initially pursued a pro-Turkish line but after Aliyev acceded to power he strove to follow policies that accommodated the Russian views and concerns. Ten international oil companies²⁷⁷ along with the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) formed the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) and signed a 30-year Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) on 20 September 1994 to develop Azeri,

²⁷⁵ Tuncay Babalı, "Implications of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Oil Pipeline Project", *Perceptions* (Journal of International Affairs) 10, no.4 (Winter 2005), p.34.

²⁷⁶ Richard R. Dion, "Long View of Caspian Oil Export Options Tilts to Kazakhstan-China", *Oil and Gas Journal* 97, no.23 (07 June 1999), pp. 22-23.

²⁷⁷ Amoco, British Petroleum (BP), Delta, Lukoil, McDermott, Pennzoil, Ramco, Statoil, Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), Unocal.

Chirag and Guneshli fields in the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea.²⁷⁸ Although Russian oil company Lukoil obtained 10 percent of the shares of the contract, Sergei Lavrov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, submitted a letter to the Secretary General on 05 October 1994 which claimed that the Caspian Sea was subject to joint utilization by the littoral states and any activities regarding the Sea, including the exploitation of its resources, must be decided jointly by all the countries bordering the coast.²⁷⁹ Moreover, Russia also stated that any unilateral action in respect of the Caspian Sea was deemed unlawful and not recognized by the Russian Federation and necessary measures would be taken to prevent it. Russia here referred to the Soviet-Iranian agreements of 1921 and 1940 which provided free navigation in the Caspian Sea and fishing in its waters to the coastal states and claimed that not only Iran and Russia but also other coastal states were bound by the provisions of these treaties as they were still in force.

The AIOC took the middle course and declared on 09 October 1995 that until the selection of the ultimate main export line, it would use two pipeline routes, the western route, Baku-Supsa; and the northern route Baku-Novorossiisk to export the early production oil.²⁸⁰ This was also in line with the US energy policy that advocated multiple pipelines -except the ones that would go through Iran- without alienating and antagonizing Russian Federation.

²⁷⁸ Azerbaijan Oil Contracts. Available [online]: <
http://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/62_folder/62_articles/62_socar_aioc.html> [11 May 2008].

²⁷⁹ "Position of the Russian Federation Regarding the Legal Regime of the Caspian Sea", Letter Dated 05 October 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General, Document No. A/49/475, 05 October 1994.

²⁸⁰ Meliha Altunışık, "Turkey and the Changing Oil Market in Eurasia", in *The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East?*, (ed.) Libby Rittenberg (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), p.168.

The corrosion of the invincibility of the Russian army after the First Chechen War and the discovery of new oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea led Washington to champion more strongly the BTC as the main export pipeline in the following years. On 18 November 1999, the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkey in the course of an OSCE summit signed the Istanbul Declaration within the presence of US President and pledged to undertake all necessary actions to realize the BTC project.²⁸¹ Russia responded to the manoeuvres of signatory states by bringing up the legal status of the Caspian Sea along with Iran in the UN²⁸² and mobilizing the environmentalists and local groups by pointing out the environmental damage the pipeline could inflict on the ecosystem of Caspian Sea and the environment of the hosting countries.²⁸³ However, these activities failed to materialize any concrete result and the BTC became operational on 10 May 2005.

Balance Sheet: Appraisal of the Turkish Model and Near Abroad Policy

In the early years of the post-Soviet era, both the Western countries and Turkey had striven to promote the Turkish Model in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Turkey with its parliamentary democracy, market economy, secular stance and close alignment with the Western world could help Azerbaijan and Central Asian

²⁸¹ Istanbul Declaration, 18 November 1999. Azerbaijan Oil Contracts. Available [online]: <<http://www.netnative.com/news/02/sep/1060.html>> [12 May 2008].

²⁸² “Joint Russian-Iranian Statement on the Caspian Sea”, Letter Dated 18 January 1996 from the Permanent Representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, Document No. A/51/59, 27 January 1996.

²⁸³ For example some environmentalist groups and NGOs were rallied against the passing of BTC through the Borjomi region as it was a home to mineral waters and tourism industries. See Giorgi Kandelaki and Mevlut Katik, “Environmental Activists Not Reassured by Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Hearings”, *Eurasianet*, 17 September 2003, Özden Zeynep Oktav, “American Policies Towards the Caspian Sea and the BTC Pipeline”, *Perceptions* (Journal of International Affairs) 10, no.1 (Spring 2005), p.27 and “Caucasus: Environmentalist Says BTC Pipeline Could Be Death Of Caspian”, *RFE/RL*, 12 July 2006.

Republics in their political and economic restructuring and reintegration into the international system as independent actors. The main motive of the USA and the EU in broaching a more assertive and active Turkish role in Eurasia was their apprehension about a possible creation of an Iranian sphere of influence in the region.²⁸⁴ In addition to the Western backing, the Russian Federation, heir of the former hegemon, acquiesced to and even approved Turkey's energetic attempts in the South Caucasus and Central Asia for a brief period as Russia was having political, economic and social difficulties at home and was in need of Western financial aid badly.²⁸⁵

However, after the initial euphoria passed, it became manifest that Turkey did not have the financial and technical wherewithal to cover all the needs of these nascent republics. Moreover, these states were being administered by the Soviet-era nomenclature²⁸⁶ and these leaders had obvious authoritarian tendencies without much tolerance for opposition. Chinese and South Korean models with their strict political systems and proven economic successes became much more appealing than the Turkish one.

Turkey also encountered problems due to its geographical location. It lacks direct access to the region. There exist three possible routes that pass through Armenia, Georgia and Iran. Armenian border is closed due to Turkey's blockade

²⁸⁴ For a similar view see Gün Kut, "Yeni Türk Cumhuriyetleri ve Uluslararası Ortam", in *Bağımsızlığın İlk Yılları: Azerbaycan, Kazakistan, Kırgızistan, Özbekistan, Türkmenistan*, (ed.) Büşra Ersanlı Behar (Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı Milli Kütüphane Basımevi, 1994), p.15.

²⁸⁵ Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Kozyrev had said that the Turkish model of political and economic development would be the most suitable for the new Islamic republics. See Danilov, p.61. For a similar view which qualified Turkey as the natural ally of Russia in foiling the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and promoting secularism in the region see Sergei Gretskey, "Russia's Policy Toward Central Asia", *Central Asia and the Caucasus* (1997). Available [online]: < <http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/GRETSKY.shtml> > [05 January 2008].

²⁸⁶ One exception is the former President of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev. Before he assumed the presidential post, Akayev who held a Ph.D degree in physics engineering, chaired the Academy of Sciences of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic.

over this country because of Armenia's bearing on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Iran occasionally causes bureaucratic problems during the transportation. Georgian route, although highly preferred by the Turkish vehicles, is not safe as it passes through Javakheti region which possesses a sizeable Armenian population. Moreover, the roads here are not good and they are closed during the adverse winter conditions. In contrast to Turkey, Iran is located at the heart of the Eurasian continent. It has land borders with Azerbaijan, Armenia; sea borders with Russia and Kazakhstan and both land and sea border with Turkmenistan. This geographical proximity and the existence of Armenian, Azerbaijani and Turkmen diaspora communities in Iran gave Tehran the opportunity to cement close commercial links with these countries.²⁸⁷

European and American scholars and policy makers exaggerated and overestimated Iranian efforts of exporting its revolutionary Islamic regime to Central Asia and the South Caucasus. At a first glance it was not very probable for Azerbaijan and Central Asian states to adopt radical Islamic ideology as they had been heavily indoctrinated under a communist and atheist Soviet thinking for long decades. Moreover, apart from Azerbaijan, all of the republics belonged to the Sunni sect of Islam. Azerbaijan, which owned a Shiite population, felt closer affinity to Turkey with whom it had shared ethnic and linguistic commonalities rather than the neighbouring Shiite Iran. Furthermore, Iran, cognizant of the sensitivities of regional actors and the Western powers, pursued an extra assiduous and practical policy. Tehran, similar to Turkey, promoted regional cooperation and integration projects through the launch of ECO and the Caspian Sea Littoral States Organization and attempted to cultivate cultural links with the Persian-speaking world by the help of

²⁸⁷ Iran has a large (approximately twenty-five percent) Azeri and small but historically important Armenian population. Moreover, a large number of Turkmens live in the Iranian province of Khorasan. See Vitaly Naumkin, "The Russian-Iranian Relations: Present Status and Prospects for the Future", *Perceptions* (Journal of International Affairs) 3, no.1 (March-May 1998), p. 84.

Association of Persian-Language Speakers.²⁸⁸ Iran also resorted to conflict resolution and mediation diplomacy in regional conflicts that took place in Nagorno-Karabakh and Tajikistan. It tried to broker a cease-fire settlement during the Nagorno-Karabakh war but its initiative was nipped in the bud by Russian intervention. Although Iran had close linguistic and cultural ties with the Tajik state it refrained from providing arms to the Islamic opposition in the country in order not to provoke Moscow.²⁸⁹

It became apparent after a short while that neither Turkey nor Iran was a match for Russia in establishing a zone of influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Both countries were bereft of comprehensive knowledge, financial strength and political clout to compete with Moscow. Moreover, they abstained from taking steps to keep in power friendly regimes in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan in order not to confront Russia. Russian administration, by its implicit interference in Azerbaijani and Georgian politics and its blatant military intervention in Tajikistan managed to reassert its power in its backyard in accordance with the Near Abroad doctrine. Here, it should be noted that the Western world, especially the US government, did not throw its full weight behind Turkey in its competition with Russia. During a January 1994 visit to Moscow, former US President Bill Clinton even stated that:

“You will be more likely to be involved in some of these areas near you, just like the US has been involved in the last several years in Panama and Granada and other places near our area.”²⁹⁰

²⁸⁸ Persian language is spoken in Iran, Tajikistan, and in parts of Afghanistan and Uzbekistan where Tajik minorities live.

²⁸⁹ Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Iran and Tajikistan”, in *Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey, and Iran*, (eds.) Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Oles M. Smolansky (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), p.127.

²⁹⁰ *RFE/RL Daily Report*, 01 February 1993. Cited in Jeffrey Checkel, “Structure, Institutions, and Process: Russia’s Changing Foreign Policy”, in *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, (eds.) Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), p.48.

These words can be taken as an American acknowledgement of Russian Near Abroad Policy. It can be said that after Russia made some important concessions about the European Union and NATO expansion and began to follow a more conciliatory path in Bosnian War, the West started to take into account Russian concerns and sensitivities more seriously. Moreover, ascending Russian influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia was also welcomed by Washington as it would curb Iranian designs and overtures in these regions. These developments put Russia in a more advantageous position with respect to Turkey in its struggle for primacy in Eurasia.

Political divergence and disagreement between Turkey and Russia in the early post-Cold War period was not restricted to the competition in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The two states sparred over on a wide range of issues such as Russian tankers' passage through Turkish Straits, and Russia's sales of S-300 missiles to Greek Cypriots. They also had different views regarding their vital internal problems, namely the Chechen and Kurdish separatist movements, as well as about the regional matters such as the war erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the flank ceilings in the Caucasus. Subsequent sections of the dissertation will throw light on these matters of discrepancy between the two countries through the presentation of detailed account of these issues of contention followed by an analysis of the Turkish and Russian standings with respect to each of them.

Sensitive Spots: Chechen Uprising versus the Kurdish Unrest

Chechnya became part of the Tsarist Russian Empire in nineteenth century after the result of a long, fierce and wearisome battle.²⁹¹ The Chechen territory was merged with Ingushetia during the Soviet time and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was declared on 05 December 1936.²⁹² The elections which took place in October 1991, just before the demise of the Soviet Union, brought to power in Chechen-Ingush Republic Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former general in Soviet Air Force.

On 02 November 1991, Dudayev announced the establishment of an independent and sovereign Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, a decision which was repudiated immediately both by Moscow and the Ingush administration.²⁹³ Russia resorted to a full-scale military assault in December 1994 after its attempts to overthrow Dudayev came to naught. The war which lasted nearly two years, much to the consternation and disillusionment of Russian government, ended in August 1996 with the signing of Khasavyurt Agreement. The agreement encapsulated the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya, Russian rebuilding of the socio-economic infrastructure of the Chechen Republic, reconstruction of mutual budgetary, currency and fiscal relations between the parties and the supply of food

²⁹¹ For the detailed account of the Chechen struggle against the Russian armies, see Antero Leitzinger, "Historical Reflections on the War in Chechnya", *Perceptions* (Journal of International Affairs) (September-November 1997), pp. 148-155.

²⁹² Moshe Gammer, *The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), p.152.

²⁹³ Ingushetia joined Russia in 1992 after a referendum held on 30 November-01 December 1991 in which 92 percent of the population voted for autonomy within the Russian Federation. See Edward Kline, ASF Chechnya Brief. Available [online]: <
http://asf.wdn.com/cgi/ASFdb.pl?&action=Linkview&pass=&link_name=doc&link_type_doc=file&main_page=http://asf.wdn.com/&main_page_title=ASF+Home+Page&layout=noframe&database=asf_docs_chechbp_num_sprivat&link_res_doc=bp2.898547617.html> [12 April 2008].

and medical aid to the population.²⁹⁴ Although the future status of Chechnya was not mentioned in the document, the acceptance of Russia to enter into a truce agreement with one of its rebellious autonomous republics and the inclusion of the right of self-determination in the text was a remarkable feat for the Chechens.

Russia could not let Chechnya leave the federation as secession of the Chechen Republic could incite separatist tendencies in other provinces of Russia. In addition, Baku-Novorossiisk pipeline, which carried Azeri oil to the Russian Black Sea ports passed through Chechen territory. Lastly, Chechnya shared a border with South Ossetia region of Georgia, a province that had cordial relations with Russia and which Russia used as leverage against the Georgian state. Loss of Chechnya would deprive Moscow of a significant bargaining chip which it frequently utilized to meddle in the affairs of this key South Caucasus state.

Chechnya came to the attention of Turkey when Shamil Basayev hijacked an Aeroflot jet with its 178 passengers and forced its route to Ankara on 09 November 1991. Basayev claimed that his was a protest act which was purported to impel international community to take notice of the Russian troop deployment in Chechen territory.²⁹⁵ After five hours of circling in the air, the plane returned to Grozny and the hostages were released. In January 1996, six Turkish citizens of Abkhaz and Chechen origin, along with an Abkhaz and two Chechens kidnapped the Avrasya ferryboat which was getting ready to travel to Sochi from the Turkish Black Sea port of Trabzon.²⁹⁶ The militants demanded from Russia to allow the departure of Chechen fighters from Pervamoiskoye where they were under the heavy artillery and

²⁹⁴ The Khasavyurt Truce Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Government of the Chechen Republic, 25 August 1996, in Moshe Gammer, *The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), pp. 221-223.

²⁹⁵ Smith, p.127.

²⁹⁶ “Türkiye Eylem Sahası”, *Radikal*, 07 May 2002.

helicopter gunship of the Russian army as a result of their raid on Russian military air base in Kizlyar, Dagestan and taking hostage of 160 civilians.²⁹⁷ The ferryboat incident ended three days later after the surrender of the hijackers. In the wake of the crisis, while the Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent a note of thanks to his Turkish counterpart Süleyman Demirel for Turkey's cooperation in solving the hijacking incident, he also suggested in his note that Turkey and Russia should cooperate more and work together in their shared uncompromising stand against terror.²⁹⁸ Moscow also openly conveyed its annoyance and disappointment to Turkish authorities in February 1997 when Istanbul State Security Court decided to try the hijacking case as interference in the ferryboat's direction rather than a terrorist act.²⁹⁹

For Turkish government, the Chechen issue was an internal matter of Russia and should be resolved within the confines of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation without losing the emphasis on respect of human rights. However, Turkey also sheltered citizens of Chechen descent who had immigrated to Ottoman Empire following the Russian conquest of North Caucasus and they supported their kins with rallies and financial aid.

Russia saw Turkey as an intruder who through its Chechen and Caucasian diaspora, interfered in the affairs of Russia with the objective of debilitating Russian state and gaining supremacy in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Dudayev's visits to Turkey and his reception by the Prime Minister Demirel were criticized by the

²⁹⁷ Anatol Lieven, *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), p.139.

²⁹⁸ "Russia Seeks Anti-Terror Cooperation with Turkey", *Hürriyet*, 22 January 1996.

²⁹⁹ Jülide Mollaoğlu, "Kuznetsov on Avrasya Trial, Weapons Sales", *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, 28 February 1997.

Russian officials and Russia also accused Turkey of sending arms and volunteer fighters to Chechen Republic.³⁰⁰

Russia responded to Chechen sympathy in Turkey by permitting the convening of conferences and congresses which were organized by the Kurdish National Liberation Front (ERNK), the political wing of PKK and opening up a Kurdish House in Moscow. Although the Russian government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected any kind of connection with PKK, some members of the Russian Duma attended to the conferences hosted by PKK and gave their backing to the Kurdish cause.

Russia and Turkey signed a Protocol to Prevent Terrorism during Turkey's Minister of Interior Nahit Menteşe's visit to his interlocutor Victor Yerin on 24 January 1995. According to the protocol, the two countries would prevent the sheltering of terrorist organizations in their territories.³⁰¹ This was followed by the Memorandum on Cooperation against Terrorism that was forged on 18 December 1996 in the course of Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Tansu Çiller's meeting with Yevgeny Primakov, Russia's Foreign Minister. The two countries pledged to cooperate against terrorism through prevention of terrorist acts, information exchange and detention of criminals.³⁰²

In spite of the agreements Russia did not add PKK to the list of terror groups and the PKK separatists arranged a Conference on Cooperation between Russian and Kurdish People in February 1997. The conference was attended by a number of

³⁰⁰ "Rusya: Türkiye Çeçenistan'a Silah Yolluyor", *Milliyet*, 18 October 1995.

³⁰¹ *Ayın Tarihi*, 24 January 1995.

³⁰² Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Terörizm ile Mücadele Alanında İşbirliğine İlişkin Memorandum. Available [online]: <
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFile.aspx> [12 April 2008].

Duma deputies.³⁰³ Moreover, despite the closure of the Kurdish House, a PKK-controlled training camp was set up in Yaroslavl, lying 250 kilometers northwest of Moscow where the wounded militants were treated and an ideological education was given to the PKK members.³⁰⁴ The PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan stayed in Moscow in October-November 1998 before he flew to Italy. Although the Duma passed a resolution pushing Yeltsin for granting Öcalan political asylum, the Russian government avoided from such an act which would strain relations with Turkey.³⁰⁵

On 07 August 1999, Chechen militants headed by Shamil Basayev and Emir Khattab launched an attack to the mountainous Botlikh region in Dagestan, took control of two villages therein and proclaimed the Islamic Republic of Dagestan on August 10.³⁰⁶ This was followed by a series of bombings in apartments in Moscow that were attributed to Chechens although there was not much evidence to support it. As a result of the bomb attacks 294 people were killed³⁰⁷ and this incident paved the way for Russia's second military incursion to Chechnya.

Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit paid an official visit to Moscow in November 1999 during Russia's second campaign against Chechnya. A joint declaration on cooperation in fight against terrorism was announced and Ecevit portrayed the Chechen conflict as an internal affair of Russia; a statement, whilst pleased the Russian officials brought on a great deal of criticism to him from Islamist and nationalist political circles in Turkey.

³⁰³ *Sabah*, 14 February 1997.

³⁰⁴ Robert Olson, "Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies, 1991-1997: The Kurdish and Chechnya Questions", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 18, no.2 (1998), p.220.

³⁰⁵ Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, "Turkish-Russian Relations: From Adversity to Virtual Rapprochement", in *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, (eds.) Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p.106.

³⁰⁶ Tracey C. German, *Russia's Chechen War* (New York, NY: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p.151.

³⁰⁷ Smith, p.26.

Turkey continued to provide humanitarian relief to the Chechen people during the Second Russian-Chechen War. Chechens that were wounded in combats with the Russian soldiers were brought to Turkish hospitals.³⁰⁸ Some Chechen civilians were lodged in guest-houses in Fenerbahçe, Ümraniye and Beykoz.³⁰⁹ But these activities were low profile compared to the first war.

Sporadic hostage incidents brought the Chechen issue to the attention of Turkish public. In March 2001, a plane which flew from Istanbul to Moscow was hijacked and its route was diverted to Medina. The hijackers demanded an end to the war in Chechnya. After a security operation that was executed by Saudi security forces, a Russian flight attendant, a Turkish passenger and one of the hijackers died.³¹⁰ In April 2001, thirteen gunmen burst into the lobby of the Swissotel in Istanbul, took hostage about 120 guests and stated that their action was in protest at Russia's bloody attacks in the Caucasus.³¹¹ The event was directed by Muhammed Emin Tokcan who was the leader of the Avrasya ferryboat hijacking incident in 1996. He had been sentenced to eight years in March 1997 but escaped from prison in October 1997. He was recaptured in 1999 but released from prison in November 2000 under a general amnesty.³¹² Tokcan again surrendered to the Turkish security forces and was sentenced for twelve years imprisonment on 30 December 2002 for his involvement in the hostage-taking act.

The last Chechen hostage incident in Turkey occurred in May 2002 when a gunned Turkish citizen held hostage about thirteen people at The Marmara Hotel in

³⁰⁸ Chris Morris, "Turkey Succours Wounded Chechens", *BBC News*, 02 February 2000.

³⁰⁹ Fehim Taştekin, "Çeçen Mülteci Sorunu", Kafkas Vakfı Çeçen Mülteciler Raporu (Ekim 2001). Available [online]: < http://www.kafkas.org.tr/ajans/Cecen_Multeci_Sorunu.htm > [12 April 2008].

³¹⁰ "Operasyon'da Biri Türk Üç Ölü Bir Türk Yaralı", *Hürriyet*, 16 March 2001.

³¹¹ "Hostage Drama in Istanbul", *BBC News*, 23 April 2001.

³¹² "Profile: Istanbul Gang's Leader", *BBC News*, 23 April 2001.

Istanbul in order to protest Russia's intervention in Chechnya.³¹³ The incident ended with the gunman's surrender to the Turkish police.

Turkey began to distance itself from the Chechen cause starting with the end of the Second Russian-Chechen War. The flourishing of Wahhabi ideology in Chechnya, the adoption of Sharia law in the country and the targeting of civilians in terrorist operations estranged both the Turkish administration and the public. Moreover, Turkey took steps to curtail the influence of the Chechen diaspora in the country. Turkish government expropriated one million dollars of Caucasus-Chechen Solidarity Committee and the International Chechen Conference which would be held in Istanbul in May 2002 was cancelled.³¹⁴ Furthermore, in November 2002, right after the Dubrovka theater hostage incident³¹⁵, Turkish authorities decided to ban the entry of Chechen leaders such as Mevladi Udugov and Ruslan Gelayev into Turkey and also expelled the so-called representatives of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Badrudin Zelimkhan Arslangereyev and Rakhman Dushuyev from the country.³¹⁶

Ankara has recently also developed its ties with the current pro-Russian administration in Chechnya. The President of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov accompanied Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in his visit to Turkey in May 2010 and Turkish Minister of National Defense İsmet Yılmaz, along with the governor of

³¹³ "The Marmara'da Rehine Krizi", *Hürriyet*, 04 May 2002.

³¹⁴ "Dünya Çeçen Konferansı'nın İptaline Tepki", *Ajans Kafkas*, 18 May 2002.

³¹⁵ 41 armed Chechen militants led by Movsar Barayev raided the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow on 23 October 2002 and held 850 people as hostages. They demanded the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechen territory and the end of the Second Russian-Chechen War. The hijacking crisis ended with the pumping of an unknown chemical gas by the Russian security forces. It killed thirty-nine of the militants as well as the 129 of hostages.

³¹⁶ Statement by Alexander Yakovenko, the Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding Decision by Turkish Authorities to Ban Entry into Country of Leaders of Terrorist Formations Operating in Chechnya. Available [online]: < <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/20.html> > [17 June 2008].

Sivas and mayor of Sivas participated in April 2012 in the opening ceremony of a pro-Russian Chechen association in the city of Sivas.³¹⁷ This act of the Minister however, was criticized by some of the Chechen solidarity organizations in Turkey³¹⁸ as it came after a couple of months later when three militants of the Chechen separatist movement had been killed in Istanbul by the weapons used by Russian special forces.³¹⁹

Chechen and Kurdish issues do not dominate or shadow bilateral relations between the two countries anymore. Although Russia occasionally complains about the existence of Turkish mercenaries that fought against the Russian army in Chechnya³²⁰ and Turkey is frustrated with the activities of PKK sympathizers on Russian soil, the two countries refrain from using the Chechen and Kurdish issues as trump cards to weaken each other.

The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) of November 1990 which came into force on 17 July 1992³²¹ was the first conventional weapons arms control agreement ever to be signed in Europe. It was signed between NATO and Warsaw

³¹⁷ “Yılmaz: Grozni Bir Daha Yıkılmasın”, *Timetürk*, 08 April 2012.

³¹⁸ See Murat Özer, “Türkiye Rus İşbirlikçisi İmajını Hak Etmiyor”, İMKANDER Press Release, 09 April 2012. Available [online]: < <http://www.imkander.org.tr/?aType=haber&ArticleID=258> > [26 May 2012].

³¹⁹ Since 2008 six Chechen militants who had been active members of the separatist movement in Chechnya had been killed in Istanbul. While the Russian authorities denied any involvement in the killings, both the Turkish government and the Turkish National Police kept their silence on the matter. See “3 Çeçen’e Suikast Rus Gizli Servisinin ‘İntikam Operasyonu’”, *Vatan*, 23 September 2011 and Sergei Balmasov, “Turkey Sacrifices Interests of Chechen Separatists”, *Pravda*, 21 October 2011.

³²⁰ Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov in a public statement declared that among those killed or captured since Russia began military operations in Chechnya, there were mercenaries from about ten foreign countries, the majority of whom were Turkish citizens. “Russia Names Turkey as Source of Chechen Fighters”, *Gateway to Russia*, 07 February 2004.

³²¹ Gülnur Aybet, “The CFE Treaty: The Way Forward for Conventional Arms Control in Europe”, *Perceptions* (Journal of International Affairs) 1, no.1 (March -May 1996), p.18.

Pact members. The treaty set strict limits on the number of offensive weapons such as battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, heavy artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. The agreement also included regional limits to prevent destabilizing force concentrations of ground equipment.

The Turkish view clashed with that of Greece's regarding the geographic zone that would be subject to CFE control and inspection during the negotiation phase of the treaty. Turkey requested the exclusion of its south-eastern Anatolia region from the treaty due to the remoteness of this area from Europe along with the security risks it was exposed to emanating from Iraq and Syria. Greece accepted the Turkish request with the condition of inclusion of Mersin to the area of application of CFE treaty owing to the reason that Turkey was using the Mersin port to supply its troops in Northern Cyprus. The Soviets supported the Greek position as it would extend the CFE controls in a region in proximity to the South Caucasus. However, when it became clear that the situation was leading to a deadlock, Moscow changed its stance and announced that it would no longer insist on the inclusion of Mersin into the CFE zone. The Soviet change of position might be attributable to the fact that it did not want to lose the opportunity of hammering out an important security treaty with the USA just because of the existence of a point of disagreement between the two NATO members. Moscow put forward a new wording for the definition of Turkish zone of CFE which allowed for the flexible interpretation of the situation of Mersin by both Turkey and Greece.³²²

Turkey and this time the major heir of the Soviet Union, Russia, hassled over the CFE treaty when Russia made a formal proposition in October 1993 to the heads

³²² Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: US Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus* (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), p.56. Stearns, who was former USA Ambassador to Greece, also wrote that he was reliably informed that both the USA and the Soviet Union supported the Turkish position with regard to Mersin. See *Ibid.*, p.168.

of state of contracting parties to increase the flank ceilings in the covenant. The fundamental reason behind Russia's requisition for revision of the CFE treaty was the country's concern about the instability coming from the South Caucasus border. The flaring up of military clashes between the Russian army and Chechen fighters in 1994 also invigorated the Russian argument.

Among the signatories of the CFE treaty, Turkey was the country that vehemently opposed any change in the provisions of the agreement as that meant the redeployment of Russian military units in neighbouring South Caucasian countries such as Armenia and Georgia. However, Ankara, under pressure from its NATO allies, notably from the United States, gave in to the Russian desire of increased military presence in its southern flank. The CFE Vienna Review Conference of May 1996 allowed Russia to increase its force levels and postponed the deadline of full compliance to the CFE flank restrictions to 31 May 1999.³²³ It seemed that the USA and the European countries made this concession on CFE limits in exchange for the Russian consent to the eastern enlargement of NATO and the membership of the Baltic and Eastern European countries in Western organizations.³²⁴

Another revised version of CFE treaty came into existence in November 1999 during the Istanbul Summit. Russia acceded to the withdrawal of its troops and military equipment from Moldova and Georgia. However NATO members repudiated to ratify the agreement on the grounds that Russia did not assume its pledges fully.

³²³ Gareth Winrow, "Turkey's Evolving Role in the Post-Soviet World", in *The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East?*, (ed.) Libby Rittenberg (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), p.104.

³²⁴ Nasuh Uslu, "The Russian, Caucasian and Central Asian Aspects of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Period", *Alternatives* (Turkish Journal of International Relations) 2, no. 3 and 4 (Fall and Winter 2003), p.167.

Russia suspended the implementation of its obligations under the CFE pact on 14 July 2007. Russian administration uttered four reasons for its decision. First of all, Russian government did not see a direct link between the ratification process and the removal of its forces from Georgian and Moldavian territory. Secondly, the three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which bordered Russia were not included in the CFE treaty. Thirdly, Russia claimed that 1999 and 2004 expansions exceeded the NATO's equipment above the treaty limits. Russia, in compensation to these enlargements, demanded a removal of the North Caucasian ceilings on Russian forces. Fourthly, the planned deployment of America's conventional forces in Bulgaria and Romania was deemed as an encroachment of the Russian security.³²⁵

Although the Russian government did not openly divulge, the main motive behind this suspension resolution was American plans of establishing missile defense systems in Poland and Czech Republic. American President George Bush declared that this missile shield was stationed to stop Iran rather than Russia. In return, at the June 2007 Summit of G-8, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed the installation of the missile systems not in Eastern European countries that were in close proximity to Russian soil but in Turkey and Azerbaijan, which were neighbours to Iran.³²⁶

The Obama administration succeeding Bush decided to "reset" the USA's relations with Russia and gave Putin's proposal of changing the location of missile shield from Eastern European countries to Turkey a serious thought. At the time of NATO's Lisbon Summit that took place in November 2010, member states agreed on the adoption of a new Strategic Concept which included a plan to develop a mutual

³²⁵ Information on the decree On Suspending the Russian Federation's Participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Related International Agreements. Available [online]: <<http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2007/07/137839.shtml>> [20 January 2008].

³²⁶ Cenk Başlamış, "Füze Kalkanı Türkiye'ye", *Milliyet*, 09 June 2007.

missile defense system that would have the capability of covering all member states. Within the framework of this decision, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on 01 September 2011, that an early warning radar system would be deployed in Turkey within the NATO missile defense program aimed at countering ballistic missile threats.³²⁷ Although Russia was still not thrilled about the establishment of the missile shield system, its Special Representative of NATO, Dmitry Ragoza stated that the early radar warning system to be installed in Turkey would not pose a direct security threat to Russia.³²⁸

Rift over Passage through Turkish Straits

Since the beginning of 1990s, Turkey and Russia from time to time have argued about the procedures of Russian usage of Turkish Straits. The Turkish Straits, which comprise the Sea of Marmara, the Strait of Istanbul and the Strait of Çanakkale, are one of the narrowest and most winding waterways in the world. The Istanbul Strait is approximately 31 km long and has an average width of 1.6 km³²⁹ whereas the length of Çanakkale Strait is about seventy km with an average width of four km.³³⁰ The Turkish Straits are heavily used by the Russian tankers which carry commodities, especially oil, to southern Europe. Russian administration, most of the time, complain about the delays during the passage of their ships through the Straits and the economic losses which are stemmed from these jams. Turkey, on the other hand,

³²⁷ “Dışişleri Bakanlığı Sözcüsü’nün Bir Soruya Cevabı”, SC 26, 01 September 2011, Latest Press Releases. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sc_26_1-eylul-2011_-disisleri-bakanligi-sozcusu_nun-bir-soruya-cevabi.tr.mfa > [10 September 2011].

³²⁸ “Rusya: Tehdit Oluşturmuyor”, *Cumhuriyet*, 03 September 2011.

³²⁹ Bayram Öztürk, “The Istanbul Strait, A Closing Biological Corridor”, in *Turkish Straits: New Problems New Solutions*, (ed.) İsmail Soysal (Istanbul: ISIS, 1995), p.145.

³³⁰ Nihan Ünlü, *The Legal Regime of the Turkish Straits* (The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002), p.5.

underlines the necessity of proper regulation of the marine traffic in order to avoid accidents and air and sea pollution as Turkish Straits are located near to the country's most populous and economically developed city, Istanbul.

The legal regime of the passage through Turkish Straits was finalized by the Montreux Convention of 1936. According to the Article 2 of the agreement, during the peace time, merchant vessels would enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits, by day and by night, under any flag and with any kind of cargo as long as they possessed a clean bill of health, paid certain taxes and charges and reported their name, nationality, tonnage, destination and last port of call to the officials at the stations.³³¹ By taking into consideration the increased maritime traffic in the Straits as a result of growth in the number, length and size of the vessels and the dangerous accidents that took place in the form of stranding of ships to the coasts of Istanbul and collusion of vessels, Turkey issued in January 1994 Maritime Traffic Regulations for the Turkish Straits and the Marmara Region that entered into force on 01 July 1994. These regulations were endorsed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in November 1995.

The 1994 Regulations established a traffic separation scheme in the Straits and the Marmara region. According to the Article 7 and 8 of the Regulations, vessels which carried dangerous cargo and were five hundred gross tons and more would transmit their sailing plans to the administration before entering the Straits.³³² Article 24 authorized Turkey to halt the maritime traffic temporarily due to construction work, scientific and sports activities, salvage and rescue operations, prevention and

³³¹ Boğazlar Rejimi Hakkında Montreux'de 20 Temmuz 1936 Tarihinde İmza Edilen Mukavelename. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFFile.aspx > [29 March 2008].

³³² Maritime Regulations for the Turkish Straits and the Marmara Region Entered into Force on 1 July 1994. Available [online]: < http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/TUR_1994_Regulations.pdf > [29 March 2008].

eradication of sea pollution, accidents and pursuing criminals. Transit of large vessels and ships carrying hazardous cargo was prohibited in the time of reduced visibility. According to Article 29, vessels that were 150 meters or more in length would provide information to the administration on the vessel and its cargo at the planning stage of the passage. Article 30 brought nuclear-powered vessels or vessels carrying nuclear cargo or wastes the obligation of obtaining permission from the Under-Secretariat for Maritime Affairs at the planning phase of the passage. Vessels carrying dangerous or noxious waste would also take permission from the Ministry for Environment.³³³ Vessels fifty-eight meters or greater in height were prohibited from entering to the Strait of Istanbul with the Article 38.³³⁴

The Russian Federation supported by Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Oman, Romania and Ukraine objected to the clauses 7, 8, 24, 29 and 30 of the new regulations on the grounds that these restrictions regarding the passage of commercial ships through the Straits contravenes the Article 2 of the Montreux Convention.³³⁵ As a result of new precautions, the number of ships at the entrance of Turkish Straits waiting for passage increased. Russia revealed its discontent about the new situation by presenting a report to the IMO on 10 April 1997 which stated that between 01 July 1994 and 01 January 1997, 349 ships with Russian flag were intercepted 1,887 hours at the Straits which cost 926,000 dollars to the country.³³⁶ Turkey and Russia also disagreed about the size of the vessels that could transit the Straits safely. Russia claimed that only large vessels over 340 meters long required

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ International Maritime Organization (IMO) Report of Maritime Safety Committee on Turkish Straits, *MSC 63/11/2*, 24 May 1994.

³³⁶ Mensur Akgün, “Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye ile Rusya Arasında Görünmez Bağlar: Boğazlar”, in *Dünden Bugüne Türkiye ve Rusya: Politik, Ekonomik ve Kültürel İlişkiler*, (eds.) Gülten Kazgan and Natalya Ulçenko (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, Kasım 2003), p.80.

the taking of special measures and precautions whereas Turkey asserted that it was very perilous for vessels of three hundred meters or longer to pass and that even transits by vessels 150 meter long encountered difficulties and were slower than those of smaller vessels.³³⁷

Turkey promulgated the Turkish Regulations for the Administration of Maritime Traffic in the Turkish Straits on 06 November 1998 which included amendments in controversial stipulations of the 1994 Regulations. The temporary suspension of the Turkish Straits was limited to large construction projects, serious and unexpected traffic accidents and hazardous conditions such as collusions, fires, public safety and environmental pollution.³³⁸ The wording of the Article 29 and 30 was changed in order not to give the impression that Turkey had intended to block the passage of foreign ships through the Turkish Straits. According to the revised clauses, ships of a length of 150 meters or more and the ships operated by nuclear power, transporting nuclear cargo or waste, or transporting hazardous and/or dangerous cargo or waste would provide the administration with information regarding the cargo being transported and provide documents showing that the ship met the standards of IMO, international conventions and the applicable law.³³⁹

IMO decided at its seventy-first session that was held in May 1999 that the safety measures taken up by the Turkish authorities have proven to be effective and successful.³⁴⁰ In addition, it recommended the establishment of a modern Vessel Traffic Services System (VTS) which would keep track of vessel movements and

³³⁷ G. Plant, "The Turkish Straits and Tanker Traffic: An Update", *Marine Policy* (May 2000), p.200.

³³⁸ Türk Boğazları Deniz Trafik Düzeni Tüzüğü. Available [online]: <
<http://mevzuat.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=2.5.9811860&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=Türk%20Boğazları%20Deniz%20Trafik>> [29 March 2008].

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ Introduction of Maritime Traffic Regulations for the Turkish Straits. Available [online]: <
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/TurkishStraits/>> [29 March 2008].

provide navigational safety. The VTS system has been operational since 30 December 2003 and it enables the Turkish authorities to reduce the time gap between tankers passing through the Straits.

Although the VTS system made it possible for a greater number of vessels to transit through the Turkish Straits, Russian Federation still voiced complaints to the IMO about the delays Russian ships encountered during the passages through the Straits and proposed the usage of new technologies and better training of VTS personnel to overcome this problem.³⁴¹ Until recently Russia had also contended that Turkey implemented restrictive regulations regarding the passage through Turkish Straits in order to discredit the Baku-Novorossiisk pipeline and put forth its pipeline project Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. After it became clear that Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi pipeline project would materialize and Turkey would stand firm against the increased tanker traffic in the Straits, Russia started to seek alternative ways to carry its oil without utilizing the Turkish Straits. Moscow developed the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline project, construction of which commenced in 2008 and that will be used to transport Russian and Caspian oil from the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas to the Greek Aegean port of Alexandroupolis by bypassing the Straits.

Standing Vis-à-vis the Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War

The dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the ensuing Bosnian War formed another apple of discord between Turkey and the Russian Federation as the two countries countenanced opposite parties of the conflict. Turkey supported the independence

³⁴¹ “Rusya’nın Boğazlar Şikayeti Aralık’a Ertelendi”, Türk Kılavuz Kaptanlar Derneği, 27 May 2004. Available [online]: < http://www.turkishpilots.org/HABERLER/2004/2004_05_27_MSC_78.html > [29 March 2008].

and the sovereignty of the nascent Bosnian state whilst Russia pursued a pro-Serbian line.

With the Slovenian and the Croatian proclamation of independence and the European Union's recognition of the breakaway republics on 15 January 1992 it became impossible to hold Yugoslavia together. Turkey decided to recognize the independence of all four of the republics of Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia) collectively on 06 February 1992.³⁴² The Bosnian Serbs, who had carved out autonomous regions in October 1991 and formed a separate and unconstitutional parliament in January 1992, declared the Bosnian Serb Republic on 27 March 1992.³⁴³ This dramatically increased the tension in the country and fighting between the Muslims and Serb militias burst out in April 1992. Since the first flaring up the conflict Turkey stressed the need to sustain the independence and territorial integrity of the Bosnian state and advocated multilateral intervention in various forums such as the CSCE, NATO, OIC, and the UN in order to put pressure on Bosnian Serbs to stop the war.

Turkey welcomed the imposition of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro with the Resolution 757 of the UN Security Council in May 1992 and pushed for the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnian Muslims on the grounds of right of self-defense as they were deprived of arms and equipment while the Bosnian Serbs were furnished with former Yugoslav army's heavy weaponry and supplies.³⁴⁴ Turkey also participated to the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 31

³⁴² Şule Kut, "Turkish Diplomatic Initiatives for Bosnia-Herzegovina", in *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, (eds.) Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemali Saybaşılı (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık, 1995), p.297.

³⁴³ Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (London, United Kingdom: Macmillan, 1994), p.232.

³⁴⁴ See "Address of the Turkish Deputy Permanent Representative in the UN Ambassador Tahsin Burcuoğlu to the UN Human Rights Commission, New York, 3 December 1992", in *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest* 6, no.29 (Autumn 1992), pp.93-96.

March 1993, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 816 which allowed the member countries to implement a no-fly zone by force. Turkey contributed to the NATO operation by sending eighteen Turkish F-16s to Italy. Turkey sent 1,457 troops to Bosnia in June 1994 as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). They were stationed in Zenica and Kakanj areas, with the task of monitoring the ceasefire between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.³⁴⁵ Turkey also took part in the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) mandates in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since December 2005, 247 Turkish military officials have been serving in Sarajevo as part of the European Union Force (EUFOR).³⁴⁶

Bosnian War caught Russia off guard as it was struggling with post-Soviet political, economic and social reconstruction.³⁴⁷ In early stages of the hostilities, in accordance with its pro-Western foreign policy orientation, Moscow followed a similar stance with the USA and the EU and did not veto the sanctions imposed on Serbia for buttressing Bosnian Serbs.³⁴⁸ However, Russia also braced its traditional Slav and Orthodox ally at some point and opposed the lifting of the arms embargo in favour of the Bosnian Muslims.

³⁴⁵ Yüksel Söylemez, "An Overview of Turkish-Croatian Relations", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 3, (1996/1997), p.111.

³⁴⁶ EUFOR Troop Strength in Theatre. Available [online]: <
http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=145&Itemid=62> [20 April 2008].

³⁴⁷ See James Headley, *Russia and the Balkans: Foreign Policy from Yeltsin to Putin* (London, United Kingdom: Hurst & Company, 2008) for the detailed account of the Russian policy with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina in this period.

³⁴⁸ Sharyl Cross, "Russia and NATO Toward the 21st Century: Conflicts and Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo", *NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship Award Final Report* (August 2001), p.13.

Russia adopted a more pro-Serbian attitude after the UN's threat of air strikes against Serbian positions around Sarajevo in 1994.³⁴⁹ At the backdrop of this policy change was the combination of the domestic developments that brought the power in national assembly a majority of nationalist and communist politicians and the growing uneasiness about the prevalence of US influence and waning of Russian authority in the Balkan region. Nevertheless, despite its more assertive and high-pitched tone, Russia did not give a strong reaction when NATO confronted the Bosnian Serbs in 1995. The Russian administration confined its activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina to joining the peacekeeping operations therein. Russia dispatched a force of 1,522 military officials to Bosnia within the framework of UNPROFOR in February 1994.³⁵⁰ After the UNPROFOR mission was completed in December 1995, 1,500 troops were deployed in the northern part of Republika Srpska on 05 January 1996 as part of the NATO-led IFOR. The mission of the Russian Military Contingent (RMC) ended in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 28 May 2003 and the withdrawal of the troops was rounded out on 14 June 2003.³⁵¹

Russian Arm Sales to Greek Cypriot Administration

Russia became a party to the Turkish-Greek dispute on Cyprus after Rosvoorouzhnie, the Russian State Armament Corporation, made a deal with the Greek Cypriot Administration in January 1997 to sell S-300 surface-to-air missile systems and deploy them on the island. Russia claimed that the contract was purely

³⁴⁹ Misha Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2001), p.639.

³⁵⁰ Bosnia: A Frustrating Mission. Available [online]: <www.britains-smallwars.com/Bosnia/UNPROFOR.html> [20 April 2008].

³⁵¹ Viktor Nikolla, "The Last Farewell from the Russians", 20 June 2003. Available [online]: <<http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/articles/030620c/t030620c.htm>> [20 April 2008].

commercial in nature whereas the Greek Cypriots stated that the purchase had been materialized as a result of a defense need to protect their aircraft deprived country from a possible Turkish air attack.³⁵²

S-300 system consisted of missiles, launches and radars which had 150 km range and thus had the capability to attack planes in the Turkish airspace which was only seventy km away from Cyprus. Turkey declared that it would use any means including the military ones to bar the transfer of the S-300 systems to Greek Cypriot Administration. The US government was also uncomfortable about the whole matter. The contract encapsulated the presence and operation of Russian military personnel on the island and the system they were going to install would be able to track the movement of NATO aircraft as far away as the Balkans.³⁵³ The American pressure bore fruit and in December 1998, the Greek Cypriot government announced that the S-300 system would be dispatched to Crete³⁵⁴, a Greek island from which the missiles would not be able to reach Turkish airspace.

With the S-300 crisis, Russia demonstrated that it still had some tools at its disposal to use as leverage to have an impact on the Cyprus problem and stir up the relations between the NATO members.

³⁵² Niels Kadritzke, "From Missile to EU Membership: Cyprus Hostage to Athens-Ankara Confrontation", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September 1998.

³⁵³ Joseph Fitchett, "Island Greeks Defuse Tension with Turkey over Russian S-300s: Deployment of Missiles Is Scrapped by Cyprus", *International Herald Tribune*, 30 December 1998.

³⁵⁴ Fuat Aksu, "Turkish Greek Relations: From Conflict to Détente, the Last Decade", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 6 (2001), p.179.

Flourishing Economic Relations

Turkey and Russia were at loggerheads with each other regarding political issues during the better part of the 1990s. However, their commercial and economic ties improved steadily and continuously thus succoured Moscow and Ankara by breathing new vitality into their complex and difficult relationship. In this part of the chapter, I will initially focus on the efforts to institutionalize the economic link between the two states which came into existence in the form of establishment of Joint Economic Cooperation Commission and the Turkish-Russian Business Council. After that I will concentrate on the fields of bilateral trade, banking, construction, tourism, transportation and energy that witnessed the utmost cooperation between Turkey and Russian Federation in this period. Lastly I will examine the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, a regional economic cooperation organization which came to the scene as a result of intense Turkish endeavour and raked up not only Russia and Turkey but also a wide range of countries stretching from the Black Sea, to the Balkans as well as to the South Caucasus.

Turkey and Russia founded the Turkish-Russian Joint Economic Commission on 14 May 1992 in accordance with the Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement that was concluded between the parties.³⁵⁵ The Commission actualized its first convocation on 02-06 November 1992 in Ankara; the second one took place in Moscow on 01-06 April 1994 and the third one was carried out in Ankara on 04-07 November 1997. Both of the sides were represented by ministers and high-ranking bureaucrats also took part in the delegations.

³⁵⁵Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti ile Yapılan Ticari ve Ekonomik İşbirliği Konularında Türk-Rus Karma Ekonomik Komisyonu Kurulmasına İlişkin Anlaşma. Available [online]: < <http://www.dpt.gov.tr/dei/index.html> > [25 May 2008].

The main aim of the Commission was to revise the existing commercial-economic relations between the two states, take action to smooth out the points of disagreement and galvanize efforts to advance economic relations to a level which satisfied the interests of both of the parties. The commission set up working groups in the areas of energy, pipelines, transfer of industry and high technology, contracting services, investment cooperation, standardization, metrology, calibration and certification.³⁵⁶ It usually worked as a preparatory organ which set the stage for the upcoming economic agreements and protocols that would be signed between the two countries.

The Turkish-Russian Business Council was formed in 1991 as part of the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK) of Turkey. DEIK was constituted in 1988 to pave the way for Turkey's economic, commercial, industrial and financial relations with foreign countries as well as international business communities.³⁵⁷ It acted as an intermediary between public and private sector by bringing together state officials and representatives of business community. The Turkish-Russian Business Council which operated under the umbrella of DEIK was composed of companies that had already undertaken business relations or planned to develop such relations in each country.³⁵⁸ It ensured an effective follow-up mechanism and a continuous flow of information to member companies on trade and industrial cooperation possibilities. The Council organized joint gatherings, exhibitions, fairs, conferences,

³⁵⁶ Türk-Rus Hükümetlerarası Karma Ekonomik Komisyonu Üçüncü Dönem Toplantısı Protokolü. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFile.aspx > [25 May 2008].

³⁵⁷ About DEIK: Purpose. Available [online]: < http://www.deik.org.tr/pages/EN/DEIK_DeikHakkinda.aspx?IKID=10 > [25 May 2008].

³⁵⁸ The Turkish-Russian Business Council had 291 members in 1992, 271 in 1993, 269, in 1994, 284 in 1995, 278 in 1996 and 284 in 1997. See Gül Günver Turan, "Türkiye ve Rusya Arasındaki İktisadi İlişkilerde Gönüllü Bir Kuruluş: Türk-Rus İş Konseyi", in *Dünden Bugüne Türkiye ve Rusya: Politik, Ekonomik ve Kültürel İlişkiler*, (eds.) Gülten Kazgan and Natalya Ulçenko (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003), pp. 287-288.

seminars, symposiums, information meetings to inform Turkish and Russian businessmen on the existing business opportunities in Turkey and Russia and to acquaint them with the economic outlook, business environment and legislation in each country.

The head of the Turkish delegation was selected from among the prominent figures of the private sector. The Russian interlocutor was represented by the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Commerce. At the end of the 1997, the two sides carried out six joint council meetings and twenty-eight business activities.³⁵⁹ Regional business committees were set up in Dagestan, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, St.Petersburg and Novgorod to exploit the investment opportunities in the vast territories of Russian Federation.

In addition to the activities of the business communities, substantial work was done at the state level to clear off the bureaucratic hurdles in trade and to facilitate the activities of businessmen. An agreement regarding Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters was executed on 16 September 1997, which enjoined customs authorities to streamline customs procedures to expedite movement of goods between territories of the two states.³⁶⁰ Moreover, customs authorities would provide each other with technical assistance in the area of customs matters including exchange of customs officers, training and assistance in developing specialized skills of the customs officers, exchange of information and experience in the usage of the interdiction and detection equipment, exchange of experts knowledgeable in the field of customs matters and exchange of professional scientific and technical data relating to customs laws, regulations and procedures.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Gümrük Konularında Karşılıklı Yardım ve İşbirliği Anlaşması. Available [online]: <
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFile.aspx> [26 May 2008].

Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income issued on 15 December 1997 permitted the taxation of business profits that derived in one state by an enterprise of the other one to be paid in the first-mentioned state as long as they are earned in a permanent establishment therein.³⁶¹ Agreement Regarding the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments that was signed again on 15 December 1997, contained clauses to create favourable conditions for investments by investors of one party in the territory of the other.³⁶²

Bilateral Trade

The bilateral trade between Turkey and the Russian Federation followed an ascending course during the post-Cold War years. As can be seen in Table 1, between 1992 and 1997 Turkish exports to Russia increased 369 percent and the imports amplified 109 percent. At the end of 1997, Russia came second in Turkey's total exports and sixth in total imports whereas Turkey stood at the fourteenth rank in Russia's total exports and lied at the seventeenth place in Russia's total imports.

The total trade volume between the two countries exceeded four billion dollars in 1997 by soaring threefold in five years. The complementary character of the respective economies conduced to a great extent to this economic boom. Turkey sold textile merchandise and consumer products to Russia and in return imported industrial goods and fossil fuels. As demonstrated exhaustively in Table 1 and Table 2 of Appendix B, Russia purchased woven clothes and accessories, leather products,

³⁶¹ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ve Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Gelir Üzerinden Alınan Vergilerde Çifte Vergilendirmeyi Önleme Anlaşması. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFile.aspx> [27 May 2008].

³⁶² Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ve Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Yatırımların Karşılıklı Teşviki ve Korunmasına İlişkin Anlaşma. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFile.aspx> [27 May 2008].

shoes and gaiters, sugar, electrical machines and devices, motorized vehicles, plastics, iron and steel products, ready-made drugs, and tobacco whereas Turkey imported fossil fuels, iron and steel, fertilizer, paper and cardboards, wood coal, synthetic fibres, plastics, aluminium, motorized vehicles and oily seeds, straw and animal feed.

Table 1: Turkey-Russia Foreign Trade (million \$)³⁶³

Years	Turkish Exports	Turkish Imports	Trade Balance	Trade Volume
1992	438.4	1040.4	-602	1478.8
1993	499.1	1542.4	-1043.3	2041.5
1994	820.1	1045.4	-225.3	1865.5
1995	1238.2	2082.4	-844.2	3320.6
1996	1511.6	1921.1	-409.5	3432.7
1997	2056.4	2174.3	-117.9	4230.7

Apart from the registered commerce between the two countries, there existed luggage trade which was an important item in Turkey's business with Russia. Russian citizens came to Turkey with big and empty suitcases, bought mostly textile, leather and household goods from small shops in Istanbul, Trabzon, Artvin and resold them back in Russia. For the period until 1996, it was difficult to reach reliable data as luggage trade was largely unrecorded. It is estimated to float between six to ten billion dollars annually.³⁶⁴ Starting from 1996, the Central Bank of Turkey

³⁶³ Source: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Available [online]: http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=624 [31 May 2008].

³⁶⁴ Sezer, p.109.

started to publish official statistics regarding suitcase trade³⁶⁵ and according to its data the luggage trade reached to 8.842 billion dollars in 1996 and stood at 5.849 billion dollars in 1997.³⁶⁶

Banking

The banking relations between Turkey and Russia began in 1989 when the Turkish Eximbank allocated three hundred million dollars of export credit to the Soviet Union.³⁶⁷ This was followed by a new credit line of five hundred million dollars in 1991. These credits had been granted to the Soviet government for the purchase of consumer goods and contracting services from Turkey. When the Russian Federation could not repay the loans, the two countries signed two major debt-restructuring agreements on 19 July 1994 and 15 December 1995.³⁶⁸ Russia completed the reimbursement of the 1989 loan but for the second loan, the two parties agreed that Russia would pay back the outstanding debt in semi-annual instalments, with the last payment scheduled to take place in 2011.

During the early and mid 1990s Turkish joint stock banks stepped into the Russian market following the Turkish entrepreneurs. Yapı Kredi and Ziraat Bank established their Moscow branches in 1993, Garanti Bank in 1996 and Finansbank in 1997. The customer base of these banks was mostly made up of small and medium

³⁶⁵ This happened as a result of the pressure IMF put on Central Bank of Turkey to include luggage trade estimates into its current account calculations. See Mine Eder, Andrei Yakovlev, Ali Çarkoğlu, “The Suitcase Trade between Turkey and Russia: Microeconomics and Institutional Structure”, *Working Paper*, Moscow State University Higher School of Economics, 2003, p.5.

³⁶⁶ Türkiye Merkez Bankası Ödemeler Dengesi İstatistikleri. Available [online]: < <http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/odemedenge/odemelerdengesi.xls>> [31 May 2008].

³⁶⁷ Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu (DEİK), *Türk-Rus İş Konseyi 7. Ortak Toplantısı* (İstanbul, Lebib Yalkın Yayınları ve Basım İşleri, 1999), p.86.

³⁶⁸ Kamer Kasım, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Towards the Russian Federation”. Available [online]: < <http://biibf.comu.edu.tr/kamerkasim.pdf>> [07 June 2008].

size enterprises (SMEs) of the Russian economy and prominent Turkish corporations active in the Russian market. These banks also rendered services to major Turkish tourism operators in Russia and were involved in international money transfers between Turkey and Russia by servicing small and medium-sized companies' fund transfers.³⁶⁹

Construction and Contracting Services

The locomotive industry between Turkish and Russian economies has always been the construction since the break up of the Soviet Union. Between 1993 and 1997, 208 Turkish construction companies completed 384 projects in Russian Federation which were amounted to 5.243 billion dollars.³⁷⁰ These contracting services also created business opportunities for both Russian and Turkish workers as these companies employed 161, 799 labourers³⁷¹ to serve in their construction sites dispersed in various locations of Russia.

The Unification Treaty of Former East and West Germany that was signed on 01 July 1990, between the Federal German Government and the Russian Federation stipulated the return of 100,000 Russian soldiers based in Former East Germany to their home country. The German government undertook the financing of the housing projects to be constructed for these soldiers and their families. This development constituted a milestone for the activities of Turkish construction firms on Russian

³⁶⁹ Garanti Bank Moscow, Background. Available [online]: < <http://www.gbm.ru/english/about/>> [07 June 2008].

³⁷⁰ TC Moskova Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği, Türkiye İş Kurumu Genel Müdürlüğü, Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı Dış İlişkiler ve Yurtdışı Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, cited in Oleg A. Kolobov, Aleksandr A. Kornilov, Fatih Özbay, *Çağdaş Türk-Rus İlişkileri: Sorunlar ve İşbirliği Alanları 1992-2005* (İstanbul: Tasam Yayınları, 2006), p.42.

³⁷¹ Ibid.

soil. Of fifteen thousand of total forty-six thousand housing units were built by Turkish companies such as Baytur, Enka, Gama, Mesa, Tekfen, Tekser, and Yapı Merkezi. The total value of these military housing projects equalled 2.5 billion Deutsches Mark.³⁷²

During the following years Turkish construction corporations were heavily engaged in construction, restoration and renovation of public buildings, shopping malls, business and trade centers, hotels, guest-houses and restaurants, residential buildings, industrial facilities, hospitals and rehabilitation centers, historical, architectural and exhibition complexes and schools and educational centers in various parts of the Russian Federation.³⁷³ At the initial phase, Turkish construction companies worked on assiduously and perseveringly to foster close relations with government authorities and municipalities. These efforts paid off in the long term and they obtained lucrative bids from state-controlled corporations and private firms by overrunning foreign competitors.

The Russian construction companies also entered into contracting activities in Turkey but their fields of activity were more limited and mostly concentrated on infrastructural works and construction and renovation of industrial facilities. The total value of the Russian construction projects between 1992 and 1997 in Turkey stood at one hundred million dollars.³⁷⁴ Russian Technopromexport Company participated to the building of Orhaneli Thermal Power Reactor. A Turkish-Russian consortium completed the electrification of Çerkezköy-Kapıkule Railway. A Russian

³⁷² Rusya Federasyonu Mütahhlik Hizmetleri Ülke Profili, T.C. Başbakanlık Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı Anlaşmalar Genel Müdürlüğü, Eylül 2006. Available [online]: < <http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmadmin/upload/ANL/YurtDisiMuteahhitDb/ulkeler/rusya-mut.raporu.pdf> > [01 June 2008].

³⁷³ Check Appendix C for the list of construction and contracting works carried out by Turkish firms in Russian Federation in this period.

³⁷⁴ Türk-Rus Hükümetlerarası Karma Ekonomik Komisyonu Üçüncü Dönem Toplantısı Protokolü. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFile.aspx > [01 June 2008].

company finished the construction of a bridge in November 1996 as part of the Ankara Ringway Project. Moreover, Russia also assisted Turkey in modernization of Seydişehir Aluminium Factory and procurement of materials and spare parts.³⁷⁵

Energy

The first natural gas agreement between Turkey and the Russian Federation was signed on 18 September 1984. The accord which would last for twenty-five years enjoined the Russian Federation to dispatch an annual six billion m³ natural gas to Turkey as of 1987.³⁷⁶ Ankara would pay the gas bill with cash, manufactured foods and contracting services. This agreement not only initiated a long-term energy cooperation relationship between the two countries but also redounded to the entry of Turkish construction companies to Russian market at a time when other foreign competitors were unprepared or unwilling to exploit the dormant potential there.

As will be seen from Table 2, Turkey's natural gas import from Russian Federation increased steadily throughout the years and Russia became the sole provider of natural gas for Turkey until 1994. In that year Turkey commenced to purchase gas from Algeria to diversify its suppliers and reduce dependence on Russia.³⁷⁷ Nevertheless the lion share of profits from Turkish gas market still went to the treasury of Russian state as the natural gas transportation from Algeria was limited.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ Gazexport-Rusya Federasyonu ile Doğal Gaz Alım-Satım Anlaşması (Batı). Available [online]: < <http://www.botas.gov.tr/faliyetler/antlasmalar/rusya.asp> > [03 June 2008].

³⁷⁷ The original natural gas agreement between Algeria and Turkey had been concluded on 14 April 1988. The accord would be for twenty years and Algerian government agreed to ship annually four billion m³ liquified natural gas (LNG) to Turkey. See Sonatrach-Cezayir Alım-Satım Anlaşması. Available [online]: < <http://www.botas.gov.tr/faliyetler/antlasmalar/cezayir.asp> > [04 June 2008].

Table 2: Natural Gas Transportation by Years (Million Contract Cum)³⁷⁸

Years	Russian Federation	Algeria (LNG)
1987	433	-
1988	1.136	-
1989	2.986	-
1990	3.246	-
1991	4.031	-
1992	4.430	-
1993	4.952	-
1994	4.957	418
1995	5.560	1.058
1996	5.524	2.436
1997	6.574	3.300

The Intergovernmental Agreement that was signed on 15 December 1997, during Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin's³⁷⁹ visit to Turkey constituted another landmark in energy cooperation between Moscow and Ankara. The project envisaged to transmit Russian natural gas to Turkey via a pipeline that would pass under the Black Sea. The Russian side agreed to supply Turkey sixteen billion m³ of natural gas on an annual basis.³⁸⁰ The accord would continue for twenty-five years

³⁷⁸ Source: BOTAŞ, Natural Gas Transportation, Facilities and Trade. Available [online]: < http://www.botas.gov.tr/eng/activities/ng_ttt.asp > [04 June 2008].

³⁷⁹ Before assuming the post of premiership Chernomyrdin worked as the chairman of Gazprom, Russian state natural gas monopoly and also the deputy prime minister in charge of fuel and energy.

³⁸⁰ Rusya Federasyonu ile Türkiye Arasında Rus Doğal Gazının Karadeniz Altından Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne Sevkiyatına İlişkin Anlaşma. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFile.aspx > [05 June 2008].

and first shipment of natural gas would be launched in 2002.³⁸¹ In the course of Chernomyrdin's visit the two countries also concluded an energy cooperation agreement which included the construction of power and hydroelectric plants, modernization of oil refineries and coal industry complexes, transportation of electrical energy and coal and exploration, drilling and administration of oil and natural gas.³⁸²

Tourism

Tourism became another burgeoning industry for Turkey and Russia. The two countries signed the Tourism Cooperation Agreement on 24 March 1995 which advised the encouragement of joint projects in the form of organization of tourism fairs and tours to the historical places and declaration of National Days between the two countries.³⁸³ In line with this agreement Turkish Ministry of Tourism set up a liaison office in Moscow in March 1995 and allotted a budget for promotion fund to introduce Turkey to Russian tourists.³⁸⁴

Throughout the years the number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey especially the Mediterranean sunspots such as Antalya, Dalaman, Fethiye and Kuşadası grew continuously. Russian tourists preferred Turkey for their vacations because the country was geographically close to Russia, service was cheap and of

³⁸¹ Gazexport-Rusya Federasyonu ile Doğal Gaz Alım-Satım Anlaşması (Karadeniz Geçişli). Available [online]: < <http://www.botas.gov.tr/faliyetler/antlasmalar/rusya.asp> > [05 June 2008].

³⁸² Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Enerji Alanında İşbirliği Anlaşması. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFFile.aspx > [05 June 2008].

³⁸³ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Turizm Alanında İşbirliği Anlaşması. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFFile.aspx > [07 June 2008].

³⁸⁴ Turan Aydın and Olgan Bekar, *Türkiye'nin Orta ve Uzun Vadeli Ekonomik Çıkarları Açısından Türk Rus İlişkileri* (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 1997), p.181.

high quality and most importantly they were able to obtain visa without encountering bureaucratic formalities. The number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey was 587,982 in 1995; it rose to 721,083 in 1996 and reached to 737,700 at the end of 1997.³⁸⁵ Russia was not at high ranks as a vacation resort for Turkish tourists but nevertheless there were some therapy tours to the country for the cure of ophthalmologic diseases.³⁸⁶

Transportation

Turkey and the Russian Federation formed a Joint Transportation Committee on 09 September 1993 in accordance with the protocol signed by the prime ministers of the two countries. The committee convened four times between the years 1992-1997 and concluded three protocols.³⁸⁷ The primary objective of the committee was to create solutions to bilateral transportation issues and to find areas of cooperation. During the meetings while the Turkish side complained about the length of bureaucratic procedures at Russian Bureau of Customs, the Russian party underlined the imbalance between Turkey and Russia in terms of land transportation.³⁸⁸

³⁸⁵ It is not possible to find data about the period 1992-1994 as Turkish state agencies did not distinguish between tourists coming from Russia and the CIS at that time. See Türkiye'yi Ziyaret Eden Rus Turistlerin Sayısındaki Gelişmeler, Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu ve T.C. Turizm Bakanlığı, cited in Oleg A. Kolobov, Aleksandr A. Kornilov, Fatih Özbay, *Çağdaş Türk-Rus İlişkileri: Sorunlar ve İşbirliği Alanları 1992-2005* (Istanbul: Tasam Yayınları, 2006), p.31.

³⁸⁶ Gülten Kazgan, "The Political Economy of Relations between Turkey and Russia", in *The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East?*, (ed.) Libby Rittenberg (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), p.152.

³⁸⁷ İkili Ekonomik ve Teknik İşbirliği Anlaşmaları. Available [online]: < <http://www.dpt.gov.tr/dei/index.html> > [07 June 2008].

³⁸⁸ Türk-Rus Hükümetlerarası Karma Ekonomik Komisyonu Üçüncü Dönem Toplantısı Protokolü. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFile.aspx > [07 June 2008].

Turkey overtopped Russia in the field of land transportation because Russian vehicles were mostly composed of aged trucks without refrigerating capacity.³⁸⁹ In order to alleviate the disparity the Russian side started to reduce the number of transit bills that were submitted to Turkish truck drivers and ushered in some extra legal processes to delay their entry to the country.

Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation

The idea of establishing a regional cooperation organization in the Black Sea region was initially put forward by Şükrü Elekdağ, former Turkish ambassador to Washington, D.C. The suggestion was enthusiastically embraced by the Turkish President Turgut Özal and the negotiations regarding the foundation of a Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone was commenced in Ankara in December 1990, with the participation of representatives from Bulgaria, Romania, the Soviet Union and Turkey.³⁹⁰ The downfall of the Soviet Union interrupted the project for a while. Nevertheless, as a result of Turkey's intense endeavour Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) came into being on 25 June 1992 with the involvement of Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine.³⁹¹ The aim of the organization was expressed as "to ensure that the Black Sea becomes a sea of peace, stability and

³⁸⁹ Binhan Oğuz, *Bölgesel Ekonomik Büyüme Ortaklığı ve İşbirliğine Bir Örnek: Türkiye-Rusya-Ukrayna* (İstanbul: Kırmızı Tanıtım Yayıncılık, Kasım 2003), p.197.

³⁹⁰ Serdar Sayan and Osman Zaim, "The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project", in *The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East?*, (ed.) Libby Rittenberg (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), p.117.

³⁹¹ About BSEC. Available [online]: < http://www.bsec-organization.org/main.aspx?ID=About_BSEC > [18 May 2008].

prosperity and to strive to promote friendly and good-neighbourly relations.”³⁹² Head of State/ Government of the member states signed the Charter of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation during the Yalta Summit on 05 June 1998 and with the ratification of the charter by the respective parliaments on 01 May 1999, existing intergovernmental mechanism transformed into a fully-fledged regional economic organization.

Serbia and Montenegro was granted membership status in April 2004³⁹³ and with Belgrade’s accession, the number of the participating states reached to twelve. Thirteen countries and four international organizations attend to BSEC meetings as observers.³⁹⁴ The BSEC obtained the status of observer in the UN General Assembly on 08 October 1999; it also retains observer status at Energy Charter Secretariat.³⁹⁵

The BSEC is highly institutionalized. The Permanent Secretariat is located in Istanbul. The organization possesses three related bodies³⁹⁶, two affiliated centers³⁹⁷ and eighteen working groups.³⁹⁸ The chairmanship rotates every six months

³⁹² Summit Declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Istanbul, 25 June 1992. Available [online]: < http://www.bsec-organization.org/documents.aspx?ID=Summit_Declarations&DID=26> [18 May 2008].

³⁹³ BSEC membership was inherited by Serbia after the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro was dissolved in May 2006.

³⁹⁴ These are Austria, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Tunisia, USA, Energy Charter Secretariat, Black Sea Commission, International Black Sea Club and European Union.

³⁹⁵ Relationship with Other Organizations. Available [online]: < http://www.bsec-organization.org/main.aspx?ID=Relationship_with_Other_Organizations> [19 May 2008].

³⁹⁶ Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC), BSEC Business Council and Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB).

³⁹⁷ International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) and BSEC Coordination Center for the Exchange of Statistical Data and Economic Information.

³⁹⁸ Working groups are on agriculture and agro industry, banking and finance, cooperation in combating crime, culture, cooperation in customs matters, cooperation in emergency assistance, education, energy, environmental protection, exchange of statistical data and economic information, healthcare and pharmaceuticals, information and communication technologies, institutional renewal and good governance in BSEC, science and technology, SMEs, tourism, trade and economic development and transport. See BSEC Working Groups. Available [online]: <<http://www.bsec-organization.org/Pages/Search.aspx?k=working%20groups>> [29 August 2011].

according to the English alphabetical order and The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is the principal regular decision making organ of the BSEC.

The BSEC has a heterogeneous composition. It covers a geography encompassing the territories of the Black Sea littoral states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine), the Balkans (Albania, Greece, Moldova, Serbia) and the South Caucasus (Armenia and Azerbaijan). It represents a region of some 350 million with a foreign trade capacity of over three hundred billion dollars annually.³⁹⁹ Furthermore, the region has large sources of oil and natural gas along with rich proven reserves of minerals and metals. Despite these advantages it is hard to say that throughout the years the BSEC has turned into an effective and prominent international organization. This was also acknowledged by the Russian President Vladimir Putin during his visit to Istanbul for the occasion of the Fifteenth Anniversary Summit of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Putin stated that:

“We believe that the BSEC in spite of its apparent success stories has not yet fully realized its potential to talk about adding new structures. And of course, when opening to partnership we have to insure that the consolidation with and attention for integration and making the most out of our geographical locations should be the most efficient”.⁴⁰⁰

It is possible to number four reasons why the BSEC could not live up to initial expectations and lagged behind most of its objectives. First of all, there was the problem of serious shortage of capital in the Black Sea region. At the first inception of the BSEC, all of the member countries except Greece and Turkey were grappling with the issue of transition to market economy and suffered from decline in national income coupled with high inflation and unemployment. In the following years, Turkey and Russia, the two countries that were expected to galvanize the

³⁹⁹ About BSEC. Available [online]: < http://www.bsec-organization.org/main.aspx?ID=About_BSEC > [19 May 2008].

⁴⁰⁰ “Russia Calls for Greater Black Sea Energy Stability”, *Russia Today*, 26 June 2007.

organization encountered two severe financial crises and they were not in a position to supply capital for the financing of the project, as they too were looking for outside financial assistance in order to recover their ailing economic situation.

Secondly, there exist significant bilateral political disputes between the member states. Armenia and Azerbaijan spar over Nagorno-Karabakh, Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and the delimitation of the Aegean Sea, Georgia and Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moldova and Russia over Transnistria region, Ukraine and Russia over Crimea and the Black Sea fleet and Albania and Serbia over Kosovo. Most of the time it becomes difficult to find a common denominator as the member states focus on their bilateral issues rather than the agenda of the organization during the meetings.

Thirdly the participating states' obligations regarding their membership to other international organizations, particularly to the EU and WTO impede full economic integration on a regional scale. Turkey had made attempts in this direction during the Bucharest and Sofia preparatory meetings but Ankara's proposals were rebuffed by the other parties.⁴⁰¹ Moreover, an article was added to the founding document of the BSEC which avowed that "economic cooperation would be developed between signatories in a manner not contravening their obligations and not preventing the promotion of their relations with third parties, including international organizations as well as the EC and the cooperation within the regional initiative."⁴⁰² This closed the door for the establishment of a free trade area or a preferential trade regime in the BSEC region.

⁴⁰¹ Mensur Akgün, "Turkey and Russia: Burdened by History and Myopia", *PrivateView* (Winter 1997), p.39.

⁴⁰² Article 7, Summit Declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Istanbul, 25 June 1992. Available [online]: < http://www.bsec-organization.org/documents.aspx?ID=Summit_Declarations&DID=26 > [19 May 2008].

Lastly, the BSEC experienced hurdles resulting from lack of coherent definition of aims, priorities and long-term issues and low efficiency in implementing adopted resolutions and decisions.⁴⁰³ In order to cope with these difficulties the BSEC brought forth a project-oriented vision that promoted cooperation through development programs and projects of common interest between BSEC states. This project based approach concentrates primarily on actions, programs and joint projects which can be accomplished in a predictable time frame and also accelerates the transition from the stage of feasibility studies to project implementation. A project development fund was also set up at the seventh Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Tirana on 25 October 2002, for the purpose of facilitating the elaboration and promotion of projects with high regional cooperation and development impact in the BSEC.⁴⁰⁴

In the last years the BSEC speeded up its efforts in the areas of communications, transport and trade and development. With the Memorandum of Understanding in the field of postal services, the agencies responsible for information technologies and telecommunications of the member states decided to develop cooperation in the areas of info-communication technologies.⁴⁰⁵

In the transportation area, emphasis was given to the development of the Black Sea Ring Highway and the Motorways of the Sea infrastructure projects as they will constitute regional contributions to the extension of Trans-European

⁴⁰³ The BSEC, at its early foundation, also suffered from the deprivation of a serious, powerful and effective secretariat. Excessive bureaucratic procedures and redtape on the part of the Turkish side further impeded the well-functioning of the organization. Ambassador Murat Sungar, First Deputy Secretary General of the BSEC, interview by author, BSEC, Istanbul, Turkey, 20 November 2008.

⁴⁰⁴ "Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs", Tirana, 25 October 2002. Available [online]: < <http://www.bsec-organization.org/admin/Tirana%2025%20October%202002.pdf> > [19 May 2008].

⁴⁰⁵ Memorandum of Understanding on Multilateral Cooperation in the Field of Postal Service. Available [online]: < <http://www.bsec-organization.org/admin/Annex%20II%20-%20MoU%20PostalService.pdf> > [19 May 2008].

networks and the development of Euro-Asian transport links. The Black Sea Ring Highway project envisages a four lane ring highway system, approximately 7,100 km long, to connect the BSEC member states with each other.⁴⁰⁶ The project on development of the Motorways of the Sea in the BSEC region aims to strengthen the maritime links among the ports of the participating countries as well as the enhancement of maritime security and safety in the BSEC region.⁴⁰⁷ These two assignments will help BSEC to gain visibility and attention in the eyes of the citizens of the BSEC countries as they will make a concrete difference in the lives of the people of the region by boosting trade and tourism. Moreover, they will also contribute to people-to-people diplomacy by bringing citizens of the BSEC region closer.

In the field of trade and development, member states concentrated on trade facilitation in the forms of elimination of non-tariff barriers and business/investment disincentives, simplification of visa procedures for businessmen and professional drivers and further interaction between the business communities of the BSEC countries.⁴⁰⁸ Recently, the Turkish party has also put forth the idea of hosting a trade center in the city of Bursa. The objective behind this proposal was to eventually establish similar trade and commerce centers in all BSEC states and set up sectoral

⁴⁰⁶ Areas of Cooperation, Transport, Information. Available [online]: < <http://www.bsec-organization.org/aoc/Transport/Pages/Information.aspx> > [19 May 2008].

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ The BSEC Agreements on Simplification of Visa Procedures for the Businesspeople and for the Professional Lorry Drivers Nationals of the BSEC member states opened for signature in October 2008. Up to now Albania, Armenia, Moldova and Turkey have put their signatures on the accord. However, the Russian Federation declared that it would not sign the agreement on the grounds that the proposed pact was not in harmony with its internal regulations. See “Press Release on the Results of the 19th Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation”. Available [online]: < <http://www.bsec-organization.org/bsecnews/PressReleases/PressReleases/Press%20Release-Conclusions%20of%20Tirana%20CMFA-English.pdf> > [29 November 2008].

networks among them in order to develop trade relations with the countries of the Black Sea region.

It can be said that Turkey and Russia, with their geographical location, historical experience and growing economic power are the motor forces that can drive the BSEC further towards success. However, they should strive more for concrete joint projects and programs and motivate the other member states more wholeheartedly especially at a time when rival regional organizations such as Community of Democratic Choice and Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership came into existence with US interest and support.

The early post Cold War years witnessed the establishment and institutionalization of economic ties between Turkey and Russia both at the state and business level through the foundation of Joint Economic Commission and Turkish-Russian Business Council. Agreements that would encourage mutual investments and facilitate the activities of business people in each country came after shortly.

The complementary character of the Turkish and Russian economies, meaning that Turkey's buying off industrial goods from Russia in return for its export of consumer goods to this country made Turkey and Russia well-matched economic partners in this immediate post-Cold War period. Russia's natural gas and mineral deliveries to Turkey in increasing proportions helped it to secure a special place among Turkey's major trade partners whereas Turkey managed to step into the large Russian market from which it had been for long years cut off with its construction companies, textile firms and tourism agencies.

The promising economic collaboration between the two states did not suffice to the demonstration of determined leadership and united synergy on the part of Turkey and Russia to provide for a more effective and efficient functioning of the

BSEC. Weak economies of the member states in addition to the territorial disputes between themselves and their obligations to other organizations were serious obstacles which could not be parried easily.

Military relations had been the weakest link between the Soviet Union and Turkey during the Cold War years owing to the fact that the former being the leader of a security bloc, Warsaw Pact, which had been set up to counteract the activities of NATO, the rival defense organization of which the latter had been one of the leading members. However, with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, it became also necessary to re-think and re-define the military aspect of the relationship. In this regard, the final part of the second chapter of the study will deal with this period during which military ties between Turkey and the Russian Federation were rekindled after a long interval and Turkey decided to purchase armaments from Moscow to use them in its fight against PKK.

Foundation of Military Relations

The military relations between Russia and Turkey kicked off with the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding by the Ministries of Defense of the two countries on 11 May 1993. This was followed by the Agreement on Turkey's Purchases of Military Equipment from the Russian Federation that was concluded on 31 October 1993. With the latter accord Turkey purchased nineteen general purpose Mi-17V (Hip H) helicopters, seventy BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers and other weapons worth a total of 114 million dollars.⁴⁰⁹ The deliveries were made with payment of 100 percent in hard currency in the year of delivery, as well as in exchange for

⁴⁰⁹ Sergei Kandaurov, "Russian Arms Exports to Greece, Cyprus and Turkey", Moscow Defense Brief. Available [online]: < <http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2002/at/raegct/> > [08 June 2008].

Russian debt on loans extended to Vnesheconombank of Russia by Turkey's Eximbank.

This arms contract with Russian Federation was significant for Turkey due to two reasons. First it became the first NATO country that obtained arms and military equipment from Russia. Second, the deal came at a time when Turkey's so-called Western allies refused to sell military hardware to Turkey on the grounds of violation of the human rights by Turkish Armed Forces in their struggle against PKK.

The Turkish Minister of National Defense Mehmet Gölhan and the Russian Minister of Defense General Pavel Grachev concluded the Agreement on Cooperation in Military Technical Matters and in the Field of Defense Industry on 20 April 1994 which aimed to extend collaboration in the sectors of development, production and supply of defense goods and services between the two countries through joint programmes, projects and exchange of technical information.⁴¹⁰ The accord also envisaged the establishment of a joint committee for the implementation of the clauses of the agreement.

The early years of the post-Cold War epoch became a period, during which Turkey and the Russian Federation built up the basic pillars of their relations in political, economic and military spheres through signing of agreements and memorandum of understandings in political matters, trade and economic cooperation, military collaboration and the establishment of commissions, committees, working groups and business councils to carry out the tasks mentioned in these documents.

Economic cooperation started to gain ground, chiefly in the fields of energy, banking, consumer goods, retail, construction and tourism thanks to the efforts of Russian suitcase traders coming to Turkey and the Turkish businessmen investing in

⁴¹⁰ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Askeri Teknik Konular ve Savunma Sanayi Alanında İşbirliği Yapılmasına Dair Anlaşma. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFFile.aspx > [08 June 2008].

Russian economy. Suitcase trade in this period most of the time exceeded the legal trade between the two countries in terms of value. However, Turkish governments turned a blind eye to this irregular activity as it was significant source of foreign currency and generated employment in other sectors such as accommodation, transportation and travel services. For Russia suitcase trade was equally important as approximately thirty million Russian nationals were involved in the process and this economic activity not only improved the ailing financial situation of individual Russian citizens but also provided them with consumer goods they had been deprived of for a long time.

This period also witnessed the emergence and gaining prominence of Turkish business interest groups such as Turkish-Russian Business Council, Laleli Industrialists and Businessmen Association (LASİAD), Merter Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MESİAD) and Russian-Turkish Businessmen Association (RTİD) whose members were composed of people doing business in Russia or with Russian citizens. These organizations entered into contact with government officials occasionally, conveyed their demands, suggestions as well as grievances regarding Turkish-Russian economic interaction to the Turkish authorities and commenced to act as important lobbying mechanisms for development of better political relations between Turkey and Russia. These increasing contacts at the business level as well as growing bilateral trade forced Turkey and Russia to prepare the legal framework for the further development of the economic relations between the two countries. Agreements signed in 1997 regarding customs matters, prevention of double taxation and promotion of reciprocal investments could be taken in this sense.

The flourishing of economic bonds were however, still not powerful enough to overcome the serious political and economic competition and confrontation

between the two countries especially in the South Caucasus which came into light clearly with Turkey and Russia's backing up of opposite parties in Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetian conflicts along with their urge to host competing pipeline projects for the transportation of the Caspian oil to world markets.

Such an intense rivalry in the South Caucasus accompanied by the presence of other severe bilateral problems with respect to the passage of Russian ships through Turkish Straits and Russia's decision to supply Greek Cypriots with S-300 missiles which would equip them with the capacity to carry out attacks onto the southern territories of Turkey coupled with reciprocal accusations directed against each other by the other party with regard to Chechen and Kurdish separatist currents in addition to different views about flank limitations in CFE treaty made it difficult for the two countries to adopt a common outlook not to mention common policies and projects to position BSEC as a efficient, successful and result-oriented regional cooperation organization.

CHAPTER III

COMPROMISE AND RAPPROCHEMENT

The scathing and vitriolic nature of Turkish-Russian relations gave way to an equanimous and conciliatory atmosphere in the last part of the 1990s and early 2000s. The political instability accompanied by profound economic crises and the following social turmoil stove off the unrelenting competition between the two governments as they were immersed in ameliorating the egregious internal situation in their respective countries. It would be a facile optimism to impart that Russia and Turkey straightened out all the kinks in their convoluted relationship in this period but it could at least be stated that both of the parties came to terms with their feeblenesses and vulnerabilities and adopted a more realistic and resilient approach in their dealings with each other.

Turkey accepted that Russia had the upper hand in Central Asia due to its close bonds with the political elite therein and the economic and military dependence of Central Asian states on Moscow. Russia conceded Turkey's existence in the South Caucasian equation and Ankara's expanding permeation to Azerbaijan and Georgia in political, economic and military dimensions. Ankara and Moscow found common grounds in their objection to NATO's eastern enlargement albeit for different reasons. They both supported the USA's fight against international terrorism; Russia by opening Russian air space to relief missions, intelligence sharing, arming anti-Taliban forces inside Afghanistan and most importantly acquiescing the American use of military airports and bases in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan;

Turkey, on the other hand, participated to the NATO's ISAF operation in Afghanistan which aimed to help the establishment of a transitional administration in the country after toppling of the Taliban regime.

Cooperation in the economic realm continued to be the brightest spot in the interaction despite the disruptive August 1998 and February 2001 financial crises. Big Turkish companies commenced to enter into the Russian market in this period and they realized important investments in FMCG, retail and industrial sectors. These firms, along with powerful construction companies that had started their operations in Russia in the early 1990s, emerged as significant business interest groups that worked for closer Turkish-Russian collaboration in the economic area. The lobbying activities of some of these construction conglomerates were also influential in the realization of the Blue Stream gas pipeline project which became the major mortar that glued the future of the two countries.

Another interesting development occurred in the military area. Military cooperation agreements followed the high-level contacts and the adversaries of the Cold War era commenced to carry out joint operations in the Black Sea within the structure of Black Sea Force.

The main focus of this chapter will be to look into these major events that led the way to the compromise and rapprochement in the Turkish-Russian interaction. In this context, special attention will be paid to the developments in the South Caucasus and Central Asia as Russia and Turkey were at odds with each other regarding their policies in these regions at the most part of the 1990s. NATO expansion in Eastern Europe and the Kosovo imbroglio are other global topics that will be covered in this section as they one way or other involved both of the countries and affected the course of their relationship. Finally, increasing contacts between Turkey and Russia

at political, economic and military levels will also be scrutinized and analyzed in depth in this chapter.

A New Phase in the Political Interaction: The Declaration of Action Plan for Eurasia

Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit went to Moscow on 04 November 1999 for a three-day official visit upon the invitation of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. The two parties released the Joint Declaration on the Fight against Terrorism and an Agreement on Abolition of Visas for Diplomatic Passport Owners on 05 November 1999. Protocols on Joint Economic Commission, Cooperation in the Veterinary Field, Cooperation between Turkish Directorate General of Press and Information and Russian Itar-Tass Agency were also concluded.⁴¹¹ Moreover, the two prime ministers also put their signatures on a document which promised close cooperation in the area of energy.⁴¹² During the visit Bülent Ecevit underlined that “Today Europe united with Asia, the world was encountering the epoch of Eurasia” and stated that “Turkey and Russia held the key to this process by being the major players in the region”.⁴¹³

Ecevit’s visit was reciprocated by the Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov’s visit to Turkey on 23-25 October 2000. Kasyanov came to Ankara with a large delegate of Russian ministers and met with many high-level Turkish representatives including President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, President of the Turkish Grand National Assembly Ömer İzgi, Minister of National Defense Sabahattin Çakmakoglu, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources

⁴¹¹ *Ayin Tarihi*, 05 November 1999.

⁴¹² Turkey’s Political Relations with Russian Federation. Available [online]: <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/common/print.htm>> [16 June 2008].

⁴¹³ *Ayin Tarihi*, 04 November 1999.

Cumhur Ersümer and the Minister of State Rüştü Kazım Yücelen.⁴¹⁴ During the visit, a series of agreements were issued on removal of quotas to diplomatic and consular personnel on respective embassies, cooperation in transportation field, formation of a joint cooperation committee in defense industry and cooperation in intelligence sharing.⁴¹⁵ The two sides also signed a Joint Economic Commission Agreement which intended to improve bilateral economic relations, increase trade volume and deepen cooperation in the field of energy. Kasyanov's declaration that "cooperation, not confrontation, was the centerpiece of Russian policy toward Turkey"⁴¹⁶ was the harbinger of entering into a more harmonious and constructive phase of relationship between the two countries.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov paid an official visit to Turkey on 07-08 June 2001 and was received separately by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem. The Turkish and Russian side signed protocols in the areas of education, culture and science and Ivanov avowed that the extensive field of common interests in different regions, the unprecedentedly high level of trade and economic cooperation and contacts between people dictated the taking of the relation to a qualitatively new level which he defined as genuine partnership.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁴ *Ayın Tarihi*, 23 October 2000.

⁴¹⁵ Aktürk, p.357.

⁴¹⁶ Russian History Encyclopedia: Relations with Turkey. Available [online]: < <http://www.answers.com/topic/relations-with-turkey> > [16 June 2008].

⁴¹⁷ "Transcript of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov's Remarks at Joint Press Conference on Results of Talks with Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem, Ankara, June 8, 2001", Rusya Federasyonu'nun Türkiye Büyükelçiliği. Available [online]: <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/9.html> > [17 June 2008] and "Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov at Meeting with Representatives of Turkey's Business Circles, Istanbul, June 8, 2001", Rusya Federasyonu'nun Türkiye Büyükelçiliği. Available [online]: <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/29.html> > [17 June 2008].

These reciprocal high-level visits, fruitful dialogue and growing political interaction between the two capitals culminated in the signing of Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey: From Bilateral Cooperation towards Multi-dimensional Partnership by Ivanov and Cem at the fifty-sixth session of the UN General Assembly in New York on 16 November 2001.

The document underlined the fact that Russia and Turkey were determined to carry their existing good political and economic relations to the level of an enhanced constructive partnership in Eurasia. Russia and Turkey, two countries which bore the characteristics of both Asia and Europe could contribute to bring about peaceful and lasting political solutions to the disputes in the region, reinforce stability and create conditions for sustainable development in the Eurasian area. The areas of consultation and cooperation covered various political, economic and security aspects ranging from settling the discords in the Balkans, South Caucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Cyprus, Middle East, in particular Iraq, and Black Sea region, discussing Mediterranean issues, cooperation initiatives in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, cooperation in international organizations regarding Eurasian matters, counteracting and fighting against international terrorism and cooperating in the fields of energy, trade, transportation, tourism and environment.⁴¹⁸

The two countries decided to establish Joint Working Group which would be made up of the representatives of the ministries of foreign affairs and where prospects for improvement of relations on a bilateral basis and in the Eurasian

⁴¹⁸ “Rusya Federasyonu ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Arasında Avrasya’da İşbirliği Eylem Planı: İkili İşbirliğinden Çok Boyutlu Ortaklığa”, Rusya Federasyonu’nun Türkiye Büyükelçiliği. Available [online]: <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/relat_2_t.html> [17 June 2008].

platform as well as regional and international issues would be taken up.⁴¹⁹ The meetings of the group would take place on a rotational basis in Ankara and Moscow. This mechanism, while increasing the number of direct contacts between the officials of Russia and Turkey, would also facilitate the implementation of concrete measures in various areas of relations.

The first gathering of the Turkish-Russian Joint Working Group was held in Moscow on 09 April 2002 under the chairmanship of Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Razov and Turkish Deputy Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Ali Tuygan.⁴²⁰ The two sides decided to establish a subgroup for the South Caucasus, focus on economic dimension of cooperation in Eurasia and continue with the regular bilateral consultations regarding cooperation in struggle with international terrorism. The second meeting took place in Ankara on 17-18 December 2002 along with the first convention of the South Caucasus Subgroup.⁴²¹

New Millennium, New Leader, and New Russian Doctrines of National Security, Military and Foreign Policy

On 31 December 1999, while most of the Russians were celebrating the upcoming new century like the rest of the world, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced that he was resigning from his post and handed over the powers of President to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. After stating that his was a decision that was taken after

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

⁴²⁰ “16 Kasım 2001 Tarihinde Türkiye ve Rusya Federasyonu Dışişleri Bakanları Tarafından İmzalanan Avrasya'da İşbirliği Eylem Planı Uyarınca Kurulmuş Olan Yüksek Düzeyli Ortak Çalışma Grubu'nun İlk Toplantısının 9 Nisan 2002 Tarihinde Moskova'da Yapılması Hakkında”, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı Basın Açıklamaları, No.49, 09 Nisan 2002. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_49---9-nisan-2002_-16-kasim-2001-tarihinde-turkiye-ve-rusya-federasyonu-disisleri-bakanlari-terafindan-imzalanan-avrasya_da-isbirligi-eylem-planı-uyarinca_-kurulmus-olan-yuksek-duzeyli-ortak-calisma-grubu_nun-ilk-toplantisinin-9-nisan-2002-tarihin.tr.mfa > [12 July 2008].

⁴²¹ Hasan Kanbolat, “Avrasya İşbirliği Eylem Planı: Türkiye İle Rusya Federasyonu Arasında Yeni Bir Dönem mi?”, *Stratejik Analiz* (Nisan 2003), p.51.

long and painful pondering, Yeltsin explicated that Russia should enter the new millennium with new politicians, new faces, new people who were intelligent, strong, energetic and in addition who would do more and better than the ones that had been in power for many years.⁴²²

The 26 March 2000 presidential elections made the Acting President Vladimir Putin the new leader of Russia.⁴²³ The new host of Kremlin had joined the ranks of KGB in 1975 right after his graduation from Leningrad State University with a degree in law. His secret service career lasted until 20 August 1991 when he resigned from the establishment at the rank of lieutenant colonel.⁴²⁴ Putin spent last years (1985-1990) of his service in KGB in Eastern Germany where he wandered through Bonn, Dresden, Leipzig and Erfurt and occasionally visited Vienna.⁴²⁵ The time he spent in Germany and Austria earned him mastery in German language which he spoke near to native impeccability.

In 1991 Putin became Chairman of the St. Petersburg City Council's International Committee and starting with 1994 he took on the responsibility of First Deputy Mayor of St. Petersburg, thus becoming the right arm of the liberal mayor of the city Anatoly Sobchak.⁴²⁶ He parted ways with Sobchak after the latter's defeat at the gubernatorial election of July 1996. Pavel Borodin, the Head of the Presidential Property Management Directorate appointed Putin as his deputy in August 1996 and this assignment led him to step into Kremlin. The things started to go from good to

⁴²² Presidential Speeches, Statement by Boris Yeltsin, 31 December 1999. Available [online]: <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/1999/12/31/0003_122617.shtml> [20 July 2008].

⁴²³ Vladimir Putin became the President of the Russian Federation on 07 May 2000.

⁴²⁴ Richard Sakwa, *Putin: Russia's Choice* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004), p.10.

⁴²⁵ Wolfgang Seiffert, *Putin: Politika* (Istanbul: Gendaş, 2004), p.36.

⁴²⁶ Presidents of Russia, Biographies, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. Available [online]: <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/presidents_eng.shtml> [20 July 2008].

better in the following years for the new Muscovite as he climbed the ladders of bureaucracy with vertiginous pace and vigour.

In March 1997 Putin became Deputy Head of the Executive Office of the President and Head of the Central Supervision and Inspections Directorate.⁴²⁷ One year later, he was promoted to the First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration in charge of relations with the regions. In July 1998, Putin was appointed Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the organization that took place of KGB in the post-Soviet period. In March 1999, besides his FSB role, he also assumed the responsibility of Secretary of the Security Council.⁴²⁸ Five months later, in August 1999, Yeltsin elevated Putin to the prime ministry of the Russian Federation.

Most of the allegations and rumours designated the inner circle in the presidential administration, namely the Family, as the brainchild behind the handpicking up of Putin as the successor of Yeltsin. The family was composed of Tatyana Dyachenko, Yeltsin's younger daughter and his advisor, Valentin Yumashev, Kremlin Administration Head and long-time boy friend and future husband of Tatyana Dyachenko, the Chief of Staff Alexander Voloshin and the oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich. These people have appropriated big chunks of state property and assets at trifling costs during the transitional period and were worried about possible charges and investigations that might be directed against them when Yeltsin stepped down from presidency. Putin's resolute character, his administrative skills and the fealty he demonstrated to his

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

former superior convinced the Yeltsin entourage that they could rely on this man.⁴²⁹ So it was not a coincidence that Putin's first execution after undertaking the duty of Acting President was to promulgate a degree which provided Yeltsin and his aides' legal immunity.⁴³⁰

Putin inherited a country that was facing economic and social hardships. As he also avouched in his New Year Speech on 29 December 1999, per capita GDP dropped to approximately 3,500 dollars after the August 1998 financial crisis, labour productivity in real economy was extremely low, foreign direct investment was consistently falling, wage arrears were common and the shadow economy constituted forty percent of whole Russian economy.⁴³¹ In addition to domestic difficulties Russia had been outshined by the Western alliance after NATO's eastern expansion and it's bombing of Yugoslavia by sidelining the UN.

One of the first actions of the new President was the revision and reformulation of national security and foreign policy concepts and the military doctrine that dated from the Yeltsin era. The following section will examine these documents and trace to what extent Putin's domestic and foreign policies conformed and took shape to the principles and guidelines that were specified in those papers.

The Russian National Security Concept of 10 January 2000, similar to its predecessor started with the depiction of Russia as a state with great economic,

⁴²⁹ Putin's former boss, the ex mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak was accused of irregularities in distribution of city-owned apartments. On 07 November 1997, he flew to Paris on a private plane without passport control on the Russian side. In June 1999, Sobchak returned to Russia after the prosecutors dropped charges against him. There were serious assertions that Putin by using his position in the presidential administration made the escape of Sobchak to Paris possible and he also exerted pressure on legal authorities to extract the investigation against him. See: Biography: Anatoly Alexandrovich Sobchak. Available [online]: < <http://www.answers.com/topic/anatoly-sobchak> > [20 July 2008].

⁴³⁰ Lilia Shevtsova, *Putin's Russia* (Washington: DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), p.69.

⁴³¹ Vladimir Putin, "Russia at the Turn of the Millennium, 29 December 1999", in Richard Sakwa, *Putin: Russia's Choice* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004), p. 252.

scientific, technological and military potential, therewithal situated at unique strategic location on the Eurasian continent. It was again accentuated that Russia would facilitate the formation of an ideology of establishing a multipolar world.⁴³² But this time it was also asseverated that there existed attempts to ignore Russia's interest when solving major issues of international relations including conflicting situations.

Another novelty of the new version was the emphasis on economic interests. It was purported that future well-being and stability of Russian society could only be assured on the basis of sustainable economic development which would speed up by broader attachment and integration of Russian economy to the globalized world economies, expansion of markets for Russian products and creation of a single economic domain with the members of the CIS. Adverse economic conditions in the country would not only lead to the waning of Russian influence on international stage but would also trigger separatist aspirations and tendencies in the constituent parts of the Russian Federation.⁴³³ Furthermore, the emergence of a narrow circle of rich people versus the masses below the poverty threshold and growing unemployment were counted as other serious threats that might jeopardize the country's social steadiness.

In line with the above mentioned provisions of the National Security Concept, one of the first deeds of the new President was to make legal swipes against the wealthy tycoons of the Russian business world who had acquired their fortune

⁴³² National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, 10 January 2000. Available [online]: <<http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/36aba64ac09f737fc32575d9002bbf31?OpenDocument>> [21 July 2008].

⁴³³ Ibid.

through knocking down of the crown jewels of the Russian industry at the early privatization years.

Vladimir Gusinsky, founder of the Media Most Holding,⁴³⁴ was arrested on 13 June 2000 and spent three days in prison owing to embezzling the funds he borrowed from Gazprom.⁴³⁵ On 11 July 2000, tax evasion charges were lodged against the President of Lukoil⁴³⁶, Vagit Alekperov.⁴³⁷ Parallel allegations were also wedged against Boris Berezovsky, the owner of Autovaz, Russia's main automobile manufacturer.⁴³⁸ Moscow city prosecutor charged that the acquisition of Noril's Nickel, a Siberian mining company by Interros Holding⁴³⁹ was illegal and sought the return of government's thirty-eight percent stake. A similar complaint was filed against Tyumen Oil Company in late June.⁴⁴⁰ On 15 July 2000, the Russian Parliament's Audit Chamber accused Anatoly Chubais, Chairman of the electricity

⁴³⁴ Media Most Holding was comprised of Most Bank, NTV television channel, TNT cable network, radio station Ekho Moskvy, daily newspaper Segodnya, weekly political journal Itogi and two television guide magazines Semdnei and Karavan Istoriy. See Nick Holdsworth, "Vladimir Gusinsky Is Rich, Ambitious and Media Savvy but Is He Really the Russian Rupert", *The Hollywood Reporter*, (02 December 1997), p.2.

⁴³⁵ Ekaterina Zapodinskaya, "Vladimir Gusinsky Condemns His Homeland", *Kommersant*, 20 May 2004.

⁴³⁶ Lukoil was the leading petroleum company in Russia. The firm also had extensive interests in newspapers and local television.

⁴³⁷ Paul Starobin and Catherine Belton, "Boris Berezovsky: Tycoon under Siege", *Business Week*, 24 July 2000.

⁴³⁸ Boris Berezovsky at that time was deemed as the most powerful businessman in Russia. He helped Yeltsin to win 1996 elections and ensured a secure place in Kremlin. He took the ownership of Sibneft Oil Company and Aereflot, the state airline corporation. Berezovsky gained a foothold in media when he became the main shareholder of the country's primary TV channel ORT. His media assets also included TV 6 along with the newspapers Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Novye Izvestiya, Kommersant and the magazine Vlast. See Erin E. Arvedlund, "The World; Money, if Not Power", *The New York Times*, 09 November 2003.

⁴³⁹ Interros Holding was a Russian conglomerate that mainly operated in metals and mining sectors but also had investments in areas of energy, finance, retail and real estate. The main owners were Vladimir Potanin and Mikhail Prokhorov. Potanin was also a major shareholder in the national daily Izvestia.

⁴⁴⁰ Michael Wines, "Russian Puzzle: What Does War on Tycoons Mean?", *The New York Times*, 15 July 2000.

monopoly RAO-UES, of illegally selling a stake to foreigners when company was opening to public in 1992.⁴⁴¹

The main drive of the President, while plotting this crackdown on moguls, was to curb the influence of these oligarchs in Russian state and also forestall their political aspirations. Those who chose to accommodate with Putin went on with their businesses untouched by the governmental agencies while the others like Gusinsky and Berezovsky were hounded out of the country.⁴⁴² Nevertheless, this oligarch operation exalted the credibility and popularity of Putin in the eyes of the Russian people who most of the time blamed these tycoons as the main reasons of their financial privation and social degradation in post-Soviet years.

Strengthening Russian statehood and improving federal relationships were articulated as other salient tasks in the document to uphold the national security of the country. Unwavering compliance with Russian Federation legislation both by the state bodies and federal units was set as a precondition for the creation of harmonious relations between the centre and the regions.

Putin took steps to consolidate and centralize the state authority right after he took office. On 13 May 2000 he issued a decree that envisaged the formation of seven federal administrative districts over Russia's eighty-nine regions which would be headed by presidential representatives.⁴⁴³ These officials would examine the local laws and take action to bring them in line with the Constitution. The Duma adopted a

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴⁴² Gusinsky moved abroad in the summer of 2001. NTV and his other belongings were acquired by Gazprom. See "Gazprom Buys Exiled Tycoon's Media Stakes", *United Press International*, 12 July 2002. Berezovsky went to exile to London in November 2000 after handing over his shares in ORT to the government. See "Moscow's Most Wanted Man-Billionaire Boris", *The Observer*, 27 April 2003.

⁴⁴³ These districts were classified as Central, Northwestern, Southern, Volga, Urals, Siberian and Far Eastern. It was striking that this new assortment corresponded completely to the regional command structure of the Russian Ministry of Interior Affairs troops. Most of the presidential envoys came from the security apparatus such as army, FSB and MVD (Interior Ministry). See Nikolai Petrov and Darrell Slider, "Putin and the Regions", in *Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*, (ed.) Dale R. Herspring (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), pp. 82-88.

bill on 19 July 2000 which gave the president the right to dismiss governors who violated federal laws on more than one occasion and replace them with temporary leaders.⁴⁴⁴ Furthermore, regional leaders would no longer preside in the upper chamber of Federation Council or exempt from legal prosecution.⁴⁴⁵

The Military Doctrine of 2000 that was declared on 21 April 2000 started with the evaluation that “the threat of direct military aggression in traditional forms against the Russian Federation has declined thanks to the positive changes in the international situation, the implementation of a peaceful foreign policy course by the country, and the maintenance of Russia’s nuclear deterrent potential.”⁴⁴⁶ Still, it was made known that the attempts to weaken and ignore the existing mechanisms for safeguarding international security namely the UN and the OSCE, the utilization of military-force actions as a means of humanitarian intervention without the sanction of the UN Security Council, and the violation by certain states of international treaties and agreements in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament were counted as actions which had a destabilizing impact on the international military-political state of affairs. These statements affirmed the Russian resentment toward NATO-led Kosovo campaign against Yugoslavia and the United States’ possible withdrawal from Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Akin to 1993 Doctrine, priority attached to reinforcement of the collective security system within the CIS framework was reiterated. The document enunciated the discharge of a joint defense policy with Belarus, which would take place in the

⁴⁴⁴ Sakwa, p.149.

⁴⁴⁵ Dmitry Gorenburg and H. H. Gaffney, “Great Promise Unfulfilled: How Russia Lost its Way After Independence”, *Insight Turkey* 8, no.1 (January-March 2006), p.130.

⁴⁴⁶ The Russian Federation Military Doctrine. Available [online]: <
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_05/dc3ma00.asp?print
> [26 July 2008].

form of coordination of activities in the sphere of military organizational development, the development of the armed forces of the Union State's member states, and the utilization of military infrastructure.⁴⁴⁷

In the area of nuclear arsenal, different from the 1997 concept, the new doctrine proclaimed that the Russian state reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction and also in response to a large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons.

Another development in the 2000 Doctrine was the harbinger of a comprehensive military reform which would safeguard the military security of the country and would ease its adaptation to radical changes in the international environment. In line with this policy, on 15 January 2001, President Putin approved a plan which aimed to improve the military's conventional capabilities. The plan envisaged personnel reductions in the army and navy, creation of powerful battle-ready troops to be based in the strategic locations such as Southwest and Central Asia, amelioration of the infrastructure of military facilities and the rise in payrolls of the soldiers.⁴⁴⁸

The new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, which was publicized on 28 June 2000, revealed once more again the growing Russian annoyance about current international order that was dominated by the USA in political and economic dimensions. The Concept repeated Russia's determination to

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁸ Dale R. Herspring, "Putin and Military Reform", in *Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*, (ed.) Dale R. Herspring (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), p.179 and Shevtsova, p.131.

achieve a multi-polar system of international relations that would take into account mutual interests and therefore really reflect the diversity of the modern world.⁴⁴⁹

The paper gave clues regarding future international economic policy of the Russian state and how it would attempt to use energy dependency of certain states to exert influence on their political decisions. It stated that Russia must be prepared to utilize all its available economic levers and resources for upholding its national interests.⁴⁵⁰

Improving bilateral and multilateral bonds with the CIS states was announced as the major concern of the Russian Federation. Like its predecessor the Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 avowed that the Russian Federation would protect the rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad and would seek to obtain adequate guarantees for the rights and freedoms of these people in states where they permanently resided.⁴⁵¹ Particular emphasis was made on the development of economic cooperation, between Russia and CIS, including the creation of a free trade zone and implementation of programs of joint rational use of natural resources.

Relations with the European states were defined as Russia's traditional foreign policy priority. It was pointed out that Russian Federation viewed the EU as one of its main political and economic partners and would strive to develop with it an intensive, stable and long-term cooperation.

The concept acknowledged that there existed serious and fundamental differences between the USA and Russia in a number of cases but attested that Russian Federation would do its best to overcome these difficulties to sustain the

⁴⁴⁹ The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 26 June 2000. Available [online]: < <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm>

> [27 July 2008].

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

basis of Russian-American cooperation, which had come into being after a long and arduous endeavour on part of the both parties.

In conformity with the principles of the Foreign Policy Concept, Russia took steps under Putin presidency to promote its security and economic interests in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Moscow exerted intense pressure, well-nigh intimidation on Baku and Tbilisi to cut off their ties with the Chechen militants and became main supplier of natural gas and electricity in these countries. Armenia continued to be the most loyal ally of Russia in the former Soviet region and conceded to the seizure of its strategic assets by the Russian state conglomerates in exchange for getting under Moscow's security umbrella against Azerbaijan and Turkey.

In Central Asia, Russia pursued a trilateral policy. First of all, Russian government, by utilizing the policy window opened by the incursion of Islamic extremists into southern Kyrgyzstan in August 1999, tried to mobilize the local leaders against the Islamic terrorism and fundamentalism through consolidation of the multilateral regional cooperation in security realm. Secondly, Russia wrestled to persuade Central Asian countries to cooperate with Russian oil and gas companies in production, exploration and sale of natural resources in their lands, to choose Russian territory and pipelines to transport their oil and natural gas to Western markets and to allow the establishment of new joint industrial plants in their countries. Finally, although the multilateral integration was the priority of Russian state in the region, taking into account that this might take a while, Russia, under Putin's leadership galvanized its efforts toward beefing up bilateral ties with the Central Asian states.

In the following section of the study, I will trace the details of this new Russian activism in Transcaucasia and Central Asia which while sustaining the

security dimension, exploited successfully the economic means to consolidate Moscow's position in its near abroad.

New Russian Policy in the South Caucasus and Central Asia: The Use of both
Economic and Military Instruments

Russia and the States of the South Caucasus: A New-Fangled Policy of Dominance

Russia pursued a two-fold policy in Transcaucasia during Putin's first term which embodied both security and financial facets. The primary impetus of Moscow was to arrest any kind of political, economic and moral support to Chechen militants from the capitals of Baku and Tbilisi. In order to ensure this Moscow employed a diverse set of tools that included military bullying, introduction of a visa control regime, backing up secessionist entities in some of the South Caucasian states and cutting off natural gas supplies in the middle of winter. On the other hand, Russia also toiled to sustain its position as being the chief provider of energy supplies to these South Caucasian Republics; a cardinal leverage, which it made use of, to appropriate valuable assets of some of these countries.

Georgia appeared as the least cooperative Transcaucasus state in Russia's struggle against Chechen insurrection. Tbilisi harboured thousands of Chechen refugees at the beginning of the second Russo-Chechen war and settled them in the Pankisi Gorge where Georgian citizens of Chechen origin called Kists resided. Furthermore, when the Russian President Boris Yeltsin asked his Georgian interlocutor Eduard Shevardnadze to use military bases in Georgia to zap attacks

against Chechen insurgents, Shevardnadze rejected this request.⁴⁵² The Georgian government allowed the functioning of a Chechen Representation Office and Information Center in Tbilisi and a Chechen Information Bureau had begun publication of the newspaper *Chechenskaya Pravda*⁴⁵³ with the assistance of the Association of the Georgian Free Press.

These pro-Chechen attitude of the Georgian administration infuriated Russia and Moscow continuously accused Tbilisi of not doing enough to bolster security along the Georgian-Russian frontier. The Russian authorities claimed that Pankisi Gorge had become a safe haven for the Chechen militants who not only launched strikes against Russian military forces in Chechnya but also terrorized the local population by systematic kidnappings for ransom, heroin-trafficking and weapon smuggling.

The Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov and his Georgian counterpart Nugzar Sadjaya met in June 2000 and signed a security agreement to straighten out the disagreements between the two countries. With the accord, the two sides pledged cooperation in the struggle against terrorism, organized crime, arms and drug trafficking.⁴⁵⁴ However, the accord did not lead to a major breakthrough in bilateral relations and Sergey Yastrzhembsky, the aide of President Putin, announced in November 2000 that as of 05 December, Russia would impose a visa control

⁴⁵² Zeyno Baran, "The Caucasus: Ten Years after Independence", *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no.1 (Winter 2002), p.224 and Revaz Gachechiladze, "Geopolitics in the South Caucasus: Local and External Players", *Geopolitics* 7, no. 1 (Summer 2002), p. 131.

⁴⁵³ Justin Burke, "Chechens Begin Publishing Newspaper in Georgia", *RFE/RL*, 28 January 2000 and Jonathan Hooper, "Russia Demands Closure of Chechen Representation in Georgia", *RFE/RL*, 06 March 2000.

⁴⁵⁴ Justin Burke, "Georgia, Russia Sign Security Agreement", *RFE/RL*, 16 June 2000.

regime on the border between Russia and Georgia as the Tbilisi government could not avert the infiltration of Chechen militants into Russian territory.⁴⁵⁵

Russia kept reproaching Georgia on account of Tbilisi's accommodating policies towards the Chechens in Pankisi Gorge and from time to time entered into acts that would further blight the already frail relationship. Planes coming from Russian airspace bombed the Valley in November 2001.⁴⁵⁶ Despite Russian Security Council Secretary Vladimir Rushailo and his Georgian colleague Nugzar Sadjaya's January 2002 agreement on launching a joint operation to neutralize criminals and Islamic extremists in the Pankisi Gorge⁴⁵⁷, Russia in the summer of 2002, declared that it would send troops to the region unless Georgia took preventive measures against Chechen fighters. A Georgian military force of one thousand soldiers were deployed to the area in late August after four military aircraft presumed to be Russian bombed the Pankisi Gorge and killed a woman and a child.⁴⁵⁸ This Georgian move did not quiet down the simmering dispute as in September 2002; Putin argued that in line with the self-defense principle of the UN Charter, Russia retained the right to attack Georgia if the latter failed to secure the Russian-Georgian border. After this ultimatum, the two sides called for a truce and Georgia accepted to arrest some Chechen militants and extradited some to Russia.⁴⁵⁹

⁴⁵⁵ "Putin's Aide Accuses Georgia of Leniency Towards Chechen Rebels", *ITAR-TASS*, 29 November 2000 and Pavel K. Baev, "Russia's Policies in the Southern Caucasus and the Caspian Area", *European Security* 10, no. 2 (Summer 2001), p. 101. The breakaway regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, were exempted from the new visa regime.

⁴⁵⁶ Jaba Devdariani, "A Planned Strong Complaint from Georgia Becomes a Show of Russian Power", *Eurasia Insight*, 03 December 2001 and Khatuna Giorgadze, "Russia: Regional Partner or Aggressor?", *The Review of International Affairs* 2, no. 1 (Autumn 2002), p. 74.

⁴⁵⁷ Daniel Sershen, "Georgia, Russia Agree to Launch Joint Operation in Pankisi", *RFE/RL*, 31 January 2002.

⁴⁵⁸ Abe Rein, "Russia Denies Bombing Pankisi, While Georgia Claims Two Killed", *RFE/RL*, 23 August 2002 and Esra Hatipoğlu, "After Empire: Georgia-Russia Relations and the Prospects for Stability in the South Caucasus", *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies* (April 2004), p.184.

⁴⁵⁹ Hatipoğlu, p.185 and Kenneth Yalowitz and Svante E. Cornell, "The Critical but Perilous Caucasus", *ORBIS* 48, no. 1 (Winter 2004), p. 112.

Arrival of American military instructors to Georgia at the end of February 2002 in order to train nearly two thousand Georgian special forces within the framework of Train and Equip program became another point of concern for Russia. Although the Georgian officials underlined that US advisors were training Georgian soldiers outside Tbilisi and had played no role in the Pankisi Gorge operations⁴⁶⁰, this was hardly a relief for the Russian government who was watching anxiously the increasing American sway in its claimed zone of influence.

The Russian military bases on Georgian soil were other causes of friction between the two countries. Russian leader Yeltsin and Shevardnadze had signed a joint statement at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999 which affirmed that Russia would close down the Gudauta and Vaziani bases by 01 July 2001 while the shut-down date of Batumi and Akhalkalaki military facilities would be decided in future negotiations.⁴⁶¹ Although the Vaziani military base was liquidated, only weaponry and military machinery restricted by the CFE Treaty were removed from the Gudauta base.⁴⁶² Moreover, the Russian side continued to drag its feet regarding the fate of remaining bases.

Azerbaijan was another Transcaucasian country that was sympathetic to the Chechen cause. Small groups of Chechens had fought at the ranks of Azerbaijani army in the course of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and this had strengthened the bond between the Chechen and Azerbaijani people. Some one hundred Chechens, injured

⁴⁶⁰ Vitaly Naumkin, "Russian Policy in the South Caucasus", *The Quarterly Journal* no.3 (September 2002), p.34, Mark Berniker, "Georgia Faces Harsh Questions As American Training Begins", *Eurasia Insight*, 28 May 2002 and "Pankisi Gorge in Crossfire", *The Washington Times*, 05 October 2002.

⁴⁶¹ Giorgi Kandelaki, "Georgia, Russia Wrestle Over Bases, Visa Regime", *Eurasia Insight*, 30 November 2000 and Hatipoğlu, p.176.

⁴⁶² "Resolution of the Parliament of Georgia on the Military Bases of the Russian Federation Located on the Territory of Georgia", 10 March 2005. Available [online]: <
<http://www.georgiaemb.org/DisplayMedia.asp?id=379>

> [12 Aug 2008].

in Russian artillery sallies during the Second Russian-Chechen War, were treated in hospitals in Azerbaijan under the terms of a 1997 agreement between the Azerbaijani and Chechen health authorities.⁴⁶³ In July 2000, prominent Chechen leader Shamil Basayev made a public appearance on a private television station in Baku.⁴⁶⁴ Azerbaijan also hosted an independent school attended by the children of Chechen refugees who were denied access to the state-run school system due to the lack of proper refugee documentation, and a cultural center that served as a de facto representative office of the separatist leadership under Aslan Maskhadov.

The bombing of Kımır village by a Russian combat plane⁴⁶⁵, the participation of Russian troops in military manoeuvres with Armenian forces along Armenia's border with Azerbaijan, and the consideration of Russian government to impose visa restrictions on Azerbaijani citizens like the Georgians changed the wind in favour of Russia. Azerbaijan prosecuted several suspected Chechen rebels and the others were extradited to Russia. Moscow and Baku signed agreements on preventing terrorism and deepening cooperation in hindering the smuggling of arms and narcotics across their shared border during Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Rushail's visit to Azerbaijan on 03-04 February 2002.⁴⁶⁶ Moreover, in October 2002, the Azerbaijani authorities sealed off the Chechen school and the cultural center, thus, deprived Chechens of significant education and propaganda tools.⁴⁶⁷

The status of Gabala Radar Station, another thorny matter between Azerbaijan and Russia, was sorted out on 24 January 2002 during Azerbaijani

⁴⁶³ "Chechens Receiving Medical Treatment in Azerbaijan", *Interfax*, 06 January 2000.

⁴⁶⁴ Hikmet Hadjy-zadeh, "The Chechen War Echoes in Azerbaijan", *Eurasia Insight*, 24 August 2000.

⁴⁶⁵ Okan Yeşilot, "Azerbaycan'daki Çeçen Mülteciler ve Rusya ile İlişkilere Yansımaları", in *Değişen Dünya Düzeninde Kafkasya*, (ed.) Okan Yeşilot (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2005), p.197.

⁴⁶⁶ "Russia, Azerbaijan Condemn Terrorism, Separatism", *Turan News Agency*, 07 February 2002.

⁴⁶⁷ Daan van der Schriek, "Moscow Hostage Crisis Encourages Close Russian-Azerbaijani Relations", *Eurasia Insight*, 30 October 2002.

President Heydar Aliyev's official visit to Moscow.⁴⁶⁸ The radar facility was substantial for Russia as it had the capacity to detect missile launches as far as from the Indian Ocean. In addition, the radar's surveillance covers the entire Middle East, thus, gave the Russian Space Forces the opportunity to trace the military activities of the regional states. The agreement acknowledged that the Gabala Radar Station was the property of Azerbaijan and granted Russia a ten-year lease of the facility.⁴⁶⁹

In September 2002, Azerbaijan and Russia made a salient stride for resolution of the Caspian Sea issue. The two states agreed on an accord towards the delineation of the boundary between their nations' sections of the Caspian Sea.⁴⁷⁰ In October 2003, with the partaking of Kazakhstan, a trilateral agreement was signed between the three countries dividing the northern sixty-four percent of the Caspian Sea into three unequal parts according to a median line principle, allocating Kazakhstan twenty-seven percent, Russia nineteen percent and Azerbaijan eighteen percent.⁴⁷¹

The incessant scuffling with Georgia plus Azerbaijan's offish demeanour solidified the indispensability of Armenia in the eyes of the Russian policy makers. Russia continued to arm Armenia with heavy weapons. In December 1998, a MiG-29 squadron was deployed in Armenia and Russia commenced to send S-300 Zenith air defense systems to Gyumri military base as of February 1999.⁴⁷² Seventy-six

⁴⁶⁸ Sinan Oğan, "Gabala Radar İstasyonu: Biri Bizi Gözetliyor", *Türksam*, 01 June 2007. Available [online]: < <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazdir1286.html> > [16 Aug 2008].

⁴⁶⁹ "President Vladimir Putin and President Heydar Aliyev Signed an Agreement on the Status and Principles and Terms of Using the Daryal-type Radar in Gabala", President of Russia, News, The Kremlin, Moscow, 25 January 2002. Available [online]: < <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/news/2002/01/146984.shtml> > [16 August 2008].

⁴⁷⁰ "Russia, Azerbaijan Signs Caspian Sea Deal", *The Russia Journal*, 23 September 2002.

⁴⁷¹ Jeronim Perovic, "From Disengagement to Active Economic Competition: Russia's Return to the South Caucasus and Central Asia", *Demokratizatsiya* (Winter 2005), p.7.

⁴⁷² Mustafa Aydın, "Kafkasya ve Orta Asya'yla İlişkiler", in *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, (ed.) Baskın Oran, Volume II, 8. Edition (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), pp. 412-413.

armoured vehicles from the Russian base in Akhalkalaki, southern Georgia were also transferred to the Gyumri facility in November 2000.⁴⁷³

In April 2001 Armenia and Russia agreed to create a joint military contingent.⁴⁷⁴ On 14 September, at the time of Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov's visit to Armenia, he and his counterpart Serzh Sargsyan put signatures on two intergovernmental documents. The first agreement was about sending Russian military advisors and specialists to Armenia on a business trip and the other document regulated exchange of lands and assured favourable conditions for Russians serving at the Russian bases in Armenia.⁴⁷⁵ Furthermore, with the second agreement, the 102nd Russian military base in Armenia was given new territories.

On 3 October 2001, in the course of Russian Chief of General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin's visit to Yerevan, a protocol was signed concerning the furnishing of the 102nd military base with Russian anti-aircraft systems and execution of joint air defense exercises.⁴⁷⁶ The two countries entered into two other military cooperation agreements on the joint usage of military infrastructure and information exchanges during Armenian Defense Minister Serzh Sargsyan's visit to Russia in October 2002.⁴⁷⁷ In May 2002, Armenia along with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan agreed to set up Collective Security Organization⁴⁷⁸ which meant that

⁴⁷³ Abraham Rein, "Russia Rejects Criticism of Transfer of Armoured Vehicles from Georgia to Armenia", *RFE/RL*, 06 November 2000.

⁴⁷⁴ Abraham Rein, "Armenia, Russia Agree to Create Joint Military Contingent", *RFE/RL*, 17 April 2001.

⁴⁷⁵ "Armenian, Russian Defense Ministers Signed Two Intergovernmental Agreements", *Caspian News Agency*, 14 September 2001.

⁴⁷⁶ "Armenian, Russian Defense Ministries Sign Cooperation Protocols", *Noyan Tapan News Agency*, 03 November 2001 and Nazmi Gül and Gökçen Ekici, "Stratejik Ortaklar Arasında Bir Sorun mu Var? Putin'in Ermenistan Ziyareti ve Moskova-Erivan İlişkileri", *Stratejik Analiz* 2, no. 19 (November 2001), p. 36.

⁴⁷⁷ Alena Kim, "Armenia, Russia Reaffirm Commitment to Military Cooperation", *RFE/RL*, 02 October 2002.

the bilateral military relationship between the two countries acquired also a multilateral security aspect.

In the economic area, Armenia had to cede some of its strategic assets to Russia in return for writing off of its lingering debts after encountering cut-offs in gas supplies. In September 2002 Armenia's largest cement factory was handed over to the Russian natural gas company Itera in payment for the country's 10 million dollars debt for past gas deliveries.⁴⁷⁹ On 04 December 2002, the Armenian Parliament ratified the Assets-For-Debt Deal that was signed on 17 July 2002. According to the agreement, nearly 100 million dollars of the outstanding Armenian debt to Russia would be eliminated by relinquishing control of five state-run Armenian enterprises to Russia. These corporations included the Hrazdan thermal power plant that produced about forty percent of power in Armenia, the Mars Electronics Company which manufactured signalling devices and the three research institutes that used to work for the Soviet military-industrial complex.⁴⁸⁰

Russia's dominance in Armenia's energy market persisted. Rosenergoatom, Russian nuclear power stations operator, was the sole supplier of fuel for Armenia's nuclear power station Medzamor.⁴⁸¹ Gazprom together with Itera controlled fifty-

⁴⁷⁸ Fraser Cameron and Jarek M. Domanski, "Russian Foreign Policy with Special Reference to its Western Neighbours", *EPC Issue Paper*, no. 37 (13 July 2005), p.14.

⁴⁷⁹ Emil Danielyan, "Russia Tightens Grip on Armenia with Debt Agreements", *Eurasianet*, 07 May 2003.

⁴⁸⁰ Haroutiun Khachatrian, "Yerevan Moscow Debt Pact Extends Russia's Caucasus Influence", *Eurasianet*, 30 July 2002, Ayk Gevorkyan, "Towards the Lesson of History", *Aykakan Zhamanak*, 07 December 2002, Aleksandr Chepurin, "On Yerevan's Foreign Policy", *International Affairs (Moscow)* 50, no.2 (April 2004), p. 117 and Andrei P. Tsygankov, "If Not by Tanks, then by Banks? The Role of Soft Power in Putin's Foreign Policy", *Euro-Asia Studies* 58, no. 7 (November 2006), p. 1091.

⁴⁸¹ Emil Danielyan, "Energy Disputes May Mar Russian-Armenian Partnership", *Eurasianet*, 25 April 2000.

five percent of stakes in Armenian Amrosgaz firm. Gazprom also possessed the controlling package of shares in Hayrusgasard gas distribution system in Armenia.⁴⁸²

Georgia, similar to Armenia, was indebted to Itera and the Russian company suspended gas supplies to Georgia many times including the winter season. In October 2001, Itera became owner of Sakgazi Georgian gas distribution company by buying fifty percent shares of the firm that were represented by Channel International Company.⁴⁸³ Itera and the Georgian government signed a protocol on 16 August 2002, under which Itera obtained the majority of shares of Tbilgazi Company that distributed gas in Tbilisi and Azoti chemical factory in Rustavi town.⁴⁸⁴

Compared to other two South Caucasus states, Azerbaijan was less dependent on Russian energy supplies thanks to its oil and natural gas reserves. Even so in 2000, because of severe weather conditions and shortages of electricity in Baku and the other regions of the country, the Azerbaijani government decided to buy natural gas from Itera for electrical power generation and residential heating.⁴⁸⁵ In January 2001, at the time of Putin's visit to Baku, Lukoil signed a deal with SOCAR to develop the Hovsani-Six onshore field. The oil would be refined in Baku into gasoline for sale at Lukoil's chain of petrol stations in Azerbaijan.⁴⁸⁶ In 2002, after Aliyev's visit to Moscow, it was arranged that Russia would increase the amount of

⁴⁸² Ayk Gevorkyan, "Armenia's Energy System Handed Over to Russia", *Aykakan Zhamanak*, 06 November 2002.

⁴⁸³ "ITERA Became Owner of Sakgazi Georgian Gas Distributing Company", *Caspian News Agency*, 04 October 2001.

⁴⁸⁴ Revaz Bakhtadze, "Russian Energy Giant Takes Over Georgian Gas Distribution System: One More Tool of Pressure Goes into Russia's Hands", *Civil Georgia*, 16 August 2002.

⁴⁸⁵ Faris Ismailzade, "Russia's Energy Gambit: It Won't Work in Azerbaijan", *CACI Analyst*, 25 January 2006.

⁴⁸⁶ Justin Burke, "Lukoil to Extract, Refine and Sell Azerbaijani Oil", *RFE/RL*, 10 January 2001.

electricity it sold to Azerbaijan through Inter RAO UAS up to three billion kilowatt in the forthcoming years.⁴⁸⁷

With Vladimir Putin's undertaking of the post of presidency in 2000, inducing the economic interests of the Russian state along with the objective of sustaining the military presence came into prominence in Russian foreign policy-making with respect to the South Caucasus. The secessionist movement in Chechnya was accepted as the major internal threat for the Russian Federation as it had the potential to trigger a chain reaction within the country which could ultimately lead to its dismemberment. The problem of Chechnya also became decisive in Russia's dealings with Georgia and Azerbaijan as Moscow exerted intense pressure on Baku and Tbilisi to cut off their ties with the Chechen militants. Armenia, on the other hand, continued to be the most loyal ally of Russia in the region and conceded to the seizure of its strategic assets by Russian state conglomerates in exchange for inclusion under Moscow's security umbrella against Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Russia and the Central Asian States: Endeavour for Strengthened Partnership

In Central Asia Russia carried on with its policy of steaming up the multilateral security and economic cooperation between the states of the region under its leadership and initiation. However, as being aware of the unattainability of this objective at least in the short run, Moscow channelled its energy towards vivification of bilateral ties with Central Asian Republics in political, economic and security fields.

⁴⁸⁷ Shirinov, p.85.

Car bombings targeted government buildings in Uzbekistan in February 1999, the declaration of *jihad* (holy war) by Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) against Kerimov regime and the kidnappings perpetrated by the members of the same group in the Batken region of southern Kyrgyzstan in August of the same year helped Russia to come on the scene with the resolve to fight against Islamic radicalism and rally the Central Asian leaders around this common cause.

At the meeting of the Council of CIS Heads of State on 25 January 2000, the Council members decided to draft an international target programme for combating all manifestations of terrorism, in part by establishing a joint counter-terrorist centre.⁴⁸⁸ At the next CIS Summit that took place in June 2000, an action plan for combating terrorism and extremism until 2003 was prepared and the decision to establish a CIS Anti-Terrorist Centre and appoint its head was finalized.⁴⁸⁹ A military cooperation agreement was signed on 11 October 2000, in the course of a CSTO meeting in Bishkek which brought forth the foundation of joint military contingents for Central Asia to counter military aggression and hold joint counter-terrorist operations or command and troop exercises.⁴⁹⁰ A rapid deployment force for Central Asia came into existence at the CSTO summit of May 2001 in Yerevan. The troops would consist of 1,500 men provided by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the coordination staff would be sited in Bishkek.⁴⁹¹

⁴⁸⁸ The Kremlin Hosted a Meeting of the Council of CIS Heads of State, 25 January 2000. Available [online]: < <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/events/chronicle/2000/01/122923.shtml> > [31 August 2008].

⁴⁸⁹ The Kremlin Hosted a Meeting of the Council of CIS Heads of State, 21 June 2000. Available [online]: < <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/events/chronicle/2000/06/132154.shtml> > [31 August 2008].

⁴⁹⁰ A Meeting of the Collective Security Council of the Signatories to the Collective Security Took Place in Bishkek, 11 October 2000. Available [online]: < <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/events/chronicle/2000/10/136477.shtml> > [31 August 2008].

⁴⁹¹ Lena Jonson, *Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy* (London, United Kingdom: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p.69.

The SCO, a regional grouping which was composed of Russia and four of five Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan along with China signed the Shanghai convention on fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism on 15 June 2001.⁴⁹² On 7 June 2002, in the course of the second meeting of the Heads of SCO in St. Petersburg, the participating parties agreed on the establishment of a regional anti-terrorist structure.⁴⁹³

In the economic realm, the Presidents of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan came together in Astana on 10 October 2000, and approved the broad outlines of a five-year program for restructuring their respective economies, promoting macro economic stabilization, improving the investment climate, and ensuring adequate food supplies for their populations.⁴⁹⁴ In this new organization, which was called Eurasian Economic Community, the decisions would be reached by a two-thirds majority vote. Russia would have forty percent of the vote, Kazakhstan and Belarus obtained a share of twenty percent and the remaining twenty percent would be divided equally between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

President Putin paid special attention to the consolidation of political and economic ties with the Central Asian states and in this context first foreign visit of Putin as Head of the Russian state was made to Uzbekistan between 18 and 19 May 2000. During the visit Russia and Uzbekistan reached an agreement on the dispatch to Russia of five billion cubic meters of gas.⁴⁹⁵ On 23 July 2001, Lukoil President Vagit Alekperov, Itera Chief Igor Makarov, Uzbek Deputy Prime Minister Valery

⁴⁹² Chronicle of Main Events of Shanghai Five and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Available [online]: < <http://www.sectSCO.org/html/00030.html> > [01 September 2008].

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ Justin Burke, "CIS Customs Union States Create New Eurasian Economic Union", *RFE/RL*, 11 October 2000.

⁴⁹⁵ "Putin Visits Uzbekistan", *ITAR-TASS*, 19 May 2000.

Atayev and Uzbekneftegaz First Deputy Chairman Asror Abidov put their signatures on a document in Moscow that endorsed guidelines for developing oil and gas fields in Uzbekistan. The blueprint determined the principles and provisions of a future agreement to cultivate oil and gas fields in the Bukhara-Khiva and Gissar regions of Uzbek Republic and also for carrying out geological exploration in the country.⁴⁹⁶ Lastly, following a meeting between the Uzbek President Islam Kerimov and Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller in Tashkent, Uzbekneftegaz signed a deal to supply natural gas to Russia from 2003 until the year 2012.⁴⁹⁷ The text also envisaged cooperation on gas transportation systems and the joint development of Uzbekistan's Shahpahty gas condensate field.

The military cooperation constituted the weakest link between Moscow and Tashkent despite Putin's efforts on the contrary direction. Uzbekistan failed to renew its participation to CIS Collective Security Treaty when it expired in April 1999. Although Putin had concluded a military cooperation agreement with Uzbekistan in December 1999 that anticipated cooperation between the defense ministries and armed forces of the two countries on security issues, the joint development and production of military equipment and armaments, and the training of military staff⁴⁹⁸ he could not convince Kerimov to revise his decision regarding CSTO Treaty. Nevertheless, the bilateral aspect of the military collaboration lasted and Uzbek Defense Minister Yurii Akmazov and his Russian interlocutor Igor Sergeev hammered out another bilateral military assistance accord in June 2000 which allowed Uzbekistan to use Russian weapon testing facilities.⁴⁹⁹

⁴⁹⁶ Justin Burke, "Three Companies Strike Deal On Oil, Gas in Uzbekistan", *Interfax*, 23 July 2001.

⁴⁹⁷ Abe Rein, "Uzbekistan Signs 10-Year Gas Contract with Russia", *RFE/RL*, 18 December 2002.

⁴⁹⁸ *ITAR-TASS*, 11 December 1999.

⁴⁹⁹ Justin Burke, "Uzbekistan, Russia Sign New Military Cooperation Agreements", *RFE/RL*, 27 June 2000.

Putin paid a one-day visit to Turkmenistan on 19 May 2000 right after his visit to Tashkent. Russia and Turkmenistan signed a joint statement to fight against international terrorism, religious and political extremism, drug and weapons trafficking in a coordinated fashion. Putin and Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov also laid down the principles for trade and economic cooperation for the period 2000-2005.⁵⁰⁰ During the visit an agreement was reached regarding transportation of Turkmen natural gas to Russian territory. Putin announced that Turkmenistan would annually increase gas supplies to Russia by ten billion cubic meters a year for the subsequent years until it reached 50-60 million cubic meters.⁵⁰¹

Niyazov and Itera Chairman Igor Makarov agreed on another natural gas contract on 11 December 2001, under which Itera would purchase ten billion cubic meters of Turkmen natural gas in 2002. The two sides also entered into a three-way agreement with Russian Oil Company Zarubezhneft Head Nikolai Tokarev, under which Itera and Zarubezhneft took on the joint development of onshore and offshore Turkmen hydrocarbon deposits.⁵⁰² In October 2002, Gazprom and Turkmenneftegaz settled a long-term contract on gas sales and transport.⁵⁰³

Tajikistan, the only Central Asian state that welcomed the deployment of Russian soldiers on its soil continued to stay in Russian orbit throughout Putin's presidency. During Tajik President Imomali Rahmonov's visit to Moscow, it was

⁵⁰⁰ Vladimir Putin Arrived in Turkmenistan, 19 May 2000. Available [online]: <
<http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/events/chronicle/2000/05/128988.shtml>> [02 September 2008].

⁵⁰¹ President Vladimir Putin and Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov Gave a Joint News Conference, 19 May 2000. Available [online]: <
<http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/events/chronicle/2000/05/128988.shtml>> [02 September 2008].

⁵⁰² Daniel Sershen, "Turkmenistan Signs Gas, Oil Agreements with Russia", *ITAR-TASS*, 12 December 2001.

⁵⁰³ Isabel Gorst, "Focus: Russia Gas Alliance", *Platts Oilgram News* 80, no. 205 (24 October 2002).

decided that a Russian military base would be established in Tajikistan on the basis of the 201st division of the Russian Interior Ministry.⁵⁰⁴

Dushanbe and Moscow commenced to cooperate in the field of hydro energy. The two countries reached an agreement in April 2002 on the building of the Sangtuda hydroelectric power station, as well as considering Russia's participation in finishing the construction of the Roghun hydroelectric power plant, building the Dasht-i Jum hydroelectric power plant and commissioning the Dushanbe and Yovon thermoelectric power stations.⁵⁰⁵

Kyrgyzstan was another Central Asian country that perpetuated a special relationship with Russia. During Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev's visit to Moscow in July 2000 the two states signed an Eternal Friendship Treaty, a ten-year economic cooperation program, an arrangement on restructuring of Kyrgyzstan's debt and a joint venture accord with the participation of Kazakhstan to exploit the Zarechnoye uranium deposit in Western Kazakhstan.⁵⁰⁶

Military cooperation became an indispensable ingredient of the Russian-Kyrgyz rapport as the Kyrgyz state felt itself more vulnerable after the terrorist attacks in Batken region. More than one hundred Kyrgyz servicemen were sent to institutions of higher education of the Russian Defense Ministry in 2000 and Moscow gave Bishkek free charge of a set of protection devices worth 700,000 dollars to upgrade the republic's state borders.⁵⁰⁷ A special group from Russia's Federal Border Service in Kyrgyzstan opened the first training courses for border

⁵⁰⁴ "Russian Military Base To Be Established in Tajikistan", *Interfax*, 23 April 2001.

⁵⁰⁵ "Russia, Tajikistan Mull Joint Economic Projects", *ITAR-TASS*, 08 April 2002.

⁵⁰⁶ Justin Burke, "Kyrgyz, Russian Presidents Sign Eternal Friendship Declaration", *RFE/RL*, 31 July 2000 and Justin Burke, "Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia to Form Uranium-Mining Joint Venture", *RFE/RL*, 01 August 2000.

⁵⁰⁷ Justin Burke, "Russian Attache to Kyrgyzstan Upbeat on Russian-Kyrgyz Military Cooperation", *RFE/RL*, 13 March 2001.

guards in February 2001 and Russia provided Kyrgyzstan with equipment and spare parts worth 129, 775 dollars to modernize its air defense system.⁵⁰⁸

A memorandum on cooperation between the Interior Ministries of Russia and Kyrgyzstan on combating terrorism, extremism and illegal trafficking was signed in Bishkek in November 2002 during the meeting of Russian Minister of Interior Boris Gryzlov and Kyrgyz Interior Minister Bakurdin Subanbekov. One month later in December, Russia reopened a military airbase in Kant, near Bishkek which dated from Soviet time. Russia took over the responsibility of financing the base and maintained operational control there.⁵⁰⁹

In the economic area, the two countries signed another debt restructuring deal in the course of Putin's visit to Kyrgyzstan in December 2002 which rescheduled the Kyrgyz debt to Moscow over twenty years and decided the conversion of one-fifth of the overall debt into Russian investments in environmental protection projects, as well as in the Kant airfield for use by the Russian military.⁵¹⁰ Russia showed interest in water sources of Kyrgyzstan and the Russian company Technopromexport built a new turbo generator at the Chui Valley of Kyrgyzstan in October 2000.⁵¹¹ Additionally in October 2002, an agreement was signed with the Russian Unified Energy Systems (UES) Corporation to upgrade five major hydroelectric power stations in Kyrgyzstan over the next ten years.⁵¹²

The already pleasant Kazakh-Russian relations were revved up with Putin's rise to power in Kremlin. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev made an official

⁵⁰⁸ Giorgi Kandelaki, "Russia Upgrades Kyrgyz Air Defense System", *RFE/RL*, 11 July 2002.

⁵⁰⁹ Jonson, p.96.

⁵¹⁰ *BBC Inside Central Asia* 455, 02-08 December 2002.

⁵¹¹ President Vladimir Putin and President Askar Akayev Took Part in a Ceremony to Launch a New Hydro-Turbine at the Bishkek Heating and Electricity Station, 11 October 2000. Available [online]: <<http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/events/chronicle/2000/10/136477.shtml>> [04 September 2008].

⁵¹² *Worldwide Monitoring*, 23 October 2002.

visit to Moscow on 18-20 July 2000 and met with President Putin. During the visit a Joint Declaration and a Memorandum on Further Cooperation to Ensure the Operation of the Baikonur Complex was signed which settled Russia's rent arrears to Kazakh state for the tenancy of the cosmodrome.⁵¹³ Several other agreements such as cooperation in defense and military technology, information and communications, and formation of national sections within the Inter-State Commission for military economic cooperation of the CIS also came into being in the course of the visit.⁵¹⁴

The military cooperation continued within the CSTO domain. In the bilateral sphere, FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev and Kazakh National Security Committee Chairman Nartai Dutbaev signed a protocol in Almaty on 26 June 2002, on providing each other information to facilitate search for wanted or suspected criminals or terrorists.⁵¹⁵

Economic interests sustained their significance in bilateral affairs. In September 1999 Putin had visited Kazakhstan as Prime Minister and the two states negotiated a program for mutual cooperation extending to 2007 and creating five enterprises in metallurgy, three in machine construction, eight transnational oil and coal companies and more than one hundred joint ventures.⁵¹⁶ In January 2000, Kazakh Premier Qasymzhomart Toqaev came to Moscow at the head of a delegation and met with his Russian interlocutor Mikhail Kasyanov. The two sides reached a deal by which Russia would supply Kazakhstan with civil aviation equipment in partial payment for the lease of the Baikonur space facility. Kazakhstan, in turn,

⁵¹³ Vitaly V. Naumkin, "Russian Policy Toward Kazakhstan", in *Thinking Strategically: The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus*, (ed.) Robert Legvold (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003), p.59.

⁵¹⁴ Sally N. Cummings, "Happier Bedfellows? Russia and Central Asia under Putin", *Asian Affairs* 32, no.2 (2001), p.147.

⁵¹⁵ Giorgi Kandelaki, "Kazakh, Russian Special Services Sign Cooperation Agreement", *RFE/RL*, 27 June 2002.

⁵¹⁶ Naumkin, p.55.

ceded UES a fifty percent stake in the state thermal power plant in Ekibastuz for the payment of its outstanding 239 million dollars energy debt to Russia.⁵¹⁷

Toqayev and Kasyanov met again in November 2001 in Moscow and decided on a cooperation agreement in gas industry for a period of ten years. According to the contract, Russia and Kazakhstan would cooperate in construction, reconstruction and exploitation of gas pipelines, underground gas reservoirs and other sites of gas complex. In addition they would work on joint projects on gas transportation to the third states via the Russian and Kazakh territory.⁵¹⁸ The opening of Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline that carried oil from Kazakhstan's Tengiz field to Russian Novorossiisk terminal on the Black Sea coast in October 2001 further consolidated the financial ties between the two countries.⁵¹⁹

In line with the November 2001 agreement, the KazRosGaz joint venture was set up by Russia's Gazprom and Kazakhstan's KazMunayGaz in May 2002. The new company would market, process, transport and sell Kazakh natural gas. It was decided to export 3.5 billion cubic meters of Kazakh gas to European markets through the Russian natural gas system.⁵²⁰

Russia and Kazakhstan signed a fifteen-year oil transit agreement in June 2002 that guaranteed the transportation of Kazakh oil to the Western markets through Russian oil pipelines. According to the concord, fifteen millions of Kazakh oil would be exported via the Atyrau-Samara pipeline whereas the 2.5 millions of tons would

⁵¹⁷ Justin Burke, "Kazakhstan, Russia Positively Assess Bilateral Relations", *RFE/RL*, 20 January 2000.

⁵¹⁸ "Gazprom and Transport Oil and Gas Kazakh Company Will Cooperate Without Mediators", *Caspian News Agency*, 29 November 2001.

⁵¹⁹ Caspian Pipeline Consortium, General Information. Available [online]: <<http://www.cpc.ru/portal/alias!press/lang!en-us/tabID!3357/DesktopDefault.aspx>> [07 September 2008].

⁵²⁰ "Russia and Kazakhstan Sign Crude Transport Agreement", *Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections News and Trends: Central Asia* 7, no.4 (12 July 2002).

pass through Makhachkala-Tikhoretsk-Novorossiisk route.⁵²¹ The oil and gas transit agreements carried out with Kazakhstan secured Russia's status as a transit country.

The entry of United States into Central Asia after 9/11, Washington's reaching out to Central Asian states to use their military bases to conduct operations against Taleban forces in Afghanistan and offering military equipment and training to these countries restrained the Russian position in Central Asia by adding another powerful and capable player into Central Asian equation.

All the Central Asian states except Turkmenistan declared that they were ready to participate in US's fight against terrorism with all the means at their disposal. Uzbekistan's Karshi-Khanabad base served as a forward area for US activities and humanitarian assistance going to northern Afghanistan.⁵²² Kyrgyz leadership allowed the international anti-terrorism coalition headed by US to station war planes at the Manas airport near Bishkek⁵²³ whereas Tajik administration granted American military contingency use of the Kulyab airport in Dushanbe.⁵²⁴ Likewise, Washington and Astana hammered out a deal for over flight rights and material transshipments.

The USA improved its military ties with states of Central Asia by providing military technology, equipment and training to the armies of these countries. Kazakh Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Abuseitov and US Ambassador to Kazakhstan Larry Napper signed a memorandum of understanding in Astana in July 2002, through

⁵²¹ Oil Transit Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 10 June 2002. Available [online]: < <http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf/900b2c3ac91734634325698f002d9dcf/b4f46317d6c1314343256bd5002fece9?OpenDocument> > [07 September 2008].

⁵²² Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia", *Strategic Asia* (2002-2003), p.248.

⁵²³ Abe Rein, "Kyrgyzstan Agrees to Grant Antiterrorism Coalition Use of International Airport", *RFE/RL*, 06 December 2001.

⁵²⁴ Ilan Berman, "The New Battleground: Central Asia and the Caucasus", *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no.1 (Winter 2004-2005), p.60.

which the USA undertook to supply Kazakhstan with advanced military technology and help to develop its rapid reaction forces. The USA would also train Kazakh officers, starting from 2003.⁵²⁵ Washington pledged to provide support to the Tajik Border Force with training and the purchase of technical and communications equipment due to a bilateral accord that was signed on 05 February 2002.⁵²⁶ Furthermore, the US Congress granted 3.5 million dollars to Kyrgyzstan in 2001 to be used for getting spare parts for military helicopters and repair the warplanes of the Kyrgyz Defense Ministry.⁵²⁷

It is manifest that relations between Russia and Central Asian states gained a new impetus with Putin's coming up to power. Multilateral collaboration in regional organizations was speeded up and bilateral relations were revitalized. Russia adeptly took advantage of the security concerns of the Central Asian states mounted up by the outbreak of the Batken events and the growing activities of Islamic militants in the region and led the efforts to strengthen regional cooperation mechanisms of CSTO and SCO to fight against terrorism, extremism and separatism. In addition to security cooperation, attempts were made to promote economic integration through the foundation of Eurasian Economic Community.

The strengthening of bilateral political, economic and military ties with the Central Asian states was materialized via regular contacts at the presidential, premier, ministerial levels, development of oil and gas fields in resource rich Central Asian Republics such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, establishment of joint ventures, construction of hydroturbine and hydroelectric power stations and provision of military equipment and training to Central Asian Republics beside the

⁵²⁵ "US to Expand Defense Cooperation with Kazakhstan", *ITAR-TASS*, 16 July 2002.

⁵²⁶ Jonson, p.90.

⁵²⁷ "US Help Kyrgyzstan Modernizing Its Air Forces", *Kyrgyz News*, 19 December 2001.

re-opening of the military bases and granting permission to the military officers of these states to benefit from Russian military facilities for exercising purposes.

After examining the new Russian foreign policy in the South Caucasus and Central Asia planned, formulated and executed under the new Russian leadership, I will now move on to probe the underpinnings of Turkish foreign policy in the same regions. Comparing the foreign policies of the two states with respect to the South Caucasus and Central Asia will be informative as considerable part of the political problems between the two states in previous years had emanated from different and competitive policies Turkey and Russia pursued with regard to these regions.

Balanced and Calculated Turkish Foreign Policy Line in the South Caucasus and Central Asia

Turkish Leap toward the South Caucasus: Gaining Foothold in a Turbulent Region

The end of the 1990s and the early 2000s witnessed Turkey's efforts to point up its imprint in the South Caucasus. Cognizant of the fact that pursuing effective policies in the region necessitated normalization of relations with Armenia, Turkey first of all gave countenance to Armenian –Azeri parley to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh deadlock. Furthermore, Ankara took steps to relax the economic embargo it applied to Yerevan and backed up meetings that were conducted through informal channels to find reconciliation between the two countries. Lastly, Ankara proposed a regional cooperation scheme that was aimed to develop peace, security and prosperity in Transcaucasia without ostracizing Armenia.

The continuation of stalemate over Nagorno-Karabakh and the insistence of Armenian government to seek international recognition of the so-called genocide baffled Ankara's rapprochement endeavour. After its attempts to wipe out the old scores were fizzled out, Turkey concentrated its energy on giving weight to advancing its diplomatic, economic and military ties with Azerbaijan and Georgia and developing pipeline and transportation projects that sidelined Armenia.

Following the Azerbaijani rejection of the November 1998 plan of Minsk Group whereby Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh would form a common state in which Nagorno-Karabakh would be part of Azerbaijan in a loose confederated structure, the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Aliyev and Kocharian starting from the summer of 1999, continued to meet occasionally to find a satisfying formula to the Gordian knot which would be acceptable to all the concerned parties of the conflict.⁵²⁸ While the year 1999 was folding up, a preliminary deal was reportedly reached between Azerbaijan and Armenia that also obtained the approval of Turkey and the USA. With the so-called land-swap plan, Azerbaijan conceded the unification of Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh whereas Armenia ceded Meghri district that was located at the south-eastern part of the country to Azerbaijan. The territory exchange would secure Azerbaijan to establish a land corridor with Nakhichevan but would divest Armenia of its border with Iran.⁵²⁹

The land-swap proposal drew upon both domestic and international criticism. Opposition in both countries coupled with the Azeri refugees of Nagorno-Karabakh and residents of Meghri region accused their Heads of States' of selling out the

⁵²⁸ David D. Laitin and Ronald Grigor Suny, "Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh", *Middle East Policy* (October 1999), p.21.

⁵²⁹ Eva Lashchenova, "Armenia on the U.S. 'Chessboard'", *Russian Politics and Law* 46, no.2 (March-April 2008), p.26 and "The South Caucasus: A Regional Overview and Conflict Assessment: Conflict and Security Assessment", *Cornell Caspian Consulting*, (2002). Available [online]: < <http://www.cornellcaspiian.com/sida/sida-cfl-2.html> > [27 September 2008].

national cause. In the international arena, Iran repudiated the plan instantly and vehemently as it would be encircled by two countries of Turkish origin in case of realization of the scheme, whereas Russia gave a lukewarm response and stated that it would accept whatever solution the two presidents agreed on.⁵³⁰

The killings of Armenian Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkisian and Speaker of the Parliament Karen Demirchian along with six parliamentarians in the Armenian National Assembly on 27 October 1999 pared down the possibility of the eventuation of the formula.⁵³¹ The negotiations persisted during the next three years until the proposition was completely removed from the table in the summer of 2002. In the same year, Azerbaijan came up with another arrangement which envisaged the pull out of Armenian forces from four of the seven occupied Azerbaijani districts, the ones abutting Iran in return for the opening of the rail road between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Furthermore, Azerbaijani administration pledged that it would not object to the reopening of the rail line between Armenia and Turkey. The plan flopped with the Armenian repulse.⁵³²

Turkey adopted a constructive approach during the Armenian-Azerbaijani deliberations and supported the resolution attempts despite the abnegation of its mediation offer by the Armenian side.⁵³³ In addition, Ankara initiated a trilateral dialogue between Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Foreign Ministers of three countries İsmail Cem, Vardan Oskanian and Vilayet Guliyev met on 15 May

⁵³⁰ Gerard J. Libaridian, *Modern Armenia: People, Nation, State* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007), p.262.

⁵³¹ Tigran Martirosyan, "Land Swap in Nagorno-Karabakh: Much Noise Over an Unrealistic Option", *CACI Analyst*, 14 August 2002.

⁵³² Libaridian, p.262.

⁵³³ Abraham Rein, "Armenia Rejects Turkish Offer of Karabakh Mediation", *RFE/RL*, 20 February 2001.

2002, during the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Reykjavik.⁵³⁴ However, these Turkish efforts proved to be impotent in creating a significant breakthrough in bringing out a desired solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

Despite the conundrum in Nagorno-Karabakh problem, Turkey rustled to mend ties with Armenia. Ankara introduced a relaxation in its visa regime for Armenian nationals in January 2002. They would only pay a ten dollars tax and would receive Turkish visas either at the Georgian-Turkish border or at customs checkpoints at Turkish airports upon arrival.⁵³⁵ The fact that Turkish decision coincided with the Prime Minister Ecevit's visit to the USA and the various American calls to Turkey for the softening of the relations with Armenia brought to mind that Washington might have played a role in this Turkish opening. Turkey had also resumed charter flights between the two countries a while ago and Armenia opened its first official representative office in Turkey in 2002 within BSEC.⁵³⁶ Washington saw the mounting economic and military dependence of Armenia on Russia as detrimental to American interests in the region and urged Turkey to take steps which would lead to an ultimate thaw in the relations.

In addition to utilizing diplomatic pressure on both Yerevan and Ankara, Washington also gave its backing to reconciliation attempts that were conducted by unofficial parties. In this vein, the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) that was established on 09 July 2001, with the aim of fostering cooperation and communication between Turkey and Armenia on the basis of mutual interests⁵³⁷

⁵³⁴ "Turkish, Armenian, Azeri Foreign Ministers Hold First Tripartite Meeting", *Caspian News Agency*, 16 May 2002.

⁵³⁵ Justin Burke, "Turkey Introduces Visa Free Entry for Armenians", *Interfax*, 15 January 2002.

⁵³⁶ "Armenia Opens First Ever Mission in Turkey", *Asbarez*, 04 March 2002.

⁵³⁷ "Armenian, Turkish Representatives Create Unofficial Reconciliation Commission", *The New York Times*, 11 July 2001.

received significant diplomatic and financial support from the USA. Composed of six Turkish⁵³⁸ and four Armenian⁵³⁹ civil society members, TARC sought to promote mutual understanding and goodwill between Turks and Armenians and to encourage improved relations between Armenia and Turkey.⁵⁴⁰ The most conspicuous activity of the TARC was to apply to International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), a New York based human rights organization for a legal study on the applicability of the 1948 Genocide Convention to the 1915 events. The report that was released by ICTJ in 2003 claimed that the events included all of the elements of the genocide as defined in the Convention.⁵⁴¹ The memorandum provoked a controversy between the Armenian and Turkish associates of the TARC and three of the Turkish affiliates resigned in June 2003.⁵⁴² The commission was disbanded on 14 April 2004, without registering a noticeable rapport in Armenian-Turkish relations.⁵⁴³

Armenia's state policy of the international recognition of the so-called genocide that was enforced hand in hand with diaspora groups and the resolutions adopted by various national parliaments condemning the "genocide" of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey in 1915 and calling on Turkey to recognize it triggered off a further strain between the two countries. Deciding that a truce with Armenia was not in the

⁵³⁸ The Turkish members of TARC were: Gündüz Aktan, retired ambassador, Üstün Ergüder, academic, Sadi Ergüvenç, retired lieutenant general in Turkish Airforce, Özdem Sanberk, retired ambassador and former undersecretary of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, İlter Türkmen, former Foreign Minister of Turkey and Vamık Volkan, academic.

⁵³⁹ Alexander Arzoumanian, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, David Hovhanissian, a diplomat from Armenian Foreign Ministry, Van Krikorian, chairman of the Armenian Assembly of America and Andranik Migranian, political consultant constituted the Armenian members of TARC.

⁵⁴⁰ Terms of Reference of the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission. Available [online]: < <http://www.american.edu/cgp/track2/data/TARCtermsofreference.doc> > [27 September 2008].

⁵⁴¹ The Applicability of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to Events Which Occurred During the Early Twentieth Century: Legal Analysis Prepared for the International Center for Transitional Justice. Available [online]: < <http://www.american.edu/cgp/track2/data/ICTJreportEnglish.pdf> > [27 September 2008].

⁵⁴² These were Gündüz Aktan, Sadi Ergüvenç and Özdem Sanberk.

⁵⁴³ Rachel Goshgarian, "Breaking the Stalemate: Turkish-Armenian Relations in the 21st Century". Available [online]: < http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_46.pdf > [27 September 2008].

horizon, Turkey turned to Azerbaijan and Georgia and focused on actualizing economic and military cooperation projects with these two states by excluding Armenia.

Close economic and military relations with Azerbaijan continued to be of paramount importance to Turkey whilst devising South-Caucasian policy. Baku and Ankara kept on engaging into significant commercial and military contacts. On 12 March 2001, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a fifteen-year agreement whereby Turkey would purchase natural gas from Azerbaijan's Caspian Shah Deniz field beginning in 2005.⁵⁴⁴ The Azeri gas would be pumped from the Shah Deniz field to Turkey through Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipeline and part of the fuel would be sold to Georgia. A Turkish company Barmek obtained the rights of electricity distribution network of Baku for twenty-five years as the successful bidder of the tender solicited by the Ministry of State Property in Azerbaijan in 2001.⁵⁴⁵ Later Barmek also won the bids of Sumgait city electricity distribution network, as well as the electricity distribution network of the northern regions of the country.⁵⁴⁶ Turkish entrepreneurs operated in nearly all fields of the Azerbaijani economy and except the energy sector, their investments outranked those of their competitors'.⁵⁴⁷

In the military field, Azerbaijani Deputy Defense Minister Colonel Mamed Beydullaev and Commander of the Turkish Ground Forces Colonel General Baha

⁵⁴⁴ SOCAR-Azerbaycan ile Doğal Gaz Alım-Satım Anlaşması. Available [online]: <<http://www.botas.gov.tr/>> [28 September 2008].

⁵⁴⁵ Barmek Azerbaijan Electricity Distribution Ltd. Available [online]: <http://www.barmek.com.tr/english/barmek_azerbaycan/barmek_azerbaycan.htm> [30 September 2008].

⁵⁴⁶ Faris Ismailzade, Russia's *Energy Interests in Azerbaijan*...., p.37.

⁵⁴⁷ İlgar İsmayilov, "Azerbaycan-Türkiye Ticari İlişkileri", in *Azerbaycanlı Genç Bilim Adamları I. Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, (ed.) Vügar İmanov (İstanbul: Kurtiş Matbaacılık, 2005), p.301. Bilateral trade between Turkey and Azerbaijan came at 296 million dollars at the end of 2002. See Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=621> [05 October 2008].

Tüzüner signed a protocol in Baku on 05 April 2000 for training military personnel. The defense ministers of Azerbaijan and Turkey, Colonel General Safer Abiyev and Sabahattin Çakmakoglu signed an agreement in Baku on 20 September 2000 on military-industrial cooperation between their respective ministries.⁵⁴⁸ On 28 February 2001, during the meeting of Azeri Defense Minister Colonel General Safer Abiyev and Major-General Şerafettin Telyazan, Chief of the Department of Defense Planning and Directing of Sources of the Turkish Armed Forces Chief Headquarter, an Agreement on Gratuitous Military Aid Between Azerbaijani and Turkish Government and Protocol on Financial Assistance Between the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense and Chief Headquarter of Turkish Armed Forces took place. According to the documents, Turkey would render financial assistance to the Azerbaijani Armed Forces worth three million dollars.⁵⁴⁹ Another military high-level visit to Azerbaijan was carried out in April 2001. The Head of the Turkish Armed Forces Logistical Service Hurşit Tolon came together with Azeri Defense Minister Colonel General Safer Abiyev and Deputy Defense Minister Gorkhmaz Garaev and put signatures on a protocol on cooperation in Baku on 28 April 2001.⁵⁵⁰ On 14 May 2002 at the time of Turkish General Staff Official Brigadier General Cihangir Dumanlı's visit to Baku, he and Azeri Defense Minister Colonel General Safer Abiyev signed an agreement under which Turkey would provide military aid to the Azerbaijani Armed Forces and a protocol under which Azeri Defense Ministry would be endowed with funds coming from the Turkish General Staff.⁵⁵¹

⁵⁴⁸ Abraham Rein, "Azerbaijan, Turkey Sign Agreement on Defense Industry Cooperation", *RFE/RL*, 21 September 2000.

⁵⁴⁹ "Turkey Aids Azeri Army Worth to 3 Million USD", *Azerbaijan Bulletin*, 01 March 2001.

⁵⁵⁰ "Azerbaijan, Turkey Sign Another Military Cooperation Agreement", *Turan News Agency*, 02 May 2001.

⁵⁵¹ Daniel Serhsen, "Azerbaijan, Turkey Sign New Defense Agreement", *RFE/RL*, 16 May 2002.

On 23 July 2001, two Iranian air force planes overflew BP-Amoco-ARCO ships that were exploring the Caspian's Araz-Alov-Sharg area. Iran claiming that the region was located within its sector of Caspian Sea sent a warship later that evening and threatened to fire on an Azeri oil exploration ship unless it departed from the region. Iranian aircraft then violated Azeri airspace on three occasions.⁵⁵² Turkey intervened in the dispute at the side of Azerbaijan and Turkish Foreign Ministry submitted a verbal note to the Iranian Ambassador Hussain Lavasani in Ankara which stated that in case of further escalation of the situation in Caspian, Turkey would support Azerbaijan.⁵⁵³ This was followed by Turkish Chief of Staff General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu's two-day official visit to Baku on 25-26 August 2001 whose main goal was to participate in the first graduation ceremony of Azeri officers trained by NATO standards. Before Kıvrıkoğlu's arrival to Azerbaijan, on 24 August 2001, ten Turkish F-5 jets participated in a military parade in Baku.⁵⁵⁴ This gesture of Turkey in the eyes of many Azeris contributed to a great extent to the wind-down of the tension with Iran and attested Azerbaijan's significance for Turkish policy makers.⁵⁵⁵

Turkey also cultivated its military ties with the other South Caucasian state Georgia and the two countries entered into many military aid, training and cooperation accords. Turkey and Georgia signed a military assistance and cooperation agreement in March 1999. In line with the agreement, in February 2000, Turkey earmarked two grants of 3.8 million dollars for the Georgian army and border

⁵⁵² Jon Gorvett, "Turkey Plays Big Brother to Azerbaijan in Opening Skirmishes Over Control of Caspian Resources", *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* (November 2001), p.31.

⁵⁵³ "Baku Welcomes Statement by Turkish Foreign Ministry Regarding the Recent Events in Caspian", *Caspian News Agency*, 16 August 2001.

⁵⁵⁴ "500,000 Watch Turkish Flights in Azerbaijani Capital", *Turan News Agency*, 24 August 2001.

⁵⁵⁵ See Faris Ismailzade "Turkey-Azerbaijan: The Honeymoon Is Over", *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 4, no. 4 (Winter 2005), p.3.

units which would be used to buy computers, communications and air defense navigation equipment, to modernize a military airfield, to form a motor transport battalion and to do construction work at a special forces training center.⁵⁵⁶ With the deal signed by Major General Şerafettin Telyazan who headed the Financial Department of the Turkish Armed Forces General Staff and Georgian Deputy Defense Minister Giorgi Katamadze on 19 April 2000, Turkey released further four million dollars for the Georgian Armed Forces most of which would be utilized for reorganizing the eleventh brigade of the Georgian army for measures to raise standards to comply with NATO requirements and to finance the opening of a NATO office in Georgia.⁵⁵⁷ Turkey finished repair and modernization of the military airbase in Marneuli that was situated in south-eastern part of Georgia and the formal reopening took place on 28 January 2001.⁵⁵⁸ It was also announced by Turkish and Georgian officials that Turkish warplanes would benefit from the military airfield.

During Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze's official visit to Ankara, the two countries signed an agreement to clear their common border of anti-personnel mines laid down during the days of the Cold War. At the time of the same visit on 29 January 2001, Georgian Defense Minister David Tevzadze and his Turkish counterpart Sabahattin Çakmakoglu agreed on another cooperation accord between the two countries' military-industrial sectors.⁵⁵⁹

Visiting Major-General Şerafettin Telyazan, Chief of the Department of Defense Planning and Directing of Sources of the Turkish Armed Forces Chief

⁵⁵⁶ Justin Burke, "Turkey Assigns Funds to Assist Georgian Army, Border Units", *RFE/RL*, 10 February 2000.

⁵⁵⁷ Justin Burke, "Turkey Allocates Further Grant for Georgian Military", *RFE/RL*, 19 April 2000.

⁵⁵⁸ Justin Burke, "Turkey Funds Reconstruction of Georgian Military Airfield", *RFE/RL*, 29 January 2001.

⁵⁵⁹ "Georgia and Turkey Sign Defense Accord", *BBC News*, 29 January 2001.

Headquarter and Georgian Deputy Defense Minister Gela Bezhuashvili signed a protocol in Tbilisi on 04 June 2001, whereby Ankara would provide Georgia with a fourth grant, worth 2.5 million dollars for defense purposes. The fund would be spent on Georgian border guards, vehicles and communications systems for the eleventh motorized rifle brigade, to develop the Marneuli military airfield and the Tbilisi military academy.⁵⁶⁰ Gela Bezhuashvili paid a visit to Turkey in November 2001 and in the course of the visit, Turkey took up to assist Georgia in reforming the military education system, improving the structure of the Georgian armed forces and adopting Western weapons and training standards.⁵⁶¹

Georgia, along with Azerbaijan, served as part of the Turkish contingent in the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Kosovo and Tbilisi and Ankara commenced to conduct joint military exercises on Georgian soil. On 19 March 2002, the border guard services of Georgia and Turkey performed military exercises in Samtskhe-Javakheti region of Georgia that bordered Turkey on eradication of illegal migration and smuggling.⁵⁶²

In the economic realm, Georgia and Turkey came to an agreement on construction of the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railway during President Demirel's visit to Georgia on 14-15 January 2000.⁵⁶³ In September 2001, Batumi-Kobileti highway and new tunnel construction project that were executed by Turkish-Adjarian company Tushtash was inaugurated in the presence of Shevardnadze and

⁵⁶⁰ Justin Burke, "Georgian, Turkish Officials Sign Defense Grant Protocol", *RFE/RL*, 05 June 2001.

⁵⁶¹ "Turkey to Help Georgia Modernize Defense Forces", *AVN Military News Agency*, 14 November 2001.

⁵⁶² "Georgia and Turkey Started Joint Exercises in Samtskhe-Javakheti", *Caspian News Agency*, 19 March 2002.

⁵⁶³ Mustafa Aydın, p. 419.

Demirel.⁵⁶⁴ Moreover, Turkey became main trade partner of Georgia after Russia implemented a visa regime on Tbilisi in December 2000.⁵⁶⁵

The officials of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia convened together occasionally and entered into security arrangements. In January 2002, three countries signed a military cooperation agreement that projected a number of measures relating to the execution of joint struggle against smuggling, terrorism as well as the protection of BTC.⁵⁶⁶ Turkish, Azerbaijani and Georgian Presidents came to Trabzon on 29-30 April 2002 for a tripartite summit meeting and discussed topics of Silk Road, BTC and BTE pipelines, communication projects as well as economic relations between the three countries.⁵⁶⁷ During the convocation, the interior ministers of the three countries hammered out a cooperation agreement against terrorism, organized crime and other important felonies.⁵⁶⁸ Lastly, Turkish, Azerbaijani and Georgian soldiers began joint trainings in one of the military bases in Tbilisi in July 2002. The trainings funded by Turkey were held in order to defend the security of BTC main export pipeline.⁵⁶⁹

Another noteworthy development of this period was the introduction and promotion of cooperation pacts for the South Caucasus that were put forth both by regional actors and international organizations. The first proposal in this regard was

⁵⁶⁴ “Shevardnadze and Ex-President of Turkey Participate in Opening Ceremony of Highway and Tunnel Construction Between Batumi and Kobuleti”, *Caspian News Agency*, 10 September 2001.

⁵⁶⁵ Bilateral trade between Turkey and Georgia came at 241 million dollars at the end of 2002. See Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: < http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=621 > [05 October 2008].

⁵⁶⁶ Igor Torbakov, “A New Security Arrangement Takes Shape in the South Caucasus”, *Eurasia Insight*, 24 January 2002.

⁵⁶⁷ Hasan Kanbolat, “Türkiye-Azerbaycan-Gürcistan Zirvesi ve Gölgedeki Ortak: Ermenistan”, *Stratejik Analiz* 3, no.26 (June 2002), p.53.

⁵⁶⁸ “Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti, Gürcistan ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Arasında İmzalanan Terörizm, Örgütlü Suçlar ve Diğer Önemli Suçlarla Mücadele Anlaşması”, *Resmî Gazete*, no. 24810 (09 July 2002). Available [online]: < <http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/#>> [28 September 2008].

⁵⁶⁹ “Azerbaijani, Turkish, and Georgian Soldiers Begin Joint Trainings”, *Azerbaijan Bulletin*, 01 August 2002.

propounded by Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vardan Oskanian on 15 March 1999. Oskanian suggested a Regional Security and Cooperation Pact which would encompass three South Caucasian states, Russia, Turkey and Iran. Azeri offer to establish a Caucasus Security Pact came ensuing in November 1999 during the OSCE Istanbul Summit. Azerbaijan's pact gave way to the USA instead of Iran and included also the EU members.⁵⁷⁰

Turkey launched its own regional cooperation initiative Caucasus Peace and Stability Pact in January 2000 during President Demirel's visit to Georgia. It would be jointly drafted and signed by three South Caucasian states and regional powers like Turkey and Russia and would also be participated by the USA, the EU and the OSCE. Demirel also opened the door for international organizations such as the IMF and World Bank which could take part in the project by providing funds and financial aid. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia responded warmly to Demirel's plan. Heydar Aliyev stated that the pact could be crucial in resolving the Karabakh conflict and contributing to a permanent peace in the South Caucasus.⁵⁷¹ Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, too, viewed the pact as a substantial instrument on the settlement of the conflicts and restoration of territorial integrity of Transcaucasian states.⁵⁷²

Moscow officially welcomed Demirel's proposal but frankly expressed its discomfort at the prospect of US' involvement in the scheme. The Chief of the Main Department of International Cooperation at the Russian Defense Ministry, Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, enounced that the U.S. and NATO should not be allowed to participate in the creation of a security system in the Caucasus as the involvement of

⁵⁷⁰ "Azerbaijan Advocates Wide Participation in South Caucasus Pact", *Interfax*, 22 February 2000.

⁵⁷¹ Justin Burke, "Azerbaijani President Pledges Support for South Caucasus", *RFE/RL*, 15 May 2000.

⁵⁷² "President Shevardnadze Calls for Signing Pact on Peace and Stability in the Caucasus", *Interfax*, 17 July 2000.

Americans in the South Caucasus would not improve the security of the region.⁵⁷³

Russia also came up with its own proposal and recommended the formation of Caucasus Four that was comprised of Russia and the three South Caucasian Republics.

Armenian President Robert Kocharian set forth a concept of collective security for the Caucasus at some point in his address to German parliament on 29 March 2000. His was a 3+3+2 formula which included all states of the South Caucasus. Russia, Turkey and Iran would act as guarantors whereas the USA and the EU would be sponsors.⁵⁷⁴

The last proposal entitled A Stability Pact for the Caucasus was drafted in May 2000 by the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) which played a major role in shaping the EU's Balkan Stability Pact. The CEPS brought forward the idea of creating a South Caucasus Community modelled on the EU. This community which would have its own assembly and executive body would be jointly guaranteed by the EU, the USA and Russia. CEPS advocated resolving ethnic problems in the South Caucasus through shared sovereignty, separate constitutions and multi-tiered governing structures.⁵⁷⁵

None of the proposed regional cooperation groupings was embraced full-heartedly by the South Caucasian states. Complexity of the ethnic problems, mistrust and qualm between the neighbours and the intense rivalry and confrontation among regional actors obviated the prospect of such organizations.

⁵⁷³ Harry Tamrazian, "Which Formula Can Guarantee Security for the South Caucasus?", *RFE/RL*, 09 June 2000.

⁵⁷⁴ "Armenia Proposes Collective Security Concept for Southern Caucasus", *Interfax*, 29 March 2000.

⁵⁷⁵ Emil Danielyan, "Caucasus Peace and Integration Still Seen As Far Off", *RFE/RL*, 04 October 2000.

Turkey pursued an inclusive and multi-dimensional foreign policy line in the South Caucasus in the period between the late 1990s and early 2000s. By adopting a regional perspective Turkey aimed to elevate its relations with all the South Caucasus states to a higher stage. In accordance with this new outlook, the efforts in the direction of resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was strongly supported as the settlement of this complex and long-standing issue in a way acceptable to both Azerbaijan and Armenia would also open the path for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations. However, when Azerbaijani-Armenian negotiations regarding Nagorno-Karabakh came to naught and Turkey's reconciliation measures did not find any response on the Armenian side, Turkey stepped up its efforts for the consolidation of economic and military ties with Azerbaijan and Georgia by casting out Armenia. Ankara introduced Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline project which would carry Azerbaijani natural gas to Turkey through Georgian territory and Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku rail link scheme that would connect the three countries. Respecting the military cooperation, Ankara extended financial aid to Azerbaijan and Georgia, trained their military personnel and participated to peacekeeping operations with military units from these countries.

Turkey and Central Asia: Moderate Policy Driven by Economic Motives

Turkish policy in Central Asia at the end of the 1990s and in the beginning of the millennium was shaped for the most part according to economic inducements. Becoming aware of the fact that it did not have the requisite political, economic and military potency to overpower Moscow in the region, Ankara strove to sustain and expand the economic interests and investments of Turkish businessmen in Central

Asia. The events that broke out in Ferghana Valley in 1999 and the USA's incursion to Afghanistan after 9/11 also helped Turkey to enter into some security arrangements with the Central Asian Republics.

Kazakhstan became Turkey's major trade partner in Central Asia. Trade volume between the two countries reached to 364 million dollars in 2002⁵⁷⁶ and Turkey ranked third after the US and UK in terms of foreign investments, with 1.2 billion dollars investment.⁵⁷⁷ Turkish entrepreneurs operated in food, beverages, construction, oil, retail, textile, telecommunications and banking sectors of the Kazakh economy. Large projects were taken on by Turkish contractors; they constructed public buildings, energy facilities, pipelines, plants, highways and shopping centers. In particular, seventy percent of Astana, the Kazakh capital, was built by Turkish undertakers.

Turkish-Kazakh collaboration in the field of security gained momentum. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Necdet Sezer met for talks in Astana on 19 October 2000, and signed a joint declaration on cooperation in struggle against terrorism and organized crime.⁵⁷⁸ Turkey handed over 700,000 dollars in military equipment to the defense forces of Kazakhstan in April 2001⁵⁷⁹ and The Turkish Armed Forces opened an office in Astana on 03 August 2001 to coordinate bilateral military cooperation.⁵⁸⁰

Visiting Turkish Defense Minister Sabahattin Çakmakoglu came together with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, First Deputy of Kazakh Prime

⁵⁷⁶ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: < http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=621 > [05 October 2008].

⁵⁷⁷ "Deputy Premier Bahçeli Urges for Improved Strategic Partnership Relations with Kazakhstan", *Caspian News Agency*, 20 March 2002.

⁵⁷⁸ "Kazakh, Turkish Presidents Aim to Expand Cooperation", *ITAR-TASS*, 20 October 2000.

⁵⁷⁹ "Turkey Gives Kazakh Army \$700,000 in Equipment", *Panaroma*, 27 April 2001.

⁵⁸⁰ "Turkey Opens Military Representation in Kazakhstan", *Turan*, 03 August 2001.

Minister Daniyal Akhmetov and his Kazakh equivalent Lieutenant General Sat Toqpaqbaev in Almaty on 19 September 2001. Çakmakoglu announced that Turkey would give Kazakh Armed Forces thirty military vehicles and other military-technical aid worth some 800,000 dollars.⁵⁸¹ Chief of Turkish Army's General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu visited Kazakhstan on 15 March 2002 upon the invitation of Kazakh Defense Minister General Mukhtar Altynbayev and put signature on a protocol under which Turkish military would provide computers, communication equipment and military vehicles worth some 1 million dollars to the Kazakh Armed Forces.⁵⁸² Kıvrıkoğlu also stressed that the training of Kazakhstani youth at Turkish Military Educational Institution was continued within the frameworks of signed agreements.⁵⁸³

The Turkish-Uzbek relations had tensed up to a great extent in 1999 as a result of assassination attempt to Uzbek President Islam Kerimov in February 1999 and the incursion of Uzbek Islamists to Kyrgyzstan in the fall. Uzbek officials claimed that well-known Uzbek dissident Muhammed Salih who lived in Turkey between the years of 1993-1997 were also involved in the attacks⁵⁸⁴ and his fellow men in Turkey were brainwashing the Uzbek students with radical Islamic propaganda. Kerimov ordered the closure of Turkish schools in Uzbekistan and called for hundreds of Uzbek students in Turkey to return home. The Uzbek administration also put some restrictions on the activities of Turkish businessmen in Uzbekistan.

⁵⁸¹ Justin Burke, "Turkish Defense Minister Visits Kazakhstan", *RFE/RL*, 20 September 2001.

⁵⁸² "Chief of Turkish Army's General Staff in Astana", *RFE/RL*, 15 March 2002.

⁵⁸³ "Kazakhstan and Turkey Expand Cooperation", *Caspian News Agency*, 18 March 2002.

⁵⁸⁴ Shireen Hunter, "Turkey, Central Asia, and the Caucasus: Ten Years after Independence", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 1, no. 2 (May 2001), p.14.

The ongoing security problem in Central Asia brought about a mellowing attitude on the side of Uzbek state towards Turkey. Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer visited Uzbekistan on 16 October 2000 and met with Islam Kerimov. The two leaders discussed security issues and signed joint statements on cooperation to fight drug-smuggling, terrorism and organized crime.⁵⁸⁵ In the course of the same visit, Uzbek Defense Minister Kadyr Gulyamov and Turkish General Staff Official Lieutenant General Ünal Önsipahioğlu came together and concerted a military cooperation covenant by which Turkey pledged to send military equipment to Uzbekistan and train Uzbek soldiers against terrorist threats.⁵⁸⁶

In March 2002, Turkey provided another aid to Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan consisting of military gear and equipment worth 300,000 dollars. The aid included military clothing, outfit for cold weather and mountainous areas.⁵⁸⁷ Meeting on 18 March 2002 with Uzbek President Islam Kerimov, visiting Chief of General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu declared that Turkey released a further 1.2 million dollars in assistance to the Uzbek Armed Forces.⁵⁸⁸

Trade volume between Uzbekistan and Turkey totalled to 170 million dollars at the end of 2002.⁵⁸⁹ Turkish companies mostly worked in automotive, consumer durables, textile and construction fields in the country. Turkish contractors built highways, plants, shopping centers and industrial complexes. Turkish firms took part in joint ventures in the textile sector. For instance, Chinoz Tukumachi Textile Factory that was established with the partnership of Turkish, Uzbek and Japanese

⁵⁸⁵ “Turkey and Uzbekistan Agree Military Cooperation”, *BBC News*, 16 October 2000.

⁵⁸⁶ “Uzbekistan, Turkey to Join Forces Against Terrorism, Crime”, *Interfax*, 16 October 2000.

⁵⁸⁷ “Turkey to Provide Uzbek Military an Aid Worth \$300,000”, *UZa.Uz*, 06 March 2002.

⁵⁸⁸ “Turkey to Provide Military Aid to Uzbekistan”, *Interfax*, 19 March 2002.

⁵⁸⁹ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: < http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=621 > [05 October 2008].

firms was put into operation in September 2000. The company with its annual over five thousand tons of high-quality yarn and 2,500 tons of stockinet became the second high-capacity textile enterprise in Uzbekistan.⁵⁹⁰

Turkmenistan was another Central Asian state where Turkish businessmen invested heavily in textile, building, food and beverages sectors. The volume of bilateral trade between the two countries hit 216 million dollars in 2002, and there were two hundred Turkish companies functioning in Turkmenistan.⁵⁹¹ Along with fountains, hospitals, plants and industrial complexes, Turkish contractors also fulfilled restoration works in Turkmenistan such as the renovation of Sultan Sencer's Tomb in Merv.⁵⁹² A new textile factory named Turkmenbashi built by Çalık Holding in the outskirts of Ashgabat was also opened on 12 July 2001.⁵⁹³

In the military sphere, in the course of Chief of General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu's official visit to Ashgabat on 13 March 2002, he and Turkmen Defense Minister Gurbangurdi Begenchov signed an agreement for Turkish military equipment donations for Turkmenistan and a protocol for financial aid.⁵⁹⁴

Kyrgyzstan and Turkey augmented bilateral military cooperation beginning from late 2000s. Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev and Turkish Head of State Ahmet

⁵⁹⁰ "Turkish-Uzbek-Japanese Textile JV Opened in Tashkent Region", *Caspian News Agency*, 13 September 2000.

⁵⁹¹ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=621> [05 October 2008].

⁵⁹² See "Turkey's Polimeks to Build \$8.5 Million Worth of Fountains in Ashkabad", *Interfax*, 31 May 2001, "Turkish Company to Build Fountain Complex in Ashkabad", *Caspian News Agency*, 02 October 2001, "Turkmenistan Construction Materials Plant", *Caspian News Agency*, 11 January 2002, "Oil Processing Complex of Turkmenbashi Attracts Foreign Partners", *Turkmenistan.Ru*, 03 October 2002, and "Turkish State Minister Reşat Doğru Visiting Turkmenistan", *Caspian News Agency*, 03 April 2002.

⁵⁹³ Maya Artikova, "Turkish Businessman Weaves Textile Empire in Turkmenistan", *Business & Economics*, 10 August 2001.

⁵⁹⁴ "Turkmenistan and Turkey Signed Military Cooperation Agreement", *Caspian News Agency*, 13 March 2002.

Necdet Sezer signed a declaration in Bishkek on 18 October 2000, on cooperation to fight terrorism and organized crime. Turkey undertook to provide the Kyrgyz Armed Forces with military and technical aid worth 2.5 million dollars.⁵⁹⁵ A group of Turkish military specialists trained several dozen officers for the Kyrgyz army and its National Guard. Fifty-five servicemen attended a two-month retraining course at the Kyrgyz-Turkish University in Bishkek and received certificates.⁵⁹⁶ Turkey also accepted several dozen Kyrgyz students to study at military colleges. On 02 October 2001, Turkey delivered a planeload of 300,000 dollars worth of military-technical aid, including uniforms, night-vision instruments and infrared sights for sniper rifles to Kyrgyzstan.⁵⁹⁷ On 09 March 2002, a Turkish military transport aircraft delivered a consignment of ammunition and radio equipment worth one million dollars to Bishkek.⁵⁹⁸ Lastly, Turkey and Kyrgyzstan put signatures on an agreement on the further military assistance from Turkey to Kyrgyzstan on 13 March 2002, at the time of Chief of General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu's visit to Bishkek.⁵⁹⁹

Bilateral trade remained to be low compared to other Central Asian states. It equalled forty-two million dollars in 2002.⁶⁰⁰ Most of the economic activity between the two countries was focused on construction and food sectors. Turkey and

⁵⁹⁵ "Kyrgyzstan, Turkey Discuss Terrorism Threat", *Interfax*, 19 October 2000.

⁵⁹⁶ "Russian, Turkish Military Specialists Help Kyrgyzstan Train Officers", *Kyrgyz Press International News Agency*, 14 February 2001.

⁵⁹⁷ "Turkey Delivers Military-Technical Aid to Kyrgyzstan", *Interfax*, 02 October 2001.

⁵⁹⁸ "Kyrgyzstan Receives Military Aid from Turkey", *RFE/RL*, 11 March 2002.

⁵⁹⁹ "Turkish Military Delegation in Kyrgyzstan", *Kyrgyz News*, 13 March 2002.

⁶⁰⁰ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=621> [05 October 2008].

Kyrgyzstan also formed a special joint business to prepare construction materials and send them to Afghanistan.⁶⁰¹

The total volume of trade between Turkey and Tajikistan was in meager proportions at the end of the 2002. It counted fifty-two million dollars and there were also joint enterprises in construction, textile and polygraph fields.⁶⁰² The two countries signed an agreement on long-term cooperation in the spheres of economy, trade, mining, agriculture, transport and tourism during Tajik Minister of Economy and Trade Hokim Soliev's visit to Turkey on 22-29 December 2001. Turkey committed to help Tajikistan in modernizing and developing the railway and highway network and airports at Kulob and Danghara in order to facilitate bilateral trade.⁶⁰³ The two sides also agreed to open trade centers and Turkish store chains in Tajikistan.

Compared to the early post-Cold War years, Turkey set out less ambitious goals in Central Asia in the following period and attained more successful results. The main impetus of the Turkish policy makers was to enhance economic presence of Turkey in the region by presenting alternatives to Central Asian people other than Russian and Chinese products and services. In accordance with this policy line, Turkish capital commenced to pour into Central Asian states particularly in energy, construction, textile and fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) sectors. Meager steps toward military cooperation were also taken through extension of military equipment and financial aid to Central Asian armies in addition to provision of training opportunities for Central Asian military officers in Turkish military institutions.

⁶⁰¹ "Kyrgyz-Turkish Joint Venture Is Formed to Help Afghanistan", *Kyrgyz News*, 15 June 2002.

⁶⁰² Cooperation of Republic of Tajikistan with the Republic of Turkey. Available [online]: <<http://www.mid.tj/index.php?node=article&id=376>> [05 October 2008].

⁶⁰³ "Tajikistan, Turkey Seek to Expand Economic Ties", *AsiaPlus-Blitz*, 03 January 2002.

After investigating new Russian and Turkish policies with regard to the South Caucasus and Central Asia in the period starting with the end of 1990s till the early 2000s which constituted crux of the political interaction between the two countries, I will now delve into another significant foreign policy matter, NATO's first expansion in the post-Cold War epoch, to which both Turkey and Russia objected at initial phase albeit on different grounds but in the end had to concede to the participation of one time Warsaw Pact members of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the North Atlantic Alliance.

Turkish and Russian Objections to NATO's Eastern Expansion: Uniting on a Common Ground

Both Turkey and Russia were unhappy and exasperated about the fourth expansion of NATO which would include Visegrad countries of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Despite its declaration of support for enlargement in principle, Ankara was lukewarm to the idea of sharing the resources of the Alliance with the former members of the Warsaw Pact. Turkey was also upset about the close prospect of accession of these former communist countries to the European Union while it was sitting in the waiting room for more than thirty years. Russia, on the other hand, fretted about the assignment of security role in Europe to an organization it was excluded from and resented at the rising American sway and presence in Central and Eastern Europe.

Turkish officials linked NATO's eastern enlargement with the country's aspiration to become part of the European Union and stated that NATO expansion and the EU membership should be a parallel process. Onur Öymen, Undersecretary

of Foreign Ministry remarked that if Turkey had the feeling that it was not being discriminated against in the EU, then it would be in a position to participate in the NATO enlargement process.⁶⁰⁴ Sedat Aloğlu, the Chairman of Foreign Relations Commission of the Turkish Grand National Assembly stated that none of the parties in the parliament could approve the enlargement of NATO in its current form and schedule.⁶⁰⁵ Furthermore, in order not to directly challenge US, its major ally that was strongly in favour of the Eastern enlargement, Turkey underlined that while it was supporting the enlargement plans in principle, they were too much focused on Central Europe while ignoring areas in the southern parts of the European continent where there existed serious security challenges. Within this framework Ankara offered Romania's inclusion to the NATO's immediate expansion process.⁶⁰⁶

Turkey's initial objection to Eastern enlargement could be evaluated as a tactical manoeuvre to secure invitation from the EU to start accession negotiations in the upcoming Luxembourg Summit which would convene in December 1997. Accordingly, Turkey dropped its intransigent attitude gradually and on 27 May 1997, at the ceremony which marked the signing of a new NATO-Russia agreement in Paris, Turkish President Süleyman Demirel expressed his country's support for the enlargement of NATO. Demirel in his speech said that the enlargement of all European institutions should be parallel, but refrained from making this a precondition for Turkish agreement to NATO enlargement.⁶⁰⁷

⁶⁰⁴ Craig R. Whitney, "NATO Invitations Snarled by Splits Among Allies", *The New York Times*, 15 June 1997.

⁶⁰⁵ *Ayın Tarihi*, 06 February 1997.

⁶⁰⁶ Sean Kay and Judith Yaphe, "Turkey's International Affairs: Shaping the U.S. Turkey Strategic Partnership", *Strategic Forum*, 122 (July 1997), p.4.

⁶⁰⁷ "Demirel Says Turkey Welcomes NATO Enlargement", *Milliyet*, 28 May 1997 and Nazlan Ertan, "NATO-Russia Deal Down, On With Enlargement", *Turkish Daily News*, 29 May 1997.

Russia, like Turkey, did not have the muscle and influence to hinder the enlargement process and in the end acquiesced to an agreement with the Alliance which gave it a voice but not a veto right in its transactions with the organization. The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation that was materialized in NATO's Paris Summit on 27 May 1997, while highlighting that the member states of NATO had no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members in the foreseeable future and also underlying that the Alliance would carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces, accentuated that the provisions of the Act did not provide Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of NATO.⁶⁰⁸

After getting over Turkish reluctance and Russian opposition, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to begin accession talks at the NATO's Madrid Summit that took place on 08-09 July 1997 and joined the Alliance on 12 March 1999 as full-fledged members.⁶⁰⁹

The Balkans had to go through another cycle of inter-ethnic killings, armed conflict and population displacements just three years after the end of the Bosnian War with the outbreak of the Kosovo War in 1998. Turkey and Russia had different standings with respect to the issue proved by the policies pursued by them in the course of the conflict. In the next section, the background and unfolding of the conflict, together with the details and motives of the respective Turkish and Russian positions vis-à-vis the issue will be touched upon.

⁶⁰⁸ "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation", Paris, 27 May 1997. Available [online]: < <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/fndact-a.htm> > [12 October 2008].

⁶⁰⁹ Enlargement: How Did This Policy Evolve?. Available [online]: < <http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/evolution.html> > [12 October 2008].

Balkan Ghosts Revisited: Kosovo Imbroglio

Turkey and Russia found themselves again at the opposite camps in the Balkans when the Kosovo grenade exploded in 1998. Although Turkey championed the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav state in principle, Ankara decided to participate in NATO's Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia that was conducted to compel Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo. For Russia, NATO's operation in Kosovo, which was performed without a UN mandate, was an act of aggression against a sovereign state and meant the breach of the international law and crumple of the UN-based international order.

Milosevic had abolished the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989 and put the province under the direct control of Belgrade. The Albanians of Kosovo under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova responded to this move by rejecting the Yugoslav authority and creating a parallel administration structure in order to deal with the education, healthcare and social needs of the population. The already strained relations between the Albanian and Serbian communities of Kosovo further went downhill starting from 1996 with shootings and bomb attacks organized against Serbian officials and institutions by Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the guerrilla organization of the Kosovar Albanians. The situation worsened when the KLA acquired the weapons and ammunition of the Albanian army during the internal turmoil in Albania in spring 1997.

The KLA declared itself the armed force of the Kosovar Albanians in January 1998. On 28 February 1998, the KLA killed four Serbian policemen in Likosane village in Drenica and within few weeks they took most of the Drenica region under

control.⁶¹⁰ Serbia responded to the uprising by launching a major drive against the KLA forces and at the beginning of March 1998, eighty Albanians were killed in Drenica, among whom twenty-five were women and children.⁶¹¹

The intensification of the Albanian-Serbian clashes in Kosovo alarmed the Western governments not just because of the numerous Albanian refugees, but also due to the potential of the spread of the conflict to neighbouring countries, especially Macedonia, which had a large Albanian population. The international community imposed an embargo against Belgrade, and the Contact Group, that included France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US, held bilateral talks with Milosevic.

The situation deteriorated on 15 January 1999, when forty-five bodies of Albanians, including three women and one young boy were found in the southern village of Racak.⁶¹² In February 1999, with the initiative of the Contact Group, the Kosovo peace talks were opened in Rambouillet, Paris. The first agreement text that requested the withdrawal of Yugoslav military forces from Kosovo and the settling of the NATO peace forces in the region was rejected by both parties. The second agreement which included, immediate cessation of violence, the withdrawal of Yugoslav military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo, the stationing of an international military force led by NATO in Kosovo and a referendum for independence after a three year transition period was accepted by the Kosovar Albanians, but refused by the Serbs.⁶¹³

⁶¹⁰ R. J. Crampton, *The Balkans since the Second World War* (New York, NY: Longman, 2002), p.272.

⁶¹¹ Enika Abazi, "Kosovo: War, Peace and Intervention in a Nutshell", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 6, (2001), p.65.

⁶¹² Raymond Tanter and John Psarouthakis, *Balancing in the Balkans* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p.78.

⁶¹³ Enika Abazi, "Kosovo/a Conflict and the Post-Cold War Order: Russia and Turkey Policies", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 7 (2002), p.223.

On 24 March 1999, NATO launched a series of air strikes on Serbian forces. The air strikes lasted seventy-eight days and Milosevic agreed to sign the peace plan proposed by G-8 countries on 10 June 1999. The G-8 Peace Plan had three main points: “the retreat of all military, police and paramilitary forces from the region, the settlement of international civil and security entities in the region under the patronage of the UN, the establishment of a transitory administration by the UN Security Council with the purpose of creating a temporary political framework that would guarantee peaceful and normal living conditions in the area and that would give significant autonomy to Kosovo.”⁶¹⁴

After Yugoslavia signed the G-8 Peace Plan, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which approved the establishment of United Nations Interim Administration for Kosovo (UNMIK) and NATO led Kosovo Force (KFOR). UNMIK would administer the communications, police, schools, public transport, and power plants while KFOR would help to maintain the peace in the region.⁶¹⁵

When compared to Bosnian issue, it seemed that Turkey chose a low profile in the Kosovo crisis. Although Turkish authorities condemned the violence and violation of human rights openly they did not launch any major diplomatic initiatives. The most important Turkish diplomatic initiative during the Kosovo conflict was the visit of İsmail Cem, the Turkish Foreign Minister, to Belgrade in March 1998. Cem advocated a peaceful solution to the problem, which included the restitution of autonomous status of Kosovo and the restoration of the rights of the

⁶¹⁴ Nuray Bozbora, “The Endurance of Uncertainty in Kosovo”, *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 7 (2002), p.206.

⁶¹⁵ Crampton, p.276.

Albanians.⁶¹⁶ There were several considerations behind Ankara's cautious and hesitant policy which could be listed as follows:

Bosnia and Herzegovina was an independent and sovereign state that was recognized by the international community and accepted to the membership of the UN. However, Kosovo was part of the Yugoslavia although it had been granted political autonomy by the 1974 Constitution. Turkey, which had been fighting against a separatist movement in its own territory for nearly fifteen years could not provoke or support separatist tendencies in the region. As early as 1992, when Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Kosovar Albanians visited Ankara and requested from Turkey to recognize the independence of Kosovo, he was rejected by the Turkish officials. President Demirel also had declared many times that if Kosovo proclaimed its independence, this would not be approved by the international community.⁶¹⁷

There was also a Turkish minority living in Kosovo that Turkish officials needed to take into account while forging policies regarding Kosovo. The history of Turks in Kosovo dated back to the Battle of 1389 when Ottoman armies defeated the Serbian forces in Kosovo Polje. After that, hundreds of thousands of Turks started to live in the province. They mostly resided in Prizren, Dragas, Sandzak, Mamusha, Gnjilane, Pristina, Mitrovica and Djakovica and were estimated to number around sixty thousand.⁶¹⁸ The relations between the Albanians and the Turks in Kosovo were far from ideal. Repressive policies and the assimilation attempts of the radical

⁶¹⁶ İlhan Uzgel, "The Balkans: Turkey's Stabilizing Role", in *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, (eds.) Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002), pp. 82-83.

⁶¹⁷ See *Ayın Tarihi*, 12 July 1998 and 03 April 1999.

⁶¹⁸ Erhan Türbedar, "Tarihte Değişen Siyasi ve Sosyal Dengeler İçinde Kosovo Türkleri", in *Balkan Türkleri: Balkanlar'da Türk Varlığı*, (ed.) Erhan Türbedar (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 2003), pp.76-77.

Albanians that directly questioned and imperilled their identity and presence in Kosovo perturbed the Turkish people to a great extent.

The Belgrade government, which sought to impede any kind of Albanian-Turkish unity in the province, had treated its Turkish minority fairly well. When most of the Kosovar Albanians lost their jobs after their defiance of Belgrade's policies and went on a general strike, the Turks had abstained from confronting the Yugoslav government and kept their positions in state mechanisms in Kosovo. Furthermore, the Serbian authorities that had banned the Albanian broadcasting of Radio Television Pristina in July 1990 allowed Turkish language broadcasting.⁶¹⁹ These developments deepened the division between the Albanians and Turks in Kosovo and the Albanians accused the Turks of being in collaboration with the Serbs.

The Turkish authorities were also worried about the possibility of the conflict extending to Macedonia, where there was a large Albanian community. Turkey had developed close ties with Macedonia and attached this country a special importance for the preservation of the regional balance in the Balkans. If Kosovo became an independent state this could provoke a separatist movement in Macedonia and give rise to political turmoil in the entire peninsula.

When a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo issue could not be reached and the harassment of the Albanians by the Serbs continued, NATO took the decision to intervene. Turkey participated in NATO's military action and provided eleven F-16 fighter jets. After the end of the NATO bombing and following the withdrawal of the Serbian forces from Kosovo, Turkey sent a detachment of one thousand troops to

⁶¹⁹ Şule Kut, "Turks of Kosovo: What to Expect?", *Perceptions*(Journal of International Affairs) 5, no.3 (September-November 2000), p.57.

join the KFOR in July 1999.⁶²⁰ They were deployed around the town of Prizren, in Dragas and Mamusa, where a large majority of the Kosovar Turks lived. Turkey also accepted about approximately twenty thousand refugees from Kosovo.⁶²¹ Some of them joined their relatives in Turkey and some of them stayed in the refugee camp in Kırklareli. The Turkish authorities also established refugee camps in Albania and Macedonia.

The UNMIK assigned a specific number of seats for the Turks in the Kosovo assembly and allowed the use of the Turkish alphabet and language in assembly sessions and acts.⁶²² However, it fell short of recognizing the former constitutional status of Turkish minority and its native language which were stipulated in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution. For this reason after the end of the war political demands of the Turkish state and Turkish community in Kosovo focused on the restoration of former rights and status.

Russia opposed fiercely and criticized strongly the military intervention of NATO in Kosovo. It was manifest that Russia was concerned about its own territorial integrity and worried about the possibility that it could one day become the target of a humanitarian intervention because of its heavy-handed policies in Chechnya.⁶²³ Russian people also felt ethno-religious affinity and solidarity towards Serbs. However, the most bothering aspect of NATO's operation in Yugoslavia in

⁶²⁰ Uzgel, p.82.

⁶²¹ "Turkey Welcomes First Mass Resettlement of Kosovo Refugees", *CNN*, 06 April 1999 and Carol Migdalovitz, "Kosovo: Greek and Turkish Perspectives", *CRS Report for Congress*, 27 May 1999, p.6.

⁶²² Nazif Mandacı, "Turks of Kosovo and the Protection of Minority Culture at the Local Level", *Perceptions* (Journal of International Affairs) 9 (June-August 2004), p.66.

⁶²³ Vladimir Baranovsky, "The Kosovo Factor in Russia's Foreign Policy", *The International Spectator* 35, no.2 (April 2000), p.115 and Christopher Williams and Zinaida T. Golenkova, "Russia: Walking the Tightrope", in *The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?*, (eds.) Anthony Weymouth and Stanley Henig (New York, NY: Pearson Education, 2001), p.208.

the eyes of the Russian officials was the exclusion of the country from the decision-making process. American-led and NATO-dominated new world order was replacing the UN regime and Russia's objections and protests were counted for little in this new environment.

Moscow's immediate reaction to NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia was to suspend its participation to Founding Act and PfP, withdraw its military mission from Brussels, expel NATO representatives from Moscow, delay the implementation of cooperative programs between Russia and NATO and finally remove Russian troops from the NATO operational command in Bosnia.⁶²⁴ Despite the initial frustration and talks from high pitch, after a short time, Russia had to sit at the table with the other Contact Group members and coordinate the principles of a Kosovo settlement. Moreover, Russia spent time and effort to persuade Milosevic to retreat its military units from Kosovo. It was evident that Moscow was not in a position to resist West for a long time with a desultory government, ruined economy and a ravaged military.

Russia was not allowed to have its own military sector in Kosovo. The Russian military contingent that was composed of 3,600 soldiers and sixteen liaison officers were deployed into US, German and French sectors.⁶²⁵ The contingent was mainly responsible for refurbishing and operating Pristina airport, which was badly damaged during the war. The Russian troops also ran a hospital in the province.

⁶²⁴ Oksana Antonenko, "Russia, NATO and European Security after Kosovo", *Survival* 41, no.4 (1999-2000), p.131 and Dimitri Danilov, "Implications of the NATO Attack against Yugoslavia for European Security and Russian-Western Relations", *Mediterranean Quarterly* 10, no.3 (1999), p.66.

⁶²⁵ Agreed Points on Russian Participation in KFOR. Available [online]: <<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990618a.htm>> [18 October 2008].

After four years of service, the Russian military contingent withdrew from Kosovo on 02 July 2003.⁶²⁶

Consolidation of Economic Ties

The economic and commercial relations between Turkey and the Russian Federation went ahead in an upward fashion during this era despite the brief decline that was encountered in years 1998 and 1999 as a consequence of the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia. The Joint Economic Commission met twice in Moscow and Ankara and The Turkish-Russian Business Council set three convocations in the cities of Antalya, Istanbul and Kazan.

Energy cooperation between the two countries took on a cardinal and permanent form with the realization of the Blue Stream project which came into existence after overcoming consistent and high-toned domestic and foreign objections. The activities of Turkish contractors and hauliers on Russian land, mutual investments and visits of Russian tourists to Turkey's southern vacation resorts in growing numbers constituted other significant links between the two countries. This part of the study will delve into cooperation between Turkey and Russian Federation in the fields of trade, construction, investments, transportation and tourism while attaching special attention to growing energy collaboration.

⁶²⁶ Russian Troops Leave KFOR. Available [online]: <
<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990618a.htm>> [18 October 2008].

The Blue Stream Pipeline: The Foundation of a Perpetual Partnership

On 20 October 2002, the Blue Stream gas pipeline, which was designed to transport Russian natural gas to Turkey across the Black Sea bypassing third countries, was completed. The new pipeline would supplement the existing western route which passed through Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria. The current long direction was making the gas more expensive and Turkey continuously complained about gas being illicitly siphoned off while being shipped through Ukraine and Moldova. A direct pipeline between the two countries might solve these problems.

The total length of the conduit accounted for 1,213 km and it went at a record depth of 2, 150 m below the sea. The pipeline started from Izobilnoye gas plant in southern Russia, ran to Dzhugba on the Black Sea, and then under the Black Sea it reached to the Turkish port of Samsun. After Samsun, the Blue Stream continued towards its final destination Ankara.⁶²⁷ On 30 December 2002, a protocol signing ceremony for the Blue Stream commissioning took place in Durusu, near Samsun and on 20 February 2003; first Russian natural gas was transmitted to Turkey via the new pipeline.⁶²⁸

The Blue Stream gas pipeline came in amidst a lot of domestic and external flak. Turkish critiques stated that the project would lead to a parlous Turkish dependency on Russian energy sources and Russian state would use this infirmity as

⁶²⁷ Nadir Devlet, "Turkey's Energy Policy in the Next Decade", *Perceptions* (Journal of International Affairs) (Winter 2004-2005), p.76.

⁶²⁸ "Marine and Onshore Sections of Blue Stream Gas Pipeline Connected", *Information Directorate, OAO Gazprom*, 21 October 2002 and "Blue Stream Gas Pipeline Commissioned", *Information Directorate, OAO Gazprom*, 30 December 2002.

a wildcard to outsmart Turkey in the Caucasus and Central Asia. They also pointed out to the graft allegations regarding the construction of the Turkish part of the pipeline. The USA also talked about the drawbacks of Turkey getting too ingrained with Russian gas imports and propounded the building of Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline which would cast out Russia.⁶²⁹ The following pages while explaining the construction process of Blue Stream will also try to shed light on the disputes and controversies that came along with it.

The project of natural gas import from Turkmenistan through a submarine pipeline had been suggested by Washington in 1996. The project was activated on 29 October 1998, with the signing of a framework agreement between Turkey and Turkmenistan according to which Turkmenistan would deliver thirty billion cubic meters of gas per year; sixteen billion cubic meters of which would be consumed in Turkey and the remainder would be transported to Europe.⁶³⁰ On 19 February 1999, the Turkmen government entered into an agreement with General Electric and Bechtel Group for a feasibility study and on August 06, Shell joined the consortium.⁶³¹ Meanwhile, Turkey and Turkmenistan agreed on a commercial agreement on 21 May 1999 and this was followed by the signature of an intergovernmental declaration by Turkey, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia during the Istanbul OSCE Summit on 18 November 1999.

The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project appealed to Turkey because of two primary reasons. The project proposed the construction of a pipeline from

⁶²⁹ Gökhan Bacık, "The Blue Stream Project, Energy Cooperation and Conflicting Interests", *Turkish Studies* 2, no.2 (Autumn 2001), p.89.

⁶³⁰ Türkmenistan ile Doğal Gaz Alım-Satım Anlaşması. Available [online]: <<http://www.botas.gov.tr>> [26 October 2008].

⁶³¹ "Conference on Natural Gas Transit and Storage in Southeast Europe: An Opportunity to Diversify European Gas Supply?", *International Energy Agency* (31 May-01 June 2002), p.77.

Turkmenistan to Turkey running in parallel to the BTC crude oil pipeline until it joined the Eastern Anatolia natural gas transmission line near Erzurum.⁶³² Such a pipeline that transmitted natural gas to Europe through Turkish territory by circumventing both Russia and Iran would earn Turkey a distinct advantage in its regional rivalry with these countries. Moreover, the grave economic crisis in Russia that erupted in the summer of 1998 raised question marks in the minds of the Turkish policy makers about the actualization of the Blue Stream gas pipeline.

Turkmenistan embraced the project full-heartedly as it would reduce the country's dependence on Russia as the major export channel. Some of the gas reserves (about twenty billion cubic meters) of Turkmenistan were exported via Russia to western countries and Ukraine, although Turkmenistan had been complaining with high fees imposed from Russian government to the transit of its gas through the Russian pipeline.⁶³³

A possible construction of a rival pipeline to Blue Stream alarmed Russia. Moscow, while opposing the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline by indicating the unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea, precipitated its efforts to find sponsors to finance the Blue Stream. In February 1999, Gazprom and the Italian ENI signed a Memorandum of Understanding for joint participation in the Blue Stream project implementation. On 16 November 1999, the two companies registered a special-purpose Russian-Italian entity, Blue Stream Pipeline B.V., on a parity basis in Netherlands.⁶³⁴ One week later, on 23 November 1999, the Russian- Italian joint

⁶³² Ibid, p.79.

⁶³³ Antonio Tricarico, "The Blue Stream-Black Sea Gas Pipeline Project", *EcaWatch* (September 2001). Available [online]: < http://www.eca-watch.org/problems/oil_gas_mining/caspoil/bluestream.html > [26 October 2008].

⁶³⁴ Gazprom: About/Major Projects/Blue Stream/History. Available [online]: < <http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article8895.shtml> > [26 October 2008].

venture signed a 1.7 billion dollar contract in Moscow with an international consortium headed by Saipem S.p.A., part of the Italian ENI Group, Bouygues Offshore SA, Katran-K, Mitsui&Co, Sumitomo Corp. and Itoshu Corporation to build the underwater section of the Blue Stream project.⁶³⁵ These agreements removed Turkish qualms about the financial viability of the scheme.

The running into snags of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline also played into the hands of the proponents of the Blue Stream pipeline. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan hassled over ownership of the Caspian Sea resources and Turkmenistan wanted Azerbaijan to pay gas debts from early 1990s, although these were probably incurred by Azeri private firms. Moreover, Turkmen state closed its embassy in Baku as a sign of its displeasure. On top of these, the discovery of rich gas resources in Shah Deniz gas field of Azerbaijan in 1999 led to a lost of appetite to Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline on the Azerbaijani side.

There were also strong indications that in Turkey Blue Stream had a clique of advocates that was composed of owners of big construction conglomerates who were engaged in business activities in Russia, oil and gas executives from Turkish state petroleum pipeline company BOTAŞ, officials from the Turkish Energy Ministry and leading members of the coalition partner Motherland Party. Later, charges were also levelled against Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State Mesut Yılmaz who also headed the Motherland Party, for lobbying in favour of Blue Stream in order to help his construction magnate cronies to secure deals in Russia and awarding the contract to build pipeline's Turkish section to his associates without a tender.⁶³⁶

⁶³⁵ Tricarico

⁶³⁶ These allegations were investigated by State Security Court in Ankara and several high ranking functionaries of the Ministry of Energy were put into prison. This White Energy inquisition also led to the resignation of Energy Minister Cümhur Ersümer from his post on 26 April 2001. See Amberin

With the signature of a protocol between Turkey and Russia regarding the taxation of Blue Stream pipeline project on 27 November 1999, it became clear that Russian gas won over the Turkmen one.⁶³⁷ This gave rise to a strain in relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan and with shelving of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project, Ashgabat compelled to sign a treaty with Russia to sell its gas to this country.

Turkey's gas imports from Russian Federation through the Western route continued on an accelerating basis in this period. Although Turkey's natural gas transmissions from Nigeria and Iran started in 1999 and 2001 respectively and Algeria kept on shipping deliveries to Turkey, as will be seen from Table 3, Russia between the years 1998-2002 solely provided sixty-seven percent of Turkey's natural gas demand. Moreover, an agreement was signed on 18 February 1998 between the Russian Federation and Turusgaz, a Turkish-Russian joint venture which was made up of Gazprom (45 percent), BOTAŞ (35 percent) and GAMA (20 percent), to deliver annually eight billion cubic meters of Russian natural gas to Turkey over a period of twenty-three years.⁶³⁸

Zaman, "Corruption Scandal Threatens to Sink Blue Stream Pipeline Project", *Business & Economics*, 31 May 2001 and Robert M. Cutler, "The Blue Stream Gas Project: Not a Pipe-Dream Anymore", *CACI Analyst*, 08 January 2001.

⁶³⁷ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Rus Doğal Gazının Karadeniz Altından Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne Sevkiyatına İlişkin Protokol. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFFile.aspx > [26 October 2008]. The General Parliamentary Assembly of the Russian Federation ratified Blue Stream Tax Protocol in December 1999 whereas it was certified by Turkish Parliament in June 2000. See *Turkish Press Review*, 23 December 1999 and Ayhan Demirbaş, Turkey's Energy Overview Beginning in the Twenty-First Century", *Energy Conversion and Management* 43, no.14 (September 2002), p.1884.

⁶³⁸ Turusgaz-Rusya Federasyonu ile Doğal Gaz Alım-Satım Anlaşması (Batı). Available [online]: < <http://www.botas.gov.tr> > [26 October 2008].

Table 3: Natural Gas Transportation by Years (Million Contract Cum)⁶³⁹

Years	Russian Federation	Iran	Nigeria (LNG)	Algeria (LNG)
1998	6.539	-	-	3.051
1999	8.693	-	77	3.256
2000	10.079	-	780	3.962
2001	10.931	115	1.337	3.985
2002	11.603	669	1.274	4.078

Another aspect of the energy cooperation between Turkey and Russia came into the picture with Russia's vending of electric power to Turkey through Georgia. According to a deal contracted between Russian, Georgian and Turkish power engineering specialists in 2000, UES Russia began to export electric power to Turkey via Georgian high voltage power lines Kavkasioni (500 kV) and Achara (220 kV). For transit service Georgia obtained the right to sell a certain part of electric power to Turkey thus reduced some of its energy debts to Russia and Turkey.⁶⁴⁰

Bilateral Trade

The trade volume between Turkey and the Russian Federation perpetuated its ascending trend during this period except the years 1998, 1999 and 2001 when both countries suffered from serious and convulsive economic crises. As will be seen below in Table 4, at the end of the 2002, Turkish exports to Russia increased twenty-

⁶³⁹ Source: BOTAS, Natural Gas Transportation, Facilities and Trade. Available [online]: <http://www.botas.gov.tr/eng/activities/ng_ttt.asp> [26 October 2008].

⁶⁴⁰ "Turkey Received over 107 million kW/h of Russian and Georgian Electric Power", *Caspian News Agency*, 07 September 2001.

seven percent, imports from Russia accrued thirteen percent and the bilateral trade between the two countries exceeded five billion dollars, demonstrating sixteen percent accretion compared to previous year.

Table 4: Turkey-Russia Foreign Trade (million \$)⁶⁴¹

Years	Turkish Exports	Turkish Imports	Trade Balance	Trade Volume
1998	1348	2155	-807	3503
1999	588.7	2374.1	-1785.4	2962.8
2000	643.9	3886.6	-3242.7	4530.5
2001	924.1	3435.7	-2511.6	4359.8
2002	1172	3891.7	-2719.7	5063.7

What was remarkable about Turkish-Russian commerce throughout these years was the fact that trade imbalance totted up more than threefold to the disadvantage of Turkey. This disequilibrium emanated from the characteristics of the items that were included in bilateral trade. As demonstrated in Table 3 of Appendix B, Turkey mostly sent off clothes, accessories, shoes, and citrus fruits to Russia although in the last years iron and steel products, motorized vehicles and electrical machines commenced to take part in export activities. These imported goods could easily be replaced with the domestic ones. The August 1998 fiscal crisis in Russia led to a sharp decline in income and purchasing power of Russian consumers. The price of the products became more important than ever and locally manufactured goods were substituted for the imported ones.⁶⁴² Furthermore, in some of the regions of

⁶⁴¹ Source: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Available [online]:

<http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=624> [28 October 2008].

⁶⁴² Şaban Gül, Project Manager, interview by author, Russia-Turkey Business and Friendship Association (RUTİD), Istanbul, Turkey, 25 February 2008.

Russian Federation, imported goods mainly from Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the European countries shipped via Moscow were replaced with imports from China and Korea coming through Novosibirsk markets.⁶⁴³ In this adverse and handicapped financial environment, Turkish exports to Russia fell off thirty-four percent in 1998 and Turkish small business owners and entrepreneurs who relied on exports to Russian Federation had severe hardships.

When we look into the Turkish imports from the Russian Federation in Table 4 in Appendix B, we see that fossil fuels, iron, steel and aluminium products, paper and cardboards and fertilizers loomed large. As the goods Turkey imported from Russia were mostly composed of energy items, metals and industrial products which Turkey was either deprived of or unable to manufacture in the domestic market, Ankara could not forgo them easily. Thus, even in year 2001, when the country went through one of the worst economic crises of its history, Russian exports to Turkey only descended twelve percent.

The Russian August 1998 economic crisis had a detrimental impact on unofficial suitcase trade between Turkey and the Russian Federation and it dropped off thirty-seven percent in 1998. The decline continued in 1999 with Russian luggage traders heading towards new markets such as China, Greece, Italy, Pakistan, Poland and United Arab Emirates. As seen from the Table 5, beginning from 2000, suitcase trade between the two states registered an upward drift and it reached to 4.065 billion dollars in 2002.

⁶⁴³ Vadim Radaev, "The Development of Small Entrepreneurship in Russia", *UN University WIDER (World Institute for Development Economics Research) Discussion Paper* No: 2001/135 (November 2001), p.20.

Table 5: Turkey-Russian Federation Suitcase Trade (million \$)⁶⁴⁴

Years	Income
1998	3689
1999	2255
2000	2946
2001	3039
2002	4065

The suitcase trade between Turkey and Russia was also subject to disruptions in the face of rising political tensions between Turkey and Russia. When the Turkish customs officials stopped the Maltese freighter *Natasha-1* with Russian personnel which they suspected of carrying S-300 missiles to Greek Cypriots in Dardanelles in June 1998; Russia, two weeks after this incident, obviously in retaliation, sent back to Turkey Professor *Vise* and *Vernadsky* ships loaded with the goods Russian suitcase traders purchased from Istanbul.⁶⁴⁵

Construction and Contracting Services

The number of the tenders Turkish construction companies obtained in Russia diminished visibly as a result of the contraction in the Russian economy. Between years 1998-2002 Turkish firms finished 203 projects with a value of 1.849 billion dollars.⁶⁴⁶ The number of the employees recruited for construction work was also dwindled twelve percent and figures stood at 42,345.⁶⁴⁷

⁶⁴⁴ Source: Türkiye Merkez Bankası Ödemeler Dengesi İstatistikleri. Available [online]: < <http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/odemedenge/odemelerdengesi.xls> > [29 October 2008].

⁶⁴⁵ “Laleli’de Nataşa Misillemesi Telaşı”, *Hürriyet*, 01 July 1998.

⁶⁴⁶ TC Moskova Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği, Türkiye İş Kurumu Genel Müdürlüğü, Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı Dış İlişkiler ve Yurtdışı Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, cited in Oleg A. Kolobov, Aleksandr A. Kornilov, Fatih Özbay, *Çağdaş Türk-Rus İlişkileri: Sorunlar ve İşbirliği Alanları 1992-2005* (Istanbul: Tasam Yayınları, 2006), p.42.

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid.

The Turkish construction corporations, similar to previous period, were involved in diverse contracting services ranging from construction of public buildings, business and shopping centers, airports, industrial plants, dwellings, hotels, hospitals, education facilities; restoration of administrative structures plus embassies and lastly renovation of historical and architectural complexes.⁶⁴⁸

The scope of activities of Russian contracting companies in Turkey concentrated on building gas pipelines and constructing dam and hydroelectric power plants. Stroytransgaz completed the Turkish section (Samsun-Ankara) of the Blue Stream pipeline in 2001.⁶⁴⁹ SMU-4, in partnership with Turkish Tepe İnşaat, finished the Kayseri part of Sivas-Kayseri natural gas pipeline in 2002.⁶⁵⁰

A joint consortium of Russian Technostroyexport, Turkish Erg İnşaat and Swiss ABB, Sulzer Hydro, Hydro Vevey and Stucky Companies started the construction of Deriner Dam near the Black Sea town of Artvin in April 1998.⁶⁵¹ Russian Energomachexport and Turkish Baytur and Özdemir won the tender concerning building of Torul Dam and hydroelectric power station near the Black Sea city of Gümüşhane in October 2000.⁶⁵² Construction would be performed by Baytur and Özdemir while Energomachexport would be responsible for the supply of equipment and infrastructure services.⁶⁵³ Moreover, contracts for the construction of Bayram and Bağlık hydroelectric power plants by a consortium of

⁶⁴⁸ Check Appendix C for the list of construction and contracting works carried out by Turkish firms in Russian Federation in this period.

⁶⁴⁹ Stroytransgaz, Completed Oil and Gas Construction Projects. Available [online]: <http://www.stroytransgaz.com/projects/turkey/samsun-ankara_gas_pipeline> [01 November 2008].

⁶⁵⁰ Metin Özasan and Haluk Şeftalici, *Kayseri City Development Report* (Ankara: SPO Publications, April 2002), p.206.

⁶⁵¹ “Çoruh’a Altın Kelepçe”, *Hürriyet*, 27 April 1998 and Mehmet Erdoğan Elgin, “İlişkilerin Yönünde Nükleer Etkili Olacak”, *Bloomberg Businessweek Türkiye*, no.45, 27 December 2009, p.16.

⁶⁵² “Torul Barajı ve HES İhalesi Tamam”, *Dünya*, 02 October 2000.

⁶⁵³ Energomachexport, Hydroturbine Equipment. Available [online]: <http://energomachexport.com/common/data/pub/files/articles/2553/hydroturb_buklet_ENG.pdf> [01 November 2008].

Technostroyexport, Erg İnşaat, Vemb GmbH, and GE Energy were ratified in 2002.⁶⁵⁴

Mutual Investments

As of October 2002, Turkish investments in Russian Federation amounted to 362.4 million dollars and Turkey ranked at the tenth place among countries that actualized foreign direct investments in the country.⁶⁵⁵ Turkish companies by and large invested in FMCG, retail, banking and industrial sectors in Russia.

Ramenka Company was founded in Moscow in 1997 as a joint undertaking of Koç and Enka. The retail chain spread rapidly and reached to fourteen stores at the end of 2002.⁶⁵⁶ Ramenka hypermarkets and shopping malls sold European and Russian brands of foods, beverages, clothings, cleaning products, textile goods and small household appliances.⁶⁵⁷

Anadolu Group established Moscow Efes Brewery in 1999 in partnership with the EBRD and City Government of Moscow. In that same year, the firm launched the Sary-Melnik beer brand and production commenced in the malt

⁶⁵⁴ Türkiye - Rusya Baraj ve HES Projelerinde Yeni Gelişmeler. Available [online]: < http://www.ersumer.org/enerji_son/hes_proje01.htm> [01 November 2008] and Ministry for Economic Development of the Russian Federation, Press and Information Office, 27 April 2005. Available [online]: < http://www.economy.gov.ru/wps/wcm/connect/economylib/mert/welcome_eng/pressservice/eventschronicle/doc1115373379875> [01 November 2008].

⁶⁵⁵ Rusya Federasyonu Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Verileri, cited in Oleg A. Kolobov, Aleksandr A. Kornilov, Fatih Özbay, *Çağdaş Türk-Rus İlişkileri: Sorunlar ve İşbirliği Alanları 1992-2005*, (İstanbul: Tasam Yayınları, 2006), p.65.

⁶⁵⁶ Yalçın Bayer, “Rusya’da Kadınlar Güzeldir Lalelim!”, *Hürriyet*, 17 December 2002.

⁶⁵⁷ Ramstore, Common Information. Available [online]: < <http://www.ramstore.ru/eng/about/history/>> [02 November 2008].

production facility in Moscow, adjacent to Moscow Efes Brewery.⁶⁵⁸ Stary Melnik became Moscow's leading beer in local premium segment two years later, in 2001.

Şişecam put into operation in June 2002, in Vladimir region of Russian Federation, the first furnace of the Ruscam Gorohovets Plant with a capacity of ninety thousand tons/year with the purpose of fulfilling the demand for high quality beer bottles of the country's ever growing beer market. The Moscow sales office of the glass packaging business was also opened in that same year.⁶⁵⁹

Russian market witnessed the investments of medium-sized Turkish enterprises along with the big ones in early 2000s. Eroğlu Group's denim products company Colin's Jeans which opened its first store in Moscow in 1995, augmented the number of its shops in Russia and speeded up its wholesale and retail operations in the country. Denizbank opened its Moscow branch in 1998. In April 2000, Turkish company Meksan and Russian financial-industrial corporation BIN set up a joint venture to produce pumps for gasoline stations in Moscow.⁶⁶⁰ Muya opened a slipper factory in Moscow⁶⁶¹ and Levent Kimya established a detergent plant in Klin in 2002.⁶⁶² A döner factory and an aluminium exterior plant were other small investments that were realized by Turkish entrepreneurs in Russian Federation.⁶⁶³

Russian investments in Turkey were in meager proportions compared to their Turkish equivalents in Russia. They stood at 62.27 million dollars at the end of 2002

⁶⁵⁸ Anadolu Efes, History. Available [online]: <http://www.anadoluefes.com/our_group/history.aspx> [02 November 2008].

⁶⁵⁹ Şişecam, History. Available [online]: <<http://www.sisecam.com/history/chronology.html>> [02 November 2008].

⁶⁶⁰ Polina Zvereva, "Turkish Joint Venture to Produce Gas Pumps", *The Russia Journal* 56 (10 April 2000). Available [online]: <<http://www.russajournal.com/node/2962>> [02 November 2008] and "Turkish Company Launches First Factory in Putin's Russia", *Turkish Daily News*, 01 April 2000.

⁶⁶¹ Muya Hakkında. Available [online]: <<http://www.muya.com/test/new/muyahakkında.asp>> [02 November 2008].

⁶⁶² Levent Kimya, History. Available [online]: <<http://www.leventkimya.com.tr/index.asp?islem=icerik&key=43&lang=EN>> [02 November 2008].

⁶⁶³ Yavuz Donat, "Rusya'da Bunları Gördük", *Sabah*, 06 June 2000.

and the share of Russian investments in Turkey was only 0.01 percent.⁶⁶⁴ The activities of the Russian corporations such as Gazprom, Stroytransgaz, Technostroyexport and Turusgaz, as mentioned in preceding pages, were condensed in pipeline construction, gas distribution and providing engineering and technical supervision services.

Tourism

The Russian economic crisis of summer 1998 adversely affected the trips of Russian travellers to Turkey and as it is demonstrated in Table 6, the number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey decreased thirty-five percent in 1999. The stabilization of the Russian economy led to a rise in the income levels of the Russian people in the subsequent years and this was noticeably reflected in their desire to go vacation. The number of the Russians that preferred Turkey for their excursions hit 676,958 in 2002 and Russia came at the third place after Germany and England in terms of the numbers of its citizens that travelled to Turkey. Majority of the Russians still wandered Turkey's summer sunspots, whereas Russian vacationers choosing mountain resorts such as Uludağ and Palandöken scaled up steadily.

At the intergovernmental level, Turkey and the Russian Federation executed the first Tourism Joint Commission meeting on 28-31 March 2001 in Moscow and a protocol was signed between the representatives of the two states to further vivify and improve cooperation in the field of tourism.⁶⁶⁵

⁶⁶⁴ T.C. Başbakanlık Hazine Müsteşarlığı, Doğrudan Yabancı Sermaye Yatırımları, İzin Verilen Yabancı Sermayenin Ülkelere Dağılımı (1980-2003). Available [online]: < <http://www.hazine.gov.tr/irj/portal/anonymous?NavigationTarget=navurl://831679608c6ba2da641258f88362f886> > [02 November 2008].

⁶⁶⁵ “Türkiye-Rusya I. Dönem Turizm Karma Komisyonu Protokolü”, *Resmî Gazete*, no. 24570 (01 November 2001). Available [online]: < <http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/#>> [03 November 2008].

Table 6: Number of Russian Tourists Visiting Turkey⁶⁶⁶

Years	Number
1998	676,183
1999	438,719
2000	676, 958
2001	757, 446
2002	946, 511

Transportation

The Turkish-Russian Joint Transportation Committee met twice between the years 1998-2002 and the attendees mostly discussed the disparity in land transportation between the two countries. The proportion of Turkish carriers in total land transportation between Turkey and Russia was eighty-nine percent in 2000; it grew to 97.5 percent the next year, and reached to 98 percent in 2002.⁶⁶⁷

At the Sixth gathering of the Turkish-Russian Joint Transportation Committee that took place in Moscow between 16 and 17 January 2001, the Russian side once again voiced its discomfort concerning the imbalance in land transportation and claimed that this situation was emanated from the disadvantageous working conditions of the Russian transporters in Turkish borders. These grievances were listed as: the low freight charges, insufficient trailer usage in Turkey, limitations set

⁶⁶⁶ Source: T.C. Turizm Bakanlığı, Sınır Giriş-Çıkış İstatistikleri, 1984-2002 Yıllarında Ülkemize Gelen Yabancıların Milliyetlerine Göre Dağılımı. Available [online]: < <http://www.kultur.gov.tr/TR/BelgeGoster.aspx?F6E10F8892433CFF2B81939FD5B60AFAFFDE13C621852F44>> [03 November 2008].

⁶⁶⁷ “Türk-Rus Ortak Ulaştırma Komisyonu VI. Dönem Toplantısı Protokolü”, *Resmi Gazete*, no. 24353 (25 March 2001). Available [online]: < <http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/#>> [08 November 2008] and “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ulaştırma Bakanlığı ile Rusya Federasyonu Ulaştırma Bakanlığı Arasındaki Görüşme Protokolü”, *Resmi Gazete*, no. 24810 (09 July 2002). Available [online]: < <http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/#>> [08 November 2008].

for the fuel in depot of the Russian trucks and the long periods of waiting for loading-unloading procedures and return cargo.⁶⁶⁸

Turkish party responded that the freight charges were designated according to the market economy principles and added that Turkish transporters also spent several hours in Russian Customs Administration due to formalities and drew attention the diminishment in the numbers of the Turkish vehicles that drove off to Russian Federation for shipping purposes.⁶⁶⁹ Turkish side also stated that Turkish exporters abstained from using Russian trailers because of their small sizes.

The officials from Turkish and Russian Ministries of Transportation met in Moscow on 23-25 April 2002 and agreed on a bonus system of one-to-four. According to this new arrangement, in return of each Russian truck carrying shipment to Turkey, Russian Ministry of Transportation would provide four free-of-charge transit passes to Turkey.⁶⁷⁰

The promising economic relations of immediate post-Cold War period continued in a rising trend in the succeeding years despite the upheaval in the economies of Russia and Turkey precipitated by the financial crises of 1998 and 2001. Energy cooperation elevated to higher level with the completion of the Blue Stream pipeline project that would directly transport Russian natural gas to Turkey as well as with Turkey's commencement of purchasing electricity from Russia. Turkish investments in Russia grew in size and varied in scope. Not only small and medium sized Turkish firms but also big Turkish conglomerates along with prominent

⁶⁶⁸ "Türk-Rus Ortak Ulaştırma Komisyonu VI. Dönem Toplantısı Protokolü", *Resmi Gazete*, no. 24353 (25 March 2001). Available [online]: < <http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/#>> [08 November 2008].

⁶⁶⁹ While 27,000 Turkish vehicles visited Russia in 1997 for carrying intentions, it fell sixty-eight percent in 2002 and stood at 8,707. See Oğuz, p.197.

⁶⁷⁰ "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ulaştırma Bakanlığı ile Rusya Federasyonu Ulaştırma Bakanlığı Arasındaki Görüşme Protokolü", *Resmi Gazete*, no. 24810 (09 July 2002). Available [online]: < <http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/#>> [08 November 2008].

industrial corporations carried out investments in diverse sectors of the Russian economy.

The next section will examine the state of military relations between Turkey and Russia in the late 1990s and early 2000s which took place in the form of exchange of high-level visits, signing of agreements to improve military-technical cooperation and establishment of Joint Military Cooperation Committee. A significant development was the foundation of a naval cooperation task force in the Black Sea which brought together Turkey and Russia for the first time in a joint security structure.

Momentum in Military Relations

Turkey and Russia expanded cooperation in the military sphere between the years 1998-2002 though in moderate level compared to political and economic realms. Turkish Chief of General Staff General İsmail Hakkı Karadayı met his interlocutor Anatoly Kvashnin on his two-day visit to Moscow on 18-20 May 1998 and they concluded a Memorandum of Understanding to diversify and improve military relations between the two countries.⁶⁷¹ Kvashnin came to Turkey in January 2002 and discussed with the new Turkish Chief of General Staff General Hüseyin Kivrıkoğlu the issues of bilateral military cooperation, Russia-NATO relations and international terrorism.⁶⁷² A Framework Agreement on Cooperation in the Military Field and Agreement and Cooperation of Training of Military Personnel were also

⁶⁷¹ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Genelkurmay Başkanlığı ve Rusya Federasyonu Silahlı Kuvvetleri Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Arasında Mutabakat Zaptı. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PDF_Pool/showUAFile.aspx> [08 November 2008].

⁶⁷² Igor Torbakov, "Turkey-Russia: Competition and Cooperation", *Eurasia Insight*, 27 December 2002.

signed in the course of Kvashnin's visit to Turkey. Lastly, Kıvrıkoğlu was received by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov on 04 June 2002 at the time of his visit to Moscow. They consulted over the status and prospects of bilateral military and military-technical cooperation as well as Russia-NATO affairs, the situation in the Chechen Republic and the organizations and foundations in Turkey that collected monetary resources with the aim of transferring them to Chechnya to financially support the separatist movement therein.⁶⁷³

Another significant development in the area of bilateral military relation was the establishment of Joint Military Cooperation Committee between Russia and Turkey on 16 May 2002 in line with the 1994 agreement.⁶⁷⁴ The committee convened its first meeting in September 2002 in Ankara.

Turkey and Russia also commenced to come together within the framework of a multilateral security structure, Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force (BLACKSEAFOR), along with four Black Sea littoral countries, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania and Ukraine. The idea of setting up a multinational naval peace task force was initiated by Turkey at the Second Chiefs of the Black Sea Navies meeting which was held in Varna, Bulgaria in 1998. After three-year of talks and negotiations, the founding agreement of BLACKSEAFOR was signed in Istanbul on 02 April 2001.⁶⁷⁵ The principal duties of the task group would be search and rescue operations, humanitarian assistance, mine counter measures, environmental protection and

⁶⁷³ On the Meeting of the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov with Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Turkey Army General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu. Available [online]: < <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/8.html> > [08 November 2008].

⁶⁷⁴ See "20 Nisan 1994 Tarihinde Moskova'da İmzalanan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Askeri Teknik Konular ve Savunma Sanayi Alanında İşbirliği Yapılmasına Dair Anlaşma'nın 5. Maddesinde Yer Alan Karma Komisyonun Teşkiline İlişkin Protokol", *Resmî Gazete*, no. 24993 (14 January 2003). Available [online]: < <http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/01/20030114.htm> > [24 November 2008].

⁶⁷⁵ BLACKSEAFOR Chronology. Available [online]: < http://www.blackseafor.org/English/Chronology_Home.asp > [08 November 2008].

goodwill visits.⁶⁷⁶ The BLACKSEAFOR started to conduct joint activations right after its foundation. The first was a search and rescue mission that took place in Turkey and the other was a marine demining activity that was realized in Ukraine.

Turkish-Russian relations were transformed into a less conflict-laden and more conciliatory state starting with the end of 1990s. Competition in the South Caucasus and Central Asia endured albeit at a lower profile. While Azerbaijan and Georgia occupied the central place in Turkey's regional policy in the South Caucasus, Russia enhanced its economic and security ties with Armenia through military agreements that granted more rights to Russian forces in Armenia and via assets-for-debt deals which secured Russian control over significant energy and industrial enterprises of the Armenian state. Turkish Central Asian policy, different from the previous period, followed a moderate course and was mostly driven by economic motives. On the other hand, Russia's opening to Central Asia spurred by the new President in Kremlin recorded partial success as although Russia invigorated its political, economic and security ties with the Central Asian Republics, it had to recognize the involvement of another player in the Central Asian chessboard after the USA set its foot to the region in the course of its military campaign in Afghanistan.

The watershed in Turkish-Russian relations came into being in the wake of the two disruptive economic crises both countries underwent one after another. With a run-down economy that was in urgent need of cash, Russia started to see Turkey not just as a relentless competitor that continuously strove to curb the Russian influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia but also as a potential client of its rich natural gas resources.

⁶⁷⁶ BLACKSEAFOR Agreement. Available [online]: <
http://www.blackseafor.org/English/Agreement_Home.asp> [08 November 2008].

Compromise and accommodation in its intricate relationship with Russia was also appealing to Turkey as large Russian market could cure some of the ills of the severe financial crisis that had hit most of the Turkish companies both large and small. The primary factors that led to change of mind on Turkish foreign policy decision makers with regard to Russia were increasing calls coming from the Turkish business circles that have significant investments in Russia for a rapprochement between Turkey and Russia which would obviously help them in expanding their businesses in this country, joining forces of some Turkish construction firms with some Turkish and Russian officials for the signing of the Blue Stream gas pipeline agreement and finally the emergence of new Turkish-Russian organizations such as Russian-Turkish Business and Friendship Association (RUTİD) which promoted closer economic, social and cultural ties with Russia.

So, despite the ongoing rivalry in the South Caucasus and Central Asia and the existence of different point of views pertaining to some regional affairs such as the Kosovo War, elevating economic relations crowned by the construction of Blue Stream gas pipeline project led to a rapprochement in political matters between the two countries which resulted in the signing of Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia on 16 November 2001 that envisaged a common foreign policy outlook and joint course of action on behalf of Turkey and Russia for the creation of the conditions for peace, stability and welfare in a vast area encompassing the Balkan, Black Sea, South Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East regions.

CHAPTER IV

COOPERATION AND MULTI-DIMENSIONAL PARTNERSHIP

The Turkish-Russian relations gained a visible momentum in political, economic, military as well as social and intellectual dimensions during the most part of the 2000s. Frequent high-level visits, direct contacts and regular consultations helped the political relationship to ground on a solid and steady foundation. Despite their ongoing competition in the South Caucasus and Central Asia and discrepant standings on the issues of Cyprus and Kosovo, Russia and Turkey commenced to find themselves having similar or close views concerning many regional problems. Both Ankara and Moscow eschew from letting the USA enter the Black Sea basin, they underline the necessity of preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Iraqi state; the two countries also declare at every rostrum that they are against resorting to military force to settle the issues of Iran and Syria as well as the Palestinian-Israeli dispute.

In the economic area, Russia continues to be the major energy provider of Turkey whereas Turkish investments in Russia are on the upswing. Russian capital also started to flow into Turkey in the form of telecommunications, energy and manufacturing projects and Russian tourists kept on setting out for Turkey in large numbers to spend their vacations in holiday resorts therein.

Business-to-business relations have reached to new dimensions thanks to the efforts of Turkish and Russian business people who carried out serious investments in each other's country. The activities of economic organizations that were

established by Turkish manufacturers and service providers who did business to Russia should also be mentioned as whenever Turkish companies encountered difficulties in their interaction with the Russian authorities, they actively stepped in and struggled to solve the problem by engaging Turkish officials as well as government members.

In the area of security, military officials of Turkey and Russia periodically visit each other and hold negotiations. Russia participates to the Operation Black Sea Harmony, a naval manoeuvre put in action by Turkey, with the objective of deterring terrorism and asymmetric threats in the Black Sea.

It should also be noted that mixed marriages, student exchanges, visits of tourists all had positive impact on strengthening of social and cultural bonds between Turkey and Russia. A novelty in this period was the foundation of education, culture, friendship associations by Turkish and Russian citizens in the cities of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Antalya, Moscow and St. Petersburg which contributed to the development of social and cultural ties between two societies through opening of Turkish and Russian language courses, organizing exhibitions, holding conferences and extending help in legal matters.

There is also progress in cooperation between Turkey and Russia in academic and intellectual level. Turkish and Russian academics, journalists, field specialists occasionally come together in conferences, workshops, round-table meetings and discuss the current state and future of the relationship.

This last chapter of the study will examine the growing Turkish-Russian political cooperation and dialogue in the Black Sea and Middle East as well as continuing augmentation of collaboration in economic and military spheres. The areas of competition such as the situation in Transcaucasia and Central Asia; besides

the points of disagreement, precisely, the questions of Cyprus and Kosovo will also be analyzed profoundly in the following pages.

Deepening and Intensification of Political Relations

The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül carried out the first official visit in eight years from Turkey to Russia at the level of Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23-26 February 2004. During the visit Abdullah Gül was accompanied by a large group of Turkish businessmen and received by Russian President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Chairman of the Federation Council of the Federation Assembly Sergey Mironov, Minister of Property Relations Farit Gazizullin and the Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov. Abdullah Gül gave a speech at the Russian Diplomacy Academy and partook in the convention of the Turkish-Russian Business Council.

In the course of the visit, 2004-2005 Consultations Programme between the Two Ministries of Foreign Affairs, an Intergovernmental Agreement about Cooperation in the Area of Search and Rescue in the Black Sea, Agreement between the Ministries of Transportation on Mutual Recognition of the Diplomas of the Naval Crews and a Protocol on Cooperation between the Archive Associations of Turkey and the Russian Federation were signed.⁶⁷⁷ During his meetings with the Russian officials, Abdullah Gül also exchanged views on the issue of fight against

⁶⁷⁷ “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakan Yardımcısı, Dışişleri Bakanı A. Gül’ün Moskova’ya Gerçekleştirdiği Ziyaret Konusunda Açıklama”, Rusya Federasyonu’nun Türkiye Büyükelçiliği, Basın Bildirisi, no.9, 05 March 2004. Available [online]: <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t32.html> [30 November 2008].

international terrorism and on the resolution of the problems in the Caucasus, Afghanistan, Iraq and Near East.⁶⁷⁸

The Head of the State of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin arrived in Turkey on 5 December 2004 for a two-day official visit with a delegation of many high-level representatives including the President of the Republic of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaymiyev, the President of the Republic of Ingushetia Murat Zyazikov, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov and the Industry and Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko.⁶⁷⁹ Putin's visit was marked as a watershed in the history of Turkish-Russian relations as he became the second Russian President that had ever set foot in Turkey.⁶⁸⁰ The Russian President conducted bilateral meetings with his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly Bülent Arınç. Putin also participated and delivered a speech at the Russian-Turkish Business Forum which was organized by the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey.

In the course of bilateral negotiations during the visit, Putin and Sezer put their signatures on a document on 06 December 2004 which was called Joint Declaration on Deepening of Friendship and Multi-dimensional Partnership. By attributing to their unique geopolitical location as part of both European and Asian continents, Russia and Turkey asseverated that they would continue to contribute to

⁶⁷⁸ “Moskova’da Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakan Yardımcısı, Dışişleri Bakanı A.Gül ile Yapılan Görüşmeler Ardından Düzenlenen Basın Toplantısında Rusya Federasyonu Dışişleri Bakanı İ.S.İvanov’un Demeci ve Basına Yapılan Açıklamaları, 25.02.2004”, Rusya Federasyonu’nun Türkiye Büyükelçiliği. Available [online]: < http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t27.html> [30 November 2008].

⁶⁷⁹ Putin’s visit to Turkey was originally scheduled for 02-04 September 2004 but it was put off because of the attack in Beslan on 01 September 2004.

⁶⁸⁰ The first formal visit to Turkey from Russia at the presidential level had been actualized by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Nikolai Podgorny on 11 April 1972. See Serkan Demirtaş, “Karadeniz’de İlk Rüzgar”, *Strateji* 1, no.8 (23 August 2004), p.4.

the development of security, peace, stability and welfare in Eurasia region.

Furthermore, noting that they held close or similar positions regarding the majority of regional and international matters, the two states pledged to diversify and deepen their already improved relationship and advance it to the level of enhanced multi-dimensional partnership.⁶⁸¹

Other agreements and memorandums that were signed between the ministries and companies of Turkey and Russian Federation at the time of Putin's visit were: Agreement on Preventing Incidents at Sea Outside the Limits of Territorial Waters, Agreement on Mutual Protection of the Results of Intellectual Activity Used and Received in the Course of Bilateral Military and Technical Cooperation, Agreement on Mutual Protection of Secret Information and Materials Delivered or Created During Bilateral Cooperation in the Defense Industry, Memorandum on Cooperation between the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry and the Centre of Strategic Research of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Turkey, Memorandum on Developing Cooperation in the Gas Sphere between Gazprom and Botaş and finally, Agreement on Cooperation between Vneshekonombank, Roseksimbank and Eximbank of Turkey.⁶⁸²

Shortly after President Putin's visit to Turkey, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in the company of three ministers; Minister of State in Charge of Foreign Trade Kürşad Tüzmen, Minister of Industry and Commerce Ali Coşkun and Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Hilmi Güler, fifty-two MPs and six hundred businessmen came to Moscow on 10-12 January 2005 in order to participate

⁶⁸¹ "Rusya Federasyonu ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Arasında Dostluğun ve Çok Boyutlu Ortaklığın Derinleştirilmesine İlişkin Ortak Deklarasyon", Rusya Federasyonu'nun Türkiye Büyükelçiliği. Available [online]: < http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t73.html > [30 November 2008].

⁶⁸² "List of Documents Signed and Adopted During the Official Visit to the Republic of Turkey, December 5-6, 2004", President of Russia, Events Files. Available [online]: < <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/events/articles/2004/12/80760/80759.shtml> > [30 November 2008].

to the opening of the Turkish Trade Center which was jointly built by the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey and Export Council of Turkey.⁶⁸³

Erdoğan was received by President Putin and the two leaders mainly focused attention on the international issues such as the situation in Iraq and the problem of Cyprus and also on the bilateral economic relations specifically in the fields of energy and transportation.⁶⁸⁴ At the time of the visit, Putin invited Erdoğan to take part in the celebrations of the anniversary of the World War II Victory Day which would eventuate on 9 May 2005 in Moscow. Erdoğan accepted the invitation and attended to the convocation.

Putin and Erdoğan came together again on 17-18 July 2005 in the Russian resort city of Sochi at the Black Sea for a working visit. Political and commercial matters came into prominence during the discussions of the two leaders. Putin and Erdoğan deliberated on the issue of settling the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, discussed the situation in Iraq and Iran and also examined the latest developments in Cyprus. In the economic sphere, the talks were revolved around the ways to increase mutual investment, to cultivate trade and economic ties and to expand cooperation in the energy sector.⁶⁸⁵ Putin expressed Russia's alacrity to build large underground gas

⁶⁸³ Şaban Gül, "Rusya ile Üst Düzey İşbirliği Dönemi", *MOST* 6, (Spring 2005), p.25.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had actualized his first meeting with President Putin on 24 December 2002 before he had assumed the post of premiership. See "Opening Remarks by Russian President Vladimir Putin at Meeting with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Leader of Turkey's Justice and Development Party, the Kremlin, Moscow, December 24, 2002", Rusya Federasyonu'nun Türkiye Büyükelçiliği. Available [online]: < <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/22.html> > [30 November 2008].

⁶⁸⁴ "The Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey Mr. R.T. Erdoğan's Visit to Moscow, January 10-12, 2005", Rusya Federasyonu'nun Türkiye Büyükelçiliği. Available [online]: < http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t79.html > [01 December 2008] and "Concluding Remarks after a Meeting with Representatives of Turkish Business Circles", Moscow, 11 January 2005, President of Russia. Available [online]: < http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2005/01/11/2200_type82914type84779_82473.shtml > [01 December 2008].

⁶⁸⁵ "President Vladimir Putin and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Discussed a Broad Range of Russian-Turkish Cooperation Issues During Their Two Days of Talks", 18 July 2005, President of Russia. Available [online]: < http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/themes/2005/07/182123_91575.shtml > [02 December 2008].

storage reservoirs on Turkish territory, to enter Turkey's gas distribution network through the privatization process and also deliver electricity supplies to third countries via Turkey.⁶⁸⁶ Putin and Erdoğan also declared that they decided to organize a Year of Turkey in Russia and a Year of Russia in Turkey with the aim of bolstering the cultural exchanges between the two countries.⁶⁸⁷

On 31 May-01 June 2006, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov paid an official visit to Turkey upon the invitation of Turkish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül. Once in Turkey, Lavrov firstly visited Ankara and met with Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül and Speaker of the Grand National Assembly Bülent Arınç. On June 01, Lavrov arrived in Istanbul to visit the Permanent Secretariat of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization which Russia had been presiding since May 2006. Lavrov's talks with Abdullah Gül and other high-ranking representatives of the Turkish state focused attention on the situation surrounding Iran's nuclear program, the prospects for Iraq and Middle East settlement, conditions in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, and the issue of Cyprus.⁶⁸⁸

Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer commenced his three-day official visit to Russia on 28 June 2006.⁶⁸⁹ Sezer's visit came as a response to the visit of Russian President Putin to Turkey in December 2004. The two Heads of States exchanged

⁶⁸⁶ "The Meeting of the Russian V.V. Putin with Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Press Statements and Answers to Questions Following Talks," Bocharov Ruchei, Sochi, 18 July 2005, Rusya Federasyonu'nun Türkiye Büyükelçiliği. Available [online]: <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t99.html> [02 December 2008].

⁶⁸⁷ The Year 2007 was declared as the Year of Russia in Turkey and 2008 was dubbed as the Year of Turkey in Russian Federation.

⁶⁸⁸ "Official Visit of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov to the Republic of Turkey", Rusya Federasyonu'nun Türkiye Büyükelçiliği, 01 June 2006. Available [online]: <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t128.html> [03 December 2008].

⁶⁸⁹ He was the first Turkish President that visited Russia in the post-Cold War period.

views on the situation in the Middle East, on Iraq and on the Iranian nuclear issue. They also discussed the issue of cooperation in the Black Sea basin. Putin apprised that his country supported the Turkish initiative Black Sea Harmony and added that Russia also was completing the internal procedures to take full part in the operation.⁶⁹⁰ The last visit of Putin to Turkey as the Head of State took place on 25 June 2007 when he came to Istanbul together with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to attend to the fifteenth Anniversary Summit of the BSEC.⁶⁹¹

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan paid an official visit to Russian Federation on 19-20 February 2008, upon the invitation of Sergey Lavrov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Lavrov and Babacan held talks on a number of regional and international issue topics including the situation in Iraq and the Middle East, the state of affairs in the Black Sea Region and the South Caucasus, Cyprus and Kosovo settlement problems. In the framework of the visit, the two sides also signed a Protocol between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey on the Introduction of Amendments to the Consular Convention between the USSR and the Republic of Turkey of April 27, 1988.⁶⁹²

Sergey Lavrov reciprocated to Ali Babacan's visit to Moscow on 01-02 July 2008 with his official visit to Turkey. Apart from his meeting with the Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, the visiting Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was also

⁶⁹⁰ "Press Statements following Russian-Turkish Talks", 29 June 2006, President of Russia. Available [online]: < http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2006/06/29/1904_type82914type82915_107917.shtml > [06 December 2008].

⁶⁹¹ Turkey's Political Relations with Russian Federation. Available [online]: < <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/common/print.htm> > [06 December 2008] and "Working Visit to Turkey. Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation Summit", President of Russia, Events Files, Istanbul, 25 June 2007. Available [online]: < <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/events/chronicle/2007/06/136240.shtml> > [06 December 2008].

⁶⁹² "Talks between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan", Current Dynamics of Russian-Turkish Relations, 20 February 2008. Available [online]: < http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/hron_e_08.html > [06 December 2008].

received by Turkish President Abdullah Gül. The main focus of the negotiations of Babacan and Lavrov was the Russian-Turkish interaction in the Black Sea and developments in Cyprus, Middle East and Transcaucasia. Regarding the situation in the Middle East, Lavrov stated that Russia gave its countenance to Turkish mediation attempts between Israel and Syria.⁶⁹³

Turkish President Abdullah Gül met with his counterpart Dmitry Medvedev on 05 July 2008, during his visit to Kazakhstan for the occasion of the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the declaration of Astana as the new Kazakh capital. The two leaders discussed the bilateral relations, including trade and economic relations, as well as the possibility of increasing trade and cooperating in implementing major infrastructure projects. Abdullah Gül noted the desire of Turkish companies to involve in the implementation of projects related to the Sochi Olympics. Gül and Medvedev also touched upon the situation in the Caucasus region and cooperation in the Black Sea at the time of their concurrence.⁶⁹⁴

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came to Moscow on 13 August 2008 along with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan and carried out an end on meeting with the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Meiendorf Castle near Moscow. Erdoğan, together with Babacan, also came together with the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a working dinner on that same day. The Turkish and Russian sides mostly talked about the

⁶⁹³ “Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov’s Visit to Turkey,” Current Dynamics of Russian-Turkish Relations, 03 July 2008. Available [online]: <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/hron_e_14.html> [06 December 2008] and “Transcript of Remarks and Response to Media Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Joint Press Conference Following Talks with Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan, Ankara, July 2, 2008”, Current Dynamics of Russian-Turkish Relations, 03 July 2008. Available [online]: <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/hron_e_15.html> [06 December 2008].

⁶⁹⁴ “Dmitry Medvedev Met with Turkish President Abdullah Gül, Astana, July 5, 2008”, Current Dynamics of Russian-Turkish Relations, 05 July 2008. Available [online]: <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/hron_e_16.html> [06 December 2008].

situation in South Ossetia and Erdoğan handed out a proposal to the Russian party for the creation of a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Pact which would include three South Caucasian states as well as Turkey and Russia.⁶⁹⁵

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov drew in Istanbul on 02 September 2008 for a working visit at the invitation of Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan. The two ministers evaluated the situation in the South Caucasus in light of the consequences of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict as well as the Turkish suggestion for the establishment of a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Both Babacan and Lavrov underlined the need to undertake a permanent, viable and definitive resolution to the situation in Iraq on the basis of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. They also highlighted the necessity of a political peaceful settlement to the situation surrounding Iran's nuclear program. An exchange of views also took place on Russian-Turkish cooperation in the Black Sea region and both sides expressed their pleasure concerning the level of collaboration between two states within the framework of BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR and Black Sea Harmony.⁶⁹⁶

Turkish Head of State Abdullah Gül made a state visit to Russian Federation on 12-15 February 2009, at the invitation of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Gül was accompanied by Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, Minister of State in Charge of Foreign Trade Kürşad Tüzmen, and Minister of Energy and Natural Resources

⁶⁹⁵ "Beginning of a Meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 13 August 2008", President of Russia, Diplomacy and External Affairs. Available [online]: <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/08/13/1134_type82914_205292.shtml> [06 December 2008], *Ayın Tarihi*, 13 August 2008, Cenk Başlamış, "Erdoğan'ı Şatoda Ağırladılar", *Milliyet*, 14 August 2008, "Türkiye-Rusya Kafkas Birliği için Çalışacak", *Radikal*, 14 August 2008, "İttifakın İlk Adımı", *Akşam*, 14 August 2008, and "Kafkas İttifakı'na Doğru", *Star*, 14 August 2008.

⁶⁹⁶ "Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov's Visit to Turkey, September 3, 2008", Current Dynamics of Russian-Turkish Relations, 03 September 2008. Available [online]: <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/hron_e_18.html> [06 December 2008] and "Transcript of Remarks and Response to Media Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Joint Press Conference with Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan, Istanbul, September 2, 2008", Current Dynamics of Russian-Turkish Relations, 03 September 2008. Available [online]: <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/hron_e_19.html> [06 December 2008].

Hilmi Güler. Gül was received by Medvedev and held meetings with Russian Premier Vladimir Putin, Chairman of Duma Boris Grizlov and Chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation Sergey Mironov.⁶⁹⁷ He also paid a visit to Kazan, the capital of Republic of Tatarstan.⁶⁹⁸

Gül and Medvedev signed the Joint Declaration on Progress towards a New Stage in Relations and Further Deepening of Friendship and Multi-dimensional Partnership on 13 February 2009 which declared that the two countries had similar approaches and policies on many regional and international issues and pledged to strengthen current consultation mechanisms as well as to develop efficient cooperation at the United Nations and at other multilateral platforms.⁶⁹⁹ The positive impact of the elevating economic and commercial relations on overall bilateral interaction was highlighted and the document called for adoption of legal regulations to encourage free movement of capital, goods and services, harmonize the two countries' economic infrastructures, and develop and enforce bilateral and regional joint policies in the fields of transportation and customs.⁷⁰⁰

On 16 May 2009, Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan carried out a day-long working visit to Sochi to meet with his Russian equivalent Vladimir Putin. The two sides discussed the bilateral energy and trade relations as well as the possibility

⁶⁹⁷ Halit Gülşen, "Cumhurbaşkanı Abdullah Gül'ün Moskova Ziyareti ve Düşündürdükleri", *ASAM*, 20 February 2009.

⁶⁹⁸ Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey and Russia Developing a New Economic and Strategic Partnership", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 6, no. 31 (17 February 2009) and Nihat Dağdelen, "Ruslar, Moskova'dan Kazan'a Böyle Uğurladı", *Anadolu Ajansı*, 15 February 2009.

⁶⁹⁹ "Joint Declaration on Progress towards a New Stage in Relations and Further Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership", Moscow, 13 February 2009, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-declaration-between-the-republic-of-turkey-and-the-russian-federation-on-progress-towards-a-new-stage-in-relations-and-further-deepening-of-friendship-and-multidimensional-partnership_-moscow_-13-february-2009.en.mfa > [22.03.2009].

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid.

of reaching a permanent and sustainable solution with respect to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.⁷⁰¹

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu rounded off a two-day working visit to Russia on 01-02 July 2009 during which he discussed prospects for an Iraq and Middle East settlement, peaceful resolution of the issues surrounding Iranian nuclear program and the situation in Transcaucasia with his counterpart Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.⁷⁰²

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin came to Ankara on 06 August 2009, for a one-day working visit. He held talks with his counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as well as with the Turkish Head of State Abdullah Gül. Following the talks twelve joint documents were signed between Turkey and Russia in the fields of agriculture, customs, energy, education and culture, regulation, trade and economic cooperation plus scientific collaboration.⁷⁰³

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in company of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Energy and Resources Taner Yıldız and Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs Mehdi Eker paid a working visit to Russia on 12-13 January 2010 upon the invitation of Russian Premier Vladimir Putin. Erdoğan met both with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin and a Joint Statement on Cooperation in Building a Nuclear Power

⁷⁰¹ Nerdun Hacıoğlu, “Putin: Türkiye En İyi Ticaret Ortağımız, 35 Milyar Dolarlık Hacim Artırılmalı”, *Hürriyet*, 17 May 2009 and Cenk Başlamış, “Soçi Şifreleri”, *Milliyet*, 18 May 2009.

⁷⁰² “MFA Spokesman Andrei Nesterenko Interview with RIA Novosti Concerning the Working Visit to Moscow of Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Davutoglu”, Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 01 July 2009. Available [online]: < http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/B83DF977E2230149C32575E60059A6D0> [11 July 2009] and “Transcript of Remarks and Response to Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Joint Press Conference Following Talks with Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Davutoglu”, Moscow, 02 July 2009. Available [online]: < http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/4DCBA3DAD1DC4FB3C32575E8002F135D> [11 July 2009].

⁷⁰³ International Visits, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, 06 August 2009. Available [online]: <http://premier.gov.ru/eng/visits/world/123/3400.html> > [07 August 2009].

Plant in Turkey and an Agreement on Quarantine Regulations for Plants were signed after the talks.⁷⁰⁴

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev paid an official visit to Turkey on 11-12 May 2010. The Russian Head of State held talks with Turkish President Abdullah Gül, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey Mehmet Ali Şahin. Gül and Medvedev while discussing trade and economic cooperation, joint efforts to fight extremism and terrorism, cooperation in the Black Sea region, the situation in the Southern Caucasus, the Iranian nuclear programme, and the Middle East peace process also oversaw the signing of agreement on air transport links, an intergovernmental agreement on sea transportation, cooperation agreement between the two countries' interior ministries, memorandum of understanding between Russia's Federal Drug Control Service and Turkey's Interior Ministry on combating trafficking of drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors and a joint action plan of the Russian Federal Agency for Tourism and Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism for 2010-2011.⁷⁰⁵

In the course of Medvedev and Erdoğan's deliberations, the two leaders put their signatures on the Joint Declaration on Creation of the High-Level Cooperation Council which would act as the guiding body in setting the strategy and main directions for developing Russian-Turkish relations. The Council would meet annually and coordinate implementation of important political, trade and economic projects as well as facilitation of cultural and humanitarian cooperation.⁷⁰⁶ Public

⁷⁰⁴ Working Day, Events, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, 13 January 2010. Available [online]: <http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/8966> > [14 January 2010].

⁷⁰⁵ "Talks with Turkish President Abdullah Gül Have Taken Place", News, President of Russia, Ankara, 12 May 2010. Available [online]: < <http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/news/2010/05/226016.shtml>> [12 May 2010].

⁷⁰⁶ "Russia and Turkey Have Established the High-Level Cooperation Council", News, President of Russia, Ankara, 12 May 2010. Available [online]: < <http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/news/2010/05/226021.shtml>> [12 May 2010].

Forum that will be composed of famous and reputable figures of Turkey and Russia is also established within the capacity of the Council in order to bring Turkish and Russian nations closer.⁷⁰⁷

Medvedev and Erdoğan also concluded intergovernmental agreements on mutual visa-free travel of their citizens up to thirty days, cooperation on construction and operation of a nuclear power plant at the Akkuyu site in Mersin and organization of a mixed international rail and ferry link between the ports of Russian Kavkaz and Turkish Samsun.⁷⁰⁸ The two sides also agreed on many memorandums such as memorandum on cooperation in higher education, compliance with phyto-sanitary measures in reciprocal supply of plant-derived products, grain quality and safety, conditions for supply of poultry and other raw meat products and agriculture.⁷⁰⁹

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin came to Istanbul on 08 June 2010, in order to attend the third summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). During the summit he met with Turkish President Abdullah Gül and the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In the course of Putin's intercourse with Erdoğan, the two sides oversaw an agreement between the Russian Federal Service for Supervision of Environment, Technology and Nuclear Management and the Turkish Atomic Authority on cooperation in nuclear safety licensing and supervision and also a joint statement of the head of the Russian Federal Agency for Tourism and the Turkish Deputy Minister of Culture and

⁷⁰⁷ Correspondence with Yağmur Güldere, Undersecretary of the Moscow Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, 27 October 2010.

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid.

Tourism on ensuring the safety of the two countries' tourists in Russia and Turkey.⁷¹⁰

Accompanied by seven ministers and 150 businessmen Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan arrived in Moscow for a three-day visit on 15 March 2011. The following day he and the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev co-chaired the second meeting of the High-Level Cooperation Council and put their signatures on a protocol on the operation of the Public Forum and an agreement on cooperation between the Russian Federal State Unitary Enterprise National Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) and Turkish TRT.⁷¹¹ The most significant upshot of Erdoğan's visit became the exchange of notes between Turkey and Russia on the entry into force of the visa-free agreement on 17 April 2011 for the up to thirty days visits of the Turkish and Russian citizens to each other's country.⁷¹²

The relations between the Parliaments of Turkey and the Russian Federation also acquired some momentum. The Chairman of Turkish Grand National Assembly Bülent Arınç visited Russia in July 2006 and the Chairman of the Federation Council Sergey Mironov came to Turkey in March 2007.⁷¹³ Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Vladimir Titov met a visiting delegation headed by Murat Mercan, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Turkey's Grand

⁷¹⁰ "Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, on a Visit to Turkey, Meets with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan", International Visits, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Istanbul, 08 June 2010. Available [online]: < <http://www.premier.gov.ru/eng/visits/world/10905/events/10765> > [09 June 2010].

⁷¹¹ "Meeting of High-Level Russian-Turkish Cooperation Council", News, President of Russia, Moscow, 16 March 2011. Available [online]: < <http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/1917/print> > [17 March 2011].

⁷¹² On 02 July 2011 Turkey declared that it unilaterally extended the visa-free travel for Russian citizens from thirty days to sixty days until 31 December 2011. See "Turkey Unilaterally Extends Term of Visa-free Travel for Russians", *Itar-Tass*, 02 July 2011 and "Ruslara Vizesiz Kalış Süresi 60 Güne Uzatıldı", *Hürriyet*, 03 July 2011.

⁷¹³ Turkey's Political Relations with Russian Federation. Available [online]: < <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/common/print.htm> > [06 December 2008].

National Assembly in November 2010.⁷¹⁴ Contacts between the friendship groups, functional committees and expert commissions of two Parliaments as well as the regular meetings and consultations held by the Turkish-Russian High-Level Joint Working Group further earned the bilateral relationship a solid and institutional character.

Change of Hands in Kremlin and the Declaration of New Foreign Policy, National Security and Military Doctrines

After serving eight years as the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin went off duty on 07 May 2008, and left the presidential post to Dmitry Medvedev.⁷¹⁵ The new incumbent, right after his coronation as Head of the State, nominated Putin to be Russia's Premier and Putin assumed the position on 08 May 2008.

The bequest of Putin to his descendant was a centralized and consolidated political system⁷¹⁶, bouncing economy⁷¹⁷ and an assertive foreign policy stance.

⁷¹⁴ "Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov Meets with Murat Mercan, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Turkey's Grand National Assembly", *Current Dynamics of Russian-Turkish Relations*, 30 November 2010. Available [online]: < http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/hron_e_59.html > [17 March 2011].

⁷¹⁵ Putin could not stand as candidate for the third time in the Presidential elections held on 07 March 2008, due to constitutional limitations.

⁷¹⁶ On 29 October 2004, the Russian Duma enacted a proposal that was put forward by President Putin on September 13, following the Beslan incident. The bill replaced the direct election of all regional executive-branch heads, including the presidents of the constituent republics with a system under which the candidates would be nominated by the President and appointed by the regional parliaments. The President was also granted the right to dismiss any regional head in case he/she failed to fulfill his/her obligations or the Head of State lost his/her confidence in the regional official. A Public Chamber with consultative powers was set up in July 2005 to oversee the general direction of policy and monitor the activities of the parliament, government and other governmental organs of the country. See Robert Koalson, "Analysis: How Will Russian Governors Be Appointed", *RFE/RL*, 01 November 2004.

⁷¹⁷ During Putin's presidency thanks to rising revenues from energy exports, Russia was able to repay its foreign debts and accumulated large currency and gold reserves. The total investment in the economy rose seven-fold. Russian economy increased to an average eight percent of yearly growth in GDP. Poverty diminished whereas industrial production grew and real incomes, pensions and salaries mounted. See President Vladimir Putin, "Speech at Expanded Meeting of the State Council on Russia's Development Strategy through to 2020", The Kremlin, Moscow, February 8, 2008. Available [online]: < http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/02/08/1137_type82912type82913_159643.shtml >

Crackdowns on opposition, media and human-rights organizations⁷¹⁸, in addition the relentless combat against some of the infamous bigwigs that had political ambitions, were other remarkable deeds of the Putin administration.⁷¹⁹

The new Russian President, different from his predecessors, had neither military nor security connections nor held elective political office before. He got acquainted with Putin back in 1990s, while working as an expert consultant to the St Petersburg City Hall's Committee for External Affairs in addition to his post as a law professor in St Petersburg State University.⁷²⁰ After Putin became premier in 1999, Medvedev moved to Moscow and assumed the duty of Deputy Government Chief of Staff. He took on the responsibility of First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office following Putin's ascension to the post of presidency in May 2000. Between the years 2003 and 2005 Medvedev acted as the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office. In November 2005, Putin appointed him as the First Deputy Prime Minister and delegated him national projects in areas of health,

> [11 December 2008].

⁷¹⁸ President Putin signed a new legislation named Federal Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation on 10 January 2006, which restricted the rights of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and tightened the state control on their activities. The new law equipped the registration authorities with the mandate to deny the registration of a NGO if they decided that the goals and objectives of the association posed a threat to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, unique character, cultural heritage and national interests of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the new act required these organizations to report all funds received from foreign resources and how these were allocated or used. See Natalia Bourjaily, "Some Issues Related to Russia's New NGO Law", *The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law* 8, no.3 (May 2006), p.5.

⁷¹⁹ On 02 July 2003, Platon Lebedev, the Chairman of Menatep Financial Group and second largest shareholder of Yukos Oil Company was arrested on suspicion of illegally acquiring a twenty percent stake in a state-owned fertilizer firm, Apatit in 1994. This was followed on 25 October 2003, by the criminal prosecution of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the Chief Executive Officer and major owner of Yukos. He was convicted of charges of embezzlement, fraud and tax evasion and was sent to a prison in Chita, Siberia in May 2005 to serve his condemnation. See "Tycoon Banished to Siberia", *The New York Times*, 21 October 2005. Khodorkovsky was openly providing generous funds to opposition parties and had also advocated increasing exports to the West and building pipelines that would sidestep Russian soil. It was clear that his speeches and activities had incensed Kremlin and brought his downfall. As a result of several legal suits, Yukos was broken up and taken over by Gazprom. After the Yukos affair, Russian oligarchs preferred dealing with their own businesses and attentively balked from criticizing or challenging the President and his close associates.

⁷²⁰ Presidents of Russia, Biographies, Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev. Available [online]: < http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/D_Medvedev.shtml> [11 December 2008].

education, housing and agriculture.⁷²¹ Medvedev also had served as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Gazprom incessantly starting from June 2002 until his inauguration to presidency.

It was lucid that Medvedev had been part of the narrow circle of Putin's aides and confidants for a long time and had taken active part in the direction and governance of the country. Such a situation led to an explicit continuity in the execution of foreign policy. Russia under President Putin had demonstrated a noticeable renewed interest in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. It was no coincidence that one of Medvedev's first conducts as the Head of the State of the Russian Federation in May 2008 became the announcement of the establishment of the Federal Agency for CIS Affairs. The organization would appertain to Foreign Ministry but would also be answerable directly to the President.⁷²² It would coordinate inter-state target programs, work out and realize aid programs to the CIS countries, interact with NGOs in the research, cultural and economic spheres and promote the Russian language abroad.⁷²³ This act was followed by the announcement of new blueprints of Foreign Policy Concept, National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine one after another which sketched the outlines of Russian foreign policy in the South Caucasus and Central Asia along with other regions.

The new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation that was released on 12 July 2008 stated that Russia would pursue an open, predictable and pragmatic foreign policy which would respect the supremacy of international law and promote

⁷²¹ Nazrin Mehdiyeva, "New Man in the Kremlin: What Future for Russian Foreign Policy?", *The International Spectator* 43, no.2 (June 2008), p.23.

⁷²² Rainer Lindner, "New Realism: The Making of Russia's Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet World", *The EU-Russia Centre Review* 8 (October 2008), p.30.

⁷²³ Farit Mukhametshin, Russia's ambassador to Uzbekistan, was appointed as the Head of the Federal Agency for the CIS. See Vladimir Solovyov, "Russia's Protector in CIS", *Kommersant*, 20 October 2008.

principles of multilateralism in international relations. Different from the Foreign Policy Concept of 2000, the new document did not call Russia as a great power but distinguished it as the largest Eurasian power.⁷²⁴ In 2000, amidst all the political turbulence, economic mire and social disarray, it was significant to name Russia as a grand power, as one of the most influential centers of the modern world. However, eight years later, Russia had revived its economy, put its internal situation in order and restored its place on the world stage as a country whose views and considerations were heeded. So the Concept did not need to emphasize the greatness and splendour of the Russian Federation in its new form.

The mentioning of Russia as a Eurasian power, coupled with the lines that cited the CIS region as Russia's area of priority in Russia's foreign policy indicated perspicuously the future orientation of the country. Russia vowed to increase cooperation with the CIS member states in the economic, security and cultural realms, in addition, through the CSTO, EurAsEc and SCO mechanisms. The creation of a Union of Belarus and Russia was no longer a priority task. The economic cooperation preceded the political integration, as the paper declared that the relations between the two countries would gradually transform on the basis of market principles within the framework of developing a common economic space.⁷²⁵

The importance Russia attached to the establishment of close relations with the European Union in the spheres of trade, security, education, science and culture was underlined. The difference from the 2000 Concept was about the number of the European countries that were deemed as critical for Russia for the advancement of its national interests in the European continent. Whereas in 2000, only Britain,

⁷²⁴ The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 12 July 2008. Available [online]: <<http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml>>

> [12 December 2008].

⁷²⁵ Ibid.

Germany, France and Italy were enumerated by name as Russia's chief partners in Europe, in 2008, the states that Russia entered into an energy relationship, or planned to realize joint energy projects, such as Spain, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands and Norway, were added to the list as well.⁷²⁶

The Concept underlined Russia's desire to overcome the current barriers in its bilateral relations with the USA and heaved the relationship to the level of strategic partnership. Yet, Moscow also conveyed its discomfort concerning the unilateral actions of the USA on international arena that violated the principles and norms of international law, especially the Charter of UN. The Concept also announced Russia's negative attitude in the event of admission of Georgia and Ukraine in NATO as well as the bringing of the Alliance's military infrastructure closer to the borders of the Russian Federation.

In the Middle East, the Concept enunciated Russia's intention to develop its relations with Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran in bilateral and multilateral formats.⁷²⁷ Russia accentuated its determination to find a diplomatic solution to the nuclear programme of Iran and avowed that it would make a substantial contribution to the comprehensive and long-term settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict by using its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a member of the Quartet.

The new National Security Strategy that was approved by President Medvedev on 12 May 2009⁷²⁸, akin to its predecessors, defined its main objective as ensuring Russia's security and stability in a multi-polar world. The document

⁷²⁶ Ibid.

⁷²⁷ Ibid. What is interesting here is that in 2000, with regard to Middle East, there was only mentioning of Iran as a country with which it was seen important to further develop relations.

⁷²⁸ "Dmitry Medvedev Signed an Executive Order on Russia's National Security Strategy through to 2020", President of Russia, News, 13 May 2009. Available [online]: <<http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/Text/news/2009/05/216230.shtml>> [26 May 2009].

highlighted that Russia was walking confidently in the direction of this end owing to its technological progress, ascending living standards of its population and the country's towering influence upon world processes.⁷²⁹

Strategic armaments with non-nuclear ordnance, the unilateral formation of the global missile system and militarization of outer space were counted as the major threats to military security.⁷³⁰ The depth and essence of cooperation between NATO and Russia was preconditioned on the Alliance's preparedness for taking into account Russia's legitimate interests in its military-political planning which could be read that Russia would develop relations with NATO on the condition that the organization would throw up plans for the Eastern expansion.

The economic security emerged as a novel phenomenon that was stressed considerably in the new blueprint. The rivalry for the acquisition of energy resources was articulated as a major bone of contention in international politics in the long-run. Energy-rich regions such as the Arctic, Barents Sea, Caspian Sea, Central Asia and Middle East were named as potential flashpoints in this context.⁷³¹ The preservation of the raw materials export model of national economic development, the declining competitiveness and high dependence of the economy's most important spheres on the foreign economic situation, loss of control over national resources, the worsening state of the raw materials base of industry and power generation, the regions' uneven development and progressive labour shortage, the poor stability and unprotected nature of the national financial system, and the preservation of conditions for corruption and the criminalization of financial-economic relations were listed as

⁷²⁹ "Medvedev Endorses National Security Strategy Until 2020", *Itar-Tass*, 13 May 2009.

⁷³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷³¹ "Russia's New Security Strategy: Sleeker and Stronger", *Russia Today*, 13 May 2009.

principal economic dangers that might thwart proper functioning of the Russian state.⁷³²

In a similar fashion with the Foreign Policy Concept, the Strategy prioritized Russia's bonds with the CIS.⁷³³ Closer development of relations with CIS, Eurasian Economic Union and Collective Security Treaty organizations were uttered as the main tenets of Russian national security strategy in the coming years.

The new Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, the last of the three documents was declared on 05 February 2010.⁷³⁴ The new Doctrine, despite its statement that the current international environment had today more room for multipolarity and the adoption of diverse processes, did not abstain from adding that there was an ongoing propensity towards a strong-arm resolution of the regional conflicts, including the ones that were adjacent to the borders of the Russian Federation.⁷³⁵

The expansion of NATO, the deployment of foreign troops and naval forces on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation, the creation and build-up of strategic missile defense systems, and the territorial claims against the Russian Federation and its allies and interference in their internal affairs were named as the most featured external military dangers whereas the main internal military dangers were uttered as the attempts to change the constitutional structure of the Russian Federation by force, the undermining of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian state and the disruption of the functioning of organs of state

⁷³² Roger McDermott, "Russia's National Security Strategy", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 6, no. 96, (19 May 2009).

⁷³³ "Russia Unveils New National Security Strategy", *Xinhua*, 14 May 2009.

⁷³⁴ "Medvedev Signed the Military Doctrine and the Principles of State Nuclear Deterrence Policy to 2020", News, President of Russia, Gorki, Moscow, 05 February 2010. Available [online]: <<http://eng.kremlin.ru/Text/news/2010/02/224154.shtml>> [29 August 2010].

⁷³⁵ "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation", 05 February 2010. Available [online]: <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Russia2010_English.pdf> [30 August 2010].

power.⁷³⁶ In order to deter and prevent the possible threats and conflicts, the Doctrine advised to enhance and strengthen collective security system, similar to previous doctrines, within the framework of military cooperation with Belarus, CSTO, CIS, OSCE, and the SCO.

Like the Military Doctrine of 2000, the new blueprint gave the Russian Federation the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat.⁷³⁷

The following part of the study will investigate the Russian foreign policy in the South Caucasus and Central Asia both under Putin's and Medvedev's presidential administrations. Main objective of the Russian state in both periods became the endorsement of Russian commercial and security interests in these regions even by taking the risk of immersing in a military confrontation with one of the states of the region.

Russian Attempts to Gain Economic and Military Supremacy in the South Caucasus and Central Asia

The Tightening of Russian Grip on the South Caucasus

Russia, during the second tenure of President Putin and also in the course of Medvedev's Presidency carried on with its policy of asset seizure in strategic sectors of the Transcaucasian states through clever and deft exploitation of dependence of

⁷³⁶ Ibid.

⁷³⁷ Ibid.

these countries on Russian natural resources. Moscow also fought hard to crumple and encumber the integration of regional states into Euro-Atlantic structures. Lastly, Russia's fiery and rumbustious reaction to Georgia's attempt to reassert its authority in the breakaway province of South Ossetia and the draconian measures it utilized to repulse the Georgian troops in the conflict zone, demonstrated once and for all that the country was ready to show muscle if it believed that vital interests were at stake in the South Caucasus region.

Russia, similar to previous periods, had the most gruelling and problematical relationship with Georgia in Transcaucasia. Tbilisi's efforts to forge closer ties with the USA and the EU and the country's drive to join NATO incited an explicit demur on the Russian side whereas Moscow's shoring up of secessionist districts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia morally and materially, further enraged Georgia and made it to increase its efforts to dissociate itself from Russia.

Georgia frequently inculpated Russia of violating Georgian airspace, dropping bombs on Georgian villages and shooting down Georgian military aircraft.⁷³⁸ Russia denied the allegations continuously and drew notice to the U2 flights that were carried out by the US military. Although the American party sustained that the flights were gathering reconnaissance for the fight against terrorism in the Caucasus; Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov claimed that their main objective was to

⁷³⁸ See Elina Karakulova, "Georgia Accuses Russia of Again Violating its Airspace", *RFE/RL*, 27 June 2003, Vladic Ravich, "Georgia Says Russian Helicopters Violated its Airspace", *RFE/RL*, 15 September 2004, "Tbilisi Protests Russian Violation of Georgian Airspace", *RFE/RL*, 23 February 2006, "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia Regarding the Act of Aggression Against Georgia of 6 August 2007" Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Tbilisi, 7 August 2007. Available [online]: < http://mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=36&info_id=4824 > [03 January 2009], "Georgia Condemns 'Russian Aggression' in Reported Bombing on Georgian Territory", *RFE/RL*, 07 August 2007, Paul Rimple, "Georgia Accuses Russia of Carrying Out Bombing Aid", *Eurasia Insight*, 07 August 2007, Vladimir Socor, "Evidence Accumulates on Russian Air Incursion into Georgia", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4, no. 157, (13 August 2007), "Georgia Again Claims Russian Aircraft Violated its Airspace", *RFE/RL*, 05 November 2007 and Nina Akhmeteli, "Georgia Claims 'Clear Proof' of Russian Violation of Airspace", *Eurasia Insight*, 22 April 2008.

pick up data about locations and facilities within Russia.⁷³⁹ Tbilisi's bilateral security pact that was ratified by the Georgian parliament in late March 2003 and with which the US military personnel were permitted visa-free entry and exit from the country, to carry weapons and to deploy military hardware without impediments on Georgian territory was another development that led to an uneasiness among Russian security circles.⁷⁴⁰

Georgian-Russian relations received a heavy blow on 27 September 2006, when four Russian military officers along with eleven Georgian citizens were arrested in Tbilisi of charges of espionage. Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili announced on the same day that the detained were reprehended of obtaining information regarding Georgia's defensive capabilities, strategies for integration with NATO, Georgian ports, railways and opposition political parties.⁷⁴¹

Russia responded next day, on 28 September 2006, by recalling Vyacheslav Kovalenko, its ambassador to Georgia, and starting a partial evacuation of diplomatic representatives and their families from Georgia on the ground of a growing threat to their security. The Russian embassy in Tbilisi also issued a press release on the same day stating that its consulate would not accept visa applications to Russia from Georgian citizens.⁷⁴²

Russian officers were set free on October 02 and were handed over to the OSCE officials in Tbilisi. However, this act did not appease Moscow, as within hours of the group's release, Russian Ministry of Transportation enunciated that it

⁷³⁹ Giorgi Kandelaki, "U2 Spy Flights Over Georgia Help Raise US-Russian Tension", *Eurasia Insight*, 27 March 2003.

⁷⁴⁰ Sergei Blagov, "US-Georgian Security Cooperation Agreement Provokes Outcry in Russia", *Eurasia Insight*, 16 April 2003 and Aleksandr Chigorin, "Russian-Georgian Relations", *International Affairs (Moscow)* 49, no. 4 (August 2003), p.130.

⁷⁴¹ Diana Petriashvili, "Russia Recalls Ambassador to Georgia, Plans Evacuation", *Eurasia Insight*, 28 September 2006.

⁷⁴² Ibid.

suspended all air, railway, road and maritime transport as well as postal communication between Russia and Georgia.⁷⁴³ Kovalenko could return to Tbilisi on 23 January 2007, after a four-month hiatus; Russia resumed the air traffic between Moscow and Tbilisi in March 2008 and the postal services between the two countries were reinstated in April 2008.⁷⁴⁴ In addition to communication and transport embargo, Russia took extra measures to chastise the Georgian government. The immigration controls were tightened and raids were made on Georgian-owned businesses. Moreover, Moscow courts ordered the deportation of nearly 700 Georgians for immigration violations.⁷⁴⁵

The only silver lining in the troubled Russian Georgian intercourse was the smooth and duly closure of the Russian military bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki. On 30 May 2005, Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Salome Zourabichvili and her Russian equivalent Sergei Lavrov put their signatures on a joint statement which stipulated the cessation of the functioning of Batumi and Akhalkalaki facilities, installations and withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia by the end of 2008.⁷⁴⁶ Russia completed the removal process on 15 November 2007, ahead of the schedule.⁷⁴⁷

⁷⁴³ Vladimir Socor, "Russia's Economic and Political Warfare Failing to Subdue Georgia", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no. 186, (10 October 2006) and Diana Petriashvili, "Georgians Express Outrage at Russian Sanctions", *Eurasia Insight*, 10 October 2006.

⁷⁴⁴ Molly Corso, "Georgia: Despite Russian Ambassador's Return, No Fresh Start for Ties with Moscow", *Eurasia Insight*, 23 January 2007, "Georgian President Meets with Newly Returned Russian Ambassador", *RFE/RL*, 01 February 2007, Nino Patsuria, "With Flights to Moscow, Georgia Hopes Trade Ties Will Again Take Off", *Business and Economics*, 25 March 2008 and "Russia Reopens Postal Links with Georgia After 2.5 Year Freeze", *RIA Novosti*, 21 April 2008.

⁷⁴⁵ "Georgian President Protests Russian Deportation of Georgians", *RFE/RL*, 10 October 2006 and "Georgia: Hundreds Left Stranded after Deportations from Russia", *Eurasia Insight*, 21 October 2006.

⁷⁴⁶ Robert Parsons, "Russia Agrees to Pull Troops from Georgia by 2008", *Eurasia Insight*, 30 May 2005 and Nikolai Sokov, "The Withdrawal of Russian Military Bases from Georgia: Not Solving Anything", *PONARS Policy Memo* 363 (June 2005), p.1.

⁷⁴⁷ "12th Russian Military Base Officially Transferred to Georgia", Georgia Ministry of Defense, News Archive, 13 November 2007. Available [online]: <http://www.mod.gov.ge/?l=E&m=11&sm=0&id=785> > [03 January 2009].

Russian-Georgian relations reached to their lowest ebb in the summer of 2008 when Georgia commenced a military offensive on August 07 to reassert its authority in South Ossetia. The operation sparked an adamant and livid retort from Russia and Moscow went to bat for the separatist province with troops, naval force, military aircraft and tanks.⁷⁴⁸ After a five-day war in which Russia not only expelled the Georgian forces from Abkhazia and South Ossetia but also invaded Georgia proper, Georgian government declared a unilateral ceasefire. With the stepping in of French President Nicolas Sarkozy, Georgia and Russia agreed on an armistice on 12 August 2008 and Russia began to pull out its military units from Georgian territory.⁷⁴⁹

On 14 August 2008, the Parliament of Georgia adopted resolutions terminating the country's membership to CIS.⁷⁵⁰ This was followed by Russia's recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on 26 August 2008 and establishment of diplomatic relations with these two entities on 09 September 2008.⁷⁵¹ Although Russia imputed its decision to hostile and irresponsible acts of the Georgian leadership to the peoples of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it had already entered into a process of de-facto recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in reaction to Georgia's push to receive a NATO Membership Action Plan and international acknowledgement of the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo. On 16 April 2008, Russian President signed a decree which envisaged direct

⁷⁴⁸ Brian Whitmore, "Did Russia Plan its War in Georgia?", *Eurasia Insight*, 16 August 2008 and Oksana Antonenko, "A War with No Winners", *Survival* 5, no. 5 (October 2008), p. 26.

⁷⁴⁹ Vladimir Socor, "Sarkozy Armistice Plan Favors Russia, Undercuts Georgia", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 155, (13 August 2008) and Chad Nagle, "Whither Transcaucasia", *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 7, no. 2 (Summer 2008), p. 74.

⁷⁵⁰ "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on Georgia's Withdrawal from CIS", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Tbilisi, 18 August 2008. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=36&info_id=7526> [03 January 2009].

⁷⁵¹ "Statement by President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev", President of Russia, Statement on Major Issues, 26 August 2008. Available [online]: <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/26/1543_type82912_205752.shtml> [03 January 2009].

official relations between Russian government bodies in the North Caucasus and the secessionist authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The edict recognized the legal acts issued by Abkhazian and South Ossetian officials and entities registered under Abkhaz and South Ossetian laws. The statute also called on Russian authorities to provide legal assistance on matters of civil and criminal law directly to Abkhazian and South Ossetian executives and residents.⁷⁵² It can be said that Georgia's August 2008 military incursion to South Ossetia did not induce, but quickened Russia's decision of recognition.

Despite the periodic disruption in gas supply, ever so often electricity cut-offs and price hikes⁷⁵³, Russia held the ground in Georgia by preserving its position as the country's chief energy provider. Moscow also captured the energy infrastructure of Tbilisi by acquiring the controlling stakes in gas and power companies in Georgia. On 01 July 2003, the Georgian government and Gazprom signed a memorandum on strategic cooperation for twenty-five years for the supply of Russian natural gas to Georgian customers in large amounts as well as the upgrade of the current pipeline system in Georgia.⁷⁵⁴ RAO UES publicized on 06 August 2003 its purchase of a seventy-five percent share in Georgia's AES-Telasi joint venture from AES Silk Road, a subsidiary of the American AES Corporation.⁷⁵⁵ On 31 December 2008, the RAO UES Chairman of the Management Board, Yevgeny Dod and the Georgian

⁷⁵² Molly Corso, "Georgia Holds Steady As Moscow Inches Closer to Abkhazia, South Ossetia", *Eurasia Insight*, 17 April 2008, Vladimir Socor, "Russia Moves Forward Open Annexation of Abkhazia, South Ossetia", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 74 (18 April 2008) and Oktay F. Tanrısever, "Gürcistan'ın Güney Osetya'daki Askeri Operasyonu ve Rusya'nın Tepkisi", *ASAM*, 12 August 2008.

⁷⁵³ See "Russian Itera Reduced Gas Supply to Georgia Without Specifying the Reasons", *Caspian News Agency*, 04 April 2003, "Blasts Cut Russian Gas Flow to Georgia, Armenia", *Los Angeles Times*, 23 January 2006 and "Georgia Anticipates Sharp Rise in Price of Russian Gas", *RFE/RL*, 03 November 2006.

⁷⁵⁴ Ivars Indans, "Relations of Russia and Georgia: Developments and Future Prospects", *Baltic Security and Defense Review* 9 (2007), p.137.

⁷⁵⁵ Zeyno Baran, "Deals Give Russian Companies Influence over Georgia's Energy Infrastructure", *Business and Economics*, 18 August 2003.

Energy Minister Aleko Khetaguri signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the joint execution of the Inguri hydroelectric power plant which was located between Georgia proper and the breakaway region of Abkhazia.⁷⁵⁶ Russian companies also laid hands on the financial sector of Georgia. In January 2005, Russia's state-controlled Vneshtorgbank bought fifty-one percent of the shares of the United Georgian Bank, one of the three leading banks in Georgia.⁷⁵⁷

Bilateral trade between Russia and Georgia suffered to a great degree as a result of the sanctions imposed by the Russian authorities on the import of Georgian products. In December 2005, Russia banned the import of all Georgian farming products due to the violation of phytosanitary norms. In March 2006, the dispatch of Georgian wines to Russia was prohibited on the grounds that they contained pesticides and heavy metals, and finally, the restrictions were extended to Georgian Borjomi and Nabeghlavi mineral waters in April 2006.⁷⁵⁸ In response to the Russian adduction which argued that the Georgian goods were not in compliance with the standards of sanitation and quality, the Georgian side came up with the contention that Russia was castigating the country because of its withholding of Moscow's bid to join WTO.⁷⁵⁹

Russia's already preponderant status in Armenia's security establishment and economic structure waxed and deepened more as a result of the military cooperation agreements signed between the two states and Russia's take-over of Armenia's state-

⁷⁵⁶ "Inter RAO UES Signs a Memorandum on Effective Operation of Inguri Hydroelectric Power Plant", Company News, 31 December 2008. Available [online]: < <http://www.interrao.ru/eng/news/company/212/>> [03 January 2009].

⁷⁵⁷ Zaal Anjaparidze, "Russia Claims Strategic Victory in Georgian Privatization Round", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 2, no. 22 (31 January 2005).

⁷⁵⁸ "Relations between Georgia and Russia", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?sec_id=420&lang_id=ENG> [03 January 2009].

⁷⁵⁹ Indans, p.133.

controlled companies in strategic sectors such as energy, telecommunications, transportation, finance and mining in return for the latter's swelling debt.

At the time of Armenian President Robert Kocharian's 16-18 January 2003 visit to Russia, the two sides signed a military-technical cooperation agreement.⁷⁶⁰ During Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov's visit to Yerevan on 11 November 2003, he and his Armenian interlocutor Serzh Sargsyan concurred on a military cooperation agreement with which the Russian military facilities at Gyumri was merged into one base in keeping with Russian Defense Ministry requirements. Ivanov also apprised that Russia would continue to supply Armenia with weaponry and military hardware.⁷⁶¹ Moscow also transferred great deal of arms and military equipment from its bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki in Georgia to Gyumri in the course of evacuation of these military facilities.⁷⁶² With an agreement signed on 20 August 2010, in the course of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Armenia, Russia's right to station a military base in Gyumri was also extended to year 2044.⁷⁶³

On 05 February 2003, Russian Industry and Science Minister Ilya Klebanov and Armenian Minister of Defense Serzh Sargsyan agreed an accord under which financial management of the Medzamor nuclear power plant was passed on to Russia's UES in exchange for paying off Armenia's forty million dollars debt to

⁷⁶⁰ Sergei Blagov, "Kocharian's Moscow Visit Underscores Strengthening Armenian-Russian Security Cooperation", *Eurasia Insight*, 21 January 2003.

⁷⁶¹ Timur Onica, "Armenia, Russia Sign Further Military Cooperation Agreements", *RFE/RL*, 13 November 2003 and Kim Iskyan, "Big Bad Pariah: Armenia in Russia's Embrace", *Moscow Times*, 24 March 2004, and Ilan Berman, "The New Battleground: Central Asia and the Caucasus", *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (Winter 2004-2005), p. 66.

⁷⁶² Samvel Matirosyan and Alman Mir Ismail, "Armenia and Azerbaijan Differ over Russian Base Pull-out", *Eurasia Insight*, 28 June 2005.

⁷⁶³ "Russian-Armenian Talks", News, President of Russia, Yerevan, 20 August 2010. Available [online]: < <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/808> > [29 August 2010] and "Ruslar Ermenistan'a Yerleşti", *Cumhuriyet*, 21 August 2010.

Russian nuclear fuel suppliers.⁷⁶⁴ In August 2003, Armenia signed another agreement with UES to hand over Sevan-Razdansky hydro-power plant for the purpose of wiping out the debts owed for deliveries of nuclear fuel for the Armyanskaya nuclear station.⁷⁶⁵

In September 2005, Armenian government gave its consent to the sale of Armenia's national power grid by British Midland Resources Holding to Interenergo, a subsidiary of UES.⁷⁶⁶ In April 2006, Armenian government reached a twenty-five year gas agreement with Russia under which joint Armenian-Russian firm, ArmRosGaz took over the fifth unit of the Hrazdan thermal power plant and unified it with the four old blocs, which were already controlled by UES under a single management system. ArmRosGaz also seized the control of Armenian portion of the Iran-Armenian gas pipeline.⁷⁶⁷ The deal came soon after Gazprom's announcement that it would increase the price of gas sold to Armenia from fifty-six dollars per one thousand cubic meters to 110 dollars per one thousand cubic meters.⁷⁶⁸ With the new contract Armenia accepted the new price but there would not be any scaling up of the gas price until 01 January 2009.⁷⁶⁹

The Armenian government's Public Service Regulatory Commission gave its approval on 14 November 2006, for the acquisition by the Russian mobile phone operator VimpelCom of the ninety percent stakes of the Armenian Telephone

⁷⁶⁴ "Armenia Agrees to Transfer Financial Management of Medzamor to EES", *Noyan Tapan*, 07 February 2003.

⁷⁶⁵ Stanislav Secieru, "Russia's Foreign Policy Under Putin: CIS Project Renewed", *UNISCI Discussion Papers* (January 2006), p.299.

⁷⁶⁶ "Armenian Government Approves Sale of National Power Grid", *RFE/RL*, 26 September 2005.

⁷⁶⁷ "Armenia Cedes Power Plant in Exchange for Cheap Russian Gas", *RFE/RL*, 06 April 2006 and Vladimir Socor, "Armenia's Giveaways to Russia: From Property-for-Debt to Property-for-Gas", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no. 76, (19 April 2006).

⁷⁶⁸ Haroutiun Khachatryan, "Gas Prices Prompt Armenia to Debate Alliance with Russia", *Business and Economics*, 30 January 2006.

⁷⁶⁹ Vladimir Socor, "Russia Cements Control of Armenia's Energy System", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no. 204, (03 November 2006).

Company (ArmenTel) which was owned by Greece's Hellenic Telecommunication Organization (OTE).⁷⁷⁰ During President Kocharian's visit to Moscow in November 2006, Russia's Comstar Telesystems declared that it had obtained the seventy-five percent of the shares of the Armenia's second largest telecommunications group CallNet and its subsidiary, the internet service provider, CorNet.⁷⁷¹ Finally, Russian telecommunications operator MTS purchased Armenia's largest mobile phone network, VivaCell from a Lebanese company in September 2007.⁷⁷²

Armavia Airlines that belonged to Russia's Sibir Airlines was granted the bulk of the flights of the Armenian Airlines after agreeing to assume twenty-five million dollars debt of the company.⁷⁷³ A thirty-year concession agreement was signed on 13 February 2008 by Vladimir Yakunin, President of Russian Railways and Andranik Manukyan, Minister of Transport and Communication of Armenia through which Russian South Caucasus Railways obtained the right to manage the Armenia's existing railway network.⁷⁷⁴

Russian Ingosstrakh Company purchased seventy-five percent of the shares of Armenian insurance company Efes in 2003.⁷⁷⁵ In March 2004, Vneshtorgbank,

⁷⁷⁰ "Russian Operator Acquires Armenian Telecom Network", *Noyan Tapan*, 15 November 2006. ArmenTel's shares were transferred to VimpelCom to offset Greece's debts for the Russian gas. See "Armenian Telecom Giant Set to Be Handed over to Russia", *BBC News*, 30 September 2003.

⁷⁷¹ Vladimir Socor, "Armenia Selling More Infrastructure Industry to Russia", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no. 206, (07 November 2006).

⁷⁷² Emil Danielyan, "Soaring Trade Boost Russian-Armenian Economic Ties", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4, no. 21 (30 October 2007).

⁷⁷³ Emil Danielyan, "Russia Tightens Grip on Armenia with Debt Agreements", *Business and Economics*, 07 May 2003.

⁷⁷⁴ "Russian Railways Awarded Concession to Manage Armenian Railways", News, Russian Railways, 14 February 2008. Available [online]: <http://www.eng.rzd.ru/wps/portal/rzdeng?STRUCTURE_ID=4082> [04 January 2009].

⁷⁷⁵ "Ingo-Armenia Insurance Company Marks its 10th Anniversary", *ArmInfo*, 30 October 2007 and Ömer Kocaman, "Rusya'nın Ermenistan Politikası: Tek Boyutlu Siyasetten Çok Boyutlu Siyasete Doğru", *ASAM*, 18 February 2006.

Russia's state-dominated bank, acquired seventy percent stakes in Armenian Savings Bank (Armsberbank).⁷⁷⁶

On 16 April 2004, Armenia's biggest chemical factory, Nairit, that produced chloroprene rubber, was sold to the Volgaburmash Company, based in the Russian city of Samarra.⁷⁷⁷ In September 2007, one of Armenia's biggest mining concerns, the Ararat Gold Recovery Company was purchased by Madneuli Resources, a mining conglomerate, controlled by Industrial Investors; a group of Russian financiers headed by Sergei Generalov, a former Russian Energy Minister.⁷⁷⁸ A deal was clinched during Russian Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov and Head of the Russian Federal Atomic Agency (Rosatom), Sergei Kiriyenko's visit to Armenia on 06 February 2008, that foresaw the creation of a joint venture with Russian Atomredmetzoloto, a uranium mining subsidiary of Rosatom and the Armenian government to develop uranium reserves in Armenia which were estimated at 30,000-60,000 tons.⁷⁷⁹

Russia's relations with Azerbaijan maintained their steady course. Energy cooperation constituted the epicenter of the association between Baku and Moscow whereas military collaboration remained in meager dimensions. Russia continuously wooed Azerbaijani authorities to persuade them to sell natural gas to Russia with long-term contracts in order to prevent Azerbaijan's participation to Western-originated pipeline projects that would bypass Russia. Furthermore, with bilateral

⁷⁷⁶ "Russia's Vneshtorgbank Takes Over Armenian Bank", *ArmInfo*, 24 March 2004.

⁷⁷⁷ "Russians Take Over Armenian Chemical Plant", *Caucasus Reporting Service*, 27 May 2004.

⁷⁷⁸ Kieran Cooke, "Armenia's Controversial Gold Rush", *BBC News*, 09 January 2008.

⁷⁷⁹ Sergei Blagov, "Armenia Seeks Stronger Ties with Russia", *Eurasia Insight*, 27 March 2008.

trade reaching to two billion dollars, Azerbaijan became Russia's most important trade partner in the South Caucasus.⁷⁸⁰

Russian Security Council Secretary Vladimir Rushailo and his Azerbaijani equivalent Ramiz Mekhtiev signed an accord on 20 February 2003, during the former's visit to Baku that anticipated cooperation between their respective agencies in the issues of crime, drug trafficking and international terrorism.⁷⁸¹ On 27 February 2003, visiting Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov signed a cooperation agreement with his Azeri counterpart which paved the way for Azerbaijan to supply weapons and spare parts from Russia.⁷⁸²

Azerbaijan continued to buy natural gas and electricity from Russia unremittingly until December 2006 when Gazprom declared that it would increase gas prices for Azerbaijan in 2007 from 110 dollars to 230 dollars per one thousand cubic meters. Gazprom also would cut the volume of supplies it exported to Azerbaijan from 4.5 billion cubic meters to 1.5 billion cubic meters.⁷⁸³ The price hike was seen by the Azerbaijani government as blackmail to impel the country stopping gas supplies to Georgia and the Azeri officials enounced that they desisted from importing gas at all from Russia in 2007 at the proposed price.⁷⁸⁴

Despite the row on gas price rise, Russia did not lose its interest in Azerbaijan. A Gazprom delegation visited Azerbaijan on 02 June 2008, and the

⁷⁸⁰ Russian-Armenian bilateral trade came at 860 million dollars in 2010 whereas Russian-Georgian bilateral trade remained at 249 million dollars. See Rusya Federasyonu'nun Genel Ekonomik Durumu ve Türkiye ile Ekonomik-Ticari İlişkileri, T.C.Moskova Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği, July 2011, p.82. Available [online]: <http://www.musavirlikler.gov.tr/upload/RF/RUSYA%20rapor%202010-2011.doc#_Toc240530796> [11 September 2011].

⁷⁸¹ Abe Rein, "Russian Security Council Secretary Visits Azerbaijan", *RFE/RL*, 21 February 2003.

⁷⁸² "Azerbaijan, Russia Sign Military Cooperation Agreement", *Turan*, 28 February 2003.

⁷⁸³ Rovshan Ismayilov, "Baku Banks on Independent Energy Policy", *Business and Economics*, 13 December 2006.

⁷⁸⁴ Sergei Blagov, "Russian Ties with Azerbaijan Reach New Lows", *Eurasia Insight*, 25 January 2007.

company's CEO, Alexei Miller, who met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, made a proposal to buy Azerbaijani gas at market prices on the basis of long term contracts.⁷⁸⁵ This generous offer, if Azerbaijan takes it up, will definitely axe the realization of prospective Western-backed pipeline projects such as Nabucco, Poseidon or Trans-Asia.⁷⁸⁶

Russian foreign policy toward the South Caucasus region in this period is shaped around two main goals. Firstly, Russia was extremely uncomfortable about NATO's possible next expansion wave which would enable the Alliance to come nearer to its borders by extension of invitation to Georgia for the membership. Therefore, Moscow frowned at any Georgian attempt to put its military structure in line with NATO standards; be it accepting financial aid from NATO members, purchasing US weapons and military hardware or permitting the training of Georgian soldiers by American instructors. Russia seemed to reach to its target at least for now as NATO became highly apprehensive about Georgia's accession to the alliance after the deployment of Russian troops on its two secessionist regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a result of the August War of 2008.

Second pillar of Russian South Caucasian policy was the penetration of the economies of South Caucasian states by getting hold of these countries' leading

⁷⁸⁵ "Gazprom Ready to Buy Azerbaijani Gas at Market Prices-Envoy", *RIA Novosti*, 04 June 2008.

⁷⁸⁶ Amanda Akçakoca, "Azerbaijan: The Cork in the Caspian Bottle", *Today's Zaman*, 03 September 2008. Azerbaijan and Russia signed an agreement on June 29, 2009, with which Gazprom and SOCAR agreed on basic conditions of contracts for the purchase and sale of Azerbaijani natural gas. According to the deal Azerbaijan pledged to deliver five hundred million cubic meters of gas to Russia starting from 01 January 2010. Although the initial volumes were trivial, there existed the possibility of expanding the deliveries in the coming years. See "Dmitry Medvedev Held Talks with President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev", News, President of Russia, Baku, 29 June 2009. Available [online]: < <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/docs/news.shtml#218969> > [04 July 2009], "Rusya, Azeri Gazında İmzayı Attı", *Milliyet*, 30 June 2009, "Azeri Gazını Ruslar Kaptı", *Sabah*, 30 June 2009, and Nerdun Hacıoğlu, "Azerbaycan'dan Türkiye ve Avrupa'ya Gaz Tokadı", *Hürriyet*, 30 June 2009. In September 2010, at the time of President Medvedev's official visit to Baku, Azerbaijan and Russia signed a supplementary gas agreement under which Gazprom would increase its purchases of Azerbaijani gas in 2011 to two billion cubic meters. See Joint News Conference Following Russian-Azerbaijani Talks, Speeches and Transcripts, President of Russia, Baku, 03 September 2010. Available [online]: <<http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/883>> [26 September 2010].

companies in energy, banking, telecommunications, transportation and industrial sectors. This asset acquisition tactic became successful in Armenia and Georgia where Russia had the opportunity to capture the controlling stakes of these firms as a result of Armenian and Georgian debts to Russia emanating from unpaid natural gas, fuel oil and electricity bills whereas Azerbaijan was off the Russian hook thanks to its rich oil and natural gas reserves.

Russian Central Asian Policy of Enhancing Economic and Military Ties

The mainstay of the Russian policy in Central Asia starting from the early 2000s became the perpetuation and consolidation of bilateral economic and security bonds between Moscow and the capitals of the region. In the field of economics, Russia strained every nerve to convince the leaders of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to export major bulk of oil and natural gas resources of their countries to Russia and through the pipelines that passed along Russian territory. Russia also signed agreements to explore and develop oil and gas fields in these countries. Furthermore, Moscow ploughed in noticeable investments in energy, telecommunications and banking/financial services sectors of Central Asian Republics either via joint ventures or through acquisition of local companies.

Military cooperation between Russia and the states of Central Asia soared gradually with Russia's weapon and technical equipment sales to these countries, execution of joint defense drills, Russia's construction of military bases or use of the existing military bases and Moscow's provision of training opportunities in its war colleges for the Central Asian military personnel and students.

Kazakhstan retained its position of being the focal point of Russian economic designs and schemes in Central Asia. The two countries signed many agreements to develop oil and gas fields in Kazakh territory. Moreover, Russian corporations entered into many partnerships with Kazakh firms in energy, telecommunications, banking, and automotive sectors of the Kazakh economy. The bilateral trade between the two countries exceeded fifteen billion dollars in 2010 and Kazakhstan became Russia's fourteenth largest trade partner.⁷⁸⁷

The President of Lukoil, Vagit Alekperov, and Lazzat Kiinov, the Head of KazMunayGaz, penned a Memorandum of Understanding in Astana on 10 February 2003, to create by 20 November 2003, a joint enterprise to explore and develop Khvalynsky oil field in the northern Caspian Sea.⁷⁸⁸ Following the talks between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Kazakh counterpart Nursultan Nazarbayev on 09 January 2004, Lukoil and KazMunayGaz agreed on another contract with which Lukoil had obtained the right to develop the Tyub-Karagan and Atashsky off-shore oil fields in the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea for forty years.⁷⁸⁹ On 06 January 2005, in the course of President Putin's working visit to Kazakhstan, the two countries signed a fifty-five-year Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) to develop the Kurmangazy oil field in Kazakhstan.⁷⁹⁰

On 18 January 2005, at the time of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev's visit to Russia, the two Heads of States concluded a border delimitation agreement

⁷⁸⁷ Rusya Federasyonu'nun Genel Ekonomik Durumu ve Türkiye ile Ekonomik-Ticari İlişkileri, T.C.Moskova Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği, July 2011, pp. 81-83. Available [online]: <http://www.musavirlikler.gov.tr/upload/RF/RUSYA%20rapor%202010-2011.doc#_Toc240530796> [11 September 2011].

⁷⁸⁸ Ina Iankulova, "Kazakhstan, Lukoil Envisage Joint Venture", *RFE/RL*, 11 February 2003.

⁷⁸⁹ Sergei Blagov, "Economic Union Slips from View at Russia-Kazakhstan Summit", *Business and Economics*, 15 January 2004 and "Start of the Practical Implementation of the Tyub-Karagan and Atashsky Projects", *OilVoice*, 26 January 2004.

⁷⁹⁰ Vladimir Socor, "Major Russian-Kazakh Oil Production-Sharing Agreement Signed", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 2, no.131, (07 July 2005).

which defined the 7,500 km-long frontier⁷⁹¹ between their states. In return for the border demarcation deal with Russia, Kazakhstan conceded to the joint development of the Caspian Sea's Imashevskoye natural gas field by Gazprom and KazMunayGaz despite its earlier insistence on being the sole owner of the gas deposit.⁷⁹²

In November 2005, Kazakhstan's Intergaz Central Asia, a subsidiary of the state-controlled KazTransgaz, and Gazprom reached a deal to restore the old Soviet-era gas supply system in Central Asia using the ramified network of the Tsentralnaya Azia-Tsentr, Bukhara-Ural and Orenburg-Novopskov pipelines.⁷⁹³ In July 2006, Putin and Nazarbayev signed a declaration on long-term cooperation in processing Karachaganak gas at Gazprom's Orenburg plant; three months later, on 03 October, the two Presidents put their signatures under another agreement which foresaw the establishment of a gas joint venture based at the Orenburg gas refinery in Russia.⁷⁹⁴

Russian UES concluded a deal in September 2004 to take half of the shares in Kazakhstan's large Ekibastuz power plant.⁷⁹⁵ In October 2006, the Kazakh Energy Grid Operating Company (KEGOC) and the UES clinched an agreement whereby North Kazakhstan would provide electricity to the Urals region of Russian

⁷⁹¹ The Kazakh-Russian boundary is the world's longest land border.

⁷⁹² "Russia and Kazakhstan Divide Gas Field", *Gateway to Russia*, 18 January 2005 and Sergei Blagov, "Nazarbayev and Putin Pledge 'God-Given' Friendship", *Business and Economics*, 19 January 2005.

⁷⁹³ Marat Yermukanov, "Russian-Kazakh Partnership Leads Central Asian Integration", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 2, no. 234, (16 December 2005).

⁷⁹⁴ Sergei Blagov, "Putin and Nazarbayev Ink Deal to Process Gas at Orenburg", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no.138, (18 July 2006), Sergei Blagov, "New Deal Will Process Kazakh Gas at Nearby Russian Facility", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no.185, (06 October 2006), and "The President Signed the Federal Law on the Ratification of the Agreement Between the Governments of Russia and Kazakhstan on Cooperation in Establishing a Joint Venture Based at the Orenburg Gas Refinery", Presidents of Russia, News, 23 July 2008. Available [online]: <
<http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/news/2008/07/204616.shtml>> [31 January 2009].

⁷⁹⁵ Gregory Gleason, "Russian Companies Propose Debt-Equity Swaps in Central Asia", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 1, no. 103, (11 October 2004).

Federation in exchange for Russian power supplies to West Kazakhstan and Aktope.⁷⁹⁶

In July 2006, Kazakhstan's national atomic company Kazatomprom signed contracts for the establishment of three joint ventures totalling ten billion dollars for the construction of nuclear reactors, exploitation of uranium deposits of Yuzhnoe Zarechnoe and Budenovsk in southern Kazakhstan and uranium enrichment in the Angarsk plant in Eastern Siberia.⁷⁹⁷ On 07 December 2006, Kazakh Prime Minister Daniyal Akhmetov inaugurated a Kazakh-Kyrgyz-Russian joint business in southern Kazakhstan to extract uranium for further processing in Russia.⁷⁹⁸ Lastly, at the time of Russian President Vladimir Putin's official visit to Kazakhstan, the two sides hammered out an accord for the establishment of an International Uranium Enrichment Centre in Astana.⁷⁹⁹

Kamaz, leading Russian truck manufacturer, signed an agreement in July 2003 with a number of Kazakh firms for the construction of an automobile assembly operation in the republic.⁸⁰⁰ In September 2004, Moscow laid hands on the telecommunications industry of Kazakhstan with VimpelCom's seizure of the country's second largest mobile operator Kar-Tel for the price of 425 million dollars.⁸⁰¹ The two countries also decided to join forces in financial arena and set up

⁷⁹⁶ Marat Yermukanov, "Russian and Western Energy Interests Clash in Kazakhstan", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no. 197, (25 October 2006).

⁷⁹⁷ Marlene Laruelle, "Russia's Central Asia Policy and the Role of Russian Nationalism", *Silk Road Paper*, (April 2008), pp. 26-27 and "Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan", World Nuclear Association, January 2009. Available [online]: <www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf89.html> [31 January 2009].

⁷⁹⁸ "Kazakhstan, Russia Launch Uranium Joint Venture", *Kazinform*, 11 December 2006.

⁷⁹⁹ "Russia and Kazakhstan, Important Players in the World Energy Market, Have Increased Their Cooperation in the Energy Sector", President of Russia, 10 May 2007. Available [online]: <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/themes/2007/05/102251_127780.shtml> [31 January 2009].

⁸⁰⁰ Denis Pinchuk, "Buy, Russia, Buy", *Rosbalt News*, 01 October 2003.

⁸⁰¹ Peter Vahtra, "Russian Investments in the CIS-Scope, Motivations and Leverage", *Electronic Publications of Pan-European Institute*, (September 2005), p.23.

a Eurasian Development Bank in Almaty in January 2006 to finance joint projects with the contribution of Russian Vnesheconombank and the Development Bank of Kazakhstan.⁸⁰²

Kazakhstan and Russia continued to come together in regional economic organizations. In September 2003, the Presidents of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan signed a treaty on the creation of a Single Economic Space (SEC) that stipulated the harmonization of the legislation of the respective countries' on trade, competition and natural monopolies along with the promotion of free movement of capital, goods, services and labour.⁸⁰³ In October 2007, Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan reached another agreement during the Eurasian Economic Community Summit in Dushanbe on forming the necessary mechanisms to ease tariffs and customs procedures to boost trade between them.⁸⁰⁴ Starting from 01 January 2010, the unified tariff preferences system between these three countries came into force⁸⁰⁵ and it was followed by the realization of SEC on 01 January 2012.

The Baikonur Space Center in Kazakhstan preserved to be an important element of military collaboration between the two countries. Although Russia had moved most of its military space work to Plesetsk Cosmodrome in northern Kazakhstan, Baikonur was still used for commercial and scientific launches.⁸⁰⁶ On 09 January 2004, Putin and Nazarbayev signed a treaty in Astana that extended the

⁸⁰² "Kazakhstan and Countries of the CIS: Cooperation of the Republic of Kazakhstan with Russia". Available [online]: < <http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/en/content/policy/cooperation/cis/09> > [31 January 2009] and Marat Yermukanov, "Nazarbayev Places Priority on Ties with Moscow", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no. 14, (20 January 2006).

⁸⁰³ Secrieru, p.295.

⁸⁰⁴ "Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan Agree to Form Customs Union", *Russia Today*, 06 October 2007.

⁸⁰⁵ "Dmitry Medvedev Signed the Federal Law on Ratification of the Protocol on a Unified Tariff Preferences System within the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.", President of Russia, News, 30 November 2009. Available [online]: < <http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/news/2009/11/223104.shtml> > [20 March 2010].

⁸⁰⁶ "Russia Extends Space Site Lease", *BBC News*, 09 January 2004.

lease of the site by Russia until 2050. The two Presidents also came to an agreement on the foundation of a joint space venture called Baiterek.⁸⁰⁷ One week later, on January 16, the Defense Ministers of Russia and Kazakhstan penned another accord that allowed for common planning of troop deployments under the auspices of the CSTO.⁸⁰⁸

Kazakh Premier Daniyal Akhmetov met with his counterpart Mikhail Fradkov on 25 January 2005 in Moscow during a convention of the Council of the CIS Heads of Governments, and the two Prime Ministers arranged a settlement on renting the Emba and Saryshagan military training grounds to Russia and receiving education of Kazakh servicemen in Russian higher educational establishments.⁸⁰⁹

The January 2004 agreement enabled Kazakhstan to purchase Russian arms at Russian internal prices and on favourable terms. With the contracts signed in 2006 and 2007, Russia donated the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan with armoured personnel carriers, helicopters, modern simulators, missile defense systems and other aircrew training equipment.⁸¹⁰ Kazakhistani Minister of Defense Daniyal Akhmetov enunciated on 12 May 2008 that his country selected Russia's arms export monopoly, Rosoboronexport to act as the exclusive supplier for the Kazakhstani navy. The year 2015 has been slotted as the target completion date for the creation of

⁸⁰⁷ "The President Signed the Federal Law on Ratification of the Agreement Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Development of Cooperation for Effective Usage of the Baikonur Space Center", President of Russia, News, 20 June 2005. Available [online]: <<http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/themes/2005/06/89998.shtml>> [31 January 2009].

⁸⁰⁸ Ibrahim Alibekov, "Kazakhstan Tilts Towards Russia", *Eurasia Insight*, 18 February 2004.

⁸⁰⁹ Justin Burke, "Kazakhstan, Russia Sign Military Cooperation Accords", *RFE/RL*, 30 November 2005.

⁸¹⁰ Vladimir Paramonov and Oleg Stolpovski, "Russia and Central Asia: Bilateral Cooperation in the Defense Sector", *Advanced Research and Development Group*, (May 2008), p.4 and "Kazakhstan Signs Agreements to Buy More Russian Military Aviation Equipment", *RFE/RL*, 23 August 2007.

a full-fledged Kazakh navy.⁸¹¹ On 08 December 2010, right after the meeting between Russian Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov and his Kazakh counterpart Adilbek Dzhaksybekov, it was declared that Russia would transfer S-300 air defense systems to Kazakhstan.⁸¹²

Russia and Kazakhstan carried out two large scale joint military exercises in 2008. The first one took place at the Gvardeyskiy military range near Almaty on 06 July 2008 with the participation of 2,300 Russian and Kazakh paratroopers, more than forty aircraft and helicopters and more than 240 pieces of military hardware.⁸¹³ The second one, the largest joint military drill of Russia and Kazakhstan since the collapse of the Soviet Union was conducted on 04 September 2008, at the Chebarkul training range near Chelyabinsk region in Urals in Russian Federation. The manoeuvre involved around two thousand servicemen, more than one hundred units of armoured vehicles, and thirty planes and helicopters.⁸¹⁴

Terrorist bombings in Tashkent and Bukhara in late March and early April 2004 and the ensuing Andijan events⁸¹⁵ broke out in May 2005, while dissociating Uzbekistan from the West, brought the country close to the Russian orbit both in economic and military spheres.

After the attacks in Tashkent and Bukhara, the Uzbek government decided to ban the George Soros Open Society Institute from operating in the country. The US

⁸¹¹ Sergei Blagov, "Medvedev Kicks Off Kazakhstan Courtship", *Business and Economics*, 15 May 2008.

⁸¹² "Russia To Deliver S-300 Missiles To Kazakhstan", *Agence France Presse*, 08 December 2010.

⁸¹³ "Kazakh Minister Praises Kazakh-Russian Military Exercises", *Interfax-Kazakhstan*, 11 July 2008.

⁸¹⁴ Roger McDermott, "Russia's Central Asian Exercises with Kazakhstan Focus on Defending Energy Assets", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 174, (11 September 2008).

⁸¹⁵ In the early hours of 13 May 2005, militants stormed to a prison in Andijan and set as many as four thousand inmates free. By day break, militants, along with civilian protestors, occupied the city's central square, including the regional government offices. In the evening, Uzbek security forces, backed by tanks and armoured vehicles crushed the unrest sternly. As a result of the operation, the city center was retaken from protestors but many civilians lost their lives. See "Dozens Killed in Uzbek City, As Security Forces Crush Protest in Andijan", *Civil Society*, 13 May 2005.

administration criticized the Uzbek decision and suggested that the regime should pay closer attention to democratic reforms and human rights. Moreover, Washington slashed foreign aid to Uzbekistan by eighteen million dollars on the grounds of the death of detainees in custody in the country and the failure to register opposition parties.⁸¹⁶ In the same days, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development also refused to grant credits to Uzbekistan.⁸¹⁷

After the chilling out of the situation in Andijan, both the US and the EU demanded an independent investigation to reveal the true nature of the incident. However, Kerimov rejected the offer fiercely and claimed that the attacks were carried out by external radical Islamist forces with the aim of overthrowing the current regime and setting up an Islamic Caliphate in its place. The EU, not satisfied with Kerimov's explanation, initiated an arms and partial visa embargo on Uzbekistan in November 2005. The US government fully endorsed the EU sanctions and froze twenty million dollars financial aid to Tashkent.

Russia chose to keep a low profile during the Western-Uzbek dispute and evaded from criticizing the Kerimov administration. Moscow had significant economic and military stakes in Uzbekistan and could not throw away the opportunity that would segregate Tashkent from the Western bloc.

In April 2004, Uzbekneftegaz and Gazprom signed a fifteen-year Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) on gas extraction at Uzbekistan's Shakpakhty gas field.⁸¹⁸ In June of the same year, Uzbekneftegaz, this time with Lukoil, agreed on a thirty-

⁸¹⁶ Roger McDermott, "Tashkent Largely Silent on Cut in US Aid", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 1, no. 54, (18 July 2004).

⁸¹⁷ Konstantin Syroezhkin, "Russia: On the Path to Empire?", in *Central Asia at the End of the Transition*, (ed.) Boris Rumer (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), p.119.

⁸¹⁸ Daria Solovieva, "Uzbek-Russian Gas Accord", *RFE/RL*, 15 April 2004 and Bertil Nygren, "Putin Plays the Energy Card: Putin's Use of Natural Gas to Reintegrate the CIS Region", *Problems of Post-Communism* 55, no. 4 (July-August 2008), p. 10.

five-year PSA relating to the Kandym-Khausak-Shady-Kungrad oilfield in Uzbekistan. In April 2006, Uzbekneftegaz and Gazprom commenced a one billion dollars joint venture to explore and develop oil and gas deposits in the Ustyurt plains in Karakalpakiya region in Uzbekistan.⁸¹⁹ In August 2006, Lukoil joined in the international consortium composed of Uzbekneftegaz, Petronas (Malaysia), CNPC (China) and Korea National Oil Company (South Korea) to conclude a PSA concerning the Aral Sea deposits.⁸²⁰ Gazprom was granted licenses to develop sizeable acreage in Qoraqalpogiston in December 2006 and in Urga, Kuanysh, and Akchalak in January 2007.⁸²¹ Finally, in March 2008, Lukoil closed a 580 million dollars deal to acquire seven gas deposits in Uzbekistan.⁸²²

The Russian-Uzbek bilateral trade came at 3.4 billion dollars in 2010.⁸²³ Other than the energy sector, FMCG, banking and telecommunications industries of Uzbekistan witnessed the entry of Russian firms either through acquisitions or joint businesses with the Uzbek companies. In 2003, the premier Russian juice and dairy manufacturer Wimm-Bill-Dann Food Products purchased the 77 percent shares of Uzbek dairy plant Tashkent Sut.⁸²⁴ In the same year, Russian Tsentro-Kredit captured a 33 percent stake in Uzbek Ravnak Bank.⁸²⁵ In June 2004, Russia's then largest telecommunications company Golden Telecom seized the fifty-four percent

⁸¹⁹ Sergei Blagov, "Russian Economic Ties with Uzbekistan Hit Turbulence", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4, no. 47 (08 March 2007).

⁸²⁰ Laruelle, p.23.

⁸²¹ "Uzbekistan Gives Russian Gas Company Exploration License", *Eurasia Digest*, 18 January 2007.

⁸²² These are Jarkuduk, Gumbulak, Amanata, Pachkamar, Adamtash, South Kyzylbairak and Koshkuduk. See Sergei Blagov, "Russia Mulls Stronger Partnership with Uzbekistan", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 84, (02 May 2008).

⁸²³ Rusya Federasyonu'nun Genel Ekonomik Durumu ve Türkiye ile Ekonomik-Ticari İlişkileri, T.C.Moskova Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği, July 2011, p.83. Available [online]: <http://www.musavirlikler.gov.tr/upload/RF/RUSYA%20rapor%202010-2011.doc#_Toc240530796> [11 September 2011].

⁸²⁴ "WBD Buys Up Uzbekistan Dairy", *Dairy Reporter*, 02 April 2004.

⁸²⁵ Denis Pinchuk, "Buy, Russia, Buy", *Rosbalt News*, 01 October 2003.

shares of the major Uzbek corporate service provider firm Buzton for 2.8 million dollars.⁸²⁶ On 16 July 2004, Russia's Mobile Telesystems (MTS) announced that it had purchased 74 percent shares of Uzbekistan's Uzdunrobita telecommunications corporation that controlled fifty-one percent of the country's cellular market for 121 million dollars.⁸²⁷ On 18 January 2006, Russia's second-biggest cellular telephone operator VimpelCom declared that it would pay 275 million dollars to acquire Uzbek mobile operators Buztel and Unitel.⁸²⁸

Russia and Uzbekistan signed a Treaty on Strategic Partnership on 16 June 2004 that set the stage for bilateral military cooperation in the following years.⁸²⁹

With the accord, the two states granted each other the right to deploy armed forces on each other's territory when the occasion arises. Russia undertook to upgrade air and air defense facilities in Uzbekistan, modernize dated Uzbek military equipment and provide Uzbek army with novel weapons. Furthermore, Moscow would also increase access to its military educational establishments for the training of Uzbek military personnel.⁸³⁰

On 29 July 2005, Uzbekistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a note to the US Embassy in Tashkent, asking the US to vacate the Karshi-Khanabad air base

⁸²⁶ "Golden Telecom Buys Majority Stake in Uzbek Telco", *TeleGeography*, 04 June 2004.

⁸²⁷ Sophie Mathiaut, "Russia's MTS Buys Uzbek Cellular Operator", *RFE/RL*, 19 July 2004.

⁸²⁸ "Russian Company Buys Two Uzbek Mobile-Tel Operators", *Eurasia Digest*, 19 January 2006 and "Uzbekistan: Mobile Phone Operator Sold to Russia's Vimpel Communications for \$ 200m", *CaucasEurope News*, 19 February 2006.

⁸²⁹ Irina Zviagel'skaia, "Russia and Central Asia: Problems of Security", in *Central Asia at the End of the Transition*, (ed.) Boris Rumer (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), pp. 84-85 and Matteo Fumagalli, "Alignments and Realignments in Central Asia: The Rationale and Implications of Uzbekistan's Rapprochement with Russia", *International Political Science Review* 28, no. 3 (2007), p. 263.

⁸³⁰ Roger McDermott, "Russia Signs Strategic Partnership with Uzbekistan", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 1, no. 37 (22 June 2004).

and withdraw the troops and material from Uzbekistan.⁸³¹ Kerimov flew to Moscow on 14 November 2005, and he and Russian President Putin clinched a military alliance treaty by which the signatories obtained the right to use military facilities located on their respective territories in case of need.⁸³² In December 2006, Russia obtained the right to use the Uzbek airfield at Navoi in emergency situations in exchange for furnishing of Uzbek army with modern navigation systems and air-defense weapons.⁸³³

On 07 March 2007, in the course of Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov's visit to Tashkent, an agreement came into existence for the establishment of a Russian-Uzbek joint aviation company called UzRosAvia for the repair of Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters.⁸³⁴ In May 2007, Russia agreed to supply the air defense units of the land forces of Uzbekistan with Strela and Igla man-portable SAM systems.⁸³⁵ At the beginning of February 2008, Putin and Kerimov penned an accord in Moscow on the integration of the Tashkent Chkalov Aircraft Plant and the Russian United Aircraft Corporation.⁸³⁶

Between 19 and 24 September 2005, Russia and Uzbekistan held the first joint military exercises since the dissolution of the Soviet Union on Uzbek soil with the participation of four hundred troops.⁸³⁷ One year later, again on the same date,

⁸³¹ Vladimir Socor, "Tashkent Asks US to Close Air Base", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 2, no. 150 (02 August 2005).

⁸³² Sergei Blagov, "Uzbekistan and Russia Sign Mutual Defense Pact", *Eurasia Insight*, 15 November 2005.

⁸³³ Stephen Blank, "An Uzbek Air Base: Russia's Newest Achievement in Central Asia", *Eurasia Insight*, 11 January 2007.

⁸³⁴ "Russian Premier Visits Uzbekistan", *Eurasia Digest*, 08 March 2007.

⁸³⁵ Paramonov and Stolpovski, p.14.

⁸³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.15.

⁸³⁷ Bruce Pannier, "Uzbekistan: Military Exercises with Russia Timely for Tashkent", *Eurasia Insight*, 24 September 2005 and Vladimir Socor, "Unprecedented Uzbek-Russian Joint Military Exercise Held", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 2, no. 179 (27 September 2005).

Russia conducted a counter-terrorism operation with the involvement of a force of roughly 130 Uzbek special forces in its southern Krasnodar Krai.⁸³⁸

Uzbekistan took some additional measures to distance itself from the Western axis and bring it closer to Russia. Tashkent terminated its membership in American-inspired GUUAM in May 2005.⁸³⁹ In January 2006, Uzbekistan became the member of Eurasian Economic Community and in June 2006, it returned to the CSTO.⁸⁴⁰

The bilateral trade between Russia and Turkmenistan hit 906 million dollars in 2010⁸⁴¹, energy cooperation continuing to form the main component of the Russian-Turkmen relationship. On 10 April 2003, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Head of the State of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov signed an agreement in Moscow for the delivery of two trillion cubic meters of Turkmen gas for twenty-five years.⁸⁴² On 21 April 2003, President Niyazov concluded a ten-year contract with the Head of the Itera, Igor Makarov, to supply ten cubic meters of Turkmen gas annually.⁸⁴³ Turkmen Deputy Prime Minister Yolly Gurbanmuradov materialized a contract with Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller in Moscow on 18 August on the reconstruction and expansion of the gas pipeline system connecting Central Asia

⁸³⁸ “Joint Uzbek-Russian Counterterrorism Drills Start”, *Eurasia Digest*, 20 September 2006 and Roger McDermott, “Kerimov Prioritizes Russian Armaments”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no. 176 (25 September 2006).

⁸³⁹ Alisher Ilkhamov, “Russia Lures Uzbekistan as Its Strategic Satellite in Central Asia”, *Russian Analytical Digest*, no. 29 (16 October 2007), p.9.

⁸⁴⁰ Laruelle, p.19 and Vladimir Socor, “Uzbekistan Accedes to Collective Security Treaty Organization”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no. 124 (27 June 2006).

⁸⁴¹ Rusya Federasyonu’nun Genel Ekonomik Durumu ve Türkiye ile Ekonomik-Ticari İlişkileri, T.C.Moskova Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği, July 2011, p.83. Available [online]: <http://www.musavirlikler.gov.tr/upload/RF/RUSYA%20rapor%202010-2011.doc#_Toc240530796> [11 September 2011].

⁸⁴² “Russia and Turkmenistan Signed Agreement on Gas Purchase for 25 Years”, *Turkmenistan Daily Digest*, 14 April 2003 and Aleksandr Medvedev, “Gazexport: Achievements and Prospects”, *International Affairs (Moscow)* 52, no. 5 (2006), p.148.

⁸⁴³ Ina Iankulova, “Turkmen President Signs Another Gas Contract”, *RFE/RL*, 22 April 2003.

with Russia.⁸⁴⁴ An additional deal was fixed on the same day on the delivery by the Russian firm Gazeksport of equipment and services as partial payment for Turkmen gas deliveries in 2004-2006.

On 12 May 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kazakhstan Head of the State Nursultan Nazarbayev and the Turkmen leader Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov came together at a tripartite summit in Turkmenbashi city of Turkmenistan and put their signatures on a declaration of intent to upgrade and expand gas transport pipelines from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, along the Caspian Sea shore, directly to Russian Federation. A separate declaration, signed by Uzbek President Islam Kerimov, on 09 May, that promised to expand the gas transportation system linking the four countries, was also made public during the convention.⁸⁴⁵ A joint agreement was signed on 20 December 2007 in Moscow in the presence of Putin, Nazarbayev and Bairammyrat Myradov, Executive Director of the State Agency for the Management and Use of Hydrocarbon Resources of Turkmenistan, for the construction of the natural gas pipeline. The parties planned to build the pipeline along the Caspian coast, 360 km on Turkmenistan's territory and about 150 km through Kazakhstan, in order to link it with the existing Central Asia-Centre Pipeline on the Russian-Kazakh border.⁸⁴⁶ Russia, with this new gas accord, succeeded in killing two birds with one stone. Moscow, not only preserved and strengthened its

⁸⁴⁴ Edward Weihman, "Gazprom and Turkmen Officials Agree on Pipeline Reconstruction", *RFE/RL*, 19 August 2003.

⁸⁴⁵ "Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan Plan New Gas Pipeline", *RFE/RL*, 14 May 2007, Ilyas Kamalov, "Avrasya'daki Enerji Oyunları ve Türkiye", *ASAM*, 15 May 2007, Vladimir Socor, "Russia Surging Farther Ahead in Race for Central Asian Gas", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4, no. 96 (16 May 2007) and "Kazakhstan-Russia-Central Asia Gas Deal", *APS Review Oil Market Trends*, 04 August 2008.

⁸⁴⁶ "Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan Signed an Agreement on Constructing the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline", President of Russia, 20 December 2007. Available [online]: <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/themes/2007/12/201819_154953.shtml> [02 February 2009], "Russia to Transport Natural Gas from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan", *RIA Novosti*, 25 December 2007, and Anar Somuncuoğlu, "Türkiye Devre Dışı", *Strateji* 4, no. 184 (07 January 2008), pp. 8-9.

control on the export routes of natural gas resources of Central Asia, but also made the realization of the EU and US backed Trans-Caspian and Nabucco projects which aspired to bypass its territory, much more difficult.⁸⁴⁷

Another area where Russian corporations were active in Turkmenistan was the telecommunications industry. In June 2005, Russian MTS purchased a fifty-one percent stake in Barash Communications Technologies of Turkmenistan for 28 million dollars.⁸⁴⁸

Bilateral military cooperation between Russia and Turkmenistan remained limited in size and scope. In April 2003, the two countries penned a security agreement to counter outside threats, to coordinate their foreign policy activities and to broaden cooperation between their respective special services.⁸⁴⁹

Kyrgyzstan kept on its policy of accommodation with Russia in economic⁸⁵⁰ and security realms despite the change in leadership in the country after the Tulip Revolution⁸⁵¹. In May 2003, Gazprom signed a twenty-five-year agreement with Kyrgyzstan on repairing and modernizing existing gas pipelines and developing the joint production of oil and gas in the country.⁸⁵² On 20 August 2004, Kyrgyz Premier

⁸⁴⁷ Cenk Başlamış, “Putin Engeli”, *Milliyet*, 13 May 2007 and “Putin Enerji Darbesi İndirdi”, *Radikal*, 13 May 2007.

⁸⁴⁸ “Russian Owned Company Regains Cellular License in Turkmenistan”, *Eurasia Digest*, 08 July 2005.

⁸⁴⁹ Roy Allison, “Strategic Reassertion in Russia’s Central Asia Policy”, *International Affairs* 80, no. 2 (2004), p.289.

⁸⁵⁰ Bilateral trade between Russia and Kyrgyzstan reached to 1.3 billion dollars in 2010. See Rusya Federasyonu’nun Genel Ekonomik Durumu ve Türkiye ile Ekonomik-Ticari İlişkileri, T.C.Moskova Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği, July 2011, p.83. Available [online]: <http://www.musavirlikler.gov.tr/upload/RF/RUSYA%20rapor%202010-2011.doc#_Toc240530796> [11 September 2011].

⁸⁵¹ The regime of President Askar Akayev was toppled in March 2005 as a result of massive protest gatherings around the country. On 24 March 2005, Kurmanbek Bakiyev assumed the Presidential post and carried out this duty until his resignation from office on 15 April 2010 as a result of large-scale protests and bloody riots that took place in the country. Roza Otunbayeva assumed duty as the interim president between July 2010 and December 2011 and Almazbek Atambayev has been acting as the new president of Kyrgyzstan since 01 December 2011.

⁸⁵² Jonson, pp. 103-104.

Nikolai Tanaev and Anatolii Chubais, CEO of UES, agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding to finish the construction of Kyrgyzstan's two Kambar-Ata hydroelectric power stations.⁸⁵³

In June 2006, Gazprom acquired one hundred filling stations, which accounted for thirty percent of the total market in Kyrgyzstan, for approximately 99 million dollars.⁸⁵⁴ Russia's Renova Group won a tender to purchase the Kyrgyz government's 72.28 percent stake in the Kara Balta uranium production facility in February 2007.⁸⁵⁵ Gazprom and the Kyrgyz administration signed a deal on 10 October 2008 to sell Gazprom about seventy-five percent of the state-owned natural gas firm Kyrgyzgaz.⁸⁵⁶ Lastly, on 03 February 2009, at the time of President Bakiyev's visit to Moscow, the two countries firmed up plans to form a joint stock company between Kyrgyz Elektricheskie Stantsii and Russian RAO UES. Russia pledged to allocate 1.7 billion dollars credit for the completion of the Kambar-Ata 1 hydropower station from 2009 through 2013.⁸⁵⁷ Furthermore, it took over the forty-eight percent shares of Dastan naval torpedoes and spare parts manufacturing company in return for the writing off some part of the Kyrgyz debt.⁸⁵⁸

The Russian military base at Kant formed the touchstone of the Russian-Kyrgyz military cooperation. It began as a group of twenty-five to thirty Russian officials and has grown to a seven hundred-men contingent with one hundred Kyrgyz

⁸⁵³ Dow Kimbrell, "Kyrgyz-Russian Accord to Finish Building Power Stations", *RFE/RL*, 23 August 2004.

⁸⁵⁴ "Russian Gas Company Buys Kyrgyz Filling Stations", *Eurasia Digest*, 21 June 2006.

⁸⁵⁵ "Russian Company Wins Kyrgyz Mine Tender", *RFE/RL*, 23 February 2007.

⁸⁵⁶ Bruce Pannier, "Gazprom Works to Advance Russia's Interests in Central Asia", *Business and Economics*, 20 October 2008.

⁸⁵⁷ Erica Marat, "Bakiyev Pleases Moscow, Seeks to Oust U.S. Military Base", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 6, no.23 (04 February 2009).

⁸⁵⁸ Sinan Oğan, "Rusya'dan Obama'ya Kötü Sürpriz: ABD Orta Asya'daki Son Askeri Üssü'nü de Kaybetti", *TURKSAM*, 04 February 2009. Available [online]: <<http://www.turksam.net.tr/a1580.html>> [02 February 2009].

military personnel.⁸⁵⁹ Russia equipped the Kyrgyz army out with modern weapons and military gear⁸⁶⁰; the two states held joint anti-terrorism exercises in Osh region, located in southern Kyrgyzstan.⁸⁶¹ In Osh, Russia also plans to open a new military base as well as a training center that will be open to military personnel from all CSTO member countries.⁸⁶²

Like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan sustained its close economic and military bonds with Russia. Bilateral trade between the two countries reached to 886 million dollars in 2010.⁸⁶³ In May 2003, a twenty-five-year agreement was signed between Gazprom and Tajikistan, which gave the former the right to explore and develop the gas fields of Rangon and Sargazon.⁸⁶⁴ The Energy Minister of Tajikistan, Jurabek Nurmahmadov, and his Russian counterpart Viktor Khristenko concerted an agreement on 24 August 2004 for the obtainment of Russian government the majority shares in Tajikistan's unfinished Sangtuda hydropower plant for 100 million dollars.⁸⁶⁵

After a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Tajik Head of State Imomali Rahmonov that took place on 04 June 2004, Tajikistan granted Moscow the right to use the Nurek space surveillance center in exchange for writing

⁸⁵⁹ Erica Marat, "Russia Drumps up Support for Its Airbase in Kyrgyzstan", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no.236 (11 December 2008).

⁸⁶⁰ Paramonov and Stolpovski, p.8, Daria Solovieva, "Russia Gives Kyrgyzstan \$ 2,3 Million Worth of Military Aid", *RFE/RL*, 27 April 2004, Seyhun Şahin, "Devrim Sonrası Kırgızistan", *Strateji* 2, no. 76 (12 December 2005), p.23. and Asem Nauşabayeva Hekimoğlu, *Rusya'nın Dış Politikası* (Ankara: Vadi Yayınları, 2007), p.154.

⁸⁶¹ Sergei Blagov, "Moscow Beefs up Security Ties with Kyrgyzstan", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no.189 (13 October 2006).

⁸⁶² Roger McDermott, "CSTO in Crisis as Moscow Secures Second Military Base in Kyrgyzstan", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 6, no.149 (04 August 2009).

⁸⁶³ Rusya Federasyonu'nun Genel Ekonomik Durumu ve Türkiye ile Ekonomik-Ticari İlişkileri, T.C.Moskova Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği, July 2011, p.83. Available [online]: <http://www.musavirlikler.gov.tr/upload/RF/RUSYA%20rapor%202010-2011.doc#_Toc240530796> [11 September 2011].

⁸⁶⁴ Jonson, p.110.

⁸⁶⁵ Dow Kimbrell, "Russia to Gain Control of Tajik Power Station", *RFE/RL*, 27 August 2004.

off approximately three hundred million dollar debt.⁸⁶⁶ In October 2004, the second biggest military base outside Russian borders was inaugurated in Dushanbe.⁸⁶⁷ Russian border guards patrolled the country's frontier with Afghanistan until July 2005.⁸⁶⁸ Furthermore, Russia provided armament, ammunition, military equipment as well as financial aid to Tajik Armed Forces.⁸⁶⁹

In addition to consolidating bilateral military ties with Central Asian states, Russia also took some steps to accelerate regional security cooperation within the confines of CSTO. Russia demonstrated its intention to buckle down to the transformation and strengthening of the CSTO with President Dmitry Medvedev's statements on 04 February 2009, following an extraordinary session of CSTO in Moscow, about the creation of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force, mission of which would be to resist military aggression, to conduct special operations to eliminate terrorists and extremists, to fight against organized crime and drug trafficking and to deal with the consequences of natural and industrial disasters.⁸⁷⁰ According to the agreement, each member country would permanently assign one battalion-size unit to the planned military force. The assigned units would be trained under a common program, would receive compatible armaments, equipment, and communications systems from Russia and would also conduct regular joint

⁸⁶⁶ "Details Emerge on Russian-Tajik Agreement", *RFE/RL*, 08 June 2004 and Kambiz Arman, "Tajikistan Shuns United States, Tilts toward Russia", *Eurasia Insight*, 16 June 2004.

⁸⁶⁷ Secieru, p.298.

⁸⁶⁸ John C. K. Daly, "Tajikistan Comes in From the Cold", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 84 (02 May 2008).

⁸⁶⁹ Paramonov and Stolpovski, p.12.

⁸⁷⁰ "Press Conference following CSTO and EurAsEC Summits", Presidents of Russia, Diplomacy and External Affairs, Moscow, 04 February 2009. Available [online]: <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/02/04/1956_type82914type82915_212504.shtml> [07 February 2009].

exercises.⁸⁷¹ Despite the calls and efforts coming from Russia to position CSTO as a more active and effective security organization, the organization's reluctance to send peacekeeping troops and police forces to southern Kyrgyzstan where ethnic clashes broke out in June 2010 between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities led to question marks about the adequacy, capability and efficacy of CSTO as a military organization.

Russia has succeeded in establishing a military and economic stranglehold on natural resources bereft and financially poor states of Central Asia such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. On the other hand, resource-rich countries of Central Asia like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan managed to pursue a more balanced foreign policy and keep all the vying powers at arm's length. Turkmenistan sustains its policy of neutrality despite the recent overtures of President Berdimukhamedov towards Russia with the objective of securing Moscow's backing to consolidate his position in the country. Kazakhstan, while dubbed by Russia as its closest ally in Central Asia, allowed in December 2008 use of US and NATO forces a section of the Almaty airport as a reserve aerodrome for emergency landings during military operations in Afghanistan.⁸⁷² Uzbekistan, which had run into the arms of Russia after its rift with the EU and the USA, suspended its membership in Russian led EEC in November 2008 citing the organization's inability to promote greater regional cooperation on water and energy issues.⁸⁷³ What was gripping about the Uzbek withholding decision was that it came on the heels of an EU announcement which stated that the limited sanctions on Uzbekistan in force since November 2005

⁸⁷¹ Vladimir Socor, "CSTO Summit: Rapid Deployment Forces Advance at a Snail's Pace", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 6, no. 24 (05 February 2009).

⁸⁷² "Kazakhstan Gives US, NATO Airport Rights", *Eurasia Insight*, 03 December 2008.

⁸⁷³ "Uzbekistan: Tashkent Announces Withdrawal from Moscow-Dominated Economic Group", *Business and Economics*, 12 November 2008.

would be lifted. Moreover, the USA and the Uzbek administration also signed an agreement in February 2009 which would allow the USA to transport non-military supplies through Uzbek territory to Afghanistan.⁸⁷⁴

Turkey's policy toward the South Caucasus and Central Asia demonstrated similar characteristics with the previous period. Turkey, similar to Russia, gave weight to the economic and commercial dimensions while formulating and executing policies with regard to these regions. However, cooperation of Turkey with Central Asian states in military sector remained in meager amounts compared to Russia. The following section while giving a detailed account of Turkish initiatives in the South Caucasus and Central Asia will also try to find out whether the increasing political interaction as well as strong economic ties with Russia did bring out any similar perspectives and common approaches for the resolution of regional problems of the South Caucasus.

Turkey's South Caucasus and Central Asian Policy Aimed at Economic Penetration

Turkey and the South Caucasus: Efforts toward Economic Integration

Starting from mid 2000s, Turkey noticeably expanded its power and influence in the Transcaucasus. Ascending and deepening bilateral economic and military relations with the two regional capitals, Baku and Tbilisi, in addition to the completion of BTC and BTE oil and natural gas pipeline projects as well as making significant progress toward Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway construction raised Ankara's regional profile considerably. Turkey in this period again took the plunge to

⁸⁷⁴ "Uzbek President to Allow US Non-Military Transport", *AFP*, 25 February 2009.

normalize, at least mitigate, its intricate and knotty relation with Armenia but failed in this endeavour once again.

On 25 May 2005, the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, in company with Head of State of Kazakhstan, came together in Baku to celebrate the formal opening of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline.⁸⁷⁵ The BTC pipeline, while eradicating Russia's monopoly position in energy transportation in the Caspian Basin also colligated the future of Turkey with that of the regional countries. The second component of the East-West energy corridor, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline became operational on 03 July 2007.⁸⁷⁶ In consistent with an Intergovernmental Agreement clinched between Greece and Turkey on 23 February 2003, the Azeri gas commenced to flow into Europe through Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector Pipeline as of 18 November 2007.⁸⁷⁷

The last regional collaboration project that raked up Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey encapsulated the construction of a 258-km-long railway that would directly link three countries. Known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railroad, the tripartite transportation plan was first proposed by the Turkish government in 1993. A protocol was signed in 2004 and the feasibility studies began one year later.⁸⁷⁸ In May 2005, the presidents of the three states declared their backing to the BTK with a formal declaration in Baku.⁸⁷⁹ Despite participant countries' openness to

⁸⁷⁵ The first tanker loaded with oil from the Azerbaijan's offshore fields exported via the BTC pipeline left Ceyhan on 04 June 2006.

⁸⁷⁶ "Turkey's Energy Strategy", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, January 2009, p.4.

⁸⁷⁷ Emre Soncan and Kadri Kılıç, "Avrupa Doğalgazla Türkiye'ye Bağlandı", *Zaman*, 19 November 2007, Dr. Sohbet Karbuz, "Doğalgaz Koridoru Olma Yolunda İlk Adım", *Zaman*, 19 November 2007, and Vladimir Socor, "Azerbaijan: Regional Locomotive Not Only for the Railroad", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4, no. 220 (28 November 2007).

⁸⁷⁸ Hasan Kanbolat, "Kars-Tiflis-Bakü Demiryolu Projesi: Kafkasya, Türkiye'ye Bağlanıyor", *Strateji* 4, no. 170 (01 October 2007), p.19.

⁸⁷⁹ Rovshan Ismayilov, "Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey: Building a Transportation Triumvirate?", *Business and Economics*, 07 February 2007.

international funds for the financing of the project, both the US and the EU refused to provide financial aid to the projected railway on the grounds that it would further lead to the isolation and marginalization of Armenia in the region. Washington and Brussels in conjunction with Yerevan, offered the reopening of the already existing Kars-Gyumri-Tbilisi railway which was mostly used for passenger transportation during the Soviet times but remained obsolete since 1993 due to Turkey's closure of its border with Armenia in solidarity with Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan, determined to exclude Armenia from any regional cooperation project that might boost the country's economic situation thus might crank up its belligerency, decided to make a loan to Georgia and with Baku's material assistance, Tbilisi began construction work on its part of the BTK railroad on 21 November 2007.⁸⁸⁰ The Turkish section of the BTK was inaugurated on 24 July 2008⁸⁸¹ and it is planned to be fully finished by 2012.

The main benefit of BTK for Turkey will be to have direct railroad access with its key South Caucasian ally Azerbaijan. Moreover, after the Marmaray project which will build a tunnel passing under the Turkish Straits is completed, the movement of trains from China to Europe through this novel railway will be possible. The BTK, accordingly, will become an alternative to the existing Trans-Siberian line which enjoys a monopolistic position in rail transportation between major countries in Europe and Asia.⁸⁸²

⁸⁸⁰ "Avrupa'ya Pencere Açtık", *Star Gazetesi*, 21 November 2007 and Vladimir Socor, "Momentous Implications of Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey Railroad", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4, no. 219 (27 November 2007).

⁸⁸¹ Deniz Çiçek, "Asya'dan Avrupa'ya Demir İpekyolu", *Akşam*, 25 July 2008, "Armenia Misses the Trans-Caucasus Train", *Turkish Daily News*, 25 July 2008 and Gareth Jenkins, "Turkey and Armenia: From Secret Talks to 'Soccer Diplomacy'", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 142 (25 July 2008).

⁸⁸² "Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Rail Construction Launched", *Geotimes*, 26 November 2007.

Turkey undergirded its bilateral commercial and security ties with Azerbaijan and Georgia in addition to the endorsement of regional integration activities. The bilateral trade volume between Turkey and Azerbaijan reached to 2.4 billion dollars in 2010.⁸⁸³ Cooperation in energy sector continued to constitute an important component of Turkish-Azeri economic relations. The two countries signed another intergovernmental agreement in the field of energy in October 2011 which set the conditions for the sale of Azerbaijani gas to Turkey from the Shah Deniz-2 project starting from 2017 as well the transit of the same gas to Turkey via the networks of BOTAŞ in 2017-2042.⁸⁸⁴ Moreover, on 26 December 2011, a memorandum of understanding to build Trans-Anatolia Gas Pipeline to transfer Azerbaijani natural gas to Europe through Turkish territory was signed by Turkish Minister of Energy Taner Yıldız and his Azerbaijani equivalent Natig Aliyev which would further strengthen the energy ties between the two countries.

Energy sector investments of Turkish businesses in Azerbaijan stood at 2.4 billion dollars whilst the total value of Turkish investments excluding the energy industry arrived at 2.5 billion dollars.⁸⁸⁵ Azeri companies have also started to invest in Turkey especially through privatizations and acquisitions. The investments carried out by them exceeded 4 billion dollars.⁸⁸⁶ On 22 November 2007, SOCAR and its Saudi (Injaz) and Turkish (Turcas) partners won the privatization tender for Petkim, Turkey's largest petrochemicals company, and took over a fifty-one percent stake in

⁸⁸³ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: < http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4 > [13 February 2011].

⁸⁸⁴ "New Era for Azerbaijan's Gas Industry", SOCAR President Rovnag Abdullayev's Interview to ANS TV, News. Available [online]: <<http://www.socar.az/3892-news-view-en.html>> [28 October 2011].

⁸⁸⁵ "Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations with Azerbaijan", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-azerbaijan.en.mfa > [10 March 2009].

⁸⁸⁶ Şaban Kardaş, "Erdogan Responds to Sarksyian's Remarks by Backing Azerbaijan", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 8, no.146 (29 July 2011).

the corporation for 2.04 billion dollars.⁸⁸⁷ The sole thorny matter between Turkey and Azerbaijan in the field of economics was the expulsion of Turkish Barmek from Azerbaijan in 2006 on the grounds of tax evasion, violation of contract regarding investment volumes and invoice falsification.⁸⁸⁸

In the military sphere, Turkey continued to provide financial aid, logistical and technical assistance and technical training to the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.⁸⁸⁹ Furthermore, lately, the two states have begun to engage in a partnership pertaining to arms production. Turkish weapons manufacturer and defense contractor Roketsan and Azerbaijani military scientific and industrial enterprise Iglim has reached an agreement on the joint production of rocket launcher systems as of March 2009. In accordance with the deal, rocket launchers, some parts and molds of some arms will be made at Iglim enterprise and rockets will be manufactured at plants of Roketsan in Turkey.⁸⁹⁰ First large-size delivery of missiles from Roketsan to Azerbaijan took place in February 2012.⁸⁹¹ In a similar sense, the Ministry of Defense Industry of Azerbaijan and Turkey's Otokar signed a protocol of intention in October 2010 to produce armoured equipments.⁸⁹²

⁸⁸⁷ Vladimir Socor, "Azerbaijan: Regional Locomotive Not Only for the Railroad", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4, no. 220 (28 November 2007), "Ankara: Petkim, A New Energy Venture Between Turkey and Azerbaijan", *Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 23 October 2007, and "Petkim Socar'ın Oldu", *Star Gazetesi*, 23 November 2007.

⁸⁸⁸ Faris Ismailzade, "Expulsion of Turkish Electricity Company Promises Geopolitical Losses for Azerbaijan", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no. 131 (07 July 2006).

⁸⁸⁹ "Turkey Gives Additional Military Aid to Azerbaijan, Georgia", *Turan*, 08 June 2005.

⁸⁹⁰ "Azerbaijan and Turkey Will Launch Arms Joint Production", *Today Az*, 25 December 2008.

⁸⁹¹ Rashad Suleymanov, "Turkish Company Starts Delivering Missiles for Azerbaijani Armed Forces", *APA*, 13 February 2012 and Uğur Ergun, "Azerbaycan Ordusuna Türk Roketi Gidiyor", *Hürriyet*, 19 February 2012.

⁸⁹² "Azerbaijan - Turkey to Launch Joint Production of Military Equipments Next Year", *APA*, 08 December 2010.

The trade volume between Turkey and Georgia exceeded one billion dollars in 2010.⁸⁹³ 15.9 percent of the foreign direct investments in Georgia were actualized by Turkish businessmen, which made Turkey the third biggest investor in Georgian economy after United Arab Emirates and Netherlands.⁸⁹⁴ Turkish enterprises mostly operate in food and beverages, airport and harbour management, energy, construction, textile, manufacturing, telecommunications, glass packaging and water bottling sectors in Georgia.⁸⁹⁵ The lifting of visa requirements for Georgian and Turkish citizens in February 2006, signing of Free Trade Agreement and Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation in November 2007 and finally the inking of an agreement in May 2011⁸⁹⁶ between the two states which allowed the citizens of both countries' to visit each other's state by showing just a national identity card facilitated further strengthening of commercial and people-to-people ties between Turkey and Georgia.⁸⁹⁷

Georgian Armed Forces were endowed with financial help, material and technical property, and training programs coming from the Turkish Armed Forces. On 09 June 2005, Turkish and Georgian military representatives signed an accord in Tbilisi under which Turkey allocated 1.5 million dollars to re-equip the Kodori special brigade, provide equipment for the Georgian Navy, and lent assistance to the

⁸⁹³ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4> [13 February 2011].

⁸⁹⁴ Investment Overview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=57> [14 March 2009].

⁸⁹⁵ Serkan Yalçın, "Turkish Investments in Georgia and Azerbaijan: Recent Trends and Future Prospects", *Caucas Europe News*, 03 September 2006, "TAV Batum Havaalanı'nı İşletecek", *CNBC-E*, 24 May 2007, Ünsal Ereke, "Gürcistan'da HES Yapacak, Türkiye'ye Elektrik Satacak", *Milliyet*, 29 May 2007, "Anadolu Grubu, Gürcistan'da Hidroelektrik Santralı Kuracak", *Dünya*, 05 December 2008, "Anadolu Grubu'ndan Gürcistan'a Santral", *Hürriyet*, 16 April 2009, and "Ağaoğlu, Gürcistan'da 3 HES İmzası Attı", *Hürriyet*, 20 February 2011.

⁸⁹⁶ "Artık Pasaporta Da Gerek Yok", *Hürriyet*, 31 May 2011.

⁸⁹⁷ "Turkey's Commercial and Political Relations with Georgia", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-political-relations-with-georgia.en.mfa> [10 March 2009].

modernization of military field at Marneuli.⁸⁹⁸ In November 2006, Zviad Shanava, Lieutenant Colonel in logistical department of the General Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, and Brigadier General Yüksel Öztekin, military attaché of Turkey to Georgia, penned an Agreement on Implementation of Financial Support. According to the document, Turkish side would give out 1.8 million dollars to Georgian army. One portion of the allotted money would be delivered to Georgian side in the form of material aid; another part would be used for daily expenses of the Georgian Armed Forces' platoon serving in Kosovo as a part of the Turkish Battalion and for covering the financial expenses of the Georgian military representative in NATO Headquarters.⁸⁹⁹ Turkey gave away radio-technical navigation devices, uniforms and diving equipment to Georgian Navy and offered training courses for Georgian military specialists through grant assistance deals and military protocols signed in 2007 and 2008.⁹⁰⁰

The existence of Georgia as an independent, sovereign and united state is of significant importance to Turkey and Ankara diligently refrains from getting involved in acts that might undermine this objective. When the relations between the Georgian government and the autonomous administration of Adjara strained considerably in the spring of 2004 with the threat of a military confrontation in sight, Turkey, even though held the right of being a guarantor to the maintenance of the region's autonomous status owing to the 1921 Treaty of Kars, shunned from

⁸⁹⁸ "Turkey Gives Additional Military Aid to Azerbaijan, Georgia", *Turan*, 08 June 2005.

⁸⁹⁹ "An Agreement was Signed between Georgia and Turkey", Georgia Ministry of Defense, News Archive, 28 November 2006. Available [online]: < <http://www.mod.gov.ge/?l=E&m=11&sm=0&id=429> > [14 March 2009].

⁹⁰⁰ "Grant Assistance", Georgia Ministry of Defense, News Archive, 03 May 2007. Available [online]: < <http://www.mod.gov.ge/?l=E&m=11&sm=0&id=557> > [14 March 2009], "Turkish Grant to the Georgian Navy", Georgia Ministry of Defense, News Archive, 14 March 2008. Available [online]: < <http://www.mod.gov.ge/?l=E&m=11&sm=0&id=876> > [14 March 2009] and "Georgian and Turkish Military Authorities Signed the Protocol", Georgia Ministry of Defense, News Archive, 01 May 2008. Available [online]: < <http://www.mod.gov.ge/?l=E&m=11&sm=0&id=919> > [14 March 2009].

declarations that might provoke separatist tendencies in Adjara and intensified its efforts in the direction of contributing to the peaceful solution of the conflict. To this end, Ankara dispatched a parliamentary delegation to Georgia on 19-21 March 2004 composed of former Minister of Foreign Affairs Yaşar Yakış and former Minister of State Refaeddin Şahin to get into contact with the Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and the leader of Adjara Aslan Abashidze.⁹⁰¹

Turkey, despite strong calls from its North Caucasian diaspora to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the August war erupted between Georgia and Russia, declared on 26 August 2008, that it attached importance to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia.⁹⁰² Besides, Turkey was among the first to send humanitarian aid to Georgia in the form of food, drinking water, disposable medical goods, tents and blankets.⁹⁰³

The sole matter of discord between the Georgian and Turkish governments was appertaining to the resettlement of Ahıska/Meskhethian Turks to their homeland in Georgia. The roots of Ahıska Turks trace back to Anatolia. They migrated en masse to Meskhethia (Samtskhe-Javakheti) that is located in southern Georgia during the rule of Ottoman Empire. The province fell under the reign of Czarist Russia in the nineteenth century and with the Treaty of Moscow signed between Turkey and

⁹⁰¹ “Gürcistan Hükümeti ile Acara Özerk Cumhuriyeti Yönetimi Arasındaki Krizin Aşılması Hakkında”, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı Açıklamaları, no 147, 19 Mart 2004. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_47--_19-mart-2004_-gurcistan-hukumeti-ile-acara-ozerk-cumhuriyeti-yonetimi-arasindaki-krizin-asilmasi-hk_.tr.mfa > [14 March 2009].

⁹⁰² “Press Release Regarding the Independence of Georgia”, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no 158, 26 August 2008. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_158_-26-agustos-2008_-gurcistan_in-bagimsizligi-hk_.en.mfa > [14 March 2009].

⁹⁰³ “Press Release Regarding the Humanitarian Assistance to Georgia”, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no 147, 14 August 2008. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no-147---14-august-2008_-press-release-regarding-the-humanitarian-assistance-to-georgia.en.mfa> [14 March 2009], “Kızılay Ekibi Tiflis’e Girdi”, *Milliyet*, 11 August 2008, and “Kızılay Tiflis’e 20 Ton Gıda Gönderdi”, *Milliyet*, 12 August 2008.

the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic on 16 March 1921, the region was incorporated into the supremacy of the latter.⁹⁰⁴

In November 1944, upon a decision by the State Security Committee of the Soviet Union, about ninety thousand Ahıska Turks including Kurds and Khemshils were deported from their ancestral territories to Siberia and Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.⁹⁰⁵ The exile decree was based on the population's smuggling activities, its demonstration of inclination to immigrate to Turkey and its possibility of engaging in subversive spying actions hand in hand with the Turkish intelligence services against the Soviet Union.⁹⁰⁶ Despite these accusations, Ahıska Turks had not shown any signs of disobedience or disloyalty to the country they had been residing in; on the contrary, thousands of them were fighting at the ranks of the Red Army against the Nazi forces when the repatriation resolution was executed.⁹⁰⁷

In June 1989, in the Ferghana Valley of Uzbekistan, Ahıska Turks were subjected to an ethnic violence tide perpetrated by the local inhabitants but condoned by the government officials and Russian soldiers. After the incidents approximately one hundred Ahıska Turks lost their lives, hundreds of them were wounded and they had to evacuate Uzbekistan in large numbers.⁹⁰⁸ Today, Ahıska Turks, whose numbers are estimated to be around 350,000-400,000 are living in scattered

⁹⁰⁴ Tekin Taşdemir, *Türkiye'nin Kafkasya Politikasında Ahıska ve Sürgün Halk Ahıskalılar* (Istanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2005), pp. 95-108.

⁹⁰⁵ Devlet Savunma Komitesi Kararı, No. 6279, Kremlin, Moskova, 31 Temmuz 1944, in Tekin Taşdemir, *Türkiye'nin Kafkasya Politikasında Ahıska ve Sürgün Halk Ahıskalılar* (Istanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2005), pp. 200-205.

⁹⁰⁶ Lavrentin Beriya, Devlet Savunma Komitesi'ne, 28 Kasım 1944, in Tekin Taşdemir, *Türkiye'nin Kafkasya Politikasında Ahıska ve Sürgün Halk Ahıskalılar* (Istanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2005), p.205.

⁹⁰⁷ Dan Brennan, "Meskhetian Turks: Still Struggling to Return to Their Homeland", *Human Rights*, 25 March 2003.

⁹⁰⁸ Ayşegül Baydar Aydıngün, "A Deported Nationality: The Ahıska Turks", *Perceptions* (Journal of International Affairs) 3, no. 4 (December 1998-February 1999), p.106.

communities in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, the USA and Uzbekistan.

The accession of Georgia to Council of Europe in April 1999 became a glimmer of hope for the Ahıska Turks to return to their motherland. The Tbilisi administration pledged to enact legislation that would allow the repatriation of Ahıska Turks to Georgia within two years, implement the law by 2002 and complete the return of Ahıska Turks by 2011.⁹⁰⁹ The Georgian government protracted the issuance of repatriation law for some time as it had concerns regarding the return of Ahıska Turks to Georgia for mainly two reasons. First, mostly Armenians and also some Georgians were dwelling on the villages that were vacated by the Ahıska Turks and the return of Ahıska Turks to these lands might spark inter-ethnic tensions in the region and further upset the already chafed order and stability in the country. Second, Georgia did not have the financial means to sponsor the comeback of Ahıska Turks as it was still struggling with the rehabilitation and reintegration of refugees from Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgian society. However, the international pressure coming from the EU and Turkey led Georgia to promulgate the Law on Repatriation of Persons Forcefully Sent into Exile from the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia by the Former USSR in the 40's of the 20th Century on 11 July 2007 which opened the door for the Ahıska Turks to go back to their native lands.⁹¹⁰ Yet, there have been limited number of applications up to date as a result of bureaucratic difficulties, uncertainties about the recognition of ethnic, religious and linguistic rights of the Ahıska Turks by the Georgian authorities and the unwillingness of

⁹⁰⁹ Hasan Kanbolat, "Will the Meskhetian Turks Return to Georgia?", *Today's Zaman*, 24 July 2007.

⁹¹⁰ See "Law on Repatriation of Persons Forcefully Sent into Exile from the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia by the Former USSR in the 40's of the 20th Century", Law of Georgia, 11 July 2007. Available [online]: <<http://www.ecmigeorgia.org/database>> [15 March 2009].

Ahıska Turks to resettle in a war-torn country after the August hostilities experienced between Russia and Georgia.⁹¹¹

Turkey, while embracing its political, economic and military ties with Azerbaijan and Georgia, also continued to make efforts to break the gridlock in its awkward and involute relationship with Armenia. In April 2005, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wrote a letter to Armenian President Robert Kocharian suggesting that the two countries constitute a commission of historians that would examine the 1915 events and determine their true nature. Kocharian rejected the idea stating that the Armenian genocide was already an established fact. Instead of the historians' committee Kocharian proposed the creation of an Armenian-Turkish intergovernmental commission which would discuss all issues of mutual concern between the two states.⁹¹²

Turkey carried on its policy of unilateral gestures to atone Armenia. An ancient Armenian church which was an example of medieval Armenian architecture and that was sited on the island of Akdamar in eastern Turkey was renovated and reopened as a museum on 29 March 2007 in the presence of a twenty-person delegation from Armenia headed by Armenian Deputy Culture Minister Gagik Gyurjian.⁹¹³ Turkey initiated cargo transportation from Yerevan to Istanbul⁹¹⁴ as well

⁹¹¹ See Ayşegül Baydar Aydıngün, "Ahıska Türkleri'nin Gürcistan'a Dönüşü", *ASAM Bakış*, no. 6 (July 2008), pp. 8-10 and Çağrı Erhan, "Gürcistan'daki Durum Ahıska Türkleri'nin Dönüşünü İmkansız Kılıyor", *ASAM*, 11 August 2008.

⁹¹² Emil Danielyan, "Turkey, Armenia Miss Opportunity for Rapprochement", *Eurasia Insight*, 03 June 2005.

⁹¹³ Nicholas Birch, "Turkey Opens Restored Armenian Church", *Eurasia Insight*, 29 March 2007, "Akdamar Is Now a Memorial Museum", *Sabah*, 30 March 2007, and "Armenian Official Defends Trip to Turkey", *Eurasia Digest*, 03 April 2007. Akdamar Museum was also opened to religious worship for one day. See Sebahattin Yılmaz, "Kilisede İbadet İzni", *Hürriyet*, 25 March 2010.

⁹¹⁴ "Genocide Has Never Been Part of Turkey's History", *Arminfo*, 18 November 2005.

as charter flights between Yerevan and Antalya.⁹¹⁵ Recently, TRT has also begun broadcasting radio programs in Armenian language.⁹¹⁶

The Turkish-Armenian relations gained steam with the induction of Serzh Sargsyan as the new Head of State of Armenia in April 2008 following the February 2008 presidential election. On 09 July 2008, in an article published on the *Wall Street Journal*, Sargsyan extended an invitation to his counterpart Turkish President Abdullah Gül to watch the World Cup qualifier football match that would take place in Yerevan between the Armenian and Turkish national football teams on 06 September 2008.⁹¹⁷ Gül accepted the invitation and thus became the first Turkish President that ever set foot on Armenian soil.⁹¹⁸

Most of Armenia's fuel and much of its grain came through Georgia's Black Sea ports and the containment of the country deepened during the Georgian-Russian fight as a key railway bridge between Armenia and Georgia was mined and the port of Poti remained occupied by Russian troops. Armenian Premier Tigran Sargsyan uttered that Armenian economy suffered losses of 670 million dollars as a result of the feud between Moscow and Tbilisi.⁹¹⁹ The disruption in Armenia's trade levels and the boggling of international investors made Yerevan more amenable and willing to look for an accommodation with Ankara.

⁹¹⁵ Yıldız Deveci Bozkuş, "Türkiye'den Bir Adım Daha: Erivan-Antalya Uçak Seferleri", *ASAM*, 30 July 2008.

⁹¹⁶ "Turkey's State Run TRT Began Radio Broadcasting in Armenian Language", *PanArmenian.Net*, 02 April 2009, "Ermenistan'la Anlaşma İddiası", *Hürriyet*, 03 April 2009, and "Ermenice Radyo Yayında", *Milliyet*, 04 April 2009.

⁹¹⁷ Serzh Sargsyan, "We Are Ready to Talk to Turkey", *The Wall Street Journal*, 09 July 2008.

⁹¹⁸ Marianna Grigoryan, "Armenia, Turkey Put Differences Aside for Soccer", *Eurasia Insight*, 05 September 2008, "Win-Win Match Ends in Yerevan", *Turkish Daily News*, 08 September 2008, and Cavid Veliev, "Gül 'ün Ermenistan Ziyaretinin Yankıları: Futbolda Kazandık, ya Diplomaside?", *Strateji* 5, no. 220 (15 September 2008), pp. 12-13.

⁹¹⁹ "Serious Damage to Armenia's Economy from Georgian Conflict: PM", *Hürriyet*, 23 October 2008.

Turkey put forth the idea of Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform which would include Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia along with Russia and Turkey right after the Georgian-Russian military conflict. The platform would act as a forum for dialogue for regional countries and would make them to sit around a table and discuss their mutual severe problems.⁹²⁰ For this objective to be realized, Turkey needed to secure Armenia's participation to this regional framework, Gül's visit also served this purpose as Sargsyan signalled that his country supported the Turkish initiative.⁹²¹ Turkey, while trying to restore its bilateral relation with Armenia, did not leave in the cold the final solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and spent time and effort to bring Azerbaijani and Armenian officials together on international podiums to reach a permanent settlement to the impasse though a major breakthrough towards the resolution of the deadlock has not been attained yet.⁹²² Turkey's latest attempt to mend fences with Armenia through the signing of two protocols on 10 October 2009 in Switzerland within the presence of high profile figures from international community was also aborted after it was clearly understood that Armenia did not have any intention of putting an end to its occupation of Azerbaijani territories.⁹²³

⁹²⁰ "Speech Delivered by H.E. Mr. Ali Babacan at the 45. Munich Security Conference", 7 February 2009, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ali-babacan_in-45_-munih-guvenlik-konferansi_nda-yaptiklari-konusma-ve-soru-cevap-bolumunun-cozumu_-munih_-7-subat-2009.en.mfa > [18 March 2009].

⁹²¹ "A Win-Win Match Ends in Yerevan", *Turkish Daily News*, 08 September 2008.

⁹²² Sophie Mathiaut, "Armenian Foreign Minister Discusses Karabakh with Turkish, Azerbaijani Counterparts", *RFE/RL*, 29 June 2004, Ömer Göksel İşyar, "Türkiye'nin Azerbaycan-Ermenistan Uyuşmazlığına Yönelik Politikaları", in *Geçmişten Günümüze Dönüşen Orta Asya ve Kafkasya*, (eds.) Yelda Demirağ and Cem Karadeli (Ankara: Palme Yayıncılık, 2006), p.300, John. C. K. Daly, "Turkey Acts As Caucasian Peacemaker", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 188, (01 October 2008), and "Moscow Hosts Armenia-Azerbaijan Talks on Nagorno-Karabakh", *Today's Zaman*, 03 November 2008.

⁹²³ For the content of the protocols see "Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia" and "Protocol on Development of Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia." Available [online]: <

While Turkey rushed forward to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to achieve a lasting peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia which would also enhance its role in the region as a facilitator and mediator, Russia made a counter riposte and gathered together Aliyev and Sargsyan in Kremlin in the company of President Medvedev on 02 November 2008. At the end of the convocation, the parties released a declaration that accentuated that they would pursue a political settlement for the resolution of the matter.⁹²⁴ However, the succeeding trilateral meetings held at St.Petersburg in June 2009, at Moscow in July 2009, at Chisinau in October 2009, at Sochi in January 2010, at St. Petersburg in June 2010, at Astrakhan in October 2010, at Sochi in March 2011 at Kazan in June 2011 and finally at Sochi in January 2012 were too far away from bringing any concrete development toward the resolution of the conflict.⁹²⁵

Russia's response to the Turkish plan of Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform has been positive so far. The exclusive regional character of the scheme was appealing for Moscow as it always frowned on any kind of American or European interest and involvement in the South Caucasus. However, being in the same organization with an aggressive and resurgent Russia was not enthralling for the other invitees of the pact, that is to say, Azerbaijan and Georgia. It seems that the Turkish initiative has a slim chance of success because of Baku's reluctance and

<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/t%C3%BCrkiye-ermenistan-ingilizce.pdf>> [29 August 2010].

⁹²⁴ "Declaration between the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation", President of Russia, Documents, Moscow, November 2, 2008. Available [online]: < <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/11/208708.shtml>> [20 March 2009].

⁹²⁵ "The Presidents of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia Held a Trilateral Meeting.", News, President of Russia, Krasnaya Polyana, Sochi, January 25, 2010. Available [online]: < <http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/news/2010/01/223942.shtml>> [29 August 2010], and "Meeting with Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan", News, President of Russia, Krasnaya Polyana, Sochi, March 05, 2011. Available [online]: < <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/1859>> [06 March 2011].

Tbilisi's opposition and probably is doomed to failure like the Turkish Caucasus Peace and Stability Pact of 2000.

The divergence of Turkish and Russian views and standings with regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow and Ankara's different approaches to Nagorno Karabakh issue coupled with their inability to form a regional cooperation mechanism that could act as a barrier against the outbreak of military conflicts among the regional states in the South Caucasus manifested clearly that increasing political relations and strong economic ties between Turkey and Russia was not enough to overcome the existing rivalry and divergent foreign policy lines in the South Caucasus.

Low Profile Turkish Foreign Policy in Central Asia

Turkey stuck with its cautious and modest foreign policy in Central Asia. The principle design of the Turkish administration pertaining to the region was the consolidation and furtherance of bilateral economic and commercial relations with the Central Asian Republics. Military collaboration in the form of granting financial aid, sending out military equipment, accepting students to military academies in Turkey and inaugurating training programs for officers of the Central Asian states was carried on with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.

With trade volume surpassing three billion dollars at the end of 2010⁹²⁶, Kazakhstan continued to be Turkey's major trade partner in Central Asia. There are more than 1,650 enterprises in Kazakhstan, working with participation from Turkish capital. These companies mostly function in consumer goods, construction, hotel

⁹²⁶ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: < http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4 > [13 February 2011].

management, retail, textile, and tourism sectors of the Kazakh economy.⁹²⁷ Although Turkey occupies the first place regarding the number of foreign firms operating in Kazakhstan⁹²⁸, with direct investments amounted to two billion dollars, it lags far behind Russian and Chinese businesses.⁹²⁹ There are more than 150 Kazakh corporations that are active in Turkey, whose value of investments is around four billion dollars. They, by and large, manifest activity in banking and tourism areas. In May 2006, Kazakhstan's prominent energy company KazMunayGaz acquired a seventy-five percent stake in one of the leading hotels in Turkey.⁹³⁰ One month later, Turkey's Şekerbank signed an agreement with TuranAlemSecurities of Kazakhstan, a fully-owned subsidiary of BankTuranAlem for the sale of 33.98 percent shares, and the partnership was realized in March 2007.⁹³¹

In the military field, Turkey donated technical and military equipment to the Kazakh Armed Forces and also assisted in the training of Kazakh military officers. In June 2005 Turkey granted twenty-four Land Rover vehicles, four of them intended for use as military ambulances, an additional military car and over ninety hand-held portable radios.⁹³² On 28 November 2005, a visiting delegation of senior officers

⁹²⁷ Mehmet Dikkaya and Ali Bora, "Çağdaş Kazakistan'ın Ekonomi Politikası ve Türkiye'nin Yeri", *OAKA* (Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları) 1, no.2 (2006), p.121, Marat Yermukanov, "Kazakhstan and Turkey Spearhead Integration of Turkic Nations", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no.226 (07 December 2006), "Kazakh Economy Top Performer in Central Asia", *Kazinform*, 09 December 2007, "Kazak Petrolü de Ceyhan'a Akacak", *Zaman*, 13 December 2007, Kerim Balci, "Turkey and Kazakhstan Have Words Left to Say, Says Kazakh Ambassador", *Today's Zaman*, 13 August 2008, and Esra Özşümer, "20 Milyon Dolarlık Krediyle Gitti, Kazakistan'da Dev Oldu", *Milliyet*, 25 April 2009.

⁹²⁸ "Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations with Kazakhstan", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-kazakhstan.en.mfa > [12 April 2009].

⁹²⁹ Yıldız Yazıcıoğlu, "Nazarbayev: En Az Yatırım Yapan Ülke Türkiye", *Milliyet*, 15 December 2007, and "Turkish Parliament Speaker in Kazakhstan", *Anatolian Agency*, 20 October 2008.

⁹³⁰ Serpil Yılmaz, "Bodrum'a Kazak Yatırımı", *Milliyet*, 21 May 2006.

⁹³¹ About Sekerbank. Available [online]: < <http://www.sekerbank.com.tr/english/about/sekerbank.jsp> > [12 April 2009].

⁹³² Roger McDermott, "Turkish Military Assistance to Kazakhstan Highlights Western Dilemma", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 2, no.115 (14 June 2005) and "Turkey Providing Military Aid to Kazakhstan", *WorldTribune.com*, 06 March 2006.

from the Turkish General Staff announced an aid package of modern military gear worth 900,000 dollars.⁹³³ In 2006, Turkey gave a hand to Kazakhstan in the training of around five hundred Kazakh soldiers.⁹³⁴ In 2007, training of Kazakh officers at the medical courses of the Gulhane Military-Medical Academy was initiated and Turkish specialists trained the Kazakh battalion of Special Forces in military education centers of Kazakhstan. Under this program, more than four hundred Kazakhstani military officers were educated and acquired new skills and techniques.⁹³⁵ In 2008, another group of more than three hundred Kazakh officers graduated from the War Academies of Turkey. Turkey also assisted Kazakhstan in constructing a naval base in Aktau and naval port in Yeraliyevo.⁹³⁶

With trade volume that exceeded 1.5 billion dollars in 2010⁹³⁷, Turkmenistan comes second after Kazakhstan in Turkey's total trade with Central Asia. The amount of Turkish investments in the country came at four billion dollars in 2011.⁹³⁸ In 2008, 479 enterprises with the Turkish capital existed in Turkmenistan⁹³⁹, which was about thirty-three percent of the total number of the foreign companies registered in the republic. Turkish companies implemented joint projects in

⁹³³ "Visiting Turkish Military Delegation Unveils Aid to Kazakhstan", *Kazakhstan Today*, 29 November 2005.

⁹³⁴ Roger McDermott, "Kazakhstan's Parliament Ratifies Strategic Partnership with Azerbaijan", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no.129 (05 July 2006).

⁹³⁵ Aigerim Shilibekova, "Turkey-Kazakhstan Relationship in the Military Sphere: Outcome and Outlook", *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies* 1, no.2 (2008), p.69.

⁹³⁶ Roger McDermott, "United States and NATO Military Cooperation with Kazakhstan: The Need for a New Approach", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 21, no.4 (October 2008), p.624.

⁹³⁷ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4> [13 February 2011].

⁹³⁸ "Türkiye ile Türkmenistan Arasında Yedi Anlaşma İmzalandı", *ANKA*, 29 February 2012.

⁹³⁹ "Cooperation for the Welfare and Happiness of the Fraternal Peoples", *State News Agency of Turkmenistan*, 24 March 2008.

agriculture technologies, construction, energy, healthcare, paper and packaging, textile, tourism, transport and urban planning sectors of Turkmen economy.⁹⁴⁰

Military cooperation between Turkey and Turkmenistan remained limited in size and scope. In July 2005 Turkish army officers shared their experiences with their counterparts from the Border Guard and Immigration Service of Turkmenistan in a brief five-day course which took place in Ashgabat and that included topics such as fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, arms contraband and kidnapping.⁹⁴¹

Turkey's trade volume with Uzbekistan arrived at 1.1 billion dollars⁹⁴² in 2010 despite the political relations that were on rocky grounds as a result of Turkey's sheltering of Uzbek dissidents and withholding its support from the Uzbek government in international platforms concerning the investigation of the Andijan events. According to the December 2008 statistics of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, Investments and Trade of Uzbekistan, Turkish investments in the country exceeded 1 billion dollars; and 596 firms with Turkish capital did business in Uzbekistan, operating in agriculture, automotive, chemicals, construction, consumer goods, medicine, manufacturing, retail, textile and tourism sectors of the

⁹⁴⁰ See Justin Burke, "US, Turkish Firms to Supply Drilling Rigs to Turkmenistan", *Turkmenistan. Ru*, 06 August 2003, "123 MW Power Station Opened in Turkmenistan", 04 November 2003. Available [online]: < <http://www.calikenerji.com/news.php> > [12 April 2009], Nataliya Shirinskikh, "Gas-turbine Power Plant Worth \$109 Million to be Built in Ashgabat", *Kazakhstan Today*, 13 December 2004, Vladimir Komarov, "New Technologies in the Power Engineering Sector of Turkmenistan", *Neytralniy Turkmenistan*, 03 September 2005, "Gül, Çalık Grubu'nun Santralini Açtı", *Hürriyet*, 07 December 2007, Fırat Bozok, "Gül, Çalık'ın Santralini Açtı", *Cumhuriyet*, 08 December 2007, "Çalık, Türkmenistan'da Beşinci Santralini Açtı", *Milliyet*, 08 December 2007, "President of Turkmenistan Accomplishes the Official Visit to the Republic of Turkey", *State News Agency of Turkmenistan*, 26 March 2008, "Cotam Enterprises Is to Build a Fashion House and Two Shopping Centres in Ashgabat", *State News Agency of Turkmenistan*, 23 May 2008, and "Business: Turkey's Calik Enerji to Build Natural-Gas Power Plant in Turkmenistan", *SETimes.com*, 25 July 2008.

⁹⁴¹ "Turkish Army Officers Share Experience with their Turkmen Counterparts", *Axis Globe*, 10 July 2005.

⁹⁴² Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: < http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4 > [13 February 2011].

Uzbek economy.⁹⁴³ There exist 42 Uzbek corporations in Turkey, mainly working in fields of agriculture, automotive, manufacturing, and mining.⁹⁴⁴

The trade volume between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan stood at 160⁹⁴⁵ million dollars in 2010 with Turkish investments in Kyrgyzstan coming at 450 million dollars.⁹⁴⁶ Turkish enterprises are active in bottling, consumer goods, construction, packaging, retail, textile and transportation industries of the country.⁹⁴⁷ During Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Kyrgyzstan which took place on 01-02 February 2011, the two states decided to abolish the visa regime by the end of 2011.⁹⁴⁸

Despite the meager trade levels between the two countries, Kyrgyzstan became one of the Central Asian Republics that regularly received military assistance from Turkey. In October 2005 Turkish military officers arrived in Kyrgyzstan to train special task force servicemen.⁹⁴⁹ One month later, on 25 November 2005, Kyrgyz Deputy Defense Minister Major General Boris Yugai signed an agreement on military cooperation with a visiting Turkish military delegation in Bishkek which declared a Turkish military aid package of more than eight hundred million dollars that contained equipment and supplies for the Kyrgyz Armed Forces and facilities for

⁹⁴³ "Uzbek, Turkish Businesses Discuss Cooperation", *Uzininvest*, 22 December 2008.

⁹⁴⁴ "Haşimov: Özbekistan'daki Türk Yatırımları Gurur Verici", *Zaman*, 27 August 2008 and "Turkey-Uzbekistan Strengthening Cooperation and Achieving Progress", *UZreport*, 07 November 2008.

⁹⁴⁵ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4> [13 February 2011].

⁹⁴⁶ Hasan Kanbolat, "Başbakan Erdoğan'ın Kırgızistan Ziyareti'nin Ardından", *ORSAM*, 02 February 2011.

⁹⁴⁷ Erica Marat, "Turkey's Cultural and Economic Presence Grows in Kyrgyzstan", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4, no.145 (26 July 2007) and "Pegasus Kırgızistan Havayolları'na Ortak Oldu.", *Anatolian Agency*, 23 July 2009.

⁹⁴⁸ Erica Marat, "Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan Visits Bishkek", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 8, no.27 (08 February 2011).

⁹⁴⁹ "Turkish Experts Arrive in Kyrgyzstan to Train Task Force Group", *BBC Monitoring Central Asia*, 02 October 2005.

Kyrgyz border guard units.⁹⁵⁰ On 25 January 2007, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Turkey would provide again military assistance over eight hundred million dollars in accordance with an agreement penned between the Kyrgyz Defense Ministry and the Turkish General Staff.⁹⁵¹ Lastly, in July 2008, Mambatjunus Abilov, the Kyrgyz Plenipotentiary Ambassador to Turkey, and Major General Alpaslan Erdoğan, the Head of Defense Planning and Resource Management Department of the Turkish General Staff clinched a deal, with which Turkey pledged to issue grant of more than 1 million dollars to the Kyrgyz army.⁹⁵²

The trade volume between Turkey and Tajikistan equalled to 428⁹⁵³ million dollars in 2010 and the investments of Turkish companies in the country reached to four hundred million dollars.⁹⁵⁴ There exist fifty Turkish companies operating in Tajikistan. These firms mainly function in the sectors of food, white goods, manufacturing, construction, textile and tourism.⁹⁵⁵ The value of construction projects undertaken by Turkish firms has amounted to three hundred million dollars.⁹⁵⁶

Turkish foreign policy in Central Asia since the early 2000s, akin to prior period, has been purely stimulated by economic motives and found its most successful reflection in Turkey's ascending economic ties with Kazakhstan and

⁹⁵⁰ "New Turkish-Kyrgyz Military Agreement Signed", *RFE/RL*, 28 November 2005.

⁹⁵¹ "Kyrgyzstan Signs New Military Agreement with Turkey", *AKIpress*, 26 January 2007.

⁹⁵² R. Meshedihanli, "Turkey and Kyrgyzstan Sign Agreement on Military Aid", *Trend News*, 24 July 2008.

⁹⁵³ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: < http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4 > [13 February 2011].

⁹⁵⁴ "Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations with Tajikistan", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-tajikistan.en.mfa > [12 April 2009].

⁹⁵⁵ Hasan Kanbolat, "Bağımsızlığı'nın 20. Yıldönümünde Türkiye-Tacikistan İlişkileri", *ORSAM*, 20 September 2011.

⁹⁵⁶ Ibid.

Turkmenistan, two countries which hosted many Turkish firms and Turkish joint-ventures in various sectors of their economies. Uzbekistan became Turkey's third largest trade partner in Central Asia despite the tense and troubled political relations between the two countries.

The Black Sea and the Middle East were two regions about which Turkey and Russia have adopted close views, perspectives and policies in recent years. Both Moscow and Ankara supported the endurance of existing status-quo in the Black Sea and countered the USA moves to challenge it. In the Middle East, both of the countries came out against the US-led military operation to Iraq as well as the attempts to isolate and marginalize Iran and Syria. The following two parts of the study will delve into the details of this common outlook between Turkey and Russia which is a new and significant phenomenon for the bilateral relationship.

Turkish-Russian Collaboration in the Black Sea

Turkey and Russia joined forces in the Black Sea by preserving a common front against the access of extra-regional forces into the area. The two countries also became uncomfortable upon the establishment of new regional structures in the Black Sea spearheaded by other littoral states such as Georgia, Ukraine and Romania that could function as potential rivals to BSEC.

Turkey and Russia jointly demurred to the US proposal to expand NATO-led Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) in Mediterranean into the Black Sea.⁹⁵⁷ Russia was categorically opposed to the expansion of any NATO activity close to its

⁹⁵⁷ The OAE was constituted in late 2001 following the terrorist attacks against USA on September 11. Its mission is to conduct maritime operations in the Mediterranean zone against terrorism, illicit arms, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration. See Operation Active Endeavor, Allied Maritime Component Command Naples. Available [online]: <http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Operations/ActiveEndeavour/Endeavour.htm> [19 April 2009].

borders. Turkey's wavering stemmed from the fact that passage of a NATO marine task force through the Turkish Straits could contravene the Montreux Convention to which Turkey attributed significant importance in ensuring the naval balance in the Black Sea. Moreover, both Russia and Turkey pointed out that security and confidence-building measures taken up within the framework of BSEC would be appropriate and sufficient to parry any kind of hazard and threat in the region.⁹⁵⁸

It seems that Ankara, although is in a long-term alliance and partnership relation with NATO as well as its chief benefactor US, is quite comfortable with the condominium reached with Moscow over the Black Sea and is not pleased with US attempts to infiltrate into the region. In September 2005, when US application to obtain an observer status in BSEC was voted, Turkey abstained from casting a vote in favour of Washington; the US's candidacy was accepted only after Belarus participated to the organization as an observer upon Russia's demand.⁹⁵⁹

Turkey proved its strict adherence to the Montreux regime once more again, when in the wake of the Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008, the USA decided to send humanitarian aid to Georgia through its two warships. Originally, Washington intended to dispatch two navy hospitals, the USNS Comfort and the USNS Mercy to Georgia but the Turkish side objected to these two vessels as their aggregate weight amounted approximately to 140,000 tons, much higher than the maximum limit of forty-five thousand tons permitted for non-Black Sea powers in

⁹⁵⁸ Igor Torbakov, "Turkey Sides with Moscow Against Washington on Black Sea Force", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no. 43 (03 March 2006).

⁹⁵⁹ Suat Kınıklioğlu, "The Anatomy of Turkish-Russian Relations", The Brookings Institution, 2006. Available [online]: < http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20060523sabanci_3a.pdf > [19 April 2009], and Fiona Hill and Ömer Taşpınar, "Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded", *Survival* 48, no. 1 (Spring 2006), p.88.

the Montreux Convention.⁹⁶⁰ In the end, three smaller American ships transited the Turkish Straits to transmit relief to Georgia.⁹⁶¹ Furthermore, after a sharp statement coming from the Russian Deputy Chief of General Staff Colonel General Anatoly Nogovitsyn on 27 August 2008, which stated that if the NATO ships did not leave the Black Sea after twenty-one days in line with the Montreux legal blueprint then Turkey would be deemed responsible⁹⁶², Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt the need to issue an information note that enumerated the basic principles of passage through Turkish Straits for non-littoral countries⁹⁶³ and Ministry officials confirmed that Turkey would insist on the application of the relevant provisions of the agreement scrupulously.⁹⁶⁴

The new regional cooperation organizations such as The Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) and the Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue (BSFPD) received tepid welcome from Turkey and Russia. Both countries were represented at low levels at these platforms and Turkish and Russian attendees of these associations designated BSEC as the actual rostrum for the solution of regional matters.

On 12 August 2005, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and his Ukrainian counterpart Viktor Yuschenko met at the Georgian town of Borjomi and hammered out the Borjomi Declaration which invited the countries of the post-Soviet

⁹⁶⁰ M. K. Bhadrakumar, "Russia and Turkey Tango in the Black Sea", *Asia Times Online*, 12 September 2008 and John C. K. Daly, "Turkey Pursues its Own Foreign Policy Line", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 207 (29 October 2008).

⁹⁶¹ Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey's Delicate Act of Balancing in the Black Sea", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 164 (27 August 2008) and Alexander Murinson, "Russia Accuses Turkey of Violating Montreux Convention", *CACI Analyst*, 15 October 2008.

⁹⁶² Nerdun Hacıoğlu, "Montrö Faturası", *Hürriyet*, 28 August 2008.

⁹⁶³ "BN-11-23 Ağustos 2008, Montrö Sözleşmesi Uygulamaları Hakkında Özet Not", Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/bn_11---23-agustos-2008_-montro-sozlesmesi-uygulamaları-hakkında-ozet-not.tr.mfa > [19 April 2009].

⁹⁶⁴ "Türkiye'den Rusya'ya Montrö Güvencesi", *Hürriyet*, 27 August 2008.

space to join them in a new coalition which would aim at promoting democracy and security in the area stretching from the Baltics to the Caspian Sea.⁹⁶⁵ The Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) was set up in Kiev on 02 December 2005, in the presence of Presidents of Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia and Ukraine, along with government delegations from Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia as well as observers from the EU, the USA, and the OSCE. The organization was founded as a governmental and non-governmental forum of cooperation for dialogue, through which the participating states proclaimed to cooperate closely towards achieving the common goal of establishing lasting peace, democracy, economic and social development in addition to combating against corruption, money laundering, organized crime, terrorism and illicit trafficking in arms, drugs and human beings.⁹⁶⁶ The Russian government which characterized the formation as a pro-American design intended to curb and weaken Russian influence in the Black Sea sent an embassy official to the inauguration whereas Turkey also demonstrated a minimal presence in the meeting by sending a junior official from the Foreign Ministry.⁹⁶⁷

On 05 June 2006, this time Bucharest hosted a summit launching the Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue with the accretion of the Presidents of Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, plus the attendance of ministers from Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey and a senior official from the USA as observers. According to the Joint Declaration released at the end of the gathering,

⁹⁶⁵ Célia Chauffour, “Ongoing Special: The Community of Democratic Choice, the Stakes of a Remarkable Diplomatic Feat”, *Caucas Europe News*, 04 November 2005.

⁹⁶⁶ “Declaration of the Countries of the Community of Democratic Choice”, Kyiv, Ukraine, 02 December 2005. Available [online]: < <http://www.nsc.gov.ge/download/pdf/decl/EN.pdf> > [19 April 2009].

⁹⁶⁷ M. Vorotnyuk, “Turkey’s Attitude Toward the Community of Democratic Choice”, Community of Democratic Choice: Current State and Perspectives of Development, Odesa, Ukraine, 2006. Available [online]: < <http://www.niss.od.ua/p/130.doc> > [19 April 2009].

the Forum, which would have no permanent structures or bodies, would serve as a regional platform to endorse good governance, identify regional means and capabilities that could be mobilized to guarantee sustainable development and encourage cooperation in the fields of crisis management, civil emergency planning, post-conflict reconstruction and environmental protection.⁹⁶⁸

Russia authorized its ambassador to Romania, Nikolai Tolkachev to sit in the meeting as an observer. Tolkachev conveyed the official Russian position in the course of the summit, which saw the existing cooperation frameworks such as BSEC and BLACKSEAFOR as adequate mechanisms for deepening regional cooperation in the Black Sea.⁹⁶⁹ Turkish Minister of State, Beşir Atalay in a similar vein, avowed that the Romanian initiative would not dilute the importance of the BSEC, which remained the actual platform for the procurement of solutions to the problems of the region.⁹⁷⁰ A representative from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also acknowledged that Turkey's partaking in the Forum was about seeing what was going on in a newly created rival regional organization rather than having the interest and will to become a genuine partner of it.⁹⁷¹

Converging Standings of Russia and Turkey in the Middle East

⁹⁶⁸ Joint Declaration of the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership, Bucharest, Romania, 05 June 2006. Available [online]: < http://www.blackseaforum.org/joint_declaration.html > [19 April 2009].

⁹⁶⁹ Vladimir Socor, "Black Sea Forum Seeking its Rationale", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no. 111 (08 June 2006) and Vladimir Socor, "Moscow, Ankara Reluctant to Welcome New Black Sea Forum", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3, no. 112 (09 June 2006).

⁹⁷⁰ Necdet Çelik and Özgür Güralp, "Russian Clouds over Black Sea Forum", *Today's Zaman*, 06 June 2006.

⁹⁷¹ Meltem Atay, Executive Manager of the BSEC, interview by author, BSEC, Istanbul, Turkey, 20 November 2008.

Turkey and Russia have demonstrated similar stances with respect to many Middle Eastern issues since the early 2000s. Both Ankara and Moscow opposed the U.S.-headed military action against Iraq and stood against the dividing up the country into smaller entities. They were against the Western calls to cast out Iran and Syria as evil or rogue states and quite the opposite recommended political dialogue and negotiation to re-engage these two countries into the international system. Turkey and Russia supported the permanent and peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by drawing all parties of the dispute, including Hamas, on to the bargaining table. Moreover, both of the countries have recently actualized political and economic openings to the Gulf States with the objective of cementing ties with these affluent Arabian states.

New Russian Activism in the Middle East

Moscow has recently adopted a non-ideological, practical and pragmatic policy line in the Middle East which is largely based on bolstering Russian economic influence in the region besides challenging the USA's unilateral approach and interventions. Russia constructs nuclear reactors in Iran, sells arms and military equipment to this country. Moscow also rekindled its relation with Syria by writing off Damascus's lingering debt dated from Soviet era and providing the Assad regime anti-craft missiles to protect itself against the encroachments of Israel.

Another novelty of this period is Russia's proclivity to follow a more even-handed approach in its dealings with Israeli and Palestinian authorities. So, although Russia does not consider Hamas or Hezbollah to be terrorist organizations due to their electoral victories and a high ranking delegation of Hamas was greeted warmly

in Moscow in March 2006 and February 2007, Russia improved its commercial ties with Israel thanks to the existence of Jews emigrated from Russia. Furthermore, Putin took steps to improve Russia's relations with Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan which were known as traditional US allies. He also tried to sign trade deals with the new Iraqi government.

In this part of the study, I will trace the details of this new activism in Russian Middle East policy by examining Russia's relations with Iran, Syria, Israel, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar.

Iran: An Important Ally

Iran and Russia have cooperated in many areas in post-Cold War period. Iran followed similar policies with Russia in the South Caucasus and Central Asia in order to break out of its containment in international arena. Moreover, a resurgent Russia was of use to Iranian interests as it could block US and Turkey led designs and projects in the Eurasian region. Tehran condoned the overthrow of the Islamic and pro-Iranian government of Tajikistan by a coalition of Russian, Uzbek and communist groups in December 1992. In Afghanistan both countries opposed Taliban which had a radical anti-Russian and anti-Shiite character. In the South Caucasus the interests of Tehran and Moscow once more converged in Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and both sides backed up Armenia. Russia did not want to see a strong, independent and wealthy Azerbaijan near its borders that would steadily distance itself from Russian influence whereas a powerful Azerbaijan was also seen as a potential threat for Tehran as this country possessed a large Azeri population.

The already growing relation reached to new strongholds in military and economic realms during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. Putin abrogated in November 2000 the June 1995 treaty between the Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and the US Vice President Al Gore, which pledged the cessation of Russian arm sales to Iran as of 31 December 1999.⁹⁷² In March 2001 the Iranian President Mohammad Khatami visited Moscow and a Treaty on the Foundations of Mutual Relations and the Principles of Cooperation was signed.⁹⁷³ In the same year Russia also initiated new arm agreements with Iran worth between two billion and seven billion dollars.⁹⁷⁴

The most controversial decision of Russian administration regarding Iran was Moscow's declaration in July 2002⁹⁷⁵ that it would finish construction of the nuclear reactor in south-western Iranian city of Bushehr. The project was started by the German company Siemens in 1975 but it was cancelled in early stages of the construction following the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Russia has taken on the completion of the nuclear plant after it signed a deal with Iran on 08 January 1995.⁹⁷⁶ Although the Iranian government stated that the uranium enrichment and plutonium manufacturing programs would serve the energy interests of the country, the USA

⁹⁷² Robert O. Freedman, "Putin and Iran: A Changing Relationship", *NCEEER Papers* (27 March 2006). Available [online]: < http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/2006_819_11_Freedman.pdf > [26 April 2009].

⁹⁷³ Roland Dannreuther, "Russia and the Middle East", in *The Middle East's Relations with Asia and Russia*, (eds.) Hannah Carter and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (New York, NY: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p.27 and Gleb Ivashentsov, "Iran: Horizons of Future Cooperation", *International Affairs (Moscow)* 50, no.6 (December 2004), pp. 97-98.

⁹⁷⁴ Carol R. Saivetz, "Russia's Iran Dilemma", *Russian Analytical Digest* (June 2006), p.9.

⁹⁷⁵ Victor Mizin, "The Russia-Iran Nuclear Connection and U.S. Policy Options", *MERIA* (Middle East Review of International Affairs) 8, no.1 (March 2004). Available [online]: < <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue1/jv8n1a7.html> > [26 April 2009].

⁹⁷⁶ See Russian-Iranian Nuclear Cooperation Accord, 08 January 1995. Available [online]: <http://www.defensejournal.com/2001/august/russians.htm> > [26 April 2009]. The Bushehr nuclear power plant was completed in October 2004. See Vladimir A. Orlov and Alexander Vinnikov, "The Great Guessing Game: Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Issue", *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (Spring 2005), p. 55.

claimed that nuclear energy generation program was a cover under which nuclear materials, technology and equipment could be imported for use in a nuclear weapons program.⁹⁷⁷ On more than one occasion, the American government pressed for tougher sanctions against Iran in UN but it was blocked by Russian administration. Russia offered a more active role for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which included working with Tehran on smoothing out the outstanding issues.

Iran's Nuclear Energy Chief Gholamruza Aghazadeh and his Russian counterpart, Alexander Rumyantsev agreed a deal in February 2005 for Moscow to supply fuel to Bushehr. Under the agreement Iran had to return spent nuclear fuel rods from the reactor to Russia. The clause was designated as a safeguard to alleviate the fears that Iran might misuse the rods to build nuclear weapons.⁹⁷⁸ Russia finished the delivery of shipment of fuel in January 2008⁹⁷⁹ and the nuclear power station began its operations on 21 August 2010.⁹⁸⁰

Russia also signed an arms contract with Iran in December 2005 to sell twenty-nine of its Tor M-1 anti-missile systems, a development that would make it difficult to attack on the country's nuclear facilities.⁹⁸¹ The missiles were shipped to Iran in December 2007. The Russian military officials underlined that the Tor system was a weapon of defense and did not represent a danger to any country if they did not attack Iran.

Apart from military cooperation, Russia and Iran also took steps to advance the economic side of their relationship. At the Russian-Iranian trade commission

⁹⁷⁷ Michael Jasinski, "Russia's Nuclear and Missile Technology Assistance to Iran". Available [online]: <<http://cns.miis.edu/research/iran/rusnuc.htm>> [26 April 2009].

⁹⁷⁸ *BBC News*, 27 February 2005.

⁹⁷⁹ *Associated Press*, 28 January 2008.

⁹⁸⁰ "İran'ı Yaptırımlar ve Baskılar Caydıramadı: Nükleer Santral Devrede", *Hürriyet*, 22 August 2010.

⁹⁸¹ *World Net Daily*, 02 December 2005.

meeting that was convened in Moscow on 13 December 2007, the two countries signed agreements on air transport and investment.⁹⁸² Furthermore, Russia and Iran mooted plans to set up a joint gas venture to explore deposits in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. According to Russian energy officials, the joint venture could undertake the construction of the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline.⁹⁸³ The two countries also discuss 130 economic projects worth over one hundred billion dollars and aim at boosting bilateral trade from the current 3.7 billion dollars to two hundred billion dollars in the next ten years.

In the field of transportation, a railway connecting Russia and Iran via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is planned to be operational in 2012. The link will start from the Kazakh city Uzen and end at the northern Iranian city of Gurgan. When completed, the railway is expected to transport up to five million tons of goods per year.⁹⁸⁴

Iran and Russia also came together in international organizations such as the OIC, the SCO and the Caspian Sea Littoral States Organization. Although Tehran, as being the chairman of the OIC, criticized Moscow for its harsh treatment of Chechens during Putin's military campaign in 1999, it refrained from furthering the Chechen cause in the organization. Russia was granted the observer status in OIC in 2005 although it lacked the minimum fifty percent Muslim population required for membership.⁹⁸⁵ In 2005, Iran became an observer state in SCO, a regional security grouping that was dominated by China and Russia and defied US-led NATO

⁹⁸² *RIA Novosti*, 13 December 2007.

⁹⁸³ Vladimir Radyuhin, "Russia-Iran Ties on the Upswing", *The Hindu International*, 07 January 2008.

⁹⁸⁴ Amie Ferris-Rotman, "Russia-Iran Rail Link to Open in 2011", *Reuters*, 19 May 2008.

⁹⁸⁵ Igor Khrestin and John Elliott, "Russia and the Middle East", *Middle East Quarterly* 14, no.1 (Winter 2007), p.22.

hegemony in international system. At the Second Summit of the Caspian Sea Littoral States in October 2007, Russia, along with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan highlighted that they would not allow any country to use their soil for a military attack against Iran.⁹⁸⁶ Russia also supported the Iran's initiative to establish an economic cooperation association of the Caspian nations. The new body held its first meeting at the Russian city of Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea on 03 October 2008.⁹⁸⁷

Although at the summit, the Caspian ownership and the future of the legal regime were relegated to the background and the participating states focused on areas of shared interests, the demarcation issue is one of the perennial problems in the region about which Russia and Iran have differing positions. In 2003, Russia had reached a trilateral agreement with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan that divided the northern sixty-four percent of the Caspian Sea into three unequal shares.⁹⁸⁸ Iran, in return, enunciated that it did not recognize the bilateral or trilateral concordats among the other littoral states and insisted on hammering out a single multilateral agreement between all five Caspian states.

Syria: Invigoration of Bonds with an Old Friend

Russia and Syria opened up a new chapter in their post-Cold War relations with Bashar al-Assad's visit to Moscow in January 2005. The two countries signed agreements on cooperation in oil/gas industry, international motor service,

⁹⁸⁶ *Tehran Times*, 17 October 2007 and İlyas Kamalov, "Putin'in Tarihi İran Ziyareti", *ASAM*, 18 October 2007.

⁹⁸⁷ Alexsey Druginyn, "Inter-Government Economic Conference of Caspian States in Astrakhan", *RIA Novosti*, 03 October 2008.

⁹⁸⁸ Richard Weitz, "Second Caspian Summit Fails to Resolve Contentious Issues", *CACI Analyst*, 31 October 2007. Available [online]: <<http://www.cacianalyst.org/?g=node/4724>> [26 April 2009].

encouragement and mutual protection of investments.⁹⁸⁹ A separate protocol was also concluded to settle the repayment of Syrian debt to Russia which accrued as a result of Damascus's military purchases from the Soviet Union. Russia decided to write off seventy-three percent of the total debt which equalled to 14.5 billion dollars.⁹⁹⁰ The remaining amount would be paid by the Syrian state in a period of ten years.

The finalization of the protracted debt agreement paved the way for the acquisition of new Russian weapons and military equipment. Russia delivered Streletz short-ranged air-missile and Kornet-E anti-tank guided missile systems to Syria in April 2005.⁹⁹¹ Moscow sent military advisors to Damascus and the Russian officers held teaching positions at Syria's military officer training academy. In September 2008, Russia announced that it had begun renovation procedures on the Syrian port of Tartus, which once was a re-supplying point of the Soviet navy, with the objective of setting up a permanent facility therein for the Russian navy that would secure it a major military foothold in the Mediterranean.⁹⁹² Furthermore, in September 2010 Russia announced it would deliver several Bastion anti-ship missile systems armed with SS-N-26 Yakhont supersonic cruise missiles to Syria despite objections coming from the USA and Israel.⁹⁹³

Energy cooperation is also on the upbeat. Russia and Syria established a joint oil and gas company on 09 February 2003. The new company, Amrit, would carry

⁹⁸⁹ *IRIB News*, 26 January 2005.

⁹⁹⁰ *RIA Novosti*, 29 May 2005.

⁹⁹¹ Uwe Klussman, "An Old Base (Friendship) Gets a Facelift", *Spiegel Online*, 22 June 2006.

⁹⁹² "Syria and Russia Strengthen Naval Cooperation", *Associated Press*, 12 September 2008, Hugh Macleod, "From Syrian Fishing Port to Naval Power Base: Russia Moves into the Mediterranean", *The Guardian*, 08 October 2008, and Cenk Başlamış, "Ruslar Yine Sıcak Denizlere İniyor", *Milliyet*, 17 January 2009.

⁹⁹³ "Yakhont Missiles Could Protect Russian Naval Base in Syria-Analyst", *RIA Novosti*, 20 September 2010.

out exploration, development and maintenance activities in the oil and gas sector.⁹⁹⁴ Russian specialists took part in the erection of a new hydroelectric power station at Halabiyah.⁹⁹⁵ In March 2005, Russia's Tatneft signed an agreement to explore and develop new oil and gas deposits in Syria.⁹⁹⁶ In December 2005, Russian and Syrian governments put their signatures on a gas agreement which presupposed the construction of a pipeline that ended in the Syrian city of Ar Rayyan, and of a gas processing plant next to Palmyra. Lastly, in October 2008, Sroytransgaz and the Syrian Gas Company signed a deal to build a sixty-two-mile pipeline to transport natural gas from Syria's Aleppo to the Turkish border.⁹⁹⁷

The two countries adopted circumvent postures in each other's thorny issues. Syria regarded the Chechen conflict as an internal problem of Russia and eschewed from criticizing Moscow in international platforms. Moreover, Syria was one of the few countries that had explicitly supported the Russian actions and standing concerning the situation in South Ossetia.⁹⁹⁸ In return Russia opposed the imposition of military sanctions on Syrian regime based on alleged involvement of some Syrian officials in the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri.⁹⁹⁹ Furthermore, Russia, in October 2011 along with China vetoed a UN Security Council resolution which threatened the Assad regime with sanctions unless it stopped military crackdown on civilians in protest of the administration.

⁹⁹⁴ *Russia in Global Affairs*, 11 February 2003.

⁹⁹⁵ *ITAR-TASS*, 21 December 2004.

⁹⁹⁶ Mark N. Katz "Putin's Foreign Policy Toward Syria", *MERIA* (Middle East Review of International Affairs) 10, no.1 (March 2006). Available [online]: <<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a4.html>> [03 May 2009].

⁹⁹⁷ "Syria, Russia Sign \$71 Million Gas Deal", *Gulfnews*, 14 October 2008.

⁹⁹⁸ See "Dmitry Medvedev Met with President of Syria Bashar al-Assad", *Presidents of Russia*, 21 August 2008. Available [online]: <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/themes/2008/08/211308_205584.shtml> [08 May 2009].

⁹⁹⁹ Andrej Kreutz, *Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), pp. 31-32.

Russia between Israel and the Palestinian Authority: A Balanced Policy

Commencing from Putin's inauguration to presidential post, Russia tried to pursue a balanced policy in its dealings with Israel and the Palestinian Authority. As being a member of the Quartet on Middle East¹⁰⁰⁰, Moscow frequently acknowledged the legitimate right of the Palestinians to establish an independent state on their homeland. Russia also repeatedly condemned and voted in UN against Israeli actions in the Palestinian territories. Russia's opinion regarding Hamas differs from the USA and the Western European countries as Moscow does not classify it as a terrorist organization but the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. A high level delegation of Hamas under the leadership of Khaled Mashal visited Russia twice in March 2006 and February 2007¹⁰⁰¹ and Moscow transferred ten million dollars for economic assistance to the Palestinian government.¹⁰⁰² Moreover, Russia continued to provide military donations to the Palestinians. In the years 2008 and 2009, seventy-five armoured vehicles were delivered to the Palestinian administration along with two civil helicopters.¹⁰⁰³

¹⁰⁰⁰ USA, EU and UN are other parties of the Quartet.

¹⁰⁰¹ Alek D. Epstein, "Russia and Israel: A Romance Aborted", *Russia in Global Affairs*, (October-December 2007).

¹⁰⁰² "The Middle East and North Africa Region in the Foreign Policy of Russia in 2006", Information and Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Available [online]: <http://www.in.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/itogi06/E1BE538F2EFA0940C32572510046EBCB> [09 May 2009].

¹⁰⁰³ "Russia to Give 50 Armored Vehicles to Palestine", *Pravda.Ru*, 03 March 2009.

These developments hardly surprised anybody as Russia had always supported and voiced the Palestinian cause on international arena during the Soviet era. What was striking however was Putin's moves to narrow the gap between his country and Israel. The two sides found common grounds in curbing the influence of radical Islamic threat and international terrorism. Economic cooperation is also on the rise.¹⁰⁰⁴ In October 2000, Russia and Israel agreed to make use of Israel's neglected oil pipeline, known as the Tipline.¹⁰⁰⁵ Russia currently provides between fifty to eighty percent of Israel's crude oil supply. The two countries work together in heavy industry, aviation, energy, and medicine sectors.¹⁰⁰⁶ In September 2008, Israel and Russia also signed an agreement which abolished the tourist visa requirement between the two states.¹⁰⁰⁷

Russia's new policy line of staying at an equal distance from both Israel and the Palestinian administration was felt intensely during Israel's tremendous military assault on Gaza in December 2008. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement on 27 December 2008, which, while urging Israel to "stop the large-scale military action against the Gaza Strip that had already led to significant casualties

¹⁰⁰⁴ The bilateral trade between Russia and Israel exceeded 2.5 billion dollars in 2010, recording 38% increase in five years. See "Foreign Trade of the Russian Federation with Far Abroad Countries", External Economic Activities, Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service. Available [online]: < http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b11_12/IssWWW.exe/stg/d02/26-05.htm > [03.03.2012].

¹⁰⁰⁵ Dr. Sam Vaknin, "Russia's Israeli Oil Bond". Available [online]: < <http://samvak.tripod.com/brief-russia-israel01.html> > [16 May 2009].

¹⁰⁰⁶ Ilya Bourtnan, "Putin and Russia's Middle Eastern Policy", *MERIA* (Middle East Review of International Affairs) 10, no.2 (June 2006). Available [online]: < <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue2/jv10no2a1.html> > [16 May 2009].

¹⁰⁰⁷ "Israel and Russia Sign Agreement Canceling Tourist Visa Requirement", MFA Press Releases, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 September 2008. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/MFA+Spokesman/2008/Israel_and_Russia_sign_visa_nullification_agreement_17-Sep-2008.htm > [16 May 2009].

and suffering among the Palestinian civilian population, also called on the Hamas leadership to end rocket attacks on Israeli territory.”¹⁰⁰⁸

Another stunning development concerning the Russian-Israeli relationship took place on the military front. In September 2008, the Russian corporation ISS Reshetnev signed a contract with Israel and the European concern Thales Alenia Space to supply equipment and montage of Israeli telecommunication satellite Amos-5.¹⁰⁰⁹ Russian Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin, who directed all military procurement programs in the Russian Federation, publicized on 10 April 2009, a deal with Israel’s Israel Aerospace Industries (IAS) to buy three reconnaissance drones, their ground operating systems, spare parts, maintenance, instruction and an option to purchase additional unnamed aerial vehicles.¹⁰¹⁰ The deal was historical in nature as it was the first time that Russia decided to obtain Israeli military hardware. The new weapons are expected to improve the intelligence and surveillance capabilities of the Russian military whose weakness and vulnerability came to the surface when several Russian Tipchuk UAVs delivered a poor performance in August 2008 war against the Georgian drones manufactured by the Israeli firm Elbit Systems.¹⁰¹¹

The existence of more than a million Russian Jews that emigrated to Israel after the disintegration of the Soviet Union was another significant factor that

¹⁰⁰⁸ “Statement by Russian MFA Spokesman Andrei Nesterenko in Relation to the Israeli Airstrikes on the Gaza Strip”, Information and Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 27 December 2008. Available [online]: <http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/698fe8c87c2b17afc325752e00479df2?OpenDocument> [16 May 2009].

¹⁰⁰⁹ Katarina Mozova, “The Rivalry and Cooperation between Israel and Russia in the Field of Armament Industry”, *Central and Eastern European Watch*. Available [online]: <http://www.despiteborders.com/clanky/data/upimages/mozova-izrael-a-rusko_en.pdf> [16 May 2009].

¹⁰¹⁰ Yossi Melman, “Israel Selling Reconnaissance Drones to Russia”, *Haaretz*, 13 April 2009 and “Russia Confirms Spy Drone Deal with Israel”, *RIA Novosti*, 10 April 2009.

¹⁰¹¹ Martin Sieff, “Russia Defense Watch: UAVs from Israel”, *UPI*, 13 April 2009 and Alexander Melikishvili, “Israel-Russia UAV Deal Reflects Conflicting Rationales and Interests”, *Jamestown Foundation Blog*, 20 April 2009.

contributed to the improvement of relations between Russian Federation and Israel. Many of them retained links with their former countries and did business with Russia and CIS states. They formed political parties such as Yisrael Beiteinu and Yisrael BaAliyah¹⁰¹² and their leaders occasionally visited Moscow and were received warmly by high ranking Russian officials.

There exists also a group of Russian-originated Jews in Israel that caused a major strain between Putin administration and Israel. These are Leonid Nevzlin, Mikhail Brudno and Vladimir Dubov who were partners of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, former CEO of Yukos Oil Company that was put into prison in October 2003 on charges of fraud and tax evasion. These figures now live in Israel and are directors of Group Menatep, a holding company that owns sixty percent of what remains of the collapsed Yukos Empire.¹⁰¹³ Israel also sheltered two media tycoons Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky who incurred Putin's fury. These two magnates were also accused of engaging in financial misdeeds. All of the five oligarchs were accepted to Israel under the Law of Return which granted automatic citizenship to any Jew. Russia repeatedly requested the extradition of these businessmen but was turned down by the Israeli authorities.

It can be said that Russian and Israeli relations are on the mend but from time to time problems emerge. For example, Israel criticized sharply the Russian arm deals with Iran and Syria and Moscow's backing of Iran in United Nations about its nuclear program. On the other hand, Russia branded Israel's attack on Lebanon in July 2006 disproportionate and far beyond the boundaries of an anti-terrorist

¹⁰¹² Yisrael BaAliyah merged with Likud in 2003.

¹⁰¹³ *Associated Press*, 26 April 2004.

operation.¹⁰¹⁴ Moreover, after the war, based on a bilateral agreement with the Lebanese government, Russia sent an engineer battalion in October 2006 to the country which took part in reconstruction efforts in the form of repairing bridges and removing mines.¹⁰¹⁵ Under a military-technical assistance agreement signed between Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and his Lebanese equivalent Elias Murrhis on 17 December 2008, Russia also gave Lebanon free of charge ten MiG 29 Fulcrum fighter jets.¹⁰¹⁶

Iraq: Restoration of Energy Ties

Russia was opposed to the US invasion of Iraq due to its political and economic interests in this country but the Russian government was also cognizant of the fact that it had neither the power nor the means to confront Washington directly on this matter. So after the US administration gained the upper hand in Baghdad, Russia's main objective became the endorsement of its oil contracts that dated from the Saddam Hussein era.

The Russian state oil company Lukoil wanted to develop the West Qurna field in southern Iraq. In the past years, the firm spent twenty million dollars to train one thousand to two thousand Iraqi oil field engineers in Russian fields and put another one thousand through Russian universities and provided equipment for Iraq's

¹⁰¹⁴ *RIA Novosti*, 20 July 2006 and Anton Troianovski, "Russia Criticizes Israel for Offensive", *Associated Press*, 20 July 2006.

¹⁰¹⁵ İlyas Kamalov, "Moskova Lübnan'a Asker Gönderecek mi?", *ASAM*, 20 September 2006 and Zeynep Dağı, "Russia: Back to the Middle East?", *Perceptions* (Journal of International Affairs) 12, no.1 (Spring 2007), pp.140-141.

¹⁰¹⁶ Robert F. Worth, "Russia, Testing U.S. Sway, Offers Lebanon 10 Warplanes", *The New York Times*, 17 December 2008 and Tony Halpin, "Russia Provides 10 MiG Fighter Jets to Lebanon for Free", *The Times*, 18 December 2008.

oil industry.¹⁰¹⁷ However the new Iraqi government rescinded the oil deal in November 2007¹⁰¹⁸ and the Russian activities came to naught.

Although discouraged and balked by the decision of the Iraqi administration, Russia stuck to its goal of strengthening economic ties with Iraq perseveringly. Russia made an agreement with Iraq on narrowing its debt estimated at ten billion dollars to thirteen billion dollars in February 2008. The pact was signed under a November 2004 agreement in which Russia and other creditor nations agreed to write off eighty percent of Iraq's debts. Moscow and Iraq also concluded a trading and economic cooperation memorandum and the memorandum on research and engineering during the Moscow visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari on 11 February 2008.¹⁰¹⁹ In April 2009, the Russian companies resumed their operations in Iraq. On April 10, Technopromexport signed a 133 million dollar contract in Moscow with the Iraqi energy agency to rebuild the Harta power plant in Iraq.¹⁰²⁰

This entire Russian endeavour to promote its economic interests in Iraq paid off after Lukoil and its consortium partner Norwegian Statoil emerged victorious in the bid held in December 2009 for the development and production of the West Qurna-2 field.¹⁰²¹

Testing the Water in American Zone of Influence: Russia's Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar Openings

¹⁰¹⁷ *Weltpolitik*, 25 April 2007.

¹⁰¹⁸ *International Herald Tribune*, 04 November 2007.

¹⁰¹⁹ *RIA Novosti*, 11 February 2008.

¹⁰²⁰ Sergei Blagov, "Russia Eyes Iraqi Energy Sector", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 6, no. 79 (24 April 2009).

¹⁰²¹ "Lukoil Signs Development and Production Agreement at the Iraqi West Qurna-2 Field", Press Release, Lukoil Oil Company, 01 February 2010. Available [online]: <http://www.lukoil.com/press.asp?div_id=5&id=3195> [20 March 2010].

Another notable aspect of recent Russian Middle East policy was Moscow's approaching to traditional US allies such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar. Russia by developing its relations with these states tried to permeate into the Gulf region where lucrative trade and investment projects could be carried out. Moreover, Russia aimed to minimize the financial aid that flowed from these countries to Chechen fighters on Russian land.

In September 2003, the Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz came to Moscow and during his visit Gazprom's Stroytransgaz agreed with Saudi Oger construction company to establish the first Russian-Saudi consortium.¹⁰²² In January 2004, Lukoil won a tender to develop the 11,200-square-mile Zone A natural gas field in the Rub' al-Khali desert in Saudi Arabia. In order to realize the project, Lukoil formed a joint venture with Saudi Arabia's Aramco and they set up a new firm named Luksar in which Lukoil held an eighty percent stake whereas the remaining twenty percent belonged to Aramco. Russia reaped the benefits of this rapprochement with Saudis within a short time. Chechnya's pro-Moscow President Akhmad Kadyrov was recognized as the legitimate leader of the Chechens by Riyadh and he was welcomed cordially during his visit to Saudi Arabia in January 2004.¹⁰²³

Another breakthrough in Russian-Saudi relations was Putin's historic visit to Saudi Arabia in February 2007. Putin became the first Russian President that had ever set foot on Saudi soil. In the course of the visit the two countries signed agreements in the areas of elimination of double taxation on income and capital and expansion of air transport. Memorandum of understandings on cultural exchange, development of funds and cooperation between the two countries' state news

¹⁰²² *The New York Times*, 03 September 2003.

¹⁰²³ Kreutz, p.133.

agencies were also concluded.¹⁰²⁴ Russia's AFK Sistema and Saudi Jeraisy Group made a contract to sell and produce plastic cards, invest in real estate, engage in marketing, sales and servicing of Russian helicopters and cooperate on international stock markets.¹⁰²⁵

Russian-Saudi military cooperation took off in November 2007 with the Saudi decision to buy T-90 tanks, 150 fighter helicopters Mi-17 and Mi-35 and an anti-medium-range missile system from Russia.¹⁰²⁶ On 14 July 2008, at the time of National Security Council of Saudi Arabia Secretary General Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz's visit to Moscow, he and the Russian Premier Vladimir Putin put their signatures on a military-technical cooperation agreement.¹⁰²⁷

Russia's second destination after Saudi Arabia was Qatar, the small gas-rich emirate of Gulf region. The relations between the two countries had chilled out after Qatari authorities detained three Russians officials in February 2004 on the grounds of murdering former Acting President of Chechnya, Zelimkhan Yanderbiyev.¹⁰²⁸ Qatar released one of the detainees that had a diplomatic passport. Although the other two were convicted of murder by Qatari court, they were sent to Russia in December 2004 to serve out their sentences.¹⁰²⁹ This put an end to the rift between Moscow and Doha.

¹⁰²⁴ "Documents Signed Due the Official Visit to Saudi Arabia", Official Visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, 11-12 February 2007, President of Russia, Events Files. Available [online]: <<http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/events/articles/2007/02/117680/118368.shtml>> [17 May 2009].

¹⁰²⁵ *RIA Novosti*, 12 February 2007.

¹⁰²⁶ Mozova and "Saudi Arabia to Purchase Russian Helicopters", *Russia-IC*, 07 November 2007.

¹⁰²⁷ John C. K. Daly, "Saudi-Russian Military Cooperation", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 137 (18 July 2008) and Mark N. Katz, "Saudi-Russian Relations since the Abdullah-Putin Summit", *Middle East Policy* 16, no. 1 (Spring 2009), p. 113.

¹⁰²⁸ Mark N. Katz, "Russia and Qatar", *MERIA* (Middle East Review of International Affairs) 11, no.4 (December 2007), p.1.

¹⁰²⁹ *Ibid.*

During Putin's visit Russia and Qatar signed a memorandum that would ensure visa-free travel to their citizens. A Russian-Qatari Business Council was formed and a governmental agreement to encourage trade and investment came into being.¹⁰³⁰ In addition, Lukoil and Qatar Petroleum signed a cooperation agreement covering possible participation in oil and gas exploration projects in Qatar.¹⁰³¹

In November 2008, Qatar's Liquefied Gas Company, along with Russian Gazprom and Iran's National Iranian Oil Company, enunciated the formation of a joint venture where each of the firms would have a thirty percent stake.¹⁰³² The three countries, that control over half of the world's gas reserves, intend to effectuate joint exploration and production projects via this newly formed gas troika.

Jordan, despite its lack of natural resources, is still a significant country for Russia due to its proximity to Iraq. Amman hosted many Russian oil companies which had contacts in Iraq and Russia attempted to re-enter into Iraqi market through this country. At the time of Putin's visit to Jordan in February 2007, Russia and Jordan entered into a treaty on the sale of Russian Ka-226 light multi-purpose helicopters.¹⁰³³ Russia shouldered the construction of a plant to assemble Russian-made Lada automobiles. Agreements on the protection of investments and foundation of a Russian-Jordanian Business Council were signed.¹⁰³⁴ Putin also

¹⁰³⁰ "Documents Signed During the Working Visit to the State of Qatar", Visit to Qatar, Doha, 12 February 2007, President of Russia, Events Files. Available [online]: <<http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/events/articles/2007/02/117845/118365.shtml>> [17 May 2009].

¹⁰³¹ Ibid and see also "Russia Bolsters Gulf Energy Strategy", *Ame Info*, 18 March 2007.

¹⁰³² The remaining ten percent share in the joint venture will go to a fourth partner whose name has not been publicized yet. See "Gazprom Linked Iran and Qatar", *Kommersant*, 12 November 2008.

¹⁰³³ "Documents Adopted During the Official Visit to Jordan", Official Visit to Jordan, Amman, 13 February 2007, President of Russia, Events Files. Available [online]: <<http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/events/articles/2007/02/117801/118405.shtml>> [19 May 2009].

¹⁰³⁴ Ibid and Robert O. Freedman, "The Putin Visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan: Business Promotion or Great Power Maneuvering", *Johnson's Russia List*, 15 February 2007. Available [online]: <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-39-39.cfm>> [19 May 2009].

pledged to build a guest-house for Russian pilgrims in Jordan who would visit holy places such as the St. John the Baptist Orthodox Church.

Military cooperation between Moscow and Amman is on the rise. Talks are undergoing to found a joint corporation for the production of RPG-32 Hashim multi-caliber launchers. The launchers will be developed by the Bazalt Moscow State Research and Production Enterprise at the suggestion of Jordanian King Abdullah II.¹⁰³⁵

Russia and Jordan also commenced to collaborate in the field of nuclear technology. On 26 February 2009, Russian Rosatom's Nikolay Spasskiy and his Jordanian counterpart Kamal Araj agreed on a memorandum of understanding on nuclear cooperation that would see construction of a nuclear power plant in Jordan coupled with a fuel takeback arrangement as well as a sea water desalination plant, and cooperation in research and training of nuclear personnel.¹⁰³⁶

It can be said that Russia's leap toward the Middle East emanated from three main motives. Firstly, by constituting joint ventures and local partnership in these countries Russia penetrated into a profitable market which had been for a long time dominated by the USA. Secondly, by improving its relations with these predominantly Muslim nations, Moscow strove to ensure at least their neutrality about the Chechen problem. Thirdly, in contrast to the EU and NATO ruled Europe, the Middle East was still a region where Russian influence was still, albeit meager, felt. The Russian leadership, that sought to reassert the former glory and supremacy

¹⁰³⁵ Alexander Gelogaev, "Jordan to Build Russian Grenade Launchers", *Reuters*, 29 July 2008 and Nikita Petrov, "Russia Pushing Weapons Sales in Middle East and Beyond", *RIA Novosti*, 27 August 2008.

¹⁰³⁶ Anya Loukianova, "Russia and Jordan Initial Nuclear Cooperation Agreement", *Fuel Cycle*, 26 February 2009, "Jordan, Russia Sign Nuclear Deal", *AFP*, 26 February 2009, and "Jordan, Russia Sign Nuclear Agreement", *Khaleej Times Online*, 27 February 2009.

of the country found a receptive audience in this area that was wary of American schemes and interventions.

While implementing the new guidelines of the Middle Eastern foreign policy, Russian administration released itself from the ideological baggage of the Soviet times. Moscow declared that regarding the Palestinian issue, it stood at an equal distance from both parties of the conflict. President Putin paid visits to Gulf region states whose leaders were in the past despised and labelled as puppets of the US hegemony by the Soviet officials. These overtures showed the pragmatic side of the new Russian Middle Eastern policy and they paid off. Today Russian companies widely operate in the Middle East and obtain lucrative bids from the Arab governments. However, Russian power also has its limits as was clearly demonstrated by Russia's inability to prevent American invasion of Iraq and Israel's incursions to Palestine and Lebanon. Moreover, despite Moscow's propping up of Syria and Iran it is highly doubtful that Russia will be able to come to their rescue if the USA and its allies become more determined to resort to military force to bring these regimes to their knees.

An Assertive and Energetic Turkish Diplomacy in the Middle East

Turkey, similar to Russia, has pursued an active, dynamic and multi-dimensional foreign policy in the Middle East since the early 2000s that was based on political dialogue, economic interaction and social and cultural relationship. The coming of power to Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey after the November 2002 elections plus the invasion of Iraq, Turkey's south-eastern neighbour, in March 2003

by a coalition spearheaded by the US became the two major events that contributed to the taking shape of the Turkish foreign policy with regard to the region.

The massive killings, political chaos, and social upheaval triggered by the occupation and the irreconcilable interests of the different ethnic and religious communities in the country cast a long shadow on the perpetuation of the territorial integrity and national unity of Iraq. Extremely uncomfortable and apprehensive of the fact that the north of Iraq had become a safe haven for PKK to launch attacks on Turkish security forces and civil population which resulted in casualties in growing numbers; and the independence aspirations of the Iraqi Kurdish groups aggravated the threat perceptions of Turkish political and security circles and urged them to close ranks with other regional countries such as Iran and Syria to contain the uplifting Kurdish nationalism and secessionism.

Israel's backing of Kurdish separatism in Iraq through economic and military means in addition to its usage of disproportionate force on Palestinian people induced the AKP government, known with its Islamic sensitivities, to distance itself from Tel Aviv and to pay more attention toward the amelioration of the grievances of the Palestinians.

Turkey, under the AKP leadership, also improved its political and economic relations with other members of the Arab world, especially with the participants of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman.

The following pages will seek to explain the main features of Turkish foreign policy with respect to the Middle East by scouting Turkey's bilateral relations with the abovementioned states through the prism of political, economic and security lenses.

Iraq: A Difficult and Fragile Relationship

Molding for the preservation of the current borders of the Iraqi state, putting pressure on the Iraqi administration to enlist Turkey in its struggle with PKK terrorism and tussling for the entrenchment of the rights and well-being of the Turcoman community in the country were the chief guidelines to whom Turkish government and the foreign policy establishment hewed while designing and implementing policies pertaining to Iraq in the post-invasion period.

The disrobement of the power of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athian state apparatus in the wake of the US-led assailment played into the hands of centrifugal forces in the northern and southern parts of Iraq and made the prospect of the fragmentation of the country along ethnic and sectarian lines exceedingly likely. Recoiled and discomfited by the possibility of the appearance of a Kurdish state abutted to its frontiers that could enflame the separatist penchant among its already restive Kurdish population, besides the probable emanation of a Shiite Islamic Republic on southern territories of Iraq which would boost the prestige and influence of Iran in the region evoked Turkey to push forward a political solution in Iraq which would hold the nation together and kybosh secessionist currents. In order to attain this end, Turkey commended the re-opening of channels of political dialogue and consensus between the various ethnic and religious groups in Iraq, inducted the Neighbouring Countries Process which brought together Iraq's neighbours to contribute to the restoration of peace, reconciliation and stability in the country and finally hummed to support the reconstruction process in this neighbouring state.

Turkey encouraged the Sunni Arabs and the Turcoman society to participate in the January 2005 elections in Iraq¹⁰³⁷ and also established good relations with the Shiite government representatives. Moreover, Turkey also advised Moqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Sadrist movement and one of the keen adversaries of the American existence in Iraq, to form a political party to voice its ideas, views and perspectives on the future shaping of Iraq.¹⁰³⁸ Turkey, during the government vacuum that ensued after the Iraqi elections of 2010, continued to struggle against the separatist and sectarian tide and urged the Sunni Al Iraqiyya List to work with the coalition government led by Shiite Nuri al-Maliki.

The Neighbouring Countries Process that was initiated by Turkey in January 2003 and was attended by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria¹⁰³⁹ served as a platform through which support mechanisms and working groups were established for rebuilding of Iraq and regional states affirmed their commitments in the name of the national unity and preservation of internationally recognized borders of the Baghdad regime. Ten official and three unofficial meetings of Foreign Ministers have taken place up to now.¹⁰⁴⁰ The Initiative was incorporated into a UN Advisory Group in 2004 and it presently encompasses the UN, P-5 and G-8 Countries, OIC, Arab League, European Commission in addition to the neighbours of Iraq.

¹⁰³⁷ “Statement of the Spokesman of the Turkish Foreign Ministry Mr. Namık Tan in Response to a Question Regarding Kirkuk and the Participation of the Iraqi Turkoman Society to the January 30th Elections in Iraq”, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No: 3, January 28, 2005. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_p_no_3---january-28th_-2005_-statement-of-the-spokesman-of-the-turkish-foreign-ministry-mr_-namik-tan-in-response-to-a-question-regarding-kirkuk-and-the-participation-of-the-iraqi-turkoman-society-to-the-january-30th-elections-in-iraq_p_.en.mfa > [05 July 2009].

¹⁰³⁸ “Sadr ‘Partileşin’ Telkinine Uydu”, *Sabah*, 05 May 2009.

¹⁰³⁹ Bill Park, “Iraq’s Kurds and Turkey: Challenges for US Policy”, *Parameters* (Autumn 2004), pp. 22-23.

¹⁰⁴⁰ “Turkey’s Political Contributions to Iraq”, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-contributions-to-iraq.en.mfa > [05 July 2009].

Turkey initiated the establishment of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council with Iraq on 10 July 2008 with the aim of enhancing political, economic, energy, water, cultural, security and military cooperation between the two countries.¹⁰⁴¹ Headed by the Premiers of the two countries, the Council convenes at least once a year within the presence of Iraqi and Turkish Ministers in charge of foreign affairs, energy, trade, investments, security and water resources.

Recognizing the fact that the survival of Iraq as a sovereign and unified state was also dependent on economic recuperation, Turkey gave full backing to attempts in this direction. Humanitarian aid sent to Iraq from Turkey since 2003 has exceeded 5.4 million dollars, and Turkish companies heavily invest in Iraq in the fields of construction and energy.¹⁰⁴² The bilateral trade between the two states surpassed eight billion dollars in 2011 and Iraq became Turkey's second biggest export market after Germany.¹⁰⁴³ Transportation projects between the two countries are on the rise as well which can be witnessed by the reopening of the Iraq-Turkey railroad, passing through Syria after a nearly thirty-year hiatus.¹⁰⁴⁴

Seventy percent of the trade with Iraq is carried out with the Kurdish region and sixty percent of the firms registered in this region have Turkish owners.¹⁰⁴⁵

¹⁰⁴¹ Joint Political Declaration on the Establishment of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council between Governments of the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Iraq. Available [online]: < <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Bolgeler/ortadogu/irak/Ortak%20Siyasi%20Bilirge%20İngilizce.pdf> > [05 July 2009].

¹⁰⁴² "Turkey's Economic, Financial and Humanitarian Contributions to Iraq", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-contributions-to-iraq.en.mfa > [05 July 2009], Serap Güneş Aydın, "Genel Enerji Kuzey Irak'tan Petrol İhracatına Başladı", *Dünya*, 02 June 2009, and "Doğan Enerji Kuzey Irak'ta 2 Projeye Ortak", *Hürriyet*, 30 June 2009.

¹⁰⁴³ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: < http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4 > [03 March 2012].

¹⁰⁴⁴ "Iraq-Turkey Railroad to Bring Neighbors Closer, Stimulate Trade", *Today's Zaman*, 18 February 2010.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Erdiñ Çelikkan, "Irak, Bir Günde 400 Milyon Dolarlık Türk Yatırımını Onayladı", *Hürriyet*, 19 January 2012 and Khaled Al-Sharikh, "Erasing the Frontier: Turkey's Trade and Investment in Iraqi Kurdistan", *NIMEP Insights* (2011), p.114.

Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds have recently also increased their cooperation in the energy sector. Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yıldız who participated to the First International Energy Conference held in Erbil on 20 May 2010², declared that Turkey agreed to resume the exchange process in oil sector, which was interrupted five years ago. Iraq will export raw oil to Turkey whereas Turkey, in return, will export oil products to Iraq. This process will be realized through tankers in the first stage. The two sides also decided to increase the capacity of the the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline.¹⁰⁴⁶

The ensconcing of PKK training camps in the northern territories of Iraq, the connivance of Kurdish regional government to the terrorist organization's activities on its soil and the assaults that were pointed at Turkish security personnel and civilians from therein tainted not only the Turkish-Iraqi intercourse but also caused ripples in Turkish-American relations. Washington's reluctance in taking effective measures for the elimination of PKK's presence in northern Iraq arising from the concern not to pique its ties with its Kurdish allies who, at the time of invasion, gave their full support to the US combat forces, raised serious quandaries in the minds of the Turkish political and military elites about the substance and verity of the Turkish-American security cooperation in the post-Cold War period.

The status and the rights of the Turcoman society in Iraq was another matter of concern for the Turkish statesmen. Being one of the oldest inhabitants of Iraq, the Turcoman are mostly resided in Kirkuk, Arbil, Salahaddin, Mosul and Diyala.¹⁰⁴⁷ Originating from historical, ethnic and cultural affinity with the Turcoman population plus the terminus to bridle the possible irredentist intentions of Iraqi

¹⁰⁴⁶ A. Taghiyeva, "Iraq, Turkey to Resume Energy Resources Exchange", *Trend AZ*, 21 May 2012.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Hasan Yılmaz, "Irak'ın Gizlenen Gerçeği: Türkmenler", *Stratejik Analiz* (May 2003), p.26. and Bilgay Duman, "Irak'ta Türkmen Varlığı", *ORSAM* 33 (March 2011), p.9.

Kurds toward Turkish territory led Turkey to prop up Turcoman people adamantly and studiously in their quest for strong and permanent political representation in Iraqi politics. The future status of the city of Kirkuk, notorious with its diverse ethnical make-up¹⁰⁴⁸ and rich oil-fields, was another stringent subject that preoccupied the minds of the Turkish political, military and foreign policy elites. The ultimate aim of Kurdish groups is to put Kirkuk under their authority and make it the capital of a possible Kurdish state. Turkey, for the same basic reason, is opposed to the idea of the incorporation of the city into Kurdish region as it will lay the economic ground for an independent Kurdistan adjacent to its problematic area. Turkey opts for the granting of a special status for Kirkuk which will guarantee that the province will be exempt both from the rule of central government and the Kurdish regional administration.¹⁰⁴⁹

Iran: Turkey's Eternal Neighbour and Perennial Rival

The invasion of Iraq by the external military forces under the leadership of the USA and the subsequent fall of the Saddam Hussein administration generated both positive and negative results for the Iranian state. On the one hand, the occupation resulted in the disappearance of a long-time adversary of Iran and inducted a Shiite-dominated government¹⁰⁵⁰ which denoted a much friendlier and meeker disposition toward the Iranian leadership compared to its predecessor. On the other hand, the

¹⁰⁴⁸ Assyrians, Arabs, Kurds and Turkomans make up the current population of Kirkuk.

¹⁰⁴⁹ "Turkish Foreign Policy on Iraq", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: < <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-foreign-policy-on-iraq.en.mfa> > [11 July 2009].

¹⁰⁵⁰ The United Iraqi Alliance which was made up of major Shiite factions in Iraq won 128 of the 275 seats in the parliament in the December 15, 2005 elections. The new Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri al-Maliki was member of the Dawa Party which was one of the participants of the United Iraqi Alliance. See Kenneth Katzman, "Iran's Activities and Influence in Iraq", *CRS Report for Congress*, 26 December 2007, pp.1-2.

rising standings of the Iraqi Kurds aroused separatist tendencies among Iran's Kurdish citizens who mostly resided in northwest regions of the country¹⁰⁵¹ that were adjacent to northern territories of Iraq which were populated by the Kurds of Iraq en masse. On top of this, Iran's arch-enemies the USA and Israel seized the opportunity to closely monitor the Iranian activities in the Middle East, including the nuclear ones.

The emergence of the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) in March 2004 and its launch of attacks against Iranian security officials from its sanctuaries in Qandil Mountains elicited a military response from Iran in the form of air strikes to the PJAK bases in northern Iraq.¹⁰⁵² Moreover, the Iranian administration that had not lifted a finger to aid Turkey in its struggle with PKK till then commenced to arrest the members of the organization in Iran and turned them over to Turkey. With the security agreement signed between Iran and Turkey in July 2004 at the time of Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Tehran, the Iranian party declared that it had added PKK to its list of terrorist organizations. In return, Turkey enlisted People's Mujahedin of Iran, a militant organization that was located in Iraq and aimed to overthrow the Islamic regime in Iran, as a terrorist formation.¹⁰⁵³ As a result of the bilateral security cooperation deal, Turkey and Iran realized joint strikes against PKK and PJAK and they shared military intelligence.¹⁰⁵⁴

Another reason of Iran's extending a hand to Turkey in its fight against secessionist terrorism was to secure at least Ankara's neutrality regarding its nuclear

¹⁰⁵¹ Hussein D. Hassan, "Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities", *CRS Report for Congress*, 25 May 2007, p.4.

¹⁰⁵² Kamal Majid, "An Assessment of Conditions in the Kurdish Region of Iraq", *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 2, no. 1 (January-March 2009), p.72.

¹⁰⁵³ Arif Keskin, "İran-Türkiye İlişkilerinin Tutkalı: PKK/PJAK Odaklı Güvenlik İşbirliği", *ASAM*, 03 December 2008.

¹⁰⁵⁴ "Turkey and Iran Unite Attack Kurdish Rebels", *Associated Press*, 06 June 2008.

development program. Turkey, despite its concerns and reservations, accepted the right of Iran to develop nuclear technology for peaceful ends. It is true that a nuclear-furnished Iran may outpower Turkey in their rivalry in the South Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East. However, a military assault against Tehran that may instigate the break-up of the country and has the potential to destabilize the entire region is not at the benefit of Turkey either.

There existed however limits to the recent Turkish-Iranian rapprochement. Iran, both at the foreign ministerial and presidential level, voiced objection to the deployment of early radar warning system in Turkey as part of NATO's missile defense system which the country saw it as a threat to its security. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast stated that "Iran believed that having the missile defense system in Turkey would not serve regional stability" and added that "Iran expected its neighbours not to pave way for policies that would lead to complicated consequences".¹⁰⁵⁵ Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad while underscoring that Turkey was a genuine friend of Iran declared that "one has to be vigilant especially when the enemies installed missile shield on Turkish territory and acknowledged that this act was against Iran".¹⁰⁵⁶

The up-front evolution of security and political relations between Turkey and Iran found their reflections also in the economic sphere. The bilateral trade volume between the two countries amounted to more than sixteen billion dollars in 2011.¹⁰⁵⁷ Natural gas, oil and oil products make up the primary portion of Turkey's imports

¹⁰⁵⁵ "Iran Warns Turkey about 'Consequences' of Hosting NATO's Missile Defense System", *Associated Press*, 08 September 2011.

¹⁰⁵⁶ "Cumhurbaşkanı Ahmedinejad: Türkiye Dostumuzdur", *İran İslam Cumhuriyeti Haber Ajansı (IRNA)*, 10 September 2011.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4> [03 March 2012].

from Iran whilst Iran buys consumer and processed goods, iron, steel and plastic materials from Turkey.¹⁰⁵⁸

Turkey and Syria: An Elevating Relationship

The Turkish-Syrian relations had entered into a process of reconciliation after Syria's expulsion of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of PKK, from the country in October 1998, the closure of PKK training camps on the Syrian land and the cut-off of logistical support for the organization.¹⁰⁵⁹ The likelihood of the dismemberment of Iraq on ethnical and confessional lines, in contrast to the continuous strivings of the both of the states' in opposite direction and Syria's deliberative decision to drawing near to Turkey to break out of its isolation on international stage which intensified after the Syrian administration was accused of devising and soliciting the murder of Lebanon's former Prime Minister, Refik Hariri in February 2005, brought two neighbours closer and converged their policies pertaining to the region.

Syria had to face with its own Kurdish problem in March 2004 when clashes broke out between its Arab and Kurdish populations following the incidents between these two groups at a football match in Qamishli, in northern part of the country in

¹⁰⁵⁸ "Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations with Iran", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-iran.en.mfa> [18 July 2009] and Arif Keskin, "İran-Türkiye Ekonomik İlişkileri: Zor Ancak Zorunlu Ticaret", *ASAM*, 02 December 2008.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, "From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations", *Security Dialogue* 37, no.2 (June 2006), p.238.

close proximity to the Iraq border.¹⁰⁶⁰ The Qamishli event sparked off a firmer stance in the Syrian state in dealing with the Kurdish separatism and motivated it further toward cooperating with Turkey in containment of the PKK. Syria, similar to Iran, arrested local PKK members and handed over them to the Turkish security personnel, besides; Ankara and Damascus founded consultation mechanisms to exchange views on regional matters and to cope effectively with crime and terrorism.¹⁰⁶¹ Moreover, on 26-29 April 2009, for the first time in their history, the land forces of Turkey and Syria performed joint military exercises to increase training and operational capabilities of the respective border units and to deal more efficaciously with smugglers and the PKK militants operating along the border.¹⁰⁶² At the time of the military drills, Turkey and Syria also signed a technical military cooperation agreement to enhance and deepen collaboration between their defense industries.

Turkey served as a conduit to Syria in its engagement with the outside world especially after the country was blacklisted by the USA government owing to its support to the resistance movement in Iraq, its alleged role in the assassination of Refik Hariri and the covert activities of the Syrian intelligence organization, Al-Muhaberat in Lebanon.¹⁰⁶³ Turkey advocated Syria in its attempt to reach a rapprochement with Israel and the two states started indirect peace talks under the

¹⁰⁶⁰ Hicran Kazancı, "Suriye'nin Elinde Patlayan 'Kürt Kozu' ", *Strateji* 1, no.7 (16 August 2004), p.10. There exist 1.25-1.5 million Kurdish nationals living in Syria. They constitute eight-ten percent of the Syrian population. See Oytun Orhan, "Suriye Kürtleri ve Türkiye", *Stratejik Analiz* (May 2006), p.77.

¹⁰⁶¹ Allon Bar, "Turkish Foreign Policy Survey: Directions and Dilemmas in 2007", *Perceptions* (Journal of International Affairs) 11, no.3 (Autumn-Winter 2006), pp. 47-48.

¹⁰⁶² "Turkey and Syria to Stage Joint Military Exercise", *The Anatolia News Agency*, 26 April 2009, Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu, "Turkey, 'Israel's Muslim Friend', in Military Drill with Syria", *Israel National News*, 27 April 2009 and Bilal Y. Saab, "Syria and Turkey Deepen Bilateral Relations", *Jane's Foreign Report*, 06 May 2009.

¹⁰⁶³ H. Miray Vurmay, "Değişen Dengeler, Gelişen İlişkiler Doğrultusunda Türkiye-Suriye İlişkileri", *Strateji* 1, no.52 (27 August 2005), p.8.

auspices of Turkey.¹⁰⁶⁴ After four rounds of negotiations, the peace process was discontinued because of Israel's offensive on Gaza Strip in December 2008.

In recent years, concomitant to the mounting political and security ties, the two states also improved the economic and commercial facet of their relationship. Remarkable moves in this direction were the signature of the Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and Syria during Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to the country on December 22-23, 2004¹⁰⁶⁵, foundation of the Syrian-Turkish High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council on 16 September 2009¹⁰⁶⁶ and the abolition of visa requirements between the two states on 13 October 2009.¹⁰⁶⁷ Furthermore, Turkey and Syria, along with Jordan and Lebanon, declared the establishment of Quadripartite High Level Cooperation Council on 10 June 2010 to create a zone of free movement of goods and persons among themselves.¹⁰⁶⁸ The bilateral trade between Ankara and Damascus came at nearly 2 billion dollars in 2011¹⁰⁶⁹ and investments by Turkish firms in Syria reached to 260 million dollars. Turkey exports electrical machines, mineral fuel, animal and vegetable oil, automotive and its by-products, iron and steel, processed petroleum, and chemical

¹⁰⁶⁴ "Press Release Regarding the Indirect Peace Talks between Syria and Israel under the Auspices of Turkey", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no 81, 21 May 2008. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no-81---21-may-2008_-press-release-regarding-the-indirect-peace-talks-between-syria-and-israel-under-the-auspices-of-turkey-_unofficial-translation_.en.mfa > [19 July 2009].

¹⁰⁶⁵ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq* (London, United Kingdom: SAQI, 2007), p.136. The agreement entered into force in January 2007. See "Turkey's Political Relations with Syria", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-syria.en.mfa > [19 July 2009].

¹⁰⁶⁶ H. Sabbagh, "First Ministerial Meeting of the Syrian-Turkish Strategic Cooperation Council Concluded, Long-Term Strategic Partnership between the Two Countries Established.", *Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA)*, 14 October 2009.

¹⁰⁶⁷ "Turkey and Syria Abolish Visa Requirements", *TRT World*, 14 October 2009.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Joint Political Declaration on the Establishment of the High Level Cooperation Council among Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-political-declaration-on-the-establishment-of-the-high-level-cooperation-council-among-turkey_-syria_-jordan-and-lebanon.en.mfa > [13 February 2011].

¹⁰⁶⁹ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: < http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4 > [03 March 2012].

industry products to Syria whereas main imports from Syria to Turkey are mineral fuel, cotton, fruits and vegetables, automotive and its by-products, paper and fertilizers.¹⁰⁷⁰ Syria is also an important transit country for Turkey for the delivery of Turkish goods to other states in the Middle East.

This elevating and promising relationship received a heavy blow in the summer of 2011, when the Assad regime in fear of losing its power and control in the country in face of massive demonstrations against its administration inspired by the similar rallies in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya which toppled the long-standing autocratic regimes in these countries decided to quell the uprising with heavy-handed military measures. Turkey criticized this policy vocally and severely and restrained its political, economic and military ties with Syria. It seems that unless a regime change takes place in Syria, Turkish-Syrian relations will keep a low profile.

Turkey, Israel and the Palestinian Authority: The Bermuda Triangle

The Turkish-Israeli cooperation in the Middle East that had gathered pace in the late 1990s, took a receding turn right after the Iraqi war with the collision of the national interests of the two countries' concerning the future of the Iraqi state. While Israel envisioned a weak, subdued and vulnerable Iraq that would not pose any danger and threat to its existence and corroborated the Kurdish deeds in this direction financially and militarily, Turkey followed a totally different path and pursued a policy line that ensured the consolidation of the control and authority of the government in Baghdad over the federal regions. Another matter of controversy between the two states

¹⁰⁷⁰ "Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations with Syria", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-syria.en.mfa> [19 July 2009].

became the hard-hitting reaction of Turkey's conservative government, renowned with its Islamic credentials, to Israel's heavy-handed treatment of the Palestinians.

News and reports disclosing the fact that Israel was providing training to Kurdish commando units to stamp out the Shiite and Sunni resistance to occupying forces, running covert operations in Kurdish-inhabited areas of Iran and Syria, sneaking into nuclear facilities of Iran and purchasing land and property in the north of Iraq through its citizens of Kurdish origin¹⁰⁷¹ entailed Tel Aviv to receive the cold shoulder from Ankara. Despite the Israeli statements in the opposite direction¹⁰⁷², Turkey was well aware of the fact that Israel had a stake in entering into an alignment with the Iraqi Kurds. An independent Kurdistan coveting the Kurdish-populated territories of the neighbouring countries such as Iran, Syria and Turkey would raise new difficulties for these states and would impel them to pay less attention to the Palestinian cause. Such a development would earn Israel a new leverage in its struggle with the Palestinians.

Turkey, under the government of AKP, became more interested in posing itself as a facilitator to find a lasting settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This new Turkish position could be attributed to the governing party's sympathy toward the Palestinian people that grew out of the notion of Islamic brotherhood and solidarity. On the other hand, this impasse was seen as the main cause of many problems in the Middle East by the Turkish foreign-policy establishment and the resolution of the issue in the form of the foundation of two states within secure and

¹⁰⁷¹ Seymour M. Hersh, "Plan B: As June 30th Approaches, Israel Looks to the Kurds", *The New Yorker*, 22 June 2004, "Turkey Eyes the Middle East", *Strategic Comments* 10, no.6 (July 2004), p.2, and Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Clash of Interest over Northern Iraq Drives Turkish-Israeli Alliance to a Crossroads", *Middle East Journal* 59, no.2 (Spring 2005), p.248.

¹⁰⁷² Ümit Enginsoy and David Judson, "Israel Denies Helping Iraqi Kurds, Sees One Iraq", *Turkish Daily News*, 20 April 2007.

recognized borders would bring order and stability to the region.¹⁰⁷³ In line with this reasoning, Turkey underpinned the revitalization of the negotiation process between the Israeli and Palestinian parties and chipped in the development of economic projects for Palestine.

On 13 November 2007, before their itinerary to Annapolis for peace consultations, Israeli President Shimon Peres and the Head of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas met in Turkey and they both addressed the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Peres became the first Israeli President who spoke before the parliament of a country whose citizens were predominantly composed of Muslims.¹⁰⁷⁴

Ankara Forum, Turkey's economic initiative to improve the socio-economic infrastructure of Palestine was inaugurated by the Presidents of the Trade Chambers of Turkey, Israel and Palestine in April 2005.¹⁰⁷⁵ The Forum's first project, rehabilitation of the industrial zone in Erez in the Gaza Strip was shelved in the wake of the Hamas victory in the January 2006 elections therein; a similar project in Tarqumia, West Bank was included by Quartet Representative Tony Blair among the four "Quick Impact Projects" that had to be primarily supported for development in Palestine.¹⁰⁷⁶

¹⁰⁷³ "Middle East Peace Process", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/middle-east-peace-process.en.mfa>> [26 July 2009].

¹⁰⁷⁴ "H.E., President Peres Visited Turkey", Bilateral Relations: Latest Developments, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: <<http://ankara.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/Document.asp?SubjectID=18365&MissionID=65&LanguageID=0&StatusID=3&DocumentID=-1>> [26 July 2009].

¹⁰⁷⁵ "Turkey's Political Relations with the Palestinian National Authority", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-the-palestinian-national-authority.en.mfa> [26 July 2009].

¹⁰⁷⁶ "Middle East Peace Process", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/middle-east-peace-process.en.mfa>> [26 July 2009].

The strengthening of the Hamas organization in Palestine that denied the existence of Israel, and Tel Aviv's stern measures to counter the attacks Hamas carried out targeting Israeli locations which resulted in high numbers of Palestinian civilian deaths provoked an outcry in the AKP government. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan frequently criticized the Israeli policy in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Lebanon¹⁰⁷⁷; branded it as illegitimate and disproportionate and accused the Israeli authorities of committing state terror.¹⁰⁷⁸ Israel on the other hand, watched with increasing annoyance and concern, AKP's backing up of Hamas as the representative of the will of the Palestinian people and hosting its leader in exile Khaled Mashal and his delegation at the party's headquarters in Ankara in February 2006.¹⁰⁷⁹

Turkish-Israeli relations further got out of hand when the Israeli Defense Forces attacked the *Mavi Marmara* (Blue Marmara) flotilla in international waters on 31 May 2010, which had left Turkey three days ago in order to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza and defy the Israeli embargo therein. As a result of the Israeli raid nine Turkish citizens lost their lives and more than thirty people were wounded.¹⁰⁸⁰ Turkey condemned the Israeli attack strongly and demanded from Israel an official

¹⁰⁷⁷ Turkey has been participating to the UN peacekeeping force UNIFIL that was deployed in Lebanon after the Israeli-Lebanese war in summer 2006 with one thousand ground and naval forces since October 2006. See "BM Lübnan Geçici Kuvveti (UNIFIL)", Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, Uluslararası İlişkiler. Available [online]: <
http://www.tsk.tr/4_ULUSLARARASI_ILISKILER/4_22_BM_Lubnangecicikuvveti/BM_UNIFIL.htm> [26 July 2009].

¹⁰⁷⁸ Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy since 2002: Between a 'post-Islamist' Government and a Kemalist State", *International Affairs* 83, no. 2 (March 2007), p.299, F. Stephen Larrabee, *Turkey as a US Security Partner* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), p.19, and "Turkey's PM Storms off Stage over Peres Remarks on Gaza", *The Associated Press*, 30 January 2009.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Joshua Walker, "Turkey and Israel's Relationship in the Middle East", *Mediterranean Quarterly* 17, no. 4 (Fall 2006), p.89.

¹⁰⁸⁰ "Press Release Regarding the Use of Force by the Israeli Defense Forces Against the Humanitarian Aid Flotilla to Gaza", No: 115, 31 May 2010. Available [online]: <
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-115_-31-may-2010_--press-release-regarding-the--use-of-force-by-the-israeli-defense-forces-against-the-humanitarian-aid-fleet-to-gaza.en.mfa> [02 October 2010].

apology, release of the ships in the aid convoy, compensation of the families of the deceased and the wounded, acceptance of an international inquiry regarding the incident and an immediate lifting off the naval blockade of Gaza.¹⁰⁸¹ The Israeli government allowed the return of the ships to Turkey in July 2010¹⁰⁸² and dropped its objection to the international probe¹⁰⁸³ but it avoided Turkish requisitions of apology and compensation which put the bilateral relationship on a precipitous trail.

The deterioration in political relations between Turkey and Israel had its impact on the military ties as well. Turkey limited Israeli access to its airspace and cancelled military exercises with Tel Aviv.¹⁰⁸⁴ However, Israel had been continuing to modernize 170 of Turkey's U.S.-made M 60 A1 tanks was supplying Turkey with Heron UAVs as part of a military deal signed in April 2005.¹⁰⁸⁵ With Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's statement on 07 September 2011, that blamed Israel for failing to meet its obligations in the military deal by not sending back to Turkey the drones that were in Israel for maintenance, it came to the surface that there were serious problems on that matter too. Furthermore, the Israeli government

¹⁰⁸¹ "Speech by Ahmet Davutoğlu at the UN Security Council", 01 June 2010. Available [online]: <<http://www.voltairenet.org/article165603.html>> [02 October 2010].

¹⁰⁸² "Israel to Return Gaza Aid Ships to Turkey", *Reuters*, 24 July 2010.

¹⁰⁸³ The Panel of Inquiry on the flotilla incident that was established by the Secretary-General of UN on 02 August 2010 released its report on 02 September 2011. The report, much to the dismay of Turkey, stated that the naval blockade imposed by Israel on Gaza was legal and its implementation complied with the requirements of international law. The naval blockade was evaluated as a legitimate security measure in order to prevent weapons from entering Gaza by sea. Moreover, the report implicitly accused Turkey of not warning the flotilla participants of the potential risks involved and not dissuading them from their actions. Israel's decision on the other hand to board the flotilla with substantial force at a great distance from the blockade zone and with no final warning immediately prior to the boarding was deemed as excessive and unreasonable and call was made to Israel to issue an appropriate statement of regret as well as to offer payment for the benefit of the deceased and injured victims and their families. See "Report of the Secretary-General's Panel of Inquiry on 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident", September 2011. Available [online]: <http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/middle_east/Gaza_Flotilla_Panel_Report.pdf> [11 September 2011].

¹⁰⁸⁴ Ahmet Sözen, "A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges", *Turkish Studies* 11, no.1 (March 2010), p.119.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Gareth Jenkins, "Israel's Barak in Ankara to Try to Boost Defense Ties", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no.28 (13 February 2008) and Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Israeli-Turkish Relations Put to the Test", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 6, no.15 (23 January 2009).

also cancelled a military contract to supply Turkey with advanced aerial intelligence systems on 23 December 2011 on the grounds that this critical military equipment might end up in the hands of hostile countries' to Israel such as Iran.¹⁰⁸⁶

Despite the occasional ups and downs in the political and military relations, economic bonds between Turkey and Israel followed a better course. The bilateral trade between the two countries approximated 4.5 billion dollars in 2011.¹⁰⁸⁷ Alcoholic beverages, banking, construction services, textile and tourism constituted the cornerstones of Turkish-Israeli commercial relations.¹⁰⁸⁸

Turkey and the GCC: Steaming Up the Economic and Commercial Ties

The AKP government, since its coming to power in 2002, has exhibited an apparent interest in innervating the political, economic and commercial relations between Turkey and the states of GCC. The prime mover of AKP's leap toward these countries sprang from the intention to convince the cash-rich businessmen of these Arab states to make investments in the developing Turkish economy. In this context, agreements on the prevention of double taxation, on the mutual promotion and protection of investments as well as on trade and economic cooperation were signed in the course of reciprocal high-level visits between Turkey and these countries. These efforts were successful at some extent as the trade volume between Turkey

¹⁰⁸⁶ Isabel Kershner, "Israel Cancels Military Contract with Turkey to Supply Aerial System", *The New York Times*, 23 December 2011.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4> [03 March 2012].

¹⁰⁸⁸ "Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations with Israel", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-israel.en.mfa> [26 July 2009], "Atlas Halı'nın %51'ini İsraili Carmel Aldı", *Milliyet*, 05 June 2006, Alexander Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy", *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no.6 (November 2006), p.959 and "Türk Tuborg İsraili Meşrubatçının", *Radikal*, 24 July 2008.

and the GCC members boosted and the Arab foreign capital entered into Turkish market in the form of establishing new companies, setting up joint ventures or taking up stakes in Turkish corporations.

In 2011, the bilateral trade volume between Turkey and the GCC participants came at nearly twelve billion dollars¹⁰⁸⁹, with United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia occupying the leading ranks in commerce with Turkey. The GCC investments in Turkey mostly concentrated on the fields of agriculture, automotive, banking and financial services, consumer goods, healthcare services, logistics and transportation, manufacturing, media, real estate, retailing, technology, telecommunications and yachting.¹⁰⁹⁰ The Turkish firms investing in the GCC states were preponderantly active in banking and financial services, construction, consumer durables, FMCG, manufacturing, and retailing sectors in these countries.¹⁰⁹¹

¹⁰⁸⁹ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: < http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4 > [03 March 2012].

¹⁰⁹⁰ “Dubai İslam Bankası MNG Bank’i 160 Milyon Dolara Satın Aldı”, *Referans*, 31 January 2006, Sadi Özdemir, “Katarlı United Development Millenya A.Ş.’ye Ortak Oldu”, *Hürriyet*, 13 June 2006, “Koç İzocam’ı Sattı”, *Türkiye*, 07 September 2006, “SEDCO has purchased 49% shares of Atılım Paper Products & Printing Industry”, About SEDCO. Available [online]: < <http://www.sedco.com/about/newsroom.html> > [02 August 2009], Dorian Jones, “Arab Petrodollars Move into Istanbul”, *Qantara.de*, 28 September 2006, *Birleşme ve Satın Alma İşlemleri 2006 Raporu*, (Istanbul: Ernst & Young, 2007), pp. 19-23, “Oger Telecom to Complete Payment for Türk Telekom Privatization with 4,31 billion US Dollars”, Press Release, 28 March 2007. Available [online]: < <http://www.ogertelecom.com/docs/OTL20070328.pdf> > [02 August 2009], “Türkiye Finans, Suudi NCB’ye Satıldı”, *Hürriyet*, 17 July 2007, Kadife Şahin, “Turkish Bank’in Yüzde 40’ı 160 Milyon Dolara NBK’nin”, *Milliyet*, 01 August 2007, “Savola Buys Turkey’s Yudum for \$ 53 Million”, *Arab News*, 25 November 2007, *Annual Turkish M&A Review*, (Istanbul: Deloitte, 2008), p.9, Cevahir, Property Summary. Available [online]: < <http://www.stmartinsproperty.com/property/property-portfolio/cevahir.aspx> > [02 August 2009], “Cevahir’in Tamamı Kuveytlilerin Oldu”, *Milliyet*, 07 March 2007, “Ülker’in Finansal Kiralama Şirketi 120 Milyon Dolara Kuveytlilerin”, *Zaman*, 19 December 2007, *Annual Turkish M&A Review*, (Istanbul: Deloitte, 2009), pp.7-10, Thomas Grove, “Saudi Firm to Invest \$ 3 Billion in Turkey Farms”, *Maktoob*, 10 July 2009, and “Sabancı Toyota’yı Resmen Devretti”, *Milliyet*, 01 October 2009.

¹⁰⁹¹ Bülent Aras, “Turkey and the GCC: An Emerging Relationship”, *Middle East Policy* 12, no. 4 (Winter 2005), p.96, “ENKA Wins \$ 1.9 Billion Oman Resort Deal”, *Reuters*, 08 January 2006, Robert Olson, “Relations among Turkey, Iraq, Kurdistan-Iraq, the Wider Middle East, and Iran”, *Mediterranean Quarterly* 17, no. 4 (Fall 2006), pp. 34-38, Rainer Hermann, “Turkey as Model for the Middle East?”, *Qantara.de*, 23 November 2006, “Tekfen, Katar’da 165 Milyon Dolarlık İş Aldı”, *Hürriyet*, 02 June 2009 and “Tekfen Holding, Abu Dabi’de 225 Milyon \$’lık Proje Yapacak”, *Sabah*, 12 June 2009.

The security perils and threats flowing from Iraq in the aftermath of the US-led invasion, the reluctance of the US administration to help Turkey in warding off the PKK terrorism and Israel's befriending of the separatist currents among the Kurds of the Iraqi state urged Turkey to estrange itself from Washington and Tel Aviv and to reach out to Tehran and Damascus that had similar reservations about the possible foundation of a Kurdish state in the north of Iraq. Moreover, the chafing of the close bonds with Israel gave Turkey's conservative-Islamic government a free hand in expressing its criticism and discontent about the Israeli treatment of the Palestinians in a prickly language that had not been used before. With the aim of bolstering up political and economic ties with the Arab and in a wide perspective Islamic world, Turkey in 2007, concluded a framework agreement with the Arab League to institutionalize relations and cooperation through the establishment of a Turkish-Arab Cooperation Forum, took on the leadership position in the OIC, and signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the GCC in 2008.¹⁰⁹²

Turkey is expected to follow similar policies with respect to the Middle East in the coming years as long as the security situation in Iraq which was detrimental to vital Turkish interests endured. Establishing close economic and commercial ties with the affluent Arab states will remain as a priority objective taking into account that the Turkish government will be in need of Arab petro-dollars in order to cushion the economic crisis whose effects in the Turkish economy is not totally eradicated.

Apart from the rivalry in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, there exist also other political matters about which Turkey and Russia have divergent points of view. While Turkey welcomed the independence decision of Kosovo, Russia was

¹⁰⁹² Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available [online]: < <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa> > [02 August 2009] and Lenore G. Martin, "Turkey and Gulf Cooperation Security", *Turkish Studies* 10, no.1 (March 2009), p.76.

bluntly opposed to it. Furthermore, despite the Turkish appeals, Russian state did not waive from standing by the Greek Cypriots on the Cyprus dispute. Although these bones of contention were not crucial or decisive in the conduct of the Turkish-Russian interaction; they, nevertheless, obviated the further strengthening of the relationship. The following sections will shed light on these matters of discrepancy between Turkey and Russia by analyzing their policies and positions with regard to Kosovo and Cyprus problems.

The Emergence of an Independent Kosovo State in the Balkans

Kosovo, which had been enjoying de-facto liberation from Belgrade's administrative and political authority since 1999, proclaimed its independence on 17 February 2008. Turkey recognized Kosovo on 18 February 2008, being one of the first countries around the world that accepted the young Balkan republic as a sovereign and independent country.¹⁰⁹³ Turkey's posture with regard to Kosovo matter evolved from a chary and self-effacing policy line that took into account the territorial integrity of the Serbian state to the one which Ankara put itself forward for the recognition of the nascent Kosovo state. The difficulty of re-integration of Albanians into the Serbian-dominated administrative, political and economic structures after nearly ten years of dissociation, the backing up of the independence cause by the US and many members of the EU and Turkey's desire to set up healthy political and

¹⁰⁹³ "Statement of H.E. Mr. Ali Babacan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Regarding the Recognition of Kosovo by Turkey", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 February 2008. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-of-h_e_-mr_-ali-babacan_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic--of-turkey_-regarding-the-recognition-of-kosovo.en.mfa > [12 August 2009].

economic relations with a country which it had shared a common history and culture elicited this alteration in Turkey's stance.

Turkey still participates to the KFOR with approximately 550 Turkish military personnel and contributes to the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX); a civilian EU initiative, whose aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the police, judiciary and customs areas, with thirty-seven police officers.¹⁰⁹⁴

The new Constitution of Kosovo fell behind the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia in terms of the language rights granted to the Turkish population. With the new constitution Turkish became the official language at the municipalities where Turkish people constituted the majority in contrast to the nationwide recognition of the language in its predecessor.¹⁰⁹⁵ The Turkish community was guaranteed two seats at the Kosovo Assembly and 23 April began to be celebrated as "National Holiday of Turks of Kosovo".

Turkey-Kosovo Business Council was established in June 2009 within DEİK to institutionalize and improve the commercial and economic relationship between the two states. Turkey ranks third after Macedonia and Serbia as being the supplier to the Kosovo market. There exist also Turkish investments in airport management, banking, insurance, food, construction, manufacturing, textile, and tourism sectors in the Kosovo economy.¹⁰⁹⁶

¹⁰⁹⁴ Turkey's Political Relations with Kosovo. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-kosovo.en.mfa > [12 August 2009].

¹⁰⁹⁵ Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. Available [online]: < <http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf> > [12 August 2009].

¹⁰⁹⁶ Didem Ekinci, "Turkey and Kosovo: A Chronicle of Post-Cold War Bilateral Relations", *Avrasya Dosyası* 14, no. 1 (2008), pp. 296-297, Mehmet Öztekin, "Krizde Cazip Yatırım Fırsatları", *Diünya*, 11 May 2009, Turkey's Economic and Commercial Relations with Kosovo. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-economic-and-commercial-relations-with-kosovo.en.mfa > [12 August 2009], Hasan Eriş, "Kosovo'da İlk İmtiyaz Türkler'e", *Cumhuriyet*, 14 August 2010, Beste

Different from Turkey, Russia adhered to its original position pertaining to the Kosovo question. Russia had historical, cultural and religious fraternity with the Serbian people, and there were significant Russian investments in Serbia in the fields of automotive, energy, manufacturing and tourism.¹⁰⁹⁷ More importantly, from Russia's purview the independence decision was a gross violation of the international law as well as a major threat to the international stability and world order due to the fact that it would set out a precedent to other separatist movements around the world including the ones within the borders of the Russian Federation and would have the potential to aggravate and even detonate the dormant flashpoints.¹⁰⁹⁸ However, the Russian argument of the sacrosanct of the territorial integrity of the Serbian state was weakened to a large extent with Russia's recognition of the independence of secessionist regions of Georgia; Abkhazia and South Ossetia, following the August 2008 war.

Russia, Turkey and the Cyprus Conundrum

Cultivating close political and economic ties with the Russian administration was not enough to supple the pro-Greek outlook of the Russian headship with respect to

Önkol, "Kosova'ya Havadan Girdi. Hedefte Otoyola İnmek Var.", *Milliyet*, 14 August 2010, and "Balkanlar'ın En Büyük Un Fabrikası Aksoy'dan", *Sabah*, 05 November 2010.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Fikret Ertan, "Rusya'nın Balkan Hamleleri", *Zaman*, 31 January 2008, Anar Somuncuoğlu, "Kuzey'den sonra Güney Akım da Somutlaşıyor: Gazprom Balkanlar'a Yöneliyor", *Strateji* 4, no. 188 (04 February 2008), p.16, Linda Popova, "Russian Foreign Policy toward the Balkans: A Situation Assessment", Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies, 13 May 2008. Available [online]: < <http://newrisks.files.wordpress.com/2008/05/russian-foreign-policy-toward-the-balkans.pdf>> [12 August 2009] and Yelena Vladimirovna Danilova, "Guide to Russian Investments in Serbia", Ministry for Economic Development of the Russian Federation, Press and Information Office, 18 December 2008. Available [online]: < http://www.economy.gov.ru/wps/wcm/myconnect/economylib/mert/welcome_eng/pressservice/events/chronicle/doc1229612064630> [12 August 2009].

¹⁰⁹⁸ "Statement by Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Kosovo", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department, 17 February 2008. Available [online]: <http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/041c5af46913d38ac32573f30027b380?OpenDocument> [12 August 2009].

Cyprus issue. Right after the referendum of 24 April 2004, which was held to reunite the island under the aegis of a UN-devised plan, and that was rejected by the Greek-Cypriot citizens with a high margin¹⁰⁹⁹, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, who was also one of the creators of the arrangement, prepared a report which called on the members of the Security Council to eliminate barriers and restrictions on the Turkish Cypriots in a demonstration of camaraderie with the Turkish residents of Cyprus for their clear respect and contribution to the efforts in the name of foundation of a bicomunal and bizonal federation on the Cyprus island.¹¹⁰⁰ Yet, the report was shelved owing to Russian veto on behalf of the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Historical bonds going back to the times of the Soviet Union, commercial ties plus the cultural and religious affiliation can explain the Russian behaviour regarding the Cyprus matter and it not expected to change course in the near future despite the strengthening of political and economic relations between Turkey and Russia.

Broadening and Deepening of Economic Relations

The expanding and thriving economic and commercial links between Turkey and the Russian Federation continued to be a determining and fundamental factor on the advancement of the political and diplomatic relations between the two countries. While Turkey's energy imports from Russia were the main engine of the bilateral

¹⁰⁹⁹ 64.91 percent of the Turkish Cypriot population voted in favour of the proposed settlement whereas 75.83 percent of Greek Cypriots was against it. See "Cyprus Issue", Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-issue-summary_en.mfa > [17 August 2009].

¹¹⁰⁰ "Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus", United Nations Security Council, No. 437, 28 May 2004. Available [online]: < <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/{65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9}/Cyprus%20S2004437.pdf> > [17 August 2009].

trade, construction and contracting services of Turkish corporations in Russia, reciprocal investments and Russian tourists' sticking up with Turkey as their primary route for summer peregrinations were other significant dynamics that innervated the association between the two parties.

The gatherings between the business people, bureaucrats and ministers of the two states eventuated on a regular basis. The Joint Economic Commission carried out six encounters; two in Moscow, two in Ankara one in Istanbul and one in Kazan whereas the representatives of the Turkish-Russian Business Council came together at seven joint meetings that were held in the cities of Istanbul, Antalya, Moscow and Ankara.

The following pages will explore the current status of Turkish-Russian collaboration in the areas of energy, trade, construction and contracting activities, investments, transportation and tourism.

Energy

As will be seen in Table 7, the quantity of natural gas that Turkey bought from the Russian Federation mounted up all over the years with going off of the Blue Stream line in 2003. In the year 2010, forty-six percent of Turkey's natural gas purchases were provided from Russia. Bearing in mind that reliance on a single supplier may leave the country in lurch especially in the winter season in the case of a possible fall out with Moscow; Ankara stepped up its exertion toward diversifying natural gas vendors, activating underground natural gas storages and giving green light to projects that will make use of the Caspian, Central Asian and Middle Eastern natural gas possessions.

Table 7: Natural Gas Transportation by Years (Million Contract Cum)¹¹⁰¹

Years	Russian Federation	Iran	Azerbaijan	Nigeria (LNG)	Algeria (LNG)
2003	12.460	3.461	-	1.107	3.795
2004	14.102	3.497	-	1.016	3.182
2005	17.524	4.248	-	1.012	3.814
2006	19.316	5.594	-	1.099	4.210
2007	22.753	6.054	1.257	1.395	4.204
2008	22.962	4.113	4.580	1.017	4.219
2009	17.207	5.252	4.959	903	4.487
2010	14.535	7.765	4.521	1.189	3.907

Works began for the augmentation of the capacity of the Iranian track but Iran's sporadic cutting off gas supplies in the middle of the winter on the basis of domestic consumption needs and technical problems stripped it off being a credible supplier.¹¹⁰² Natural gas procured from Azerbaijan, Algeria and Nigeria does not satisfy the local demand in full either. In order to meet a probable gas supply deficit,

¹¹⁰¹ Source: BOTAŞ 2010 Yılı Sektör Raporu, p.7. Available [online]: <http://www.enerji.gov.tr/yayinlar_raporlar/Sektor_Raporu_BOTAS_2010.pdf> [05 June 2011].

¹¹⁰² Ankara asked Moscow to redouble the gas coming from Blue Stream plenty of times because of Iran's stopping of the natural gas flow to Turkey. See Reha Aykul Muratoğlu, Türkiye ile Rusya Arasındaki Enerji Alanındaki Çok Boyutlu İlişkiler Paneli, Ankara, 28 January 2009. Available [online]: <<http://www.turksam.net/tr/a1601.html>> [22 August 2009], Leyla Tavşanoğlu's interview with Vladimir Ivanovskiy, the Ambassador of Russian Federation to Turkey, *Cumhuriyet*, 28 June 2009, and T.C. Moskova Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği, Aylık Raporlar, Ağustos 2010, p.7. Available [online]: <<http://www.musavirlikler.gov.tr/upload/RF/agustos%202010.DOC>> [06 October 2010].

underground storage facilities were established in Silivri and Değirmenköy and another one will be constructed in Tuz Gölü.¹¹⁰³

Turkey also supported the Nabucco Natural Gas Pipeline project which was cogitated to reduce the European dependence on Russian natural gas by exploiting the reserves in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and maybe in Iraq and Iran. The natural gas extracted from these source countries is planned to be transported via Turkey through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Austria. Although the intergovernmental agreement for the proposed project was signed in Ankara on 13 July 2009, none of the mentioned prospective suppliers affirmed their intention of involving in the project. This situation raised doubts about the practicability of the scheme.

Despite Turkey's buoying up of the Nabucco project, it became palpable that the country was not intended to put all its eggs in one basket when Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan disclosed, at the time of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's working trip to Turkey on 06 August 2009, that Ankara gave its consent to the construction of South Stream gas pipeline,¹¹⁰⁴ which was considered as a contestant mission to Nabucco, via Turkey's economic zone.¹¹⁰⁵ During Putin's sojourn, a gas protocol which would extend the earlier 1987 contract expiring in 2012 for twenty years was signed and the two heads of government declared that they decided to outstretch the Blue Stream to Cyprus, Israel, Lebanon and Syria.¹¹⁰⁶

¹¹⁰³ "Natural Gas Underground Storage Projects", BOTAS, International Projects. Available [online]: < <http://www.botas.gov.tr/index.asp> > [22 August 2009].

¹¹⁰⁴ The projected pipeline is envisaged to transport Russian natural gas to the Black Sea to Bulgaria and further to Italy and Austria.

¹¹⁰⁵ "Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his Turkish Counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Held a Joint News Conference on the Results of the Talks", International Visits, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, 06 August 2009. Available [online]: [Http://premier.gov.ru/eng/visits/world/123/3400.html](http://premier.gov.ru/eng/visits/world/123/3400.html) > [22 August 2009].

¹¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

In addition to being Turkey's chief natural gas provider, in the last years Russia also ranked first in Turkey's oil imports. According to the figures of the EPDK, Russia supplied fifty percent of Turkey's oil requirement in 2010.¹¹⁰⁷ In the course of Putin's August 06 journey, the two sides signed an intergovernmental protocol on cooperation in the oil industry and the Russian party pledged to take part in the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline project.

Russia has commenced to export electricity to Turkey through the subsidiary of Inter RAO UES, TGR Enerji, starting from August 2010. Total electricity supply comes to twelve million kilowatt hours a month with a maximum capacity of up to thirty megawatts. In order to optimize supplies during the spring and summer period, the company will deliver electricity from Georgia and during the autumn-winter period - via transit from Russia. Electricity from Russia will be supplied through Georgian territory via the Batumi-Khopa line.¹¹⁰⁸

Turkey and Russia also put signature on intergovernmental protocol on cooperation in the nuclear power industry and intergovernmental agreements on cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and on prompt notice about a nuclear accident as well as on exchange of information about nuclear plants at the time of Putin's visit to Turkey. The consortium between Russian state-owned enterprise Atomstroyexport-Inter RAO and the Park Teknik, subsidiary of the Ciner Group, was the sole bidder in the tender which took place on 24 September 2008 for the first nuclear plant that would be built in Turkey. The proposal was declined on 20

¹¹⁰⁷ 2010 EPDK Petrol Piyasası Sektör Raporu, p.50. Available [online]: <<http://www.epdk.gov.tr/documents/10157/8144ba40-42cc-42ef-8a0a-920a7b67249b>> [30 May 2011].

¹¹⁰⁸ T.C. Moskova Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği, Aylık Raporlar, Ağustos 2010, p.6. Available [online]: <<http://www.musavirlikler.gov.tr/upload/RF/agustos%202010.DOC>> [06 October 2010], "Inter RAO Subsidiary Starts Supplying Power to Turkey from Georgia, Transit from Russia to Start in Autumn", *Interfax*, 02 August 2010 and "Rusya'dan Elektrik Alıyoruz", *Haberturk*, 03 August 2010.

November 2009.¹¹⁰⁹ With the intergovernmental agreement signed on 12 May 2010, at the time of Russian President Medvedev’s visit to Turkey, Russia obtained the right to construct and operate a nuclear power plant at the Akkuyu site in Mersin via the establishment of a subsidiary whose total shares would be owned by Russian Rosatom. Turkey will purchase electricity that will be generated in the nuclear unit for fifteen years and it will also be granted twenty percent of the profit that will be earned from the plant.¹¹¹⁰

Bilateral Trade

The bilateral trade capacity between Turkey and the Russian Federation followed an elevating trend between the years 2003 and 2008 as demonstrated in Table 8. It touched thirty-eight billion dollars in 2008, making Russia Turkey’s number one trading partner, while Turkey ranked fifth on the list of Russia’s commercial partners. As a result of the contraction of the economies of both states’ due to the global economic crisis that erupted in fall 2008, the trade volume between Ankara and Moscow registered a sixty-seven percent decrease in the year 2009 compared to 2008 figures. In order to increase the Turkish exports to Russia and to facilitate the collection of the unpaid debts owed to Turkish businessmen in the country, the Turkish Council of Ministers passed a regulation in March 2009 which made possible to carry on commerce with ruble.¹¹¹¹ However, trade in national currencies

¹¹⁰⁹ “Nükleer Santral İhalesi İptal Edildi”, *Milliyet*, 20 November 2009 and “Nükleer İhalesi İptal Edildi”, *Cumhuriyet*, 21 November 2009.

¹¹¹⁰ “Nükleer Şirketi Yüzde 100 Rus”, *Haberturk*, 13 May 2010 and Murat Kışlalı, “Rusya’ya Ödün Kar Payı İçin”, *Cumhuriyet*, 20 June 2010.

¹¹¹¹ See “Türk Parası Kıymetini Koruma Hakkında 32 Sayılı Kararda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Karar’ın Yürürlüğe Konulması”, *Resmî Gazete*, no. 27165 (10 March 2009). Available [online]: < <http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/#>> [23 August 2009].

have not become prevalent up to now as a bank that will designate rate of exchange on a daily base in a swift manner has not come out yet.¹¹¹² The trade volume registered sixteen percent increase in 2010 and reached to twenty-six billion dollars, the upward trend continued in 2011 and the bilateral trade between the two countries came at nearly thirty billion dollars. Russia occupies the first place in Turkey's imports whereas it is at the seventh rank in terms of Turkey's exports. Turkey is Russia's sixth biggest export partner and it is lined up at the thirteenth place in Russia's imports.¹¹¹³

Table 8: Turkey-Russia Foreign Trade (million \$)¹¹¹⁴

Years	Turkish Exports	Turkish Imports	Trade Balance	Trade Volume
2003	1367.6	5451.3	-4083.7	6818.9
2004	1859.2	9033.1	-7173.9	10892.3
2005	2377.1	12905.6	-10528.5	15282.7
2006	3237.6	17806.2	-14568.6	21043.8
2007	4726.9	23508.5	-18781.6	28235.4
2008	6483	31364.5	-24881.5	37847.5
2009	3202.3	19447.9	-16245.6	22650.2
2010	4632.3	21592.2	-16959.9	26224.5
2011	5995.2	23951.5	-17956.3	29946.7

¹¹¹² Correspondence with Murat Nesimoğlu, Moscow Embassy of the Republic of Turkey Office of the Commercial Counsellor, 08 October 2010.

¹¹¹³ T.C. Moskova Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği, Aylık Raporlar, Ocak 2012, p.3. Available [online]: < <http://www.musavirlikler.gov.tr/upload/RF/ocak%202012.DOC> > [03 March 2012] and En Çok İhracat ve İthalat Yapılan 20 Ülke, 2011. Available [online]: < http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=8429&tb_id=6 > [03 March 2012].

¹¹¹⁴ Source: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret Verileri. Available [online]: < http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4 > [03 March 2012].

As seen in Table 5 and Table 6 of Appendix B, the composition of the Turkish-Russian bilateral trade did not demonstrate much variety over the years. Turkey kept on selling out motorized vehicles, fruits, electrical machines and textile products to Russia and purchasing energy and industrial products in return. The trade balance between the two states swelled in escalating proportions to the disadvantage of Turkey.

Turkey, from time to time, ran into logjams in its commerce with Russia. In May 2005, Russia suspended the importation of flowers, fruits, vegetables and poultry products from Turkey on the grounds that they did not meet the health standards of the Russian Federal Veterinary and Phyto-sanitary Control Service.¹¹¹⁵ The ban remained in effect for four months and Turkish producers lost nearly three hundred million dollars.¹¹¹⁶

A similar ban on some Turkish fruits and vegetables (tomato, aubergine, potato, grape and lemon) was put into force in June 2008 by Russian authorities after the discovery of high levels of chemical fertilizer and pesticides in these agricultural products.¹¹¹⁷ The two countries signed a memorandum in April 2009 to reach a final solution in the dispute. According to the agreement, in the case of non-compliance of Turkish agricultural products to Russian sanitary standards; instead of an embargo on

¹¹¹⁵ Elif Ünal Arslan, "Russian Ambassador Says Cooperation Intact Despite Fruit Fly Trouble", *Turkish Daily News*, 10 June 2005.

¹¹¹⁶ Faruk Akkan, "Putin Erdoğan'ı Rusya'ya Davet Etti", *Cihan*, 05 June 2008 and Tuğba Tekerek and Serkan Arman, "Ucuz Gübre ve Çin İlacı Domatesi Yaktı", *Milliyet*, 12 June 2008.

¹¹¹⁷ "Domates Krizi Büyüyor", *Zaman*, 09 June 2008 and John C. K. Daly, "Does Turkish-Russian Agricultural Dispute Have Underlying Causes?", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no.111 (11 June 2008). The Russian ban on Turkish agricultural products was also attributed to the lobbying activities of the big global firms that provided fruits and vegetables to Russian market in large amounts. Correspondence with representatives from TUSKON Moscow office, 12 January 2009.

whole Turkish exporters, the Russian state would sanction only the company that had committed the misdeed.¹¹¹⁸

Russia's full inspection of Turkey-originated goods except fruits and vegetables at customs stations starting from 16 July 2008 became a major grievance in commercial relations. The strict customs regulations and increase in customs duties set forth by the Russian state for the protection and promotion of domestic production caused Turkish firms to suffer financial losses and fall behind in their competition with other exporters to Russian market.¹¹¹⁹ A protocol was hammered out on 18 September 2008 between the Turkish Undersecretariat of Customs and the Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation for the simplification of the customs procedures. According to the document, the firms that gave explicit information about invoice value, tariffs and chattel papers would receive preferential treatment at the Russian customs gates.¹¹²⁰ Despite the signing of the protocol, problems endured. Russian authorities annulled the regulation requiring the full inspection of Turkish goods at customs check points on 17 August 2009, with the endorsement of a memorandum on customs procedures between the Russian and Turkish customs agencies at the time of Putin's 06 August 2009, visit to Turkey.¹¹²¹

The suitcase trade between Turkey and Russia is still an important element in Turkey's exports to this country. As displayed in Table 9, the figures exceeded six

¹¹¹⁸ "Rusya ile Ticarete Sadece Kusurlu Firma Ceza Alacak", *Dünya*, 29 April 2009 and "Eker: Rusya Artık Firmayı Cezalandırarak", *Milliyet*, 29 April 2009.

¹¹¹⁹ Adem Kula, Assistant Coordinator, Turkish-Eurasian Business Council, interview by author, DEIK, Istanbul, Turkey, 20 January 2009.

¹¹²⁰ "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Gümrük Müsteşarlığı ile Rusya Federasyonu Federal Gümrük Servisi Arasında Gümrük İşlemlerinin Basitleştirilmesine İlişkin Protokol'un Onaylanması", *Resmi Gazete*, no. 27052 (12 November 2008). Available [online]: < <http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/#>> [23 August 2009].

¹¹²¹ Rusya-Türkiye Gümrük Sorunları ve Basitleştirilmiş Gümrük Hattı (BGH), T.C. Başbakanlık Gümrük Müsteşarlığı, 20 August 2009. Available [online]: < <http://www.gumruk.gov.tr/tr-TR/abdisiliskiler/Sayfalar/RusyaBGH.aspx> > [23 August 2009] and Murat Nesimoğlu, telephone interview by author, Moscow Embassy of the Republic of Turkey Office of the Commercial Counsellor, 11 October 2010.

billion dollars in 2008. However, the financial crisis in Russia and the Russian government's ensuing measures¹¹²² to empower local SMEs and boost domestic production undercut suitcase commerce in 2009 and it did not demonstrate striking upturn in 2010 and 2011 either.

Table 9: Turkey-Russian Federation Suitcase Trade (million \$)¹¹²³

Years	Income
2003	3953
2004	3880
2005	3473
2006	6408
2007	6002
2008	6200
2009	4783
2010	4951
2011	4424

Construction and Contracting Services

Between the years 2003-2011, Turkish construction companies completed 530 projects in Russian Federation that were worth 20.835 billion dollars.¹¹²⁴ Russia ranked first with eighteen percent share in terms of the total number of projects

¹¹²² The Russian anti-smuggling authorities closed the Cherkizovsky market in Moscow on 28 June 2009 and confiscated the products sold there for further investigation. The traders were accused of breaching consumer safety and sanitation codes as well as immigration rules. Along with Turkish traders the Cherkizovsky market was hosting merchants from many countries including Azerbaijan, China, India, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and Vietnam. It was alleged that the market raid was carried out to punish the owner, Telman Ismailov, for his preference of selection of Antalya for his luxury hotel investment instead of the Russian vacation resort Sochi. See "Rusya, Telman'a Vurdu 2 Milyar Dolarlık Türk Malı Çerkez Pazarı'nda Kaldı", *Hürriyet*, 26 July 2009, Şaban Kardaş, "Moscow Market Crackdown Strains Turkish-Russian Trade Relations", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 6, no. 144 (28 July 2009), and Mehmet Erdoğan Elgin, "Rusya Son Bavulları da Topladı", *BusinessWeek Türkiye*, no. 27, 02 August 2009, pp. 25-27.

¹¹²³ Source: Türkiye Merkez Bankası Ödemeler Dengesi İstatistikleri. Available [online]: < <http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/odemedenge/odemelerdengesi.xls> > [03 March 2012].

¹¹²⁴ Rusya Dış Ticaretine ve Türkiye-Rusya İkili İlişkilerine Yönelik Güncel İstatistikler. Available [online]: < <http://www.musavirlikler.gov.tr/altdetay.cfm?AltAlanID=125&dil=TR&ulke=RF> > [03 March 2012].

finished by Turkish firms abroad. The economic crisis of fall 2008 took a heavy toll on the activities of the Turkish contractors in Russia and in 2009 only twenty-one projects which valued 1.809 billion dollars were realized in the country.¹¹²⁵ In parallel with the contraction in the industry, Turkish workers started to return back to Turkey; the number of Turkish construction workforce in Russia fell below ten thousand.¹¹²⁶

Turkish companies run into problems while shipping construction machines into Russia, letter of guarantee issue persists as well. Furthermore, the quotas for Turkish workers in Russian Federation are kept low. Due to the absence of social security agreement between Russia and Turkey, Turkish construction firms have to pay social security premiums for Turkish workers both in Russia and Turkey.¹¹²⁷

Similar to previous periods, Turkish construction corporations in Russia were active in the renovation, restoration and construction of public/government buildings, shopping centers, business and trade complexes, hotels, guest-houses, industrial units, residential structures, art, entertainment, sport centers, educational facilities and sanatoriums.¹¹²⁸

Akin to preceding terms, Russian construction firms in Turkey were engaged in the realization of infrastructure projects. Russian Technostroyexport and Turkish Tekser cooperated in the electrification of Turkish railways in addition to the building of bridges and dams.¹¹²⁹ Russian Transstroy and Turkish Hazinesaröđlu and

¹¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹¹²⁶ Leyla İlhan, “Müteahhitlerin Rusya’daki İşlerinde %50 Gerileme Var”, *Dünya*, 11 August 2009.

¹¹²⁷ “Doğalgaz Karşılığı İnşaat Rusya ile 5 Milyar Dolar Ticaret Hacmi Yaratır”, *Dünya*, 16 March 2011.

¹¹²⁸ Check Appendix C for the list of construction and contracting works carried out by Turkish firms in Russian Federation in this period.

¹¹²⁹ Oleg A. Kolobov, Aleksandr A. Kornilov, Fatih Özbay, *Çağdaş Türk-Rus İlişkileri: Sorunlar ve İşbirliği Alanları 1992-2005*, (Istanbul: Tasam Yayınları, 2006), p.51.

Üniver Consortium constructed the 2.2 km. long light rapid transit system in Eminönü-Kabataş and 16.3 km. long light transit system in Sultançiftliği-Edirnekapi-Vezneciler regions of Istanbul including all electro-mechanical works.¹¹³⁰ Moreover, Russian companies were involved in upgrading of the İskenderun metal hardware plant, provided engineering services for the gas storage facility installations and erected an aqueduct within the context of Istanbul Melen project.¹¹³¹

Mutual Investments

By the end of 2010, Turkish investments in Russian Federation have reached seven billion dollars¹¹³², centering on banking, consumer durables, FMCG, retail, media, manufacturing, transportation and recreation industries. According to the data from the Office of the Commercial Counsellor of Turkish Embassy in Moscow there exist nearly one thousand Turkish companies in Russia. Real number is estimated to be much higher, more than two thousand.¹¹³³ In recent years Turkish companies have started to shift their attention from Moscow and St. Petersburg to smaller cities and provinces such as Ivanovo, Tver and Vladimir where they took the advantage of

¹¹³⁰ Hazinedaroğlu Group, Turkey. Available [online]: < <http://www.hazinedaroglu-group.com/CountryDetail.aspx?CID=6> > [21 September 2009] and Üniver Construction, Light Rail System Projects. Available [online]: <http://www.unuvarinsaat.com.tr/web/eng/raylisistem.aspx?SecilenProjeNo=25> > [21 September 2009].

¹¹³¹ Cihangir Gürkan Şen, “Türk-Rus Ekonomik İlişkileri: Mevcut Durum, Sorunlar ve Perspektifler”, *Stradigma* 7 (August 2003), p. 5.

¹¹³² Rusya Federasyonu’nun Genel Ekonomik Durumu ve Türkiye ile Ekonomik-Ticari İlişkileri, T.C.Moskova Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği, July 2011, p.96. Available [online]: <http://www.musavirlikler.gov.tr/upload/RF/RUSYA%20rapor%202010-2011.doc#_Toc240530796> [11 September 2011].

¹¹³³ “İşadamlarımız için Pratik Bilgiler-Öneriler-1”. T.C.Moskova Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği, 19 October 2011. Available [online]: < <http://www.musavirlikler.gov.tr/haberdetay.cfm?HaberID=12867&ulke=RF&dil=TR> > [03 March 2012].

cheaper raw materials, less costly employee force and incentives from the Russian state.¹¹³⁴

Anadolu Efes acquired the Krasny Vostok Beer Group in January 2006 that was based in Kazan and had a market share of three percent. Currently, the company has 20.2 million hectoliters of brewing capacity in five breweries which are located in Moscow, Rostov, Ufa, Kazan, Novosibirsk, and has 139,000 tones of malt production capacity.¹¹³⁵ In May 2008 the parent company of Anadolu Efes, Anadolu Endüstri Holding, decided to invest in a different sector in Russia and the Chairman of the Holding, Tuncay Özilhan, expounded that they would set up a health center in Moscow.¹¹³⁶

With fifty-one percent Turkish capital, ProCommerce Bank was founded in Moscow in mid-2006 by a group of Turkish and Russian investors and the Bank commenced its activities on 06 July 2006. It provides commercial banking services and credits to SMEs and private individuals doing business in Russia.¹¹³⁷

The Koç Group's first facility built overseas, the Beko refrigerator and washing machine plant in Kirzhach, Vladimir, started production in October 2006. The plant celebrated its one millionth product in November 2008, and it was dubbed

¹¹³⁴ *Turkish Business in the BSEC Region: Direct Investments, Contracting Services, Prospects for Cooperation*, (Istanbul: DEİK, February 2005), p.14 and Burcu Tuvay, "Rusya'da Gerçek Fırsatlar Moskova Dışında", *KOBİ Girişim*, (July 2008), pp. 16-17.

¹¹³⁵ Russia Beer Operations, Efes Beverage Group. Available [online]: < http://www.efesbev.com/our_group/russian_federation.aspx > [21 September 2009].

¹¹³⁶ "Anadolu, Sağlıkta da Rusya'ya Gidiyor", *Milliyet*, 24 May 2008 and "Moskova'ya Hastane", *Cumhuriyet*, 25 May 2008.

¹¹³⁷ ProCommerce Bank, About Us. Available [online]: < <http://procommercebank.ru/eng/about> > [23 October 2010] and Correspondence with Artemis Sümer, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 October 2010.

the “Company of the Year” in Russia and received the award for “the company with highest quality products.”¹¹³⁸

The Zorlu Group was another Turkish conglomerate that materialized significant investments in the Russian Federation. Zorlu entered the Russian market with the foundation of Vestel CIS in November 2003 in Alexandrov as the first foreign company to manufacture TV sets in the country. A fire that broke out on 14 November 2005 completely destroyed the television plant. Vestel CIS carried on its activities in Russia with the washing machine and refrigerator factories which came on stream in 2006.¹¹³⁹ In May 2010, the Company inaugurated its LCD TV production unit¹¹⁴⁰. Zorlu Energy, another subsidiary of the Group, has been constructing the Tereshkovo and Kojukhovo electric power plants in Moscow.¹¹⁴¹

Paşabahçe, the glassware subsidiary of Şişecam, made its first foreign investment in 2003 and took over one hundred percent shares of the Posuda manufacturing glassware in Nizhny Novgorod from Bor Glassworks. In 2004, Şişecam purchased the Pokrovsky Plant located near St. Petersburg which was specialized in glass packaging business and Anadolu Cam became a partner of the Balkum Sand Plant in Balahna. Anadolu Cam glass-packaging investment in Ufa was completed in 2005 and in the same year the first foreign prestige shop of Paşabahçe was opened in Moscow.¹¹⁴² Şişecam also commenced glass packaging

¹¹³⁸ Arçelik, Plants. Available [online]: < <http://www.arcelikas.com.tr/Cultures/en-US/Kurumsal/Isletmeler/?MENUID=1> > [21 September 2009] and “Beko’dan Rusya’da 1 Milyonuncu Ürün Gururu”, *Dünya*, 27 November 2008.

¹¹³⁹ Vestel Group of Companies, Vestel CIS Ltd. Available [online]: < http://www.zorlu.com.tr/EN/GRUP/ves_cis.asp > [21 September 2009].

¹¹⁴⁰ “Vestel Rusya’da LCD Televizyon Fabrikası Açtı”, *Sabah*, 28 May 2010 and Cenk Başlamış, “Rusya’ya 15 Milyon Dolarlık Vestel Yatırımı”, *Milliyet*, 29 May 2010.

¹¹⁴¹ Zorlu Energy Group, Investments Abroad. Available [online]: < <http://www.zoren.com.tr/EN/ACTIVITY/default.asp> > [21 September 2009].

¹¹⁴² Şişecam, History. Available [online]: < <http://www.sisecam.com/history/chronology.html> > [21 September 2009].

investments in Kirishi, Kuban, Novosibirsk and St. Petersburg in the years 2007 and 2008.¹¹⁴³

Ütüsan and its German partner Zass founded a factory in Tatarstan in 2003 under the name of Zass Alabuga which fabricated wide range of products including irons, heating systems, grills, barbecues, ventilators and electrical kitchen products.¹¹⁴⁴ Ansan in 2004 opened a factory in Tatarstan for bathroom accessories production and Nurol Holding purchased the famous Russian shoe brand Rockland with its production plant in Serpuhov.¹¹⁴⁵ In 2005, Adopen installed a PVC profil, door and window production facility in Moscow¹¹⁴⁶, Burgazlı Tekstil introduced shops in Tatarstan and Merinos activated a carpet manufacturing unit in Rostov.¹¹⁴⁷ DenKateks purchased a textile plant in Ivanova in 2009 that dated from the Czarist Empire but closed down after the end of the Soviet Union and reopened it as a home textile factory.¹¹⁴⁸

In 2007, Hürriyet purchased 67.3 percent shares of the TraderMedia East Corporation, which provided print and online classified advertising services in the Russian Federation, Commonwealth of Independent States, Baltics, Balkans and Eastern European region.¹¹⁴⁹ Same year, Rixos Group opened a spa in Moscow.

¹¹⁴³ *Rusya İş Yapma Rehberi*, (Istanbul: DEİK, 2008), p. 65.

¹¹⁴⁴ *Turkish Business in the BSEC Region: Direct Investments, Contracting Services, Prospects for Cooperation*, (Istanbul: DEİK, February 2005), p.16.

¹¹⁴⁵ Oya Yalman, “Satın Alma Sırası Türk Şirketlerde”, *Platin*, November 2005.

¹¹⁴⁶ *Rusya Ülke Bülteni*, (Istanbul: DEİK, 2008), p.39.

¹¹⁴⁷ *Rusya İş Yapma Rehberi*, (Istanbul: DEİK, 2008), p.65.

¹¹⁴⁸ “İvanova’nın Antalya’sı Çarların Tekstil Fabrikasını Canlandırdı”, *Haberrus*, 22 October 2011.

¹¹⁴⁹ Trader Media East, Introducing Our Company. Available [online]: < http://www.tmeast.com/tme/index.jsp?place=Menu02&news_cat_id=109&layout=1 > [22 September 2009].

In December 2008, Eczacıbaşı Building Products Group laid the foundation for the establishment of a ceramic production and vitrification plant in Serpuhov¹¹⁵⁰ and in September 2010, the company declared that it would open a second factory which would specialize in ceramic health devices.¹¹⁵¹ In May 2009, Kalekim, the prominent construction chemical producer of Turkey, inaugurated a ceramic pasting and isolation mortar production unit in Serpuhov.¹¹⁵² In September 2010, Turkey's air carrier Atlasjet and the government of Russia's Omsk region declared that they would set up a joint company to set up a regional airline and construct an international airport in Omsk.¹¹⁵³ In October 2010, DYO, one of Turkey's leading dye companies, and whose products has been on the Russian market for twelve years through dealers started production in its facility in Krasnodar.¹¹⁵⁴ Again, in October 2010, Turkey's biggest private Bank, Türkiye İş Bankası, acquired one hundred interest of Russian Bank Sofia with the objective of serving Turkish firms which were operating in Russia and were clients of Türkiye İş Bankası.¹¹⁵⁵

Turkey's Boydak Holding, a conglomerate which mainly operates in furniture, textile, chemistry, marketing, iron-steel, logistics, energy sectors, declared in March 2011 its buying off of two furniture factories in Russia and Ukraine from the Polish Forte at twenty million dollars.¹¹⁵⁶

¹¹⁵⁰ "Eczacıbaşı'ndan Rusya'ya Yatırım", *Habertürk Ekonomi*, 05 December 2008.

¹¹⁵¹ "Eczacıbaşı, Rusya'da İkinci Fabrikanın Temelini Attı", *Hürriyet*, 24 September 2010.

¹¹⁵² "Kalekim Bölgesel Liderliği Hedefliyor", *Milliyet*, 05 March 2009.

¹¹⁵³ "Russia's Omsk Region and Turkey's AtlasJet to Set Up Airline in Siberia", *RIA Novosti*, 15 September 2010 and "110 Milyon Dolara Rusya'da Şirket Kuruyor", *Hürriyet*, 17 September 2010.

¹¹⁵⁴ "Turkish Dye Company Starts Production in Russia", *AA*, 21 October 2010 and "DYO Rusya'da Üretime Başladı", *Hürriyet*, 21 October 2010.

¹¹⁵⁵ "Turkish Lender Isbank Looking to Announce Acquisition of Bank Sofia in Days to Come", *Kommersant*, 25 October 2010 and "İş Bankası Ruslar'la El Sıkıştı, Bank Sofia'yı 40 Milyon Dolara Alacak", *Hürriyet*, 26 October 2010.

¹¹⁵⁶ "Boydak Ukrayna ve Rusya'da İki Mobilya Fabrikası Satın Aldı", *Milliyet*, 14 March 2011.

Russian investments in Turkey exhibited a conspicuous surge in recent years. According to the latest data, the value of Russian businesses in Turkey exceeded seven billion dollars in 2010.¹¹⁵⁷ Russian capital flew Turkey in the form of acquisitions and through partnerships with local Turkish companies in the fields of energy, telecommunications, manufacturing, logistics, media, and tourism.

Gazprom emanated as a player in Turkish gas market after the firm took hold of a forty percent stake in Bosphorus Gaz Corporation via its German subsidiary Zarubezhgaz Management und Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH (ZMB) and its export arm Gazexport in 2004.¹¹⁵⁸ Gazprom currently possesses seventy percent of the shares of Bosphorus Gaz Corporation and the company was granted to sell and distribute 750 million m3 of the imported Russian gas, which accounted for two percent of the natural gas sent to Turkey from Russian Federation, with a natural gas import transfer agreement signed with BOTAŞ in December 2008.¹¹⁵⁹

Lukoil signed an agreement with Akpet, petroleum and petroleum products distributor that had 693 gas filling stations and a market share of five percent, in July 2008 to gain one hundred percent interests of the company.¹¹⁶⁰ Akpet which belonged to Aytemiz Group was Turkey's sixth largest fuel oil distribution firm as

¹¹⁵⁷ Rusya Federasyonu'nun Genel Ekonomik Durumu ve Türkiye ile Ekonomik-Ticari İlişkileri, T.C.Moskova Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği, July 2011, p.96. Available [online]: <http://www.musavirlikler.gov.tr/upload/RF/RUSYA%20rapor%202010-2011.doc#_Toc240530796> [11 September 2011].

¹¹⁵⁸ Bosphorus Gaz Corporation, Energy and Gas Report, 2006. Available [online]: <http://www.bosphorusgaz.com/fileadmin/bosphorusgaz/documents/gas_report_nocontents.pdf> [22 September 2009].

¹¹⁵⁹ "Bosphorus Gaz, Botaş ve Gazprom ile El Sıkıştı", *Hürriyet*, 21 December 2008 and "Bosphorus Gaz İthalı için İmzayı Attı", *Milliyet*, 21 December 2008.

¹¹⁶⁰ "Lukoil Acquires Large Retail Assets in Turkey", Press Release, Lukoil Oil Company, 28 July 2008. Available [online]: <http://www.lukoil.com/press.asp?div_id=1&id=2907> [22 September 2009].

well as the second biggest enterprise in terms of the number of stations and the third largest oil storage corporation.¹¹⁶¹

Turkish conglomerate Çalık Holding and the Russian national oil company Rosneft signed an agreement on 15 December 2010 to start a joint company with the aim of trading in oil in the Mediterranean and the Turkish markets.¹¹⁶²

In November 2005, Altimo, an affiliate of Alfa Group Consortium; a large financial-industrial conglomerate in Russian Federation finalized a series of transactions totalling 3.3 billion dollars with Çukurova Group, resulting in Alfa's acquisition of a beneficial interest of 13.2 percent of Turkcell.¹¹⁶³ In March 2009, Altimo's shares in Turkcell reduced to 4.99 percent after the company sold 62.2 percent of its stake to Kazakhstan based Visor Group subsidiary Nadash International Holdings and Russian entrepreneur Alexander Mamut's Henri Services Limited.¹¹⁶⁴

In May 2007, Russian Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works (MMK) and the Turkish Atakaş signed an agreement to jointly build a new steel plant in Turkey. The new plant will occupy two sites, with the main production facilities to be located in İskenderun, and a second site near in Gebze. It is planned to produce about 2.4 million tons of flat products from steel scrap and metallised raw materials.¹¹⁶⁵ In

¹¹⁶¹ John. C. K. Daly, "Lukoil and Turkey", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 150 (06 August 2008) and Sema Tokat, "Lukoil, Akpet için 250 Milyon Dolar Ödedi", *Habertürk*, 24 November 2008.

¹¹⁶² "Massive Cooperation between Çalık Holding and Rosneft", News, Çalık Holding, 16 December 2010. Available [online]: < http://www.calik.com/news_item.aspx?id=77 > [13 January 2011].

¹¹⁶³ "Alfa Telecom Finalises Turkcell Deal", Press Releases, 28 November 2005. Available [online]: < <http://www.altimo.org/?id=71&key=Turkcell> > [22 September 2009].

¹¹⁶⁴ "Alfa Reduces Stake in Turkcell to 4.99%", Press Releases, 18 March 2009. Available [online]: < <http://www.altimo.org/?id=211&key=Turkcell> > [22 September 2009].

¹¹⁶⁵ "MMK is Making Headway with its Turkey Project", News, 17 March 2008. Available [online]: < <http://www.mmk.ru/eng/press/news/article.wbp?article-id=E4ADA29B-AC10-1016-01B1-FBF4553F4236> > [22 September 2009], Ahmet Destici, "İskenderun'da Dev Yatırım", *Milliyet*, 16 March 2008, "Türk-Rus Yatırımı 2 Bin Kişiye İstihdam Sağlayacak", *Cumhuriyet*, 22 February 2009, and "Hatay'da Dev Demir Çelik Yatırımı", *Hürriyet*, 19 February 2010. In March 2011, MMK signed an agreement with the Atakaş family to purchase the shares under its control. See "OJSC Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works (MMK) Announces Signing of Share Purchase Agreement with View to Consolidate 100% shares of MMK Atakaş Metalürji Sanayi Ticaret ve Liman İşletmeciliği

2009, Turkish Kuzu Airlines Cargo was sold to Russian Universal Systems Logistics.¹¹⁶⁶

In September 2007, Segezha Packaging, world's second largest industrial paper sack manufacturing company that belonged to Russian ILP Group, publicized that it had acquired the cement sack operations of Işıklar Ambalaj, with two sack plants which were located in Elazığ and İzmir.¹¹⁶⁷

In July 2010 Mechel, one of the leading Russian mining and steel companies, purchased one hundred percent shares of the Turkish steel company Ramateks which was specialized in distribution of carbon, alloy and stainless steel for three million dollars.¹¹⁶⁸

In 2007, Russian International Marketing and Sales Group (IMSG) acquired Turkish online marketing and advertising services agency Zap Medya and seized seventy percent of the shares of MAPP Merchandising Group, a sales and marketing agency with a focus on trade marketing and sales support.¹¹⁶⁹ In 2008, Elektrik, Turkish marketing communication services company came under IMSG's umbrella of event businesses.¹¹⁷⁰

Anonim Şirketi", News. Available [online]: < http://eng.mmk.ru/press_center/49267/> [13 March 2011].

¹¹⁶⁶ "Kuzu Kargo Havayolları Tarihe Karışıyor", *Ulaşım Online*, 07 July 2009. Available [online]: < <http://www.ulasimonline.com/HAVA-YOLLARI/8177/Kuzu-Kargo-Havayolları-tarihe-karisiyor.html>> [22 September 2009].

¹¹⁶⁷ "Segezha Packaging Acquires Assets in Turkey", News/Info, 24 September 2007. Available [online]: < <http://www.segezha-packaging.com/page139.aspx?newsid139=12>> [13 September 2009] and Elif Batu Yener, "Çimento Ambalajından Çekilen Işıklar, Hayvan Besleyecek", *Referans*, 12 September 2007.

¹¹⁶⁸ "Mechel Acquires Turkish Steel Trading Company Ramateks", *Steel Guru*, 08 July 2010 and İrfan Donat, "Rus Mechel, Ramateks'i 3 Milyon Dolara Satın Aldı", *Sabah*, 12 July 2010.

¹¹⁶⁹ "Audited Results for the Year Ended 31 December 2007", International News, 16 June 2008. Available [online]: < http://www.imsmsg.co.uk/news_detail.php?cat=1&news_id=20> [22 September 2009].

¹¹⁷⁰ "Unaudited Results for the Year Ended 31 December 2008", International News, 30 June 2009. Available [online]: < http://www.imsmsg.co.uk/news_detail.php?cat=2&news_id=44> [22 September 2009].

In August 2007, Russian Mirax Group purchased the Sungate Port Royal Hotel in Kemer, Antalya from Cengiz Group.¹¹⁷¹ The hotel investment of Russian KAF Hotel International, Crown Plaza, came into service in Konyaaltı, Antalya in April 2009.¹¹⁷² AST Group's biggest tourism investment in Turkey, Mardan Palace Hotel, was opened in Kundu, Antalya in May 2009.¹¹⁷³

Tourism

Russian tourists continued to visit Turkey in growing numbers for their vacations throughout the years. In 2008, as seen from the Table 10, more than 2.8 million Russian vacationers came to Turkey, mostly to sunspots in southern cities but also to Istanbul and Black Sea; hence placing Russia to the second rank after Germany in terms of the total tourists travelled to Turkey.¹¹⁷⁴ The upending economic crisis of fall 2008 which put Russian economy in morass did not halt nearly 2.7 million Russians from touring Turkey in 2009; the number surpassed three million tourists in 2010 and it nearly reached to 3.5 million in 2011.

¹¹⁷¹ "Mirax Group to Create First-Rate Hotel Network in Europe," 16 August 2007. Available [online]: < <http://eng.mirax.ru/tabid/73/EntryID/3564/Default.aspx> > [22 September 2009] and also see Türker Çelik, "Kuzeyden Esen Yatırım Rüzgarı Şiddetleniyor", *Platin*, September 2008, p.62.

¹¹⁷² Hotels & Resorts, KAF Group. Available [online]: <<http://www.kafholding.com/en/indexen.html>> [22 September 2009].

¹¹⁷³ "Mardan Palace Oteli'nin Açılış Törenine Hollywood Yıldızları da Davetli", *PatronTurk*, 07 May 2009.

¹¹⁷⁴ Leyla Ekinci, "Ruslar, Rotayı İstanbul ve Anadolu'ya Çevirdi", *Dünya*, 26 February 2009.

Table 10: Number of Russian Tourists Visiting Turkey¹¹⁷⁵

Years	Number
2003	1,281,407
2004	1,605,006
2005	1,864,682
2006	1,853,442
2007	2,465,336
2008	2,879, 278
2009	2,694,733
2010	3,107, 043
2011	3,468,214

At the state level, the second meeting of the Turkish-Russian Tourism Joint Commission was held in Antalya between 10 and 12 June 2009 and the two parties decided to increase cooperation in the fields of promotion, reciprocal flights, tourism investments, simplification of the formalities of tourist travel, tourism education, life and travel insurance and tourist security in order to enhance the already advanced relations.¹¹⁷⁶

Transportation

The enduring imbalance between the Turkish and Russian carriers in land transportation in favour of the Turkish hauliers continued to be a fretting point for the Russian side and this discontent was explicitly conveyed by the Russian officials

¹¹⁷⁵ Source: T.C. Turizm Bakanlığı, Sınır Giriş-Çıkış İstatistikleri, 2003-2009 Yıllarında Ülkemize Gelen Yabancıların Milliyetlerine Göre Dağılımı. Available [online]: < <http://www.kultur.gov.tr/TR/BelgeGoster.aspx?F6E10F8892433CFF2B81939FD5B60AFAFFDE13C621852F44>> [30 August 2010] and T.C. Turizm Bakanlığı, Sınır Giriş-Çıkış İstatistikleri, 2009-2011 Yılları Ocak-Aralık Döneminde Ülkemize Gelen Yabancıların Milliyetlere Göre Dağılımı-İlk On Ülke. Available [online]: < <http://www.ktbyatirimisletmeler.gov.tr/dosya/1-286186/h/aralik2011bulten.xls>> [03 March 2012].

¹¹⁷⁶ Türk-Rus Hükümetlerarası Karma Ekonomik Komisyonu Dokuzuncu Dönem Toplantısı Protokolü. Available [online]: < http://www.deik.org.tr/Pages/TR/IK_TicariIliskilerDetay.aspx?tiDetId=112&IKID=35> [26 September 2009] and “Second Session of the Russian-Turkish Tourism Working Group”, Current Dynamics of Russian-Turkish Relations, 11 June 2009. Available [online]: <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/hron_e_08.html> [26 September 2009].

to the Turkish bureaucrats in seventh and eight Joint Transportation Committee meetings, which were held in Istanbul and Ankara in 2003 and 2006.¹¹⁷⁷

The Russian party stopped granting transit-passes to Turkish transporters in March 2009¹¹⁷⁸, the issue dragged on seven months and it was resolved on 09 October 2009 as a result of signing of a four-year protocol between the two sides in Moscow in the course of Land Transportation Joint Economic Commission meeting. According to the agreement, the number of transit-passes granted to the Turkish transporters was increased to twelve thousand from five thousand and the shippings conducted by them using Russian territory were liberated.¹¹⁷⁹

The maritime transportation between Turkey and Russia was set out in 2002 after the activation of Samsun-Novorossiisk and Trabzon-Sochi routes for ro-ro shipment. The number of the vehicles transported through ro-ro ships between Samsun- Novorossiisk lines amounted 21,148 in 2008 whereas the number was 10,150 between Trabzon-Sochi tracks.¹¹⁸⁰

In the last nine years bilateral trade between Turkey and Russia recorded 339 percent growth making two countries increasingly significant economic partners for

¹¹⁷⁷ In 2008, forty-six percent of the Turkish-Russian land transportation was carried out by Turkish vehicles, forty-five percent by the trucks of the third countries and nine percent by the Russian lorries. See Rusya, BDT, ve Asya Ülkelerine İhraç Taşımalarımız, Uluslararası Nakliyeciler Derneği (UND) 2009 Yılı Temmuz İstatistikleri. Available [online]: <
<http://www.und.org.tr/public/istatistikler/temmuz09.xls>> [27 September 2009] and “Türk Taşımacıda ‘Rus Geçiş Belgesi’ Kalmadı”, *ANKA*, 08 June 2009.

¹¹⁷⁸ Serap Güneş Aydın, “UND’dan Türk ve Rus Ulaştırma Bakanları’na Açık Çağrı: Geçiş Belgeleri için Acil Çözüm Bekliyoruz”, *Dünya*, 24 April 2009, “Rusya Taşımacılıkta Anlaşmaları Hiçe Sayıyor, Sektör Zorda”, *Dünya*, 15 May 2009, and Selçuk Onur, “Nakliyeciden Çağrı: Kota Sorunu Artık Çözölsün”, *Dünya*, 06 August 2009.

¹¹⁷⁹ “Ulaştırma Bakanı Binali Yıldırım: “Türkiye’den Rusya’ya Yapılacak Taşımacılıkta Yıllık İzin Sayısı 5,000 Adetten 12,000 Adede Çıkartıldı. ” Available [online]: <
http://www.ubak.gov.tr/BLSM_WIYS/UBAK/tr/BELGELIK/guncel_haber/20091009_115202_204_1_64.html> [09 October 2009].

¹¹⁸⁰ Yıllar İtibariyle Ro-Ro Gemileri ile Taşınan Araç Sayısı (2002-2009). Available [online]: <
http://www.denizcilik.gov.tr/dm/istatistikler/istatistik/istatistik_dosyalar/Kruvaziyer%20Yolcu%20ve%20Araç%20İstatistikleri/Ro-Ro%20Gemileri%20ile%20Taşınan%20Araç%20Sayısı.doc> [27 September 2009].

each other. Turkey's natural gas imports from Russia continued to be the most important item in the bilateral trade. Russia preserved its top place as Turkey's number one natural gas provider among many competitors such as Iran, Azerbaijan, Algeria and Nigeria. It also came first in satisfying Turkey's oil needs in 2010. Turkey continued to purchase electricity from Russia through Georgian territory. Electricity purchases from Russia will augment with Russia's completion of Turkey's first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu. All these developments indicated that energy ties between the two countries evolved into an expanding and deepening phase.

Reciprocal investments between Turkey and Russia, despite falling far behind the investments carried out by European companies, demonstrated an ascending trend. While Turkish firms overwhelmingly invested in construction, FMCG, consumer durables and manufacturing sectors in Russia, Russian companies in Turkey focused to a large extent on energy, telecommunications and manufacturing businesses.

Turkey sustained its first place as being the favourite destination of Russian tourists. The number of Russian tourists coming to Turkey registered 171 percent increase in the last nine years and reached nearly 3.5 million in 2011. The abolition of the visa requirements between Turkey and Russia in April 2011 is expected to make a positive impact on further strengthening of the commercial and touristic relations between the two countries.

Compared to the expanding and deepening economic ties engendered by collaboration in energy, reciprocal investments and tourism plus growing political interaction between Turkey and Russia, cooperation in military field between the two countries remained at modest levels owing to the hesitation and restraint on the

Turkish side resulting from its membership to NATO. Nevertheless, some kind of progress has also been recorded in the military sphere in the last six years which manifested itself in Russia's participation to the Turkish initiative of Operation Black Sea Harmony that aimed to deter possible risks and threats in the Black Sea and Turkey's decision to return to Russia for weapons and military equipment after a fifteen year break. The following section of the study will examine this modest revival in military relations between the two countries.

Growing Military Relations

The Turkish-Russian military relations have been in an upward trend in the recent years. High-level visits took place every so often between the defense ministers, chief of general staffs and high-ranking commanders of the two countries during which the concerning parties discussed matters regarding fight against terrorism, bilateral cooperation in the Black Sea, and Turkey's purchasing of military equipment from Russia.¹¹⁸¹

The BLACKSEAFOR political consultation group gatherings and the occasional Black Sea Naval Commanders Meetings provided military officials of Turkey and Russia with the opportunity to get together in multilateral structures. Furthermore, when Turkey launched Operation Black Sea Harmony (OBSh) on 01 March 2004, mission of which was to randomly patrol the Black Sea, detect and trail

¹¹⁸¹ "Rusya Federasyonu Savunma Bakanı Sergey Borisovich Ivanov'un Genelkurmay Başkanı Hımi Özkök'ü Ziyareti", Ziyaretler, 07 December 2004. Available [online]: <http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_4_Ziyaretler/2004/rusyasavunma_bakani_0712/ana.html> [04 October 2009], "Rus Genelkurmay Başkanı Karadeniz için Geliyor", *Cumhuriyet*, 04 June 2007, "Commander in Chief of Russian Naval Forces Vladimir Visotskiy Visits Turkey", Current Dynamics of Russian-Turkish Relations, 17 June 2008. Available [online]: <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/hron_e_13.html> [04 October 2009], and "Rusya Federasyonu Savunma Bakanı'nın Türkiye'ye Yaptığı Resmi Ziyaret Hakkında", Rus-Türk İlişkileri Kronolojisi. Available [online]: <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/pr_t_23.html> [04 October 2009].

ships suspected of being involved in illegal activities; Russian Federation became the first littoral state to participate in this initiative on 27 December 2006.¹¹⁸²

Another interesting development in the military sphere was Turkey's signing of an agreement with the Russian state defense products procurement company Rosoboronexport on 29 August 2008 to purchase medium range anti-tank weapon systems that involved eighty weapon units and eight hundred missiles. With the deal, the Russian arms-industry managed to re-enter the Turkish market after a fifteen-year hiatus by beating its American and Israeli competitors.¹¹⁸³

Russia also participated to Turkey's attack helicopter bid with its Kamov Ka-50-2 Erdogan type helicopters. Although the Russian side was one of the two short-listers in the competition, the bid was cancelled in May 2004 much to the dismay and disappointment of Moscow. The negative impact of Turkey's experience with Mi-17V helicopters was an important obstacle that stood in the way of Russia as two of the nineteen helicopters Turkey bought from the country in 1993 were crashed, thirteen of them were put in warehouses due to mechanical malfunction and the remaining four helicopters that were sent to Russia in 2003 for maintenance had not been sent back.¹¹⁸⁴

¹¹⁸² Ukraine joined Black Sea Harmony on 25 April 2007 and Romania also decided to participate to the structure in March 2008. See Operation Black Sea Harmony. Available [online]: < <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/blackseafor.en.mfa> > [04 October 2009], "Rusya Federasyonu'nun Karadeniz Uyumu Harekati'na Katılımına İlişkin Anlaşma Hakkında", Press Releases and Statements, 27 December 2006. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_195---27-aralik-2007_-rusya-federasyonu_nun-karadeniz-uyumu-harekati_na-katilimina-iliskin-anlasma-hk_.tr.mfa > [04 October 2009] and "Regional Initiatives Aimed at Enhancing Security in the Black Sea Maritime Domain, Operation Black Sea Harmony". Available [online]: < www.tsk.tr/eng/uluslararası/karadenizisbirligigorevgrubu.htm > [04 October 2009].

¹¹⁸³ "Orta Menzilli Tanksavar Silah Sistemi Projesi (Hazır Alım)", Projeler, 18 November 2008. Available [online]: < http://www.ssm.gov.tr/tr/projeler/roketfuzemuhimmat/prjgrptanksavar/pages/omtachaziralim__k.aspx > [04 October 2009], Erhan Seven, "Tanksavarlar Rus Firmasından", *Yeni Şafak*, 10 April 2008, Özgür Ekşi, "İsrail Yerine Ruslar'dan Füze Alıyoruz", *Hürriyet*, 11 April 2008, and Özgür Ekşi, "Türkiye 15 Yıl Sonra Rusya'ya Döndü", *Hürriyet*, 15 March 2009.

¹¹⁸⁴ "4 Helikopterimiz Kayıp", *Vatan*, 22 September 2007. The missing four helicopter issue was resolved in August 2011 in the wake of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to

The last eight years became a period of intensification and deepening of Turkish-Russian relations in many dimensions which became clear indication of genuineness of their nature. In the political sphere two important documents, Joint Declaration on Deepening of Friendship and Multi-dimensional Partnership and Joint Declaration on Progress towards a New Stage in Relations and Further Deepening of Friendship and Multi-dimensional Partnership of 2009 were signed both of which underlined that the two states had close or similar positions with regard to many regional and international matters and their collaboration in Eurasia would contribute to the security, stability and welfare in this region. Reciprocal visits at the presidential, prime ministerial and ministerial levels became common occurrences, as well as regular contacts and consultations between the state agencies.

Growing and diversifying economic relations especially in the fields of energy, construction, FMCG and manufacturing sectors, along with increasing mutual investments created a strong and lasting foundation for political association.¹¹⁸⁵ The activities and initiatives of Turkish business interest groups such as Antalya Fruit and Vegetable Exporters Union, Turkish Exporters Assembly (TİM) and International Transporters Association (UND) were valuable during this process as they brought forth new policy options when Turkish-Russian economic relations experienced brief disruptions due to the bureaucratic problems between the two states.¹¹⁸⁶

Moscow in March 2011 and his bringing up the issue to his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. See Yahya Bostan, “Rusya Kayıp Helikopterleri Gönderdi”, *Sabah*, 12 August 2011.

¹¹⁸⁵ The positive impact of increasing and developing economic relations on overall bilateral interaction was also acknowledged in Joint Declaration on Deepening of Friendship and Multi-dimensional Partnership and Joint Declaration on Progress towards a New Stage in Relations and Further Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership.

¹¹⁸⁶ See “İhracatta Mutlu Son”, *VTV*, 02 July 2008, “Tarım Sektöründeki Düzensizlik Ürün Kontrolünü Zorlaştırıyor”, *Referans*, 22 September 2008, Serap Girgin Baykal, “Mehmet Büyükeksi: Rusya’ya İhracatımızın Normale Dönmesi Yolunda Ümitliyiz”, *ABVizyonu*, 18 February 2009, “Rusya Geçiş Belgesi Vermiyor Kara Yoluyla İhracat Durdu”, *Radikal*, 25 April 2009, “UND:

At the academic and intellectual level Turkish think tanks and research centers such as ORSAM, TEPAV, SETA, Turkish Historical Society (TTK) along with their Russian counterparts, namely RISS, IVRAN and Valdai Club started to organize joint conferences, workshops and round-table meetings on a regular basis in which historians, international relations scholars, journalists, field specialists, opinion leaders, businessmen and former politicians from Turkey and Russia came together to discuss background, current dynamics and future orientation of Turkish-Russian relations and evaluated possible areas of cooperation between the two countries in the South Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East regions.¹¹⁸⁷ There exist also a small group of Turkish and Russian intellectuals called Neo-Eurasianists who suggested closer and deeper Turkish-Russian collaboration, in the form of Eurasian Union, which might also brace other regional powers such as Iran and China and will act as a balancing force against the EU and USA in international politics. This movement is composed of Turkish and Russian politicians, journalists, writers, academics, former military officers who belong to different political factions. What brings them together is their deep uneasiness and suspicion regarding Western policies in the regions surrounding Turkey and Russia. Although they favour and

Hükümet Devreye Girsin”, *Sabah*, 25 April 2009 and “Rusya’ya İhracat Yapacak Firmalarda Liste Krizi”, *AA*, 20 October 2009.

¹¹⁸⁷ See “Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri Çalıştayı”, 12-14 October 2009. Available [online]: <<http://www.setav.org/public/HaberDetay.aspx?Dil=tr&hid=13336&q=turkiye-rusya-iliskileri-calistayi>> [13 October 2009], “Tarihten Günümüze Ortadoğu’ya Türk-Rus Bakışı: Türk Tarih Kurumu-ORSAM Ortak Sempozyumu”, 04 March 2011. Available [online]: <http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/trUploads/Yazilar/Dosyalar/201259_2tutanak.pdf> [08 February 2012], “Rus ve Türk Perspektifinden Suriye Krizi: ORSAM-RISS Ortak Toplantısı”, 26 October 2011. Available [online]: <http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/trUploads/Yazilar/Dosyalar/20111114_26ekim%20tutanak.pdf> [09 February 2012], “The 2011-2012 Elections and the Future of Russia: Development Scenarios for the Next 5-8 Years”, Valdai International Discussion Club, 07-09 November 2011. Available [online]: <<http://valdaiclub.com/search/?search=The+2011-2012+Elections+and+the+Future+of+Russia%3A+Development+Scenarios+for+the+Next+5-8+Years>> [17 November 2011], “Transformation in the Arab World and Russia’s Interests”, Valdai Discussion Club, 17-18 February 2012. Available [online]: <<http://valdaiclub.com/event/37424.html>> [19 February 2012], and “Türkiye - Rusya - İran İlişkileri: Ekonomi ve Enerji Boyutları” TEPAV-CSIS-IVRAN Ortak Çalıştayı, 29 March 2012. Available [online]: <<http://www.tepav.org.tr/tr/haberler/s/2786>> [29 March 2012].

promote closer Turkish-Russian interaction, their contribution to Turkish-Russian rapprochement is marginal compared to the impact of business interest groups due to the fact that their access to decision-making structures in their respective countries is very limited.

Returning back to the political matters I can state that Turkish-Russian views with respect to regional matters converged mostly in the Black Sea and Middle East. They both stood up for the preservation of the current status-quo in the Black Sea whose boundaries were drawn up by the Montreux Convention of 1936. In the Middle East, Turkey and Russia resisted the Western attempts to cast out Iran and Syria as rogue states and tried to keep these countries within the confines of the international system. Turkey needed the support and cooperation of Iran and Syria along with Iraq to ward off the terrorist and separatist PKK threat. Furthermore, improving economic and commercial ties with these three countries would benefit its citizens living in South-eastern Anatolia. Turkey, with economic imperatives, also reached out to the wealthy states of Gulf area to draw their capital through acquisitions and partnerships to the resurgent Turkish economy.

Economic motives were important aspects of Russian foreign policy with regard to the Middle East as was demonstrated by Moscow's economic incursion to Gulf States with its state officials and businessmen. On the other hand, backing up Iran and Syria in United Nations Security Council also served political ends by providing Russia with a bargaining card in its rivalry with the USA and the EU. Russia and Turkey differed in their standings to Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Whereas Russia, different from the Cold War years, chose to pursue a low profile policy regarding this thorny issue and speeded up its efforts to improve its relations with both sides of the conflict, Turkish-Israeli relations went downhill gradually due to the

high-tone Turkish criticism of Israel's harsh treatment of Palestinians along with clash of interests of the two countries' in Iraq after the American invasion.

The South Caucasus region continued to be a serious point of discord in the bilateral relationship. Turkey and Russia carried on with their policy of countenancing different sides in regional disputes. Turkey boosted its political and economic ties with Azerbaijan and Georgia and made some headway in military cooperation with these states. Russia sustained its economic and military dominance in Armenia when Yerevan failed to reach a compromise with its two neighbours Azerbaijan and Turkey on Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Despite the breakdown of the political relations with Georgia as a result of the August 2008 war, Russia managed to penetrate the region economically through its natural gas exports to Armenia and Georgia and via appropriation of Armenian and Georgian companies in various sectors in return of unpaid debts of these states to Russia. However, in terms of regional trade Turkey surpassed Russia with a slight margin. The situation is reversed in Central Asia; as Russia overtopped Turkey in their economic competition in this region.

Political divergence between Turkey and Russia again came to the surface with the proclamation of the independence of Kosovo state in February 2008. While Turkey embraced the sovereignty and independence of the young state right away, Russia stood by Serbia, its long-term ally in the Balkans and announced that it still recognized Belgrade's authority on the disputed province.

Cyprus issue was another matter of disagreement between the two countries. Russia blocked the release of a UN report prepared just after the referendum process in the island that advised the elimination of the embargoes imposed on the Turkish

Cypriot community owing to its voting in favour of the reunification plan devised by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in April 2004.

Progress in bilateral military ties lagged far behind the political and economic bonds mostly due to the limitations emanating from Turkey's membership to NATO. Nonetheless, Turkey and Russia came together in a naval initiative in the Black Sea and Russia retook its place among Turkey's arm suppliers.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This dissertation examined the political, economic and military dimensions of Turkish-Russian relations in post-Cold War period through utilization of complex interdependency theory. The study went beyond the limits of bilateral interaction and analyzed the relationship in a regional context by examining in depth and details the views, standings and foreign policy preferences of Turkey and Russia with regard to main hotspots and problematic areas in the Balkan, Black Sea, South Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East regions.

In concluding part of the dissertation my initial remarks will comprise of caveats of this study followed by suggestions for researchers and academics that will examine Turkish-Russian interaction in the future. Then, I will revisit my research questions and my hypotheses and will assess the accuracy and veracity of my hypotheses against the data I have analyzed throughout the research. After that, I will place the Turkish-Russian relationship on a global context and will make some projections about the nature of future power struggles in Eurasia and how they will affect the shaping and development of Turkish-Russian relations in the longer term.

Upcoming studies that will delve into post-Cold War Turkish-Russian relations can examine the impact of domestic factors in each country on formulation and implementation of policies vis-à-vis each other. Such a research will necessitate utilization of sources written in both Turkish and Russian as well as having access to Turkish and Russian bureaucratic and political circles. These two points constitute

also the major caveats of the current study as I, due to financial and time limitations, was unable to earn mastery in Russian language to make use of sources written in this language. Moreover, although I managed to get a glimpse of views, policies and standings of Turkish foreign policy and business circles with regard to the Turkish-Russian relations via the expert interviews I had conducted with officials from Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and representatives from the business associations in Turkey, I was unable to reach out to their Russian counterparts to obtain first-hand information and opinion from them regarding the current state of Turkish-Russian relations. Future studies that overcome these two barriers and focus on domestic determinants of foreign-policy making in both countries will provide rich insights to the international relations literature by inquiring one of the rarely-studied aspects of Turkish-Russian relationship.

Returning back to the current study, my first research question was about current character of Turkish-Russian relations, whether the relationship is an example of genuine cooperation or a marriage of convenience that stemmed from shared disappointment with policies of the USA and the EU. My hypothesis to this question pointed out the peculiar dynamics and distinctive characteristics of the Turkish-Russian relationship free from their interaction with the EU and the USA which intersected the paths of two states especially in the Black Sea, South Caucasus and Central Asia. It is clear that both the USA and the EU are important security and economic partners for Turkey and Russia. Both of the countries realize majority of their trade with the EU members besides the EU is the chief investor in various sectors of the Turkish and Russian economies. Moreover, Turkey has been carrying out accession negotiations with the EU since 2005 albeit at a crawling pace and in a convoluted way and has been aspiring to become the member of the European club

for long years. In a similar vein, Turkey and the USA are long-standing allies in NATO and their military relations are well-rounded and deep-rooted. Russia, on the other hand, had been in a fierce competition with the USA over world dominance during Cold War years and although its fervour and intensity diminished to a great extent in the post-Cold War era, rivalry between the two countries still continues unabated in the regions surrounding Turkey.

The reluctance of some members of the EU to accept Turkey into the European club as an equal member along with mounting of disagreements between Turkey and the USA after Washington's invasion of Iraq engendered exasperation and discomfort on Turkey and contributed surely at some point to the rapprochement with Russia, which had been for a long time feeling growing resentment toward unilateralist American actions be it Washington's withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty or its attack on Iraq with a coalition of the willing without a UN mandate. However, it will be incorrect to reduce the emergence of advanced level of Turkish-Russian association to both countries' disputes with Brussels and Washington as warming of relations between Turkey and Russia did not emanate from the joint feelings of frustration, disappointment and uneasiness towards the USA and Europe but came into existence as a result of mutual willingness and determination on part of Turkish and Russian statesmen and foreign policy makers whose building blocks were established in the wake of growing economic ties between the two countries.

In retrospect, it will be accurate to state that the 1990s had been difficult for both Turkey and Russia as they both had to find their new place in a completely altered world while at the same time had to grapple with serious domestic troubles. The West, including Turkey came out as victorious from the Cold War. Russia

accepted its defeat, acquiesced to the break up of the Soviet Empire, receded from its zones of influence in Central and Eastern Europe and tried to harmonize its political and economic structure with that of the West's. However, the Western reform programmes and aid packages were not adequate enough to cure Russia's ills especially while the country was immersed in political instability and economic crises and was also facing the threat of a separatist movement in Chechnya. Furthermore, being the heir of one of the two superpowers, it was not easy for the Russian statehood to settle for a second-ranking place in the international arena. So after a period of baffling, Russia held onto the last remnants of its defunct Empire in the South Caucasus and Central Asia that sheltered many citizens of Russian origin in addition to possessing rich energy resources.

Turkey, on the other hand, despite being part of the winning bloc of the Cold War, realized that with the "Soviet aggression and communist threat" out of the picture, its influence and privileged position within the Western alliance was shaken considerably. Moreover, emergence of a separatist Kurdish movement, economic problems and conflicts with the neighbouring states put Turkey in a difficult and risky position. Ankara wanted to try its chance in the South Caucasus and Central Asia where independent states, with most of whom Turkey shared common historical, ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural ties, had come on the international scene with the demise of the Soviet Union. This situation of clash of interests between Turkey and Russia triggered in consequence of vying for influence in the same regions brought on competition and confrontation in their relationship at the beginning of the 1990s.

However, it did not take much time for Turkey to become aware of its own limitations and seeking for a rapprochement with Russia in Eurasia which had

proved that it was still the most efficacious player in the region with its explicit and implicit interventions in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia and its not so easily erasable impact in Central Asian states sustained through close ties with local political cadres, commercial links and linguistic dominance. Elevating economic and commercial ties between Turkey and Russia also played crucial role in this period in easing out the tension between the two countries and overcoming the atmosphere of suspicion, mistrust and tension. Turkish contractors, businesspeople and entrepreneurs discovered the large and untapped Russian market, won out many bids in construction sector and realized investments in various industries. The complementary character of the Turkish and Russian economies engendered steady growth in bilateral commerce. Turkey purchased fossil fuels and industrial goods from the Russian Federation whereas in return sold consumer and retail products.

The first signs of genuine moderation and long-lasting accommodation in Turkish-Russian relations came forth at the beginning of 2000s when Russia after a period of qualm and hesitation commenced to see Turkey not just as a prospective rival but also as a lucrative market for its energy products. Turkey was a perfect client for Russian oil and natural gas exports due to its geographical proximity, growing economy and natural-resource bereft situation. Moreover, a rapprochement with Ankara also promised dividends for Moscow in the political sphere as Turkey that entertained close and cordial relations with Russia would be less prone to tolerating the activities of Chechen militants and organizations on its territory and would endeavour to strike a fine balance between Washington and Moscow in matters of confrontation and rivalry between these two capitals.

Reaching a compromise with Russia was evaluated as a positive and important step by the AKP government that took the helm of Turkey at the end of

2002. The new administration since coming to power has been attaching special importance to the pursuit of less-conflict ridden and problem-free foreign policy in the immediate neighbourhood of Turkey and has been searching for ways to strengthen the country's political and economic ties with the regional states. Russia, in this regard occupies a significant place in Turkish foreign policy as a chief energy provider, important trade partner and a global balancer against the unilateral and revisionist encroachments of the USA.

In line with the first hypothesis, the examination of Turkish-Russian relations in the last twenty years attested to the fact that far from being strange bedfellows that ran into each other's arms in defiance of the EU and the USA, Turkey and Russia consciously, deliberately and willingly reached out to each other for a genuine reconciliation in their bilateral association which would offer both of them obvious political and economic benefits.

The second research question focused on the impact of growing economic ties between Turkey and Russia, especially Turkey's increasing energy dependence on Russia, on the emergence of political normalization and rapprochement between the two countries. The second hypothesis stated that there existed positive correlation between the two, ascending economic relations in particular, expanding collaboration in the field of energy, preceded and facilitated political détente. The findings reached at the end of the research in this study confirmed this hypothesis. The opening of large Russian market to Turkish products, entrepreneurs, and businesspeople in the immediate post-Cold War period and the numerous Turkish investments in the country relaxed the tense and uneasy atmosphere between the two states when the issues such as Nagorno-Karabakh War, Chechen separatism and the Kurdish unrest clouded the political interaction during the most part of the 1990s. With the rise of

Russian natural gas exports to Turkey, accelerated with the construction of the Blue Stream gas pipeline, as well providing oil and electricity to Turkish market in large quantities, Russia obtained substantial leverage on Turkey whose effect was clearly observed in the course of August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia when Turkey chose to adopt a neutral stance and eschewed from criticizing Russia despite its close bonds with Georgia. Taking into account the fact that Russian experts will be building the first nuclear plant of Turkey in the coming years thus enhancing and deepening the energy connection between Russia and Turkey, mutual investments exceeding fourteen billion dollars and Russia heavily benefiting from Turkish Straits for the oil transportation prove that the economic side of the Turkish-Russian relationship will preserve its significance in the overall interaction in the following years. The gaining primacy and importance of economic issues in Turkish-Russian relations is also in line with the complex interdependency argument that economic matters carry as much as weight as political and security questions for states that are in an interdependent relationship.

Growing and diversification of political and economic relations became possible with bilateral interaction at various levels. In accordance with the premise of complex interdependency theory, Turkey and Russia connect through multiple channels both at governmental and non-governmental spheres. Close contacts at the state and governmental level in the form of frequent reciprocal high-profile visits, regular telephone conversations between Presidents, Premiers and Foreign Ministers of the two states with respect to bilateral, regional and global issues, setting up working groups in various topics as well as the institutions founded by Turkish and Russian business people who effectuate considerable amount of investments in each other's countries and which act as lobbying mechanisms on governments, the

Russian people choosing Turkey for their vacations who brought about mutual awareness and recognition on people-to-people basis, and finally recurring gatherings and joint works of Turkish and Russian academics also figured large in the transpiration of a marked rapport between Ankara and Moscow.

The third research question probed whether the intensifying political dialogue between Turkey and Russia, buttressed by rising economic cooperation could help the two states to adopt common outlook and course of action with regard to regional problems in the South Caucasus. The third hypothesis answered to this question positively and claimed that the apparent thaw in the political domain between Turkey and Russia could pave the way for the formulation and execution of common policies toward the resolution of contentious matters in the South Caucasus such as Nagorno-Karabakh issue and problems between Georgia and its secessionist regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Findings of the study do not verify the third hypothesis. Far from developing joint projects to resolve the regional disputes, political divergence and competition between the two countries endured in the South Caucasus. Turkey's attempt to break the ice in its problematic history with Armenia backfired; after the latter refused to desist from its policy of the international recognition of the so-called genocide and avoided the withdrawal of its troops from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Despite the chafing of its relationship with Azerbaijan as a result of its opening with Armenia, Ankara continued to give its full support to Baku's standing in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russia, on the other hand, from the outset seemed to avoid taking sides in Nagorno-Karabakh talks. However, Moscow's accelerating political, economic and especially military bonds with Yerevan demonstrated that it was too far away from positioning itself as an honest broker in negotiations between Armenia

and Azerbaijan. In addition to backing up competing sides, Turkey and Russia also differed in the mechanism they employed for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Turkish policy was bounded within the framework of the Minsk Group while Russia preferred convening summits that brought together presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia.

The questions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia constituted other points of discrepancy between the two countries. For Moscow these issues were solved after the declaration of independence of these two separatist entities and Russia's recognition of their sovereignty in August 2008. Turkey, on the contrary, still paid importance to the territorial integrity of the Georgian state and enjoyed good political and economic relations with the Saakashvili administration with whom Russia was at daggers drawn situation as clearly understood by the declarations of Russian officials that unless Saakashvili remained in power a compromise between Georgia and Russia would not be in the offing.

Along with different standings in the South Caucasus, Turkey and Russia also had divergent point of views with regard to some other regional matters such as Cyprus and Kosovo. However, as the third premise of complex interdependency theory points out, it is very unlikely that the two states will make use of military tools to solve these disagreements when they are in such an entrenched and interdependent economic relationship.

The Turkish-Russian interaction, albeit retaining unique and distinct features, does not take place in an isolated environment, and is affected by the regional and global developments. In line with this reality, final pages of this study are devoted to projections about the future status of Turkish-Russian relations taking into account regional and global dynamics as well as power struggles.

With respect to regional dimension, the future of the current regime of Iran has considerable impact on Turkish-Russian energy relations due to the fact that Russia will sustain its position of Turkey's number one supplier of energy products as long as Iran is excluded from oil and natural gas projects by Turkey's Western allies. On the other hand, a compromise between Iran and the West or a regime change in Iran which will bring to power a new administration that is on better terms with the USA and the EU can open the way for increased energy cooperation between Ankara and Tehran thus reducing Turkey's dependence on Russian energy exports. Such a radical development in the region may lead Turkey to become more vocal and persistent in pursuing its interests in the South Caucasus whereas Russia may feel itself contained and may demonstrate tougher and more assertive stance in its South Caucasus policy.

At the global level, the future shaping of increasing competition between the USA and China will have significant implications for Turkish-Russian relationship. If China continues its economic, military and technological ascendance and comes on to the international scene as a serious rival to US power then the USA will speed up its efforts to encircle China by entering into alliances with its neighbours and obstructing Beijing's access to energy resources which are necessary and vital for the country to fuel its economic growth. While carrying out this mission Washington will most probably seek a compromise with Russia and will strive to draw Moscow to its side in return for some concessions in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia may respond to American overtures warmly for the reason that it is quite uneasy and concerned about the expanding and deepening Chinese influence in Central Asia which expedited after China's inauguration of oil and natural gas pipelines with the Central Asian states that bypassed Russia and broke its

monopoly on transit routes for oil and natural gas. China also builds new roads and railways with the aim of directly connecting its territory to Central Asia thus bolstering its trade with the region. Furthermore, Beijing offers aid programs to Central Asian states, gives support to infrastructure projects such as the construction of hydropower plants and extraction of natural resources and the Chinese firms acquire companies, enter into joint ventures and carry out many investments in Central Asia. With these activities China directly challenges the Russian supremacy and position in the region. Moscow's fears of losing the ground to China in Central Asia coupled with its anxiety about possible Chinese demographic and economic penetration into its sparsely populated Far East region may make Russia more enthusiastic about taking part in American policy of encirclement of China. Such a possible rapprochement with the USA and Russia, though putting Turkey at ease while developing its political, economic and military relations with Russia, may also give rise to a confrontation with a more assertive and demanding Russia specifically in the South Caucasus region and may bring about Turkey's retraction from its active and dynamic policy in this area. On the other hand, the USA's preservation of its current superiority may engender a balancing act from China and Russia against the USA moves in Central Asia and this situation may put constraints on Turkey while making inroads into the region through economic instruments.

The findings of the dissertation attested to the endurance of serious competition and policy differences between Turkey and Russia in the South Caucasus in addition to the divergence of opinion on some regional and global matters. On the other hand, the study also demonstrated that two countries are engaged in a complex interdependent relationship despite the existence of points of disagreement between them thanks to the ascending and diversifying economic

collaboration, especially cooperation in energy field along with growing interaction at business and people-to-people levels which paved the way for increasing contacts and intensifying dialogue at the political level. Although strong economic ties and growing political interaction are not sufficient to overcome the political divergence in some matters, they, nevertheless, keep the relationship on a solid and steady foundation and provide the necessary motivation and impetus to Turkey and Russia for further advancement of the bilateral relations.

The propositions of the complex interdependency theory held true in this case of post-Cold War Turkish-Russian relations. In a time span of twenty years Turkey and Russia made significant progress in transforming their conflictual and confrontational interaction into a cooperative and mutually beneficial one. This became possible by emergence of multiple channels of contact between the two countries at diplomatic, economic, social, academic and intellectual levels as well as preponderance of economic issues in the bilateral interaction.

The remarkable development in political and economic relations however, did not lead to increased political integration between Turkey and Russia as clearly seen by not coming true of the third hypothesis. There was not any coordination of policies between the two states regarding South Caucasian matters. As a result of this situation they were unable to create common institutions or consultant mechanisms to ensure peaceful and permanent resolution of the conflicts in the region. Moreover, although the two states refrained from using military instruments for the resolution of political disagreements between each other as the third premise of the complex interdependency theory dictated, there was at some point linkage of political and economic matters, as proven by the delays Turkish goods faced at Russian customs during the presence of three American warships in Black Sea for the transmission of

humanitarian relief to Georgia in the wake of the August 2008 war. Although this situation weakens the complex interdependency argument that linkage strategies will be less likely to be employed in complex interdependent relations, efforts on both sides to prevent further politicization of the issue by pursuing a quiet diplomacy in the form of political bargaining and persuasion and quick resolution of the problem afterwards as a result of this endeavour demonstrated once more that although conflicts might take place on political issues between states in a complex interdependent relationship, they are not allowed to disturb the relationship as the parties focus more on long-term joint gains rather than short-term separate zero-sum victories in their dealings with each other.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TEXTS OF THE MAIN POLITICAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Arasındaki İlişkilerin Esasları Hakkında Antlaşma

Aşağıda Taraflar olarak adlandırılacak Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Rusya Federasyonu, Ülkeleri arasında asırlardır mevcut dostluk ve iyi komşuluk ilişkilerinin gelecek açısından değerli bir temel oluşturduğunu vurgulayarak,

Dünya'da yer alan tarihi değişikliklerle bölünme döneminin geride kaldığını, ülkeler arasındaki ilişkilerde özgürlük, barış, güvenlik, demokrasi ve işbirliği döneminin açılmış olduğunu kaydederek,

Birleşmiş Milletler Yasası'nın amaç ve ilkelerine bağlılıklarını yineleyerek,

1 Ağustos 1975 tarihli Helsinki Nihai Senedi, 21 Kasım 1990 tarihli Yeni Bir Avrupa için Paris Yasası ve Avrupa'da Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Konferansı süreci çerçevesinde kabul edilen diğer belgeler ile 19 Kasım 1990 Paris Zirvesi'nde imzalanan 22 Devlet Ortak Deklarasyonu uyarınca üstlendikleri yükümlülükleri teyid ederek,

Avrupa ile Asya kıtalarının birleştiği ve Türkiye ile Rusya'nın komşu olarak yer aldıkları bölgede barış ve istikrara katkıda bulunmayı amaçlayarak,

Aralarındaki ilişkilerin geliştirilmesi ve güçlendirilmesi amacıyla,

Aşağıdaki hususlarda mutabık kalmışlardır:

MADDE 1

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Rusya Federasyonu birbirlerini dost Devlet kabul ederler ve aralarındaki ilişkileri iyi komşuluk, işbirliği ve karşılıklı güven temellerine dayandırır.

Taraflar, ilişkilerini birbirlerinin siyasi bağımsızlığına, egemenliğine ve toprak bütünlüğüne saygı, içişlerine karışmama, hak eşitliği ve ortak yarar ilkelerine dayalı olarak her alanda etkin biçimde geliştirmek karar ve azimlerini teyid ederler.

MADDE 2

Taraflar, karşılıklı ilişkilerinde güç kullanmamayı veya güç kullanma tehdidinde bulunmamayı, topraklarının yekdiğerine karşı saldırı amacıyla veya yıkıcı ve bölücü faaliyetler için kullanılmasına izin vermemeyi taahhüt ederler.

MADDE 3

Taraflar, aralarında doğabilecek uyuşmazlıkları, uluslararası barışı, güvenliği ve adaleti tehlikeye sokmayacak biçimde, münhasıran barışçı yöntemlerle çözmek hususunda mutabıktır.

MADDE 4

Taraflar, yekdiğerinin üçüncü devlet veya devletlerin doğrudan veya dolaylı saldırısına maruz kalması halinde, saldırıya veya saldırganlara herhangi bir şekilde destek veya yardım sağlamayacaklarını ve bu saldırının durdurulması ve tüm sonuçlarının bertaraf edilmesi amacıyla Birleşmiş Milletler Örgütü ve diğer ilgili uluslararası kuruluş ve düzenlemeler çerçevesinde çaba sarfedeceklerini beyan ederler.

MADDE 5

Taraflar, barış ve güvenliği ihlâl veya tehdit eden veya uluslararası düzeyde gerginliğe sebebiyet verebilecek bir gelişme karşısında, temasa geçerek durumu değerlendirecekler ve sorunun çözüme kavuşturulması için alınabilecek tedbirler konusunda danışmalarda bulunacaklardır.

MADDE 6

Taraflar, ilişkilerinin düzenli şekilde gelişmesini sağlamak, uluslararası ve bölgesel konularda görüş teatisinde bulunmak amaçlarıyla danışmalarda bulunacaklardır.

Taraflar, siyasal danışmaları, en üst düzeyi de içermek üzere, her düzeyde Ankara ve Moskova'da sıra ile yılda en az bir kere yapacaklardır. Dışişleri Bakanları düzenli olarak biraraya geleceklerdir.

MADDE 7

Taraflar, Birleşmiş Milletler Örgütü potansiyelinden tam olarak yararlanılması amacı ile işbirliği içinde bulunmak hususunda mutabıktır. Taraflar, bu amaçla, Örgütün uluslararası barış ve güvenliğin idamesi konusunda ve öteki çeşitli alanlarda oynadığı rolün güçlendirilmesi yolundaki çabalarını sürdürecektir.

MADDE 8

Taraflar, 21 Kasım 1990 tarihli Yeni Bir Avrupa İçin Paris Yasası'nın kabulü ile kurumsallaşma ve AĞİK yapılarının geliştirilmesi aşamasına giren Avrupa'da Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Konferansı sürecine tam bağlılıklarını ve bu süreci desteklediklerini teyid etmişlerdir.

Taraflar, uluslararası ilişkilerde dostluk, anlayış, karşılıklı güven ve işbirliği ortamının yerleştirilmesi ve hukukun üstünlüğü, insan hakları, çoğulcu demokrasi düşüncesi, din ve ibadet özgürlüğü, pazar ekonomisi, sosyal adalet gibi ortak değerlere dayalı bir Avrupa düzeninin geliştirilip, güçlendirilmesine katkıda bulunacaklardır.

MADDE 9

Taraflar, uygulanması etkin bir şekilde denetlenebilen anlaşmaların yapılması suretiyle silahların sınırlandırılmasının, silahsızlanma sürecinin ve nükleer silahların yayılmasının önlenmesinin uluslararası güvenliğin korunması ve güçlendirilmesine katkıda bulunduğu hususundaki ortak görüşlerini teyid ederler ve bu alandaki çabaları arasında uyum sağlamak amacıyla danışmalarda bulunmayı kabul ederler.

Taraflar, 1990 Viyana Toplantısı Nihai Belgesi'nin, güvenlik, güven ve istikrarın artırılmasındaki önemli rolünün bilincinde olarak, ikili ve bölgesel düzeyde etkili biçimde uygulanması ve daha da geliştirilmesi amacıyla işbirliğinde bulunacaklardır.

MADDE 10

İkili askerî temasların artırılmasının önemine inanan Taraflar, askerî makamlar arasında üst düzeyli temasların düzenli olarak gerçekleştirilmesi hususunda mutabık kalmışlardır.

MADDE 11

Taraflar, aralarındaki ekonomik, ticarî, bilimsel, teknolojik ve ekoloji alanlarındaki işbirliğinin kapsamlı biçimde ve uzun vadeli bir perspektifle geliştirilmesi hususunda mutabıktır.

Taraflar, bu amaçla mal, hizmetler ve sermayenin iki ülke arasında geniş ve etkin dolaşımına tedricen geçiş için elverişli hukukî, ekonomik, malî ve ticarî şartları yaratacaklar özellikle sanayi, tarım, turizm, ulaştırma, telekomünikasyon, enerji, müteahhitlik hizmetleri, çevre koruma alanlarındaki işbirliğini güçlendirecekler ve işgücünden etkin biçimde yararlanma imkânlarını araştırarak, ayrıca ülkelerinde ve üçüncü ülkelerde ikili ve çok taraflı ortak yatırım projelerini destekleyecekler, bu faaliyetlere en uygun koşullarda malî kaynak sağlanması için çaba göstereceklerdir.

MADDE 12

Taraflar, ekonomik, bilimsel ve teknik alanlarda aralarında bilgi ve deneyim değişimi ile düzenli danışmaları teşvik edecekler ve iki ülkenin bu alandaki potansiyel ve olanaklarının birbirlerine daha iyi tanıtılmasını ve değerlendirilmesini sağlamak üzere her düzeyde temasların artırılmasını destekleyeceklerdir.

Taraflar, ekonomik, bilimsel ve teknik işbirliğinin daha da güçlendirilmesi amacıyla, diğer ilgili makamlara ilaveten Hükümetlerarası Türk-Rus Karma Ekonomik Komisyonu ile Türk-Rus İş Konseyi'ne de bu alanda önemli görevler ve rol düştüğüne inanmaktadırlar.

Taraflar, aralarındaki kıyı ticaretinin daha da geliştirilmesi yolunda çaba sarfedeceklerdir.

Taraflar, aralarında ve Karadeniz bölgesinde ekonomik, ticarî, bilimsel ve teknik işbirliğinin geliştirilmesi ve bölgede istikrar ve refahın artırılması için ortak çaba göstereceklerdir.

MADDE 13

Taraflar, karşılıklılık ilkesi çerçevesinde birbirleri nezdindeki diplomatik, konsolosluk, ticaret ve diğer resmî temsilciliklerin faaliyetlerini azami ölçüde kolaylaştıracak, ayrıca iş adamları, gazeteci ve ortak projelerde görevli uzmanlar için gerekli uygun çalışma ve yaşam koşullarını sağlayacaklardır.

MADDE 14

Taraflar, turistik, ekonomik, ticarî ve kültürel amaçlı seyahatler ile bilimsel ve teknolojik işbirliğini öngören temaslarda vatandaşlarına vize verilmesi işlemlerinin karşılıklı olarak basitleştirilmesi yönünde çaba sarfedeceklerdir.

MADDE 15

Taraflar, parlamentoları arasındaki temasların geliştirilmesine önem atfetmektedirler.

Taraflar, halkları arasındaki temasların artırılmasını ve siyasi partiler, sendikalar, vakıflar, eğitim kurumları, spor kuruluşları, dini ve sosyal kurumlar, gençlik örgütleri ve dostluk dernekleri, kadın ve çevre koruma örgütleri ile diğer meslekî ve sosyal örgütler ve dernekler arasındaki işbirliğinin geliştirilmesini destekleyeceklerdir.

MADDE 16

Taraflar, bölgeler, kentler, yerel organlar ve yönetimler arasında temasların ve işbirliğinin aralarındaki ilişkilere kapsam ve muhteva kazandıracağı inancı ile bu ilişkileri teşvik edeceklerini teyid ederler.

MADDE 17

Taraflar, aralarındaki kültürel ve bilimsel işbirliğinin daha da geliştirilmesi ve çeşitlendirilmesi konusunda kararlıdır.

Taraflar, iki ülkenin üniversiteleri, kültürel ve sanat kuruluşları arasında doğrudan işbirliği yapılmasını teşvik edeceklerdir.

Taraflar, Türkiye'de Rusça ve Rusya'da Türkçe öğrenimini teşvik edecekler ve destekleyeceklerdir.

MADDE 18

Taraflar, basın ve yayın alanlarındaki işbirliğinin gelişmesini destekleyecek ve aralarındaki haberleşmenin çağdaş olanaklardan da yararlanmak suretiyle daha geniş ve özgür biçimde gerçekleşmesini teşvik edeceklerdir.

MADDE 19

Taraflar, gerekçesi ve amacı ne olursa olsun, her tür terör eylemine kararlı şekilde karşı olduklarını ve terörizmin hiçbir koşulda haklı görülmeyeceği hususundaki kesin inançlarını teyid etmişlerdir.

Taraflar, uluslararası terörizme, örgütlenmiş suçlara, silah ve uyuşturucu madde, tarihi ve kültürel eserler ile diğer benzer kaçakçılığa karşı mücadelede işbirliğinde bulunacaklar, sivil havacılık faaliyetlerine kanun dışı müdahale olaylarını uluslararası anlaşmalarla belirlenmiş ilkeler çerçevesinde çözümleyeceklerdir.

MADDE 20

Bu Andlaşma herhangi bir Devlete karşı değildir ve Tarafların mevcut ikili ve çok taraflı anlaşma ve anlaşmalardan doğan hak ve vecibelerini hiçbir şekilde etkilemeyecektir.

MADDE 21

İşbu Antlaşma Taraflarca onaylanacak ve onay belgelerinin teati edildiği tarihte yürürlüğe girecektir.

İşbu Andlaşma yirmi yıl süreli olup Taraflardan birinin yürürlük süresinin dolmasından bir yıl önce yazılı olarak feshi ihbarda bulunmaması halinde beşer yıllık sürelerle yürürlükte kalmaya devam edecektir.

Moskova'da 25/5/1992 tarihinde Türkçe ve Rusça dillerinde ikişer nüsha halinde ve her iki metin aynı ölçüde geçerli olacak şekilde imzalanmıştır.

TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ
ADINA

İMZA

RUSYA FEDERASYONU
ADINA

İMZA

Rusya Federasyonu ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Arasında Avrasya'da İşbirliği Eylem Planı (İkili İşbirliğinden Çok Boyutlu Ortaklığa)

Dünyada meydana gelen tarihi önemdeki köklü değişiklikler, Rusya ile Türkiye arasındaki ilişkiler manzumesinde, verimli ikili ve bölgesel işbirliğini her alanda dostluk ve karşılıklı güven ruhuyla geliştirecek olanaklarla tanımlanan yeni bir dönem açmıştır. Rusya ve Türkiye, ilişkilerini güçlendirilmiş yapıcı ortaklık düzeyine taşımak amacıyla ilave çabalar sarf etmek hususunda kararlıdırlar.

Rusya ile Türkiye arasındaki bu ortaklığın ilkeleri 25 Mayıs 1992 tarihli "Rusya Federasyonu ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Arasındaki İlişkilerin Esasları Hakkındaki Anlaşma"ya dayanmaktadır. 26 Ağustos 1992 tarihli Rusya Türkiye Danışmalar Protokolü işbirliğinin kapsamının geliştirilmesi açısından yararlı bir araç oluşturmaktadır.

Rusya ve Türkiye, uluslararası ilişkilerde ana sorunlara ortak çözümler üretilmesi ve hukukun üstünlüğü mekanizmalarının 21. yüzyıldaki dünya düzeninin temelini teşkil etmesi gerektiği inancından hareketle, ilişkilerini çok kutuplu uluslararası ilişkiler sistemi çerçevesinde geliştirmek arzularını teyid ederler. Bunun yanı sıra, BM Şartı amaç ve ilkelerine olan bağlılıklarını ve Birleşmiş Milletler Teşkilatı'nın daha da güçlendirilmesine ve dünya meselelerindeki merkezi rolünün pekiştirilmesine katkıda bulunmak yönündeki temennilerini bir kez daha dile getirirler. İki Taraf devletlerin bağımsızlığı, egemenliği ve toprak bütünlüğüne saygı ilkelerinin vazgeçilmez olduğunu özellikle teyid ederler. Rusya ve Türkiye BM, AGİT ve diğer uluslararası örgütlerdeki işbirliğini geliştireceklerdir.

Rusya ve Türkiye tüm Avrupa devletlerinin çıkarlarına, ortak değerler, yükümlülükler ve davranış normlarına dayanan ve bölünmemiş ve nüfuz alanlarına ayrılmamış bir ortak Avrupa alanının oluşturulması yolunda, Avrupa'da yeni ve kapsamlı bir güvenlik mimarisinin yaratılmasını kolaylaştırmak için yapıcı bir diyaloga gireceklerdir.

Rusya ve Türkiye tarih, kültür ve ortak coğrafyadan kaynaklanan Avrupa ve Asya özelliklerini paylaşmaktadırlar. Avrasya bölgesinin iki önemli ülkesi olan Rusya ve Türkiye, bölgede barış, istikrar ve sürdürülebilir kalkınmanın yanı sıra uluslararası hukukun, demokrasinin ve insan haklarının güçlendirilmesi yollarını değerlendirme konusunda mutabıktırlar. Bu ortak anlayış ve yeni işbirliği olanakları Rus Türk ikili ilişkilerine aynı zamanda yeni bir boyut, derinlik ve perspektif getirecektir.

Rusya ve Türkiye, Avrasya'daki diyalog ve işbirliklerinin Avrasya bölgesindeki ihtilaflara barışçı, adil ve kalıcı çözümler ile anlaşmazlıklara siyasi çözümler getirilmesine olumlu katkıda bulunacağı inancını paylaşırlar.

Rusya ve Türkiye, sadece uluslararası toplumun ortak çabaları ile etkin bir şekilde mukabele edilebilecek sınıraşan tehditler olarak algıladıkları uluslararası terörizm, organize suçlar ve aşırıcılığın yanı sıra uyuşturucu, psikotropik maddeler ve silah kaçakçılığı olgusu ile mücadelede işbirliğini geliştirme niyetindedirler.

5 Kasım 1999 tarihli Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Terörizmle Mücadelede İşbirliği Ortak Deklarasyonu'na, 18 Aralık 1996 tarihli Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti arasında Terörizm ile Mücadele Alanında İşbirliğine İlişkin Memorandum'a ve 30 Ekim 1992 tarihli Rusya Federasyonu İçişleri Bakanlığı ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İçişleri Bakanlığı arasında İşbirliği Anlaşması'na atıfla, İki Taraf söz konusu sorunlar üzerindeki danışmalarını yoğunlaştırmak arzularını dile getirirler.

Rusya ve Türkiye ekonomik işbirliğini hem ikili hem de çok taraflı düzeylerde artırmak isteklerini dile getirirler. İki taraf, ekonomi, ticaret, enerji, ulaştırma, turizm, çevre ve diğer alanlarda işbirliğini geliştirmek için varolan olanakları değerlendirmenin yararını vurgularlar. Taraflar, Avrasya bölgesindeki ekonomik ve ticari işbirliklerini güçlendirmelerinin, ikili işbirliğini çok taraflı ortaklığa yükseltmek yönünde itici güç olacağı anlayışını paylaşırlar. İki Taraf Hükümetlerarası Karma Ekonomik ve Ticari İşbirliği Komisyonu'nun çalışmalarının önemini vurgularlar ve iki ülke girişimcilerinin daha kapsamlı işbirliğini desteklerler.

Rusya ve Türkiye Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü'nün bölgesel ekonomik istikrara ve güvene katkıda bulunmakta olduğunu kaydederler. Karadeniz Deniz İşbirliği Görev Grubu (BLACKSEAFOR) iki ülkenin işbirliği yapma niyetlerinin bir diğer göstergesidir.

Taraflar Hazar Karadeniz Bölgesinin ihracat ve transit potansiyelinin geliştirilmesine katkıda bulunma arzusundadırlar. Taraflar bu konuda karşılıklı çıkarlarını mümkün olan en iyi şekilde korumak amacıyla

danışmalarda bulunmaya niyetlidirler.

Rusya ve Türkiye enerji konularını ikili ilişkilerinin ve güçlü karşılıklı menfaatler yaratacak bölgesel işbirliklerinin önemli bir parçası olarak mütalaa ederler. Taraflar, Mavi Akım Projesini Rusya ile Türkiye arasındaki yapıcı ortaklığın daha da geliştirilmesinin ana unsurlarından biri olarak görürler.

İkili düzeydeki ilişkilerde olduğu gibi Avrasya bölgesindeki işbirliğinin temel şartlarından biri güven ve karşılıklı anlayışın mevcudiyetidir. Bu bakımdan her alan ve boyutta açıklık, şeffaflık ve karşılıklı güven bu işbirliğinin başarısında önemli bir rol oynayacaktır.

Taraflar mevcut iyi ilişkilerini, siyasi danışmalarını ve ekonomik işbirliği alanındaki deneyimlerini Avrasya boyutuna da taşıma ve böylece ikili ilişkilerinde yeni ve yüksek bir düzeye ulaşma kararlılıklarındadırlar. Bu amaçla, Taraflar sözkonusu yeni işbirliği platformunu çeşitli açılardan değerlendirmek üzere Dışişleri Bakanlıklarının yüksek düzeyli temsilcilerinden oluşan bir Ortak Çalışma Grubu oluşturmak hususunda mutabık kalmışlardır. Bu Grup aynı zamanda, çok boyutlu ortaklığı hedefleyen işbirliğinin temel ilkeleri ve yönelimleri hususunda somut öneriler hazırlamakla da görevlendirilmiştir.

Taraflar Ortak Çalışma Grubu'nun faaliyetlerinin çeşitli alanlardaki diyalog ve işbirliklerinin düzeyinin kayda değer ölçüde yükselmesine yardımcı olacağı inancındadırlar. Grup dönüşümlü ve düzenli olarak Moskova ve Ankara'da toplanacak, eşgüdüm sağlayacak ve işbu Eylem Planı'nın uygulanmasına ilişkin çalışmalarının sonuçlarını belirli aralıklarla Dışişleri Bakanlarına sunacaktır. Ek'te belirtilen başlıca danışma ve işbirliği alanlarını değerlendirmek amacıyla alt gruplar oluşturabilecektir. Grup aynı şekilde yeni işbirliği alanları tespit edebilecektir.

Avrasya bölgesindeki gelişmelerin daha iyi değerlendirilmesinin sağlanması amacıyla her iki ülkenin akademisyenleri ve dış politika düşünce kuruluşları arasındaki işbirliği, bu arada akademisyenlerin Ortak Çalışma Grubu toplantılarına katılmaları teşvik edilecektir.

New York, 16 Kasım 2001

IGOR IVANOV
DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI
RUSYA FEDERASYONU

İSMAİL CEM
DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI
TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ

Ek

DANIŞMA VE İŞBİRLİĞİ ALANLARI **SİYASİ**

Balkanlar
Güney Kafkasya
Orta Asya
Afganistan
Kıbrıs
Orta Doğu Irak
Karadeniz Bölgesi
Akdeniz Konuları
Güney Kafkasya ve Orta Asya'da İşbirliği Girişimleri
Uluslararası Kuruluşlarda Avrasya Konularında İşbirliği
Kapsamlı Avrupa Güvenlik Yapısı Konusu
ULUSLARARASI TERÖRİZMLE MÜCADELE
Uluslararası Terörizm Konularında İkili Danışmaların Geliştirilmesi
EKONOMİK ALAN
Enerji

Rusya Federasyonu ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Arasında Dostluğun ve Çok Boyutlu Ortaklığın Derinleştirilmesine İlişkin

ORTAK DEKLARASYON

Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Başkanı ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı Ankara'da gerçekleştirilen resmi görüşmelerin tamamlanmasını takiben,

Olumlu bir temele dayalı ve dostluk ve iyi komşuluk geleneği bulunan devletlerarası ilişkilerin 500 yılı aşkın tarihine ve özellikle son on yıl içinde gözlenen yeni ve nitelikli ikili işbirliği tecrübesine dayanarak,

25 Mayıs 1992 tarihli 'Rusya Federasyonu ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Arasındaki İlişkilerin Esasları Hakkındaki Antlaşma' ve 16 Kasım 2001 tarihli 'Rusya Federasyonu ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Arasında Avrasya'da İşbirliği Eylem Planı' dahil olmak üzere diğer Rus-Türk belgelerinde ortaya konulan ilkeleri esas alarak,

Uluslararası hukukun genel kabul gören ilkeleri ve normlarına, Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) Şartında ve iki devletin taraf bulunduğu diğer ikili ve çok taraflı uluslararası antlaşmalar ve anlaşmalarda belirtilen sorumluluklarına sadık olduklarını ifade ederek,

Devletlerinin, BM Şartında öngörülen küresel ve bölgesel düzeylerdeki ortak güvenlik tedbirlerinin etkin şekilde uygulanmasını desteklemek yönündeki arzularını teyid ederek,

Siyasi bağımsızlık, egemenlik ve toprak bütünlüğü, içişlerine karışmama, eşitlik, karşılıklı anlayış ve güven ilkeleri temelinde Rus-Türk ilişkilerinin ve karşılıklı yarara dayalı işbirliğinin daha da geliştirilmesi ve pekiştirilmesi yönündeki karşılıklı irade ve arzudan hareketle ve ikili ilişkilerin çok boyutlu güçlendirilmiş ortaklık düzeyine yükseltilmesini hedefleyerek, aşağıdaki hususları açıklarlar:

I

Rusya Federasyonu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, dost ve komşu iki ülke olarak, ikili ilişkilerin siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal temellerinin daha sağlamlaşmış ve derinleşmiş, karşılıklı güven ve dayanışma ortamının pekiştirilmiş olduğunu memnuniyetle not ederler.

Taraflar, ilişkilerin çeşitlendirilmesi ve derinleştirilmesi yönündeki imkan ve potansiyelin azami ölçüde kullanılması hususundaki yapıcı görüş birliğinden hareketle, bu amaca yönelik olarak Devlet Başkanları, Başbakanlar, Parlamento Başkanları ve Bakanlar düzeyi dahil, her düzeydeki temas ve ziyaretlerin sıklaştırılmasının, siyasi, ekonomik, kültürel ve diğer konulardaki istişare mekanizmalarının düzenli ve en etkin şekilde kullanılmasının ve geliştirilmesinin, Birleşmiş Milletler Örgütü ve diğer çok taraflı forumlarda temas ve işbirliğinin güçlendirilmesinin önemini vurgularlar.

Rusya Federasyonu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Avrupa ve Asya'nın birer parçası olarak eşsiz bir jeopolitik konumda olan, dünya uygarlığının önde gelen odakları Batı ve Doğu arasında doğal köprü rolünü üstlenen, BM Şartında belirtilen demokrasi ve hukukun üstünlüğü gibi temel ilke ve değerlere bağlılık temelinde buluşan iki Avrasya ülkesi sıfatıyla, içinde bulundukları bölgede ve genel olarak uluslararası alanda güvenlik, barış, istikrar ve refahın geliştirilmesine katkıda bulunmaya devam edeceklerini belirtirler.

Taraflar, konumları ve dünya barışı için taşıdıkları önem itibarıyla, kültürler arası diyaloga ve dayanışmaya özenle katkılarını sürdüreceklerini kaydederler.

Rusya Federasyonu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, uluslararası ve bölgesel birçok soruna ilişkin temel yaklaşımlarının birbirine benzer veya yakın olduğunu memnuniyetle not ederler.

Rusya Federasyonu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, BM Şartı hükümlerinin ve uluslararası hukukun diğer normlarının üstünlüğüne ve uluslararası ilişkilerde ana sorunların çözülmesinde ortak ve çok taraflı yaklaşımlara dayanan mekanizmaların 21.yüzyıldaki dünya düzeninin temelini teşkil etmesi gerektiği inancından hareketle, uluslararası barış ve güvenliğin güçlendirilmesine, bölgesel ihtilafların önlenmesine ve çözüme kavuşturulmasına, BM Güvenlik Konseyi, Genel Kurulu ve diğer ana organlarının etkinliğinin artırılmasına, bunların yeni dünya gerçeklerine uyarlanmasına ortak katkıda

bulunmak için ikili planda, BM çerçevesinde ve diğer çok taraflı forumlarda işbirliğinin ve istişarelerin güçlendirilmesi gereğinin altını çizerler.

Rusya Federasyonu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti BM, AGİT ve diğer uluslararası kuruluşların organlarına yapılacak seçimlerde Tarafların adaylıklarını karşılıklılık temeli üzerinde hayırhahlıkla ele almaya hazır olduklarını beyan ederler.

Taraflar, BM Şartından kaynaklanan sorumluluklarını ve Birleşmiş Milletler Teşkilatı'nın daha da güçlendirilmesine ve dünya meselelerindeki merkezi rolünün pekiştirilmesine katkıda bulunmak yönündeki isteklerini teyid ederler; uluslararası güvenliğin sağlanması, terörizmin çeşitli tür ve şekilleriyle mücadele başta olmak üzere güncel risk ve tehditlere karşı ortak mücadelede Birleşmiş Milletler, AGİT, Avrupa Konseyi ve diğer bölgesel kuruluşlar ile işbirliğinin güçlendirilmesini desteklerler.

Rusya Federasyonu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, tüm Avrupa devletlerinin çıkarları ile ortak değerlerine, yükümlülüklerine ve davranış normlarına dayanan, bir ortak Avrupa alanının oluşturulması yolunda, Avrupa'da kapsamlı bir güvenlik mimarisinin güçlendirilmesi için yapıcı bir diyalogun önemini vurgularlar.

II

Taraflar, uluslararası barış ve güvenliğe yönelik yeni bir tehdit oluşturan terörizme, kitle imha silahlarının yayılmasına, kaçakçılığa, yasadışı uyuşturucu ticaretine, yasadışı göçe, insan ticaretine ve organize suç türlerine karşı, ikili ve çok taraflı uluslararası anlaşma ve sözleşmeler çerçevesinde ortak mücadele etme kararlıklarını teyid ederler. Taraflar, BM Şartı'nda öngörülen ortak güvenlik sisteminin küresel ve bölgesel düzeyde etkinliğinin artırılmasını, BM Binyıl Bildirgesi'nde onaylanan hedeflere ulaşmak amacıyla BM'nin önderliğinde 21.yüzyılın yeni risk ve tehditlerine kapsamlı bir karşı strateji hazırlanmasını desteklerler.

Taraflar, her tür ve şekildeki terörizmi kınar, terörizmle mücadele alanında ortak çabaların güçlendirilmesinin önemini vurgularlar. Bu çerçevede Taraflar, 5 Kasım 1999 tarihli Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında Terörizm ile Mücadelede İşbirliği Ortak Deklarasyonu'na, 18 Aralık 1996 tarihli Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında Terörizm ile Mücadele Alanında İşbirliğine İlişkin Memorandum'a ve 30 Ekim 1992 tarihli Rusya Federasyonu İçişleri Bakanlığı ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İçişleri Bakanlığı Arasında İşbirliği Anlaşması'na atıfta bulunarak, bu düzenlemelerle tesis edilen istişare ve işbirliği mekanizmalarının etkin şekilde işletilmeleri hususundaki kararlılıklarını belirtirler.

III

Rusya Federasyonu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, son yıllarda ticari – ekonomik ilişkilerinin dinamik şekilde gelişmesinden duydukları memnuniyeti dile getirir ve çok yönlü, kapsamlı ve istikrarlı ticari ve ekonomik ilişkilerin ikili ilişkilerin bütününe olan olumlu etkisini teyid ederler.

Taraflar, ikili ticaret hacminin ulaştığı düzeyi memnuniyetle kaydederler ve bu alandaki potansyelin en iyi şekilde kullanılarak ticaretin her iki tarafın yararına olacak şekilde dengeli bir zeminde daha da artırılmasına yönelik çabalara hız kazandırılması gereğini vurgularlar.

Taraflar, karşılıklı yatırımları ve müteahhitlik hizmetlerini, sanayi tesislerinin özelleştirilmesine katılımı, ulaştırma ve haberleşme alanlarındaki her iki tarafın yararına olan ilişkilerin daha da gelişmesini ve genişlemesini teşvik edici şartların hazırlanmasını etkin şekilde desteklerler.

Taraflar, ikili ticari ve ekonomik ilişkilerin geliştirilmesi yönünde, mevcut olan Hükümetlerarası Karma Ekonomik Komisyon (KEK) ve çalışma grupları gibi mekanizmaların çalışmalarının önemini vurgulayarak, bunlardan en verimli ve etkin bir şekilde istifade edilmesi ve ikili ticari ve ekonomik ilişkilerin niteliğini ve küresel ekonomik eğilimleri de dikkate alan uzun vadeli bir strateji oluşturulması yönünde çaba sarfedeceklerini belirtirler.

Taraflar, ticari ve ekonomik alanda özel sektörün başlıca rolü oynadığını dikkate alarak, iki ülkenin iş çevreleri, ticaret ve sanayi odaları, işadamları dernekleri ve birlikleri arasındaki temasları, işadamları için vize işlemlerinin basitleştirilmesi ve hızlandırılması dahil desteklerler. Bu çerçevede, Rusya Federasyonu Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası ile Türkiye Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu (DEİK) himayesi altında

faaliyet gösteren ve bölgelerarası ekonomik ilişkilerin düzenlenmesine ve gelişmesine pratik yardım sağlayan Rus-Türk ve Türk-Rus İş Konseylerinin çalışmalarını takdir ederler.

Taraflar, enerji sektöründeki işbirliğinin iki ülke arasındaki bağları ve karşılıklı çıkarları güçlendiren önemli bir unsur oluşturduğunu tespit ederek, enerji alanındaki işbirliğinin karşılıklı çıkar temelinde daha da geliştirilmesi ve çeşitlendirilmesi imkanlarının araştırılmasının önemini belirtirler.

Taraflar, turizm alanındaki ilişkilerin, gerek iki ülke halklarının birbirlerini daha yakından tanımalarına, gerek ticari ve ekonomik ilişkilerin geliştirilmesine katkıda bulunması cihetiyle, geliştirilmesi ve turizm alanındaki yatırım ve müteahhitlik hizmetlerinde işbirliğinin daha ileri seviyeye çıkarılması hususunda görüş birliğine varmışlardır.

Taraflar, askeri, teknik ve savunma sanayii alanında ikili işbirliğinin ortak yarar doğrultusunda geliştirilmesi amacıyla bu alanda mevcut olanakların değerlendirilmesine yönelik çalışmalara destek olacaklardır. Bu çerçevede Taraflar, Hükümetlerarası Rus-Türk askeri, teknik ve savunma sanayii işbirliği Karma Komisyonu'nun verimli çalışmalar gerçekleştirmesine özel önem verirler.

IV

Taraflar, parlamentolar düzeyindeki temasları daha da geliştirmek ve düzenli hale getirmek ve bu çerçevede, dostluk grupları ile ilgili komiteler düzeyinde karşılıklı ziyaret ve görüş alış verişini arttırmak niyetindedirler.

Taraflar, iki ülke halklarının birbirlerini daha iyi tanımalarına, karşılıklı güven ve dayanışma ortamının pekiştirilmesine yönelik olarak, sosyal, kültürel, eğitim, bilim ve teknoloji, basın-yayın, spor ve gençlik alanlarında temas ve işbirliğine ivme kazandırılmasının önemini dile getirirler.

Taraflar, anılan alanlardaki işbirliğinin geliştirilmesi ve çeşitlendirilmesi konusunda kararlılıklarını vurgularlar ve bu amaçla, hazırlanan Kültür, Eğitim, Bilim, Gençlik ve Spor alanlarında Hükümetlerarası Değişim Programı'nın bir an evvel imzalayarak uygulamaya konması, keza Tanıtma ve Kültür Merkezlerinin Oluşturulması ve Faaliyet Koşullarına dair Hükümetlerarası Anlaşma taslağı üzerinde çalışmaların sonuçlandırılmasının gerektiği hususunda mutabık kalmışlardır.

Bu çerçevede Taraflar iki ülkenin kültür ve sanat kuruluşları, üniversiteleri ile diğer eğitim kuruluşları, bilimsel araştırma kuruluşları, basın yayın organları, arşivleri, gençlik ve spor kuruluşları arasında doğrudan temas ve işbirliğinde bulunulmasını ve ortak faaliyetler düzenlenmesini destekleyeceklerdir.

Taraflar iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin her alanda gelişmesinin en temel koşullarından birinin insani temasları arttırmak olduğu düşüncesinden hareketle, Rusya Federasyonu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşlarının birbirlerinin ülkelerine yapacakları seyahatleri kolaylaştırmak ve özendirmek amacıyla, vize işlemlerini basitleştirme ve süratlendirme doğrultusunda çaba göstereceklerdir.

V

Avrasya bölgesine büyük ilgi gösteren ve burada özel çıkarları bulunan Rusya Federasyonu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, bölgenin güvenliğine, istikrarına ve refahına katkı sağlayacağı anlayışından hareketle, siyasi ve ekonomik danışmaları ve işbirliğini Avrasya boyutuna taşımak hedefi doğrultusunda imzaladıkları "Rusya Federasyonu ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Arasında Avrasya'da İşbirliği Eylem Planı" çerçevesinde hayata geçirilen Yüksek Düzeyli Ortak Çalışma Grubu'nun faaliyetlerinde duydukları memnuniyeti dile getirirler.

Taraflar, Yüksek Düzeyli Ortak Çalışma Grubu'nun, iki ülke arasındaki mevcut işbirliğinin Avrasya bölgesine taşınması bakımından önemli bir platform haline geldiğini, iki ülkeyi ilgilendiren bölgesel ve uluslararası konuların yapıcı ve samimi bir ortamda ele alınmasına katkı sağladığını teyid ederler. Taraflar ayrıca Ortak Çalışma Grubu'nun ekonomik ve ticari işbirliğinin somut projeler temelinde Avrasya coğrafyasına taşınması yönündeki çalışmalarından duyulan memnuniyeti belirtirler.

VI

Taraflar, Hazar-Karadeniz bölgesinin hidrokarbon kaynakları dahil, ihracat ve transit potansiyelinin geliştirilmesine katkıda bulunma arzusundadırlar. Taraflar, bu konuda karşılıklı çıkarlara dayalı işbirliğini, ekonomik uygunluk ve çevresel güvenlik ilkeleri gözönünde tutarak, geliştirme imkanlarını

araştırmaya yönelik danışmalarda bulunma niyetlerini belirtirler. Ayrıca, Avrasya'da ulaşım ve iletişim yollarına desteklerini teyid ederler.

Taraflar, 20 Temmuz 1936 tarihli "Boğazlar Rejimi Hakkında Montrö Sözleşmesi'ne ve seyir güvenliği ile çevrenin korunmasına ilişkin uluslararası yükümlülüklerine karşılıklı bağlılıklarını vurgulayarak, Boğazlarda can, mal, çevre ve seyir güvenliğinin sağlanmasının ve geçiş serbestisinin muhafazasının önemini teyid ederek, iki ülke arasındaki denizcilik ilişkilerinin daha da geliştirilmesi için istişarelerde bulunmaya devam edeceklerdir.

Rusya Federasyonu ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örtü'nün (KEİ) bölgesel ekonomik işbirliğine ve dolayısıyla istikrara ve güvenliğe önemli katkıda bulunmakta olduğunu beyan ederler. Taraflar, Örgütün etkinliğinin daha da güçlendirilerek artırılmasını destekleyeceklerdir.

Taraflar, yeni risk ve tehditlerle mücadele dahil Karadeniz bölgesinin güvenlik ve istikrarı için BLACKSEAFOR, Karadeniz'de Deniz Kuvvetleri Alanında Güven ve Güvenlik Artırıcı Önlemler Belgesi" ve yapılabilecek diğer düzenlemelerle kıyıdaş ülkeler arasında işbirliğinin güçlendirilmesine ve derinleştirilmesine verdikleri önemi teyid ederler.

VII

Rusya Federasyonu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, karşılıklı güven ve saygıya dayalı sağlam bir temeli olan mevcut dostluk ilişkilerini ve işbirliğini iki ülke halkının yararı için çok boyutlu güçlendirilmiş ortaklık düzeyine yükseltmek hususundaki kararlılıklarını ifade ederler.

Taraflar, böyle bir ortaklığın bölgesel ve uluslararası planda barışa, istikrara ve refaha katkıda bulunacağına dair güçlü inançlarını vurgularlar.

Rus Tarafı ve Türk Tarafı, işbu Deklarasyon'un Rus-Türk işbirliğine yeni bir ivme sağlayacağı inancındadırlar.

06 Aralık 2004 tarihinde Ankara'da Rusça ve Türkçe dillerinde iki nüsha halinde yapılmıştır.

RUSYA FEDERASYONU DEVLET BAŞKANI V.PUTİN

TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ CUMHURBAŞKANI A.N.SEZER

Joint Declaration between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on Progress towards a New Stage in Relations and Further Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership, Moscow, 13 February 2009

Following the completion of official talks in Moscow between the President of the Republic of Turkey and the President of the Russian Federation,

Taking into consideration traditionally friendly and good-neighbourly relations between the two countries based on a solid foundation,

Referring to the "Friendship and Brotherhood Agreement Between the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Government of the Russian Federal Socialist Republic", dated 16 March 1921, which is one of the important documents displaying the reciprocal spirit of friendship and solidarity,

Taking into consideration the principles and goals set out in the Turkish-Russian documents including "The Treaty on the Principles of Relations Between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation" dated 25 May 1992, "Action Plan Between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on Cooperation in Eurasia" dated 16 November 2001, "Joint Declaration Between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on Deepening Friendship and Multi-Dimensional Partnership" dated 6 December 2004,

Being faithful to the generally accepted principles and norms of international law, and to their responsibilities stated in the United Nations Charter and in other bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements to which they are party,

Reiterating their States' desire to support effective implementation of the common security measures foreseen at the UN Charter at global and regional level,

In line with their common will and desire to further enhance and strengthen Turkish-Russian relations and cooperation on the basis of mutual understanding and trust, they declare the following:

The Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation, as two friendly and neighbouring countries, take note with satisfaction the important progress made in bilateral relations and cooperation towards multi-dimensional enhanced partnership, in line with the objectives stated in the Joint Declaration of 6 December 2004.

The Parties, take also note with satisfaction the increase in the number of contacts and visits particularly at the level of Heads of State, Prime Ministers and Ministers, the holding of regular consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs on bilateral, regional and international issues, as well as the growing number of contacts and consultations between other state authorities and emphasize the importance of maintaining this increasing momentum.

The Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation indicate that, it is necessary to make regular visits and consultations at the level of Speakers of Parliament and Friendship Groups, with the understanding of revitalizing parliamentary relations in congruence with the advanced level of their bilateral relations, and declare their will for encouraging the parliaments of both countries accordingly.

The Parties state that, bilateral relations and cooperation between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation serve the interests of both countries and contribute considerably to peace, security, stability and development throughout the vast Eurasian geography as well as at the international level, and declare that their joint efforts towards this target will be preserved in the forthcoming period.

The Parties take note with satisfaction that their approaches and policies on many regional and international issues and problems have similarities, and in this context, reaffirm their determination to further strengthen current consultation mechanisms, as well as to develop efficient cooperation at the United Nations and at other multilateral fora.

The Parties, aiming at the further improvement of the comprehensive and indivisible security system in the Euro-Atlantic area and taking into account the contribution of all institutions working in the field of European security, support the continuation of the dialogue initiated with all partners. The Parties will take part in the comprehensive preliminary talks which will be held over the ideas and proposals put forward in this context, including the relevant initiatives of both States.

The Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation declare that they will consider with good will, on the basis of reciprocity, each other's candidatures at the elections to be held at the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and other international organisations.

The Parties reaffirm their resolve to jointly combat, within the framework of existing bilateral and multilateral agreements and conventions, terrorism which poses new threats to international peace and security, crossborder organized crimes including smuggling, the trafficking of illicitly produced goods, narcotics and arms, human trafficking and illegal immigration. The Parties support greater effectiveness at the global and regional levels for the collective security system envisaged in the UN Charter, and with a view to reaching the goals stipulated in the UN Millennium Declaration, the preparation of a comprehensive counter-strategy against the new risks and threats of the 21st century under the aegis of the United Nations. To this end, the Parties reaffirm their will to cooperate in the UN as well as within the context of other international and regional platforms dealing with issues relating to other threats to global security such as combating terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human trafficking, illegal immigration etc.

The Parties condemn all kinds and forms of terrorism; emphasize the importance of strengthening common efforts in the field of combating terrorism. The Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation declare their satisfaction over recent developments in their relations and cooperation in the field of security.

The Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation, with a view to bringing the existing cooperation in the security field to a higher level, and referring to the previously signed documents, Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation on Combating Terrorism signed between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on 18 December 1996 and lastly the Memorandum of Understanding of the Fourth Meeting of the Joint Working Group on Combating Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism, dated 14 March 2007, express their determination on consolidating the legal basis in this area.

The Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation express their satisfaction for the continuation of the rapid development and deepening of the bilateral commercial-economic relations, and confirming the positive effect of multi-dimensional, comprehensive and stable commercial-economic relations on overall bilateral relations, state that they will continue to encourage and support in this direction.

The Parties underline the importance of encouraging free movement of capital, goods and services originating from the two countries, harmonizing of the two countries' economic infrastructures, and the development and enforcement of bilateral and regional joint policies in the fields of transportation and customs.

In this respect, the Parties declare their will to put into force, as soon as possible, legal regulations providing free movement of capital, goods and services originating from the two countries.

The Parties, noting their satisfaction for the progress achieved in line with the aim to increase bilateral trade volume, as stated in the Joint Declaration of 6 December 2004, confirm their intention to exert efforts in order to reach common solutions for sustaining and diversifying the bilateral trade in a more balanced way avoiding technical and nontariff barriers. The Parties underline the importance and efficacy of solving any kind of problems which could arise in the bilateral trade, first and foremost through negotiations at technical level.

The Parties express their satisfaction for the growth in mutual investments and contracting services and their determination to sustain and encourage this process including also participation in privatization tenders.

The Parties confirm their determination to develop further the successful cooperation in contracting services achieved so far, also in the framework of the projects to be realized within the context of the preparation for 2014 Sochi Winter Games preparations.

The Parties declare their support to the projects for improving land, sea and railway transportation. In this framework, the Parties emphasize the significance of taking concrete steps regarding the liberalization of bilateral TIR transportation and of improving bilateral trade and services by establishing logistics centres in the two countries.

The Parties confirm the importance of regular convening of the Intergovernmental Joint Economic Commission (JEC), established with the aim to promote commercial and economic relations, along with its working groups; as well as the transportation, energy, agriculture, customs and other economic and decision-making platforms, including especially the meetings of the MFA General Directors on interregional cooperation and the activities of the Joint Commission for Land Transportation.

The Parties express their satisfaction for the implementation and ferry transportation project between Samsun (Republic of Turkey) and Kavkaz (Russian Federation) ports. The Parties believe that this project will further develop Turkish-Russian trade and provide integration of both countries' transportation systems on the basis of mutual interest.

The Parties, with reference to the important role of the private sector and its contribution in the commercial and economic fields, support the process of simplifying and speeding up the visa formalities for businessmen as well as facilitating contacts among business circles, chambers of trade and industry, businessmen's associations and unions, and underline the importance of intensifying efforts in this respect.

The Parties express their appreciation and support for the work of the Turkish-Russian and Russian-Turkish Business Councils.

Considering the positive effects of the development of interregional cooperation in economic, commercial, cultural, humanitarian and other fields in the bilateral relations, the Parties encourage the endeavours in this respect. Within the context of the Blue Stream Project which became operational in 2003, the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation reaffirm that the energy occupies a strategically significant place in the Turkish-Russian relations and that there is a potential for furthering the cooperation in this field. The Parties support the development as well as diversification of current relations and cooperation through concrete projects among relevant authorities/institutions in every aspect of the energy sector .

The Parties consider the cooperation in the nuclear energy field an important component of their commercial and economic relations. They also reaffirm their readiness to further develop the legal and technical basis of this cooperation. The Turkish side welcomes the Russian companies' interest in the nuclear energy projects.

The Parties note with satisfaction the progress achieved in the tourism sector, and considering its contributions to the rapprochement of the two countries' peoples and development of economic relations, declare that they will make efforts to further improve cooperation, and also to promote investments in this field. The Parties confirm their intention to further already existing close cooperation within the World Tourism Organization.

The Parties emphasize the special importance they attach at the fruitful work of the Turkish-Russian Intergovernmental Joint Commission for Cooperation in Military, Technical and Defence Industry, and at enhancing bilateral cooperation in the field of military, technical and defence industry in line with common interests. The Parties note that, solving pending issues within the context of military-technical cooperation between the two countries, will pave the way for further cooperation in this field.

The Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation emphasize that the existing cooperation in social, cultural, educational, scientific and technological fields and mass media, sports and youth should be developed further with a view to consolidating mutual confidence and solidarity between the two countries and to enable the peoples of the two countries to get better acquainted with each other and respective cultures.

The Parties confirm their will to spend efforts for the signing, as quickly as possible, of "The Cooperation Program Between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation in the Fields of Education, Science, Culture, Youth and Sports", which was prepared with a view to bringing momentum to the cooperation in the abovementioned fields.

The Parties declare that they are fully satisfied with the successful realization of Russian Culture Year in Turkey in 2007 and Turkish Culture Year in Russia in 2008, which contributed significantly to the consolidation of the cultural interaction between the peoples of the two countries, and they state that they support the realization of similar activities in the forthcoming years.

Taking into consideration the need arising from the increasing Russian population in Turkey and Turkish population in Russia, The Parties decided to intensify the cooperation between the Ministries of National Education in order to facilitate education of Turkish and Russian children in each other's countries through mutual concrete steps.

The Parties state that, in line with the economic, commercial and cultural relations developing between the two countries, they will undertake necessary efforts with respect to the establishment of cultural centers, which will lay the ground for further cooperation in these fields.

The Parties state that, with reference to the Joint Declaration of 6 December 2004 which stipulates reciprocal facilitation and expedition of visa procedures with a view to enhancing human contacts, they will continue their efforts to facilitate and encourage reciprocal visits of Turkish and Russian citizens.

Considering the fact that the history of Turkish-Russian relations dating back to 500 years is the common heritage of both peoples and constitutes the solid foundations of the existing friendly relations and partnership between the two countries, both parties will take the necessary precautions for the preservation and accessibility of their respective national monuments located in each other's countries, which constitute the historical, cultural and spiritual heritage of each party. Within this context, both Parties will provide assistance reciprocally to build new military cemeteries and to restore the existing ones in their respective countries.

The Parties, convinced that Turkish-Russian relations and cooperation serve the interests of both countries and also contribute to peace, security, stability and development of Eurasia, take note with satisfaction the activities of the High Level Joint Group established on 16 November 2001, for carrying out activities within the context of "Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation".

The Parties state their determination for continuation of the activities efficiently of the High Level Joint Group, including realization of concrete projects within the context of cooperation in economic and trade fields.

The Parties, with the understanding that security and stability in the Eurasian geography is directly related with the stability in the South Caucasus region, agree on the necessity to take effective measures for resolving frozen conflicts

that constitute potential destabilizing elements in the South Caucasus. In this regard, the Parties consider the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, that was proposed by the Republic of Turkey as a constructive initiative that would be complementary to existing international mechanisms and that would help overcome lack of confidence that they observe that exists among the countries that are parties to the frozen conflicts.

The Parties confirm their desire to further develop the potentials of export and transit, as well as of the hydro-carbon reserves in the Black Sea region. The Parties state that they will hold consultations for studying the opportunities to improve the cooperation based on mutual interests, on the principles of economic suitability, protection of environment and fight against terrorism. The Parties also confirm their support for the transportation routes in Eurasia.

The Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation declare that the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) contributes significantly to the regional economic cooperation and hence the stability and security of the Region. The two sides, declare their common will to make joint efforts in order to utilize utmost the possibilities for cooperation, with a view to increase the efficiency of BSEC which is the main multilateral cooperation platform in the Black Sea Region.

Both Parties reaffirm the importance of the participation of the Black Sea littoral states in all activities to maintain the security of the Black Sea maritime domain, including combating against possible new asymmetric threats and/or risks, within the framework of the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR), Operation Black Sea Harmony (OBSH), Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea and other potential arrangements to strengthen and enhance the cooperation among littoral states. In this context, both parties extend their full support to the Black Sea Defence Ministerial.

Bearing in mind the strategic importance of the Black Sea region, both Parties expressed their satisfaction for sharing the common views on protection of the security and stability of the region as well as the fight against risks and/or asymmetric threats, and in this context both Parties emphasize their determination to continue to develop within both international and regional organizations multilateral as well as bilateral cooperation.

The Parties, underlining their commitment to "The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of Turkish Straits" of 20 July 1936 and their international obligations concerning safety of navigation and protection of environment, and reaffirming the importance of ensuring safety of life, property, environment and navigation as well as preserving the principles of freedom of passage and navigation, state the significance of the continuation of regular consultations to further improve maritime relations between the two countries.

The Parties, emphasizing that the "Convention for the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution" signed in 21 April 1992 between the coastal states is the basic cooperation platform that is established to protect the Black Sea environment through joint efforts, declare their determination to strengthen the cooperation under the Convention and effective utilization of existing cooperation mechanisms.

The Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation emphasize their strong belief that, by putting into practice the issues included in this Joint Declaration, current relations and cooperation between the two countries will reach a new level which will define a new period of multi-dimensional partnership between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation.

Done in Moscow, on 13 February 2009, in Turkish and Russian languages in two copies.

PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

A.GÜL D.A.MEDVEDEV

APPENDIX B

Table 1: Turkish Exports to Russian Federation: Main Items¹¹⁸⁸

Rank	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
1	Grain	Iron and steel products	Sugar and sugar products	Woven clothes and accessories	Woven clothes and accessories	Woven clothes and accessories
2	Ship, waterboat and other sea vehicles	Sugar and sugar products	Leather products	Unwoven clothes and accessories	Unwoven clothes and accessories	Unwoven clothes and accessories
3	Iron and steel products	Unwoven clothes and accessories	Shoes and gaiters	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and components	Motorized vehicles	Ready-made drugs
4	Leather products	Tobacco	Motorized vehicles	Sugar and sugar products	Ready-made drugs	Shoes and gaiters
5	Tobacco	Iron and steel products	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and components	Plastics and plastical products	Plastics and plastical products	Motorized vehicles
6	Woven clothes and accessories	Leather products	Unwoven clothes and accessories	Ready-made drugs	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and components	Soap and other hygiene products
7	Animal fats and vegetable oil	Woven clothes and accessories	Woven clothes and accessories	Leather products	Sugar and sugar products	Plastics and plastical products
8	Shoes and gaiters	Electrical machines	Nuts and citrus fruits	Motorized vehicles	Soap and other	Textiles and rags

¹¹⁸⁸ Source: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Available [online]: <
<http://www.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/jsp/body/tumraporlar.jsp>> [31 May 2008].

		and devices and their parts and component s			hygiene products	
9	Unwoven clothes and accessories	Skins and furs	Textiles and rags	Textiles and rags	Shoes and gaiters	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and component s
10	Pharmaceuti cal products	Animal fats and vegetable oil	Plastics and plastical products	Animal fats and vegetable oil	Textiles and rags	Skins and furs

Table 2: Turkish Imports from Russian Federation: Main Items¹¹⁸⁹

Rank	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
1	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels
2	Iron and steel	Iron and steel	Iron and steel	Iron and steel	Iron and steel	Iron and steel
3	Fertilizer	Motorized vehicles	Paper and cardboards	Fertilizer	Oily seeds, straw and animal feed	Aluminium and aluminium products
4	Motorized vehicles	Fertilizer	Fertilizer	Aviation vehicles, spacecrafts and their parts and components	Paper and cardboards	Oily seeds, straw and animal feed
5	Shoes and gaiters	Paper and cardboards	Wood pulp	Aluminium and aluminium products	Wood coal	Paper and cardboards
6	Cotton	Wood coal	Organical chemicals	Wood pulp	Fertilizer	Wood coal
7	Paper and cardboards	Inorganical chemicals	Synthetic fibers	Oily seeds, straw and animal feed	Aluminium and aluminium products	Fertilizer
8	Animal fats and vegetable oil	Aluminium and aluminium products	Inorganical chemicals	Synthetic fibers	Plastics and plastical products	Zinc and zinc products
9	Organical chemicals	Synthetic fibers	Plastics and	Wood coal	Synthetic fibers	Copper and copper

¹¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

			plastical products			products
10	Synthetic fibers	Plastics and plastical products	Animal fats and vegetable oil	Synthetic products	Skins and furs	Plastics and plastical products

Table 3: Turkish Exports to Russian Federation: Main Items¹¹⁹⁰

Rank	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
1	Woven clothes and accessories	Woven clothes and accessories	Unwoven clothes and accessories	Iron and steel products	Iron and steel products
2	Unwoven clothes and accessories	Nuts and citrus fruits	Nuts and citrus fruits	Nuts and citrus fruits	Nuts and citrus fruits
3	Shoes and gaiters	Unwoven clothes and accessories	Plastics and plastical products	Motorized vehicles	Motorized vehicles
4	Ready-made drugs	Skins and furs	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and components	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and components	Skins and furs
5	Plastics and plastical products	Plastics and plastical products	Woven clothes and accessories	Skins and furs	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and components
6	Soap and other hygiene products	Soap and other hygiene products	Cauldrons, machines and devices and their parts and components	Plastics and plastical products	Plastics and plastical products
7	Textiles and rags	Shoes and gaiters	Skins and furs	Cauldrons, machines and devices and their parts and components	Soap and other hygiene products
8	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and components	Leather products	Soap and other hygiene products	Soap and other hygiene products	Cauldrons, machines and devices and their parts and components

¹¹⁹⁰ Source: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Available [online]: <
<http://www.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/jsp/body/tumraporlar.jsp>> [28 October 2008].

9	Sugar and sugar products	Cauldrons, machines and devices and their parts and components	Leather products	Unwoven clothes and accessories	Unwoven clothes and accessories
10	Nuts and citrus fruits	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and components	Tobacco	Textiles, laces, arrases and embroideries	Vegetables

Table 4: Turkish Imports from Russian Federation: Main Items¹¹⁹¹

Rank	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
1	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels
2	Iron and steel	Iron and steel	Iron and steel	Iron and steel	Iron and steel
3	Aluminium and aluminium products	Aluminium and aluminium products	Aluminium and aluminium products	Aluminium and aluminium products	Aluminium and aluminium products
4	Oily seeds, straw and animal feed	Paper and cardboards	Paper and cardboards	Paper and cardboards	Paper and cardboards
5	Paper and cardboards	Wood coal	Fertilizer	Fertilizer	Fertilizer
6	Fertilizer	Fertilizer	Wood coal	Zinc and zinc products	Copper and copper products
7	Wood coal	Wood pulp	Oily seeds, straw and animal feed	Wood coal	Grain
8	Zinc and zinc products	Plastics and plastical products	Copper and copper products	Copper and copper products	Wood coal
9	Copper and copper products	Copper and copper products	Zinc and zinc products	Wood pulp	Zinc and zinc products
10	Plastics and plastical products	Zinc and zinc products	Motorized vehicles	Plastics and plastical products	Synthetic fibers

¹¹⁹¹ Ibid.

Table 5: Turkish Exports to Russian Federation: Main Items¹¹⁹²

Rank	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
1	Motorized vehicles	Motorized vehicles	Motorized vehicles	Motorized vehicles	Motorized vehicles	Motorized vehicles	Nuts and citrus fruits	Motorized vehicles	Motorized vehicles
2	Nuts and citrus fruits	Nuts and citrus fruits	Nuts and citrus fruits	Nuts and citrus fruits	Nuts and citrus fruits	Cauldrons, machines and devices and their parts and components	Motorized vehicles	Nuts and citrus fruits	Nuts and citrus fruits
3	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and components	Cauldrons, machines and devices and their parts and components	Cauldrons, machines and devices and their parts and components	Cauldrons, machines and devices and their parts and components	Cauldrons, machines and devices and their parts and components	Nuts and citrus fruits	Woven goods	Woven goods	Cauldrons, machines and devices and their parts and components
4	Plastics and plastical products	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and components	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and components	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and components	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and components	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and components	Cauldrons, machines and devices and their parts and components	Vegetables	Woven goods

¹¹⁹² Source: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Available [online]: <

http://tuikrapor.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?disticaretb2&report=TYtablo03.RDF&desformat=html&p_kod=1&p_yil1=2009&p_ulke1=75&ENVID=disticaretEnv > [03 March 2012].

5	Cauldrons, machines and devices and their parts and components	Plastics and plastical products	Plastics and plastical products	Plastics and plastical products	Plastics and plastical products	Metallic salt, sulphur, stucco and cement	Plastics and plastical products	Cauldrons, machines and devices and their parts and components	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and components
6	Skins and furs	Unwoven clothes and accessories	Synthetic fibers	Synthetic fibers	Vegetables	Vegetables	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and components	Plastics and plastical products	Vegetables
7	Soap and other hygiene products	Vegetables	Textiles, laces, arrases and embroideries	Iron and steel products	Synthetic fibers	Plastics and plastical products	Synthetic fibers	Electrical machines and devices and their parts and components	Plastics and plastical products
8	Unwoven clothes and accessories	Soap and other hygiene products	Iron and steel products	Vegetables	Iron and steel products	Woven goods	Iron and steel products	Synthetic fibers	Synthetic fibers

9	Textiles, laces, arrases and embroideries	Iron and steel products	Unwoven clothes and accessories	Textiles, laces, arrases and embroideries	Woven goods	Iron and steel products	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels
10	Vegetables	Textiles, laces, arrases and embroideries	Woven goods	Woven goods	Pearls, gemstones, metal products and coins	Synthetic fibers	Textiles, laces, arrases and embroideries	Unwoven clothes and accessories	Pearls, gemstones, metal products and coins

Table 6: Turkish Imports from Russian Federation: Main Items¹¹⁹³

Rank	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
1	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels	Fossil fuels
2	Iron and steel	Iron and steel	Iron and steel	Iron and steel	Iron and steel	Iron and steel	Iron and steel	Iron and steel	Iron and steel
3	Aluminium and aluminium products	Aluminium and aluminium products	Aluminium and aluminium products	Aluminium and aluminium products	Aluminium and aluminium products	Aluminium and aluminium products	Grain	Aluminium and aluminium products	Aluminium and aluminium products
4	Fertilizer	Fertilizer	Fertilizer	Wood coal	Organical chemicals	Grain	Aluminium and aluminium	Copper and copper products	Grain

¹¹⁹³ Ibid.

							products		
5	Paper and cardboards	Copper and copper products	Organical chemicals	Copper and copper products	Copper and copper products	Organical chemicals	Fertilizer	Grain	Fertilizer
6	Grain	Paper and cardboards	Paper and cardboards	Organical chemicals	Grain	Fertilizer	Copper and copper products	Fertilizer	Organical chemicals
7	Copper and copper products	Organical chemicals	Wood coal	Fertilizer	Wood coal	Copper and copper products	Animal fats and vegetable oil	Organical chemicals	Wood coal
8	Wood coal	Wood coal	Copper and copper products	Paper and cardboards	Paper and cardboards	Paper and cardboards	Inorganical chemicals	Paper and cardboards	Inorganical chemicals
9	Zinc and zinc products	Inorganical chemicals	Inorganical chemicals	Inorganical chemicals	Fertilizer	Wood coal	Paper and cardboards	Wood coal	Paper and cardboards
10	Synthetic fibers	Synthetic fibers	Iron and steel products	Animal fats and vegetable oil	Inorganical chemicals	Inorganical chemicals	Organical chemicals	Inorganical chemicals	Rubber

APPENDIX C

CONSTRUCTION AND CONTRACTING WORKS DONE BY TURKISH FIRMS IN RUSSIAN FEDERATION

1993 -1997

Public/Government Buildings: Alarko built the Turkish and Iranian Embassy buildings.¹¹⁹⁴ Enka reconstructed the Russian Federation Government House (White House) and Russian Federation Parliament Buildings (Duma). The company was also involved in extension of Turkish Embassy building, refurbishment of the Ministry of Finance's sixth building, construction of Domodevo Airport Cargo Terminal and Supreme Court buildings.¹¹⁹⁵ Gama did the repair works of White House. Mensel JV renovated the Nefteyugansk Airport Terminal building and constructed the Nefteyugansk House of Technology.¹¹⁹⁶ Ata reconstructed Prosecutors' and Writers' buildings.¹¹⁹⁷ Finally Garanti-Koza raised the building of Saving Bank of Russia.¹¹⁹⁸

Shopping Malls, Business and Trade Centers: Most of the Turkish construction firms including Alarko, Endem, Enka, Entes, EMT-Erimtan, FEO, Gama, Güriş, Hazinedaroğlu and Özkan, Metag, Metaş, MİR, Rönesans, Summa, Tekser, Tepe and TML took part in the construction and renovation of shopping

¹¹⁹⁴ Alarko Contracting Group, Housing Projects and Public Service Buildings. Available [online]: < <http://www.alsimalarko.com.tr/housing.asp>> [01 June 2008].

¹¹⁹⁵ Enka, Completed Projects. Available [online]: < <http://www.enka.com/Projects.aspx?Completed=1>> [01 June 2008].

¹¹⁹⁶ Mensel JV, Projects Portfolio, Russia. Available [online]: < <http://www.mensel.com/>> [01 June 2008].

¹¹⁹⁷ Projects Undertaken by Ata İnşaat. Available [online]: < <http://www.atainsaat.com.tr/projects.htm>> [01 June 2008].

¹¹⁹⁸ Garanti-Koza Binalar ve Restorasyon. Available [online]: < <http://www.garantikoza.com.tr/binainsaativerestorasyon.htm>> [01 June 2008].

malls, office buildings, banks, business and commerce centers in Russian Federation. The most striking one was the Nevsky 25 Business Center project in St.Petersburg that was realized by Alarko in 1997. The project was awarded with the “Second Prize for Architecture” by the Russian Union of Architecture in 1998 as well as with “Prix d’Excellence 2000” by the International Real Estate Federation.¹¹⁹⁹

Hotels, Guest-Houses and Restaurants: Hotels, guest-houses, leisure complexes, night clubs and restaurants were again largely built by Turkish companies in many different regions of Russia. Ata, EMT-Erimtan, FEO, Gama, Hazinedaroğlu and Özkan, Mensel JV, Summa, Tekser and TML were the corporations that were most prepotent in this field of activity.

Industrial Facilities: Üçgen built the Coca Cola Bottling Plant in Rostov.¹²⁰⁰ Hazinedaroğlu and Özkan constructed Agrisovgaz extrusion and galvanizing factories for Gazprom in Maloyaroslavets.¹²⁰¹ Entes raised sinterized, expanded clay production plant in Alexin.¹²⁰² Enka erected Mars Confectionary Plant, Podreskova Ceramic Production Plant, Mars Nut Processing Plant and Mezzanine Extension and Mars Luzhniki Pet Food Plant Extension.¹²⁰³ Alarko built the Goznak Bank Note Plant in St. Petersburg.¹²⁰⁴ Gama was involved in the construction of Tomskneft Luginetsky Gas Compressor Station whereas Garanti Koza built Serpuhov Filter Factory. Baytur took part in replacement of coking chamber and other equipment in

¹¹⁹⁹ Alarko Contracting Group, Housing Projects and Public Service Buildings. Available [online]: < <http://www.alsimalarko.com.tr/housing.asp> > [01 June 2008].

¹²⁰⁰ Üçgen Group of Companies, Projects, Industrial Facilities. Available [online]: < <http://www.ucengroup.com.tr/industrialeng/16.jpg> > [01 June 2008].

¹²⁰¹ Hazinedaroğlu, Projects, Industrial. Available [online]: <<http://www.hazinedaroglu-group.com/GroupDetail.aspx?SGID=8&GID=1>> [01 June 2008].

¹²⁰² Entes, Cement and Lime Plants. Available [online]: < <http://www.entes.com/ceme1.html> > [01 June 2008].

¹²⁰³ Enka, Completed Projects. Available [online]: < <http://www.enka.com/Projects.aspx?Completed=1> > [01 June 2008].

¹²⁰⁴ Alarko Contracting Group, Industrial Plants. Available [online]: < <http://www.alsimalarko.com.tr/industrial.asp> > [01 June 2008].

Angarsk petrochemical complex and was also engaged in the construction of crude oil tank farms therein.¹²⁰⁵ Zafer Construction built the production and bottling plant of Pepsi Cola in Samarra.¹²⁰⁶ Ata reconstructed the timber saw mill and furniture factory in Vyborg.¹²⁰⁷ İdil erected the Nevinnomisk Sugar Plant in Stavropol whereas Summa set up a printing factory in Nazran.¹²⁰⁸

Residential Buildings: Aydınır, EMT-Erimtan, Enka, Entes, FEO, Gama, Güriş, Hazinedaroğlu and Özkan, Kiska, Mensel JV and MİR erected apartments, dwelling houses and villas for the high income groups of Russian society.

Hospitals and Rehabilitation Centers: Enka, Entes, Gama, Güriş, Urban, Mensel JV, and MİR were intensely focused on renovation, infrastructure and construction of guest-houses, hospitals, healthcare units, rehabilitation centers and sanitation complexes.

Historical, Architectural, Exhibition and Sport Complexes and Schools: Although they were small in number compared to the aforementioned projects, MİR, Rönesans, and Mensel JV constructed historical, architectural and exhibition complexes whereas FEO and Summa built sport complexes and stadiums and Kontek Construction erected the English-American School in Moscow.¹²⁰⁹

¹²⁰⁵ Baytur, Industrial/Petroleum Projects. Available [online]: < http://www.baytur.com/projects/ipp_08.asp > [01 June 2008].

¹²⁰⁶ Zafer Construction, Completed Projects, Russia. Available [online]: < <http://www.zafer.com.tr/zafx.asp?cat=141> > [01 June 2008].

¹²⁰⁷ Projects Undertaken by Ata İnşaat. Available [online]: < <http://www.atainsaat.com.tr/projects.htm> > [01 June 2008].

¹²⁰⁸ Summa, Industrial Projects. Available [online]: < <http://www.summa.com.tr/> > [01 June 2008].

¹²⁰⁹ Kontek Construction, Completed Projects. Available [online]: < <http://www.kontekinsaat.com.tr/Projeler.aspx> > [01 June 2008].

1998-2002

Public/Government Buildings: Baytur finished the construction of Technostroyexport Administration Building.¹²¹⁰ Enka constructed the Maly Gum Building, Kursky Cinema and Moscow International House of Music.¹²¹¹ Tefirom performed the construction and restoration of administration building of the police department in Volgograd.¹²¹² Entes built government buildings for the Republic of Ingushetia. Koray Construction erected the Russian Federation Accounting Chamber building and the complex for Moscow Tax Inspectorate.¹²¹³ The company also completed renovation and restoration of Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. Lastly, Zafer Construction renovated the American embassy in Moscow.¹²¹⁴

Airport and Airport Premises: Summa erected the International Airport Magas¹²¹⁵ and Metag constructed the International Lines Terminal of Ufa Airport in Bashkurdistan.¹²¹⁶

Shopping Malls, Business and Trade Centers and Hotels: Alarko in cooperation with Moscow Municipality founded the Marksistkaya Business

¹²¹⁰ Baytur International, About Us. Available [online]: < http://www.baytur.com/about_us/baytur_abroad.asp > [30 October 2008].

¹²¹¹ Enka, Completed Projects. Available [online]: < <http://www.enka.com/Projects.aspx?Completed=1> > [30 October 2008].

¹²¹² Tefirom, Completed Projects (Construction-Energy). Available [online]: < <http://www.tefirom.com.tr/referans/insaatenerji.html> > [30 October 2008].

¹²¹³ Koray Construction, Project References, Public Buildings. Available [online]: < <http://www.koray.com/> > [30 October 2008].

¹²¹⁴ Zafer Construction, Completed Projects, Russia. Available [online]: < <http://www.zafer.com.tr/zafx.asp?cat=141> > [30 October 2008].

¹²¹⁵ Summa, Airports, Available [online]: < <http://www.summa.com.tr/> > [01 November 2008].

¹²¹⁶ Metag, Completed Projects. Available [online]: < http://www.metag-tr.com/page.php?id=21&ref_id=36 > [01 November 2008].

Center.¹²¹⁷ Endem performed façade cladding work for Russia Mostbank.¹²¹⁸ Enka built Ramstores and raised the business offices of many local and foreign companies.¹²¹⁹ Hazinedaroğlu erected the Head Office Building of Yukos¹²²⁰ while Yenigün constructed Science and Technology Center of Gazprom.¹²²¹ Rönesans reconstructed the Arctic Tanker Office Premises of Lukoil.¹²²² Erimtan, Entes, Metag, Summa and Üçgen were other firms that were active in business and shopping center, branch office and hotel projects.

Industrial Facilities: Enka built food plants of American and French companies in Russian Federation.¹²²³ Entes constructed the Moscow Yuzhnyi Port Storage Facilities and JSC Irtyshpolymer Dehydrogenation Plant in Tobolsk, Western Siberia.¹²²⁴ Kayı Contracting Group completed the Vestel electronics plant in Moscow.¹²²⁵ Metag participated in the renovation project of Krasnodar Tobacco Factory.¹²²⁶ Rönesans built the industrial facilities of many European, Russian and American corporations. The company erected the Gypsum Board Production and

¹²¹⁷ Alarko Contracting Group, Housing Projects and Public Service Buildings. Available [online]: < <http://www.alsimalarko.com.tr/housing.asp> > [30 October 2008].

¹²¹⁸ Endem, Projects. Available [online]: < http://www.endem.com.tr/en/products/project_details.asp?ID=152&img=1 > [30 October 2008].

¹²¹⁹ Enka, Completed Projects. Available [online]: < <http://www.enka.com/Projects.aspx?Completed=1> > [30 October 2008].

¹²²⁰ Hazinedaroğlu, Offices. Available [online]: < <http://www.hazinedaroglu-group.com/GroupDetail.aspx?SGID=5&GID=1> > [01 November 2008].

¹²²¹ Yenigün, Completed Projects. Available [online]: < <http://www.yenigun.com.tr/language2/projeler/bitenprojeler.asp?ptype=0> > [30 October 2008].

¹²²² Renaissance Construction, Office Centers. Available [online]: < <http://www.rencons.com/office.html> > [01 November 2008].

¹²²³ These were Mars Warehouse Food Factory, Frito Lay Salty Snack Food Factory and Danone Food Manufacturing Plant. See Enka, Completed Projects. Available [online]: < <http://www.enka.com/Projects.aspx?Completed=1> > [01 November 2008].

¹²²⁴ Entes, Buildings. Available [online]: < <http://www.entes.com/build1.html> > [01 November 2008] and Entes, Refineries & Petrochemical Industries. Available [online]: < <http://www.entes.com/rafi1.html> > [01 November 2008].

¹²²⁵ Kayı Contracting Group, Completed Projects. Available [online]: < <http://www.kayi.com.tr/Eng/Projects/ProjectDetail.aspx?Statu=1&ID=17> > [01 November 2008].

¹²²⁶ Metag, Completed Projects. Available [online]: < <http://www.metag-tr.com/en/index.php?p=project&id=9&pid=53> > [01 November 2008].

Warehouse Facility in Novomoskovsk, Tula Region for Knauf and Unilever Rama Margarine Plant in addition to Prof Media Printing Press in Moscow. Many brewery and warehouse facilities were raised for Baltika, Yarpivo and Klin breweries. Rönesans also completed the construction of Ford Assembly Factory in Vsevolozhsk, Leningrad Region.¹²²⁷ Summa, Zafer and Üçgen were other three Turkish firms that were active in industrial assignments. Summa built the BinMeksan Plant in Moscow which was a fully equipped fuel dispensers manufacturing factory.¹²²⁸ Zafer erected two plants one in Ekaterinburg and the other in Volgograd for the Coca Cola Company¹²²⁹ and Üçgen constructed a factory for Philip Morris in St. Petersburg.¹²³⁰

Residential Buildings: Aydıner, Erimtan, Enka, Rönesans, Summa were the Turkish companies that carried out urban development and housing projects in Russia during this period.

Hospitals and Sanatoriums: Baytur completed the Burdenko Neurosurgery Hospital in Moscow¹²³¹ while Entes constructed the Hospital No: 31 in the same city.¹²³² Metag and Summa were other two Turkish firms that erected hospitals and sanatoriums in Russia.

Historical and Architectural Complexes, Schools and Educational Centers and Places of Worship: Nurol restored the Historical and Architectural Complex in

¹²²⁷ Renaissance Construction, Industrial Projects. Available [online]: < <http://www.rencons.com/industrial.html>> [01 November 2008].

¹²²⁸ Summa, Industrial Projects, Available [online]: < <http://www.summa.com.tr/>> [01 November 2008].

¹²²⁹ Zafer Construction, Completed Projects, Russia. Available [online]: < <http://www.zafer.com.tr/zafx.asp?cat=141>> [01 November 2008].

¹²³⁰ Üçgen Group of Companies, Projects, Industrial Facilities. Available [online]: < <http://www.ucgengroup.com.tr/industrialeng/industrial.htm>> [01 November 2008].

¹²³¹ Baytur International, About Us. Available [online]: < http://www.baytur.com/about_us/baytur_abroad.asp> [01 November 2008].

¹²³² Entes, Buildings. Available [online]: < <http://www.entes.com/build1.html>> [01 November 2008].

Odintsovo, Moscow.¹²³³ Rönesans erected the IOFFE Physical Technical Institute Russian Academy of Sciences Scientific and Educational Centre in St. Petersburg, Historical Dining Facility and Center for Human Initiatives School of Management of St. Petersburg State University.¹²³⁴ Metag restored the Historical Bazaar in Ufa and built from scratch Lale Tulpan Mosque in the same town.¹²³⁵ Finally, Hazinedaroğlu reconstructed the Pakrova Presvyatoy Bogoroditsi Church.¹²³⁶

2003-2010

Public/Government Buildings: EMT-Erimtan reinforced concrete works of the Krasnogorski Rayon Government Building in Moscow and Gosarchive State Archive Building in St. Petersburg.¹²³⁷ Enka completed the office complex for the Embassy of Japan, Yukos Research & Development Laboratory Technology Center and Perinatal Medical Centre Sivastopolsky in Moscow; the company also built the Gelendjik Airport in Krasnodar and realized fit-out works for the Monaco Clinic in Moscow.¹²³⁸ Kayı Construction undertook the architectural and engineering design and turn-key construction of the Tatneft Headquarters in Kazan as well as the

¹²³³ Nurol, Completed Renovation, Restoration and Modernization Projects. Available [online]: < <http://www.nurolconstruction.com/diseng.htm#renovation> > [01 November 2008].

¹²³⁴ Renaissance Construction, Educational Facilities. Available [online]: < <http://www.rencons.com/educational.html> > [01 November 2008].

¹²³⁵ Metag, Completed Projects. Available [online]: < http://www.metag-tr.com/page.php?id=21&ref_id=36 > [01 November 2008].

¹²³⁶ Hazinedaroğlu, Projects, Other. Available [online]: < <http://www.hazinedaroglu-group.com/GroupDetail.aspx?SGID=9&GID=1#> > [01 November 2008].

¹²³⁷ International Projects, EMT Erimtan Consulting Contracting Trade Co. Inc. Available [online]: < http://www.emt-erimtan.com/int_prj.html > [20 September 2009].

¹²³⁸ Enka, Completed Projects. Available [online]: < <http://www.enka.com/Projects.aspx?Completed=1> > [20 September 2009].

building of Kazan Pension Fund¹²³⁹ whereas Summa designed and developed the international airport terminal building in Vnukovo, Moscow.¹²⁴⁰

Shopping Malls, Business and Trade Centers, Hotels and Guest-houses:

Alarko, Dorçe, EMT-Erimtan, Enka, Gama, Kayı Construction, Kontek, Koray Construction, Metag, Polimeks, Rönesans, Summa and Yenigün took part in the actualization of many shopping complex, business and trade center, high-rise building, hotel and guest-house projects in various parts of the Russian Federation.

Industrial Facilities: Alarko finished the construction of the world's largest natural gas liquefaction plant on the Sakhalin Island of Russian Federation in 2007.¹²⁴¹ Enka did the secondary extension of the Philip Morris Izhora Cigarette Factory in St. Petersburg; the firm also took place in Sakhalin I Phase 1 and Sakhalin II Phase 2 development projects and constructed EPC-2 Pipelines, DeKastri Export Terminal, Toyota Car Assembly Plant and GM Opel Automobile Factory.¹²⁴² Gama carried out piping and steel erection works for offsite, utility and oil export terminal areas on Sakhalin II LNG Plant.¹²⁴³ Hazinedaroğlu built the Adler – Krasnaya Polyana Natural Gas Pipeline in Sochi¹²⁴⁴, Kayı Construction completed the Beko Household Appliances Factory in Vladimir¹²⁴⁵, Metag erected the Efes Pilsen

¹²³⁹ Kayı, Completed Projects, Russia. Available [online]: < <http://www.kayi.com.tr/Eng/Country.aspx?ID=1> > [20 September 2009].

¹²⁴⁰ Summa, Airports. Available [online]: < <http://www.summa.com.tr/> > [20 September 2009].

¹²⁴¹ Alarko Contracting Group, Refineries, Chemical and Petrochemical Plants. Available [online]: < <http://www.alsimalarko.com.tr/refineries.asp> > [20 September 2009].

¹²⁴² Enka, Completed Projects. Available [online]: < <http://www.enka.com/Projects.aspx?Completed=1> > [20 September 2009].

¹²⁴³ Gama Holding, Petrochemical & Natural Gas Plants. Available [online]: < http://www.gama.com.tr/en/holding/petrochemical_natural_gas_plants__ > [20 September 2009].

¹²⁴⁴ Hazinedaroğlu Group, Russia. Available [online]: < <http://www.hazinedaroglu-group.com/CountryDetail.aspx?CID=11> > [20 September 2009].

¹²⁴⁵ Kayı, Completed Projects, Russia. Available [online]: < <http://www.kayi.com.tr/Eng/Country.aspx?ID=1> > [20 September 2009].

Brewery in Rostov¹²⁴⁶ and Zafer Construction finished the design and construction of Pepsi bottling plants in Moscow and St. Petersburg.¹²⁴⁷ Rönesans continued to raise many industrial facilities for the leading American, Asian, European and Russian commercial corporations. These are: Volvo and Renault Commercial Trucks Assembly Plant in Kaluga, Marazzi Group Ceramic Tile Factory in Stupino, Avon Cosmetics Factory in Narofominsk, Campino Yoghurt Factory in Stupino, Rehau PVC Window Profile Plant in Ramenskoye, Wrigley Chewing Gum Factory in St. Petersburg, Serdix Pharmaceutical Factory in Podolsk, Oriflame Cosmetics Factory in Narofominsk, Merloni Water Heaters Factory in Vsevolozhsk, Cargill Malt and Vegetable Oil Production Plants and Silo Buildings in Efremov, Nestle Coffee Packing Plant in Timashevsk, Bericap PVC Cap Plant in Bor, Pfleiderer Chipboard Plant in Podberezye, Stollwerck Chocolate Factory in Pokrov, HT Troplast Triplex Polymer Film Production Facility in Bor, Hyundai Factory in St. Petersburg and Sun Interbrew Malt Plant in Saransk.¹²⁴⁸

Residential Buildings: Alarko, Baytur, EMT-Erimtan, Kayı Construction, Kontek, Rönesans, Summa and Yenigün were involved in many land development, luxury dwelling and public housing projects in Russian Federation.

Art, Entertainment, Sport Complexes, Educational Facilities, Hospitals and Sanatoriums: Dorçe completed the camp project for seven thousand people on Sakhalin Island in 2003.¹²⁴⁹ Hazinedaroğlu constructed the Krasnaya Polyana Winter

¹²⁴⁶ Metag, Completed Projects, Industrial Facilities. Available [online]: < <http://www.metag-tr.com/en/index.php?p=project&id=9&pid=56> > [20 September 2009].

¹²⁴⁷ Zafer Construction, Completed Projects, Russia. Available [online]: < <http://www.zafer.com.tr/zafx.asp?cat=241> > [20 September 2009].

¹²⁴⁸ Renaissance Construction, Industrial Projects. Available [online]: < <http://www.rencons.com/?page=projects> > [20 September 2009].

¹²⁴⁹ Dorçe, Completed Projects. Available [online]: < http://www.dorce.com.tr/en_proje.aspx?www=dorce > [20 September 2009].

Sport Facilities in Sochi.¹²⁵⁰ Kontek built many entertainment, art and sport complexes as well as education facilities.¹²⁵¹ Tekser finished the construction and furnishing of the Rehabilitation Center Building Complex for City Clinical Hospital in Moscow.¹²⁵² Metag erected the Krasnounsolsk Sanatorium, Dormitory Building at Assa Sanatorium and Water and Mud Treatment Center at Yakti Kul Sanatorium in the Republic of Bashkortostan.¹²⁵³ Rönesans restored and reconstructed the main university building of the Kazan State University.¹²⁵⁴

¹²⁵⁰ Hazinedaroğlu Group, Russia. Available [online]: < <http://www.hazinedaroglu-group.com/CountryDetail.aspx?CID=11> > [20 September 2009].

¹²⁵¹ Kontek Construction, Completed Projects. Available [online]: < <http://www.kontekinsaat.com.tr/Projeler.aspx> > [20 September 2009].

¹²⁵² Tekser, Superstructure Projects. Available [online]: < http://www.tekserinsaat.com.tr/display1178.html?language=english&screen=superstructure&page=ss_projects.html > [20 September 2009].

¹²⁵³ Metag, Completed Projects, Buildings. Available [online]: < <http://www.metag-tr.com/en/index.php?p=project&id=3&pid=23> > [20 September 2009].

¹²⁵⁴ Renaissance Construction, Educational Facilities. Available [online]: < <http://www.rencons.com/?page=projects> > [20 September 2009].

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