

THE CASE OF EGYPT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS FROM “JANUARY 25
REVOLUTION” TO JULY 2013 MILITARY INTERVENTION

ABDURRAHMAN GÜMÜŞ

BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY

2014

THE CASE OF EGYPT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS FROM “JANUARY 25
REVOLUTION” TO JULY 2013 MILITARY INTERVENTION

Thesis submitted to the
Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
in
Political Science and International Relations

by
Abdurrahman Gümüř

Boğaziçi University

2014

Thesis Abstract

Abdurrahman Gümüş, The Case of Egypt: An Analysis of the Process from “January 25 Revolution” to July 2013 Military Intervention

The fall of Mubarak as a result of mass demonstrations was a historic moment for Egypt and it meant “breaking the fear barrier” for the Egyptian people. After the transition period under the rule of the SCAF, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Morsi came to power as the first democratically elected President of Egypt. The expectations were really high and there was a substantial amount of support for him in the society. However, in one-year period of his Presidency, an opposition against Morsi emerged and it grew through time. In the first anniversary of his Presidency, large protests were organized and the crisis ended in a military intervention in July 2013. This thesis aims to analyze the reasons why the process in Egypt evolved from “January 25 Revolution” to July 2013 military intervention. It mainly focuses on the reformulation of the alliances between different actors under the impact of the conjuncture and some crucial events. Moreover, it explains how and why different political groups that were so motivated initially for manifesting their political will through elections could support the Army against the first democratically elected President in such a short amount of time. Changes in the attitudes and policies of different actors take our attention to the events emerged in this short period, especially the ones happened in the Morsi period. It seems that some events negatively affected the views of different political groups towards the President Morsi and they led to recalculations of strategies of the actors and formation of new alliances to change the political context through new mechanisms. Morsi, as an unexperienced leader, made some controversial and untimely decisions and attempts which caused opposition among people so that his policies became one reason for the growing resentment in the society. Among these policies, the November 22 Declaration and the constitution-making process came into prominence. They were accepted as the signs of the tendency of the President Morsi towards authoritarianism. These two breaking points implied the loss of conditional support given by some groups in the second round of the Presidential elections. The Salafist Nour Party remained as the only ally for Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in that process.

The following months witnessed the breaking of the alliance between the Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition to the ideological differences between the two groups, some disagreements about the policies and the Saudi impact on the Salafists made the end of the alliance inevitable. The role of Salafists was significant because their participation in the opposition camp changed the dynamics in the country and increased the legitimacy of the protests against Morsi. After that, the military played the decisive role implying the end of the Morsi period. It strengthened the place of the military in the political affairs. It became the last ring of the chain of military interference with the political issues. Thus, the military and the Salafist Nour Party appeared as the most critical actors in the process. Apart from that, the thesis points out the impact of the historical prejudices towards the MB and the role of identity for determining the credibility of Morsi in Presidency. The historical prejudices and identity factors made his credibility limited so the opposition was activated in such a short amount of time. As a result, the reasons for the evolution of the process were a combination of different factors that needed a step-by-step analysis as we have done in this thesis.

Tez Özeti

Abdurrahman Gümüş, The Case of Egypt: An Analysis of the Process from “January 25 Revolution” to July 2013 Military Intervention

Mübarek’in kitlesel gösteriler sonucu devrilmesi Mısır için tarihi bir andı ve o, Mısırlılar için “korku duvarının yıkılması” anlamına geliyordu. Mısır Silahlı Kuvvetleri Yüksek Konseyi hakimiyetindeki geçiş döneminin ardından, Mursi Mısır’ın demokratik olarak seçilmiş ilk Başkanı (Cumhurbaşkanı) olarak göreve geldi. Beklentiler oldukça yüksekti ve toplumda onun için azımsanmayacak oranda bir destek vardı. Fakat, Başkanlığının bir yıllık döneminde Mursi’ye karşı bir muhalefet ortaya çıktı ve zamanla daha da arttı. Başkanlığının birinci yıldönümünde, büyük protestolar organize edildi ve bu kriz, Temmuz 2013’teki askeri darbeyle son buldu. Bu tez, Mısır’daki sürecin “25 Ocak Devrimi”nden Temmuz 2013 askeri müdahalesine evrilmesine yol açan sebepleri analiz etmeyi amaçlıyor. Esas olarak, farklı aktörler arasındaki ittifakların konjonktür ve bazı önemli olaylar etkisinde yeniden şekillenmesine odaklanıyor. Dahası, başlangıçta seçimler yoluyla siyasi iradelerini göstermeye bu kadar motive olmuş siyasi grupların nasıl ve niçin bu kadar kısa bir zamanda demokratik yolla seçilmiş ilk başkana karşı orduyu destekleyebildiklerini açıklıyor. Farklı aktörlerin yaklaşımlarındaki ve politikalarındaki değişiklikler dikkatimizi bu kısa zaman dilimindeki, özellikle Mursi döneminde yaşanan, olaylara çekiyor. Görünen o ki, bazı olaylar farklı siyasi grupların Başkan Mursi’ye karşı bakışlarını olumsuz yönde etkiledi ve aktörlerin stratejilerini yeniden hesaplamalarına ve siyasi bağlamın yeni mekanizmalarla değişmesi için yeni ittifakların oluşumuna yol açtı. Mursi, tecrübesiz bir lider olarak, halkta bir muhalefetin oluşmasına da neden olan bazı tartışmalı ve zamansız kararlara imza attı, bu nedenle onun politikaları toplumdaki artan huzursuzluğun bir nedeni oldu. Bu politikalar arasında, 22 Kasım Bildirisi ve anayasa yapım süreci ön plana çıktı. O politikalar, Başkan Mursi’nin otoriterleşmeye olan eğiliminin işaretleri olarak kabul edildi. Bu iki kırılma noktası, bazı gruplar tarafından Başkanlık seçiminin ikinci turunda verilen şartlı desteğin yitirilmesi anlamına geliyordu. Selefi Nur Partisi, Mursi ve Müslüman Kardeşler’in bu süreçteki tek müttefiki olarak kalıyordu.

Takip eden aylar, Selefiler ile Müslüman Kardeşler arasındaki ittifakın bozulmasına şahitlik etti. İki grup arasındaki ideolojik farklılıklara ek olarak, bazı politikalar hakkındaki görüş ayrılıkları ve Selefiler üzerindeki Suudi etkisi ittifakın sonunu kaçınılmaz hale getirdi. Selefiler’in rolü çok önemliydi çünkü onların muhalif kampa dahil olması ülkedeki dinamikleri değiştirdi ve Mursi’ye karşı protestoların meşruiyetini artırmış oldu. Ondan sonra, ordu Mursi döneminin sonunu ifade eden belirleyici rolü oynadı. O rol, siyasi olaylardaki yerini güçlendirdi. Ordunun siyasi konulara müdahalesinin son halkası oldu. Böylelikle, ordu ve Selefi Nur Partisi bu süreçteki en kritik aktörler olarak ortaya çıktı. Bunun dışında, tez Mursi’nin Başkanlıktaki kredibilitesini belirleyen Müslüman Kardeşler’e yönelik tarihsel önyargılara ve kimliğin rolüne işaret ediyor. Tarihsel önyargılar ve kimlik faktörleri Mursi’nin kredisini sınırlı hale getirdi, bu yüzden muhalefet bu kadar kısa sürede harekete geçirildi. Sonuç olarak, sürecin evrilmesinin sebepleri bizim bu tezde yaptığımız gibi aşama aşama bir analizi gerektiren farklı faktörlerin kombinasyonundan oluşuyordu.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis could be prepared and completed with the assistance, encouragement and guidance of my thesis advisor, Assoc. Prof. Ayşen Candaş, who not only supported me to determine the subject but also gave me invaluable theoretical insights and structural design during my writing process. I am also thankful for her patience, understanding and kindness during the hard times that marked both the writing process of the thesis and my overall graduate studies. Her attitude towards me has been more like a mother than an academic. Her presence and academic support were so crucial for me that my thanks words would always remain poor compared to what I learned from her and gained from her academic supervision. I am also thankful to my jury member, Prof. Dr. Yeşim Arat, for her wise comments, her theoretical revisions to my subject as well as her meticulous reading of my thesis. Her long-term experience illuminated the process of completing my studies. I am also thankful to my jury member, Assoc. Prof. Oya Pancaroğlu, for her contributions to my graduate studies and the defense process. Her patience and support were crucial for the continuation of my studies. She did not avoid helping me especially during the hard times I have encountered and she really deserved my special thanks.

I wish to express my appreciation for the help and support that offered me by different persons and institutions in the writing of this thesis. The scholarship given by TÜBİTAK during my Master's education was a significant financial support for my studies. In my opinion, these kinds of generous scholarships are necessary for the researchers not to spend more hours to get the income in this limited amount of time.

I also take pleasure in expressing my gratitude to my instructors and friends who contributed to my studies about Egypt and gave me invaluable advices about my research topic. Lastly, there is no doubt that this thesis would ever have been realized without the encouragement, support and patience of my family. I am really thankful for all of them.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION.....	1
Outline of the Thesis.....	6
The Arab Spring and Path Divergence.....	10
The Special Place of Egypt in the Middle East and in the Arab Spring Process.....	11
Scholarly Approaches in the Middle Eastern Studies.....	18
CHAPTER II: TAHRIR COALITION vs. THE MUBARAK REGIME.....	26
The Mubarak Regime.....	29
The Religious Institutions in Egypt.....	35
The Emergence and Composition of the Tahrir Coalition.....	37
Youth Organizations and New Social Movements.....	39
The Role of Social Media.....	41
Other Actors.....	43
Islamic Groups and the Muslim Brotherhood.....	44
Salafists.....	46
CHAPTER III: THE PROCESS AND EVENTS BETWEEN “JANUARY 25 REVOLUTION” AND JULY 2013.....	48
The SCAF Rule in the Transition Period.....	49
The Critical Events of the Morsi Period and the Reasons for the Growing Opposition: “Why the First Elected President Became the Common Target in One-Year Period?”.....	52
Morsi’s Policies in the Office and His Controversial Decisions.....	55
The Controversial Constitutional Decree on November 22.....	58
Constitutional Debates and the Referendum.....	63
A Love-Hate Relationship between Salafist al-Nour Party and the Muslim Brotherhood	69
A General Evaluation of the Morsi Period in Egypt.....	76
Tamarod Movement and Campaign.....	81
CHAPTER IV: THE ROLE OF MILITARY IN EGYPTIAN POLITICS AND THE NATURE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS.....	83
Civil-Military Relations.....	84

The Role of Military in Politics.....	86
The Historical Record of the Role of Military in the Egyptian Political System.....	93
The Role of the Egyptian Military during the Arab Uprisings.....	95
Analysis of the Traditional Role of the Egyptian Military and Practical Cases.....	101
CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS OF THE POST-MUBARAK PERIOD AND CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	111
The Identity Factor and the Shadow of the Historical Prejudices on the Attitudes towards the Military Intervention.....	111
Conclusion.....	119
Comparison of the Turkish Case with the Morsi Period in Egypt.....	128
For Further Research.....	130
REFERENCES.....	132

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The Arab Spring started in Tunisia and it spread to different parts of the region. January 25, 2011 was a crucial breaking point for both Egypt and the Middle East because of the emergence of the mass protests and demonstrations in Tahrir Square. The uprisings targeted the ouster of Mubarak and people having different ideological and political backgrounds could come together against the common enemy. Mubarak seemed confident in the beginning due to his long-term authoritarian rule and the existence of different components of the regime with all of their strength. In other words, for most people, the Mubarak regime was invincible and it was almost inevitable to go beyond the “authoritarian stability” in Egypt and in the region as a whole. However, the Egyptian people filling Tahrir Square showed their determinacy and they did not leave there in despair. At the end of eighteen days, the political crisis came to a point that there was no way out for Mubarak so he had to leave the office in accordance with the will of Egyptians. The success of protests in Egypt became an historical event and it had of great significance particularly in the regional politics and the world politics in general. Its results would go beyond the borders of Egypt and it had such a high potential that it could change the destiny of the region. Scholars defined the event as “breaking the fear barrier”. The exact consequences would be observed in the following period but the fall of Mubarak represented itself a cornerstone for the political history of the region. It gave such a sense that the will of people could overcome all the barriers on their way and it created an optimistic atmosphere parallel to rising expectations. The notion of “will of the people” and the determinacy of people in the form of political participation brought the possibility of a democratic system in Egypt. Scholars began to debate whether the ouster of Mubarak and possible success of protests in different countries could become the starting point of democratization of the region. The determinacy and successful attempts of Egyptians provided an inspiration for other people and the uprisings spread throughout the region. However, as time passed, Egyptians encountered the cold facet

of the reality because the first ideals and expectations were not so easy to put into practice in the Egyptian political context. The coalition of different political groups was dissolved because of the variety of agendas and objectives among them. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (the SCAF) took the control in Egypt for a transition period. Although its policies and decisions were beyond the limits of a transition government and the transition period lasted longer than expected, the SCAF determined the date of elections and declared their will to transfer the power to the elected civilians. Morsi came to power as the first democratically elected President of Egypt. It was an important achievement for the Egyptian people and expectations were still high. Morsi ruled the country for one year and in his first anniversary, hundreds of thousands of people gathered to protest and they organized huge demonstrations. The Egyptian Army intervened to the political crisis and it seized the control of politics by overthrowing Morsi.

In my Master's thesis, I will focus on the following questions: "Why the process in Egypt evolved from the 'January 25 Revolution' to the 'July 2013' military intervention?" "How and why different political groups that were so motivated initially for manifesting their political will through elections could support the Army against the first democratically elected President in such a short amount of time?" "How alliances between different political actors were reshaped against Morsi's Presidency and even some actors which supported the election of Morsi could participate in this alliance?" Generally speaking, the answers to these questions are related to each other and they all signify the importance of the events emerged in this two-and-a-half year period, especially in the last one year during which Morsi ruled the country. I mainly argue that certain events in this short amount of time, especially in the Morsi period, negatively affected the views of different political groups towards the new President and these events resulted in recalculations of strategies of different actors and formation of new alliances leading to change in the political context through new

mechanisms. Morsi made some controversial and untimely decisions and attempts which led to opposition among people so that his inexperience and policies became one reason for the growing resentment against his Presidency. Moreover, the historical prejudices against the Muslim Brotherhood among different groups in the Egyptian society reinforced the negative image of Morsi as a member of the MB. To put it another way, the credibility of Morsi was not so high in the eyes of people and his controversial decisions created the loss of this limited credibility. It can be claimed that despite historical prejudices, people halfheartedly gave a chance to Morsi but he missed the opportunity in the political context of Egypt. Therefore, growing opposition and participation of different actors in this opposition camp can only be explained in a multi-causal way. The historical relationships among different actors, the nature of the events emerged in Morsi's Presidency and the reactions of different groups against these incidents should be taken into account in order to make a comprehensive analysis. The Army came into prominence as the main actor in the whole process but the role of Salafists was crucial as well because it changed the dynamics in the relations among different actors and in a sense, it brought the end of Morsi's Presidency together with other opposition groups. In that regard, the story is not a simple military intervention story; on the contrary, the process was much more complicated than it seemed.

In terms of the recent political history of Egypt, the Arab Spring emerged as a critical juncture for the Egyptian politics because it challenged the existing political order not only for Egypt but also for the whole region. The importance of the Arab Spring for Egypt and for the region in general was addressed as follows: "The Arab Spring is characterized as a fundamental challenge to the postcolonial order of the Arab world" (Ismael& Ismael 2013). The anti-Mubarak movement and uprisings should be seen as a work of a grand coalition because it consisted of different actors and turned into a collective initiative. During the protests in Egypt, the initial movements and challenges were organized by diverse groups of

people. Secular and liberal groups, Leftists, youth organizations, women, some minority groups and Islamic groups including Salafists were all in Tahrir Square against the authoritarian regime of Mubarak. It can be said that apart from some minority groups, the actors of the regime and its allies were the only remaining ones outside this grand coalition. Furthermore, it became clearer through time that even the allies of Mubarak regime could not remain loyal in that context. Youth organizations and groups came into prominence compared to former periods especially in the first days because they played a significant role for igniting the uprising and turning it into a collective movement with the help of social media tools. The members of the Muslim Brotherhood took part individually in the beginning and the Brothers declared their institutional support a few days later so that they played a role as an institution in the following period. The role and position of the military was crucial for both the military itself and the maintenance of the regime. Because the military had been identified with the regime and acted in accordance with the policies of the regime since the Free Officers' Coup, the Mubarak regime and most people expected the military to take the side of the survival of the regime and to back the existing system against the demonstrators. In order to analyze the behavior of the military leaders, we should always keep in mind that the military could keep its institutional autonomy from the other elements of the regime despite the long-term alliance with it. Therefore, it was possible for the military to make different maneuvers in the political sphere and to take different decisions in contrast with the former expectations of people. There were some turning points for the final decision of the military leaders during the protests. We will go into the details of the calculations and the attitudes of the military in the fourth chapter. Shortly, the military determined to take side with the protestors and withdrew its support from the Mubarak regime under the impact of its strategic interests and pragmatic calculations. It is necessary to think about the complex relations of the military with other actors and the nature of civil-military relations in Egypt in order to understand the dynamics

of the military's reaction to the protests. It can only be explained in a multi-causal way rather than focusing on just one point. In the end, a grand coalition was established against the Mubarak regime with the participation of the military. It resulted in the ouster of Mubarak symbolizing the achievement of the common objective. The overthrow of the authoritarian leader as a result of the mass protests changed the balance of power and created a need for reconfiguration of the political system. Surprisingly, this grand coalition, except for the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, could be again established against Morsi after one-year period of his Presidency. This situation has left an unanswered question: "How was the anti-Mubarak sentiment replaced by the anti-Morsi or anti-MB sentiment in that process in such a short amount of time and how did it turn into a pro-Sisi (or pro-Army) movement against the Muslim Brotherhood?" We will concentrate on the analysis of this issue in the thesis while explaining the formation of alliances and the impacts of developments changing the dynamics in this period.

One thing we need to clarify is the exact role of the different elements of the grand coalition in the success of mass movements. All groups which, sooner or later, participated in the grand coalition presented themselves as the "real owners" of the so-called "revolution". It can be said that the groups which triggered the mass protests against the authoritarian regime from the very beginning of the uprisings should be accepted as the main owners of the success. However, all the actors took part in Tahrir Square played a role in the final result proportional to their political weight. The first groups were important in the sense that they started the uprising and prepared the ground for further steps but it did not mean that they were more decisive than others. Generally speaking, the first groups were the ones which independently participated in the movement other than the MB and the military officers. The Muslim Brothers collectively followed these first groups in a few days and the military became the last one in the grand coalition. The involvement of the Muslim Brothers increased

the power of the protests with their large number of supporters because the number of protestors and their determinacy were really important for the position of the regime. Furthermore, the support of the military broke the resistance of Mubarak to remain in the power so that it became decisive for the fall of Mubarak. The first groups that participated in the mass movements and protests in Tahrir Square blamed the “latecomers” for “hijacking the revolution”. In my opinion, this kind of accusations is not so fair in the Egyptian context because of the significant roles each actor played during the whole process. It cannot be claimed even for the military, which remained neutral during the protests and took side with the protestors at the last minute, because its position and support was important for the survival of the dictatorship regime. We should keep in mind that the power of the first groups would most probably be insufficient for the expected outcome, even for the first step- the fall of Mubarak. As it has always been, they had to share the success and be one part of the coalition. Thus, it will be misleading to look backwards after seeing the result. In order to analyze correctly, we should focus on the role and place of each actor in the politics.

Outline of the Thesis

In this introductory part, I will prepare the ground for the debates and explanations in order to apply the theoretical frameworks to the practical issues. First of all, I will put forth the emergence of different directions in the Arab Spring countries in order to understand the importance of case studies. After that, it will be discussed why Egypt historically has a special place in the Middle East and why the developments in Egypt have been so crucial for the Arab Spring process. These explanations will be helpful for us to understand the peculiarities of Egypt and the reasons for the path divergence in the Egyptian experience. Subsequently, scholarly approaches that are used in the Middle Eastern Studies will be presented. The distinction between traditional types of cultural or essentialist approaches and historical institutional approaches is important here because the approach determines how you look at

the issues and from which viewpoint you interpret the events. From our point of view, these two groups of approaches can partially explain the truth so that we will use both of them to analyze the issue in a more accurate way. Since we focus on the events between the “January 25 Revolution” and the “July 2013 military intervention” and we believe that these events were influential on the changes in the actions and policies of different actors, historical institutional approaches provide a more useful tool kit for our arguments. In other words, historical institutional approach gives us a more dynamic view and it opens a way for explaining how the actors reformulated their policies and strategies. Furthermore, the actors having strong institutional background have more decisive effects on the political affairs in the Egyptian context. On the other hand, the identity of different actors and their historical prejudices were also in use so that we cannot entirely leave culturalist or essentialist approaches aside. The involvement of these factors will be beneficial for explaining the attitudes of actors towards each other and it is important to evaluate the credibility of the new President and the level of trust between the Muslim Brotherhood and other actors. Thus, an effective combination of two approaches will certainly have more explanatory power.

In the second chapter, the actors which constituted the “Tahrir coalition” will be described and their roles during the protests will be explained. The Tahrir coalition included diverse groups of people so that they did not have a common agenda. Liberal groups, youth organizations, secular people, Leftists, Islamic groups, women, civil society organizations were all there against the authoritarian regime of Mubarak. Muslim Brotherhood members participated in the demonstrations individually in the first days and the institutional declaration and support for the collective movement came after a few days. Salafists, who did not prefer to participate in the political affairs in the former periods, also took part in this coalition. Therefore, it can be said that Salafists were politicized during the Tahrir protests. After the fall of Mubarak, they established their own political parties in the relatively liberal

atmosphere of the post-Mubarak period. Their electoral support was important for the upcoming period and their stance in the political events gained importance. The last participant of the coalition became the military. The military officers decided to take side with the protestors in the last phase of the protests but their involvement was crucial and decisive for the resignation of Mubarak. On the other hand, Mubarak trusted the historical and traditional allies of the regime against the opposition camp because its regime consisted of different actors and they were seemingly strong in the beginning. The strength of the regime and the components of it will also be focused on in this part of the thesis. In short, pro-regime actors and anti-Mubarak actors will be demonstrated and their roles will be analyzed. Briefly, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafists and the military were the most prominent actors. The other actors were influential especially when they act together. These actors also came together against Morsi's Presidency. The participation of the Salafists in the opposition camp against Morsi was really significant in terms of the legitimization of the movement and the amount of collective support for the military against the new President. Changing alliances and the policies of different actors were decisive for the evolution of the process.

Third chapter is the one in which our main research takes place. We have collected information from the newspapers and websites about the news showing the important dates and events in the Morsi period. These events are also related to the SCAF period so that they have been considered in relation to each other. The policies, laws and regulations, constitutional amendments constitute the main elements of this period and they show the turning points in terms of organization of the protests and the changes in the reactions of different actors. The criticisms against Morsi's policies will be helpful for us to see the main controversial points among them. Moreover, they will enable us to understand why anti-Mubarak sentiment turned into an anti-Morsi coalition and even Salafists, who made an alliance with the Brothers for a certain period, participated in this opposition camp in one-year

period. The role of Salafists and changes in their policies are important in that sense so we will focus on their reactions during these major events. The research and the explanations in this chapter are of great importance for our main arguments and for replying our questions mentioned in the beginning of the thesis. They will prepare the ground to analyze the process step by step.

In the fourth chapter, the role of military in the Egyptian politics and the civil-military relations in the Egyptian context will be presented. The Egyptian Army played a significant role in the cases of both the fall of Mubarak and the overthrow of Morsi. In the former case, it remained neutral in the beginning and then, it preferred to take side with the protestors as a result of strategic calculations for the military officers. It meant the breaking of the historical alliance between the regime and the military and this move was decisive for the end of the Mubarak period. In that latter case, the military involved in the political crisis with its “48 hour ultimatum” and the process ended with the military intervention and the overthrow of the President. There was substantial amount of support among people for the intervention of the military so that the alliance with different groups in the society should be taken into account. These groups and most international actors avoided to call the intervention as a “coup”. Because of this decisive role of the military, we will concentrate on the role of the military in politics separate from other actors. Actually, the Egyptian military has always had a traditional place in the political affairs so that the explanation of this traditional role will be more helpful to understand its involvement in the current issues. Otherwise, the relations of the military with other actors may not be perceived sufficiently which are important to see its position in the Egyptian context.

Fifth chapter will be the concluding part and it will be the one in which the results will be evaluated. We will discuss whether the major events in the Morsi period were sufficient for supporting a military intervention or not. From our point of view, the identity of different

actors and the historical prejudices against the Muslim Brotherhood came into play in that regard and they reinforced the anti-Morsi sentiment. Put differently, they were not the main reason for opposing Morsi's Presidency but they accelerated the process and led to the end of Morsi period in a short amount of time. The loss of limited credibility was realized easily in that context. The inexperience of the new President, controversial or untimely decisions and historical prejudices strengthened the opposition so the already difficult task could not be accomplished under these circumstances. The evolution of the process towards the military intervention can only be understood through these multiple reasons and complex relations. As a result, the case of Egypt needs a broader view going beyond the tip of the iceberg.

The Arab Spring and Path Divergence

The Arab Spring and the recent developments in the Middle East led to important changes in the regional and international arena. This region has always been a popular area of research for many but the more current developments, in the area, increased the attention of the scholars towards the region and started new debates. Since the process has not reached an end yet, it is still early to talk about the general or particular consequences of the Arab Spring. While lots of countries experienced similar uprisings in their borders under the impact of so-called "*domino effect*", it was obvious from the very beginning that their experiences were different from one another. In other words, despite the existence of similar uprisings and their contagious effects in different countries of the region, the dynamics and evolution of the uprisings were shaped in different ways due to several factors. For example, Syria has been in turmoil of the civil war while Egypt had a military intervention after two and a half years from the ouster of Mubarak. In Libya, Qaddafi was overthrown with the help of the NATO intervention but the political situation is far from being under control. Tunisia had a smoother but still ambiguous path to follow. In some other countries, especially oil-rich Gulf countries, uprisings could have limited influences and some others were protected from the wave of

these movements with the policies of their rulers. Scholars and analysts have tried to explain why the uprisings emerged in different parts of the region at the same time and why they evolved in different directions. We should always keep in mind that “each individual Arab state has had a distinct identity based on separate origin, political history, and extreme variance in per capita income, in ethnic mix, social norms, educational systems, and in many cases religious distinctiveness” (Harik 2006, 682). Therefore, differences in their pathways can be regarded as a natural development instead of a surprising result. Each country should be evaluated with its peculiarities and the contextual differences should be taken into account. After that, a regional analysis can be put forward and it will be much more meaningful with the combination of case studies.

The Special Place of Egypt in the Middle East and in the Arab Spring Process

The case of Egypt presents a peculiar but significant example to study because the process has evolved to a very different point compared to other cases in the Middle East. While Egypt played a crucial role for the spread of the uprisings throughout the region and created expectations about changing the consolidated authoritarian regimes towards more democratic types, the dramatic shift stemmed from the last military intervention in the conditions and political atmosphere of Egypt led to disappointment among people and opened the way to question the real outcomes of the Arab Spring. Going beyond this point, Egypt is a central country and has always been a leading actor for the Middle East. These factors created regional influence in certain periods especially during the critical phases. Here, we will argue why Egypt is a central and prominent country for the Middle East in general and why it differs from others. First of all, Egypt geographically and historically takes place at the heart of the Middle East. Its geographical location can be seen as a very strategic place for the region. Moreover, together with its huge population and vast land, Egypt is a significant actor and it has a critical place for other actors too. Apart from that, Egypt has always been an

influential actor in the political events so that an order or change in the region cannot be thought or realized without participation of Egypt. It has always been a powerful alternative for the leadership in the Middle East and North Africa. There is no doubt that Egypt has a central place in terms of political actions and this historically confirmed and reproduced position allows it to have wider influence on the other actors and states of the region. It can be even claimed that despite Tunisia's triggering the Arab Spring, the main inspiration for other uprisings in different countries came from Egypt. The overthrow of long years' rule of Mubarak and its consolidated regime was really unexpected; it gave a hope for other people and represented the "breaking the fear barrier". In addition to the historical and political importance of Egypt, it also had a really institutionalized autocratic regime, called Mubarak regime, which can be considered as a good example of the political systems of the region. The institutions in Egypt were also primary and influential symbols in their fields. Mamoun Fandy explains the complexity of Egyptian politics with state-society interpenetration in the country and its diversity and variability (Fandy 1998, 87-92). In terms of state formation and legacy of former periods, Egypt has experienced both the Ottoman rule and European colonization as a prominent actor in the region. Therefore, the traces of these periods can also be better observed in this special country. In fact, Egypt is such a center of civilization that world history can be told by looking at its experiences.

In this part of the thesis, I will explain the components of Egypt's distinctive character for the region. Firstly, Egypt's geographical location creates an advantageous position in the Middle East when we think the North African countries together due to the historical and cultural relations among those countries. Egypt takes place at the center of this huge geography and this situation contributes to geopolitical and strategic potential for Egypt, and it has always utilized this potential in political activities. Additionally, Egypt has a very large population with about 90 million people living in the country. Despite the fact that this large

amount of people may be a source of problem especially during the times of crises, the demographic dimension can be turned into an important tool in different kinds of acts in the regional and international arena. At least, it makes Egypt the biggest country in the Middle East and turns people's attention to the developments in Egypt. The acts of the Egyptian people with other people from different countries make the relations more diverse and complicated so that Egyptian politics and the events happening in Egypt affect other populations and states.

Second of all, Egypt has always been a leading and influential figure in the regional political affairs. In other words, the acts of Egyptian state have become decisive for the whole region and more or less determined the responses of the other states and the relations with other actors in the international politics. It can be said that it has been an historical role for the Egyptian people and political leaders since people began to live in the region in the ancient times. Of course, we do not have to go that far to see this role because there are lots of examples in the recent history. Apart from that, it became much more visible with the increasing level of interdependence and relations with the other parts of the world. In almost all movements and activities with other regions and states of the world, the results were much more dependent on Egypt's actions and decisions. For example, in the Ottoman period, Muhammad Ali Pasha, the ruler of Egypt in that period, started the modernization attempts in his country and it was one of the earliest and prominent examples for the region. Moreover, Egypt engaged in global capitalism earlier than most other countries in the region. We should underline that these are not perfect examples and they require a process for each country but they can be considered as examples of Egypt's leading role for the region. More importantly, Egypt became the leading actor for the Arab and Muslim countries of the Middle East especially during the periods of war and peace. The relations with the Israel before and after the establishment of the Israeli state in the region clearly showed the central place of Egypt in

Middle Eastern politics. The Arab-Israeli struggle began before the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948. It took decades to continue wars against each other and Egypt was on the forefront in the Arab side. Egypt was like the representative of Arabs and protector of Palestinians throughout this period. Particularly in the Nasser period, Egypt was also the supporter of pan-Arab sentiments and the main target and enemy for the Arabs was Israel. Nasser used his charisma coming from the 1956 Suez War and ideological appeal of pan-Arabism. Anwar Sadat, the successor of Nasser, continued his policies with certain changes. Egypt's leading role and the atmosphere of war-making against Israel was not much different. Some tactical maneuvers and successful attempts during the 1973 War increased Sadat's popularity. It was obvious that Egypt was the leader of Arabs in terms of both military and political affairs. Egypt was not only the leader in the war-making; it became also the one who started peace negotiations with Israel under the peace-making role of the US President, Jimmy Carter. Despite Sadat's sincere attempts to make a peace between Arabs and Israel, the process ended in a peace treaty made only between Egypt and Israel. Since he was the leader of Egypt and representative of the Arab side, discontented Arabs blamed him because of the failure. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League and Sadat was assassinated in 1981. This political catastrophe stemmed from the Egypt's leading role in the political arena. Looking at the other side of the coin, he could have been a hero among Arabs if he had managed to sign a treaty reflecting the demands of Arabs and protecting the rights of Palestinians in the decades-long issue. After this process, the Arab countries generally acted on their own ways and the seeming unity among them was divided. Actually, they could never act as a coherent body and their fragmented structure helped Israeli army and could be defeated easily. The ideological appeal of pan-Arabism was replaced by national interests so that they did not need a leading actor representing the whole Arab world. Therefore, this historical role seemed hidden for a few years but it emerged again during the Arab Spring and people still look at

Egypt for the developments in the Middle East. It will certainly remain to be decisive for the region and Arabs. While the overthrow of Mubarak increased the expectations of people in the region and spread the sentiment to other countries, the military intervention became a direct preventive effect for the continuation of the optimistic atmosphere that has emerged just after the Arab Spring.

Another important feature of Egypt's central place in the Middle East was the regime that governed the country for about thirty years. Since the regime was a dictatorship under the leadership of Mubarak, it was called "Mubarak regime". It was one of the most consolidated and organized examples of repressive regimes in the region. Thus, it seemed unshakable and so strong that the dissolution of this regime in such a short amount of time, 18 days after the emergence of protests in Egypt, increased the hope and self-confidence of protestors in the other Arab Spring countries. Put differently, the resignation of Mubarak meant the end of a deeply-rooted dictatorship as an unexpected but the most positive development for the Egyptians and it shaped the destiny of movements after that time. In this part, I will try to describe the strength and policies of Mubarak regime to give an overview of the political system before the emergence of the Arab Spring. Mubarak came to power after the assassination of Sadat. Because of his military background and his vice presidency in the Sadat period, he did not have to struggle much to prove and show his leadership. He generally continued Sadat's policies in political and economic areas in the beginning. He directly became a central figure in the Middle East peace process and declared to guarantee the carrying out the Camp David Agreement. His economic policies were also parallel to Sadat's period and he continued liberalization attempts. However, it was not an actual opening and liberalizing move for the Egyptian people because those who benefited from Mubarak's policies were just a small, privileged economic class of entrepreneurs. On the other hand, there was an increasing level of poverty among other social classes. To put it another way, the

gap between the rich and the poor increased in the Mubarak period. This situation led to rising resentment among people and people began to show their problems in different ways. The system was not a democratic one so that people could not participate in political affairs and change their leader through the ballot box. On the contrary, repressive measures were taken by the regime in order to maintain its authoritarian system and he managed to do this about thirty years. The existence of elections was not so meaningful in such a political context. Mubarak implemented different strategies to make his system more sustainable. Kashif Mumtaz calls these strategies as “survival strategies” and categorizes them into three groups: “*containment, repression and external diversion*”. He summarizes the Mubarak era policies: “Mubarak attempted to earn legitimacy and regime survival by trying to contain political pressures through *greater political liberalization, economic reform and strengthening the military as the key supporter and guarantor of the regime*” (Mumtaz 2011, 2). He accepts the fall of Mubarak as a result of the failure of these strategies: “Ultimately, they resulted in a groundswell of popular resentment that not only brought about an ignominious end to his regime but also shattered his dream of passing on the baton to his son” (Mumtaz, 10).

Lastly, Egypt witnessed all historical periods directly and more deeply compared to other countries in the region. It can be traced back to ancient times but our main concern here is the recent history so that we will focus on the last centuries. Jacqueline and Tareq Ismael divide the experience of the Middle East with globalization into four periods: Islamic, Ottoman, nationalist and post-nationalist phases. In this periodization, the last two phases are of particular interest for our purposes. For them, in the nationalist period, “most of the states were governed by nationalist military regimes that had wrested control from the overtly pro-Western elite set up by Western powers. With sovereignty embedded in the state, political power was rooted in the institutions of state” (Ismael& Ismael 1999, 134). They also summarize the legacy of colonialism in the region: “Fragmentation of Arab society, weak

national governments, Palestinian refugees, and expansionist Israeli state were the main problems left behind by colonialism” (Ismael& Ismael, 138). In the post-nationalist phase, the influence of outside powers increases and shapes the political relations in the region different from the former periods. Because Egypt was the most significant actor in the Middle East, it became the main target for external powers and it had to deal with all the problems in the region as a leading player. Egypt was a British colony in the former period so British influence was still felt after gaining independence. It was the leader of modernization under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Pasha in the late Ottoman period. Moreover, it took part in the expansion of global capitalism and became a part of it through time. The Middle East in general, and Egypt in particular, was economically integrated into imperialist system in that sense by the turn of the 20th century. Egypt met crucial challenges in this century. On the one hand, it had to struggle with its own economic, social and political problems; and on the other, it had to lead Arabs in the regional matters especially about the “Palestinian Issue”. The establishment of the Israeli state and Arab-Israeli Wars flourished the problems and affected the political context in the Middle East. Peace negotiations were also made by Egyptian representatives in order to reach an agreement after long-years’ struggle between the two sides. During the Arab Spring, Egypt became the second country encountering the uprisings and overthrowing its leader. As a result, Egypt has experienced all historical periods at the center of debates and struggles so that a regional historical record can be prepared by looking at the Egyptian political history. It does not mean that its own experience was done in other countries in the same way but it can be a good example or a prototype for the region. If there was a model for the historical record of the Middle East, it would certainly be Egypt. Because of the differences and peculiarities between the countries in the region, it is better to go over case studies.

Scholarly Approaches in the Middle Eastern Studies

In general, there are two groups of approaches in terms of the attitudes of scholars and their viewpoints about the issues in relation with the region. On the one hand, cultural or essentialist approaches prioritize the differences with other regions because they attribute importance to the identity of different groups of people. Cultural explanations are mostly based on essentialist arguments in the framework of the Middle East and they include certain prejudices, stereotypes and negative connotations. The perception of “authoritarian stability” or exceptionalism of the region stemmed from this point and it became the mainstream or conventional point of analysis for a long period. With the emergence of the Arab Spring and changing elements in the region, this strict version of the approach became outdated. Scholars pointed out the faults or deficiencies of the conventional version. Lisa Anderson critically talks about a certain culturalist strand within the Western approaches to the Middle East and Islam. She claims that “religious affiliation may usefully be viewed as ‘socially constructed’”. Furthermore, she concentrates on the relationship between Islamic theology and political theory, and the reflections of it on the history of Islamic states (Anderson 1991, 93-112). The historian Elie Kedourie represents the negative image of Islam by saying that “democracy is alien to the mindset of Islam” and this cultural explanation is mostly referred in his ideas (Anderson 2001; Zakaria 2004). Anderson criticizes Huntington in the sense that “he was wrong about the importance of culture, but he was not wrong about the importance of the other factors he cited: political economy and external environment”, about which she blames “the West’s blind eye to domestic tyranny” (Anderson 2001, 53-60). Hudson summarizes the elements of conventional cultural approach as “sins against Arab politics such as gross overgeneralization, crude Orientalism, Eurocentric chauvinism and reductionism” (Hudson 1995, 61). His own definition of culture is not based on religion, unlike others. He defines culture institutionally, and offers to avoid exceptionalism so his perspective is grounded in the

realm of institutional approach rather than a culturalist one. Similarly again, Lisa Anderson also criticizes political culture approach characterizing it as “negative tone of assessments, stereotypical characterizations, self-fulfilling prophecies, and inability to think about change” (Anderson 1995, 88-89). The point she underlines is the explanation of the absence of liberal democracy by using cultural identifications and by portraying Arabs as aliens and unlike Westerners. Ewan Stein underlines the irresistible aspect of Middle Eastern exceptionalism for some scholars: “The region’s distinctiveness is seen to be rooted in a variety of factors including a colonial legacy resulting in unique ‘penetration’ by outside powers, a preponderance of oil resources, late development and constrained state-formation, exceptional propensity to war and conflict and –especially- shared linguistic, religious, and cultural ties that have had an unusually powerful influence on politics” (Stein 2011, 882). These features are open to historical explanations. Additionally, the identification of the Middle East with authoritarianism was a very widespread idea among people and authors until the Arab Spring. In other words, this type of culturalist view was a traditional way of evaluations towards the Middle Eastern issues but it has changed towards new forms. Jamal has reflected this view in contemporary period: “There is something inherently exceptional and antithetical to democracy in the region: the Arab political culture” (Jamal 2011, 228). The absence of democracy was generally explained by the notion of incompatibility of Islam with democracy since majority of Arab people are Muslim in the Middle Eastern and North African countries. Stefan Voigt reflects such an understanding: “We can be fairly certain that Islam has a significantly negative impact on the level of democracy to be found in a country” (Voigt 2005, 65). He expects a reformation in the Muslim world similar to the Protestant Reformation in order to overcome this problem. While some scholars have certain biases towards the issue because of their worldview or Eurocentric interpretations, there is no consensus among them. There are some others supporting the possibility of reaching a

meaningful solution or a more compatible way of practicable systems in the Muslim countries. Cook and Stathis explain the situation with the following words: “While Islam poses formidable challenges to democracy, there is no inherent contradiction between Islam and democracy and viewed in the right context, democratic ideals can also be that of Islam’s” (Cook and Stathis 2012, 177). They argue that “challenges to democracy in the Muslim world do not come from Islam but Muslims, persistence of monarchies and prevalence of dictatorships” (Cook and Stathis, 181). If there is no such an ontological problem between Islam and democracy, it signifies practical and historical matters so the possibility of collaboration is the first step in order to overcome the long years’ prejudices in people’s minds. Accordingly, demands for democratic values and democratic rule during the uprisings became the starting point for questioning the validity of this argument and strengthened institutional approaches rather than the essentialist arguments towards the region. It does not mean that the Arab Spring will result in democratization of the region but the emergence of the Arab Spring, the underlying reasons for the uprisings and the events happened so far were enough to shed serious doubts on the validity of most of the culturalist or essentialist arguments. It at least proved for good that Arab societies also contain malleable and potentially dynamic populations and are not forever doomed to remain as stable autocracies.

The connection between *Reelpolitik* and essentialist approaches should not be underestimated because recent political events related to the Muslims and the existence of some controversial groups strengthened this negative image towards Muslims. The US declaration of “global war on terrorism” after September 11 started the attacks on terrorist groups especially al-Qaeda, which originated from Saudi Arabia, and some other groups like Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Since these groups claim to represent a particular strand of Islam and they presumably act in accordance with the Islamic principles, their violent and terrorist actions led to a very unfortunate identification of Islam with terrorism. The last

example of this kind of terrorist organization was Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Its popularity and sphere of influence has risen with the Syrian Civil War and in the recent months, they have controlled particular cities of Iraq and increased their strength. They claim to establish an Islamic state and to practice the Islamic law, Sharia. However, they systematically kill people living in there depending on the reasons such as having different kinds of beliefs or rejecting their demands. Their violence and terrorist actions made the organization one of the most dangerous groups in the region. Furthermore, they not only determined the character of their own organization but also they affected people's perception towards all Muslims and Islamic principles. Actually, this is one of the weakest and the riskiest aspect of essentialism in general because it attributes the same kinds of features to all members of a large group of people. To make it clearer, Islam is a religion which includes members in all over the world. Therefore, there are certainly lots of different groups and fractions among those people and their main principles, methods and practices differ from one another. For example, the terrorist actions of radical groups who claim to represent an Islamic worldview are rejected by most other Islamic fractions so their actions cannot be generalized or attributed to all Muslims. Apart from that, there are moderate and radical discourses and practices that have crucial differences compared to each other. Their methods can be diametrically opposed in certain respects. Nevertheless, overgeneralizations or stereotypes for all Muslims would inevitably be wrong. Culturalist or essentialist approaches are prone to those kinds of crude generalizations. They have more power for explaining the perceptions and acts of different actors who define themselves in an identity-based version. In the Egyptian context, the existence of historical prejudices among different actors which have distinctions based on their identity render employing a cultural approach useful as it can explain the groups' dynamics, grand coalitions' formation and its eventual reconfiguration and collapse. These influences should be taken into account in order

to explain the issue in a better way so that the involvement of these approaches to the final analysis is necessary. But that is very different from an essentialist understanding as the culture or identity of various groups, while shaping their attitudes and the level of trust and distrust among groups, does not necessarily determine outcomes or predict actions and coalitions.

On the other hand, historical or institutional approaches try to de-essentialize the phenomena in order to make some comparisons and to make analyses from a broader perspective by taking into account the impact of institutional factors. The scholars in this group mainly argue that current conditions in the Middle East resulted from historical experiences of the Middle Eastern countries and certain institutional factors. They did not stem from cultural and religious factors if these are understood to be divorced from or unsituated in the institutional settings in which they were lived. Despite the fact that the institutions under consideration may have been dominant for decades in the region and they are therefore hard to change in a short period of time, they are still open to change and the influences of them can be replaced by some other elements through time. For example, Lisa Anderson makes a historical analysis and puts forward the legacies of state formation in the Middle East and North Africa: “widely varying degrees of administrative strength and competence, problems and divisions about boundaries of new states, existence of locally influential families, and the development of state capacities being less of a reaction to domestic political competition and economic change than a response to international developments” (Anderson 1987, 6). She claims that today’s “rentier states”, weakness of states and the features of state bureaucracies can be seen as results of historical experiences of the region which had Ottoman rule and the rule of European colonial powers in the former periods. They all had different impacts and created authoritarian type of state in these countries. According to this approach, the emergence of Arab Spring represents a crucial

point in this historical process. It shows us the need and the real possibilities for change in the region, and it rules out essentialist arguments. The underlying reasons for the uprisings, the demands of people especially the ones which were against authoritarian rule and towards democracy, and the wave of change in the region all helped the spread and dominance of institutional and historical analyses. Economic explanations, social movements, the role of different actors, especially new ones like social media, and political changes towards democratization take place at the center of these analyses. The impacts of the Arab Spring leading to change, emergence of new actors and change in the positions of existing actors can be considered in that framework. Since the Arab Spring has challenged the identification of the region with authoritarian stability and unchanged nature, the whole movement can be seen as a proof falsifying essentialist and reductionist views in general. There are more assertive ideas about “Arab exceptionalism”: “Arab exceptionalism is a historical stereotype that has long served as a camouflage for European cultural exclusion toward their neighbors to the east and south” (Harik 2006, 682)! Of course, this idea needs proof or at least strong arguments but rejection of Arab exceptionalism can be seen more valid and useful aspect for some purposes. As a result, historical or institutional approach has more explanatory power towards the issues related to changes in the political events. This approach offers a more dynamic view which opens the way for reformulation of interests or policies of different actors. Because we have a claim on the existence of changes in the period between “January 25 Revolution” and July 2013 military intervention, historical institutionalist approach will be more useful in that regard. However, it will not be sufficient to explain all the actions in that process due to the influence of the identity-based differences among the actors. Consequently, an efficient combination of historical institutionalist approach with the cultural approach, not a pure culturalist or essentialist approach, will be obviously more helpful to analyze all the

dynamics in this period. Their impacts in particular points and their stronger aspects should be accurately applied to the analyses to reach the correct results.

It is necessary to give information about the importance of the institutions in the Egyptian context. Although there are lots of actors having different roles in the political issues in Egypt, strong institutions have always been much more influential compared to individual actors. The Muslim Brotherhood and the military come into prominence in that sense because they both had decisive roles especially during the critical junctures in terms of Egyptian politics. It can be said that the recent political history of Egypt can be interpreted as a struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military in alliance with the regime. Other actors could also influence the developments in changing degrees but they could generally play more decisive roles when they could come together and constitute a collective movement. Put differently, the other actors could participate in the critical issues as a “third actor” including diverse components and they generally acted in alliance with one or two of the strong institutions. After the Free Officers’ Coup, the regime was established by a leader coming from the military ranks and he governed the country with the help of military power. Therefore, Egypt was ruled by regime-military alliance until the fall of Mubarak. In that long period, the Muslim Brotherhood was defined as “the other” for the regime and its activities were repressed together with other opposition movements. Apart from that, religious institutions such as al-Azhar and the Coptic Church also took part in the political affairs. Their roles were not so decisive but they had different missions in different periods. While al-Azhar was responsible for issuing *fatwas* and declaring the views of scholars about the religious issues, the Coptic Church represented the rights and demands of the Copts. The involvement of all these institutions and the results can be observed in the recent events especially in the Arab Uprisings process and the demonstrations before the last military intervention. There is no doubt that the military proved its power and role in the political

affairs in the recent period. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood also showed its electoral support and large number of supporters in the post-Mubarak period elections. While the military strengthened its place with the last intervention, the collective movement and struggle of the Brothers also showed their institutional power. In sum, the institutions are, by nature, more durable and they deserve more attention to analyze the political events in Egypt because of their more decisive roles compared to individual actors or less institutionalized groups.

CHAPTER II: TAHRIR COALITION vs. THE MUBARAK REGIME

Tahrir Square, which means Liberation Square, witnessed historic moments in the recent period. While thousands of people gathered there to protest the Mubarak regime in the anniversary of the National Police Day (January 25), the overthrow of Mubarak was still a little less than a dream. In other words, the common objective of these people was seen unexpected and unreachable by most of the people. The protests starting with self-immolation of Bouazizi in Tunisia which forced Ben Ali to flee to Saudi Arabia created a hope for the Egyptians because of the similar characters of the two regimes and long-term authoritarian rule in both countries but the Mubarak regime seemed much stronger and consolidated compared to its counterpart. On the other hand, the groups who participated in the Tahrir Square demonstrations established an interesting coalition which brought together diverse groups of people having different ideological, religious and social backgrounds. It was easy to claim that there was almost no common ground for these people due to their agendas and worldviews. However, they could come together against the common enemy, Mubarak and his regime. Since Mubarak ruled the country for about thirty years with an authoritarian system and did not avoid using repressive methods against all other actors who did not make alliance with the regime, the motivation of these groups in Tahrir Square was really strong. It was a risky attempt to challenge such a repressive regime but people were determined to maintain their stance at all costs. Obviously, this determination contributed to their success in the end. There were so many fractions in “the Tahrir coalition” that it is really difficult to name them one by one. Tahrir became a large umbrella gathering all these groups in that place and towards a common goal. Among them, there were political parties, professional chambers, civil society organizations, labor unions, women groups, youth movements and independent individual participants. In terms of political orientation, Tahrir coalition consisted of Islamic groups such as different Salafist groups and the Muslim Brothers;

Leftists, liberal and secular groups, and new political movements seeking a change in the political system. The Coptic Church warned the Christians not to participate in the protests because of the danger of being there so Christian minorities did not take place institutionally. Shortly, the Tahrir coalition reflected the variety and diversity within the Egyptian society with some minor exceptions. The allies of the regime did not support the protests of course but almost all other groups in the society participated in the opposition camp. The youth groups were among the organizers of the protests so they can be said to have ignited the fire in that sense. The members of the Muslim Brotherhood were in Tahrir Square individually but the official declaration for support came a few days later so the Muslim Brotherhood was regarded as a latecomer for the coalition. The military was ordered to maintain security in addition to the security forces in the first days. The soldiers were in the streets just to restore the order and stability. The military leaders decided to take side with the protestors after making strategic calculations for a long period and it became a shocking decision for Mubarak because of the previous close relationship between the regime and the military. Therefore, the military can be located in the same camp with the Tahrir coalition in the end but it cannot be regarded as a member of this coalition while evaluating the whole process. We will focus on the role of each actor taking part in the Tahrir coalition in this chapter and we will analyze the two sides of the struggle between the Mubarak regime and the Tahrir coalition.

Egypt, with its large population and social and cultural diversity, has always had a huge potential for the emergence of new political movements. This potential can be observed in the variation of the groups in the political arena. Actually, it was difficult to see different opposition movements because of the pressure of the dictatorship regime on the political movements. Even civil society organizations had a very limited area to make certain activities. Therefore, it had been almost impossible to observe the actual potential and

diversity in the Egyptian politics until the Arab Spring. It was necessary to have a proper atmosphere for political competition and the practice of political freedom. Since they were absent during the whole dictatorship period, the existence of elections was not so meaningful. Furthermore, the powerful actors were so dominant in the political sphere that there was no room for other actors to come to power and to be candidates for ruling position. From the very beginning of the authoritarian system, the regime positioned itself as the ultimate and unquestionable ruler of the country. The system was established with the Free Officers' Coup against the monarchy so the military officers were the leaders of the regime. In the successive periods, all the rulers were coming from military background so that the regime and the military were mingled in that process. To make it clearer, the military kept its institutional autonomy while appointing the rulers at the same time. The institutional autonomy of the military included the independence of decision-making mechanisms as well as financial autonomy. In other words, the military could take its decisions independent from other actors and it could make economic activities as an actor. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood was defined as the "other" of the regime and it was tried to be kept out of politics. Needless to say, the Brotherhood had the biggest organizational structure and long history of engaging in anti-regime activities. Because of its large popular support, they would be the most powerful candidate for the ruling position. They could not get this chance under the pressure of the dictatorship regime but they could succeed in keeping their large constituency and maintaining direct links with the people. The military and the Muslim Brotherhood came to the forefront as the two key actors of the two sides of the struggle and their high level of institutionalization can be considered as their advantages compared to other actors. The other actors were also repressed under the authoritarian system so it was not possible to talk about real politics without freedom of expression and political competition in the former period of Egypt. The uprisings in Egypt and the emergence of the Tahrir coalition can be interpreted as

a challenge to this political order in the country and it meant “breaking their chains” for these repressed actors. The fall of Mubarak opened the way for them to engage in political activities and the actual differentiation among the actors and the relative weight of each actor in the political arena came into prominence with the help of this relatively free atmosphere.

The Mubarak Regime

On the one side of the struggle, the Mubarak regime existed with all of its strength. The Tahrir coalition was established against the regime, and Mubarak and the components of the regime were targeted by the protestors. Mubarak, in his rule for about thirty years, established one of the biggest or the most institutionalized examples of dictatorship regimes in the Middle East. He used almost all the methods and strategies developed by the dictators, from all over the world, in his own country. Furthermore, he accomplished his personal rule with the collaboration with other influential actors and institutional settings taking part in the system as a whole. The Army, the higher judiciary, the security apparatus, media and business elites were the prominent actors working in alliance with the Presidency in this period. Although they did not involve the large parts of the population, they had the highest weight in terms of the effectiveness of the system other than the core group of the regime. Actually, all the actors who wanted to participate in the system or to act in the political arena had to obey the dominance of the regime power because opposition was not allowed or restricted in a narrow area. Even formal opposition parties in the Mubarak period were accused of being in cooperation with the Mubarak regime during and after the Arab Uprisings. This situation gives us a clue to understand the role of the actors in the framework of dictatorship.

The main groups which had opposing views against the Mubarak regime were excluded in different ways. The Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists can be regarded as the most populated actors of the opposition groups. Salafists were traditionally against

participation in the politics but the Muslim Brothers were willing to take part in the political activities. Their role in the political affairs and in the system in general was really limited compared to their potential and their support among the people. To put it another way, the Mubarak regime, similar to other dictatorships, preferred to act together with the actors which were obedient to the authority of the regime and excluded others from the system. Since the state power and mechanisms were in their hands, it was difficult to oppose this system one by one for each actor. This type of system creates a strange situation because the faith of the actors taking part in the system becomes dependent on the survival and continuation of the regime and the excluded actors has to abolish or at least change the system in order to be more influential in the politics. Regarding the nature of the system, decisions are made by the leader and activities, and relations are arranged according to the will of the dictator or the regime in general. For example, court decisions are taken in accordance with the political atmosphere and the laws regulated by the state officers. Business elite acts in accordance with the wishes of the state representatives and they involve in the political process with the help of the government. Media does not have enough freedom to make broadcasts and have to declare only those views that are not opposed to or critical of the regime. In the Mubarak regime, the higher judiciary, media and business elites followed these kinds of conformist strategies so that their positions and offices would be secure with the permission of the leader. Gamal Mubarak, son of Hosni Mubarak, had close ties with the business elites. They established a group of entrepreneurs under the leadership of Gamal and they had a sphere of influence in the politics as well. Some of them even participated in the Egyptian Parliament and involved in the political affairs. This shows the linkage between economic and political actors, and the existence of patronage relationships.

Additionally, Mubarak paid attention to the intelligence service and security apparatus, including the police force of the state. As a character of the dictatorship regimes,

“mukhabarat” or intelligence system in Egypt worked well and had extensive networks throughout the country in the Mubarak period. Since the system was based on the “fear” of the people and state power including repressive methods, the vital importance of the intelligence system was not so surprising. Omar Suleiman who worked at the top positions of the intelligence service emerged as one of the two candidates for the leadership succession in the last years of Mubarak. It confirms the central place of the intelligence and its significance for the system. In terms of security forces, Mubarak strengthened the position of the policemen and established his own guard loyal to himself.

Consequently, the nature and features of the Mubarak regime can be observed by looking at its relations with different actors. While some actors gained advantage through patronage relations in the political and economic affairs, some others were not allowed to practice the normal or legitimate activities because of being harmful for the survival or the interests of the regime and its allies. Some actors were rewarded because of their obedience and close relationship while some others were punished with forceful strategies due to having different ideas. Because institutions were not effective on the system and dependent on the personal rule and the interests of the ruling elite, this authoritarian system was implemented for such a long period until the emergence of the collective movement of the people. The more consolidated the power of the regime, the longer it could be practiced and the more difficult it was to cope with so that the overthrow of the Mubarak regime meant the “breaking the fear barrier” in the region. Cook summarizes the first twenty years of Mubarak and it can be thought for the rest of his period:

By the turn of the century, Mubarak had taken the presidential oath four times and was in every way the master of the Egyptian political universe. The self-effacing vice president and air force officer had been transformed over the previous twenty years into pharaoh. This transformation was reflected in the last decade of Mubarak’s reign, during

which economic reform became crony capitalism, political change was fortifying the authoritarian system under the guise of reform, and presidential succession that meant a potential inheritance of power. It was an era of official arrogance and popular anger; it seemed that the fabric of Egyptian society was becoming irrevocably frayed (Cook 2012, 167).

To sum up, Mubarak maintained his authority with putting pressure and using force against the actors reacting or opposing the regime. It was not different from the previous periods but he put the form and methods in the most institutionalized and systematic way. Therefore, his long period was identified with the establishment of “status quo” which was encountered in the later periods.

The “status quo” established in the Mubarak period refers to the regime as a whole. It includes both individual actors, especially the leaders, and institutional arrangements. The political apparatus of the regime goes beyond the personal rule of Mubarak and creates his own system. The key institutions of the state were police, military, intelligence and the state-controlled media (Said 2012, 415). There is a special kind of relationship between the leader and the institutions in these regimes. The continuation of the regime is provided by both the acts of individual actors and through these institutions as well. Businessmen who got richer with the help of the regime constitute the economic aspect of regime coalition. With the increasing level of engagement with global capitalism in Egypt, a new privileged economic class emerged. This new class benefited from the Mubarak regime’s policies so that they aimed at consolidation and survival of the regime in any case. Aoude explains the reasons for the uprisings in Egypt in relation with the global capitalist crisis and claims that “the economic and political crisis lies beneath of the pouring of people into the streets”, and also, he indicates the relationship between regime and the capitalist class: “Privatization and the

development of a parasitic class under Mubarak resulted in complications and contradictions to the regime” (Aoudé 2013, 246)!

It is necessary to give information about the economic policies of Mubarak and Sadat here because the capitalist model of Egyptian economy was created by Sadat’s *Infitah* (opening) policies and it was maintained and increased in the Mubarak period. As a result of these policies, a privileged group of people (businessmen with close ties to the regime) benefited and increased their wealth but most people in the society continued to live under poverty line and in poor living standards. Thus, the gap between the rich and the poor widened and it increased resentment in the society inevitably. It became one reason leading to the revolts in the country. Kadir Yıldırım describes the Egyptian economic model as much closer to crony liberalization: “In crony capitalism, businessmen or the economic elite are able to maintain their privileged access to the political decision-making mechanisms in the post-liberalization period” (Yıldırım 2009, 70). This relationship contributes to mutual benefits for both decision-makers and businessmen. Thus, their effort will be on the sustainability of authoritarian system in the country. Eva Bellin underlines the nature of patrimonial relations deriving from such an environment: “Where patrimonial institutions are wedded to coercive capacity, authoritarianism is likely to endure. In this context, regime elites possess both the will and the capacity to suppress democratic initiative. And where international support and financing is forthcoming to the authoritarian regime, rapid regime change is unlikely”! (Bellin 2004, 152)

In addition to capitalist class, elites constitute the individual actors of the regime other than the leader: “Senior elites from different state institutions cooperate in forming a consensus during autocratic leadership selections. Rather than invite a struggle for power that may threaten the regime’s survival, senior elites will bandwagon and compromise to preserve the system” (Stacher 2011, 198-199). They can be considered as decision-makers in the

system or those who have enough power to influence the decisions and acts of the individual leader. In that sense, the regime reproduces itself with certain mechanisms. Hereditary succession is also used as a way of sustainability of the regime in some cases: “Hereditary succession was predominant among those cases where the ruler’s authority predated the party’s and occurred very rarely when the ruler was himself the product of a preexisting party” (Brownlee 2007, 598). Mubarak could not put into practice his plan for Gamal as this plan was heavily criticized by the people. It showed how difficult it was in a country like Egypt.

When all of these considerations are taken into account, it can be said that those institutions are regime-dependent institutions so their fate would most probably be parallel to the fall of regimes but the existence of remnants of the regime in the next period contradicted this idea. It can be said that they generally remain to exist and act in their fields but they lose their central or effective places. Byman points out the fact that a change in leadership does not necessarily mean a complete change in the governing elite such as Egypt and Libya (Byman 2012, 27). Historically and traditionally, state bureaucracies and security establishments were the main actors in the Middle East. “Rentier states” could establish their legitimacy on their distributive role in the vast resources of their countries. Other states, which do not have vast resources, could maintain their control over people through their security agencies called “mukhabarat”. As a result, these authoritarian systems were the main actors in both political and economic arena. In the Egyptian context, “the regime had kept itself in power by its hold over the security forces, its dominance of the political structures and economy, its control over the media, and the underlying authority of the armed forces. Its hold over the security apparatus remained secure, but the excessive force employed by the police and security forces deeply alienated the public” (Korany and el-Mahdi 2012, 38). The authoritarian regimes in the region did not let people participate in political activities. Stephen J. King argues the

strategies of autocratic regimes as follows: “Incumbent strategies include blunt repression by highly developed state security forces, winner-take-all electoral systems that hinder the formation of pluralism from a single-party base, state limiting of opposition political party activities and funding, and divide-and-rule tactics that favor moderate groups and produce impotent forms of multiparty politics” (King 2007, 433). Consequently, the mechanisms and institutions of the Mubarak regime had been established during the long period until the Arab Spring so the Tahrir coalition had to challenge the enormity of power accumulated by the regime. Put differently, the common enemy was not so easy to cope with but they could succeed.

The Religious Institutions in Egypt

The role of religious institutions should be regarded as a separate category in the struggle because of their special position in the Egyptian context. The religious institutions in Egypt have always been respected actors in the society and their declarations have been considered important among people due to their expertise and authority accepted by the other actors. Al-Azhar was the prominent example of these institutions and it protected its special status with the help of well-known religious scholars and preachers in the previous periods. However, Al-Azhar turned into a state institution in the Mubarak period and the Mubarak regime used the religious institutions for instrumental reasons. With the Arab Spring, al-Azhar tried to re-articulate its position in the society and aimed to increase its profile and sphere of influence among people. “It has been playing a pivotal role in national debates since Mubarak’s fall” (Korany and el-Mahdi 2012, 79). Its effectiveness and special place is related to its independence so that the authoritarian regime restricted its authority and influence among people and the fall of Mubarak created an opportunity in that sense.

In addition, the Orthodox Coptic Church, as another religious institution, has had an important mission in the new period because it tries to protect the rights of minorities, Copts in particular, against rising Islamic forces. Its struggle is not towards the rise or increase of its place in the political or social arena but it tries to maintain the status quo and some privileges of Copts in the country. It has always been the main mission of the Coptic Church. It preferred to protect the rights and privileges of the Christians instead of being an active and more assertive player in the Egyptian politics. It does not mean that they did not engage in political activities but even their involvement in these activities was in accordance with this main mission. It can be claimed that they were more or less pleased with the status quo before the Arab Spring because their place and position was almost guaranteed.

However, the fall of Mubarak changed the dynamics and the rise of Islamic groups was seen as a threat by the Christians living in Egypt due to some radical or ultraconservative groups among the Islamic fractions. This perception of threat turned into concrete incidents with some attacks against the Christian citizens and their institutions. The Christian groups were worried about the division within the society and the chaotic atmosphere in the country. Michael Bishku mentions the factors leading to political division within the Egyptian society: “Egypt has been more divided politically as result of the fact that Islamists and the military have had an important historical impact in Egyptian politics and that it is the home of Copts” (Bishku 2013, 65). In the absence of a secure atmosphere in a society or a country, it can be thought that the rise of a radical social group threatens the interests and even the ontological identity of another group. Put differently, it may turn into a zero-sum game if there are not enough check-and-balance mechanisms of a state. The situation was similar to that context in Egypt especially in the chaotic environment of post-Mubarak period. In Egypt, where the Coptic population reaches about 9 or 10 percent of the total population, the amount of danger in such a confrontation is understandable. There was even possibility of a civil war among

those groups. Since the Coptic community had certain privileges and rights in the former period, the preference of the head of the Coptic community in favor of the status quo was normal but there were some other options for them, too. They felt themselves as a “threatened minority” (Asad 2012, 283) so they preferred to protect themselves against the masses consisting of different groups. Consequently, religious institutions have become more active after the fall of Mubarak regime and they try to get their share in the complicated atmosphere. The support of the Sheikh al-Azhar and the Head of the Coptic Church for the coalition against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were more meaningful in that context. They will certainly maintain their special status in the society but they may try to play more active roles in the political events.

The Emergence and Composition of the Tahrir Coalition

On the other hand, the Tahrir coalition emerged almost spontaneously with the participation of different groups for particular demands. It can be seen as an accumulation of anger and dissatisfaction against the existing authoritarian regime. Furthermore, the increasing number of police brutality cases and the publication of these cases through social media tools led to increase in the resentment among people so that common humanitarian concerns and common enemy brought large numbers of people together rather than some ideological or political goals. The demands of people in the beginning were the end of police brutality and the resignation of the Interior Minister. With the increasing number of groups which declared their support for the revolt, the movement began to turn into a collective uprising. After that, larger demands about the governing style of the Mubarak regime and dissatisfaction from the system were included in the demands of the people. The groups in Tahrir Square expressed their concerns for an end to state corruption, removal of the emergency law and a need for presidential term limits. In general, the people targeted the Mubarak regime and the first step for them was the ouster of Mubarak. Since the goals and

composition of the participants were also shaped during the process, it was not a completely planned or organized movement in the beginning. The general character of the protests was similar to its Tunisian counterpart and they began to be called as “leaderless protests” because of the absence of a prime mover that controlled or directed all the groups. Vincent Cannistraro shows the existence of several groups in the leaderless protests especially in Tunisia and Egypt. These groups, he mentioned, involve “traditional opposition party, spawned intellectuals, youth movement, associated Muslims and Salafists”. He argues that “one of the strengths of the leaderless model is the way it can quickly bring together disparate groups working toward a common goal” (Cannistraro 2011, 38). However, each of these actors did not affect the events in the same degree and direction. Besides, the leaderless model was important for the initial phase and for the organization of the movement but the strategies and impacts of each actor appeared in the following period. Therefore, it is necessary to concentrate on the roles of each actor, especially the most influential ones, in order to analyze the Arab Spring process and the uprisings in Egypt as a whole.

In this part, I will explain the roles of the actors participated in the Tahrir coalition. The roles of each actor should be taken into account together with their previous place in the Egyptian social and political system to see the influence of the Arab Spring in the Egyptian politics. Civil society organizations can be seen as one of these examples. Civil society in Egypt has increased its role through time. The Arab Spring was triggered by social movements and activation of “silent majority” in the Middle East. Although civil society organizations had a rich and long history in the Middle East, they were not very effective under the pressure of the authoritarian rules. They were very much limited in terms of their activity areas. They could increase in quantity, as time passed, by using relative openness as a part of “authoritarian upgrading” (Heydemann 2007) which meant a new or superior version

of authoritarianism with the addition of new tools and methods to adapt the social changes but it could not be reflected to quality and effectiveness in the society.

Asef Bayat concentrates on activism and social development in the Middle East. According to him, dominance of state prevented civil society actions. He explains why community activism is uncommon in the region. There were different types of NGOs but collective movements were not widespread so that people preferred “quite encroachment which was not the politics of collective demand making, of protest, but rather a cluster of individual direct actions” (Bayat 2002, 20-25). In general, it can be asserted that the civil society activism was very low in the period before the Arab Spring. Since the activities of the civil society organizations were restricted by the repressive mechanisms of the regime, it was almost impossible for them to increase their influence. Furthermore, the red line for the regime was engaging in political activities because the regime wanted to prevent the establishment of an opposition movement that would threaten the authority of regime. The relative openness and liberalization attempts did not change this situation because new NGOs were not also allowed to take part in political affairs. This repression could be overcome with a collective challenge so that the Arab Uprisings created an opportunity for them in that respect. As a result, the civil society organizations did not play a decisive role during the Tahrir protests but their role can be increased in the next period if the political activities can be done in a more liberal and free atmosphere.

Youth Organizations and New Social Movements

Lack of opportunities for political participation because of the repressive methods of the regime led to new pursuits for some actors who sought for change. Although there was a very limited area to succeed in this goal, especially the young groups were determined to deal with this problem. Therefore, some political movements trying to create a social action were

established by these actors. Since most of their members were at young ages and their leaders were mostly young, they can be called as youth organizations or movements. Kefaya movement in Egypt can be regarded as an example of these attempts since it aimed to go beyond ideological stances and establish a common ground. Shorbagy argues that “Kefaya’s significance lies in its transformative potential as a broad political force that is uniquely suited to the needs of the moment in Egypt” (Shorbagy 2007, 175). Kefaya was valuable at least as an attempt to create an alternative and independent movement, rejecting foreign aid to maintain their independence.

Kefaya was one of the first examples of this new political movements and activist-dominated groups but it was not the only one. The April 6 Youth Movement, which was established in 2008, was another prominent example of this category. They actively participated in different kinds of protests and they supported the strikes in the period before the Arab Spring. Moreover, these youth movements could effectively use Facebook, Twitter, blogs and other social media tools. The involvement of new members and new methods to opposition increased the dynamism and mobilization during the uprisings. It is possible to mention similar types of groups that participated in the Tahrir protests. Since their role was important for the emergence and spread of social movement, and for the increase in the number of people supporting the demonstrations, they came into prominence in this initial phase. They could increase mobilization among participants and they could use social media to publicize the issue in the international arena so that interest of the international actors towards the issue increased by this way. Shortly, the role of the youth movements can be considered as a catalyst but it should not be exaggerated because it is not correct to attribute a decisive role for these actors. They could create certain changes in the political context and added new things to opposition culture but their influence was still limited compared to other

strong and large groups. The significance of the young and educated members is obvious and the future will most probably witness the increase in their role.

The Arab Spring process and the transition period became a crucial experience for the politicization of the groups that were not formerly politicized not only in Egypt, but also in other parts of the Middle East. Young population of Middle Eastern countries has a great potential for that purpose and the emergence of the Arab Spring can be considered as the elimination of the barriers on the way. The continuation of the authoritarian systems will remain as a barrier for them so the long-term results of the process and the final shape of the political context in the region will be important for their sphere of influence and for the existence of opportunities for their activism.

The Role of Social Media

One very peculiar and novel thing that was unprecedented in the previous periods of history was the effect of social media during the Arab Spring. The actual influence of social media is still controversial among scholars. Some of them mentioned extreme concepts such as “online revolution” or “twitter revolution” to emphasize the role of social media. However, it would be mistaken to exaggerate the role of the social media. Malcolm Gladwell argues that “social networks are effective at increasing participation, not motivation. Social media only helps low-risk activism and establishes weak ties. High risk activism requires ‘strong-tie’ like good friends” (Gladwell 2010, 44). It implies that social media can increase mobilization of people especially in the initial phases of the movement but it would not be sufficient all by itself to motivate people to take risks. It also shows the effect of social media on other actors because it encourages and facilitates people to be organized easily and to come together around a collective goal. Of course, it does not mean that it was enough to reach the goal but the impact of social media is undeniable in that context. Lynch puts forth the four distinct

ways by which social media challenges to Arab states: “promoting contentious collective action, limiting or enhancing the mechanisms of state repression, affecting international support for the regime, and affecting the overall control of the public sphere” (Lynch 2011, 304). He shows the role of social media in “reducing transaction costs, informational cascades (breaking ‘the fear barrier’), the costs of repression, scale and diffusion, and movement organization”. For him, “the Internet’s most fundamental challenge to the state will likely be generational, rather than immediate”. This longer term impact is underlined by most scholars because of the increasing popularity of social media among young population. We should not underestimate its immediate effect during the uprisings but it was much more limited compared to its possible influence in people’s lives and political and social activities. Jeffrey Ghannam also stresses the same point by saying that “although the most dramatic and unprecedented improvement in freedom of expression, association, and access to information is seen in contemporary Arab history, real impact won’t be felt years, maybe even a few decades, when expectations and political regimes may have changed” (Ghannam 2011, 8).

Almost all scholars pay attention to the limitations and challenges over the impact of social media but it takes at the center of societal transformation and it has more potential that can be turned into reality in the longer term. Howard and Hussain explain the role of social media in each country during the uprisings and they assert that “it is hard to say whether the Arab Spring would still occur in case of the absence of social media” (Howard and Hussain 2011, 47). They attribute more importance to its short-term effect but they also accept the need for international support implying the limitation of social media for the overall success. Effectiveness of using social media is obvious but the number of users is still limited in these countries. They will most probably continue to increase and the attempts of authoritarian leaders to abuse and repress were also overcome by the end of Arab Spring. We can expect an increase in its role in the future but for the Arab Spring, attributing “lion’s share” to social

media will be wrong and unfair compared to the role of the enthusiasm of the activists and the regular people who have participated in the movement at the grassroots level. In fact, they need to be thought altogether as a combination of various factors rather than pinpointing some such as the role of the social media as the culprit. Although Egypt comes at the forefront in the region in terms of the number of people using Internet and social media tools, the impact of the media on the outcomes of the political events could not go beyond a certain point. We have to be aware of the three misconceptions which were underlined by Korany and el-Mahdi before looking at the impacts of actors: “The first is that the current mobilization was abrupt and completely unexpected. The second is that these uprisings are ‘Facebook’ revolutions which implies that social media were the mobilizing force. The third is that this is a ‘youth’ rebellion” (Korany and el-Mahdi 2012, 14). It could be better observed as time passed and the initial overestimation was replaced by the real effects of more powerful actors.

Other Actors

There were lots of actors that emerged during and after the Arab Spring. Social groups include more diverse elements such as young movements, labor unions, civil society organizations and women activists. The role of each actor and their effectiveness differed from one another. For example, even the participation of women activists was important because of the social and political culture of Egypt. Since religion is dominant in all spheres of life in Egypt, the status and position of women in public life is determined by the religious principles. Traditionally, the number of women taking part in public life has always been limited and women have generally played background roles. Thus, the existence of women activists individually in Tahrir Square was meaningful. Apart from that, labor unions actively participated in the protests. Actually, the strikes of the workers were important for the opposition even before the Arab Spring and they became the first signs of the growing resentment and quite a few groups took their places in these local protests to show their

problems with the regime. Labor unions and participation of workers were important especially during the movements. Although they had some umbrella institutions, their involvement cannot be reduced to this institutional framework. As Dina Bishara explains, the first phase of workers' involvement was made by independent workers, and the process evolved from small-scale group participation to much more institutional and general involvement in the end. She stresses the significance of labor involvement for the success of the movement by saying that "mobilization of workers served as a tipping point" (Korany and el-Mahdi 2012, 83).

In addition to labor unions, the professional chambers representing the rights of different occupational groups have a special place in Egypt. Because almost all occupational groups try to establish their own chambers and they actively use these chambers to organize some activities, they became channels for demonstrating their opposition voices in the Arab Spring process. The politicization of the members of these chambers could also be observed in the post-Mubarak period, especially for the protests against Morsi. These diverse groups of people could come together to depose authoritarian leaders but after elimination of collective goal, they would differentiate from each other in the next period. The election periods showed the conflicts and clashing interests of these groups. Their influence reached its zenith when they acted together especially during the periods of crises but the coalition was broken after the removal of the common target.

Islamic Groups and the Muslim Brotherhood

The Islamic groups were prominent actors because of the large number of their supporters compared to other groups. In the Egyptian case, the position of the Muslim Brotherhood is really significant and special so it should be thought with the peculiarities of Egypt and MB's own experience. The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the most organized and

oldest organizations of Islamists in the Middle East. They have been repressed by the regime for many years so they could only maintain their existence as a social or religious group rather than as a political actor. They evolved into a political actor through time. Jamal explains the reasons for their rise: “The MB’s commitment to Islam, provision of social services, and renunciation of violence over the past few decades have led to increased support for it within the general population” (Jamal 2011, 207). They began to appear in the political arena especially after the 1984 elections. They could increase their sphere of influence by making some alliances but they already had a significant support in the society. Kazzuha summarizes the lessons that can be derived from Egyptian (MB) experience related to their political activities and successes despite the authoritarian regime:

First, in the absence of vibrant political constituencies, regime continuity is assured, and its ability to pass the reins of power to the younger generation within the same ruling elite is almost guaranteed in the future. Second, the only serious challenge to the existing order come from those areas where a political constituency was capable of fortifying itself against the continuous onslaughts of those in power, namely the Islamists (Brown and Shahin 2010, 56-57).

Their electoral successes increased the harsh responses of the regime so they encountered different problems in the political arena. Therefore, their activities and impacts in social and political movements were limited in the former periods. However, the collapse of the authoritarian regime created a window of opportunity for them. They were the only organized opposition and they learned from the experiences of others (Bradley 2009, 229). By using this proper atmosphere effectively, they could get the majority of seats in the Parliament and their candidate, Morsi, was elected as the President of Egypt. It did not mean that they could overcome the problems; on the contrary, increased polarization made the situation worse so the new government and the President had to try to deal with these problems. He could not

manage the process well so that the grand coalition that was formerly established as a result of the unified opposition dissolved and the ensuing political crisis ended with the military intervention.

The emphasis on the Muslim Brotherhood stems from the fact that it is the most organized and the most popular group among the Islamists and they proved the existence of their popular support in the elections. However, it is not the only religious group; on the contrary, there is a variation of religious groups in Egypt and in other countries.

Salafists

Salafis, Sufis and neoliberal Islamic movements can be considered as religious groups. As a general distinction among them, Sufis represent the moderate Islamists and Salafis represent the more radical and militant wing (Mandaville 2005). Among them, Salafis are the prominent actors because they have been politicized in the recent period and they have the second largest basis in the society in terms of religious groups so their political stances are significant. They can undoubtedly be regarded as one of the rising groups in that period. The immediate impact of the uprisings on Islamists was the need to go beyond the border of identity politics. Since they have participated in the political activities and they are not likely to cooperate with other groups due to their ideological stances, they make certain radical attempts which can be dangerous in such chaotic situations. They have been politicized and begun to play more central role in politics. The Arab Spring process was important for the politicization of the Salafists. After establishing their own political parties, the Nour Party and some other minor ones, and getting the second highest number of votes in the first Parliamentary elections, they began to act more confidently. The next period witnessed the rise of the role of the Salafists. Their preference for supporting the opposition against Morsi became a decisive move for the end of the Morsi period and it proved the importance of them

in Egyptian politics. The third chapter, which will focus on the recent developments between the January 25 Revolution and the July 2013 military intervention, will more clearly show the role of Salafists in that critical period. The prominence of religion-based groups, namely the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists, in politics reflects the importance of religion among Egyptian people: “Religion in Egypt is not merely a set of rituals, but rather a *Weltanschauung*, with its value system and legislative guidelines” (Korany and el-Mahdi, 147). Consequently, religion will most probably remain as a significant factor in politics in the next period.

CHAPTER III: THE PROCESS AND EVENTS BETWEEN “JANUARY 25 REVOLUTION” AND JULY 2013

The fall of Mubarak as a result of mass demonstrations became the achievement of the Tahrir coalition and it represented the successful accomplishment of the first phase. However, the ouster of the common enemy could not be the end of the story because there were still many things to do in order to design the new period of the Egyptian politics. In other words, it was a beginning indeed and it opened the way to reformulate the political context according to the “will of the people”. The expectations of people were really high and the self-confidence of each actor was at its zenith because of toppling the dictator who ruled the country for many years. Their success inspired other Arab countries in the region and the Egyptian people were on the verge of changing the history of the Middle East and going beyond the restrictive mechanisms of authoritarianism. Everything was seemingly brilliant in the beginning and there was widespread optimism among people. Looking at the other side of the coin, reality was not so good for Egypt. Although diverse groups of people could come together to challenge their common target, there was no roadmap that could be shared by everyone, there was no political program and the political agendas of the actors were so different from each other that it was next to impossible to find a plausible way for satisfying the demands of all the actors who participated in the Tahrir coalition. To put it another way, it was necessary to establish a sustainable system by determining the relations among actors, give those groups opportunity to negotiate their goals and aspirations and to find the new representatives who would agree on and carry out the negotiated plan. It can be said that the Egyptians came face to face with the cold facet of the reality. Getting rid of the dictator was the first thing to do but it was not the only necessity for the people. The social and economic problems which led to the uprisings of the people against the regime were still waiting to be resolved and the absence of a clear roadmap was not a good sign for the future. In addition to this, the regime could not be completely dissolved with the fall of Mubarak and the political crisis was still

there in the post-Mubarak period so that political problems also created another source of uncertainty for the new period in Egypt. Consequently, the first step of the movement was achieved with the help of the collective sentiment and common goal among people but the situation was still full of problems and uncertainties.

The SCAF Rule in the Transition Period

In the chaotic context of the post-Mubarak period in Egypt, a power vacuum emerged and the higher military institution, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (the SCAF), took the control of the country. It was a shocking development for the Egyptian people because they were expecting to see the representatives coming among them as the new rulers of the country and the military rule was unacceptable in the new period of Egypt after being successful in the struggle against the former authoritarian system. It would mean the continuation of the old type of system in a sense so it was obviously far from satisfying the demands of people in Tahrir Square. However, it seemed a viable option until the first Presidential elections and there was no better alternative in that conjuncture. Therefore, people had to obey this *de facto* decision. The SCAF rule in Egypt lasted one-and-a-half year and the power was transferred to the new elected President, Morsi. Since the Muslim Brotherhood established its legal political party (the Freedom and Justice Party) for the first time, it was apparent that the candidate of the Brotherhood would most probably take the office in the first Presidential elections with the help of large number of supporters. It would not be an expected outcome for the military leaders so that they tried to stay in power as long as possible and they aimed to arrange the political system in a way that the new President would not do whatever he wants. In other words, the SCAF did not act as a transition body; on the contrary, the military leaders ruled the country as if they were the legitimate and permanent rulers of country. General Tantawi was the head of the SCAF and he acted as the official President of Egypt. The Council declared that they would wield power until the next

elections. The ambiguity of the timetable created criticisms by the people and some groups protested but these protests were suppressed. In this transition phase, the military government made important regulations in the Constitution and laws. First of all, they scheduled the constitutional referendum and it was done in March 2011. During this constitution-making process, Ahmed Shafik, who was the Prime Minister of Egypt in that period, had to step down as a result of large protests. Protestors raided the headquarters of the State Security Intelligence. The new Cabinet ordered a controversial law criminalizing protests and strikes in that period. However, it did not end the protests and tens of thousands of people continued demonstrations in different cities and especially in Tahrir Square. The struggle between the security forces, soldiers and the police, and the protestors lasted for months. The police and the soldiers did not avoid resorting to violence and force during these confrontations. Amnesty International accused Egypt's military of "crushing the hopes" of the protest movements and it expressed the existence of human rights abuses in that period.¹

As the first example of elections in the post-Mubarak period, the Parliamentary elections were held in two rounds and the new Parliament started its work in January 2012. In these first Parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood members got about 47 percent of the votes and the Salafist Nour Party became the second, with its 25 percent, so that the majority of the Parliament members consisted of the ones having Islamic background. As an important decision, state of emergency which was carried out for decades was expired in May. In the same month, the first round of Presidential elections was done. The Presidential elections were significant for the Egyptian politics and the new leader of the post-Mubarak period would be elected by the people. Thus, these elections were attributed much importance by different groups and they became an arena of the political struggle. However, the decisions of the Election Commission affected the process deeply because they disqualified some

¹ Tribune Business News, 22 November 2011.

powerful candidates for the Presidency with different reasons. Among them, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, Khairat el-Shater, was the most prominent figure depending on the electoral support of the Muslim Brothers.² Mohammed Morsi was declared as the second choice of Brothers after these eliminations.

In the next period, the military government adopted a martial law and gave more power to security forces to arrest civilians. It can be said that the extraordinary powers continued to be practiced despite the removal of the state of emergency. Furthermore, the decisions taken by the Supreme Constitutional Court changed the political atmosphere much in that critical period. According to those decisions, the former regime figures could be candidate for the Presidency so that Ahmed Shafik's candidacy was approved.³ In addition to this, the law regulating the Parliamentary elections was declared as invalid and the Parliament was dissolved as a result of new regulations so the legislative authority remained in the hands of the SCAF.⁴ They were just a few days before the second round of the Presidential elections. In the same day with the second round of the Presidential elections, the SCAF made his final and critical move. In that framework, the SCAF issued an interim constitution through which it gave itself more power and restricted the Presidential powers. Additionally, the interim constitution removed the military from Presidential authority and supervision. It was a clear message for the new civilian leader implying that the military did not give up involving in the political issues and they would declare their will in the political struggles. Also, the declaration gives a sense of how difficult it would be to govern the country for the new President. These crucial decisions indicated the seriousness of the military leaders.

Atef Said claimed that "two issues that will shape the near future: 1-Problem of a strong civil society and never-ending revolutionary fever 2-Crisis of duality in power, the

² Yolande Knell, 2 April 2012, *BBC News*.

³ Yolande Knell, 23 April 2012, *BBC News*.

⁴ David D. Kirkpatrick, 14 June 2012, *The New York Times*.

Brotherhood and the SCAF” (Said 2012, 426). The duality in power and a possible struggle between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood was obvious from the first day of Morsi’s Presidency. The military made its showdown during the transition period and the political struggle was inevitable.

The Critical Events of the Morsi Period and the Reasons for the Growing Opposition: “Why the First Elected President Became the Common Target in One-Year Period?”

Morsi came to power as the first democratically elected leader of Egypt and the revolutionary groups expected the realization of the demands of the Tahrir coalition from his Presidency period. After the problematic and difficult transition period under the leadership of the SCAF (the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces), the first Presidential elections created the opportunity for people to express their will with their votes. The support of the Muslim Brothers was not sufficient for electing Morsi so his success showed that he could get the support of some other groups to be elected. Expectations from his Presidency were really high because the elections were a result of the uprisings and a collective movement rather than being an ordinary election. He became the President of Egypt in this atmosphere. It was not an easy work and responsibility for a person but people certainly gave an important chance to him and they more or less trusted him to lead the country in that period. The SCAF period created disappointment among people and it could have been another chance for Morsi in the political arena against the military.

However, in one-year period, a growing opposition emerged against his Presidency and the number of people and groups participating in this opposition camp increased through time. He lost his allies and the credibility in the eyes of the people. Furthermore, he began to be compared to Mubarak and he replaced Mubarak as the new common target of a grand coalition. It was a really dramatic change for such a short period and in the end, opponents of

his Presidency preferred and celebrated the military intervention instead of supporting the first elected President in Egypt. Of course, it does not mean that all citizens were against his rule; on the contrary, there were large groups of people, consisting of mostly the Muslim Brotherhood supporters and some Islamic groups, organizing demonstrations to support him but still, it showed the loss of his credibility for different groups and brought the end of his period. The lack of trust had come to such a point that people could support the military rule instead of the Presidency of the civilian leader. Sharif Nashashibi summarized the dramatic situation in an *al-Arabiya* article on July 29, 2013: “The sad irony is that many of those who were protesting the continuation of military rule after Mubarak’s ouster are now the army’s most ardent supporters –how quickly and conveniently amnesia can set in. Military rule is bad enough, but is much more dangerous when blindly supported by a large proportion of the population to oppress another large proportion of the population”.⁵ In this chapter, we will focus on the evolution of the process towards that direction. We have collected the news from different websites and newspapers to see the events in the Morsi period and to analyze the turning points that led to such an outcome. The *content analysis* of these sources will be helpful for us to explain the change of alliances and the attitudes of different actors step by step.

In the first place, it is necessary to determine the starting point in order to make a comparison with the results. We have to know who supported Morsi in the beginning to decide whether it could really be interpreted as a failure or loss of support. Morsi came to power as the candidate of the Muslim Brothers and its political party called “Freedom and Justice Party”. It was the first time the political activities of the Brotherhood were legitimized as a result of the removal of Mubarak’s suppression. In spite of this, they were not so inexperienced in participating in politics and elections. They took part in 1984 elections

⁵ Sharif Nashashibi, 29 July 2013.

through an alliance and they continued to involve in the elections with independent candidates and alliances in the successive elections. They increased their electoral success through time but they could only get a limited number of representatives because of the election system and the unfair practices during the elections. Thus, the electoral success of the Muslim Brotherhood and its candidate in the 2012 Presidential elections was not so surprising. The existence of high support and constituency for the Muslim Brotherhood was known and expected by the people. The results indicated the amount of this support and the number of proponents for the Muslim Brothers. Since the Muslim Brotherhood was also a religious and social community and acted in these spheres to serve the people together with their political activities, they could maintain their social contacts with the people in the society under all circumstances and the repression against their members could not abolish the movement during the former three dictators' ruling periods. They were experienced in organizing electoral campaigns and attracting people's votes.

However, the results of the first Parliamentary elections showed that the support of the Muslim Brothers was not sufficient for his Presidency so he was undoubtedly supported by some other groups. We could find some evaluations among the news confirming this argument. For example, a news item mentions the demonstrations of some groups protesting the candidacy of Ahmed Shafik as a former regime figure and calling on Morsi to ally with other presidential contenders to unite against "remnants" of the Mubarak regime.⁶ In an *al-Jazeera* news on October 25, 2012, some groups are named: "Even as Morsi became president it was clear that many secular and liberal Egyptians had voted for him only because he was marginally more palatable than the alternative, Ahmed Shafik, an army man who had been Mubarak's last prime minister".⁷ Marwan Bishara also mentioned the same argument while analyzing Morsi failures and loss of allies on July 2, 2013: "He was propelled to victory

⁶ The Tripoli Post, 29 May 2012.

⁷ Al-Jazeera, 25 October 2012.

not just by the Islamist vote, but by an uneasy coalition of liberals who backed him in order to block his opponent”.⁸ Consequently, Morsi could get the votes of some liberal and secular groups in addition to the Islamic votes. However, their support was not an unconditional support. Rather, it was a conditional support to give a chance to Morsi as the lesser evil for them in the political competition. It implies that the credibility of Morsi was not so high even for some of his voters so he had to pay attention to his policies.

Morsi's Policies in the Office and His Controversial Decisions

The Presidency in the post-Mubarak was a “bed of nails” because of the accumulation of problems so that it was a difficult task to cope with. Moreover, the regulations and changes in the SCAF period made the situation more complicated and worse than before for the new President. Particularly, the last move of the military, the interim constitution, was a direct attack to restrict the Presidential powers. In order to consolidate his power in the initial period, he cancelled constitutional amendments issued by the military restricting presidential powers and took the former kind of authority and powers in his hand. Put differently, he removed the changes made by the SCAF at the last minute and got back the warrants and Presidential powers the Constitution gave him. It can be interpreted as a counter-attempt in the struggle between the military and the new President, as a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood. After that, his policies emerged clearer in the following months. While some of them were appreciated by most of the people, some others created disappointment among some groups of people and led to protests against the new President. Because of the Arab Spring process, it became much easier for the Egyptian people to mobilize and to organize large demonstrations so that they could react to all developments in a short period. Morsi declared that he would solve the five main problems of Egypt in his first one hundred days. These five problems were namely “security vacuum, traffic congestion, fuel shortages, bread

⁸ Marwan Bishara, 2 July 2013, *Al-Jazeera*.

scarcities and poor public sanitation”.⁹ It was a courageous claim but it was not so realistic indeed because the problems were not so easy to deal with and it was necessary to have more time in order to solve each of them. It was mentioned in an *al-Jazeera* news on August 19, 2012: “He (Morsi) may have described his vision for the first one hundred days, but it will take much more than a vision to make change happen. And it will take more than a one-term presidency to shape the politics of Egypt in the coming years”.¹⁰ Actually, creating artificial expectations in the society was not beneficial for his Presidency because he needed time and people were not so patient under the impact of revolutionary sentiment in the Egyptian context. In other words, disappointment in the end of one hundred days was inevitable so Morsi would be in a hard position to explain the issue. He claimed to succeed in certain improvements in all the five problems at the end of this process but this statement was far from being satisfactory.

Apart from that, Morsi issued a decree to appoint the Prosecutor General as Egypt’s envoy to Vatican¹¹ but it was cancelled by a court decision. This move started the battle between Morsi and the judges in his Presidency period. Appointing the Prosecutor General to another position or dismissal of him was not in the official warrants or powers of the President so Morsi exceeded his powers in that sense. This attempt did not create much reaction in the large segments of the society because it was not related to lives of ordinary people. However, Morsi’s bold move showed that he would not avoid using his powers comprehensively and making crucial decisions without hesitating. This attitude was really risky especially in that period and it created problems for the new President in the next months. There was some other news items claiming Morsi to be in a battle with the country’s

⁹ Ahram Online, 9 October 2012.

¹⁰ Al-Jazeera, 19 August 2012.

¹¹ Daily News Egypt, 11 October 2012.

state media. These were not positive signs for Morsi due to increasing number of discontented people and groups in the society.

As one of the most important decisions of Morsi in the early period of his office, he ordered the powerful head of the army and the defense minister, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, and several senior generals into retirement.¹² Crowds in Cairo celebrated this decision and praised Morsi for his bravery. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was appointed as defense minister and the general commander of the army in replacement of Tantawi. It was an unexpected move by Morsi because targeting the head of the military was really risky in the Egyptian context depending on the status of the military as an institution. It would mean an open confrontation with the military so that the counter-moves of the military would be probably seen in the future. However, it was a strategic attempt for Morsi to get the support of the people. Since people were not sympathetic to the head of the Army due to his policies in the SCAF period and they were challenging almost all the things representing the old type of authoritarian practices and reminding the former regime, targeting the head of the military was welcomed by the people and it was interpreted as a positive attempt by the new President. Furthermore, it was seen as a “presidential coup d’état against army” or a “civilian coup” by most scholars and people as well. It was certainly a message for the military to return to barracks and not to engage in political affairs but obviously, it was not so easy to manage in a country like Egypt. The military did not seem willing to interfere with the political issues in the months to come so that it was regarded as the biggest achievement of the Morsi’s Presidency in that period. Of course, the military intervention in July 2013 proved the wrongness of this perception. Consequently, the order of Morsi for the retirement of the generals was greeted with joy and happiness by the people who opposed military’s role in

¹² Al-Jazeera, 13 August 2012.

politics and it increased his popularity so it cannot be considered as an event leading to the growing opposition.

The Controversial Constitutional Decree on November 22

The first months in the Presidency were a real test for Morsi because Egyptian people, especially those who gave conditional support during the Presidential elections, were carefully watching his policies. Therefore, he had to be really cautious before making critical decisions. There were “fears” and “perceptions of the threat” in the people’s minds coming out of their historical experiences and recent political developments. The biggest fear was returning to authoritarianism or to a similar form of the Mubarak regime. In such a critical period, Morsi issued a constitutional decree which was really controversial for the Egyptians and it led to harsh criticisms because of the powers the decree gave to Morsi. He began to be compared to Mubarak with his attempt. It was obviously one of the most controversial decisions of the Morsi period and it became a step for losing the support of different groups of people.

It is possible to understand this reaction of people by looking at the news of that period. *Al-Ahram* presented the constitutional declaration with the following statements:

“Morsi makes his most controversial and antagonizing move to date, issuing a constitutional declaration which puts him beyond the bounds of judicial supervision. The declaration also shielded Egypt’s Constituent Assembly, which was writing a new constitution, and Egypt’s upper house Shura Council, from potential dissolution by court order. The declaration also gives the president the power to appoint Egypt’s prosecutor-general for a four-year period”.¹³

¹³ Osman El-Sharnoubi, 28 June 2013, *Al-Ahram*.

It was immediately condemned by the opposition figures, judges and prosecutors, and people criticized the decree as “dictatorial”. In the constitutional declaration, the president also gave himself the power to take any decision necessary to “protect the revolution”. This ambiguous statement reminded the extraordinary powers in the former periods like the long state of emergency in Egypt. It was possible for the President to legitimize all his actions by applying this rule so it opened the way to exceed the Presidential powers and to abuse the office. In fact, it did not have exact or absolute points but even the possibility of an authoritarian style of governing was unacceptable in the post-Mubarak period. The news published by *al-Jazeera* on November 24, 2012 clearly put the concerns and worries of the people:

Mohamed Morsi made history when he became president of Egypt. He is the first civilian to hold the post, and the first to get there by winning a contested election. But is he now becoming another authoritarian leader? The opposition certainly thinks so. Key opposition figure Mohamed ElBaradei even described him on Twitter as the country’s new pharaoh- a major blow, he said, that could have dire consequences for the revolution.¹⁴

It was also mentioned that “critics have compared Morsi’s move to Hosni Mubarak’s autocratic ways and denounced the move as a ‘coup against legitimacy’”.

These were really important claims for the new President and it was not so easy to explain the real purposes to the Egyptian people. It was interpreted in the way as follows: Morsi gave himself the power to enact any law he wants in the name of “protecting the revolution”. It can be said that the conditions in Egypt were not completely stable and it was not so easy to lead to country under these circumstances. The dissolution of the Parliament was also another handicap for Morsi because he had to deal with all the problems almost

¹⁴ Al-Jazeera, 24 November 2012.

alone. Thus, he could need some extraordinary powers in that context. However, the content of the constitutional decree was beyond this necessity and the limitations for the Presidential powers were uncertain so that people's reaction should have been taken into account before making such an initiative. It was necessary to act tactfully in Egypt in order to lead the country in a smooth way; otherwise, the cost of some policies would be much larger than expected.

November 22 Declaration became a critical turning point for the Morsi's Presidency period because it included some concrete signs of the most dangerous threat for the Egyptian people due to their historical experience: authoritarianism. It can be said that it was the first real shock or disappointment in the Morsi period but it was of high importance as a sentimental issue for the Egyptians. It might be an exaggeration to call Morsi as a dictator just because of this attempt but it created question marks in the people's minds and people began to follow the next policies from that point of view. We should keep in mind that people, other than the MB supporters, gave a conditional support to Morsi's Presidency and there was not an exact relationship of mutual trust between Morsi and large segments of society. Therefore, it was necessary to be much more cautious not to lose this low credibility but this decree was far from being a strategic move.

The reaction of the people was expressed in the news as follows: "It is very healthy that Arab citizens protest when a president claims new sweeping powers that undermine their revolutions".¹⁵ Furthermore, it was also interpreted as assuming wide powers and Morsi was accused of "neutralizing the judicial system by declaring that courts were barred from challenging his decisions". As we have mentioned before, the key figure of opposition in Egypt, ElBaradei, called Morsi as the "new pharaoh". This label can be regarded as one of the worst ones for the Egyptian context especially in the post-Mubarak period. As a criticism of a

¹⁵ Larbi Sadiki, 29 November 2012, *Al-Jazeera*.

particular group of people, it was published in *al-Arabiya* that Egypt Judges Club claimed Morsi's power decree an assault on judiciary.¹⁶ Raed Omari asks in the same newspaper on November 24: "Will Mursi's Egypt become a new Iran?"¹⁷ because of considering the decree as an attempt to convert Egypt into an Islamic single-party state. We should be aware of the fact that even one particular development in Egypt is not seen as an individual case because of the regional importance of Egypt and the context in which this particular development emerges. In other words, the events in the Morsi period were taken into account together with the Egyptian and regional history and the possible outcomes of them in the future. For instance, Abdurrahman al-Rashed from *al-Arabiya* asserted the idea on November 25 that "Mursi ends Egypt spring" and said: "If President Mursi does not revoke his decisions within the next few days, Egypt would enter into a new tunnel of tension and its short period of democratic spring would come to an end".¹⁸ All the news and the accusations towards the constitutional decree show the attributed importance to it. Of course, it was not the only reason for assuming dictatorship for Morsi; on the contrary, there were doubts about the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi himself coming from the previous periods. However, the declaration became the most apparent and concrete example triggering the former doubts so November 22 left a bad legacy for the Morsi's Presidency career.

On the other hand, we need to see the President's purposes and his and the supporters' defenses against the criticisms for the constitutional decree in order to make more objective evaluations about it. Morsi expressed the points in the declaration as "temporary measures".¹⁹ For him, they were necessary to lead the country under the circumstances of that period and they would be valid until the next Parliamentary elections. Put differently, Morsi claimed that Egypt was experiencing an extraordinary period so additional measures would be helpful for

¹⁶ Al-Arabiya 23 November 2012.

¹⁷ Raed Omari 24 November 2012.

¹⁸ Abdul Rahman al-Rashed, 25 November 2012, *Al-Arabiya*.

¹⁹ Magdi Abdelhadi, 27 November 2012, *The Guardian*.

the President to make decisions and to implement them in a more effective manner. This period would last until the normalization of the political system and arranging the relations in a feasible way. He was right on his claim that Egypt was passing through an important and extraordinary transition period. For example, the Parliament was dissolved so the legislative authority was maintained as a transition body and Morsi had to act almost alone in such a chaotic atmosphere. Thus, it could be necessary to put into practice certain policies going beyond normal time practices.

However, the perception of people was no less important than the extraordinary policies. “The fear of returning to authoritarianism” was widespread among people and the people could easily pour into the streets when they encounter unexpected situations and controversial attempts. It means that the possible reactions should have been thought and the ground for making the policies more acceptable for large segments of society should have been prepared before declaring such an assertive decree. Therefore, it can be said that even if Morsi had been right on his policy and arguments, he would have been rightly criticized because of his style of decision-making and process management. The form may become more important than the content in certain cases so that Morsi had to become more careful as a leader in that sense. Moreover, Morsi issued a new declaration on December 9 and softened some points compared to former version.²⁰ He cancelled the point putting him beyond the bounds of judicial supervision but the protection of the Constituent Assembly and the Shura Council was still in use. This attempt did not change the situation much because it was far from satisfying the demands of opposition and soothing the criticisms against the declaration. This back-step could have been useful if it had contained the regulations demanded by the opponents. Or, it would have been useless in the sense that people began to worry about his purposes and policies so the following process would be problematic in any case after the

²⁰ Abigail Hauslohner and Ingy Hassieb, 9 December 2012, *The Washington Post*.

November 22 Decree. As a result, the November 22 Declaration led to crucial problems for the Morsi's Presidency and it became the starting point of harsh criticism and large protests of growing opposition.

Constitutional Debates and the Referendum

Constitutions reflect the general legal framework to establish the system and the relations between state institutions, state-society and state-citizen relations in the country. Therefore, it is generally seen as a need when important political changes experienced and the new constitutions represent the main character of the new period. It was not much different in Egypt in the post-Mubarak period. There was expectation among people, especially among the revolutionary groups, to prepare a new constitution in order to put societal and political change into a legal form. Moreover, Morsi promised to prepare a new constitution during the presidential campaigns so that election of Morsi for the Presidency led to increase in the expectations. Morsi did not avoid implementing the policy in a few months and a constituent assembly was established consisting of different groups of people proportional to their votes in the parliamentary elections. This combination made the Islamic groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist Nour Party members, dominant in the commission. However, almost all groups in the society were represented in the Assembly in changing degrees. Since constitutions ideally reflect a societal consensus or the support of most of the groups in the society, the participation of diverse groups in the Constituent Assembly and preparation of the new Constitution was crucial for the legitimacy of the constitution. The conditions in Egypt were proper in the beginning because the Assembly more or less reflected the will of people. However, it was understood through time that reaching a consensus especially on some controversial issues was almost impossible due to very different agendas of the actors so the debates came to stalemate for some points.

The main debate was on the axis of secularism and religion-based ideas. Particularly, the law determining the place of the Sharia for the constitution, the issues related to freedom and the status and rights of women created the main disagreements between the Islamic groups and secular groups in the Constituent Assembly. The constitutional process became an arena of struggle and turned into a political crisis with the increasing debates and mutual steps by the debating actors. People attributed much importance to the constitution-making process because they thought that the Constitution would shape the general character of the political system in the new period so the struggle for that goal became inevitable. For Morsi, it was another litmus test and turning point during his Presidency but it did not result in a political success because of the evolution of the process and the events emerged in that process.

The constitution-making process took longer time compared to former controversial issues and its impact became more decisive. The attitudes of all actors could be observed in that period. It can be said that almost all the actors tried to impose their own agenda and they did not strive for reaching compromise so that they could not establish consensus over the controversial issues. Since the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist members constituted the majority of the Assembly, their policy and attitude were more important for the final result. Furthermore, Morsi's policy and strategy was also crucial to see his performance and his general perspective but he could not convince people about his impartiality or his concerns for the worries of all the actors. This kind of failure led to increase in the criticisms against his Presidency and the next period would be more difficult for him to deal with the growing opposition. Morsi seemed determinant to send the draft constitution, on which the opposition had strong objections, to the referendum and it was approved by about 64 percent of voters. However, the voter turnout was only about 33 percent because of the boycott organized by the opposition groups.²¹ Some Egyptian opposition groups declared they would vote against the

²¹ Sarah el-Deeb, Associated Press, 26 December 2012, *The Washington Times*.

constitution and some of them rejected the planned referendum so that the outcome emerged in that way. The calls for national dialogue could not get the expected result because of the preparation process of the draft constitution.

During that process, the opposition groups first aimed to continue debates with the majority groups and they wanted to change the controversial points through the legal ways. However, they could not reach a compromise or they could not get much benefit in these discussions so they decided to leave the Constituent Assembly. Almost all the opposition members resigned and in the end, the draft constitution was prepared and approved by the alliance of the MB and Salafist members of the Assembly. This aspect took part in the criticisms mentioned in the newspapers. In one of the analyses explaining the process that brought the end of Morsi period, these statements took place about the constitution:

“Reflecting the parliament, the constituent assembly had a strong Islamist majority. Most non-Islamists eventually abandoned the assembly, complaining that the Brotherhood and its allies were imposing their will” (Belfast Telegraph Online).²² There were similar news items confirming the information about the domination of Islamist members in the Constituent Assembly.²³ Another example of news published by *Associated Press* on December 10, 2012 pointed out the division within the society because of the constitution-making process: “The proposed constitution is at the heart of the nation’s worst political crisis since the overthrow nearly two years ago of authoritarian President Hosni Mubarak. The charter has divided Egypt, with Morsi and his Islamist backers, including ultraconservative Salafis, in one camp, and secularists and leftists, including minority Christians and women, in the other”.²⁴ It was generally seen as a power struggle and the more powerful majority groups preferred to use their quantitative advantage instead of increasing the legitimacy of the constitution with the

²² Belfast Telegraph Online, 9 July 2013.

²³ The Guardian, 30 November 2012.

²⁴ The Associated Press, 10 December 2012.

participation of the will of other groups. It can be questioned whether it was really possible or not but for sure, some sacrifices from the both sides were necessary to achieve such a negotiated constitution.

The criticisms against the constitution can be categorized into two groups: those that were related to the content of the constitution and those that were about the decision-making style of the Constituent Assembly and the President Morsi. The first group of criticisms focused on the main distinctions between the two camps, Islamic groups and the secular groups. It is possible to see the reflections of these criticisms in the news published in the national and international media sources. For instance, an *al-Jazeera* news published on December 11, 2012 it was mentioned that “critics of the draft constitution say it disregards the rights of women and ignores personal freedoms” and the same news included a claim that “Egypt’s political crisis began on November 22 when Morsi issued a decree expanding his powers, granting himself immunity from judicial oversight or challenge”.²⁵ In another *al-Jazeera* news on December 10, the reasons for the opposing the constitution were explained: “A diverse collection of liberal and secular groups oppose the constitution, for a variety of reasons: Freedom of speech and religion, concerns over women’s rights, and civil-military relations”.²⁶ Apart from that, the role of Islamic law as a basis for legislation, women’s equality, and workers’ rights were expressed in other articles and news as the basic problems about the content of the draft Constitution. The *Associated Press* news on December 10 summarized the main points about the content: “The draft constitution largely reflects the conservative vision of the Islamists, with articles that rights activists, liberals and others fear will lead to restrictions on women and minorities, as well as on civil liberties in general”.²⁷

²⁵ Al-Jazeera, 11 December 2012.

²⁶ Al-Jazeera, 10 December 2012.

²⁷ The Associated Press, 10 December 2012.

Generally speaking, the main controversial issues were the Sharia law, basic freedoms and the rights of women and minorities.

On the other hand, there were criticisms related to the decision-making style of the actors took part in the preparation of the Constitution. They attribute more importance to the constitution-making process rather than the controversial topics. It can be understood in the sense that if the actors had paid attention to their attitudes towards each other, it would have been easier to solve the problems among them. We can understand this fact with the following statement from *al-Jazeera*: “It was the process rather than the document that brought Egypt to the present moment”.²⁸ To put it another way, the opposition challenged the process through which the constitution was written. According to the opposition figures, the Islamists dominated the process and they aimed to impose their agenda. There were accusations for the Islamic groups, especially for the Muslim Brotherhood, about their attitudes in the constitution-making process. In the media, the criticisms reflected these negative views. To illustrate, the Muslim Brothers were accused of having “blind spots” in certain points. Moreover, the purposes or the agenda of Islamic groups were questioned in the news published by *al-Arabiya* on December 22, 2012: “An opposition made up of liberals, leftists, secular Egyptians and a swath of the public angered over Morsi’s 5-month-old rule fear that Islamists are creating a new Mubarak-style autocracy”.²⁹ Consequently, the criticisms about the constitution were as important and harsh as the ones that were related to the content of the Constitution so they should all have been taken into account together. In fact as procedures and outcomes are not so neatly separated from one another, the procedures have an impact on the outcomes.

²⁸ Mark Levine, 8 December 2012, *al-Jazeera*.

²⁹ Al-Arabiya, 22 December 2012.

Preparation of the new constitution was not a personal matter for Morsi but Morsi embraced and supported the issue in the sense that he and Islamic groups were identified with each other. Therefore, Morsi himself became the target of the opposition related to constitution matters. He preferred to approve the draft as the President and did not hesitate to send it to the referendum so that the problem grew bigger and turned into a national or domestic problem between different groups in the society. He took the responsibility in that regard so the results of the process and the viewpoints of the people towards the President Morsi were affected by his preference. In addition to his direct involvement, he made an important action affecting the result of the process. As the newspapers also put forward and emphasized the issue, Morsi appointed 90 new members, to fill one third of the 270-member body,³⁰ to the Shura Council on the eve of the referendum as a last-minute change. Thus, it was crystal clear that he would not give up the approval of the draft in the upper house of the Parliament and he showed his personal attitude towards the issue.

By looking at the policy carried out by Morsi in the constitution-making process, Morsi was criticized by those who opposed and appreciated by those who supported him because of the constitution and increasing polarization did not create much benefit for his own career. Rawya Rageh underlined the legacy of the constitution-making process: “33 percent turnout, no winners, disappointed people and reproduction of the elitist approach of politicians”.³¹ Having seen the reactions to November 22 Declaration and the constitution-making process, it can be claimed that they were important steps and turning points for the emergence of a grand coalition of opposition groups against Morsi’s Presidency. We should keep in mind that Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood as an institution were not experienced in leading the country so some mistakes and failures were possible and they emerged as most people already anticipated. It was possible to find some contextual or ideological explanations

³⁰ Ahram Online, 24 December 2012.

³¹ Rawya Rageh, 26 December 2012. *Al-Jazeera*.

for Morsi's policies. However, leading to such a grand coalition of opposition groups was an exact political failure for a President having the support of large groups in the beginning. The only remaining groups supporting Morsi after the constitution-making process were the Islamic groups, including the Salafists Nour Party, so the alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists was significant for the future political events but the next period witnessed the breaking of this alliance too which meant a more difficult period for the President Morsi and his supporters.

A Love-Hate Relationship between Salafist al-Nour Party and the Muslim Brotherhood

There are lots of Islamic groups having different number of supporters in the Egyptian society and playing role in the political affairs. In the former periods of authoritarianism, the dictators did not allow the emergence of strong opposition parties and the legal area for engaging in political activities was really limited for the actors. Most religious groups did not prefer to take part in politics in that context of Egyptian politics. They continued to present their religious activities for the people and to make social services for the community. These ways helped them to contact with the people and to increase the number of their supporters. Among them, the Salafists were one of the most prominent religious groups in terms of their large group of followers and they intentionally succeeded to keep their distance from the political arena. The Arab Spring process created a window of opportunity for the politicization of Salafist groups. It was possible for them to establish their political parties and to make legitimate political activities for the first time. Actually, there are different factions within the Salafist doctrine so that it is impossible to analyze all the principles and practices of each of them for generalization of the Salafism as a whole. It is important to keep in mind the distinctions in the framework of the Salafist ideology. In other words, there were

reformers and religious hard-liners within the Salafist doctrine too.³² Some of these Salafist groups still keep their position for abstaining from political activities due to their basic principles like obedience to the authority. On the other hand, some other Salafists preferred to establish their political parties in order to play a role in the political developments. Those who participated in the political activities can be considered as reformer groups of Salafists but there were some disagreements among them leading to fragmentation of the political parties of the Salafists. The Nour Party became the most important and prominent examples of the Salafist parties and achieved to be the umbrella party for their political views in terms of their electoral support and representativeness in the eyes of the people. The Nour Party also experienced a fragmentation in the later period and a new party emerged at the end of this split.

Among other Islamic groups, the Muslim Brotherhood comes to the forefront because it has been the most organized institution compared to others. Furthermore, the Brothers have never been categorically against making political activities but they were repressed by the authoritarian regime in the former periods and could not become influential enough on the political events. With the fall of Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood came into prominence due to its large constituency and organized structure established in the previous periods. While the Muslim Brotherhood was the most significant candidate to lead the country, the Salafist Nour Party began to play an increasing role in the political arena. As a result, the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Nour Party gained importance as the two key actors in the Egyptian politics. Naglaa Mekkawi, from *al-Arabiya*, described the relationship as a love-hate relationship.³³ There were ups and downs in the process so that it had an unstable nature affected by the events emerged in that process.

³² Ahmad Ban, 12 April 2013, *Al-Monitor*.

³³ Naglaa Mekkawi, 22 August 2013. *Al-Arabiya*.

Religion has always been a crucial component of all spheres of life and its impact on the political agenda of the parties is undeniable. It was not so surprising to see that the main axis of debate in the constitution-making process was the one between secularism and Islam. Actually, even the people who are called secular in Egypt also take religious principles and religion as central organizing principles for their lives but they generally make a distinction between their religious beliefs and political views and accuse the Islamic groups by abusing religion for the sake of their political interests. Since religion is so central in people's lives, we need to take into account the differences of actors in terms of their religious beliefs, principles and practices while analyzing the distinctions between the political agendas of the religious groups. Therefore, we will show the religious, ideological and political distinctions between the Muslim Brothers and the Salafist Nour Party by applying the media sources.

The news published by *al-Masry al-Youm*, a local or national newspaper in Egypt, showing an example of Salafists' worldview on May 29, 2013 also tells certain features of Salafists and their existence in the political affairs: "Salafis have an ultra-conservative understanding of Islam. The Nour Party, established after the January 25 revolution in the coastal city of Alexandria and officially recognized on 12 June 2011, was the first Salafi political party founded in Egypt. There are currently approximately 8 Salafi parties in Egypt".³⁴ The news was about Salafis' demand to end ballet in Egypt because of its relationship with female body and women's rights, and it can be regarded as an example of Salafist understanding and rigidity.

It is possible to see the difference between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists in that sense. The MB is considered as more moderate and flexible in their religious understanding compared to relatively more radical view of the Salafists. This comparison can just be done with the religious ideas and principles of both sides. The political connections

³⁴ Egypt Independent, 29 May 2013.

and alliances with other groups make the situation more complicated. For example, the Salafists could establish closer ties with the secular groups in the recent period. Therefore, the religious and political spheres should be taken into account separately not to cause confusion. Alaa Bayoumi from *al-Jazeera* focused on the growing disagreement between the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists and used the statements of an expert in his March 11, 2013 dated news: “The rift between Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood is both ‘ideological and political’. At the ideological level, each group believes it has the right understanding of Islam and its role in politics. At the political level, Salafis fear that if the Muslim Brotherhood dominates politically, it will exclude them. At the same time, the Muslim Brotherhood is trying to weaken the Salafis’ ability to compete over Islamic vote”.³⁵ He also mentioned that “Salafis adhere to a puritanical interpretation of Islam” and because of the fundamental differences between the two groups, the alliance between them was temporary and unsustainable. Consequently, it can be said that the politicization of the Salafists or their engagement with the political affairs added a new dimension to the relationship between them and the Muslim Brothers. While they had to collaborate or make an alliance as the key actors of Islamic groups against the secular groups, the fundamental differences would sooner or later emerge inevitably.

The Muslim Brothers and the Nour Party could maintain their alliance in the political arena especially in the first months of the Morsi period. The representatives of the two groups acted together especially during the critical political issues and followed a more Islamic pathway reflecting the interests of both sides. In addition to this, the supporters of the two groups also organized common programs such as establishing protest movements and making common declarations. There were examples of marches, including the Salafist Nour Party

³⁵ Alaa Bayoumi, 11 March 2013. *Al-Jazeera*.

members, in support of Morsi in this period.³⁶ Apart from that, the constitution-making process became one of the prominent signs of this alliance because the draft Constitution was prepared and approved by the members of the Muslim Brothers and the Nour Party. This process was most probably the highest moment of their alliance. During the increasing polarization in that process, the Muslim Brothers and the Salafists constituted the Islamic camp and the proponents of the Constitution. The Sharia law was important especially for the Salafists and they, including other Salafi groups, even insisted on a more radical or strict version of the law³⁷ but they could find a middle way with the impact of Muslim Brotherhood's strategy. An *an-Arabiya* news on December 25, 2012 showed the existence of alliance on that issue against other groups: "The opposition argues that the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups that backed the charter want to use some of its ambiguous language to slip in sharia-style strict Islamic law".³⁸

The next period following the approval of the Constitution witnessed the end of this political alliance gradually. *Al-Ahram* shows the breaking of the alliance between the Muslim Brothers and the Nour Party as a process and it points out the events in the period between February and March 2013 because in this period, Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Egypt to improve the relations between the two countries.³⁹ Since the Salafists had a more rigid or puritanical understanding of Islam, they were categorically opposed the improvement or establishing relations with the Shia groups and politicians of Iran so Ahmadinejad's visit created resentment among the Salafists. On the other hand, Morsi and the Muslim Brothers attributed importance to the relations with Iran because of Iran's political influence in the region. It proved the more flexible approach of the Muslim Brothers especially in the political issues. Morsi became the first President who visited Tahrān after the

³⁶ Liliana Mihaila, 26 December 2012. *Daily News Egypt*.

³⁷ Ben Wedeman, 9 November 2012, *CNN*.

³⁸ *Al-Arabiya*, 25 December 2012.

³⁹ Osman El-Sharnoubi, 28 June 2013. *Al-Ahram*.

Iranian Revolution and his period became the establishment of first contacts and the removal of some barriers on the mutual relations of Egypt and Iran. Although Morsi did not avoid criticizing Iran's Syrian policy during his visit, it was of historic importance in terms of the relations between the two countries.⁴⁰ Iranian leader's visit in February was a return visit in that sense. Furthermore, the flights between Cairo and Tahrān after decades had a symbolic meaning in improving the relations. Newspapers and other media sources attributed importance to these first steps because of their historical aspects.

To make it clearer, there were disagreements between the two groups about certain issues so the improvement on the relations with Iran was not the only reason but it was criticized by the Nour Party members intensively. Moreover, Morsi dismissed his advisor on environmental issues who was a leading member of the Nour Party and Morsi announced a date for elections without consulting the Nour Party leader so that Nour Party leader and its members began to openly criticize the Muslim Brotherhood. They could not reach a compromise on the procedures. These events reflected their deep differences in the religious beliefs and political agenda indeed. The main distinction lies at the difference of their political agendas and it was better understood and came into prominence as time passed. The disagreements turned into criticisms and concrete actions in the later period. As a result, it became an actual love-hate relationship and hate began to outweigh the love with the breaking of alliance.

Salafists represented the second largest group in the post-Mubarak period of the Egyptian politics in terms of their electoral support. They played a significant role in the political events. Their alliance with the ruling group, the Muslim Brothers, allowed them to have a say on the decisions and policies in the first months. However, they were not pleased to have a secondary role and the domination of the Muslim Brotherhood. The breaking of the

⁴⁰ Ernesto Londono, 27 August 2012, *The Washington Post*.

alliance between them made the Salafists more independent in their political activities and it opened the way for establishing new alliances or carrying out different policies. As the opposition against Morsi grew through time and different groups began to organize massive demonstrations against his Presidency, the position or strategy of the Salafists gained importance as a former ally of the Muslim Brotherhood. The involvement of the Salafists in this grand coalition would increase the confidence of the opposition and it would mean questioning the legitimacy of the Muslim Brotherhood against the will of a larger group. Since the Salafists supported Morsi in the second round of the Presidential elections, they could never say that his Presidency was illegitimate. However, they called Morsi for early presidential elections and they participated in the grand coalition of the opposition groups. Their involvement in the opposition camp also affected the perception of international actors because of the existence of diverse groups of people against Morsi and it increased the level of legitimacy for the opposition. The only remaining supporters of Morsi were from the Muslim Brothers and some other Islamic groups.

We could better observe the distinction within the Salafist ideology because of different policies and strategies of Salafist groups. While the Nour Party took part in the coalition against Morsi, some other Salafist and Islamic groups supported Morsi and his legitimacy in the Presidency. Their attitudes about the military intervention were also parallel to their policies. An *Anadolu Agency*, a Turkish media source, on September 16, 2013 showed this point: “Except for the Salafist Nour Party, most Egyptian Islamic groups rejected army’s roadmap”.⁴¹

In addition to the disagreement over the domestic political issues and ideological differences, the role of international actors should be taken into account to see the policies of the Nour Party. There is no doubt that the Nour Party had a close relationship with Saudi

⁴¹ Anadolu Agency, 16 September 2013.

Arabia and some other Gulf countries with the help of common ideology, the Salafism. Saudi Arabia helped and supported the Salafists in Egypt but it also tried to interfere with the policies of the Nour Party. It cannot be said that the acts and decisions of the Nour Party were directly determined by the Saudis but the Nour Party generally acted in accordance with the will of their Saudi allies especially in the critical issues. The problematic relationship of Saudi Arabia with the Muslim Brotherhood and the power struggle between the Muslim Brothers and the Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries created an important dynamic for the regional matters. In general, the Gulf countries, except for Qatar, did not improve relations with Morsi's Egypt but they became the first countries which celebrated the new Interim President after the ouster of Morsi and they funded the new administration. The policies of these countries can be seen by looking at the aid packages or loans sent by them to Egypt in different periods. While Qatar sent loans during the Morsi period, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia sent financial aid packages to Egypt after Morsi was forced to leave the office.⁴² Consequently, the alliance between the Muslim Brothers and the Salafist Nour Party was broken for a variety of reasons such religious and political differences and the impact of international actors and this break in the alliance changed the dynamics in Egypt and had a decisive influence on the end of the Morsi period.

A General Evaluation of the Morsi Period in Egypt

Morsi came to power as the first democratically elected President of Egypt and the first leader of the post-Mubarak period. There were crucial problems accumulated in the previous periods of authoritarian rule. In addition to the domestic problems, the international conjuncture was not so favorable for the new President in terms of establishing a new and sustainable system and solving all the problems in a short period. Briefly stated, it was a difficult task to accomplish for an inexperienced ruler. Moreover, Morsi's performance in the

⁴² Tehran Times, 6 June 2014; Daily News Egypt, 30 January 2014; Intellinews, 6 November 2013.

office would be significant for the continuation of the civilian rule and the expectations of the people were really high. Therefore, there was almost no room for being unsuccessful in the immediate period and people would most probably become intolerant and react to the controversial attempts directly. To be honest, a complete success in dealing with all the issues was nearly unreachable so the expectations of people should have been turned into a concrete and gradual reform program instead of taking bold steps and triggering impatience among the revolutionary groups. However, Morsi preferred to increase the expectations by giving a promise of “solving the five main problems in one hundred days” and he tried to deal with all the problems all at once. Since the problems were deeper and necessitated more time to solve, his promise did not create much benefit for his career. Apart from that, the support of different groups in the society was of critical importance for the legitimacy and success of Morsi’s policies so that it was better for him to find new allies for different issues. Although he made some attempts to achieve that goal, it was understood through time that Morsi’s strategies and policies led to loss of the support of the existing allies rather than adding new ones. In sum, Morsi underperformed in his Presidency period in terms of objective criteria but not all the reasons for this result stemmed from his failures or mistakes; on the contrary, contextual matters and the role of domestic and international actors were as important as his personal performance.

When Morsi came to power, he encountered serious problems and he had to take some measures to overcome the difficulties. Among them, the long-term economic problems were the main and the most immediate factor he had to find certain solutions. It was necessary to find at least some temporary solutions and ideally, the Egyptian economy had to be reorganized and rendered to become more sustainable and long-term economic policies needed to be put into practice. In the short term, Morsi made a loan deal of 4.8 billion dollars with the IMF in order to use it in the first period and to overcome the immediate liquidity and

financial problems. This measure was indispensable for the Egyptian economy so that this agreement did not create much criticism despite the former principles and discourses of the Muslim Brotherhood. It can be said that the loan deal was a pragmatic move for longer projects so it could be explained.

In terms of foreign policy issues, the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project led to important problems with the other neighbor countries of the Nile River. Morsi had to participate in different programs and bilateral discussions to find a permanent solution for the problem. Even in the last month of Morsi period, he struggled to deal with the issue as it was pointed out in the *Egypt Independent* news on June 14, 2013: “Egypt seeks diplomatic negotiations with Ethiopia with the participation of Sudan in order to persuade Ethiopia to provide further studies and information about the Renaissance Dam and discuss the possibility of concluding an agreement between the three countries”.⁴³ As it can be observed in this example, Morsi tried to implement a pro-active foreign policy especially in the regional matters. He could criticize Iran’s policy towards the Syrian civil war. Furthermore, he involved in the Palestinian cause and advocated the Palestinians in the forums and Egypt kept the Rafah border gate open during the Morsi period. Morsi held a mediatory position between Hamas and Israel. This role was appreciated by the international actors, including the US, and it increased the popularity of Morsi parallel to Egypt’s central role in the region. Interestingly, it was just before the November 22 Decree which resulted in harsh criticisms of opposition in the domestic political affairs. Foreign policy issues and policies of the Morsi period created dissatisfaction of some actors such as Israel and the Gulf countries because of the clash of interests with them in different matters so that the ouster of Morsi made these actors pleased. Turkey and Qatar were seemingly the main allies of Egypt in the Morsi period. Consequently, the pro-active foreign policy in the Morsi period was risky so the outcomes created an

⁴³ *Egypt Independent*, 14 June 2013.

improvement or decline in the relations with different regional and international actors depending on circumstances.

In terms of domestic political affairs, Morsi was aware of the fact that he would need the support of large segments of society. As a positive step towards establishing mutual trust with different groups, he appointed to his Presidential team consisting of four aides and seventeen advisors Christians, liberals, Salafists as well as many MB members. The composition of the Presidential team more or less reflected the diversity in the Egyptian society and it carried a symbolic meaning in that sense. However, it would have been much more meaningful if Morsi had effectively used this crew while making important decisions because of increasing the legitimacy of each decision. This team did not go beyond the symbolic meaning of the composition so that Morsi could not prove his concerns over the ideas and policies of other actors.

Contra to the ideal form of reaching compromise and attempts to establish a consensus, Morsi's decision making style was seriously questioned and he was accused of making no consultation with his advisors. This situation contributed to criticisms against Morsi and advisors resigned from the team in different periods successively. November 22 Decree was one of the turning points for the emergence of disagreements and harsh criticisms so it led to some resignations in the end. Alaa Bayoumi interpreted this period and underlined the complaints of the resigned advisers in *al-Jazeera* in the following days of the decree: "Advisers who have resigned also complain that dividing pro-revolution forces into 'Islamist' and 'non-Islamist' camps has weakened all of them. They urge the president to focus on a concrete political and economic programme, to build consensus among the various pro-revolution forces, and warn against any attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood to monopolize

the decision-making process”.⁴⁴ This was one of most emphasized criticisms in the Morsi period. Critics said that Morsi only took into account the ideas coming from different bodies of the Muslim Brotherhood and its influential members and he did not pay attention to the advices of other actors. According to them, the marginalization of other groups challenging the domination of the Muslim Brothers constituted a reason for the emergence of a deadlock. Gregg Carlstrom, in his article published by *al-Jazeera*, underlined the deliberate prioritization of the Muslim Brothers compared to other groups: “Morsi’s real failing, opponents say, is more style rather than substance: He has focused on shoring up his support base instead of trying to unite a divided country and build consensus for reform”.⁴⁵ Particularly the groups which gave conditional support and those which had always been doubtful for the Muslim Brotherhood participated in the opposition camp. The November 22 Declaration and the constitution-making process became the main turning points determining the attitudes of the actors.

The opposition against Morsi grew through time with the involvement of new groups. Morsi was accused of having a tendency to be an authoritarian ruler so that the opposition groups began to compare Morsi with the Mubarak period with the increasing degree. This perception spread among people after the first months of his Presidency and an antagonistic relationship replaced the limited amount of trust. The opposition figures claimed that Morsi was using similar methods with the Mubarak period or copying the authoritarian strategies of the former periods. The constitution-making process increased the level of polarization and the groups decided take their side in this polarized atmosphere. In the *al-Jazeera* news published on December 25, 2012 during the constitution-making process mentioned some of these opposition groups: “Morsi’s Leftist, liberal, secularist and Christian opponents had taken to the streets to block what they argued was a move to pass a charter that would mix

⁴⁴ Alaa Bayoumi, 13 December 2012, *Al-Jazeera*.

⁴⁵ Gregg Carlstrom, 3 July 2013, *Al-Jazeera*.

politics and religion”.⁴⁶ In another news item, it was underlined that those who oppose the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood were not coming from another planet and they were Muslims too.⁴⁷ By saying that, they attracted people’s attention to Morsi’s policies instead of identity problems or historical prejudices against the Islamic groups.

Furthermore, Morsi had problematic relations with different groups because of some developments in the post-Mubarak period. Judiciary and courts represented one group of those actors depending on the controversial decisions of the courts especially on political issues. The Muslim Brotherhood members were not pleased from these court decisions such as the disqualification of some Presidential candidates and the dissolution of the Parliament. There were lots of news items in the media sources showing the protests of MB supporters against the court decisions or the criticisms of judges for the policies of Morsi. It can be considered as a “battle of wills between judges and Morsi”. The Supreme Court and other local and national courts were the actors of the judiciary side. Apart from that, Copts also had different concerns about their rights. The Islamist background of the Muslim Brotherhood and its ultra-conservative ally, the Salafist Nour Party, created worries in the Coptic minority. For example, the decision for allowing the use of religious slogans in the Morsi period led to reaction by the Pope of the Coptic Orthodox Church.⁴⁸

Tamarod Movement and Campaign

As a result of the new participants to the opposition camp, the number and diversity of groups increased. “Tamarod” movement emerged in that context to call for signing up petitions against Morsi. The organizers aimed to show the high number of opposition and to present their demands from Morsi. Tamarod meant “rebel” in the Arabic language and it implied a need for a collective movement to revolt against Morsi’s Presidency. By collecting

⁴⁶ Al-Jazeera, 25 December 2012.

⁴⁷ Al-Jazeera, 12 February 2013.

⁴⁸ Egypt Independent, 8 April 2013.

signatures, they wanted to make Morsi's Presidency illegitimate in the people's eyes. It was important especially for legitimizing the opposition movement and getting the support of the international actors. They managed to get the expected results in terms of legitimization and the emergence of international support. The policies and declarations of the outside actors after the ouster of Morsi proved this tendency. The overthrow of Morsi changed the political atmosphere and the struggle for "legitimacy" of Morsi's Presidency and protests against the military rule replaced the movement against Morsi. The supporters of Morsi claimed that he was the only person who represented legitimacy in Egypt. For the actors who took part in the opposition demonstrations, the military intervention was "not a coup, but as a result of complement for revolution".⁴⁹ Consequently, the opposition movement prepared the ground for the involvement of the military as the hard-power in the country and opened the way for the military intervention. It became the final chain and decisive moment of the process. While one side celebrated the involvement of soldiers, the other side had to react against the military rule. It was interpreted as the failure of civilian rule; in fact, it was the end of the short civilian period and long-terms results would be expected to emerge through time. The role of the military in the Egyptian politics and the post-Mubarak period will be focused on in the next chapter.

⁴⁹ Daily News Egypt, 13 July 2013.

CHAPTER IV: THE ROLE OF MILITARY IN EGYPTIAN POLITICS AND THE NATURE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The Egyptian military had a traditional role in the political affairs so that its strategy and preferences were crucial for the recent developments. There had been an alliance between the regime and the military since the Free Officers' Coup until the Arab Spring. Mubarak expected the continuation of this alliance and the support of the military for his regime. The military leaders paid attention to remain neutral in the first days of the Tahrir protests and they just ordered the soldiers to take part for security concerns. The institutional autonomy of the military was advantageous for the leaders because it enabled them to think over all options. In other words, they were not dependent on the survival of the regime and they did not have to support Mubarak against the opposition of large segments of the society. At the end of the process, they decided to support the demonstrators against Mubarak and they declared to approve the demands of the people about the ouster of Mubarak. The decision was a result of strategic and pragmatic calculations under the impact of circumstances in Egypt. The military became the last component of the Tahrir coalition but its participation was really decisive to get the expected outcome. Mubarak understood that he had to leave the office because even his former allies could not back the regime. The crowds in Tahrir Square welcomed the involvement of the army officers on their side and now, they were sure that they were much stronger than before. They were aware of the importance of the role of the military in the Egyptian politics. This role was proved in the following period when the SCAF took the control during the power vacuum which appeared with the fall of Mubarak. It was a surprising event for the people because they did not expect such a result. On the contrary, their main purpose was to elect the new President reflecting the will of people. However, they had to obey this *de facto* rule of the military for a transition period. Some people blamed the military officers to hijack the "revolution" but their expectation about transferring the power to civilians decreased the level of criticisms. In the SCAF period, the policies of the Council

created resentment in the society depending on the controversial decisions and the emerging perception that the SCAF was planning to design the political arena instead of making some transition measures. In the end, the SCAF left the office to the new elected President but the military turned back with its enormous power through the military intervention after one year. In this chapter, we will focus on the role of the military in the Egyptian politics and the nature of civil-military relations. We will briefly refer to the existing literature, which is derived from the Latin American examples, on that issue. Since the Egyptian case resembles the Latin American countries in that sense, the literature will be helpful to understand the traditional role of the Egyptian military. After that, it will be easier to analyze the Egyptian context and the role of the military in the recent developments.

Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations and the role of military in politics have always been a popular area of research for the scholars. The high number of military regimes in different parts of the world and the frequency of the military interventions has revived the issue repeatedly. Particularly, some countries or regions were identified with the central role of the military in politics and the coup attempts of the military officers in different periods regardless of the success of their attempts. Latin American or Middle Eastern countries come into prominence in that regard because of the prevalence of the military interventions in these regions. Although “coup d’état” is the most extreme form of the military intervention, there are other different forms and degrees of intervention. Therefore, regulating civil-military relations is not only of concern for the countries where military has a traditional or higher role in politics but also all countries including the most democratic ones need to keep a check on the relations between the civilians and the military officers. The division between the democratic countries and military-dominated regimes stems from the success of the rules and practices in terms of division of labor, institutional autonomy of each sphere and the stability of civil-military

relations. It can be said that it is one of the most important factors for the shape and character of a political system and it becomes influential for the stability or the transfer of power in successive periods. “Civilian supremacy” or subordination of the armed forces to civilians is generally accepted as the ideal form of civil-military relations for democracies but it is not so easy to achieve. The most democratic countries are successful in the sense that their military institutions internalize this principle through formal education of soldiers and practicing the necessities of this principle in mutual relations. Since the issue is crucial for all countries and it has a huge impact on the political system, scholars paid attention to the details of the role of military in politics and they put forward different ideas and theories which established a literature on civil-military relations. The matter generally comes into forefront with the emergence of the coup attempts or problematic situations in that regard. However, it is a part of system so that there is a need for a permanent solution for the stability of a regime.

Moreover, it should be underlined that in the literature, most of the studies focus on the side of military instead of looking at the two sides- civilians and military- at the same time. The studies showing both sides of the issue are more noteworthy and valuable because the political system is determined or shaped around the principles and practices of both sides rather than one actor. In other words, civilian actors and institutions are as important as the role of military. There are specific conditions that determine or influence why the military prefers to intervene or not to intervene. In order to analyze the attitude of a particular military, we need to concentrate on these conditions. It is also necessary to uncover the history of the country to see whether there is a traditional role of the military in the political system or not. The last military intervention in Egypt recalled the issue for the Middle East scholars. For our basic concern, we will try to explain the role of military in the Egyptian politics not only for today but also for the recent political history of Egypt. In this chapter, we will make use of the insights derived from the literature which includes studies about both the civilian and military

aspects of the issue and present the theoretical framework in that regard. It will prepare the ground for us to examine the role of Egyptian military in the current period. After that, we will interpret the developments in Egypt from that perspective.

The Role of Military in Politics

The first thing that is needed to determine about civil-military relations is whether there is a role of military in the political system. Welch accepts that “civilian control is a matter of degree” (Welch 1976, 2). It implies the normality of the participation of the military in the political affairs. Moreover, Welch and Smith explain the issue more clearly: “The military’s political role is a question not of *whether* but of *how much* and *of what kind*” (Welch and Smith 1974, 6). As I have mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the matter is not only of concern for the countries which encounter the threat of military intervention but it is important for all countries due to its central place for the shape and character of the political system. If the military is a natural player in politics, it is necessary to regulate its sphere of influence and its relations with other political actors so that penetration to other spheres would be unlikely and exceptional.

Desch describes the ideal world in terms of civil-military relations and point out the gap between ideal and real world:

In an ideal world, of course, there would never be any threat of a coup, the military would always stay clearly within the ‘military’ realm and make only constructive contributions to national policy debates, there would be few civilian-military conflicts, top military and civilian leaders would respect and even like one another, and effective national policies would result. But in the real world, the bottom line for developed democracies is civilian control: can civilian leaders reliably get the military to do what they want it to? (Desch 2001, 4).

The division of spheres here underlines the differences in the professionalization of them but it also shows the coexistence of the actors in the political arena and necessity of reciprocal relations. In another description of an ideal relationship between civilian and military actors: “Liberal civil-military regime is a regime where civil-military power is shared between two separate actors, each with its own competencies and necessarily subject to, because of its democratic procedures, a more or less extensive area of close consultation, the content of security policies being defined by civilian authorities and implemented by military power or professional armed forces” (Legault and Sokolsky 2002, 25). The latter description belongs to a particular type of regime but these ideas strengthen the notion that “the military is an integral part of the political system” (Stepan 1974, 7). Finer brings the issue to a step forward and mentions the political advantages of the armed forces: “The armed forces have three massive political advantages over civilian organizations: a marked superiority in organization, a highly emotionalized symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms” (Finer 1988, 5). Of course, he does not think that the military has an absolute advantage over civilians and he mentions “the armed forces’ technical inability to administer and their lack of legitimacy” as their political weaknesses. Consequently, “civilian supremacy” is thought as the democratic principle by the scholars but they attribute a certain place if not a role to the military in the political system.

The military has a certain place in the political system but it cannot be said that all the militaries have the same roles in their countries; on the contrary, the form and degree of their influence can be completely different from one another. Welch explains the civil-military relations as a continuum in that sense: “A continuum of interactions exists between civilians and members of the armed forces, with the result that civilian control of the military is never absolute, nor military control of politics ever total” (Welch 1976, 35). According to him, the forms of military’s presence in politics may change from “military influence” to “military

control”, which is the most extreme form. The ideal democratic form, in which civilian supremacy is subordinated by the military, is generally defined as having “clear integral boundaries” and “objective civilian control” as opposed to “fragmented boundaries” and “subjective civilian control”. In the ideal form, civilian supremacy is not only subordinated but also it is internalized by the military so that the military does not wait for an opportunity to intervene and the formal education of soldiers is organized around this understanding.

The existence of clear boundaries is, first and foremost, dependent on the professionalization of army. Since a professional army has a particular form of mission and expertise, its level of existence is considered as the determinant for the boundaries with other spheres of expertise. However, there is a disagreement among scholars about the result of the level of professionalization of an army. Most scholars share Huntington’s view that “the more professionalized an army, the more integral boundaries with civilian institutions” so it decreases the likelihood of military intervention in that sense. On the other hand, Nordlinger shows the other side of the coin and puts forward the strong arguments about the positive relationship between level of expertise and likelihood of intervention (Nordlinger 1977, 50). There are examples of both views and it can be claimed that the effect of professionalization is shaped according to the context because the circumstances can make intervention easier or harder for the military. David Pion-Berlin emphasizes an important point: “Coups avoidance is not the same as civilian control” (Pion-Berlin 1997, 218). For him, military adherence to institutional norms is necessary and compliance must be internalized to achieve the civilian control. In the opposite case of the ideal form, there are countries in which boundaries are fragmented and the idea of subjective civilian control is widespread. This situation is generally observed in the Third World countries. Military control or military intervention is seen as a characteristic for these countries (Welch 1976, 5; Nordlinger 1977, 6). It is generally explained with the low political culture, in Finer’s term, or low levels of legitimacy, in

conceptualization of Welch and Smith. In sum, there are different degrees and forms of military's role in politics and it is related to both the level of professionalization of the army and the political culture of the country.

The issue of “the role of military in politics” generally reminds us of military intervention, which is the most extreme and prominent form. Scholars focus on the conditions which promote or inhibit the likelihood of military intervention. Welch and Smith summarize the factors as follows:

The political roles of the armed forces vary in accordance with factors peculiar to each state. These factors, which we call environmental, include the nature and extent of political participation within the society, the relative isolation of the armed forces from social and political currents, the extent to which the military serves as a direct support for the government, and the legitimacy enjoyed by the government. Variations in the organization of the armed forces, which we call internal factors, interact with environmental variables. Among the internal variables are mission, political awareness, level of cohesion, technological proficiency, the nature and extent of military professionalism, and the values espoused by the military, particularly values reinforcing or undercutting political subordination (Welch and Smith 1974, 3-4).

Based on these factors, it can be said that the military intervention emerges as a result of complex relations and a combination of environmental and internal elements.

Michael Desch explains the strength of civilian control with structural factors. According to him, the strength of the civilian control is shaped by “threats”. He claims that “it is easiest for civilians to control the military when they face primarily international (external) threats and it is hardest for them to control the military when they face primarily domestic

(internal) threats” (Desch 2001, 6). These explanations provide us a broader perspective because they show different aspects of the issue.

Analyses of the attitudes of the military and its institutional features are not sufficient to explain the emergence and frequency of military interventions. Pion-Berlin points out the complexity of the matter: “Armies cannot overturn elected leaders at will: they must be sufficiently motivated to act; the balance of political, social, and economic forces must be decisively arrayed on their side; and they must seize the opportunity if and when it presents itself” (Pion-Berlin 1997, 2). We should always keep in mind the need for the existence of several factors leading to the final decision of the military. These factors are not only important for the coup attempt but also they are significant for the result or the accomplishment of it. If all conditions, internal or environmental, are not proper for a military intervention, they most probably end in disappointment for the military leaders because of the failure of the coup attempt. Samuel Finer is the one who explained the issue in the clearest way in his famous book, *The Man on Horseback*. In his formulation of military intervention, it comes out of two main elements: “Disposition to intervene” and “opportunity to intervene”. In terms of disposition, the military first requires motive. The motive is a necessary but insufficient factor. For him, motives require mood for putting into practice. The notion of “mood” includes self-awareness together with a sense of overwhelming power and grievance. Motive and mood are the essential parts of disposition to intervene for the military. Besides having a disposition, the military has to watch for an opportunity; otherwise, it may make a timing error and its attempt will likely to result in failure (Finer 1988, 20-76). It is possible to understand the context in which military intervention occurs.

The civilian side of the relations is as important as the military side. Scholars generally stand out the weakness of civilian institutions and the low performance of the civilian leaders leading to loss of confidence on them. Nordlinger points out the impacts of “performance

failures” and “loss of legitimacy” as the main reasons for the military intervention (Nordlinger 1977, 64). Welch reinforces this argument with a statement looking from another point of view: “The strength and legitimacy of civilian political institutions make possible the maintenance of civilian control” (Welch 1976, 27). They mainly explain the prominence of armies with weakness of civilian institutions. It can be claimed that if the boundaries between the two spheres are not clear and integral, the penetration of the military towards the civilian realm is much more possible through force so the shape of reciprocal relations and the condition of the civilian institutions are of high importance in that sense.

Apart from the civilian institutions and leaders, other civilian actors can play direct or indirect roles in the military intervention. The existence of “civilian allies” makes it easier for the military to achieve its goals. The popular support of these allies and their influence can increase the possibility of success in the coup attempt. Hunter underlines the importance of civilian allies: “History has demonstrated the value of civilian allies as a key determinant of the success of military interventions” (Hunter 1997, 21). Moreover, there are more assertive expressions in that regard: “The armed forces cannot overthrow constitutional regimes unless they receive significant support from, or at the very least the acquiescence of, civil society” (Pion-Berlin 1997, 16). As it can be understood, scholars attribute an important role for the civilian allies to reach the goal of military intervention. Civilian allies are in essence related to the operation of the military intervention but they can also take part in the preparations of the coup attempts.

Having seen the complexity of the factors leading to military intervention, it is possible to argue more reasons for the coups. The military’s corporate interests are mentioned in the literature especially for the countries in which the military has certain privileges. Institutional autonomy of the military and military budget can be regarded as the main components of the status and privileges of the soldiers. The military generally protects these

privileges against the civilians and the soldiers become jealous of their rights and privileges in that sense. They directly challenge the civilian attempts to interfere with the corporate interests of the military and they do not want to allow the civilians to supervise or to make some changes in the status quo if these regulations are for the detriment of the military. The military in most cases identifies itself with nation or national interests so that the military leaders consider themselves in the position of representing the “will of the people”. This self-attribution creates a sense of responsibility and may be a reason for military intervention under certain circumstances. Finer and Nordlinger both put emphasis on the impact of military’s corporate interests as a motivation for military intervention (Finer 1988, 240; Nordlinger 1977, 65-78).

In addition to corporate interests of military, the military regimes themselves can be a source of next military interventions. When we take into account the number and frequency of coup attempts in some countries, it is easy to talk about the existence of “tradition of coups”. Finer mentions this concept and explains the phenomenon with the immaturity of political culture in those countries. Scholars pay attention to the recurring pattern between civilian and military regimes: “Where the soldiers have once assumed the highest offices, the most common subsequent pattern is an alternation between civilian and military regimes” so “the aftermath of military intervention is military intervention” (Nordlinger, 207). It can be said that the emergence of a military intervention legitimizes the next one so that there is a need for important regulations and changes in the political system in order to avoid this vicious circle. Lastly, there are some class-based analyses showing the weight of soldiers coming from middle-class backgrounds within the military. In a broader way, it can be formulated that if one class, sect or ethnic origin is dominant among soldiers, the military may prioritize the interests of it but this can be seen as a special and peculiar case rather than a common feature for all military institutions.

The Historical Record of the Role of Military in the Egyptian Political System

The first example of the military intervention in Egypt in the recent historical period can be seen as the Free Officers' Coup. Monarchy period of Egypt started with the official independence in 1922 ended with a military coup in 1952. The famous coup in Egypt is called Free Officers' Coup because of the fact that it was not done in the framework of the hierarchical order of the military. In other words, the leaders of the coup were not the highest ranked generals within the army but it was done by the officers having lower ranks in the military. It created an ambiguity in the political atmosphere and there was not a full-fledged roadmap planning the organization and practices that would be done after the intervention. Since the officers coming from the military took the control of politics, it was also important how civil-military relations would be shaped. It can be said that the new road of the Egyptian politics would be determined in this period. Gamal Abdel Nasser was the leader of Free Officers but his leadership was not unquestionable at the beginning. There were some other powerful candidates who were considered for this position. On the other hand, he was not the highest ranked officer in the military so that the actions of generals and other high-ranked officers were significant in that process. Clearly, there was an unexpected and ambiguous position in the political arena.

The coup created a shock for Egyptian people and for the region as a whole but it seemed that it was not a sudden decision and there were signs of such an action within the military ranks. The reasons for a coup can be understood by looking at the Arab-Israeli fights before and after the establishment of Israeli state. Egypt was at the forefront of the Arab side and the Free Officers took part in these fights. They were not pleased with the tactics and management style of the generals in these fights so they accused of the top officers due to the humiliating defeat and the establishment of an Israeli state in these lands. Taking this point into consideration, it was not surprising to see them an initiative against the will of the

generals during the coup. In addition to this, they were not pleased because of the monarchical regime and the involvement of the British officers into the local affairs. Usage of Egyptian bases by the British forces and the existence of these forces in the Egyptian lands were other sources of problem for both Egyptian people and military officers. It can be asserted that the Free Officers' coup was the military version of reaction against the governing style of that period compared to the local revolts organized by the ordinary people. It reflected the general resentment in the society. Nasser, as the leader of the coup, took the responsibility and tried to carry out his agenda step by step.

Mubarak, who worked as a pilot in the military, was aware of the importance and level of influence of the military in Egypt. Egyptian military was one of the most institutionalized and powerful example among its counterparts in the Middle East. It was not only powerful as an instrument and component of the "hard power", but also it engaged in economic activities in a large amount. It is generally argued that about thirty percent of the Egyptian economy is directed by the military so that its role cannot be neglected. In sum, Egyptian military was a traditionally powerful institution which had institutional autonomy in its works. Its interference with political and economic affairs proves that its sphere of influence goes beyond the original borders of a military. Barany claims that "in Egypt, the military's full withdrawal from politics is hard to imagine!" (Barany 2011, 33) The last military intervention in July 2013 recalled this claim practically. Thus, Mubarak's investment to police forces as a competitor, in a sense, to the military was risky and this attempt created resentment among the military officers. It was even asserted that the military did not prefer to support Mubarak during the uprisings because of this policy. Of course, it does not mean that Mubarak did not have good relations with the military and just worked well with the police forces but there can be disagreements and problems between Mubarak and some military leaders. During his long rule, Mubarak did not avoid applying military power in the regional crises and wars and in the

domestic conflicts as well. There were mutual interests for the two sides, the military and the Mubarak regime, so they acted in harmony despite some minor issues.

The Role of the Egyptian Military during the Arab Uprisings

It is necessary to explain the role of the military as an institution because the position of military commanders was decisive for the direction of uprisings in each country. Zoltan Barany underlines that “support from a preponderance of the armed forces is surely a *necessary* condition for revolutionary success” (Barany 2011, 25). He categorizes the responses of militaries in three groups: While in Tunisia and Egypt, the soldiers backed the revolution; in Libya and Yemen, they split; and in Syria and Bahrain, “they turned their guns against the demonstrators”. For him, the responses of the military in each country decided to the result of the uprisings: “When the army decides not to back the regime, the regime is most likely doomed. Where the soldiers opt to stick with the status quo, the regime survives. Where the armed forces are divided, the result is determined by other factors such as foreign intervention and the strength of the opposition forces” (Barany, 33). This analysis shows the fact that the position of armies in such conditions becomes important and sometimes the decisive factor for the success of the revolts. However, we also need more information about the historical role of the military in political affairs in each country, and about under what circumstances and what impacts the armies took their position. Otherwise, it becomes impossible how decisive their position was and to what extent they could have an influence on the result as an independent factor.

The situation is almost exclusively peculiar in Egypt among the Middle Eastern countries because military does not have such a central place in all countries and in their political cultures. During the uprisings the attitude of the military was quite important and unexpected for the regime depending on its independent identity: “More surprising for

Mubarak was the fact that his own military had developed a corporate identity independent from his rule” (Pollack 2011, 4). Mouin Rabbani points out the decisive role of the general absence of armed forces in the success of the uprisings but he also mentions the declining role of military in governance and decision-making in relation to that of the domestic security apparatus by supporting the idea that “the most important battle is likely to involve civil-military relations” (Rabbani 2011, 286). Whereas her basic concern was the Mubarak period, Lisa Anderson underlined the re-articulation of the army’s position in the post-Mubarak period: “As it assumed control of Egypt after Mubarak’s downfall, the army revealed its enormous influence in Egyptian society” (Anderson 2011, 4). We should keep in mind that the position of army in other countries such as Tunisia and Libya was also important but it was not as decisive and central as Egypt.

Al-Shimy mentioned the “composition and security role of the military”, narrow base of popular support, as one of the two factors for the success of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Egyptian and Tunisian armies were more professional and institutionalized than others in that sense. Moreover, el-Shimy talks about the existence of a military-police rivalry in Egypt: “The military-police rivalry, and the regime’s unequivocal preference for the latter, rendered the military leadership’s support for Mubarak precarious” (el-Shimy, 48). Such a rivalry between military and security forces is a characteristic feature in the countries where authoritarian regimes create their own security establishments and give some privileges to them. Since Egypt has always a strong military, this inevitably leads to discontent and problems between two groups. Mumtaz underlines the importance of security-based system of Mubarak regime and he had warned about the fact that “the dismantling of the security state that Mubarak had built was the biggest challenge for the post-Mubarak period” (Mumtaz 2011, 19). In that regard, the future of civil-military relations has been discussed by the scholars beforehand so that the emergence of such a problem was obvious even after the first

Tahrir protests and the overthrow of Mubarak because the remnant components of the former regime were still working and engaging in critical positions for the state. It does not mean that a military intervention was highly predictable but there were signs of a possible problem. Despite the existence of such views, the “myth” of military and its role in different branches were not shared by all. Hazem Kandil rejects the myth of military privileges and the idea of economic empire which is attributed to military. He explains the declining role of the military compared to security apparatus so that there emerged discontent in the military ranks (Korany and el-Mahdi, 181-196). If these claims are true, the attitude of the military during the uprisings does not seem so surprising.

In fact, the military showed its importance on Egyptian politics during the Arab Spring and they could come into prominence with the support of different groups in the society. The SCAF, the highest military institution, could rule the country until the elections. The policies they followed during this short period gave the impression that they did not willingly want to leave the political arena to elected people and they were hoping to continue their impact on politics. Despite Morsi’s counter-attempts in his office periods, the coming process has ended with 3 July military intervention. The coalition- including General el-Sisi, el-Baradei, Sheikh al-Azhar, Head of Coptic Church, representative of Salafis and the leader of youth movement- presented the picture of Egyptian politics in that day. It was dramatic in terms of democracy but it should be evaluated with the reality and context of Egypt.

The reason why the military sided with the protestors is another debated topic among scholars. Actually, the soldiers seemed neutral in the first days of the protests. They were just trying to protect order and stability in the critical regions. It can be even said that they were acting parallel to Mubarak’s policies and Mubarak was confident that the army was on his side. Protestors, on the other hand, were not targeting the soldiers in their acts. On the contrary, they were trying to gain the support of soldiers and to take them into their sides with

the slogan of “Army and People are One Hand”. When the process evolved into an unexpected and desperate point for the Mubarak regime, the generals made their ultimate decision and took their side with the protestors. People welcomed the support of soldiers but this pragmatic move was interpreted in different ways. Some people even argued that it was a move to hijack the revolution! In accordance with this view, Ali Sarihan claims that “military leaders sought power than change” (Sarihan 2012, 81). It means that military leaders aimed to consolidate their power base and increase their legitimacy by taking this position in the confrontation between people and the regime.

There are some other views interpreting the choice of the military in a multi-causal way. Barany replies the question of why the Egyptian army declined to save Mubarak’s regime in four points: “1-Military elites despised Gamal Mubarak and ‘state entrepreneurs’. 2-The top brass were growing anxious about youth alienation and spreading Islamist radicalism, as well as economic malaise and stagnation. 3-Regime’s leaning on a large police and security apparatus. 4-Egypt’s conscript army has so many ties to society at large” (Barany 2011, 28). He was not the only example who went beyond mono-causality. Atef Said sees army’s position as a result of “a set of complex and contradictory economic, social demographic, historical/cultural, and international geopolitical factors”. These factors are namely “the army’s economic empire, social base, constructed image, and special ties with the US” (Said 2012, 399). This idea seems much more relevant for the Egyptian context because the military has had a complex network with different groups of people, institutions and actors so the military leaders had to take into account all these aspects and they tried to keep balance and protect the interests of the army as an institution. They followed the developments during the process and realized that Mubarak would not remain in power in the coming days. It was more realistic and pragmatic than a volunteer decision. However, it does not mean that the military leaders wanted to hijack the revolution and rule the country after Mubarak on their

own. It was just a strategic decision to get advantage in the political arena after the overthrow of Mubarak. It was not the first time they involved in political affairs so their political calculations are not so surprising. As Hashim emphasizes, “Military power has played a major role in the country’s domestic and foreign matters since ancient times” (Hashim 2011, 64). He gives another example of politicization of officer corps which resulted in the “catastrophic defeat of 1967. According to him, “the military became a ‘state within state’” in this period. Consequently, the position of army during the uprising was in accordance with the historical role of the military and its relationship with other actors influential on the economy and politics of Egypt, and the decision to take side with the protestors was a rational choice for the leaders.

After the resignation or fall of Mubarak as a result of the uprisings, the SCAF (the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) took the power to rule Egypt until the Presidential elections in June 2012. The initiative of the higher military institution was not a simple coincidence; on the contrary, it became a sign of the traditional role of the military in the Egyptian political system. Although the protestors were not content with this attempt, all people obeyed the decision of army rule in the transition period. “At first the shift of authority from Mubarak to the SCAF was accepted by most people as the resolution of a crisis of legitimacy caused by the uprising.” (Asad 2012, 275) In other words, it was accepted as a transitional authority by the people. However, it was not guaranteed by anyone because of the complicated situation emerged in the post-Mubarak period. Furthermore, the military had institutional autonomy in Egypt and it had a powerful stance not only as the main institution of the “hard power” but also through its involvement in the political and economic activities.

The military leaders taking part in the SCAF proved the fact that they were aware of the “rules of the game” in this period so that they could act strategically and take critical decisions tactfully like a political actor. During the period of uprisings, the military remained

cautious instead of directly suppressing the protestors. Though they were formally under the rule of Mubarak and had to act in accordance with the orders coming from the regime, they avoided taking a position against the people. It would mean losing the credibility of the military in the eyes of the people and it would put the military into trouble in the case of Mubarak's overthrow. Therefore, the military just tried to keep stability and security in the critical areas and gave a sense of protecting people from possible dangers and chaotic situations. People in the streets observed the attitudes of the soldiers and appreciated their actions. Put differently, the soldiers could gain the support of the people during the uprisings and the slogans of "Army and the People are One Hand" manifested this support and trust towards the military. As a result of strategic calculations and predictions of the military leaders, they decided to take the side of the people in the last days of the uprisings instead of protecting the Mubarak regime with all means until the last minute. It was a decisive moment both for the military and Mubarak. While Mubarak became the loser of the process and had to leave the office after long years, the military could participate in the side of winners with its last minute decision and strategic maneuver. Some people and scholars interpreted this shift as a pragmatic behavior rather than a genuine attempt of the military. It was even claimed that the military aimed at hijacking the revolution and benefiting from the fruits of people's struggles against the regime. It was not possible to understand the real purposes of the military commanders in that period but it was obvious that their policies and plans were implemented successfully and they achieved their goals in this process. Despite the existence of rumors and complaints about the SCAF's rule, the military could consolidate its position in this period so that their attempt to take the control of the country had to be accepted by the people under these circumstances.

Apart from its role in this process, the military has always been a trusted and powerful institution in Egypt and it has always had a certain place in the political affairs. It can be said

that the full withdrawal of the military from the politics in Egypt was almost unimaginable! Thus, the actions and role of the military in this process should be taken into account together with its historical or traditional role; otherwise, evaluating the policy just around the short period would be misleading. This analysis for the necessity of long-term view can be applied to the military policy after taking the rule of Egypt. While it was thought in the beginning that the military would rule the country as a transitional figure and it would not take radical decisions in this short period, it became apparent through time that the transition period would last longer than expected and the SCAF would not avoid taking significant decisions if they saw them necessary. To put it another way, the SCAF seemed determinant to rule the country with all responsibilities and warrants rather than using limited and transitional policies. The perception of threat in terms of military rule came into prominence in that context compared to diversity and disagreements among different groups of people in the society: “The real danger to the fundamental aims of the revolution does not come from religious differences: it comes from the generals and their allies” (Asad 2012, 291). In a sense, the policies of the SCAF indicated that the future of the Egyptian politics would not be completely independent from its history and transformation of the system was more difficult than it seemed and expected in the beginning.

Analysis of the Traditional Role of the Egyptian Military and Practical Cases

As it was mentioned before, regulating civil-military relations is important for all countries in the world. It is much more important for the countries in which there is a “tradition of coups” because this tradition creates a recurrent pattern for the successive patterns and it legitimizes or at least opens the way for the next coup attempts. When we look at the recent history of Egypt, it is possible to observe the clear traces of such a tradition in Egypt. It can be asserted that there is a traditional role for the military in the political affairs so that its involvement in each political crisis is seen normal by the other actors. Additionally,

the relative advantages of the military as an institution make it more influential in a level that its preference and strategy becomes decisive for the resolution of that crisis or the evolution of the process. As a result, the military's role in a particular event is evaluated with the criteria of "how much and what kind" rather than "whether or not". In Egypt, the situation is far from the described version of ideal form of civil-military relations; on the contrary, it becomes closer to the extreme form of military control in certain periods. The ideal form is generally defined as "the internalization of the civilian supremacy" but the civilian rule in Egypt could only last for one year when it was removed with a military intervention. Before that, Egypt was ruled by the leaders coming from military backgrounds in the successive periods about sixty years. Thus, "internalization" is out of the question in that context and there is no respect for the civilian leaders by the military officers. Since the boundaries between the military realm and political realm are not clear, the conditions are proper for the abuses of the military leaders and they often penetrate into the political realm without encountering a deterrent factor. As a result, Egypt has experienced different forms of military control instead of "civilian supremacy" in the country. The "July 2013" military intervention became the last ring of the chain for Egyptian politics.

Having seen the traditional or what is deemed to be the legitimate role of the military in the political sphere in Egypt, we now explain the conditions that prepare the ground for the military intervention. We should keep in mind that the traditional role of a military in politics does not guarantee the success of an intervention because the conditions should be ready for such an attempt. The absence of division of spheres in Egypt has always been an advantage of the military in that sense. The Egyptian Army also utilizes the political advantages of the armed forces over civilian organizations that Finer talked about: "a marked superiority in organization, a highly emotionalized symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms". The Egyptian army comes into prominence with its level of institutionalization and professionalization

when it is compared to other Egyptian institutions. The superiority in organization and highly emotionalized symbolic status of the Egyptian army provide a special place for the armed forces in the people's minds so that people attribute great importance for the acts and discourses of the military leaders. It is not a coincidence that military is generally accepted as one of the most trusted institutions in the countries which have "tradition of coups". This perception emerges through historical experiences and it is transferred to the next generations. The origin of the superiority comes from the successes during the wars in most cases. In the Egyptian example, the wars and battles against Israel in the region increased the significance and popularity of the military despite the previous failures. As a consequence, the Egyptian military as an institution turned these points into its advantage and used them as assets for their involvement in the political affairs.

Apart from that, Egyptian case affirms the Nordlinger's argument about the impact of the professionalization on the likelihood to military intervention contrary to Huntington's view. According to Nordlinger, there is a positive relationship between the level of expertise and likelihood of intervention. Of course, the level of professionalism in the Egyptian army can be questioned and its failures against the Israeli army in the former battles can be shown as the signs of weaknesses but it is generally considered as one of the most institutionalized or professional armies in the region. In addition, changing levels of professionalization in different periods did not lead to substantial changes in the opposite direction. Thus, institutional features of the Egyptian military served the likelihood to interfere with the political affairs and increase in the level of decisiveness against the civilian actors and institutions.

The domestic and international political conjuncture should be understood well in order to evaluate the conditions for the military intervention. Michael Desch attributes importance to the "changes in structural threat" for shaping civil-military relations. For him,

the combination of low external threat and high internal threat signifies the weakest civilian control. It seems that the Egyptian case best fits this combination like other Arab Spring countries. With the emergence of uprisings in the region, the demonstrators aimed to overthrow the authoritarian regimes in their own countries. Although the revolutionary sentiment spread throughout the region, the uprisings created domestic problems so that they can be considered as internal threats. They resulted in a chaotic political atmosphere and political crisis in the countries in which the authoritarian leaders were overthrown. In Egypt, the SCAF took the control of the country and established stability in general. Despite the existence of some protests in different periods and some security problems, the situation was more or less under control. At least, it was better compared to the Tahrir demonstrations. However, growing opposition against Morsi's Presidency in the next months created another internal threat and large numbers of people participated in the protests in different cities. The army was also ordered to take part in the domestic security purposes as it was done in the previous domestic problems in Egypt. Welch and Smith claim that "The likelihood of military intervention rises should the armed forces become heavily involved in primarily domestic, police-type or counterinsurgency activities" and it rises "should the armed forces be ordered, contrary to advice of the officer corps, to use coercion against domestic opponents of the government" (Welch and Smith 1974, 10). During the first uprisings, Mubarak applied to armed forces to soothe the movements against the domestic problem. The military took the necessary measures to establish the security in the streets but the soldiers avoided using force or weapons against the people. Even this neutral attempt of the military prevented the military from remaining outside of the issue and it made the military take part in the process but the positive attitude of the soldiers towards the people increased the credibility and popularity of the military in the people's eyes and it became beneficial for the next phases of the protest. It was not a direct military intervention but the decision of the military leaders to take side with

the protestors became a decisive move for the fall of Mubarak. In that process, the leaders acted very strategically because they waited until the last minute and preferred the best way for the corporate interests of the military.

In the last case, the ouster of Morsi, the military leader, al-Sisi, again waited for a particular period and became sure that the popular support was on their side and the conditions were ready for a military intervention. The grand coalition against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood had already been established as an opposition camp before the move of the military. This opposition camp welcomed the “48 hour ultimatum” of the military and they began to celebrate the involvement of the soldiers to the political crisis. This support of the people was important for the legitimization of the intervention especially for the international community. Almost all international actors avoided to call the intervention as a “coup” by showing this popular support as a proof despite the overthrow of an elected President through the hard power of the military.

A military intervention emerges as a result of environmental and internal factors from the perspective of the military. Therefore, it should be seen as a complex process and the combination of various reasons. Alfred Stepan underlines this fact: “No single factor, institutional or otherwise, taken in isolation can explain or predict political behavior of the military (Stepan 1974, 21). This statement points out the necessity for multi-causal explanations for the military behaviors. In terms of internal variables, the corporate interests of the military and privileges of it as an institutions gain importance. The level of cohesion within the military, technological capability, political awareness of the officers and military virtues can be regarded as the main internal factors. They determine the level of professionalism so that they affect the likelihood to military intervention in that respect. Generally speaking, the military leaders strictly pay attention to protect the corporate interests of the military, and the status and privileges attributed to the military officers. Therefore, the

civilians' attempt to change these privileges or to get back some of their rights causes a harsh reaction by the military. It has been stated as the following: "Changes or intentions to alter the armed forces' areas of decision-making against their advice or desires increase the likelihood of military intervention" (Welch and Smith 1974, 17).

Actually, the military reacts to all decisions that limit their sphere of influence compared to former case. For example, the decisions about changing military budget or supervising the military affairs in different ways are criticized by the military leaders. During the Presidential elections campaign, Morsi declared the need to supervise the military budget and he continued to make some statements towards this objective. Since the Egyptian military remained out of the realm of supervision in the former periods, the military leaders reacted to this idea and showed their dissatisfaction. It should be kept in mind that the economic activities of the Egyptian military have a large amount and there are different forms of these activities. It is generally stated that about one third of the Egyptian economy is controlled by the military⁵⁰ so that supervision on the military budget and its economic activities would create a source of problem in civil-military relations. Even if the supervision had not detected a problematic or illegitimate act in the economic activities, the military would not have been pleased to be controlled or supervised by the civilians. As we have mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, the ideal form of the civil-military relations is the civilian supremacy which means the internalization of the superiority of the civilians by the military. In Egypt, the military has not obviously internalized this principle so that their obedience to be supervised without criticism cannot be expected. Furthermore, the military leaders have been accustomed to act in accordance with the existing regime in equal conditions so it is

⁵⁰ Sherine Tadros, 15 February 2012, *Al-Jazeera*.
Daily News Egypt, 14 April 2014.
Magdi Abdelhadi, 23 June 2012, *BBC News*.
David D. Kirkpatrick, 17 February 2011, *The New York Times*.

really difficult for them to be controlled by the civilian authorities. It requires more time to set up such a system in Egypt and similar countries in terms of civil-military relations.

On the civilian side, the conditions were proper for a military intervention in Egypt because of the weakness of the state institutions and low performance of the civilians. Scholars emphasize the importance of the civilian institutions for the role of the military in the political affairs because the weakness of civilian institutions creates a vacuum of power or authority towards which the military penetrates and plays role in these issues. The state institutions were identified with the Mubarak regime in the previous years and they were not so strong and consolidated. It can be understood by looking at how widespread corruption cases among the state officers and institutions in Egypt were in that period. Although Egyptian institutions were one of the best examples of their counterparts in the Middle East, the system and relations were not working well. The military was the most outstanding and the strongest institution in all periods. The large amount of economic activities and the significant role of the military in the political realm were also crucial parts of the enormous institution of the Egyptian military.

In addition to widespread corruption and the weakness of state institutions, the chaotic atmosphere after the Arab Spring and the later developments created problems in the state functions on the civilian side. The House of Representatives body of the Parliament was dissolved by a court decision so the only civilian state authorities in the political realm were the Shura Council and the Presidency. Thus, there was a power vacuum which opened a way of struggle for different actors. In the Egyptian context, the military was a possible and strong candidate for such areas. Moreover, “loss of legitimacy” and “performance failures” are mentioned as the two main reasons for the likelihood of military intervention. The dissatisfaction of the people in the society about Morsi’s policies and his low level of performance as the leader of the country created the growing amount of opposition so this

situation prepared the ground for looking for new alternatives including the intervention of the military.

Apart from that, scholars underline the significance of the existence of civilian allies for the role of military in politics. These civilian allies become helpful for the legitimization of the acts of the military and create a certain room for maneuver for the military officers. The Egyptian military was lucky in that respect because there was a growing opposition against the President Morsi and different groups of people organized protests to show their resentment and dissatisfaction. They determined a date for nation-wide demonstrations and hundreds of thousands of people came together to protest Morsi's Presidency and his policies. These opposition groups were expecting to get the support of the military or the involvement of the soldiers on their side. To put it another way, the civilian allies were already in the area so that the military did not have to look for such allies. These groups of people welcomed the "48 hour ultimatum" of the military and they began to make celebrations when they hear the official declarations of the military. As Hunter described among the possibilities, "the military's claim to represent 'the national interest' or 'the will of the people' has credence" (Hunter 1997, 21) was realized in the Egyptian context. This claim is not peculiar to Egyptian army but the large numbers of people supporting the intervention of the military increased the legitimacy of this claim and the act of the military to overthrow the elected President. Normally, the coup attempts or military interventions are considered illegitimate according to democratic standards but even the most democratic countries did not call this military intervention as a "coup". One reason for this attitude was the interests of the each actor but they mostly asserted "the will of people" and the support of large segments of society as the main proofs for their acceptance. As a result, the weakness of state institutions and the existence of civilian allies paved the way for the military intervention against Morsi's Presidency.

The conditions for the likelihood of military intervention is best described by the Finer's concepts of "disposition to intervene" and "opportunity to intervene" and the July 2013 military intervention in Egypt can also be explained by using these concepts. The Egyptian army repeatedly showed its disposition to intervene and the components of the disposition, namely motives and mood, were ready for action. However, it was necessary to find the correct timing to intervene in order to overthrow the existing authority. The military skillfully waited for the opportunity to intervene because the appropriate conditions were important for success of the attempt. The growing resentment among the people and the establishment of a grand coalition against the President created this opportunity for the military. The increasing amount of protests contributed to civilian dependence on military. While the popularity of military was on the rise, the confidence in civilians declined because of the low performance of Morsi during his Presidency. In short, domestic circumstances were favorable for a military intervention. Thus, the military did not want to miss this opportunity and made its attempt to ouster the President. These favorable conditions made it easier to legitimize the action of the military.

In addition to this, the office of Presidency was important for the role of military in politics and the overthrow the civilian leader would restore the previous order for the military. Steven Cook addresses the traditional relationship between the military and the Presidency: "It is the military's crucial and intimate association with the presidency that ensures the continuity of Egypt's political system. If the officer corps needs to, it can influence political events through the president. This mutually reinforcing relationship with the president has allowed the officers to remove themselves from day-to-day governance" (Cook 2007, 73). Egypt had been ruled by the regime-military alliance until the Arab Spring but this alliance was broken with the fall of Mubarak. It was important for the continuation of the authoritarian system and the traditional role of the military in politics. The leadership of a civilian actor did

not create the former confidence for the military leaders so that they were not pleased for the new conjuncture. The dissatisfaction among people opened the way for them to restore the order and to change the balance of power in favor of themselves. The last military intervention became the practice of this idea in the political arena. It can be claimed that al-Sisi's Presidency can be considered as the reinstatement of the old type of alliance between the office of Presidency and the military as an institution. Time will tell how sustainable this new version of the political order will be.

CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS OF THE POST-MUBARAK PERIOD AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Identity Factor and the Shadow of the Historical Prejudices on the Attitudes towards the Military Intervention

The events between the January 25 Revolution and the July 2013 military intervention played important role for the change in the policies of the actors and the formation of alliances, and for the end of the Morsi period in Egypt. The process and the developments emerged in that period came into prominence because of some unexpected changes affecting the dynamics in the Egyptian politics. Were they really the only reason for the growing opposition and were they sufficient to support the military intervention as civilian actors? Certainly they were not; because it would be a very simple explanation for such a complicated issue. The identity of each actor and their historical experiences also had a substantial influence on the decisions and activities of them. There were lots of actors having a long history and former relations with other actors. In other words, the Arab Spring process was not the first moment of having a relationship among the different actors. Therefore, the previous views and ideas towards each other affected their policies from the very beginning of the process. Among them, the most institutionalized and oldest actors were the ones which could not be thought independent from their historical backgrounds. The Muslim Brotherhood and the military come to the forefront in that regard because they had played particular roles in the old events during their historical journey. People could see their reactions against certain cases and they knew the worldview and their general policies so that the strategy and policies of these actors were more predictable compared to other new actors. Since the military protected its institutional autonomy and it had special place in political and economic affairs, its policy during the Arab Spring and aftermath was open to different possibilities and some people considered the moves of the military surprising rather than expected. On the

other hand, the historical experiences of the other actors, other than the MB members, took the form of “prejudice” in most cases depending on the religious agenda of the MB and its political vision. Because the MB emerged as a religious community and supported a particular strand of Islam, it was almost impossible for it to attract the support of secular groups and the members of other religious groups. While the number of supporters of the MB was high, the other people in the society were more or less worried about the leadership or government of the MB. There were also other actors following identity-based politics especially on some particular issues. In this concluding part, we will concentrate on the impact of identity of actors in the whole process and the relevance of the culturalist-essentialist approaches towards the issue.

The identity factor does not always affect the behaviors or policies of the actors in the same degree because of the inclusion of other factors in different situations. Thus, it should be taken into account case by case; otherwise, a culturalist approach to all events might be misleading. During the first uprisings and demonstrations against the Mubarak regime in Egypt, identity and ideological differences were not so decisive depending on the existence of a common enemy. Diverse groups of people could come together to achieve a common goal: overthrow of Mubarak. This common target let them act together and help each other until the fall of Mubarak. However, the agendas or possible roadmaps of the actors were very different for the next period. They did not aim to establish the same kind of system or they would have certainly implemented different policies if they had come to power. In that context, the identities and interests of each actor came into play. The groups participated in the Tahrir protests had changing amount of political power and sphere of influence in the political affairs. The Muslim Brotherhood, with its organizational capacity and high electoral support, was the most advantageous actor in that regard compared to others. The SCAF was aware of this fact and the military leaders tried to design the political order in order to prevent the

Muslim Brothers from being uncontrollable rulers of the country. The regulations in the transition period were towards that goal and the Presidential powers were restricted through new constitutional amendments. The first Parliamentary elections proved the high electoral support of the Muslim Brothers and they could get about 47 percent of votes. The Salafist Nour Party could get the second highest votes in these elections. This result created a different composition in the Parliament and the effectiveness of the actors was also shaped in accordance with the result as well as the activities of the actors. Salafists had preferred to abstain from political affairs because of their doctrines and the Arab Spring process witnessed the politicization of the Salafists in Egypt. Since there were religious and ideological differences between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists, the relationship between them was dependent on factors going beyond the political views. On the other hand, the other actors, including the secular and liberal groups, youth movements, Leftists, women groups, civil society organizations and the Coptic community, were worried about the power of the two largest Islamic groups and their possible religion-based policies. The identities of the actors came into prominence in that sense and the viewpoints of each actor were determined by them to a certain extent.

The Presidential elections in 2012 can be regarded as one of the major events in the post-Mubarak period and the election process was helpful for us to understand the calculations and strategies of the actors. As we have mentioned before, the Muslim Brotherhood was confident on its large constituency but there were also other groups which were against the presidency of a MB member. The Salafists supported an ex-MB member, Abdel Mounim Ebul-Futuh, in the first round of the Presidential elections. In this first round, the MB candidate, Mohammed Morsi, could get the votes of the MB supporters and the votes of some Islamic groups. He was one of the two candidates that could get the right to

participate in the second round. The other candidate in the second round was Ahmed Shafik, who worked as the Prime Minister in the Mubarak period.

In the conjuncture of the second of the Presidential elections, Morsi came to the forefront as the candidate of a new period compared to Shafik's direct relationship with the former regime. Therefore, it took the form a competition between the rule of a new President and the continuation of the former regime. The revolutionary groups felt that they had to support Morsi against Shafik in order to take a further step for the accomplishment of the revolution despite their unwillingness for a MB rule in the country. They organized campaigns against the election of Shafik and they called for challenging all the remnants of the former regime. It meant that the unwilling supporters of Morsi in the second round of Presidential elections voted for "change" rather than the candidate. By this way, Morsi could get the votes of some liberal groups and Salafists as well as the Muslim Brotherhood supporters and some minor Islamic groups. The attitude of the liberal groups was the same as we described for the revolutionaries. For Salafists, it was more meaningful in the sense that Morsi was an Islamic candidate and his worldview was much closer to Salafists compared to the other candidate. Furthermore, it was possible for Salafists to make an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, supporting Morsi was completely beneficial in terms of their political and strategic goals. Consequently, Morsi could become the first democratically elected President of Egypt under the influence of the strategic and pragmatic calculations of the actors and the conditions which brought the actors to make a preference between a new candidate and a former regime candidate in the election process.

The one-year Morsi period in Egypt witnessed the impact of the identity factor and historical prejudices towards the Muslim Brotherhood. As we have mentioned above, Morsi could get conditional support of some groups in the Presidential elections. They were not sure about the real purposes of the new President and they were suspicious about the political

agenda of the Brotherhood. Therefore, the continuation of this conditional support was dependent on Morsi's performance in the office of Presidency. Because of the conditions leading to the uprisings in Egypt and the existence of the decades-long problems, it was a really difficult task to accomplish for an inexperienced ruler. Not only Morsi but also the Muslim Brotherhood as an old institution was not experienced in ruling the country. This situation made it more difficult. Moreover, Morsi had to struggle against the remnants of the former regime and some powerful institutions such as the SCAF and the judiciary. For example, one of the court decisions resulted in the dissolution of the Parliament. The SCAF made important regulations that restricted the area of maneuver for the new President in the transition period. The combination of these factors decreased the chance of Morsi for being successful and the high expectations and impatience among the people implied the limited amount of time to reach the goals. Put differently, Morsi's credibility in the eyes of the people was not so high; thus, it was easy to lose it with a few mistakes. In the later period, Morsi's controversial decisions and policies led to such a loss so that the opposition against Morsi grew through time. It can be questioned whether it was really possible to prevent the emergence of that coalition by taking some measures or not but it was certain that the process affected the decline of the conditional support given by some groups and increased the criticisms against Morsi.

It is necessary to explain the reasons for the limited credibility of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. Morsi was elected as the new President of Egypt but the Muslim Brothers were not new actors in the political arena. People had some positive or negative ideas about the Brotherhood and they more or less knew the worldview or its religion-based political agenda. The exclusionary nature of the Brotherhood, just like other religious communities, prevented its members from attracting the support of more people in Egypt. On the contrary, an anti-MB sentiment emerged in the society due to their ideology or the

practices on certain issues. This sentiment was so powerful among people that the former authoritarian regimes could legitimize themselves as the only alternative against a possible MB rule. The Muslim Brotherhood had the role of “other” for the authoritarian regimes. In the society, the secular and liberal groups were not pleased with the religious agenda of the Muslim Brothers. Apart from that, the Salafists and some other Islamic groups defended some particular interpretations of Islam so the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood was not so beneficial for these Islamic groups either. Although the MB had large support in the society, the number of anti-MB group including a variety of actors had a substantial amount. In sum, people had different reasons for rejecting the MB rule and the historical prejudices against it changed the dynamics and had an influence on current events.

In the Morsi period, the November 22 Decree and the constitution-making process were important for losing the credibility for the people who gave conditional support to Morsi. The former reaction was against the perception of threat for turning back to authoritarianism so that it was more related to the common target of the different groups in the society. On the other hand, the constitution-making process led to debates among people reflecting the ideologies and political goals of the actors. The identity factor was directly in effect in that sense. The criticisms against the content of draft Constitution gave us a clue about the identities of the actors. The concerns over women and minority rights aimed to protect the status of women and identity of the minorities because they tried to get a constitutional guarantee not to be repressed by the majority. More importantly, the debates over the Sharia law showed the significance of the identity issue and they brought the issue to a different point. It has turned into a secularism-Islam debate which polarized the society. The Islamic groups were in favor of putting the Sharia as the basis of the Constitution while the secular groups opposed the imposition of such an idea. Parallel to the identities and religious doctrines of each group, the Salafists supported a more radical version of Sharia law

compared to the MB's more moderate legislative proposal. Actually, the issue was about the worldviews and political projects of the actors because those who dreamed a more religious society did not avoid imposing their will on the other people and the secular groups were against the intervention to their life styles. This attempt was of crucial importance for all groups and it would be decisive for the shape and final version of the Constitution. Therefore, it was not so surprising to observe the mutual criticisms and the struggle between the two camps. However, the debates did not create a compromise between the groups; on the contrary, the process increased the polarization within the society. Morsi, as the President, preferred to take side with the Islamic groups by insisting on sending the draft to the referendum and making declarations in favor of it. Morsi's policy meant the loss of limited support and trust of the secular groups. It can be said that people gave up giving a chance for Morsi in a few months. It was not a sufficient time period for restoring the order and solving the problems but it was long enough to lose the credibility with some controversial attempts.

After the constitution-making process, the number of protests and criticisms against Morsi reached its zenith. Furthermore, the disagreements between the Salafist Nour Party and the Muslim Brothers over some practical and ideological issues brought about breaking the alliance between them. The break was almost inevitable due to the existence of crucial differences in the principles and political agendas of the two groups. Thus, the Salafists, the Nour Party supporters, joined the opposition against Morsi and participation of an Islamic group and a former ally of Morsi and the MB affected the legitimacy of the existing leader negatively. Though it did not change the legitimate way of coming to power for Morsi, the loss of popular support created a new source of problem in terms of representing the will of people. The opposition tried to use this point for their own benefits by organizing some campaigns like collecting signs from the people to show the number of people opposing Morsi's Presidency and they asserted the "illegitimacy" of it. On the other hand, Morsi

emphasized that he came to power as the first democratically elected President and his rule was completely legitimate for one presidential term. The struggle over “legitimacy” became the center of debate in that regard. The Salafists who took part in the opposition camp could not claim the illegitimacy of Morsi’s rule because of their support during the Presidential elections and their alliance with the Muslim Brothers in the previous months especially in the constitution-making process but they called for early Presidential elections to change the leader.

In the end, the establishment of a grand coalition against Morsi’s Presidency did not take much time and the growing opposition and harsh criticisms replaced the conditional support for Morsi in a short amount of time. It seems that mistakes of Morsi in ruling the country cannot explain the situation because there were other factors interacting with the each other. Besides the international support for the opposition and “the revolutionary fever” coming out of the Arab Spring process, the identity factor and historical prejudices affected the credibility of the President and shortened the period of opportunity for the new President and decreased the level of patience among people. It means that another president, having a different background, could have had longer time even if he or she had made the same mistakes. The involvement of the identity-based concerns proved the relevance of the essentialist approach in the Egyptian context.

Taking all these into consideration, it can be claimed that the events emerged in the Morsi period were not enough themselves to explain the support of the civilian opposition groups to support the military intervention. The identities and historical experiences of the actors had a decisive influence on their strategies. It is important to analyze why the civilian groups and revolutionary people made such a preference. Obviously, the attributed mistakes of President Morsi were not sufficient to explain the outcome. They were more meaningful when they were considered together with other factors. The Morsi period was important for

the continuation of the civilian rule but the opposition groups came to a point that they preferred the military intervention to the rule of an elected President. It can be questioned and debated to what extent the opposition groups were right on their claims and to what extent Morsi's policies prepared the ground for the military intervention. However, the result strengthened the position of the military in the political affairs rather than the rule of civilians in the next periods. Even if they were right in their claims, the way of overthrowing an elected President would not serve their interests in terms of civil-military relations. It could be needed to overcome the ideological differences and the identity factor in order to reach better results for the longer term. Consequently, the identity factor and historical prejudices brought the end of the Morsi period in interaction with other factors but it also decreased the chance and legitimacy of the future civilian leaders as an unintended consequence.

CONCLUSION

Mubarak was overthrown as a result of the mass demonstrations started on January 25, 2011. After the transition period under the leadership of the SCAF in the post-Mubarak period, Morsi came to power as the first elected President of Egypt in June 2012. People organized protests in the first anniversary of the Morsi period and this process ended in the ouster of Morsi with July 2013 military intervention. In two-and-a-half years, the process evolved from anti-Mubarak movement and challenge against the authoritarian regime to anti-Morsi or pro-military movement. In other words, the Morsi period started with high expectations came to an end with great disenchantment and the revolts against the new President after one year. The changes in this short period reflected the dynamism in the region. While the military intervened the political affairs and a new ring of the chain of presidents having military background, al-Sisi, took the office of Presidency after the short civilian rule. While scholars began to talk about democratization and to make comparisons with the experiences of other regions in terms of transition to democracy from authoritarian

regimes, the result was far from satisfying the demands of the people and it did not lead to a democratic system. Moreover, the Egyptian people were discontented because of the repressive mechanisms of the authoritarian state in the former periods so that the uprisings and the fall of Mubarak created a window of opportunity for them. Turning back to authoritarianism and military rule was the basic fear among the people but the process has come to a point that some groups of people could prefer the military intervention instead of a civilian rule. It can be said that the post-Mubarak period witnessed sharp turns, ups and downs, in a short time period.

We have focused on, in this Master's thesis, why the process came from "January 25 Revolution" to July 2013 military intervention. Moreover, it was necessary to explain why some of the revolutionary groups that aimed to participate in the political affairs in the name of "the will of people" could support the military against the democratically elected President. The changing alliances in the Morsi period were also of concern in that framework. These main questions pointed out a certain fact which can be described as the "significance of the process". To put it another way, the events emerged in the post-Mubarak period, especially in the Morsi period, changed the dynamics of the politics in Egypt so that the actors needed to reformulate their interests and strategies. The policies of the actors had different influences on the process and they were influential on the evolution of the process. The strategies of two actors were particularly had importance because of their direct effect on the result. The Salafists, with the Nour Party, established an alliance with the Muslim Brothers in the second round of the Presidential elections and in the first months of the Morsi period, especially during the constitution-making process but they decided to participate in the opposition camp due to some ideological and political as well as some practical differences. Since they changed their side in a few months and they had the second largest electoral support, after the MB, their inclusion in the opposition camp increased the legitimacy of the opposition with the

additional support of an Islamic group and created difficulty for the position of Morsi and the MB. Apart from that, the military which seemed to remain far from engagement with the political issues in the Morsi period came into prominence with the last military intervention and it took the control of the country by overthrowing the President Morsi. The opposition groups welcomed the intervention of the military because of their challenge against the President. The political and strategic calculations of the actors in that process, the identities of the actors, historical prejudices towards the MB, the controversial policies of Morsi in his Presidency and the traditional role of the military in politics were all in use in the developments leading to the evolution of the process in that direction.

The uprisings in Egypt against the authoritarian rule of the Muslim Brotherhood took the form a collective movement and the Tahrir coalition was established with the participation of diverse groups of people having a common target, namely the Mubarak regime. The political agendas and ideologies of these actors differed from one another but they were not an obstacle for the achievement of the first step, the fall of Mubarak. Therefore, they could show their determinacy and collective will against the Mubarak regime during the demonstrations. The groups participated in the Tahrir protests played different roles so that it was important to analyze the role of each factor carefully. There were youth groups, civil society organizations, labor unions, women, some minority groups, the MB members, Salafists and some Islamic groups in the Tahrir coalition. Among them, the youth groups played a crucial role for the mobilization of the people and in a sense, they helped to ignite the fire of the movement. Moreover, with the help of social media and some innovative tools, they could increase the effectiveness of the movement in the first days. However, their role was not so decisive to reach the final result. The civil society organizations were not so powerful but the Arab Spring process created an opportunity to legitimately act in the political events for them. Apart from that, the strikes of the labor unions were helpful in the first phase of the movement

and they were crucial for showing the protests of the people against the regime. The participation of women individually was meaningful just because the status of women in the society and it could be important for the next periods.

More importantly, the Salafists had traditionally preferred to abstain from engaging in politics because of their religious and ideological doctrines but they were politicized in the mass protests against Mubarak and they established their first political parties in the post-Mubarak period. The first parliamentary elections proved the large base of the Salafists in the society and the Salafists had an increasing role in the political events in the next period. For example, the changing policy and the role of the Nour Party in the establishment of the opposition against Morsi were decisive for the end of the Morsi period. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood members took part in the demonstrations individually in the first days and the institutional support was declared after a few days. It was regarded as a “latecomer” because of this declaration but the participation of the Muslim Brothers was significant for both the historical and traditional role of them in the political events and increasing the support base in terms of number and diversity of the groups. Lastly, the military leaders decided to take side with protestors and it meant the breaking of the alliance with the regime and the military. It was a decisive move for the end of the Mubarak period because Mubarak could not remain in the office with losing the support of his allies. Consequently, the roles played by the actors in the Tahrir protests were determined by the political weight of the each actor and the emergence and the evolution of the movement.

After the fall of Mubarak, the grand Tahrir coalition was broken because of the differences of the political agendas and worldviews of the actors. Actually, such a grand coalition was not sustainable to determine a common political vision due to crucial differences in the goals of the actors. The SCAF took the control of the country in the transition period. It acted as if it was the real ruler of Egypt and made important regulations in

order to restore the system for the possible result of the elections. The restriction of the Presidential powers and making constitutional amendments towards the goal of arranging the system were the main components of the changes in the SCAF period. After that, it declared the first Presidential elections to transfer the power to civilians. Morsi came to power in that context and there were high expectations in this period. It was a difficult task to accomplish for an inexperienced ruler. Morsi did not avoid taking bold steps in his Presidency. For instance, he tried to appoint a new prosecutor-general but it was cancelled by the court and he forced the top generals for retirement. This retirement decision was appreciated by the people and it was thought that Morsi could succeed in making the military “return to barracks”. However, the military intervention in July 2013 showed the opposite and the “military turned back in” to the political affairs.

The first real political crisis came with the November 22 Decree. Morsi put himself beyond the bounds of the judicial supervision through this decree. Moreover, the Constituent Assembly and the Shura Council were shielded from potential dissolution by court order. He appointed a new prosecutor-general with the declaration. These points created a huge problem because they included extra powers for the President. The biggest fear for the Egyptians was returning to authoritarianism in the post-Mubarak period so attributing more powers to the President reminded the historical experiences and the authoritarian systems of the former periods. The declaration also gave the President to take any measures to “protect the revolution”. It was a subtle expression and it was open to be abused so that people also felt discontented because of this. Morsi claimed that these regulations and changes would be valid for a temporary period and they were necessary for protecting the revolution. However, they were not convincing arguments for some groups of people in the society. The opposition figures began to compare Morsi with Mubarak and for them, the methods of Morsi were similar to Mubarak and his policies would probably become as authoritarian as before. The

decree was the first breaking point in the Morsi period in terms of losing the support of some groups and credibility in the people's eyes. In addition, worries replaced the optimistic sentiment of the initial phase of the post-Mubarak period and people turned to follow the next policies suspiciously. It left almost no room for a controversial or wrong decision in the office of Presidency. Actually, the reaction to all mistakes or debated points had to be in legitimate ways so that they should have been accepted in that framework.

The second and more important breaking point came with the constitution-making process. The Constituent Assembly appointed in the previous months worked on preparing a new Constitution for Egypt. It consisted of members from diverse political groups proportional to their seats in the Parliament so that the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist members took the majority. The main debated points were individual freedoms, the position and content of the Sharia law, the status of women and the rights of minorities. The sessions of the Assembly witnessed hot debates between the secular groups and the Islamic members because the secularism-Islam dichotomy lied at the center of debates. Since this main debate and positions of the two camps reflected their ontological realities, they did not prefer to make concessions to others in that regard. It was impossible to reach a compromise and the debates did not create much benefit for the two sides. On the contrary, they increased the polarization within the society and they led to resignations of the opposition members from the Constituent Assembly. Therefore, the draft of the constitution was prepared by the remaining Islamic members. For sure, the withdrawal of other groups from the constitution-making process decreased the legitimacy of it and it became far from representing the diversity in the society. In spite of this, Morsi had a clear stance in that issue so he made the decision to hold a referendum on the constitution. Opposition groups wanted to protest the draft by boycotting the referendum and some of them organized campaigns to say "no" to the constitution in the referendum. As a result of the referendum, about 64 percent of voters supported the new

Constitution but 33 percent voter turnout was not a good sign for Morsi and the Islamic groups. Morsi's clear stance for the constitution caused the loss of conditional support given by other groups. Increasing polarization was a big problem for Morsi because it was harmful for his claim to represent the will of people.

Furthermore, the decision-making style of Morsi was seriously questioned by the people in the constitution-making process. Although he had advisors and aides from different ideological backgrounds, he was accused of not taking into account the recommendations of his advisors. This situation reinforced the belief that Morsi's policies were determined by the higher bodies of the Muslim Brotherhood and its decision-makers. Consequently, the constitution-making process left a bad legacy for Morsi because the only remaining groups supporting his Presidency were the Islamic groups and he became more dependent on the alliance with the Salafists.

The next months in the Morsi period passed in the shadow of the November 22 Decree and the constitution-making process because the conjuncture was shaped by the actors according to their views on Morsi's policies during these critical points. The number of protests increased and opposition groups reacted to the next policies in a biased way. More importantly, the next few months witnessed the breaking the alliance of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist Nour Party. There were ideological and political differences between the two groups and the Salafists felt themselves uneasy due to the domination of the Muslim Brothers in the political arena. Moreover, Morsi did not ask for the ideas of the Salafists before making some decisions, especially determining the date of Parliamentary elections. The high electoral support of the Salafists led them to have a more assertive role compared to former periods. Besides them, the close relationship between the Egyptian Salafists and the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, had a significant influence on the policies of the Nour Party. The ideological and religious differences and the regional

competition between the Muslim Brothers and Saudis contributed to the end of the alliance. It can be said that this break would sooner or later emerge because of the fundamental differences and confrontations of the two groups and the combination of these factors became the reason for this outcome. Of course, the loss of Salafist allies created much difficulty for Morsi's Presidency. While other opposition groups organized campaigns to prove illegitimacy of his Presidency, the Salafists joined the opposition camp without supporting his illegitimacy. The June 30 mass demonstrations against Morsi were organized in that context. The changes in the alliances and in the attitudes of different actors and the polarized atmosphere prepared the ground for the military intervention in the name of "the will of people".

The Egyptian military had a traditional role in politics and it had also close connections with large segments of society, especially through economic relations. Egypt had been ruled by authoritarian leaders coming from military background since the Free Officers' Coup until the fall of Mubarak. Although the regime-military alliance ruled the country in this long period, the military could manage to protect its institutional structure and autonomy. Therefore, it was possible for the military to have a flexible policy against the changes in the political parameters. Even the removal of so-called "authoritarian stability" could not change this situation. It was expected for the military to back the Mubarak regime. The military seemed neutral during the Tahrir protests. As a result of strategic and pragmatic calculations, the military leaders decided to take side with the protestors and it meant a "knockdown" for Mubarak. In the transition period after Mubarak, the SCAF took the country and ruled Egypt. The SCAF made important regulations and gave the message that the military would remain engaging in political affairs under any conditions. After one-and-a-half year, the SCAF transferred the power to the new elected President. One of the first attempts of Morsi was removing the SCAF decision restricting the Presidential powers. He also forced the top

generals for retirement. These moves were seemingly back steps for the role of military. However, the military waited for the correct time for itself and intervened to politics when the circumstances were proper for its final move. It can be said that the role of military today is as powerful as before. The tacit international support for the military intervention and the existence of civilian alliance in the domestic arena served the benefits of the military and the recurrent patterns of the military interventions. As a result, the role of military has always been decisive in Egyptian politics and the military will most probably remain as one of the key actors in Egypt.

So, what is next for Egypt? Al-Sisi was elected as the new President in the first Presidential elections after the ouster of Morsi. He became the last ring of the chain of leaders coming from military background. It seems that the authoritarian system based on the alliance between the leader and the military will remain in power in the short term. Moreover, the repression against the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic groups having opposition character against the system will likely to last. Since the Muslim Brotherhood has a strong institutional structure and it has been accustomed to live and act under this repression, it will most probably have another chance to challenge the status quo in Egypt. In other words, the struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military will continue in the period. Moreover, depending on the developments in the next period, the army might reformulate its position. The will of people will also be crucial determinant in this period because people have been aware of their power and they still have revolutionary fever coming out the Arab Spring process. In our point of view, the mistakes or controversial decisions of an elected ruler had to be reacted in legitimate ways instead of supporting a military intervention. It was a result of the identities of the actors and the historical prejudices towards the Muslim Brotherhood together with the influences of the events emerged in the Morsi period. The reflections of the policies and developments on the shape of Egyptian politics will be

observed in the coming period. The process has not reached an end yet so the next period is open to new possibilities and it will be significant for the future of Egyptian politics because the transition period after the Arab Uprisings will be crucial to restore the order and to create a system. The question of whether it will be a form of the old system or a new system will be replied in this period under the influence of the policies of different domestic and international actors. Egypt has not been only Egypt so far and its position will remain as it has always been.

Comparison of the Turkish Case with the Morsi Period in Egypt

“Separation of powers” is an essential element of the democratic systems. It requires strong check and balances mechanisms and clear boundaries for the three spheres. Conflicts emerge among those powers when some new regulations or changes are made in one of those spheres. Furthermore, penetration of actors into other spheres may emerge with the *de facto* initiatives of the representatives by crossing the borders. When Recep Tayyip Erdogan was elected as the President of Turkey on 10 August 2014, it started debates about the “separation of powers” due to his former declarations and practices during his long period in the office of Prime Ministry. It also reminded the Morsi period in Egypt because of the existence of similar problems and criticisms against Morsi. It should be underlined that the Morsi period witnessed extraordinary conditions so all the problems cannot be attributed to Morsi’s decision-making style. Before Morsi came to power, the lower house of the Egyptian Parliament, *the People’s Assembly of Egypt* or *the House of Representatives*, had been dissolved by the Constitutional Court and the legislative power was used by the upper house, *the Shura Council*. Morsi called the members of the Parliament to reconvene but his decision was also cancelled by another Court decision. Thus, it can be claimed that the functions of the lower house of the Parliament had to be practiced by other state institutions, especially by the Shura Council. Moreover, the Islamist members were dominant in the House of

Representatives so that the Parliament would most probably act in accordance with the new President but the dissolution of the Parliament meant the loss of this opportunity for Morsi. The vacuum in the legislative power created a strange situation and it became one source of the problems about the “separation of powers” in the Morsi period. Morsi did not avoid taking bold steps and using his initiative especially for the critical decisions so that his decisions and policies created new problems and led to resentment among people and criticisms against his Presidency. The November 22 Decree and Morsi’s appointment new members to the Shura Council in the constitution-making process can be interpreted from this point of view. On the other hand, Erdogan’s Presidency in Turkey seems closer to problematic relations in terms of separation of powers because of the former experiences in Turkey. He became the first President who was directly elected by the people. This change in the election system created more sphere of influence and power base for him compared to former Presidents. The relations among the legislative branch, the government, the judiciary and this new form of Presidency will be reformulated by the actors in the next period. The well-known charismatic leadership of Erdogan and his courageous and bold attempts should be taken into account because they will most probably be one decisive factor for the reformulation process. We will see the results of these factors in the coming period but the debates about separation of powers will more likely continue in Turkey and in other countries. The Turkish case reminded the Morsi period in Egypt and showed that Egypt is not the only example of this kind of problems. While the problem in Egypt stemmed from a power vacuum in one branch, the accumulation of power in one branch emerged as a possible source of problem in Turkey. We should also keep in mind that the peculiar aspects and contextual differences of the two countries are significant so that different outcomes are highly probable but different examples should be used to create ideal forms and to take lessons from the previous experiences.

For Further Research

We will be glad if this thesis makes a contribution to the existing literature on the Middle Eastern studies and Egypt. Our thesis will be, hopefully, helpful for explaining the role of Salafists and the military in the recent developments in Egypt. Moreover, it can be used to trace the process from “January 25 Revolution” to July 2013 military intervention step by step. By this way, the formation of new alliances and the changes in the policies and strategies of different actors can be understood and analyzed. In addition, the turning points and critical events can be determined by looking at the information presented in the thesis. However, it cannot be claimed that our thesis is free from mistakes and inadequacies. On the contrary, it has some apparent shortcomings. Since it focuses on the current events in Egypt, it can be regarded as a beginning point for further research and studies about these issues. Because of the time constraints and limited expertise in Arabic language, the research was done through the news sources having English websites. Therefore, this kind of research can be enriched with more news items and literature review in Arabic language. Particularly, Egyptian newspapers and local news sources can be more useful in order to understand the reactions of the domestic actors towards the events in that period. The sources can be diversified by adding more items from other sources. Apart from that, our case study of Egypt can be used for making comparisons with other countries to see the different directions of each of them. Comparisons will be valuable for making regional analyses and the destiny of the Arab Uprisings can be analyzed through these comparisons. In other words, the studies can be deepened or widened compared to our work because of the large number of domestic and international actors. For example, the Tahrir coalition and the opposition camp against Morsi both included many actors but we could not investigate all of them one by one because of the scope of our research. On the other hand, Egypt can be taken as one actor in the

regional arena so that the scope of the research can be widened. Last of all, our thesis is based on the policies and roles of the domestic actors so it does not pay much attention to the roles of international actors that have significant roles in the political issues of the Middle East. It is necessary to put an emphasis on their roles together with their relations with the domestic actors. As a result, our thesis can only be considered as a drop in the ocean and it would complete its mission if it can take the research studies one step further in that sense.

REFERENCES

- Abdelhadi, Magdi. (2012, June 23). Egypt's Army in Control of Vast Business Empire. *BBC News*. Retrieved July 21, 2014 from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18548659>
- Abdelhadi, Magdi. (2012, November 27). Mohamed Morsi and the Fight for Egypt. *The Guardian*. Retrieved July 21, 2014 from <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/nov/27/mohamed-morsi-fight-for-egypt>
- Ahram Online. (2012, October 9). Morsi's first 100 days: A report card. Retrieved July 16, 2014 from <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/140/55089/Egypt/The-Balance-Sheet/Morsis-first--days-A-report-card.aspx>
- Ahram Online. (2012, December 24). Rights lawyer challenges Morsi's appointment of 90 Shura members. Retrieved July 11, 2014 from <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/61228/Egypt/Politics-/Rights-lawyer-challenges-Morsis-appointment-of--Sh.aspx>
- Al-Arabiya. (2012, November 23). Egypt Judges Club says Mursi's power decree an assault on judiciary. Retrieved June 21, 2014 from <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/11/23/251266.html>
- Al-Arabiya. (2012, December 25). Egypt's new constitution approved by almost 64% of voters: officials. Retrieved June 21, 2014 from <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/25/256990.html>
- Al-Arabiya. (2012, December 22). Egyptians hold final vote on Islamist-backed constitution. Retrieved June 21, 2014 from <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/22/256436.html>
- Al-Jazeera. (2012, August 13). Crowds in Cairo praise Morsi's army overhaul. Retrieved July 10, 2014 from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/08/201281215511142445.html>
- Al-Jazeera. (2012, August 19). Egypt: A second republic? Retrieved July 10, 2014 from <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/empire/2012/07/2012711163519717268.html>
- Al-Jazeera. (2012, December 25). Egypt approves disputed draft constitution. Retrieved June 21, 2014 from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/12/201212251825337958.html>
- Al-Jazeera. (2012, October 25). Egypt: The Future Awaits. Retrieved July 10, 2014 from <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2012/10/201210248370862114.html>
- Al-Jazeera. (2012, November 24). Egypt: The president's new powers. Retrieved July 10, 2014 from <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/11/2012112482649205402.html>

- Al-Jazeera. (2012, December 10). Q&A: Egypt's constitutional referendum. Retrieved June 21, 2014 from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/egypt/2012/12/201212917759334824.html>
- Al-Jazeera. (2012, December 11). Rival rallies held in Egypt over constitution. Retrieved June 21, 2014 from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/12/20121210235329634676.html>
- Al-Jazeera. (2013, February 12). Wrestling Islam from Islamists. Retrieved June 21, 2014 from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/201326124432686900.html>
- Al-Rashed, Abdul Rahman. (2012, November 28). Mursi ends Egypt spring. *Al-Arabiya*. Retrieved June 21, 2014 from <http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2012/11/25/251621.html>
- Anadolu Agency. (2013, September 16). No exclusion of parties supporting army' roadmap. Retrieved July 11, 2014 from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- Anderson, Lisa. (2001). Arab Democracy: Dismal Prospects. *World Policy Journal*, 18(3), 53-60.
- Anderson, Lisa. (1995). Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political Culture Approach. In Rex Brynen et al (Ed.), *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World* (pp.77-92). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Anderson, Lisa. (2011). Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences between Tunisia, Egypt, Libya. *Foreign Affairs* 90, 2-7.
- Anderson, Lisa. (1991). Obligation and Accountability: Islamic Parties in North Africa. *Daedalus*, 120(3), 93-112.
- Anderson, Lisa. (1987). The State in the Middle East and North Africa. *Comparative Politics*, 20(1), 1-18.
- Aoudé, Ibrahim G. (2013). Egypt: Revolutionary Process and Global Capitalist Crisis. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 35(3), 241-254.
- Asad, Talal. (2012). Fear and the Ruptured State: Reflections on Egypt after Mubarak. *Social Research*, 79(2), 271-298.
- Ban, Ahmad. (2013, April 12). Egypt's Diverse Salafist Movements. *Al-Monitor*. Retrieved July 21, 2014 from <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/04/egypt-salafist-groups-diverse.html#>
- Barany, Zoltan. (2011). The Role of the Military. *Journal of Democracy*, 22(4), 24-35.
- Bayat, Asef. (2000). Social Movements, Activism and Social Development in the Middle East. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Civil Society and Social Movements Programme Paper 3, 1-35.

- Bayoumi, Alaa. (2013, March 11). Egypt's Islamists spar as elections loom. *Al-Jazeera*. Retrieved June 21, 2014 from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/03/201337112323385288.html>
- Bayoumi, Alaa. (2012, December 13). The many faces of Mohamed Morsi. *Al-Jazeera*. Retrieved June 21, 2014 from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/12/2012121371332920740.html>
- Belfast Telegraph Online. (2013, July 9). Brotherhood rejects Egypt deal. Retrieved July 11, 2014 from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- Bellin, Eva. (2004). The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective. *Comparative Politics*, 36(2), 139-157.
- Bishara, Marwan. (2013, July 2). Three questions on Egypt: Three radical scenarios and one viable option. *Al-Jazeera*. Retrieved July 10, 2014 from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/07/201372104442900626.html>
- Bishku, Michael. (2013). Is it an Arab Spring or Business as Usual? Recent Changes in the Arab World in Historical Context. *Journal of Third World Studies*, 30(1), 55-77.
- Bradley, John. (2009). *Inside Egypt*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Brown, Nathan and Shahin, Emad el-Din. (2010). *The Struggle over Democracy in the Middle East*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Brownlee, Jason. (2007). Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies. *World Politics*, 59, 595-628.
- Byman, Daniel. (2012). Regime Change in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects. *Political Science Quarterly*, 127(1), 25-46.
- Carlstrom, Gregg. (2013, July 3). Morsi's struggle for 'legitimacy'. *Al-Jazeera*. Retrieved June 21, 2014 from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/07/201373103545206225.html>
- Cannistraro, Vincent. (2011). Arab Spring: A Partial Awakening. *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 22(4), 36-45.
- Cook, Bradley J. & Stathis, Michael. (2012). Democracy and Islam: promises and perils for the Arab Spring protests. *Journal of Global Responsibility*, 3(2), 175-186.
- Cook, Steven A. (2007). *Ruling But Not Governing*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Cook, Steven A. (2012). *The Struggle for Egypt*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Daily News Egypt. (2014, April 14). Egypt's Military Economy: Money is Power, Power is Money. Retrieved July 21, 2014 from

<http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/04/14/egypts-military-economy-money-power-power-money/>

Daily News Egypt. (2012, October 11). Morsy sacks prosecutor general. Retrieved July 10, 2014 from <http://www.lexisnexus.com>

Daily News Egypt. (2014, January 30). Saudi Arabia to give Egypt up to \$4bn more aid. Retrieved July 11, 2014 from <http://www.lexisnexus.com>

Daily News Egypt. (2013, July 13). 6 April rejects 'international conference'. Retrieved June 21, 2014 from <http://www.lexisnexus.com>

Desch, Michael C. (2001). *Civilian Control of the Military*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Egypt Independent. (2013, June 14). Egypt's FM visits Ethiopia Sunday for talks over dam dispute. Retrieved July 11, 2014 from <http://www.lexisnexus.com>

Egypt Independent. (2013, April 8). Pope: We will never accept a "non-civil state". Retrieved July 11, 2014 from <http://www.lexisnexus.com>

Egypt Independent. (2013, May 29). Salafis demand end to women's rights body, ballet. *Al-Masry al-Youm*. Retrieved July 11, 2014 from <http://www.lexisnexus.com>

El-Deeb, Sarah. (2012, December 26). Morsi: Egyptian Constitution Sets Up a New Republic. *The Washington Times*. Retrieved July 21, 2014 from <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/dec/26/morsi-egyptian-constitution-sets-new-republic/?page=all>

El-Sharnoubi, Osman. (2013, June 28). Egypt's President Morsi in power: A timeline (Part I). *Al-Ahram*. Retrieved March 18, 2014 from <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/152/74427/Egypt/Morsi-one-year-on/Egypt-President-Morsi-in-power-A-timeline-Part-I.aspx>

El-Shimy, Yasser M. (2011). The Arab Spring Gathers Clouds: Why the Revolts for Change Have Stalled. *Insight Turkey*, 13 (4), 39-54.

Fandy, Mamoun. (1998). Political Science Without Clothes: The Politics of Dress or Contesting the Spatiality of the State in Egypt. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 20(2), 87-104.

Finer, S. E. (1988). *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Ghannam, Jeffrey. (2011). *Social Media in the Arab World: Leading up to the Uprisings of 2011*. Washington, DC: Center for International Media Assistance.

Gladwell, Malcolm. (2010, October 4). Small Change: Why the revolution will not be tweeted. *The New Yorker*.

Harik, Iliya. (2006). Democracy, "Arab Exceptionalism," and Social Science. *Middle East Journal*, 60(4), 664-684.

- Hashim, Ahmed S. (2011). The Egyptian Military, Part One: From Ottomans Through Sadat. *Middle East Policy*, 18(3), 63-78.
- Hauslohner, Abigail & Hassieb, Ingy. (2012, December 9). Confusion Pervades Egypt's Opposition After Morsi Rescinds Decree. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved July 21, 2014 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/egyptian-opposition-remains-defiant-after-morsi-annuls-decree/2012/12/09/351f8f26-41ee-11e2-8061-253bccfc7532_story.html
- Heydemann, Steven. (2007). Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World. Brookings Institution, 1-35.
- Howard, Philip, and Hussain, Muzammil. (2011). The Upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia: The Role of Digital Media. *Journal of Democracy*, 22, 35-48.
- Hudson, Michael. (1995). The Political Culture Approach to Arab Democratization: The Case for Bringing it Back in, Carefully. In Rex Brynen et al (Ed.), *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World* (pp. 61-76). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Hunter, Wendy. (1997). *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers*. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Intellinews. (2013, November 6). Egypt returns to Qatar USD 500mn deposit-report. Retrieved July 11, 2014 from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- Ismael, Jacqueline S. & Ismael, Shereen T. (2013). The Arab Spring and the Uncivil State. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 35 (3), 229-240.
- Ismael, Jacqueline S. & Ismael, Tareq Y. (1999). Globalization and the Arab World in Middle East Politics: Regional Dynamics in Historical Perspective. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 21(3), 129-144.
- Jamal, Amaney. (2011). Actors, Public Opinion, and Participation. In Ellen Lust (Ed.), *The Middle East* (pp. 193-237). Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Knell, Yolande. (2012, April 2). Egypt Candidate: Muslim Brotherhood's Khairat al-Shater. *BBC News*. Retrieved July 21, 2014 from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17583661>
- Knell, Yolande. (2012, April 23). Egypt Candidate: Ahmad Shafik, Former Prime Minister. *BBC News*. Retrieved July 21, 2014 from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17788595>
- King, Stephen J. (2007). Sustaining Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa. *Political Science Quarterly*, 122(3), 433-459.
- Kirkpatrick, David D. (2012, June 14). Blow to Transition as Court Dissolves Egypt's Parliament. *The New York Times*. Retrieved July 21, 2014 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/world/middleeast/new-political-showdown-in-egypt-as-court-invalidates-parliament.html?pagewanted=all>
- Kirkpatrick, David D. (2011, February 17). Egyptians Say Military Discourages an Open Economy. *The New York Times*. Retrieved July 21, 2014 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18military.html?pagewanted=all>

- Korany, Bahgat & El-Mahdi, Rabab. (2012). *Arab Spring in Egypt*. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.
- Legault, Albert and Sokolsky, Joel. (2002). *Civil-Military Relations: Democracy and Norm Transfer*. In *The Soldier and the State in the Post Cold War Era*. Kingston, Ontario: l'Institut québécois des hautes études internationales, Université Laval, l'Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM) and the Royal Military College of Canada.
- Levine, Mark. (2012, December 8). Egypt: Between revolution 3.0 and civil war. *Al-Jazeera*. Retrieved June 21, 2014 from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/12/201212814447968822.html>
- Londono, Ernesto. (2012, August 27). Visit by Egypt's Morsi to Iran Reflects Foreign Policy Shift. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved July 21, 2014 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/visit-by-egypts-morsi-to-iran-reflects-foreign-policy-shift/2012/08/27/4baf4b3a-f060-11e1-b74c-84ed55e0300b_story.html
- Lynch, Marc. (2011). After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab State. *Perspectives on Politics*, 9, 301-310.
- Mandaville, Peter. 2005. "Sufis and Salafis: the Political Discourse of Transnational Islam." In R. W. Hefner (Ed.), *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization* (pp.303-325).
- McClatchy. (2011, November 22). Egypt: Amnesty accuses military of 'crushing hopes'. Retrieved July 10, 2014 from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- Mekkawi, Naglaa. (2013, August 22). A love, hate relationship: Al-Nour and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. *Al-Arabiya*. Retrieved July 10, 2014 from <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/alarabiya-studies/2013/08/22/A-love-hate-relationship-Al-Nour-and-Egypt-s-Muslim-Brotherhood.html>
- Mihaila, Liliana. (2012, December 26). Muslim Brotherhood marches in support of Morsy. *Daily News Egypt*. Retrieved July 11, 2014 from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- Mumtaz, Kashif. (2011). The fall of Mubarak: the failure of survival strategies. Retrieved from http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1328590763_27748727.pdf
- Nashashibi, Sharif. (2013, July 29). Military rule returns to Egypt. Retrieved July 10, 2014 from <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2013/07/29/Military-rule-returns-to-Egypt.html>
- Nordlinger, Eric A. (1977). *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, Englewood Cliffs.
- Omari, Raed. (2012, November 24). Will Mursi's Egypt become a new Iran? *Al-Arabiya*. Retrieved June 21, 2014 from <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/11/24/251588.html>
- Pion-Berlin, David. (1997). *Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

- Pollack, Kenneth M. (2011). Understanding the Arab Awakening. *The Arab Awakening*. (The Brookings Institute): 1-9.
- Rabbani, Mouin. (2011). The Securitization of Political Rule: Security Domination of Arab Regimes and the Prospects of Democratization. *People's Power: The Arab World in Revolt*. (Heinrich Böll Stiftung), 282-286.
- Rageh, Rawya. (2012, December 26). No winners from Egypt's constitution vote. *Al-Jazeera*. Retrieved June 21, 2014 from <http://blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/middle-east/no-winners-egypt%E2%80%99s-constitution-vote>
- Sadiki, Larbi. (2012, November 29). Re-constituting Egypt. *Al-Jazeera*. Retrieved July 10, 2014 from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/11/2012112881631548791.html>
- Said, Atef. (2012). The Paradox of Transition to "Democracy" under Military Rule. *Social Research*, 79(2), 397-434.
- Sarihan, Ali. (2012). Is the Arab Spring in the Third Wave of Democratization? The Case of Syria and Egypt. *Turkish Journal of Politics*, 3(1), 67.
- Shorbagy, Manar. (2007). The Egyptian Movement for Change, Kefaya: Redefining Politics in Egypt. *Public Culture*, 19, 175-196.
- Stacher, Joshua. (2011). Reinterpreting Authoritarian Power: Syria's Hereditary Succession. *Middle East Journal*, 65(2), 197-212.
- Stein, Ewan. (2012). Beyond Arabism vs. sovereignty: relocating ideas in the international relations of the Middle East. *Review of International Studies*, 38, 881-905.
- Stepan, Alfred. (1974). The Military in Politics: The Institutional Background. In *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Tadros, Sherine. (2012, February 15). Egypt Military's Economic Empire. *Al-Jazeera*. Retrieved July 10, 2014 from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/02/2012215195912519142.html>
- Tehran Times. (2014, June 6). Egypt invites Rouhani to Sisi' inauguration. Retrieved July 11, 2014 from <http://www.lexisnexus.com>
- The Associated Press. (2012, December 10). Islamist-leaning draft constitution divides Egypt. Retrieved June 21, 2014 from <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/10/254226.html>
- The Guardian. (2012, November 30). Egypt's Draft Constitution Approved by Islamist-Dominated Assembly. Retrieved July 21, 2014 from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/30/egypt-draft-constitution-islamist-assembly>
- The Tripoli Post. (2012, May 29). Egypt: Thousands Protest As Egyptian Shafiq HQ Set on Fire. Retrieved July 10, 2014 from <http://www.lexisnexus.com>

- Voigt, Stefan. (2005). Islam and the Institutions of a Free Society. *The Independent Review*, 10(1), 59-82.
- Wedeman, Ben. (2012, November 9). Salafist Call for Islamic Law in Egypt Protest. *CNN*. Retrieved July 21, 2014 from <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/09/world/africa/egypt-protests/>
- Welch, Claude E. (1976). *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Welch, Claude E, Jr. & Smith, Arthur K. (1974). *Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations*. California: Duxbury Press.
- Yildirim, A. Kadir. (2009). Muslim Democratic Parties in Turkey, Egypt, and Morocco: An Economic Explanation. *Insight Turkey*, 11(4), 65-76.
- Zakaria, Fareed. (2004). Islam, Democracy, and Constitutional Liberalism. *Political Science Quarterly*, 119(1), 1-20.