

NATIONALISM AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF MULTI-ETHNIC FEDERATIONS
IN POST-COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE:
THE CASE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

by

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ABSTRACT

Since its foundation in 1918 Czechoslovakia had tried to solve the problems created by the association of the two different ethnic groups, namely Czechs and Slovaks. Policies pursued during the interwar and communist periods to achieve national integration and unity failed and ethnic tensions between the Czech and Slovaks dominated the political agenda in the post-communist Czechoslovakia until the eventual partition of the state.

This study looks at the development of the Czech-Slovak relations during the interwar, communist and post-communist periods. Since the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was to a large extent the outcome of the rise of the long-suppressed nationalist tension, the studies on nationalism are also critically examined with the aim of building a conceptual and theoretical framework. Marxist approaches to national problem are analyzed to better comprehend and evaluate the strategies adopted during the communist period, including the federal structure, to deal with the national question.

In addition to the ethnic conflict, political, structural and economic factors, which acted as catalysts in the break-up of the state, are also given consideration.

In this study, it is argued that the disintegration of the Czechoslovakia was to a significant extent the result of the differences in views and objectives of the Czechs and

Slovaks which reflect historical differences in levels of development, cultural traditions and political experiences of the two groups.

ÖZET

Kuruluşundan itibaren Çekoslovakya, bünyesindeki iki etnik grubun, Çeklerin ve Slovakların, birliği ile ilgili sorunları çözmeye çalıştı. İki dünya savaşı arası ve komünist dönemlerde ulusal bütünleşmeyi ve birliği sağlamaya yönelik politikalar sonuçsuz kaldı ve komünizm sonrası dönemde Çekler ve Slovaklar arasındaki etnik gerginlik ülkenin bölünmesine kadar politik gündemi işgal etti.

Bu çalışma, Çek-Slovak ilişkilerinin iki dünya savaşı arası dönemdeki, komünist ve komünizm-sonrası dönemlerdeki gelişimini incelemiştir. Çekoslovakya'nın dağılması büyük ölçüde, uzun süre bastırılmış olan bir milliyetçiliğin sonucu olduğu için, milliyetçilik üzerine yapılmış çalışmalar da kavramsal ve teorik bir çerçeve oluşturabilmek amacıyla incelenmiştir. Komünist dönemde bu sorunu çözmek için uygulanan, federalizmi de içeren yaklaşımları daha iyi anlayıp değerlendirebilmek için Marxizmin milliyetçiliğe yaklaşımı da analiz edilmiştir.

Etnik gerginliğin yanısıra, ülkenin bölünmesinde rol oynayan politik, yapısal ve ekonomik faktörlere de değinilmiştir.

Bu çalışmada, dağılmanın büyük ölçüde, tarih boyunca yaşadıkları ekonomik gelişmişlik, kültür ve politik deneyim farklılıklarının iki milletin görüşlerinde ve amaçlarında kendini göstermesine dayandığı öne sürülmüştür.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CDA	Civic Democratic Alliance
CDM	Christian Democratic Movement
CDP	Civic Democratic Party
CDU	Civic Democratic Union
CF	Civic Forum
CM	Civic Movement
CPC	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
CPS	Communist Party of Slovakia
MFDS	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
MSGD-SMS	Movement for Self-Governing Democracy- the Society for Moravia and Silesia
PAV	Public Against Violence
SNP	Slovak National Party
VONS	Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted

I. INTRODUCTION

Political and ethnic borders seldom coincide and most of the contemporary states are ethnically heterogeneous.¹ The lack of congruence between political and ethnic/national borders has been, and still is, a major threat to the existing polyethnic political entities all over the world.

The decline of nationalism and the demise of ethnic feeling and nationalist aspirations have been predicted by humanists, liberals and socialists who held the view that nationalism was an obsolete force that would disappear with the processes of modernization and economic development. However, nationalism continues to retain its role as an extraordinarily strong political force in the contemporary world. Especially the upsurge of ethnic tensions in former communist countries and the disintegration of multiethnic socialist federations made it clear that nationalism would assume a dominant role in the post-Cold War international system.

It is noteworthy that the three federal systems in the communist world, namely the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, underwent political fragmentation after the collapse of communism. Although these socialist federations argued for a long time that they had solved the "nationality" problem by introducing federal system based on ethnic divisions, it was the conflict among the constituent ethnic/national groups that led to their dissolution.

The case of Czechoslovakia is particularly notable since the break-up of Czechoslovak federation was quite peaceful, smooth and bloodless than the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The so-called "velvet divorce" of Czechoslovakia has been the result of the fact that Czech-Slovak relations were never as antagonistic as, for instance, Serb-Croat relations. In fact, there was a great deal of cooperation between Czechs and Slovaks during the 1968 Soviet invasion and the 1989 velvet revolution. Furthermore, in contrast to the Soviet and Yugoslav federations, the Czechoslovak federation consisted of only two republics, which were largely ethnically homogeneous. Thus, the number and the distribution of ethnic groups in Czechoslovakia not only prevented the outburst of a Yugoslavian-type ethnic conflict, but also made negotiations between Czechs and Slovaks possible.

Even though the ethnic conflict between Czechs and Slovaks did not result in an armed conflict, it posed the main threat to the stability of the pluralistic democratic system of post-communist Czechoslovakia and eventually led to the demise of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic in January 1993. The eventual partition of Czechoslovakia reflected the historical, cultural, religious, economic and political differences between the two groups and the failure of the policies adopted during the interwar and communist periods to overcome ethnic heterogeneity and to create a supranational identity. In fact, these policies eventually increased the ethnic tensions between Czechs and Slovaks.

Although Czechs and Slovaks had common ties through closeness of language and religion, almost thousand years of separation due to the Magyar invasion and absorption of Slovakia into the Kingdom of Hungary created two dissimilar societies. Thus, when Czechs and Slovaks were united into an independent unitary state, they had different levels of economic development, political experiences, national traditions and histories.

The idea and the belief that Czechs and Slovaks were the two branches of a single nation was the underlying proposition in the formation of the First Czechoslovak Republic. However, having confronted the difficulties of unifying the two distinct units, the leadership of the newly-founded Czechoslovak Republic tried to create a single Czechoslovak identity out of different cultural and political traditions of the Czechs and Slovaks. It was assumed that diminishing the cultural gap between the two groups would serve to homogenize Czechoslovak society. Thus, the interwar government tried to improve the literacy level of the Slovak population, establishing a school system in Slovakia.

However, the interwar government's efforts to create a single Czechoslovak nation failed since improvement in the level of education increased Slovak awareness of the inequalities and differences between Czechs and Slovaks. Thus, paradoxically, policies adopted during the interwar period fueled the existing Slovak discontent rather than promoting national integration and unity.

After the Second World War, the view that Czechs and Slovaks comprise a single nation was abandoned and the Slovaks, for the first time in their history, were recognized as a distinct nation. However, the promises given to Slovaks concerning Slovak autonomy and the rights of the Slovak people in the new state were soon forgotten.

Following the Classical Marxist assumption that the origins of national tension lies in the economic sphere, the Communist leadership initiated a large-scale program to bring about economic equality between the Czech lands and Slovakia. It was thought that the economic equalization of the two regions would reduce the differences between Czechs and Slovaks, which would in turn draw the two nations closer together in a national community. However, soon it became clear that the national question could not be reduced to solely economic terms, neglecting the importance of political and sociocultural factors. The industrialization of Slovakia increased the levels of urbanization and education and intensified Slovak nationalism.

Slovak resentment with the lack of parity within the Czechoslovak state was one of the factors that led to the Prague Spring in 1968. In the course of the 1968 reform movement, Czech and Slovak leaders agreed to create a federal system, which was the only reform that survived Warsaw Pact troops invasion in 1968. With the introduction of a federal system in January 1969, ethnic diversity was institutionalized, that is ethnic

differences were recognized and were formally incorporated into the state structure.

However, Czechoslovakia cannot be considered a genuine federal state since all power was vested in the communist party. Although there was a federal state structure, all major decision-making were concentrated at the center. This highly-centralized system was at odds with a genuine federalism which aims to disperse overcentralized power and secure social, economic and political autonomy for component units in a given state.² Thus, the Czechoslovak federal system did not accommodate, but rather suppressed, the ethnic differences which have resurfaced in 1990s when the oppressive central authority removed.

Formal recognition of ethnic differences in the geographic and political structures of Czechoslovak federalism provided a framework for raising ethnic issues once the communist system collapsed. As early as 1990 Slovak leaders voiced their demands for various forms of autonomy for Slovakia, ranging from full independence to greater autonomy within a weak federal structure. The place of Slovakia in the future form of the state reemerged as the major issue to be solved in post-communist Czechoslovakia. Thus, the ethnic tension between Czechs and Slovaks dominated the political agenda and complicated the process of constitutional revision and the plans for economic reform.

Differences in the objectives and perspectives of the two groups were reflected in the results of the June 1992 elections.

While the Czechs elected a right-of-center party that stressed the continuation of federal structure and rapid economic reforms, the Slovaks voted for parties with a more nationalist and leftist opinion that supported slower reforms and advocated much greater independence for Slovakia.

The coalition talks held after the elections between the victorious parties, Civic Democratic Party and Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, revealed their irreconcilable positions. Negotiations concerning the future of the republic continued without achieving a successful outcome. Having failed to produce a mutually acceptable formula for the future status of the country, Czech and Slovak leaders agreed to form a federal government to divide the state. By the end of 1992, the Federal Assembly approved a legislation which terminated the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic. On January 1, 1993 two sovereign states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia came into existence.

As briefly outlined above, in the history of the Czechoslovak state a fundamental problem had been the definition of the relationship between the two nations, Czechs and Slovaks. Since its foundation in 1918 Czechoslovakia tried to overcome the problems created by the association of two peoples of different ethnic background, cultural traditions and different political and historical experiences: the economically and educationally backward and deeply religious Slovaks and the economically and politically more developed and urbanized secular Czechs.

This study basically aims to focus on the reasons that led to the break-up of Czechoslovakia. The process of disintegration

will be analyzed along three different dimensions. The historical differences in the cultures, levels of development and political experiences between the Czechs and Slovaks, which were constantly expressed as ethnic tensions since the formation of the Czechoslovak state in 1918, will be considered as the major determinant of the process of disintegration.

The policies adopted during the interwar and communist periods to solve the "nationality" problem were not successful. Specifically, the federal structure, which was designed along Marxist-Leninist premises, was incapable of accommodating the different social and political interests of the Czech and Slovak populations. The policies adopted to solve the "nationality" problem, including the federalist structure, paradoxically, intensified the ethnic tensions. Legacies of these policies will be regarded as important factors that led to the disintegration of Czechoslovak state.

Equally important is the role that nationalism played in the demise of the Czechoslovak state. Therefore, theories of nationalism will be analyzed to better comprehend the historical, political and structural dimensions of the dissolution of Czechoslovak state.

In this study, it will be argued that the break-up of Czechoslovakia was to a significant extent the result of differences in views, preferences and objectives of Czechs and Slovaks which reflect historical differences in levels of development, cultural traditions and political experiences of the two groups. In addition to the ethnic conflict between

Czechs and Slovaks, the uninstitutionalized party system and the lack of will on the part of the leaders to compromise were the factors that deserve consideration as the other determinants of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia.

Since the dissolution of the Czechoslovak state is assumed to be basically an outcome of the rise of long-deferred nationalist sentiments and nationalist tensions, Chapter II focuses on the studies on nationalism with the aim of building a conceptual and theoretical framework.

Chapter III provides an overview of three types of Marxist approach to the national problem in order to better evaluate the policies adopted during the communist period to deal with the "national" problem.

In order to comprehend the break-up of Czechoslovakia it is necessary to look back into history and recognize the profound differences between Czechs and Slovaks created by their distinct historical experiences. Hence, Chapter IV provides a historical background together with an analysis of the formation and development of Czech, Slovak, and Czechoslovak national identities and nationalisms.

Chapter V focuses on the Czech-Slovak relations in the First Czechoslovak Republic and the policies pursued to overcome the ethnic heterogeneity.

The development of Czech-Slovak relations under successive phases of communist rule and the Marxist strategies adopted to deal with the national question constitutes the general content of Chapter VI.

Chapter VII focuses on the ethnic tensions between the Czechs and Slovaks in post-communist Czechoslovakia which eventually led to the break-up of the state. Furthermore, other important factors which influenced Czech-Slovak relations and exacerbated the potential for ethnic conflict are also analyzed in this chapter. These factors basically include the hardships and uncertainty created by the political and economic transition which were used by the political leaders to mobilize citizens around ethnic issues, the inadequacy of the existing political structures, which dated from the communist era, to resolve economic and political issues, the uninstitutionalized party system and developments in international environment.

II-THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

When Czechs and Slovaks were united into an independent unitary state in 1918, they had different levels of economic development, political experiences, national traditions and histories. These differences became a source of conflict and ethnic issues have dominated the political agenda since the formation of the First Republic of Czechoslovakia.

It is accepted by all students of nationalism that the "national question" exists whenever a state lacks a complete ethnic and/or national homogeneity. Was Czechoslovakia really the home of one nation, namely Czechoslovaks, as Masaryk and Benes argued or two nations, Czechs and Slovaks? In order to understand and appreciate the break-up of Czechoslovakia it is necessary to analyze the ethnic structure of Czechoslovakia, the formation and development of ethnic identities, and the causes of ethnic strife which led eventually to its dismemberment which in turn requires a conceptual and theoretical framework. Thus, since there is no single, coherent theory of nationalism, critical examination of existing approaches, identifying their important sets of assumptions, their merits and drawbacks, will be made. However, it is necessary to define and clarify the basic concepts first, such as nation, nationality, an ethnic group, that will be used throughout this study.

A. Definitions of Basic Concepts

The concept of "nation" is a highly complex and abstract one. Though it is interpreted and/or formulated in different ways there are basically two approaches. The first approach conceptualizes nation as an ethnic cultural community, the members of which are integrated by a series of common objective traits such as language, religion, history, common myths, common culture, common customs, ethnic or racial origins, and a historic geographic location. For some, a combination of several of these traits are required for a nation to exist while for others some of these elements in isolation are enough to define a community as nation.¹ This approach views a nation as an ethnic cultural community, putting an emphasis both on ethnic descent and on cultural bonds.

The second approach holds that nation is essentially a political community, united by the possession of political and social rights within a particular territory. This approach treats nation as a political concept, making nationhood synonymous with citizenship.

There are also subjective definitions of a nation. It is argued that it is the subjective awareness of nation by its members that define a nation. Hugh Seton-Watson gives a purely subjective definition of a nation. He defines a nation as "a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness".² He describes nation as a community which has a national spirit and

possesses consciousness of solidarity. According to Seton-Watson a nation exists "when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one".³ However, defining a nation as 'any significant body of people whose members regard themselves as members of it' is not a satisfactory criterion to decide which of the many social communities should be recognized as 'nations' and others should not. Hobsbawm raises the argument that a subjective definition of nation, that is defining the nation by its possession of national sentiment, is tautological and provides only an a posteriori guide to what a nation is.⁴ He also maintains that "it can lead the incautious into extremes of voluntarism which suggests that all that is needed to be or to create or recreate a nation is the will to be one".⁵

Anthony D. Smith defines a nation as "a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members."⁶ He emphasizes the importance of objective distinguishing features such as language, common ethnic ancestry, common territory, common history, a common culture for nationhood. However, he also places an emphasis on the political aspect and builds a definition by fusing the definitions of ethnic cultural and political nation. However, a group defined by these objective features is a mere human collectivity. What is needed to define a human collectivity as a 'nation' is the self-consciousness of the members of the group. In other words, they have to perceive

and declare themselves as such. However, to insist on consciousness and purely subjective choices of individuals as the sole criteria of nationhood implies that the nation has no 'objective' reality. It denies any view of nation as a cultural, objective entity and abandons any notion of group identity and/or group characteristics which distinguish one human collectivity from others. Hence, both objective and subjective bases of nationhood are necessary but not sufficient, in isolation, for defining a 'nation'. I believe that nations are identified by both objective and subjective criteria. Shared objective features gain meaning only within the framework of subjective consciousness and a nation is defined so, when its members become conscious of those objectively existing common traits. Miroslav Hroch builds a successful definition of a 'nation' fusing not only subjective and objective criteria for nationhood but also definitions of ethnic and political nation. He defines a nation as "a large social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical) and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness".⁷ Hence, it seems that Hroch gives a much more satisfactory definition of the concept nation. Throughout this thesis, then, the definition of Hroch will be employed.

At this point it is crucial to make a distinction between the concepts of nation and ethnic group. Anthony D. Smith talks about a continuity between modern nations and pre-modern ethnic

communities arguing that nations grow out of ethnic communities.⁸ He defines an ethnic group as a "type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasizes the role of myths of descent and historical memories, and that is recognized by one or more cultural differences like religion, customs, language and institutions".⁹ As we can see an ethnic community cannot exist without some common, distinctive cultural ties which constitute the core of the group's identity. A nation is also a community of common myths and memories, as is an *ethnie*. However, though modern nations and pre-modern ethnic groups are closely related, they are certainly not identical. There are some characteristics that distinguish ethnic groups from nations. To begin with, ethnic groups are exclusive, that is since members of such groups should share certain inborn characteristics, an outsider can not become a member of an ethnic group through adopting its cultural and social characteristics. Nations, on the other hand, are politically and culturally defined communities.¹⁰ They are more inclusive than *ethnies*, meaning that outsiders can join the nation through adopting its cultural, social and political characteristics. There are states which consist of more than one nation, which in turn can be multi-ethnic.

Furthermore, nations are more politicized than ethnic communities that is "they are active in inter-state relations in ways few *ethnie* were before, influencing history directly".¹¹ A nation does not have to form a state but it has the idea and the will of becoming a political reality, becoming a territorial political community -with common institutions, a single code of

rights and duties, a fairly demarcated and bounded territory with which the members of the community identify. The sense of nation has a political aspect which lacks in the case of an ethnies, which can maintain its existence through its distinctive cultural characteristics and its common history without feeling the need or willing to become a political reality. Ethnic groups usually demand cultural autonomy within the states they live. In contrast, nations want to express themselves politically in the form of state.

There is also an ambiguity in the use of the words "nation" and "nationality". They are often used interchangeably. However, there is a distinction to be made between these two concepts as well. The word "nationality" has the meaning of 'state citizenship' in the English language.¹² In the West, nationality indicates the status of belonging to a particular nation. In the East, however, in the ethnic conception of nationalism, the concept "nationality" is employed as a synonym of "ethnic group", a collectivity that possesses primordial group characteristics such as language, customs, religion, territorial affiliation and shared history.

As far as the meaning of nationalism is concerned though there seems to be no general agreement among scholars, nationalism is often defined as a set of doctrines, ideas, and sentiments. Alexander J. Motyl argues that the meaning of nationalism is neither value-neutral nor divorced from the context, that is the political, social and cultural environment

within which the word is used. In other words, meanings vary from person to person and from context to context.¹³

Hans Kohn defines nationalism as "first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness."¹⁴ The mental life of man, he says, is not only dominated by an ego-consciousness, but also by a group consciousness. A man finds himself a member of different groups at the same time. With the growth of the complexity of civilization, the number of groups of which a man finds himself a part increases. Within this pluralistic kind of group-consciousness there is generally one that is recognized by man as supreme and most important to which he owes supreme loyalty in the case of conflict of group loyalties. Kohn argues that the modern period of history, starting with the French Revolution, is characterized by the fact that in this period the nation demands the supreme loyalty of man and that all civilizations are now dominated more and more by this supreme group consciousness, namely nationalism.

While Kohn's concern is for the psychological implications attached to the meaning of nationalism, Karl W. Deutsch in his book called *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*¹⁵ emphasizes the role of social communication, after examining the contradictory viewpoints on nationalism. He argues that the important factor in determining nationality and the nature of nationalism is to be found in the communicative facilities of society, including language and alphabets, and national facilities for the storage of information, such as libraries. According to Deutsch, the

most important aspect of the unity of a people is the relative efficiency of communication among individuals. He stresses the importance of social communication for an understanding of national sentiment.

Nationalism is treated by many scholars as a political ideology or ideal that argues that nations should have their own states. For Alexander J. Motyl nationalism is "a political ideal that views statehood as the optimal form of political organization for each nation".¹⁶ Again Ernest Gellner sees nationalism as a political principle which "holds that the political and national units should be congruent".¹⁷ According to Gellner, nationalism proclaims a need for congruence between state boundaries and ethnic or national cleavages. Nationalism is defined as "the striving to make culture and polity congruent, to endow a culture with its own political roof, not more than one roof at that".¹⁸ E.J. Hobsbawm also uses the political definition of nationalism as is defined by Gellner.¹⁹ These are all political definitions of nationalism linked to the establishment or enhancement of a nation-state.

There are also cultural definitions of nationalism. Louis L. Snyder tries to build a definition by paying attention to those factors which he thinks make nationalism -common territory, a common language, common traditions, common history, religion, customs and a common urge to unite and he combines them in a simple statement: "Nationalism is that sentiment of a group or body of people living within a complex or a noncontiguous territory, using a single language or related

dialects as a vehicle for common thoughts and feelings, holding a common religious belief, possessing common institutions, traditions, and customs acquired and transmitted during the course of a common history, venerating national heroes and cherishing a common will for social homogeneity".²⁰

Anthony D. Smith argues that the notion that every nation should have its own state is a common but not a necessary deduction from the core doctrine of nationalism.²¹ Then, he goes on to argue that nationalism is primarily a cultural doctrine or a political ideology with a cultural doctrine. He defines nationalism as "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation' ".²² Smith presents nationalism as an ideological movement to unify a group and to promote its interests by organizing that group around ethnocultural identity and elaborating its unique beliefs, values and behaviors. The push toward an independent state is a possible outcome but not a necessary or defining characteristic of its ideology.

John Breuilly treats nationalism as a form of politics. He argues that "to focus upon culture, ideology, identity and class or modernization is to neglect the fundamental point that nationalism is, above and beyond all else, about politics, and that politics is about power".²³ He lays great emphasis on the central role of politics as essential to an understanding of nationalism. Therefore, he tries to develop a definition of nationalism which concentrates on its political character. For

Breuilly, the term "nationalism" refers to "political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments" ²⁴ -which are built upon three basic assertions: there exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character; the interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values; the nation must be as independent as possible which usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty.²⁵ Breuilly asserts that nationalism is a form of politics which is related to the objective of capturing and using state power. He regards nationalism as a powerful force to mobilize a large group of people uniting divergent interests and legitimating their political aspirations.

It is crucial to make a distinction between two types of nationalism and/or two rival routes to national status, namely the civic-territorial and the ethnic-genealogical. The "Western" and/or civic model of nation puts an emphasis on historic territory and legal-political community which is subject to common systems of laws and institutions. The nation is a spatial or territorial conception. The components of the Western model of nation are historic territory, legal-political equality of members, a common civic culture and ideology.²⁶ The Western model refers mainly to political reality, meaning a civic, political community in defining a national identity. This model of nation forms the basis of Western, civic-territorial nationalism which stresses citizenship and subjective choice.

The "Eastern" model -which can be termed as an "ethnic" conception of the nation²⁷-tends to underline the importance of ethnic descent and common cultural ties. It refers mainly to a community of birth and culture, that is to a community of common descent in defining a national identity. The traits of an alternative, ethnic conception of the nation are genealogy and presumed descent ties, popular mobilization, vernacular languages, customs and traditions.²⁸ As we can see ethnicity is underlined as the basis of nationhood. This model of nation gives rise to a different type of nationalism, namely ethnic-genealogical which puts an emphasis on ethno-cultural and ethno-linguistic criteria of nationality.

B. Different Approaches to the Emergence of Nationalism and to the Origins of Nations

While there is an enormous literature on nationalism, the theory of nationalism has remained 'undeveloped'²⁹ since there is no single, coherent theory of nationalism which has won wide acceptance.

As far as the emergence and development of nationalism and the origins of nations are concerned there are basically two different approaches³⁰, namely the 'primordialist' and/or perennialist and 'modernist'.³¹

Laying great emphasis on primordial ties such as language, religion, race, ethnicity and territory primordialists/perennialists claim that nations and nationalism are as old as

first historical records. Assuming the perpetuity of ethnic ties and ethnic communities -whose counterparts in the modern world are nations- they argue that the origins of nations and nationalism can be traced back to pre-modern times. They regard nations as constant, natural, inborn units that can be found in all periods of human history. For primordialists "primordial ties have always divided the human species, as naturally as have sex or geography, and will always do so. Hence, there is nothing particularly modern about nationalism, nor is it likely to disappear with any marked alteration of 'modern conditions'".³²

In fact, primordialists have two separable claims. They argue that nations and nationalism are perennial, and that they are natural.³³ Perennialist and primordialist approaches overlap in treating nations and nationalism as something perennial, that is they exist from time immemorial. However, not all perennialists are primordialists. Perennialists claim that nations have existed in all periods of history without agreeing with primordialists that nations are products of some primordial ties and that such ties are in any sense 'natural'.³⁴

The alternative approach, namely modernist or contextualist³⁵, asserts the contingency of nations and nationalism in history and their relative modernity. For modernists, nations and nationalism are purely recent and modern phenomena flourishing under the impact of industrialization and modernity and the emergence and development of nations and nationalism have nothing to do with primordial factors such as race, language, religion, nor with ethnicity.³⁶ They claim that social, economic

and political transformations -through which the economy became industrialized, the means of communication such as the linguistic medium and script became standardized and spread among the population³⁷- created a common national culture which in turn led to the emergence nations and nationalism. For modernists, the movement and ideology of nationalism can be dated back to the eighteenth century and if there is anything resembling it in antiquity or in the Middle Ages it must be regarded as exceptional.³⁸

Modernists give great prominence to the influence of modern developments on the emergence of nations and nationalism such as industrialization, urbanization, the rise of the modern secular state, the emergence of bureaucracy, the spread of mass communication, mass education and literacy. Although there are nuances among modernists in terms of stressing the primacy of either the social or political or economic or cultural factors in proposing reasons for the emergence of nationalism, all treat nations and nationalism as modern phenomena.

The modernist position perhaps finds its best expression in the theory of Gellner who argues that nationalism has nothing to do with prior ethnicity. He claims that "nationalism is not the awakening and assertion of these mythical, supposedly natural and given units. It is, on the contrary, the crystallization of new units, suitable for the conditions now prevailing, though admittedly using as their raw material the cultural, historical and other inheritances from the pre-nationalist world".³⁹

Ernest Gellner underlines the importance of literacy and a common 'high culture' for the rise of nationalism. He argues that "nationalism is not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present itself. It is in reality the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state".⁴⁰ Gellner relates the emergence of nationalism to the process of industrialization which can only function with "a mobile, literate, culturally standardized, interchangeable population".⁴¹ This in turn requires the modern state -based on nation-, as the only agency to shape, create and develop a homogeneous culture through compulsory, standardized, public mass education systems and communication. Demands for cultural homogeneity that industrialization makes lead to the creation of culturally unmixed nations. Thus, for Gellner, nationalism is a mere instrument for providing cultural homogeneity through state power.

Modernists also assert that nations are not the products of some primordial ties such as religion, language, race, ethnicity, territory and some pre-existent ethnic experience but rather an invented, imagined unit to supply the economic, social, political, and psychological needs of industrializing societies. They note the elements of artefact and invention which enter into the making of nations. According to modernists, nations flourish under the impact of urbanization, industrialization, and modernity. The modern concept of nation

is a 'construct', an 'invented' and/or 'imagined' category, developed by nationalist ideologies and politicians at the end of the eighteenth century in order to mobilize and stabilize populations in the eras of rapid industrialization and political transformation, during which people needed to feel that they belonged to a community. For Eric Hobsbawm, a nation is composed of many consciously "invented traditions"; it is a community created in the form of invented traditions to secure cohesion of the members of the group.⁴² For Ernest Gellner, "nations are the artefacts of men's convictions and loyalties and solidarities".⁴³ It is a recent cultural artefact. He argues that nations as a natural, inborn, God-given way of classifying men are a myth. It is nationalism which "sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one".⁴⁴ In the modernist image of nation an historic national or ethnic identity is a pure fiction and it is nationalism which creates national identity. Gellner says "it is nationalism which engenders nations and not the other way round".⁴⁵ Like Gellner, Hobsbawm argues that nationalism comes before nations -"nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way around".⁴⁶

The view that nations and nationalism are purely modern phenomena is adopted as a point of departure by Benedict Anderson in his famous work *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*.⁴⁷ For Anderson nation is "an imagined political community -and imagined as both

inherently limited and sovereign".⁴⁸ It is an imagined community since the members of even the smallest nation can never know most of their fellow nationals, meet them, or even hear of them, "yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion".⁴⁹ Thus, nations are simply creations of the collective imagination. Anderson argues that the invention of the printing press, the decline of religion and the dissolution of the high centers of sacred monarchy created the possibility and necessity of imagining a new kind of community with which individuals identify themselves. For Anderson, individuals became to identify themselves as being a member of an "imagined community". Through the use of the printing press, people began to learn about each other and became members of the same imagined community that served their economic and psychological needs under the conditions of capitalism.⁵⁰ Then, Anderson, like Hobsbawm and Gellner, argues that nations are constructed, imagined to supply and fulfill the new psychological, economic and social needs stemming from the pressures of modernity and industrialization.

The approach adopted by modernists is also an instrumental one. For Ernest Haas, nationalism is a type of rationalization which comes about in times of rapid change to impose coherence on societies undergoing modernization. "Nationalism is a consequence of the "objective need" for industrial rationality".⁵¹ Again Gellner relates the growth of nationalism fundamentally to the functional requirements of modernity and industrialization. In his theory, nationalism is viewed as

functional for the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society. In other words, nationalism is a function of political, economic and social changes. For Gellner, it provides the sole legitimate form of political organization, it is "a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones".⁵² Thus, for Gellner as for Haas, nationalism is a political instrument.

C. Smith's Contribution: Towards a Synthesis

Anthony D. Smith, in his famous book *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, claims that though nationalism as an ideology and movement is relatively modern, arising in the eighteenth century as an outgrowth of the French Revolution, it has its roots deep in the distant past. For Smith, national loyalty and national identity may not be inborn and natural but they are certainly related to ethnic ties, identities and sentiments. He emphasizes the continuity between ethnic community (*ethnie*) and nations arguing that "modern nations simply extend, deepen and streamline the ways in which members of *ethnie* associated and communicated. They do not introduce startlingly novel elements, or change the goals of human association and communication".⁵³

For Smith, nations have developed on the basis of pre-existing ethnic identities. He argues that nations are defined and located by their roots in an ethnic past. *Ethnie* are mobilized and politicized into nations through economic and administrative revolutions⁵⁴. For Smith, the historical

memories, heroic myths and ethno-religious ties constitute the bases of the nation and without these it is impossible to form the community called nation. He says "without ethnics and ethnicism, there could be neither nations nor nationalism. For nations need myths and pasts if they are to have a future, and such pasts cannot be forged out of nothing, nor can myths that will have resonance be fabricated".⁵⁵ He criticizes Hobsbawm arguing that it is almost impossible to disengage the elements of pure 'invention' from those of a 'revival' or 'reconstruction' of pre-existing elements since the concept 'tradition' implies some continuity with the past, with the earlier beliefs and practices.⁵⁶ Nations are not invented but reconstructed out of the traditions, myths, symbols, memories and customs, and institutions of the ethnic communities. "Rather than 'invent' the nation and its traditions, the nationalists selected one of several alternatives and recombined and reinterpreted its myths, symbols, memories and traditions".⁵⁷ Without the heritage of pre-modern ethnic ties, myths, historical memories, symbols and traditions the modern 'reconstruction', 'imagination' of a nation is unthinkable.

According to Smith, the bases of the nation must be sought in the pre-modern times and pre-modern ethnic ties. Nations are closely related to ethnic communities and any attempt to explain how and why nations emerged must start from the ethnic ties and identities which formed their cultural basis and played an important role in the formation of the first nations. Smith concludes saying "it is clear that modern nations and

nationalism have only extended and deepened the meanings and scope of older ethnic concepts and structures. Nationalism has certainly universalized these structures and ideals, but modern 'civic' nations have not in practice really transcended ethnicity or ethnic sentiments".⁵⁸

Both primordialist and modernist theories of nationalism fail to constitute a satisfactory framework for an analysis of the development of nationalism and formations of nations. The primordialist approach is too preoccupied with the primordial ties. Seeing nations as constant givens of nature leads primordialists to underestimate the economic, social and political developments throughout history which have certainly contributed to the formation of nations and the development of nationalism. They ignore the fact that a nation is also a product of historical developments. As a result, primordialist studies do not provide a satisfactory framework for an analysis of the development of nationalism with its unidimensional, ethnocentric vision.

Since they give prominence to the effects of modernization on nationalism, modernist studies make a more successful analysis of the dynamics of nationalism than primordialists. However, modernist studies are also reductionist in that they underestimate the relationship between ethnic groups of pre-national periods and today's modern nations. A common shortcoming of the modernist theories is that they lack the ethnic parameter which was an ongoing process of history that certainly affected the formation of nations. It cannot be denied

that ethnicity is an inseparable component of nationalism since it provided an important source of personal and group identity before modern nations appeared. During the Middle Ages, though ethnic groups existed, they were not conscious of the political meaning of their ethnic identity. Yet, ethnic attachments competed with other forms of group identity and overrode all other loyalties proving more powerful and durable. They provided a strong bond of sentiment that helped the birth of modern nationalism in the eighteenth century. Hence, to study nationalism without relating it to ethnicity is to leave out the dynamics of ethnicity and thus to ignore the historical origin of the doctrine. In this sense, modernist studies also fall short of giving a sufficient analysis of the dynamics of nationalism.

Modernists also fail to explain the emergence of nationalist movements in Europe before the arrival of modern industry. Since modernists argue that nationalism is simply a function of modernization and industrialization they expect it to decline and lose its force and strength in a well-established industrial society.⁵⁹ However, it has continued on its powerful course. The failure of modernists to provide answers to the persistence of nationalism was based on their underestimation of the significance of ethnicity for nationalism.

Giving prominence to the ethnic bases of nationalism and at the same time taking the effects of the modernization into account, Anthony D. Smith's analysis of the dynamics of

nationalism can be regarded as a synthesis of primordial and modernist theories. He says:

We shall have to depart from the assumptions of both the main schools of thought on the origin and formation of nations while we can no longer regard the nation as a given of social existence, a 'primordial' and natural unit of human association outside time, neither can we accept that it is a wholly modern phenomenon...The fate of these cultures and identities has depended as much upon their internal properties as upon the uneven incidence of the modern revolutions...Hence, it becomes important to enquire into the 'state of cultural identity' of a given community on the eve of its exposure to the new revolutionary forces, in order to locate the bases of its subsequent evolution into a fully-fledged 'nation'.⁶⁰

Smith argues that there is a continuity between the ethnic groups of earlier times and modern nations in terms of ethnic identity. In other words, it can be stated that the existence of ethnies is a prerequisite for the development of nations.⁶¹ However, as Smith explains it in *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, this continuity does not mean that earlier ethnic groups and nation-states are identical. As stated before, an ethnie/ethnic group was "mobilized and politicized through economic and administrative revolutions"⁶² and become more inclusive by the extension of franchise to all members. Hence, it seems that A.D. Smith makes a more complete analysis of nationalism since his analysis highlights the ethnic dimension of nationalism and thus provides us with an accurate guide.

It is impossible to explain nationalism solely by pre-existing ethnicity and it is not sufficient to view nationalism and the nation as products of modernization. Since Smith puts an emphasis on both the role of pre-ethnic ties and the influence

of modern developments on the origin and formation of nations and in development of nationalism, his analysis will be taken as a theoretical guide throughout this study.

III. MARXIST APPROACHES TO THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM

From February 1948 until the late 1980s Czechoslovakia was a communist state. Although at the outset a distinct Slovak national identity was recognized, the Slovak demands for institutional recognition of Slovakia's status in the common Czechoslovak state were not satisfied until the late 1960s. Slovak desires for parity in the state were only realized in the course of the 1968 reform movement with the introduction of a federal system which was structured along the Marxist-Leninist premises.

In order to better understand the strategies adopted on the national question during the four decades of communist rule it is necessary to look at the three different forms of Marxist thought on the nationality question.

Marxism and Nationalism are theoretically incompatible. The antagonisms between these two important ideological mainstreams of the modern world rest upon the contradictory nature of their basic assumptions. Nationalism is based on the assumption that humanity is divided vertically into separate national units which transcend classes as the supreme focus of individual and group loyalty. This contrasted obviously with the Marxist assumption that humanity is divided into horizontal divisions, that is socioeconomic classes, that cut across national groupings. Marxism stresses the antagonisms and conflicts between social classes cutting across national boundaries, claiming that class consciousness would prove more powerful than

national consciousness. The focus on national unity which nationalism suggests is at odds with Marxist ideas of class conflict and with international loyalty spanning national boundaries.

It is argued that Marxism has no coherent theory on the national question. It is also argued that Marxism in its diverse forms has tended to underestimate the significance of nationalism which is derived from the Marxist belief that nationalism was a transient phenomenon. In fact, as far as the national question is concerned three types of Marxist approach can be distinguished, each of which made a different analysis of the national question faced by Marxism. These three types are Classical Marxism, Strategic Marxism and National Marxism.

A. Classical Marxism

Marx and Engels never discussed nationalism and national movements systematically and their views and comments on nationalism emerged mainly from reaction to specific historical events. It is generally agreed that they had no theoretically coherent approach to the question of nationalism since they regarded it as a phenomenon not only of secondary importance but also of transient nature.¹

Marx and Engels considered nation and nationalism as superstructural phenomena. That is the national phenomenon has no logic of its own since the behavior of superstructural phenomena are shaped and determined by the changes that occur at

the level of the base, that is in the sphere of economic relations of production.² In other words, every aspect of the superstructural phenomena is a mere reflection of the economic base. Classical Marxism conceived nation as an epiphenomenal social formation that originated in the process of transition from feudalism to capitalism. In the Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels stated that:

The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and of property. It has agglomerated population, centralized means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralization. Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments, and systems of taxation, became lumped together into one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class interest, one frontier and one customs tariff.³

They, thus, saw the nation as a by-product and/or offspring of new economic relations, that is the development of the capitalist mode of production. Nations come into existence to consolidate and to secure the domination of the bourgeoisie during the transition to the capitalist mode of production. Furthermore, nationalism was the creation of the bourgeoisie to reach its class interests by dividing and exploiting the proletariat.

Classical Marxism perceived socioeconomic classes, rather than nations, as the sole and unique agents of history. The nation is, on the other hand, part of the superstructure and the creation of the capitalist era. Marx and Engels claimed that nations, nation-states, nationalism, national divisions and

antagonisms would lose their significance, and would even disappear, and the international interests of the working class became dominant and eventually nations would merge into an international community with the proletarian revolution. In the well-known passage of *Communist Manifesto* Marx and Engels stated that:

National differences, and antagonisms between peoples, are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto. The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster.⁴

The same economic factors that created nation and nationalism would cause them to be abolished. Here the assumption is that the proletariat in different capitalist nations have more in common with each other than with their national bourgeoisie and they are able to discard traditional ethnic and national feelings. Thus, it is believed that regardless of the cultural and ethnic similarities among different ethnic communities, identification with a nation rested upon ties with an economic unit.⁵ In other words, for the proletariat class solidarity is superior to national divisions.

However, the life of nation-state and nations did not prove as transitional as Marx and Engels had predicted. The Revolutions of 1848, when ethnonational uprisings appeared throughout Europe, demanded a greater appreciation of the power of nationalism and in the course of the 1848 revolutions Marx and Engels developed their theory of historic/revolutionary and

non-historic/counter-revolutionary nations.⁶ The central idea behind this dichotomous analysis of national communities is that large nations and/or large nation-states are progressive since they accelerate the development of the capitalist system which is a prerequisite for socialist order, while small nations are an impediment to capitalist development and thus to the following socialist order. As Charles C. Herod says, Marx and Engels:

...favored large and even multi-national politico-economic units since in their view only such large units could provide an adequate frame for industrial capitalist production and, thereby, could contribute to the growth and further development of a class conscious proletariat.⁷

The non-historic nations were those who either could not develop a hegemonic bourgeoisie, because they were mainly peasant nations, or could not develop a state of their own, because they were either small or they lived within a supranational empire. Thus, Marx and Engels suggested that the non-historic nations who had proven incapable of forming their own nation-state, had to be absorbed by the larger states, since they were hindering the development of the capitalist system.⁸

It can be argued that seeing the nation-state and nations primarily as an economic unit and thus assuming the transitoriness of the nation-state, nations and nationalism, Marx and Engels underrated the emotional aspects of nationalism. They tried to explain all social phenomena, including nations and nationalism, in terms of new economic relations and in terms of class struggle. These two dimensions of Classical Marxism,

economic reductionism and class reductionism, prevented an understanding of those aspects of the national phenomenon which transcended the effects of economic forces. This tendency of Classical Marxism to interpret social phenomena within the logic of the forces of production leads to an underestimation of non-economic aspects of nationalism, such as cultural, ethnic and psychological factors in the process of formation of national communities. However, the national phenomenon is multidimensional and it cannot be explained by monocausal explanations. Nimni asserts that "The Marxist fetish of making sense of every significant social phenomenon by subsuming it within the logic of the universal development of the forces of production, was the blueprint for ingenious but ultimately inapplicable theories of the national question".⁹

At this point, it should be added that there is a terminological confusion in Classical Marxist literature. In the works of Marx and Engels the meanings of nations and nationalities are not always clear. The concept of nation was sometimes used to refer to a sovereign state and sometimes to a fully formed national community, usually in possession of a national state. When Marx and Engels used the term "nationality" they used to refer to a national community not fully developed as a nation, sometimes to designate an ethno-cultural community that had not achieved full national status since it lacked a state of its own, sometimes it was used as a synonym for nationalism and at still other times used as a synonym of citizenship.¹⁰ This terminological ambiguity can be considered

to be an evidence of Classical Marxism's lack of insight into the national phenomenon.

Summarily it can therefore be said that the Classical Marxist perspective on nationalism with its rigid above-mentioned parameters fails to provide a coherent analysis of the national phenomenon. This is due to the fact that nationalism was always judged in the relation to new economic relations and in relation to the class struggle.

B. National Marxism: The Austro-Marxist Perspective on the National Question

The Austro-Marxists, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, differed from Marx and Engels with regard to their stance on the question of nationalism. Classical Marxists perceived socio-economic classes as the sole agents of history. For them, the nation was an ephemeral phenomenon, a creation of the bourgeoisie, which would vanish with the triumph of socialism. In contrast to Classical Marxism, the Austro-Marxists described nations, not classes, as the essential agency of social change. Karl Renner argues that:

Social democracy proceeds not from the existing states but from live nations. It neither denies nor ignores the existence of the nation but on the contrary, it accepts it as the carrier of the new order....Social democracy considers the nation both indestructible and undeserving of destruction....Far from being unnational or anti-national, it places nations at the foundation of its world structure.¹¹

For Otto Bauer, socialism would not result in the withering away of the nation, but its realization as a genuine cultural community, extended to the proletariat. Bauer asserted that the socialist project would require differentiation of national communities¹²:

So in a socialist society, no new element of spiritual (geistig) culture will be able to gain access to a nation without fusing with the culture of that nation, and without being influenced by it. The autonomy of distinctive national cultural communities will necessarily mean a growing differentiation between the spiritual (geistig) cultures of nations, despite the levelling out of material differences.

Integration of the whole people in their national cultural community, full achievement of self-determination of nations, growing spiritual (geistig) differentiation of nations -this is the meaning of socialism.¹³

Bauer also put forward the argument that in socialist society the working class would for the first time become part of the national community from which it had been excluded by the class structure of the society:

Just as private ownership of the means of production and individual production develops out of the social system of primitive communism, and from this, again, there develops co-operative production on the basis of social ownership, so the unitary nation divides into members of the nation and those who are excluded and become fragmented into small local circles; but with the development of social production these circles are again drawn together and will eventually be absorbed into the unitary socialist nation of the future.¹⁴

As far as the concept of nation was concerned both Renner and Bauer developed a richer conception of the nation than Marx and Engels. They viewed the nation in cultural rather than economic terms. For them, nation was not an economic unit but rather a cultural community. Bauer defined nation as "the

totality of human beings bound together through a community of fate into a community of character".¹⁵ Again in contrast to the Classical Marxist conception of nation, the Austro-Marxist conception of nation involved a separation of nation from state. In other words, for Austro-Marxists nations had nothing to do with class struggle and the state. They saw nation as a cultural association which was autonomous from the state and, thus, they argued that it should be analyzed on its own terms.

The Austro-Marxists wanted to settle the problem of nationalism within the framework of the multi-national empire by transforming it into a federation of cultural and national groups. In this respect they agreed with the Classical Marxist theory, which argued that larger economic units were economically progressive, that is they were functional first for capitalist and then for socialist development. Since for Austro-Marxists, the national question was primarily a cultural question, they developed the idea of cultural autonomy, which meant that each national and/or cultural group within a given polity would have the right to regulate its own national affairs, basically cultural and educational ones, while remaining loyal to the multi-national state.¹⁶ They thought that if each cultural group had a measure of autonomy in national cultural matters, the ruling classes would not be able to exploit and divide workers through using national differences and national antagonisms.

Summarily, it can be argued that breaking with the economic and class reductionism of Classical Marxism and realizing the

multidimensionality of national phenomenon, Austro-Marxists developed a new conceptualization of the national phenomenon, which must be considered as an important contribution to Marxism. Furthermore, they developed the idea of cultural autonomy, based on the view of the nation as a cultural community. They expected the nationality question to be solved within the context of Austro-Hungarian Empire through guaranteeing the national cultural autonomy of each ethno-cultural group. However, in many cases cultural autonomy proved to be not enough to solve the nationality problem. Although both Bauer and Renner realized the significance of nationalism and accepted the multidimensionality of the national phenomenon, they underestimated the disintegrating effect of demands of national separatism. However, it can be argued that the Austro-Marxists tried to provide a systematic attempt to come to terms with the national phenomenon.

C. Strategic Marxism: Lenin's Contribution to the Marxist Debate on the National Question

Lenin differed from both Classical Marxists and the Austro-Marxists with regard to his stance on the national question. The fact that during the First World War the European proletariat rejected the proletarian solidarity in favor of nationalism, proving as nationalistic as the bourgeoisie, led Lenin to take a tactical attitude to nationalism. He adopted the principle of self-determination of nations, including the right to secession.

In fact, this was a tactical use of nationalistic sentiments and nationalistic demands to consolidate political power (of the Communist Party by enlisting the sympathies of the nationalities) and to advance the cause of the revolution.

For Lenin, self-determination meant the right of secession of national communities from multi-national states, that is the right to win complete political independence, in order to form their own national states. Lenin says:

If we want to grasp the meaning of self-determination of nations, not by juggling with legal definitions, or "inventing" abstract definitions, but by examining the historico-economic conditions of the national movements, we must inevitably reach the conclusion that the self-determination of nations means the political separation of these nations from alien national bodies, and the formation of an independent national state....it would be wrong to interpret the right to self-determination as meaning anything but the right to existence as a separate state.¹⁷

However, for Lenin, allowing the right of self-determination to nations did not imply the exercise of that right. It was a strictly conditional rather than an absolute right:

The proletariat confines itself, so to speak, to the negative demand for recognition of the *right* to self-determination, without giving guarantees to any nation, and without undertaking to give *anything* at the expense of another nation.¹⁸

The right of self-determination was not actually exercised, at least within the context of the ex-Soviet Union, and this fact turned it into a dead-letter.

Lenin saw self-determination as an element in a wider process of socialist revolution. His position was the same as that of Marx in the sense that both saw nationalism as

subordinate to interests of the class struggle, that is to international socialist revolution.

While recognising equality and equal rights to a national state, it values above all and places foremost the alliance of the proletarians of all nations, and assesses any national demand, any national separation, *from the angle of the workers' class struggle.*¹⁹

Following the Classical Marxist line, Lenin stressed the advantages of large national states. He expected that granting the right of secession would lead to the formation of larger economic units, contrary to the argument that the right of secession would lead to the formation of small national states. Lenin did not anticipate that the right of secession would be exercised. He invoked the principle of self-determination, including the right of nations to secession because he thought that even if a nation seceded, the economic advantages of being a part of a larger state would bring it back:

Marxists are, of course, opposed to federation and decentralisation, for the simple reason that capitalism requires for its development the largest and most centralised possible states. *Other conditions being equal,* the class-conscious proletariat will always stand for the larger state.²⁰

Moreover, he argued that if nations were given the right to secede, they would want to stay in a union of nations of their own free will. The right of nations to self-determination was granted to prevent any national oppression with the hope that it would not take the form of secession. The aim was:

...the complete equality of rights for all nations; the right of nations to self-determination; the unity of workers of all nations.²¹

Lenin recognized the importance of national struggles and power of nationalism and thought that it could be used in certain circumstances, especially in the national liberation movements in the developing world, as a weapon of the bourgeoisie in Eastern Europe and as an anti-colonial force in Asia and Africa. He saw the national revolution as a preliminary step in the direction of the proletariat revolution. After the national liberation movements, the socialist revolution would take place as a second stage and so-called bourgeois nationalism would be replaced by proletarian internationalism. Thus, he adopted a tactical attitude to these movements arguing that those nationalist movements which would further the cause of socialism should be supported.²²

Lenin initially was opposed to the idea of federation. He claimed that the right of self-determination to nations meant the right to political divorce, not the right either to federation or to autonomy:

The right to federation is simply meaningless, since federation implies a bilateral contract. It goes without saying that Marxists cannot include the defence of federalism in general in their programme.²³

However, when Lenin saw the possibility of political disintegration in the chaos following the Revolution, he accepted a federal structure, granting territorial autonomy to nations living as homogeneous communities in a certain

continuous territory.²⁴ In other words, the structure of the federation was defined by the national and territorial principles. Furthermore, Lenin guaranteed each nation the right of self-determination by assuring each of the republics the right of secession.²⁵

Apart from the principle of self-determination of nations, including the right to secession, Lenin's formula for solving the national question included the policy of national equality, which had a cultural and political dimension.²⁶

As far as the cultural dimension was concerned, it was stated that all national groups had the right to preserve their culture. Thus, the cultural aspect of the policy of national equality guaranteed each nation the right to use its own language and an education in that language.²⁷ Since Lenin considered nationalism as an outgrowth of past discrimination and oppression, "attempts to eradicate it by force could only have the unintended effect of strengthening it."²⁸ Furthermore, Lenin argued that the policy of equality of nations would move nations closer together until a complete blending, that is a national homogeneity, was achieved.²⁹

As to the political dimension of the policy of national equality, political discrimination on the basis of nationality was prohibited. Equal opportunity was given to all citizens irrespective of their nationality and local and indigenous candidates were welcomed in the political structures of each national republic.³⁰ However, these concessions to national

diversity were not considered by Lenin as a serious threat because of the presence of the centralized communist party.

Lenin rejected both Classical and National Marxist thinking taking a tactical, strategic attitude to nationalism. What was behind this attitude was the fact that he underestimated the power of nationalism. Like Marx and Engels, he failed to understand the cultural and ethnic dimensions of nationalism and national movements, seeing the existence of national identity as a mere reaction to national oppression.

Lenin's strategical thinking constituted the theoretical base of the nationalist policies adopted by the former Soviet Union and other Marxist-Leninist states.

IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Czechoslovak Republic was established in 1918, bringing political independence to the Czechs and Slovaks, who had been part of large empires for centuries. Though Czechs and Slovaks are closely related nations, through language and religion, they had different historical, political, cultural and economic experiences.

In order to comprehend the roots of the conflict between Czechs and Slovaks it is necessary to examine the social, economic, and political differences between two nations. Throughout this chapter, then, these differences together with the formation and development of Czech and Slovak ethnic identities will be analyzed.

A. The Czech Lands and Slovakia Before 1918

The First Czechoslovak Republic was established on 28 October 1918, following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First World War.¹ Although the new Czechoslovak Republic was created to fulfill the demand for self-determination of the so-called "Czechoslovak nation", it brought together several ethnic groups in a common state for the first time. Besides the Czechs and Slovaks who together accounted for 66 percent of the population in 1921, there was a wide variety of minority groups: Germans comprised 23.4 percent, Hungarians 5.6 percent, Ruthenians, Ukrainians and Russians 3.5

percent of the population. There were also small minorities of Jews and Poles.² Thus, looking at the ethnic composition of Czechoslovakia it can be argued that the country was a multi-ethnic state, resembling the Austrian Empire, and that after the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic as an independent unitary state ethnic issues relating to the positions and rights of these ethnic groups continually dominated the political agenda. It was the dissatisfaction of the Sudeten Germans -who were economically and politically the most significant group- that provided the pretext for the breakup of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1938. However, the dominant ethnic and cultural cleavage was between the two major groups, namely the Czechs and Slovaks.

Even though the Czechs and Slovaks are closely related nations, speaking similar West Slavic languages, using the Roman alphabet and sharing a common religion, they are divided by their history and divergent cultural, economic and political developments.)

In the ninth century, the Czechs and Slovaks shared a common state, the Great Moravian Empire. After the Magyar invasion in the tenth century, Slovakia was merged into the Kingdom of Hungary and it remained under the domination of the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy until 1918. The Czechs, on the other hand, created the Kingdom of Bohemia and Moravia which was a major political power in medieval Central Europe. (When they were defeated by the Austrians at the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620, they were incorporated into the Austrian

Slovaks → Kingdom of Hungary
Czechs → " of Bohemia and Moravia

Empire. Almost 1000 years of separation and foreign rule created a great diversity in the economic and political activities, the social life, and the traditions of the Czechs and Slovaks. Thus, when they were joined once again to form an independent state in 1918, they had different levels of economic development, political experiences, national traditions and histories.)

As far as the economic development was concerned, the Czech lands were economically more developed than Slovakia.³ In the Czech lands, heavy industry, such as textile, mining and metallurgical industries had started to develop in the second part of the nineteenth century. While the Czechs were employed in industry, in public services, and in the professions, Slovaks were more heavily represented in the agrarian sector. In other words, in Slovakia, the socio-economic structure had an agrarian base with a peasant class. While the Slovaks had neither an industrial proletariat nor bourgeoisie in cities, the Czechs had developed an urban middle class.⁴ Thus, it can be argued that while the Czech lands, that is Bohemia and Moravia, experienced a steady industrial growth, Slovakia, under Magyar dominance, remained largely rural and underdeveloped.)

{ The Czechs had an opportunity to prosper not only economically but also culturally under Austrian rule. A Czech University was established and there were officially sanctioned Czech elementary and secondary schools. The language directive of 1880 accepted Czech as a language for public transactions. However, in Slovakia, educational opportunities were more limited than in the Czech lands. In the mid-1870s the Hungarian

government instituted a series of repressive measures to assimilate the non-Magyars. Magyar started to be used as the only official language. There was no Slovak University and Slovak language secondary and high schools were closed in 1874 and Magyar was made mandatory in all elementary schools.⁵ The main Slovak cultural association, *Matica Slovenska*, which was established in 1863, was closed in 1875 to impede the development of Slovak culture. There was also a considerable difference in literacy rates in the Czech lands and Slovakia. The illiteracy rate was higher in Slovakia where in 1930 8.1 percent of all inhabitants ten years and older were illiterate while only 1.2 percent of people living in Bohemia and 1.5 percent in Moravia were illiterate.⁶ (Thus, a clear difference remained between the levels of socioeconomic differentiation in the Czech lands and Slovakia.)

(The Czechs and Slovaks were also separated by religious differences. Although the majority of both the Czechs and Slovaks were Catholic Christians, the Czechs developed a Protestant tradition during the Protestant Reformation, led by Jan Hus, in the fifteenth century.) Jan Hus, a Bohemian priest, challenged the authority of the Church and attempted to reform it. He was condemned to death at the Council of Constance for heretical teachings and burned at the stake in 1415.⁷ After his death, the Hussite movement spread quickly throughout the Czech lands and gradually the Czechs adopted a Hussite variant of Protestantism.

After Hus, the Hussite movement weakened due to the rise of various factions, such as the radical Taborites and Horebites, the conservative Utraquists, the moderate Prague Party, and the Unity of Brethren.⁸ These Hussite sects remained influential in different parts of Bohemia and Moravia until 1620.⁹ The defeat of the Czech nobility by the Habsburgs at the Battle of White Mountain led to recatholization of the Czech lands.¹⁰ The Czechs saw the hierarchy of the Church as a tool in the hands of Habsburgs, who tried to impose the Catholic faith by force on the Protestant Czechs after 1620. However, despite these efforts on the part of the Catholic Habsburgs, the Hussite tradition remained an important part of the Czechs' past.

(Slovakia also developed a Protestant tradition. About a fifth of the Slovaks were Lutheran Protestants, who acquired their faith from contact with the German minorities living in Hungary.¹¹ However, the Catholic Church came to exert a much stronger influence on Slovaks, due to the lower urbanization, industrialization and literacy levels in Slovakia. The Slovaks were devout Catholics and did not attempt to question their bonds with the Church. Conversely, the Catholic Church played a less important role in the social and political life of the Czechs. Hence, it can be argued that a more secularized culture had come to predominate in the more developed Czech lands before independence.¹²)

(The political experiences of the population prior to independence also differed in the two parts of the country. Czech politicians and citizens had opportunities to participate

in public life within the framework of imperial and regional institutions, due to both the higher levels of economic and cultural developments they achieved, and the tolerant policies of the Austrian government. Conversely, Slovak participation in Hungarian politics was minimal, with only a few representatives in the Hungarian Diet.¹³ In the latter years of the 19th century, the Habsburgs tolerated the formation and activities of nationally oriented groups in Bohemia and provided opportunities for them to participate in limited forms of self-government. The Czechs had many organized political parties, such as the Agrarians, the Social Democrats, the National Socialists and Catholics, that participated in the political life of the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy.¹⁴ In Slovakia, on the other hand, there was only a primitive organizational political structure of the Slovak intellectuals, namely *Narodna Strana* which was a grouping of various interests, since the Slovak political life was paralyzed due to the Magyar centralization. While Czech leaders participated in the Diets in Bohemia and Moravia, as well as in the Parliament in Vienna¹⁵, Slovaks suffered severe limitations on political activity.¹⁶ Suffrage restrictions kept most Slovaks from participating in the broader political life under the Hungarians.

(The above-mentioned differences between the two main groups and the impact of them became evident after the establishment of the new Czechoslovak state. The disparity in the levels of economic, social and political developments in two regions, accompanied by the central government policies of the unitary

state fuelled Slovak discontent and provided fertile ground for the action of Slovak nationalists who called for autonomy after the establishment of the First Czechoslovak Republic.)

B. Czech, Slovak and Czechoslovak Nationalisms and the Development of National Identities

Josef F. Zacek argues that a Czechoslovak nation, sharing a Czechoslovak national consciousness and asserting a Czechoslovak nationalism, had never really existed.¹⁷ Taking this argument as a point of departure, I want to concentrate on the historical developments of separate "Czech", "Slovak", and "Czechoslovak" nationalisms and national identities.

1. Czech Nationalism

The roots of the Czech nationalism, of which geography, language and religion are the crucial components, dates back to the Middle Ages. Medieval Bohemia and Moravia were inhabited not only by Czechs but also by Germans. Thus, the Czechs, from their first appearance in Bohemia and Moravia in the sixth century, had to face the aggressive cultural and political expansion of the Germans. Zacek argues that the history of the Czechs and of Czech nationalism was the history of this long rivalry and association with the Germans.

It was the pressure of the Germanic Franks that pushed the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia into the loose empire of Samo in

the seventh century. In the ninth century, the Czechs and Slovaks maintained a loose association in the Great Moravian Empire.¹⁸ After the annexation of Slovakia by the Hungarians in the tenth century, the Czechs created the Kingdom of Bohemia and Moravia. Immigration of the Germans to Bohemia and the occupation of influential positions in cities and mining districts in the Middle Ages¹⁹ not only resulted in a Czech resentment of foreigners but also contributed to the emergence of Czech ethnic consciousness. Language became the most important distinction between the two groups and the Czechs associated their language with preserving their national character.

As far as religion was concerned, at the beginning of the fifteenth century a reformation movement, led by a Bohemian priest Jan Hus, appeared. The Hussite movement was mainly a religious reformation, a challenge to the authority of the Church which was in a moral crisis in the fourteenth century. However, it had also nationalistic features. For Hus, religion had to be more understandable to the common folk, hence the Czech vernacular must be used in Church services.²⁰ During the Hussite period, the Czech language underwent great development and Bible reading and preaching in the Hussite churches were done only in the reformed Czech vernacular.²¹ As a result, the use of the Czech language became widespread. At the end of the fifteenth century, the Bible was translated into the Czech language.²² The decline of dominance of Latin as a sacred language and written script and the development of vernaculars,

which were more appropriate for the masses, were what Benedict Anderson underlines as the necessary preconditions for nationalism. The development and the spread of the Czech vernacular contributed to expansion of communication which in turn helped the development of the Czech national consciousness.²³

In addition to the extensive use and the literary cultivation of the Czech language, the crusades against the Czechs during the Hussite Period contributed to the development of Czech national consciousness. The Hussite Reformation was also very significant in that in the nineteenth century the "Awakeners" rediscovered the Hussite period and made it the core of Czech history.²⁴

The first signs of the Czech national consciousness were evident in the fifteenth century. The development of the Czech language, the rivalry of the Czechs with foreigners, specifically with Germans, and the Hussite reformation played a crucial role in the emergence of a sense of community, common self-awareness and consciousness. The Czechs can be regarded as an ethnic community or *ethnie* since they possessed the six criteria that A. D. Smith outlines, namely a common name, a common myth of descent, shared history, distinctive culture, territorial association and a sense of solidarity.²⁵ Though a sense of identity, a strong sense of belongingness and an active solidarity were seen only within the privileged strata, that is nobility and clergy, but not in the non-privileged groups in towns and in the countryside, such as the peasants and working

class, we still consider the Czechs as constituting an ethnic group. Smith claims that if we are to speak of a genuine ethnic group, "the sense of solidarity and community must animate at least the educated upper strata, who can, if need be, communicate it to other strata and regions in the community."²⁶ Thus, it can be said that the Czechs acquired the attributes of *ethnie* throughout the fifteenth century and they had the potential to become a fully-developed nation.

When the Czechs were defeated by the Austrians at the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620, they were incorporated into the Austrian Empire in the early 17th century, thereby losing their independence of 300 years, their chosen religion, the use of their language and their right of self-rule.²⁷ The Czech nobility, bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia were exiled. The common folk who remained in Bohemia and Moravia were subjected to the Germanization of their culture. Furthermore, religious pluralism was abolished. Protestant sects, such as the Brethren, the Calvinists, the Lutherans and the Utraquists were banned and Catholicism became the only permitted religion. In 1624, non-Catholic priests were ordered to leave the country.²⁸ The Czech language was replaced by German in official, administrative, cultural and educational spheres. The significant characteristic of the Czechs, the Czech language, became the language of servants and peasants. Thus, the Czech cultural heritage and the Protestant tradition were suppressed. Zacek argues that if by the late 18th century the complete destruction of Czech national consciousness had not occurred, it

was only due to the inefficiency of the Habsburg monarchs in pursuing their ends.²⁹

The process of denationalization lasted for about 200 years. In the eighteenth century the Enlightenment and the French Revolution opened a new path to self-assertion for the Czechs and the Czech cultural and national revival began. Ideas of liberalism, equality and national solidarity attracted young educated people. Sons of clerks and servants who studied at the university became interested in the Czech language and literature and saw the salvation of the nation in the revitalization of the Czech language. The tolerant policies introduced by Joseph II contributed to the rebirth of the Czech language.³⁰ The leading figures in the revival were Josef Jungmann, Frantisek Palacky, Jan Kollar, Pavel Safarik, Josef Dobrovsky, the so-called "Awakeners", who intended to awaken Czech national consciousness through a literary revival. They compiled grammars and dictionaries, published newspapers and wrote on the history of Czech literature.³¹ Just as in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Czech national revival was based on language.³² Palacky's *History of the Czech Nation in Bohemia and Moravia*, in which he inspired the Czechs to identify themselves with their Hussite past, shaped the Czech national sentiment of the time.³³

As Anderson points out it was mainly the invention of the printing press and the efforts of the philologists, linguists, folklorists, and other professional intellectuals that awakened the Czechs.³⁴ Through print-capitalism, a term employed by

Anderson, the Czech vernacular was strengthened by the publishing of dictionaries and literature.³⁵

Ernest Gellner underlines the importance of literacy in the development of nationalism in his famous work, *Nations and Nationalism*. He suggests the "high culture-low culture" dichotomy to analyze the development of nationalism. He argues that during the transition from agro-literate societies to modern industrial ones, education is available only to a small group of people, who have access to power.³⁶ So far as the Czechs were concerned the sons of the emerging middle class, that is the power-holders, had access to standardized education. Gellner further maintains that by communicating through a standardized linguistic medium this group gradually develops its own culture, that is "high culture", which dominates the society. Standardized, homogeneous high culture is imposed on society and virtually everyone becomes literate. As a result, standardized literacy-carried high culture replaces the diversified, locality-tied low cultures.³⁷ The Czech "Awakeners" developed their "high culture" in the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nineteenth century began to communicate it to other strata in the Czech community.

Smith also emphasizes the role of the intellectuals in the process of turning *ethnie* into a nation which requires a thoroughly conscious program of mass education. He argues that the pressures of state and the ideas of nationalism, together with the expansion of literacy and improved communication spurs a new consciousness of ethnic distinctiveness among

intellectuals. Smith asserts that ethnic revival is generated by the activity of intellectuals, in other words "the historical, philosophical, and anthropological researches of the scholars, and the literary and artistic achievements of the poets, musicians, dramatists and painters."³⁸ The small group of Czech literary intellectuals revived the Czech vernacular in order to create a unified literature. They tried to mobilize the masses through the Czech vernacular and endowed "ethnic categories of peasants with a new consciousness of their ethnic community", which in turn became the basis of their struggle for nationhood.³⁹

The Czech historian Miroslav Hroch examined the nationalist movements of the small European nations in the nineteenth century and proposed a three phase national development.⁴⁰ In the first stage, which he called Phase A, a group of intellectuals, usually members of the middle and upper classes, begin to develop an interest in national history, language and culture. There are no political aims to be voiced. In Phase B a new range of activists try to awaken the national consciousness of the masses. The intelligentsia begin to be involved in voicing political demands. In the last phase, Phase C, a mass national movement is formed. Referring to Hroch's model of national development, it can be argued that the Czech national development entered Phase A in the eighteenth century. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Czech "Awakeners" became interested in the Czech language with the aim of making it the vehicle of national identification. Since the medieval

Czech vernacular had survived, it was easier for the "Awakeners" to revitalize and develop the modern version of the Czech language. The Czech "Awakeners" also reconstructed and cultivated their history, discovering their Hussite past.

The Czech intellectuals revived the Czech language, rediscovered their history and their culture, and used every opportunity to expand their cultural self-assertion. Thus, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the Czech cultural revival, which served as the foundation of the subsequent nationalist movement, was almost complete through the efforts of the so-called "Awakeners".

With the Revolutions of 1848 a political element was attached to Czech nationalism.⁴¹ Like the other constituent nations of the Habsburg Empire, the Czechs demanded more rights, particularly political self-assertion. The Awakeners gradually became the leaders of the Czech national movement and voiced the Czech national demands. They wanted the Habsburgs to guarantee all national groups within the Empire complete equality of rights.

During March 1848 the representatives of the Czech bourgeoisie and the Czech intelligentsia addressed two successive petitions to Vienna in which they demanded introduction of fundamental civil rights, such as religious freedom, personal safety, freedom of press, local self-government and equal status for the two languages, German and Czech, in all official business.⁴² The Viennese government accepted these demands with a Cabinet decree and in April a

National Committee, containing both Czechs and Germans, came into existence to implement these demands. However, the Germans protested this decree and they withdrew from the Committee.⁴³ In the course of the revolution none of these concessions came into force.

Meanwhile in Germany, political representatives from the German states met in Frankfurt in order to organize elections to the Parliament of a future unified German federal state. Since the Czech lands -Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia- were a part of what the Austrian authorities called the "Hereditary German Lands"⁴⁴, the Czechs were also to be represented in the Frankfurt Parliament. For the Czechs Frantisek Palacky was invited to Frankfurt. However, he refused the invitation and in a letter to the Frankfurt he argued that the Czech nation was distinct from the German nation, not a part of it. Palacky's argument reflected the opinion of the politically conscious Czech intelligentsia, who wished to remain within the Habsburg Empire, requiring however that it became a federal state of equal nations.⁴⁵

Under the new emperor, Franz Joseph I, monarchical absolutism ruled over the Habsburg lands for twelve years, until 1860. The Czechs, like other constituent nations, remained as an oppressed nation without equal rights. In this atmosphere the political and cultural activities of the Czechs were interrupted. However, the lost wars in the late 1850s resulted in a series of constitutional reforms.⁴⁶ In 1860, the emperor abolished the absolutist constitution and with the February Constitution of

1861 he conceded some power to the bicameral parliament. However, the Czechs were dissatisfied since the February Constitution failed to recognize Bohemia as an autonomous unit. As a result, the Czech deputies boycotted the Austrian Parliament ("Reichsrat") until 1879.⁴⁷

In May 1867, the Austrian Empire was transformed into the constitutional Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The hope of the Czech leaders that the Czech lands, the Historic Provinces of the Bohemian Crown, would be made into an autonomous unit was disappointed.⁴⁸ However, the new constitution granted the Czechs, like the other ethnic groups living within the Monarchy, equality before the law and civil liberties, such as freedom of press and freedom of association. The equality of all languages in the country was also recognized.⁴⁹ The cultural and political rights granted to the Czechs can be considered as a significant step for the future endeavors of the Czechs.

In October 1871 the Bohemian diet approved a project, according to which the Czech lands were to be granted a status similar to that of Hungary.⁵⁰ However, this attempt failed since the project was opposed by the Magyar and the German representatives in the government. While the Bohemian Germans were afraid of losing their privileges, the Magyars were fearful that the nationalities living within the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy would demand similar concessions.⁵¹

The Czech national movement entered the second phase of Hroch's model, Phase B, during the revolutions of 1848, that is during the social and political crisis of the old order.⁵² The

Czech national leaders were involved in voicing political demands. They developed political programmes and addressed petitions to Vienna, demanding more political self-assertion.

As far as Smith's theory of nationalism is concerned what we see during the course of the 1848 revolutions is the beginning of the "politicization of the Czech *ethnie*". It was no longer satisfactory for the Czech ethnic community to preserve its distinct culture. As a result of the growing industrialization of the Czech lands, changes in commerce and trading patterns and also in the nature of administration, and the rise of mass culture and education, which Smith calls the triple revolution -economic, administrative and cultural- the Czech national leaders began to see the Czech community as a potential nation.⁵³ The efforts of the Czech national leaders began to have political implications. They made political claims and competed with other ethnic communities within the monarchy to have a say in the political arena. However, as Smith points out, while the Czech national leaders, that is the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia, displayed this kind of a political attitude, the peasant masses were often excluded.⁵⁴

The Czech leaders during the 1880s and 1890s continued to demand political and cultural concessions from the government. While the political demands were again opposed by the Bohemian Germans and by the Magyars, the cultural demands of the Czech deputies were met. In 1879, the Czech language started to be used in administrative matters, however German remained as the official language. In 1882, the Charles University was divided

into the independent Czech and German Universities. In 1883, the building of the Czech National Theatre was completed.⁵⁵

Between 1896 and 1904 Czech political parties were created in Bohemia. A Czech Social Democratic Party, a Czech Agrarian Party, a Czech National Socialist Party and Czech Christian Social Party were formed.⁵⁶ After the introduction of universal suffrage in the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy in 1907, the political demands of the Czechs again surfaced. However, the Bohemian diet was unable to operate due to the obstructions of the Sudeten Germans.⁵⁷ Though attempts to establish an autonomous political structure within the Austro-Hungarian Empire failed, the Czechs made economic and cultural progress throughout the nineteenth century. Hence, Czech national consciousness was almost complete due to the growing number of Czech cultural and educational institutions, and organized political parties.

With the creation of the organized Czech political parties the inclusion and political mobilization of the masses for common political goals, which as Smith points out is a necessary element in the project of transformation of *ethnie* to nation, began.⁵⁸ Referring to Hroch's model, the Czech national development entered the last phase, that is Phase C, at the end of the nineteenth century, when the national political programmes of the intelligentsia acquired mass appeal. The Czech political parties began to participate in the politics of the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy. The national consciousness

spread from the Awakeners to the population and national movements were established as mass political movements.

Summarily, recalling Hroch's definition of nation, it is evident that the Czech ethnic community of the fifteenth century acquired most of the features of a nation before 1918. The Czech community was integrated by economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, historical and geographical relationships. It inhabited a common territory, Bohemia and Moravia, it spoke a common language, it shared a culture, common religion, a common economic and political life and it also acquired a sense of distinctiveness. Furthermore, through the efforts of the national leaders the masses were mobilized and all social classes, nobility, bourgeoisie, peasants and the working class acquired collective consciousness and felt themselves to be a part of the Czech nation. Thus, it can be argued that the Czech nationalist movement fits into Hroch's three historical phases.

Apart from the existence of a Czech ethnic core we should also take into account the historical, social and economic developments, such as the Industrial Revolution which brought with it social mobility, improved communication and literacy, as well as the role of the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia of the bourgeoisie and peasant background that certainly contributed in the transformation of the Czech *ethnie* to a nation. However, it can be argued that the Czechs never demanded an independent state until the First World War, and wanted to remain a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and thus, they were not politically conscious since they did not want to express

themselves politically in the form of state. However, it appears that they were afraid of being absorbed either by Germany or Russia which would have been more dangerous for their national and cultural identity. It can therefore be said that as a result of the National Revival that took place in the Czech lands in the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century, the Czech ethnic community was transformed into a nation, however without its own independent state.

2. Slovak Nationalism

Slovakia was formerly settled by Celtic and then German tribes. Slavs came from the east in the sixth and seventh centuries A.D. In the late ninth century there existed the Great Moravian Empire, which also included Bohemia. Following the collapse of the Great Moravian Empire by the Hungarian invasions at the end of the ninth century, Slovakia became part of the Kingdom of Hungary and remained under Hungarian rule for more than thousand years.

As far as Slovak nationalism is concerned it has a much shorter history than Czech nationalism. Having lived under the harsh rule of the Hungarians for almost a thousand years, Slovaks were not able to develop a national identity due to the assimilationist policies of the Hungarian rulers. Hugh Seton-Watson argues that until the end of the eighteenth century there was neither Slovak national self-consciousness nor a Slovak nation.⁵⁹

In fact before the late eighteenth century, referring to Smith's six components of *ethnie*, the Slovaks can only be regarded as an ethnic category, not even an ethnic community. They seemed to possess some of the ethnic elements, such as a common religion, a specific territory, and even a shared history. However, these ethnic components are not enough to qualify the Slovaks as an ethnic community. Until the late eighteenth century they did not have their own written language and literature, which are considered to be one of the most important distinguishing marks of an *ethnie*. However more important than language, as Smith underlines, was the lack of a definite sense of identity, a sense of belonging and solidarity.⁶⁰ Until the late eighteenth century even the educated upper strata did not seem to possess any sense of community and solidarity.

A movement of Slovak national awakening began in the late eighteenth century with an attempt to develop a standardized Slovak literary language.⁶¹ The first step was undertaken by Antonin Bernolak, a Catholic priest, who tried to raise the dialect spoken in the western part of Slovakia to the level of literary use. Bernolak was the author of a grammar of Slovak, published in 1787, and of a dictionary in six volumes.⁶² However, the new language was rejected by Slovak Protestants since it was little understood in central and eastern Slovakia.⁶³ The next attempt was made in the 1840's by Ludovit Stur who preferred the dialect of the central region. He first published a book in justification of the central dialect and

later on in 1846 a new Slovak grammar. The debate between the Catholics and Protestants over the literary language resolved in favor of the central Slovak dialect advocated by Stur.⁶⁴

As in Czech nationalism, language became the important component of Slovak nationalism. The standardization of Slovak as a literary language occurred at the time when the Hungarian government started to enforce the use of Magyar throughout the Hungarian lands.⁶⁵ Thus, a standardized language was to unite all Slovaks, both Protestant and Catholic, and mobilize them against the Magyarization.⁶⁶ The Slovak language became the criterion of the distinct Slovak identity and was used as a weapon in the struggle for national revival.

Though Czechs had a Moravian and Bohemian Kingdom and the Hussite era to rediscover and use as a point of reference to revive a national self-awareness, the Slovaks had neither an independent state nor an independent history of their own. Without a heroic past to refer to, the Slovaks used linguistic and literary criteria in determining the origins of Slovak national consciousness.⁶⁷ Hence, Slovak intellectuals worked for the revival of Slovak languages and development of national literatures. As Anderson and Smith point out it was mainly the poets, linguists, historians and other writers that played an important role in the process of awakening the national consciousness throughout the nineteenth century. In addition, as a result of the invention of the printing press dictionaries and grammars were published which accelerated the process of national awakening. This small circle of intellectuals included

Ludovit Stur, Andrej Sladkovic, Samo Chalupka, Janko Kral, Jan Botto, and Svetozar Hurban Vajansky⁶⁸ who tried to defend their national culture against the assimilationist pressures of the Magyars.

At this point it is necessary to add that in Slovakia the national awakening was preached mainly by Catholic priests and Protestant clergy.⁶⁹ This is due to the fact that in contrast to the Czech lands which experienced rapid economic and industrial growth at the end of the eighteenth century and during the nineteenth century, Slovakia was economically and socially backward and had no middle class.

The Slovak national movement entered Hroch's first phase at the end of the eighteenth century when a tiny group of Slovak intellectuals dedicated themselves to the study of the Slovak language to preserve their culture.

Like their Czech fellows, the Slovak national awakeners wanted to preserve their distinct identity and distinct culture through political means as well. During the revolutions of 1848, the Slovak intelligentsia, including not only pastors and priests but also secular writers, journalists, lawyers and school teachers⁷⁰, through petitions demanded from the Hungarian government recognition of the Slovak nation, official use of the Slovak language in public affairs in Slovakia, Slovak schools and a Slovak university, universal suffrage and a separate assembly for the Slovak nation.⁷¹ These demands were rejected by the Hungarian rulers. When Hungary was reconquered by the Habsburgs, Slovak leaders asked the Emperor Franz Josef, in a

petition of 1849, for equal status for the Slovaks among the nations of the Monarchy and for the removal of the Slovak lands from Hungarian sovereignty. The petition was disregarded by the new emperor who established a monarchical absolutism that ruled over the Habsburg lands until 1860.⁷² The March 1849 Constitution restored Hungary to its pre-1848 position.⁷³

In 1861, the Slovak intelligentsia issued a new memorandum, addressed to both Vienna and Budapest. They demanded autonomy for Slovakia, asserting once again their national identity.⁷⁴ This time they were granted some concessions, but not autonomy. Three secondary schools with the Slovak as the language of instruction were set up. In 1863, the *Matica Slovenska*, which became the centre of Slovak cultural life, was founded.⁷⁵

However, after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the Hungarians established a new Hungarian government in Budapest and instituted a policy of Magyarization. The Slovak cultural institutions -secondary schools, in 1874, and *Matica Slovenska*, in 1875- were closed.⁷⁶ Suffrage restrictions kept the Slovak intelligentsia from participating in politics. Except for these few national affirmations, the Slovaks did not have sufficient strength to resist the systematic attempts of Magyarization, which resulted in considerable emigration, in particular to the USA.⁷⁷

In contrast to the Czechs who had made considerable progress in cultural, economic and political spheres, the Slovaks were exposed to systematic Magyarization. Due to the activities of the Hungarian administration, they had no middle

class, and almost no political life of their own. Deprived of their cultural institutions and granted almost no political force, the Slovaks remained inarticulate and Slovak national consciousness was in danger of dying by 1914. Joseph F. Zacek argues that if the First World War had not intervened, assimilation by the Magyars would have been complete.⁷⁸ He also asserts that only after 1918, stimulated by independence, did Slovak nationalism increase in strength.⁷⁹ Apart from the language, new elements, namely religion and political self-determination, became important components of Slovak nationalism only after 1918.

If Hroch's model of national development is applied to the Slovak case, it appears that the transition from Phase B, which began during the 1848 Revolutions, to Phase C was not yet achieved in 1918. The efforts of the Slovak intelligentsia were obstructed with the assimilationist policies of the Magyars. Thus, the nationalist sentiments of the Slovak intelligentsia were not shared by the Slovak peasant population during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.

The main objective of the Slovak intelligentsia before 1918 was to gain civil, electoral, linguistic, and cultural rights in the existing political structure of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Without Slovak-language schools, electoral access, political organs, and with an underdeveloped rural population, the Slovaks were an ethnic group who tried to preserve its culture against the assimilationist policies of the Magyars. At the formation of

the First Czechoslovak Republic, the national consciousness of the Slovaks had not yet been completed.

3. Czechoslovak Nationalism

As far as Czechoslovak nationalism is concerned before the First World War a large number of educated Czechs and Slovaks had advocated the idea of Czechoslovakism, declaring their belief in the existence of a single "Czechoslovak nation". Among some leading Czechs were Frantisek Palacky, Karel Havlicek, Tomas G. Masaryk, and Edvard Benes. The Slovak advocates of Czechoslovakism were Vavro Srobar, Ivan Derer, Milan Stefanik, and Milan Hodza. They all basically argued for the natural unity of the Czechs and Slovaks, drawing attention to their ethnic and linguistic similarity, geographic proximity, and shared history in the Great Moravian Empire.⁸⁰

In 1849 Frantisek Palacky thought that the Austrian Empire might be transformed into a federation of new autonomous units, based on ethnic and historical frontiers, in which the Czech population of the Czech Lands would be joined by the Slovaks.⁸¹ He developed the conviction that one Czechoslovak nation and language did exist.⁸²

Again another leading Czech Karel Havlicek, a journalist, emphasized the cultural, ethnic and linguistic unity of the two people.⁸³ Masaryk and Benes believed in the oneness of the Czechoslovak nation. However, for them Czechoslovakism was not only a question of cultural, ethnic and linguistic unity, but of

political necessity, considering Hungarian revisionist and irredentist aims.⁸⁴

For Ivan Derer, leader of the Social Democratic Party, only the belief in Czechoslovakism and the Czechoslovak national pride could free Slovakia from Hungarian heritage and could bring social advancement to Slovakia.⁸⁵ Again Vavro Srobar hoped that Czech culture would spread and transform the backward culture of Slovakia.⁸⁶ Milan Stefanik, who fought for free Czechoslovakia during the war, believed that Czechs and Slovaks were actually one nation saying that "every Slovak was a Czech living in Slovakia, and every Czech was a Slovak living in the Czech lands".⁸⁷ Another prominent Slovak leader, Milan Hodza, though a Czechoslovak by conviction, avoided speaking of a future Czechoslovak state. After the war he became the leader of the Slovak branch of the Agrarian Party which represented the idea of Czechoslovakism.⁸⁸

The outbreak of the First World War caught the Czechs without a concrete political plan. During the First World War Czech politicians had widely different aims. Karel Kramar, leader of the Young Czech Party, hoped for Russian victory, and planned a Slav Union under Russian sovereignty.⁸⁹ Czech Social Democrats hoped that the Habsburg Monarchy would be replaced by a socialist republic, in which Czech workers and the Czech people would be equals of the other nations.⁹⁰

The majority of the Czech leaders, including Palacky and Masaryk, wanted the transformation of the monarchy into a federation in which the nationalities would constitute

themselves according to the principle of equality of nations.⁹¹ They appeared to be satisfied with full self-government within the Habsburg Empire since they had demanded independence neither for the Czechs nor for the "Czechoslovaks" before 1914. What they wanted was an autonomous statehood for the Czechs on their historical territory, that is Bohemia and Moravia, within the Austrian Empire.⁹² After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise Palacky admitted the fact that his plan could not be realized.⁹³ In the last decade before the war Masaryk was increasingly aware of the impossibility of preserving the Austrian Empire even if it became a union of free nations.

With the accelerated Magyarization that occurred after 1867, Czech and Slovak intellectual contacts and consciousness of unity intensified. The first efforts toward cooperation with the Czechs were begun by Slovak students in Prague, Vienna, and Budapest. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, professor at the Czech University in Prague, greatly influenced the thinking of Srobar and other Slovak students, who founded a Czechoslovak Union and, in 1898, began publishing their own periodical, *Hlas*.⁹⁴ Among the leading Hlasists were Vavro Srobar, Igor Hrusovsky, A. Stefanek and Ivan Derer, who were all devoted to the idea of Czechoslovakism, in other words to the idea of Czechoslovak unity.⁹⁵

The main purpose of the Czechoslovak movement prior to the outbreak of the First World War was to develop communication between Czechs and Slovaks, in order to share ideas and to offer moral support to each other in their respective political

struggles. It was only during the War that the leaders of the Czechoslovak movement started to adopt a position favoring independence.⁹⁶ These Slovak intellectuals, the group known as Hlasisti, came to Prague and worked closely with their Czech counterparts.

However, only a small number of Slovak intellectuals accepted and propagated the idea of Czechoslovakism, putting their faith in Czech-Slovak solidarity. A section of Slovaks was convinced that the Slovaks constituted a separate nation. For them, it was not possible to accept the idea that the two nations were two branches of one nation. Within the Slovak movement there were several orientations other than the Hlasists, including a strongly nationalist Catholic one, led by Andrej Hlinka, a Catholic priest, who maintained that Slovaks had a distinct national identity. However, even Hlinka did not deny the need for a common state. He sought the salvation of Slovakia from Hungarian oppression in union with the Czechs. In May 1918, at a meeting of the Slovak National Party he said "it is absolutely necessary for us to decide if we will continue with the Magyars or go with the Czechs. Let us say openly that we are for the Czecho-Slovak orientation. The thousand-year marriage with the Magyars has not worked. A divorce is necessary".⁹⁷ In fact it was the only viable alternative the Slovak ethnic group had if it was to survive in the twentieth century. There was also another orientation led by Milan Hodza, which favored a close relationship with the sister Czech nation.

During the course of the First World War the advocates of the Czechoslovak unity demanded independence. The Czechoslovak movement dated from November 1915, when a manifesto for Czechoslovakia's independence was issued. In the following year the Czechoslovak National Council was formed in Paris by Masaryk, Benes, and Stefanik.⁹⁸ While Masaryk and Benes were the head of the Council and its general secretary respectively, Stefanik handled Slovak affairs. They received support from the Czech and Slovak groups scattered throughout the Allied countries, particularly the United States. In order to justify the Czechoslovak claim to independence the leaders of the National Council argued that Bohemia had never ceased to be a legally independent state.⁹⁹

Masaryk, in the Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence, asserted that the Czech lands had voluntarily entered a union with the Austrian Empire in 1526 to resist the Ottoman threat to Europe. Now that the union had become unfavorable for the interests of the Czechs, they wanted to withdraw from it.¹⁰⁰ For Slovakia, the National Council went beyond the argument that the historic rights of Bohemia had been violated. Edvard Benes, in his *The Case for Bohemia's Independence*, argued for the natural unity of the Czechs and Slovaks, drawing attention to their common language, history, and civilization. He also argued that the separation of the Czechs and Slovaks in Austria and Hungary respectively had produced only insignificant differences between the two peoples.¹⁰¹

At the beginning the Allied Powers had no intention of dismantling the Habsburg Empire. Masaryk, Benes and Stefanik knew that the fate of Czechoslovakia depended on the attitudes of the Allied Powers towards the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They tried to promote the Czechoslovak cause throughout the West. They basically argued that German-dominated East Central Europe would endanger France and Italy. They maintained that the only solution was the replacement of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by new independent nation-states.¹⁰²

While Masaryk and his friends were carrying out their propaganda abroad for Czechoslovakia's independence, the political leaders at home remained cautious in their attitudes. In January 1917, when the Allied Powers began to consider the liberation of the Czechoslovaks, the Presidium of the Association of Czech Deputies, representing all political parties, though under pressure from Vienna, declared their loyalty to the Empire.¹⁰³

There were also other factors that helped Masaryk and his friends in their efforts to create an independent Czechoslovak state. The fact that Czechs living in Russia and France created their own combat units which joined the Russian and French legions and fought on the side of the Entente seemed to impress the Allied Powers.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, the Allied Powers included in their war aims the liberation of the Italians, Romanians and Czechoslovaks and other Slavs from Habsburg domination, though they would not yet consider the dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire.¹⁰⁵ It was Prime Minister Aristide Briand of France who

recognized the Czechoslovak National Council as a legitimate body on February 3, 1916.¹⁰⁶ Again the entry of the United States into the war in April 1917 led to the complete Allied victory, and to the creation of the Czechoslovak state.¹⁰⁷ In January 1918, Wilson announced his Fourteen Points, proposing autonomy, not independence, for the nations of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. If Vienna had accepted this condition, the hopes of the Czechoslovak leaders would have been destroyed.¹⁰⁸ However, Vienna refused Wilson's peace program.

In June 1918, France acknowledged the National Council as the legitimate precursor of a Czechoslovak provisional government. During the spring and summer of 1918, the Allied countries supported the program of the Czechoslovak National Council.¹⁰⁹ It was on September 3 that the National Council declared itself the provisional Czechoslovak government. Masaryk was the President and Minister of Foreign Affairs while Edvard Benes and Milan Stefanik became the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of War respectively.¹¹⁰ Throughout the month of September 1918, the major Western Countries recognized the National Council as a provisional government. Thus, the Czechoslovak National Council was recognized as the *de facto* government of the Czechoslovaks.

On 16 October, the Emperor announced in a manifesto the federalization of the Habsburg Empire. However, the manifesto was issued too late to save the Empire.¹¹¹ On October 17, the Czech National Committee in Prague, which was acting as a provisional government, merged with the Czechoslovak provisional

government in Paris. On October 28 independence was proclaimed in Prague. Masaryk became the President of the new government in Prague.¹¹² On October 30, the Slovak National Council in the town of Turcansky Svaty Martin proclaimed the union of Slovakia with the Czechs.¹¹³

The First World War gave the Czechoslovak leaders opportunity and time to promote their cause to the West. The Czechs advocated Czechoslovak unity because only with Slovaks they could propose a viable state to succeed the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As far as the Slovaks were concerned, the unity was the only alternative if they wanted to survive. Thus, at the end of the war the Czechoslovak state, uniting Czechs and Slovaks, was created in the name of the principle of self-determination.

The Czechoslovak Republic was constituted as a unitary state of the so-called Czechoslovak nation. Since it was assumed that there was one Czechoslovak nation with two languages, the idea of a federation was not even considered.¹¹⁴ A fictitious "Czechoslovak nation" tried to be formed and/or created to bolster the right to a nation-state. The major aim was to put the existence of the Czechoslovak Republic on firmer grounds than those of linguistic similarity and geographic proximity. For this end the Great Moravian Empire was also regarded as a historical precedent of Czechoslovak unity and nationhood. Hence, unlike the Czech and Slovak national identities, the "Czechoslovak nation" was an artificial construct.

Thus, it can be argued that Czechoslovakia, just like Yugoslavia, claimed to be a state of one nation and tried to

create a strong feeling of Czechoslovak nationalism. However, making the Czechoslovak nationalism the basis of legitimacy of the new Czechoslovak Republic did not solve the nationality question and the majority of the Slovaks were discontented from an early stage. The Republic failed to create a single Czechoslovak identity out of different cultural and political traditions and histories of the Czechs and Slovaks. Hence, the view that Czechoslovakia was simply the nation-state of the "Czechoslovak people" had to be gradually abandoned.

V. THE FIRST CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC AND THE NATIONAL PROBLEM

(The view that Czechs and Slovaks constitute a single nation was the underlying assumption in the formation of the First Czechoslovak Republic. However, as outlined in Chapter IV, Czechs and Slovaks were divided by their history and divergent economic, cultural and political developments. The Czechoslovak leadership soon confronted the difficulties of integrating these two disparate societies. Thus, the Czech-Slovak relations and the policy pursued by the Czechoslovak leadership to homogenize the Czechoslovak society will be the primary concern of this chapter. A brief account of the First Czechoslovak Republic will also be given in this chapter.)

A. The First Czechoslovak Republic: 1918-1938

The First Czechoslovak Republic was established on 28 October 1918 as a unitary, centralized state. Its political system was based on parliamentary democracy, with multiple political parties and coalition governments.¹

The Czechoslovak electoral system offered proportional representation as a method of election, which encouraged party fragmentation and allowed even small parties to participate in the National Assembly.² As a result, since no party was able to gain a plurality in any election, the governments were composed of five or more political parties. Korbel argued that the multiplicity of political parties, the system of proportional

representation and resulting need for coalition governments posed threats to political stability in the First Czechoslovak Republic.³)

However, since the unitary Czechoslovak state resembled the old Austrian Empire with its diverse nationalities, such a political framework was especially important to minorities in view of the centralization of the Czechoslovak state⁴ because it provided opportunities for minorities to express their political interests.)

Leff argued that although the multiparty system could assure nationalist, regional parties to enter the parliament it did not provide a corresponding decision-making role. Slovaks, for example, voted in majority for regional, nationalist parties, which were in fact opposition parties. Be it German, or Hungarian or Slovak these nationalist parties were not welcomed as coalition partners in interwar Czechoslovakia. Coalition building was the preserve of state-wide Czechoslovak parties, which were supported the idea of Czechoslovakism.⁵ Therefore, it can be argued that interwar nationalists were free to express their claims, but in fact they did not have access to central policy-making.)

¶ The 1920 Constitution also established equality between national, ethnic, and religious minorities and the so-called Czechoslovak nation. A Language Law granted minorities the right to use their own languages in personal and business discourse, in the press, and in churches. Minorities were also granted the right to use their own languages in contacts with authorities

where they constituted more than 20 percent of the population.⁶ As far as education was concerned, the state gave material support to minority schools in districts with large minority populations.⁷

As far as the Slovaks were concerned, there was no need to grant them minority rights, not even cultural autonomy since they were referred to as a branch of the Czechoslovak nation. Slovak was recognized as one of the official languages and it was the only language used in schools and offices in Slovakia.⁸)

(However, soon it became clear to the Czechoslovak leadership that there were economic and social divergences between the Czechs and Slovaks and that it would not be easy to integrate these two dissimilar societies. Czechoslovak leadership found the origin of these divergences in Slovak backwardness.) In an interview with a French reporter in 1921 President Masaryk argued that "There is no Slovak nation. That is the invention of Magyar propaganda. The Czechs and Slovaks are brothers. ... Only cultural level separates them-the Czechs are more developed than the Slovaks, for the Magyars held them in systematic unawareness. We are founding Slovak schools. It is necessary to await the results; in one generation there will be no difference between the two branches of our national family."⁹ (The difference in the cultural levels of the Czechs and Slovaks was assumed to be the sole impediment to Czechoslovak unity and integrity. Thus, it was believed that cultural development would serve to bring national integrity.)

(In order to decrease the cultural gap between the two group the Czechoslovak leadership attempted to improve the literacy level of the Slovak population.) Hundreds of new schools were opened. Czech teachers were sent to educate Slovaks. Furthermore, Slovak institutions of higher learning were established. In 1919 the Comenius University was founded in Bratislava.¹⁰ However, the improvement in the level of education did not lead to a national integration. Instead it seemed to strengthen the linguistic and ethnic identity of Slovaks, who became aware of the differences between themselves and the Czechs.

(Furthermore, serious grievances existed on the part of the Slovaks, whose expectations of autonomy in the Republic were disappointed by the unitary structure adopted.) The Pittsburgh agreement, that was made between Masaryk and the Czech and Slovak emigres in the United States in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on 30 May 1918, had promised the Slovaks an administrative system, a parliament, courts, and the official use of the Slovak language in Slovakia.¹¹ In other words, the Pittsburgh agreement envisaged considerable autonomy for Slovakia. However, (when Czechoslovakia's first constitution was promulgated in 1920, there was no provision for an autonomous status for Slovakia. Referring to the Pittsburgh agreement Slovaks argued that they were deprived of the rights that had been promised before independence. (They maintained that the Slovaks, as equal partners of the new state, should have been given self-

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government and a more equal sharing of power as promised earlier.)

However, the centralist Czechs and Slovaks claimed that the Pittsburgh Agreement was not a legally binding document, merely a declaration of intent. Since it was signed by the members of Slovak organizations in the United States, but not by any elected Slovak representatives, it did not represent the will of the nation.¹² Furthermore, (but the central government in Prague did not accept the idea of Slovak autonomy because it feared that greater autonomy for Slovakia would also mean autonomy for the Germans and the Magyars. The Prague leadership was also afraid that if they gave Slovakia a statue of autonomy, it would lead to demands for a federation that eventually would lead to separatism.) Moreover, acknowledging the Slovaks as a separate national entity would lead to the extinction of the republic, as Slovakia would fall an easy prey to Hungarian revisionism.¹³ (The failure of the First Czechoslovak Republic to fulfill the Pittsburgh agreement created great disappointment and resentment and Slovak demands for autonomy became the main issue of political opposition to the Czechs.)

(Apart from the issue of autonomy there were other reasons for Slovak discontent. Since there were no executives, professionals, and teachers in Slovakia, the Czech civil servants and teachers were sent to Slovakia in 1919 to help organize local administration and to help establish a school system to educate the Slovaks.¹⁴) The influx of Czechs into Slovakia continued throughout the 1920's. Though the Czechs

occupied key positions in industry, transportation, the judiciary, local administration and educational system at all levels, the actual number of Czechs in Slovakia was small, in 1921 2.4 percent and in 1930 3.7 percent of the population of Slovakia.¹⁵

(The newly established educational system allowed the emergence of young Slovak professionals and the creation of a Slovak intelligentsia that were qualified to replace the Czechs. However, due to the increase in unemployment in Bohemia, the Czechs did not want to give up their secure positions for an insecure situation back home.¹⁶ The continued Czech existence in Slovakia, which represented in a way Prague centralism, caused ill-feelings among the Slovaks who felt that they were being exploited.)

(Economic development was another factor that accentuated the stress between the Czechs and Slovaks. Slovaks complained that economic power was concentrated in the Czech lands. While the Czech lands were highly industrialized, Slovakia was agrarian. Efforts to industrialize Slovakia and to reduce the disparity in level of economic development of the two regions during the interwar period failed, in part as the result of the world recession.¹⁷ Thus, hostility grew towards the Czechs who were economically more prosperous.)

(Another reason for Slovak discontent was the secular culture of the Czechs.) The Slovak Catholic Andrej Hlinka said in 1908 that "I am not worried about language, ... it is [Czech] atheism that could destroy us."¹⁸ (The Catholic Church always had

predominant influence in Slovakia and the Catholic Slovaks objected to the government's efforts to secularize the school system. They wanted religious, Catholic schools, while the government insisted on secular state schools.¹⁹ Furthermore, the issue relating to the anniversary commemoration of Jan Hus's death at Constance led to bitter conflict not only with the Vatican but also with the Catholic clergy at home.²⁰

(Continued economic problems, Slovak demands for autonomy, and Slovak resentment towards the growing Czech dominance on Slovakia's economic, political and cultural life led to the emergence of nationalist views in Slovakia in the interwar period. All parties, with the exception of the Slovak People's Party led by Father Andrej Hlinka, believed in the idea of one Czechoslovak nation.²¹ Hlinka argued that the Slovaks had a distinct identity and declared in 1920 "We have never been one nation with the Czechs; we have an entirely different mentality, a different temperament, different culture, different songs, different literature".²² Those who believed that the Slovaks were distinct from the Czechs centered around Father Andrej Hlinka's Slovak's People's Party. Hlinka resented the position taken by the centralists, both Czech and Slovak, and insisted on Slovak autonomy.)

Although the Slovak demand for autonomy had a damaging effect on Czechoslovakia's political stability and development, it never posed an acute threat to the Czechoslovak state. Andrej Hlinka and his collaborators in the party pursued very limited objectives. They always put their demands within a Czechoslovak

framework, even during their participation in the governmental coalition from October 1926 until December 1929. They never wished to destroy the country. Hungarian irredentism did not pose a real threat because of the small size of that minority. In fact, the main conflict was between the Czechs and the German minority.

Though the minorities as "Czechoslovak citizens" were granted political, religious and economic equality with the so-called Czechoslovak nation, the centralism of Prague conflicted with the political aspirations of the Sudeten Germans, who had not wished to become part of the new state.

The Sudeten German minority, that comprised 22 percent of the population, was at odds with the new Czechoslovak state ever since its creation in 1918. It declared its territory independent and sought a solution of its grievances in an alignment with either Austria or Germany rather than be included in the Czechoslovak state.²³ The border areas were incorporated in the new state through the peace treaties.

The Sudeten Germans, who had been the most significant group economically and politically in the Austrian Empire, lost their advantageous position. They were hit by the land reform since most of the large estates confiscated for redistribution, most of which were given to the Czechs, were German.²⁴ Furthermore, Czech banks only gave financial assistance to Sudeten industries provided that they hired Czech workers.²⁵ In addition, few Germans were located in public services.

In the area of education, the German minority had opportunities to preserve their cultural identity. They had universities and other institutions of higher learning supported by the state.²⁶

The German minority also enjoyed political freedom. Proportional representation in the electoral system allowed representatives of the German political parties to take part in Parliament. The Christian Socialist Party and the Agrarians joined the cabinet in 1926. Most German democratic parties supported the existence of the Czechoslovak state, except the German National Party, and the German National Socialist Workers Party.²⁷

Hitler's accession to power in late January 1933 spelled danger for Czechoslovakia. In early October 1933, the leader of the Union of the German gymnastic societies, *Turnvereine*, Konrad Henlein, called for the creation of a new political entity, the Sudeten German Fatherland Front. At the early stage the Fatherland Front demanded autonomy, though declaring his loyalty to the Czechoslovak state. However, it gradually developed into an instrument of Hitler who wanted to destroy the Republic.²⁸

In October 1933 the Czechoslovak government dissolved the German National Socialist Worker's Party and German National Party because they had contacts with Hitler's Nazi Party.²⁹ In May 1935 Henlein's Fatherland Front changed its name to the Sudeten German Party and in the 1935 parliamentary elections the Party won two-thirds of the German vote in Czechoslovakia. As opposed to Henlein's party the united representatives of the

German Social Democrats, Agrarians and the Christian Socialist Party, who were willing to cooperate with the government, accounted for only a quarter of the Sudeten German electors.³⁰

From the end of 1936 Henlein began presenting the Prague government with a series of demands. He wanted territorial autonomy for the Sudeten Germans, that would have created a state within a state.³¹ The demands of the Sudeten German Party were fully supported by Hitler. The final version of the demands of the Sudeten German Party for far-reaching autonomy were voiced in the Karlsbad program³², in which the party required reparations to be paid for the injustices inflicted on the Sudeten Germans since 1918. Furthermore, they also wanted Czechoslovakia to grant the Sudeten Germans complete freedom of choice in matters of allegiance to the German nation.³³ It was not possible for these demands to be met by the Prague government.

To avoid Hitler attacking Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia's allies, France and Britain, began to urge Benes and the Prague government to accept Henlein's demands. The Czechoslovak government made some concessions but it failed to satisfy the far-reaching demands of Henlein and his party.

The fate of Czechoslovakia was decided at the Munich Conference on 29 September 1938. Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain participated in the conference and they signed an agreement, in the absence of Czechoslovakia, according to which Czechoslovakia was to cede to Germany its German-inhabited borderlands.³⁴ The Prague government surrendered and President

Benes resigned. In the first days of October 1938 the German army began to occupy the Czech lands. Under the First Vienna Award the southern borderland of Slovakia was ceded to Hungary in November 1938.³⁵

Meanwhile, during the Munich crisis, Czechs attempted to solve the Czech-Slovak conflict in order to have a united front against the Nazis. With the Zilina Accord of October 1938, Czechoslovakia was transformed into Czecho-Slovakia, the so-called Second Republic, in which the Slovaks were recognized as a separate nation and they were given an autonomous status. Thus, Czecho-Slovakia was the state of two equal nations each with their own parliament.³⁶

However, the Second Republic was also subjected to Hitler's control in March 1939. Benes's successor, Emil Hacha, was forced to accept the status of a German Protectorate for the remaining parts of Bohemia and Moravia on 15 March 1939. A day earlier, the Slovak leader, Hlinka's successor Josef Tiso, a Catholic clergyman, who made a deal with Hitler, and proclaimed a semi-independent Slovak state under German protection.³⁷ Thus, in spring 1939 the country had been dismembered into a puppet Republic of Slovakia, which was ruled by a fascist regime, and an occupied German territory.

Interwar government's efforts to create a single Czechoslovak nation failed since improvement in the level of education increased Slovak awareness of the differences between Czechs and Slovaks. The newly established educational system not only improved the literacy level of the Slovak population, but also

allowed the emergence of Slovak professionals and a Slovak intelligentsia. Slovak political parties were established and they began to participate in the politics of the First Czechoslovak Republic. Furthermore, it can be argued that the national political programs of the Slovak political leaders acquired mass appeal since Slovak electorates voted for the regional nationalist parties, as opposed to state-wide Czechoslovak parties.³⁸ The Slovak electorate seemed to be convinced of the importance of the national issue. The national consciousness of the Slovak intelligentsia began to spread to the Slovak population. Therefore, with the creation of organized Slovak political parties, inclusion and the political mobilization of the masses for common political goals, which are necessary elements in the project of transformation of an *ethnie* to nation, began.³⁹

Referring to Hroch's model, the Slovak national movement entered Hroch's last phase in the First Czechoslovak Republic. With Slovak language schools, electoral access, organized political organs, which they had been unable to attain under the Hungarian rule, the Slovaks began to develop into a nation. Transition to Phase B to Phase C was completed during the Second World War, when the Slovaks for the first time in their history attained statehood. Although what the Slovaks enjoyed during the war was not a genuine independence, under German supervision, the Slovak officials had real responsibility for running the country. They had their own president and government and, thus, they acquired a certain degree of experience in administration

and in policy-making, which brought self-confidence about their capacities.⁴⁰

(The failure of the Czechoslovak government to satisfy the nationalistic demands of the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans enabled Hitler to manipulate the ethnic tension in the republic in the pursuit of his aggressive aims. Thus, it was the ethnic conflict that ultimately provided the pretext for the breakup of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1938. However, though the First Czechoslovak Republic failed to deal successfully with the ethnic problems, it managed to survive. It was not the internal problems, be it economic or social or political, that destroyed the Czechoslovak Republic but rather an outside factor, namely the rise of German Nazism. The Catholic-autonomist party in Slovakia and the Sudeten German Party had become the tools in the hands of Hitler to dismember Czechoslovakia. However, this was only another step for Hitler as he tried to impose his rule on Europe as a whole.)

B. The Czechoslovak Struggle for National Liberation: 1939-1945

During the World War II Czech resistance movement was organized both at home and abroad. At home, there was a range of resistance groups, which formed one central body, the Central Committee for Home Resistance, to coordinate their underground activities. However, except for public protests in 1939, the assassination of the S.S. General Reinhard Heydrich, in May 1942, and the final uprising of Prague in May, 1945, the Czech

underground resistance at home was rather minimal throughout the war.⁴¹

Turning to Czechoslovak activities abroad, Benes, who fled to London in 1939, began to struggle to restore the Czechoslovak Republic within its pre-1938 frontiers. In 1941 Benes succeeded in gaining recognition of the Czechoslovak government in exile in London.⁴²

Benes foresaw that East Central Europe would be liberated by the Soviets and that the Soviet Union would be the dominant power in the region and accordingly he turned to a Soviet alliance.⁴³ He signed the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Aid, and Postwar Cooperation with the Soviet Union in December 1943.⁴⁴ Furthermore, since Benes thought that the Communists would be an important political force in the postwar Czechoslovakia, he met the Czechoslovak communists in-exile in Moscow and he invited the Communists into his government in-exile.⁴⁵ For Benes, Czechoslovakia could serve as a bridge between West and East, connecting the two cultures and amalgamating what was best in the Western democracy and Eastern socialism.⁴⁶

(The resistance was more active and widespread in Slovakia. When it became clear that the Nazis were losing the war, the opponents of the fascist Tiso regime, that is democratic and communist leaders, reached an agreement on the reestablishment of a common state with the Czechs, but this time with more equality to the Slovaks as distinct nation. For this end, democratic and communist leaders first established an underground Slovak National Council in November 1943 and then

staged an armed uprising against the fascists in late August 1944.⁴⁷ Though crushed in two months by the German army, the Slovak national uprising achieved an important political success. It justified the claims of the Slovaks who wished to reconstitute a post-war state with the Czech nation, though on condition of absolute equality.⁴⁸

However, Benes was opposing the Slovak claim for recognition as a distinct nation, saying "You will never compel me to recognize the Slovak nation...I resolutely take the view that Slovaks are Czechs and the Slovak language is one of the dialects of the Czech language. I do not object if someone says he is a Slovak, but I will not permit the statement that there is any such thing as a Slovak nation."⁴⁹ Benes failed to see the fact that the politicization of the Slovak ethnics, which had begun during the interwar period, was completed during World War II when the Slovaks attained statehood.

After the Slovak national uprising, when a delegation of the Slovak National Council went to London in November 1944 and presented its program, Benes retreated from his earlier position. (The Slovak national uprising forced the reluctant Czechoslovak government in-exile to recognize the separate nationhood of the Slovaks and to grant autonomy for Slovakia within postwar Czechoslovakia.⁵⁰ The Slovak National Council was also recognized as the executive power of the autonomous Slovakia.⁵¹)

(As far as the stance of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC) with regard to the national question was concerned,

following the directives of the Comintern, (the Party recognized the existence of a separate Slovak nationhood.⁵² However, despite its commitment to national self-determination, the Party recommended neither autonomy nor secession for the Slovaks.) This indifferent attitude of the CPC to the question of the Slovak national rights could be explained by the fact that by (then Slovak nationalism had become the main political program of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, which had more impact upon the Slovak population as a defender of the Slovak nation's interests.⁵³)

When the CPC was banned after Munich, the Czech Communist leaders went into exile in the Soviet Union. During the Second World War the communist underground identified itself both with the liberation struggle in the Czech lands and with national aspirations in Slovakia. A separate party of Slovakia, the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) was established by Gustav Husak and Vladimir Clementis as its leaders.⁵⁴

The CPC leadership in Moscow soon found itself between the conflicting interests of the Czech and Slovak factions. It shifted from one position to another, though always claiming to follow Lenin's theory of self-determination. The CPC leadership in Moscow and the Slovak faction until 1939 called for the reestablishment of Czechoslovakia. However, soon the Slovak communists condemned the concept of a restored Czechoslovakia and began to talk about a future Soviet Slovakia. When the Soviet Union decided to establish diplomatic relations with the fascist Slovakia, the CPC leadership stopped advocating the

program of reconstituting Czechoslovakia, emphasizing the right of self-determination, that is the right to an independent state, for both the Czechs and Slovaks.⁵⁵ However, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, when the Czechoslovak government and the Soviet government became allies and restored diplomatic relations, Gottwald and other Communist leaders in Moscow began to advocate a policy of complete equality for Czechs and Slovaks in the restored Czechoslovakia. After the Soviet recognition of the unity and territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia, signing a treaty of alliance with the Czechoslovak government in exile in December 1943, Slovak Communists and democrats reached an agreement on the reestablishment of Czechoslovakia, providing that the Slovaks would be granted autonomy within a future united Czechoslovak state.⁵⁶

When the Red Army was in the process of liberating Czechoslovakia, Benes and his government moved to Moscow in March 1945, where final agreement with Czech communists and with a delegation of the Slovak National Council, about a new government of postwar Czechoslovakia was reached.⁵⁷ Soon the Czechoslovak government moved to the Czechoslovak territory and in Kosice it announced its first program on April 5, 1945, which was to serve as the basis of the new Czechoslovak state. Though the Kosice program guaranteed that Czechoslovakia would be a state of two equal nations, Czechs and Slovaks, it granted Slovakia only a certain degree of autonomy.⁵⁸ The reasons for this paradox will be explained in the next chapter.

VI. NATIONAL PROBLEM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA UNDER COMMUNIST RULE (1945-1989)

(Following the Nazi defeat and the liberation by the Red Army at the end of the Second World War, the Czechoslovak state was reestablished, initially under a multi-party coalition government. Although, the Slovaks were recognized as a distinct nation, the Czechoslovak state was reconstituted as a unitary state, with the Slovaks granted only a certain degree of autonomy. However, during the period between 1945-1948 legislative and executive Slovak bodies were subjected to the ultimate control of Prague.)

(In February 1948 the Communists staged a coup d'etat and remained in power for the next four decades until the late 1989. In the 1950s Communist leadership initiated a program of economic equalization between the Czech lands and Slovakia. It was believed that economic development would resolve the national question. However, the industrialization of Slovakia intensified the Slovak nationalism and Slovak resentment with the so-called asymmetrical system was one of the factors that led to the short-lived Prague Spring liberalization in 1968. During the reform period of 1968, a federal structure was designed to satisfy Slovak demands for parity within the Czechoslovak state. ←

In January 1969, the federal system was introduced with the aim of solving the national question. However, soon the powers of federalist institutions were reduced by a series of

constitutional amendments introduced in early 1970s and under the Husak leadership a centralized system was reestablished.)

The Czech-Slovak relations under these successive phases of communist rule and the Marxist strategies pursued to resolve the national question will be covered throughout this chapter. Furthermore, the similarities and differences among the federal systems of the Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union will also be explained in this chapter.

A. Third Czechoslovak Republic: 1945-1948

(Czechoslovakia was reconstituted after the war as a state of Czechs and Slovaks. It was officially recognized that the Czechs and Slovaks are two equal nations, closely related by language and culture. Thus, the fiction of a single Czechoslovak nation was abandoned.)

(As far as its ethnic composition was concerned, the post-war Czechoslovakia, especially the Czech lands, achieved near ethnic homogeneity.) In order to solve the problem of the Sudeten German minority and put an end to the German-Czech conflict, Benes and his government in exile demanded the mass expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Bohemia and Moravia after the war. At the Potsdam Conference in August 1945, Benes succeeded to gain the consent of the all Allied Powers.¹ The so-called organized transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia began in January 1946 and by early 1947 over three million Germans had been transferred to Germany.²

The problem of Hungarian minority was attempted to be solved by partial exchange of Slovaks and Magyars. However, only a little over 70,000 people were exchanged.³ The full exchange of Magyars and Slovaks was prevented by the Hungarian government, possibly in order to have an opportunity to maintain their revisionist and irredentist action.⁴

Thus, as a result of the expulsion of Sudeten Germans to Germany, the partial exchange of Slovak and Magyar populations and the cession of Ruthenia to the Soviet Union⁵, the relations between Czechs and Slovaks became the state's major ethnic issue.

(The Slovak demands were satisfied by an explicit recognition of Slovaks as a separate nation and by granting Slovakia a certain degree of autonomy. The Slovak National Council, and the Board of Commissioners, the legislative and executive organs respectively, were acknowledged as the sole source of governmental power in Slovakia. Common problems, such as foreign policy, national defense, and finances, were to be solved in close cooperation between the government in Prague and the Slovak National Council. Other concerns, such as education, would be entirely in the hands of the Slovak authority in Bratislava. The Slovaks were also guaranteed equal representation in central government offices and institutions.)⁶

While Slovak law-making and executive organs existed below the statewide level, there was no comparable institutions in the Czech lands. The central Czechoslovak government in Prague passed decisions, some of which extended to the whole country,

while others were limited to the Czech lands. (This arrangement which was called asymmetrical existed for twenty years, until federalization in 1969.⁷)

(It should be noted here that while a distinct Slovak national identity was recognized, the Slovak right to full self-administration was denied.) It is difficult to reconcile the recognition of Slovak nationhood, on the one hand, and the denial of a decentralized state, which that recognition implies, on the other. (Instead of following the federalization along the Soviet model, the communist leadership emphasized the necessity of central direction and control. It seems that they saw federalism and even decentralization as a setback to cooperation and unity of the two nations and to the principle of democratic centralism.⁸)

In the first year of the reconstituted Republic there was no elected parliament. Six parties, the CPC, the National Socialist Party, the Czechoslovak People's Party and the Social Democratic Party in the Czech lands, and the CPS and the Slovak Democratic Party in Slovakia, constituted themselves as the National Front.⁹ Since all parties were part of the national coalition government, there was no institutionalized opposition. Though the communists constituted a minority in the coalition government, they received significant ministries, such as the Ministries of Interior, Information, and Agriculture.¹⁰

As far as socialist measures were concerned, from 1945 to 1948, banks and large industrial enterprises were nationalized, large landed estates were distributed to peasants.¹¹ Though the

communists seemed to participate loyally in a parliamentary system since they demanded only moderate socio-economic reforms, in fact, they were trying to consolidate their strength in the cabinet and in the national councils in provinces.

(In the first parliamentary election, which took place on May 26, 1946, the CPC received 40 percent of the vote in the Czech lands, while the National Socialist Party gained 24 percent, the Czechoslovak People's Party 20 percent and the Social Democratic Party 16 percent. The CPC emerged as the strongest party in the Czech lands. In Slovakia, however, the Democratic Party, which was backed by the predominantly agrarian population and the Catholic clergy, won a victory with 62 percent of the vote. The CPS gained only 30 percent of the vote. However, in the state as a whole, the Communists emerged as the strongest party with 38% of the votes and with 114 of the 300 seats in the new National Assembly.¹² Thus, taken together the democratic parties in Czechoslovakia surpassed the strength of the communists with 186 seats in the National Assembly.

After the 1946 elections in Slovakia, the victorious Slovak Democratic Party became the target of the Communists. The fear to lose political control of the Slovak administrative apparatus to the Slovak Democrats, led to the Third Prague Agreement¹³ of June 1946, which restricted the legislative competence of Slovak National Council by requiring central ratification of the Council's laws. Furthermore, the Board of Commissioners became a mere tool of implementing Czechoslovak laws and decrees. The government in Prague began to control the operations of the

regional Slovak organs. Thus, Communists sharply limited the autonomy of Slovakia, reducing it to a regional administrative unit of the Prague-centered government.¹⁴ This measure, together with the treason trial and the hanging in April, 1947 of Josef Tiso, the former President of the Slovak Republic, imposed a stress on Czech-Slovak relations.

Summarily, the CPS, which strongly advocated full recognition of Slovak demands, and had even thought in terms of a Slovak republic within the Soviet Union during the war and which returned to the policy of autonomy by the end of the war, moved toward centralism. Since the CPS had little chance of increasing its popularity, it began to support the centralization of all decision-making in Prague. It even accused the Democratic Party of propagating a program of separatism in the months preceding the Communist seizure of power.¹⁵

(A combination of foreign and domestic developments led to communist takeover of full power in February 1948. Domestically, the crisis in agriculture, caused by a severe drought, led to food shortages and an emergence of a black market. The Communists, who headed the ministries of Agriculture, Internal Trade, Social Welfare and Finance, began to lose popularity.¹⁶)

In July 1947, the Soviet Union urged the Prague government to reverse its initial decision to participate in the Marshall Plan initiated by the United States, arguing that joining the plan would be a hostile act towards the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Soviet delegates insulted the Czechoslovak

communists for their timidity and moderation in the founding session of the Cominform.¹⁷

(In order to attain total control the Communists tried to paralyze other parties.) They campaigned against the Slovak Democratic party, accusing some of its leaders of treason. They proposed that the next parliamentary elections be based on a single-ticket list, which was to be composed by the member parties of the National Front, and then ratified by the electorate by plebiscite. Furthermore, Party officials sent bomb packages to three non-communist ministers. The Communist Minister of the Interior stopped the investigation undertaken by the Ministry of Justice and began to purge the police apparatus of its non-Communist police officers without consulting his coalition partners.¹⁸

As a protest against the arbitrary measures of the communist Minister of Interior, the twelve non-communist ministers resigned, hoping that President Benes would refuse to accept their resignations, would dissolve the National Assembly and order new general elections. However, the resignations gave the Communists, who were still legally in office, an opportunity to stage a coup d'etat. Benes eventually yielded to the threat of civil unrest posed by communist-organized demonstrations and accepted the twelve resignations on February 25, 1948 and appointed a new government, the members of which were communists and their collaborators from the other political parties, such as the Social Democratic Party, which remained in the cabinet as a result of Communist pressure.¹⁹

(The Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia was bloodless and constitutional. The resignations of non-communist ministers provided the CPC with the opportunity to seize power and establish its absolute rule in Czechoslovakia by constitutional means. Thus, though the Czech and Slovak democratic parties constituted the majority in the National Assembly, they proved incapable to unite against the communists. This gave the Communists an opportunity to achieve by manipulation what they could not attain through electoral means.)

B. The National Problem After the Communist Seizure of Power (1948-1962)

(After the removal of the non-communists from the government with the so-called "Prague coup", the Communist Party began to centralize the political and economic systems along the Stalinist model. All governmental institutions and mass organizations were transformed into tools of the Communist Party. Since the Czech National Socialist and People's Parties were thoroughly purged and the Slovak Democratic Party was disbanded, the May 1948 elections took place with only a single list of candidates, dominated with the Communists and their collaborators. In May, 1948 the National Assembly approved a new Constitution, which declared the country as a people's democracy. In June, Benes resigned from the presidency, refusing to ratify the new Constitution. The Communists' victory was

completed by the election of Gottwald to the presidency in June 1948.²⁰

Political repression was directed not only at the opponents of the communists, but also at members of the CPC itself, in a series of show trials, purges, and executions in the early 1950s. Fourteen Party and government officials, including Rudolf Slansky, former Secretary-General of the CPC, and Vladimir Clementis, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, were found guilty on charges of conspiracy against the state. Furthermore, a group of Slovak intellectuals were executed for various crimes, including Titoism, bourgeois nationalism and treason.²¹

(In the economic sphere, a new Five Year Plan, which placed an emphasis on heavy industry and coordination with the economies of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, was introduced.) In the early 1950s the centralized planning resulted in nationalization of all industry, destruction of private sector, and collectivization of agriculture. In 1951, the five-year plan was revised to reinforce the industrialization of Slovakia.²²

Unlike in other people's democracies in Eastern Europe, the Stalinist policies continued to be conducted in Czechoslovakia even after the death of Stalin and Gottwald in 1953. (The workers' demonstrations in Czech towns and industrial cities in 1953 were suppressed.²³ Furthermore, political trials continued. Those Slovak communists, who had supported Slovak national autonomy during and after the World War II, were accused of "bourgeois nationalism" and were either executed or imprisoned)

in 1954. The victims included Gustav Husak, who had organized the Communist coup d'etat in Slovakia in 1947-48, and other leading Slovak communists. Thus, Slovak nationalist communists were replaced by the persons with more centralist viewpoint.²⁴

During the Stalinist years Slovakia experienced the gradual abolition of her autonomy. The rights invested in the Slovak National Council and Board of Commissioners were taken away during the period between 1945-1948. The Constitution of May 1948 reduced the National Council, which was endowed with considerable legislative power, to a formal body that met rarely. The Board of Commissioners, an influential executive organ appointed by the National Council, became a mere tool of implementing the directives of the central government in Prague and began to be appointed by Prague.²⁵ Clearly, the Slovak national organs became dependent on the central government's directives. Furthermore, the CPS was incorporated into the CPC in September 1948 and was subjected to its policy and discipline.²⁶

(Thus, it can be argued that under the Communist regime expressions of Slovak nationalism were severely suppressed and through a series of purges Slovak nationalist elements from the Party were eliminated. Any formal power that Slovak national bodies had was repressed by the highly centralized structure of the CPC. Thus, the Slovaks were deprived of their autonomous status by the centralist Communist Party, which was once an advocate of Slovak national rights.)

Meanwhile, in matters of economy, however, Slovakia received preferential treatment. Following the Classical Marxist assumption that the origins of inequality and national tension lies in the economic sphere, Communists initiated a large-scale program of economic equalization between the Czech lands and Slovakia. To balance the inequalities the CPC channelled considerable industrial investment into Slovakia.²⁷ It was thought that the rapid industrialization in Slovakia would result in economic equalization of the two regions, which would in turn reduce the differences between Czechs and Slovaks and would allow the emergence of a homogeneous national community. However, the Communist strategy to solve the national question along Classical Marxist line failed and it became clear that the national question could not be reduced to solely economic terms, neglecting the importance of political and sociocultural factors.

As far as modernization theories are concerned they argue that modernization, which involves increased urbanization, industrialization, the spread of communications, improvements in transportation and the development of mass education and literacy, within a society leads to political and economic integration.²⁸ However, this does not appear to be the case, at least when there are different ethnic groups living side by side within a state. On the contrary, the impact of modernization seems to strengthen the linguistic and ethnic identity and thus generate conflicts based upon ethnic attachments.²⁹ As a result of modernization, ethnic groups become aware of the differences

between themselves and other ethnic groups. This appears to be the case in Czechoslovakia. The near economic equalization that occurred under the Communist rule did not decrease the importance of ethnic identity. The industrialization of Slovakia increased the levels of urbanization and education and intensified the Slovak nationalism. Thus, ethnicity remained as a source of tension and political conflict, and economically developed Slovakia became more challenging to the concept of a unitary Czechoslovak state.

Even the denunciation of Stalin by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress in January 1956, which led to dramatic challenges to the Communist system in Hungary and Poland, had little impact in Czechoslovakia.³⁰ Under Antonin Novotny, who became the President of Czechoslovakia in 1957, the regime continued to pursue Stalinist policies. The 1960 Constitution, which was modeled on the Soviet pattern, endorsed the leading role of the Party. It also proclaimed that the country moved into the higher stage of socialism and hence the country was given a new name, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.³¹

The new Constitution further weakened the position of Slovakia. There was no expansion of the legislative functions of the Slovak National Council. The Constitution also abolished the Board of Commissioners.³² Moreover, Slovak territory was divided into three new regions which were placed under the direct administration of the central government in Prague.³³ This regulation further undermined the position of the Slovak national organs.

When the new Czechoslovak republic was restored in 1945, the Communists recognized the Slovaks as a nation and favored autonomy for Slovakia. Once in power, however, they tried to keep the party centralized and free of nationalist tendencies. The Slovak wing of the Party was purged and Slovak communists with nationalist viewpoint were replaced by centralist Slovak communists. The Communists also undermined the authority of the Slovak national organs, and especially after 1948 subjected Slovakia to the ultimate control of centralized government in Prague. Slovak dissatisfaction with the asymmetric system which denied them parity and Slovak resentment over the remaining inequalities in development levels in two parts of the country contributed much to the pressure for liberalization and reform which reached its climax in the late 1960s.

C: Era of Liberalization of Communist Czechoslovakia (1962-1968)

It was not until Khrushchev's renewed attack on Stalin, at the Twenty-second Party Congress in October 1961, that de-Stalinization began to be implemented in Czechoslovakia. However, this was not the only reason which led to the introduction of economic and even some political reforms. Liberalization came about also as a result of changes in economic performance, and ethnic tensions in the relationship between Czechs and Slovaks. Furthermore, in the 1960s a reform movement within the CPC itself gradually emerged.

By the early 1960s, the economy began to stagnate as a result of the rigid centralization and poor management. In 1963, the Communist Party leadership established a commission of economic experts, headed by Ota Sik, a member of the Party's Central Committee, to propose reforms to improve the deteriorating command economy. Though the Commission's proposal for economic reform, which formed the basis for a series of economic measures introduced in the mid-60s, was approved at the Thirteenth Congress of the CPC in 1966, it was not fully implemented due to the bureaucratic opposition. Ota Sik and many other economic reformers soon realized that for successful economic changes reforms in the political sphere were necessary.³⁴

The advocates of political reform were mainly intellectuals and members of the political elite. Philosophers, sociologists, historians and writers demanded greater freedom of expression for themselves and other citizens, criticizing Stalinism and strict party control of cultural life in their journals.³⁵ University students gave significant support to the campaign of the intellectuals who openly questioned the regime, voicing their discontent with the regime through their newspapers and organizations.³⁶ At the Congress of the Union of Czechoslovak Writers, held in June, 1967, participants condemned Stalinism, addressing the problems of Stalinism and censorship. Though after the Congress many writers were expelled from the party and the writers' union journal was suppressed³⁷, the Congress was

one of the main events in the process of theoretical awakening that preceded the political reforms of 1968.

Much of the pressure for general reform had its source in the Czech-Slovak nationality question. Slovak intellectuals began to voice their dissatisfaction with the asymmetrical system and with the lack of equality within the Czechoslovak state. They demanded greater equality with the Czechs not only in economy as Communists thought but in every sphere. They also called for the rehabilitation of Slovak Communists previously branded as "bourgeois nationalists" in the purges of 1950s.³⁸

The Slovak demands set the political stage for many of the reforms that followed. In 1963 some centralist and Stalinist Slovak leaders were removed. In April 1963, Karol Bacilek, first-secretary of the CPS, was ousted from his position and was replaced by Alexander Dubcek. Some victims, including Husak, who survived the purges were released from prison and rehabilitated.³⁹ In May 1964 a law, which restored some authority to the Slovak institutions, especially to the National Council, was passed.⁴⁰ It appears that the degree of development and equalization that occurred in Slovakia under the Communist rule resulted in Slovak accumulation of industrial and administrative skills, which in turn led to an upsurge of Slovak national aspirations. Furthermore, Slovaks were able to voice their demands and achieve some political effect due to the presence of constitutionally recognized Slovak national bodies and Slovak Party organization.

The growing division within the CPC leadership between those who wanted to preserve the status quo and others who supported economic and political reforms was another important factor that led to the reform movement in late 1960s. There were three loose factions within the Central Committee and the Party. The first faction, consisted of party economists headed by Ota Sik, demanded not only economic reforms but also political liberalization, arguing that a change in economics had to go with political changes. The Slovak faction, on the other hand, placed their hopes in a change in the party leadership, which would be more responsive to Slovak concerns. The third group was a loose collection of younger Communist leaders who were critical of the old generation. The Party leadership was in total disorder. Novotny tried to control the situation by imposing strict Party discipline.⁴¹

Although the Novotny regime introduced economic, and even some political reforms, it failed to deal effectively with the Slovak national issue, with economic deterioration, and with the deepening conflict between the Party apparatus and the intelligentsia. He responded to the Slovak leaders' demands for new constitutional arrangements by accusing them of nationalism and separatism. He used these demands to attack openly Alexander Dubcek.⁴² The Slovak discontent that emanated from Novotny's insensitivity to Slovak national feelings led to the demands for more liberalization and reform.

The opposition to Novotny and his policies within the party came into the open at the October and December 1967 meetings of

the Central Committee.⁴³ Novotny was unable to deal with this crisis and as a result he resigned as first secretary of the CPC in January 1968. He was replaced by Alexander Dubcek, the leader of the CPS, who was open to ideas of reform and aware of Slovak interests.

1. The Prague Spring of 1968

Novotny's ouster and replacement by Alexander Dubcek as first secretary of the CPC in January 1968 made possible much more radical reforms and a short period of political tolerance and liberalization, which was known as the "Prague Spring", began.

Dubcek and other reformers immediately embarked upon a program of radical political and economic reforms. The aim was to revitalize the system through Czech humanist and democratic traditions and to create a new model, a socialist system "with a human face", which was thought to be better suited to Czechoslovakia's democratic traditions.⁴⁴

An Action Program, which embodied the ideas of the Dubcek leadership, was adopted by the Central Committee of the CPC in April 1968.⁴⁵ The program basically outlined the new directions in policy which the party was determined to pursue. It called for a democratization of the political system, which would permit the reemergence of Czechoslovakia's democratic traditions. The Program proposed the separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers and judicial

rehabilitation of the victims of illegal trials and purges.⁴⁶ All these measures were intended put an end to the growing centralization of power in the hands of the Party and to give the party a human face, justifying its holding on to power.

Since Dubcek and other reformist-minded communist leaders believed that there was a connection between economic and political reforms, the Action Program also envisaged a socialist economy in which the market would have a role to play.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the Program asked for basic reforms in education, improvements in educational standards, the self-management of universities, and academic freedom. The Program also aimed to restore civil rights, including the freedom of press.⁴⁸

Though the Action Program embodied many reform proposals in almost every sphere, the leading role of the Party was not abandoned. While Dubcek and other leaders agreed that the CPC would remain the single governing party, they planned to modify its traditional leading role through the introduction of more genuine elections, both to parliamentary bodies and within the CPC.⁴⁹ They basically envisioned a less dominant position for the Party and an increase in the role of political and social organizations.

In the course of the political reform, Slovaks continued to voice their dissatisfaction with the asymmetric system. They argued that since there were no officially recognized Czech national organs in the party and in the state equivalent to the Slovak ones, central institutions assumed the role of the Czech national organs, defending mainly Czech interests. In addition,

Slovaks maintained that since the Czech national bodies were identical with the central ones, they were superior to the Slovak ones, having jurisdiction over all the state.⁵⁰ Slovaks basically demanded the introduction of a system which would embody the principle of a symmetrical arrangement on the basis of full equality.

The Action Program met the demands of the Slovaks who were dissatisfied over the centralization of power in Prague. The relations between Czechs and Slovaks were decided to be based on the principle of complete equality in the form of a federation. According to the Program both nations would have their own government and parliament, and only matters of state interest would be handled by common federal organs.⁵¹

It should be noted here that the federalist solution was accepted not only to solve the Slovak problem, but also to restore public confidence in the Party. Furthermore, there was no problem in legitimizing federation in accordance with Leninist principles and Soviet practice.⁵²

When the Dubcek leadership attempted to implement the reforms embodied in the Action Program, it faced challenges both from the conservatives and collaborators of Novotny who remained within the Party and from those who demanded more radical changes in the political system. The "Two Thousand Words" statement, which was signed in June by Czech intellectuals, workers and farmers, not only shocked the Party leaders but also irritated the Soviets and conservative East European leaders who

were watching the developments in Czechoslovakia with increasing suspicion.⁵³

The Soviet regime and most of the Warsaw Pact allies saw the experiments as an attack on socialism. They wanted to prevent Czechoslovakia's experimental "socialism with a human face" spreading to other countries in the region. In July, all countries of the Warsaw Pact Organization, with the exception of Romania, urged Dubcek to reverse the liberalization process, and demanded him to dismiss the liberal leaders from the government and the Party, to introduce censorship, and to dissolve anti-communist organizations.⁵⁴

Though Dubcek tried to reconcile the Soviet demands to restore full Party control and the demands of Czechs and Slovaks for freedom and democracy, he failed to prevent the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact armies in the night of 20/21 August 1968. The military action and intervention was justified by the Brezhnev doctrine, according to which it was the duty of Communist countries to intervene in a Communist country which was threatened by a counterrevolution which would in turn endanger the security of the whole socialist community.⁵⁵

Dubcek and most of the Czechoslovak leaders, with the exception of President Ludvik Svoboda, who had replaced Novotny in March 1968, were arrested and taken to Moscow. President Svoboda and a group of both conservative and liberal Communist leaders went to Moscow where the Czechoslovaks were forced to sign a document of capitulation which ended the reform program.⁵⁶ Thus, though the original intention of the Soviets of

replacing Dubcek and other reformist leaders with more conservative Communists willing to cooperate with the occupation forces failed, owing to the popular resistance of both Czechs and Slovaks and the refusal of President Svoboda to appoint a new government composed of conservative communists, the invasion ended the Prague Spring reforms.

2. Federalization of Czechoslovakia

The only significant reform which remained after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact armies was the introduction of a federal system which had been proposed in the Action Program. The constitutional amendments, which was adopted in October 1968, went into effect on January 1, 1969 and the unitary Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was transformed into a federation of Czech Socialist and Slovak Socialist republics.

It was not totally surprising that the Soviet leaders permitted the adoption of a federalist system in Czechoslovakia. Right after the invasion the two nations were united behind Dubcek, Svoboda, and other reformist leaders, against the Soviets. Although Czechs and Slovaks viewed the 1968 reform movement somewhat differently, they reacted together in identical fashion with passive resistance toward the common enemy.⁵⁷ In order to break the unity of the Czech and Slovak peoples, the Soviet leadership appealed to the Slovak displeasure with the Czech predominance in the state and manipulated the national aspirations of the Slovaks in such a

way as to turn it against solidarity with the Czechs.⁵⁸ In order to isolate both peoples and to rule more effectively, the Soviet authorities exploited the Slovak resentments towards the Czechs and allowed the Dubcek leadership to establish a federal system for Czechoslovakia in January 1969. It should be also noted here that the Soviet leadership brought about the reestablishment of a centralized system through purges in the party and through constitutional amendments during the "normalization" period, which will be analyzed later in this chapter.

With the introduction of the federal system Czechoslovakia became one of the three socialist federal states in which the ethnic factor was the principle and decisive motive for the federalization of the state. In other words, as in the case of the two other multinational socialist states, namely the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, federalism was initiated with the explicit aim of solving the national question.⁵⁹ In Czechoslovakia, with the introduction of federalism ethnicity was institutionalized, that is ethnic differences were recognized and were formally incorporated into the state structure.⁶⁰

Theoretically, socialist federations were based on the principle of the unity of the people and the diversity of nations, which was expressed in the ethnic diversity of nations associated in a federation and in the unity of the federal state.⁶¹ The relation of unity and diversity was stated in The Constitutional Law on Czechoslovak Federation in article 1: "Both Republics [i.e., the Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic] mutually respect their sovereignty,

as well as the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic; the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic likewise respects the sovereignty of the two national states."⁶²

In Article 1, section 1 of the 1968 Constitutional Law on Czechoslovak Federation, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was defined as a "a federative State of two equal, fraternal nations, the Czechs and Slovaks".⁶³ It was founded on "the voluntary bond of the equal, national states of the Czech and Slovak nations, based on the right of each of these nations to self-determination."⁶⁴ Thus, equality of nations and their right of self-determination and self-management, which were the two fundamental principles of socialist federations, were explicitly proclaimed by the Constitutional Law on Czechoslovak Federation. Furthermore, it was also stated that the two nations decided to live together in a common federal state voluntarily, that is by their own will.

It should be noted here that the Constitutional Law did not mention the right of secession. Although the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia were ethnically constructed federations, only Czechoslovakia did not acknowledge the right of secession of its constituent units. The right of secession was thought to be inapplicable due to the very binational character of the Czechoslovak federation.⁶⁵

Czechoslovakia's federal structure which was designed to satisfy Slovak aspirations for parity in the state had similarities with both the Soviet and Yugoslav federations, in which the structure of the federation was, at least in theory,

defined by the national and territorial principles.⁶⁶ The differences were due to the number of the nations and nationalities living in these federations. While in the Soviet Union there were a great number of nations and nationalities, Czechoslovakia was populated only by two nations. Thus, while the Czechoslovak federation consisted of only two republics, the Soviet Union was a federation of fifteen Soviet union republics and Yugoslavia was a federation of six republics. Furthermore, in the Soviet Union there were twenty autonomous republics and eight autonomous areas. The Yugoslav federation also had two autonomous provinces. In Czechoslovakia, however, there were no autonomus units.

Thus, according to the national and territorial principles the Czechoslovak state was divided into a Czech and a Slovak Socialist Republics. Each republic had its own national council and government. The highest organ of state power was the Czechoslovak Federal Parliament, which consisted of a House of the People, whose members were elected on a proportional basis, and a House of Nations whose 150 deputies were divided equally between representatives of the Czechs and Slovaks. The consent of both houses was required in order to pass federal laws.⁶⁷

Although the Slovaks wanted parity, that is equal representation of both the Czechs and Slovaks, in all legislative and executive decision-making bodies, arguing that proportional representation of their population would put them on minority status considering the fact that the Czech population was about twice as large as the Slovak population,

the parity principle was applied only in federal committees, constitutional courts and in the House of Nations.⁶⁸ However, in order to protect the rights of the Slovaks, on constitutional issues in the House of Nations a three-fifths majority of each national group was required. Therefore, on constitutional issues in the House of Nations, in which both the Czechs and Slovaks were represented equally, the national groups voted separately. Thus, in the legislature the Slovaks were given veto power over the Czech majority.⁶⁹

The Constitutional Law on Czechoslovak Federation also outlined the areas of exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government, the joint jurisdiction of the federal government and the two republics and the exclusive jurisdiction of the republics. While authority over culture and education was exclusively reserved for the governments of the two republics, foreign policy and matters of state security were reserved exclusively to the federal government. Furthermore, the federal government and the two republics were to exercise control over planning, prices, industry, trade, agriculture, transportation, communications and mass media, labor, wages, and the police.⁷⁰

Thus, as a result of the short-lived Prague liberalization in 1968, the Slovaks gained equality with the Czechs. Despite the invasion, in August 1968, the new federal system was introduced on 1 January 1969 and Slovakia became the Slovak Socialist Republic with its own national governmental bodies. However, under the leadership of Husak, the reimposition of

centralized Communist rule left these new institutions powerless.

D. Czech-Slovak Relations Under "Normalization"⁷¹: 1969-1989

The Soviet leaders' initial attempt to replace the Dubcek leadership with more hardline Communists immediately after the invasion was frustrated by the popular support of both Czechs and Slovaks for Dubcek and his reforms. After the victory of the Czechoslovak team over the Soviet team in ice hockey in March 1969, anti-Soviet demonstrations began in Czechoslovakia which provided the Soviet leadership with a justification to get rid of Dubcek.⁷² The Soviets condemned the Dubcek leadership for their reluctance to impose "normalization".

In April 1969 as a result of Soviet pressures Dubcek resigned from his position and he was replaced by a Slovak, Gustav Husak, as head of the party. The Soviet leadership chose Husak, who was once the leader of the Slovak reformers and the advocate of Slovak national rights, in order to undermine the Czech-Slovak unity in such a way as to break the Czechoslovak solidarity and to guarantee Slovak cooperation.⁷³

After attaining power Husak started to abolish the 1968 reforms and attempted to ensure that Czechoslovakia conformed with a model of socialism acceptable to the Soviet Union. His policy of normalization included political and economic recentralization, a reimposition of the censorship, the restitution of the Communist Party's leading role, reducing the

influence of non-party groups and individuals in politics, and massive purges of party cadres at all levels.⁷⁴ Husak attempted to restore the Party discipline, removing Dubcek and other party members associated with the reform movement of the Prague Spring from their positions in the party.⁷⁵

The Husak leadership aimed to destroy all kinds of opposition which could threaten the stability of the regime. It introduced a strict control over intellectual activity. Newspapers, journals and mass organizations which continued to oppose the new policies were closed down, their leaders were arrested and imprisoned for their activities.⁷⁶ In the economic sphere the economic reforms introduced by Ota Sik and other reformist economists was repudiated and centralized command economy was restored.⁷⁷ Thus, in general, the Party moved toward a recentralization of control in almost every sphere.

As far as public reaction to the policies adopted by the Communist Party under Husak was concerned most of the citizens disillusioned with the normalized regime withdrew from political activities. Some talked about an unwritten social contract between the Communist rulers and the Czechoslovak citizens, by which the regime provided a reasonable standards of living in return for citizen loyalty and compliance.⁷⁸ For instance, in the early 1970s the material product of the state grew by 32 percent and personal consumption by 27 percent. The price levels of basic products remained unchanged for almost twenty years.⁷⁹

The strategy of gaining public compliance through material awards, such as stable prices, growth of income, and full

employment proved to be successful for almost a decade. Most of the citizens, who enjoyed the relative comfort of the heavily subsidized consumer sector, did not engage in any political activities that could undermine the stability of the "normalized" regime.

However, this strategy did not eliminate all organized opposition in Czechoslovakia. Some well organized groups began to indulge in overtly dissident activities, challenging the "normalized" regime in the late 1970s. Named after a document published in 1977 in Prague and signed by several hundred people, Charter 77 was the best known of the dissident movements.⁸⁰ It was a small community of people of different political outlooks, different professions, and different religious convictions, such as reform Communists, liberals, conservative Catholics, Protestants, and a few democratic socialists, united in their opposition to the Czechoslovak authorities with the common purpose of working for civic and human rights. The main aim of Charter 77 was to urge the regime to abide by its own laws and international agreements, particularly those concerning human rights, such as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the United Nation's Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to which Czechoslovakia was a signatory.⁸¹ Closely connected with Charter 77 but a separate organization, the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS) was founded in 1978. The Committee dealt with violations of human

rights, particularly with wrongful arrests, which were incompatible with international agreements.⁸²

These two important opposition movements neither assumed the role of a political opposition nor proposed specific programs for political and social reform. Instead, they campaigned for the observance of human rights, engaging in building a parallel culture with samizdat publications, which included not only books, journals and other writings on history, philosophy, sociology, economics, religious and foreign affairs but also novels, poetry, and drama.⁸³

Though Charter 77 declared that it did not form the basis of any oppositional activity, it posed a challenge to the regime, which was obviously violating human rights. It also came to be involved in issues such as economic and environmental policies of the normalized regime, which have little to do with human rights. It undermined and threatened the existing system in Czechoslovakia suggesting alternative solutions to these problems. Its offer to conduct a dialogue was rejected by the state authorities, who launched a campaign of repression against the members of the dissident organizations. Particularly the members of Charter 77 were subjected to harassment, dismissal from their jobs, arrests, brutal police interrogations, imprisonment and sometimes pressure to leave the country.⁸⁴

In the late 1970s and early 1980s Charter 77 and VONS were the only voices of criticism among the silent, passive, and politically indifferent citizenry with their several literary and scholarly samizdat publications which provided a forum for

discussion. Since the dissidents were unable to publicize the movement widely, the activities of Charter 77 and VONS remained limited to a few groups of society, thus lacking widespread support of the population. It was only in the late 1980s that these dissidents organizations together with many others attracted popular support and played a key role in the Velvet Revolution of 1989 which will be analyzed later on.

Although Husak was the chief advocate of the Slovak national autonomy and was one of the main architects of the federal system during the Prague Spring, after taking power in Prague he immediately attempted to strengthen the central power. As a result of thoroughgoing series of purges at all levels of government, those with nationalist outlook were replaced with centralists.⁸⁵ The federal structure, which survived the Soviet invasion, was weakened during the normalization period by the Communist Party's monopolistic control over the country's political, economic and cultural life.

The powers of the republic governments were soon reduced by a series of amendments that increased the powers of the federal government in decision-making. Constitutional amendments introduced in 1970 restored the control of planning and economic management to the federal government. Slovak ministries of Planning, Transport and Telecommunications were reorganized and their jurisdiction was partially transferred to the federal government. In addition, the December 1970 amendment to the 1968 Law on federation abolished dual citizenship, introducing a single Czechoslovak citizenship.⁸⁶

Moreover, in 1971 responsibility for internal security became the exclusive privilege of the center in Prague, which was also empowered to invalidate or reject the enactments of the constituent republics.⁸⁷ Thus, the center came to have a strict domination over the constituent parts which were recognized as sovereign bodies in the Constitutional Law on Czechoslovak Federation.

In addition, failure to federalize the Communist Party along with the government further weakened the position of the Slovaks.⁸⁸ The Communist Party preserved its assymetric model, investing its authority in Prague. In 1969 Gustav Husak underlined the necessity of the party unity for policy uniformity saying that "The Party is not federalized; on the contrary, it is unified, and we are responsible for the work of Communists at all levels, federal as well as national".⁸⁹ Thus, failure to federalize the CPC and increasing centralization during the 1970s modified the initial federal arrangement in the direction of the greater federal control.

Although the constitutional revisions of early 1970s reduced Slovakia once again to a region without real autonomy, attainment of federalism seemed to represent a victory on the part of the Slovaks. The number of Slovaks in the cabinet and in bureaucratic agencies increased. Between 1969 and 1983, Slovaks received about one third of the ministerial assignments. The percentage of the Slovaks in any given cabinet was around 40 percent.⁹⁰ Furthermore, with Dubcek and with his successor Husak, who was the first secretary of the CPC from 1969 to 1987,

Slovaks for the first time in the history of the Czechoslovak state, supplied the top leaders for the country.

The federalization of the state and the identification of Slovak Husak with the following post-invasion period of normalization embittered Czech attitudes. Many Czechs perceived that the Slovaks gained from the policies of normalization adopted by the Husak leadership. They were displeased with the increased Slovak presence in the federal bureaucracy and in the state as a whole. Czech resentment also emanated from the fact that Slovaks filled the positions of those Czech reformers who were removed from their ranks by Husak. Furthermore, higher levels of industrial investment in Slovakia in order to equalize the living standards in the two parts of the country resulted in some antagonism among the Czechs.⁹¹

Consequently, the Czechs, who felt that they suffered more under the Husak leadership, became involved more in dissident activities. In Slovakia, on the other hand, there was less open opposition which was isolated from the Czech one. Slovak dissent was confined to a small group of Slovak intellectuals many of whom had no links with the dissidents in the Czech lands.⁹² For instance, Charter 77 remained largely confined to Czechs since it had little support in Slovakia. Only eight of the early Charter 77 signatories were Slovaks.⁹³

The lower level of Slovak participation in protests and dissident activities, which remained unchanged until mid-1980s, reflected the different political conditions in the two parts of the country. A federal system headed by a Slovak leader, more

tolerable intellectual climate in Slovakia and more moderate purges in the early 1970s compared to the purges in the Czech lands were the main reasons underlying the discrepancy between the character and frequency of Czech and Slovak protests.⁹⁴ Furthermore, while most of the Slovak dissident activity involved religious matters, Czech dissent focused on the secular human right issues.⁹⁵) This difference reflected the different religious convictions of Czechs and Slovaks, which were outlined in Chapter IV. While the Slovaks were devout Catholics, the Czechs adopted a Hussite variant of Protestantism. The Roman Catholic Church was seen by the Czechs as a force which tried to oppress the Czech national character. Conversely, the Catholic Church played a an important role in the social and political life of the Slovaks. (The absence of joint Czech-Slovak dissident activity suggests that Czech and Slovaks perceived the life under normalization differently and that they had different concerns and demands.)

(The two decades of normalization produced feelings of dissatisfaction among both Czechs and Slovaks. Although many Slovaks enjoyed top positions in Prague and Bratislava they were disappointed with the attempts of recentralization. The Czechs, on the other hand, felt that the Slovaks benefitted from the developments in normalized Czechoslovakia. The hopes that federalization of the state would settle the conflict of the two nations and would bring about a new Czech-Slovak relationship were frustrated by the dissatisfaction of both sides during the "normalization" period. Ethnic tensions between Czechs and

Slovaks continued to exist under the surface until the end of the Communist period without erupting into a violent conflict since open expression of any kind of dissatisfaction with the existing system was not permitted.)

VII. THE FALL OF COMMUNIST RULE AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE STATE

Following the "Velvet Revolution" of 1989, which brought down the communist system in Czechoslovakia, the Czech-Slovak alliance against communism soon disintegrated. The Czech-Slovak conflict reemerged in early 1990 and dominated political and economic debate in post-communist Czechoslovakia throughout the early 1990s. Ethnic tension between the two constituent nations complicated the process of constitutional revision and the plans for economic reform and eventually led to the dissolution of the state. Throughout this chapter, then, the main focus will be on the Czech-Slovak relations in post-communist Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, other factors which contributed to break-up of the state, exacerbating the potential for ethnic conflict, will be analyzed in this chapter. Before analyzing the Czech-Slovak divorce, a brief overview of the Velvet Revolution of 1989, which was the first step towards the dissolution of the state, will also be provided.

A. The Velvet Revolution

The Velvet Revolution of Czechoslovakia, which began on November 17, 1989, was a product of three major internal and external developments: economic stagnation¹ that the government faced in the 1980s, growing public discontent with the repressive policies of the Communist leadership, and development

of radical political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev and the consequent end of communist rule in Hungary, Poland and East Germany.²

The election of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in March 1985 opened a new era in the histories of both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In late 1980s Gorbachev called for a series of radical political and economic reforms, which were associated with the terms glasnost and perestroika. He also changed Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe rejecting the Brezhnev Doctrine and encouraging and supporting reforms in Eastern Europe as well.³

In the beginning Gorbachev's attempts for reform in the Soviet Union did not lead to any change in Czechoslovakia. Although some of the Czechoslovak communist leaders sympathized with the Gorbachev's ideas and reforms, most of the communist leaders, who had been in power since 1969 and who had been identified with the suppression of the Prague Spring reforms, resisted any kind of change which would undermine the post-1968 normalization regime.⁴ In January 1987 Gorbachev's policies had its impact in Czechoslovakia on the sphere of economy when a new economic program in order to restructure the economy was adopted by the Husak leadership.⁵ However, few of the planned economic changes were implemented prior to the end of the communist system.

Meanwhile the Czechoslovak leadership continued to resist any fundamental reforms in the political realm. Even Gorbachev's visit to Czechoslovakia in April 1987 and the replacement of

Husak by Milos Jakes as the general secretary of the CPC in December 1987 did not seem to affect party's repressive policies. Milos Jakes, who was involved in the purges in the party after the invasion in 1968, continued to pay lip service to perestroika but he did not appear to support any changes in the political realm.⁶

The introduction of glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union encouraged the emergence of new opposition groups in Czechoslovakia in the late 1980s. Of these new groups the Initiative for Social Defense and the Czechoslovak-Helsinki Committee focused on human rights issues. The Movement for Civil Liberties and the Democratic Initiative called for political pluralism, a new democratic constitution, intellectual and religious freedom and protection of the environment. In addition to these groups several other independent opposition groups emerged among young people, such as the Independent Peace Association, the John Lennon Club, and Czech Children.⁷ There was not only an increase in the number of new dissident groups in the late 1980s but also an increase in the number of demonstrations and protests against the regime which attracted larger numbers of people. Particularly increasing public activity in the late 1980s in the form of demonstrations and petitions reflected dissatisfaction with the oppressive "normalized" regime.

Furthermore, public opposition was no longer confined to Czechs. The Slovaks, who had played a relatively small role in dissident activities in the late 1970s and in early 1980s, began

to express their dissatisfactions with the regime and their demands for change more openly. They played an important role in the late 1980s especially in the growing religious opposition. In December 1987 a thirty-one point petition was presented to the authorities by Cardinal Tomasek demanding religious freedom and separation of the Church from the state. The initiative met with a strong response especially in Slovakia and more than 600,000 signatures were collected.⁸ In March 1988 a demonstration of several thousand Slovak Catholics took place in Bratislava demanding religious freedom.⁹ The demonstrations in Slovakia and increase in the number of Slovaks in dissidence activities showed that the Czechs and Slovaks were united against the repressive communist system. Slovak students and intellectuals together with Czechs played an important role in the collapse of communism in Czechoslovakia.

In 1988-1989 mass demonstrations began to focus more on political issues. The first of these was the demonstration on August 21, 1988 when 10,000 people gathered at Wenceslas Square in Prague to protest the twentieth anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion. A similar demonstration took place on 28 October, 1988 to commemorate the founding of the First Czechoslovak Republic in October 1918. This was followed by a demonstration in Prague, in January 1989, to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the death of Jan Palach, a student who committed suicide to protest the Soviet occupation and the suppression of Prague Spring reforms. Brutal dispersion of the crowds by the police was followed by further demonstrations in Prague which

led to the arrest of the leaders of the many opposition groups, including Vaclav Havel who was sentenced to nine-months imprisonment.¹⁰

The demonstration in Prague on November 17, organized by student organizations to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the repression of the student movement by the Nazis in 1939, became the turning point which brought down the communist government in Czechoslovakia.¹¹ The police brutality against the student demonstrators and the collapse of the communist regime in East Germany led to a series of many more demonstrations in Prague, Brno and Bratislava in which hundreds of thousands of people filled the streets protesting police violence against the students and demanding political change. On November 19, the Civic Forum (CF) in Prague and on November 20 the Public Against Violence (PAV), its counterpart in Bratislava were formed as the leading democratic forces to coordinate the public protests throughout Czechoslovakia.¹²

The two-hour general strike on November 27, organized by the CF, struck the final blow against the regime. For the first time the intellectuals, students, artists, and actors were joined by workers who were also disappointed with the regime that had ruled for twenty years.¹³ The participation of large number of citizens in demonstrations led to the resignation of communist leadership, the renunciation of the party's leading role, and the formation of a government, the Government of National Understanding led by Marian Calfa, with a non-communist majority.¹⁴ On the 29 December Vaclav Havel, the dissident

playwright and the leader of the CF, was elected president of Czechoslovakia and Alexander Dubcek became the president of the Federal Assembly.¹⁵

The dissatisfaction of both the Czechs and Slovaks with the communist system led to a cooperation among Czechs and Slovaks during the revolution. Putting aside their national grievances and problems they had joined in opposition against the regime and organizing the mass demonstrations of 1989 throughout the country brought down the communist regime in Czechoslovakia. Their organizations, the Czech CF and the Slovak PAV, assuming the leadership of the popular movement, negotiated with the government. Thus, the deteriorating state of the economy and society, Gorbachev's reforms and the changes in neighbouring socialist countries, Poland, Hungary and East Germany, created the conditions for Czechs and Slovaks to do away with communism. Since the communist regime in Czechoslovakia collapsed without violence and bloodshed, through mass demonstrations and strikes, the process of transition came to be called the "velvet revolution".

B. Czech-Slovak Relations After the Velvet Revolution

Czechoslovakia entered 1990 with an almost completely new leadership dominated largely with opposition activists of the 1989 revolution who immediately took the responsibility of instituting fundamental political and economic reforms. The newly installed 21-member Government of National Understanding

contained only 10 communists. CF and PAV were given seven ministerial posts. The four remaining posts were given to the Czechoslovak Socialist Party and the Czechoslovak People's Party, which had been the members of the communist dominated National Front since 1948. With the resignations of Marian Calfa and three other communist ministers from the CPC membership the representation of CF and PAV in the Government of National Understanding increased. Furthermore, the non-communist majority was established both in the Federal Assembly and in the Czech and Slovak National Councils between December 1989 and February 1990.¹⁶

The restoration of a multi-party parliamentary democracy, the transition from central planning to a market-based economy and the reorientation of Czechoslovakia's foreign policy were the main aims of the new government. In order to restore a multi-party democracy, on January 11, 1990 the government agreed to hold free elections for both the Federal Assembly and the Czech and Slovak National Councils before the end of June.¹⁷ On February 27, 1990, a new electoral law which established the rules for the June elections was adopted. According to the new electoral laws the June elections would be conducted by using the party list system of proportional representation. In order to prevent a proliferation of parties in the new federal parliament, any party, political movement or coalition of parties intending to contend in the elections would be required to prove that it had either 10,000 members or 10,000 signatories in its support. Furthermore, to be represented in the Federal

Assembly and in the Czech National Council a party, a political movement or a coalition of parties had to win at least 5 percent of the popular vote. To qualify for seats in the Slovak National Council parties would be required to cross a threshold of 3 percent, considering the smaller number of electorates in Slovakia.¹⁸

Apart from CF and PAV, twenty parties or coalitions competed in the elections. These included nationalist parties, such as the Slovak National Party (SNP), the Movement for Self-Governing Democracy-the Society for Moravia and Silesia (MSGD-SMS), as well as the Czech and Slovak Christian Democrats, the Greens and the Social Democratic Party. The outcome of the June 8-9 1990 elections, in which 96 percent of the electorate took part, was an overwhelming vote in support of the country's movement towards parliamentary democracy.¹⁹

The CF and its Slovak counterpart PAV won a clear victory. In the elections to the Federal Assembly the CF won 53.2 percent of the Czech votes for the House of the People and 50 percent for the House of Nations. The PAV did less well in Slovakia, winning 33 percent of the vote for the House of the People and 37 percent for the House of Nations. In the elections to Czech and Slovak Councils CF and PAV won 49.50 percent and 29.34 percent respectively.²⁰

The Communist Party performed better than expected with 13.6 percent of the vote in both republics, which made it the second largest party in the Czech Republic, and the third, after the Christian Democratic Movement (CDM), in Slovakia. The

performance of the Christian Democrats was weaker than expected in both republics. While the Christian Democratic Union won 8.7 percent of the votes in the Czech lands, the CDM scored 19.20 percent of the vote in Slovakia. Neither Social Democrats nor the Greens received enough votes to seat deputies.²¹

Another important outcome of the June 1990 parliamentary elections was the achievement of the ethnic minority parties. For instance, Coexistence, which sought support from all ethnic groups, attracting mainly Hungarian minority, scored around 8-9 percent in the Slovak National Council and in both chambers of the Federal Assembly. The resurgence of regional sentiment also affected the electoral results in the Czech lands, where the MSGD-SMS attracted a large number of people with its program of greater autonomy for Moravia and Silesia. It managed to win 7.9 percent of the votes to the House of the People and 9.1 percent to the House of Nations. However, the success of the separatist SNP, which managed to win around 11 percent of the Slovak vote for both houses of the Federal Assembly and 13.9 percent for the Slovak National Council, was much more disturbing for political stability in post-communist Czechoslovakia, considering the relations between Czechs and Slovaks.²²

Although there was a good deal of cooperation between Czechs and Slovaks in the late 1989 and in the governing coalition at the federal level in early 1990, the Czech-Slovak controversy resurfaced soon after the velvet revolution, when the common threat which brought the two nations together vanished. Furthermore, the collapse of the communist system and

subsequent rapid repluralization of political life in Czechoslovakia led to the reemergence of the Czech-Slovak conflict, which was suppressed during the communist period.

As early as 1990 Slovaks made it clear that this time they were determined to fulfill their demands for a far-reaching political autonomy. Several newly formed Slovak political parties pressed for various forms of autonomy for Slovakia, ranging from full independence to greater autonomy within a weak federal structure. The PAV, which won the majority of the seats in the Slovak National Council in the June 1990 parliamentary elections, and the CDM proposed a looser federal structure.²³ The SNP, on the other hand, demanded full independence for Slovakia. In August 1990, nine Slovak political parties, led by the separatist SNP, issued a declaration in favor of Slovak independence.²⁴ During 1990 several other nationalist organizations were formed, such as National Salvation Front, which pressed more forcefully for an independent Slovakia.²⁵

Although the SNP did not achieve good results in the November 1990 local elections²⁶, receiving only 3.2 percent of the vote, it became the source of serious threat for Czech-Slovak relations since its activities for Slovak independence pushed other political forces to adopt more nationalistic stances. The CDM and even some deputies of the PAV, which initially emphasized the need to maintain the federation, began to push for greater autonomy for Slovakia.²⁷

The existing tension between Czechs and Slovaks was first reflected in the debate over the name of the country in March

1990, which came to be known as the "hyphen controversy". Dropping the title "socialist" from the country's official name it was decided to hyphenate the word Czechoslovak. The Slovaks, not even tolerating a hyphen to link Czech and Slovak into one word, organized demonstrations in Bratislava. In April 1990, it was agreed to adopt "Czech and Slovak Federative Republic" as the country's new name. Although this conflict seemed to be trivial, it was in fact very important since it revealed the continuing mistrust and suspicion between the Czechs and Slovaks.²⁸

Soon after the June 1990 elections conflict between Czechs and Slovak political leaders increased and began to dominate the political agenda until the dissolution of the state in 1993. Differences in the objectives and perspectives of the two groups complicated the process of constitutional revision and the plans for economic reform. As far as the constitutional revisions were concerned, the major issue was the division of power between the federal and republic governments. While Czechs favored a degree of devolution to the two national republics, which would still leave a relatively strong federal government, many Slovaks proposed a degree of republican autonomy that seemed closer to a confederation. Czechs argued that too much devolution would inevitably lead to the breakup of the state. Slovaks, on the other hand, claimed that too little devolution would prevent them attaining adequate control over their own affairs.²⁹

By November 1990, a power-sharing agreement among the prime ministers of the federal government and the two republics on a

constitutional amendment was reached. While the Slovak National Council adopted the amendment in November 1990, the Czech National Council refused to adopt the amendment which gave limited powers to the federal government. The constitutional crisis was temporarily resolved in mid-December. After many meetings the groups reached an agreement, which was adopted as a constitutional amendment on December 12, 1990 by the Federal Assembly.³⁰ The amendment established spheres of exclusive jurisdiction for the federal government in a very few areas such as foreign policy and national defense, customs, and banking.³¹ Although both Czechs and Slovaks supported a significant devolution of powers to the republics, they continued to disagree on the speed, extent, and the content of administrative decentralization. Debates continued not only over the powers of the federal and republic governments, but also over the powers of the parliament and president at the federal level and the powers of the parliament and prime ministers at the republic level.

The negotiations on constitutional issues continued throughout 1991 without achieving a successful outcome. In order to resolve the deadlock and push the process of constitution-making forward, President Havel proposed a draft constitution in March 1991.³² The draft constitution included a number of proposals such as a referendum and expanding the executive powers of the president. These included prerogatives to declare a state of emergency and to call for a referendum on any constitutional act, concerning the principal problems of the

political system or the organization of the state.³³ Havel's close involvement with the reconstruction of the Czechoslovak federation was evident in the speech he delivered on March 10, 1991:

By the proposed constitution, we have attempted to define something I would rather call a functioning, viable federation that still has some meaning.... Rather than have a nonfunctioning federation that is felt to be an obstacle to the development of the republic, it is better to have two independent republics. The disintegration of the state is an alternative that we have to consider seriously. I have never denied any nation self-determination.... I consider, however, that it would not be to their advantage for either republic or either nation to establish themselves as two independent entities.... If the Slovak nation prefers this solution, then it has a legitimate right to it. I insist, however, that it should follow a constitutional, civilized, and dignified way. I therefore think the Federal Assembly should accept a law on referenda at the earliest plenary session... enabling us to discover what the true will of the Slovak nation actually is.³⁴

However, Slovak deputies in the Federal Assembly rejected President Havel's draft constitution, which was mainly proposed to resolve legislative deadlocks on constitutional amendments.³⁵

Negotiations concerning a power-sharing agreement were suspended many times between 1990-1992 and adoption of new constitutions for both the federal and republic governments was postponed.³⁶ Czech and Slovak leaders proved unable to agree on a division of powers between the federal and republic levels which satisfied both sides and failed to adopt a new constitution.

Differences in the perspectives of Czechs and Slovaks was also reflected in efforts to reform the economy. Although the federal, Czech and Slovak governments adopted a plan for

economic reform³⁷ in early September 1990, important differences emerged in the objectives and perspectives of each government concerning the speed and extent of economic change in 1991.³⁸ While Czech leaders favored a speedy transition to the free market, Slovak leaders demanded a slower economic reform. Since most of the arms factories and other large enterprises of heavy industry were located in Slovakia, the Slovak economy began to suffer much more than the Czech economy after the end of the cold war. The level of unemployment was about three times as high in Slovakia as in the Czech lands. Several strikes were organized by trade unions in 1991 and 1992 in Slovakia to protest against the federal government's efforts to remove subsidies to Slovak industries and agriculture.³⁹ Furthermore, Slovaks perceived the economic reform program as another manifestation of Czech centralism since it was proposed by the Czechs.⁴⁰

Differences of opinion on the national question strained the coalition between the CDM and PAV. The CDM began to adopt the ideas of the SNP and pressed more forcefully for Slovak autonomy. In March 1991, the CDM, led by Jan Carnogoursky, proposed a treaty between the two republics to form a state with a very limited power in the federal government.⁴¹

Furthermore, serious divisions emerged within PAV itself in early 1991. There were basically two factions within PAV, which had different views on economic issues and Slovakia's position in the federation. Vladimir Meciar, who became Slovak Prime Minister after the June 1990 elections, supported a weak

federation in which substantial powers would be devolved to two republic governments. Meciar's policies and conflicts within PAV resulted in Meciar's dismissal as head of the Slovak government and his replacement by the Christian Democratic leader Jan Carnogursky in April 1991. In response Meciar and his supporters left PAV and formed a new political party, Movement For A Democratic Slovakia (MFDS). After the split the federalist faction of PAV renamed itself the Civic Democratic Union (CDU).⁴²

Divisions within CF, which embraced people with varying political views and policy preferences, centered basically on the speed with which to pursue the economic reforms. The election of Vaclav Klaus as leader of CF in October 1991 and the decision to transform the CF into a united, well-disciplined political party of the center-right led to its split into three groups: center-right Civic Democratic Party (CDP), headed by Vaclav Klaus, the Civic Democratic Alliance (CDA), led by Zdenek Jicinsky and Civic Movement (CM), headed by Jiri Dienstbier. These three groups continued to cooperate in order to preserve the governing coalition.⁴³

Although there was a general consensus on the need to move toward a market economy and to change the over-centralized federalist system, the Czech-Slovak ethnic issue complicated the constitutional process and hindered rapid economic transformation. The Federal Assembly was deadlocked because of Czech-Slovak disagreement and the breakup of multi-party coalitions. It was evident that the aspirations of Slovak

nationalists for complete independence increased. Though at the time of the June 1990 parliamentary elections only the SNP advocated separatism, a year later the CDM and MFDS began to press for Slovak sovereignty. MFDS leader Meciar and other Slovak nationalists opposed President Havel's call for a referendum on the future of the state, fearing that the majority of Czechs and Slovaks would support retaining of a common state. In September 1991, Slovak nationalists pushed the Slovak National Council to adopt a declaration of Slovak sovereignty and a new Slovak constitution. However, the Slovak National Council declined to vote on the proposal several times in 1991 and 1992.⁴⁴ Different political aspirations of Czechs and Slovaks left many issues unresolved before the June 1992 elections.

C. The June 1992 Elections and the Disintegration of the Federation

The breakup of the mass movements of the CF and PAV in 1991 and the disintegration of the CPC and CDM resulted in the fragmentation of political forces in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Before the June 1992 elections there were almost 20 political parties within the Federal Assembly. None of these political parties were represented in both Republics and all the political parties were organized in only one republic.⁴⁵

In January 1992 the Federal Assembly adopted an electoral law, according to which the June 1992 elections, just like the 1990 elections, would be conducted using the party list system

of proportional representation. However, in the June 1992 elections political parties would be required to cross a threshold of 5 percent of the vote in each republic to enter the Federal Assembly.⁴⁶

The 1992 election was dominated by two issues, federalism and economic reform. The Slovak parties seemed to be divided on the issue of federalism. Although most of the Slovak parties demanded a greater autonomy for Slovakia, only two parties, the SNP and the Slovak Christian Democrats, which had split from the CDM in 1992, demanded Slovak independence and separatism.⁴⁷ The MFDS, led by Vladimir Meciar, and the CDM advocated a 'looser association' between the two republics.⁴⁸ Other parties, the CDU, the Democratic Party and the Democratic Left Party were pro-federalist.

The Czech views on the federalism question were not as diverse as the Slovak views. All Czech parties advocated the preservation of the federal state. They all favored a degree of devolution to the two republics that would still leave a relatively strong federal government. Czech parties argued that too much devolution of power from the center to the republics would inevitably result in the dissolution of the state.⁴⁹

Since the economic conditions differed between the two republics, Czech and Slovak parties held different perspectives on the issue of economic transformation. As discussed above, the concentration of heavy industry and high unemployment rates in Slovakia led the major Slovak parties, with the exception of Civic Democratic Union and the Democratic party which supported

Klaus's radical economic reforms, to favor a slow pace of economic reform. Slovak parties also advocated a degree of state intervention in the economy, to protect the Slovaks against the severe effects of economic transformation.⁵⁰

Most of the Czech parties, especially the parties on the right, on the other hand, supported Vaclav Klaus's rapid and radical economic reform plan which advocated only a limited role for the state in economy. Only the Social democrats and the communists emphasized the need for economic reform but advocated slower rate of transition.⁵¹

Before analyzing the results of the 1992 elections and the subsequent disintegration of the federation, it is necessary to look at the views and opinions of the Czech and Slovak population on the federalism question and on economic transformation. According to the public opinion surveys conducted between June 1990 and June 1992, Czechs and Slovaks had different preferences in regard to the form of the state. A public opinion survey conducted in June 1990 found out that 42 percent of Czechs compared to 16 percent of Slovaks favored a common state with a strong central government. However, 41 percent of Slovaks compared to 30 percent of Czechs preferred a common state with considerable powers for republic governments and 30 percent compared to 16 percent of Czechs favored confederation. Only 8 percent of Slovaks compared to 5 percent of Czechs favored two independent states.⁵²

The differences in the preferences of Czechs and Slovaks on the form of the state increased between 1990 and June 1992. The

most important difference in the results of the surveys conducted in 1990 and in the 1991-1992 period was the decrease in support for federation in Slovakia. While in June 1990 41 percent of Slovak respondents were in favor of a federation, by June 1992 this proportion decreased to 26 percent.⁵³ Furthermore, support for dividing the state increased in the Czech lands in the course of 1991 and 1992. In June 1992, 13 percent of Czech surveyed preferred two independent states. In addition, according to the public opinion polls conducted in 1991-1992 Slovaks seemed to be more supportive of a confederation (approximately 30 percent) than Czechs (approximately 5 percent).⁵⁴

Czechs and Slovaks also held different views on economic reform. Public opinion polls conducted in 1990 found that respondents in Slovakia were less supportive of a radical and fast move to market (51 percent) than those in the Czech lands (60 percent). Furthermore, fears about a decline in the standard of living and unemployment were greater in Slovakia than in the Czech lands.⁵⁵

Support for the creation of a market economy decreased in Slovakia in the course of 1991-1992. Fewer respondents in Slovakia (39 percent) than those in the Czech lands (52 percent) supported a market economy in April 1992.⁵⁶ Furthermore, support for the privatization of large as well as small enterprises was greater in the Czech lands than in Slovakia.⁵⁷ In addition, the surveys conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research in Prague found out that while 50 percent of respondents in the

Czech lands held positive attitudes toward the economic reform, a large majority of Slovaks (77 percent) felt that the reform should either be modified or ended.⁵⁸

These differences in the perspectives and political preferences of Czechs and Slovaks were reflected in the results of the June 1992 elections.⁵⁹ No single political party or movement won the majority of the vote in either Slovakia or in the Czech lands. The CDP, led by Vaclav Klaus, and the MFDS, led by Vladimir Meciar, emerged as the strongest parties in their republics.

In the elections to the Federal Assembly Klaus's CDP, which formed a coalition with the Christian Democratic Party, led by the former dissident Vaclav Benda, won 33.9 percent of the Czech votes for the House of the People and 33.4 percent for the House of Nations. This coalition also managed to obtain 29.7 percent of the vote for the Czech National Council. In Slovakia, the MFDS, led by Vladimir Meciar, received 33.5 percent of the Slovak vote for the House of the People and 33.8 percent for the House of the Nations. It also obtained 37.3 percent of the Slovak vote for the Slovak National Council.

In Slovakia, the pro-federalist parties did badly. Both the CDU and the Democratic Party, which supported federalism and Klaus's radical economic reforms, failed to win any seats in either parliament. The SNP did not seem to attract a large number of Slovaks with its program of Slovak separatism. It managed to receive 9.4 percent of the Slovak vote for the

Federal Assembly and 7.9 percent for the Slovak National Council.

The communist parties, the Left Bloc, the coalition of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and the Democratic Left, in the Czech lands and the Democratic Left Party in Slovakia, came in second in the elections, getting 14 percent of vote for both houses of the Federal Assembly and for the National Councils of the two republics. As opposed to the communists, both Czech and Slovak Social Democrats did very poorly in the elections. The Czech Social Democrats obtained less than 8 percent of the Czech vote for the two houses of the Federal Assembly and for the Czech National Council. The Slovak Social Democrats, on the other hand, seated deputies only in the House of the Nations in the Federal Assembly, failing to win seats both in the House of the People and in the Slovak National Council.

One of the important outcomes of the 1992 elections was the failure of the remnants of the mass movements of the 1989 revolution, namely CM in the Czech lands and its counterpart in Slovakia, the CDU, to get enough votes to seat deputies in the Federal Assembly and in their respective National Councils. The CDA, another remnant of the former CF, managed to win representation in the Czech National Council with 5.9 percent of the Czech vote. However, it failed to win any seats in both houses of the Federal Assembly.

The MSGD-SMS articulated Moravian and Silesian concerns about their status in the common state and demanded a tripartite

federation. The party failed to seat deputies in the Federal Assembly. It obtained 6 percent of the vote only for the Czech National Council. In Slovakia, Coexistence Party of Hungarian minority received approximately 7 percent of the Slovak vote both for the Federal Assembly and for the Slovak National Council.

Two new Czech parties entered the Federal Assembly and the Czech National Council. The Liberal Social Union, which was formed by old socialists and the greens, and the racist right-wing Republican Association won around 6 percent of the Czech vote for both parliaments. The success of the Republican Association reflected the racist inclination among the some sections of the Czech population. There was an overt racism especially against the gypsies. In the early 1990s skinheads attacked Vietnamese workers and gypsies in various towns in the Czech lands.⁶⁰

The results of the June 1992 elections reflected the differences in the views and attitudes of Czechs and Slovaks toward the federation and economic reform. While the Czechs elected a right-of-center party that stressed the continuation of federalist structure and rapid economic reforms, the Slovaks voted for parties with a more nationalist and leftist opinion that supported slower economic reforms and advocated much greater independence for Slovakia.

Although the majority of Slovaks did not support the break-up of the state, as the above-mentioned public opinion polls indicated, the political parties supporting the continuation of

a common state did very poorly in Slovakia. Slovaks tended to vote for those political parties which advocated greater independence for Slovakia. For instance, Meciar's MFDS, which attracted more popular support in Slovakia, did not openly call for the break-up of the state. Meciar advocated a 'looser association' between two sovereign, independent and internationally recognized republics.⁶¹ Furthermore, it can be argued that voter preferences in June 1992 elections, in Slovakia, depended on another factor, that is the Slovak attitudes toward the economic reform.

Since neither Klaus's CDP nor Meciar's MFDS won the majority of the popular vote in their republics, both were forced to form coalition governments. Thus after the elections in the Czech Republic, the Civic Democratic and Christian Democratic Parties, which had 76 seats in the Czech National Council, formed a coalition government with two other right of center parties, the Christian Democratic Union (with 15 seats) and the CDA (with 14 seats). The Czech coalition government had a majority in the Czech National Council, holding 105 of the 200 seats. In Slovakia, on the other hand, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, with 74 of the 150 seats in the National Council, formed a coalition government with the Slovak National Party, which had 15 seats.⁶²

In the Federal Assembly, however, it was almost impossible to form a stable and effective federal level government. The existing structure of the Federal Assembly made agreement between the elected parties difficult since for the adoption of

proposed laws, separate majorities of 60 percent were required in both halves of the House of Nations and any minority of 40 percent within either Republic section of the House of Nations could block the adoption of major bills.

In the June 1992 parliamentary elections, the two parties, which gained a clear majority within each republic section of House of Nations, disagreed strongly on the most critical issues facing Czechoslovakia, the status of the federation, and the extent and the pace of the economic reform. In the House of Nations, both Klaus's CDP and Meciar's MFDS had more than 40 percent of the seats needed to veto any constitutional amendment they found unacceptable.⁶³

During the negotiations in the days following the elections concerning the future of the republic, Klaus and Meciar failed to produce a mutually acceptable formula for the future status of the country. Meciar insisted on his rather vaguely defined confederation, in which Slovakia would gain international sovereignty while preserving a loose form of a common state with Czechs. However, Meciar's preference for a 'looser association' was not acceptable to Klaus, who argued that such a looser association would not work. Furthermore, Klaus and his supporters claimed that such an arrangement would only allow Slovakia to get money from common resources. They also saw this type of an arrangement as a threat to the completion of the economic reform plan.⁶⁴

Thus, the coalition talks held after the elections between the victorious parties, the CDP and the MFDS, revealed their

irreconcilable positions. As the negotiations on the future of the republic continued, the inevitability of the splitting up of the state became apparent. Indeed, on July 2, 1992 a coalition embracing the CDP, the MFDS and the Christian Democratic Union was formed to govern the country until the completion of the divorce process.⁶⁵

Slovak representatives in the Federal Assembly prevented the reelection of Havel as president of the country. When the Slovak National Council approved a declaration of sovereignty for Slovakia On July 17, 1992, Havel resigned from presidency.⁶⁶ In late July, Meciar and Klaus agreed to work out a formal split by the end of September. On September 1, 1992, the Slovak National Council adopted a new Slovak constitution.⁶⁷ By the end of 1992, the Federal Assembly approved a legislation terminating the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic and dividing its property between the two successor republics. On January 1, 1993 two sovereign states, a Czech Republic and a Slovak Republic came into existence.

In understanding the Czech-Slovak divorce, apart from the differences in the perspectives and attitudes of the Czechs and Slovaks toward the federation and economic reform, which reflected the historical differences of the two groups, attention must also be paid to the other factors that contributed to the break-up of the state.

David M. Olson points to the party system as having an important role in the disintegration of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic. He argues that the "Republic-centric

electoral law" and "Republic-centric party system", led to the polarization of the party structure within the country, eliminating the moderate center from the Federal Assembly.⁶⁸ For Olson, the absence of federal political parties which pursue country-wide concerns, instead of a parties pursuing regional interests, is also another factor contributing to the break-up of Czechoslovakia.⁶⁹ Furthermore, as mentioned above, the seat distribution in the Federal Assembly after the June 1992 elections made the formation of an effective federal level government difficult. Thus, Olson argues, the election results transferred the decision-making power of the parliament to the republic level National Councils and their Prime Ministers, who decided the future of Czechoslovakia.⁷⁰

Economic issues must also be taken into account in analyzing the Czech-Slovak divorce. The Czech leadership considered Slovakia a burden on the Czech road toward a market economy and an obstacle to the implementation of the radical economic reforms. The Czech leaders believed that when they were freed of the burden of Slovak economic problems they could be more easily integrated into Europe. The prospect of entering the European Community fueled the Czech desire to end the seventy-four year old union with the Slovaks.⁷¹ Thus, the movement toward greater unity in Western Europe stimulated separatist tendencies in Czechoslovakia.

Meciar's power ambitions and nationalist rhetoric also played an important role in the division of Czechoslovakia. Meciar was successful in mobilizing the Slovak masses around

ethnic issues and appealing to nationalist sentiments of Slovaks. He exploited Slovak ethnic nationalism in order to consolidate power.⁷²

Since the ethnic tension between the Czechs and Slovaks prevented an agreement on a division of powers between the federal and republican levels, political life was conditioned by the institutions and procedures of the communist system, which impeded efforts to resolve the disputed issues and deal with the problems facing the country. The existing machinery did not have a mechanism to break the deadlock that characterized political life in early 1990s.⁷³

All of the above-mentioned factors, the uninstitutionalized party system, the ambitions of the political leaders, economics and deficiency of the existing institutions, played a role in the dissolution of Czechoslovak federation. However, all of these problems could have been possibly solved if the Czechs and Slovaks had wished to compromise, putting aside their historical differences.

VIII. CONCLUSION

With the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the breakdown of the bipolar structure of international relations, the world has witnessed the reemergence of national and ethnic conflicts in former communist countries. The upsurge of ethnic tensions in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union and the dissolution of the multiethnic socialist federations made it clear that nationalism would assume a dominant role in the post-Cold War international system. Springing up of ethnic conflicts and ethnic movements demanding cultural and/or political autonomy and even independence showed that the loyalties to ethnic identities transcended all other collective identities in power.

Czechoslovakia was one of the three federal states in the communist world that underwent political fragmentation after the collapse of communism. The Czechoslovak Republic was established after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First World War as a unitary state of the "Czechoslovak" nation.

The main purpose of the Czechoslovak solidarity prior to the outbreak of the First World War was to develop communication between Czechs and Slovaks, in order to offer moral support to each other in their respective political struggles. It was only during the First World War that the leaders of the Czechoslovak movement adopted a position favoring independence. Thus, the First World War not only enhanced Czechoslovak unity and

collaboration but also gave the Czechoslovak leaders opportunity to promote their cause to the West. The Czechs advocated Czechoslovak unity because only with Slovaks they could propose a viable state to succeed the Austro-Hungarian Empire. For the Slovaks, on the other hand, the unity was the only alternative if they wanted to survive in the twentieth century, considering Hungarian revisionist and irredentist claims.

Furthermore, President Wilson's proclamations in favor of national self-determination gave opportunity to the Czechoslovak leaders to determine their own future and to establish an independent state on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Thus, at the end of the War the Czechoslovak state was created to fulfill the demand for self-determination of the "Czechoslovak nation".

In addition, nationalism as an ideological factor contributed to the redrawing of political boundaries after the dissolution of the multinational empires in the region at the end of the First World War. Nationalism provided a principle of political legitimacy for the newly created states. Thus, Czechoslovak nationalism was used as a basis of legitimacy of the new Czechoslovak state.

The union of the Czech lands and Slovakia in 1918 brought together two different cultural entities with different historical and political backgrounds: deeply religious, economically and culturally backward Slovaks and more industrialized and more urbanized secular Czechs. The leaders of

the Czechoslovak state tried to diminish this gap for almost seventy years in order to achieve national integration.

In both the First Republic and the socialist state the main assumption behind the policies pursued to resolve the national question was that socioeconomic development would serve to promote national unity. In the First Republic the emphasis was on the cultural gap between the two groups. Thus, the First Czechoslovak leadership attempted to solve the national problem through education. Hundreds of new schools were opened in Slovakia and Czech teachers were sent to educate Slovaks. However, improvement in the level of education did not lead to national integration. Instead it strengthened the linguistic and ethnic identity of Slovaks.

In the socialist state, the diagnosis of the problem was the Slovak economic backwardness. Thus, the communist leaders initiated a large-scale program of economic equalization between the Czech lands and Slovakia. However, this strategy did not draw Czechs and Slovaks closer together in a common culture, although the rapid industrialization in Slovakia resulted in near economic equalization of the two regions. Thus, it became clear that the national question could not be reduced to solely economic terms.

In fact, the assumptions behind the policies pursued by both the First Republic and the socialist state to achieve national integration overlap with the arguments raised by modernization theories. The main argument is that modernization, which involves increased urbanization, industrialization, the

spread of communications, improvements in transportation and the development of mass education and literacy, within a society leads to political and economic integration. However, this does not appear to be the case in Czechoslovakia. On the contrary, the socioeconomic developments strengthened the linguistic and ethnic identity of the Slovaks and thus generated conflicts between the Czechs and Slovaks based upon ethnic attachments.

As the case of Czechoslovakia illustrates modernization theories failed to give a sufficient analysis of nationalism since they ignored the ethnic dimension of nationalism. Modernists also saw nationalism as simply a function of modernization and industrialization and they expected it to decline in a well-established industrial society. However, nationalism remains to be a potential source of political conflict. The failure of modernists to provide answers to the persistence of nationalism was based on their underestimation of the significance of ethnicity. However, it became evident that ethnicity is an inseparable component of nationalism since it provides an important source of personal and group identity.

Ethnicity remained as a source of tension and political conflict, and socially and economically developed Slovakia became more challenging to the concept of a unitary Czechoslovak state. Slovak demands for greater recognition of Slovak interests within the common state grew during the 1950s and 1960s. In the course of the reform movement of 1968, Czech and Slovak leaders agreed to create a federal system in order to satisfy Slovak desires for parity in the state. Thus, in

January, 1969 the federal system was introduced with the explicit aim of solving the nationality problem. However, during the early years of the "normalization", the federal system was undermined by a series of amendments, which concentrated decision-making at the center. This highly centralized decision-making process was at odds with a genuine federal system which implies decentralization of power, that is division of power between central and regional governments.

Thus, the Czechoslovak federation, just as the other multinational socialist federations, was not a genuine federalist system since all power was vested in a strong center. Although there were federalist structures designed to accommodate ethnic diversity, there were no corresponding federalist processes. Thus, it can be argued that the Czechoslovak federal system served to accommodate ethnic diversity only symbolically. When the power of the central authority diminished after the "velvet revolution", the suppressed ethnic tensions between the Czechs and Slovaks resurfaced in early 1990. The political and economic disputes began to be defined according to ethnic cleavages. Ethnically and geographically defined federalist structures came to be used by Czech and Slovak nationalist leaders to consolidate power by appealing nationalist sentiments.¹

The end of the communist monopoly of power and the demise of the bipolar system with the dissolution of the Soviet Union were followed by the establishment of the nation-states. Nationalism reemerged and filled the ideological vacuum created

by the collapse of communism. The nationalist ideology, which calls for the redrawing of political boundaries, replaced communism as the basis of legitimacy for the newly established nation-states.

In Czechoslovakia the alliance of the Czechs and Slovaks opposed to communism during the "velvet revolution" soon disintegrated. As the results of the June 1992 elections showed, the electoral support in both the Czech lands and Slovakia shifted to the leaders and parties which aimed to pursue regional interests at the expense of the continuation of the Czechoslovak federation.

The opportunity to establish an independent state proved more appealing to the nationalist leaders in Slovakia than the task of democratizing a common Czechoslovak state. Slovak political leader Meciar manipulated rising ethnic-based Slovak nationalism to gain political power. He mobilized the Slovak masses around ethnic issues and appealed to the nationalist sentiments of the Slovaks in order to consolidate power.

Thus, the break-up of Czechoslovakia reflects the current trend in Eastern Europe to form states in which ethnic and political borders coincide. The reason of redefining borders along ethnic lines lies in the very understanding of the "nation", which refers mainly to a community of common descent in defining a national identity.

However, the rise of nationalism and the desire for power by the Czech and Slovak leaders were not the only factors that contributed to the disintegration of the Czechoslovak

federation. The movement toward the greater unity in Western Europe stimulated separatist tendencies in Czechoslovakia. The Czech political leaders claimed that when they were freed of the burden of Slovak economic problems they could be more easily join the European Community. Thus, the prospect of entering the European Community and the integration into Europe fueled the Czech desire to terminate the seventy-four year old union with the Slovaks.

During the First World War nationalism served to unite and mobilize the Czechs and Slovaks against the old system. It was Czechoslovak nationalism which integrated the two ethnic groups into a common state. However, the specific type of nationalism that emerged in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of communism led to the fragmentation of the former communist countries. In Czechoslovakia the rise of Czech and Slovak nationalisms played an important role in the dissolution of the Czechoslovak federation.

The Czechoslovak federation, with its largely ethnically homogeneous republics, could have been a constructive example for different ethnic groups to live together peacefully within a common state. The separation of the Czechs and Slovaks marked the end of the relatively successful multiethnic state, which was transformed into nation-states, whose borders are now defined according to ethnicity.

As the Czechoslovak break-up illustrates, the differences between the ethnic groups do not have to be based on great differences in culture, religion or language to lead to

political fragmentation. The disintegration of Czechoslovakia is a warning that even in countries where ethnic group interaction is characterized by relatively more mutual accommodation, ethnic issues can still hinder the search for solutions to existing problems, be it economic, social or political.

NOTES

Chapter I

1. Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.27, no.1 (1973), p.1 and Uri Ra'anan, "The Nation-State Fallacy" in Joseph V. Montville (ed.), *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp.6-8.
2. Vojislav Stanovcic, "Problems and Options in Institutionalizing Ethnic Relations", *International Political Science Review*, Vol.13, no.4 (1992), p.365.

Chapter II

1. For example Miroslav Hroch argues that for a nation to exist not one but a combination of several kinds of objective relationships, such as economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical, are required. Miroslav Hroch, "From National Movement to Fully-Fledged Nation", *New Left Review*, no. 198 (March/April 1993), p.4.
2. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), p.1.
3. *Ibid.*, p.5.

4. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.7-8.
5. *Ibid.*, p.8; for critical analysis of both subjective and objective definitions of nations see pp.5-8.
6. Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p.14.
7. Hroch, "From National Movement to Fully-Fledged Nation", p.4.
8. For detailed argument see Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*, (Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.85-86, *National Identity*, p.52 and *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
9. Smith, *National Identity*, p.20.
10. James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1993), p.4.
11. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p.215.
12. *Ibid.*, p.4.
13. Alexander J. Motyl, "The Modernity of Nationalism: Nations, States and Nation-States in the Contemporary World", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 45, no.2 (Winter 1992), p.308.
14. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origin and Background*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 10-11.
15. Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*, New York: John Wiley&Sons, 1966).

16. Alexander J. Motyl, *Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p.53.
17. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), p.1.
18. *Ibid.*, p.43.
19. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, p.9.
20. Louis L. Snyder, *Varieties of Nationalism: A Comparative Study*, (Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1976), p.25.
21. Smith, *National Identity*, p.74.
22. *Ibid.*, p.73.
23. John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, (The University of Chicago Press, 1985), p.2.
24. *Ibid.*, p.3.
25. *Ibid.*
26. Smith, *National Identity*, p.11.
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*, p.12.
29. Gale Stokes, "The Undeveloped Theory of Nationalism", *World Politics*, Vol.31, no.1 (Oct.1978), pp.150-160.
30. The theories discussed here are those that are not based on Marxism.
31. See Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, chp.1.
32. *Ibid.*, p.12.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*, pp.12-13.

35. Conceptualization of James G. Kellas in his book *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, where he aims to provide "an integrated theory of the politics of nationalism and ethnicity", James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, p.35.
36. For examples of the modernist approach see Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, and Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, 1983).
37. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, p.36.
38. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p.8.
39. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p.49.
40. *Ibid.*, p.48.
41. *Ibid.*, p.46.
42. E.J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
43. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p.7.
44. *Ibid.*, p.49.
45. *Ibid.*, p.55.
46. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, p.10.
47. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*.
48. *Ibid.*, p.15.
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Ibid.*, pp.17-25.

51. Ernst B. Haas, "What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?", *International Organization*, Vol.40, no. 3, (Summer 1986), p.721.
52. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p.1.
53. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p.215.
54. *Ibid.*, pp.153-173.
55. *Ibid.*, p.214.
56. Anthony D. Smith, "The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?", *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.20, no.3 (1991), pp.356-357.
57. *Ibid.*, p.359.
58. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p.216.
59. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p.122.
60. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p.3.
61. Although there are exceptions to this claim like the United States where the formation of nationhood was purely on territorial grounds, even in nation-states formed not on the basis of ethnies, there is a later effort to create or invent some ethnic bases.
62. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p.214.

Chapter III

1. Contrary to this general position, Ephraim Nimni, in his book *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of A Political Crisis*, (London: Pluto Press, 1991) argues that Marx and Engels

had a coherent view of national question, even if there is no single work that presents their position comprehensively.

2. *Ibid.*, pp.8-11.

3. David Fernbach (ed.), *Karl Marx: The Revolutions of 1848*, (England: Penguin Books, 1973), p.72.

4. *Ibid.*, p.85.

5. Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.8.

6. Shlomo Avineri argues that there are two distinct analyses of nationalism in Marx, one pre-and one post-1848. He calls the pre-1848 the premodern paradigm and the post-1848 the bourgeois paradigm. See Shlomo Avineri, "Toward a Socialist Theory of Nationalism", *Dissent*, (Fall 1990), pp. 447-457.

7. Charles C. Herod, *The Nation in the History of Marxian Thought*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p.37.

8. Marx and Engels made exceptions to their general principle by supporting the demand for national independence in the cases of Poland and Ireland even though they did not involve larger nations. See Shlomo Avineri, "Toward a Socialist Theory of Nationalism", p.449; Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, pp.13-14 and Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of A Political Crisis*, pp.33-34.

9. Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism*, p.3.

10. Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, p.9.

11. Quoted in *ibid.*, p.28.
12. Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism*, p.142.
13. Quoted in *ibid.*
14. Quoted in Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, p.29.
15. Quoted in Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism*, p.163.
16. *Ibid.*, pp.127-128 and p.177.
17. V.I.Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-determination" in *Collected Works*, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1972), Vol.20, p.397.
18. *Ibid.*, p.410.
19. *Ibid.*, p.411.
20. V.I.Lenin, "Critical Remarks on The National Question" in *Collected Works*, Vol.20, p.45.
21. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-determination", p.454.
22. Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, pp.31-32.
23. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-determination", p.441.
24. Viktor Knapp, "Socialist Federation-A Legal Means to the Solution of the Nationality Problem: A Comparative Study", *Michigan Law Review*, Vol.82, no.5-6 (1984), p.1218.
25. Gregory Gleason, "The Federal Formula and the Collapse of the USSR", *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol.22, (Summer 1992), p.144.
26. Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, chp.8.

27. Connor, *ibid.*, pp.208-214; Rudolf Schlesinger, *Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), p.381 and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Chickens Coming Home to Roost: A Perspective on Soviet Ethnic Relations", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.45, no.2 (Winter 1992), p.524.
28. Connor, *ibid.*, p.37.
29. *Ibid.*, p.201.
30. Connor, *ibid.*, pp.217-218; Schlesinger, *Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe*, pp.386-387 and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Chickens Coming Home to Roost: A Perspective on Soviet Ethnic Relations", pp.523-524.

Chapter IV

1. On 28 October 1918, the First Czechoslovak Republic was proclaimed by the Czech National Council and approved by the Slovak National Council, that wished to create a common state with the Czechs, in Turciansky Svaty Martin on 30 October. See Josef Korbel, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia: The Meanings of Its History*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp.1-4.
2. See Sharon L. Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition: Politics, Economics and Society*, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), pp.6-7.
3. *Ibid.*, p.7.
4. For detailed discussion of the differences in the size of agrarian and industrial sectors, and of the occupational

structure in the Czech lands and Slovakia see Carol S. Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp.12-14 and Edita Bosak "Slovaks and Czechs: An Uneasy Coexistence" in Gordon Skilling (ed.), *Czechoslovakia 1918-1988: Seventy Years From Independence*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp.12-13.

5. Korbel, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.89.

6. Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, pp.16-17 and Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, p.7.

7. Jaroslav Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, (London: I B Tauris & Co.Ltd. Publishers, 1990), p.38.

8. For the main differences between individual factions see *ibid.*, pp.39-50.

9. During the sixteenth century, the Hussite factions were influenced by Luther's and Calvin's teachings. While some of them, especially Utraquists, wanted to adopt Lutheranism, Calvin's teaching exerted a strong influence on the Unity of Brethren. Especially the German population of Bohemia turned to the Lutheran Reformation. *ibid.*, pp.69-70.

10. *Ibid.*, pp.84-92 and Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, p.11.

11. Luther's teaching spread among the German settlers in the Czech lands and Hungary. It made many converts among Slovaks. See Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, (Colorado:

Westview Press, 1977), p.169 and Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, pp.64-65.

12. Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, p.11.

13. Due to the suffrage restrictions only 20 Slovaks had the opportunity to participate in the Hungarian Diet between 1847-1910, see Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, p.24.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Although the numbers of the Czech deputies were very small, they were quite active in the parliament of Vienna. For instance, they achieved the division of the University in Prague into a Czech University and a German University. See Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, p.9.

16. *Ibid.*, pp.8-9.

17. Joseph F. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia" in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (eds.), *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), p.166.

18. *Ibid.*, p.170.

19. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p.149.

20. Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.37.

21. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia", pp.171-172.

22. Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.62.

23. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso Edition, 1983), pp.17-25.

24. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia" p.173.

25. Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp.21-31.
26. *Ibid.*, p.30.
27. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia", p.174.
28. For details see Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.84-88.
29. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia", p.175.
30. Though Joseph II insisted that German should be the language of administration, he was not opposed to the use of other languages at the local level. See Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p.150-151.
31. Josef Jungmann published a history of Czech literature in 1825. He also compiled five volume Czech-German dictionary. Palacky played an active role in the foundation of Bohemian Museum in Prague. See *Ibid.*, p.151.
32. Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.96.
33. Palacky wrote a massive history of the Czech people, identifying the Hussite Revolution as the core of Czech history. See Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia", p.179.
34. See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p.73. For a detailed discussion see chp.5.
35. *Ibid.*, chp.5.
36. See Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp.35-38 and pp.50-52.
37. *Ibid.*, pp.50-58 and p.76.
38. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p.160.

39. *Ibid.*, p.142.
40. For details see Miroslav Hroch, "From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation", *New Left Review*, No.198, (March/April 1993), pp.3-20.
41. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia", pp.181-182.
42. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p.153.
43. Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, pp.107-108.
44. *Ibid.*, p.108.
45. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia" p.182 and Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p.153.
46. Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.113.
47. *Ibid.*, pp.113-114.
48. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p.155.
49. Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.116.
50. *Ibid.*, p.117.
51. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia", p.183.
52. Hroch, "From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation", p.10.
53. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, pp. 154-155.
54. For a detailed discussion see *ibid.*, pp.154-157.
55. Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.122 and Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p.155.
56. Robin Okey, *Eastern Europe 1740-1985: Feudalism to Communism* (2nd edition), (London: Routledge, 1992), p.139.

57. Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.129.
58. See Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, pp.165-169.
59. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p.169.
60. See Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, pp.29-31.
61. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia", pp.188-189.
62. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p.170.
63. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia", pp.188-189.
64. Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.89 and Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, pp.170-171.
65. In 1844, Magyar was declared to be the official language of education, the judiciary and the administration. See Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.104.
66. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia", p.189.
67. *Ibid.*, pp.186-187.
68. See Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.89 and David Warren Paul, "Slovak Nationalism and the Hungarian State, 1870-1910" in Paul R. Brass (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and the State*, (New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books, 1985), p.119.
69. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p.431.
70. *Ibid.*
71. See Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia", pp.189-190.
72. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p.172.
73. Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present*, (London: Routledge, 1992), p.161.
74. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p.172.

75. *Ibid.*, p.172.
76. Paul, "Slovak Nationalism and the Hungarian State, 1870-1910", pp.120-121 and Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia", p.190.
77. Later on these Slovak emigrants played an important role in the development of nationalist politics in Slovakia.
78. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia" p.190.
79. *Ibid.*, p.186.
80. *Ibid.*, p.191.
81. George J. Kovtun, "T.G.Masaryk: The Problem of a Small Nation" in Gordon Skilling (ed.) *Czechoslovakia 1918-1988*, p.27.
82. Korbel, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.91.
83. Bosak "Slovaks and Czechs: An Uneasy Coexistence", p.70.
84. Korbel, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.98.
85. *Ibid.*
86. During the Second World War, Srobar had to admit a distinct Slovak identity. See *ibid.*, p.97.
87. *Ibid.*, p.98.
88. *Ibid.*, p.97.
89. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p.155.
90. *Ibid.*
91. Kovtun, "T.G.Masaryk: The Problem of a Small Nation", p.27.
92. *Ibid.*, p.31.
93. *Ibid.*
94. Paul, "Slovak Nationalism and the Hungarian State, 1870-1910", p.122 and Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, p.34.

95. Bosak "Slovaks and Czechs: An Uneasy Coexistence", p.71 and Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.92.
96. Paul, "Slovak Nationalism and the Hungarian State, 1870-1910", p.123.
97. Bosak "Slovaks and Czechs: An Uneasy Coexistence", p.65.
98. Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.30.
99. David Kelly, "Woodrow Wilson and The Creation of Czechoslovakia", *East European Quarterly*, XXVI, No.2, June 1992, pp.188-189.
100. *Ibid.*, p.189.
101. *Ibid.*
102. *Ibid.* p.190.
103. Though there were some acts of resistance by the Czechoslovaks, they were not widespread. See Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.35, Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, p.196 and Kelly, "Woodrow Wilson and The Creation of Czechoslovakia", p.190.
104. See Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, pp.131-133.
105. *Ibid.*, pp.132-133 and Kelly, "Woodrow Wilson and The Creation of Czechoslovakia", pp.192-193.
106. Kelly, "Woodrow Wilson and The Creation of Czechoslovakia", p.193.
107. See Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.32-35.
108. Wilson advocated independence only for the Poles. See Kelly, "Woodrow Wilson and The Creation of Czechoslovakia", p.195.

109. Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.33.
110. Kelly, "Woodrow Wilson and The Creation of Czechoslovakia", p.198.
111. See Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.135 and Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.36-37.
112. Kelly, "Woodrow Wilson and The Creation of Czechoslovakia", p.200.
113. *Ibid.*, pp.200-201.
114. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia", p.193.

Chapter V

1. Eugen Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp.21-22 and Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present*, (London: Routledge, 1992), p.217.
2. See Lloyd Cutler and Herman Schwartz, "Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E Duobus Unum?", *University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol.58, Iss.2, 1991, p.516 and Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia: The Meanings of Its History*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp.68-69.
3. Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.67-71.
4. Carol S. Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp.64-66.
5. *Ibid.*, pp.71-72 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, p.26.

6. See Cutler and Schwartz, "Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E Duobus Unum?", p.534 and Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.117.
7. See Cutler and Schwartz, "Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E Duobus Unum?", p.534.
8. Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, p.19.
9. Quoted in Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, p.138.
10. *Ibid.*, p.139 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, p.19.
11. Edita Bosak "Slovaks and Czechs: An Uneasy Coexistence" in Gordon Skilling (ed.), *Czechoslovakia 1918-1988*, p.75 and Joseph F. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia" in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (eds.), *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), p.194.
12. Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.108-109.
13. See Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, p.136.
14. Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.104-106 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, pp.19-20.
15. Korbelt, *ibid.*, p.106.
16. Bosak "Slovaks and Czechs: An Uneasy Coexistence", p.73.
17. Sharon L. Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition: Politics, Economics and Society*, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), p.12.
18. Quoted in Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, p.23.
19. Jaroslav Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, (London: I B Tauris & Co.Ltd. Publishers, 1990), p.139.
20. Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, p.76.
21. Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.95-96.

22. *Ibid.*, p.101.
23. *Ibid.*, p.43.
24. *Ibid.*, p.116.
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*, p.118 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, p.17.
27. Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.114 and Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.118-119.
28. Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, pp.149-150.
29. *Ibid.*, p.149 and Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.118.
30. See Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, p.220 and Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.150.
31. Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.119.
32. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, p.221.
33. Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.153.
34. *Ibid.*, pp.153-154. For details on Munich agreement see Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, chp.7.
35. Korbelt, *ibid.*, pp.151-152.
36. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, p.221.
37. See Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, pp.156-157 and Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.121-155.
38. See Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, pp.70-71.

39. See Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp.165-169.
40. See Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, pp.89-91 and Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.187.
41. For details on resistance activities in the Czech lands and in Slovakia see Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.160-167. See also Joseph Rothschild, *Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe Since World War II*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.36 and Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia", p.197.
42. In 1941, the three big Allies, namely UK, USSR and USA, granted the Czechoslovak National Council recognition as the country's government. See Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp. 164-167 and pp.185-186.
43. For Benes's wartime policy toward the Soviet Union see *ibid.*, pp.169-178.
44. See *ibid.*, pp.175-176; Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.168 and Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, p.233.
45. See Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.168 and Rothschild, *Return to Diversity*, p.39. For details of negotiations between Benes and Communists in Moscow see Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.201-208.
46. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, p.242.
47. For details on Slovak uprising see Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, pp.60-68.

48. See Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia", p.199 and Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, p.17.
49. Quoted in Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.193. See also Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, pp.49-53.
50. See Rothschild, *Return to Diversity*, pp.37-38 and Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nationalism and Communism: Essays 1946-1963*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1964), p.123.
51. Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, pp.71-72.
52. For the national policy of the CPC see *ibid.*, pp.41-47.
53. Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.173 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, p.42.
54. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, p.242
55. Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, pp.45-46.
56. For details see Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.188-193; Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, pp.91-92 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, pp.45-47.
57. The Czechoslovak government was to be made up of representatives of all permitted political parties, which would form a permanent coalition called the National Front. The provisional parliament would be constituted of equal numbers of MPs from each political party. Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, pp.170-171. For details of negotiations see Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.164-165 and pp.210-211.
58. See Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.218-222 and Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, p.233.

Chapter VI

1. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), p.156 and Josef Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia: The Meanings of Its History*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p.187.
2. Jaroslav Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, (London: I B Tauris & Co.Ltd. Publishers, 1990), p.175 and Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present*, (London: Routledge, 1992), p.239.
3. Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.175.
4. Joseph F. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia" in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (eds.), *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), p.203.
5. In 1945 Ruthenia was ceded to the USSR. See Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.167.
6. See Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.228-229 and Eugen Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p.78.
7. Carol S. Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp.98-99 and Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.229
8. Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, pp.144-146.

9. The prewar right and center parties, which collaborated with the Nazis and the Slovak state, the National Democrats, the Agrarians, and Hlinka populists were not allowed to reconstitute themselves. See Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.168 and Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, p.242.
10. Korbel, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.226.
11. *Ibid.*, pp.237-238. See also Joseph Rothschild, *Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe Since World War II*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.91 and Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, p.243.
12. As a result of the elections, the number of the communists in the government increased. Klement Gottwald became prime minister. Furthermore, the Communist Party retained the Ministries of Interior, Information, and Agriculture. For details on the results of the first general elections see Korbel, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.234-237 and John F.N. Bradley, *Politics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1990*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991) pp.17-18.
13. Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, p.97.
14. *Ibid.*, pp.96-97. See also H. Gordon Skilling, *The Governments of Communist East Europe*, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966), p.155 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, p.81.
15. Korbel, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.230-231 and Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia" in *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, p.202 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, p.81.

16. Though the communists introduced some measures, such as a "millionarie tax" on all property, land distribution, and more nationalization of enterprises, the opinion polls revealed a substantial decline in communist support. However, the results were not announced since the institution responsible for the opinion polls was under the control of the communists. See Rothschild, *Return to Diversity*, p.93 and Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.179.

17. At that session, Cominform condemned the formerly acceptable doctrine of separate national paths to socialism. See Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.242-244 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, p.85.

18. See Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, pp.178-179 Rothschild, *Return to Diversity*, p.94 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, p.86.

19. For details concerning the Communist coup d'etat see Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.245-252; Rothschild, *Return to Diversity*, pp.94-95; Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, pp.179-181 and Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, pp.246-247.

20. For details on the dissolution of the democratic system in Czechoslovakia see Bradley, *Politics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1990*, pp.27-34 1990, pp.27-33.

21. See Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, pp.39-104; Rothschild, *Return to Diversity*, pp.135-136 and Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia" in *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, p.202.

22. For details see Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.261-264 and Bradley, *Politics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1990*, pp.33-35.
23. The workers were protesting against price rises and a currency reform of June 1953, which diminished the value of the savings. For details on currency reform see Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.263-264.
24. Edita Bosak "Slovaks and Czechs: An Uneasy Coexistence" in H. Gordon Skilling (ed.), *Czechoslovakia 1918-1988: Seventy Years From Independence*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p.78; Skilling, *The Governments of Communist East Europe*, p.156 and Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia" in *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, p.202.
25. For details see Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, pp.100-101 and Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.259-260.
26. Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, p.100 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, pp.91-92.
27. Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.260 and Sharon L. Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition: Politics, Economics and Society*, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), p.187 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, p.83.
28. See Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*, (New York: John Wiley&Sons, 1966) and Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983).

29. See Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying", in Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994)
30. The Twentieth Party Congress also proclaimed the equality of all Communist Parties and the right of each country to follow its own road to socialism. For the impact of the Twentieth Party Congress see Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, pp.105-111 and Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, p.251.
31. Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.256
32. Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, p.101 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, p.113.
33. Skilling, *The Governments of Communist East Europe*, p.156, and Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, p.107.
34. Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.271-273. For details on the economic reform plan see Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, pp.240-242.
35. See Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.273-277 and Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, pp.28-29.
36. Prague students also voiced their grievances in a street riot in 1967. See Bradley, *Politics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1990*, p.45 and Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.280.
37. For details on the Congress see Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.277-279 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, pp.146-149.
38. Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, pp.108-109 and Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, p.30.

39. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia" in *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, p.202.
40. Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.281.
41. See Bradley, *Politics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1990*, pp.44-45; Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.283-285 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, pp.154-157.
42. Bradley, *Politics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1990*, p.46.
43. Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, pp.30-31 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, pp.158-159.
44. Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.285.
45. *Ibid.*, pp.287-288.
46. Bradley, *Politics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1990*, pp.49-50.
47. Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.288.
48. Bradley, *Politics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1990*, p.48 and Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.287 and p.290.
49. For details see Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.296-298; Bradley, *Politics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1990*, p.49 and Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, p.32.
50. Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, p.123 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, p.172.
51. For details see Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, pp.121-128; Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, pp.172-174 and Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984) p.232.
52. Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, p.124.

53. The "Two Thousand Words" statement attacked the past practices of the Party and it asked for more rapid purges of Stalinist communists who obstructed the aim of creating a socialist regime with a human face. See Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.294; Bradley, *Politics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1990*, p.51 and Rothschild, *Return to Diversity*, p.171.

54. For details see Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.301-305.

55. For details on intervention see Korbelt, *ibid.*, pp.305-308. See also Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, pp.189-190; Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, pp.191-192 and Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, p.257.

56. For details see Korbelt, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, pp.308-309 and Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, p.186.

57. Bradley, *Politics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1990*, p.52 and Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, pp.190-191.

58. Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, p.232.

59. For details see Viktor Knapp, "Socialist Federation-A Legal Means to the Solution of the Nationality Problem: A Comparative Study", *Michigan Law Review*, Vol.82, no.5-6, pp.1213-1228.

60. Wolchik, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia", *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol.8,

No.1, (Winter 1994), pp.162-163 and Bradley, *Politics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1990*, p.53.

61. Knapp, "Socialist Federation-A Legal Means to the Solution of the Nationality Problem:A Comparative Study", pp.1214-1215.

62. Quoted in *ibid.*, p.1215.

63. Quoted in Lloyd Cutler and Herman Schwartz, "Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E Duobus Unum?", *University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol.58, Iss.2 (1991), p.526.

64. Quoted in *ibid.*, p.527.

65. Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, p.124.

66. In practice, however, both in Yugoslav and in Soviet federations, with few exceptions, the republics were not nationally homogeneous. See Knapp, "Socialist Federation-A Legal Means to the Solution of the Nationality Problem:A Comparative Study", p.1219 and Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, pp.222-223.

67. See Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, p.198,; Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, p.127; Viktor Knapp, "Socialist Federation-A Legal Means to the Solution of the Nationality Problem: A Comparative Study", *Michigan Law Review*, p.1223 and Bradley, *Politics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1990*, p.75.

68. For details See Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, pp.126-127.

69. See Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma*, p.198; See Cutler and Schwartz, "Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E Duobus Unum?", p.519 and Knapp, "Socialist Federation-A Legal Means to

the Solution of the Nationality Problem: A Comparative Study", p.1124-1226.

70. Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, p.232 and Bradley, *Politics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1990*, p.103.

71. The period, which became known as "normalization", was characterized by the attempts to reverse the changes begun in the Prague Spring of 1968 and to reestablish rigid, centralized control.

72. Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.313 and Bradley, *Politics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1990*, p.54.

73. Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, p.446.

74. For details on Husak's normalization policies see Edward Taborsky, "Czechoslovakia: The Return to 'Normalcy'", *Problems of Communism*, Vol.XIX (November-December 1970), pp.31-41 and Bernard Wheaton and Zdenek Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslovakia, 1988-1991*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), pp.6-9.

75. Bradley, *Politics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1990*, p.55-57; Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, p.36 and Taborsky, "Czechoslovakia: The Return to 'Normalcy'", pp.32-33.

76. See Korbél, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.314 and Taborsky, "Czechoslovakia: The Return to 'Normalcy'", pp.34-36.

77. See Taborsky, *ibid.* pp.37-39 and Vladimir V. Kusin, "Husak's Czechoslovakia and Economic Stagnation", *Problems of Communism*, Vol.XXXI (May-June 1982), pp.24-31.

78. See Kusin, *ibid.*, p.27, Wheaton and Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution*, pp.9-11 and Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, p.37.

79. Kusin, *ibid.*

80. For details on Charter 77 see Mary Hrabik Samal, "Dissent's Challenge to the East European Political Systems: The Case of Charter '77 in Czechoslovakia", *East European Quarterly*, XXI, no.4 (January 1988), pp. 469-490; Tenley Adams "Charter 77 and the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR): The Struggle for Human Rights in Czechoslovakia and Poland", *East European Quarterly*, XXVI, no.2 (June 1992), pp.219-238 and H. Gordon Skilling, "Independent Currents in Czechoslovakia", *Problems of Communism*, Vol.XXXIV (Jan-Feb 1985), pp.32-49, and Wheaton and Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution*, pp.11-13.

81. Adams "Charter 77 and the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR): The Struggle for Human Rights in Czechoslovakia and Poland", p.221 and Samal, "Dissent's Challenge to the East European Political Systems: The Case of Charter '77 in Czechoslovakia", pp.470-471.

82. See Samal, *ibid.*, p.480 and Skilling, "Independent Currents in Czechoslovakia", p.35.

83. Skilling, *ibid.*, pp.38-40 and Adams "Charter 77 and the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR): The Struggle for Human Rights in Czechoslovakia and Poland", pp.231-232.

84. Adams, *ibid.*, p.232 and Rothschild, *Return to Diversity*, p.209.

85. Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, p.232.
86. See Bradley, *Politics in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1990*, p.58 and Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, p. 247.
87. Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, pp.232-233.
88. See Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, pp.245-247 and Korbel, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia*, p.314.
89. Quoted in Leff, *ibid.*, p.246.
90. *Ibid.*, p.253.
91. For reasons of Czech resentment toward the Slovaks see *ibid.*, pp.268-271, Wheaton and Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslovakia, 1988-1991*, p.11 and Edita Bosak "Slovaks and Czechs: An Uneasy Coexistence" in H. Gordon Skilling (ed.), *Czechoslovakia 1918-1988: Seventy Years From Independence*, p.79.
92. Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, pp.154-155.
93. Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, p.264.
94. *Ibid.*
95. *Ibid.*, pp.265-266.

Chapter VII

1. For the problems in Czechoslovak economy see Vladimir V. Kusin, "Husak's Czechoslovakia and Economic Stagnation", *Problems of Communism*, Vol.XXXI (May-June 1982), pp.24-37; Michael Kraus, "Czechoslovakia in the 1980's", *Current History*, November 1985, Vol. 84, no.505 (November 1985), p.374 and, J.F. Brown, *Surge To Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern*

Europe, (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1991), pp.152-155.

2. For details on the reasons which brought about the collapse of communism in Czechoslovakia see Bernard Wheaton and Zdenek Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslovakia, 1988-1991*, (Boulder, San Fransisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), pp.23-36; Brown, *Surge To Freedom*, pp.149-179; William H. Luers, "Czechoslovakia: Road to Revolution", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.62, No.2, (Spring 1990), pp.77-98 and Tony R. Judt, "Metamorphosis: The Democratic Revolution in Czechoslovakia" in Ivo Banac (ed.) *Eastern Europe in Revolution*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp.96-97.

3. Wheaton and Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution*, pp.14-21 and Jaroslav Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, (London: IB Tauris & Co.Ltd. Publishers, 1990), p.196.

4. The Czechoslovak leadership split into three groups over Gorbachev's reforms: those in favor of immediate reforms like Lubomir Strougal, those in favor of slower pace of reforms like Milos Jakes and Ladislav Adamec and those hardliners who rejected any kind of restructuring like Vasil Bilak. See Otto Ulc, "Czechoslovakia: Realistic Socialism?", *Current History*, Vol.88, no.541 (Nov.1989), pp.389-390, Brown, *Surge To Freedom*, pp.158-160, and Joseph Rothschild, *Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe Since World War II*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.236.

5. For details see Sharon L. Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition: Politics, Economics and Society*, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), chapter 4.
6. See Richard Davy, "Czechoslovakia Under Jakes", *The World Today*, Vol.44, Iss.4 (April 1988), pp.55-56 and Ulc, "Czechoslovakia: Realistic Socialism?", pp.389-404.
7. Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, pp.42-43, Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.193 and Luers, "Czechoslovakia: Road to Revolution", p.90.
8. Luers, *ibid.*, p.91 and Brown, *Surge To Freedom*, p.168.
9. Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, pp.43-45.
10. See Luers, "Czechoslovakia: Road to Revolution", p.91-93; Wolchik, *ibid.*, p.44 and Brown, *Surge To Freedom*, pp.172-173.
11. See Wheaton and Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution*, pp. 39-48.
12. For details see Wheaton and Kavan, *ibid.*, pp.49-81 and Brown, *Surge To Freedom*, pp.177-178.
13. See Wheaton and Kavan, *ibid.*, pp.83-98; Rothschild, *Return to Diversity*, p.238 and Krejci, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, p.201.
14. Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, p.50, Wheaton and Kavan, *ibid.*, pp.98-108 and Brown, *Surge To Freedom*, p.178.
15. See Wheaton and Kavan, *ibid.*, pp.108-111 and Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present*, (London: Routledge, 1992), p.267.
16. See Gordon Wightman, "The Collapse of Communist Rule in Czechoslovakia and the June 1990 Parliamentary Elections",

Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.44, Iss.1 (1991), pp.98-99 and Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, p.68.

17. Wigthman, *ibid.*, p.99.

18. For details see Wigthman, *ibid.*, pp.99-101, Wheaton and Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution*, pp.130-131 and Judy Batt, "After Czechoslovakia's Velvet Poll", *The World Today*, Vol.46, Iss.8-9 (1990), p.141.

19. Wigthman, *ibid.*, pp.101-104, Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, p.51 and Wheaton and Kavan, *ibid.*, pp.131-132.

20. Wigthman, *ibid.*, pp.107-108, Batt, "After Czechoslovakia's Velvet Poll", p.141 and Wolchik, *ibid.*, pp.51-52.

21. Wigthman, *ibid.*, pp.108-109, Batt, *ibid.*, p.142-143 and Wolchik, *ibid.*, p.52.

22. *Ibid.*

23. Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, pp.82-83.

24. Wheaton and Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution*, p.168 and Wolchik, *ibid.*, p.95.

25. Wolchik, *ibid.*

26. In the local elections, held in late November, the Civic Forum retained its position in the Czech lands with 35.4 percent of the vote. However, in Slovakia the PAV, with 20.4 percent of vote, followed the Christian Democrats which received 27.4 percent of the Slovak vote. For details see Wolchik, *ibid.*, p.53 and Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, p.267

27. See Wolchik, *ibid.* p.83 and p.94 and Wheaton and Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution*, p.168.

28. See Gordon Wightman, "The Czech and Slovak Republics" in Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lewis (eds.), *Developments in East European Politics*, (The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1993), p.54 and Wheaton and Kavan, *ibid.*, p.138.

29. Wightman, *ibid.*, p.57.

30. For details see Lloyd Cutler and Herman Schwartz, "Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E Duobus Unum?", *University of Chicago Law Review*, 1991, Vol.58, Iss.2, pp.524-525.

31. See *ibid.*, pp.527-529.

32. For details on President Havel's draft constitution see *ibid.*, pp.545-551.

33. *Ibid.*, pp.550-551.

34. Cited in Wheaton and Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution*, p.171.

35. Gale Stokes, *The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.205.

36. See Sharon L. Wolchik, "Repluralization of Politics in Czechoslovakia", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.26, No.4, (December 1993), pp.415-416 and "The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia", *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol.8, No.1, (Winter 1994), pp.156-157, and Wheaton and Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution*, pp.168-172.

37. The Federal Assembly in late 1990 approved a federal legislation containing some economic measures necessary to create a free market. The laws on the privatization of small firms and the privatization of large state-owned industrial

enterprises were passed by the Federal Assembly in October, 1990 and in February, 1991 respectively. For details on economic plan see Wheaton and Kavan, *ibid.*, pp.154-164, and Milan Svec, "Czechoslovakia's Velvet Divorce", *Current History*, Vol.91, Iss.568, (November 1992) pp.377-379.

38. See Wolchik, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia", pp.166-167 and Wheaton and Kavan, *ibid.*, pp.169-170.

39. See Wolchik, *ibid.*, 165-166 and *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, pp.194-195, and Milan Svec, "Czechoslovakia's Velvet Divorce", p.379.

40. Wheaton and Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution*, pp.169-170.

41. See Reneo Lukic, "Twilight of The Federations in East Central Europe and the Soviet Union", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.45, no.2, (Winter 1992) pp.589-591 and Cutler and Schwartz, "Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E Duobus Unum?", p.524.

42. See Wheaton and Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution*, pp.175-176; Wightman, "The Czech and Slovak Republics", p.58 and Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, p.83.

43. See Wheaton and Kavan, *ibid.*, pp.164-168 and p.175, and Wolchik, *ibid.*, 82-83.

44. Milan Svec, "Czechoslovakia's Velvet Divorce", p.379 and Wheaton and Kavan, *ibid.*, pp.177-178.

45. David M. Olson, "Dissolution of the State: Political Parties and the 1992 Election in Czechoslovakia", *Communist and Post-*

Communist Studies, Vol.26, no.3 (September 1993), p.303 and Svec, "Czechoslovakia's Velvet Divorce", p.379.

46. Olson, "Dissolution of the State: Political Parties and the 1992 Election in Czechoslovakia", pp.306-307; Wheaton and Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution*, pp.176-177 and Svec, "Czechoslovakia's Velvet Divorce", p.379.

47. Olson, "Dissolution of the State: Political Parties and the 1992 Election in Czechoslovakia", p.304.

48. Wightman, "The Czech and Slovak Republics", pp.57-58.

49. *Ibid.*, p.57.

50. Svec, "Czechoslovakia's Velvet Divorce", p.379 and Olson, "Dissolution of the State: Political Parties and the 1992 Election in Czechoslovakia", p.305.

51. It should be noted that the reform program which was put forward by Klaus was criticized by some Czech leaders in the government led by Valtr Komarek, then the deputy prime minister, who favored a slower economic reform and more state intervention in the economy. For details see Wheaton and Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution*, pp.154-164 and Stokes, *The Walls Came Tumbling Down*, pp.199-200.

52. Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, pp.124-125.

53. Wolchik, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia", p. 179.

54. *Ibid.*, pp.179-180.

55. Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, pp.123-124.

56. Wolchik, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia", pp.182-183.

57. Sharon Wolchik, "Repluralization of Politics in Czechoslovakia", p.427 and "The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia", p.183..
58. Wolchik, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia", pp.183-184.
59. For the results of the June 1992 elections see *ibid.*, pp.184-186; Olson, "Dissolution of the State: Political Parties and the 1992 Election in Czechoslovakia", pp.309-313 and Wightman, "The Czech and Slovak Republics", pp.58-60.
60. Wheaton and Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution*, p.178 and Wolchik, *Czechoslovakia In Transition*, p.185.
61. Wolchik, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia", p.157.
62. Wightman, "The Czech and Slovak Republics", p.60.
63. *Ibid.*
64. Wolchik, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia", p.157.
65. Wightman, "The Czech and Slovak Republics", p.60.
66. Stokes, *The Walls Came Tumbling Down*, p.205 and Svec, "Czechoslovakia's Velvet Divorce", p.380.
67. Svec, "Czechoslovakia's Velvet Divorce", p.380.
68. Olson, "Dissolution of the State: Political Parties and the 1992 Election in Czechoslovakia", pp. 301-314.
69. *Ibid.*, pp.301-302.
70. *Ibid.*, p.313.

71. Martin Butora and Zora Butorova, "Slovakia: The Identity Challenges of the Newly Born State", *Social Research*, Vol.60, no.4, (Winter 1993), p.719.
72. *Ibid.*, p.717.
73. Wolchik, "Repluralization of Politics in Czechoslovakia", p.415.

Chapter VIII

1. Philip G. Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization", *World Politics*, Vol.43, No.2, (January, 1991), pp.197-199.

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