

FORMATION OF A MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY DISCOURSE IN
TURKEY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1946-1960

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Thesis Abstract

Naz Geliş, “Formation of a Majoritarian Democracy Discourse in Turkey: An Examination of The Democratic Party, 1946-1960”

This thesis aims to study the formation of a majoritarian democracy discourse in Turkish politics, which has become the main trend in Turkish political life starting with the Democratic Party (DP) that ruled the country from 1950 to 1960. The DP, also the first party that was elected with a competitive election, had a majoritarian approach to democracy, a view that has become the fundamental tendency in center-right politics in Turkey, and a legacy that the DP passed to its future successors. In testing this hypothesis, the democracy rhetoric of the DP is analyzed to shed light over its conceptualization of the party basis, meaning of democracy, elections, political control and political accountability, political and social opposition, civil institutions, definition of nation and individualism. This evaluation is presented through a discourse analysis of the parliamentary speeches of the leading figures of the DP. Finally, by briefly looking at the democratic view of the DP's future successors (Justice Party, Motherland Party, True Path Party and Justice and Development Party), it is argued that the DP's majoritarian understanding of democracy became a legacy for the forthcoming center-right parties in Turkey.

Tez Özeti

Naz Geliş, “Türkiye’de Çoğunlukçu Demokrasi Söyleminin Oluşumu: Demokrat Parti Dönemi İncelemesi, 1946-1960”

Bu tezde, 1950-1960 yılları arasında iktidarda bulunan Demokrat Parti (DP) ile başlayan ve daha sonraki süreçte de Türkiye’deki siyasetin ana çizgisi haline gelen çoğunlukçu demokrasi söyleminin oluşumu incelenmektedir. Türkiye’de ilk defa rekabetçi bir seçimle iktidara gelen DP, kendisinden sonra gelen merkez-sağ çizgideki partilerin de kendilerine miras olarak edindikleri çoğunlukçu bir demokrasi anlayışını benimsemiştir. Bu hipotez test edilirken DP’nin demokrasi retoriği, söz konusu partinin parti tabanı, demokrasi anlayışı, seçimler, siyasi kontrol ve hesap sorulabilirlik, siyasi ve sosyal muhalefet, sivil örgütler, millet tanımı ve bireycilik kavramsallaştırmaları üzerinden analiz edilmiştir. Söz konusu analiz yapılırken, DP’nin önde gelen isimlerinin meclis konuşmaları temel kaynak olarak kullanılmıştır. Tezin son bölümünde ise DP’den sonra gelen merkez-sağ çizgisindeki partilerin (Adalet Partisi, Anavatan Partisi, Doğru Yol Partisi ve Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) demokrasi söylemleri kısaca incelenerek DP’nin çoğunlukçu demokrasi anlayışının, mirasçılarının da demokrasi anlayışının temelini oluşturduğu savunulmuştur.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKP - Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and Development Party

ANAP - Anavatan Partisi - Motherland Party

AP - Adalet Partisi - Justice Party

CHP - Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - Republican People's Party

DP - Demokrat Parti – Democratic Party

DYP - Doğru Yol Partisi - True Path Party

HP - Halkçı Parti - Populist Party

MDP - Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi - Nationalist Democracy Party

NGO - Non-Governmental Organization

TBMM - Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi - Turkish Grand National Assembly

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of the 1950s, center-right parties became the key players of Turkish political life. Of the sixteen elections held in Turkey since 1950, Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party – DP) or its successors; Süleyman Demirel’s Adalet Partisi (Justice Party – AP) (1961 - 1980), the Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party – ANAP) established by Turgut Özal in 1983, and, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party – AKP) got the majority of the votes in twelve of them, and in eight out of twelve elections, the percentage of the vote that was received by the winning center-right party was above 40%.¹ What is more, all single-party governments established in Turkey since 1950 were formed by these center-right parties; DP from 1950 to 1960, AP from 1965 to 1973, ANAP after the 1983 elections until 1991, and finally, AKP since 2002. After the June 2011 general elections that once again resulted in the victory of Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, it is highly likely that this trend of center-right parties being the dominant political actors will continue its momentum in Turkey.

Where does this popularity and success of center-right parties in Turkey come from? Aristotle once said that “if you would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development” (Szasz, 1974, p.555). So, in order to answer this question and shed light on the present and the future of contemporary Turkish politics, one has to go back in history and trace the roots of the formation of the center-right in Turkey. Such a trail leads one to the transition from the single-party

¹ See Appendix A

authoritarian regime to multiparty politics in Turkey in 1950, where, the ancestor of the center-right parties, the Democratic Party, came to power and ruled the country for a decade.

Among the few studies that mention the importance of the center right ideology of the party in the existing literature, there is a consensus that the Democratic Party is the antecedent of the center-right politics in Turkey. For example, İlkey Sunar, in his article called “Populism and Patronage: The Demokrat Party and Its Legacy in Turkey” acknowledged the DP for shaping “the nature and course of post-authoritarian politics in Turkey (Sunar, 2004, p.128). He argued that DP’s “clientelist incorporation of the rural population, (its) patronage-induced private initiative and the great but haphazard societal dynamism fueled by populism – all of these have not only outlived the DP, but have become the permanent features of center-right politics, dominant in Turkey since 1950” (Sunar, 2004, p.128). Similarly, in Nuray Mert’s analysis of the history of the center-right in Turkey, the DP was considered as the founding party of the trend. For example, she argued that the opposition towards elitism and inclination towards populism that started with the DP policies have been one of the major themes of center-right policies in Turkey (Mert, 2000, p.47), or the center right tradition in Turkey was fed from the struggle to become a first-class citizen economically, which was nourished with populist policies. Finally, she held that from the very beginning, the basis of the center-right politics in Turkey was established through the attempt to synthesize liberal economic policies with conservative religious ideologies (Mert, 2007, p.36).

It seems that in the existing studies, DP’s majoritarianism was mixed with its populist ideology and was not discussed as a factor of its own. For example, Sabri Sayarı argued that “the political ideology that best represents Menderes’s worldview

and belief system was populism” (Sayarı, 2002, p.78) and “the extraordinary emphasis on the notion of the “will of the people” is an important characteristic” (Sayarı, 2002, p.78) of this populist movement. He also held that Menderes’s populist ideology reflects “his basic understanding of democracy as a system in which the wishes of the people, as expressed through elections, are the basis for the legitimacy of the government’s actions and policies” (Sayarı, 2002, p.78).

Although these evaluations are accurate and highly plausible, still, DP’s majoritarianism should be evaluated in detail, and should be considered as a tendency of its own, due to several reasons. First of all, it is this majoritarian view that shaped the policies of the DP in other policy areas, such as its attitudes towards the opposition. This is highly evident in one of Adnan Menderes’s speeches in the parliament, where he attacked the critics of his government and policies with these words: “Those who think that they are attacking the government or Menderes are in fact resisting the national will” (Kılçık, 1992, p. 304).

Another reason for the need to analyze DP’s majoritarianism *per se* is that, as Yılmaz (1997), Özbudun (2000) and Sayarı (2002) also argue, majoritarianism constitutes the main trend of Turkish center-right politics. The frequently-debated current majoritarian tendencies of AKP, which is a party that proudly considers itself to be the successor of the DP, also shows the importance of the need for a detailed analysis of the legacy of this particular view in Turkey. Driving from this motivation, this thesis tried to fill this gap by acknowledging the center-right ideology of the DP, and focusing exclusively on their understanding of the principle of majoritarianism.

The concept of majoritarianism finds its roots in Rousseau’s Social Contract (1762) and his concept of “general will”. According to him, the general will is the actions or policies which are in everyone’s interest, and consequently, sovereignty

should be the exercise of the general will. He argued that the general will was never wrong and always promoted the highest interest of the nation. After Rousseau, majoritarianism did not lose support mainly due to the idea of nationalism, surfaced with the French Revolution. The revolution incorporated Rousseau's idea of monolithic society with the idea of monolithic nation, making power hostile and intolerant towards any differences more than ever. So in sum, majoritarianism, finding its roots in Rousseau and growing strong with the idea of nationalism, can be defined as the idea of monolithic society with a monolithic interest, represented by the ones that are in power. Majoritarianism can have 2 fundamental reflections: the tyranny of the majority – a concept that is first used by Tocqueville that sees majoritarianism as a political phenomenon and a bottom up process, first created in society with the potential to transform into a political pressure. The second version, O'Donnell's delegative democracy, can be viewed as the politicized version of the tyranny of the majority. Although some authors tend to argue that delegative democracy is no different from populism, in fact, they differ from each other in fundamental respects. Populism is a more socio-economic phenomenon and more of a party ideology, but delegative democracy is directly related with the regime in practice. And although they are both hyper-presidential, delegative regimes are based on mass social apathy rather than mass mobilization as populism.

So driving from this background, this thesis argued that the notion that best represents the understanding of DP's democracy is O'Donnell's concept of delegative democracy. It is a concept that O'Donnell developed for the Latin American democratic experience but it also fits the Turkish case.

Delegative democracies have some specific characteristics. It is strongly majoritarian: democracy is seen as constituting, in clean elections, a majority that

empowers a party to become, for a given number of years, the embodiment and interpreter of the highest interest of the nation. The government by the people is interpreted as the government by the majority of the people.

It defines nation as a living organism – a monolithic society that has to be healed and saved by uniting its dispersed fragments into a harmonious whole. The idea that society in hand makes up of any kind of social, economic, or ideological classes is strongly rejected.

In this type of democracies, since the party in charge has to take care of the nation as a whole, their political bases are always grounded on a movement, coming directly within the nation. Such parties tend to identify themselves with “national will”, which, according to them, is never wrong and always promotes the highest interest of the nation.

Elections are seen as the single decisive and conclusive tools that embody a party to gain the legitimacy to rule the country. The clear-cut majority gained by the elections is interpreted as the irrefutable expression of the general will.

Also, in this type of democracies, elections are seen as very emotional and high stakes processes and definitely a zero-sum game.

When the elections are over, citizens are expected to dissociate themselves from politics and become inactive but hopefully cheering bystanders of what the government does. That means, elections are considered as the only way for citizens to become actively involved in the decision-making. Consequently, civil institutions and NGOs are always met with hostility. What is more, institutions of political control and horizontal accountability are viewed as unnecessary obstacles to the full authority of the governing party.

Since they consider elections as a zero-sum game, these type of democracies show severe antagonism towards the opposition, both politically and socially, simply because they see any kind of opposition as illegitimate actions against the national will.

Finally, the exercise of power in this type of democratic gender is highly individualistic. President is seen as the winner that is granted with the right to rule the country as he sees fit. This, in turn, causes low levels of institutionalization and allows the President to bend the rules very easily. But as a consequence, these presidents suffer from the wildest swings in popularity: in O'Donnells terms, today they are the acclaimed saviors; tomorrow they become cursed as the fallen gods can be.

The above-mentioned characteristics of O'Donnell's delegative democracy gave way to the determination of nine themes for analyzing the DP era and to see whether it was really a delegative democracy;

- 1-Party basis
- 2- Meaning of democracy
- 3- Meaning of elections
- 4-Attitude towards political control and accountability
- 5- Attitude towards political opposition
- 6- Attitude towards social opposition
- 7- Attitude towards civil institutions
- 8- Definition of the nation and finally,
- 9- Individualism

The scope of the research was purely based on the discourse of the DP, and the policies in practice were beyond the scope of this thesis. In other words,

discourse analysis constituted the main methodology of this research. To briefly explain, discourse analysis is a multidisciplinary method that originated from several areas including sociology, linguistics, anthropology and psychology, and is “concerned with the study of the relationship between language and the contexts in which it is used” (McCarthy, 1994, p.5). Although discourse analysis has the same concerns with other qualitative methods, it differs from them in an important respect: it interprets social reality through spoken or written language. As Philips and Hardy (2002) argue, “traditional qualitative approaches often assume a social world and then seek to understand this world for participants. Discourse analysis on the other hand, tries to explore how the socially produced ideas and objects that populate the world were created in the first place and how they maintained and held in place over time”, and it “views discourse as constitutive of the social world – not a route to it – and assumes that the world cannot be known separately from discourse” (p.6). In other words, while other qualitative methodologies aim to uncover the existing social reality, discourse analysis aims to find out how it is produced. In that sense, in the rationale of discourse analysis, language is not a neutral channel of communication, but it is a tool for generating and forming the societal spheres.

So, by using the discourse analysis methodology and with idea of “majoritarianism” and its particular reflection in the DP’s discourse set up in the theoretical background, this thesis aimed to investigate the speeches and thoughts of the leading DP figures.

How the majoritarian discourse changed and/or transformed throughout the era was also a major interest of the analysis.

Outline of the Thesis

The first part of the thesis, followed by the introduction, will be about the theoretical background. Within this chapter, the concept of majoritarianism will be introduced. The definition of majoritarian democratic view, its basic features and version in Turkey will be presented. This chapter is especially important in the sense that it will provide the basis for the analysis of the DP's majoritarian discourse in the era.

The chapter following the presentation of the theoretical background will be about the general history of the era, as the period in question is a turning point in Turkish political history that marks the transition from a single-party authoritarian regime to multiparty politics. Following this, a brief internal history of the party in question will be presented in order to get familiar with the dynamics and changes within the DP throughout its political existence.

In the third chapter, DP's majoritarianism will be examined in detail through the Party's attitude towards nine conceptual frameworks that constitute the main characteristics of the distinctive majoritarian view of the DP. After this, the last chapter will be devoted to the discussion of the changes and continuities of this discourse after the DP era. In other words, how majoritarian discourse changed or continued throughout the center-right parties of 1960s to the present will be discussed in this section.

Lastly, in the discussion and conclusion section, a general summary, together with an overall assessment about the validity of the main argument of the thesis will be presented.

CHAPTER 2

THEORATICAL BACKGROUND: THE CONCEPT OF MAJORITARIANISM

The idea of majoritarianism finds its roots Rousseau's Social Contract (1762). In his work, Rousseau aimed to determine the ways people can still be free within the bounds of a sovereign political organization, and argued that the only way to achieve this aim is through people, becoming the sovereign power itself (Merriam, 2001, p.18).

Rousseau's notion of the "general will" becomes especially important in this regard. According to him, the general will is the actions or policies which are in everyone's interest, and, consequently, sovereignty should be the exercise of this general will. He even argues that only "the general will alone can direct the State according to the object for which it was instituted, i.e., the common good" (Rousseau, 1762, p.31), as it is never wrong and always promotes the highest benefit of the community.

Rousseau is against the idea of the creation associations within society, as their interests differ from those of the majority, which are expressed by the general will; and when one particular association comes to prevail over the others, the general will disappears and only particular and private interests begin to prevail. Thus, he claims "if the general will is to be able to express itself, there should be no partial society within the state"(Rousseau, 1762, p.35). This argument became the fundamental principle of majoritarianism: the idea of a monolithic society with one single interest that can be expressed through one single channel.

The main reason why majoritarianism did not lose support and continued to be a dominant vision after Rousseau is due to the idea of *nationalism*, surfaced with the French Revolution. The Revolution incorporated Rousseau's idea of *monolithic society* with the idea of *monolithic nation*, creating an even more unified community, and making the power hostile and intolerant towards differences more than ever (Merriam, 2001, p.19). Nationalism, in other words, entrenched the majoritarianist vision and created a solid basis for its legitimization.

So, in sum, majoritarianism, finding its first roots in Rousseau and growing strong with the idea of nationalism, can be defined as the idea of monolithic society with a monolithic interest, represented by the ones that are in power.

Majoritarianism can have two fundamental reflections; the idea of tyranny of the majority, and secondly, the form that can be best expressed by "Guillermo O'Donnell's notion of a delegative democracy" (Özbudun, 2000, p.151).

The idea of tyranny of the majority, the concept that is first used by Alexis de Tocqueville, expresses concerns about the notion of majoritarianism from a social perspective, and regards majoritarianism as a non-political phenomenon. It argues that the society itself is repressive, and believes that the adoption of majoritarianism as an idea creates social pressure among individuals, regardless of its adoption in the political sphere. For example, according to Tocqueville, when "the right and the means of absolute command are conferred on any power, (...) (there is a) germ of tyranny" (Tocqueville, 1838, p.31), and countries that embrace the majoritarian vision of democracy, such as the US at the time, is not an exception to this situation. In majoritarian democracies, according to Tocqueville, "since everything is subject to majority control, people come to think that the majority combines not only more power but also more wisdom than any other force or group" (Spitz, 1984, pp.174 –

175). In such democracies, any opposition towards the majority rule faces hostility and social exclusion among the community.

Herbert Marcuse and John Stuart Mill shared the same concerns as Alexis de Tocqueville on the issue. According to both scholars, education, media and the government are used as instruments of domination, and these mechanisms of mass expression become oppressive, rather than liberating. Consequently, the majority becomes unable to think on its own and fails to speak for the general will. Under such conditions, in Marcus's words, majority rule come to mean "the tyranny of the tyrannized majority" (Marcuse, 1964, p.256). Similarly, according to Mill, under majoritarian rules, "the will of the people does not reflect the general will, but the will of the most numerous, "the tyranny of the majority"" (Mill, 1859, p.933). So, in sum, according to this view, evaluation of tyranny of the majority is a bottom up process, first created in society with the potential to transform into a political pressure.

The second version of majoritarianism, delegative democracy, can be viewed as the politicized version of the tyranny of the majority. In such a situation, the political party, which came to power with elections, came to be seen as the sole representative of the highest interest of the nation, the general will. Any opposition towards the will of the nation is not welcomed, and any differentiation is seen as high treason.

At that point, it is highly important to note that majoritarianist ideal always has the potential to create an anti-democratic system, such as in the case of fascist regimes. Fascist regimes create a governmental system with a dictator, who exercises the political power alone by suppressing any kind of opposition and criticism towards his regime. In accordance with the fundamental principles of

majoritarianism, these movements and systems introduce themselves as the power of the people, the soul of the society. They consider themselves as the sole representatives of the monolithic nation that they self-appointed themselves to rule. What differentiates fascist regimes, or dictatorial majoritarianism from other forms of majoritarian view is their legitimization of power without any democratic means. The fundamental rationale of majoritarianism, however, remains the same; a unified society with a monolithic interest that represents the general will of the nation (Yilmaz Interview).

What we see as the mirror image of the idea of majoritarianism is the idea of pluralism, which finds its roots in the liberal philosophical thought. From the pluralist standpoint, society is not a sole united entity, but a unit which is composed of different individuals and their groups pursuing different interests, which, each and every group should be respected and should be protected. It believes that modern societies make up of numerous different groups with shared interests. In contrast to majoritarianism, pluralism favors decentralized government structure with strong but divided interest groups that have the open access to the decision making process. “Compared with majoritarian thinking, pluralist theory shifts the focus of democratic government from the mass electorate to organized groups” (Janda, Barry, Goldman, 2011, p.46), that are composed of individuals with interests.

Which vision, majoritarianism or pluralism, constitutes the ideal type for the government rule is subject to continuing debate, but it can be argued that in contemporary political thought, it has come to be believed that “the pluralist model makes (countries) look far more democratic than the majoritarian model would” (Janda, Barry, Goldman, 2011, p.36).

Majoritarianism and the Case of Turkey: A Delegative Democracy

Turkey experienced a dictatorial majoritarian system for twenty-seven years, from the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 until the transition from single party authoritarian regime to democracy in 1950. Already in the single-party period, the nation was regarded as a single, unified entity without any antagonistic social classes. The only party of the time, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party - CHP), self appointed itself as the sole representative of the national will, and claimed itself as the soul of the society. Unfortunately, transition from this self appointed single party regime to democracy did not change the underlying logic of this view of majoritarianism. The only change happened in the idea of how the right to express this unified national will is obtained: through elections. Thus, it can be argued that the change of power from the CHP rule to the DP government was in fact nothing more than a transition from a dictatorial majoritarianism to democratic majoritarianism, to delegative democracy (Yılmaz Interview).

As mentioned earlier, delegative democracy is the top-down version of the tyranny of the majority, first developed by Guillermo O'Donnell in 1990 on the basis of Latin American democratic experience.

At that point, it is highly important to note that although some authors (Peruzzotti, 2001) tend to argue that delegative democracy is no different from populism, in fact, they differ from each other in significant respects. First of all, while populism is a more socio-economic phenomenon and more of a party ideology, delegative democracy is directly related with the *regime in practice*. What is more, according to O'Donnell, "although the two concepts share some common characteristics, populism (...) led to larger political mobilization and organization,

although vertically controlled, and coincided with periods of expansion of the national economy. On the contrary, delegative democracies tended to demobilize their populations, with the exception of periods in which they needed their plebiscitary support, and coincided with periods of profound economic crisis” (Gonzales, 2012, p.3). Finally, although they are both highly hyper-presidential, delegative regimes are based on mass social apathy rather than on the mass mobilization characteristic of classical populism” (Peruzotti, 2009).

Delegative democracies are “strongly majoritarian: democracy is seen as constituting, in clean elections, a majority that empowers somebody to become, for a given number of years, the embodiment and interpreter of the highest interest of the nation” (O’Donnell, 1990, pp.8 – 9). But when the elections are over, voters are expected to dissociate themselves from public affairs and to become inactive but cheering bystanders of the President’s actions.

In this vision, the nation is seen as a living organism. In other words, the idea that the society at hand makes up of any kind of social, economic or ideological classes is strongly rejected. The belief is that “the nation has to be healed and saved by uniting its chaotically dispersed fragments (sectoralism, political parties, egoism) into a harmonious whole” (O’Donnell, 1990, p.8).

Perhaps the most striking feature of delegative democracies is their intense individualism. In delegative democracies, the President is seen as the “embodiment of the nation and the main custodian of the national interest, which is incumbent upon him to define. What he does in government does not need to bear any resemblance to what he said or promised during the electoral campaign – he has been authorized to govern as he sees fit” (O’Donnell, 1990, p.7). But this results in a much higher degree of popularity of the President among the people. In the eyes of the

voters, the President can go from being the best to the worst in a very short period of time.

As the President is seen as the one and only representative of the national will, accountability to institutions that create horizontal checks and balances, or to autonomous civil institutions “appears as an unnecessary impediment to the full authority that the President has been delegated to exercise” (O’Donnell, 1990, p.7). Accordingly, resistance from any of these institutions and even from the streets is overlooked in delegative democracies. Expression of any kind of difference, or opposition towards the government is not considered as legitimate, and is regarded as high treason. Because they ignore both public and private institutions in this manner, these democracies end up with low levels of institutionalization.

Although O’Donnell developed his notion on the basis of Latin American democratic experience, it can be argued that delegative democracy also has been the perception of democracy of the center-right in Turkey, and was especially of the DP between 1950 and 1960.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORY OF THE DP ERA

Democratic Party was born as a product of the new world order, rapidly shaping in the post-World War II era. With the condemnation of fascism and the defeat of the Axis Powers, İnönü soon understood that not inviting opposition and not transitioning to multi party regime would make Turkey fall into social upheaval, as the single party regime was no longer the system suitable for the modern state (Ahmad, 2003, p.99).

In addition to the pressures for change from the international conjuncture, there were also internal pressures, pushing the governments in the same direction. According to Ahmad (1993):

Though external factors were significant in pushing Turkey towards political change, it was the erosion of the political alliance between the military bureaucratic elite, the landlords, and the bourgeoisie that made the status quo impossible to maintain. The private sector had grown considerably during the republic and was no longer willing to endure the unpredictable and arbitrary behavior of the state (pp. 102-103).

Similarly, due to the defeat of fascism and glorification of democracy, society was getting convinced that transition to democracy would be the answer to all of their problems.

The Land Reform Bill of January 1945 made the polarization and the desire for the transition the democracy, both within the country and the CHP, visible to the public. The most polemical and heatedly debated article of the Bill in the Türkiye

Büyük Millet Meclisi (Turkish Grand National Assembly – TBMM) was article seventeen. Under this clause, “even up to three quarters of the land owned by farmers with more than 200 dönüm (50 acres) could be expropriated in densely populated areas” (Zürcher, 1993, p.210).

Article seventeen made large landowners in the TBMM start raising their voices, as the article was allowing the government to levy and nationalize part of their lands. It was such a probability that led the large landowners such as Adnan Menderes, Emin Sazak or Cavit Oral within the TBMM strongly went counter to adaptation of the Bill, and gave rise to the most heated debate in the TBMM until that time of the Republican history.

There were two fundamental reasons behind the attacks of the critics to the Bill and the government: one economic and one legal. They believed that article seventeen would destroy the medium sized agricultural industries that were necessary for productivity in the agricultural sector (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 17, 1945, p.65). In terms of the latter reason, opponents accused the Bill for “giving Ali’s property to Veli” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 17, 1945, p. 70), criticized the Bill for not being compatible with the “basic principles of democracy and its unquestionable provisions” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 17, 1945, p. 73), and saw it as an expression of “hostility to private property” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 17, 1945, p. 82).

Despite this harsh opposition, the Bill was adopted on June 5, 1945. Instead of surrendering to the intimidation and settling for the outcome, four of the main critics of the Bill, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan, Celal Bayar and Fuat Köprülü “broadened the attack on the government” (Ahmad, 1992, p.103) and issued the document that came to be known as the Memorandum of the Four, demanding the

full implementation of the Constitution, in line with the principles of democracy. The Memorandum was met with hostility within the Party and resulted in the expulsion of Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü and Refik Koraltan, and the resignation of Celal Bayar shortly thereafter.

On January 7, 1946, the owners of the Memorandum of the Four formally founded the DP. Their first program was based on advancing democracy and economic liberalism. In fact, the former was announced as the main purpose of the foundation of the party, and was clearly expressed in the first article of their program. The article stressed that the DP was founded with the aim to make politics operate under the framework of a broad vision of democracy (Albayrak, 2004, p.599). As for the economic liberalism, DP was an eager supporter of private enterprise and minimum state intervention.

From the first day of its foundation, “the Democrats quickly gained popularity with the masses” (Heper, Landau, 1991, p.121), as they had been tired of and unhappy with the single party regime and therefore welcomed DP with joy and enthusiasm. However, “the Republicans quickly spotted the danger and responded by (...) holding a general election in 1946 rather than in 1947 so as to give the Democrats little time to organize, and to win a mandate before the DP could defeat them” (Ahmad, 1993, pp.105-106).

Without a surprise, the CHP won the elections with an overwhelming majority, leaving the DP with only sixty-two seats in the parliament. But given that the elections caught DP with a weak organization and that there was a general agreement about the elections – conducted in an unfair environment, the sixty-two seats the DP had won could also be seen as a success for the DP.

Although the DP did not win the elections, it still made a significant effect on the politics of that period. For once, the significant support that it received from the public forced CHP to take measures to liberalize their party and the policies. With the extraordinary congress CHP had on May 1946, it adopted a series of liberalizing measures, agreed on the principle of direct elections, the position of permanent chairman of the party was abolished, and finally, the title of *Milli Şef* (National Leader) was eradicated. After the Congress, a liberal press law was come into action and the autonomy for the university was legally recognized. Similarly, with the 1947 Congress, CHP moved even closer to the DP program. It started to advocate free enterprise, decided to withdraw article seventeen of the Land Reform Bill, allowed religious education in the schools and reformed the *Köy Enstitüleri* (Village Institutes).

“Despite the radical reforms which had transformed the legal and institutional structure of Turkey, the people in general had benefited only marginally, though their expectations had risen dramatically” (Ahmad, 1993, p.105). In Zürcher (1993)’s words, “the memory of the years of repression, of which İsmet Pasha himself was very much the symbol, weighted too heavily with the electorate – it did not trust the CHP’s ‘new look’” (p. 217) and voted for the symbol of change, the DP, in the 1950 elections.

The first thing that the DP did after it come to power was to relax secularist policies. The call to prayer was reversed to Arabic on June 1950, religious education was expanded, the building of mosques was accelerated, and the number of preacher schools was increased. This, in turn, resulted in Islam becoming much more prominent in the everyday life in the cities.

The relationship between the DP and the CHP was intense from the very beginning of the era. Ahmad (1993) expressed the reasons behind this tension the best with these words:

(Despite its overwhelming success in the elections, the Democrats) suffered from a sense of insecurity vis-à-vis Ismet Pasha personally. He had ruled Turkey for virtually the entire span of the Republic, first as prime minister and then as president. The Democrats could not cast off his shadow now that he was the leader of the opposition. They found themselves confronting the so-called ‘Pasha Factor’ (Paşa Faktörü) with İnönü symbolizing the ‘vigilant forces’ (zinde kuvvetler) led by the army and the bureaucracy. The history of their ten-year rule maybe summed up as their failure to come to terms with this factor (pp.110-111).

Therefore, although the DP came to power promising that they would make peace with the past; their policies indicated just the opposite. In 1953, with a new law adopted by the majority of the Assembly (341 votes), the DP requisitioned all the CHP’s material assets and closed *Halkevleri* (People’s Houses) and *Halkodaları* (People’s Rooms).

In the first years of its power, DP was aiming to promote democracy by particular emphasis on individual rights and freedoms and by limiting the state interference. “In this vein, the DP, for example, adopted a Liberal Amnesty Law, enacted a similar press Law, amended some of the restrictive laws and established a committee to list ‘undemocratic laws’” (Heper, Landau, 1991, p.126).

However, due to the feeling of insecurity vis-à-vis the political opposition, from 1953 and onwards, DP started to put repressive legislation into action in order to curb the power of the opposition. In 1953, with the new amendments made on the relevant law, the government put intense control on the press and the universities.

But according to Zürcher (1993), those feelings of insecurity were completely needless. Because of DP's successful economic policies and dubious election campaign of the CHP (they based their campaign on the lack of freedom in the country and authoritarian tendencies of the government), DP won the 1954 elections with even a greater majority.

The 1954 election was a major success, and a personal triumph for Menderes (Sayarı, 2002, p.71). The economic boom, together with the democratic initiatives, created a huge public support for him among the public. However, the positive acceleration of the DP started to turn upside down in the following three years after the 1954 elections. The downtrend in the standards of living and the simultaneous rise in the expectations of material improvement eroded support for the DP among the masses.

A more serious problem was the erosion of support from intellectuals, bureaucracy and the armed forces (Zürcher, 1995, p.334). The main reason behind this process was the growing economic difficulties resulted in inflation, followed by growing authoritarianism towards intellectuals, universities and any kind of opposition. "The government, which had came to power with a party program of economic and political liberalization, started to sacrifice political liberalization in the purpose of saving the economic liberalization" (Zürcher, 1995, pp.334-35).

"Parallel to the failure of the economy, measures against the opposition began to be taken" (Heper, Landau, 1991, p.126). After 1954, DP sought to bolster the opposition by restricting political liberties. The amendments to the Civil Service Law in 1954 allowed the government to retire the judges and university teachers after twenty-five years of service or who were over sixty; with the amendment to the electoral law, activities of the political parties were curtailed (opposition was banned

from using the state radio), electoral coalitions were prevented and public meetings and demonstrations were banned except in the campaign period before the elections.

The DP went to 1957 elections with worsening economic conditions (inflation hit the wage and salary earners), with no sign of self-sustaining developments, serious trade deficits, growing intolerance towards any kind of opposition, and consequently, a gradual loss of support for DP among the public. Although DP once again won the elections, it was a major setback for the DP. Republicans raised their seats from 31 to 178, while DP declined from 503 to 424.

Sadly, the results of the 1957 elections did not considered as a wake up call for the DP. Instead, it continued its oppressive behaviors to consolidate its power. In 1958, DP created *Vatan Cephesi* (Fatherland Front) “as a nation wide campaign to enlist non-member supporters of the party within its organizational network” (Toprak, 1981, p.86) and to mobilize the masses. Meanwhile, it also continued to harass “the opposition in every way possible” (Ahmad, 1993, p.114). In April 1960, with the proposal of the DP Assembly Group, *Tahkikat Komisyonu* (Investigatory Commission) was established to investigate the activities of the opposition. The Commission was granted with extraordinary powers that undoubtedly violated the principles of the Constitution. It was authorized to take possession of publications, close down newspapers and printing houses. It also granted the authorization to proceed against anyone not following the decisions of the Commission.

The establishment of the Investigatory Commission was the final straw that broke the camel’s back. Political strife was driven out into the streets, resulted in the Public Demonstrations of April 28 – 29, 1960 in Ankara and Istanbul. The demonstrators were the students and educated section of the society, including civil service and military officers’ classes.

Demonstrations continued through May 1960. Menderes tried to normalize the chaotic political situation by a promise to hold an early general election in September. “But Menderes’s gestures came too late. Groups of military officers, alienated from DP rule, had been conspiring to bring about its end. They carried out their coup on 27 May and toppled the Menderes government” (Ahmad, 1993, p.114), with the pretext of preventing *kardeş katli* (fratricide), and disentangling the parties from the irreconcilable situation into which they had fallen (Toprak, 2008).

CHAPTER 4

INTERNAL HISTORY OF THE DP

The history of the Democratic Party, from the first day of its foundation, starts with the endless conflicts within and between those who were expelled and those who stayed in the party and (...) this conflict continued until the day the DP died, the day military coup crossed out the name of Democratic Party from Turkish political life.

Şevket Süreyya Aydemir²

From the day of its foundation by the four leaders, Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan and Fuat Köprülü in May 7, 1946, the DP received a hero's welcome from the Turkish society. Every subgroup in the society that was unhappy, displeased and implicitly antagonistic towards the CHP and the single-party authoritarian regime supported this new party and started to join its local representatives (Kabasakal, 1990, p.171). DP established its earliest provincial organizations, in Ankara by the lawyer Zühtü Velibeşe, in Aydın by the judicial officer Ethem Menderes, and in Samsun by the retired colonel Şefik Avni Özudoğlu. These were followed by the establishment of Burdur organization by the merchant Mehmet Erkazancı, Manisa organization by Professor Hüsnü Yaman, İzmir organization by Doctor Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, by the lawyer Hulusi Köymen in Bursa, and finally, İstanbul organization by the lawyer and the former undersecretary Kenan Öner. Within two months, the organized provinces had increased to eighteen, together with thirty-eight counties and numerous villages. As of fall 1946, there were DP organizations in fifty-three of sixty-three provinces, with members of almost one million.

²In Aydemir, 1969, pp.154-55.

The stirring interest in the DP was also evident among the political bureaucracy. One by one, the CHP members that was close to Celal Bayar in the single party period started to resign from their party and became members of this fresh movement. “As it was to become more visible afterwards, the situation was like the formation of a second CHP” (Goloğlu, 1982, p.171). For this reason, Goloğlu (1982) predicted, highly accurately, that there would be future clashes between those who just entered into politics and those who had transferred from the CHP.

The candidates of the DP for July 1946 elections (also known as the “disputed elections” due to major frauds made by the government party) were from different backgrounds. Numbers-wise, fifty-two of them were lawyers, forty-one farmers, forty doctors, thirty-nine businessmen, fifteen retired generals, fourteen engineers, thirteen teachers, and the rest of them from various occupations. (Karpat, 1959, p.163). Unfortunately, only fifty-four of them could make it to the TBMM.

DP’s First Grand Convention was held in the anniversary of the foundation of the DP, on October 7, 1947. This convention was highly important and exceptional in Turkish political history, as “for the first time in Republican history, a successful opposition party gathered a convention that is completely libertarian, and that publicly challenged the single party government and threatened it for abandoning its destiny to the hands of the society if it would refuse to enforce the judgments made by them” (Eroğlu, 1990, p.46). According to Bayar (1969), the first Convention was a license exam that Turkish nation issued to the democracy (p. 69).

548 delegates participated to the Convention. “Majority of the delegates were belong to the middle-class and nearly all of them were just entering into the politics” (Yeşil, 2001, p.103). The Convention has taken place in an atmosphere of complete freedom where delegates spoke to their hearts. (Kabasakal, 1991, p.174).

The most heatedly debated issue during the Convention was the election of deputy candidates. The present enforcement about the issue, election of the candidates by the General Executive Board of the party, was harshly criticized by the delegates and accused of being a legacy of the single party dictatorship. A middle way was reached after long lasting debates and it was agreed that the main initiative would come from the organization, while the General Executive Board would partially retain the power to intervene.³ In addition to this change, the Convention also adopted a memorandum called *Hürriyet Misakı* (Pact of Freedom), declaring that the DP group would leave the National Assembly if changes demanded by the Convention would not be made by the government in power. The changes demanded were: elimination of the laws that were against the Constitution, adoption of a more secure and democratic Election Law, and separation of the statue of the Head of the State and party presidency (Albayrak, 2004, p.101). Finally, members of the General Executive Board was increased to fifteen, and Celal Bayar (also elected as the Party President), Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan, Fuat Köprülü, Refik Şevket İnce, Fevzi Lütfü Karaosmanoğlu, Cemal Tunca, Yusuf Kemal Tengirşek, Ahmet Tahtakılıç, Ahmet Oğuz, Samet Ağaoğlu, Enis Akaygen, Celal Ramazanoğlu, and Hasan Dinçer were elected for the positions.

Hürriyet Misakı was met with hostility by the government, and strained the relationship between the DP – Celal Bayar – and the Recep Peker Government. After numerous efforts for mediation that failed, the President İsmet İnönü issued the famous *12 Temmuz Beyannamesi*⁴ (July 12 Declaration) with the aim of softening the tension between the parties. Although the Declaration achieved its aim, this time, it

³ According to Eroğul (1990), this incident was important in the sense that it shows how far this thirst for freedom could sharpen (p.49).

⁴ In this Declaration, İnönü assured that the opposition party would continue its practices in equal terms with the party in power, and reassured the continuation of multi-party politics in Turkey.

led to heated conflicts and inter-party depressions in both parties (Eroğul, 1990, p.64). The rapprochement between the parties after the Declaration received harsh criticisms from the extremists within the DP, leaded by Kenan Öner. This extremist group regarded the Declaration as a frame-up; they sided against the founders, and called for a complete close out of the single-party regime. This internal contestation, also known as the Fuat Köprülü – Kenan Öner conflict accelerated with the resignation of Kenan Öner a day before the Istanbul Convention. In the resignation, Öner argued that “the founders tried to manipulate the party for their individual interests and set the will of the nation aside” (Yeşil, 2001, p.125).

The resignation of Öner did not create the expected effect on the Istanbul Convention on January 1948. But still, the pro-Öner deputies deposed Köprülü from the Group Vice Chairmanship and elected Hulusi Demirelli. However, the situation was “met with discontent among the founders and several other members, such as Samet Ağaoğlu, Refik Şevket İnce, Celal Ramazanoğlu, Cemal Tunca and Fevzi Lütüf Karaosmanoğlu” (Albayrak, 2004, p.29). In the end, the DP General Executive Board voted for the invalidation and renewed the election. Although Demirelli was elected again, this incident initiated the several dismissals from the party. On May 10, 1948, Osman Nuri Koni, Necati Erdem, Enis Akaygen, Ahmet Oğuz, Hasan Dinçer and Ahmet Tahtakılıç were expelled from the party. Following this, the ten DP deputies that were highly critical about the refinements accused the founders for being dictators. These ten deputies were also expelled from the party soon after the incident.⁵ So, by summer 1948, together with the resignation of Suphi Batur and Enver Kök, the number of DP’s seats in the parliament was reduced to thirty-one.

⁵ These deputies were; Ali Rıza Kırsever, Asım Gürsu, Bahaeddin Öğütmen, Behçet Gökçen, Fethi Erimcağ, Hasan Arslan, Mehmet Askar, Mehmet Öktem, Şahin Laçın, Hazım Bozca.

While some of the expelled deputies formed a group called *Müstakil Demokratlar* (Independent Democrats), the others founded a new political party, Millet Partisi (Nation Party) in July 1948.⁶ In 1949, members of the *Müstakil Demokratlar* also joined the Millet Partisi. At the end of this cleaning process, the strength of the DP “in the Assembly was cut in half, but it became more unified (Ahmad, 1977, p.27).

DP’s Second Grand Convention was held under serious inter-party depression. Between two Conventions, half of the Assembly group had lost and one third of the General Executive Board had executed (Kabasakal, 1991, p.178). Although a proposal that allowed the expelled deputies to return to the party was issued to the congress, it was rejected.

The Grand Convention made an amendment in party regulations, and decided that while the Executive Board would elect 20% of the deputy candidates, the delegates would elect the remaining 80%. Additionally, a highly strongly worded declaration, known as the *Milli Husumet Andı* (National Hostility Declaration)⁷ was approved by the participants.

Within this tense political atmosphere, Turkey went to the general elections in May 14, 1950, which resulted in the overwhelming success of the DP. DP received 4,242,831 votes, constituting the 53.59% of the total, and won 408 seats in the Assembly. With this victory, the Grand Assembly witnessed a fundamental transformation in terms of the social backgrounds of its members. The new Assembly was composed by and large of businessmen, merchants and local elites, reducing the amount of civil and military bureaucrats (Tachau, 1975, p.9).

⁶ The first honorary president of the party was Fevzi Çakmak, and the first formal president was Hikmet Bayur.

⁷ In the same line with the Pact of Freedom, DP threatened the government for leaving their future in the hands of the animosity of the nation if they once again fail to guarantee the security of the elections. For more information, see *Milli And*: http://www.ata.boun.edu.tr/htr/documents/312_6/DP/Demokrat_Parti_Belgeleri.pdf

On May 22, Menderes announced the very first cabinet⁸ of the multiparty politics in Turkey. Although the cabinet received positive feedback from the press and the society, it was met with displeasure among the parliamentary group, as “only 6 (Menderes, Köprülü, Polatkan, İleri, Özsan and Velibeşe) could be considered truly party men. The rest were either technocrats or former bureaucrats who had joined the party very recently. (...) Furthermore, all were men with no independent standing in the party. They lacked the popularity and local support in their constituencies to be elected without the party’s promotion of their cause. Therefore if they wish to remain in the cabinet, or even to be re-elected, they had to be absolutely royal to the Prime Minister” (Ahmad, 1977, p.79).

Predictably, there was a discontent among the leading figures of the DP that were excluded from the First Menderes cabinet. So, in order to resolve this discontent, Menderes made some gradual changes in the following months and added Samet Ağaoğlu, Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu, Tevfik İleri, Seyfi Kurtberk, Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, Hulusi Köymen and Kemal Zeytinoğlu to the cabinet.

Despite the changes in the cabinet, there was gradual tension surfacing within the DP organization, especially between local delegations and the main administration. “The first spark of discontent occurred in Istanbul organization, resulting in the authority of the center by the alteration of eight administrators of the province” (Kabasakal, 1991, p.181). However, the discontent continued to manifest itself, first in the İzmir Congress on February 3, 1951, followed by Seyhan, Zonguldak and Eskişehir congresses within the same year. The dissatisfaction was mainly directed towards the main administration by the local delegations, accusing them for establishing a power monopoly and being extremely authoritarian

⁸ See Appendix B.

(Kabasakal, 1991, p.181). However, at the end, these kinds of conflicts were always solving by the intervention of the headquarters, usually by the refinement of the opposition.

DP held its Third Grand Convention on October 15-20, 1951. No gradual changes or decisions were made during the Convention, and Menderes was once again chosen as the President of the Party, without any opposition. Regarding the General Executive Board, only five members could not get reelected,⁹ and only one third of the Board was renewed.

After maintaining the hegemony over the Convention, “the Assembly Group remained the only check on Menderes’s authority, but it too, turned out to be ineffective” (Ahmad, 1977, p.85). Refik Şevket İnce, a popular figure within the DP for his political experience and moderate line and also known for his opposition towards Menderes’s arbitrary behavior, resigned after the Group’s decision of cancelling the 1952 by-elections. His resignation was important in the sense that for the first time, a leading figure within the DP openly criticized Menderes’s policies (Ahmad, 1977, p.93).

Inter-party dismissals continued in the years 1953 and 1954. Menderes even appointed Hüsnü Yalman for the inspection of local organizations and refining them from the opposition towards Menderes. The regular Grand Convention was canceled, and one by one, dissenting voices started to be expelled from the party. At the same time, the Millet Partisi was banned from politics by the government, for “being a religious-based organization and for hiding its essential intention” (Kabasakal, 1991, p.184). However, the same political cadre formed Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi

⁹ These were; Hulusi Köymen, İhsan Şerif Özgen, Üzeyir Avunduk, Nuri Özsan and Kemal Özçoban. Instead, with one additional member, Fethi Çelikbaş, Atıf Benderlioğlu, Emin Kalafat, Tevfik İleri, Rıfki Salim Burçak and Mustafa Zeren replaced their positions.

(Republican National Party) in February 1954 and continued its opposition towards the DP.

Fall 1955 witnessed major intra-party depressions in the DP. The Minister of Businesses and a leading figure in the DP, Fethi Çelikbaş resigned from the party, and consequently, “it was around Çelikbaş that the opposition to the Menderes – Bayar oligarchy began to take shape” (Ahmad, 1977, p.88). This opposition became visible with the introduction of a motion by nineteen deputies¹⁰ (also known as *İspatçılar*), demanding an amendment in Turkish Criminal Code that allowed individuals the right to prove one’s accusations. Predictably, the government rejected the amendment; nine members of the *İspatçılar* group were expelled from the party, and an inquiry was launched for the remaining ten. As a counter-attack, the remaining ten also resigned from the party and established Hürriyet Partisi (Liberty Party) in December 1955, under the leadership of Fevzi Lütüf Karaosmanoğlu.

In the late November of the same year, the DP group had its roughest session of its history. In the meeting, the group lied heavily to the ministers, especially about the worsening economic situation of the country, and accused the government for lacking a proper program to reverse the situation, resulting in the collective resignation of the third Menderes Cabinet (Kabasakal, 1990, p.187).

In its last four years in government, the DP started to get more and more repressive, not just externally, but also towards its inter-party rule. The last Grand Party Convention met in 1954, under extreme influence of Menderes. No significant decisions were made during the Congress, and Menderes’s criticisms towards

¹⁰ These were; (*those who were expelled*) Fevzi Lütüf Karaosmanoğlu, Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, Safaettin Karanakçı, Ragıp Karaosmanoğlu, İsmail Hakkı Akyüz, Behçet Kayaalp, Ziyat Ebuzziya, Mustafa Timur, Sabahaddin Çıracıoğlu; (*those who resigned*) Fethi Çalikbaş, Enver Güreli, İbrahim Öktem, Raif Arbay, Şeref Kamil Mengü, Muhlis Bayramoğlu, Ekrem Alican, Mustafa Ekinci, Kasım Küfrevi (Çakmak, 2008, pp.153-154)

İspatçılar constituted the main purpose of the meeting (Kabasakal, 1991, p.189). And after 1955, DP completely abandoned the gathering of these conventions.

DP went to the 1957 elections with a series of dismissals and resignations. Perhaps the most striking one was the resignation of the Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü, one of the four founding leaders that had founded the party in 1946. Many others followed this, particularly after the Menderes's candidate list for the elections. 140 former deputies were excluded from the list, and the majority of the candidates that Menderes nominated were former figures of the single-party period (Ahmad, 1977, pp.94 - 95).

DP won the 1957 elections, though with considerable loss of support both internally and externally. Many DP members resigned from the party before the elections, main opposition party got 40.82% of the votes and increased its seats from 30 to 178.

“Whereas Menderes had formed his previous cabinets in less than 24 hours, this time, it took a month to form his government. (...) Only seven ministers were new, and an additional ministry, Ministry of Press, Release and Tourism was formed” (Eroğul, 1990, pp.211-12). However, it was soon understood that the new cabinet was as unstable as the previous ones. Within his remaining thirty months in power, the cabinet was changed seventeen times. Menderes “continued to use ministerial appointments as a way to control possible rivals and trouble makers, and to a lesser extent, to appease pressure groups. The resignations of three key ministers in September 1958 (Sıtkı Yırcalı, Samet Ağaoğlu and Emin Kalafat) suggested that all was not well” (Ahmad, 1977, pp.95-96). Meanwhile, CHP was gaining support, travelling the country and criticizing the government, and accusing Menderes for his repressive and autocratic practices. As a response, DP was getting more and more

repressive towards the opposition while at the same time trying to regain its popularity. In August 1959, the General Executive Board issued a pronouncement calling back all the former refined and resigned members of the DP to resume its power. However, it did not create the expected impact and fell through (Eroğul, 1990, p.196). After that, the DP could not recover itself and continued its repressive intolerance, leading to the military intervention in May 27, 1960. All the leading figures of the DP got arrested, and in Yassıada trials, the Court of Justice sentenced fifteen¹¹ DP figures to death. In the end, only Adnan Menderes, Hasan Polatkan and Fatih Rüştü Zorlu were executed, and the others were converted to lifetime imprisonment. Thereby, the DP government that was initiated with admiration both from the public and the world came to an end pathetically, in an atmosphere of resentment and hatred from its very own former admirers (Eroğul, 1990, p.244).

¹¹ These were; Celâl Bayar, Adnan Menderes, former Foreign Minister Fatih Rüştü Zorlu, former Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan, Refik Koraltan, former Chief of General Staff Rüştü Erdelhun, Agah Eroz, İbrahim Kirazoğlu, Ahmet Hamdi Sancar, Nusret Kirişçioğlu, Bahadır Dülger, Emin Kalafat, Baha Akşit, Osman Kavrakoğlu, and Zeki Erataman.

CHAPTER 5

MAJORITARIANISM IN THE DP

Party Basis: A Movement

Our route is the route of freedom, and we will eventually achieve this aim. If those who are glorifying for the dispersion of the DP really want to destroy the DP, they must rout the love of freedom from the hearts of the Turkish nation and of the billions of democrats in the country, if they can.
Adnan Menderes¹²

According to O'Donnell, one of the most important features of a delegative democracy is its political basis. In delegative type of majoritarian democracies, since the party in charge or the party that wants to come to power has to take care of the national as a whole, its support cannot be based on the party itself or only a small and distinct fragment of the population; its "political basis had to be a movement, the supposedly vibrant overcoming of the factionalism and conflicts that parties bring about (O'Donnell, 1990, p.8). For this reason, such parties tend to argue that they represent the nation as a whole and identify themselves with the "national will", which is never wrong and always promotes the highest interest of the nation.

Such an incentive to ground the party basis on a movement that finds its roots directly within the nation is highly evident in the rationale of the DP, from the very beginning of its foundation in 1946 until its dissolution by the military coup in 1960. Already in 1947, only after a year of the Party's foundation, Celal Bayar was arguing that the grand cause of their party was the establishment of democracy in the country

¹² In Demir, 2010, p.153.

(Şahingiray, 1956, p.69) something that the Turkish nation had been longing for for years.

During the opposition years from 1946 to 1950, the leaders of the DP were already convinced that they were the sole representative of the nation, and the democratic movement that it was willing to initiate. For example, in the speeches he gave in the first annual congress of the DP in January 1947 and his election stunts in different districts, Celal Bayar was declaring that “DP was blessed with the privilege and honor to be the first party that was founded directly by the Turkish nation itself” (Şahingiray, 1956, p.58) that “DP is the party of the nation”, and therefore his words were the “property of the whole citizens” (Şahingiray, 1956, p.78). He even argued that “those who malign DP are in fact maligning the Turkish nation” (Şahingiray, 1956, p.109).

The attempt to identify the Party with the nation as a whole grew even stronger after the DP came to power with May 1950 elections. DP was proudly announcing that their government was born from the bosom of the nation, and according to Menderes, “getting its inspiration and orders from villages, towns and cities of the country” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 46, 1954, p. 582), and “carrying the responsibility of the 22 million people on its shoulders” (Doğan, 1957a, p.149). This transition of power from CHP to DP was declared as a “groundbreaking reform that allowed the wheels of the nation to be administrated by the nation itself” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 7, 1951, p. 140) and that, for the first time, the national will came into power. DP had been the sole representative of the nation’s struggle for democracy and freedom (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 53, 1954, p. 12012), a struggle that ended with a victory by clean elections. With the DP’s

success, “the nation started to be governed by a party created by the Turkish spirit of democracy” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 41, 1952, p. 329).

Such identification with the will of the national allowed DP to justify and legitimate their actions, decisions and legislations; even they were oppressive rather than liberating. For example, during the parliamentary discussions to close down the *Halkevleri* (People’s Houses), one of the DP members, Süreyya Endik, offered to pay attention to the wishes of the Turkish nation, and justified the need to close down the Houses by arguing that “it is the nation’s will to close them down immediately” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 111, 1951, p. 272). The same rationale was also evident during the discussions to confiscate CHP’s unjust properties in 1953, and during the discussions on the National Protection Law in 1956. For example, in terms of the discussions to confiscate CHP’s unjust properties, Nusret Kirişcioğlu declared that there was a direct order from the nation on the issue, as the nation that had sent them to this Assembly had continuously been complaining about the issue in every congress and meetings, and ordering for the return of the unjust properties that CHP owed to the nation (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 17, 1953, p. 196). Similarly, during the talks on the re-initiation of the National Protection Law, Menderes argued that “the law in question was born in the hearts of the community”, and it was for this reason that the DP brought the law proposal to the Assembly in the first place (Doğan, 1957b, p.265).

Similar to the strategy of legitimizing actions by identifying itself with the national will, DP used the same strategy for delegitimizing the criticism and opposition towards its government, especially from the print media. During his power, Menderes declared more than once that, “aggressions toward the DP cause injury to the national will and national dignity” (Doğan, 1957b, p.79), “those who

were harassed are not only the ones that are elected, but the very being of the nation, the nation's right to vote, its free conscience" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 4, 1951, p. 100). According to Menderes, averting the government meant averting the proper ruling and well being of the Turkish nation (Doğan, 1957b, p.102).

DP's unshakeable and unquestionable belief that they were the sole representatives of the Turkish nation - confirmed, according to them, in every four years - also made the government highly reckless and hostile towards the opposition, especially after their third victory in 1957 elections. For example, Haluk Şaman, the Minister of the State at the time, went too far to say that "the government's *authority* is the direct expression of the rule of the nation" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 38, 1960, p. 964) while he was responding the accusations towards his government in the Assembly by the opposition parties for creating an authoritarian regime and violating the principles of democracy and freedom. Similarly, Celal Yardımcı's (Minister of Education) response to the opposition's call for the resignation of the government clearly revealed the position of the DP on the issue:

Turkish Nation elected my government and me, and sent us here, not you. Therefore, I do not need to take your call for resignation seriously. As you see, my friends, Turkish nation saw this mentality and brought us to power. He decides for the acquittal or the conviction. It is for this reason that we came here as the government with over 400 people, and you came as the opposition with of no more than 4 members (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 55, 1959, p. 188).

In sum, it is evident that the DP clearly displayed an important and a highly typical characteristic of delegative democracies. During its foundation and opposition years to its three terms in government, DP and its leading figures regarded themselves as the unquestionable representatives of the general will. They identified

the Party with the nation, claimed that the DP *was* the nation, allowing them to create an area for political maneuvering both by legitimizing its actions and delegitimizing the opposition.

Meaning of Democracy

Democracy, in simple terms, is the system of power that is changed by elections.

*Celal Bayar*¹³

As you all know, when we look at the roots of democracy, elections are (...) based on majority rule.

*Celal Bayar*¹⁴

In the politicized version of majoritarianism, democracy is seen as a system for constituting, “in clean elections, a majority that empowers somebody to become, for a given number of years, the embodiment and interpreter of the highest interest of the nation” (O’Donnell, 1990, pp.8-9). In such systems, “government by the people is interpreted as government by the majority of the people” (Jand et al., 2011, p.43), and it is believed that “majorities should govern and minorities should oppose” (Lijphard, 1999, p.31). In addition, elections are considered as conclusive, and as a means to decide on government’s policy choices (O’Donnell, 1990, pp. 8-9).

DP’s vision of democracy was the perfect exemplar of a majoritarian view of democracy. Democracy was seen as the “system that is based on the voting majority”,¹⁵ changed every four years by clean and free elections, where election

¹³ In Şahingiray, 1956, p.293.

¹⁴ In Bayar, 1969, p. 164.

¹⁵ From the circular letter by Celal Bayar on how the elections would proceed and the duties of the DP, June 3, 1946. See Şahingiray (1956), p.442.

results were interpreted as the will of the nation. Accepting the decisions of the majority was seen as the “only meritorious way in a community that is governed by consultation” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 41, 1956, p. 485). Any opposition towards the decisions of the majority - which meant the decisions of DP after their transition to power by 1950 elections - was interpreted as undemocratic. The words of Kemal Biberoğlu, during the parliamentary talks about the Law on Public Meetings and Demonstrations on June 27, 1956, clearly illustrate the vision of DP on the issue:

Democracy is a regime for those who accept the fact that the majority that came to power with free elections will be in power within the terms provided by the law, no matter what. It is not a regime for those who abandon their duty as the opposition as a result of not getting what they want as a minority and thus seeing themselves above the decisions of the majority¹⁶ (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 82, 1956, p. 521).

Other than having a majoritarian vision, DP’s understanding of democracy put a lot of emphasis on individual rights and freedoms, equality among the citizens and freedom of the press; even though how they interpret these principles underwent a transformation process during their ten years in power.

During their opposition years and first four years in power, the DP leaders saw individual liberties and freedom of speech as the unconditional principles that constitute the definition of democracy. For example, during their four years in the opposition, DP defined democracy simply as a regime where “citizens’ rights and

¹⁶ A similar statement was made by Muammer Alakant, the Minister of State from September 1952 to April 1953: “(During the DP’s time in government), the national will will always prevail. Those who win the majority in the elections will gain the responsibility and the honor to rule the country. On the contrary, those who lose the majority will submit to the decision of the will of the nation” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 10, 1952, p.386).

freedoms are secured and guaranteed” (Fersoy, 1971, p.217). The right to be criticized by the press was seen as the “fundamental basis of democracy” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 14, 1946, p. 296). This advocacy for unconditional and unrestricted rights and freedoms also continued throughout the first four years of DP’s power. Democracy continued to be defined as “freedoms, inviolability of individual rights and property” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 28, 1951, p. 137). Equality was seen as the “fundamental basis of democracy” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 110, 1951, p. 673). Any law that restricts the fundamental individual rights granted to citizens by the Constitution in any way was labeled as antidemocratic (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 37, 1951, pp. 472-473).

Contrary to their definition of democracy and the principles they attribute to it during their eight years in politics, we see a fundamental change on the democracy rhetoric of DP, gradually increasing after the 1954 elections and reaching its apex in the last months of their power. During those years, the rhetoric on democracy as the unconditional and unrestricted freedoms was superseded with the need to mark the bounds of these principles; and such a need for restrictions were again justified on behalf of the democracy itself. When the relationship between the DP and the press started to deteriorate and a public discontent began to flourish against DP due to social and economic reasons especially after the 1957 elections, the DP’s understanding of democracy and the principles the DP had attributed to it changed drastically. Democracy started to be defined as a “system of material and moral responsibilities” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 37, 1960, p. 911), rather than a system of sole rights and freedoms. Menderes’s below mentioned words on the subject worth mentioning to illustrate this point further:

Democracy is like an exotic flower. We need a greenhouse to keep it alive. Without this, it cannot survive from strong winds, blowing from left to right and front to rear (Ağaoğlu, 2003, pp.124-125).

As is seen, the democracy rhetoric of the DP underwent a transformation process during its fourteen years of political existence. Although the idea of democracy as the majority rule, expressed through free elections remained the same, DP's attitude towards the fundamental principles of democracy transformed significantly. With the gradual increase in its self-confidence and simultaneous decrease in its popular support, DP went from supporting a democracy of wider rights and freedoms to a democracy of law, order and boundaries.

Elections

Citizens use their authority on election days
*Fuad Hulusi Demirelli*¹⁷

Voting right is the fundamental basis of democracy and civic rights. It is intrusting the destiny of the government and the nation to the hands of the nation itself
*Sedat Zeki Örs*¹⁸

The distinct standpoint on elections is perhaps the most important feature of delegative democracies. To begin with, in this type of democracy, according to O'Donnell (1990), elections are seen as the single decisive and conclusive tool that embodies a party to gain the legitimacy to rule the country for a given number of years. The clear-cut majority gained by the election results is interpreted as the irrefutable expression of the general will, which is never wrong and always promotes

¹⁷ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 81, 1948, p. 684.

¹⁸ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 10, 1951, p. 272.

the highest interest of the nation. Thus, elections are also seen as instruments to confirm the citizens' approval to the general administration and policies of the government in power. In other words, if a party that is currently in power is to be chosen consecutively by the majority in several elections, it is interpreted as a clear sign of citizens' approval of and confidence in its every policy choice (pp. 8-11).

“Elections in delegative democracies are a very emotional and high-stakes process: various candidates compete to be the absolutely zero-sum winner of the delegation to rule the country” (O'Donnell, 1990, p.9). But when the elections are over, voters are expected to dissociate themselves from public affairs and to become inactive but cheering bystanders of the government's actions. That means, elections are considered as the only way for citizens to become actively involved in the decision making process and in the ruling of the country (O'Donnell, 1990, p.9).

Elections held the primary importance for the DP, as they saw the elections by means of “the only and the most important instrument for revealing the national will” (Şahingiray, 1956, p.225), and a crucial “part of citizens' fundamental rights and freedoms” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 4, 1954, p. 70). According to them, elections constitute the actual “expression of the will of the nation”¹⁹ and the fundamental basis of democracy (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 44, 1954, p. 454). A leading figure of the DP, Osman Çiçekdağ, for example, once argued that “(May 14) was the day of the rearing and the establishment of the national will, which had been prevented from forging ahead until then” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 110, 1951, p. 636).

¹⁹ Same description was used by various DP members:

By Refik Koraltan: TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 8, 1946, p. 184,

By Fuat Köprülü: TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 8, 1946, p. 123,

By Adnan Menderes: TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 17, 1953, p. 185,

By Osman Şevki Çiçekdağ: TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 18, 1950, pp. 449-450,

By Ferit Alpiskender: TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 73, 1951, p. 94, and

By Haluk Şalman: TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 49, 1958, p. 1172.

Of course, what the DP considered as the true will of the nation was the decision of the majority. The remaining votes of the minority were denied and regarded as the votes of the irrational and votes of the citizens without free will. Thus, in DP's eyes, these votes were ignored and regarded as invalid. For example, about the results of the 1950 elections, Boyacıgiller once argued that three million citizens that had voted for the CHP in 1950 elections "did not oppose (to the DP) knowingly and willfully. Most of these votes were dispersed, and obtained by pressuring the village headmen" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 4, 1950, p. 83). Similarly, Zeki Örs was convinced that "the votes given to the CHP were the votes of the ones who had been scared of the rage of the CHP" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 21, 1950, p. 542).

Boyacıgiller's above-mentioned words about the 1950 elections also reveal another important characteristic of DP's understanding of the voting process; that it is a zero-sum game. The party who received the majority was the ultimate winner of the game, where the others, even though they also managed to get into the Assembly, were just insignificant losers. Mükerrerem Sarol, Minister of State in the 3rd Menderes Cabinet, once even argued that "elections are like war, and the General (İsmet İnönü) lost in all three"²⁰ (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 27, 1960, p. 218).

In DP's vision, elections were seen as a highly emotional and high stakes process, a distinctive quality of a typical delegative democracy. It was for this extreme importance attributed to the elections that before May 14, 1950, Bayar advised the voters to protect their votes "from any kind of intervention, like they protect their family integrity" (Şahingiray, 1956, p.253), and to vote from their "hearts, without any hesitation" (Şahingiray, 1956, p.419). 1950 elections started to

²⁰ Elections of 1950, 1954 and 1957.

be collectively termed as a national revolution, a “festival for democracy and freedom” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 27, 1960, p. 218) for the Turkish nation, and a “nationwide mutiny” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 5, 1950, p. 128) for the CHP.

Elections, in the eyes of the party that ruled Turkey from 1950 to 1960, were also considered as the ultimate conclusive mechanism for a party to gain the legitimacy to rule the country. It was regarded as a way for gaining citizen’s approval for the proper ruling of the country. It was perhaps this rationale that made DP gain excessive self-confidence and lean towards authoritarian governance, after winning the 1954 elections with a higher majority than the previous one. For example, Samet Ağaoğlu, in his speech in the Assembly after 1954 elections, argued that “in these elections, the Turkish nation gave the majority of its votes to the DP to show that it is fully approving the performance of the government” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 17, 1953, p. 181). Likewise, Namık Gedik interpreted the results as “the proof of meaningful and magnificent confidence for the DP government” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 4, 1954, p. 72), and Menderes saw it as “the Nation’s approval of the Government’s actions in every single policy area” (Demir, 2010, p.298). But above all, Sıtkı Koraltan perhaps gave the most striking speech on the issue:

Our actions and policies in the last six years were accepted by the crushing majority and passed through the souls of the mass public that, Turkish Nation, after four years of experience, once again put the DP in charge, and it is now standing erect, as the treasure and joy of this grand nation. [...] What did this overwhelming majority mean? It was the unquestionable love of the Turkish Nation to the DP government. “I had seen what you did, I believed in what you would do and

therefore I gave you my heart with my vote” was what was meant by the May 2, 1954 results (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 4, 1954, p. 70).

The results of the 1957 elections were also interpreted by the same token. Himmet Ölçmen argued that they “received the approval of the nation for the third time” and they are “on the right track” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 4, 1954, p. 70). Haluk Şalman’s speech on the issue was also highly self-explanatory:

There is no need to doubt that while approving the DP’s program for the third time, the Grand Turkish Nation considered both the vision of this program and the products of it during our seven years in power, and once again delegated the government to the DP with deep rationality and political maturity (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 44, 1957, p. 564).

DP described election days as “adjudication days” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 17, 1953, p. 220), where the nation was the ultimate “arbitrator” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 57, 1954, p. 218). However, according to DP, it was at this point that the citizens’ responsibility and participation to the political decision making process ended. In other words, in between two election periods, citizens were expected to become inactive bystanders, not to involve in any other political activity, and leave the job to the government in power. To give an example, before 1950 elections, Kenan Öner addressed the citizens with these words:

Your most important responsibility on the Election Day is to find your polling station and use your right to vote. It is when you use this right that your political will power will prevail and accrue. If you do not use your right, you will lose your permission to complain about the governance for four years (Fersoy, 1971, p.152).

So, in sum, it is clear that elections constituted the most important political apparatus for the DP, and the significance attributed to them exceeded the original

meaning, making it a classic case of a delegative democracy. During their ten years of power, elections were not just simple decision making procedures by the citizens to choose their representatives, but mechanisms for national will to prevail; fatal and conclusive battles that determine the party which gets to be the sole and the highest representative of the general will, and instruments for collectively approving and legitimizing the government's policy choices.

Political Control and Political Accountability

We, above other things, believe in the need of political control. Unsupervised power, sooner or later, is always doomed to come to a halt.
Celal Bayar²¹

Dear friends, there are important reasons for the division of the State mechanism as executive, legislative and the judiciary. To act contrary to this mechanism could cause fatal missteps.
Refik Şevket İnce²²

In delegative democracies, institutions that create political control and accountability are viewed as “nuisances that come attached to the domestic and international advantages of being a democratically elected President. Accountability to those institutions, or to other private or semi-private organizations, appears as an unnecessary impediment to the full authority that the President has been delegated to exercise” (O'Donnell, 1990, p.8).

Contrary to what is expected, the members of the DP always seemed to be in favor of horizontal accountability and political control, and they continuously promoted the crucial need for such autonomous institutions. Already in their

²¹ In Şahingiray, 1956, p.157.

²² TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 21, 1950, p. 555.

opposition years, for example, Menderes was convinced that “the authority and the competence of the government, which actually uses the power of the nation and acts on behalf of it, should be restricted in a way that ensures the individual and political rights of the citizens” (Fersoy, 1971, p.217). Similarly, in their proposal for the new Election Law in 1946, the DP suggested judicial supervision of elections, provided that the “judges were neutral and objective, and therefore could supervise the elections in the same manner” (Şahingiray, 1956, p.249).

For the DP, the judiciary was seen as the most important institution for the political control and for the “proper development of democracy” (Doğan, 1957b, p.33). In order for it to function properly, the complete autonomy of it was considered mandatory, and as in relation to this vision, it was argued that “it is impossible to live in a state where there is no sovereignty left in judges’ sense of rights and wrongs” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 12, 1950, p. 81). They saw the judicial institutions as “active forces of the CHP” (Şeyhanlıoğlu, 2011, p.259), feel obliged to discard all the adjustments of the single party regime to “save the judiciary mechanism both from any external pressure and the control of the ministry, and to give the full sovereignty it deserves, as soon as possible” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 4, 1950, p. 81).

The Government was also seen to be under the supervision of laws. The words of Hamid Şevket İnce, during the parliamentary talks on November 29, 1950 illustrate this point:

Dear friends, the Assembly is not a pharmacy that holds the cure for everything. The Assembly is an institution that operates within the borders provided by the law, by the Constitution. It does not have the judicial function. [...] We are

capable of doing everything, but only by the process of law (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 12, 1950, p. 553).

Apart from the Judiciary, the National Assembly was also considered, in speech, as a recognized instrument for the control over the Government's power. Menderes expressed this view when he was responding to the opposition's claims about the Government – putting pressure on the judiciary:

There is Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Turkish Grand National Assembly – TBMM), there is you. If you prove that the Government is actually treading this path, we will lose our dignity and will be thrown out of power (Doğan, 1957b, p.33).

Although this was the situation in DP's political discourse, in reality, their actions and implemented decisions were indicating just the opposite. When we look at the relationship between the Government and the institutions of political control and accountability during the DP era, we see a highly tense relation where the Government, though not openly, tried to put pressure and control over those institutions.

Before the DP era, civil servants who complete thirty years of office could be pensioned off, but with their legal right to dispute the decision. When the DP came to power, however, they first foreclosed the right of objection, and reduced the terms in service to twenty-five years. Until 1954, the members of the Supreme Court, Council of State, Court of Auditors and professors were exempt from this enforcement. But with the Law on Amendment of the Certain Clauses of Retirement Fund²³ adopted on June 21, 1954, civil servants serving in those institutions also started to become

²³ *TC Emekli Sandığı Kanununun Bazı Maddelerinin Değiştirilmesi Hakkında Kanun* (Law on the Amendment of the Law of Turkish Retirement Fund). For parliamentary debates, see TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 11, 1954, pp. 218-251.

subjected to the same procedure. Following this, with a new legislation²⁴ adopted on July 6, 1954, the legal requirement of twenty-five years of office was eliminated, paving the way for the Government to remove any civil servant from the service without any legal constraints, leaving them with no right of appeal and with no legal protection. “Considering the important role these institutions play in majoritarian democracies for holding the arbitrariness of the government in bounds, it was easy to predict that these amendments were the signs of DP’s underlying intentions that are to become apparent in the near future” (Eroğul, 1998, p.164).

In consequence, with the legal restrictions out of the way, the DP Government initiated a major liquidation process among civil servants, especially among the Judiciary. On May 3, 1956, sixteen judges, three of them being members of the Supreme Court, were put out to grass. The process was followed by the forced retirement of seven more judges, including the President of the Supreme Court and the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Republic. According to Eroğul (1998), this process was the living proof that DP was not hesitant to even rectify the essentials of a democratic regime (p.188).

In terms of the issue of political accountability, the DP was taking “accountability to the nation” - through the elections - as the only legitimate way of ensuring this principle. Concerning this, Hakkı Gedik once argued that the DP is only “responsible to the court of national conscience” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 46, 1954, p. 582). Likewise, Menderes was always confident that the only authority that they were subject to is the general will of the Turkish Nation (Doğan, 1957b, p.315). In their judgment, their government could only surrender to the will

²⁴ *Bağlı Bulundukları Teşkilat Emrine Alınmak Suretiyle Vazifeden Uzaklaştırılacaklar Hakkında Kanun* (Law on the Removal from Office by Order of the Governance they Serve). For parliamentary debates, see TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 17, 1954, pp. 430-469.

of the nation, and as long as they represent it, they were superior to any other political institution.

So, it can be argued that although the DP was not showing the symptoms of a typical delegative democracy in terms of political control and accountability on paper, and even seemed totally in favor of these principles, when we look at their actions and policy implementations, we see that the case was just the opposite. Due to their conception of the institutions of political checks and balances as the furtive soldiers of the CHP and their excessive emphasis on the elections, in reality, the DP era was in fact an era of a politicized majoritarianism.

Political Opposition

Not only granting other parties the right of existence but grounding our relationship on mutual courtesy and affection and providing them the facilities they need for serving the country is the primary motto of the DP
Adnan Menderes²⁵

We will show them the arrogance and nerve to push their actions through provocations for civil insurgency. We will pull up stakes with them, and show them that they are just a bunch of ambitious power freaks. So, you are thinking of moving from the fight for power to civic insurgency, and then to fraternal fighting. Is that so? You should remember, and take this as a warning that those who dared to do it before were condemned to death.
Adnan Menderes²⁶

In delegative democracies, because the party that wins the elections comes to power with the approval of the majority of the citizens, it considers itself as the one and only legitimate representative of the national will. Consequently, any opposition towards their party, i.e., towards the will of the nation, is not welcomed and regarded as high treason (O'Donnel, 1990, p.9).

²⁵ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 46, 1953, p. 423.

²⁶ In Demir, 2010, p.341.

In the first four years of its political life, DP was the most enthusiastic promoter of political opposition and establishment of a sustainable multi-party regime, probably due to the fact that its survival and success depended on the adoption of these principles. During those years and in the first years of its time in government, political opposition was seen as a fundamental value for a proper democratic regime. For example, Bayar once argued; “no one can claim that having more than one political party is destructive to the national unity. Because that leads to false conclusions like denying democracy or claiming that democratic states lack national unity” (Şahingiray, 1956, p.6). Likewise, according to Menderes, the first article of the DP’s program clearly expressed that “democratic regime can only be established by various parties which have mutual feelings of love and respect to one another” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 58, 1951, p. 66). Similarly, during the first years of its power, DP cadre seemed to be pleased with having competing parties in Turkish political life, and saw, especially the CHP, as a “valuable component of the democratic life” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 56, 1953, p. 1379) that they had been trying so hard to establish.

Unfortunately, those feelings of satisfaction did not last long. The increase in the number of opposing parties²⁷ and their stiffening attitude towards the Government’s policies especially after the 1954 elections made a vital change in DP’s approach to political opposition and its extent of power. The DP cadre started to look down on the opposition and viewed them only as a “handful of opposers” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 17, 1954, p. 454), whom, according to the DP, was

²⁷ Opposition parties that participated in the general elections were: Republican People’s Party (1923- ..), Peasants Party (1952-1958), Republican Nation Party (1954-1958), Republican Peasant’s Nation Party (1958-1969), Nation Party (1948-1954), Freedom Party (1955-1958), Democratic Worker’s Party (1950-1954) and Land Party (1954-1957)

trying to tyrannize over the greater majority (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 73, 1956, p. 146). Gradually, DP started to form the boundaries of the political opposition, and began to define the “proper” and the “ideal” one. According to Menderes, for example, the political struggle between the parties “should take place within the boundaries of the highest interests of the nation. Therefore, the idea that opposition is what it is, it is democracy, freedom of rights, it can do whatever it wants as long as the law sanctions, is not acceptable to the principles of the DP” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 25, 1952, p. 91). For them, the ideal opposition should be constructive and supportive to the Government, which was the only true representative of the highest interest of the nation. Consequently, any other behavior that fell outside of these borders, according to them, was actually actions of opposition towards the national will. It was with this rationale in mind that Haluk Şaman, an important figure in the DP, made this observation about the main opposition party, during the parliamentary discussions on Sırrı Atalay’s proposal for ordering a parliamentary inquiry for some of the broadcasts of the national radio:²⁸

This party practically opposes the national will since the 1950s. Creating disturbance among the public, confusing the citizen’s minds, raising doubts and uncertainty, are the fundamental aims of the CHP. Disseminating depravity, setting people against each other, preventing the Government from serving the country, making up new issues every single day are also the political games that the CHP brings into play. Their political aims are to oppose to and deny everything, and to present every good thing as bad. (...) Alteration and destruction is ethical for this

²⁸ The Proposal For Initiating and Investigation on Some Broadcasts of the National Radio by Kars Deputy Sırrı Atalay and His Friends. For parliamentary debates, see TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 38, 1960, pp. 962-982.

party. The ambition of coming to power by using these methods is deeply rooted in this party's head (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 38, 1960, p. 963).

The last three years of the DP rule can be described as a period of mutual accusations, resentments and contestations between the DP and the main opposition party, the CHP. The attitude towards the opposition became more and more aggressive, finally leading DP to order a parliamentary inquiry about the CHP on July 12, 1960. In this proposal, the CHP was accused as organizing a guerilla movement to come to power by illegal means, becoming armed against the legitimate forces of the nation, and preparing for an insurrection (Eroğul, 1990, p.234). During the parliamentary debates of this proposal, the Minister of State, Samet Ağaoğlu legitimized their rigorous measures towards the opposition with these words:

Dear friends, the decision you will make today would destroy this rebellious and monopolist mentality forever. Because no one except the Grand National Assembly and the Government that is provided with its power, no individual, regardless of his history, have the right to declare: "I, on behalf of this or that group, revolt and refuse to comply with the rules" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 58, 1960, p. 198).

The adoption of this proposal by the Parliament on April 18, 1960, according to Eroğul (1998), was a clear sign of the DP's commitment to eliminate the opposition entirely, if the 1960 coup had not stopped them a month later.

Social Opposition

With the first flush of victory after the May 14 1950 elections, we modified the Press Law in great haste, without thinking in detail, and caused six years of great chaos, leading to a highly dangerous situation that we face today. (...) The majority of the press today, excluding the exceptions, is made

up of bullies, occupying all the corners of the streets of politics. It is our Government's responsibility to show them their true space. We must protect our community from their violence.
Adnan Menderes²⁹

DP's attitude towards the social opposition followed the same track as its attitude towards the political opposition. Due to its absolute and unquestionable belief that DP itself was the very definition of the national will, when the non-public political mechanisms, such as the press, started to criticize the Government's policy choices, DP once again interpreted this as a betrayal of the national will and began to put pressure on them. Similar to its approach towards the political opposition, DP again began to define the boundaries of how the social opposition could operate, and to tend to punish those who refused to cope with the principles that the DP set for them.

Relationship with the Press

During their opposition years and the first three years of power, DP was very moderate and sympathetic towards the press. They were defining it as the "fourth estate" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 60, 1951, p. 98), and were considering the freedom of the press as "the fundamental principle of democracy" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 14, 1946, p. 296). That is why the very first legal amendment that the DP made when it had come to power in May 1950 was on the press law. On July 21, 1950, only two months after the elections, the DP Government approved the new law that liberalized the media from the excessive authorization of the government. With another amendment on June 1952, press members were granted with several

²⁹ In Demir, 2010, p.525.

legal guarantees such as generous social security rights, severance allowances and union rights.

Nevertheless, repressive tendencies of the DP towards the opposition, starting from its third year in the Government, also upset the journalists. With a new law³⁰ adopted on March 9, 1954, DP practically reversed the liberating atmosphere it granted to the press. With this new law, those who issued news that could ruin the prestige of the country and insult one's honor and dignity would be faced with serious fines and penalty of imprisonment. The right for journalists to prove their claims was also eliminated. During the parliamentary debates for the adoption of this new press law, Özyörük discussed and legitimized the decision as follows:

Although the press is a vital necessity for democracy and an inseparable aspect of this system, there is no doubt that it could also lead to the degeneration of the regime if it departs from its principles and is used for personal opposition. It is proved by the histories of all civilized nations that despite its crucial importance, due to the misuse of it in the first years of the consolidation of the regime, it starts to become a tool for attacking the national decision makers. (...) Just like any other liberties, freedom of the press should also have boundaries (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 60, 1954, pp. 405-406).

The DP's discourse on the issue came to be even more aggressive in the last four years of its power. The Press law grew even restrictive and oppressive with the amendments made in July 1956. One by one, the dissident press started to get silenced, dissenting newspapers started to be shut down, and more journalists were

³⁰ Neşir Yoluyla veya Radyo İle İşlenecek Bazı Cürümler Hakkında Kanun (Law on the Felonies Committed through Publishing or Radio), see TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 62, 1954, pp. 530-572.

sent to prison.³¹ Within the same period, Mükerrerrem Sarol defined, in the name of the DP, the boundaries in which the press could operate:

The reason for the existence of the freedom of press is their responsibility to inform the citizens objectively about national interests and public events. That means, freedom granted to the press is not a privilege. This freedom is granted to them because of their above-mentioned responsibility to the society. (...) The limits of the freedom of press can be determined by assessing whether it performs this duty properly. It is by assessing this, the boundaries of the freedom gets set accordingly; sometimes in a wider, but sometimes in a narrower framework (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 38, 1960, p. 993).

Clearly, Sarol was convinced that the right to carry out this assessment was assigned to the government in power, the representative of the national will.

Attitude Towards Public Demonstrations

DP, from the very beginning, was antagonistic towards public demonstrations and street protests. It regarded street demonstrations as signs of anarchy (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 59, 1951, p. 98) and illegitimate attempts to take over the power from a legitimately - elected government. Bahadır Dülger, for example, went so far as to declare that “propaganda does not exist in democratic regimes. Propaganda is a political activity that is invented by totalitarian regimes and is used for political ambitions” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 50, 1960, p. 1005).

³¹ Between March 1954 and May 1956, there were legal prosecutions about 1161 journalists in which 238 of them were found guilty. (Yıldız, 1996, p.502). From 1956 to 1960, journalists were sentenced to fifty-seven years of jail time in total. (Yıldız, 1996, p.504).

The eventful public protests of the university students against the DP in Istanbul and Ankara on 28-29 April 1960 showed the unambiguous antagonism of the DP cadre towards this kind of public opposition. Martial law was immediately imposed in these cities, and protestors were declared as traitors, vagabonds, or reactionaries (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 62, 1960, p. 323). Menderes discussed the issue as follows:

Protesters in Istanbul and Ankara are just a handful of bedazzled citizens compared to the overall population of these cities. Although they chant “We don’t want you” in their slogans, unfortunately, they are not aware of what they do want. Do these things happen because of what they want anyway? They are just a tiny group of people here and there. (Fersoy, 1971, pp.421-422).

Menderes’s these words confirmed the underlying mindset of the DP towards the opposition, as well as the role of citizens in politics. That means, for the DP, the only mechanism for the citizens to participate in politics was through elections. Other mechanisms, especially street protests, were minor, insignificant and illegitimate attacks towards the true will of the nation.

So, in sum, it is clear that the DP’s moderate and friendly attitudes towards the opposition during its first years of political existence was only strategic, as, during those crucial years, its survival was dependent on the adoption of these principles. When we look at the relations with the opposition especially after the second half of the DP era, it is clear that DP was hostile and ignorant towards all kinds of dissenting voices against its national administration – a typical deed that can be observed in the governing parties of delegative democracies.

Civil Institutions

They say the right to strike is a double-edged weapon. Our opinion is as follows: We want to ensure the individual rights and freedoms in this country. We acknowledge the democratic principles as a whole. For this reason, although it is double-edged, we still introduce the right to strike to our workers.
*Celal Bayar*³²

In its opposition years, DP was an eager supporter of non-political organizations such as unions, cooperative organizations, or occupational associations. Article seven of the DP Program indicated that the DP was in favor of the foundation of “occupational, trade-related and social unions, organizations and associations by workers, farmers, merchants and manufacturers, freelancers, civil servants, teachers and university students” (Koçak, 2010, p.3). Also in the second general meeting of the DP on July 1949, delegations adopted decision for enabling the right to strike for the workers, though only for non-political purposes (Koçak, 2010, p.3). Similarly, Celal Bayar, in his 1950 electoral campaign in İzmir announced that they consider workers’ right to strike as a fundamental principle of democracy and an economic, as well as a political and a social necessity (Şahingiray, 1955, p.75).

Despite the welcoming attitude towards these organizations, there were clear signs that the DP was not sincere about this approach. For example, on December 16, 1946, the CHP shut down Istanbul Labor Union Association and Worker’s Club for being associated with two parties (Turkish Socialist Party of the Working and the Peasant and Turkish Socialist Party) that were banned from politics and DP remained silent to these closings. Similarly, although the amendments on the Union Law in the same year lifted the ban for the occupational associations, articles that had granted excessive authorization to the government on these organizations remained

³² In Şahingiray, 1956, p.414

unchanged, and, the DP supported this arrangement and did not raise its voice on the issue (Özçelik, 2010, p.174).

As in all other policy areas, DP was only in favor of these principles on a conditional basis: that they must operate within the boundaries set by the Government. Already in the first meeting of the new TBMM after the 1950 elections, DP began to give signs of intensive control over these organizations. While delivering the new government program, Menderes hinted this with these words:

We will legalize the right to strike; a right that we consider as a customary principle of democracy, in a way that it will not distort social order and economic coherence (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 3, 1950, p. 29).

Similarly, in the opening speech of the third legislative year of the ninth period of TBMM, Celal Bayar declared:

In a free economy with private enterprise, we should acknowledge worker's right to strike and to get organized. But of course, as in all rights and freedoms, this right will also have boundaries, which are going to be set according on behalf of the national interests (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 1, 1950, p. 9).

Not surprisingly, the signs of oppressive behavior towards these organizations disclosed themselves in the second half of the era. After the events of September 6-7, 1955, thirty-four labor unions were shut down.³³ Following this, in the last days of April 1957, "DP Government openly proceeded to attack the labor unions. (...) On May 20, 1957, Labor Unions Confederation was shut down. It was followed by İstanbul, Güney, Çukurova, Sakarya and Ankara confederations. On May 7, Bursa Union Confederation and Federation of Labor Unions in Marmara

³³ 25 of the 80 administrators of the organization that held responsible for the events, *Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti* (Cyprus is Turkish Association), were union members. It was also known that the association was working together with other labor unions. Additionally, majority of the workers that got arrested after the events were members of several worker's associations. (Koçak, 2010, p.8)

Region (Marmara Bölgesi İşçi Sendikaları Federasyonu) were shut down” (Eroğul, 1998, p.190). Finally, on July 7, Turkish Journalists Union was also gone to the wall.

Yılmaz (1997) makes a highly accurate observation on the DP’s policies towards civil institutions in the second half of their time in government with these words:

In this system, there was no place for state-independent, autonomous civil institutions. This last point was most clearly expressed in the words of Celal Bayar (...) Bayar said that in the West the democratic legitimacy of a law or policy had two sources. One was the decision of the parliamentary majority which conferred on it legality and the other was the negotiated consensus between the autonomous institutions of the civil society which guaranteed its social acceptability. Bayar argued that this was a peculiar characteristic of Western society which was divided into antagonistic social classes. It was through this mechanism that in the West class antagonisms were peacefully resolved and society was held together. In Turkish society, there were no antagonistic social classes. Therefore, there was no need for autonomous social institutions and the only source of legitimacy had to be the decision of the parliamentary majority (pp. 4-5).

So, it is clear that the DP’s moderate approach during its opposition years towards civil associations was nothing more than an election strategy. The right to strike for workers, promised in the first government program of the DP, mysteriously disappeared in their consequent programs, and it did not lose time to initiate its attempts to put control over the civil associations. It “supported and tolerated the unions as long as it had the full control and administration over them” (Koçak, 2010, p.7). For the rest, it followed the get-through policy, which, consequently, resulted in collective closings of the associations in the second half of the era.

Definition of the Nation

We are all equal slices of the same bread. There is no East or West in this country
Celal Bayar³⁴

Dear friends, today, even the world acknowledged that the important thing is not the individuals, but the nation
Celal Yardımcı³⁵

In delegative democracies, the nation is seen as a living organism. The idea that the society in hand makes up of any kind of social, economic or ideological classes is strongly rejected. The belief is that “the nation has to be healed and saved by uniting its chaotically dispersed fragments (...) into a harmonious whole” (O’Donnel, 1990, p.8).

In line with the above-mentioned characteristics of delegative democracies, the DP too saw the nation as a living organism, which was conducive to transformation and change; and sharply rejected the idea of a class-based nation. As for the nation – being a living organism, the DP stated its mind expressly in its first party program, and described the will of the majority as “something that changes and inclines towards different opinions from time to time” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 40, 1950, p. 157). Similarly, from the very beginning, the DP cadre rejected any kind of class-based divisions within the nation, and even declared that kind of thinking as “deriding the society” (Balıkesir Speech of Adnan Menderes, quoted in Fersoy, 1971, p.227). This was clearly expressed by Emrullah Nutku, during the

³⁴ In Şahingiray, 1956, p.157.

³⁵ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 79, 1951, p. 383.

discussions on his proposal to make May 14 a national holiday instead of the Labor Day:

It is not our country's tradition or habit to celebrate a day for a certain class. We are a classless society. Therefore, there is no point in recognizing a particular class's holiday (...). If we need a Holiday, that should be May 14 instead of May 1 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 102, 1951, p. 234).

Apart from the antagonism towards a class-based society, DP also refused to acknowledge any kind of regional distinctions within the country, even though the diverse living conditions between the cities and the villages, and from eastern to western part of the country were highly visible. For example, during his speech for the 1950 electoral campaign in Çorum, Celal Bayar announced that for the DP, there were "no distinctions between town people and village people. There is only grand Turkish Nation" (Şahingiray, 1956, p.231). DP was disturbed by any kind of a separatist discourse that divides the country to regions as North, South, East and West. Hüseyin Ülkü expressed his concerns about the issue with these words:

There is some talk among the public, which regionally divides the country to the East, the West and Middle Anatolia. This is not a favorable discourse. (...) It is our duty to view the country as a whole. My request is neither the discourse of East nor West. We must accept Turkey as Turkey, and we should try to develop the country accordingly (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 46, 1951, p. 336).

As an inevitable consequence, DP was also against the idea of minorities within the nation. This point was clearly expressed numerous by Celal Bayar in his electoral campaigns,³⁶ and by many other leading figures of the DP, especially after

³⁶ "As for the nation, DP considers every citizen as Turks, regardless of their race or religion" (Şahingiray, 1956, p.347).

"We are committed to a type of nationalism that depends on the idea of a common culture and ideal among citizens, established by a common history; and that strongly rejects any

the Events of September 6-7, 1955. During the highly heated parliamentary debates after these events, even the President of the TBMM declared that there were no minorities within the nation:

Osman Alişiroğlu: As a nation that is always hospitable towards the minorities and that shows them the greatest courtesy and fairness to those who live under its roof... (Loud noises saying “There are no minorities!”)

The President: There are neither minorities nor majorities in the Turkish Nation (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 80, 1955, p. 674).³⁷

Similarly, within the same discussion, Sinan Tekelioğlu also stated that no one should talk about a certain case of minorities, as they were the very own people of the Turkish nation and were no different from other citizens (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 80, 1955, p. 681).

So, from these claims, it can clearly be argued that the DP era showed clear-cut evidence of a delegative democracy in terms of how the winning party approaches to the nation. They saw the nation as a harmonious living organism, in which any kind of regional, social or economic rifts were strongly rejected. Different racial, ethnic or religious minorities were also overlooked. In line with the majoritarian thinking, the DP tended to see a unified, single society with a monolithic interest and without any kind of antagonistic classes.

kind of discriminatory thoughts. Our Party considers every citizen as Turks, regardless of their race or religion” (Şahingiray, 1956, p.9). We are all from the same paste. It is for this reason that DP wants complete equality in this country” (Şahingiray, 1956, p.154).

³⁷ Same thing happened with Muammer Alakant:

Throughout its history, Turkish Nation have always treated Orthodox, Gregorian and Jewish citizens that entrusted themselves to the Turkish Nation with kindness and courtesy. (Noises from the left saying “You should be ashamed of yourself! You served as the Minister of State!”)

President: As you also know, there is only Turkish citizens in Turkey, there is no such thing as minorities. (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 23, 1956, p. 88).

Individualism

What is the point for me to hold fast to my chair? As you remember, İnönü did that in the past but the nation brought him down. Dear friends, it is not possible to sit here by force, it was possible in the previous period. Is it thinkable for me to be in here, even if I sew or nail myself to this chair, if I act against the wishes of the deputies who represent the will of the majority here?

*Adnan Menderes*³⁸

Intense individualism is perhaps the most striking feature of delegative democracies. In this type of democratic gender, the President is seen as the winner of a type of power that enables him to “govern the country as he sees fit” (O’Donnell, 1990, p.8). In other words, the highest will of the nation is delegated to him to define. This, in turn, causes low levels of institutionalization, disables the horizontal accountability, and allows the President to bend the rules and alter the policy choices very easily. But consequently and “not surprisingly, these Presidents suffer from the wildest wings in popularity: today they are acclaimed saviors, tomorrow they are cursed only as fallen gods can be” (O’Donnell, 1990, p.11).

While in the opposition from 1946 to 1950, the DP leaders were completely against the idea of the ruling of the country by a particular cadre or class, and the personalization of power. In fact, it was the DP biggest election strategy³⁹ to criticize the single-party regime for using the power for personal interests and establishing an

³⁸ In Doğan, 1957b, p.206

³⁹ In one of his campaign speech in İzmir in 1949, Celal Bayar declared: “We should understand that it is wrong to commit the destiny of the country to a person or a particular cadre” (Şahingiray, 1956, p.370). Similarly in his Bakıköy speech, he confidently argued that “in democratic regimes, there are no privileged individuals” (Şahingiray, 1956, p.384).

authoritarian cadre regime, which favors only a particular section of the nation and completely ignores the “true general will”.

Although the same discourse continued throughout the era,⁴⁰ in practice, we see a highly personalized exercise of power by one of the founding fathers of the DP, Adnan Menderes. In Turkey between 1950 and 1960, Adnan Menderes was the acclaimed savior of the nation (Sayarı, 2002, p.76) who would eventually become the fallen god with the 1960 military coup.

According to Sayarı, Menderes’s authority came from several sources. Although he had already maintained significant influence over the party during the opposition years, “it was his election as prime minister and DP chairman after the 1950 elections that provided Menderes with the formal authority to exercise his power and control over the party” (Sayarı, 2002, p.75).

One of the reasons for Menderes to personalize his power was probably the fact that although he was the leader of the counter - movement against the single-party authoritarian regime, he, as a matter of fact, gained his political experience from this order. “The authoritarian one-party regime in which he got his political training and experience was notable the concentration of power in the hands of a single leader, first Atatürk, and after his death in 1938, İnönü” (Sayarı, 2002, p.76),

⁴⁰ Menderes: “It is not acceptable to claim that the Government that came to power with May 14 elections is a property of a particular cadre. Governments of particular cadres, or even particular individuals belong to the previous period” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 59, 1951, p. 119).

“In our party, there is no man, but friends. In the TBMM, the majority party is in charge, not the President.” (Doğan, 1957b, p.153).

Similarly, Cihad Baban: “The party that came to power today is not a party of this or that. These people are the ones who feel responsible for making the orders and wishes of Turkish people come true” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 4, 1950, p. 79).

“We did not overthrow the previous regime to build another cadre regality” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 4, 1950, p. 78).

Ferit Alpiskender: “The reform of May 14 is the day that put an end to the rule of a cadre and the rule of an individual” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 73, 1951, p. 94).

which, clearly made a considerable impact on Menderes's governance style when he came to power.

In addition to his political background, the most important source of Menderes's personal authority and power was undoubtedly his electoral basis. Winning the 1950 elections with more than 50% of the votes that had enabled him to form an absolute majority within the Assembly made Menderes gain an unquestionable strength. "His strong electoral and parliamentary basis provided Menderes with an important political resource that enabled him to authoritatively direct the actions of his subordinates in the DP and the government" (Sayarı, 2002, p.75).

The fact that the DP won the 1954 elections with even more majority than the 1950 elections⁴¹ strengthened and consolidated Menderes's power in the DP. It also made visible changes in Menderes's political leadership. For example, according to Demir (2010), 1954 elections was the most critical juncture of the era, as the victory in this election made Menderes excessively self-confident about his leadership and in turn, led to an exercise of an authoritarian regime. "The DP's lopsided victory in 1954, coupled with Menderes's growing political power and influence, increased his distaste of the criticisms directed at the government's policies and his leadership" (Sayarı, 2002, p.71).

According to Sayarı (2002), Menderes's authority did not solely come from electoral or parliamentary power. It also had social and psychological aspects:

Menderes had that rare leadership quality of generating an effective bond between himself and his followers. His charismatic political persona undoubtedly played a major role in the emotional response and support that received from them.

⁴¹ See Appendix A

The emotional ties that he built with his asides, subordinates, and supporters in the DP's organization also reflected Menderes's ability to convey to those who came into contact with him a sense that he had a bold vision for implementing major projects that would transform Turkey (p.76).

In accordance with Sayarı (2002)'s observation, Menderes, during one of the parliamentary discussions in 1957 argued that he was the only person in the country to take state matters in hand that fearless and nervy (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Session 72, 1957, p. 308).

Another important source of Menderes's authority over the DP group was his usage of political patronage for the consolidation of his power. That is to say, Menderes used governmental sources, most importantly the ministerial posts, in exchange for support and loyalty. "The Menderes loyalists were rewarded with jobs and employment in the government ministries, state economic enterprises, and municipal and local administrations" (Sayarı, 2002, p.77). Ahmad (1977) gives the best example of the hierarchical patron-client relationship within the Party, even in the first years of its power, when he discusses Menderes's first ministerial council with these words:

Only 6 (Menderes, Köprülü, Polatkan, İleri, Özsan and Velibeşe) could be considered truly party men. The rest were either technocrats or former bureaucrats who joined the party very recently (...) Furthermore, all were men with no independent standing in the party. They lacked the popularity and local support in their constituencies to be elected without party's promotion of their cause. Therefore if they wish to remain in the cabinet, or even be re-elected, they had to be absolutely royal to the Prime Minister (p.79).

So, all in all, it is highly evident that intense individualism and personalization of power – a striking characteristic of delegative democracies – was also a striking feature of the DP era. Due to his personal charisma, his political and social background and his willingness to use patron-client relations in his political leadership, Menderes became the figure that dominated the first years of multi-party politics in Turkey. Especially after the second half of the era, the Government, even the state came to be identified with Menderes.⁴² After the lopsided victory in 1954, Menderes became much more inclined towards personalized decision-making in governmental affairs. Especially about inter-state issues, he usually decided on policies “after discussing these with a very small number of aides who appeared to be more typical “yes-men” types than independent-minded advisors” (Sayarı, 2002, p.77). He also abandoned the gathering of DP Conventions after 1955, and “the DP’s General Administrative Council, which had played a major role in shaping the party’s policy choices before 1950, gradually became subservient to Menderes’s own preferences and decisions” (Sayarı, 2002, p.76) - both of them being clear signs of the beginning of a top-down, personalized control and decision-making process within the Party and the Government. But nonetheless, due to his personal charisma and his ability to be a man “from the nation’s heart”, “millions of Turkish voters, especially those who lived in the rural areas, idolized Menderes, considered him their hero, attributed extraordinary powers to him, and continued to cherish his memory” (Sayarı, 2002, p.74) long after the end of this period – a period that often came to be referred as the “Menderes era”.

⁴² Menderes identified himself with the state: “Do not you also mean that all state organs, military courts, military institutions, the Council of State and the Higher Committee also participated in Adnan Menderes’s shady personality and his doubtful actions when you claim that you are suspicious of the President? Yes indeed you mean that.” (Doğan, 1957b, p. 181).

CHAPTER 6

LEGACY OF THE DP

Following the 1960 military coup and the dissolution of the DP, Adalet Partisi was founded as the successor of the DP, “with the aim of ‘bringing justice’ to the DP” (Levi, 1991, p.136) and to attend to its the voting base. After its foundation on February 11, 1961, the AP easily organized itself within the nation, as the organization process was “nothing more than putting up the previous DP signs to provinces and districts, just with a different name” (Teziç, 1976, p.300).

The AP’s understanding of democracy was by no means different from the rationale of the DP. That means, the same democratic gender –delegative democracy- passed over to the DP’s successor. As in the case of DP, AP also grounded itself to a social movement, pursued a majoritarian-democratic view, considered elections as emotional processes where citizens delegate their will to a particular party, showed hostility towards social and political opposition, viewed the nation as a harmonious organism, and finally, pursued a highly personalized exercise of power based on patron-client relations.

In line with the DP roots, AP also grounded the Party’s basis on a movement that grew directly within the nation. For example, according to Demirel (2004), the most important aspect of AP’s image in the eyes of its members were their definition of the party as a democratic movement that had revolted against the minority (the CHP), which self-appointed itself the right to govern the country. This attitude was also highly evident in the discourse of the Party’s leader, Süleyman Demirel. To give

an example, he once argued that AP was a party of a grand cause, a fight against any obstacles to the empowerment of the national will (Demirel, 2004, p.111).

Following the footsteps of the DP, AP similarly defined democracy as the system that is based voting majority, a majority that empowers a party to become the representative of the general will. In the same way as the DP, AP also attributed certain “sacredness” (Demirel, 2004, p.222) to the elections. According to AP, elections were the sole mechanism for revealing the true will of the nation. As a consequent result of this view, AP was also antagonistic towards citizens to participate in the political decision-making process through other means besides the elections. Demirel (2004)’s observation on the issue further illustrates this point:

AP, just like DP, was in favor of representative democracy; it viewed elections as the only tool for political participation and showed antagonism towards any other mechanisms. According to this view, a democratic regime was a system where citizens go to the ballot box periodically and elect their representatives. The political power elected by the majority of the voters were empowered, for a given number of years, as the legitimate governor of the country, and therefore, any claims between the election periods about the government losing social support did not have any significant importance. What really matters is the national will, revealed by free and fair elections. Society and the interest groups do not have the right to question the legitimacy of the government (p.226).

The AP was the continuation of the DP tradition that “poorly understood the constraints of democracy” (Türsan, 2004, p.157). It followed the footsteps of the DP in their attitude towards both political and social opposition. During their time in government, like DP, AP’s unquestionable identification with the national will made it view any kind of opposition towards its policies as opposition towards the will of

the people, and betrayal to the nation. For example, Kenan İmran, an AP member that attempted to run for the presidency of the party against Demirel in 1978, claimed that he had received an unanimous letter from one of the deputies, accusing him of going against the national will and betraying his country (Demirel, 2004, p.112). Similarly, as for the social opposition, “with the emergence of a socialist movement, of working class activism, and support for it from students and the intelligentsia” in the 1960s and 1970s, “AP government’s confrontational strategy showed the AP to be downright hostile to democratic values of participation and competition” (Türsan, 2004, p.157). Instead of a conciliatory approach, “AP sought to restrict the political space and establish coercion over social movements” (Türsan, 2004, p.158). AP was also antagonistic towards institutions of political accountability, as “unfavorable Constitutional Court and Council of State decisions were all considered as ‘illegitimate’, i.e. undemocratic restrictions on those who had the ‘popular mandate’” (Acar, 1991, p.194)

Lastly, AP also continued the legacy of the DP as a party with a highly personalistic exercise of power. Demirel (2004), in his deep analysis of the AP expressed the individualist governance style of the AP – or Süleyman Demirel – with these words;

With the foundation of the Democratic Party,⁴³ Demirel left his mark on the party and became the leader. Demirel was careful about electing the people who would not be in conflict with him, and this process went hand in hand with liquidating (or expelling) his critics from the party (p.109).

⁴³ Democratic Party is the political party that was founded on December 1970 by the conservative group that left the AP on November 1970. The party introduced itself as the true successor of the DP, but it failed to achieve any significant success. It dissolved itself on May 1980.

Similar to Menderes's approach, Demirel (2004) used political patronage for the consolidation of his power. According to Sunar (2004), the politics of patronage pioneered by the DP was also "represented by the AP in the 1960s and 1970s and continued to be the dominant force in Turkish politics until the military intervention in 1980" (p.129).

According to Demirel (2004), AP distinguished from the DP, though slightly, in two respects. First of all, according to him, AP did not have the mentality that those who were delegated to exercise the national will have the unlimited power to do anything. Although Süleyman Demirel also believed that democracy was based on the motto "majority is never wrong", still, he was convinced that the majority did not have the right to damage the essence of the rights and freedoms. This, according to Demirel (2004), was the fundamental difference between DP's and AP's understandings of democracy.

The second difference between the DP and the AP was in their view of the nation. Demirel (2004) argued that while DP claimed Turkey was a classless society where any kind of rifts were strongly rejected, due to highly visible and undeniable rifts within the society in the 1960s and 70s, AP preferred not to deny the rifts, but not to encourage them. In other words, AP based its view of the nation as a living organism that "has to be healed and saved by uniting its chaotically dispersed fragments into a harmonious whole" (O'Donnell, 1990, p.9). So, according to AP, national will was above any classes and was created by harmonizing different interests in the uniting "national interest" (Demirel, 2004, pp.223-224).

After the 1980 military intervention that banned all the pre-coup parties and party leaders from politics, two new center-right parties, ANAP and the Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party – DYP) were formed and entered to the Turkish political

arena. Thus, for the first time in the political history of Turkey, there were two center-right parties competing for public support and legitimacy. But, “as opposed to the ANAP’s initial claim of being an amalgam of various pre-1980 political identities, the DYP’s clear message has been the articulation of its exclusive association with the AP” (Acar, 1991, p.188).

ANAP was founded by Turgut Özal on May 20, 1983. He was “an economist, a former World Bank bureaucrat, and Turkish State Planning Organization expert” (Türsan, 2004, p.199). Before the military coup, he was undersecretary to the Prime Minister Demirel. Then, he became the deputy Prime Minister in charge of economic affairs during the 1980 military rule.

Although ANAP tried to break its links with the pre-1980 period and denied any kind of political inheritance, there were still continuities with the patterns of politics of the center-right ideologies, especially in terms of the approach towards democracy. This was clearly revealed in ANAP’s party program, where in the article on democracy, it put considerable emphasis on “the importance of a parliament emerging from the national will, the supreme position of the President of the Republic and the cruciality of government in providing a strong and stable administration” (Türsan, 2004, p.201).

Inherently, ANAP was a party that had based its roots within the nation, as a movement that was seeking for the expression of the will of the people. According to Ergüder (1991), for example, ANAP, after the 1980 military intervention, was the only party that was closest to the expression of the true general will within the nation. “It was the ANAP – among the three the Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party – MDP) and the Halkçı Parti (Populist Party – HP) being the other two which competed – that cast an image of being a product of the

society rather than a concoction from above. It was closest to a center-right party – an image that the DP and AP had moulded since 1950 – that gets things done and is responsive to policy demands of the masses” (p.163).

In line with the DP – AP ideology, ANAP was also an advocate of the majoritarian democracy that empowers the national will through elections. According to Türsan (2004), ANAP also had a philosophy of democracy, which was limited to the holding of the elections (p.201). That means, as a heritage from the DP and AP, ANAP was also antagonistic towards citizens – participating the political decision making through other means than the elections. Public demonstrations were considered fatal for the country. In ANAP’s view, political participation of the society from other means than the elections had the potential to deteriorate the neutrality of the political governance. So, “participation was defined as participation in economic affairs (...). Civil society was seen as an instrument in strengthening the market” (Topcuoğlu, 2006, p.45).

ANAP also inherited intense individualism, exercise of power through patron-client relations and antagonism towards the opposition from the pre-coup center-right ancestry, especially after the lifting of the ban on the pre-coup political leaders. Ergüder (1991) expresses his view on the issue with these words;

The intensifying consolidation crisis (with old parties trying to make a comeback while the ANAP is hanging for a dear life) of the Turkish party system seems to be pushing the ANAP to the old ways of party politics as witnessed by the emergence of patron-client relations, excessive expenditures at election time to win the votes, and a less conciliatory attitude towards the press and the opposition” (pp.165-166).

As for the personalized exercise of power, Ergüder (1991) also argued that ANAP, as in the case of pre-coup parties, was a highly personalistic party, dominated by a leader that made all the decisions. This, in turn, caused resentment towards the leadership that Özal enjoyed among the local organizations of the party. Ergüder (1991) gave the example of the 1989 local elections to illustrate this point:

In many municipalities the organization did not campaign, resenting the increasingly personal and authoritarian style of Özal's leadership. An important sign of resentment was the use of the term 'dynasty' with reference to decision-making by Özal in consultation with his immediate family, brothers and some close advisers, to the exclusion of the properly elected executive (p.161).

Apart from the continuities with the center-right line of the pre-coup era, according to Ergüder (1991), the ANAP also had an important distinction from its ancestors in terms of its style in politics; it put "an emphasis on a conciliatory style of politics and moderation in sharp contrast to the polarized and non-conciliatory style of politics of the pre-1980 days" (p.157). However, according to Mert (2007), this was also continuity rather than a break with the past, and an important characteristic of the overall center-right ideology of Turkey. She argued; "the parties that represent the center-right politics, as the name suggests, are the moderate and conciliatory expressions of the reactions against the Republican project" (pp.106-107).

The DYP was founded as a continuation of the AP in 1983. From the very first day of its foundation, "through the public and private statements of its officials, party publications and symbolic demonstrations", it hammered home the claim that "it is 'in body and soul' the Justice Party" (Acar, 1991, p.188). Thus, just as in the

case of AP, it quickly organized itself locally by making use of the previous AP branches.

Because the DYP introduced itself as the very same party as the AP, it embraced its ideology and ideas without any significant changes. “There was very little, if any, genuine DYP discourse, distinct from that of the AP, that could be analyzed in its own right” (Acar, 1991, p.193). That means, the understanding of democracy of the DYP was also the same as the understanding of it by the AP. DYP had the same majoritarianist, personalized understanding of democracy that was based on political patronage. The main aim was to make the national will of the people prevail, of which it claimed itself as the true representative. While doing that, the DYP, just like its predecessors, was hostile to any kind of political checks and balances and saw the opposition as a threat to the empowerment of the true will of the people. It resented any kind of civil association in the political decision-making, other than the elections. Acar (1991) defined the DYP’s understanding of democracy with these words:

‘Free democracy’, a most frequently emphasized term in the party’s ideological discourse, means unquestionable superiority and unhindered exercise of the national will (*milli irade*) [...] The approach is based on exclusionary attitudes towards other groups in that is hardly tolerant of other political groups and parties and of their claims to represent civil societal elements. Thus, it perceives ‘free democracy’ both as simple majoritarianism relying exclusively on the forces of the periphery which are assumed to be the incarnation of the national will and as coming to the fore only when the DP, the AP or the DYP, i.e. true representatives of the masses, are in government. This perception naturally has negative implications in terms of minority

rights, legitimacy of opposition, the peaceful transfer of power and desirability of a governmental system characterized by checks and balances (pp.195-196).

Similar to its attitude towards democracy, use of power and the hostility towards the opposition, DYP also inherited the personalized style of leadership based on patron-client relations from the DP-AP line. According to Huri, both leaders of the DYP, Demirel and Çiller ruled the party single-handedly and tolerated little criticism towards their leadership. “Conflicts within the party were often resolved by expulsion or resignation” (Türsan, 2004, p.204).

The AKP, founded in 2001 was “the first single-party government since 1991, when the Motherland Party (ANAP) lost its parliamentary majority”, and the party to claim itself as the “indisputable force of the center-right”⁴⁴ (Özbudun, 2006, p.546).

When we look at the democracy rhetoric of the AKP, we see a considerable continuity, as well as differences from the center-right tradition in Turkey. More precisely, AKP is a continuation of the traditional center-right in terms of its views about society being a living organism, its extraordinary emphasis on the national will, its tendency to introduce itself as a national movement, its leader-dominated decision-making structure, and finally, its attitudes towards the opposition. In contrast, AKP represents a break with the past in terms of its more pluralistic vision of democracy that acknowledges minorities and different identities within the nation.

Like the previous center-right parties, AKP also put extraordinary emphasis on the will of the nation. “AKP’s constitution asserts that ‘the will of the nation is the only determinant power’” (Özbudun, 2006, p.547). From the very beginning, AKP claimed that “political legitimacy should be based on sovereignty of the people,

⁴⁴ Analysis of the voter base of AKP in 2002 elections showed that AKP received substantial support from the previous center-right parties, ANAP and DYP (Özbudun, 2006, p.546).

which was defended by the AP in the 1960s and by the DYP in the 1990s. Thus, the first component of authority is the “national will”, which is based on the consent of the people” (Topcuoğlu, 2006, p.98).

Likewise, AKP also introduced itself as an anti status-quo social movement, bringing change and dynamism to Turkish nation, just like the DP and ANAP had done. To give an example, “in the party’s first congress, Erdoğan introduced the party as a movement that brings the “political wisdom” and the “demands of society” to the politics of Turkey” (Topcuoğlu, 2006, p.72). Also following the line of ANAP, AKP followed a moderate and conciliatory style of politics. AKP argued that “politics should be established on the basis of integration and tolerance instead of conflict and polarization” (Topcuoğlu, 2006, p.91).

Although AKP considered society as a living organism “that survives by restoring itself in the cultural environment” (Topcuoğlu, 2006, p.93) like its claimed ancestors, it had a rather different view on the substance of the Turkish nation. It recognized the heterogeneous structure of the society, not based on classes but on different identities, and with adopting a synthesizing approach –an approach that is not alien to the center-right tradition – the party introduced itself as an inclusive platform that attracts many different people. The main difference from the center-right tradition was that, the AKP considered the rifts as richness, not as a potential source of conflict.

AKP is also in the same line with the center-right tradition in terms of its personalistic exercise of power and of its attitudes towards the opposition. AKP is again a leader-dominated cadre party with strong clientalistic features (Özbudun, 2006, p.552). It is also intolerant towards the opposition and criticisms towards its governance, especially from the press. Since the beginning of AKP rule in 2002, for

example, Turkey fell back 48 places in the World Press Freedom Index of Reporters without Borders.

Despite these similarities, AKP's discourse on democracy differs from the previous center-right rhetoric in one significant respect; that it had a more pluralistic rather than a majoritarian understanding of democracy. In Özbudun's (2006) words, "AKP's notion of democracy is more pluralistic than majoritarian. The importance of tolerance, dialogue and respect for minority rights is constantly emphasized" (p.458). Rather than rejecting or ignoring the social rifts like the center-right tradition, AKP embraced the values such as plurality, tolerance and protection of minority rights and made them an important section of their democratic discourse. It also put considerable emphasis on the role of the civil society, the Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in strengthening democracy and the decision-making process. For example, in its election manifesto, AKP expressed the importance it attributes to civil society with these words:

With the enabling of the active participation of the NGOs in governance, we will transform representative democracy to participatory democracy. In this way, citizens will be able to reflect their will to the political process not just from one election to another, but also for everyday developments (Doğanay, 2007, p.79).

AKP – leaning towards a more pluralistic vision of democracy is highly related with the EU accession process. According to Yılmaz, Similar to the international impact on the transformation to a multi-party regime in the second half of 1940s which allowed DP to come to power, AKP's adoption of a more pluralist understanding of democracy came from above, with the carrot to become a member of the European Union.

How they pursue these principles in practice, however, is highly questionable. The authoritarian tendencies of the party especially after the 2007 elections create a contradiction between its theory of democracy being a system of tolerance and pluralism. For example, according to strategist and journalist Vahid Abdülmecid, “in spite of the democratic appearance of AKP, there is no sign that it is committed to democracy rather than using the victory of 2007 elections for a totalitarian hegemony” (Camcı, 2009, p.18). Just like the course of events in the second half of the DP era, AKP started to put constraints in its understanding of democracy as a pluralist, conciliatory regime, started to pull the strings on the social opposition and the NGOs, and showed its intolerance towards the “non-Islamist other” (Tibi, 2008, p.47). Similarly, the “reformist rhetoric has increasingly given way to authoritarian talk about the “will of the people”, typical of right-wing Turkish parties drunk on power” (Camcı, 2009, p.18).

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed to study the formation of a majoritarian democracy discourse in Turkish politics, and argued that the founding party of this tradition, the Democratic Party, had a majoritarian democratic view, a view that has become a legacy that the DP passed on to its future successors.

The analysis aimed to show that the DP had a majoritarian democratic view. They believed in the idea of a monolithic society with a monolithic interest, represented by the ones that are in power – in this case, themselves.

The analysis also aimed to show that the DP's understanding of democracy was a typical version of what came to be known as "delegative democracy" – the type of democracy that is strongly majoritarian, that envisages a complete delegation of power from the society, only by elections, to the governing party (O'Donnell, 1990, p.9). It is also an understanding of democracy that sees elections as the only legitimate power for the delegation of the national will and for citizens to participate in the political decision-making process that is hostile towards horizontal accountability, autonomous civil institutions, and towards all other kinds of potential control over the governmental power (O'Donnell, 1990, pp.9-11).

Driving from the nine main characteristics of delegative democracies, we see that from its early opposition years to the last day of its ten years of power, we see all the typical characteristics of a delegative democracy. For example, analysis showed that DP always considered the Turkish Nation as a monolithic society and rejected any kind of social, economic or ideological fragments within the nation. In line with

this view, they were also against the idea of any type of minorities (political, ethnic or religious) within the nation. That is to say, consistent with the majoritarian thinking, the DP tended to see a unified, single society with a monolithic interest and without any kind of antagonistic classes.

When it came to life in 1946, the DP also introduced itself as a national movement – a movement that was striving to bring democracy, liberty and freedom to the country and that aimed to empower the will of the nation. According to Sayarı (2002), for example, the reason for the DP, or Menderes in particular, to gain that much support from the Turkish voters was “due to the fact that he became identified with a social movement for change at a time when the democratization of the country’s political system created a large constituency that demanded political, economic, and social changes after living under an authoritarian one-party regime for nearly three decades” (p.74).

For the DP, elections “worked as the means through which “the nation” delegated its “will” to the winning party, and particularly to the party leader” (Yılmaz, 1997, p.4). The clear-cut majority gained by the elections was interpreted as the irrefutable expression of the general will. Consequently, elections were seen as a highly emotional and high-stake process, as they were the only tools for the citizens to express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction towards the political decision-makers.

Not surprisingly, it was clear that the DP was also hostile towards any kind of political and civil opposition to its way of ruling the country, as it identified itself with the national will, which is the sole promoter of the highest interest of the nation. It was due to this rationale that Celal Bayar, in one of his election campaign speeches in Gaziantep declared that if the nation trusts the ones who hold the nation’s destiny

in hand, it means they succeeded, even if the decisions they had made were wrong (Şahingiray, 1956, p.277).

The final, but perhaps the most important characteristic that made DP a typical delegative democracy was its intense leadership cult. Incrementally after he became the President of the DP and the Vice-President of the Republic with the 1950 elections, Menderes started to be empathized with the Government and the State. “Consequently, the decade-long DP rule in Turkey, with its achievements and failures, came to be largely identified with the personal triumphs and shortcomings of Adnan Menderes” (Sayarı, 2002, pp.69-70).

So, in sum, the analysis that I briefly summarized here constitutes the proof of the first part of the initial hypothesis of this thesis: that the DP had a majoritarian democratic view, the type of majoritarianism that could be best explained by O'Donnell's concept of “delegative democracy”.

As for the second part of the hypothesis, that majoritarian democratic view has become a legacy that the DP passed to its future successors, the analysis in chapter 5 made clear that the DP had a considerable impact on shaping the democratic gender of its successors. As the brief overview of the center-right tradition after the DP clearly shows, although the research did not argue that adoption of a majoritarian democracy discourse is not specific to right wing parties and did not necessarily stem from being one, the majoritarian democratic view that the DP laid the foundations of in fact became the main trend in center-right politics in Turkey. Although the discourse underwent a transformation process over time, the main rationale always remained the same. The particular emphasis on the “national will”, the extraordinary emotional and political importance attributed to the elections, antagonism towards political accountability, opposition and civil institutions,

definition of the nation as a living organism that needs to be preserved as a monolithic entity, and the highly personalistic exercise of political power based on patronage relations became a legacy that the DP had passed to its future successors. Although the ANAP in the 1980s tried to break with the tradition and to present itself as a “new right” phenomenon, the legacy still remained, though with slight modifications such as a more conciliatory approach in democratic discourse and an increasing prominence of civil society. The AKP also overplayed these approaches and put emphasis on a more pluralistic and participatory democracy, mainly due to the external pressures coming from the EU accession process. However, in practice, both of these parties failed to transfer this discourse into action. ANAP turned to the traditional center-right oppressive tendencies after the pre-1980 political leaders made a comeback to the political arena. Similarly, the successor of the center-right today, the AKP started to show the typical majoritarian understanding of democracy especially after its second victory of 2007 elections in which, following the history of the DP, it won the elections with a higher ratio of votes than the previous elections and began to lean towards more authoritarian exercise of power. Since the extraordinary emphasis put onto the EU process faded away in AKP’s agenda and the latest general elections in 2011 once again resulted in the victory of AKP, it is highly likely that we are going to see more and more resemblances between the AKP’s policies and the former center-right tradition.

The scope of this research was only limited to the democracy discourse of the DP. So, picking up from where this research left, a highly interesting analysis of the first years of Turkey’s experience with the multi- party politics would be analyzing the democracy discourse of the era based on the actions and policies of the DP, rather than focusing solely at their discourse, and even comparing and contrasting the

democracy discourse with practice. What is more, as this research limited itself with the DP era and relied on secondary sources to analyze the legacy of the majoritarian democracy discourse of the DP's successors, a more in-depth analysis of the democracy discourse of all the successors of this tradition would also be a highly interesting topic for further research. Adding the parties from the left-wing to the parameter and comparing and contrasting their democracy discourse with that of right-wing parties could also be beneficial for shedding light on the meaning of democracy in the Turkish political tradition.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TURKISH GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS FROM 1950 TO 2011

Milletvekili genel seçimi sonuçları, 1950 - 1977									TÜRKİYE
Results of the general election of representatives 1950 - 1977									TURKEY
A. Alınan oy sayısı - Votes received	B. Oy oranı - Rate of vote		C. Milletvekili sayısı - Number of representatives						
	1950	1954	1957	1961	1965	1969	1973	1977	
Kayıtlı seçmen sayısı - Number of registered voters	8 905 743	10 262 063	12 078 623	12 925 395	13 679 753	14 788 552	16 798 164	21 207 303	
Oy kullanan seçmen sayısı Number of actual voters	7 953 085	9 095 617	9 250 949	10 522 716	9 748 678	9 516 035	11 223 843	15 358 210	
Katılım oranı (%) - Participation rate (%)	89,3	88,6	76,6	81,4	71,3	64,3	66,8	72,4	
Geçerli oy sayısı - Number of valid votes	-	-	-	10 138 035	9 307 563	9 086 296	10 723 658	14 827 172	
Milletvekili sayısı - Number of representatives	487	541	610	450	450	450	450	450	
Siyasi parti ve bağımsızlar Political parties and independents									
Adalet Partisi Justice Party	A	-	-	3 527 435	4 921 235	4 229 712	3 197 897	5 468 202	
	B	-	-	34,8	52,9	46,6	29,8	36,9	
	C	-	-	158	240	256	149	189	
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Republican People's Party	A	3 148 626	3 193 471	3 825 267	3 724 752	2 675 785	3 570 583	6 136 171	
	B	39,6	35,1	41,4	36,7	28,7	33,3	41,4	
	C	69	31	178	173	134	185	213	
Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi Republican Reliance Party	A	-	-	-	-	597 818	564 343	277 713	
	B	-	-	-	-	6,6	5,3	1,9	
	C	-	-	-	-	15	13	3	
Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi Republican Peasant's Nation Party	A	-	-	1 415 390	208 696	-	-	-	
	B	-	-	14,0	2,2	-	-	-	
	C	-	-	54	11	-	-	-	
Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi Republican Nation Party	A	-	480 249	604 087	-	-	-	-	
	B	-	5,3	6,5	-	-	-	-	
	C	-	5	4	-	-	-	-	
Demokrat Parti Democrat Party	A	4 391 694	5 313 659	4 497 811	-	-	-	-	
	B	55,2	58,4	48,6	-	-	-	-	
	C	416	503	424	-	-	-	-	
Demokratik Parti Democratic Party	A	-	-	-	-	-	1 275 502	274 484	
	B	-	-	-	-	-	11,9	1,8	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	45	1	
Köylü Partisi Peasant's Party	A	-	50 935	-	-	-	-	-	
	B	-	0,6	-	-	-	-	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Hürriyet Partisi Freedom Party	A	-	-	321 471	-	-	-	-	
	B	-	-	3,5	-	-	-	-	
	C	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	
Millet Partisi Nation Party	A	368 537	-	-	582 704	292 961	62 377	-	
	B	4,6	-	-	6,3	3,2	0,6	-	
	C	1	-	-	31	6	-	-	
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Nationalist Movement Party	A	-	-	-	-	275 091	362 208	951 544	
	B	-	-	-	-	3,0	3,4	6,4	
	C	-	-	-	-	1	3	16	
Milli Selamet Partisi National Salvation Party	A	-	-	-	-	-	1 265 771	1 269 918	
	B	-	-	-	-	-	11,8	8,6	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	48	24	
Türkiye Birlik Partisi Turkey Union Party	A	-	-	-	-	254 695	121 759	58 540	
	B	-	-	-	-	2,8	1,1	0,4	
	C	-	-	-	-	8	1	-	
Türkiye İşçi Partisi Turkey Worker's Party	A	-	910	-	276 101	243 631	-	20 565	
	B	-	0,0	-	3,0	2,7	-	0,1	
	C	-	-	-	14	2	-	-	
Yeni Türkiye Partisi New Turkey Party	A	-	-	463	1 391 934	346 514	197 929	-	
	B	-	-	0,0	13,7	3,7	2,2	-	
	C	-	-	-	65	19	6	-	
Bağımsızlar Independents	A	44 537	56 393	1 850	81 732	296 528	511 023	303 218	370 035
	B	0,6	0,6	0,0	0,8	3,2	5,6	2,8	2,5
	C	1	2	-	-	1	13	6	4

Not. 1) 1950, 1954 ve 1957 seçimlerinde, partilerin ve bağımsız adayların aldığı oy sayısı, seçime katılan adayların almış oldukları toplam oy sayısının, aday sayısına bölünmesi ile elde edilen ortalama oy sayısıdır.

2) 1954 yılında İşçi Partisi tarafından alınan oy miktarı Türkiye İşçi Partisi satırında, 1957 yılında Vatan Partisi tarafından alınan oy miktarı Yeni Türkiye Partisi satırında, 1969 yılında Güven Partisi tarafından alınan oy miktarı, Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi satırında, Birlik Partisi tarafından alınan oy miktarı Türkiye Birlik Partisi satırında gösterilmiştir.

Note. 1) Number of votes received by parties and independent candidates is the average number of votes which is obtained by dividing the number of total votes received by candidates participated in the election by number of candidates.

2) Number of votes received by the Labour Party is shown in the Turkey Labour Party line in the year 1954, number of votes received by the Land Party is shown in the New Turkey Party line in the year 1957; number of votes received by the Reliance Party is shown in the Republican Reliance Party line, number of votes received by the Union Party is shown in the Turkey Union Party line in the year 1969.

Milletvekili genel seçimi sonuçları, 1983-2011

Results of the general election of representatives, 1983-2011

TÜRKİYE

A. Alınan oy sayısı - Votes received	B. Oy oranı - Rate of vote	C. Milletvekili sayısı - Number of representatives							
		1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002	2007	2011
Kayıtlı seçmen sayısı - Number of registered voters		19 767 366	26 376 926	29 979 123	34 155 981	37 495 217	41 407 027	42 799 303	52 806 322
Oy kullanan seçmen sayısı - Number of actual voters		18 238 362	24 603 541	25 157 089	29 101 469	32 656 070	32 768 161	36 056 293	43 914 948
Katılım oranı (%) - Participation rate (%)		92,3	93,3	83,9	85,2	87,1	79,1	84,2	83,2
Geçerli oy sayısı - Number of valid votes		17 351 510	23 923 687	24 371 474	28 040 392	31 119 242	31 414 748	34 822 907	42 813 896
Gümrük kapıları geçerli oy sayısı - Number of valid votes at customs gates		-	47 942	45 192	86 601	65 254	114 035	226 784	127 867
Toplam geçerli oy sayısı - Total valid votes		17 351 510	23 971 629	24 416 666	28 126 993	31 184 496	31 528 783	35 049 691	42 941 763
Milletvekili sayısı - Number of representatives		399	450	450	550	550	550	550	550
Siyasi parti ve bağımsızlar									
Political parties and independents									
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi	A	-	-	-	-	-	10 808 229	16 327 291	21 399 082
Justice and Development Party	B	-	-	-	-	-	34,3	46,6	49,8
	C	-	-	-	-	-	363	341	327
Anavatan Partisi	A	7 833 148	8 704 335	5 862 623	5 527 288	4 122 929	1 618 465	-	-
Motherland Party	B	45,1	36,3	24,0	19,6	13,2	5,1	-	-
	C	211	292	115	132	86	-	-	-
Aydınlık Türkiye Partisi	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	100 982	-
Bright Turkey Party	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,3	-
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bağımsız Türkiye Partisi	A	-	-	-	-	-	150 482	182 095	-
Independent Turkey Party	B	-	-	-	-	-	0,5	0,5	-
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barış Partisi	A	-	-	-	-	78 922	-	-	-
Peace Party	B	-	-	-	-	0,2	-	-	-
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Büyük Birlik Partisi	A	-	-	-	-	456 353	322 093	-	323 251
Great Union Party	B	-	-	-	-	1,5	1,0	-	0,8
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi	A	-	-	-	3 011 076	2 716 094	6 113 352	7 317 808	11 155 972
Republican People's Party	B	-	-	-	10,7	8,7	19,4	20,9	26,0
	C	-	-	-	49	-	178	112	135
Değişen Türkiye Partisi	A	-	-	-	-	37 175	-	-	-
Changing Turkey Party	B	-	-	-	-	0,1	-	-	-
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Demokrasi ve Barış Partisi	A	-	-	-	-	24 620	-	-	-
Democracy and Peace Party	B	-	-	-	-	0,1	-	-	-
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Demokrat Parti	A	-	-	-	-	92 093	-	1 898 873	279 480
Democrat Party	B	-	-	-	-	0,3	-	5,4	0,7
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Demokrat Türkiye Partisi	A	-	-	-	-	179 871	-	-	-
Democrat Turkey Party	B	-	-	-	-	0,6	-	-	-
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Demokratik Halk Partisi	A	-	-	-	-	-	1 960 660	-	-
Democratic People's Party	B	-	-	-	-	-	6,2	-	-
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Demokratik Sol Parti	A	-	2 044 576	2 624 301	4 118 025	6 919 670	384 009	-	108 089
Democratic Left Party	B	-	8,5	10,8	14,6	22,2	1,2	-	0,3
	C	-	-	7	76	136	-	-	-

Not. 1983 milletvekili genel seçiminde, Anavatan Partisi, aday listesindeki isim eksikliğinden dolayı, Bingöl'de 3 milletvekili yerine 2 milletvekili çıkartmıştır. Bu nedenle Meclis'e 400 yerine 399 milletvekili seçilmiştir.

Note. At the general election of representatives held in 1983, Motherland Party won 2 representatives instead of 3 representatives because of lack of name on the candidate list. Therefore, in the parliament, 399 representatives were selected instead of 400.

(1) 1999 seçimine Emegün Partisi adı ile katılmıştır.

(1) It was participated in the 1999 election under the name of Party of Labour.

Milletvekili genel seçimi sonuçları, 1983-2011 (devam)

Results of the general election of representatives, 1983-2011 (continued)

A. Alınan oy sayısı - Votes received			B. Oy oranı - Rate of vote			C. Milletvekili sayısı - Number of representatives			TURKEY		
			1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002	2007	2011	
Siyasi parti ve bağımsızlar											
Political parties and independents											
Doğru Yol Partisi True Path Party	A	-	4 587 062	6 600 726	5 396 009	3 745 417	3 008 942	-	-	64 607	
	B	-	19,1	27,0	19,2	12,0	9,5	-	-	0,2	
	C	-	59	178	135	85	-	-	-	-	
Emek Partisi ⁽¹⁾ Labour Party	A	-	-	-	-	51 756	-	26 292	32 128	-	
	B	-	-	-	-	0,2	-	0,1	0,1	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Fazilet Partisi Virtue Party	A	-	-	-	-	4 805 381	-	-	-	-	
	B	-	-	-	-	15,4	-	-	-	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	111	-	-	-	-	
Genç Parti Youth Party	A	-	-	-	-	-	2 285 598	1 064 871	-	-	
	B	-	-	-	-	-	7,2	3,0	-	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Hak ve Eşitlik Partisi Rights and Equality Party	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	124 415	
	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,3	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Halkçı Parti Populist Party	A	5 285 804	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	B	30,5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	C	117	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Halkın Demokrasi Partisi People's Democracy Party	A	-	-	-	1 171 623	1 482 196	-	-	-	-	
	B	-	-	-	4,2	4,7	-	-	-	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Halkın Sesi Partisi People's Voice Party	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	329 723	
	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,8	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Halkın Yükselişi Partisi People's Ascent Party	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	179 010	-	-	
	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,5	-	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
İslahatçı Demokrasi Partisi Reformist Democracy Party	A	-	196 272	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	B	-	0,8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
İşçi Partisi Worker's Party	A	-	-	-	61 428	57 607	159 843	128 148	-	-	
	B	-	-	-	0,2	0,2	0,5	0,4	-	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Liberal Demokrat Parti Liberal Democrat Party	A	-	-	-	-	127 174	89 331	35 364	15 222	-	
	B	-	-	-	-	0,4	0,3	0,1	0,0	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Millet Partisi Nation Party	A	-	-	-	127 630	79 370	68 271	-	60 716	-	
	B	-	-	-	0,5	0,3	0,2	-	0,1	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi Nationalist Work Party	A	-	701 538	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	B	-	2,9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi Nationalist Democracy Party	A	4 036 970	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	B	23,3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	C	71	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Nationalist Movement Party	A	-	-	-	2 301 343	5 606 583	2 635 787	5 001 869	5 585 513	-	
	B	-	-	-	8,2	18,0	8,4	14,3	13,0	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	129	-	71	53	-	
Milliyetçi ve Muhafazakar Parti Nationalist and Conservative Party	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36 188	-	
	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,1	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi Freedom and Solidarity Party	A	-	-	-	-	248 553	106 023	52 055	-	-	
	B	-	-	-	-	0,8	0,3	0,2	-	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Refah Partisi Welfare Party	A	-	1 717 425	4 121 355	6 012 450	-	-	-	-	-	
	B	-	7,2	16,9	21,4	-	-	-	-	-	
	C	-	-	62	158	-	-	-	-	-	

Milletvekili genel seçimi sonuçları, 1983-2011 (devam)

Results of the general election of representatives, 1983-2011 (continued)

TÜRKİYE

A. Alınan oy sayısı - Votes received		B. Oy oranı - Rate of vote		C. Milletvekili sayısı - Number of representatives						
		1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002	2007	2011	
Siyasi parti ve bağımsızlar										
Political parties and independents										
Saadet Partisi Felicity Party	A	-	-	-	-	-	785 489	820 289	543 454	
	B	-	-	-	-	-	2,5	2,3	1,3	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti Social Democratic Populist Party	A	-	5 931 000	5 066 571	-	-	-	-	-	
	B	-	24,8	20,8	-	-	-	-	-	
	C	-	99	88	-	-	-	-	-	
Sosyalist Parti Socialist Party	A	-	-	108 369	-	-	-	-	-	
	B	-	-	0,4	-	-	-	-	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Sosyalist İktidar Partisi Socialist Rule Party	A	-	-	-	-	37 680	-	-	-	
	B	-	-	-	-	0,1	-	-	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Türkiye Komünist Partisi Communist Party of Turkey	A	-	-	-	-	-	59 180	79 258	64 006	
	B	-	-	-	-	-	0,2	0,2	0,2	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Yeni Parti New Party	A	-	-	-	36 853	-	-	-	-	
	B	-	-	-	0,1	-	-	-	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi New Democracy Movement	A	-	-	-	133 889	-	-	-	-	
	B	-	-	-	0,5	-	-	-	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Yeni Türkiye Partisi New Turkey Party	A	-	-	-	-	-	363 869	-	-	
	B	-	-	-	-	-	1,2	-	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Yeniden Doğuş Partisi Rebirth Party	A	-	-	-	95 484	44 787	-	-	-	
	B	-	-	-	0,3	0,1	-	-	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Yurt Partisi Country Party	A	-	-	-	-	-	294 909	-	-	
	B	-	-	-	-	-	0,9	-	-	
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Bağımsızlar Independents	A	195 588	89 421	32 721	133 895	270 265	314 251	1 835 486	2 819 917	
	B	1,1	0,4	0,1	0,5	0,9	1,0	5,2	6,6	
	C	-	-	-	-	3	9	26	35	

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

APPENDIX B CABINET CHANGES IN THE DP

Sources:

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May 22, 1950: 1st Menderes Cabinet (May 22, 1950 – March 9, 1951) was formed;

Minister of Justice: Halil Özyörük

Minister of National Defence: Refik Şevket İnce

Minister of the Interior: Rükneddin Nasulioğlu

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Fuad Köprülü

Minister of Finance: Halil Ayan

Minister of Education: Avni Başman

Minister of Public Works: Lieutenant General Fahri Belen

Minister of Economic Affairs: Zühtü Velibeşe

Minister of Health: Prof. Nihat Berger

Minister of Agriculture: Nihat İğriböz

Minister of Transportation: Tevfik İleri

Minister of Labour: Hasan Polatkan

Minister of Businesses: Prof. Muhlis Ete

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State: Samet Ağaoğlu

July 11, 1950: Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu became the Minister of State

November 6, 1950: Minister of Education Avni Başman, Minister of Health Nihat Berger and Minister of Public Works Fahri Belen withdrew from the office.

Tevfik İleri became the Minister of Education, and Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ was appointed to Minister of Transportation

December 15, 1950: Minister of Finance Halil Ayan was replaced with Hasan Polatkan

December 25, 1950: Kemal Zeytinoğlu became the Minister of Public Works and Hulusi Köymen became the Minister of Labour

March 9, 1951: 2nd Menderes Cabinet (March 9, 1951 - May 17, 1954) was formed;

Minister of Justice: Rükneddin Nasuhioğlu

Minister of National Defence: Hulusi Köymen

Minister of the Interior: Halil Özyörük

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Fuad Köprülü

Minister of Finance: Hasan Polatkan

Minister of Education: Tevfik İleri

Minister of Public Works: Kemal Zeytinoğlu

Minister of Economic Affairs and Trade: Muhlis Ete

Minister of Health: Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ

Minister of Agriculture: Nedim Ökmen

Minister of Transportation: Seyfi Kurtberk

Minister of Labour: Nuri Özsan

Minister of Businesses: Hakkı Gedik

Minister of Customs and Monopoly: Rıfkı Salim Burçak

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State: Samet Ağaoğlu

Minister of State: Refik İnce

April 4, 1951: Refik Şevket İnce withdrew from Ministry of State

June 20, 1951: Fevzi Lütfü Karaosmanoğlu became the new Minister of State

November 9, 1951: Minister of the Interior Halil Özyörük and Minister of Customs and Monopoly Rıfkı Salim Burçak resigned

December 3, 1951: Fevzi Lütfü Karaosmanoğlu was appointed as the Minister of the Interior and Sıtkı Yırcalı was appointed as the Minister of Customs and Monopoly, withdrawing his position as the vice chairman

December 14, 1951: Minister of Businesses Hakkı Gedik withdrew and replaced with the Minister of Labour Nuri Özsan

April 7, 1952: Fevzi Lütfü Karaosmanoğlu withdrew from his office.

September 1, 1952: Muammer Alakan was appointed as the new Minister of State, Aydın Menderes became the Minister of the Interior. After Muhlis Ete's resignation from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Trade, Enver Güreli was appointed for this office.

September 10, 1952: Hulusi Öymen resigned from the Ministry of National Defence and replaced with Seyfi Kurtberk, the Minister of Transportation. Nuri Özsan resigned from the Ministry of Labour and replaced with Samet Ağaoğlu. Yümnü Üresin became the new Minister of Transportation.

Rükneddin Nasuhioğlu resigned from the Ministry of Justice and replaced with Osman Şevki Çiçekdağ

April 9, 1953: Muammer Alakant, Tevfik İleri and Samet Ağaoğlu resigned. Celal Yardımcı and Fethi Çelikbaş became the Deputy Prime Ministers, Rıfkı Salim Burçak was appointed as the Minister of Education, Emin Kalafat became the Minister of Customs and Monopoly, and finally, Hayrettin Erkmen became the Minister of Labour.

April 15, 1953: Celal Yardımcı resigned from his office

May 27, 1953: Enver Güreli resigned

November 1, 1953: Minister of National Defence Seyfi Kurtberk resigned and replaced with Kenan Yılmaz

May 17, 1954: 3rd Adnan Menderes Cabinet (May 17, 1954 – December 9, 1955) was formed;

Minister of Justice: Osman Şevki Çiçekdağ

Minister of National Defence: Ethem Menderes

Minister of the Interior: Namık Gedik

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Fuad Köprülü

Minister of Finance: Hasan Polatkan

Minister of Education: Celal Yardımcı

Minister of Public Works: Kemal Zeytinoğlu

Minister of Economic Affairs and Trade: Sıtkı Yırcalı

Minister of Health: Behçet Uz

Minister of Agriculture: Nedim Ökmen

Minister of Transportation: Muammer Çavuşoğlu

Minister of Labour: Hayrettin Erkmen

Minister of Businesses: Fethi Çelikbaş

Minister of Customs and Monopoly: Emin Kalafat

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State: Fatih Rüştü Zorlu

Minister of State: Mükerrerem Sarol

Minister of State: Osman Kapari

December 8, 1954: Fethi Çelikbaş resigned, Samet Ağaoğlu became the next Minister of Businesses

November 1, 1955: Minister of State Fuat Köprülü also became Deputy Prime Minister. Namık Gedik, Mükerrerem Sarol and Osman Kapari resigned

from their offices. Ethem Menderes became the Minister of the Interior and replaced with Fahrettin Ulaş.

December 9, 1955: 4th Menderes Cabinet (December 9, 1955 – November 25, 1957) was formed;

Minister of Justice: Hüseyin Avni Göktürk

Minister of National Defence: not appointed

Minister of the Interior: Ethem Menderes

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Fuad Köprülü

Minister of Finance: Nedim Ökmen

Minister of Education: Ahmed Özen

Minister of Public Works: Muammer Çavuşoğlu

Minister of Economic Affairs and Trade: Fahrettin Ulaş

Minister of Health: Nafiz Körez

Minister of Agriculture: Esad Budakoğlu

Minister of Transportation: Arif Demirer

Minister of Labour: Mümtaz Tarhan

Minister of Businesses: Samet Ağaoğlu

Minister of Customs and Monopoly: Hadi Hüsman

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State: Mehmet Cemil Bengü

Minister of State: Şemi Ergün

Minister of State: Emin Kalafat

Minister of State: Celal Yardımcı

December 21, 1955: Şemi Ergin was reappointed to Ministry of National Defence

April 16, 1956: Fahrettin Ulaş resigned

May 9, 1956: Zeyyad Mandalinci replaced Fahrettin Ulaş as the Minister of Economic Affairs and Trade

June 20, 1956: Fuad Köprülü resigned

August 24, 1956: Nedim Öktem resigned

November 1, 1956: Muammer Çavuşoğlu resigned and replaced with Ethem Menderes, and Ethem Menderes was replaced with the Minister of Justice, Avni Gökürk

November 30, 1956: Minister of Economic Affairs and Trade, Zeyyad Mandalinci resigned. Abdullah Aker was appointed as the new Minister of Economic Affairs and Trade.

December 3, 1956: Hasan Polatkan became the Minister of Finance

December 24, 1956: Namık Gedik became the Minister of the Interior

April 15, 1957: Ahmet Özel resigned, Tevfik İleri became the new Minister of Education

October 2, 1957: The Minister of State, Şemi Ergin became the Minister of National Defence, and Tevfik İleri was appointed as the new Minister of State

November 25, 1957: 5th Adnan Menderes Cabinet (November 25, 1957 – May 27, 1960) was formed;

Minister of Justice: not appointed

Minister of National Defence: Şemi Ergin

Minister of the Interior: Namık Gedik

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Fatih Rüştü Zorlu

Minister of Finance: Hasan Polatkan

Minister of Education: Celal Yardımcı

Minister of Public Works: Ethem Menderes

Minister of Economic Affairs and Trade: Abdullah Aker

Minister of Health: Lütfü Kırdar

Minister of Agriculture: Nedim Ökmen

Minister of Transportation: Fevzi Uçaner

Minister of Labour: Hayrettin Erkmen

Minister of State for the Industry: Samet Ağaoğlu

Minister of Customs and Monopoly: Hadi Hüsman

Minister of Press Release and Tourism: Sıtkı Yırcalı

Minister of Public Development: Medeni Berk

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State: Tevfik İleri

Minister of State: Muzaffer Kurbanoglu

Minister of State: Emin Kalafat

January 20, 1958: Minister of National defence Şemi Ergin resigned and replaced with Ethem Menderes. Deputy Prime Minister was reappointed as the Minister of Public Works.

February 10, 1958: Samet Ağaoğlu was reappointed as the Minister of State

July 26, 1958: Ministry of Coordination was established and Sebati Atamen became the Minister. Sıtkı Yırcalı was reappointed as the Minister of State for the Industry, and Server Somuncuoğlu became the new Minister of Press Release and Tourism

November 1, 1958: Sıtkı Yırcalı, Fevzi Uçaner and Emin Kalafat resigned.

Minister of Trade, Abdullah Aker became the new Minister of State, and Minister of Labour, Hayrettin Erkmen was reappointed as the Minister of Trade. Haluk Şalman also became a Minister of State

November 14, 1958: Samet Ağaoğlu resigned

June 8, 1959: Minister of Education, Celal Yardımcı resigned

November 1, 1959: İzzet Akçal became the Minister of State

December 9, 1959: Muzaffer Kurbanoğlu resigned; Şemi Ergin replaced him as the Minister of State. Atıf Benderlioğlu became the Minister of Education

APPENDIX C WHO IS WHO

There is no single source for DP leaders' biographies. Information here was compiled from the following sources:

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Adnan Menderes (1889-1960): He was born in Aydın in 1889 as the second child of a notable landowner, İbrahim Ethem Bey. He became an orphan at the age of three and was raised by his grandmother. After primary school, he first attended to the high school İttihat ve Terakki İdaadisi, and then to the American Collage in İzmir. He fought against the Greek army in Aydın during the Turkish War of Independence and awarded with independence medal of honor for his contributions. “Menderes embarked his political career in 1930 as the chairman of the newly formed Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) in Aydın” (Sayarı, 2002, p.67) but the party was forced to disband after six months. After that, he was invited by Atatürk to join the CHP. In 1931 elections, he was elected as the Deputy of Aydın. While he was serving in the parliament, he also graduated from the Law School of Ankara University in 1935. In 1945, he was expelled from the CHP together with Refik Koraltan and Fuat Köprülü. In January 7, 1946 he became one of the founders of the Democratic Party. He served as the Prime Minister of Turkish Republic from May 14, 1950 to the 1960 military coup. In the Yassıada trials, he was sentenced to death for violating the Constitution, and executed in September 17, 1961 at İmralı Island.

Mahmut Celal Bayar (1883-1986): He was born in 1883 in Gemlik, Bursa as the son of a religious teacher, Abdullah Fehmi Efendi. After his education at İpek Vocational High School and College Francais de l'Assomtion, he worked as a clerk in Ziraat Bankası and Deutsche Orient Bank. In 1908, he joined the Committee of Union and Progress and served as the Head of Bursa and İzmir branches of the party. In 1919, he was elected to the Ottoman Parliament as the Deputy of Manisa. In 1920, he moved to Ankara to join the independence movement. He became the Deputy of Bursa in the first TBMM. He was appointed as the Minister of Economy in the first term. On 1924 he was appointed as the Minister of Population Exchange, Development and Resettlement, but served in this position only for months. On August 1924, he founded Türkiye İş Bankası, and worked as the Head of the Bank until 1932. On 1937, he became the Prime Minister of Atatürk. He continued to serve as the Prime Minister when Atatürk died and replaced by İsmet İnönü. However, he resigned from office in 1939, due to divided opinion with the new President of the Republic. On January 1946, he founded DP together with Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan and Fuat Köprülü. With the 1950 elections, he became the third President of the Republic and served in the position until the military intervention on May 1960. In Yassıada trials, he was sentenced to death, but his death penalty was commuted to lifetime imprisonment because of his old age. On July 17, 1966, he was pardoned and released by Cevdet Sunay, the fifth President of the Republic. He died in 1986, at the age of 103.

Refik Koraltan (1890-1974): He was born in 1890, in Sivas-Divriği. He graduated from İstanbul University School of Law. After his graduation, he entered into public service and started to work as the attorney general of Karaman. 1918, he became the chief police officer of Trabzon. From 1920 to 1946, he was the Deputy of Konya

from the CHP. In 1946, he founded the DP together with Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes and Fuat Köprülü. From DP's transition to power to the Military coup of 1960, he served as the Speaker of the TBMM. He was sentenced to death together with fourteen other DP figures in Yassıada trials, but his death sentence was converted to lifetime imprisonment. He was released with the amnesty in 1964. He died on June 1974 in Istanbul.

Mehmet Fuad Köprülü (1890-1966): He was born in December 5, 1890 in İstanbul. Before he became the Deputy of Kars in 1935, he was the dean of Istanbul University Faculty of Literature and founded Türkiyat Institute. Until 1943, he continued teaching both in Ankara and Istanbul universities. In 1946, he founded DP together with Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar and Refik Koraltan. From 1950 to 1955, he served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1955, he was appointed as the Minister of State and the Deputy Prime Minister. On July 1957, he resigned from DP and joined Freedom Party. He got arrested for the Events of September 6-7, but released in January 1961. On December 1961, he founded Free Democrat Party, but he retired from politics only four years after. He died in İstanbul on June 28, 1966.

Samet Ağaoğlu (1909-1982): He was born in 1919, in Baku – Azerbaijan. He was the son of the famous politician of the Constitutional and Republican eras, Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey. He graduated from Ankara University School of Law and went to Strasbourg to pursue his graduate degree, but he returned back to the country only after sixteen months. He became a civil servant in Economy and Trade Ministries, until he entered into politics with the formation of the DP in 1946. He was elected as the Deputy of Manisa in 1950, 1954 and 1957 elections. During his term, he served as Minister of State, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Businesses and Minister of State for Industry. He got arrested in 1960 military coup and sentenced to lifetime

imprisonment. He was released with the amnesty in 1964. After his release, he retired from politics and became a writer. He published several books including stories, memoirs and political journals. He died in August 1982.

Kenan Öner (1881-1949): After he finished Istanbul University School of Law in 1922, he started working in Ministry of Justice and even promoted to the Chief of Inspectoral Staff. In 1925, he resigned and moved to Istanbul and started teaching in Istanbul University. In 1946, he became the Istanbul Provincial Chairman of the DP, but he resigned from the party in 1947, due to divided opinion. He died in March 1949 in Istanbul.

Fevzi Lütü Karaosmanoğlu (1900-1978): He was born in Manisa, as a son of a local notable family. He graduated from Istanbul Halkalı College of Agriculture and became an agricultural engineer. He underwent a trial for his article published in Son Telgraf in favor of Progressive Republican Party. He cleared himself from the accusations but he stopped writing, as a protest to the atmosphere of restricted freedoms in the country. He became a founder of the DP and served as the Minister of State and Minister of the Interior. He was expelled from the party in 1955 for his opposition to Menderes for his approach towards freedom of the press and the recognition of the right to prove. He founded Freedom Party in 1955 and became the chairman of the party together with Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ. He died in 1978.

Refik Şevket İnce (1885-1955): He was born in 1885 on Midilli Island. He graduated from Thessaloniki School of Law. Then he came to Turkey and also graduated from Beylerbeyi School of Reserve Officers as a lieutenant. He joined the Independence War after Greece invaded İzmir. He was elected as deputy of Manisa in 1920, 1931, 1935 and 1939 elections and he became a founder of the DP in 1946. He served as the Minister of National Defense in the first Menderes Cabinet, and as the Minister

of the State in the second Menderes Cabinet. From 1951 to 1952, he was the president of the DP Assembly Group. He died in 1955, in Istanbul.

Yusuf Hikmet Bayur (1891-1980): He finished Galatasaray High School and graduated from Sorbonne University in France. He served as the Deputy of Manisa in fifth, sixth, seventh, tenth and eleventh terms of TBMM. In 1948, he formed Nation Party, together with Osman Bölükbaşı, Enis Akaygen, Kenan Öner and Sadık Aldoğan, claiming that the DP was ineffective as opposition to the CHP. He died in 1980 in İstanbul.

İbrahim Hakkı Gedik (1896-1975): He studied trade in Switzerland. He was a tradesman, a fabricant and Deputy of Uşak in eighth and ninth, and the Deputy of Kütahya in tenth term of TBMM. He served as the Minister of Businesses in the second Menderes Cabinet.

Ahmet Tevfik İleri (1911-1961): He was born as the son of İbrahimoğulları family, a notable lineage in Rize. He graduated from Istanbul Technical University School of Engineering. Between 1933 and 1937, he served as a highway engineer in Erzurum. After that, he was the Chief of Public Works in Çanakkale and Samsun. In 1950, he was elected as the Deputy of Samsun and served in ninth, tenth and eleventh terms of TBMM. During this time, he was Minister of Transportation in 1950, Minister of Education from 1950 to 1953, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State between 1957 and 1958, and Minister of Public Works from 1958 to 1960. He got arrested in 1960 military intervention and convicted to lifetime imprisonment. He died in December 1961.

Fethi Çelikbaş (1912-2009): Before he was elected as the Deputy of Burdur from DP, he was the dean of Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences. He served in ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth terms of

TBMM. In second Menderes Cabinet, he was appointed to Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State. From May 1953 to May 1954, he was the Minister of Economy and Trade. In third Menderes Cabinet, he served as the Minister of Businesses for a period of six months (from May 1954 to December 1954). In 1955, he resigned from DP and founded Freedom Party. He got elected from Hürriyet Partisi (Freedom Party) in 1957 elections. In November 1957, Hürriyet Partisi dissolved itself and joined the CHP. He was reelected in 1961 from CHP as the Deputy of Burdur. He served as the Minister of Industry and Energy from 1961 to 1963. He resigned from CHP and joined Republican Reliance Party. In Naim Talu Cabinet, he was the Minister of Customs and Monopoly (from April 1973 to January 1974). In 1983 and 1987 elections, he entered to TBMM once again as the Deputy of Burdur from ANAP. He died in November 2009.

İbrahim Sıtkı Yırcalı (1908-1988): He graduated from İstanbul University School of Law and pursued a PhD degree in Paris School of Law. Before he became the Deputy of Balıkesir in ninth, tenth, and eleventh terms of TBMM, he worked as a treasury inspector and the editor of Balıkesir Postası newspaper, which he also owned. He served as the Minister of the Interior and then the Minister of Customs and Monopoly in the second Menderes Cabinet. He was the Minister of Economic Affairs and Trade from May 1954 to December 1955. He resigned from his office after the events of September 6-7. He became the Minister of Press Release and Tourism in the fifth Menderes Cabinet. He got arrested in 1960 coup and sent to Kayseri prison. He died on December 29, 1988.

Emin Kalafat (1902-1984): He was born in Thessaloniki in 1902. He got elected as the Deputy of Çanakkale in 1950, 1954 and 1957 elections. He became the minister of Customs and Monopoly in 1953, and then the Minister of State in the fifth

Menderes Cabinet. He was sentenced to death penalty in Yassıada trials, but the penalty was converted to lifetime imprisonment. He got released with the amnesty in 1964 while he was serving his time in Kayseri prison.

Hasan Polatkan (1915-1961): He was born in 1915 in Eskişehir. After finishing high school in Eskişehir, he moved to Ankara to study political science in Ankara University. Before he became a founder of DP in 1946 and got elected as the Deputy of Eskişehir in the elections of the same year, he was working as an inspector at Bank of Ziraat. In the first Menderes Cabinet, he was the Minister of Labor. In December 1950, he was reappointed as the Minister of Finance and served in the same position until the 1960 coup. He was sentenced to death in Yassıada trials and executed in September 16, 1961.

Fatih Rüştü Zorlu (1910-1961): He was born in Artvin in April 1910. He graduated from Galatasaray High School, Paris School of Political Sciences and Geneva School of Law. In 1938, he became the chief clerk of the Consulate of Bern, and the Chief Clerk of the Consulate of Paris a year after. In 1941, he was appointed as the Head of the Political Planning Unit. From 1942 to 1954, he served as the Chief Clerk of the Consulate General of Moscow, the Ministerial Undersecretary, the Consulate General of Beirut, Director General in the Ministry of Trade and Economy, Secretary General of Economic Affairs, Secretary General of Organization of International Economic Cooperation under the Ministry of State, and as the Permanent Representative of the Ambassador in Turkey's permanent representation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Paris, respectively. In 1954, he got elected as the Deputy of Çanakkale from DP. He served as the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State and as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He got arrested in the 1960 military

intervention and sentenced to death in the Yassıada trials. He was executed in September 16, 1961.

Hüseyin Celal Yardımcı (1911-1986): He graduated from Istanbul University School of Law. He got elected as the Deputy of Ağrı in 1950, 1954 and 1957 elections. He served as the Deputy Prime Minister from April 9 to April 15 in 1953. In the third Menderes Cabinet, he was appointed as the Minister of Education. He was reappointed as the Minister of State in the fourth Menderes Cabinet. He became the Minister of Justice in April 1960, until the military coup on May 1960.

Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ (1886-1956): He was born in Preveza in 1886. Before he founded and became the Head of DP İzmir organization, he was the head physician in the French Hospital in İzmir. He became the Deputy of İzmir with the 1950 and 1954 elections and served as the Minister of Health in first and second Menderes Cabinets. He died in 1956.

Ahmet Hulusi Köymen (1891-1965): He graduated from İstanbul University School of Law in 1914. He served as a reserve officer in the World War I in Çanakkale and Caucasian fronts. After the war, he started his career as a lawyer in Bursa and became the Head of Bursa Bar Association. He got elected as the Deputy of Bursa in 1950, 1954 and 1957 elections. He served as the Minister of Labor in the first Menderes Cabinet and the Minister of National Defense in the second one, until his resignation from office in December 1952. He got arrested in the 1960 military coup and underwent a trial for transgressing the Constitution, but was acquitted of the charges. After the trial, he resigned from politics, and died in 1965.

Osman Şevki Çiçekdağ (1899-1956): He was born in 1899 in Kırşehir. He graduated from the Ankara University School of Law and became a legal practitioner until he got elected as the Deputy of Ankara in 1950 elections. He served as the Minister of

Justice in the first and second Menderes Cabinets. He was also the Head of the Society for the Protection of Children from 1951 to 1955. He died in July 21, 1956 in Ankara.

APPENDIX D TURKISH QUOTATIONS

Yolumuz hürriyet yoludur ve hedefine ulaşacaktır. Demokrat Parti dağılıyor diye sevinenler, Demokrat Parti'nin hakikatten yok olmasını istiyorlarsa hürriyete aşık Türk milletinin ve milyonlarca democrat vatandaşın kalplerine pençelerini sokup hürriyet aşkını, mümkünse söküp atsınlar. (p.34)

İktidarımı, hükümetimi, binnetice beni buraya seçip getiren Türklü millettir, zatıalınız değilsiniz ki; sizin istifası sözünüze pabuç bırakayım. (...) İşte arkadaşlar Türk Milleti bu zihniyeti görmüş ve kararını vererek istediğini iş başına getirmiştir. Beraet ve makumiyet hükmünü o verir. İşte biz 400'ü aşan bir iktidar, sizde bu sebeple dördü geçmeyen bir muhalefet halinde buraya geldik. (p.37)

Demokrasi, kısa bir tarife göre, reylerle değişen iktidar sistemidir. (p.38)

Hepinizin bildiği gibi demokrasinin köklerine baktığımızda, seçimlerin çoğunluğun hakimiyetine dayandığı görülür. (p.38)

Demokrasi serbest seçimle iktidara gelen bir ekseriyetin kanunlarla muayyen müddet için her halükarda iş başında kalacağını kabul edenlerin rejimidir. Yoksa kendi dediği ve arzu ettiği ekseriyetçe kabule şayan görülmediği için, kendisini ekseriyetin bu kararıyla bağlı saymayan ve onu boykot maksadiyle muhalefet ve meşrii vazifelerini terkedenlerin rejimi değildir. (p.39)

Demokrasi egzotik bir çiçeğe benzer. Onu içinde yaşatabileceğimiz serlere ihtiyacımız vardır. Yoksa sağdan soldan, önden arkadan esen sert rüzgarlara dayanamaz. (p.41)

Millet hakimiyetini seçim günlerinde kullanır. (p. 41)

Demokrasinin, vatandaş haklarının ana temeli oy serbestliğidir. Hükümetin ve Devletin her intihaptan mukadderatını milletin oylarına tevdi ve teslim etmesidir. (p.41)

Altı yıldan beri bizim yaptıklarımız Türk Milletinin kahir ekseriyeti tarafından o kadar benimsenmiş ve büyük halk kütlelerinin ruhuna o derece nüfuz etmiştir ki, dört yıl tecrübeden sonra 1954 seçimleriyle Türk Milleti'nin tekrar tekrar iş başına getirdiği Demokrat Parti ve onun iktidarı, yine bu büyük milletin göz bebeği ve gönüller neşesi olarak dimdik ayakta durmaktadır. (...) Demokrat Parti lehine tecelli eden bu rey üstünlüğü ne demektir? Bu rey çoğunluğu, Türk Milletinin Demokrat iktidara söz götürmez bir sevgi tezahürü idi. 2 Mayıs 1954 neticeleri: Yaptıklarını gördüm, yapacaklarına inandım, onun için sana reyimle beraber gönlümü verdim demektir. (pp.44 - 45)

Şüphe etmemek lazımgelir ki, Büyük Türk Milleti Demokrat Parti programını üçüncü defa olarak tasvibederken bir taraftan bu programın ifade ettiği fikirler ve diğer taraftan yedi iktidar senesi zarfında (...) her sahada vukua gelen eserleri göz önünde bulundurarak akliselimi ve siyasi olgunluğu ile hükmünü vermiş ve iktidarı yine Demokrat Parti'ye tevdi ve emanet eylemiştir. (p.45)

Seim gn en nemli vazifen, baėlandıėın seim sandıėını bulup intihap hakkını kullanmaktır. Siyasi ve itimai hayattaki hakimiyet ve iraden, bu hakkı yerine getirmekle baėlayacak ve tahakkuk edecektir. Byle yapmazsan, idare tarzından ŗikayet hakkını drt sene kaybetmiŗ olursun. (p.45)

Biz, herŗeyden nce denetlemenin lzumuna inanıyoruz. Denetimsiz her kuvvet er ge nisyana mahkumdur. (p.46)

Arkadaŗlar bir devlet bnyesinin icrai, teŗrii ve kazai diye e ayrılmıŗ olmasının ok esaslı manaları vardır. Bunun hilafına hareket ok byk hataları icabettirebilir. (p.46)

Arkadaŗlar Meclis, her derdin ŗıfasını elinde tutan bir eczane gibi ila deposu deėildir. Meclis, kanunların izdiėi hudut iinde faaliyet eden, anayasanın sınırları iinde alıŗan bir messesedir. Fakat asla kazai yetkiye haiz deėildir. (...) Biz herŗeye muktediriz, fakat ancak kanun yolu ile. (p.48)

TBMM var, siz varsınız. Bu yolda hareket edecek olursa fenalıėı derhal ispat edersiniz ve biz ondan sonra millete itibarımızı kaybederiz, iktidardan uzaklaŗtırırız. (p.48)

(...) Diėer partilere sadece hayat hakkı tanımakla kalmayıp, onlarla karŗılıklı mnasebetlerimizi hrmet ve muabbet esası zerine kurmak ve onlara vatani hizmet

vazifelerinin ifasında elden gelen kolaylıkları temin etmek, Demokrat Parti'nin en başta şiarı olmak icabeder. (p.50)

Biz cüret ve küstahlıklarını ihtilal tahriklerine yol açacak dereceler kadar götürmenin ne demek olduğunu onlara anlatacağız. Biz, hem onlara haddini bildireceğiz, hem de kendilerinin sadece sandalye düşkünü, muhteris insanlar olduğunu anlatacağız.

Devlet düşkünlüğünden, sandalye kavgasında ihtilale, oradan da kardeş kavgasına öyle mi? (...) Buna cüret edenlerin idam sehpalarında can verdiklerini hatırlasınlar ve onlardan ibret alsınlar. (p.50)

Bu parti, 1950'den bu yana adeta, milli iradeye cephe almış durumdadır. Umui afkarı huzursuz bir hale getirmek, zihinleri bulandırmak, şüpheler ve tereddütler uyandırmak Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin başlıca gayesidir. Her şeyi red ve inkar etmek, her güzeli çirkin, her iyiyi kötü göstermek bu partinin politika hedefidir. (...) Bu yollardan gayeye ulaşma sevdası ve hırsı bu partinin kafasında kökleşmiş haldedir (pp.52-53)

İşte aziz arkadaşlar, bugün burada vereceğiniz karar bu isyancı ve inhisarcı zihniyeti ebediyen yok edecektir. TBMM'nin dışında, hiçbir makam sahibi, TBMM'nin mukaberesi dışında, onun itimadını haiz Hükümetin dışında hiçbir şahıs, mazisi ne olursa olsun, 'Ben şu zümre naıma, bu zümre namına isyan ediyorum, itaat etmiyorum' diye konuşmak hakkına haiz değildir. (p.53)

14 Mayıs 1950 seçimleri zaferimizden mest olmuşçasına, yaptığımız işin nereye varacağını teemmül etmeden matbuat kanununu gece ile gündüz arasında teemnüksüz

olarak tadil etmek sureti ile altı senelik keşmekeşe yol açtık ve nihayet bugün, bir revizyone tabi tutmaya mecbur eden bugünkü fevkalade tehlikeli hale geldik. (...) Bugün matbuatın büyük kitlesi, istisnaları hariç tutmak kaydıyla arz ediyorum, siyaset sokaklarında köşe başlarını tutmuş zorbalardır. Bu siyaset zorbalarının, bu modern zorbaların haddini bildirmek iktidarımızın vazifesidir. Cemiyetimizi bunların tasallutundan muhafaza ve müdafaa etmek mecburiyetindeyiz. (p.54)

Basın, demokrasinin gayrimüferik bir lazımı ve bu sistemin ayrılmaz unsuru ve müeyyidesi olmakla beraber, prensiplerden ayrıldığı ve şahsi itiraza alet edildiği takdirde rejimi soysuzlaştırmak tehlikesini de yaratacağına şüphe edilemez. Her medeni memleketin tarihinde geçen hadiselerle sabit olunmuştur ki, basın, demokrasi rejiminin tekarrüründe ne kadar büyük bir rol ifa ederse etsin ilk zamanlarda henüz itiyat hasıl olmayan kullanım şekli itibariyle ifratkarane hareketlere yol açmakta ve bilhassa devlet faaliyetlerinde rol alanlara hücum için bir vasıta olarak istifadeye mevzu ittihaz edilmektedir. (...) Her hürriyet gibi, matbuat hürriyetinin de elbette bir hududu vardır, bir sınırı vardır. (p.55)

Basın hürriyetinin mevcudiyedinin sebebi aynı zamanda hududu; umumi menfaatlerle ilgili hadiseler hakkında halkı objektif bir surette tenvir etmek ve haberdar etmekte, halkı objektif bir surette tenvir ve haberdar etmek vazifesini deruhde etmiş olmasıdır. Yani, bu basın hürriyeti bir vakıf değildir, mintarafillah kendisine mevdu bir imtiyaz değildir. Halk için, halk hizmetinde olmak için ve bir vazife aldığı için bu hürriyet kabul edilmiştir. (...) Hürriyetinin hududu, vazifesini görüp görmemekle tayin edilir. İşte basın hürriyetinin hududunu tayin eden amil

budur. Bu sebeptendir ki, bu hürriyet, bazen geniş, bazen dar bir surette çerçevelenmiştir. (p.56)

Ankara'da ve İstanbul'da bu iki şehrin nüfuslarına göre birer avuç bile sayılamayacak miktarda şaşırtılmış vatandaşlar 'istemeyiz' diye haykırıışları ile neyi istemediklerinin de, neyi istediklerinin de maalesef farkında değillerdir. Hem bu işler onların istemesi ile mi olur? Şurada burada birer avuç insan.. (p.57)

Grevin iki tarafı keskin bir silah olduğu ileri sürölüyor. Bizim kanaatimiz şudur: Memleketimizde fertlerin hak ve hürriyetlerini sağlamak istiyoruz. Demokrasinin bütün icaplarını kül olarak kabul ediyoruz. Bu sebeple iki tarafı keskin dahi olsa grevi işçilerimize tanıtıyoruz. (p.58)

Demokrasi prensiplerine göre tabii bir hak olarak tanıdığımız grev hakkını sair demokrat memleketlerde olduğu gibi, içtimai nizamı ve iktisadı aheng bozmayacak surette kanunileştireceğiz. (p.59)

Hususi teşebbüsü esas tutan serbest bir ekonomi nizamında işçinin grev hakkını ve teşkilatlandırma hürriyetini tanımak icabeder. Elbetteki her hak ve hürriyette olduğu gibi bunun da, umumi menfaat ölçüsüne göre sınırları olacaktır. (p.59)

Biz bir ekmeğin eşit dilimleriyiz. Bizde şark, garp yoktur. (p.61)

Arkadaşlar, bugün dünya kabul etmiştir ki, fert yok millet vardır. (p.61)

Bizim memleketimizde bir sınıf için bayram kabul etmenin ne ananesi ne adeti vardır. Biz sınıfsız bir milletiz. Bir sınıfın bayramını (...) kabul ettirmenin hiçbir manası yoktur. (...) Mademki bir bahar bayramı lazımdır, bu 1 Mayıs değil, 14 Mayıs olmalıdır arkadaşlar. (p.62)

Memlekette Şark, Garp, ve Orta Anadolu diye bir takım mahalli düşünceler dönmektedir. Bu çok iyi birşey değildir. (...) Memleketi kül halinde mütala etmek hepimizin borcudur. Benim ricam ne Şark ne Garp değildir. Türkiye'yi Türkiye olarak kabul etmek mecburiyetindeyiz ve ona göre yükseltmeye çalışacağız. (p.62)

Millet meselesine gelince, din ve ırk farkı gözetmeksizin ben Türküm diyen vatandaşları Demokrat Parti Türk sayar. (p.63, footnote 36)

Yurttaşlar arasında müşterek bir tarihin yarattığı kültür ve ülkü birliğine dayanan ve her türlü ayrımcı teamülü reddeden bir milliyetçilik telakkisine bağlıyız. Partimiz tüm vatandaşları din ve ırk farkı gözetmeksizin Türk sayar (p.63, footnote 36)

Biz bir hamurdan yoğrulmuşuz. İnsanlar farklı olamaz. İşte Demokrat Parti onun içindir ki memlekette mutlak bir eşitlik istiyor. (p.63, footnote 36)

Osman Alişiroğlu: Misafirperver olan ve içindeki ekkaliyetlere adeta misafir muamelesi yapan, onlara nezaketin ve hakşinaslığın azamisini gösteren bir millet olarak ... (Gürültüler, “Ekkaliyet yok sesleri”)

Reis: Türk Vatanında ekkaliyet, ekseriyet yoktur. (p.63)

Muammer Alakant: Türk Milleti bütün tarihi boyunca kendisini Türk milletine emanet etmiş olan Ortodoks, Gregoryan ve Musevi vatandaşlara şefkatle, muabbetle muamele etmiştir. (Soldan gürültüler, “Ayıptır, Devlet Vekilliği ettin!” sesleri)

Reis: Siz de bilirsiniz ki, Türkiye’de Türk vatandaşı vardır, ekkaliyet diye birşey yoktur. (p.63, footnote 37)

Ben istediğim kadat sandalyeye sarılısam ne faydası vardır? Vaktiyle İsmet İnönü de sandalyesine ne kadar sarılmıştı bilirsiniz, fakat millet kendisini elinden tuttu, sandalyeden yere çaldı. Arkadaşlar burada zorla oturulmaz; zorla oturmak imkanı eski devirlerde idi. Burada milletin ekseriyeti azimesini temsil eden şu kadar adedde milletvekilimizin kanaati hilafına hakaret etsem, itimada layık olmasam, Adnan Menderes isterse kendisini sandalyesine diktirmiş, çivilemiş olsun, orada bir an kalmaya imkan var mı? (p.64)

Milli mukaderatı bir kişiye, birkaç kişiye veya bir zümreye bağlamanın doğru olmayacağını bilmeliyiz.(p.64, footnote 39)

Demokrasi rejiminde imtiyazlı hiçkimse yoktur. (p.64, footnote 39)

Menderes: 14 Mayıs seçimleri ile başa gelen bir Hükümetin; bir zümrenin malı olduğunu iddia etmek caiz değildir. O zümre malı hükümetler, hatta şahıs malı hükümetler eski devre ait olanlardır.

Bizde adam yok, arkadaş vardır. Bizde Başbakan değil, ekseriyet grubu hakimdir, Büyük Millet Meclisi hakimdir, ekseriyet partisi hakimdir. (p.65, footnote 40)

Cihad Baban: Bugün iktidara gelen parti, ne şunun ne de bunun partisidir. Şu be bu, bu partiyi teşkil eden Türk fertlerinin emir ve direktiflerini, arzularını yerine getirmekle mükellef kimselerdir.

Bu memleket bir zümre saltanatını, başka bir zümre saltanatı yerine gelsin diye yıkmadı. (p.65, footnote 40)

Ferit Alpiskender: 14 Mayıs (işte bu) şahıs ve zümre hakimiyetine nihayet veren bir inklap'tır. (p.65, footnote 40)

Başvekilden şüphe ediyorum demekle asıl işi elinde tutan devlet organlarının, askeri mahkemelerin, askeri makamların, Devlet Şurasının ve Yüksek Heyetinizin, Adnan Menderes'in şüpheli hüviyeti ile onun şüpheli hareketlerine iştirak etmiş olduğu iddiası acaba bu sözlerde mündemiç değil midir? Elbette bu sözlerde onlar da mündemiç'tir. (p.68, footnote 42)

AP çizgisi, tıpkı DP gibi, temsili demokrasiden yana tavır almış, demokratik rejimi savunurken siyasal katılımı sadece seçimlerden ibaret görme eğilimine girerek, seçim dışı katılım mekanizmalarına sıcak bakmamıştır. Buna göre, demokratik rejim demek vatandaşların belirli periyodlarla sandık başına gidip oy kullanarak kendilerini yönetecek olan kişileri işbaşına getirmeleri demektir. Sandıktan çıkan milli iradeye dayanan iktidar, gelecek seçim dönemine kadar yönetme yetkisini yönetilenlerden almıştır ve bu nedenle seçim dönemleri arasında iktidara yönelik desteğin azaldığı iddialarının fazlaca bir anlamı yoktur. Önemli olan, milli iradenin hür ve serbest seçimler yoluyla ortaya çıkmasıdır. Milli irade tecelli ettikten sonra, kamuoyu ve

çeşitli baskı grupları bir iktidarın meşru olup olmadığını sorgulama hakkına sahip olmamalıdır. (p.70)

Demokrat Parti'nin kuruluşuyla birlikte, Demirel AP'ye damgasını vurmuş ve tek adam konumuna gelmiştir. Demirel, parti içindeki stratejik pozisyonlara kendine yakın, istekleriyle çatışmayacak insanların gelmesine dikkat etmiş; bu süreç liderin çizgisinden ayrı düşenlerin pasifleştirilmesiyle (veya partiden uzaklaştırılmalarıyla) paralel gitmiştir. (p.71)

Sivil toplum kuruluşlarının yönetime daha aktif katılımı ile temsili demokrasinin katılımcı demokrasiye doğru gelişmesi sağlanacaktır. Böylece vatandaş, sadece seçimden seçime değil, güncel gelişmeler için de iradesini siyasal sürece yansıtmaya fırsatı kazanacaktır. (p. 86)

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