

PRODUCING CONFRONTATIONAL ALTERITY:
URBAN REGENERATION IN TARLABA I, ISTANBUL

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2013

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Thesis submitted to the
Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
in
Political Science and International Relations

by
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Boğaziçi University

2013

Thesis Abstract

Guy Alexander Mountfort Parker, “Producing Confrontational Alterity: Urban
Regeneration in Tarlaba 1, Istanbul”

This thesis is concerned with large-scale urban regeneration, and its impact on the socialization and behaviour of the populations who suffer through its mechanisms of exclusion. The field research is focused on the Istanbul neighbourhood of Tarlaba 1, where a renewal project in the name of historical preservation has displaced approximately 3,000 residents. While the local community was already living on Turkish society's margins to varying degrees, the presence of the project under investigation is found to be necessitating or encouraging the performance of a confrontational form of alterity. Control mechanisms are rendered ineffective, and individual subjectivities distorted, by the visible confirmation of the status of the neighbourhood's residents in the eyes of official power, and by the examples of individuals temporarily reclaiming their rights to the city in the spaces of the project itself.

Tez Özeti

Guy Alexander Mountfort Parker, “Çatı an Ötekilikler Üretmek: İstanbul,
Tarlaba ı'nda Kentsel Dönü üm”

Bu tez büyük çaplı kentsel dönü ümü ve kentsel dönü ümün dı layıcı mekanizmalarının kurbanı olan toplulukların, sosyalle me biçimleri ve davranı ları üzerindeki etkilerini ara tırmaktadır. Saha ara tırması, tarihi eserleri koruma adı altında gerçekleştirilen kentsel dönü üm projesiyle 3000 kadar sakinin evinden çıkartıldı ı Tarlaba ı semtine odaklanmı tır. Bölge halkı zaten de i ik biçimlerde toplumsal hayatın dı çeperine itilmi ken, bölgede sürdürülen projenin ortaya çıkı ı ile bölge halkının ötekili in çatı an bir biçimini sergilemesi kaçınılmaz ve mümkün kılınmı tır. Bölgenin resmi iktidarın gözündeki konumunun açıkça olumlanması ve devam etmekte olan projenin hala in aat halinde olan kısımlarını kullanarak ehir üzerindeki haklarını geçici olarak yeniden kazanmaya çalı an birey örnekleri ile kontrol mekanizmalarının etkisizli i gözler önüne serilmi , bireylerin öznellikleri yeniden ekillendirilmi tir.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As a student alone in Istanbul, what is good in this thesis would have been completely impossible to produce, considering my lack of practical and political knowledge, and limited Turkish. I am very thankful for the continuous guidance and support of my advisor Zeynep Kadirbeyo lu, who directed my study of the sordid world of neoliberalism, who suggested Tarlababa 1 as an interesting case, and who, most importantly, has been encouraging and available at every step, even when I should have been very low on her list of priorities. Thank you to Mine Eder, for her enthusiastic response to my draft chapters which pushed me on to try to take the ideas coming out of my research as far as possible (although the inevitable oversteps in places are entirely my responsibility). Thank you also to my external jury member, Ayfer Bartu Candan, for reading my work but also for her own writing, which has been incredibly enlightening as to the violence and cynicism of the urban regeneration processes currently engulfing Istanbul.

Finally, thank you to my fiancée İma, whose presence illuminates every page of this thesis. Thank you for the constant support, thank you for the hours and hours spent walking around Tarlababa 1 so that I would be able to talk to people, thank you for the intellectual curiosity and insight which led me to Agamben amongst others and, more than anything, thank you for putting up with me during the many periods over the last two years when my time for social life has been reduced to a film at 11pm which I would inevitably fall asleep ten minutes into.

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PREFACE

I have spent the last two years living in an apartment overlooking the Üsküdar Sarıyer Stadium in the Istanbul neighbourhood of Kadıköy, home to Fenerbahçe Football Club. The experience of watching the weekly stand-off between football fans and the police, as well as attending a number of political protest marches, has given me particular insight into the attitude of the Turkish authorities to those it suspects to be out to cause disturbance. The domineering presence of vast swarms of riot police at even the most mild mannered of gatherings breeds an intense atmosphere, provoking anger from those awaiting their strike. What appears an inevitability seems to almost always come to pass. I have on more than one occasion been on the fringes of the pre-emptive release of tear gas, as those in power take the opportunity to display their position, and to remind others to respect their own subjection.

My interest in the containment of those who do not conform to certain conservative expectations developed from this experience of the “assertive” nature of state control in Istanbul. Living here, a similar interest in the way the city fabric is changing is almost unavoidable. After all, what else is one supposed to think about, sitting on a sweaty bus in endless traffic while the same roads are dug up again, seemingly every summer without fail? Such infrastructural work is a regular headache for residents, but nothing compared to the constant attack on historical buildings and neighbourhoods in the name of development. The inspiration to combine these two concerns in my thesis emerged when reading the late Eric Hobsbawm's essay *Cities and Insurrections*, in which he describes the physical

elements of cities which make them more or less susceptible to rebellion (Hobsbawm, 1999, pp.261-278). I wondered how the processes of neoliberal urban change sweeping through Istanbul were affecting the ability of the city's residents to behave in ways which do not reflect the interests of the state and its allies in business.

Following Hobsbawm, my initial intention was to document the way the urban regeneration project in Tarlaba 1 was changing the material construction of the neighbourhood and thereby affecting the ability of the residents to act. I still believe this to be a very valid area of investigation. It is noticeable, for example, how many changes taking place in Istanbul make the gathering of large numbers difficult. In Kadıköy several open areas have been redesigned, with flowerbeds, paths and fencing breaking them into small sections. Such division makes grouping together to conduct protest very difficult, but it also means frivolous activities like informal football games or frisbee throwing are largely impossible. Spaces that were previously free to the interpretive use of whoever so desired are becoming restricted, with designs dictating very specific functions. Similar changes are taking place to varying degrees throughout the city, not least the contested redevelopment of Taksim Square, the traditional heart of Istanbul's public politics.

What has emerged from this research is something a little different. The environment that the regeneration ultimately produces will undoubtedly cause users to behave differently, with a representative of the developers keen to explain to me the sophisticated security mechanisms which would be introduced to ensure good behaviour. However, in studying the actions of the current residents during the construction process, what has seemed to me to be of most importance is the effect on the people themselves, rather than the spaces they inhabit. How users of a space

act depends not only on the options available to them because of the design of the area, but also on their perceptions of those options. I have found during this research evidence to suggest that the project is significantly affecting these perceptions, with residents seeing themselves, society, and power-holders, and the relationships between them, differently. The regeneration *process*, rather than the end result, is a fundamental influence on this change, and it is this which forms the basis of my research.

The short time available to me to conduct field research means that there are inevitable limitations to what is produced here. For a complete picture extensive study would need to be conducted in the space prior to any substantial change, through the design and contestation of the project, during the period of redevelopment, and then in the aftermath. My research took place entirely during the third phase, relying on the work of others to construct the background. In pointing to the future therefore I am speculating to a significant extent. What has emerged however is, I hope, a useful contribution to critical urban theory in a number of areas, and an interesting perspective on the significance of method in urban change. Evolution in cities is vital to their continuing vitality and success but, as I show in what follows, the process by which change occurs has the potential to alienate substantial proportions of the population. This alienation is damaging for all, as it creates deeper divisions between communities and undermines the diversity and interdependence that makes cities so valued as the form of habitation we chose for ourselves to reflect our character.

CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION

With a history of rapid population growth and self-built homes, Istanbul as much as anywhere is a city in the image of its people. This intimate relationship between society, land and the production of space has in recent years been changing. As the race to produce a city attractive to international business, tourism and Turkey's money-makers intensifies, those not in time with the rhythms of the market are excluded. This thesis addresses the connection between urban regeneration and exclusion, with a particular focus on the ways a project which forces people from their homes affects the spaces and communities which remain. I ask how the control and socialization of residents is impacted by the implementation of a project which marks them out as citizens without the rights and protections that should be reasonably expected by full members of society. In other words, as people living in the state of exception.

The empirical focus of the research is the neighbourhood of Tarlaba 1, a poverty-stricken area in the central, prosperous district of Beyo lu. Home to an array of marginalized communities, including a Kurdish majority but also groups of Roma, transsexuals, and immigrants from Africa and Asia, Tarlaba 1 has all of the elements one would look for when choosing a site for regeneration. It is perfectly located, the architecture is historically significant, and the residents lack the financial, political and legal power to resist. The project in the process of being introduced has removed an estimated 3,000 people from their homes, replacing the historically protected buildings with new apartments, offices, shopping units and a hotel, all with an array of modern facilities behind façades which recall the original buildings (Letsch,

2011a). This is all done in the name of historical preservation, as new buildings with old-looking fronts are considered a better representation of history than the historical buildings themselves, which the residents cannot afford to maintain.

The Academic Background

Throughout this work my focus is on the spatial aspects of politics, looking at the ways politics and power are inscribed in space, and the way spatial restrictions affect the relationships of individuals and society. In this regard I am following a prominent trend in political academia in recent years and decades, giving an increased emphasis to the dimension of space where previously time dominated (Soja, 1989, p.11; Foucault, 1986, p.22; Elden, 2004, p.181). Henri Lefebvre argued for space to be considered 'the ultimate locus and medium of struggle' (Elden, 2004, p.183). If this is accepted, then correspondingly the control and restriction of space becomes the ultimate form of political repression. It is from this perspective that the notion of spatial justice has developed as a mode of thinking to uncover aspects of justice and democracy that may otherwise have remained hidden (Soja, 2009).

My research falls within the broad critical urban literature. As defined by Neil Brenner, Peter Marcuse and Margit Mayer, it addresses the intersection between capitalism and urbanization, is concerned with sociospatial imbalances and injustices, and identifies contradictions in the processes of change (Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer, 2012, p.5). Within this literature I contribute to the comparative strand, as I address 'the place- and territory-specific forms of urban sociospatial organization' (Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer, 2012, p.4). While my research is very much site-specific, the uniformity of large-scale urban regeneration practices allows the

implications identified here to speak to other cases and environments. This is particularly true given the patterns of change in Istanbul and elsewhere, with cities ever more securitized and segregated, restricting access, movement, and behavioural possibility. Such changes may be expected to accentuate the already existing behavioural impacts of urban regeneration projects.

I address the city, but this does not make the research here irrelevant for rural communities. The urban investigated in this thesis refers more to a style of living and social organization, rather than a particular density or size of settlement. As an issue of the enclosure of common space, the regulation of everyday life and the direction of future planetary organization, the urban is boundless (Brenner, 2012, p.21; Amin and Thrift, 2002, p.1). In Peter Marcuse's terms, the "urban" under investigation here is merely 'synecdoche and metaphor' (Marcuse, 2012, p.35).

The Research Method

The research methodology employed is informed by the work of Loïc Wacquant, who has researched and written extensively on urban "ghetto" environments, principally in France and the United States. He suggests the importance of ethnography as a method of understanding because of the danger of entering the field with pre-conceived ideas owing to the 'discourses whirling around these territories of urban perdition' (Wacquant, 2008a, p.9). To capture meaning in Tarlaba 1 or elsewhere, the observation of lived relations, behavioural choices and spatial interactions are of key importance. Wacquant suggests supplementing field observation with structural analysis and a theoretical framework (Wacquant, 2008a, p.9). This is what I attempt to achieve in the chapters which follow.

In preparation for entering the field I read as widely as possible on Tarlaba 1 and the structures influencing change in the area, and on theories of control and urban space. By studying a broad range of thinking in advance I hoped to minimize the risk of seeing merely that which I expected. In addition, I have attempted here to allow the theoretical framework to speak reciprocally with the field observations, such that each may inform the other. The architectural plans for the project have been made available online, so I studied these in order to gain a deeper understanding of the intentions of the developers, which served me well when observing the control mechanisms they utilized during construction.

The field research for this thesis took place over the course of four months from December 2012 until March 2013, with some supplementary visits in the weeks before and after. During the main research period I visited the project site and surrounding neighbourhood several times each week, observing patterns of behaviour and material changes around the site. Where I did not understand something, or where an opportunity presented itself, I conducted informal interviews with local people. In addition to this informal process, I spent time volunteering at the local community centre, where I had the opportunity to interact with local children and gain the perspectives of those working with the community. The majority of my research visits were conducted alone, while on some occasions, particularly when there was a certain piece of information I knew I wanted to obtain, or if I had an interview pre-arranged, a translator accompanied me so as to ensure I understood answers fully. As well as Wacquant, in this method I follow Louis Wirth, who argued that the actions of individuals and groups provide more insight into collective values than the ways in which they verbally justify themselves (Smith, 1980, p.7).

The scale at which my research is conducted has a huge bearing on the nature of my analysis. As Jean-Michel Brabant notes, for power to be fully understood it must be mapped at all levels, and the spatial scale at which one works determines one's answer (Brabant, 2007, pp.25-27). For the purposes of this thesis the research was carried out at the level of the community and at the level of the individual. As I allude to above, to capture a complete picture of the impact of urban regeneration projects on the behaviours of individuals on society's fringes, a broader, higher perspective would be insightful. In the first instance, however, I felt it appropriate to learn lessons from this one neighbourhood, as in looking from a higher level the more subtle effects on those at the bottom of the societal totem pole are often lost.

The Thesis Structure

This thesis is divided into four substantial sections. In Chapter Two I place the research in its correct empirical context. I first explain the processes of globalizing neoliberal capitalism which are key to understanding the developments in Tarlababa 1, addressing the urbanization trend as well as the emerging patterns of division and control in our cities. I then proceed to describe how these global changes have been experienced in Turkey, with vast movements of people and the introduction of laws and methods of governance that reflect above all the interests of capital over those of the people most intimately affected. Finally I discuss the background to my study in Tarlababa 1, describing the character of the neighbourhood and the struggle it has been through in self-defence against the developers aiming to replace the citizenry with a population of higher disposable income.

Chapter Three builds the theoretical base on which I conduct my analysis. I discuss the various ways we can perceive space, and the idea of the urban as a social construction. From there I consider how the ability of all of society to participate in the construction of the city is limited, how certain groups are excluded and the ways in which the control of populations can be theorized systemically. Although not all of the literature discussed in this section is applied directly in the final analysis, it is very important as a complement to the empirical chapters, as an explanation of the theoretical understanding that underpins my thinking, as a way to connect this study to that which comes before and after it, and as a tool to enhance the relevance of the study for other empirical cases.

Chapters Four and Five provide detail of the research outcomes and their meanings, with images captured during the research process contained in Appendix B to contribute to the reader's picture of the environment of the project. In Chapter Four I describe the research period, and the evolution of the Tarlaba 1 community's response to the regeneration project being undertaken in their midst. Through the actions of individuals re-engaging with the project space after it was taken from them I identify a necessary confrontation between society's power holders, and individuals living outside of that society, in exclusion. This confrontation and its possible implications I examine further in Chapter Five, where the particular significance of the Tarlaba 1 case study is established, and the important connections between neoliberal capitalism, security mechanisms, urban regeneration and the status of individuals and groups in relation to broader society are made clear.

CHAPTER TWO:
GLOBAL CAPITAL AND URBAN REGENERATION:
TARLABA 1 IN THE WORLD

The empirical case on which this thesis is based is simultaneously unique and strikingly familiar. In *Rebel Cities*, David Harvey quotes Friedrich Engels' 1872 observations on the bourgeois method of addressing housing problems, remarking that the lessons are still prescient and that many of the issues and behaviours are still regularly recurring (Harvey, 2012, pp.16-17). In my reading during the research process for this work I have been startled on a number of occasions by the similarity between the case of Tarlaba 1 and others, across a broad temporal and geographical spectrum. There appears to be a large body of evidence to show that the type of urban change currently being witnessed in Istanbul is in many ways simply the latest in a long line of such changes, in Turkey and around the world. Lovering and Türkmen (2011, p.79), for example, draw parallels between current patterns of urban regeneration and processes undertaken in the late era of the Ottoman Empire, while Nan Ellin's description of the tactics used to reduce the risk of public insubordination in Paris following the protests of 1968 closely resembles the projects in Tarlaba 1 and neighbouring Taksim (Ellin, 1996, p.148). Similarities should not however mask the important differences in the Tarlaba 1 case which mark it out from other regeneration projects in Istanbul, Turkey and beyond. There are broad rules to which much neoliberal urban change conforms, but neoliberalization is always context dependent, and the historical contingencies which shape a project must be closely considered if we are to understand the drivers and effects of actions (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p.36).

This chapter draws down from a general global perspective to a specific perspective on Tarlaba 1, tracing the evolution of neoliberal urbanization and the consequent effects on mechanisms of social control. I first present the broad changes witnessed around the world in recent decades, addressing the path of globalization, large-scale urban regeneration and methods of securing space for particular behaviours. I then track the changing position of Istanbul in the global network. I map the ever-developing regulatory system for urban change in Turkey, and explain the building and regeneration patterns in a city which at all times appears to be half under construction.¹ Finally, I introduce the *Tarlaba 1 Yenileniyor* (Tarlaba 1 Renewal) project by describing the history of the project, its aims and the building plans, as well as the community it affects, and its social implications.

The aim of this chapter is to present the empirical context in which the research is undertaken. Due to the short research period, a sense of change and of the evolving behaviours through the urban transition in Tarlaba 1 can only be achieved with a thorough understanding of the history of the area, its people, the interest groups engaged with the project, and the processes that have led to the present day and the façaded future.

Global Patterns

Urban environments around the world have in recent decades been changing rapidly, in scale, design, usage and distribution, amongst many other dimensions. To understand or evaluate this change one must take a position on the relative importance of things like society versus economy, equality versus growth, stability

¹ 'Istanbul is a city where change is the rule' (Esen and Rieniets, 2008, p.90)

versus “creative destruction,” and, particularly in the case of the physical environment, the historical versus the modern (or post-modern).² While these pairings are of course not natural antonyms, and are inter-dependent, I argue that the key actors and processes that have shaped today's world place greater emphasis on the latter concerns than on the former. In this section I articulate this through a broad discussion firstly of global patterns of capitalism and consequent urbanization, and then through a focus on evolving fashions of urban regeneration and mechanisms of control.

Capitalism and Urbanization

The neoliberal era is commonly considered to have started in the mid-1970s, following the property crash and oil crisis of 1973 and consequent bankruptcy of New York City in 1975 (Duménil and Lévy, 2005, p.9). This was the point where capitalism needed to be reinvented, or at least repackaged, to overcome its contradictions once again (Harvey, 2012, p.10). The neoliberal answer involves the combination of neoclassical economics and freedom focused at the level of the individual, and has become increasingly dominant in global political and economic policy-making. The principal role of states that have adopted the neoliberal concept is the defence of the free market (Harvey, 2005, pp.20-21). Labour and management structures have changed to benefit shareholders. Welfare support has reduced and corporate activity has been liberated. The number and size of financial institutions has grown, and an increasingly advantageous business environment has developed for financial over non-financial sectors. Mergers and acquisitions have become easier,

²Of course, these oppositional pairings are themselves imbued with subjectivities.

and resources have moved towards the centre as the peripheral areas of the world become increasingly saddled with debt (Duménil and Lévy, 2005, p.10). The ideas are defended on the basis that the market knows best, policies such as welfare support are inefficient market distortions, and the success of business is good for everyone because it means economic growth, which will eventually reach all areas of society (Johnston, 2005, p.135). These policies have been vigorously promoted and often made compulsory by, amongst others, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) whenever nations required financial support, and by powerful states led by the United States when negotiating trade agreements (Harvey, 2005, pp.73-75).

Neoliberalization has occurred in different stages, extents and ways. Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell describe two key phases of neoliberalization: “roll-back neoliberalism” and “roll-out neoliberalism” (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p.37). Roll-back involves the dismantling of public enterprises and deregulation of markets. Roll-out involves the active construction of a state in a new, corporate-friendly form, with the introduction of new regulation to better defend the rights and needs of businesses. In the US and UK, amongst the neoliberal vanguard, roll-back took place in the 1980s under Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, with the neoliberal principles secured through roll-out in the 1990s under Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. These notions are important for understanding the process of change in Turkey, as discussed below.

The neoliberal turn has had a substantial impact on the shape of the world, the pattern of globalization and the way spaces of production are distributed. The liberalization and interconnection of financial networks has assisted the flow of capital to spaces where it can be most effective, or where the potential for profit is highest. Capital has become increasingly free to attempt to resolve its contradictions through what Henri Lefebvre described as 'producing a space' in order to achieve

growth (Lefebvre, 1976, p.21, cited in Soja, 1989, p.91).

The pattern of this production has led towards cities, as the dominance of finance capitalism makes cities increasingly valuable in comparison with rural land. Saskia Sassen (1991) has identified what she calls “global cities,” the major nodes through which the global network runs. These centres are key business and social sites, attracting huge numbers of visitors and investment, such that they are constantly changing, culturally abstract entities (Amin and Thrift, 2002, p.14). But it is not just the Londons, New Yorks and Tokyos of the world that have developed as a result of neoliberal globalization.

As capitalists search for opportunities for investment, they are drawn to cities where exchange values are higher. The need to use the perpetually produced surplus value is driving urbanization (Harvey, 2012, p.5).³ This, in conjunction with the mass rural-to-urban migration which has been experienced around the world as agriculture becomes more mechanized, has caused building booms in almost every city. This building can be financed because of the increasingly globalized nature of the financial markets (Harvey, 2012, p.12).

But while cities have been growing through migration and rampant building, the benefits are not felt by all. The great profits accrued by developers are not seen by the migrants responsible for the population growth, leading to rising inequalities. This is the case everywhere, but particularly in cities (Body-Gendrot, 2000, p.X). In most examples there is a pattern of neoliberal restructuring, reducing the strength of workers in support of business, although in each case the movements are

³Global capitalism's necessarily perpetual construction and reconstruction is artfully caricatured by Italo Calvino who, describing the imaginary city of Thekla, writes ‘If you ask, “Why is Thekla’s construction taking such a long time?” the inhabitants continue hoisting sacks, lowering leaded strings, moving long brushes up and down, as they answer, “So that its destruction cannot begin.” And if asked whether they fear that, once the scaffoldings are removed, the city may begin to crumble and fall to pieces, they add hastily, in a whisper, “Not only the city.”’ (Calvino, 1997, p.115).

contextually specific (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, p.14). The pattern of neoliberal urbanization has been broadly seen across the globe however. As growth is seen as the ultimate goal, and foreign investment perceived to be an important method of achieving this, cities have been drawn into a competition, acting in the role of entrepreneurs, in order to be more attractive than their rivals to investors (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p.46). To be more attractive they must be more liberal with business, make the investment environment more conducive to profit, and thus weaken the position of workers. They are placed in a race to the bottom in terms of social responsibility. As shown later in this thesis, this combination has highly detrimental implications for the urban space more generally. Cities are drawn into a logic which is damaging for their own populations as a whole (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p.46). Capitalism's contradictions have not been resolved but rather repeatedly repositioned. As a consequence there have been a large number of peaks as well as troughs around the globe from East Asia, to Russia, to Argentina and, of course, in Turkey (Harvey, 2012, p.11).

There are myriad explanations for these phenomena, but at a high level it may be argued that crises develop where governance and institutional structures do not fit the structures controlling capital. Particularly (though not exclusively) we see sovereignty challenged through phenomena such as free-trade zones, spaces simultaneously within a nation's boundaries and yet beyond it's control (Body-Gendrot, 2000, p.4). As Peck and Tickell observe, democratic processes still exist such that local political actors retain responsibility in the eyes of a population. However, they have lost power to international actors, who do not consider it their responsibility to concern themselves with the well-being of those who are not potential consumers. There is a fundamental asymmetry between the power and

responsibility of local and international actors, resulting in decision making to the detriment of the powerless majority (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p.39). In addition to the influence of international actors, there has also been a dissolution of democratic power through the creation of supra-governmental institutions such as “quangos” and other forms of public-private partnership.⁴ These groups carry out tasks traditionally reserved for the state, but without the accountability expected in a democracy (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, p.18).

This section has articulated some of the overarching patterns of globalization and urbanization, and how they have been impacted by the shift towards a neoliberal governance paradigm. In the next section I consider the implications of these movements in the global city, in terms of the techniques and styles of construction in city spaces and how they are impacting methods of social control.

Regeneration and Control

There are a number of global trends regarding urban regeneration and the control of space, all interconnected. In cities everywhere, what was once truly public space is being converted into something less clearly defined. Cities are being divided, both in terms of the diversity of usage of a space, and in terms of access. The methods and policies employed to maintain these divisions are simultaneously more sophisticated technologically, and more brutal in their effects.

⁴Quangos are quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations, performing functions such as the regulation or organization of particular industries or aspects of public life (such as forests), often with the help of state funding, but outside of the official state structure, and therefore without democratic accountability. There are currently three hundred and forty six non-ministerial departments, agencies and other public bodies which may be considered quangos in the UK (UK Government, 2013).

There is debate about the extent to which it may be said that we are losing public space, or whether its form is changing. Some (for example, Sennett (1977), Ellin (1996) and Graham (2001)) argue that the public realm is being destroyed by the advancement of development based on public-private partnerships, or outright private ownership. Others (for example, Brill (1989) and Loukaitou-Sideris and Banerjee (1998)), contend that in fact levels of public interaction have never been higher, and that this is the most important measure of public space and the strength of the public realm (Carmona et al., 2003, pp.110-111). Whichever way one views it, what may be stated with confidence is that we are losing many of the areas that have constituted our traditional conception of “public space.” Loretta Lees charts a course between these two sides of the argument, suggesting that while redevelopment is removing what previously existed as pure public space, some new public spaces are simultaneously being developed. Studying the new Vancouver Public Library, she argues that while the new space was limiting behaviour in some ways, it was also providing internet access to many who could not otherwise be online, thereby opening a new world of virtual public space to them (Lees, 1998). Additionally, it may be that in some cases the perception of what is meant by public space is changing, such that privately controlled, heavily corporate spaces can still be viewed as public and “authentic” in certain circumstances (Zukin, 2010, p.131).

David Harvey writes that ‘the corporatization, commodification and privatization of hitherto public assets has been a signal feature of the neo-liberal project’ (Harvey, 2006, p.44). While these public assets include services and resources, a key aspect is public space, with roads, squares, and buildings that were previously accessible by all and organized by public bodies changing into restricted spaces such as shopping malls, office developments, and hotels. These restrictions

undermine the performance of political action of all sorts. As Michael Hardt explains, the public arena is 'where the action of the individual is exposed in the presence of others and there seeks recognition' (Hardt, 1998, p.141).

As the neoclassical logic is embraced by city planners and other power holders, spaces are understood almost exclusively in terms of their commercial value. This perspective is reflected in patterns of regeneration, as space is redesigned and allocated to maximize potential profit (which we are told is in the long-term interest of everyone). Gordon MacLeod observes that regeneration decisions are taken to maximize value for the developer, rather than the citizen (MacLeod, 2002, p.257). The outcomes are bland city centres which have lost their individuality and internal diversity, all focused instead on consumption and tourism, all neutralized and sanitized (MacLeod, 2002, p.268; Sennett, 1992a, p.XII). Regeneration projects financed by the private sector are producing spaces which while theoretically open to all, in reality are tightly controlled, limiting access to those who conform to certain written and unwritten codes of behaviour. These are what Mike Davis refers to as “pseudo-public spaces” (Davis, 1990, p.226).⁵ The effect of such projects, as well as producing divisions between social groups, is often to remove public assets (such as beaches, lakes or green space) or use public subsidies to finance the creation of spaces which in the long term cannot be accessed by the public at large (Low, 2006).

The fragmentation of city centres is both driver and consequence of the re-imagining of public spaces. The common method of regeneration, a partnership with a private developer to renew a substantial area, is itself promoting a loss of diversity. Whole blocks are given over to one developer, who is instructed to produce

⁵Nan Ellin gives a particularly stark example of explicit restrictions in pseudo-public space, Citywalk at Universal Studios, where signs warn against ‘obscene language or gestures, noisy or boisterous behavior, singing, playing of musical instruments, unnecessary staring, running, skating, roller blading, bringing pets, “non-commercial expressive activity,” distributing commercial advertising, “failing to be fully clothed,” or “sitting on the ground more than 5 minutes.”’ (Ellin, 1996, p.146).

a space which makes sense as a totality. The result is a space designed for one demographic, in one style, without the contrasts and range of traditional urban spaces. Elsewhere, whole streets or blocks are bought up by one owner so as to maximize efficiency and maintain control over the space. This is encouraged by political powers as an economically productive solution, but damages the diversity and democracy of a multi-owner occupied space (Caruso, 2001).

In addition to this method of regeneration, and these ownership structures, the neoliberal economic model, which as discussed above has seen the promotion of increased socio-economic inequalities, has also increased divisions within urban space. The polarization of incomes has fractured cities, as hypothetical communities divide themselves from others (Harvey, 2012, p.15). Separation of urban communities is not a new phenomenon, with Richard Sennett analysing the process from a socio-psychological perspective in *The Uses of Disorder* in 1970. The gating of communities and securing of spaces has however advanced substantially in recent decades. Sophie Body-Gendrot refers to the rise of gated communities as the wealthy “Brazilianizing,” separating themselves from the poor, and in so doing abdicating from the responsibility to deal with perceived social problems (Body-Gendrot, 2000, p.59).

Jane Jacobs explained that connections between the public and private spheres are key to individuals finding social balance, and that without such links the individual must either fully engage the community, or withdraw from it (Jacobs, 1961, pp.62-66). The fracturing of space therefore encourages gated communities further by making people very selective of who they live near, or alternatively pulling their walls back more completely still to keep out the public sphere entirely. Such withdrawal has been specifically noted in poorer, ghettoised communities by

Loïc Wacquant, as discussed in Chapter Three (Wacquant, 2010, p.3).

This urban fragmentation illustrates a transition from the old global social structure of centre and periphery. Where before there existed strong wealthy centres (the urban areas of rich countries) and poor peripheries (rural areas and most of the developing world), now around the globe we see centre and periphery existing side-by-side in the city, separated but physically proximate (Merrifield, 2013). These physical divisions reflect an equivalent psychological shift, according to Mike Davis, who perceives a change from a liberal paradigm of social control (balancing repression with reform) to a popular perspective of zero-sum social warfare, where certain groups must be actively restrained in order to ensure the ongoing prosperity of others (Davis, 1990, p.224). This perspective is reinforced by elements of society in a variety of roles, from street cleaning organizations to libraries, which have been forced to adopt the neoliberal logics of efficiency and security in order to survive (Eick, 2007, p.271). Neil Smith notes that 'a market more powerful and extensive than ever before is endowed with the power to establish social norms; the market is increasingly the determinant of "natural" social relations, and consequences' (Smith, 1998, p.11).

The design and operation of pseudo-public spaces, gated communities and their ilk, is increasingly determining available actions in cities. Spaces are today designed with consideration of "opportunity reduction strategies" (Carmona et al., 2003, p.123). Particularly clear in shopping malls and theme parks (perhaps the most obvious of public-private spaces), opportunity reduction strategies involve shaping spaces so that the choices of action available to users is very limited, through layout, clear signage indicating expectations, and staffing. Beyond such coercive methods, there has also been a great rise in monitoring technologies so that unacceptable

behaviour can be quickly restrained. While by no means globally ubiquitous at this point, the growing presence of closed circuit television, for example, has led Edward Soja to proclaim an “urban panopticon” and a 'veritable labyrinth of interdictory spaces' in Los Angeles, the archetypal neoliberal city (Soja, 1989, cited in Flusty, 2001, p.658).

There is a growing trend for all urban space outside of the home to be either actively controlled, or at least contained (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p.42). Social issues increasingly are deemed ripe for intervention, and problems that were previously tackled through welfare support are now addressed either by containment, or where it is deemed more efficient, incarceration (Body-Gendrot, 2001, pp.XXIX, 175). From the 1990s onwards we have seen a preference for zero-tolerance policing, initially in Mayor Giuliani's New York and then elsewhere (Smith, 1998; Brenner and Theodore, 2002, p.25). Throughout the neoliberal urban environment, the liberal city has been rejected in favour of a fractured, contained, surveilled and carceral alternative. Considering the extent to which public urban space has been locked down and/or privatized, it has been argued by Michael Hardt that the public-private distinction is no longer of great meaning for the postmodern city, as 'the place of politics has been deactualized' (Hardt, 1998, p.142).

Istanbul as a Regenerating Global City

Istanbul fits very closely with most of the patterns articulated above. Since the turn of the century the city has risen in importance in the global system, as the governing *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (Justice and Development Party, hereafter AKP) has embarked on its neoliberal, outward-facing economic course. Construction, and

consequently reconstruction, has for a long time been a cornerstone of the Turkish economy and it remains so. With this in mind it is no surprise that, under the direction of Istanbul mayor Kadir Topba , *Toplu Konut daresi Ba kanlı ı* (The Housing Development Administration of Turkey, hereafter TOK) has targeted the replacement of fifty percent of Istanbul's housing stock between 2008 and 2028 (Aksoy, 2008, p.219). Urban building has played a substantial role in Istanbul's recent political, economic and social past, and will continue to do so in the future. This section outlines the city's past, the legal developments that have changed how and why (re)construction is carried out in Turkey, and the type of regeneration projects that are currently being undertaken. These projects have brought with them significant controversy and consternation.

Markets for Regeneration

A city of historical importance, Istanbul has in recent years re-emerged as a key geopolitical node, as a gateway between Europe and Asia and as a vital market in its own right (Sassen, 2012, pp.202-203). A number of scholars have declared Istanbul to be a regional and global city, in Sassen's terms (Enlil, 2011; Ozus, Turk and Dokmeci, 2011; Robins and Aksoy, 1995). Richard Falk has even proposed Istanbul as an appropriate choice as a “world capital” (Falk, 2012). This standing has been prompted by the opening of the Turkish economy to international business since the 1980s, and particularly in the aftermath of the economic crash of 2000/2001. As with other global cities, drawing in investment and people has been a main focus for successive governments, but particularly for the current AKP. The regeneration agenda has been driven by many factors, from creating fully functioning markets, to

redistributing wealth and populations, to making the city more resistant to natural disasters, and even to tackling terrorism.⁶ That regeneration (or at least the outcomes of regeneration) is a central development concern under the AKP is important to recognize if we are to understand the changes in Istanbul over the last decade, and in the years to come. They are “cleansing” the city, in order to make it palatable for the global business and tourist community, and consequently operating as agents of the market, rather than regulators (Aksoy, 2008, pp.217, 227). Regeneration has become a systemic policy, guiding changes in regulation and funding streams (Ünsal and Kuyucu, 2010, p.52). As the state takes a more active role in directing building habits in Istanbul, there has been a reversal of trends regarding the location of construction for the wealthier portion of the population. Where for a long time the rich were moving out to the periphery of the city (often to gated communities, as discussed below), they are increasingly returning to the centre, a fact reflected in rocketing land values (Aksoy, 2008, pp.218-219). The state assists this process by moving the traditional users of central space, such as periodic bazaars, out to less valuable locations, thereby making space for formal, higher value enterprises like shopping malls (Öz and Eder, 2012).

Although it has been argued that the current era should be considered Istanbul's 'fifth urban planning period' (Kocabas, 2005), it may be more appropriate to consider the time-line that brings us to the present as starting in the 1950s. It was from 1950 to 1960 that Istanbul experienced its first modern period of rapid growth, from 983,041 people to 1,466,535, as the economy was opened to foreign investment and industrialization caused mass migration to the city (Inceo lu and Yürekli, 2011, p.2). Migrants at this time largely lived in *gecekondus* (literally, “built at night”),

⁶According to the former head of TOK , Erdo an Bayraktar, ‘irregular urbanization breeds terrorism’ (Quoted in Bartu Candan and Kolluo lu, 2008, p.19).

self-built houses constructed on unoccupied land on what were then the city's peripheries. The *gecekondu* phenomenon has gone on to play a very significant role in shaping Istanbul's growth, housing policies, and politics more generally.

The neoliberal turn in Turkey started in 1980 under the government of Turgut Özal as substantial structural adjustments were undertaken, removing the old preservationist monetary system and encouraging a new liberalization (Dinçer, 2011, p.43). This may be considered the “roll-back” phase of Turkey’s neoliberalization. From 1980-1985 Istanbul's population almost doubled from 2,772,708 to 5,475,982 (Inceo lu and Yürekli, 2011, p.1). Migrants to Istanbul during this period tended to move into privately built housing blocks, often on *gecekondu* land, turning the earlier migrants into landlords and property developers (Inceo lu and Yürekli, 2011, p.2). The legalization of *gecekondus* has in the recent past proved a very useful way to secure local political support. By offering legal ownership rights to *gecekondu* builders, politicians have been able to secure their future success. As early migrants have gained land, however, they have blocked further legalization, thereby making their land more valuable (Balaban, 2011). The legalization of *gecekondus* also had the effect of placating workers during the 1980s as labour incomes fell in real terms. The loss of wage income was more acceptable to migrants than it may have been otherwise, because with additional migration, and thus demand for housing, their newly legal land value was rising (Keyder, 2005, p.126). The Özal years saw great changes to the physical structure of Istanbul, as under Mayor Bedrettin Dalan a number of major projects were initiated, including the Tarlababa 1 Boulevard as discussed later in this chapter.

Further reforms were carried out in the 1990s, including the creation of a customs union with the European Union in 1996, with the majority of migrants

during this period being Kurds from Eastern and South-Eastern Turkey (Keyder, 2005, p.131). This phase has been described as forced migration. Whereas in previous decades migrants moving to Istanbul did so on the basis of the opportunities of the city, the Kurdish migrants of the 1990s were pushed towards the city because of the poverty and devastation in their home region, the consequence of ethnic/separatist war and a reduction in national developmentalism as a state policy (Keydar, 2005, p.131).

The next substantial wave of population growth in Istanbul came in the 2000s. In the ten years to 2010, Istanbul's population grew from 8,803,468 to 13,120,596 (Inceo lu and Yürekli, 2011, p.1). This followed a massive economic collapse in Turkey which took place in 2000/2001. Typically for economic collapses in the neoliberal era, the official explanation was that the process of opening to global markets had been insufficiently completed, that the public sector was still acting as a barrier to the functioning of the market through its inefficient administration. It has however been argued that in fact the contrary is true – the Turkish economy collapsed not because it was insufficiently open to globalized capital, but because globalization and the dominance of foreign direct investment had made the domestic economy too sensitive to global pressures (Yeldan, 2002). Another suggestion has been that the rapid opening of the economy in 1989 was carried out without the pre-requisite fiscal and monetary discipline. This left the economy dangerously dependent on foreign capital inflows and risky, speculative investment (Öni , 2006, p.3).

Despite these suggestions, the newly elected AKP, with support from the IMF, responded to the crisis with further market opening and neoliberal reform (Dinçer, 2011, pp.43-44). A tranche of reforms and new laws in the aid of the market may

represent the “roll-out” phase of the AKP’s neoliberal plan. These reforms included putting an end to the legalization of *gecekondu* (Ünsal and Kuyucu, 2010, p.54). The post-crash era drew a third wave of migration, particularly though not exclusively from the economically deprived Eastern Anatolia. These migrants could no longer be easily housed in *gecekondu*, and were instead mainly placed in blocks built by the public and/or private sector (Inceo lu and Yürekli, 2011, p.3).

One of the major housing reforms has been related to TOK , the state construction organization responsible for providing accommodation for those who cannot afford market rents. In the 2000s TOK was given increased responsibility, becoming the most important organization in Turkey for urban regeneration and city planning (Lovering and Türkmen, 2011, pp.78-79). Its powers are almost unlimited in terms of choosing sites for building or regeneration, extending to displacement where necessary (Dinçer, 2011, p.59). In addition, since 2002 TOK has been allowed to build for-profit developments in order to finance building of affordable housing (Ünsal and Kuyucu, 2010, p.55). This change is significant, as it allows a state organization to actively work on the production of luxury redevelopments on valuable land in the centre of the city, while producing housing for poorer sections of society on the periphery where land is more “affordable.” Effectively amounting to state-sponsored social exclusion, this change is particularly sinister when considered in conjunction with the other laws on regeneration discussed below.

The pace of population growth in Istanbul has had a number of effects on the urban structure. The pattern of change for a long time saw the city spreading outwards, as a combination of new migrants building houses on vacant plots and the taste of the rich for suburban living pushed back the boundaries. The city has reached a point now however where, barring substantial changes to infrastructure, it is

difficult to live on the edge and travel to the centre, where the majority of business is still carried out. As a consequence, the value of land in the centre of Istanbul has begun to increase rapidly (Aksoy, 2008, pp.218-219). As Ça lar Keyder (2005) observes, this pattern of change, creating exchange value in city centre land for the first time, has had an exclusionary effect for certain social groups. Migration has seen the creation of a diverse array of social groupings (as migrants from the same area tend to live close to each other), and with the development of value in the central city, income and social inequalities are more pronounced as the state selects sites for regeneration. In practical reality, if not in the regeneration discourse, the inner city's physical and social history is being discarded by the state in this selection process (Lovering and Türkmen, 2011, p.75). Markets are being created in spaces where they have not previously functioned as markets should (providing those with the greatest ability to pay with the greatest product). The city centre is today a primary source of capital accumulation potential, and in order to realise this potential the historical buildings and communities can no longer be considered part of the city's common assets (Dinçer, 2011, p.58-59).

Changing Laws, Changing Neighbourhoods

Given the hunger for central land, there are a number of important questions: How is a neighbourhood chosen for regeneration? How are the properties acquired? And what happens to those who live there? A number of law changes in recent years help to answer these questions.

The building of *gecekondu*s was made illegal in 2004, punishable by up to five years in prison, with the introduction of Law 5237. This was followed in 2005

by Law 5393, allowing local municipalities to implement, with the help of TOK , regeneration projects in areas considered derelict, obsolete or unsafe (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010, pp.1484-1485). Changes to the law increasing the power of municipalities to conduct urban transformation projects around this time are important, as they not only allow the commencement of projects independent of other planning organizations, but also allow the municipalities to work in partnership with private developers. In addition, the laws gave municipalities greater responsibility regarding the prevention of damage from natural disasters, something that has proved a very useful justification for the destruction of historical buildings and neighbourhoods (Bartu Candan and Kolluo lu, 2008, p.13).

Law 5582 from 2007, a typical piece of neoliberal legislation, reformed the property finance market, making it easier for people to acquire mortgages, thereby drawing more people into the marketplace (and also into debt to financial institutions). Perhaps the most important law change for the purposes of this thesis is Law 5366, also from 2005, as this is the law used to justify the transformation project in Tarlababa¹. This law allowed regeneration projects to be carried out in places otherwise protected because of their historical value (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010, pp.1484-1485). This was a notable change as a number of laws had previously been put in place to preserve Turkey's physical cultural heritage, including providing ten percent of property tax for conservation projects. Such investment is particularly important in a city like Istanbul where the depth of history and variety of people who have lived in it mean that nearly ten percent of the land in the city has been designated for conservation (Dinçer, 2011, p.46-48).

Law 5366 has proved to be particularly controversial. It is stated to be for the 'preservation by renovation and utilization by revitalizing of deteriorated immovable

historical and cultural properties' (Aksoy and Robins, 2011, p.11). In neighbourhoods where residents are deemed unwilling or unable to maintain historical buildings to the standard required, municipalities have been given the power to take on that responsibility, with the assistance of private developers. As with much of the governance of the AKP, and neoliberal states around the world more generally, what appears to be in theory well-meaning legislation is in reality used in quite a different manner, and for quite different ends. Critical responses point to the fact that while the preservation of a historical neighbourhood should take into account the socio-economic and cultural health of the residents, the law actually just results in projects concerned with architectural preservation (Dinçer, 2011, pp.47-48). In other words, the cultural shells are saved (or at least reproduced), while that which gives them meaning is discarded.

A great number of large-scale urban regeneration projects have been initiated in central Istanbul in the last few years, based on the laws discussed above, in neighbourhoods like Sulukule, Fener, Balat, Süleymaniye, Tarlaba 1 and elsewhere. However, the particular justifications for the projects are in some ways of only minor relevance. As Ayfer Bartu Candan and Biray Kolluoğlu note, in practice, whether a project is carried out to preserve historical buildings, to protect against the danger of earthquakes, to marketize *gecekondu*s or to provide the city with a new “prestige” development, the outcomes are very similar. They all increase the value of the land, displace large proportions of the existing population (often to new TOK constructions on the periphery), and change the social and physical fabric of the central city (Bartu Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008, p.15). Zeynep Günay describes Law 5366 as a “social exclusion instrument,” designed and used by municipalities to make the city globally competitive (Günay, 2012).

The demographic movements that result from these projects are given more significance from an urbanist perspective when considered alongside the rise of gated communities that the city has witnessed in recent years. The preference for living behind gates has been emerging in Istanbul at an alarming rate. From six hundred and fifty gated communities in 2005 (Bartu Candan and Kolluo lu, 2008, p.6), it has been claimed that in 2007 and 2008 ‘not a single *project* has been completed or planned – no matter at which location or for which target group without bearing the distinctive properties of a gated community’ (Esen and Rieniets, 2008, p.84). As a global city, Istanbul is increasingly conforming to the fragmented norm described in the preceding section, a trend encouraged by urban regeneration projects. Although the relatively short time since the legislation has come into force means that few projects have been completed, the plans show more luxurious “prestige” living spaces, and a full spectrum of security facilities. The projects are also for complete sites, thus producing homogeneity and enclosure. Developments are either as complete blocks, or produced as “vertical” gated communities, condominiums (Esen and Rieniets, 2008, p.109). The former residents of the spaces are invited to relocate to TOK sites elsewhere in the city, again in complete units, separate from other social groups. With the rise of gated communities, we therefore see a picture of a city where those who do not live in the same metaphorical worlds no longer have to see one another. Parts of the city become “spaces of exclusion” (peripheral housing blocks for those no longer able to afford the rising city centre prices) and parts become “exclusionary spaces” (gated communities and central developments only accessible to those who have the “right” to be there) (Bartu Candan and Kolluo lu, 2008, p.41).

China Miéville's novel *The City and The City* (2010) is based on a premise of two cities existing in the same physical space, with residents of one living their lives pretending to be unaware of the presence of the other and vice versa, under threat of punishment if they fail to (un)observe the distinction. In the physical space of Istanbul, such a situation is becoming easier and easier to maintain. The cities of Istanbul are ever more separated. The implications of this loss of diversity and interconnectedness are investigated further later in this thesis.

This movement is being fiercely resisted on one side at least. A clear piece of evidence in favour of the argument that the recent urban regeneration projects are not to the benefit of the residents of the neighbourhoods affected is that in every case the local community has come together to attempt to challenge the plans (Ünsal and Kuyucu, 2010, p.53). This is a particularly pertinent fact as Turkey lacks a common history of community organizing (Günay, 2012, p.9). That such responses have occurred in all cases is also important to note as the law on which the projects are based states the requirement that local communities be consulted during the project development process. As this is clearly not happening, it reinforces our understanding of the motives behind the transformations. In addition, in a number of cases organizations such as the Chamber of Architects and Chamber of Planners, which have special status under the Turkish constitution, have intervened as mediators between the project instigators and the communities affected (Lovering and Evren, 2011, p.2).

The success of these community responses has been mixed. In the case of Tarlaba 1, as discussed in more detail below, the residents were only able to improve their deal, not change the fundamentals of the project. In Sulukule, the project has been halted by the court on the grounds that it is “not in the public interest.” This

victory for the community is hollow however, as much of the destruction and reconstruction work has already been carried out. In addition, the municipality has simply resubmitted a “new” project (which architects claim is exactly the same as the previous one) and continued its construction (Vardar, 2012a). A more successful case is that of the Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray districts. These neighbourhoods have been given a stay of execution by the courts because the project stood to destroy the local culture. Fortunately, unlike in Sulukule this decision was taken before demolition began (Vardar, 2012b).

One may argue that the weight of community response to urban regeneration projects in Istanbul since Law 5366 was introduced is in part responsible for the production of Law 6306 in May 2012. This new law overrides previous legislation, stating that where housing is deemed at risk of earthquake damage priority must be given to renovating it, regardless of historical value or the views of the community (Adanalı, 2012, p.37). The law’s effects are already being felt, as Armutlu and Derbent, two neighbourhoods on the banks of the Bosphorus, have been declared areas of earthquake risk and thus in need of regeneration, while residents argue that the declaration reflects nothing more than the profit potential of their Bosphorus view (Vardar, 2013). Given cases such as this it is no surprise that urban regeneration projects in Istanbul are ‘quickly becoming synonymous with gentrification and political corruption in the eyes of the public’ (Inceolu and Yürekli, 2011, p.12).

Treating the “Gangrene”: The Tarlababa 1 Renewal Project

Tarlababa 1 is a neighbourhood very used to change, and more aware of the impact of state-driven urban transformation than most. Twice in the recent past the character of

Tarlaba 1 has been changed dramatically as a result of state intervention.

Traditionally a non-Muslim, Greek and Armenian neighbourhood, a large proportion of the population left following a spate of attacks on Greek properties in 1955, with much of the remainder forced to leave in 1964 during a crisis of relations between Greece and Turkey (Tonbul, 2011, p.3; Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010, p.1497). The district's wholesale emigration left space which was filled by domestic migrants, brought in from rural areas of the country. Then in 1986, one of Istanbul's first "Haussmannian" mega-projects was completed, setting Tarlaba 1 on a course to relative isolation and poverty (Bartu Candan and Kolluo lu, 2008, p.13). The Tarlaba 1 Boulevard project required the destruction of more than three hundred buildings to make space for a wide road running from Taksim Square, with a barrier across the middle to prevent pedestrian crossing except in a couple of designated places. The road has become a boundary, breaking Tarlaba 1's physical connection with the rest of Beyo lu. As Beyo lu has flourished, becoming the social heart of Istanbul with a vast array of shops, restaurants, bars and nightclubs, Tarlaba 1 has seen no benefit, remaining isolated and developing a reputation as a place of poverty and illicit activity (Inceo lu and Yürekli, 2011, p.5).

This very proximity to prosperity is what is attracting the attention of developers again. There is great potential in Tarlaba 1 as a new wing of Beyo lu, if only the elements the municipality's mayor Ahmet Misbah Demircan described as "gangrenous" could be eradicated (Today's Zaman, 2010a). Consequently, one of the largest and most high profile urban transformations in Istanbul is currently taking place in the neighbourhood, officially to protect and revitalize the historical value of the area. In this section I present Tarlaba 1, its population and the project which is in the process of altering its character irreversibly. Some aspects of the project are very

clear, while others wilfully obscured. It is, however, in many ways an example of typical neoliberal urban change in microcosm, and thus a case from which much can be learned.

Tarlaba 1: Demography and Geography

The neighbourhood is almost as central as can be amidst the sprawl of Istanbul. Bordering Taksim Square, arguably Istanbul's most important public space, the district sits on the north side of the city's grandest shopping street, *istiklal*. From Tarlaba 1 Boulevard, the roads roll down hill towards Dolapdere, and from Taksim similarly fall away towards Kasımpaşa and the Golden Horn. This dual gradient makes the streets feel very enclosed, particularly as a lot of the smaller streets wind and meander between themselves. They developed in the late nineteenth century, with the architecture still reflecting the Pera style of that era (Tonbul, 2011, p.3). The roads are generally uneven, with pedestrians tending to walk along the road edges owing to a lack of usable pathways, or dominating the whole of the side streets which are too narrow to be readily accessed by cars. Perhaps Tarlaba 1's most iconic elements are the clothes lines running between opposing houses in most of the streets at various levels, giving a great sense of community and interconnection. While principally a residential space, there are shops and tea houses, and many small workshops in the basements of housing blocks.

Approximately 31,000 people live in Tarlaba 1, seventy five percent of whom are migrants (Saybaşlı, 2006, p.102). There is widespread poverty, with data showing the population to be significantly below the Istanbul average for educational level, income, job security and status of occupation (Güvenç, 2005, cited by Kuyucu

and Ünsal, 2010, p.1487). Most employment comes from low-paying service jobs, and informal manufacturing and construction. Employment opportunities are particularly restricted for Tarlababa's substantial population of illegal immigrants (Inceolu and Yürekli, 2011, p.5).

The largest ethnic group in Tarlababa is Kurdish, due to the numbers of migrants that have arrived in the area from the south east of the country (Dinçer, 2011, p.54). This group is particularly developed as a community, a fact which may explain the slow progress of the regeneration project, as discussed below. In addition, there is a substantial Roma population, as well as migrants (both legal and illegal) from around the world but particularly the west of Africa (Özdil, 2008). While the Kurdish community is quite strong, there is evidence to suggest that others do not have the same voice or presence. Koray Özdil, for example, articulates the way that West African migrants create public spaces for themselves in the neighbourhood (Özdil, 2008, pp.279-280). However, in describing these spaces he does not identify what makes them truly public. In reality the spaces, upper-floor restaurants available only to those who know of them, are barely public at all, and in fact speak of the marginalization of the West African community. Despite these apparent divisions however, a 1999 social analysis in the area found a closely bonded neighbourhood and a vibrant street life (Tonbul, 2011, p.5). The Kurdish community is the only one politically visible, through graffiti referencing the *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan* (the Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK) and *Koma Civakên Kurdistan* (the Kurdistan Communities Union, KCK) and a number of offices of the *Barî ve Demokrasi Partisi* (the Peace and Democracy Party, BDP).

Owing to the population change of the 1950s and 1960s the vast majority of property in Tarlababa has clear legal ownership, unlike in many *gecekondu*

communities. There is a common pattern of owners living on one floor of a building and renting out the rest to others. As a result it has been estimated that seventy five percent of residents are tenants, twenty percent are owner-occupiers, and five percent are occupying buildings without paying rent (Kentsel Strateji A. ., 2008, cited by Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010, p.1487). This distribution is important in regeneration projects as the interests of owners and tenants rarely overlap.

As Tarlabası suffers as the victim of ghettoization and stigmatization, many of the residents of the neighbourhood are isolated and separated from surrounding areas of Istanbul in a number of ways. In official discourse the area is defined as a space of prostitution, transsexuals, drugs and crime (Dinçer, 2011, p.54). It is a place seemingly rejected by the state, reflected in the lack of effort to clear its rubbish-filled streets and abandoned homes, in addition to being declared “gangrene” by the local mayor and one of the city’s “tumours” by Prime Minister Erdoğan (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010, p.1484). This state rejection coupled with the aforementioned lack of formal, reliable employment marks Tarlabası as a typical “hyperghetto” in Loïc Wacquant's terms. He describes the hyperghetto as the consequence of the transition to financial capitalism (and away from manufacturing) with the neoliberal withdrawal of welfare support in favour of mechanisms of social control, with resulting spiralling poverty and exclusion (Wacquant, 2008b, p.114). The only aspect which may help Tarlabası avoid hyperghetto status is the preservation of social and community support networks and institutions, elements under ever greater threat as the strength of the community is challenged by the area's regeneration.

The physical geography encourages a degree of insularity. As Nermin Saybaşı observes, the maze of multi-levelled streets act to superimpose cultures, families and ways of living upon one-another (Saybaşı, 2006, p.106). The

aforementioned Tarlaba 1 Boulevard presents a barrier, with perpendicular roads running from it turning in on themselves, building invisible borderlines separating the space from its surroundings (Ovacik and Dinçer, 2011, p.5). The combination of physical confinement, harsh perception from outside, and severe poverty emphasizes the importance of community and social networks, with residents helping each other to survive in a conflictual urban environment (Enlil, 2011, p.20). This community is placed in great danger by the regeneration project currently transforming the area.

The Development of a Façade

The area's characteristic architecture led to much of it being designated a conservation zone in 1993 (Dinçer, 2011, p.54). This status has made renovation very difficult, as planners had to take care to preserve the physical fabric. Such barriers were overcome with the introduction of Law 5366, a law ostensibly designed to help protect historical buildings. It is no coincidence that the Beyoğlu Municipality, with a number of areas such as Tarlaba 1 and Galata ripe for commercialization but largely protected by conservation rules, played a key role in writing the new law and lobbying for it to be passed by parliament (Kıslam and Enlil, 2006, p.3). Tarlaba 1 was designated a renewal zone in 2006, with the private construction firm G.A.P. in charge, operated by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's son-in-law, winning the tender to deliver the redevelopment in April 2007 (Letsch, 2011a). The project involves an area of 20,000 square metres, encompassing nine blocks consisting of 278 plots, seventy percent of which are listed for protection (Dinçer, 2011, p.54). At the time the project was conceived, the zone to be regenerated provided homes for 3,000 people (Letsch, 2011a). Despite the number of residents and the buildings' protected status, the

intention of the project is to destroy almost everything on the site, with the bizarre justification that the most effective way to preserve the listed structures is to knock them down and build new ones with similar frontal façades. Despite the project growing so quickly after the passing of Law 5366, the commencement of transformation work was not announced until August 2010 (Today's Zaman, 2010a). During the research period destruction/construction was still apparently in its very early stages, with most houses remaining in the state they were in when the residents left them. The timetable for completion of the project is currently 2017. The slow progress of the project from conception to completion is most probably a reflection of the strength of resistance shown by the local community, although the developers explain it as being due to the careful renewal process.

Upon the presentation of the project, Beyoğlu mayor Ahmet Misbah Demircan explained that the site chosen was done so because it contained the Tarlabaşı housing in the poorest condition ('about to collapse at any minute'), and thus most in need of renewal (Today's Zaman, 2010a). The theory behind the development is that by rebuilding part of the neighbourhood, other property owners will be encouraged to invest for themselves, thereby improving the standard of the whole area. By driving forward with the development of part of the district, the rest will follow naturally (Inceoğlu and Yürekli, 2011, p.5). The project is also said to provide residents with more modern facilities and remove the current health risks, although clearly the "residents" in this case are different, because those who lived in the area prior to the project are not in the financial position to be able to make use of modern facilities like underground car parking (Tonbul, 2011, p.6). Demircan claimed that seventy percent of the project plots were unoccupied, with the remaining thirty percent containing businesses. This claim has since been brought

into question by the project's own developers, who in a presentation have reported that actually only forty percent were empty, with the rest either used as residence or workplace. In addition, they suggested that half of the properties were in an average or good condition, rather than 'about to collapse,' which may help to explain how so many of them continue to stand two years or more after the residents were forced to abandon them (Çenderim, 2010).

The design for each block was delivered by different architects, in an attempt to avoid uniformity. Some blocks are purely residential, one will contain a shopping centre and office space, one a conference hall and offices, one a hotel, and a couple will combine retail and residential units (GAP nıfat, 2012). The listed buildings will remain in the neighbourhood in the form of façades adorning the front of the new blocks, although in almost all cases the developers are constructing addition levels above and around the façades, thereby removing any semblance of the originals. Zehra Tonbul describes the façade designs as 'a stage set, a make-up reference to history, and a tool of advertisement' (Tonbul, 2011, p.7). Most of the new blocks contain inner gardens, accessible only to residents, and most blocks are accessible via a single main entrance. These aspects combine to heavily restrict a key defining element of Tarlabası street life, the regular interactions which take place in front of the entrance spaces of houses, what Jane Jacobs called the “eyes on the street” (Tonbul, 2011, pp.7-12; Jacobs, 1961). Beyond these anti-social elements, the designs also contain roofing in the deconstructivist architectural style, balconies and green terraces, none of which are to be found elsewhere in the neighbourhood (Tonbul, 2011, p.12).

The plans for the project were completed prior to any consultation with residents, which in itself is contrary to Law 5366 which requires openness from the

developers and the participation of residents, and was the basis for an appeal from the Tarlabası Neighbourhood Association lawyers (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010, p.1480). This formal and legal resistance led by the neighbourhood association made implementation a difficult process, and eventually brought some concessions following the commencement of negotiation in February 2008 (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010, p.1481; Ünsal and Kuyucu, 2010, p.60). The initial offer to owners of the properties in the project was a replacement in the new development equivalent to forty two percent of the size of their existing property, or monetary compensation. This was rejected, as most of the apartments in the development are one and two bed studios, insufficiently large for the majority of Tarlabası families (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010, p.1488). The strength of the neighbourhood's unity allowed for some collective negotiation and a degree of concession, with owners given 55% of their original property if they could pay the difference in value (Inceoğlu and Yürekli, 2011, p.6). In addition, while tenants were initially not considered by the developers, their negotiation alongside the owners led to the offer of a purchasable apartment in a TOKİ development in Kayabaşı, some thirty five kilometres from the city centre (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010, p.1488). G.A.P. also offered residents some training and the possibility of gaining employment working on the construction (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010, p.1491). This was proposed following a survey of the area carried out by an urban consultancy firm after the project had been decided, reflecting the consideration of residents only as an afterthought to the project.

While satisfying a handful of the residents, for most the offers from the developers and municipality were insufficient. Offers of training failed to address the residents' basic needs of health care, education and secure employment, many owners could not fit into one of the smaller apartments offered, and could not afford the cost

of the larger alternative (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010, p.1491). For the tenants, most of whom rely on work in Tarlababa and neighbouring Beyoğlu for income, the offer of a place thirty five kilometres away is no offer at all – there are very limited employment opportunities near TOKİ's satellite developments, and travelling into the centre and back again would be impossible, economically and logistically. For many residents such as transgender women, Roma and internally displaced Kurds, Tarlababa is perceived to be the only place in Istanbul where they can live without fear of harassment, and in some cases the only place where landlords are willing to rent to them (Letsch, 2011b). For these people, there are few, if any, alternative options.

There have been further attempts to stall or halt the project, with the association's lawyers appealing to UNESCO and the European Court of Human Rights in early 2010 (Today's Zaman, 2010b). Following the lack of success of these attempts, and an extensive public relations campaign by G.A.P. initiated in Tarlababa and around Istanbul, it was stated that the majority of residents had accepted defeat when the transformation began in August 2010 (Today's Zaman, 2010a; Ünsal and Kuyucu, 2010, p.64). For those not willing to leave their homes, forced evictions became a reality following the AKP's electoral victory in June 2011. Some have claimed that they were pressured to agree to the terms of the municipality, and that they now expect to lose their homes without compensation because they will be unable to pay the difference between the value of their old home and the new one being built (Letsch, 2011b).

As this narrative illustrates, the Tarlababa renewal project in many regards seems very familiar when considered in relation to global patterns of neoliberal urbanism, the changes made in recent years and decades in Turkish society generally,

and in terms of the treatment of those who contribute economically and those who do not in particular. As leaders talk of removing “tumours” or “gangrene,” they demonstrate a mindset that disregards what happens to that which is removed. Tarlaba 1’s project and those like it are developed in order to create economically valuable urban space, but they are neither instantaneous nor complete. The neighbourhoods and communities continue to exist, at least in part, and the effect of the official state and societal rejection implicit in these projects must be substantial. In the next chapter I consider the theoretical literature on the ways we perceive and conceptualize space, its connection to behaviour, urban change and social control, so as to better understand the effects of this large-scale environmental change on those it most severely impacts.

CHAPTER THREE:

MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF SPACE, POWER, AND CONSTRAINT

‘In every age someone, looking at Fedora as it was, imagined a way of making it the ideal city, but while he constructed his miniature model, Fedora was already no longer the same as before, and what had been until yesterday a possible future became only a toy in a glass globe’ (Calvino, 1997, p.28). This problem, as described by Italo Calvino regarding the fictional Fedora, plagues all critical empirical studies of cities, no more so than this one. I do not here attempt to provide a template for an ideal city. However, to draw useful implications from the study requires the application of theoretical insights which by their conceptual nature are not generally threatened by the glass globe. In this way, while the portrait of Tarlaba 1 may quickly lose accuracy the findings and lessons have the chance to hold their value, at least for a time, before becoming toys or curiosities.

This chapter discusses the theoretical base on which my analysis of the situation in Tarlaba 1 is built. The issues I am concerned with do not fit easily within one of the established fields of literature. I therefore conceive the scholarly work discussed here to fall into three broad categories: on space and human perception of it; on politics as it is inscribed in space; and on the mechanisms and structures of behavioural and societal control. There is significant overlap between these branches, however, and as a result the chapter is in fact divided into five sections, with the three branches reaching between them.

The first section of the chapter addresses much of the category on space and human perception. I discuss Harvey's three conceptions of space, Sennett's writing on how we perceive and experience space, and Lefebvre's ideas about the way space is

understood. This section, dealing with individual relationships with space and the city then feeds into the second, which expands to consider societal or community relations with the urban environment. I introduce the key ideas on the particularity of urban communal relationships, and the theory which underpins how city space is produced and utilized. The third section discusses some aspects of how power and politics are reflected spatially, considering particularly Lefebvre's notion of the right to the city, and the way geographical mechanisms are used to exclude certain groups politically. This is complemented by the following section, where I combine a number of theoretical contributions relating to urban spaces which exist outside of the system, spaces of exclusion or abandonment. These are spaces where the political and social rights of individuals are (at least partially) rejected, and where unwanted elements are enclosed, a key component of the control of populations. This is therefore closely connected to the final section of the chapter, where I introduce some of the major thinkers on the structures of social control, and incorporate ideas which have developed regarding the nature of security and control in twenty-first century cities.

The Individual in Space

In order to understand how actions and choices are restrained in the specific neoliberalizing urban environment of Tarlaba 1, the first step is to look in more abstract terms at how individuals perceive their city environment. Drawing together the perceptions of all members of the community through interviews would be an impossible task, but through the insights of others writing in general terms it may be possible to generate basic assumptions from which to develop an analysis. These

notions of basic perception underpin much of the higher level thinking discussed later in this chapter on the interactions of communities with each other, with power holders and with the urban environment.

To understand how an individual exists in space we must consider how space itself is to be conceptualized. David Harvey suggests three aspects to the concept of space, distinctions which I utilize in Chapter Five to approach the research findings from different perspectives. Harvey divides space into “absolute,” “relative” and “relational” aspects (Harvey, 2006, pp.121-125). Absolute space is to be considered in isolation, as a 'thing in itself,' irrespective of surrounding materials. We may, for example, consider the Tarlaba 1 renewal project in terms of the absolute space which is being taken beyond the reach of its existing users. Relative space is that which is defined by the presence of material objects. It is understood by the relationship between objects. For example, the relative space of a Tarlaba 1 street can be defined by the distance between the houses on either side, and by the clothes line hanging between the two. Relational space is how we understand the houses themselves. They are each defined by their connection to the other, by their position relative to other streets in the neighbourhood, by Tarlaba 1's position in Beyo lu and Istanbul, and by Istanbul as a part of Turkey and the world. As Harvey explains, ‘space is neither absolute, relative or relational in itself, but it can become one or all simultaneously depending on the circumstances’ (Harvey, 2006, p.125).

It may be argued that when Henri Lefebvre writes on space he is particularly concerned with its relational aspects. For example, he considers the function of roads to be much more than simply tools of transit, instead being meeting places. Stuart Elden writes that for Lefebvre the road 'both links up the other meeting places such as cafes and halls and *makes them possible*' (Elden, 2004, p.145, emphasis added).

Martin Heidegger and Lefebvre separately suggest another way of thinking about space, beyond but similar to Harvey's distinctions. As Elden notes, both Heidegger and Lefebvre place an opposition 'between our *conception* of space – abstract, mental and geometric – and our *perception* of space – concrete, material and physical' (Elden, 2004, p.189, emphasis in original). Our conception of space is something akin to Harvey's absolute and relative spaces, something which is thought of logically but without meaning attached. Our perception of space is something more than Harvey's relational space, with the interactions between material objects and people giving spaces meaning. This idea of spaces being given meaning by communities is expanded on in the following sections.

Kevin Lynch's work on the elements of the city contributes to our understanding of individual perception of the urban. He writes, for example, of the important role played by paths which wind through city space. It is a simple yet pertinent observation that the routes an individual takes through the city determine his or her perceptions of it. Pathways (both intended and unintended), providing regular, new or potential routes through space, determine the angles and positions from which the urban is experienced. They play an important role in defining common "images" of the city (Lynch, 2000, p.479). The significance of the consistent images produced by pathways is made stark during regeneration. It is striking how different a very familiar part of a city can look and feel when a new angle is created by the removal or production of a building. Other elements that Lynch identifies include edges and nodes, the former being a physical aspect which defines the limits of a space and separates it from others, and the latter being a major focal point of transit between distinct spaces. These elements, determining (and thus presumably psychologically limiting) individual behaviour are vital to consider in a

study of a changing physical environment.

The physical elements identified by Lynch which help shape the individual experience of the city are amongst those which Richard Sennett attempts to explain and understand from a socio-historical perspective in *The Conscience of the Eye*. His arguments are based on a narrative history of Western urban civilization and thus are not directly applicable in their entirety to the case of Tarlaba 1. However, as Istanbul becomes increasingly global and, as I showed in the preceding chapter, incorporating of a Western logic of urban development, the core messages are informative. He argues that authority and control are derived from precision, from cleanly defined, sober spaces which are less confused and thus less contestable (Sennett, 1992, pp.34-37). Building from an argument about the Puritan desire for inner mastery, he shows neutrality as something reassuring and powerful for those who fear the Other, such that 'neutrality becomes an instrument of power' (Sennett, 1992, p.46). This idea of the importance of neutral space for power is used to understand the success of grid systems in US cities and elsewhere, removing centres in favour of less influential nodes (Sennett, 1992, p.50). Sennett argues that skyscrapers have a similar vertical effect. In both grids and skyscrapers, individuals in different places cannot see each other, and cannot gauge their respective positions. They cannot evaluate their relationships. The designs act to dominate and subdue (Sennett, 1992, p.60). In Harvey's terms, it may be said that the hard lines of modern urban design, the skyscraper with its restricted views and consequent neutrality, acts to reduce relational space. For Heidegger and Lefebvre, spatial conception remains but spatial perception is limited. We understand that the person two floors up is there, but we cannot relate to them materially.

While Sennett's writings on perception in the city are highly informative and very helpful when thinking about Tarlaba 1, they are not definitive or exhaustive. It is possible, for example, to make a somewhat different argument to Sennett's on the impact of skyscrapers, and height in buildings generally. Where Sennett notes the vertical grid element of a tall building, a passing insight from Michel de Certeau presents another possibility to be taken into account. He writes of the emergence of Renaissance painting, how artists for the first time imagined the view from above. They gave individuals the view of the “celestial eye,” creating Gods (de Certeau, 2000, p.102). From this we may take the idea that those high in skyscrapers have the perspective of Gods, overlooking the masses traversing the grid below. Height in certain contexts, particularly perhaps where one building rises above its surroundings, may bestow a sense of power and importance. The theory that power is given to those who have a view over their surroundings is important for the Tarlaba 1 case. As Zehra Tonbul notes in her analysis of the project plans, the proposed buildings are planned in many cases to be built to a higher level than the surroundings, with roof gardens and terraces which 'overlook the street and define a dominating relation with it' (Tonbul, 2011, p.8).

Henri Lefebvre goes further in considering the importance of verticality in the urban environment when he notes the result of the vertical meeting with the political. He identifies buildings such as police stations and bureaucratic buildings as “oozing” with anxiety as a result of their presence in the community as symbols of official power. He writes that 'the Phallic unites with the political; verticality symbolizes Power. Transparent, metal and glass, constructed space tells of the ruses of the will to power' (Lefebvre, 1976, p.86-88, cited in Elden, 2004, p.239). In this Lefebvre is going beyond the physical dimensions of urban space, introducing the element of

power. Power as something entwined in the physical fabric of the city reappears regularly in the remainder of the chapter and thesis.

It is self-evident that the design of space affects the behaviour of individuals. There are however a number of positions on the *extent* to which behaviour can be pre-determined, although of course which is most accurate in any given case depends on myriad factors. Environmental determinism suggests that the shape and design of the physical space has a strictly limiting effect on behaviour. Environmental possibilists argue that an environment presents individuals with a number of potential courses of action, from which the individual chooses. Environmental probabilism lies between these two, suggesting that in a given space certain actions are likely to be deemed preferable to others and thus are more commonly carried out, but that there are a number of other possibilities available (Carmona et al., 2003, p.106). It is particularly possible to limit the choices of users when the design of space is complemented by other aspects, such as signage and staffing, all combining to closely “script” space (Sklair, 2009, p.2708). Matthew Carmona and his architectural colleagues argue that it is the designer/architect's role to create a space with a particular set of possible actions, but that the users of that space are the ones who make it effective by choosing the best options (Carmona et al., 2003, p.107). As Michel Foucault observes, it is not possible for architects or planners to completely dictate action because they control only one aspect of space, and are 'not the technicians or engineers of the three great variables – territory, communication, and speed' (Foucault, 1984, p.244).⁷ Spaces, and thus the designers of spaces, have the ability to encourage or restrict liberty. As discussed in the preceding chapter, and again in later sections, they can strictly limit the available options and keep an

⁷Similar may be said of other groups who only have the power to affect certain aspects of behaviour. The police for example, can restrict behaviour to a certain extent, but have no power over the social causes of the will to act (Herbert, 1998, p.228).

individual tightly controlled, even if this control is not perceived. However, they cannot enforce particular behaviours, or completely free action. This must be performed by the individual (Foucault, 1984, p.246).

The Construction and Life of Urban Communities

The city as a way of living is most notable for its density and diversity of population. It represents an environment entirely created by man, distinct from previous ways of living which grew as a response to the surrounding physical geography. As Robert Park wrote, 'the urban environment represents man's most consistent and, on the whole, his most successful attempt to remake the world he lives more after his own heart's desire' (Park, 1967, p.3). But as he goes on to note, as we create the world in which we must live, we create and recreate ourselves. If we accept that the physical spaces in which we exist, to at least some extent, determine our choice of actions, then this may, in conjunction with the social limitations imposed by others occupying the same spaces, define us. This section of the chapter looks to expand on the relationship between the social and the material in the context of the city.

The creation of cities saw a change in the way people interacted with each other. Whereas historically humans lived in communities united by ancestry with this relationship bonding groups and creating natural hierarchies, in the city interactions are based much more on geographical placement, class and economic status. The city replaces relationships based on the biological with those based on the social (Bookchin, 1990, pp.80-81). This has a relatively isolating effect, with individuals existing principally alone or in small family units rather than in communal peasant groups (Bookchin, 1990, p.81; Park, 1967, p.4). While modern capitalist societies are

highly social in terms of levels of interaction, they are also privatized. In the city we have responsibility and concern for our own lives only (Thrift, 1996, p.67).

Building on the previous section's discussion of the variety of ways space may be perceived, I return again to Henri Lefebvre and his notion of the way the urban is constructed, through social relations. This is an idea repeated in different forms by a great number of scholars. Just as perception of space may only be realized through individuals experiencing the space, its meaning may only be developed by the interaction of these individual perceptions as a community. This is how Lefebvre differentiates between *the city* and *the urban*. The former is 'a present and immediate reality, a practico-material and architectural fact' while the latter is 'a social reality made up of relations which are to be conceived of, constructed or reconstructed by thought' (Lefebvre, 1996, p.103). Harvey provides a slightly different articulation, writing that 'the production of space is as much a political and moral as a physical fact' (Harvey, 2001, p305). The distinction between the city and the urban is very important for this thesis. The Tarlaba 1 renewal project is ostensibly revitalizing the city, and assessed in such terms it appears a very worthwhile venture. It must be looked at in terms of the urban to appreciate the negative consequences. Edward Soja (2009) has argued that engaging with the social aspect of space is a key principle for effective critical social thinking, and this is certainly true in this case.

Like the city and its continual construction and reconstruction, the urban is constantly evolving. This evolution occurs through changes in the individuals constituting a community and constituting spaces, both as individuals come and go and as individuals evolve personally. Evolution also occurs as individuals traverse barriers and encounter others, in other spaces. Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift describe communities in urban settings in terms of networks, extending a metaphor of city-as-

machine and following Deleuze and Guattari (Amin and Thrift, 2002, pp.78-79).

They argue that places are created by encounters between networks, between different spatial understandings (Amin and Thrift, 2002, p.30). From this we are led to understand the importance of transitivity or porosity in a city's construction, with the development and reproduction of the urban dependent on it (Amin and Thrift, 2002, p.10). It is no surprise that, for the state and other power holders, creating barriers between spaces and limiting urban porosity is a key control tactic (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, cited in Haggerty and Ericson, 2000, pp.608-609).

The above lines of thought are drawn together neatly by Doreen Massey in what she suggests is an alternative way to think about space, but which actually replicates much of this previous thinking. She makes three propositions: space is the product of the interactions of users; it is a multiplicity, as numerous perspectives on the same space exist in a 'contemporaneous plurality'; and it constantly evolves, as a 'simultaneity of stories-so-far' (Massey, 2005, p.9).

Given this understanding of space, the question then arises of what role planners can or should play in aiding its creation. This discussion is fundamental to urban theory. Can architects and planners design spaces in such a way as to promote improvements in the urban? I wrote above about the role planners may play or not play in liberating or controlling perspectives on the available behaviours in space. Having added this definition of space as a social construction, that debate becomes one of whether and how planners shape the construction of society. This is something Henri Lefebvre addresses when he argues that although the architect cannot create social relations, he/she can help clear the way. The architect may 'provide a lesson from failure and give birth to the possible' (Lefebvre, 1996, p.151). The counter argument is provided by Richard Sennett, who writes that one of the lessons

bequeathed to many by Baron Haussmann following his redevelopment of Paris was that physical space should be designed for certain pre-determined uses. The city and society influence and reflect each other, and it has been deemed easier to change the city in order to shape society, than to improve society which would then improve urban space (Sennett, 1992b, p.90). The implication of this lesson is that space and thus society is shaped in order to improve it according to the principles of those with power. While improving the lot of the community through improvements to fundamentals such as health, education and welfare and then allowing them to reproduce the urban for themselves would lead to cities reflective of the will of all of society, the dominant method sees construction according to the will of the few.

The effects of this policy of addressing the needs of society by first addressing the needs of the city are seen all over the urban world. Perhaps the clearest examples are the cities planned and built by Le Corbusier and his followers. These planners took their inspiration from living styles found in the natural world, particularly bee-hives, which were viewed as highly efficient constructions. These dense living methods were seen to make best use of space, increasing a city's productivity. However, as Jon Adams and Edmund Ramsden (2011) explain, human society is not necessarily well-disposed to life as a bee, with the high levels of unwanted social contact such designs necessitated resulting in exaggerations of behavioural problems. Jane Jacobs' classic *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* addresses in great detail the damaging social effects of such prescriptive planning, as do her modern contemporaries (Jacobs, 1961; Minton, 2012).

One important element of the city which is particularly under threat from the preference for urban planning as a cure for social ills is that of population diversity. Diversity is a key aspect of what separates the urban from the rural. While in village

societies there is an expectation of conformity, and social pressure generated by the fact that everyone knows everyone, the city is supposed to liberate, providing opportunities for personal expression, in anonymity or otherwise (Garber, 2000). Marshall Berman's impassioned plea for free access for all to the public arena is made because it is a fundamental part of democracy. Only by the public encounter of all groups in society can we hope to overcome collective repressions, through the recognition of the positions of others (Berman, 1986). As discussed in the previous chapter however, separation within the city is rapidly increasing. Planning logic states that like a machine or factory the city is most productive and efficient when divided into sections according to function, and thus we see the development of business districts, areas of recreation and consumption, tourist centres, residential areas etc. In addition, the market demands that people live near people who are like them, or more importantly, away from difference. According to Sennett, individuals groomed to desire neutral space seek separation from difference as a way of avoiding confrontation with others and with their own position in society (Sennett, 1992a, p.123; Sennett, 1977, p.96). For Nan Ellin, separation from others leads to ignorance, which leads to fear, which leads to further demand for separation, which is satisfied by the market and the planners' logic (Ellin, 1996, p.146). In a similar cycle, fear leads to increased surveillance, which encourages further loss of diversity and more reminders of real or imagined dangers, which provokes further fear (Flusty, 2001, p.659; Minton, 2012, p.169).

We are seeing a rejection of what is understood as the urban, with a preference for aesthetics and order over more complex lived relationships (Mitchell, 2001, cited in Macleod, 2002, p.261). The neoliberal globalist logic is pervading our cities, with the planning carried out using its logic reflected onto the population

(Rankin, 2012, p.105). The conception of socially constructed space above involves a reciprocal relationship between space and society, with each influencing the other. The dominance of planning and capitalist finance removes, to an extent at least, this reciprocity. Neoliberal urban development affects the behaviour, logic and morality of the populous while, as discussed below, the advancement of sophisticated, holistic control mechanisms look to prevent the populous from affecting the reality of the space.

Restricting the Right to the City

Having discussed the way space is perceived by the individual and constructed by society, and having begun to consider how politics and power influences this process, I now take this further. In the next two sections I consider the meaning and effects of the unequal weight given to the various groups and individuals that contribute to the construction of the urban.

Influence on urban development patterns by political and economic power distorts the social city. Substantial groups of people around the world deemed by planning and capitalist logic to be inefficient contributors to the central city are removed to the periphery. Michel de Certeau explains that the city system appropriates, transforms and utilizes what it can, abandoning that which cannot be incorporated (de Certeau, 2000, p.104). These actors are no longer able to play a role in the creation and recreation of the urban. They have lost what Henri Lefebvre refers to as the “right to the city.” This concept, the standard behind which many critical urbanists march into battle, builds on the idea of space as a reciprocal social construction, one which is created by and creates society. It is not simply the right to

access the resources of the city, but is the right to change the city and to be changed by it (Harvey, 2012, p.4). Lefebvre elaborates, stating that this right is 'a superior form of rights: right to freedom, to individualism in socialization, to habitat and dwelling. The right to the *oeuvre*, to participation and *appropriation* (clearly distinct from the right to property), are implied in the right to the city' (Lefebvre, 1996, cited in Elden, 2004, p.152, emphasis in original). The centrality which underpins the right to the city should be considered both metaphorical and literal. Space should be available for all to change, and such changes should affect society generally. All should be able to contribute to the collective experience of the urban. In this regard, therefore, despite its geographically central location, the social exclusion of most Tarlaba 1 residents means that their use of space does not affect other sections of society, and thus they cannot be said to have the right to the city. The project designed to remove them to the city periphery will only further strengthen the loss of this right.

Peter Marcuse claims that spatial justice is a part of a broader social justice (Marcuse, 2009). Similarly, the right to the city can be understood as a key component of the collection of rights which makes up what one may expect as a citizen in relation to a state. The neoliberal urbanist logic can therefore be said to be destroying the role of citizen for substantial numbers of communities. Whereas for earlier generations the nation-state created a broadly clear distinction between members and non-members, the capital-induced porosity of external borders and disintegration of class unity means that 'hitherto hidden fractures of the space of citizenship are appearing in full light' (Wacquant, 2008a, p.38). Previously, groups and individuals claiming full rights may have been rejected, but now increasingly this rejection is manifested and becomes apparent in the urban environment.

Furthermore, the rights of those who previously considered themselves to be full citizens are being brought into question by their position in the urban reality. Oren Yiftachel describes a “ladder” of urban civil status, as degrees of distinction are developed between those who are respected by the urban policies of the state (including aspects such as the delivery of key services) and those who are not (Yiftachel, 2009a, p.95).

Don Mitchell connects the erection of exclusionary infrastructure and targeted control mechanisms with the acceptability of the removal of those unwanted by the powerful in society. These methods help to change the notion we have of what citizenship means, thereby making the exclusion of some understandable to those who remain (Mitchell, 1997, cited in MacLeod, 2002, p.261). Yiftachel responds to the disrespect of the right of all to the city by proposing a form of “planning citizenship”... linking spatial policy to full political, cultural and material membership in the metropolis' (Yiftachel, 2009a, p.98).

This sense that certain members of society are to be considered lesser citizens extends beyond the process of planning space, to all aspects of the spatial/social order. We see, for example, in the revanchist policing policies introduced by New York's Mayor Giuliani in the 1990s the abandonment of the previously assumed role of the state as ensurer of at least a minimal level of existence for all members of society (Smith, 1998, p.1). Support is replaced with oppression. The signs of decay that the spaces of the humiliated former-citizenry produce (such as homelessness and prostitution) are tackled for removal by those with power, rather than addressing the causes of this decay (such as capital flight and investment for exchange instead of use) (Smith, 1998, p3).⁸ This is so because to tackle the causes of decay would be to

⁸Dennis Smith defines an act as humiliating ‘if it forcefully overrides or contradicts the claim that particular individuals ... are making about who they are and where and how they fit in ...

support the right of all to the city. By tackling the signs of decay, space is “cleaned” for those still in the centre.

Twenty-first century urban development mechanisms encourage a process whereby the members of society that are not identified as productive according to this particular logic are denied recognition or respect and are under constant threat of exclusion. Zygmunt Bauman identifies this as the principal reason for the anger many individuals feel towards society (Bauman, 2008, p.22). Thus, as with the cycle of fear above, here we see a vicious circle of exclusion. The drivers pushing cities towards greater neoclassical economic efficiency promote division and isolation, which encourages feelings of rejection and anger, which in turn sees the wealthy respond by protecting themselves behind real and metaphorical walls. In the next section I describe various ways in which scholars have theorized the spaces of exclusion which are the inevitable consequence.

Spaces of Exclusion/Spaces of Possibility

As with other forms of urban space, areas that house the excluded are too varied in nature to easily theorize in general terms. I therefore here attempt to bring together a number of thinkers considering different aspects of such spaces, so as to produce an overall picture with which I may address Tarlaba 1.

The theory which perhaps represents Tarlaba 1 as a totality most accurately is Oren Yiftachel's “gray space” which, while developed to represent the quasi-urban communities of Bedouin in Israel, captures the status of many spaces of exclusion as being caught between legality and illegality, approval and rejection, white and black

Humiliation is the experience of being unfairly, unreasonably and unwillingly pushed down, held down, held back or pushed out’ (Smith, 2006, cited in Bauman, 2008, p.22).

(Yiftachel, 2009b, p.250). Communities that exist in gray space are informally tolerated by the state, while simultaneously denigrated in official discourse, as in Tarlaba 1 (Yiftachel, 2009b, p.250). This in-between status allows residents to engage society on certain terms, but not to contribute through official channels, leaving them open to exploitation and outright rejection where it suits the purposes of the formally recognized polity (Yiftachel, 2009a, p.90). “Gray space” captures some important aspects of the nature of the Tarlaba 1 community’s relationship with the state and broader society. This characterization provides some clues as we look to gain an understanding of the perspectives of the individuals in the community, and the way these perspectives shape behavioural outcomes.

One theory which attempts to overcome the diversity of spaces to which the unwanted are excluded is Michel Foucault’s “heterotopia.” Foucault uses this term to refer to spaces that exist for people and behaviours that do not fit well within the system society has created, with its morals and expectations. Society is created by sets of relations, but some spaces operate outside, linked but contradictory. They are spaces where the real sites of the culture ‘are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted’ (Foucault, 1986, p.24). They may be sites where behaviour outside of the norm is conducted (such as honeymoon suites for “deflowering” and boarding schools for puberty) or sites of deviation (such as mental hospitals) (Foucault, 1986, pp.24-25). These spaces can be characterized as sites of escape and possibility, because they are not confined by societal norms. They may also be seen as spaces which drive changes in the society, as they are still connected to the mainstream. Although heterotopias are not usually freely accessible public places, there must be porosity at least in some cases, giving heterotopias a window through which to influence. They operate according to different ordering, and provide a vision of

alternative action (Hetherington, 1997, cited by Harvey, 2001, p.280). It may be possible to understand spaces within Tarlaba 1 as heterotopic, or even to take the whole neighbourhood as a heterotopia (although this somewhat stretches Foucault's definition). But such a characterization is somewhat problematic compared to the application of the notion of gray spaces because of the nature of the theory itself.

The problem with the notion of heterotopia is a consequence of its intended subject. By trying to represent all spaces of deviation, Foucault succeeds in capturing none of them. The idea makes difference useful and productive as a vision of alterity, but leaves “difference” ill-defined, potentially capturing anything helpful to a particular argument or perspective (Harvey, 2001, pp.280-281). It is therefore perhaps useful mostly as a reminder of the interrelation between spaces, and the role even those spaces rejected by mainstream society may play in influencing the whole. Perhaps it may even be argued that through rejection the excluded are given a new power, as visions of alterity and thus of the possibility of deviation. If this is accepted the outcomes of the research as detailed in the next chapters take on new significance. As Don Mitchell rightly notes, however, this power of self-expression granted through the creation of exclusion or heterotopia is less useful as a tool for resolving social problems than good housing and welfare provision (Mitchell, 2001, cited in Amin and Thrift, 2002, p.142).

More refined but less ambitious concepts are those of the “dead zone” and “terrain vague.” They consider similar but slightly different spaces, and consequently provide two perspectives. Gil Doron's dead zones refer to the spaces officially considered derelict, the voids in the urban map which allows the state to justify abandonment but which also allows users of the spaces to create a new environment outside of popular social expectation (Doron, 2000, pp.248-252). Doron argues that

the people left with these spaces affect them more radically than in conventional, state-managed areas (Doron, 2000, p.252). They have the liberty to invent, and must do so owing to their limited spatial resources. Out of necessity these spaces must be transformed into something usable, but this usability need not conform to societal norms. Dead zones may foster alternative usage because, in addition to their position away from social expectation, they may be said to exist in an unconventional space-time. As spaces that do not fit within the plans of the city generally, they do not have intended uses, but also are not evolving according to the planners' aims. In one sense, then, they operate in a continuous present, without consideration for the unknown future. This state encourages transgression (Doron, 2000, p.261). The notion of dead zones is particularly important because, as Doron notes, mainstream critical urban theorists such as David Harvey and Neil Smith have a tendency to focus on the ways in which groups are excluded from the city, rather than what they do in the spaces left to them (Doron, 2000, p.252).

Ignaci de Solà-Morales also analyses the potential of abandoned spaces, but while Doron considers official voids, meaning the absence of the state/power and its planning intentions, de Solà-Morales looks to abandoned buildings and areas considered unsafe or awaiting regeneration. His concern is the way these abandoned spaces - *terrain vague* – affect our perception of the city and sense of its history (de Solà-Morales, 1995). He presents *terrains vague* as spaces of absent use, which means possibility and freedom (de Solà-Morales, 1995, p.4). In some sense perhaps abandoned spaces can be said to capture the essence of the urban, as areas open for production, voids waiting to become space. This is supported by de Solà-Morales who suggests that 'in these apparently forgotten places, the memory of the past seems to predominate over the present ... where it can be said that the city is no longer' (de

Solà-Morales, 1995, p.5). The city is no longer there, but the space is imbued with the potential for production of the urban. These are spaces where the order imposed by planning and architecture is lost, and where there is potential for a more organic creation.

These two theories therefore provide optimistic readings on the potential of spaces excluded from the planning system for alternative action and the performance of liberty. Such spaces are abundant in Tarlaba 1 and this thesis is therefore informed by and hopefully informs the concepts. The optimistic must be tempered however by the analysis of Loïc Wacquant, who looks at what he calls the “hyperghetto” as a whole, rather than isolating specific spaces or blocks as in the above theories. Wacquant describes the social consequences of the mainstream rejection experienced by those forced to the margins. He describes a process of 'collective demoralization' as 'the amputation of objective life chances, in turn, collapses the social horizon of subjective expectations' (Wacquant, 2010, p.216). The picture Wacquant paints recalls Lefebvre, as he describes the mimicry between the disintegrating material environment, ignored and left to rot by those with the power to preserve and revitalize, and the elevation of assorted mental, physical and social problems amongst the local population (Wacquant, 2010). He goes on to recount how social groups found in this situation tend themselves to increase the distance between one another, with support networks and neighbourhood spirit breaking down under the strain of the desire to escape. The message is that the creation of barriers in urban society generally, with the consequent ghettos, is self-perpetuating, as the result of this ghettoization is further barriers, further separation, and further rejection of those deemed different. This occurs both between the ghetto and the outside, and within the ghetto itself.

Wacquant's description of the social impact of spaces of exclusion, while clearly not applicable in all cases, gives a useful counter-point to the ideas of heterotopia, dead zones and terrain vague. One may wonder how, given what Wacquant says about life in the ghetto, the latter theories can be so positive about the potential in spaces outside of the system. The answer is clear in the way each space is defined – all three theories receive their optimism from the lack of control implicit in their definitions. These scholars characterize the urban as a space of near complete control, such that the most hopeful places are the few where power does not reach, even if they are abandoned, run down and derelict. The spaces of exclusion are of a contradictory nature. They are places of denigration, but this very denigration may be a source of hope, given the implications of the control society as described in the final section of this chapter.

Systems of Control in Urban Society

As the neoliberal logic has expanded around the world, the role of the state has been altered. Where before the state played a key role in shaping and directing the economy, its primary function in most cases now is to ensure the market's continued viability. A basic aspect of this is the maintenance of order, through mechanisms of social control (Sassen, 2000, p.X). The literature on social control in its various forms is voluminous and diverse, ranging from the early sociological analysis of Robert Park and Louis Wirth, to the more modern thinkers on holistic mechanisms of societal control, the most prominent being Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. For the sake of brevity I focus here more on the latter than the former, but this is not to say that an understanding of basic behavioural patterns is unimportant. Park and

Wirth, amongst others, inform this thesis throughout.

A seemingly obvious but actually very useful observation from Robert Park is that institutions such as the police require the broad consent of those they are controlling (Park, 1967, p.210). It is a vital insight to remember as it may explain why spaces of exclusion are often policed at the borders, with local populations allowed to some extent to do as they wish so long as they do not move beyond spatial limits (Body-Gendrot, 2000, p.XXIX). The population removes its consent as a result of state rejection, and the institutions of control thus withdraw to the frontier. This may be supported by Louis Wirth. He observed that in relatively homogeneous societies control is largely achieved through community consensus rather than imposing policing, but that this becomes increasingly difficult to achieve as the population become more heterogeneous, as in the city (Smith, 1980, p.5, 21). The combination of these two observations leads to the idea that the physical division of the city is an efficient policing strategy. By restricting troublesome individuals to certain spaces consent is less important, as encounters with the police are avoidable, and in any case less frequent. In addition, the divisions encourage similar people to live near each other, which increases the likelihood of local community cooperation and understanding of social norms, reducing the need for policing further.

Foucault's work on the processes through which power-holders manipulate populations represents a critical juncture in the social control literature. Synthesizing a lot of previous thinking on the subject, Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* presents a complete model of social control.⁹ He describes how individuals are coerced to act in

⁹Considering the seminal status of *Discipline and Punish*, it is interesting to note how much of Foucault's thinking had been articulated long before. Louis Wirth, for example, included the following as formal social control mechanisms which held society together when informal controls failed, all of which fit very well within Foucault's model: 'law, bureaucracy, segregation of land uses, professional norms, organized interest groups, courts and police services, the clock and the traffic signal, formal representation, mass media, and the corporate structure' (Smith, 1980, p.14).

certain ways through what he calls “disciplines.” These methods ‘made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body’ and ‘assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility’ (Foucault, 1977, p.137). Individuals are reduced to the role of human material (“docile bodies”) which fits within a system and operates in such a way as to maximize efficiency. This is principally achieved through observation and examination, the meticulous collection of information on subjects making them intimately aware of their position within the system, the expectations of those at different levels within the hierarchy, and their status as both subject and object (Foucault, 1977, pp.170-184). Strict limits on acceptable behaviour are imposed such that conformity appears logical. Deviant behaviour is not viewed as a possible choice for the fully subjectified individual. The system of disciplinary control separates the complex mass of a population into distinct individuals (Foucault, 1977, p.201). While the perfect disciplinary institution is the prison camp, the ideas can be applied in society more generally. Individuals move from one disciplinary institution to the next (school, university, factory, hospital, etc.), but also exist under the faceless gaze of political institutions such as the police and civil bureaucracies. This ‘exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance ... transformed the whole social body into a field of perception’ (Foucault, 1977, p.214). Some degree of deviance is viewed as desirable, and it is this deviant class which fills the prisons, institutions which merely serve to encourage further deviation, providing the masses with a vision of punishment (Foucault, 1977, pp.272-281). This need for some incarceration as a component of wider societal control has been acquiring great levels of empirical supporting evidence for some time (Harvey, 2006,

Similarly, William Burroughs described the use of effective subjectification in a few words many years before *Discipline and Punish* in his controversial 1959 novel *Naked Lunch*: ‘A functioning police state needs no police. Homosexuality does not occur to anyone as conceivable behavior’ (Burroughs, 2005, p.31).

p.26; Body-Gendrot, 2000, p.175).

In 1992, Gilles Deleuze looked to point the way towards advancing Foucault's argument in a brief article entitled *Postscript on the Societies of Control*. Here he argued that capitalist society in the neoliberal era has moved beyond that conceptualized by Foucault. Instead of moving from one institution to the next and occasionally being assessed through examination or data collection, individuals now are perpetually controlled (Deleuze, 1992, pp.4-5). We exist in a number of disciplinary institutions concurrently, and present different identities in different places (Deleuze, 1992, pp.5-6). The whole city exists as a mechanism of control, and by operating in the city the individual is defined by his or her place amidst the surroundings (Deleuze, 1992, p.7). To distinguish between Foucault's disciplinary society and the society of control, Deleuze uses the metaphor of a mole's tunnels compared with a snake's undulations - 'The coils of a serpent are even more complex than the burrows of a molehill' (Deleuze, 1992, p.7). Michael Hardt suggests that Deleuze's society of control is akin to the 'the fully realized regime of biopower' he and Antonio Negri refer to as "Empire" (Hardt, 1998, p.140). Bruno LaTour's "oligopticon" is another comparable notion, in which a great number of partial panopticons combine to cover the entire city, but with each only providing partial information (Amin and Thrift, 2002, p.92). In contrast to the arguments of the previous section, Hardt suggests that, in a properly functioning society of control, alterity (and thus the potential positive outcomes of heterotopia, dead zones and terrain vague) is impossible as all alterity becomes relativized and thus managed (Hardt, 1998, p.148). Considering this, then, the society of control must either be incomplete (or an inaccurate model), or the above theories are invalid. The complete society of control and the alterity of dead zones, for example, cannot exist

concurrently.

Another Deleuzian concept is used by Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson to describe the process of surveillance as it exists in the society of control. They use the rhizome metaphor, explaining that methods of surveillance are emerging in all places and for all people. Whereas in Foucault's hierarchical disciplinary society all were watched but surveillance occurred looking down from above, in the society of control the rhizomatic surveillance mechanism means no-one escapes (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000, p.606). The rhizomatic structure also allows for rapid growth, as it can develop in any place and in a variety of ways (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000, p.614). While surveillance in Foucault's panopticon is predominantly human, in the society of control it mostly takes place mechanically, using cameras but also through the collection of the vast amount of data we all provide on a daily basis, during payments, travel, entrance to buildings etc. Every body has its "data double" (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000, pp.212-213).

A mediating scholar who adopts many of the ideas of Foucault and Deleuze but who still leaves space for the alterity of the previous section is Giorgio Agamben. This is achieved through concepts of bare life, *homo sacer* ("sacred life") and the state of exception. Bare life is Agamben's equivalent of docile bodies, human life stripped of political power and free will through a process of subjectification (Agamben, 1998, p.9). Political power for Agamben is realized in two ways: through the harnessing of the bare life of others; and through the determination of who is included and who is excluded from society. Those who are not considered as a part of society – in modern Western society those who are not economically useful contributors – are excluded and deemed to be *homo sacer*. The term comes from Roman law, meaning a criminal who will not be killed by the state, but who can be

murdered without punishment. Their right to have their life protected by the state has been revoked and they are exposed to violence (Agamben, 1998, pp.71, 82). As with Foucault, Agamben uses the camp as the typical example of the way *homo sacer* can be treated by society, with the rights we normally associate with the society removed (Agamben, 1998, pp.169-176). But the theory also applies very well to urban centres. We see in Agamben's description of politics as the power to decide on the state of exception an articulation of the process by which spaces of exclusion are created. Foucault and those who followed have created a clear model of the mechanisms of social control, but Agamben provides a logic to the spaces that the panoptic system leaves. It is thus an important idea for this thesis.

In this chapter I have connected individual perception in the city and the way urban space is produced through social interaction to the processes of division, exclusion and control that are shaping most twenty-first century cities. The theories included here can be used to explain a lot of the patterns described in the previous chapter. However, many theories (particularly those systemic control models just discussed) are based on hypothetical perfectly operating mechanisms. What this thesis investigates is a space-time of contestation, where change is occurring but not without resistance. If we take the models of Foucault, Deleuze and Agamben to be accurate, most members of society should be subjectified and intensely aware of the limits of behaviour they operate under. In the situation of Tarlaba 1, there is a process of altering subjectification. The relationship between the population and power is changing, even if the community has been marginalized for a long time. The people of Tarlaba 1 are being confronted by their own exclusion/marginalization in a new way. This thesis is about how fresh exclusion affects the subject, how a community already aware of its lack of political good life adjusts to an impending status as

undeniable *homo sacer*.

CHAPTER FOUR:

CONTESTING AMPUTATED SPACE

Walking in Tarlaba 1 in the early days of the regeneration's realization, at the point when the majority of residents of the site had left (or been removed), the division between the project space and that surrounding it was striking. The strong, high barriers presented a formidable image of control and power. The shells of the houses that remained behind the imposing new boundaries appeared meek and derelict, an impression enhanced by the lack of windows and frames (which had been taken as the owners departed or sold to scrap merchants (Interview 1)¹⁰). The mood near the site was dark, with people preferring to stop and talk on other streets, around tea houses and shops. Carrying out the research, it seemed clear that what was occurring was a process akin to amputation, with the project space being forcibly removed from its historical and social context. The neighbourhood/body that remained appeared to be grieving for the lost space/limb. I thus anticipated building an evidence base on this premise, gathering data to discover how the community's actions and behaviours were affected by the loss of a central area, almost entirely removed from view and use. While I believe the "amputation" metaphor is still useful in certain ways, particularly when analysing the choices and actions of the developers and municipality, the response of the community over subsequent months has shown this to be too simplistic as a tool for capturing the complex relationship between external power-holders, internal residents and the space. Despite the best efforts of the developers, the removal of the site from the neighbourhood is being

¹⁰While many informal interviews were carried out during the course of this research, where appropriate I indicate in this chapter particular interviewees, as listed in Appendix A, as the source of a piece of information so that the reader may have a clearer picture of the context in which the data has been gathered.

contested. In this chapter and the next I will demonstrate that rather than mourn the loss, the population is denying it, reintegrating the space into its environment. This I perceive not to be a deliberate political choice, but the independent, necessitated reaction of individuals to their status as *homo sacer*. As the project makes tangible the state of exception, authority is further de-legitimized. Power, authority and control are left unrecognised by those who have themselves been disregarded.

In this chapter I describe the process through which the status of Tarlaba 1's residents as *homo sacer* has been clearly established and reinforced. To achieve this I discuss the methods of control used by the developers in the area of the project, and how they have looked to amputate the space from its context. I articulate the initial community reaction to this process, and how it is changing over time. In this evolving response I identify a transition in the actions of the population. Physical control and psychological behavioural limitations are changed in a very interesting way in consequence, as elaborated in Chapter Five. At this stage it is impossible to know what the end result of the community's relationship with the regeneration will be. In the long term it seems unlikely that the interests of those with power will be denied. However, by studying the process of reformulating spatial and social relations it is possible to identify effects that may be missed if one were to exclusively look at the neighbourhood pre- and post-transformation.

Securing the Perimeter

At the point when the field research started the vast majority of the units in the regeneration site had been emptied one way or another, with gaps in the ten foot high metal fencing that enclosed the site only in a few places where residents still

officially occupied their properties. A retailer selling from a mobile stall in one of the few remaining open spaces between the fencing suggested that where residents had not been forced out this was because the property was historical and therefore would not be destroyed by the project (Interview 2). While he was correct to suggest that the building from which he worked had “protected” status, the official plans include his building and most of the others still occupied in the regeneration, so it may be more likely that the developers have simply yet to need to close that building like the others, and therefore have not been required to forcibly evict the residents. A representative of the project confirmed that the only three buildings excluded from the project are religious sites (Interview 3).

The fencing used to close down the site is notable for its height and sense of strength, visually precluding access to the homes behind. Other smaller scale building projects in the vicinity use chipboard and tarpaulin for enclosure, apparently designed principally to contain the work rather than to restrict access. Similarly, the massive project taking place in nearby Taksim is largely fenced off with chipboard, with substantial holes gouged out for spectators to view the progress of the redevelopment. While the Taksim regeneration is itself very controversial, there does not appear to be a significant attempt to disguise the work or to remove it from the consciousness of the population. The high fences of the Tarlaba 1 project make seeing what is happening practically impossible. They are particularly imposing because of the narrowness of the streets they line. Removing the already minimal pathways in front of the houses, the new metal walls seem to lean in on the passing pedestrians. As one nearby resident observed, the fencing makes the space of and around the site feel “not like our neighbourhood, they’ve turned it into a building site” (Interview 4). The old homes are still visible above the barriers, intricate

patterns and the colourful, chipped paintwork of bedrooms standing as a testament to the recently relocated community. The absence of windows or continuing care however gives them a similar feel to ruins, rather than existing residences. Like walking round an abandoned castle, one can see the remains and settlements that are still in use and imagine well how people lived there, but the human touch of the buildings is lost. This impression is supported by the lack of night-time street lights, particularly in side streets, and by the piles of rubbish filling most available spaces. The abandoned buildings of the project site and those in adjacent streets have been left to disrepair by the state, with no evidence that the municipality engages in any form of street cleaning (Interview 5).

During the research period work was only being carried out actively on one of the blocks adjacent to Tarlaba 1 Boulevard, a block which will be used primarily as office space and which is the first the developers aim to complete (Interview 3). This block and the other two that face the main road are the most visible for people passing outside of the neighbourhood. It is unsurprising therefore that in addition to the high fences, these blocks are obscured by much higher bill-board style displays. While they are only being used to advertise the regeneration along the length of one block, with the other blocks being simple plain brown displays, they cover the entire front of the project.

Beyond the barriers used to restrict access and remove viewpoints of the space, there are no other material control mechanisms used outside of the site. There are no signs of closed circuit television, for example, and security guards do not routinely patrol. The only illumination of the site is inside the block that is being worked on, presumably to deter thieves from removing the equipment left there overnight. One must watch closely to note that security guards are used by the

developers. During the research period I only observed them on a handful of occasions, as the entrances to the site were opened for construction workers. Security guards are working, but on the inside, away from the view of the public. This method of control is similar to that employed by the local police force (although it is diametrically opposite). Despite a substantial and highly visible police presence (complete with ever-present armoured riot vehicle) outside the police station on Tarlaba 1 Boulevard not far from the project site, it is very unusual to see police in the neighbourhood itself. Informal observation suggests that the main tactic of the police in the area is to control closely behaviour when people leave the neighbourhood, while leaving the space inside to the free wills of the residents.

In Chapter Two I discussed the history of the project, and particularly the long and committed resistance of the community to its implementation (as detailed by Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010). I also discussed the implications, with large numbers removed from their homes on the understanding that they were expected to move to the city's periphery. A local community resident, worker and activist explained to me that, as Kuyucu and Ünsal also suggested, the process of designing and implementing the regeneration in Tarlaba 1 was necessarily cautious rather than unduly antagonistic because of the strength and coordination of the neighbourhood's Kurdish community. He argued that, because of this strength, unity and relative organization, the municipality and developer could not afford to be too confrontational. If they approached the fulfilment of the development aggressively they could encounter a violent reaction - "The people here are too close, they cannot attack them directly without causing a response. The publicity would not be good" (Interview 6). With this in mind, the rationale behind the tactics of the municipality and the developer described in this section appears clear. The barriers are

intimidating and strongly separating, extricating the space. Simultaneously, however, the opportunities for sparking outrage and responses from the community have been minimized. As much as possible, confrontation has been avoided. When evictions happened, they were carried out with little warning, making it difficult to mount an organized response. Now the project is in place and moving forward, it is set up such that there are few points from which to attack. As I elaborate upon in the next chapter, the power of neutrality is utilized, while symbols of official power are minimized. I suggested above the idea of amputation because the space was intended to be precisely and cleanly broken from the neighbourhood. The community was to be left with a ghost limb in the sense that the relationship between the spaces was lost (and therefore a part of what constitutes the remaining space is lost with it), but a feeling of the *absence* of this space/relationship prevailed.

The Community Response

The task of characterising the effect of the regeneration project on the community in general terms is an almost impossible one owing to the diversity of situations, understandings and reactions in the neighbourhood. For one interviewee, the project was the latest in a long line of negative changes in Tarlaba ¹. He longed for a time when the community was more unified and similar in background, behaviour and perspective (or, to be more precise, more in line with his own position), before the immigration of the last twenty years (Interview 2). Another demonstrated a common trait found amongst many interviewees, of a dangerous misunderstanding of the implications of the project. He explained to me that it was a good thing that the state was finally doing something, because the buildings were in disrepair and the

residents would have a nicer place to live once their homes had been refurbished for them - “The regeneration is going to make the spaces better. We cannot accept the old buildings like they are just so tourists can come and take photos with the historical buildings. It’s good because they are not going to change the look of the buildings. In the ones the government is destroying, the people are living like rats” (Interview 1). For another recent migrant, what she described as the “weight” of the atmosphere in Tarlaba 1 had become even heavier with the initiation of the project, something which was making her long to live elsewhere (Interview 7). For one of the few families still to be evicted from the project site, the municipality turning off their water supply (leaving them collecting rain water as an alternative source) had brought a new level of hardship directly related to the regeneration (Interview 5).

One aspect that unified a large proportion of the residents I encountered during the research period was pride and a sense of belonging. Despite a preconception that the project (as well as the many other struggles which the typical Tarlaba 1 resident faces) would prove divisive for the community and damage fragile self-worth in relation to broader society, I repeatedly found this not to be the case. Numerous conversations were started with individuals on the streets asking me where I was from, and proceeding to declare warmly that “I am from Tarlaba 1.” I was particularly startled when escorting a group of youngsters back from a lesson in computer skills at a local university. The group, primarily of Kurdish origin and users of the nearby community centre, spontaneously broke into chants of “I love you Tarlaba 1!” (in English) as well as other songs declaring support for the BDP. This anecdotal evidence does not prove that the population as a whole is united and has a strong sense of place. Roma groups, for example, exist publicly largely in particular streets, often away from the main through roads. Similarly, African migrants have

their own particular places to eat and socialize. There is however a strength of local feeling, particularly within the majority Kurdish community. It seems highly unlikely that many of the youngsters from the community centre (most of whom were around twelve years old) had a strong grasp of the political positions of the BDP, but they had clearly been taught the value of the party as a representation of their interests, and as a figurehead for their community, and this was also something which they connected to the place they lived. The connections between the Kurdish community and with the physical spaces of Tarlaba 1 are strengthened by the ways in which the residents use the environment. Beyond the clean clothes strung between buildings on every block, many “village” activities are transported from Anatolia to the public spaces of the Tarlaba 1 streets, from preparing food for dinner, to light manufacturing, to watching the younger children playing and socializing. Such behaviours not only give Tarlaba 1 an unusual feel as an Istanbul neighbourhood, but also enhance the importance of the space as social production. The community closely connects to its space, such that many residents see themselves as from Tarlaba 1 rather than from Istanbul or elsewhere. For many, there are very few opportunities to leave the boundaries of their district.¹¹

Despite the apparent unifying connection to the space, the complexity of the community as a whole makes looking at other forms of data beyond individual subjective opinion very valuable. The physical evidence of the negotiation between the various claims to the space provides some very useful clues. In the early weeks after the fences were erected they were left largely untouched. The only visible interaction with them was small amounts of graffiti at various points. This was often quickly removed or covered so as to be unreadable. At this time the only people I

¹¹One of the students from the community centre explained to me excitedly that he was going on holiday soon to visit an Aunt. This holiday would be taking him to another nearby area of Istanbul, which to him appeared to be a foreign land.

saw spending much time (beyond travelling through) near the site were small groups of young men, particularly in the side streets near the barriers. The space around the project had in consequence an unwelcome feel. It had rapidly become an area to be avoided by all but those most acutely rejected by society, or most in need of spaces where others fear to tread. As the relationship between the project space and the community became more normalized in subsequent weeks and months, however, the changes in how the space was used and how the site was approached were significant.

Reintegrating Space into Society

As the time passed I observed more and more people using the streets around the project site, suggesting that the instinct that was previously keeping people away was fading. At the same time, the barriers themselves were becoming less and less imposing and untouchable. Damage to the fences was observable in a large number of places, amounts of graffiti were increasing and in some areas substantial fires had clearly been lit against the fence during the night. At a lot of the joining points between sections of fence a panel had been ripped back to create a passage way, while elsewhere holes had been cut. Every time I returned to the neighbourhood it seemed that the barriers had been damaged in a new place. A physical rebellion which had previously appeared as the work of a small number of disaffected youths, was starting to look more like the independent actions of a relatively substantial minority of the community.

Further research showed me that the damage to the project's perimeter should not be understood as coordinated protest. The confrontation between the project space and that outside it was not organized, and was without pattern. Beyond a

handful of political slogans similar to those found elsewhere in Tarlaba 1 and Istanbul, there was no sign that community groups or political parties were actively challenging the developers or municipality in this way. The response can also not be seen purely as a manifestation of anger, or as vandalism. The graffiti may suggest a violent reply to the violence perpetrated on the community, a visualisation of exclusion. The fire damage may also fall into this category although, given that much of the research took place during cold winter months, the creation of a source of warmth may be a more likely explanation.

Organised political or disorganised violent action are unsatisfactory explanations because the encroachment onto the project site has not been significantly disturbing the work of the developers. The spaces that are being re-appropriated are not those which are actively being worked on, and thus the progress of the regeneration suffers minimally. As I studied the emerging response of the community to the project I identified a number of types of action. Firstly, many people started using the abandoned lots as useful short-cuts through Tarlaba 1's network of streets. While talking to Interviewee 2, I noted upwards of ten people in a twenty minute period moving through a hole next to his stand, in both directions. When I asked he explained that this route made it easier for people, and that they could also access their old homes.

Walking around outside the site early in the morning the human noises coming from behind the fences showed that a number of the houses had become places to sleep again for those left without a place of their own. I observed in the early weeks of the research coughing and talking noises coming from behind the battered metal doors of basements with no light. The unhealthy sounds amid streets lined with rubbish and crumbling pathways reminded me of Metin Kaçan's *A ır*

Roman (translated into English as Cholera Street), and the damaging conditions in which many Tarlaba 1 residents must live, something easy to forget when round the next corner children are laughing happily watched by their mother, and when others demonstrate their pride in their neighbourhood. As time passed it became clear that some of the population that had previously found shelter in dank basements or derelict buildings were now occupying some of the project spaces as a preferable alternative. It appears that the fences designed to keep Tarlaba 1's residents out have in fact been providing spaces for some of the most downtrodden, spaces which were perhaps a little quieter, safer, larger and lighter than that for which they usually had to settle.

A group of prostitutes were using the site as a place to conduct business, apparently twenty four hours a day, quite openly and in close proximity to both the police station and the block on which building work is currently being carried out. Standing or sitting near holes in the fences large enough to comfortably pass through, the women would attract men on the street and make use of the relative seclusion of the site, close to the bustling Tarlaba 1 Boulevard and the many people waiting for buses from the nearby stop. This activity was unusual in comparison with others in the research site because while most action occurred in the areas where the developers were doing minimal work, prostitution appeared to be happening near the main road, next to the most active block.

Perhaps predictably, once spaces through which to pass had been created by members of the community the site became a huge playground for the neighbourhood's children, with the school holidays seeing numerous little faces nipping in and out through the gaps. While this may seem inconsequential, it reflects the extent to which the project space became reintegrated into the society. Initially a

forbidding space, over the course of a couple of months the imposing barriers had become easily and more-or-less openly traversed obstacles for Tarlaba 1's army of juvenile explorers. A local community worker expressed to me her concern about how the local children would use rubbish filled (and thus rat infested) buildings as a place to play (Interview 8). That they use the project site in the same way as other abandoned spaces indicates how the mystique of the official power was quick to disappear.

The impulse for these varied actions should in almost all cases be considered a response to the drivers of compulsion or convenience, rather than as a self-identified political response on the part of the actors. As a place for prostitution and shelter, the reclaimed project space provides a vital, minimal resource for individuals with nowhere else to turn. As a transit route or playground, the residents show that, in utilizing the site despite the visible efforts of the developers to remove access, the presence of outside power has little impact on their decision making (or at least not a defining impact).

The developers have made attempts to fix their fencing in some areas. In fact, the only time construction workers and security are seen outside the site is when reinforcing the barriers and attempting to patch holes. They have also added signs to the fences reminding passers-by that it is a construction site and warning against entering the area. However, it appears that, to at least some extent, for much of the site they have admitted defeat, and are accepting the community's informal usage of the blocks where they are not actively working. This attitude fits well with the design of the site generally, where the developer looks to avoid conflict first and foremost. It is apparently not overly problematic for the developers to allow such usage in the short term. Having gone through the process of evicting the legal occupants from the

project site, the developers can afford to accept informal use, safe in the knowledge that when necessary they will be able to clear the site without encountering legal obstacles.

There are significant conclusions which can be drawn from the patterns of social change identified here. In a period of a few months I have witnessed a community adjusting to the changing dimensions of its being, and responding to that change. The Tarlaba 1 regeneration project as a typical neoliberal urban transformation may have established the residents as *homo sacer* or it may have merely reinforced that standing. One can make a strong case for suggesting, as I do in chapters Two and Three, that the majority of Tarlaba 1 residents have for a long time lived in the state of exception, outside of the system and without the rights one may expect as a citizen. While the project may not therefore have produced this status, or moved residents from within to without, what it certainly has done is produce a confrontation with this status for a large number of people in the neighbourhood. For the Tarlaba 1 residents who live in uncertain conditions, as squatters or on the streets, or for those who must resort to prostitution, the removal of significant space from the only area where they can live means they must necessarily respond through action. Where before an individual transitioning into the state of exception may have found resources in Tarlaba 1 which could absorb him or her without challenging official power, now these resources have been reduced and the challenge made unavoidable. For residents in a less critical situation, reintegrating the space through their passage between the gaps and casual utilization, we may see this as an unspoken collective acknowledgement of status. The imposition of the project, the implications for the former residents of the site, and the construction's constant visual presence provides a vivid reminder of status. This status we thus see

in action as the residents disregard official control mechanisms. These ideas have substantial implications, as I attempt to make clear when examining them in greater detail in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE:

THE PRODUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF URBAN ALTERITY

In Chapter Four, I detailed the research process and findings, which I analyse here with consideration of the empirical and theoretical context as set out in the preceding chapters. The case examined in this thesis is unique in a number of ways, despite the consistency with which regeneration projects are being carried out in Istanbul and elsewhere. As discussed previously, the design and implementation of projects in the Istanbul neighbourhoods of Sulukule, Fener, Balat, Süleymaniye and elsewhere share many of the characteristics of the Tarlaba 1 project. When studying other projects the contributions to our understanding of control and socialization of the communities affected would most likely be quite different however, owing to the particular composition of the Tarlaba 1 population and its relationship with the rest of Turkish society. An awareness of the particularities and commonalities that connect Tarlaba 1 and other projects and communities in Turkey and elsewhere is vital for the drawing of wider lessons from this research. From the example of Tarlaba 1 it is possible to look out and forward, to the impact of other regeneration projects, and to the possible implications of a future where the neoliberal urban project is advanced and the revanchist city further established.

This chapter is divided into five sections. In the first section I look at the tactics employed by the developer in detail, considering Richard Sennett's theories on the ways power is manifested in the urban environment. From there I look at the effects of the project on the behaviours of the resident population, with consideration of their position in relation to broader society. I analyse the outcomes noted in the research as a consequence of lost space, leading to an enforced confrontation with

power-holders and by association the subjectivities under which the majority of society operates and which power represents and reinforces. Third, I consider the effect of the project's scale as a factor promoting outcomes different to those that would be experienced were change to occur at a slower speed. I then consider the future of Tarlaba 1 for its residents and Istanbul more generally before, finally, I draw out the broader implications of the findings, in light of systems of control and the divided, segregated urban world.

Tactics of Sober Authority

As discussed previously, the strength of the Kurdish community and the controversy surrounding the project in Tarlaba 1 necessitated a careful approach from the developers. GAP n aat and the Beyo lu municipality demonstrated throughout the process a keen sense of the importance of influencing the broader public perceptions of the project, as well as those of the local community, with an extensive advertising campaign and negotiation (once the decision to go ahead with the project had already been taken). This is also reflected in the control mechanisms (and lack thereof) used to secure the site during the destruction and reconstruction process, mechanisms which combined a visual display of strength with a subtle lack of provocative targets. The patrolling of security guards around the perimeter, for example, would likely have been highly antagonistic to the local residents as a symbol of the presence of illegitimate power. Instead the residents were presented with a blank front, a dehumanized visual façade against which the expression of anger appears futile, leaving organized resistance impotent for lack of focal point.

The design of the security apparatus utilized by the developers would seem to reflect much of Richard Sennett's argument about the power of neutral space, as referenced in Chapter Three. In the same way that the grid system in American cities breaks the eye lines between citizens, thereby removing connections, sense of relativity and thus potential collective power, the barriers erected in Tarlabası break the visible connections of the project spaces with those around them. The sobriety of the security apparatus and its imposing height from street level implies authority and control, denying the possibility of conflict. In Chapter Three I wrote that for Sennett 'authority and control is derived from precision, from cleanly defined, sober spaces which are less confused and thus less contestable.' The tactics of the developers in their site security closely reflect this very logic. The fences are cleanly defined, leaving no confusion as to which spaces it is appropriate to access, and which it is not. They reject interaction, and discourage familiarity through their height, cold visage and position tight up against the road. The effective removal of footpaths from the main through-road (Sakız Avcı Avenue) reminds pedestrian users, which includes almost all of the Tarlabası community, of their second-class status in the eyes of the developers, as they squeeze down the sides between the traffic and the fences. Sennett writes that '[t]he planning of neutral space is an act of dominating and subduing others' (Sennett, 1992, p.60) and this is certainly true in the design of the project site. As Lefebvre would observe, the fences and disconnections present the undeniable presence of official power, incongruous in the environment of alterity.

While Sennett's descriptions of the way power forms in urban space as sobriety and neutrality can be seen in the design of the developer's security apparatus, the eventual responses from the community might suggest that Sennett's prescriptions are inaccurate. After all, if the design was effectively controlling,

members of the population should not have responded by re-entering the site and re-appropriating it. One would expect a sustained response like that observed in the early weeks of the research, with people largely avoiding the area and small-scale graffiti constituting the only notable rebellion. The eventual failure of the tactics from this perspective should not be taken as an indictment of Sennett's arguments about the power of neutral space and authority, however. What must be recalled, and what may be a useful lesson for others designing mechanisms to secure and control space, is something which remains implicit in Sennett's *The Conscience of the Eye*. Sober authority and neutrality are effective because the population is a part of broad society, is fearful of the "other" and of difference more generally, and exists under certain subjectivities and expectations derived from a social mechanism which includes the power-holders. They exist as part of the Deleuzian society of control. In the response of the Tarlaba 1 community to the security structures of the project site we see a reflection of their alterity. The actions and reactions of the community detailed in this research are those of a community with increasingly strongly acknowledged subjectivities of exclusion. The interaction of such subjectivities with material control mechanisms is necessarily different.

In the construction and defence of the project, and in the reactions observed during this research we see a number of aspects of Tarlaba 1's position in gray space, in Yiftachel's terms. The (eventual) inclusion of most owners and tenants in some form of negotiation shows that the status of the Tarlaba 1 residents cannot be considered the same as that of the Bedouin communities on which Yiftachel based his research (Yiftachel, 2009a, p.89; Yiftachel, 2009b, p.247). The project has however brought some of the ambiguities in which the residents live into starker relief.

The discourse justifying the project and the steps taken to implement it show the official contempt for the legitimacy of the residents as stakeholders, even if there was an eventual negotiation of sorts. On the side of the residents, acts of prostitution, damage to the fences, use of the space as unauthorised shelter and other forms of illegal entering reflect the status of many in the community as outside of the state, as *homo sacer*. Many or all of these actions were occurring prior to the project, but its presence makes the illegality, and continuing existence, clearer. The response of the developers and the local municipality, re-securing the site as possible without enhancing the policing of the area or taking substantial steps to close the barriers, reflects a key element of gray spacing, the unspoken acceptance of the presence of the community (with all its ambiguous legality) and lack of desire to confront it, within certain limits. The development of the project and the securitization of the space may be said to be making clearer the “gray” status of much of Tarlaba 1’s space. As I discuss below, however, the completion of the project will likely resolve the ambiguities, and separate action and existence into clearer blacks and whites.

Lost Dimensions of Space, and Confrontational Alterity

The consequence of the enclosure of the project perimeter was a loss of space for the resident community. It is informative to consider this loss from a number of spatial perspectives as, again recalling Chapter Three, looking at space in absolute, relative and relational terms captures different aspects of the experience in Tarlaba 1. The loss of space in relative terms is obvious and need not be discussed again, with the majority of the former residents of the houses of the project site excluded from those which will replace them, and thus excluded from this particular relative space. The

absolute and relational aspects require more attention because they are key to the arguments of this thesis.

For a substantial proportion of the Tarlaba 1 population, many of whom consider the neighbourhood to be the only place in which they can live because of the prejudice that they experience elsewhere, the amount of space they are able to access has been genuinely reduced, rather than simply moved. This is particularly true for groups such as Tarlaba 1's transsexual community, but the problem of needing to stay in or near the neighbourhood extends also to all of the people who need to live near Beyo lu for employment, as well as those for whom kinship and ethnic ties in the area are of fundamental importance.¹² The offer of alternative accommodation on the edge of the city is worthless to such people, and therefore when a substantial space is fenced off, this space is lost for them in absolute terms. This absolute loss provides part of the explanation for the behaviours which followed the space's amputation.

The relational aspect of space - 'contained in objects in the sense that an object can be said to exist only insofar as it contains and represents within itself relationships to other objects' (Harvey, 2006, p.121) - provides another piece of the puzzle. In fencing off some of the neighbourhood, the meaning given to both the project site and that outside of it is irreparably changed. The web of understandings that connected all areas and people of Tarlaba 1 to each other, the metaphorical and literal links, have undoubtedly been significantly impacted by the new presence of this symbol of official power and society, a symbol which concurrently represents the exclusion of much of the Tarlaba 1 population. Again connecting the relational aspect of space to Lefebvre's notion of space as a reciprocal social construction, we see that

¹²Although not addressed specifically in this research, it may be expected that for many of the residents of Tarlaba 1 social networks are a key survival tool, similar to the observations of Julia Elyachar in Cairo (Elyachar, 2005).

as relations between the project site and the neighbourhood have changed, similarly the effect of the space on its users has also changed. The design of the Tarlaba 1 streets and housing, with many crossing connections and regular doorways from which to interact, is reflected in the strong, related and interdependent community (or, communities). The imposition of an external presence, representing the groups in society whose interests must be considered by decision makers and from which Tarlaba 1 has until now been largely excluded, must therefore affect the community. By definition, for *homo sacer* to exist there must be a society and an outer limit, what Giorgio Agamben calls 'the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only "sacred life," and can as such be eliminated without punishment' (Agamben, 1998, p.139). While in any city the boundaries are predominantly porous, with Tarlaba 1 being no exception (evidenced by the emerging representations of neoliberal capitalism in the areas near Taksim, and the number of residents in low paying but legal service jobs in Beyo lu), the material limit of politically relevant society has for a long time been considered the Tarlaba 1 Boulevard, with police and society challenging the actions of individuals on and outside this line, but rarely encroaching inside. Large proportions of the residents have long existed as *homo sacer* but the construction of their community and its space has been relatively untouched by this classification, with the ambiguities of gray space predominating. The introduction of the project site, with the consequent movement of the limit of the state of exception, has brought the reality of *homo sacer* into the spatial and social construction of the neighbourhood.

At this point we may better understand why members of the community started to reintegrate the project site into its surroundings as described in the previous chapter. Individuals are affected to different extents by the loss of absolute space and

the changing social construction of the space/spatial construction of the society, with most impacted by varying combinations of the two. For those carrying out prostitution in the space, or using it as shelter at night, it may be that the loss of space in absolute terms is most important. These actors were previously able to exist and operate in Tarlaba 1 away from the eyes and judgements of the state, performing alterity without contesting society's broader subjectivities directly. The loss of a large piece of this "free" space leaves little choice but to actively engage (a) official power, and (b) their own status as *homo sacer*, through the rejection of the control mechanisms introduced by the developers. They act not in protest or from conscious political inclination, but out of the necessity to reproduce absolute space in which to survive.

Users of the site for less necessary activity, such as those moving through it as a short-cut, or children playing, may be considered to be responding more to the relational impact of the project. For these users, the project may be said to be producing alterity in the sense that through its presence it is constructing a local community more conscious of its own exclusion. As citizens are confronted with their lack of citizenship, the authority of the fences and the power more generally is de-legitimized. In rejecting control, the users are acting to reproduce and change relational space. At least temporarily, they may be said to be asserting their right to the city. In Chapter Three I wrote that the project should be expected in the long term to have the effect of accentuating and reinforcing the denial of the right to the city experienced by most of the residents of Tarlaba 1. However, to paraphrase Lefebvre and his description of the right to the city, the project space in Tarlaba 1 at least during the construction phase promotes a local display of freedom, individualization in (or liberation from) socialization, a space of habitat and dwelling, and a right to

participation and appropriation (see Lefebvre, 1996, cited in Elden, 2004, p.152).

The introduction of the project, and with it the introduction of a concrete, visible interconnection between Tarlaba 1, official power, and politically recognized society, allows the participation and appropriation fundamental to the right to the city that was previously denied to the majority of the community. The presence of the project engenders the possibility of a (temporarily) effective participation until such a time as the space is more firmly denied to those for whom it is not intended.

I suggested in Chapter Three that through the process of planning the city, those with power could impose their logic and principles on the population, without the people being able to similarly affect the city. This research shows that those who have been excluded still retain the theoretical ability to socially construct space, which can be activated in certain circumstances even in the contrary presence of planning power. In the next section, I consider how we may understand the outcomes of this temporarily reclaimed right to the city, with consideration of the previously discussed theories of spaces of exclusion.

The Implications of Transitory Dead Zones

So far in this chapter I have articulated the tactics of the developers of the project, with the resulting loss of space for the community, triggering an enhanced sense of alterity and consequent confrontational behaviours. I now attempt to explain the significance of the community's response, and the effect of the large-scale urban regeneration as distinct from gradual gentrification.

Of the various conceptions of spaces of alterity discussed in Chapter Three, perhaps the most applicable to the research findings in dealing with the particular

effects of this process of urban change is that of the “dead zone.” While Gil Doron uses the term to refer to spaces that have been officially declared derelict – spaces which in official consciousness contain nothing of note – the idea is useful for helping our understanding of the effects of the Tarlaba 1 community’s response to the development.

Although many spaces in Tarlaba 1 that were and are considered officially derelict continue in reality to be used by the local community, it would be too much of a stretch of definition to suggest that the neighbourhood as a whole conformed to the dead zone concept. While the majority of the people have in many ways been ignored by the state and much of society for some time, if nothing else the neighbourhood does not fit the definition because of the number of buildings listed for protection. In this regard, Tarlaba 1 may be said to be the very opposite of a dead zone, as it is officially closely recorded as a site to be protected for particular uses and in particular ways. My descriptions of the nature of the majority of the community's exclusion above prior to the regeneration project have an important spatial element, but it is largely limited to the outer limits of the neighbourhood. What are less prominent in my descriptions are spatial manifestations of exclusion within the neighbourhood itself. The “dead zones” in pre-project Tarlaba 1 should not be considered a significant characteristic of the area, in terms of power or subjectivities. They represent a minor aspect of the distribution of people's lives and their relationships with the state and other powers.

The introduction of the project, as discussed above, clearly brings to prominence the internal spatial dimensions of power and exclusion. Unlike Tarlaba 1 generally with its carefully recorded buildings, as the project space is in the process of being redeveloped, it is considered by the state to be absent of use by the

population. It therefore contains no expected behaviours beyond this absence, and in consequence fits well with the definition of dead zones (albeit somewhat re-purposed). I wrote of dead zones that 'out of necessity these spaces must be transformed into something usable, but this usability need not conform to societal norms.' In this chapter and the last I have explained how the use of the project space by the community can in many cases be understood as a response to necessity, and the actions performed do not correlate with the subjectivities and thus expected behaviours which limit the choices of the majority of Istanbul's society. The site also contains the typical quality of a dead zone of existing outside of time in as much as users of the space cannot plan for a future there, and the project space does not contain the social meanings that had been attributed to it in the past.

The meaning of this correlation between the site in Tarlaba 1 and the concept of dead zones, as well as the similar, related concepts of heterotopia and terrain vague, is important. In the process of designing and completing the regeneration project, the municipality and the developer have effectively produced a space of alterity where the excluded can perform their status in the state of exception, and influence others to act similarly. This is therefore another step in the process of change. First, Tarlaba 1 was a community operating outside of the neoliberal urban logic, occupying valuable land but not utilizing it to maximum efficiency from a global capitalist perspective. The response was to force a portion of that population out and take the space for more productive users. In so doing the alterity of the existing residents was made more stark, and they responded by rejecting the control mechanisms used around the new site. Finally, the site which promoted some conflictual alterity initially acts as a symbol of exclusion and difference for others. In becoming something like a dead zone, it represents a vision of different action

outside of the subjectivities which define and structure the majority of society.

In some ways, therefore, the behaviours found in this research are a consequence of the method of change employed by the municipality. Most of Tarlaba 1 was already suffering in the state of exception, or at the very least in a form of gray space. People were already struggling to survive under neoliberal capitalism. But their transitions to *homo sacer* status were individual and often gradual, as were their interactions and confrontations with the state and wider society. A more “natural” form of gentrification is taking place in the parts of Tarlaba 1 nearest to Taksim Square, with hotels, apartments and boutique shops emerging, the legals “grays” as described above giving way to a better-functioning market. Tenants forced out in this manner can be absorbed into their surroundings more easily, and without confrontation, because it takes place relatively slowly and on an individual level. Their status as *homo sacer* may be being established by this process, but it is less visible to the rest of the community. The violence of large-scale projects like that studied here provokes a different effect. In total, the number of individuals taken further into the state of exception by the project may not be different to what would happen if gentrification were allowed to occur over a period of years, but the project's speed means that the numbers losing their homes and positions in one moment cannot easily be absorbed. The loss is felt more emphatically, by the individuals directly affected but also by the broader community which must acknowledge their own impending fate, and also must contemplate the ghost of the amputated space in the form of the project's transitory dead zone. The project design generates a more widely felt, collective form of alterity. The alterity itself may not be new, nor the confrontation with the state in some cases, but the collective production of this confrontational alterity and mutual recognition of such is a different

proposition with different implications.

Prospects for Tarlaba 1 and its People

Even before the introduction of the regeneration project, the spaces available to Tarlaba 1's most vulnerable communities were shrinking, as the streets nearest to Taksim started to give way to boutique hotels and shopping opportunities. In the longer term, once the work of the developers has been completed, the streets that up to now have been left untouched are sure to change beyond recognition. It seems impossible that the thin corridor of poorer housing between the interior edges of the project and the far border at Dolapdere will withstand the inevitable arrival of speculative investment. The project not only regenerates nine blocks of the neighbourhood, but provides security for those wishing to capitalize on the exchange value of those buildings surrounding the blocks. The developer and municipality cannot afford to allow the project space to be reintegrated into the pre-existing neighbourhood, and thus purchasing surrounding buildings will likely lead to handsome returns for investors. The surrounding streets cannot continue as a hyperghetto for the regeneration to be a long-term success.

While the project plans do not include actual gates around the perimeter of the site, the design is such that it resists the encroachment of those who are not desired. As discussed in Chapter Two, the design of the blocks encourages residents to stay within the complex, utilizing inner gardens for recreation and socialization, rather than the streets. Some of the streets between blocks are to be pedestrianized and lined with luxurious shops and cafés, and are expected to be policed by more prominent security guards than currently operate around the development. In short,

once completed the space stands to exist as a permanent testament to the exclusion of those who were there before and those who still attempt to exist on its edges.

The finished project promises to have a significantly different effect on Tarlaba 1's existing residents than it has as a project space under construction. While the dead zone of the space awaiting destruction/construction confronted residents with their alterity and invited reintegration (and thus a temporary reproduction of the space), as well as accentuating the ambiguous (or "gray") aspects of the space, the finished site will offer no such opportunity. Quite the opposite to a construction space where behaviour is defined only by its absence, the developed space will operate with very precise expectations of use, similar to those around the world in privatized, formerly public spaces as described in Chapter Two.

Tarlaba 1's status as a space existing for many outside of the society of control is likely to be entirely lost. In the project space itself, of course, control will reign. But outside, in the remaining undeveloped areas, the newly intimate connections to Beyo lu and beyond will make the old relative liberty of Tarlaba 1 unsustainable. Socially and politically, when society and official power permanently enter excluded spaces together, alterity cannot be allowed to be performed. All in close contact with official power and broad society must be enveloped by subjectivities. Upon completion of the work the transitory dead zones of the construction space will be lost, and with them will go the gray spaces of Tarlaba 1 more generally, with the area more clearly defined as belonging to the state, the municipality, the developers, the corporations who have invested in the project units, the new residents, and the society which dominates the rest of Beyo lu and central Istanbul – everyone but the former residents who still exist in an informality that no longer has a central space in which to operate freely. The completed project will act to overcome the barrier of the

Tarlaba 1 Boulevard. The final loss of separation, perhaps previously more relevant as a barrier to others coming in than residents going out, will individualize the exclusion of those who remain in the neighbourhood, fulfilling Michael Hardt's expectation that no-one can avoid being part of the society of control, at least in the central city (Hardt, 1998, p.148). However, as I discuss in the final section of this chapter, it seems unlikely that many of those who have been affected by the introduction of the Tarlaba 1 regeneration project will ultimately remain in the area to be reintegrated into the society of control in this manner.

Beyond the Tarlaba 1 Boulevard

There remain two substantial questions to answer: Are the behaviours in Tarlaba 1 likely to be replicated elsewhere, and what are the broader implications? A degree of speculation is necessary to answer them, but with the aid of theory it is possible to put forward suggestions with at least some confidence.

As with all ethnographic studies of urban life, the idiosyncrasies of Tarlaba 1, its people and the project may suggest that comparison and wider lessons would be difficult to derive. However, as discussed in Chapter Two, the design and pattern of implementation of the Tarlaba 1 regeneration shares many similar traits with other projects in Istanbul and around the world. Furthermore, many members of Tarlaba 1's community hold links to the area similar to those found in other neighbourhoods affected by large-scale change. In some cases the vital ties are different, such as for the transsexual community. For this not insubstantial group, Tarlaba 1 is seen as the only place where they may live freely as they wish, and the only place in which landlords will rent apartments to them. For others, however, the connections of

history and social networks share much with those which stop residents of other impoverished neighbourhoods from leaving. Despite the apparent expectations of the municipalities who force families from their homes, leaving for the periphery appears to be an impossibility for most. If a displaced population have options for escape to other areas when a regeneration project is introduced, confrontation and visible alterity as described above is perhaps less likely. But in most cases, particularly for older members of a community, this is simply not possible. As such, we may expect to see similar collective confrontational responses to other projects, and this is only likely to become more the case as the neoliberal city is developed further.

In Chapter Two I described the patterns of change in urban environments around the world, with cities becoming more and more privatized and segregated. Public space is diminishing, with fear of difference and the ubiquity of the market ensuring that walls are rising between the haves and the have nots. Furthermore, as control mechanisms and methods of data capture become more sophisticated, the subjectivities that direct the behaviours of society become ever more entrenched. These patterns suggest that spaces of “escape” for the victims of regeneration projects are becoming smaller. Those who suffer the loss of their homes are less and less likely to be able to find others in their neighbourhoods, and similarly less likely to be able to move to equivalently priced houses elsewhere in the central city. There are fewer spaces for those on the fringes of society to inhabit, except for the literal fringes, where the dead zones, gray spaces and hyperghettos previously created in the central city with varying degrees of stability can be reproduced relatively unmolested. If departure to these new spaces on the urban edges is impractical or impossible, the generation of confrontational alterity as seen in Tarlaba 1 may be increasingly likely

to be observed elsewhere. In this sense, the Tarlaba 1 case and those like it may be considered useful precursors of a future where alternative, non-confrontational options are few.

This points to the broader implications of the study. The pattern of state-sponsored massive urban regeneration looks set to continue. The global neoliberal logic of competition between countries and between cities makes optimal use of central space vital and urgent. Improving central real estate by addressing the basic needs of the existing residents, thereby allowing them to improve their lives and consequently their neighbourhoods, is inefficient and time consuming. For places like Tarlaba 1 and land containing *gecekondus*, incomplete commercialization of property makes the market function imperfectly. A competitive city cannot wait for a market to become fully established in order for gentrification to naturally take hold. Thus the state and developers push forward in tandem, taking anything of value with disregard for the effects on those in the way. While a logic which prizes the speed and size of change in order to maximise growth remains dominant, those who fall outside of the system's needs are likely to be increasingly estranged.

If substantial regeneration projects continue then, and with them we see increases in the separation between people in the city, the strengthening of control mechanisms, and the exclusion of those without the ability to pay, what outcome can we expect? As I have shown, these projects have the potential to make exclusion more prominent for those in the state of exception. They create temporary spaces of active, visible alterity, as residents are forced to confront power. The projects encourage a rejection of the legitimacy of power-holders, a rejection of subjection, and a rejection of control. Increasingly, and on a potentially massive scale, the process of regeneration may lead to populations viewing, performing and responding

to their growing alterity. Where in the past gradual change has led to the creation of *homo sacer* on an individual level, violent change today is starting to result in collective acknowledgement of exclusion. In the post-modern society of individuals, the very mechanisms which are driving the society and the previous individualization may lead to some recognizing their contemporaries and their shared plight.

It is too much of a stretch of speculation to say with any confidence what the long term outcomes of these patterns may be. The performance of alterity, and the temporary reclaiming of the right to the city is unlikely to block the path of “progress” in the short term. Those driven from their homes are likely, eventually, to be forced back into ever shrinking spaces in the centres of cities, or more likely onto the periphery as I suggest in the previous section, where they can exist in more conventional gray spaces/dead zones/terrains vague/hyperghettos/heterotopias. What remains to be seen however is what the effects of this transitory, active, confrontational alterity are on those who perform it and those who witness it. For those who remain in the central spaces, subjection and confrontation with authority is likely to revert to an individual experience, as “free” spaces are removed and those left are forced to operate within the logic of the system. But there may be significant ramifications for the large proportion of the population who have experienced the rejection of power, the disregard of control mechanisms and the weakening of the authority of the real and metaphorical fences, and have proceeded, eventually and most probably against their will, to relocate to other spaces on the periphery.

It is possible to imagine the production of a self-acknowledged underclass of sorts. Whether such an underclass could be unified and act together is another question. What is important however is its emerging existence. As the global system of capital develops further, and the choices of those with power become increasingly

insensitive to the human outcomes, different possibilities must be sought. The experiences of those who have lived in the state of exception, and have performed their alterity, may be key to finding and acknowledging alternatives. Those who have lived exclusion and repression, and who have learned the possibility of the rejection of subjectification, may provide the visions necessary to supersede the society of control. Gilles Deleuze wrote that 'control will not only have to deal with erosions of frontiers but with the explosions within shanty towns or ghettos' (Deleuze, 1992, p.7). The experience in Tarlaba 1 documented here suggests that neoliberal urban regeneration is encouraging the possibility of ever more dangerous explosions.

CHAPTER SIX:

CONCLUSION

In this thesis I have investigated the impact of large-scale, state-led urban regeneration on the population most affected. I have questioned how changes in the physical structure of space are reflected in the actions of the local community. More particularly, I have attempted to understand the behavioural implications of these projects, and whether the subjectivities which shape individual choices can be broken or distorted by attempts to remake the lived environment.

This research contributes to the literature on critical urbanism, as I have attempted to show some of the ways in which the drivers of capitalism and urbanization combine to affect the sociospatial organization of those without control over the processes. Following an introduction, in the second chapter I described the patterns of global change driven by a trend towards neoliberal policy which is simultaneously freeing capital to shape our environments and restricting the supports which help those who do not live up to capitalist expectations to survive. Turkey, and particularly Istanbul, is undergoing a period of rapid urban change as the neoliberal-minded AKP government have driven through a number of legal changes to make large-scale regeneration projects easier to implement, particularly in areas previously protected because of their environmental or historical value. These projects are forcing vulnerable populations from their homes to make way for more prosperous communities, and contributing to the increasingly segregated reality of the city. The project in the neighbourhood of Tarlaba 1 is a particularly prominent example of the regeneration enveloping wide sections of central Istanbul.

In order to create a framework for my analysis, in the third chapter I articulated the theoretical background which underpinned my research. To illuminate the effects of the local population on the meaning given to spaces, and the effects of those spaces on the subjectivities which shape individuals and their behaviour, I relied on the notion of space as a reciprocal social construction as articulated by Henri Lefebvre. This ability of the whole urban population to produce and be produced by the city is challenged by planners and investors, as spaces and peoples are increasingly controlled through complex systems of restraint and division, with some forced out of the city and society altogether. These people are said to be losing their right to the city.

I discussed a number of theories with which we can understand the spaces occupied by those excluded from the mainstream, and a number of systemic theories of societal control. To conceptualize the alterity or otherness in which the residents of Tarlaba 1 and other marginalized communities exist, I utilized principally Giorgio Agamben's ideas of the state of exception and *homo sacer*, the status of individuals living ostensibly in a society but without the protections and rights granted to genuine citizens. As *homo sacer*, many of the residents of Tarlaba 1 were left open to exploitation or destruction, with the perpetrators clear in their understanding that such destruction would not be punished, and in fact would be indirectly rewarded.

Over the course of four months of field research, I observed significant changes in the way the local community responded to the presence of a project which had forced approximately 3,000 people from their homes. The developers responsible for the project had as far as possible removed the site from the public consciousness, hiding it behind fencing and darkness, and the residents reacted in kind, withdrawing from the space. Over time, however, they returned, reclaiming parts of the space as

their own and reintegrating it into the performance of their everyday lives, re-entering the removed spaces and using them for an array of activities ranging from prostitution to childhood adventuring. The methods of control utilized in the space and, more importantly, the authority of the power-holders was being challenged. Where previously residents could exist in Tarlaba 1 away from the judgement and limitations imposed by broader society, the regeneration project was removing this available space, and thus forcing the community into a collective form of confrontation both with official power and with their own alterity. For some defying the control mechanisms of the developer was a necessity, owing to a lack of alternative options. For others, the visible representation of their own alterity in the form of the project space collectivized their outsider status.

The confrontation between authority and the excluded residents of Tarlaba 1 I interpret as a restatement of the right of all to, however temporarily, construct and reconstruct the city. Concurrently, it reflects a growing consciousness of collective alterity, and consequently a performance of that status. This has potentially significant implications for broader social control issues, as more and more people experience their own alterity and that of others around them.

Istanbul and cities around the world are undergoing rapid change as they seek to compete as centres of business, tourism and consumption. The methods used to drive this change are creating huge material divisions between sections of the population. This research points to the significant psychological and social divisions that are also being created by the process, divisions which weaken social control mechanisms and present great possibilities for alternative perspectives and actions. The theories of social exclusion utilized in this thesis highlight different aspects of the process of change and continuities occurring in Tarlaba 1 and elsewhere.

Tarlaba 1 as a hyperghetto (as discussed in Chapter Two), for example, has been relatively unaffected by the presence of the construction project. Poverty and isolation from prospects and government assistance or even acknowledgement remain similar, at least in the short term, until the rest of the neighbourhood can be gentrified. The social restrictions emphasized by the hyperghetto concept are relatively untouched by the presence of the construction, enhanced for some but largely unchanged in character. In the aftermath of the project's completion, however, we can expect Tarlaba 1 as a hyperghetto to cease to exist, as the residents not directly affected by this project are forced out, with any remaining doing so in relative isolation.

As gray space, the pattern of change is similar, although the effect of the construction itself is more pronounced than as hyperghetto. Gray space emphasizes more the legal ambiguities that affect many of Tarlaba 1's residents in one way or another, and the official state rejection (with the consequent status of *homo sacer*, in contrast to hyperghetto's emphasis on a more implied rejection). From the perspective of gray space, the project's process of construction is enhancing the ambiguities and making them more stark, simultaneously making more visible the status of much of the community as *homo sacer*. However, as with the space as hyperghetto, post-completion these ambiguities will be eradicated, as the remaining neighbourhood adopts the clarity given by the capitalist market or is removed.

The idea of dead zones (taken here beyond its original use) is the one which captures most substantially the impact of the construction phase of the project as distinct from the before and after phases. Dead zones existed in only isolated spaces of Tarlaba 1 without substantial community-wide effects prior to the project's initiation, and it is likely that in the neighbourhood after completion they will be

even harder to find. However, in the construction process, the project site became in effect one large dead zone, at least in terms of its impact if not according to the original definition. From this perspective more than others we see the effects of the *process* of change, as the altered spatial construction of the neighbourhood interacts with the exclusion of many of its residents. The intimate, relatively brief interaction of the excluded and official power in the space of the construction is what allows the temporary reclaiming of the right to the city. A form of Tarlaba 1 as hyperghetto or gray space (and perhaps to a lesser extent as terrain vague, heterotopia or dead zone) may be recreated in a TOC development on the city outskirts as exclusion is moved rather than addressed. The right to the city will not move with the people, but the experience may.

As I allude to in the preface, there are a vast number of questions left not fully explored. The scope of this research allows only tentative conclusions. Further research should engage with the issues over a much longer period, and preferably in a number of locations. I do not, for example, address here the very likely possibility that there is great variety in the experience of alterity in different times, places and peoples. The contingencies at play in this case study are undeniably huge, and of course have a large effect on the choices made by the residents of Tarlaba 1. Different histories and experiences may also affect the chances of shared, mutually recognized alterity between different communities in the future.

Despite the limitations, however, the findings here present some intriguing possibilities. In studying a transitory moment in the everlasting process of urban development, I hope to have contributed something to our understanding of the ways individual perspectives, relationships and spaces are built. Plenty is written in urban politics about where people go and where they are pushed, overlooking the method

of travel. What this research suggests is that there is much to be explored in the vehicle itself. Through the violence of the process of urban regeneration, the people forced to the fringes of the city may not be the same as the ones who previously occupied the centre having experienced direct confrontation with power and subjectivities outside of the control of the state.

It is impossible to know how that experience will manifest itself in the future choices and behaviours of those on the fringes. To be positive and optimistic, one may imagine communities comfortable with the idea of the rejection of the controlling subjectivities of official, exclusionary power, who respond by performing a different, more inclusive form of societal organization. This performance may then provide an example to others, challenging the status quo. It is unfortunate that history is littered with many more examples of communities responding to violent rejection with mirrored violence and hostility than with positive change. Whichever path is chosen, in this research we see the seeds of a possible future fringe less apathetic and resigned in its subjection, and less readily controlled by established power and norms of behaviour. Where the recent past has seen the largely uncontested development of the revanchist city, the case of Tarlaba 1 suggests that this revanchism may be increasingly challenged, as psychological and potentially physical conflict forms between a mainstream behind walls and a fringe which does not recognize them.

APPENDIX A:
INTERVIEW LIST

1. A male resident of a Tarlaba 1 property outside of the project site, aged approximately thirty. Interview in December 2012.
2. A local retailer, operating out of one of the few remaining open units in the project site. Aged approximately fifty, a non-resident who has worked in Tarlaba 1 for around twenty years. Interview in February 2013.
3. A salesperson for GAP in Anatolia. I discussed the plans for the development as a potential purchaser of a forthcoming apartment. Interview in January 2013.
4. A female resident of a Tarlaba 1 property outside of the project site, aged approximately forty. Interview in January 2013.
5. An elderly male resident, still living in one of the buildings on the project site. Interview in January 2013.
6. A male resident of a Tarlaba 1 property outside of the project site, aged approximately thirty, who also works with the community to enhance skills and creativity. Interview in February 2013.
7. A female resident of a Tarlaba 1 property outside of the project site, aged approximately thirty. She had recently migrated to the area from the South East of Turkey. Interview in March 2013.
8. A female community worker, aged approximately thirty-five. Interview in February 2013.

APPEND X B:

IMAGES OF THE PROJECT



Photo 1: The fencing along Sakız Aacı Avenue, through the centre of the project.



Photo 2: Detail on a house behind the fences, with doors and windows removed.



Photo 3: Display boarding in the process of construction along the front of the project on Tarlaba 1 Boulevard.



Photo 4: Anti-state graffiti on the wall of an abandoned Tarlaba 1 house - “We don’t want the AKP”.



Photo 5: The neighbourhood's winding, interlocking housing.

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