

THE IMPACT OF TURKEY'S NATIONALISTIC CULTURE ON TURKISH
FOREIGN POLICYMAKING AS OBSERVED IN TURKEY'S RELATIONS
WITH THE CENTRAL ASIAN TURKIC REPUBLICS

by

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ABSTRACT

The emergence of independent Turkic states in former Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaijan has triggered off the latent Turkish nationalistic culture in Turkey. Indeed, it has been lying dormant since the last days of the Ottoman Empire. In this thesis, the existence of a latent undercurrent of extreme Turkish nationalism has been related to the nature of the particular model of the national identity building adopted by the Turkish intelligentsia. The incompatible combination of Anthony D. Smith's Western/civic-territorial and non-Western/ethnic models constituted the Turkish framework of the nation. In Smith's ethnic model of the nation, there is an overemphasis on the mythical, historical, and linguistic traditions of the community. Genealogy assumes a special importance in this non-Western conception of the nation. The Western type, on the other hand, underlines the existence of a common civic-legal ideology, and an historic homeland.

In this thesis, the mythical aspects of some of the important tools employed by the elites in transforming the Ottoman Empire to the modern Turkish nation have been examined. These national myths have been decomposed by using Roland Barthes's theory on the nature of mythologies. Barthes conceived of myths as the outcome of the association between a signifier and a signified. He further emphasized the two-level semiological system underlying every mythical speech. The message conveyed by the myth operates on the plane of language--the immediate, surface meaning--, and the plane of myth--the distortion of the surface meaning.

The combination of Barthes's views on mythologies with Smith's conception of the nation has demonstrated that the overreliance on mythical elements in the initial phase of the Turkish nation-building process has unwittingly nourished a latent stream of pan-Turkism. The pan-Turkist attitude which used to have negative implications has, however, assumed a relatively positive connotation at present. Its claim for a political-geographical unity of all the Turkic peoples has been replaced by a yearning for Turkic cultural unity. The factors that have paved the way to the current popularization of cultural pan-Turkism will be analyzed with regard to Turkey's relations with the Turkic republics in post-Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaijan. The hypothesis that Turkey might be intending to establish and lead a prospective Turkic culture area has been studied in this context. It has been concluded that while the Ministries of Education and Culture tend to form their policies in a cultural pan-Turkist line, this would not seem to be the policy pursued by Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

ÖZET

Eski Sovyet Orta Asyası'nda ve Azerbaycan'da bağımsız Türk devletlerinin ortaya çıkması, Türkiye'deki örtülü Türk milliyetçiliği kültürünün hareketlenmesine yol açtı. Bu tezde, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun son günlerinden beri örtülü kalmış olan aşırı Türk milliyetçiliği akımı, Türk aydınlarınca benimsenmiş olan özel ulus-oluşturma modelinin yapısıyla ilişkilendirilmektedir. Anthony D. Smith'in bağdaşmaz nitelikteki Batı/sivil-coğrafi temelli ve batılı-olmayan/etnik modellerinin kombinezonu, Türk tipi ulus modelini meydana getirmektedir. Smith'in etnik millet modelinde, topluluğun mitsel, tarihi ve dilsel gelenekleri özellikle vurgulanmaktadır. Bu batılı-olmayan millet kavramında etnik-genetik mirasın özel bir önemi vardır. Buna karşılık Batı modeli tarihi bir anayurt, ortak bir yasal-sivil ideolojinin varlığını vurgulamaktadır.

Bu çalışmada Türk seçkinlerinin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nu modern Türk ulusuna dönüştürmekte kullandıkları araçların mitsel özellikleri incelenmiştir. Bu ulusal mitler Barthes'ın mitlerin doğası hakkındaki teorisi kullanılarak ayrıştırılmıştır. Barthes mitleri "gösteren" ve "gösterilen" arasındaki çağrışımın bir sonucu olarak değerlendirmektedir. Barthes daha da ileri giderek iki düzlemli göstergebilimsel sistemin bütün mitsel konuşmaların altında yattığını vurgulamaktadır. Mitin taşıdığı mesaj dil düzleminde--derhal algılanan, yüzeysel anlam-- ve mit düzleminde--yüzeysel anlamın çarpıtılması-- işlev görmektedir.

Barthes'ın mitolojiler konusundaki görüşleri Smith'in ulus kavramı ile bir arada ele alınmıştır. Buna göre, Türk uluslaştırma sürecinin başlangıç döneminde mitsel unsurlara fazlasıyla yaslanılmış, bunun sonucu olarak da örtülü kalmış bir pan-Türkizm akımı

gelişmiştir. Öte yandan, geçmişte negatif çağrışımlar uyandıran pan-Türkist tutumlar, günümüzde görece olarak olumlu bir anlam kazanmıştır. Pan-Türkizmin bütün Türk halklarının politik-coğrafi birliğine ilişkin iddiaları, yerini Türk kültürel birliğine yönelik bir özleyişe bırakmıştır. Kültürel pan-Türkizmin bugünkü popülerliğine giden yolu döşeyen faktörler, Türkiye'nin eski Sovyet Orta Asyası ve Azerbaycan'daki Türk cumhuriyetleriyle ilişkisi açısından incelenmiştir. Türkiye'nin ileriye dönük olarak bir Türk kültür alanı oluşturmayı ve bu alanı yönlendirmeyi amaçlayıp amaçlamadığına ilişkin varsayım da bu çerçeve içinde ele alınmıştır. Buna göre, Kültür ve Milli Eğitim Bakanlıkları eski Sovyet Asyası'ndaki Türk Cumhuriyetlerine yönelik politikalarını kültürel bir pan-Türkizm çizgisine oturturken, bu yaklaşımın Dışişleri Bakanlığı tarafından benimsenmediği izlenimi uyanmaktadır.

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CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

With the unexpected disintegration of the former Soviet Union in December 1991, the Central Asian Turkic peoples and Azerbaijan have emerged as independent states. Since then, there has been an increased interest in these newly independent Turkic nations both in Turkey and abroad. Part of this growing attention has been due to economic and security reasons. For example, the rich natural resources possessed by these republics have been a source of attraction. In addition to this economic dimension, the geopolitical location of Central Asia with its proximity to the Middle East and occupation of a strategic region between Europe and Asia, has aroused considerable interest in a great number of states. Also there is the cultural-political aspect involved in the augmented importance of the former Soviet Central Asian republics to states like Turkey, Iran and China. While Turkey and Iran are in a way competing to prove their cultural affinities to the region, Turkey is keen to play up its presumed cultural, historical, and ethnical links with the Central Asian peoples. On the other hand, Iran is anxious to have a say in the region by imposing the Arabic script to replace the Cyrillic alphabet hoping thus to underline the common religious Shiite sect shared by Iran and Azerbaijan. And China has been forced to pay special attention to the former Soviet Central Asian Turkic republics bearing in mind its Xinjiang region mainly populated by the Uighurs, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Kirgiz, constituting a constant "potential threat" to stability (Ferdinand 1994, 95-96).

Related to the increased popularity of former Soviet Central Asia, there has been a boom in the literature on this specific region

and its relations with a variety of states, and Turkey in particular. However, this study is quite different from the rest of the works dealing with Central Asia mostly from economic and security angles. The purpose of this work is to explore Turkish foreign policymaking with regard to former Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaijan as an example of the impact of Turkey's nationalistic culture on its foreign policy objectives, viewing it as a consequence of the particular nation-building model employed in creating the Turkish Republic. In this context, special attention will be paid to the concept of culture while Roland Barthes's theory on mythologies will be applied to demythisize the tools utilized in Turkish nation formation.

In this thesis, the concept of nationalistic culture is investigated in the context of the nation-building process in Turkey. In this particular case, culture was employed by the nation-building elite as a tool in evoking a Turkish national consciousness in the masses. The Oxford English Dictionary defines national as "of or belonging to a nation; affected, or shared by, the nation as a whole". Nationalist is in turn described as "one characterized by national tendencies or sympathies". However, the term nationalistic is not defined as a separate entry. In Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language the definition of nationalistic is as follows: "of, favoring, or having the characteristics of nationalism". Nonetheless, the dictionary definitions of national and nationalistic are inadequate in explaining their social psychological connotations, which are rather negative. The exclusiveness connoted by the concept of nationalistic, as opposed to a universalistic vision is probably the reason behind this negative connotation.

The main problem is to delineate the conceptual borders of Turkish nationalism and Turkish nationalist culture. This thesis focuses on the assumption that the specific approach to the supposedly pre-existing Turkic culture has engendered an undercurrent of extreme Turkish nationalism. In order to form a nation-state out of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, Atatürk and his immediate circle have undertaken the "mission" of rediscovering the "historical" Turkic culture originating in Central Asia. However, racial elements were overemphasized. The rhetoric of the nation-building elite claimed that the past and present glories of the Turkish nation were thanks to its "magnificent" racial properties. Moreover, Turks, in their opinion, were the originators of the "higher civilization" in the world, which, they contended, had started in Central Asia. The Sun Language Theory was invented to support the new thesis on Turkish history. This pseudolinguistic theory maintained that the Turkish language was the origin of all the languages spoken in the world. The official thesis on Turkish history which was hastily invented in the thirties, has remained influential to some extent until the present day. School children start learning about their "glorious" Central Asian ancestors at an early age. For instance, in one of the standard history textbooks for high schools, Central Asia is referred to as the motherland or original land ("ana yurt"/ "ilk yurt") of Turks (Sümer 1993, 23). In the same textbook Anatolia is regarded as the "adopted" motherland of Turks after they had migrated from Central Asia (Sümer 1993, 218).

The initial overemphasis on the existence of a "glorious" and "magnificent" Turkic race with Central Asian origins has contributed to the emergence of a nationalistic tendency in Turkish

political culture. Culture, by definition¹, is a "historically derived system of explicit and implicit designs for living" (Kluckhohn 1972, 181), which is transmitted through generations. So it is quite natural that pride in the Turkic race and a sense of affinity with the Central Asian peoples be conveyed to the younger Turkish generations. The emergence of independent Turkic states in former Soviet Central Asia with the collapse of the former Soviet Union has stimulated this latent nationalistic culture in Turkey.

Nevertheless, the nationalistic element in the Turkish political system is not an all-encompassing phenomenon. In fact, different groups, bureaucratic bodies, lobbies, and political parties represent different attitudes in respect of Turkey's relations with the former Soviet Central Asian republics. While the official Turkish Foreign Ministry line reflects a neutral stance, the policies adopted by the Ministries of Education and Culture reveal nationalistic tendencies. The increased popularity of Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of the extreme nationalist party, the Nationalist Action Party (NAP), may be interpreted in terms of this latent Turkish nationalist culture. Today the domestic and international circumstances are favorable to the flourishing of cultural pan-Turkism. Turkey is probably expecting some amelioration in its international status by playing an active role in post-Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Türkeş and his advocates are exploiting this factor to consolidate their position in domestic politics. Likewise, the Education and Cultural Ministries might be competing for influence in domestic and international politics, hence an increase in their respective budgets.

¹ See sections 3.2. and 6.2. for the full definitions of culture.

In the second chapter, a brief literature review of nationalism and semiotics will be made in order to place the works of Anthony D. Smith and Roland Barthes in proper context. Then this thesis will attempt to display how Smith's conception of the nation combines some elements of the primordial perspective with those of the modernist vision. Thus it will be made clear how his theory of nationalism fits the Turkish nation-building process. Finally, the heavily mythical components involved in this particular case will be examined under the light of Barthes's theory. The third chapter contains a detailed analysis of all the mythical tools, namely culture, language, territory, and to some extent religion, employed while forming the Turkish nation. In the fourth chapter it will be demonstrated how the overemphasis on the ethnic and linguistic elements, especially in the initial phase of the nation-building process in Turkey, has constituted a source of inspiration and encouragement to pan-Turkism. Then the origins and the stages of development of the pan-Turkist movement will be analyzed. The reader will find clear-cut definitions and typologies of pan-Turkism in that chapter. Most works rather have adopted simplistic descriptions of this ideology. Then the different stages of evolution classical pan-Turkism has undergone until it has acquired a cultural and seemingly positive connotation today will be examined. Chapter five will mainly focus on the nature of the official and popular support enjoyed by the extreme nationalist party of Türkiye, the NAP, in the 1990s. The main reasons behind this phenomenon will also be explored. In chapter six the distinction between the terms Turkish versus Turkic will be clarified, and the anthropological concept of culture area will be examined. This concept will in turn be employed in the analysis of

Turkey's relations with the former Soviet Central Asian Turkic republics and Azerbaijan. In this context, Turkey's position in relation to a prospective culture area will be discussed. Starting with the definitions of culture, culture area, culture center, language prestige, and lingua franca, the relevance of these concepts in revealing the nature of Turkish attitudes towards Central Asia and Azerbaijan will be explained. In the final chapter the reader will find a summary of the findings of this thesis. Some speculations pertaining to the future possibilities that could shape Turkish foreign policy towards former Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaijan will also be made.

As already stated, there has recently been an increase in the number of publications discussing various aspects of Central Asia and its place in the international scene. For example, Philip Robins first examines Turkey's foreign policy toward the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan from the perspective of "sentiment", and then shifts to the view that today mutual relations tend to be based on "self-interest": ". . . [H]ard decisions based on interests rather than fanciful notions of ethnic solidarity are informing decisions on both sides" (Robins 1994, 610). Another work dealing with the role of Turkey in Central Asia from the perspective of security is by Gareth M. Winrow (1993). Nonetheless, there is no work devoted to the cultural aspect of the relations between Turkey and the Central Asian states except for an article by Winrow exploring the possibilities of the formation of a Turkic culture area (1995a).

A book by Erol Mütercimler (1993), however, gives a general review of the newly emerged Turkic states in former Soviet Central Asia, with special emphasis on their economic and strategic importance for Turkey. Without basing his arguments on a

theoretical basis, Mütercimler gives a journalistic account of Turkey's relations with these Turkic republics. His focus is not the formation of Turkish foreign policy towards Central Asia, but rather the mutual interaction of both parties. Although he discards the prospect of a political union as dangerous, he plainly sides with the idea that Turkey should play the role of an "elder brother" in "leading" and "protecting" these independent Turkic states in international forums (Mütercimler 1993, 201). The stance adopted by the writer of this thesis is, however, quite different from that of Mütercimler's. This divergence is most obviously reflected in the perception of the Turkic languages in relation to Anatolian Turkish. Whereas Mütercimler consistently calls the Turkic languages spoken by the Central Asian peoples as "dialects", one of the main arguments of this M.A. thesis is that referring to the separate languages belonging to the Turkic linguistic family as "dialects" implies a cultural pan-Turkic stance. For in this case the speaker is probably regarding İstanbul Turkish more prestigious over the other Turkic languages, and degrading the latter to mere derivatives of the former. Mütercimler spares some pages to the origins of the pan-Turkist movement among the Turkic peoples living in Russia. However, he does not say that there is a connection between this initial pan-Turkist movement and the current cultural pan-Turkist tendencies in Turkey. Nor does he give a hint to the revival of extreme Turkish nationalism today.

In her unpublished Ph.D. dissertation Günay Özdoğan (1990) adopts a similar stance to that of the author of this master's thesis with regard to the emergence and development of pan-Turkism in Turkey. Nevertheless, this M.A. thesis is unique in examining the Turkish foreign policy formation in relation to Central Asia and

Azerbaijan from the perspective of Turkey's nationalistic culture. The Özdoğan thesis studies the particular case of "Racism-Turanism" during the single-party period between 1931-1944. Özdoğan specifically refers to the emergence of a "Turkist current" with "Pan-Turkist and racist rhetoric" during the single party era of the Turkish Republic (1990, 10). Yet, this thesis focuses on the impact of this nationalistic culture inherent in the Turkish political system on foreign policymaking vis-à-vis the Central Asian Turkic republics and Azerbaijan. Both works attempt to demonstrate how the element of ethnic nationalism employed in the Turkish nation-building process has in turn prepared fertile ground for the nourishment of extreme Turkish nationalism. This thesis has linked the current rise of the far right Turkish nationalism to the encouraging developments in the domestic and international conjunctures, such as the upsurge of the Kurdish issue at home and the emergence of independent Turkic states in former Soviet Central Asia. The relative decline of the Russian threat has also played an important role in this context. However, it should be noted that Russia continues to be a most powerful neighbour of Turkey. For that reason Turkey is keen that Russia should not be suspicious of the rising trend in Turkish nationalism, especially with regards to Turkey's contacts with the Central Asian states.

In the next chapter a general review of the modernist versus primordialist approaches to the question of the nation will be given. It will then be explained why the distinction between the ethnic and civic models of nationalism proposed by Smith are particularly helpful in shedding light on the nation-building process in the Turkish Republic. Semiotics (also called semiology), the science of signs and significations, will be introduced to provide a means of

deciphering the mythical elements involved in Turkish nationalism. After a brief discussion of this specific field, Barthes's system of thinking will be analyzed and applied to the mythical tools of the Turkish model of nation-building.

CHAPTER 2 : NATIONALISM AS A MYTHICAL CONCEPT AND THE TURKISH CASE

The purpose of this chapter is to probe into the problem of nationalism as a "mythical concept" and set a theoretical basis for the nation-building process in the Turkish Republic. A review of the literature on nationalism will demonstrate how the modernist theories of the nation fall short of explaining the nation-building process undertaken in the Turkish Republic. As a consequence, Smith's argument concerning nationalism as a "collective cultural phenomenon" and an "identity myth" with primordial connotations (Smith 1991) will be discussed.

2.1. Theories of Nationalism

While Ernest Gellner (1983) and E.J. Hobsbawm (1993) approach the emergence of the nation as a historically recent phenomenon, and study the concept from a modernist perspective, Smith chooses to trace its roots back to the pre-modern *ethnie* and makes a distinction between the Western or civic and non-Western or ethnic models of the nation (1991). Ernest Renan offered yet another interpretation of the nation by calling it "a soul, a spiritual principle" (1990, 19). In Renan's conception of nationalism, two elements constitute this "spiritual principle": "One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together. . . ." (1990, 19). Sharing past glories and heroic ancestors, and "having suffered, enjoyed and hoped together" are the necessary conditions that make up the nation in Renan's views (1990, 19). So Renan's model combines

certain elements of both the modern and primordial interpretations of the nation.

Gellner proposed two criteria in defining the nation. First of all there must be a shared culture among the members of the nation. Gellner then defined culture as "a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating" (1983, 7). Second, for Gellner a community can be called a nation only when there is a strict recognition of particular "mutual rights and duties" among the members of the community (1983, 7).

Gellner is a modernist in his conception of the nation, since he takes the advent of industrialism and mass literacy as the starting point of nationalism (1983, 8). Moreover, he does not agree that the nation is "the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force" (Gellner 1983, 48). To him nationalism has emerged as a consequence of the new type of "social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state" (Gellner 1983, 48). It should be noted, however, that Gellner admits that nationalism transforms some of the "pre-existing cultures" (1983, 48). Nevertheless, he is against the idea that nations are "a natural, God-given way of classifying men, . . . an inherent though long-delayed political destiny. . . ." (Gellner 1983, 49). To him, nationalism "sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures. . . ." (Gellner 1983, 49). Gellner also stresses the importance of "standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures" in making the people willing and ardent to identify with the nation (1983, 55). Indeed, in this context, Gellner's views seem to be very similar to Smith's conception of the nation. Nonetheless, Smith and Gellner

had completely different stances with regard to the concept of common culture. Gellner regarded pre-existing cultures as part of pre-industrial, agrarian societies (1983, 11-12), whereas Smith views culture in connection with ethnicity, common "historical memories" and "myths of descent" (1991, 20). Gellner, underlining the plurality of local illiterate cultures in the pre-industrial era, claimed that a "literate and unified culture" was indispensable in the age of nationalism (1983, 38). Yet, Smith stresses the importance of culture as a collective phenomenon in the formation of nations (1991, 20). Smith conceives of each ethnic group as "a type of cultural collectivity" which has emerged thanks to "specific historical forces" (1991, 20).

Gellner does not explain the process of establishing a standardized and shared culture; nor does he mention how the mechanism works in building the nation. He just claims that when the simple people (volk) are ruled by alien officials, the nationalism first fights against these foreign elements, yet does not replace "the alien high culture . . . by the old local low culture. . . . Instead, it revives, or invents, a local high (literate-specialist-transmitted) culture of its own" although it may have some connection to the "earlier local folk styles and dialects" (Gellner 1983, 57). This argument, however, appears to be valid for post-colonial nations of the Third World, and it does not fit the Turkish case.

In Gellner's conception of nationalism, the common people are left with almost nothing of their own to cling to. They just have to imagine that they belong to a certain high culture and in turn perform certain duties for the good of that "imagined community" to quote Benedict Anderson's renowned phrase (1991, 6). Gellner perceived the masses as a rather passive receptive body with no

choice of their own. It is, of course, the elites that lead the common people in the process of nation formation. Yet, there is always the risk that the masses might decide not to follow the nation-building elites, if they do not find their rhetoric convincing. Even if that does not happen at inception, the incompatibility of the national model with the sentiments of the common people may prove to be problematic in the future.

In the Turkish case there was a sharp distinction between the elites and the masses. It was the elites who manipulated the need of the people to take pride in their ethnic origins. The nation-building elites had to make the masses believe in a collective myth of glorious and historical ethnic descent. The conviction that they had common historical, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic roots would enable them to imagine themselves as constituting the Turkish nation. In this context, Smith's model of the nation (1991) is particularly helpful to understand the mythical and primordial elements that have been imposed on a quite diverse population.

Hobsbawm adopts a similar stance to that of Gellner's. First he finds language, ethnicity, religion, culture--the objective criteria of nationhood-- quite misleading, because they are "fuzzy, shifting and ambiguous" (Hobsbawm 1993, 6). He regards the subjective definitions of the nation, namely the "members' consciousness of belonging to it", just as unsatisfactory. He cautions the reader that the subjective criterion of choice could lead to "extremes of voluntarism" such as equating nation-building with "the will to be one" (Hobsbawm 1993, 8-9). To Hobsbawm, the term nation connotes a particular type of "modern territorial state, the nation-state. . ." (1993, 9). In his conception of nationalism, the nation is a product of the recent "political, technological, administrative,

economic and other" developments, since it is thanks to these breakthroughs that standard national languages and mass education could emerge as they are (Hobsbawm 1993, 10).

In fact it is impossible not to agree with Gellner and Hobsbawm in this particular point. Nonetheless, the problem posed by their theories is that they almost totally disregard the need of the masses to believe in common historical memories that connect the present to a past in which they can take pride. Both Gellner and Hobsbawm explained the role of the elites in leading the masses to form a nation. For instance, the nation-builders would select the "standardized idiom" in the case of language (Hobsbawm 1993, 54), or have the "monopoly of legitimate education" (Gellner 1983, 34). Hobsbawm did not mention the leadership of the elites in inventing or rediscovering common historical and cultural roots which would help the people to imagine themselves as a nation. Moreover, Hobsbawm's almost exclusive reliance on the size of the nation and its viability may create certain problems. For instance such a vision would not take into account how people perceive themselves and the social group they belong to. This could in turn transform the approach to an extremely mechanical one. Even his three criteria of nationhood apply only to those nations that are sufficiently large to pass the threshold" (Hobsbawm 1993, 37). Gellner, however, did not totally disregard the element of myth in his conception of the nation. Focusing on an imaginary community, the Ruritians, he demonstrated how the intelligentsia awakened a national consciousness in a rural population by rediscovering folk culture. Nonetheless, he did not mention the role of ethnie in nation-building (Gellner 1983, 58-62).

Even though the first criterion, that of "historic association with a current state or one with a fairly lengthy and recent past" (Hobsbawm 1993, 37) seem to be working for the Turkish Republic with its Ottoman past, the second and third criteria apparently fail in this respect. The second criterion of Hobsbawm demands the "existence of a long-established cultural elite, possessing a written national literary and administrative vernacular" (1993, 37). Yet, in the Turkish case, Ottoman Turkish, the traditional written and official language was replaced by the vernacular with no written tradition at all. And thirdly, "a proven capacity for conquest" (Hobsbawm 1993, 38) does not apply to the Turkish nation-building process, which itself was fighting against foreign invasion, let alone conquest.

In short, Hobsbawm's conception of the nation is not adequate in explaining the particular type of nation formation carried out in Turkey. For it almost totally disregards the linguistic, ethnic, historical and cultural criteria, which indeed make up the backbone of the Turkish nation. Hobsbawm rejects the idea that national languages are "the primordial foundations of national culture and matrices of the national mind" (1993, 54). Nevertheless, in the Turkish case, it was the "historicity" of the Turkish language (The Sun Language Theory) that the nation-building elite endeavored to prove.

As a result, Smith's approach to the nation, which combines some primordial elements with the modernist theory of nationalism will be opted for in examining the Turkish nation-building process and its implications for the future.

2.2. Anthony D. Smith's Conception of Nationalism

Smith claims that nationalism is an appealing identity myth in the modern world, and he focuses on the problem of continuity between pre-modern ethnie and modern nations. (1991, viii: 23). He differentiates between two models of the nation: the Western or civic model and an alternative non-Western or ethnic conception of nation. The former is "a predominantly spatial or territorial conception . . . [which means that] nations must possess compact, well-defined territories. . . . It is . . . the 'historic' land, the 'homeland,' the 'cradle' of our people. . . . The homeland becomes a repository of historic memories and associations . . ." (Smith 1991, 9).

A second element in the Western model is the idea of "patria , a community with a single political will. . . . Concurrent with the growth of a sense of legal and political community we may trace a sense of legal equality among the members of that community (Smith 1991, 10).

Finally, "nations must have a measure of common culture and a civic ideology, a set of common understandings and aspirations that bind the population together in their homeland" (Smith 1991, 11). It is here that the role of common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions is stressed as uniting elements for such "culture communities".

The Western model of the nation is a predominantly territorial and civic one. Yet it may also be conceived as primordial due to the role of "historical memories". It is a legal-political, civic culture community residing on a historic 'homeland,' whereas in the non-Western, ethnic conception of nation the emphasis is on

descent-or rather, presumed descent-rather than territory. The nation is seen as a fictive 'super family,' and it boasts pedigrees and genealogies to back up its claims. . . . [That is,] the nation can trace its roots to an imputed common ancestry, and . . . therefore its members are brothers and sisters, or at least cousins, differentiated by family ties from outsiders (Smith 1991, 11).

While law is integral to the Western model, vernacular culture, usually languages and customs replace it in the ethnic conception. "By creating a widespread awareness of the myths, history and linguistic traditions of the community [, nationalist leaders] succeeded in substantiating and crystallizing the idea of an ethnic nation in the minds of most members . . ." (Smith 1991, 11). However, there is no clear-cut line between the two models: in every nationalism there is room for dualism. Every nationalism blends civic and ethnic components in different proportions. Whenever civic and territorial elements are in the foreground, then it is the Western model, while the stress on ethnic and vernacular elements indicate that it is the non-Western type.

Smith reasons that "[t]he West acquired nations almost by accident; in other parts of the globe nations were created by design" (1991, 100). Then he distinguishes between two "routes" in the process of nation-building. In the first one, called the imperial route, the political entity is already "formally sovereign and independent" with no need to be freed of a foreign yoke, unlike the case in the colonial route. It just requires "a transformation of its political system and cultural self-definition" (Smith 1991, 101). Smith includes Ottoman Turkey, which was later transformed into the Turkish Republic, in this category. Smith talks about four

characteristics of the units that have been transformed into nation-states through the imperial route: First, "an aristocratic culture and tradition" make up an important part of the state. Second, "significant ethnic minorities" are included in the polity. Thirdly, such "bureaucratic states" are engaged in a modernization process, which aims at "the consolidation of a dominant ethnic core and ruling class over subordinate ethnies and classes". Lastly, "'official' and institutional nationalism" is utilised in order to "assimilate ethnic minorities," and the elites in power employ the educational system to its advantage. To this end, "they promote official, established ideas and images of the nation, to which everyone must conform" (Smith 1991, 101-102). Some of these key concepts will come up later, such as the dominant ethnie acting in the foreground supporting an "official nationalism".

While transforming the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish Republic, the aim was to achieve a civic-territorial nation model. However, the Western model of the nation presupposes a common culture and institutions backed by civic rights and duties. It also requires a defined territory (Smith 1991, 9-10). It is crucial that the political society first of all internalize the common cultural basis on which the civic-territorial nation is built. Otherwise, the attempts at attaining a Western model of the nation are doomed to fail. In the case of Turkey, the problematic issue was that the multi-cultural and multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire was to undergo a total metamorphosis, at the end of which it was to emerge as a civic-territorial nation based on a new understanding of history and a completely novel national-cultural identity. Yet, the change was rather abrupt and quite unnatural. For it did not come about smoothly as a result of a gradual evolution in the nature of the

society itself but was designed and imposed on the people by the reforming elites, namely Mustafa Kemal and his close circle, mostly composed of politician-historians and bureaucrats. This fact was likely to store problems for the future, since the "designed" nation, nourished by various myths pertaining to "historic roots" in Central Asia and to a "historic" mother tongue, presumed to be the first source of all languages (The Sun Language Theory), could easily be faced with an identity crisis in the long run. The problem would mostly arise from the attempted combination of two incompatible models of nation building--the Western and the ethnic models. Atatürk, while planning to attain a civic-territorial nation, had to rely on the tools of the non-Western model (genealogy, myths of historicity, etc.) which did not constitute a solid enough base for the new nation. Moreover, it was the dominant ethnie, the Turkish element of the Anatolian population that was at the center of this new perspective to history, cultural and national identity. Such an ethno-centric approach could eventually offend the non-Turkic groups, for instance Kurds, in a political society constituting a cultural and ethnic mosaic. Some traces of an identity crisis have surfaced even today: There is a strong tendency on the part of the Islamist groups in Turkey to identify themselves with the cultural and linguistic background of the Ottoman Empire rather than the pre-Ottoman past. At the other end of the continuum, the pan-Turkist groups of the present day, whose national-cultural self-identification lies in the pre-Ottoman era of Turkish history, steadily increase their political and ideological influence both at home and on foreign policy-making. An example of this could be the second Turkic States and Communities Friendship, Brotherhood, and Cooperation Assembly (İkinci Türk Devletleri ve Toplulukları

Dostluk, Kardeşlik ve İşbirliği Kurultayı) held on October 20, 1994 in İzmir. The idea was first proposed by Türkeş, the leader of the pan-Turkist Nationalist Action Party. Both President Süleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Tansu Çiller participated in the congress and each of them made a speech. (Milliyet 20 Oct. 1994).

2.3. A Model for Nation-Building in the Turkish Republic

As already stated, in the attempt to create a civic-territorial nation, Kemal Atatürk made use of geneology, vernacular languages, customs and traditions, myths of an historic homeland and an historic language in order to secure popular mobilization in "reawakening [the Turkish people] from a long slumber to take [its] place in a world of nations" (Smith 1991, 19). So what we observe in this case is the creation of a nation by design through the employment of the tools of the ethnic model with the aim of arriving at a Western type of national identity.

The first proof of the aspiration toward a territorial nation is the articulation of the concept called Misak-ı Milli (National Pact) which came to be pronounced more and more once the War of Independence was over. The issue was first taken up during the Erzurum Congress of 23 July-17 August 1919, and the principle of the National Pact was adopted in January 1920. The nation conveyed, according to Mustafa Kemal, the possible boundaries of the homeland over which the army could have authority and could defend (Oran 1990, 153-4).

Laws concerning citizenship and legal-political authority are integral to the model put forth by Atatürk. The first step taken in this direction was the establishment of a republican regime to replace the theocratic rule of the Sultan in October 1923. The

second step was the abolition of the Caliphate in March 1924. This was an attempt to bring the religious rule under the control of the political authority. Hence, secularism came to be the main pillar of the new regime. However, there never was a total separation of religious and political domains. Religion was confined inside the state apparatus. For instance, a special branch of the state is still in charge of regulating religious affairs. Even the imams in the mosques are considered as civil servants paid by the government. The examples given above demonstrate the efforts on the part of the nation-builders at attaining a national unit that would reflect, at least, the first two components of the Western model, namely an historic territory and a legal-political community.

However, there was a serious dilemma which the Kemalists had to face: The National Pact defined the borders of Anatolia as the final official borders of modern Turkey. Yet, it was Central Asia where the "glorious" historic past of the Turks lay. They had to reconcile the actual territory with the concept of historicity. Özdoğan also brings up this particular dilemma stating that Anatolia, "the main territorial base of the republic" was rather "identified mostly with the Seljuk and the Ottoman periods . . . [and] the Islamic past in general" (Özdoğan 1990, 88). This, she claims, was unthinkable for the "rationale" of Kemalist nationalism," since they could not reconcile "a republican and secular identity" with Ottoman-Islamic tradition (Özdoğan 1990, 88). The dilemma was resolved by a new approach to history. The official thesis on Turkish history argued that various Turkic groups had migrated from Central Asia throughout the world, including Anatolia (Özdoğan 1990, 89). This provided the Anatolian Turkish population with ethnicity and historicity and a new "cultural self-

definition". To recapitulate, though the element of territory, as defined by Misak-ı Milli, did not sound "historic" at the beginning, the nation-builders, under the initiative of Atatürk, have endeavored to create common myths pertaining to Central Asia as the cradle of the Turks: In 1930 Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti (Turkish Historical Research Society) was founded. This was later transformed to an academy. Thanks to the close interest of Mustafa Kemal and with the contribution of certain European Turkologists, a thesis on Turkish history was proposed. It claimed the basis of all civilizations to be the Turkish civilization, created by Turks who had to migrate from Central Asia, their homeland, to all parts of the world (Oran 1990, 184). In her paper presented at the First Turkish History Congress Afet (İnan) Hanım, a member of the Turkish Historical Research Society, argued that there has been one single cradle of the higher civilization of humanity--Central Asia. She further declared that every people who was after creating an image of grandeur, of magnificence sought to present Central Asian ethnic origins in their ancestors. Afet Hanım cited the words of the French historian Henri Martin to prove her argument. Martin contended that their ancestors lived at a place called "aria" situated in the middle of Asia (Afet 1932, 24). Moreover, she clearly stated that, while talking about Central Asia and its people, she had one race in mind: the Turkic race. She must have put great emphasis on the word Turkic, since it is in bold type (Afet 1932, 31). Arguing in such manner means, doubtless, to disregard the immense population movements of the Persian, Arab, and Mongol peoples mentioned in various articles on Central Asia.

However, here, the point was not accuracy or reliable scientific information. Rather, there was a clear attempt on the part

of the nation-building elites to evoke a national consciousness in connection with a "historic" homeland. A collective myth of belonging to a special and sacred piece of land which is the "cradle" of not only the Turkish civilization but also of the whole world, was invented. This is a clear case of the intermingling of the first component of the Western model of the nation, namely the historic land becoming a repository of historic memories and associations, and the heavily mythical aspects of the ethnic conception of the nation. The process undertaken here is explained by Smith:

". . . myths of political foundation, migration and selection take some historical event as their starting-point for subsequent interpretation and elaboration"(1991, 22). As Smith later clarifies, "[a]ttachments to specific stretches of territory have a mythical and subjective quality. It is the attachments and associations, rather than residence in or possession of the land that matters for ethnic identification" (Smith 1991, 23).

The second step in creating common national sentiments was the foundation of the Turkish Language Academy in 1932, immediately following the First Turkish History Congress. The initial target was to purify the Turkish language of Arabic and Persian words. However, later, under the influence of the thesis on Turkish history, the academy claimed that Turkish was the origin of all the languages spoken in the world (Oran 1990, 185). Again, at the First Turkish History Congress Afet Hanım argued that just one language was spoken in Central Asia: the Turkish language (Afet 1932, 31). This attempt would finally lead to the invention of the Sun Language Theory, put forth during the Third Turkish Language Assembly. Along with minimizing the linguistic distance between the higher and lower levels of the population in the former

Ottoman Empire, a complete rupture from the Ottoman background was aimed at by the adoption of the Latin alphabet and purification of the language. Thus, language came to be the foremost cultural pillar of the newly forming nation. The increased interest in Turkish history, homeland and the native, vernacular language was coupled with genealogy. This is reminiscent of the ethnic model which stresses the role of presumed descent ties in the formation of nations. Smith mentions that myths of common ancestry are crucial in this context. He relies on the reasoning given by Horowitz who has

likened ethnic groups to 'super-families' of fictive descent because members view their ethnie as composed of interrelated families forming one huge 'family' linked by mythical ties of filiation and ancestry. Such a linkage between family and nation appears in nationalist mythologies (Smith 1991, 22).

During the First Turkish History Congress Afet Hanım made use of genealogy, tracing the origins of Turks back to the land of Central Asia:

the Turkish children of today know and will make it known that they . . . come from a civilized, Arian and magnificent race with a history of tens of thousands of years, and that they are a people of great talents. . . .

The solid bases of the Turkish Republic rest on the strong rocks of this homeland[--Central Asia]. The genuine inheritors of this holy homeland are us, Turks, who are the young and healthy children of that great, magnificent and noble Turkic people (Afet 1932, 33-41).

The speech contains value-laden words and phrases praising the Turkic people as "great," "magnificent," "civilized," "healthy," "noble," etc. The general tendency of the argument makes one think of it in terms of the fascist ideology with so much emphasis on the importance of racial differences in the fields of intelligence, health, and superiority. Here, it would be useful to give Smith's definition of race as "a social group that is held to possess unique hereditary biological traits that allegedly determine the mental attributes of the group (Smith 1991, 21). Afet Hanım's arguments were probably the efforts made to consolidate the newly built nation by injecting pride in the Turkic race. Here, we could talk about an attempt at creating a nation by design.

The rhetoric pertaining to the Central Asian roots of Turks was a very much repeated theme during the first stages of nation-building in Turkey. For example, Education Minister Esat Bey observed in his opening speech at the First History Congress that Turks passed through the Paleolithic Age in Central Asia, their motherland, in 12,000 BC. Therefore, he stated, the Turks were 5,000 years in advance of the Europeans. He also contended that the Turkic language, most probably the origin of all languages, in his opinion, proved that the world civilization originated in Central Asia, and was later transmitted to the other parts of the world (Esat 1932, 7). In addition to his claims of a pre-existing Turkic culture, Esat Bey argued that the "glorious and vigorous" Turkic race was "born of the sun" and owed its existence to Atatürk (Esat 1932, 16). Köprülüzade Fuat Bey also tried to prove that Central Asia was the land of "white and beautiful brachycephalic race" (1932, 49).

This particular approach to history, where Central Asian Turkic origins constitute the core of the Turkish national identity,

has remained partially influential until the present day since the history books taught in high schools have been written accordingly. The initial step was taken by Atatürk, under whose initiative history studies were started between 1928-29 (Behar 1992, 96). During the republican era, it was decided that history should be written in a manner to serve the political ends of the nation-builders (Behar 1992, 99). Nevertheless, it should be remembered that, as Renan expresses it properly, "the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things" (1990, 11). Then Turkey is not an exceptional case in this context.

So there was a radical change in the basic approach to history. This is reflected in the high school history textbooks written in accordance with the official thesis on Turkish history. In this context, Behar states the objectives of the nation-builders:

The thesis on Turkish history should be understandable to adults, children, the young, those specialized in the field, and to common people. This was a sort of mobilization with the aim of standardizing the younger generation, the adults, the elite, and the people in terms of understanding the official thesis on Turkish history The ultimate objective was to integrate the official thesis on history into textbooks and to establish a strong consciousness of citizenship (Behar 1992, 117).

Behar also explains that the same approach to history still prevails today, especially in the history textbooks.

As for the civic ideological component of the Turkish Republic, the most apparent indicator of it would be the establishment of six

principles: secularism, nationalism, populism, etatism, revolutionarism, and republicanism.

In creating a Western type of nation "by design," Mustafa Kemal had to rely on mythologies of common ancestry, shared historical memories, and an historic territory along with language. Smith has already commented on the nature of myths: "they take some historical event" as their point of departure for further "interpretation and elaboration" (1991, 22). Barthes, who decomposed myths using the tools of semiotics, had a similar stance: "Ancient or not, mythology can only have an historical foundation, for myth is a type of speech chosen by history: it cannot possibly evolve from the 'nature of things'" (1989, 118). In this context, it is clear that the presence of a piece of land called Central Asia, of a Turkic language, namely Turkish is a historic fact. However, it is not history, but rather mythology that is responsible for the claims that Central Asia was the homeland of Turks exclusively, and the cradle of human civilization. The same thing is valid for the Sun Language Theory, which assumes Turkish to be the source of all languages. Here, one should be on guard that the shaky border between history and mythology has been transgressed. Semiotics would contribute to the analysis of the mythical element in Turkish nation-building.

2.4. Myth as Decomposed by Roland Barthes

The New Encyclopaedia Britannica defines semiotics as "the study of signs and sign-using behavior, including the use of words (linguistics), of tone of voice, tempo or drawal (paralinguistics), of body motions and gestures (kinesics), and animal communication".

The same encyclopedic source explains that the term was first used by the seventeenth-century philosopher John Locke. However, it was thanks to the American logician and philosopher Charles Peirce and the American behavioral scientist Charles Morris that semiotics came to be widely employed ("semiotics" a). Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language gives yet another definition of semiotics: "a general philosophical theory of signs and symbols that deals especially with their function in both artificially constructed and natural languages and comprises the three branches of syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics" ("semiotics" b).

It should be noted at the outset that semiology and semiotics are interchangeably utilized, and they refer to the same system of thinking. Nonetheless, out of respect for Saussure, who coined the term as semiology, Europeans favor the former. Ferdinand de Saussure defined this science as follows: "Semiology would show what constitutes signs, what laws govern them" (qtd. in Hawkes 1977, 123). The English, on the other hand, prefer Peirce's reference--semiotics (Hawkes 1977, 124).

Jakobson draws attention to the two-level system of communication that semiotics presupposes. He observes that a sign involves "an immediately perceptible signans and an inferable, apprehensible signatum" (qtd. in Hawkes 1977, 126). In fact, this is the backbone of semiotics. It relies on the relationship between the apparent message and the deep meaning underlying it.

Interpreting Julia Kristeva's words, Hawkes argues that "[e]very speech-act includes the transmission of messages through the 'languages' of gesture, posture, clothing, hair-style, perfume, accent, social context etc. over, and above, under and beneath, even at cross-purposes with what words actually say" (1977, 125).

Studying in the field of semiotics, Barthes explained social phenomena, and analyzed modern day myths in this context. He offered a definition: "Semiology is a science of forms, since it studies significations apart from their content. . . [And] mythology . . . studies ideas-in-form" (Barthes 1989, 120-121). Barthes explained the logic of semiology which "postulates a relation between two terms, a signifier and a signified": ". . . [W]hat we grasp is not at all one term after the other, but the correlation which unites them: there are, therefore, the signifier, the signified and the sign, which is the associative total of the first two terms" (Barthes 1989, 121). Barthes conceived of myth as a kind of speech, a "message," arguing that it was not "confined to oral speech" meaning that it comprised all sorts of "representations," including writing, photography, reporting, publicity, etc. These were the media that could "serve as a support to mythical speech," according to Barthes (1989, 118). Before decomposing the concept, Barthes further clarified the nature of myth:

Mythical speech is made of a material which has already been worked on so as to make it suitable for communication. It is because all the materials of myth . . . presuppose a signifying consciousness, that one can reason about them while discounting their substance (Barthes 1989, 119).

Then, we may conclude that mythical speech does not arise directly from the crude nature of things. Rather, it necessitates an elaboration, a specific loading of meaning, an association of concepts related to the object which has fallen into the paws of myth. A process of signification comes to dominate the content of the material in question. Therefore, it is not the "substance" that

matters, but rather what the material signifies. This is why mythical speech "presupposes a signifying consciousness".

An example would help a great deal to make the relationship more intelligible: A mother buys a warm sweater for her child's birthday. She thinks of the present as an occasion to signify her compassion for the child. Then, here, we have a sweater loaded with compassion: "a compassionified sweater". In this case, although it is possible to decompose the material into "sweater" and "compassion," when we see the present as a whole, we cannot dissociate the "sweater" from the message it conveys. In this particular instance, the "sweater" is the signifier: it signifies the mother's compassion for the child. "Compassion" is signified, embodied by the "sweater". The "present" is the sign, the overall result of the signification process. This is a first-order semiological system since it takes place on the plane of language, whereas the "tri-dimensional pattern" witnessed in myth is a second-order system: "that which is a sign (namely the associative total of a concept and an image) in the first system, becomes a mere signifier in the second " (Barthes 1989, 123).

This two-level relation can be clarified by an example based on a picture of Atatürk, in which he is presented in front of a blackboard teaching a young schoolgirl the new Latin alphabet. Both Mustafa Kemal and the girl are dressed in Western-type clothes. This is not a mere photograph but an instrument to serve the ends of myth in constructing the "Westernized" Turkish nation. The specific point in this particular picture is the introduction of a new alphabet containing the Latin letters. Here, two levels of association may be analysed: On the first level, that is on the plane of (visual) language, Atatürk, as signifier, merely stands for a

teacher in his Westernized clothes, with a piece of chalk in his hand, writing the Latin letters on the board. And the little girl just signifies a schoolgirl, learning the new alphabet composed of Latin letters. The sign of this first-level system is the fact that a young schoolgirl is being taught by Atatürk, her teacher, the Latin alphabet. Yet, once this visual picture lends itself to myth, the nature of association is immediately changed: Atatürk, in his Western-type clothes, teaching the Latin letters to a schoolgirl in front of a blackboard, becomes the signifier of the second-order system of myth. So now, it is the totality of the picture that becomes the signifier of the myth. The signified, on the other hand, is the sum of his qualities as "modern," "Western," "instructor," and "director". Atatürk signifies the person who is the instructor and the ideologue of the new society which is to be based on learning, belief in progress, and by implication, the other ideals of enlightenment. The schoolgirl is a young representative of the female sex and the change in the role attributed to her in specific, and to women in general in the new modern society that is to be developed under the guidance of Atatürk. That she is to achieve this role through education implies that she is no longer going to be secluded from the society and kept in the home, but that she is going to take an active role in its social institutions as a member of the new intelligentsia (i.e. she is going to be an "enlightened," active member of the new society, on a par with men.) The overall signification offered by the picture is that, the new ideology put into effect by Atatürk is going to enable the community to become a modern nation-state, developed, learned, and on a par with the Western nations of the world. Also, the new learning will be in line with Western thinking, as represented by the Latin alphabet.

Barthes demonstrated the theoretical framework of this two-level relationship in a chart (1989, 124):

Language	1. Signifier (Meaning)	2. Signified (Concept)
	3. Sign (Sign) I. SIGNIFIER (Form)	II. SIGNIFIED (Concept)
MYTH	III. SIGN (Signification)	

In order to avoid a confusion in terms Barthes called the signifier "meaning" when we are on the plane of the language; and "form" when we have shifted to the plane of myth. Nevertheless, he chose to employ a common name for the signified on both planes:

"concept". And, the sign was called "signification" in the case of myth (Barthes 1989, 126). After a clarification of concepts Barthes proceeded to explain the method of operation in the case of myth: "The signifier of myth represents itself in an ambiguous way: it is at the same time meaning and form, full on one side, empty on the other. As meaning, the signifier already postulates a reading, I grasp it through my eyes . . ." (Barthes 1989, 126). This aspect of myth can be illustrated by the schoolgirl being taught the Latin alphabet: What is conceived here might be a schoolgirl learning the alphabet. She could by herself convey a message pertaining to her individual past and present. Yet, myth captures this meaning and changes it "into an empty, parasitical form". Thus, it is

"impoverished," deprived of meaning, and "history evaporates" (Barthes 1989, 127).

What Barthes is saying in this passage is that, whenever we see an image we are aware of its past, its specific history. However, once the image is seized by myth, we stop thinking of this history and start associating it with something new, with what the myth is trying to impose on us. As in the case of the schoolgirl, we no longer take her to be a child with certain family ties, friends and a personal history of her own. Rather she comes to signify the new type of woman developed by the nationalist ideologue, Atatürk. This is what Barthes means by "history evaporates, only the letter remains". In Barthes' words,

the history which drains out of the form will be wholly absorbed by the concept [--the signified]. As for the latter, it is determined, it is at once historical and intentional; it is the motivation which causes the myth to be uttered. . . . Unlike the form, the concept is in no way abstract: it is filled with a situation. Through the concept it is a whole new history which is implanted in the myth (Barthes 1989, 127-128).

So what myth really does is to empty an image of its genuine meaning, take it as a blank form, then abuse it by squeezing a situation of its own choice into this frame. Barthes named this "a relation of deformation". It could also be called a process of distortion, since "the meaning is distorted by the concept" (Barthes 1989, 132). Nonetheless, this process of distortion is not time-frozen, and Barthes cautioned the reader about the changing nature of "mythical concepts". He maintained that their existence was one of constant flux due to the fact that "they are historical," and that

under the shadow of history, these concepts are subject to suppression (Barthes 1989, 131).

In scrutinizing mythical concepts, one should beware of their shifting nature, always bearing the historical context in mind. It should then not be forgotten that the same signifier can possibly signify two different things in history. Another point to remember is that the same concept may be implied by a number of different elements (Barthes 1989, 129).

CHAPTER 3:

THE MYTHICAL TOOLS EMPLOYED IN THE CASE OF TURKEY

In this chapter the tools employed in the process of the formation of a Turkish nation out of the Ottoman Empire will be examined in the light of Smith's and Barthes's views.

National myths owe their existence to various concepts used as signifiers. Hence the abundance of signifiers that point to the same myth. Signifiers are the building blocks of myths. They underline the idea that the myth in question is unique. This is true of Turkish nationalism provided that it is examined as myth. However, this does not mean that Turkish nationalism is exclusively based on myth. The point made here is, rather, to employ Barthes's system of signs in order to shed light on certain aspects of the nation-building process in Turkey.

A number of elements (signifiers) are utilized to support the construction of the Turkish nation. Thus, culture, language, territory, and history have all fallen into the trap of myth. Religion and citizenship, though used to intensify the the nation-building process, should be examined from a different point of view.

3.1. Culture

Before understanding the role of culture as a signifier of nationalism (sign), one has first to fix the boundaries of the concept. What are its constituents? What is the interrelation amongst these components? What is it that really creates culture? Is this process of creation natural or artificial? If it is artificial, to what extent? Which forces contribute to the creation of it? What is it that the people involved in this creation process have in mind? If we finally conclude that culture is something manufactured rather than

natural, at least in certain cases, then we are moving closer to Barthes's argument concerning the nature of myths. In this case, culture would fall in the domain of myth.

First, the interrelation of culture to its constituents will be analyzed. In this context, if we are to follow the definition of culture by Kluckhohn and Kelly, we have to admit the close relationship between culture and history:

A culture is a historically derived system of explicit and implicit designs for living, which tends to be shared by all or designated members of a group . . . At least in those groups which have some historical continuity and which are generally designed as 'societies,' all individuals tend to share common interpretations of the external world and man's place in it. To some degree every individual is affected by this common view of life'. . . (Kluckhohn 1972, 181).

However, if we admit the role of history as protagonist in the making of a culture, then we are to be watchful for the danger of manipulation on culture through manipulative interpretations of history. The motives behind this manipulative attitude may be various, such as the wish of consolidating the nation-building process through injecting ancestral pride in the members of the nation in question. Another driving force may be pan-nationalism. Subjects nourishing a sense of cultural affinity with their so-called "ethnic relatives" living beyond their national boundaries would provide the movement with the popular support it needs. The Turkish Republic during the first years of its foundation may provide an example to the former motive, and the latter objective is adopted by the extreme rightists that long for the realization of

the pan-Turk dream--the political and geographical union of all Turks.

In 1930 Turkish nation-builders under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk founded the Turkish Historical Research Society. This was an attempt to interpret history in a specific manner so as to enable the people to imagine that they have a common, historical culture.

The Turkish Historical Research Society was not founded overnight; rather it was the product of a gradual process. In April 1930 under the instructions of Atatürk a special commission of the Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocakları) was appointed to be responsible for research on Turkish history. It would work as a sub-branch of the Turkish Hearths Central Commission (İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi 1943, XXXII). In the introduction to the Proceedings of the Second History Congress, the aim of the association and how it emerged are made clear: As the Turkish Hearths were closed down in April 1931, the special Commission of the Turkish Hearths for Turkish Historical Research was transformed into the Turkish Historical Research Society. It then became an independent association and came under the direct patronage of Atatürk. Later, Atatürk had the name of the association changed to the Turkish History Academy. The fundamental purpose of the association was to do research on Turkish history and publish its findings. Thus, its first project was the preparation of a four-volume series of history books to be taught at high schools. The history textbooks for primary and secondary schools were in turn based on this series (İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi 1943, XXXII).

We know that there are several versions of national history, and that the version in the foreground is the one perpetuated by

nation-builders and later on by governments. So history is shaped in such a way that it may be employed as a tool in the state apparatus. This was probably what Renan meant by his statement that nations tend to get their history wrong (Renan 1990, 11). This was the case in the First History Congress. Efforts were made to discover or construct links connecting the present day Turkish Republic to the distant past of Central Asia. If it could be proved that the origins of Turks dated back to an ancient past, with ancestors living on a piece of land called Central Asia (formerly Turkestan), then it would be easy for the people populating the Turkish Republic to believe that their culture has a "continuing history". Since culture is a "system of . . . designs for living," it is crucial for every nation to have a common and unique culture of its own so as to shape the world views of their citizens. That is why history, language, religion and citizenship assume so much importance in nation formation.

The group of people referred throughout the chapter as "nation-builders" comprise mainly Mustafa Kemal, the charismatic leader, and his immediate circle. In this circle, there were politicians appointed to be historians who were at the same time leading party members of the Republican Peoples Party (RPP) (Behar 1992, 93).

Returning to the ambition of the Turkish historians to glorify the past related to Central Asia and the magnificent ancestors who once lived there, it should be made clear that these efforts were especially in the foreground in the thirties. Yet they are still influential in the modern day Turkey thanks to the Nationalist Action Party of Türkiye and the more extremist nationalist party called the Great Union Party, headed by Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu. Besides,

we should not forget the fact that the official thesis on Turkish history is still being taught in schools. Afet Hanım's arguments, which tend to be reminiscent of racism, did not mark the "official" policymaking after the thirties. Nevertheless, it would not be right to deny its existence at this particular point in history, even though it has remained marginal ever since. This line of thinking, mainly influenced by the Nazi ideology of its day, was unwittingly encouraging for today's Pan-Turkist movement led by Türkeş.

In decomposing culture following Barthes's theory, the thesis on Turkish history will be taken up first. In this thesis it was claimed that all civilizations were initiated by and later built on the Turkish civilization and culture originating in Central Asia. Central Asia was supposed to be populated exclusively by the Turkic peoples, according to this theory. Here, culture is just one of the concepts employed to symbolize Turkish nation and nationalism. The Turkish civilization and culture originating in Central Asia signify the belief that Turks have an historic culture. The result of the signification, namely the sign, is the idea that Turks make up a nation based on a unique and ancient culture, embodied in the Turkish Republic. Here, what we witness is the overwhelming power of the dominant ethnie in creating a nation. That is, since it was the Turkish ethnic group that make up the majority in terms of population, the Anatolian Turks constituted the core in the invented myths of historic territory, history, culture and language.

3.2. Language

Returning to the concept of culture, we realize that it is defined as a "symbol system" by Clifford Geertz. Adopting Parson's concept of culture, Geertz defines it

as a system of symbols by which man confers significance upon his own experience. Symbol systems, man-created, shared, conventional, ordered, and indeed learned provide human beings with a meaningful framework for orienting themselves to one another, to the world around them, and to themselves . . . [T]hey are to the process of social life as a computer's program is to its operations, the genetic helix to the development of the organism . . .--so the symbol system is the information source . . . that gives shape, direction, particularity, and point to an ongoing flow of activity (Geertz 1973, 250).

The above given definition may as well be applied to language, which itself is a symbol system. As Fromkin and Rodman put it, [w]hen you know a language, you can speak and be understood by others who know that language. This means you have the capacity to produce sounds that signify certain meanings and to understand or interpret the sounds produced by others . . . A most important part of knowing a language is knowing that certain sounds or sound sequences signify or represent different concepts or 'meanings' . . . Knowing a language is therefore knowing the system that relates sounds and meanings (Fromkin 1986, 4-5).

Starting from these two descriptions, we may find a parallelism between culture and language. And Herder's words will help us in this context:

Parents never teach their children language, without the latter at the same time inventing it themselves. The former only direct their children's attention to the difference between things, by certain verbal signs and thus do not

supply these, but by means of language only facilitate and accelerate for children the use of reason (qtd. in Fromkin 1986, 26).

Since the people who speak the same language mutually understand each other, language like culture is shared. Because newly learning children are capable of inventing their language in a certain mannner, it is clear that language is man-made or man-created. So is culture. If children learn their mother tongue from their parents, then it is evident that language and culture are both learned and transmitted through generations. Language is ordered as is culture: ". . . when you know a language you know the sounds, the words, and the rules for their combination" (Fromkin 1986, 10). This points out to the fact that we need to know some rules in order to be able to speak or understand a language. In the passage quoted from Herder, it is obvious that language helps children to orient themselves to their environment. With the help of "verbal signs" children learn how to relate one thing to another through the use of reason, and culture does the same thing through its specific system of symbols. Thus human beings are oriented to the external world, and to themselves. Indeed, like culture, language is the information medium that helps people shape their activities. Without language, how would we be able to communicate and act accordingly? And without culture, how would we manage to decipher the reality around our microcosm?

Therefore, we may conclude that language is a crucial part of culture and it deserves special attention. Language is not isolated from the external environment. On the contrary it is an integral part of a society, its values, traditions, view of life, in short, its culture as a whole. That is the reason behind the ambition of

having and maintaining a single official language on the part of nation-builders. This usually happens to be the language spoken by the dominant ethnie, as is the case in the Turkish Republic.

Yet, in this section, the emphasis will be rather on the question of how language was employed as a tool in consolidating national consciousness in the case of Turkey. The first step taken in this direction was the establishment of the Turkish Language Academy in 1932. One way of moving away from the Ottoman heritage towards the Turkish nation was purifying the language of foreign words. Ottoman Turkish, the official language of the empire, was loaded with Arabic and Persian words. Now the target was attaining a pure Turkish language based on the vernacular spoken by the common Turkish people. Thus the new purified national language would come to symbolize the Turkish nation as unique, having a particular language, hence a particular culture of its own. The introduction of the Sun Language Theory was especially important in this context.

In her paper presented at the first History Congress Afet Hanım tried to prove that Central Asia was the homeland of the "Turkic race". Then she claimed that the civilization created in Central Asia was the basis of the higher civilization in the whole world. Another argument proposed by Afet Hanım was that only one single language had been spoken in Central Asia. The language she had in mind was of course the Turkic or Turkish language. Although it is difficult to differentiate between Turkic and Turkish in the Turkish language, departing from the dominating tendency in her speech, it is possible to anticipate that she was favouring the latter. This is supported by her choice of the term "dialect" rather than "language" in admitting the linguistic diversity among the

languages spoken in the area. This indicates her refusing to take these languages by and in themselves. Instead she treated them as derivatives of Anatolian Turkish. Moreover, Afet Hanım did not acknowledge any borrowings from other languages, which is incompatible with the nature of language. On the contrary, she stated that Turkish itself was borrowed by other peoples (Afet 1932, 31). This theorizing came to assert that Turkish was the mother of all the other languages. As a signifier, this theory signified the so-called historic foundations of the Turkish language, and it was only natural that the Turkish nation should have the same historic foundations if the language spoken by its people had such a deeply rooted background. So the sign in this tri-dimensional relation would be the final reasoning that the Turkish Republic, though yet young, had solid bases in history due to the "glorious" past of its language. If we bear the close relationship between language and culture in mind, it would be easier to grasp why it was particularly the language that the Turkish nation-builders concentrated on.

Özdoğan draws attention to how and why the seemingly ironic phenomenon--the almost overnight ascension of the vernacular Anatolian to the master language in place of Ottoman Turkish came about. Özdoğan explains the puzzle in relation to romantic nationalism:

The common people constituted the 'volk,' . . . whose native language, ethnic characteristics, and historical origin had gained more significance within the logic of the romantic nationalist movement . . . In popular literature, while Turkish vernacular was promoted as the 'national language' in place of the 'Ottoman Turkish' of the elites, the common people and

their living, tradition, life-struggle, and outlook on life became the very themes of the Turkish 'nationalist literature' (milli edebiyat) along with an interest in Turkish folklore (Özdoğan 1990, 277-278).

3.3. Territory

Territory is usually classified among the physical and tangible capabilities of nations by realist scholars of international politics. For example, Theodore A. Coulombis and James H. Wolfe argue "that larger nation-states are more powerful than smaller ones" (Coulombis 1986, 96). Among the six attributes of power, they place territory second in the order based on preeminence. However, Coulombis and Wolfe caution that "the mere measurement of an area in square kilometers is not necessarily adequate even as a partial measure of power" (1986, 96). They also point to the "dimension of intangibility" inherently present in "territory": "[N]atural boundaries, climate, strategic or peripheral location, and number of neighbours" constitute the "intangible characteristics" of territory (Coulombis 1986, 96). Hans Morgenthau Joachim, who is regarded as the father of power politics, adopts a similar approach. First, he takes "geography" as "the most stable factor upon which the power of a nation depends" (Morgenthau 1965, 110). Just like Coulombis and Wolfe, to Morgenthau it is rather the geographical position of a nation-state that counts as an element of power. He questions whether there really is a correlation between large territory and great might, and he concludes that it is wrong to assume "a nation [to be] the more powerful the more territory it possesses" (Morgenthau 1965, 205). Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr also include territory among the "tangible capabilities" of

states. They believe that "sheer size or land area by itself is not sufficient to make a state a great power," yet they emphasize the importance of a large piece of territory since "it can support a fairly large population, a large industrial base, and large domestic sources of food and natural resources" (Russett 1989, 139). "[D]epth for military defense and isolation from neighbours" are what a large piece of land supply the state with, according to Russett and Starr. Moreover, "physical features of the land," "its physical and political location," plus the "climate" are all related to territory. So they also stress the importance of geo-political location, rather than "sheer size" (Russett 1989, 139). Then, we can conclude that territory is a crucial and integral part of the state and of international relations.

When the theory of nationalism developed by Smith is considered, it is evident that the concept of territory also has an emotional component. Smith takes a "historic territory" to be one of the main "features of national identity" (1991, 14). Later he explains what he means by this: "It is the attachments and associations, rather than residence in or possession of the land that matters for ethnic identification" (Smith 1991, 23). So what Smith talks about is rather different from the territory that realist scholars mention as part of physical capabilities of a nation. If we attempt to combine the two approaches we may conclude that territory is important to a nation both as a strategical tool and a manifestation of power, and as a mythical and emotional entity that enables the nation to conceive itself as a "nation".

In this section the emotional aspect of territory and how it was employed as a tool in nation-building in the case of the Turkish Republic will be tackled. Before passing to the reception of Central Asia as "the historic homeland" of Turkic peoples, it would be

useful to define the boundaries of the region. Indeed, Central Asia is a "cultural area" (qtd. in Hauner 1990, 73). The name "cultural area" is an anthropological term. As a primordial concept, "culture areas" are "unique patterns and complexes of elements" (Steward 1970, 73). George P. Murdock also gives a description of the "culture area": [It] embraces the related cultures of different peoples inhabiting a defined geographical region" (1970, 477).

Starting from these definitions of culture area, we may reason that the boundaries of Central Asia should coincide with the specific geographic area where similar cultures and similar social behavior patterns exist. However, we encounter various classifications of the same culture area called Central Asia, sometimes referred to as Inner Asia or even as Turkestan (or Turkistan), its archaic name. Karl H. Menges makes it clear why today's Central Asia was once called Turkistan. He states that the region is "one of the most compact and unified major Turkic language areas in the world" (Menges 1989, 60). It is evident that Menges here bases his classification on language which is an essential component of culture as explained in section 2.1. Here is his definition of the borders of Turkistan: "Ethnologically and linguistically, the entire area to the east of the Caspian Sea as far as the Altay mountains and the Lob desert separating the Taqlamaqan from the Gobi . . . may well be called Turkistan" (Menges 1989, 60). Compton's Picture Encyclopedia provides us with almost an identical description with the only exception that it divides the area into sub-regions: "In the heart of Asia, north of the high mountain wall of India, lies the vast arid region called Turkestan, or Central Asia. From the Gobi, the great desert in central China, of which it is a continuation, it stretches westward to the Caspian Sea . . . The long chain of Tien-

Shan (Mountains) crosses it, sharply dividing it into two parts. On one side lies Chinese or Eastern Turkestan. On the other side is Western Turkestan, made up of Russian Turkestan (Soviet Central Asia) and to the south of it, Afghan Turkestan" (Turkestan" a).

However, it is mainly "Western Turkestan" that is of interest to this section. These two definitions concentrate mainly on geographic features of the land. Yet, there are others that set the borders of the culture area in accordance with political frontiers of the republics standing on the region: Encyclopedia International, dividing the area called "Turkestan" into Chinese and Russian parts, designates the Russian portion by including the Kazakh, Uzbek, Tadzhik, Kirgiz, and Turkmen Republics. It also states that "[a] part of historic Turkestan is also included in northern Afghanistan," ("Turkestan" b). Encyclopedia Americana also divides the region into two sections and includes "the Uzbek, Tadzhik, and Kirghiz republics and portions of the Kazak and Turkmen republics" ("Asia--cultural regions"). Wheeler points to the fact that, although only Kazakhstan was "treated by both Tsarist and Soviet geographers as a separate area," for "modern . . . purposes," five of them are grouped together because of their "ethnographical and cultural affinities" (Wheeler 1964, 1). Both the New Encyclopedia Britannica and Encyclopedia Americana caution that the region "has no specific boundaries" ("Central Asian Arts") and that it is "a somewhat imprecise region" ("Asia--culture areas"). If we go back to the term Turkestan, we can divide it into "Turk" and "stan" (= stand, in Persian) meaning the place where Turks stand, inhabit.

This must have been appealing to the historians of modern Turkey while preparing the official thesis on Turkish history. As Behar claims, during the first years of the Turkish

Republic, as part of the Kemalist ideology, politician historians were growing in number and some politicians were appointed to be historians. Behar draws attention to the fact that "the task of writing the national history was regarded as a political mission," thus "nationalist leaders," "leading party members" constituted the historians in charge of "rewriting history" (Behar 1992, 93). This information is verified by the words of Afet Hanım, the deputy chief of the Turkish History Academy, pertaining to Atatürk: "He made a history for Turkey. And he wrote a history for the Turks" (Afet 1939, 243). She further tells the story of this particular history writing process: ". . . I was the one who wrote for him and read with him. I was his history student" (Afet 1939, 243). Explaining that they started working in 1929, Afet Hanım maintained not only that the Turkish History Academy was a fruit of their work, but also that the first meeting in 1931 of the academy was achieved "under his close interest and supervision" (Afet 1939, 243).

The motives behind the creation of a "national history" was to arouse the feeling of attachment to a historic homeland, which was originally Central Asia for all the Turkic peoples, and to consolidate the national consciousness. Although the present boundaries of the Turkish Republic were in reality far away from that "historic land," the "cradle of Turkish Civilization and of the world," the point was to overcome the problem of rootlessness. Thus the Anatolian Turkish people would easily imagine ancestral links with the "legendary" Turks of Central Asia. In this context, the culture area called Central Asia becomes a signifier of the Turkish nation with a past full of pride. Since the region is an historically existing one, presumed to be the land of Turks, it signifies the existence of a

"historic homeland," which in turn connotes the presence of a people rooted in this territory. The outcome of the association is that the Turkish Republic has "solid bases" as Afet Hanım claimed (Afet 1932, 41).

3.4. Religion

The most controversial component of the nationalist movement in Turkey is perhaps religion. It is difficult, almost impossible to treat it as a signifier in Turkish nationalism. During the initial stages of the War of Independence, it was used as a motivating element in the fight against non-Muslims (Lewis 1961, 396). When Şeyh-ül-İslam ordered by fetva that, as a "religious duty" the rebels--meaning the nationalists--be killed on the word of the Caliphate, shortly afterwards, Mustafa Kemal and his advocates acted by the same token: "[T]he Mufti of Ankara . . . issued a fetva, endorsed by 152 other Muftis in Anatolia, declaring that a fetva issued under foreign duress was invalid, and calling on the Muslims to 'liberate their Caliph from captivity'" (Lewis 1961, 246-247). This was a clever manoeuvre on the part of Kemal Atatürk and his supporters. This act can surely be categorized as a pragmatic move. Similarly, since during the times of the Ottoman Empire, the political allegiance of the people was to the Islamic religion rather than a particular nation, the first years of the War of Independence was characterized by a religious motive to drive the non-Muslims out of the holy territories of Islam (Lewis 1961, 396). Lewis points to the fact that during the First World War, when Arabs rebelled under the initiative of the British, there was a weakening in religious identity, but that the struggle under Mustafa Kemal to defend Anatolia "against the ancient and familiar

Greek Christian enemy" revived "religious identification and loyalty" (Lewis 1961, 397). Lewis draws our attention to the adoption of the title Gazi by Kemal Atatürk. This was granted by the Grand National Assembly to indicate that Mustafa Kemal was a "victor in the holy war". Lewis also draws a parallelism between the fighting tradition of Islam for Turks and the adoption of this particular title (1961, 11).

Clearly, Islam was exploited in the military mobilization period of the nationalist movement, yet it was later viewed as a challenge to the newly born republic which was founded on a nationalist basis. Earlier, Islam was the main pillar of the Ottoman Empire and it served the same function of holding different ethnic communities together under the authority of the Sultan-Caliphate. In order to consolidate the Turkish national consciousness, it was a must for Kemalists to fight against Islam as a means of political identification. Mustafa Kemal endeavoured to replace religious identity with national identity. So the radical reforms to abolish religious authority and to take religion under the supervision of the state should be considered in this context. Although it took only four years to "repeal the Holy Law" and "disestablish Islam" (Lewis 1961, 368), Atatürk was extremely cautious in taking steps against Islam. Taha Parla makes it clear that Mustafa Kemal was careful to employ a pragmatic strategy, especially in the field of religion, during the War of Independence and the First National Assembly in order to procure the widest possible support and not to antagonize certain segments of the society (Parla 1992, 3: 272). Parla's claims on one of Atatürk's speeches in 1922, may be interpreted as such: Atatürk could express just the opposite of what he himself sincerely believed in. For example, he spoke in praise of the

dictates of Koran and of mosques, stating that the prayers told in the language understandable to the people would revive the body, clear the mind, and strengthen the belief (Parla 1992, 3: 273). As Parla also points out, Mustafa Kemal had the modernization of Islam in mind, believing in the use of by-passing the Arab, Persian and Ottoman period, which he regarded as corrupt. This line of thinking was not isolated from his ideal of creating a purified, glorified Turkism going back to pre-Islamic roots of Turks. Then, it would be problematic to treat religion as a signifier of the Turkish nation since there is no consistent line that can be followed.

As for citizenship, even though it cannot be overlooked in the context of nation-building in Turkey, it is not relevant to this section, because citizenship does not assume a mythical aspect.

In the next chapter the nature of Pan-Turkism will be studied, tracing its origins and pursuing its main trend until the present day.

CHAPTER 4:

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF PAN-TURKISM

It is very important that clear-cut definitions and typologies of pan-Turkism be given at inception, since there have been some simplistic, confusing, and misleading approaches to this concept. For instance, it has often been defined in vague terms without making any distinction between its political and cultural versions: ". . . Pan-Turkism is a movement which aims at union, cultural or political, of all Turkic speaking peoples" (Hostler 1957, 115).

4.1. Definitions and Typologies of Pan-Turkism:

A. Classical/Political and Geographical Pan-Turkism: It was first introduced by a Jewish-Hungarian traveller and orientalist, Arminius Vambery in his book called Travels in Asia as early as 1871 (qtd. in Landau 1981, 1-2). He introduced the concept of a Turkic race and defined the nation in terms of physical traits. Vambery proposed a political, territorial unity of all the Turkic peoples "from the shore of Adriatic far into China" (qtd. in Landau 1981, 1-2).

Yusuf Akçura should be placed in the context of classical pan-Turkism, too, since he was the one to call for a political unity of all the Turkic peoples in the world around the political entity of the Ottoman Empire in his famous pamphlet "Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset" (Three systems of Government) (Zenkovsky 1960, 38-39).

B. Moderate/Cultural Pan-Turkism: Gaspıralı İsmail Bey and Ziya Gökalp would definitely fall into that category. Gaspıralı focused on the linguistic unity of the Turkic peoples living in

Russia. What he really had in mind was a Turkic lingua franca, indeed a lingua Turca based on the İstanbul dialect of Anatolian Turkish, and he had a familiar slogan, "unity in language, thought and action" (dilde, fikirde, işte birlik). It should be noted that in this slogan, there is no implication for a political-geographical union. The point is, rather, some sort of a solidarity among the Turkic peoples.

Gökalp, who has often been victim to misunderstanding because of his celebrated poem "Turan", falls in the cultural category of pan-Turkism. For, when one looks closely at his claims pertaining to Turkism, it is quite obvious that he was not after a political union of Turkic peoples. What he really longed for was the "cultural unity of the Oghuz peoples" (Gökalp 1968, 17). This parallels his definition of the nation which regarded common culture and education rather than blood as the criteria of nationhood (Gökalp 1968, 12).

In the cultural pan-Turkist model, linguistic and cultural unity is in the foreground. And the distinguishing element in cultural pan-Turkism is the central and prestigious position of Turkey, which constitutes a source of aspiration for the rest of the Turkic peoples. This phenomenon will later be evaluated in detail under the light of the language prestige concept.

The pan-Turkist movement that originated among the Tatars inhabiting Russia was, in the first place, an attempt to assert a Turkic national identity in the face of Russian pressure. Moreover, it was quite difficult to separate Turkism from Islam. When the Turkic peoples of Russia managed to gather at a formal meeting for the first time, it was under the banner of Islam. At the first Moslem Congress convened in 1905, it was decided to organize an all-

Russian Moslem union (Zenkovsky 1960, 41). And the idea of unity was "based on national and religious principles" (Zenkovsky 1960, 47). So it would be helpful to keep in mind that it is most difficult to decide whether the particular type of national consciousness that emerged in Russia was pan-Turkism or pan-Islamism .

Again, when pan-Turkism was exported to the Ottoman Empire, it was perceived as a feasible way of defending the rights of the Turkish people as opposed to the rising trend of nationalism among other peoples in the empire. And finally, this particular ideology became instrumental in the creation of a new nation based on Turkish nationalism--the Turkish Republic-- out of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. However, during the last days of the empire, the ideal of liberating the "captive Turks" living in Russian Central Asia was propagated by the Ottoman War Minister Enver Paşa. This vision was reflected in the Ottoman Empire's declaration of war against Russia, which included the longing for a union of the Turkic race. This was probably the most obvious example of geographical pan-Turkism motivated by the cause of "outside Turks".

Yet, once the Turkish Republic was established under the leadership Atatürk, the ideological background of pan-Turkism was transformed into a Turkey-centered nationalism. As a result, pan-Turkism in the classical sense of the word was dismissed from the Turkish political system. In the first years of the Turkish Republic, Kemalist nationalism placed an overemphasis on ethnicity and racial properties of the Turkish nation. Nonetheless, this does not mean that pan-Turkism and Kemalist nationalism were identical. They just overlapped at certain points. Özdoğan remarks that Turkism started to acquire its specific characteristics only in the

thirties (1990, 194). And it was in the forties, during the days of the Second World War, that the political pan-Turkic aspirations enjoyed considerable popularity (Özdoğan 1990, 193).

The most prominent Turkist figure in the 1930s was Nihal Atsız, who defined national identity in terms of race and blood. For instance, he once tried to estimate what percentage of Albanian blood Namık Kemal could possess by virtue of an Albanian father (Atsız 1966, 145). The kind of Turkism advocated by Atsız is definitely an example of political pan-Turkism, since he clearly expressed a longing for the geographical unity of all the Turkic peoples under the same flag (Özdoğan 1990, 199). His political loyalty was not restricted to Anatolia, and Atsız turned to the historical places where his Turkic ancestors once lived (Atsız 1966, 37). Atsız also insisted that the people suitable to rule should come from pure Turkic race of three generations at a minimum (Özdoğan 1990, 212).

Nevertheless, with Ahmet Caferoğlu, an Azerbaijani immigrant, appearing on the scene in the forties, cultural pan-Turkism re-emerged. The focus of this cultural pan-Turkist movement was a linguistic, rather than political or geographical unity of the Turkic peoples (Özdoğan 1990, 212).

4.2. The Emergence of Pan-Turkism in the Ottoman Empire

When people are themselves part of a certain phenomenon, it is usually difficult for them to evaluate objectively the real significance of that event. This is exactly what happened to the Turkish people of the Ottoman Empire. Neither the elites nor the masses could view their situation out of the Ottoman perspective

although the empire was declining. It seemed to them that any plausible solution to the ongoing degeneration could only be worked out within the Ottoman framework. That is why Lewis finds it natural that "[a]mong the peoples of the Ottoman Empire the last to be affected by the national idea were . . . the masters of the Empire themselves" (Lewis 1961, 338). Thus, Turkish national consciousness was a foreign phenomenon to the Ottoman Turks. It was partly a reaction flourishing among the Turks of the Ottoman Empire to the secessionist movements of different nationalities within the empire (Özdoğan 1990, 35), and partly an instance of solidarity between the Turkic peoples living in Russia and the Turkish people of the Ottoman Empire in the face of a common enemy, namely Russia. Özdoğan argues that the "nationalist revolt of various foreign ethnic populations of the empire" led the Ottoman Turks to ponder "about their own identity in ethnic terms . . ." (1990, 42). Moreover, the Turkic peoples of Russia were suffering from linguistic, religious, and cultural assimilation policies of Czarist Russia. As a result they had to cling to their own "faith and national origins". This is how "[t]he concept of a common origin for all Turkic groups" emerged (Landau 1981, 8). In the meantime, the Ottoman Empire was faced with the danger of disintegration and the occupation of Constantinople by Russia. Thus the Eastern and Western Turks were under similar circumstances, standing against a common enemy (Hostler 1957, 139), which helped nourish mutual sympathies between these two Turkic groups.

Indeed, there were five sources that inspired the growth of pan-Turkism in the Ottoman Empire. One of them was the transmittal of the Western romantic nationalist ideas by way of student exchanges between the Ottoman Empire and Europe. This

was a different concept of nationalism than the classical Western territorial and political notion of the nation:

In central Europe, where there were no well-defined and long-established territorial nation-states such as England and France, the visible and external criteria of nationhood--land and state--were insufficient . . . In place of the patriotism of Western Europe, a different sentiment arose--nationalism, romantic and subjective in its criteria of identity, all too often illiberal and chauvinistic in its expression (Lewis 1961, 338).

Özdoğan explains the origins of this romantic-cultural nationalism: "Departing from an organicistic . . . theory of politics, [Herder] introduced the concept of volk as a natural division of the mankind, endowed with its own historical language and giving it an organic unity". Thus, as Özdoğan makes it clear, ethnicity was placed in the core of a people's identity, and the new concept of volk "entailed a sense of historicism emphasizing myths, legends, national heroes as expressions of national character . . ." (1990, 47). So under the influence of the romantic nationalist current, the Turks of the Ottoman Empire realized that they could discover their own nation based on their unique common language, history, and culture. And as Lewis explains, Turks slowly and "under foreign influence" came to the realization of their separate national identity as Turks" (Lewis 1961, 339).

The second source of inspiration was the novel trend of European orientalist to study the history of Turks (Behar 1992, 64). This new "European Science of Turkology" concentrated its attention specifically on "the history and languages of the eastern and pre-Islamic Turks" (Lewis 1961, 339). Especially important in this context were Vambery and Léon Cahun. It was Vambery that

first coined the word Turan: He "contended that all Turkic groups belonged to one race, subdivided according to physical traits and customs" (Landau 1981, 1-2). In his book called Travels in Asia (1871), Vambery proposed that the state founded by the Ottomans could possibly be extended to cover a huge territory starting "from the shore of the Adriatic far into China" thanks to "the bond of a common language, religion and history" of the "Turkish dynasty" (qtd. in Landau 1981, 2). He also underlined that "Anatolians, Azerbaydjanes, Turkomans, Öbegs, Kirghis, and Tatars" comprise the building blocks of "a mighty Turkish colossus" (qtd. in Landau 1981, 2). Thus the classical rhetoric of Pan-Turkism was ready made. Another influential figure that inspired Pan-Turkism was Cahun, who in his work Introduction a l'Histoire de l'Asie praised Mongols, hence--in his opinion--Turks, their descendants as superior to Arabs and Persians. To him, the Moslem religion had "denationalized and weakened" the Turks. He thought highly of the cultural, artistic and scientific "achievements" of the Turks (Hostler 1957, 141). In addition to this, the European Turkologists came up with the hypotheses that the Turkish past was the starting point of modern civilization and that the Turkish language had greatly influenced the developments of the Western languages (Hostler 1957, 140). So it is not surprising that a growing interest in pre-Islamic origins started to be in vogue for the Turkist thinkers. For example, the Young Turks concluded that a return to the pre-Islamic traditions and institutions would give new life to the Turkish nation and enable a "cooperation with other Turkish speaking peoples outside the Ottoman frontiers" (qtd. in Hostler 1957, 141).

Another triggering factor for the emergence of pan-Turkism was the philological assumption that linguistic categories corresponded to racial categories: "'Aryan' was a philological concept denoting the common origin (mother-tongue) of Indo-European languages. . . . However, the inference was made that the people who spoke those languages were related 'by blood' to the original group who spoke it" (Özdoğan 1990, 48). And the same line of thinking was applied to the term "Turan," the name of another language family. The people who spoke the languages of this family were assumed to be from the Turanian race. It was also supposed "that all the people speaking the same languages. . . . must have constituted in the distant past a political unity as well" (Özdoğan 1990, 49). And it was during the Young Ottoman period that "the term Turk appeared now and then in political literature" (Özdoğan 1990, 56).

The fourth impact on the emergence of pan-Turkism came from the field of anthropology, a specific theory of which, inspired by Darwin's Origin of Species, identified race with psychology. The anthropologists that adopted this particular view tried to systemize the "evolution of races" and studies were conducted in order to discover the relationship between physical properties such as skull size, colour, hair, etc., and psychology (Özdoğan 1990, 50).

Besides this ideological baggage, a social event, the emigration of Turkic intellectuals from Russia to the Ottoman Empire was decisive in the spread of pan-Turkism as a system of thinking. Coinciding with the development of nationalism in Europe and in Russia, "national consciousness" flourished in the Tatar community (Zenkovsky 1960, 26). Thanks to the improvements in railroad transportation and "maritime communications" contact between the

Turks inhabiting Russia and Ottoman Turkey increased. Since the Ottoman Empire was in possession of the holy cities Mecca and Medina, being ruled by a Sultan-Caliph, it "enjoyed. . . [considerable]. . . prestige. . . among the Moslem peoples of Russia" (Zenkovsky 1960, 27). As a result of the soured relations between Tatars and the Russian government, hundreds of thousands of Crimean and Volga Tatars emigrated to the Ottoman Empire (Zenkovsky 1960, 27). This event marked the beginning of the intellectual interaction between the Ottoman and Russian Turks with regard to the ideals of pan-Turkism.

Starting from 1881 Gaspıralı (Gasprinsky) İsmail Bey, a Crimean-Tatar intellectual, initiated a program for the unification of the Russian Moslems. His program had three pillars: unity of language, thought, and action (Zenkovsky 1960, 31-32). Gaspıralı was the one to propose "the idea of a cultural unity based on language," suggesting to develop "a lingua Turca based on the İstanbul dialect", and to him all Turks and Tatars formed one "nation" (Özdoğan 1990, 60).

In the 19th century Ottoman Empire, it was Ahmet Vefik Paşa, scholar, translator and statesman, who stressed for the first time that "the Turks and their language were not merely Ottoman, but were the western-most branch of a great and ancient family stretching across Asia to the Pacific" (Lewis 1961, 341). Similarly in 1897 a Turkish poet, Mehmed Emin (Yurdakul) wrote in the vernacular Turkish for the first time. Moreover, he employed the word Turk with a positive connotation in contrast to the degrading-- "boorish, ignorant peasant or nomad"--implications attributed to the name in the Ottoman Empire. Mehmed Emin was "proud" to be a Turk. As Lewis comments "with this new word a new concept of

identity had found its way into the collective self-awareness of the Turkish-speaking Ottoman Muslims" (Lewis 1961, 337). In addition to this promotion in status, the concept of "Turk" gained some historical depth thanks to the deciphering of the Orkhun inscriptions in 1893, the earliest records found in a Turkic language and giving information on a Turkic state and Turkic peoples" (Özdoğan 1990, 59).

During the same period Yusuf Akçura, again a Turk living in Russia, put forth an alternative way of saving the Ottoman Empire in his renowned paper "Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset" (Three Systems of Government) published in the Cairo newspaper called Türk in 1904. Discarding Pan-Islamism and Ottomanism he proposed that the only plausible solution "to reorganize the empire" was "the political unification of the Turkic peoples of both the Ottoman and Russian empires, as well as the Turkic minority groups in other countries." Zenkovsky remarks that this new doctrine was called Pan-Turkism, inspired by the Pan-German theories (Zenkovsky 1960, 38-39). Although Landau claims that Gaspıralı "laid the groundwork for political Pan-Turkism of an irredentist character" (Landau 1991, 83), it was indeed Yusuf Akçura who came up with the first political call for an expansionist pan-Turkism with Turkey at its center.

The first "poetical call to Turkish unity" made by Ali Hüseyinzade, again a Turkic intellectual living in Russia, in his poem "Turan" published in İstanbul (Hostler 1957, 142) completed the circle. Thus, cultural, political and literary dimensions of Turkism were constructed by Gaspıralı, Akçura, and Hüseyinzade, respectively. In conclusion, the seeds of the Turkish national

revival were sown by the Turkish intellectuals originating outside the Ottoman Empire.

With the emigration of prominent Tatar intellectuals, such as Hüseyinzade and Akçura, and eminent journalists like Ağaoğlu (Agayev) to İstanbul around the First World War, the center of Pan-Turkism shifted to the Ottoman Empire. As a consequence, Ottoman thinkers were exposed to the ideas of pan-Turkism. Among them was Ziya Gökalp, who, according to Landau, was the one to "systemize Turkish thinking on Pan-Turkism" (Landau 1991, 84). However, Gökalp is unfairly labelled as an "irredentist pan-Turkist" intellectual by Landau, who centered mainly on a couplet extracted from his famous poem "Turan": "For the Turks, Fatherland means neither Turkey, nor Turkestan, Fatherland is a large and eternal country--Turan!" (qtd. in Landau 1991, 84). Yet Gökalp devised a three-stage scheme of Turkism: Turkeyism, Oghuzism or Turkmenism and Turanism, and in this plan it was only the first stage that was considered as a "reality" whereas the "prospect" of Turanism is described as "a very attractive phantom" (Gökalp 1968, 20). Even while mentioning the middle range ideal, namely the Oghuz unity, Gökalp dwelled on the cultural aspect of the ideal, rejecting a political unity: "What would be the purpose of this unity? A political union? For the present, no! . . . [O]ur goal is only cultural unity of the Oghuz peoples [the Turkmens of Azerbaijan, Iran and Khwarizm]" (1968, 17).

Gökalp's understanding of nationalism can actually be defined in terms of culture rather than ethnicity or racial/blood ties. He discarded the ideals of the racist Turkists reasoning stating that "race has no relationship to social traits" (Gökalp 1968, 12). Neither did he see eye to eye with the ethnic Turkists since Gökalp did not

believe in the possibility of ethnic purity. Moreover, he maintained that "social traits are not transmitted through biological inheritance but only through education" concluding that "ethnic origin plays no role whatever as regards national character" (Gökalp 1968, 13).

Gökalp then defined the concept of nation: "a nation is not a racial or ethnic or geographic or political or volitional group but one composed of individuals who share a common language, religion, morality and aesthetics, that is to say, who have received the same education" (Gökalp 1968, 15).

It is possible to trace Gökalp's influence on the Kemalist understanding of the nation: Atatürk similarly conceived of the nation as "consist[ing] of a group of people that inhabit the same piece of land, that are bound with the same laws, that share a common morality and language" (Parla 1992, 3: 188). This is a civic-territorial and cultural definition of the nation differing from Gökalp's conception in the geographical dimension. Yet, it resembles that of Gökalp's since it bears no indication as for race and/or ethnic origins to be placed in the foreground. "[S]haring a rich historical heritage," and "a consensus on and a desire for living together", according to Atatürk, were the criteria that enable a social entity to become a nation (Parla 1992, 3: 188). In addition to that, Atatürk contends that "to have suffered, loved, and hoped together will help to transcend the differences in race and language" (Parla 1992, 3: 188). Then it may be inferred from the above given quotation that common remembrances, common experiences and common ideals, rather than the ethnic factor, form the basis of the nation, at least in theory.

Gökalp and Atatürk can also be compared in their varying approaches to the Turkification of the language. Although they both

were for a purification process in the Turkish language adopting the vernacular, their attitudes differed when the application of the program was in question. For example Gökalp maintained that

[t]he elimination from Turkish of the Arabic and Persian words which have become integral parts of the popular language would deprive that language of its most enduring terms as well as its religious, moral and philosophic terms. . . . By the elimination of natural words and their replacement with artificial words, the movement would have created an artificial Turkish Esperanto in place of a real language (Gökalp 1968, 7).

Then Gökalp threw light on the kind of purification he opted for: A reform in the Turkish language should encompass only the replacement of Arabic and Persian grammatical rules with those of Turkish instead of eliminating all the loan words. His criterion of selection was based on the rule of assimilation. Only those foreign words that have not been completely assimilated into Turkish should be discarded (Gökalp 1968, 9). What is more, he demanded that "ancient fossilized Turkish words" not be resuscitated to replace the eliminated loan words (Gökalp 1968, 93). The overall meaning to be deduced from his linguistic stance is that he did not believe in a sort of language purification that would tear the society of its cultural roots. In this context Kemalists adopted a totally different point of view. What they did was to work for a complete purge of all the foreign elements in Turkish and also invent new Turkish words along with reviving the "ancient fossilized" ones. This can be seen in the glossary attached to the 1935 party program of the RPP (Republican People's Party). Some curious words of Turkic origin were used in place of their well-recognized

counterparts: "almaç" for "ahize" (= telephone handset), "asığ" for "menfaat" (= interest), etc. (qtd. in Parla 1992, 3: 100). However, the newly coined Turkish words could not survive until the present day, whereas their Ottoman versions are still in use today.

Such attempts lead one to the reasoning that a return to the pre-Islamic Turkish language, hence to the ancient Turkic culture might have been intended in order to ensure the cultural and historical contact between the Turks of Russia and the Anatolian Turks. This supposition is supported by the words of Atatürk during a talk. Atatürk stated that Turkey should cautiously restrain its actions as long as the Soviet Union existed but that through the bonds of history and language Turkey should be prepared for the future, in case the Soviet Union disintegrated and certain Turkic peoples escaped to Turkey (Oran 1990, 152). Nevertheless, this quotation is not from a written but an oral source, therefore it is not possible to rely completely on it as given.

On the other hand, being an extremely pragmatic person, Atatürk chose to act prudently in international politics in order not to offend Turkey's most powerful neighbour, the Soviet Union. However, at the same time, he might have nourished some secret prospects for the future and taken some measures accordingly. However, he did not reveal his intentions so that the international community would not be suspicious of any political pan-Turkist implications. There was probably the same reason behind his frequent reference to the dangers of going beyond the defined national borders. Atatürk believed that neither the overall power of Turkey nor the world conjuncture were suitable for the realization of any Pan-Turkist ideals. And his speech made in 1921 proves this point:

Gentlemen! Every one of our compatriots and coreligionists may nourish a high ideal in his mind; he is free to do so, and no one will interfere. But the government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey has a firm, positive, material policy, and that gentlemen, is directed to the preservation of life and independence. . . within defined national frontiers. . . Rather than run after ideas which we did not and could not realize and thus increase the number of our enemies and the pressure upon us, let us return to our natural, legitimate limits. And let us know our limits. . . (qtd. in Lewis 1961, 346-347).

As this quotation indicates, Atatürk was a very rational person acting in line with what the circumstances necessitated. He did not want to increase the number of the enemies and for that reason limited political and military action to the national borders. Nevertheless, he did not banish "high" Pan-Turk ideals from the minds, reassuring those who imagine it by saying that they were "free to do so, and no one will interfere".

Moreover, the excessive emphasis on the discovery of the pre-Islamic Central Asian ethnic, historical, cultural , and linguistic Turkic identity as part of the nation-building efforts during the early days, namely the thirties, of the republic paved the way, though maybe unintentionally, to Pan-Turkism. Taking blood and race as determining qualities of a nation also had a similar effect on the flourishing of the Pan-Turkists ideology. Afet Hanım, for instance, declared that Turkish "children will know and make it known that they are. . . a nation of great talents coming from an Arian, civilized and noble race. . ." (Afet 1932, 41). So here, Gökalp's cultural nationalism is transcended to reach a race-oriented

understanding of the nation, nourishing the Pan-Turkist movement. Another example that proves the racist tendencies of the nation-building historians can be cited from Reşit Galip's paper presented at the First Turkish History Congress. Reşit Bey argued that "races constituted the largest family in humanity. For that reason, first the race should be studied while national history is being worked on" (Reşit 1932, 99). In addition, Atatürk's certain speeches may be viewed as reminiscent of racism: "Gentlemen; bad marks of the past have lingered on the Turkish race. . . As you see. . . this great nation has been found to be a little weak, sick and thin. Gentlemen, I want robust and tough children" (qtd. in Parla 1992, 3: 194). In another speech, in the context of Turkish-Bulgarian relations, Atatürk related the sympathy he nourishes for the Bulgarians to the factor that both nations had their roots in Central Asia, and still shared the same blood (qtd. in Parla 1992, 3: 196).

Therefore, both Hostler and Özdoğan viewed Kemalist nationalism as a source nourishing the Pan-Turkist ideology. Hostler saw Pan-Turkism as an undercurrent of the Kemalist nationalism regarding both as "indices of the All-Turkish élan. . . during and after the First World War" (Hostler 1957, 200). He also pointed to the fact that "Turkish sources avoid the term Pan-Turkism and prefer phrases such as 'the Turkish World'" (Hostler 1957, 202). Özdoğan correctly remarks that ". . . it was the particular aspects of the Kemalist nationalism in the thirties that had led to the emergence of a Pan-Turkist nationalism" (Özdoğan 1990, 34). So, in short, the invention of various myths regarding the pre-Islamic past of the Turkic peoples prepared the ideological and theoretical framework for the Pan-Turkists.

In addition to that the term soydaş, currently put into usage in the 1990s was partially coined by Atatürk himself: In a speech delivered at the reception of two envoys from the Republic of Bukhara, he called the Turks of Bukhara as "the coreligionists and brothers of the Anatolian Turks" (qtd. in Parla 1992, 3: 204). Parla interprets the word "brother" as reminiscent of "soydaş," meaning of the same race.

It may be hypothesized that Pan-Turkism has always been an ever-present phenomenon starting from the last days of the Ottoman Empire. It has gone through phases of boom or regression correlating with the changes in the world conjuncture and at home. In accordance with that hypothesis, when the World War I broke out, the upsurge of Pan-Turkism was experienced in the Ottoman Empire because there was some hope for the disintegration of the Russian Empire, and hence the liberation of the Turkic peoples living in Russia. Since, like all revisionist movements, Pan-Turkism relies on a change in international frontiers, it is during war-time that it enters a boom phase. However, it is not necessarily a war condition that incites the movement with some hope for the freeing of the outside Turks. Any favorable condition that will enable the pan-Turk dreams to come true can cause a revival in geographical pan-Turkist sentiments and activities. For instance, at present the collapse of the communist regime in 1991 is promising for a unification of the Turkic peoples of the former Soviet Union with Turkey.

Landau makes it explicit that right before and during the World War I the emigration of prominent Tatars to the Ottoman Empire had an impact on the growth of Pan-Turkism (Landau 1991, 84). In addition to that the dethronement of Sultan Abdülhamid by

the Young Turks, who adopted a Pan-Turkist vision was important in reviving the ideology within the empire. The war conditions were extremely favorable to the aims of the Pan-Turkists, which resulted in the involvement of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I in 1914 (Landau 1991, 86). Another influential factor during the World War I was the German exploitation of the Pan-Turk sentiments against Russia to the advantage of Germany, which was later repeated in the course of the World War II, as Özdoğan makes it clear (1990, 24).

Once the war came to an end in favor of the Soviet Union and Turkey emerged as victorious at the end of the National War of Independence, a new regime based on a cultural and linguistic Turkism was adopted by Kemal Atatürk. Since an expansionist vision was regarded as dangerous under the conditions of the day, political Pan-Turkism was discarded from official policymaking (qtd. in Lewis 1961, 346-347), if not from the imagination. So during the times of Atatürk, namely the twenties and thirties, pan-Turkism passed on a "latent stage" and did not have a say in policymaking, because there was a strict governmental control (Landau 1991, 87).

The characteristic trait of 1930s was the influence of the Nazi ideology on both the RPP and the Pan-Turkist groups. Again the two streams were nourished by the same sources. According to Özdoğan's interpretation, the outstanding pan-Turkist figure of the time, Nihal Atsız for example, is claimed to be influenced by Le Bon, who "introduced the concept of 'racial psychology'". The essence of this philosophy was the belief that "it was the race which gave the nation its spirit" (Özdoğan 1990, 52-53).

In the forties, with the signing of the Turkish-German Pact of Friendship and Non-Aggression (1941), a period of pan-Turkist resurgence took place (Hostler 1957, 176). This was again due to the expectations that there would be a revision in the geographical borders of the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. In German secret documents it is recorded that "[t]he Pan-Turkist irredentists regarded as inevitable the defeat of the USSR and considered possible the creation of a confederation of all the Turkish peoples of Soviet Russia and Chinese Turkestan under the Turkish Republic's leadership" (qtd. in Hostler 1957, 176). In the meantime there was also a corresponding softening in the official attitude towards pan-Turkism in Turkey: "The period of 1939-1944 was the 'golden years' of the pan-Turkist current under study because of increased publication and wider support. The World War II and especially the regional warfare between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union had revived pan-Turkist aspirations" (Özdoğan 1990, 246) despite the limited opportunities for open pan-Turkist propaganda (Hostler 1957, 168). This boom was again due to the conviction that at the end of the war the Soviet Union would be dismembered and a great number of Turkic peoples would be set free. These inspirations were fanned by the German attempts to exploit pan-Turkist sentiments to their own ends in Turkey and in Europe by directing their propaganda to the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union (Landau 1991, 88). Yet, the Turkish government was hostile to the pan-Turkist activists: in May 1944 the top leaders of the pan-Turkist movement were arrested and charged with being "engaged in a plot to overthrow the government to realize a state based on racist and Turanist principles. . ." (Özdoğan 1990, 93). In addition 195 Soviet refugees were returned forcefully to the Soviet Union (Hostler

1957, 185). This repressive attitude on the part of the government was an attempt at smoothing relations with the Soviet Union once the the Germans were defeated at the end of World War II (Hostler 1957, 183).

However, later the suppressive measures were slackened once more as a result of the changes in the international conjuncture: Turkey was reassured with the establishment of the Truman Doctrine that guaranteed to prevent any intervention on the part of the Soviet Union in Turkey and Greece (Hostler 1957, 187). One consequence of the change in the official policy towards pan-Turkism was the re-trial of the accused pan-Turkist leaders and their final acquittal in 1947 (Özdoğan 1990, 94). Özdoğan relates the eventual decision to the shift to a multi-party regime in 1946 and to the "souring" of relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union because of the territorial demands of the Soviet Union on Turkey concerning "Turkish eastern frontiers" and the status of the Straits (Özdoğan 1990, 94).

Although the reign of the DP (Democrat Party) caused disillusionment among the Turkist groups since it was equally intolerant both towards extremist right and left (Özdoğan 1990, 299), the military coup of 1960 promised some "relative" liberalization (Landau 1991, 89). It was in 1965 that the marginal pan-Turkist movements were channelled into the mainstream of politics of the Turkish Republic: a party with a pan-Turkist ideology headed by Türkeş, was founded under the name of the Republican Peasant and Nation Party, which was later transformed into the Nationalist Action Party (Landau 1991, 90). Landau points out that "[w]hen the party was in opposition, irredentist sentiments often found expression in Türkeş's speeches and writings [whereas he] . .

. toned down his style considerably when serving in the cabinet, refraining from irredentist declarations. . ." (Landau, 1991, 90).

Then it is possible to remark that even the leader of a pan-Turkist party is careful about the international repercussions of his utterances once he is in the government, and hence is forced to act more prudently so as not to offend the international community.

Among the reasons why the movement never managed to attract immense popular support, its inability to formulate viable solutions to the issues that are on the agenda of the common people, such as economical problems, may be counted. In addition to that there are some characteristic flaws of the movement. Being an elitist movement, its ideology is "phrased in too elaborate terms," unable to elicit governmental "support and commitment". Moreover there was the great might of the Soviet Union against which the pan-Turk activities were aimed. What is more, the dispersed geo-political situation of the Turkic peoples and the commitment to peace of the Turkish Republic with its neighbours contributed to the lack of popular pan-Turkist support (Landau 1991, 93). Now that the long desired dream--the liberation of the Central Asian Turkic peoples--has come true, both the popular support for pan-Turkism and the impact of the movemet on governmental policymaking seem to have considerably increased today.

Bearing in mind the distinction between political/geographical versus cultural/moderate versions of pan-Turkism, the ideological legacy of today's leading pan-Turkist figure, and the leader of the NAP, Türkeş, will be studied.

4.3. Pan-Turkism Today

Even though Türkeş claims in his book Temel Görüşler (Principle Ideas) that he believes neither in racism, nor in an anthropological concept of the nation (1975, 23), he contradicts himself in his memoirs published in Sabah (4-31 June 1994) pertaining to the case of racism-Turanism: His argument regarding "mixed races" makes it clear that he does not see it sufficient that a person calls himself or herself a Turk. However, in Temel Görüşler, he insists on the point that he regards nationalism as a matter of spiritual consciousness, and that everybody who has reached that state of consciousness and genuinely calls himself or herself a Turk, is a Turk (1975, 23). Nevertheless, he again argues in two contradictory ways stating that even if a Jewish person claims himself to be Turkish it would not be right to believe him since neither his mother nor his mother tongue is Turkish.

When Türkeş is asked about his criteria to distinguish Turks from non-Turks, his reply is significant in revealing his racist inclinations: "Sir, I have not worked on racism. I have not measured anyone's skull. Nor have I made a detailed examination as regards the shape of one's nose or the color of one's skin" (Türkeş 27 June 1994). This explanation is revealing in the sense that, had he adopted a cultural conception of the nation he would never have taken up the question in terms of relating physical characteristics to psychological traits. Moreover, he advocates a discriminative policy against ethnic minorities : "those people who are in charge of important official affairs should be completely and exclusively Turkish"(Türkeş 27 June 1994). This is in turn, quite reminiscent of the classical, racist pan-Turkist vision of Atsız.

It would also be helpful to look into the definition of the nation as conceived by Türkeş: "In his 'national' doctrine, Dokuz Işık (Nine Rays) the Turkish nation was still defined as the collectivity of all Turkic groups" (qtd. in Özdoğan 1990, 308), and this is demonstrated in his memoirs: "We are nationalists. We want all the Turks living in the world to be happy and set free" (Türkeş 20 June 1994). Since he focuses on the wellbeing of the Turks alone, but not that of the humanity, one is suspicious that he adopts some sort of a pan-Turkist nationalism. Türkeş also admits that he wrote a letter to Nihal Atsız claiming that the World War II will cause the liberation of Turks, and that Russia will disintegrate along with the communist regime" (Türkeş 24 June 1994). It is clear that Türkeş can be placed in the context of the classical pan-Turkist ideology that relies on a change in the geographical frontiers of Russia as a result of the World War II. Moreover Türkeş is a faithful racist in his ideological vision: "I believe that the Turkish nation is an unmatched creation on earth and that it is peerless in the field of heroic deed" (Türkeş 26 June 1994).

He is cautious in explaining his ideal pertaining to Turan: "It is a matter of population density. One factor playing role in nourishing such an ideal might be the density of the population. However, [while mentioning the necessity for the unification of all the Turkic peoples,] I never meant an immediate march for unity. Rather, such a prospect for the future constitutes a source of power for our state" (Türkeş 27 June 1994). Türkeş admits that he and Atsız used to talk about the possibility of a unity of Turkic peoples as in the days of the Oghuz period (Türkeş 28 June 1994). Then, without doubt, Türkeş adopts a racist and irredentist Turkism and longs for a total Turkic unification.

Today, maybe the movement is going through its most blossoming phase due to the favorable conditions prevailing both in the former Soviet Union, and in Turkey. Cultural pan-Turkism is even having an increasing say in domestic politics. It is also likely to comment that the pan-Turkist leaders of today, namely Türkeş and Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, the leader of the Great Union Party (GUP) will manage to drag Turkish policymaking closer towards their stance, as is obvious from the organization of the Second Congress of Friendship, Fraternity and Cooperation of Turkic States and Groups under the initiative of Türkeş.

Sami Kohen also comments that "[a] Pan-Turkic fever is spreading in Turkey, as many Turks now publicly express the desire to see Turkey leading the Turkic republics emerging from the break-up of the Soviet Union and extending from the Caucasus across Central Asia to the borders of China" (Kohen 1992).

CHAPTER 5:

THE INCREASED IMPACT OF CULTURAL PAN-TURKISM ON TURKISH POLICYMAKING

A number of indicators point to the augmenting impact of pan-Turkism, embodied in the NAP and Türkeş, on Turkish policymaking. One of these signs is the obvious rapprochement between the True Path Party (TPP), headed by Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, and the Nationalist Action Party (NAP). There is also the considerable tolerance manifested by the government towards the political moves of Türkeş, who used to be the arch pan-Turkist leader in Turkey, but seems to follow a cultural pan-Turkist line today. Even going beyond that, Türkeş is encouraged to have a say in foreign policymaking concerning the Central Asian Turkic republics. In addition to that there is an increase in the popular support rendered to Türkeş, his ideas and militant-political organization net. Related to this phenomenon, nowadays, there is an increased press coverage of Türkeş including research on his ideology and the publication of his memoirs².

As stated earlier, this rise in the popularity of the extreme nationalist ideology and its advocates is due to the current circumstances prevailing in the domestic and international scenes. The Kurdish issue and the unexpected liberation of the Central Asian Turkic peoples with the disintegration of the former Soviet Union are especially important in this context. In the following sections first, the indicators of the growing cultural pan-Turkist

² See for example Sabah 4-31 June 1994, Tercüman 11-15 May 1992, and Yeni Yüzyıl 2-7 Jan. 1995.

influence on official policy formation will be explored. Then, the reasons that lie behind this phenomenon will be examined.

5.1. How did NAP Gain Official and Popular Support?

Before taking up the present situation, it would be useful to briefly review the evolution of the NAP until the 1990s. Tanıl Bora comments that today the NAP is once more relying on pan-Turkist preaching which characterized the symbols and ideology of the party in the 1930s-40s, and 1960s-70s. This particular teaching, Bora claims, contains "fanatic and ethnic" conceptions of the nation such as the belief in an "eternal mythology of Turkic history," and a "pure Turkic culture". In addition to that, Bora declares, the fact that the NAP faith in a "progressive race" proves that the party sides with a biological racist understanding of the nation. As part of the ideological restructuring of the party, the NAP adopted a secular vision, and as a result, Bora maintains, it procured some support from city-dwellers, and then the party reestablished good relations with the state (Bora,1995).

Now, the present rapprochement between the TPP, the political party in power, and the NAP in the light of Bora's explanations will be examined. The establishment of close links between the state and the pan-Turkist groups started as early as 1992. Indeed, when the seventeen NAP militants killed during the political military strife prior to the 12 September 1980 coup d'état were declared as martyrs in Resmi Gazete (the Official Gazette) (Gündem 12 Nov. 1992).

It should also be noted that there is no governmental restraint on the pan-Turkist propaganda carried out by the NAP, and its leader in person. For example, it is interesting that the

Fourth Victory Assembly of the NAP in August 1993 was attended by a number of visitors³ from various Turkic communities. Tents representing the twentyfour Turkic tribes⁴ were set up in the Erciyes Mountains, and it turned out to be an occasion for a pan-Turkist demonstration where Türkeş claimed that an Orthodox alliance encircled Turkey (Milliyet 9 Aug. 1993).

In addition to that, Türkeş has established a prestigious position in the domestic political scene by playing on the Turkish syndrome which Philip Robins properly translates as "the Turk has no other friend than the Turk" (Robins 1994, 67). This phrase is frequently pronounced as a means of self-justification, especially during the times when Turkey feels itself isolated in the international community. For instance, as Europe voted against including Turkey in the common customs tariffs group because of its problems in the human rights issue, Turkey simply tended to interpret the situation within the above given framework.

As Robins points out, this perceived isolation and the historical memories of betrayal by allies bring about this "state of the Turkish psyche," which will in turn lead Turkey to consolidate friendship, cooperation and political contacts with its cousins in Central Asia. Again as Robins correctly observes, the "emergence of a belt of what Turks tend to call 'Turkic republics' running from Azerbaijan across Central Asia raised hopes that at last a natural constituency of states had emerged which Turkey could feel it belonged". Robins elaborates on his argument by stating that in addition to overcoming the psychological syndrome of isolation,

³ For the complete list of visitors see Milliyet 9 Aug. 1993.

⁴ No information as to the names of these tribes is supplied in the news item printed in Milliyet.

Turkey would get "practical support over a range of issues at international forums . . ." (Robins 1994, 67).

Obviously, at present, domestic and international circumstances present a fertile field of maneuver for Türkeş to stamp his mark on Turkish policymaking. As Bora also contends, the Turkish government is willing to cooperate with pan-Turkists while fighting against the Kurdish terrorist organization PKK. For example, Çiller held a joint meeting with Türkeş in Yozgat where intensive pan-Turkist propaganda took place (Milliyet 17 Aug. 1994). It was later rumoured that the Yozgat meeting was the first step towards a prospective coalition between the TPP and NAP (Milliyet 24 Nov. 1994). Moreover, in answering back to the rumours, the government spokesman Yıldırım Aktuna explained that the only reason behind Çiller's joint tour with Türkeş to Yozgat was the mutual sympathy nourished by both parties. In fact, this is a plain proof that radical pan-Turkism is overlapping the official nationalist approach, and these signs have implications that the situation could become even worse in the future.

Along with a rapprochement at the ideological level, there is the penetration of the NAP members into the ranks of bureaucracy and security forces, which has been a source of frustration within the TPP since April 1994. The main points of complaint concerned the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the special security teams located in the south-east of Turkey. It was argued that the ranks of the Internal Ministry were invaded by the NAP members. It was likewise stated that the special security teams staff greeted the people with the two-fingered wolf's head sign, a gesture peculiar to extreme nationalist groups (Yeni Yüzyıl, 22 Dec. 1994). Then, it can be assumed that the NAP is increasingly having a say in

governmental affairs and establishing itself in the bureaucratic core of the state. And it can also be inferred that, as Bora claims, this is a case of "symbiosis" between the state and the NAP: In return for rendering political and ideological support to the government in the Kurdish issue and supplying information about Turkey's long forgotten cousins, Türkiye is rewarded with consolidation of power at home and is allowed to have a say in Turkish foreign policymaking as regards Central Asia, which will be tackled in the next section.

It should also be noted that the advocates of the NAP seem to come from a variety of social segments and that it has followers in some of the Central Asian Turkic republics as well. For instance, during the 71th Anniversary Celebrations of the Turkish Republic on 29 October 1994, a group of young idealists was reported to stand in the front row, participating in the celebrations by doing pan-Turkist propaganda. During the football matches of Fenerbahçe, a popular team in Turkey, when the team scores a goal the supporters of the team make the two-finger wolf sign (Berber 1995). In addition, Türkiye claims that his ideology is supported by university students in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Particularly during his visit to the Turkic republics in 1992, Türkiye rejoiced in the great number of pan-Turkist advocates that welcomed him. He was also pleased with the sympathy of the Azerbaijani people (Türkeş 15 May 1992). As Kohen notes, Türkiye "is regarded as a hero in Azerbaijan and the Turkic republics of Central Asia" (Kohen 1992).

Another dimension of the increased support for the nationalist far right is observed in the field of business. Businessmen with strong nationalist tendencies have formed an

alternative society called the MİSİAD (Milliyetçi İşadamları Derneği--NBS, Nationalist Businessmen Society). And they are aiming for a rapid establishment of an organizational network in the South-East (Milliyet 25 Oct. 1994).

The reason lying behind this booming support may seem to be the popular reaction against the PKK, the separatist terrorist organization fighting for the independence of the Kurds inhabiting mainly in the south-eastern region of Turkey. And the state officials might also be nourishing a desire to turn these sentiments to its advantage. Yet, in reality, the situation is much more complicated. Surprisingly enough, even the Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin have been recruited to the NAP in the Turkish south-east. In a piece of news in Milliyet it was argued that the reaction against the PKK and the sympathy for the NAP among the security forces (including the police officers, the army, and special security teams) played an important role in promoting pan-Turkist backing. Especially in Şırnak there is considerable support for the NAP. However, there the motives of the advocates are quite different: The supporters are usually the local protectors of villages that are paid by the government and are seeking refuge from the PKK with which they have blood feuds (Milliyet 1 Oct. 1994). The militarist tendency of the extreme right nationalist groups could result in the further escalation of the confrontation still going on in the region.

5.2. Cultural Pan-Turkist Elements in Turkish Foreign Policymaking

A second aspect of the growing influence of the pan-Turkist movement in Turkey is reflected in Turkey's relations with the

Central Asian Turkic republics. As the Soviet Union suddenly collapsed and the Turkic republics gained independence, Turkey was caught unawares in the face of a newly-emerged Turkic world. There was no preparation on the part of the Turkish Republic.

Since communism was a taboo in the real sense of the word, any contacts with the Turkic peoples inhabiting Russia were avoided as potentially dangerous. It was feared that relations with these peoples could result in the exportation of the communist ideology into Turkey. There was also the anxiety that Russia would be offended by any attempts at a rapprochement between Turkey and the Turkic peoples living in its territory.

Sami Kohen observes that until recently there existed no division specialized exclusively on the Central Asian Turkic peoples within the body of Foreign Ministry: There was just a single section responsible for the former Soviet Union as a whole. Kohen adds that even today there is not sufficiently qualified and knowledgeable personnel to handle the present challenging situation (Kohen 1994). Indeed the then Prime Minister Demirel's inviting Türkeş to join the official delegation that would tour the Central Asian Turkic republics between April 27-May 4 1992 is an evidence to the bewilderment experienced at the official level. Demirel's words to Türkeş, "your presence will exhilarate and honour us" (Türkeş 13 May 1992) are meaningful in this context. So, this is an example to demonstrate how unprepared the government was for the unexpected disintegration of the former SU. Since there was no definite policy schemed in advance, there was first puzzlement and then a necessity for urgent help. And this help would gladly be offered by the arch pan-Turkist leader, who had for years dreamed of the liberation of the "captive" Turks of Russia.

The conjuncture was favorable both at the domestic and international levels for the involvement of the NAP and Türkeş in Turkish foreign policymaking. What is more, the NAP was encouraged to help the government in establishing relations with the newly independent Turkic republics. Rıza Müftüoğlu, Vice President of the NAP, comments on the emergence of a newly independent Turkic world:

First, the super power [SU] has disintegrated. And we have always been arguing for certain ideas as a result of which we had long been isolated from the society. We have always claimed communism to be a nuisance for humanity. Second, we have always stated that we should pay special attention to the Turkic peoples living outside the Turkish Republic . . .

[We have also maintained] that we should deal with the problems of these peoples who are of our race and religion, but, we were unfairly labelled as 'bigotted fascists.'

And now the Turkish people have understood how pertinent our theses had been" (Müftüoğlu 1995).

As Ali Tevfik Berber remarks, "Türkeş's current theme of tormented Turks of Central Asia emerged for the first time as an actual phenomenon," which helped Türkeş consolidate his position as a prestigious leader (Berber 5 Jan. 1995).

One indicator of his growing prestige is the organization of the Second Turkic States and Communities Friendship, Brotherhood, and Cooperation Assembly (19-23 Oct. 1994) in İzmir under the initiative of Türkeş and patronage of Demirel (Cumhuriyet 21 Oct. 1994). Given that top governmental representatives (i.e. Cindoruk, Demirel, Çiller) made opening and closing speeches, it is evident that the assembly had a strong official backing. So much so that

State Minister Baki Ataç declared that the "Turkic world with its 200 million population should be in some sort of unity in language, thought, and business," (Turkish Daily News 17 Oct. 1994) which is reminiscent of the kind of cultural pan-Turkism advocated by Gaspıralı, the nineteenth-century Crimean-Tatar intellectual who called for the establishment of İstanbul Turkish as the Turkic lingua franca. (Zenkovsky 1960, 31-32). Then Ataç thanked Türkiye "for his contribution to the convention" (Turkish Daily News 17 Oct. 1994).

In addition to all this, a cultural pan-Turkist flavour can be traced in the opening speech given by Demirel: He emphasized that a Turkic world had emerged as a consequence of the recent changes that have taken place in the world within four or five years. "Let nobody have the right or assume the might to object to this," Demirel declared, and added that "they were not obliged to explain what that assembly was and what it was not". Demirel also contended that the Turkic peoples "were not in quest for identity since they had never lost their own identity" (Cumhuriyet 21 Oct. 1994).

It is also worth noting that "nationalist prime minister" slogans were shouted at Çiller just before she started her speech. Although Çiller underlined that the assembly was not convened in reaction to any other state or nation, it appears that Turkey will have difficulty in reassuring Russia, already suspicious of this Second Friendship Assembly.

Russia was indeed rather anxious that the Second Turkic Assembly would result in extreme and fanatic outbursts of nationalism, as reported in Cumhuriyet: Russia argued that even though it was not against contacts based on common history,

culture, and language, it would feel ill at ease should the Turkic states get organized on an extremely racist or pan-Turkist basis (Cumhuriyet 21 Oct. 1994).

What is most interesting about the Second Turkic Assembly is that it was "brotherhood" and "common origins" that were specifically underlined. There was great emphasis on the idea that a huge Turkic world was now a reality. For example, Demirel observed that he was greeting the Turkic world of 200 million population occupying a geographic area of 11.5 million square kilometers. Then he maintained that their guests who had been separated from one another for centuries "had the right to know their origins and hug each other again". Demirel demanded, in the same speech, who else could be called brothers but those peoples that have shared the same language, religion, culture, lullabies, tales and epics, and who, despite remaining apart for centuries still retained common names (Zaman 21 Oct. 1994). And there was a tinge of cultural pan-Turkist sentiments in Demirel's words:

Those living in Turkey, thank God, have never forgotten their brothers inhabiting the area between Ural and Altai mountains . . . The great sycamore of the Turkic world has been resistant to decades, centuries, and even thousands of years of duration. It has not died, and its leaves are still green, and will remain green for ever" (Zaman 21 Oct. 1994).

What is observed here comes close to the classical pan-Turkist teaching which regards all Turks as a huge family-nation. Especially the phrases "[Turks] have never forgotten their brothers" and the "great sycamore of the Turkic world [with ever green leaves]" may easily arouse suspicion that Demirel is slightly leaning on pan-Turkist preaching. The image of a sycamore tree is

suggestive of a huge family and is reminiscent of the family relations leitmotif that keeps coming up in Turkey's contacts with the Central Asian Turkic states. In addition to Demirel's employment of the term "brothers" when referring to the Central Asian Turkic peoples, State Minister Ayvaz Gökdemir repeats that Turkey and the Central Asian Turkic peoples "are brothers as a consequence of natural and historical factors" (Zaman 21 Oct. 1994).

All this is in line with Smith's theory concerning the ethnic conception of the nation. In Smith's understanding, one aspect of the ethnic model "is the stress on descent--or rather, presumed descent--rather than territory. The nation is seen as a fictive 'super-family'. . . The point here is that, in this conception, the nation can trace its roots to an imputed common ancestry and that therefore its members are brothers and sisters, or at least cousins, differentiated by family ties from outsiders" (Smith 1991, 12).

Most of the time the Turkish attitude is shaped at the level of familial relations, rather than in a professional framework. This is quite evident in the frequent employment of the epithet "brothers"--not even cousins--by top Turkish bureaucrats, above all by Demirel, the Turkish President. Nonetheless, it should be noted that familial epithets are part and parcel of the Turkish political culture. It should also be made clear that the official policy of the Turkish Foreign Ministry is totally different from the cultural pan-Turkist approach: Winrow explains that the Foreign Ministry officials he interviewed in person asserted that they were definitely not involved in the Turkic Friendship Assemblies. The same officials further claimed that their policy was not pan-Turkism, but just developing closer economic and cultural relations along with assisting these states in their way to democratization.

Moreover, they contended that the Turkish Foreign Ministry would be pleased to see Russia or Iran cooperating with the Central Asian states on the same basis (Winrow 1995b).

Then it is impossible to talk about a single official foreign policy towards Central Asia. Rather, one can talk about different approaches on the part of different officials, and even different attitudes of the same top officials, like Demirel or Çiller, on different occasions and before different audiences. For example, Demirel was observed to be more careful on the wording of his speech during the Second Turkic Summit (18-20 Oct. 1994) convened in İstanbul. He paid special attention to dissipating Russian anxieties, stressing that no one should feel uneasy about the summit since the intention was just friendship and peace. He further explained that Turkey was not after a region of influence (Cumhuriyet 19 Oct. 1994).

It is clear that the Turkic Summit meetings organized by the government reflect the Foreign Ministry line which emphasizes economic cooperation for the sake of peace and friendship, whereas the Friendship Assemblies initiated by Türkeş nourish the cultural pan-Turkist approach. The problematic point here is that top Turkish officials nevertheless support and participate in these Friendship Assemblies. What is more, they even address the opening and closing sessions in a manner that would evidently encourage Türkeş and his followers.

For instance, during the official tour to Central Asia in Spring 1992 Türkeş was at liberty to make speeches calling for Turkic unity. He even acted as the spokesman of the Turkish parliament delegation during the visit to the Uzbek parliament. There he preached that unity and cooperation would mutually benefit

Uzbekistan and Turkey. Then he proposed a model on which a prospective union could be based:

So as to realize unity and cooperation as soon as possible, as the first step, it would be useful to set up a Turkic Republics Cooperation Council with the contribution of presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers from each republic.

This council would set the general rules and determine the steps to be taken. The council would be annually chaired by the presidents of each republic in alphabetical order. Along with this council, a permanent Turkic Republics Cooperation

Assembly would be established. The council would meet at least once a year, and more often when needed. It would take decisions which the assembly would translate into fact.

The assembly would draw out a plan suitable for the needs of each republic, formulate how it should be implemented, and oversee its implementation (Türkeş 13 May 1992).

Still, what is even more interesting about this incident is that there was no objection to it on the part of government officials. Türkeş's proposal was criticized only by the Prosperity Party (PP) representatives, who opted for an Islamic rather than a Turkic unity, and by the Motherland Party (MP) members. Safa Giray, an MP representative and a member of the parliament, was opposed to Türkeş's suggestion of establishing a Turkic Republics Cooperation High Commission. He argued that this could result in suspicion and hostility towards Turkey adding that it was too hasty a decision (Türkeş 13 May 1992), and considering Türkeş's call for the reestablishment of the "Great Turkestan" (Türkeş 13 May 1992), Giray probably had a point there. The Turkic Assemblies could in fact be evaluated as the realization of the Turkic Coalition

Assembly initially suggested by Türkeş in Uzbekistan in 1992. The general atmosphere of the Second Turkic Friendship Assembly, which resembled "dances with wolves" as TDN puts it, proves the point:

The assembly met again this year under the sign of the wolf's head which forms the centerpiece of its official symbol. The wolf's head reflects the shared Central Asian origins of the assembly members. It is also the symbol adopted by organizations and movements on the far right of the political spectrum in Turkey" (TDN 25 Oct. 1994).

As a result, the speeches made at the closing session were far from reassuring Russia.

The suspicions of Russia may not be groundless after all given that even the working system of the assembly resembles the model put forward by Türkeş: First, the reports prepared by various commissions were presented to the 750 delegates at the closing session. In the concluding proclamation it was announced that necessary regulations would be put into effect so as to promote cooperation (Cumhuriyet 24 Oct. 1994).

At the end of the assembly, however, it was declared that reciprocal relations were based on the principles of equality, reciprocity, respect to independence, and non-intervention in internal affairs. The reason why great emphasis was put on these basic principles was probably to insure the Turkic republics that Turkey did not claim superiority or domination over them. The speech must also be aimed at dissipating the black clouds of suspicion hovering over Turkish-Russian relations.

Nonetheless, the final address by Cindoruk, Chairman of the Turkish National Assembly, was far from reassuring: Reminding the delegations of the Turkic emperor Kağan's will, where Kağan demanded that the Turks be one, like an iron-hand, Cindoruk remarked that it was just the right day for the Turks to be one, like an iron-hand. The word "iron-hand" has such aggressive connotations that it is most likely to arouse suspicions in Russia.

5.3. Rivalry Between Turkey and Russia

At the very beginning of the dismemberment of the Soviet Empire, the economic, social, and political problems were so challenging that Russia had neither the time nor the energy to keep an eye on Central Asia. Once the immediate bewilderment was over, it became clear to Russia that due attention had not been given to the newly independent Turkic Republics in former Soviet Central Asia. Fearing that the power vacuum created in the region would be an encouragement for radical Islam or pan-Turkist aspirations, Russia turned to Central Asia with renewed enthusiasm (Rumer 1993, 91). Part of Russia's anxiety with regard to fundamentalist Islam, as Winrow remarks, is related to the presence of Moslem minorities in the republics of the former Soviet Union. A possible revival of the Islamic religion in a radical form could easily infect these Moslem minorities in the Russian Federation (1995c, 66).

Rumer draws attention to the Russian population reaching some 3.2 million in number inhabiting Central Asia (1993, 98), which would make Russia mindful of intensive contacts between the Central Asian Turkic peoples and Turkey. For instance, the prospect of adoption of a Turkic lingua franca by these republics or

a shift to the Latin script would not be well received by Russia in this respect. However, there are implications that Russia favors the prospect of Central Asia emerging as a zone of cooperation. For instance, Albert Chernishev, the then Russian Ambassador in Ankara proposed to Demirel the establishment of a Eurasian Common Market. This, he believed, would help Russia and Turkey to develop good relations. (Milliyet 2 March 1994).

It should also be kept in mind that the impulsive speeches referring to the emergence of a "gigantic Turkic world" on the part of Turkish President Demirel must have fanned the Russian "Turcophobia", to quote Winrow's term (1995c, 67). Indeed, Demirel kept on repeating this unfortunate speech of his despite the negative repercussions it had on Turkey's relations with Russia. First in 1992 (Cumhuriyet 24 Feb. 1992) he referred to the emergence of a Turkic world from the Sea of Adriatic to the Great Wall of China. However, given the difficulty in differentiating Turkish from Turkic in the Turkish language, it is most probable that part of the misunderstanding was due to this confusion in terms. Özsoy explains the process of perception in such cases: The listener associates a particular linguistic element with the most salient image. Hence, the concept of prestige language and its cultural pan-Turkist implications as regards Turkish versus the other Turkic languages spoken in Central Asia comes to the foreground. The second time Demirel mentioned the emergence of a Turkic world, he remarked that the boundaries of the Turkish Republic had "transgressed the frontiers delineated by the National Pact" (Milliyet 5 Oct. 1994).

Although it should be admitted that such impetuous utterances are very likely to arouse suspicions, there is the other

side of the coin as well. Winrow contends that there might be a deliberate exaggeration of pan-Turkist fears on the part of Yeltsin in order to compete with the far end nationalist groups in Russia (1995c, 66). Related to this point is the yearning of the Russian nationalists for a tighter control over the CIS members as "a matter of prestige" (Winrow, 1995c).

Whatever the genuine attitude of Russia towards the role of Turkish involvement in former Soviet Central Asia, Turkey is conscious of the Russia's suspicions. Turkey accomodates its political moves to Russian attitudes, when the reciprocal relations with its powerful neighbour tend to sour. An example of this is Demirel's cancellation of his tour to Central Asia under Russian pressure right after the convention of two consecutive Turkic meetings in October 1994 (Milliyet 24 Oct. 1994).

In the next chapter various dimensions of cultural pan-Turkism and its implications for Turkish foreign policymaking in relation to the Central Asian Turkic states will be studied.

CHAPTER 6:

THE PROSPECTS OF CULTURAL PAN-TURKISM

Observing the increased Turkish popular and governmental interest in Central Asia, it might be argued that Turkey is trying to establish a belt of influence populated mainly by its cousins. This is, however, only the sentimental aspect of the phenomenon.

There is also some self-interest invested in the region: Turkey would like to profit from the natural resources, such as oil and natural gas, abundantly found in the Central Asian republics. There appears another dimension in the relations with Central Asia, and that is a combination of psychological and material factors: The Turkish Republic might be expecting to secure a considerable amount of political support from its cousins that could facilitate resolving its problematic issues in world politics. Robins also draws attention to Turkey's need for a "natural" bloc of allies in international relations (Robins 1994, 67).

Now, the question is how Turkey will manage to secure such a "natural" cluster of allies. Given that the Central Asian peoples, except for Tadjikistan⁵, have ethnic, linguistic, cultural, historical and religious affinities with Turkey, mutual friendship and cooperation seem to be quite natural, in fact. The Western (European and American) tendency to push Turkey to the foreground in dealings with Central Asia will further facilitate the establishment of good relations. Actually, at the time when the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan suddenly gained independence, both Russia and the United States were much too "preoccupied with

⁵ Tadjiks are from Persian stock, but they largely sharing the Sunni religious sect with Turkish people.

their own economic and political problems" (Deming 1992, 19). So, they could not concentrate on these newly independent Turkic republics. Moreover, the US found it more convenient to encourage Turkey to promote the Western interests in Central Asia rather than direct involvement: In a CRS Report for Congress in 1992, it was declared that Turkey could promote the US interest in the region by enabling the "peaceful integration" of the Central Asian states into the Middle East region. Turkey was also reported to be a "moderate Muslim nation" with a secular and Western-oriented world view. The linguistic similarity between Turkey and the Central Asian peoples was underlined in the same report. In the words of the then President George Bush, Turkey was presented as "a beacon of stability in a region of changing tides" and as "a friend, a partner of the West," also as a "model to others" (Nichol 1992, 12). As a consequence of this approach, Turkey was encouraged to have an active role in the region as a role-model for the newly independent states which were in search of an identity. This Western support was the kind of flattery Turkey needed with the Cold War over. Now, although its position as a trustworthy military ally to NATO was weakened, Turkey rejoiced over its new role-model status, which proved it to be still indispensable for the West.

The enthusiasm on the part of the Turkish officials in embracing Turkey's new prestigious position can be grasped to some extent by examining a declaration on the part of Demirel in February 1992: Stating that a new Turkic world emerged to the north of Turkey, Demirel claimed that Turkey had expanded although its boundaries had remained the same (Cumhuriyet 24 Feb. 1992). It is quite interesting that in this particular newspaper clip the name Turkish (Türk) instead of Turkic (Türki) was quoted

from Demirel. Yet, as a result of a personal interview with Gün Kut, a participant in the international meeting at Davos during which the phrase "from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China" was coined, it was made clear that in the English version of his speech Demirel utilized the word Turkic, and not Turkish. Kut also remarked that this phrase was a coinage of Kissinger's and that Demirel had afterwards picked up on it. Moreover, Kut stated that Demirel underlined the point that they wanted to see independent states capable of standing on their own feet, and also that Turkey would be proud to see the flags of other Turkic republics side by side with the Turkish flag (Kut 1994). Thus two inferences can be made: First, Turkey is greatly inspired and influenced by the American attitude towards its role as a "model," and second, Demirel's words were not intended for pan-Turkist purposes. Nonetheless, there is the pitfall that the phrase might arouse suspicion, especially in Russia. The fact that Demirel felt obliged to explain himself during the second Turkic Summit in order to reassure Russia proves this point: Demirel underlined the fact that the Turkish Republic was not after establishing a zone of influence in Central Asia but that Turkey viewed the region as one of cooperation and solidarity (Cumhuriyet 19 Oct. 1994). Here, it should be pointed out that this misunderstanding is partially due to the difficulty in differentiating Turkish from Turkic in Turkish language.

6.1. A Confusion in Terms: Turkish or Turkic?

Sumru Özsoy, professor of linguistics, affirms that in the Turkish language two different words that could convey the difference between Turkish versus Turkic do not exist. Özsoy also

claims that to overcome this difficulty, in addition to Türk, which expressed both Turkish and Turkic at the same time, it was attempted to coin a new word, Türki which was neither well-received nor approved of by the majority of the Turkish people. The reason behind this, according to Özsoy, was that the word Türki was coined by adding an Arabic suffix to a Turkish name (Özsoy 1995). Indeed, in response to Nadir Devlet's siding with the employment of Türki in order not to offend the Turkic peoples by ignoring their separate national identities, Hasibe Mazıoğlu argues on the same line with Özsoy, further claiming that the meaning of the name Türki is not accurate (Mazıoğlu 1993, 92). Both Özsoy and Mazıoğlu propose the same solution to clarify this confusion in terms: Türk should be employed in reference to the Turkish people, whereas the Turkic peoples of the former Soviet Union should be referred as Orta Asya Türk Cumhuriyetleri (the Central Asian Turkic Republics), indicating that they populate a different geographical area and constitute different political entities as opposed to the Turkish Republic.

In Turkey, when the term Türki was in vogue--it was dropped later, though--the general tendency was to lump the Central Asian Turkic peoples together, and name them commonly Türki in linguistic reference at least. Yet, as Özsoy also remarks, the Turkish people seemed virtually to exclude themselves from this classification, which meant that they did not perceive themselves as conforming to the objective criteria that define the broad base of all Turkic language speakers, called Turkic. So, again subjective indicators replace the objective in the context of language prestige. The reasons that lie behind the Turkish people's self-perception as a separate category, perhaps more prestigious than the rest of the

Turkic peoples could be the topic of a separate field research project.

Still, it should be noted that although Turkey conceives itself to be a role-model to the Central Asian Turkic republics there are misgivings on the part of the Central Asian states that Turkey is the right model for them. For example, Uzbek President Islam Kerimov was reported to explain on different occasions that Uzbekistan could as well adopt the Chinese or Indonesian models, and that Turkey did not constitute the single model (Yalçın 1992, 23).

The increased interest and activity of the Turkish Republic in former Soviet Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Empire reminds one of Michael Vlahos's argument concerning the culture area as a determinant of political alliance formation (Vlahos 1991). The possibility that a Turkic culture area with Turkey at its center may be established was discussed by Gareth M. Winrow in his article called "Turkey and Former Soviet Central Asia: A Turkic Culture Area in the Making?" (Winrow 1995a). Before investigating the ins and outs of the concept "culture area" as an anthropological term, it should be noted that Turkey, after all, is competing to have an active role in moulding the Central Asian identities. This hypothesis will be tackled in detail in the coming sections of this chapter, though.

6.2. Culture Area: An Anthropological Concept

Vlahos, bringing in a new dimension to the phenomenon of political group formation, argued that "culture is bigger than countries" (1991, 59). Thus, he laid the basis of his contention that culture area is the key concept in understanding today's realities (Vlahos 1991, 61). To him the world is formed by "a series of

culture area villages" and "[p]eoples' sense of self is informed fundamentally at the level of culture, not at the level of tribe (nationalism) or humanity (internationalism)". In place of perceiving the globe as made up of "geographical regions and nation-states," Vlahos argues, culture should be taken into account "as the actual source of human reality" since, he contends, it is by culture and not by nationalism that "[p]atterns of thought and behavior are shaped" (1991, 62). Vlahos declares that Western Europe is slowly moving towards the formation of a culture area of its own (1991, 64). Likewise, the United States along with Canada, Vlahos claims, makes up yet another culture area (1991, 60).

In fact what Vlahos does is to pick up the anthropological term culture area, which is employed in order to study ancient or primitive cultures by anthropologists, and to apply to it to the domain of political science with a shift in meaning and connotation. Originally, the term culture area is defined as "[a] geographical region in which the clusters tend to be similar in a number of significant aspects" in the glossary of Cultural and Social Anthropology (Hammond 1975, 534). Yet another description of the term is as follows: ". . . the concept of the culture area . . . embraces the related cultures of different peoples inhabiting a defined geographical region. A culture area would appear to correspond in general to a 'family' in biological classification" (Murdock 1970, 477). This particular depiction of the culture area as a counterpart of "family" in biology would be instrumental in conceptualizing a political entity based on related culture communities, such as the Central Asian Turkic republics and Turkey. However, the once geographical connotation of the culture area has now changed: It no longer relies exclusively on geographical proximity. Another

definition of the concept, on the other hand, emphasizes the shared behavior and similar outlook of the members of the culture area:

Basically, the culture area is characterized by a distinctive element content, which, on a tribal level at least, constitutes the shared behavior of all members of the society . . . [And] classifications [of culture areas] all presuppose a common core of culture traits which cause all members of the society to have the same outlook and psychological characteristics (Steward 1970, 321).

This definition brings one to the description of culture as a shared and learned social code of behavior that helps the members of a social group to have similar interpretations of the external environment. This is some sort of a synthesis of the various definitions offered by social anthropologists. Culture is a sum total of common remembrances, customs and traditions, religion and, most important of all, a shared language.

In fact, two different views can be adopted while elaborating on culture: Culture can be seen as a sort of language, as it was demonstrated in Chapter 1, and some parallelism can be drawn between culture and identity. Within the context of the culture area as constituting the reality of peoples, according to Vlahos, the nucleus or center of the area assumes importance. The question of who or which group will become the culture center can be addressed from a linguistic point of view. That is to say, it can be supposed that the particular community constituting the culture center of a certain culture area might also be in possession of the prestigious dialect. In order to manifest the relationship between

the two, one must go back to the origin of the linguistic definition of the concept of prestige dialect.

Linguists approach the question of the prestige dialect from two viewpoints: objective and subjective. There is consensus on the assumption that,

no language or variety of a language (called a dialect) is superior to any other in a linguistic sense. Every grammar is equally complex and capable of producing an infinite set of sentences. . . . Because grammars are what determine the nature of languages, no grammar is to be preferred except perhaps for nonlinguistic reasons (Fromkin 1986, 12).

This description is important in showing the difference between linguistic versus nonlinguistic approaches. The former is an objective, scientific conception, whereas the latter is suggestive of subjectivity based on maybe political, economic and/or social reasons.

As Fromkin and Rodman put it, with the emergence of capitalism, the newly rising middle classes desired their children to speak "the dialect of the 'upper' classes" (1986, 13-14). This concept of the "prestige dialect" can be expanded to include the "prestige language". Then, it may be argued that, the languages spoken by economically developed countries would be more prestigious in the face of those spoken by the less developed peoples. English can be given as an example to demonstrate the correlation between economic and social prestige and the promotion of the language spoken by that particular nation. However, it should be remembered that this is a subjective distinction which resides in the hearts of the people "for nonlinguistic reasons".

Nevertheless, there exists a standard dialect in every language for reasons of convenience. For instance, when two languages are to be compared, the comparison is made between the standard dialects. Also, it is the standard dialect that is taught to foreigners. Yet, it is the "dominant or prestige dialect," remark Fromkin and Rodman, "[that] is often called the standard dialect" (1986, 251). The social functions of the standard dialect will be examined later. Still, for the time being, it should be reminded that if the core of a culture area enjoys economic and social prestige, it is quite natural that the dialect or language spoken in that nucleus zone be the prestige dialect or language, hence the standard linguistic medium of the culture area.

Turkey's close relations with the region could result in its becoming the culture center of a prospective Turkic culture area, and in the establishment of Turkish as the standard language of the region. However, it should be kept in mind that "culture area" does not exist in the minds of the people as a conscious category, but rather, as Winrow also comments, it was first formulated as an abstract "construct," which did not "refer to an 'incipient reality' or to a 'self-conscious grouping'" (1995a, 287). Although certain Turkish officials aim for the establishment of close cultural relations with the Central Asian Turkic peoples, probably there is not a perceived culture area category in their minds, whereas it is most probable that extreme pan-Turkist groups in Turkey yearn for the formation of a Turkic culture area with Turkey at its center.

The concept of the standard dialect, as stated earlier, may serve a variety of social functions. For example, it enables the speakers of different dialects to share a common literary medium, since the standard dialect "is the accepted literary language". In

addition to that, this dialect is functional in "bind[ing] people together" (Fromkin 1986, 253). These functions may in turn be valid for the standard language, which leads one to the notion of the lingua franca.

6.3. Is Turkey Trying to Lead a Prospective Turkic Culture Area?

In this sub-section the hypothesis that Turkey is endeavoring to shape the identities of the Central Asian Turkic peoples will be explored. Shirin Akiner claims that the region has always been a spot of constant flux in terms of population movements and exposition to different cultures. And she goes on to argue that once the former Soviet Union is dismembered, Central Asia has set out for the quest of its new identity. To Akiner, the region is an arena of rivalry to shape its new identity. As part of their search for identity, she comments, the peoples of Central Asia wish to rewrite their history in order to revise the Russian interpretation of their past and get it right. However, she adds, the problem is who will undertake this demanding task of history writing (Akiner 1994, 22).

It now appears that Turkey is willing to do the job for them. The Turkish Education Ministry has resumed the proceedings of writing common history textbooks for Turkey and the Central Asian republics. The project was already initiated as early as 1992 and standard textbooks were designed to be studied in the 1995-1996 academic year in all the Turkic and Turkish secondary schools. Despite the presence of Azerbaijani, Kirghiz, Kazakh, Turkmen and Uzbek representatives in the commission set up within the Turkish Education Ministry (Cumhuriyet 13 Dec. 1994), the project should

be undertaken under the Turkish initiative. Given that a set of common literature textbooks for secondary schools is being written as part of the current project (Cumhuriyet 13 Dec. 1994), it is possible to infer that Turkey is volunteering to take an active part in shaping a Central Asian Turkic identity. These attempts deserve some attention, because, as Smith demonstrates, it is the same type of method used in forming a homogeneous national culture: "compulsory, standardized, public mass education systems" instill the feeling of belonging to a "distinctive, homogeneous culture" (qtd. in Smith 1991, 16). And given the role of history writing in nation-building⁶, this project can be interpreted as a first step in moulding the national identities in Central Asia.

Some other evidence pointing to the Turkish zeal for shaping a Central Asian identity comes from the 1992 project of offering Open University education to the Central Asian republics. In Cumhuriyet it was reported that there was general consensus in the Turkish Education Ministry on the idea that, with their unexpected independence, the Central Asian states were in great need for Turkish assistance in the field of education. And it was concluded that Open University education was the only feasible method to meet their needs. In this context, the Anadolu University Rector commented that, by providing mass education via television broadcasts, the project could not only facilitate the replacement of the Cyrillic alphabet with the Roman letters, but also make them speak in Anatolian Turkish within six or seven months (Cumhuriyet 18 Dec. 1992).

⁶ See 1.1.2. for a detailed account of Behar's arguments on the role of history writing in nation-building.

And the program is not limited to higher education alone but covers the primary and secondary schools. The then Education Minister Köksal Toptan declared that exemplary Turkish primary and secondary schools would be founded in the Turkic republics of Central Asia. Likewise, student exchange was included in the project (Cumhuriyet 18 Dec. 1992). Granted that this is a joint project between Anadolu University and the Education Ministry, it could be concluded that a cultural pan-Turkist approach has gained ground among education officials. Together with that, the insistence on the adoption of the 29-letter Turkish Roman alphabet by the Turkic republics (Cumhuriyet 18 Dec. 1992) is another aspect of the same phenomenon which further leads one to suspect of the Education Ministry's ambitions to impose Turkish as the lingua franca of the Turkic world.

As Fromkin and Rodman define it, a "lingua franca is typically a language with a broad base of native speakers, likely to be used and learned by persons whose native language is in the same family"(1986, 261). Indeed, the function of a lingua franca is to provide people inhabiting a large area but speaking different languages with a common communication medium in social and/or commercial dealings, explain Fromkin and Rodman. However, they also remark that while "certain lingua francas arise naturally, others are developed due to government policy and intervention"(Fromkin 1986, 261). It may be assumed that the prestige language spoken in an area of related languages could become the lingua franca of the region, and sometimes not quite naturally. And the moves of the Education Ministry may be interpreted in this context.

Thus it can be reasoned that Anatolian Turkish is perceived to be superior or more prestigious over the other Turkic languages, at least by certain groups in Turkey. This point of view was in the foreground during the fourth Turkic Speaking States Cultural Ministers Convention (17-18 Feb. 1994) in Marmaris.⁷ Since translators were indispensable during the convention, along with working on a common alphabet, it was emphasized that, in the long run Anatolian Turkish should become the lingua franca among the Turkic states in order to facilitate communication (Cumhuriyet 26 Feb. 1994).

One way of detecting the proponents of Turkish as the prestige language, hence the prospective lingua franca of the Turkic world would be inspecting the terms they choose to employ. And this brings one back to the distinction between Turkish and Turkic. From a linguistic point of view, all Turkic languages belong to the big linguistic family called Turkic. It is a part of the yet bigger Ural-Altaic family and belongs to the Altaic branch along with Mongolian and Tungusic (Comrie 1981, 39). Each one of these branches have sub-branches which are to be treated as separate languages, and not dialects. Comrie, for example, does not employ the term dialect in referring to the members of the Turkic language family. Then, calling the Turkic languages spoken by the peoples of Central Asia dialects of Turkish would evidently mean to place Anatolian Turkish at a more prestigious position over the others. And this would indicate the stance of the person who is utilizing

⁷ The first convention met in June 1992 in Istanbul where it was agreed upon to form a council that would work in the name of Turkey, the Central Asian Turkic republics and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. At the second convention in Azerbaijan the "Turkic Cultures and Arts Joint Administration" (TÜRKSOY), which would develop and realize common projects, was established. The third convention gathered in Kazakhstan.

the term dialect concerning Turkey's relations with the Central Asian states. The speaker would certainly be defending the case that Turkish is the language, and the other Turkic languages just derivatives of it. Hence, the person would argue for the domination or superiority of Turkish over the other languages in the Turkic linguistic family. This linguistic position has its counterpart in political attitude, too. It would surely be reflected in the vision that Turkey is the "big brother" of the Central Asian republics. The employment of the word Turkish or dialect in reference to the Turkic languages would then imply a cultural pan-Turkist approach on the part of the speaker or the writer.

Now, going back to the concepts of prestige language and lingua franca, it should be noted that it is difficult to estimate the attitude of the Turkic peoples, unless one has lived in the Central Asian states. Upon an interview with Kut, who stayed in these Turkic republics for a certain period of time, it was clarified that the Turkic peoples of the former Soviet Union, except for Azerbaijan, hardly viewed Turkish as more prestigious than their own languages. And in fact this seems quite natural considering that if they admitted Turkish as the prestige language or the prospective lingua franca of the region, it would also mean they acknowledged Turkey as the big brother". Yet, this is something rather difficult to assume, while the Turkic republics are especially keen on not losing their newly gained independence, neither to Russia nor to Turkey. This point is clearly underlined by the Turkic presidents who participated in the second Turkic Summit in 1994 (Cumhuriyet 19 Oct. 1994).

Despite the reluctance to adopt the Turkish language as the Turkic lingua franca on the part of the Central Asian states, Turkey

still insists on taking steps to see its aim fulfilled: The TRT-INT/Avrasya channel which broadcasts programs to Central Asia in Anatolian Turkish is, for example, an attempt at achieving this goal. It may be supposed that the Turkish government officials are hoping to exert some linguistic and cultural influence on the Central Asian peoples. Still, this seems to be too ambitious an aim which is difficult to achieve. For, there are reports that not many people are able to watch that particular Turkish channel due to technical and financial problems in picking up the signals, as Winrow explains based on an interview he made with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials. Central Asians who do not live in big cities, as a consequence, do not have access to the Turkish broadcasts which can be spread locally only via special receiver stations (Winrow 1995b). Added to that is the poor quality of the programs broadcast to the region. Robins contends that they have "proved to be rather dull" and have "hence made somewhat unattractive viewing" (1994, 73).

Nonetheless, the difficulties in broadcasting to Central Asia are not the only obstacle to the promotion of Anatolian Turkish to the status of the Turkic lingua franca. Not even the adoption of the Roman alphabet by all the Central Asian republics has yet been accomplished. Added to that is the fact that the purification process carried out in the Turkic languages of the Central Asian states, in reality, puts these languages at a further distance from Turkish. Akiner claims that, as part of their nation-building program, these republics manifest "a conscious effort to replace Russian on international words with Arabic, Persian or Turkic equivalents (for example, darulfunun instead of universitet)" (1994, 22). In Turkey, however, the linguistic trend is moving just the opposite direction:

In place of Persian and Arabic words, international words are preferred. For instance, instead of darulfunun, a word long ago abandoned, üniversite is employed in contemporary Turkish.

Bearing in mind that the official Foreign Ministry line is establishing cooperation with the Central Asian states just for the purpose of promoting peace and stability in the region, it is remarkable how the the official lines of the Education and Cultural Ministries diverge from it. Then, it can be stated that there is not a consistent or single foreign policy line adopted in dealings with the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union. Rather, as opposed to the Foreign Ministry approach, the Education and Cultural Ministries opt for cultural pan-Turkism. This seems to be an example of the competing bureaucratic groups within the state apparatus. And it is evident that "there can be more than one official policy at a given time, on a given issue" as Winrow formulates it (Winrow, 1995b). Besides, individuals are observed to compete with each other and with different bureaucratic bodies. For instance, although Demirel more than once referred to "the emergence of a Turkic world from the Sea of Adriatic to the Great Wall of China,"⁸ Çiller argued against it when she was in Moscow: She maintained that it would not be right to pronounce these phrases if they had a negative impact on Turkish-Russian relations (Hürriyet 9 Sept. 1993).

In the concluding chapter a brief summary of the main findings reached in this study will be presented to the reader, and the implications of these findings will be tackled. Then some

⁸ See for instance (Demirel 1992, 9), (Cumhuriyet 24 Feb. 1992), and (Milliyet 5 Oct. 1994).

speculations on the unfolding of foreseeable happenings will be made.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined the particular model of nation formation employed in Turkey to transform the Ottoman Empire into a modern nation-state, namely the Turkish Republic. Smith's conception of the nation has been particularly useful in understanding the Turkish case. Smith, combines modern and primordial elements in his two models. The Western or civic type of nationalism relies more on the elements of civic culture and territory, whereas in his non-Western or ethnic framework of the nation, myths of common origin come to the fore. The Turkish nation-building elites aimed for a combination of the incompatible ethnic (non-Western) and civic (Western) models of nationalism. Especially at the initial stage of the nation-building process, there was an overreliance on the myths of common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and historical origins in Central Asia, regarded as the "sanctified" and "legendary" homeland of all the Turkic peoples.

Barthes's application of semiotics to mythologies, and the way he decomposed myths have been helpful in understanding the nature of the mythical elements employed in the Turkish nation formation process. Barthes observed that myth was "a system of communication," "a message". He dwelled on how myths cling to an image and distorted it. In Barthes's system of thinking, every message is the final outcome of an association between a sign and a signifier. The message resulting from this correlation is in turn called a sign. In the case of myth, however, this system of signification becomes more complicated. There are two different levels of association. There is a surface meaning conveyed by the

language, and an underlying meaning which is built on the linguistic message (Barthes 1989). This signification system has been applied to the mythical tools used by the Turkish nation-building intelligentsia. For example, Central Asia, a piece of land with a history of its own, attained a central position in the myths invented to create a Turkish nation. Nevertheless, this piece of territory, once it yielded itself to myth, was perceived as sacred, symbolizing the "glorious" and "historical" past of the Turks. Similarly, the Turkic race which supposedly inhabited this sacred land connoted the "magnificent" ethnic origins of the Turkish nation.

This particularity of the Turkish nation-building process has in turn given way to two consequences: First, there has emerged a major identity crisis in relation to the Kurdish citizens of the Turkish Republic. Second, the mythological emphasis on the historicity of Central Asia and the "glories" of the Turkic race has been, even if unwittingly, a source of nourishment for the pan-Turkist movement.

This ethnic nationalistic element of the Turkish political culture was especially to the fore in the thirties. However, the ideological baggage which has nourished both the Kemalist nationalism and the radical pan-Turkist movements has since then remained influential in the Turkish political system. This undercurrent of the extreme Turkish nationalism has tended to flourish whenever the international circumstances become suitable. And the particular circumstances of the international environment have a direct impact on the stance adopted towards pan-Turkism in the Turkish domestic scene. The periods when extreme Turkish nationalism was suppressed or tolerated at home correlated with

the perception of Soviet threat vis-a-vis Turkey. When the tension between the two countries slackened, activities of pan-Turkist groups in Turkey gained momentum.

Today, with the dismemberment of the former Soviet Union the Russian threat has abated, and the Central Asian Turkic republics have emerged as independent states. Given the Turkish romantic attachment to Central Asia as the "sacred" homeland of the "Turkic race", it is not surprising that certain circles should support a cultural pan-Turkist line in Turkey's relations with the Central Asian Turkic republics.

However, it would be a mistake to consider Turkish foreign policymaking as an indivisible whole with a single political objective. Rather, there are several groups, individuals, ministries and other bureaucratic bodies, with sometimes conflicting objectives. They might be competing with each other to accomplish their different aims. For example, while the Turkish Foreign Ministry does not opt for cultural pan-Turkism in establishing good relations with the Central Asian Turkic peoples, the Ministry of Education is clearly working in line with a cultural pan-Turkist stance. Even top officials such as Prime Minister Çiller, and President Demirel address different audiences in different, and sometimes conflicting styles.

Nonetheless, it would not be very realistic to assume that the present circumstances are time-frozen. Indeed, the present conditions are constantly changing due to the emergence of a variety of factors. There might be a change towards extreme nationalism in the domestic politics of Russia souring Turkish-Russian relations. This could in turn force Turkey to take strict

measures against the pan-Turkist groups at home. Another possibility is the formation of a new coalition government by the TPP and the NAP, further encouraging an ultra-nationalist orientation towards Central Asian Turkic states. Yet another prediction can be made based on a prospective coalition government led by the Prosperity Party of Necmettin Erbakan and the NAP of Türkiye. In this case, a mixture of cultural pan-Turkist and pan-Islamist undertones could increasingly influence the formation of official Turkish policy toward the Central Asian Turkic republics. This thesis has arrived at the conclusion that a latent undercurrent of pan-Turkism has been present within the Turkish political system since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. Indeed, the roots of pan-Turkism may be traced back to the final phase of the Ottoman Empire. The emergence of independent Turkic states in post-Soviet Central Asia in the 1990s has provided an external stimulus which has activated the previously dormant undercurrent of pan-Turkism.

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