

NORMATIVITY IN WITTGENSTEIN: A CRITIQUE OF THE CALCULUS
PICTURE

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NORMATIVITY IN WITTGENSTEIN:
A CRITIQUE OF THE CALCULUS PICTURE

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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ABSTRACT

Normativity in Wittgenstein: A Critique of the Calculus Picture

In this dissertation, I argue that Wittgenstein's both early and late writings can be read as two different critiques of the calculus conception of language and two different attempts to provide alternative accounts of the normativity of language. In both of his early and late writings, he attacks the philosophical theories that aim to explain its subject matter by relying on theses and doctrines, because for him these theories rely on conceptualizing language as a calculus. In his *Tractatus*, his critique aims of showing the inexpressible character of general rules. He gives an immanent critique of the philosophical projects that axiomatize language. However, his mystical solution for expressing the general structure of language still relies on the idea that language operates according to calculus. In his *Philosophical Investigations*, he repudiates the calculus conception of language, by undermining its conceptual assumptions in the primitive picture of meaning and linguistic exchange, which informs many philosophical theories. His criticism of this picture and the rule-following argument show us the implausible absurdities inherent in this picture. I argue that his practice-based conception of language and rules in *Philosophical Investigations*, overcome the difficulties of the calculus conception of normativity altogether by providing a new sense of linguistic necessity with his account of grammatical propositions. Lastly, I claim that his conceptions of rules and normativity provide a new understanding of doing philosophy.

ÖZET

Wittgenstein’da Normativite: Kalkülüs Resminin Eleştirisi

Bu tezde, anlamın bir kalkülüs olarak kavramsallaştırılmasına karşı Wittgenstein'in hem erken hem de geç dönem yazılarının iki farklı eleştiri geliştirdiğini, aynı zamanda bu eserlerinde anlamın normatifliğini iki farklı şekilde tariflemeye çalıştığını savunuyorum. Wittgenstein, hem erken hem de geç yazılarında, ele aldığı konuları tezler veya doktrinler üreterek açıklamaya çalışan felsefi teorilere saldırır, çünkü ona göre bu felsefi teoriler dil ve anlamın bir kalkülüs olarak kavramsallaştırılmasına dayanır. *Tractatus*'ta eleştirisinin temel noktası, dilin bir kalkülüs olarak düşünüldüğünde genel kuralların ifade edilemez karakterini göstermeyi amaçlar. Dilin genel kurallarının aksiyomlaştırılmasına çalışan felsefi projelerin içkin bir eleştirisini verir, ancak Wittgenstein'in dilin genel yapısını göstermek amacıyla sunduğu mistisisme dayanan çözümü, yine dilin kalkülüse göre işlediği kabulüne yaslanır. *Felsefi Soruşturmalar*'da, Wittgenstein ona göre birçok felsefi teorinin örtük bir kabul olarak varsaydığı anlam ve dilsel mübadele anlayışının kavramsal varsayımlarının altını oyar. Bu varsayımların eleştirisi ve kural-takibi argümanı bize dilin kalkülüs olarak tasavvurunun doğasında var olan absürlükleri gösterir. Wittgenstein'in *Felsefi Soruşturmalar*'daki pratiğe dayalı dil ve kurallar anlayışının, gramatik ifadeler kavramıyla birlikte, yeni bir dilsel zorunluluk kavramı tarifleyerek, kalkülüs tasavvurunun karşılaştığı açmazları aştığını ileri sürüyorum. Son olarak, Wittgenstein'in kural ve normatiflik kavramlarının yeni bir felsefe yapma anlayışı sağladığını iddia ediyorum.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

When Wittgenstein went to Cambridge to study philosophy with Bertrand Russell between 1911 and 1913, the fascination of this philosophical circle was Frege's new notation and formalization of logic. One project related to this new logic was articulating mathematical expressions in terms of Fregean logic. Both Frege and Russell published on conceptualizing mathematics as a derivative of logic. Russell's and Whitehead's three-volume work *Principia Mathematica* was published with the same concern between 1910-1913. The second project was eliminating certain expressions from the field of philosophy by regarding them as nonsense and metaphysical, using logical analysis as the criterion for meaning. Fregean logic is thought to be a remedy for philosophical problems as well. The philosophical ethos that the young engineer Ludwig Wittgenstein was part of had two endeavors: eliminating metaphysics from philosophy and conceptualizing the language and mathematics as a mechanism governed by logical calculus.

After the publication of *Principia Mathematica*, Russell believed that “his contribution to technical philosophy was finished, was looking for someone with the youth, vitality, and ability to build upon the work which he had begun” (Monk, 1991, s. 38). Bertrand Russell's and Gottlob Frege's works are the inspirations for his work, responsible for stimulating his thoughts (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.4). Despite the expectations of Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein did not take part in completing such projects, but he provided a critique of such attempts as being nonsense.

Garver argues that the difficulty in understanding Wittgenstein is seeing his point, “for he does not seem to be either expounding texts or advocating or rebutting theses” (Garver, 2008, p.64). In this dissertation, I argue that Wittgenstein's works' main concern is transforming the picture of linguistic normativity as a logical calculus and consequently transforming the methods and aims of philosophy. If we look at this problem as central in his philosophy, many difficulties disappear. We see an ongoing concern of conceiving language as a calculus. The word 'calculus' is associated with mathematics, but Wittgenstein uses the term more broadly. Calculus refers to rule formulations from which linguistic expressions can be derived. This picture suggests a particular nature, function, and status of the rules in language. Accordingly, general definitive rules in calculus are seen as the source of the all-possible meaningful moves in language and determining all possible moves in advance once and for all according to the calculus. According to this conception of language as a calculus, an expression in language is meaningful when it accords with the set of general rules that determine its meaning. General rules are the sources and conditions of meaningful propositions. They are meaningful on their own, not thanks to some other rule, and they are prior and independent from actual linguistic practices. When such conditions are articulated, one can say that there cannot be a possibility that contradicts them. They give the set of all possible meaningful statements. In §81 of *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein calls this picture of language calculus-picture of language (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.43).

Wittgenstein's inquiries show that any intellectual discipline (*Wissenschaft*) that seeks to form a calculus for the study of meaning is futile and ends up in nonsense because they depend on misconceptions about the rule and normativity. This idea is present in his early and late works, relying on different conceptions of

rules and language. He raises his objections two times in his intellectual life differently. In his first book *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (TLP)*, he argues that the law of language cannot be expressed in the form of a proposition, but he believes that language is essentially a logical calculus. Language as a calculus can only be witnessed mystically, not expressed through logic or language. Since, in his critique, he relies on the same assumptions that he criticizes, in his later work, *Philosophical Investigations (PI)*, he attacks the very idea of calculus, not only the expressibility conditions of the calculus. The conception of the rule is of pivotal importance for his two main inquiries, *TLP* and *PI*. I argue that he manages to show the absurdities of picturing language as a calculus. Furthermore, he also works to provide an alternative picture of linguistic normativity that does not rely on the idea of calculus. His understanding of grammar gives us new tools to look for the logic of concepts. This way of looking at logical inquiry offers new ways to practice philosophy.

In this work, I follow his problematization of the idea of calculus and describe his critique of this picture of normativity in early and late writings. Then, I discuss his alternative picture, i.e., practice-based normativity, which opens a way to rethink the philosophy as a grammatical inquiry.

There is a vast amount of scholarship on Wittgenstein's ideas about his rule-following argument, his critique of the Augustinian picture of language, the unity of his philosophy, and his metaphilosophy. I aim to create an aspect that sees these arguments in his thinking as a fight against the calculus conception of normativity. To make such a claim, most of the dissertation deals with interpreting his texts to show the centrality of the critique of the calculus picture of rules in Wittgenstein's philosophical endeavor. In interpreting his works, I used them in three groups. I used *Notes on Logic (NL)*, *TLP*, and *A Lecture on Ethics (LE)* for his early writings.

Second, for his late writings, I used his works starting from *Big Typescript (BT)* to *On Certainty (OC)* because, in this period, his views on grammar, meaning, rule, language, and philosophical inquiry did not change radically between *BT* and *OC*. Thirdly, I rarely use his *32-35 Lectures*, and *Philosophical Grammar (PG)* and *Philosophical Remarks (PR)* often since Wittgenstein defends that language games are autonomous calculi to detach from his early ideas of isomorphism in the *TLP* (Wittgenstein, 1980b, p.29) (Wittgenstein, 1974, p.20). These views change in *PI*.

In following his inquiry on the calculus picture of rules, my main aim is to clarify his conception of normativity and relate it to his understanding of the philosophical practice. Providing this aspect can help three points. First, once we build such a conceptual narrative for Wittgenstein's philosophy, I believe that many misunderstandings, such as seeing him as relativist, quietist, or skeptic, lose their points because he does not deny the normativity of language but provides an alternative practice-based understanding of normativity, which makes such categorizations non-applicable. Secondly, we can gain a perspective for the discussions about the unity of his philosophy. Furthermore, understanding his views on normativity makes his proposal for the intellectual disciplines, i.e., philosophy (or *Wissenschafts*) as grammatical inquiry, more visible.

Let me start with the first point. I argue that Wittgenstein's meta-philosophical views are products of his views on normativity, meaning, and rules in his early and later philosophy. Baker and Hacker (1992) argue the same way, but Horwich (2012) contends with this idea. To clarify this relation, I describe Wittgenstein's critique of the normativity in the calculus picture and his alternative proposals in early and late works. Once we do this, we see the centrality of the problematization of the calculus conception of language in his philosophy. This

clarification also helps us avoid the misinterpretation that he is skeptical about normativity, as Kripke argued (1982), or his philosophy is conservative and quietist, as Nyiri (1982) argued.

Secondly, the publication of Cora Diamond's and James Conant's "resolute" reading of the *Tractatus*, where they defend a unity in his early and late philosophy, created another scholarly debate about the periodization of his philosophy. Alice Crary (2001) edited *New Wittgenstein* on resolute view. Since the emergence of resolute reading, the periodization of Wittgenstein's philosophy has created a field of scholarship. The concern about the unity of Wittgenstein's writings is not limited to *PI* and *TLP*, but Wittgenstein's lectures between 1932 and 1935, or *On Certainty* (*OC*), are classified as different from his earlier works. For example, David Stern (1991) suggests the middle period for his works between the *TLP* and *PI*. Danielle Moyal-Sharrock (2004) interprets *On Certainty* as the third Wittgenstein. I argue that reading his philosophy as a fight against building calculus for linguistic normativity shows us the unity of concern about the normativity of language and the possibility of philosophical activity. Focusing on the problematization of the calculus conception of language and its effects on the study of philosophy in Wittgenstein's thinking provides us a perspective to look at the contemporary debates in Wittgenstein's scholarship. The unity of his philosophy can be seen as the unity of the problematization of the calculus picture, which aims to clarify its misunderstandings and misconceptions. However, I believe the solutions he provides do not suggest a unity of the conception of rules, meaning, language, normativity, and philosophical activity. They differ in early and later works. However, I limit my work to describing his arguments against the calculus picture of normativity and its effects on philosophical practice. If the change of his ideas and approach to the

problematization of the calculus can provide criteria for periodization is not within the scope of this thesis.

Thirdly, I argue that providing a proper understanding of his inquiry on normativity is related to philosophy and is highly related to the nature of language. Wittgenstein's critique of the calculus conception of language and his alternative picture of practice-based normativity directly responds to the questions: "how and what can I assert on the logic of concepts?" Wittgenstein's grammatical remarks provide the signposts for the practitioners of the disciplines not to be bewitched by the wrong demands that result from the calculus conception of rules and language. To connect philosophical practice and practice-based normativity, I discuss Wittgenstein's methodological concerns about his philosophy related to his understanding of normativity.

In the end, my main aim is to clarify and highlight the centrality of his challenge against the dominant philosophical ethos and his attempt to build an alternative picture of normativity. Once we clarify his concerns, aims, and strategies in his works, I think it is visible that he neither offers a skeptical philosophical position nor aims to cancel out philosophical practice as such. Secondly, his practice-based understanding of normativity provides an accurate picture of philosophy as a practical discipline. Thirdly, his ideas do not form a unity in terms of outcomes, but there is a continuity of concern. These three points are the main findings of the dissertation as well. The dissertation ends by pointing out further research on the relation between philosophical methods and normativity. However, these insights need other critical discussions, which are out of the scope of this thesis.

In the second chapter, I focus on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and discuss his critique of conceiving language as a formal calculus, in which simple rules can be

articulated as *a priori* and meaningful on their own. Indeed, In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein thinks that there is a formal structure that all meaningful utterances must conform to a language. In this sense, Wittgenstein believes that language operates according to a hidden calculus part of the language, the world, and the thought.

However, he rejects the idea that this form is expressible in the form of a rule or a law. He criticizes the attempts to articulate the laws of the calculus of the language in the *Tractatus*. In his view, any meaningful expression in language must conform to the possibilities in logical space predetermined by the logical form without exception. The order of language is logically prior to any linguistic utterance. Such a conception of language assumes a perfect order between world, language, and thought sustained by the general logical form, which is the constitutive condition of any correspondence between them. Once this picture is accepted as correct, he shows that the logical structure is necessarily transcendent to language and cannot be represented explicitly in the form of a rule by language. Recognizing the ineffable nature of the logical calculus is not an acceptance of an intellectual lack but the ethical purpose of philosophical work, which is seeing the right *a priori* logic of language. Wittgenstein criticizes the attempts to explicitly state this *a priori* order of the world and language in the form of rules from four aspects; logical, ethical, religious, and aesthetic. I describe Wittgenstein's critique from these perspectives and lay down his argument for the inexpressibility of rules and thus the impossibility of philosophical theories that aim to state the laws of language. His solution for the expression problem of constitutive conditions is to leave such endeavors and witness the mystic beauty of language, logic, and the world.

In his later writings, the direction of his critique changes. He does not criticize stating the constitutive rules of the language but thinks of it as a calculus in the first place. This time to exemplify the misconceptions of the calculus conception of language, he focuses on the Augustinian picture of language, which picturizes how we conceive language in a commonsense way that commits to the idea of language as a calculus. Again, his critique focuses on the misconceptions about the rules once the language is thought to be calculus. In the third chapter, I describe how Wittgenstein undermines the assumptions about rules which are presumed by the calculus conception of the language exemplified in the Augustinian picture of language. I first list the misconceptions that Wittgenstein finds problematic in this picture. Then, I articulate his objections under four main titles. First, Wittgenstein assumes a calculus is rooted in seeing the ostensive function of language as its essence. After presenting the Augustinian picture of language in *PI*, Wittgenstein starts criticizing seeing language as an ostensive device. He gives different examples that show various non-descriptive functions of language. Secondly, Wittgenstein argues that linguistic practices in natural languages are categorically different from artificial languages, and they form irreducible multiplicities that cannot be subsumed under fixed, strict, complete rules, which can be completely surveyable. Thirdly, Wittgenstein argues that the way we conceive language as calculus is mediated by the desires and attitudes of the philosophers. Here I focus on various later writings that Wittgenstein criticizes elements of mindsets that aim to form calculus conception of normativity. Fourthly, between §185-202 of the paragraphs of *PI*, he shows that the relation between rules and their application ends up producing paradoxical results in the calculus picture of normativity. His attack follows two lines of objections; the first is that rules' determination of applications in linguistic

exchanges are analogous to causal processes, according to which meaning as a mental entity triggers the relation between rules and applications. His second critique is against the idea that rules somehow contain the applications prior to the practices as if they are predetermined. He shows that once these two assumptions of the calculus conception of language are taken to their end, the function of rules in language dissolves. I argue that the implausible results of the calculus conception of the rules that are shown in *PI* provide a *reductio* argument against the calculus conception of language. The *reductio* arguments help Wittgenstein to construct his practice-based account of the rules.

Following his critique of the calculus conception of language in the *PI*, in the fourth chapter, I discuss Wittgenstein's practice-based account of normativity in language to show how rules function in language if not as a calculus. In his new account of language, there is no unified idea of language that works like a calculus thanks to some constitutive rules, but different language games that cannot be imagined as a finite totality or be subsumed under general constitutive rules.

Wittgenstein rejects the idea that the normative character of language is grounded in something other than the practices. Wittgenstein highlights the essential connection between the rules we follow and the forms of life. His conception of linguistic normativity relies on the primacy of practices instead of the *a priori* laws that determine the possibilities in advance. He thinks of rules as practice-based conventions that are techniques in language and considers the grammar of a language game to be derivative of the linguistic practices for serving some practical purposes such as the training process of the learners of the language game. Wittgenstein also argues that the agreement in definitions is not enough for linguistic normativity, but the agreement in judgments is also necessary. In his new account of language, rules

are situated in practice. In the second part of the fourth chapter, I describe Wittgenstein's account of grammar, which is his crucial concept for transforming the calculus picture of linguistic normativity. Practice-based understanding of rule-following offers a new sense of necessity and the determination of meaning without being relativist or skeptical. I argue that Gordon Baker's and Peter Hacker's interpretation of grammatical statements as internal relations provides an accurate picture of linguistic normativity (Baker and Hacker, 1984) (Baker and Hacker, 1992).

In the last part of the fourth chapter, I discuss how the implications of Wittgenstein's conceptual investigations on rules and normativity might cultivate a different philosophical ethos. In this part, I aim to describe the techniques and purposes of Wittgensteinian philosophical inquiry as he exemplifies them in his critique of the calculus picture of language. My primary goal is to relate his understanding of philosophical inquiry to his account of practice-based normativity. Although Wittgenstein does not suggest strict inscriptions on how a philosophical inquiry shall be conducted, I think there are certain discernible qualities of his grammatical inquiry of language games. Such an interpretation of his views on philosophy helps us distance Wittgenstein's understanding of philosophy from skeptic and quietist interpretations. Wittgenstein suggests that philosophical activity shall focus on the necessities created in different language games by internal relations instead of looking for language-independent necessities. Wittgensteinian philosophical practice can only aim at understanding and describing how language games work. Philosophers describe how words work in different linguistic topographies. The task of describing the grammar of a concept includes clearing the misconceptions, drawing family resemblances, providing aspects, and aiming to

reach a better understanding of their use in the language. I argue that this philosophical practice is exemplified in his critique of the calculus understanding of normativity and rule-following. In this sense, philosophy aims to change the perspective of people who are captivated by various pictures, and being captive in the calculus view of language is a major misleading picture that radically affects the direction of the philosophizing.

CHAPTER 2

CRITIQUE OF THE CALCULUS PICTURE IN THE *TRACTATUS*

In this chapter, I describe how Wittgenstein criticizes the attempts to formalize language as a logical calculus in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein thinks that language operates according to a logical order. As Monk states, Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* is after the question if there is an order in the world *a priori* and, if so, what it consists of (Monk, 1991, p.129). He understands language as a correspondence relation between propositions and the facts. The totality of propositions forms the language. For him, this correspondence is sustained by logical calculus. This calculus shows the possibilities in the language in advance, prior and independent from, and transcendent to actual linguistic practices.

However, there is also a critique of this conception of language since, for him, the logical calculus cannot be stated in the form of *a priori* logical laws, rules, or axioms. He argues that the logical order is outside of the limit of the sayable. In his early period of thinking, Wittgenstein is deeply perplexed by the inexpressible nature of the general propositional form (*GPF*) of language, which according to him, is the possibility of any language. Thus, Wittgenstein noted in his notebook: “My difficulty is only an enormous difficulty of expression (Wittgenstein, 1979, p.40). Wittgenstein's conviction in his early thinking is that expressing the logic of language in calculus is a transgression of the limit that marks the domain of legitimately sayable expressions and that is delineated by this logic. In other words, stating the logic of language violates that very condition. I analyze how Wittgenstein claims that the expression of laws of language trespasses the limit of thinkable that is

drawn by itself. I discuss Wittgenstein's critique of the attempts to articulate the nature of language from four aspects; logical, ethical, religious, and aesthetic points of view. His critique argues that logical calculus cannot contain any propositions. Any expression of the calculus in the form of a rule is nonsense. The logical calculus cannot be formed from true and meaningful statements, but they are shown in senseless symbolism and be grasped mystically. However, Wittgenstein's claim is a contravention and violates the rules of logical order. The self-annihilating structure of the *Tractatus* transcends the philosophical problems and leads to an awareness of the totality of thought, language, and the world.

The chapter discusses Wittgenstein's formulation of the cardinal problem in philosophy and his ambition in the *Tractatus* to respond to this cardinal problem. For him, the cardinal problem is an institutional tendency of philosophical enterprise that transgresses the limits of expression in the language in its inquiry. He wants to show that any substantial theory about the essences of language, thought, or the world is condemned to be nonsense. Still, inquiring about a theory of expression and showing its impossibility, at the price of being nonsense, is believed to help transform the philosophers' motive that tends to transgress the limits of meaningful expressions.

Wittgenstein's strong belief about the futility of theory depends on his inquiry into the nature of the constitutive rules and of the language. In his understanding of language and meaning, the expressions transcendental about meaning and language necessarily fail to make sense. In the second part of chapter 2.2, *From the Logical Point of View*, I discuss his radical immanent view of language in *Tractatus*.

According to Wittgenstein, "propositions cannot express what is higher."

(Wittgenstein, 2001, p.86) The radical immanent understanding of language depends on the isomorphic relation between the world, language, and thought. Wittgenstein

argues that logical form is inexorable and the constitutive condition of any possible language. He criticizes the attempts to express the constitutive conditions in the form of a proposition. Expressing the constitutive condition of language in the form of law creates a paradox of self-referentiality. To avoid this problem, arguing for creating meta-languages does not address the problem of expression for Wittgenstein. Moreover, any claim to totality requires an outside perspective. However, in the case of language and expression, if we go out of language, we cannot express anything since we are out language.

Consequently, any ethical, aesthetic, or logical proposition requires a position beyond the limits of sense; thus, they are nonsense. Wittgenstein argues for describing the constitutive rules in senseless symbolism. He construes scientific laws, ethics, and aesthetics in the same way. However, for Wittgenstein logical form of language cannot be argued only with senseless symbolism. He argues that this senseless symbolism is the only way to see its mystic and sublime nature, which I discuss following parts of the chapter.

In the next part, 2.3, from the ethical point of view, I argue that for Wittgenstein, the demand to express the general logical form of meaningful expressions is not only a logical excess of the limits of language, but he also thinks that indulging to this demand of expression is an unethical move that undermines the integrity of thinking. I discuss how Wittgenstein argues that the ethical point of the *Tractatus* is being silent about transcendence. Accordingly, I claim the end of the book “passing to silence” is a logico-categorical imperative that demands recognizing the impossibility of talking about totalities from a transcendental point of view. I argue that Wittgenstein satisfies the ethical standards he sets for philosophizing partially.

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein states that the logic of language is transcendental to language (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.78). Therefore, thinking about the constitutive conditions also has a religious aspect for Wittgenstein. According to him, by making and expressing the logic of language by laws that are higher to the language, one ruins the mystic religious experience of witnessing the higher. In the fourth part of chapter 2.4, I approach the problem of expression of the constitutive rules of language from the religious point of view that is present in the *Tractatus*. I focus on the themes of metaphysical subject, mysticism, and religious sublimation of logical form in *Tractatus*. The calculus conception of the language is made sensible through a mystical stance. I relate the mystical points in *Tractatus* correlates to Wittgenstein's *Lecture on Ethics*, where he mentions “seeing the world as mystery,” “wondering about its existence,” and “feeling of absolute safety” (Wittgenstein, 1993, p.37).

Lastly, in 2.5, I discuss Wittgenstein's critique of formalizing language as a calculus from the aesthetic point of view. For Wittgenstein, formalizing a calculus distorts the mystic relation between the world and logical law, and this act ruins the experience of beauty. The aesthetic act of *showing* that Wittgenstein aims to replace philosophy in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein claims that the proper relation to the constitutive conditions is not propositional but aesthetic. I discuss Badiou's reading of Wittgenstein's philosophy as mainly archiaesthetic in *Wittgenstein's Anti-Philosophy* (Badiou, 2019). Philosophy as theory replaces with the act of clearance of the constitutive conditions of the world, language, and thought. This act sublimates the logic and its inexorable status.

At the end of the chapter, I point out the drawbacks of Wittgenstein's criticism, leading him to change his understanding of language, rules, and normativity in his later writings.

2.1 Deducing logical form as constitutive condition of any language

In this section, I expose how Wittgenstein justifies that logical form is the possibility of any language, world, and thought. He argues that they have the same structure, their constitutive condition. For Wittgenstein, logical form is the condition of making meaningful statements, thinking, and having a world. The connection between the world and words is explained by their conformity to the logical form. Later, I will show that for Wittgenstein, logical form is prior to any language, thought, and the world. It is independent of time and the subjects who use language. Later in the next section, I will present Wittgenstein's three arguments against the possibility of forming rules in calculus for expressing this form.

I want to start with how Wittgenstein conceives language in his primitive form in the *Tractatus* since, as he states in his later writings, his ideas are mediated by how we picture language in its primitive form. In *PG*, one of his later writings, Wittgenstein states;

The concept of meaning I adopted in my philosophical discussions originates in a primitive philosophy of language. The German word for “meaning” is derived from the German word for “pointing” (Wittgenstein, 1974, p.56)

In the *Tractatus*, the way the primitive form of language is conceived directly affects his critique of the calculus conception of language. Wittgenstein does not write his view, but von Wright writes in his memoir the description of a car accident in Paris which I think is a good example of how Wittgenstein himself thinks of language as a relation between names and objects. Von Wright states;

It was in the autumn of 1914, on the Eastern Front. Wittgenstein was reading in a magazine about a lawsuit in Paris concerning an automobile accident. At the trial, a miniature model of the accident was presented before the court. The model here served as a proposition, that is, as a description of a possible state of affairs. It had this function owing to a correspondence between the parts of the model (the miniature houses, cars, people) and things (houses, cars, people) in reality. It now occurred to Wittgenstein that one might reverse the analogy and say that a proposition serves as a model or picture, by virtue of a similar correspondence between its parts and the world. (Malcolm, 2001, p.8) (Stern, 1995, p.35)

Indeed, Wittgenstein's inquiry starts with stating some truisms about language. We use language, and we represent things to ourselves. A second undeniable truism for him is that it is impossible to imagine something illogical. There is no illogical thought, world, or language. Starting from these two trivialities, that there is language and the impossibility of imagining anything illogical, Wittgenstein argues that for any language to be present, both language and reality must share the same logical structure. Wittgenstein argues that this common structure is the logical form. Let me describe how he argues for it in detail.

At the very beginning of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein describes what he understands of the world and its relation to logic. He states that “the world is the totality of facts” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.5). Just after the statement about the composition of the world, he makes a transition to the concept of logical space, which contains the structure of the world. The relation between the world and the logical space is conjoint through the logical possibilities: “the facts in logical space are the world” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.5). In the fifth line, Wittgenstein defines the relation between the world and logical space. Logical space combines all logical possibilities (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.5).

He describes logical space as the formal scaffolding of the world. As the world exists, the logical order is its formal structure. Logical possibilities cannot be disturbed in time. He says: “in logic, nothing is accidental. If things can occur in

states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning (Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts).” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.6). I shall note that Wittgenstein talks about possibilities of things, state of affairs, and facts, not their actuality in reality. The structure of logical space is a formal entity. It is not a substantial logical structure. All that happens is contained as a possibility in logical space formally. So, the logical space that contains all the possibilities is inexorably present. As he states, a new possibility cannot be discovered later (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.6). The presence of logic as an unalterable structure is formal and does not inform anything about the content of the world. The possibilities are set prior to any language. One of the results of this understanding is that the possibilities have ontological priority over practices in the *Tractatus*.

After introducing the primacy of the logical form, he starts inquiring about language and expression of facts at §2.1: “we picture facts to ourselves” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.9). Wittgenstein stipulates a correspondence between the world and the pictures. Their correspondence is related to the logical space. He describes the pictures in the following way: “a picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of states of affairs” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.9). The formal order of the world is present in these pictures as well. The connection between the world and the language is established through the descriptive and representative function of the picture. With an analogy to measuring, Wittgenstein says: “the pictorial form, the picture reaches out to reality , and it is laid like a measure” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.10). The function of propositions is understood to be analogous to picturing and measuring. In *Wittgenstein and Vienna Circle*, Wittgenstein repeats this idea in his conversation with Friedrich Waismann: “in many respects, a proposition behaves just like a measuring-rod, and therefore I might

just as well have called propositions measuring-rods” (Waismann, 1973, p. 185). In order to achieve the measuring function of the picture, Wittgenstein thinks that between two spaces, that is, pictorial space and reality, there must be something in common. The common element between the picture and the pictured is set as a condition for the pictorial relation.

The common structure is the form of the picture and the form of what is depicted (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.11). In this way, the world and the pictures have a representational relation that is possible by sharing the same structure, i.e., logical form (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.11). The logical form is both the structure of reality and the structure of the pictures. The condition of language, or a pictorial relation, is to have something in common with the world. Having something in common between reality and pictures also informs us about the structure of the world.

What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in any way at all, is logical form, i.e., the form of reality. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.11)

Since the picture must conform to the logical form, Wittgenstein states that every picture is logical (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.11). So, both the pictures and the world share a logical form. As Wittgenstein states: “a picture shares the logical pictorial form with reality” (Wittgenstein, 2001,p.11). A representative and correspondence relation is established between pictures and the world. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein's conviction about isomorphism between world and language relies on the idea that the correspondence between world and language is a necessary demand of thought and thus the condition of possibility of any *WLT*. If there were not a common element between them, the correspondence would not hold. The logical form shows itself in meaningful propositions. He calls this form the general propositional form (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.43). The need for a common structure is

definitive for Wittgenstein. He supposes that there must be a commonality to be a relation, and the common element is the logical form. He justifies the necessity of a common element as the logical form by relying on the idea that illogical thought is not imaginable (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.12). The presence of the logical form is given without any further justification. Similarly, a state of affairs that contradicts the logical form is impossible.

Wittgenstein extends this isomorphism between the world and pictures to our thoughts. He starts with the claim that “a logical picture of facts is thought” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.12). The common structure makes the engagement between the world, thoughts, and pictures. Later, Wittgenstein defines thought as “a proposition with a sense” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.22). In the same way that the totality of facts is the world, “the totality of propositions is the language” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.22). Thanks to their form, there is a perfect symmetry between the three planes. What is thinkable is possible and is represented in the language. What could be represented is thinkable and possible. Lastly, what is possible is thinkable and can be represented. Thinkable, possible, and what can be represented are up to a regime of logical form. As he states in §3.03-§3.031, what is possible, thinkable, and sayable cannot be illogical either. So, thought, language, and the world cannot have an illogical possibility, and all the possibilities they have structurally share a common form.

How is such a correspondence possible? Wittgenstein asks this question in §5.511 and gives the immediate answer:

How can logic—all-embracing logic, which mirrors the world—use such peculiar crotchets and contrivances? Only because they are all connected with one another in an infinitely fine network, the great mirror.
(Wittgenstein, 2001, p.59)

What makes the mirror great? In the *Tractatus*, greatness comes from its all-embracing nature. The logical form is inexorable. By establishing isomorphism,

Wittgenstein also concludes that the world is logical, i.e., logical form is not only the form of language but also the world. He records this idea in his notebooks: “*work has extended from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world*” (Wittgenstein, 1979, p.79). However, he criticizes this idea in his later thought. Hacker states that Wittgenstein's isomorphism “is the dogmatism of projecting features of our method of representation onto the objects represented and then insisting that they must be thus-and so, otherwise we wouldn't be able to . . . (Hacker, 2013, p.47). Indeed, Wittgenstein not only states that the logical form is the means of representation and states that the logical form is the structure of the world, but he also insists that imagining otherwise is an impossibility. His idea that logical form is the constitutive rule of any language, world, and thought relies on this fallacious projection. In arguing for isomorphism, Wittgenstein deduces the general propositional form as a product of his inquiry, but he supposes the logical form from the beginning of the inquiry. In other words, the common structure of the totality of language reached through philosophical argumentation is possible by assuming that there must be a common element that is essential to any linguistic practice in the first place.

Secondly, any meaningful statement in a language is to fit the logical form. Any expression that does not fit in this structure is not meaningful. Hacker articulates in the *Tractatus* that Wittgenstein posits the logical form as the constitutive rule of any possible language. As he states, “it was supposed that logic, represented by the new logical calculus, is the transcendental condition for the possibility of symbolic provides the structural forms of the depth grammar of any possible language” (Hacker, 2013, p.132). In the *Tractatus*, logical form as a constitutive condition of language, thought, and the world is prior to any linguistic expression. Logic is

presented as the shared order of the world language and thought. He conceives it as a closed system sustained by the all-embracing logical form.

In his later thinking, Wittgenstein criticizes his imagination of how primitive language works, his way of arguing for the isomorphism of language and the world. He also contends the implications of isomorphism; one is the idea that logical form determines all the applications in advance, and the other is that all the possible propositions are somehow present in logical form. However, in the *Tractatus*, his critique denies the possibility that the general logical form can be propositions that have meaning. So, stating what we take to be necessarily true would be nonsense. Thus, I argue that the book aims to criticize the idea of a formal calculus while assuming it simultaneously. Because of this, he needed a new critique which I will elaborate on in the third chapter.

In this part, I described how Wittgenstein deduces logical form as the constitutive of any language and world. This assumption is the crucial point for developing a calculus conception of language. However, Wittgenstein shows us in his later parts of the *Tractatus* that once one accepts language as a calculus, a closed system, one must accept that its constitutive language conditions are outside of language and are inexpressible. The inexpressibility of rules relies on the priority and the sublime status of the logical form over any possibility of practice, facts, and thoughts. What comes with the greatness of logic is that the inexpressibility of its structure is the faith of all great mirrors or constitutive conditions. Talking about the great mirror would create nothing but nonsense, a “transcendental twaddle,” in Wittgenstein's understanding of language.

In the next part, I discuss how Wittgenstein argues for the problems of expressing this form in the form of the constitutive rules as propositions. He thinks that this is the cardinal problem of philosophy.

2.2 From the logical point of view

From the logical point of view, Wittgenstein thinks that any sensible linguistic expression in any language has to accord with logic. However, Wittgenstein opposes the idea that the general logical form of thoughts can be put in words in the form of laws, principles, axioms, or rules that can be expressed, communicated, or taught as a body of doctrine as meaningful utterances. He thinks the idea that the logical form can be communicated results from “misunderstanding the logic of language” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.3). He names this misunderstanding the cardinal problem of philosophy (Russell, 1974, p.37).

In this part, first, I describe the cardinal problem of philosophy as the temptation to provide laws in the form of propositions. I exemplify such attempts in Frege's and Russell's writings since they are the source of the stimulation of his ideas in the *Tractatus*. Then, I describe his three objections to the attempts to state the logical form in the form of law and genuine proposition. His first objection is that any law expression cannot escape from the paradox of self-referentiality. Secondly, constructing meta languages to express the law of language does not address the problem and is superficial. Third, the expression of law requires a God point of view, which we speaking subjects cannot attain. After Wittgenstein raises his objections, he provides an alternative account in which he aims to formulate a logical syntax that symbolizes the logical form without forming it as a law or giving it a status of an

axiom. From the logical point of view, I critically discuss Wittgenstein's arguments against the expression of the constitutive rules.

The right logical point of view is reached at the end of the book after the mystical articulation of logical form. Articulating the logical form as an ineffable essence of language will give us the background to understand Wittgenstein's conception of the constitutive rules in his later philosophy.

2.2.1 The cardinal problem of philosophy as expressing the logical form of language

The challenge of *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* is mainly about a problem of expression, which Wittgenstein experiences a great difficulty: how can one sensibly express the logical form of the language, world, and thought. This belief relies on the assumption that the general logical form constitutes the space of sensible expressions, i.e., the totality of language. Thus, the inquiry into the nature of language, meaning, and normativity coincides with the inquiry of logic. If one can construct rules of logic as a calculus, then one manages to formulate the calculus conception of language. Wittgenstein states that the challenge of providing a calculus of this logical form is the cardinal problem of philosophy in his letters to Russell after his professor sent his comments about the *Tractatus*:

...whole business of logical propositions is only corollary... The main point is the theory of what can be expressed [gesagt] by props i.e., by language (and, which comes to the same, what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by props, but only shown [gezeigt] which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy) (Wittgenstein to Russell, 1974, p.37)

The *Tractatus* is challenging to answer this cardinal problem by drawing the limit between sayable and unsayable. Wittgenstein says:

the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather – not to thought but the expression of the thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the

limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought) (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.3)

In the background, Wittgenstein responds to Frege's and Russell's understanding of logical laws since they both thought that logical laws are true and meaningful. As Hacker states,

Frege and Russell both conceived of logic as an axiomatic science (akin, in this respect, to geometry). The theorems of logic are accordingly deduced from axioms by means of stipulated rules of inference. What then is the status of the axioms and how do we know them to be true? (Hacker, 1986, p.42)

The challenge in the *Tractatus* is to repudiate the idea that the limits of language (laws of logic) are propositional and have meaning. For example, according to Frege, logical laws are not only descriptive generalities about how things are but also indicate how things must be. Frege writes that “like ethics, logic is a normative discipline (Frege, 1897, p. 226)(Steinberger, 2017, p144). For him, laws of thought are both prescriptive and descriptive. He states;

Like the laws of psychology, biology, and physics, the laws of logic are first and foremost descriptive in that they are responsible to how things stand in the world. (Frege, 1956, p. 289)

As Ricketts points out, according to Frege, “logical laws are maximally general truths, substantive generalizations that are 'about reality' in the same fashion that the laws of geometry, physics, and chemistry are” (Ricketts & Levine, 1996, p. 123).

Similarly, in *Problems of Philosophy* (1912), Russell states that propositions with the highest degree of self-evidence (what he here calls “intuitive knowledge”) include “those which merely state what is given in sense, and also certain abstract logical and arithmetical principles, and (though with less certainty) some ethical propositions” (Russell, 1912, p.109). For Frege, our 'logical faculty' apprehends the self-evidence of logical laws (Hacker and Baker, 2009, p.356). In an axiomatic

system, the truth and meaning of logical propositions like axioms are self-evident.

Wittgenstein's argument aims to undermine the possibility of providing such rules for language's constitutive conditions.

This aim is not realized by providing an answer for the cardinal problem but by showing that the problems presuppose a common misunderstanding regarding the logic of the language (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.3). Philosophy's cardinal problem dissolves because its legitimacy is rejected. So, Wittgenstein's primary strategy for solving the cardinal problem in philosophy is to limit the legitimate expressions and clear the misconceptions around the logical form. Both at the beginning and the end of the book, he states: "what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over silence" (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.3) (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.89).

Any inquiry that aims to formulate a calculus conception of language by propositions is doomed to fail. His main critique against the theories that formulate the essence of language in the form of laws, principles, or axioms is that they cannot be true or false, cannot have independent meaning on their own, and must be senseless.. The ground rules of language, world, and thought cannot be stated, but they are shown (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.89). He aims to clear the way that the logical form shows itself so that we do not need to grasp it through representation.

Wittgenstein inquires on the limit of the sayable, something in the language, the "limit will therefore only be in the language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense (unsinnig.)" (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.4). The transcendental expression of constitutive rules, limits, and laws are futile endeavors that end up in nonsense.

However, the *Tractatus* shares the same faith with the other works in philosophy, i.e., being nonsense. The paradoxical structure of the book produces a dense inquiry on the logic of language, its limit, and its other side, together with an unexpected extension to ethics, aesthetics, science, and religion. According to Wittgenstein, his work manages the reader to witness the limit of language. The main hope of the book is that *Tractarian* nonsense functions for awareness, “illumination” about the logic and the limit of language. Once the logic of language is understood, one can “see the world aright” and avoid creating nonsense.

In the next section, I expose how Wittgenstein constructs his argument against expressing the condition of language in the form of propositions. He argues that the general logical form is not said, but it shows itself.

2.2.2 Against the expression of logical form

After deducing the logical form as the constitutive condition of the world and the language by relying on the inconceivability of illogical thought, Wittgenstein states that propositions cannot picture the common logical structure for three reasons. First, stating the rule creates the problem of self-referentiality. Secondly, constructing meta-languages to express the logical form is not a genuine solution. Lastly, Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of expression because such an expression requires an outward position that is out of the domain of the linguistic space.

2.2.2.1 Problem of self-referentiality

Wittgenstein considers the propositions like pictures, and he states that a picture cannot be a picture of itself. A picture is always a picture of something. Thus, there must be a distance between a picture and what is pictured. Wittgenstein says:

2.173 A picture represents its subject from a position outside it. (Its standpoint is its representational form.)

2.174 A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.12)

The representational form of the picture is the common structure between reality and the picture, but the pictures cannot create a distance between their form and themselves. However, differentiating between a picture and its form requires us to go outside the logical form and make a picture of it, like in §2.1. However, for Wittgenstein, this is not possible simply because “thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.12). There are no possible views for pictures to go out of logical, take logical form as their subject, and represent it.

The measuring-rod analogy is also used in *Philosophical Investigations* in a similar context. It can help us understand why representative picturing requires a certain distance and why self-depiction is impossible in a representative understanding of language. For example, Wittgenstein says: “Imagine someone saying: 'But I know how tall I am!' and laying his hand on top of his head to prove it” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.103e). Similarly, pictures are laid on the reality in the *Tractarian* understanding of language; thus, in the way that it does not make sense to measure something by itself, the common structure cannot be measured since it is the means of measuring. Later, in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein says, “clearly the laws of logic cannot in their turn be subject to laws of logic” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.75).

If the rules of language are applied to themselves in order to express the laws of thoughts, the expression of the constitutive rule becomes nonsense since it does not have the pictorial form; in other words, it does not register a possibility in the logical space. Self-reference, applying the norm to itself, is as absurd as measuring someone's height by putting his hand on his head. The law cannot determine its self-

evidence, and its truth since truth is defined as a relation between facts and propositions, not between propositions. Wittgenstein says, “it is quite impossible for a proposition to state that itself is true” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.40). The impossibility of expressing the general logical form of language as a proposition results from Wittgenstein's understanding of the function of language. The only meaningful function of language is picturing. So, the expression of the logical form cannot escape from the paradox of self-referentiality. We can formulate the paradox of self-referentiality in the *Tractatus* as follows:

(A) For an expression to make sense, it has to picture a fact, if not, the expression is nonsense.

(B) (A) does not picture a fact.

Thus, (A) is nonsense.

If we state (A) as a criterion of making sense, then when one asks if (A) meets the condition of making sense, it is apparent that it does not meet the condition that it sets. For Wittgenstein, any constitutive condition that sets a limit to thought faces this problem. Thus, as I will later discuss, Wittgenstein defends that (A) shall not be a proposition but an ineffable insight mirrored in propositions about the world, thought, and language.

Richard Rorty also argues that Wittgenstein realizes that “the search for non-empirical truth about the conditions of the possibility of describability raises the self-referential problem of its own possibility.” (Rorty, 1991, p.54) Indeed, any statement that gives unity to language is not in the form of an elementary proposition.

Wittgenstein notices that “propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it—logical form” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.31).

Rorty thinks that the problem of self-referentiality is not peculiar to stating the condition of making sense but to a more general problem for theorizing and describes how it emerges in language. He differentiates between two distinct sets of objects of any inquiry; he calls them “type A” and “type B” entities. According to this distinction, type A entities “contextualize and explain” type B entities but cannot be contextualized or explained on pain of infinite regress. On the other hand, Type B entities are lower-level entities that “require relations but cannot themselves relate, require contextualization and explanation but can-not themselves contextualize nor explain” (Rorty, 1991, p.54). He says: “All type A entities, all unexplained explainers, are in the same situation as a transcendent Deity.” (Rorty, 1991, p.55) In this sense, “the Platonic Forms, the Kantian categories, and the Russellian logical objects are examples of what I shall call type A entities.” (Rorty, 1991, p.54) The problem of self-referentiality is a product of the need to postulate type A objects in language.

A similar problem is present in the *Tractatus* since the general logical form is a type A entity. In the case of stating the logical form in the form of a law, it faces the problem of self-referentiality. Compared to the other philosophers who posited type A entities, Wittgenstein's argument for the ineffable or inexpressible nature of logical form is an original move for Rorty. Rorty states, “Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* can be read as a heroic attempt to save philosophy from naturalism by claiming that type A objects must be ineffable, that they can be shown but not said, that they can never become available in the way that type B objects are.” (Rorty, 1991, p.55)

Wittgenstein is aware that a limit is something that does not have a beyond, unlike a border. We can analogically relate Wittgenstein's question about the limits of language to the limits of space. The question about the limits of space can be

formulated as “What is at the limit of the universe?” For Wittgenstein, this question would also imply an interrogation about what lies outside of the universe. It asks what is on the other side of the limit of the universe. Such a question is ill-formed because by referring to an outside of the limit with spatial terms. However, the other side is supposed to be non-spatial since the question assumes that the inside of the limit is spatial. The question configures both sides as spatial by using terms such as beyond, at, out, in, and side. Thus, the question is ill-formed. Another similar ill-formed question can be formulated regarding the limits of time. “What lies before the beginning of time.” or “What lies after time?” In such questions as the questions of space, as Wittgenstein says, “temporality is embedded in their grammar.” (Wittgenstein, 1980, p.26) Before and after are the temporal terms.

While we search for something atemporal, we refer to this thing within the grammar of temporality and time. Similarly, when one asks, “what is at or beyond the limit of language?” there is a similar problem in forming our question. We think that being at the limit is a place inside the domain of language. However, for Wittgenstein thinking “at the limit” implies outside of the limit (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.3). So, inquiring about the limit is no different from inquiring about the beyond of language. We think that there is a possibility of expression outside of language, but we readily demand to place ourselves outside of the language. So, outside of language, there is no possibility of expression.

The *Tractatus* attempts to show the outcomes of thinking language as a totality (limited whole) by thinking about its limits. The limits of language do not just mark the totality of language. The limits of the world and the thought overlap with the limits of language. Stating a criterion that refers to these limits creates a

paradox. Livingstone summarizes how thinking on the totality of thinkable leads to paradox:

The totality of thinkable, for instance, if it exists, presumably also has thinkable boundaries. But then we can define an element of this totality, namely, the thought of the boundaries themselves, that are both inside and the outside the totality and contradiction results. (Livingstone, 2012, p.24)

So, the paradox of self-referentiality unavoidably appears “whenever any totality (or whole) is thought or invoked by means of something which is an element of that very totality” (Livingstone, 2012, p.24). Wittgenstein's solution to this problem is not to solve the paradox within the language but to change our perspective and question the legitimacy of the demand to conceptualize the language as a self-referential system. Wittgenstein also criticizes any attempt to defer the problem of self-referentiality. Bertrand Russell offers that the constitutive elements of a language can be expressed by constructing meta-language by assimilating his *Theory of Types* into the domain of language. Wittgenstein's arguments against meta-language are the second reason he argues against the expression of the constitutive conditions of language.

2.2.2.2 Against meta language: radical immanence of language

Wittgenstein works to elucidate the implausibility of constructing a meta-language to describe the general form of language in the form of a general rule. In doing this, he elaborates on one of the possible solutions, i.e., Russell's Theory of Types, to avoid the self-referentiality problem. For Russell, the paradoxes about self-referentiality in mathematics emerge because of confusion when a class name is taken as its own member. He suggests a theory that does not allow confusion

between types to occur. He produces hierarchically related logical types and differentiated their use so that a class is never treated as its own member.

Additionally, he creates infinite hierarchy by conceptualizing natural numbers as sets so that there will be no class that could not have the possibility to establish a higher logical type. Consequently, a class is never confused with its members. In order for the Theory of Types to be a solution to avoid the self-referentiality problem, one has to suppose the same mechanism is at work in mathematics, logic, and language. Accepting that such a transition is possible, at least as an analogy, the idea is that the statement about the constitutive rule of language is not a member of statements that fit this rule and does not picture reality, but still, it makes sense in a meta language. The statement of the constitutive rule is a statement at another level, and it is a different type from the lower level propositions, and they make sense at this higher level. For Wittgenstein, the critical idea of the Theory of Types is that “the no proposition can make a statement about itself, because a propositional sign cannot be contained in itself” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.19). This idea is important for Wittgenstein since he rejects the idea that the constitutive condition that draws a limit to expression can have meaning. He states that constitutive rules, which he later symbolizes as the logical syntax that gives the form to meaningful sentences, cannot have meaning themselves. The logical form shall be devoid of meaning so that a possibility of self-referentiality shall not arise at all. He states that “in logical syntax, the meaning of a sign should never play a role” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.19). Even if it is at the meta-level, logical syntax cannot have meaning. For Wittgenstein, the construction of meta-languages to avoid self-referentiality does not encounter the problem of the expression of constitutive rule

with sense because “he had to mention the meaning of signs when establishing the rules for them” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.19). As Bearn states:

a majestic Russellian hierarchy, then *either* hierarchy has a topmost language and we will either not be able to understand its meanings or we will understand them as Wittgenstein (rather than Russell) does *or* the hierarchy goes up forever, which simply defers addressing the philosophical question permanently without ever addressing it.
(Bearn, 1997, p.54)

Indeed, constructing or inventing the meta languages does not touch the problem since, for Wittgenstein, the problem is not about the forms that one can invent, but what he deals with is “that which makes it possible for me to invent them.” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.67) Wittgenstein finds the solution of appealing to higher types as a superfluous not only for language but also for mathematics. He says that “the theory of classes is completely superfluous in mathematics.” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.71) One reason he thinks that the hierarchies are not useful for the problem of expression is because he thinks that he is dealing with a problem concerning the world. As he states, for him, “the general propositional form is the essence of a proposition. And the essence of the world” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.56). This transition from proposition to the world results from the supposition of the necessary shared logical formal structure. He thinks that hierarchies, on the other hand, do not concern with reality (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.67). Thus, they are irrelevant.

In Wittgenstein's understanding of language, any statement overarching the world/language is not possible. The so-called laws of logic are senseless forms displayed in elementary propositions. Baltas calls this philosophical perspective, borrowing Spinoza's terminology, “the perspective of radical immanence” (Baltas, 2012, p.1). In a sense, there is no possibility of going higher or deeper down the principles. Bearn states that “we cannot step outside of language to say what it means in some finer language. And there is no escape, as Russell thought, through

hierarchy” (Bearn, 1997, p.54). In short, Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* argues that giving a foundation to language by such a theory is not plausible.

Impotence of language to refer to higher and to its limit is also an indication about an impotency of human-beings for setting their finitude. Wittgenstein raises his third objection to a subject position that has the potency to express what is higher.

2.2.2.3 The metaphysical subject

For Wittgenstein, expressing the constitutive condition of the language requires a subject position that is placed above the world and can see the world and language as a totality. He says:

In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.31)

However, this position is not imaginable for us, we cannot go outside of logic and say how logical form looks like:

3.031 It used to be said that God could create anything except what would be contrary to the laws of logic.—The truth is that we could not *say* what an 'illogical' world would look like. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.12)

Wittgenstein again argues for the impossibility of creating an outside point, which can make us express the logical form of the world, thought, and language. Because of this impossibility, the distance to the logical rules cannot be attained. The outside position is similar to God's position, which could not be imagined or thought of. Here, Wittgenstein corrects an anonymous saying. He does not claim that God could not create anything against logic or there would not be any other possibilities of logic, rather, he claims that we could not make sense of what falls outside of logic.

Whereas Wittgenstein affirms a certain duality of mind that gives the possibility to distance itself from the world and imagine the world as a totality, he rejects the idea that this subject can entertain linguistic abilities and provide us a body of thoughts that inform us about the a priori logical order of the world from outside the world. The main difficulty in stating the logical laws is the subject's potency, which can experience the world and language as a limited totality.

Seeing the world as a totality requires the subject to take a flight, as Wittgenstein writes in his *Notebooks* (Wittgenstein, 1979, p.23). The possibility of flight relies on a dualist conception of mind. Wittgenstein uses the concept “metaphysical subject” or “philosophical subject” to make sense of this subject that is differentiated from our presence in the world as human beings. For Wittgenstein, the philosophical subject is “not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a part of it” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.70).

However, like the logical form of language, the metaphysical self cannot be pictured since it is at the limit of the world. To make his point about the metaphysical self, Wittgenstein constructs a thought experiment where he imagines a transcendent point of view, where he looks at the world as a totality, and writes a book called *The World as I found it* (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.69). In this book, there shall be a report on his body as well. The reports about the body shall talk about the relations between his will and the bodily parts. However, according to Wittgenstein, in this book to mention the metaphysical subject is impossible since it is something not in the world, but at the limit of the world. Thus, the isolation of the metaphysical subject “that thinks or entertains ideas” is not possible, “for it alone could not be mentioned in that book” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.69). Whether the expressions of

witnessing the limits of the world and language are nonsensical, the subject position that makes them possible is a critical metaphysical assumption that Wittgenstein appeals to in the *Tractatus*. It is a transcendent position that can witness the language as a totality at the limit of the world, but it lacks the means of expression. Compared to Descartes' cogito, Wittgenstein's metaphysical subject lacks the conditions of making deductions such as “cogito, ergo sum,” or making statements like “cogito.”

The desire to express an *a priori* conditions of the language would fail since such ideas require a metaphysical subject, which can entertain ideas, but as Wittgenstein stated metaphysical subject is not part of the world, but it is not outside of the world either. This way of conceptualizing the subject makes the world solipsistic since world's limit is coordinated with the metaphysical subject.

Wittgenstein writes:

5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.69)

To understand the metaphysical subject's position in the world, Wittgenstein appeals to the analogy of the eye's relation to the visual field at §5.633. We see the visual field, but we cannot see the eye. He adds: “And nothing *in the visual field* allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.69). In a sense, the eye shows itself in our seeing. Eye analogy holds for the deduction of the logical form. It is also similar to the impossibility of self-referentiality of the general logical form of the language. The eye can see everything but not of itself, but the eye is the constitutive condition of the visual field. Similarly, the metaphysical subject conditions the world's limits in the same way the logical form does.

To conclude, discussing the metaphysical subject serves two purposes in the *Tractatus*. First, it shows that expressing the constitutive rules which inform us about

the totality of the world and language is untenable. In order to state the laws of logic, one needs a transcendent subject position that sees the world, language, and logic as a limited whole and that can report about them. Such a subject position lacks the conditions of expression since it positions itself outside of language. Secondly, the alternative account of the metaphysical subject makes the mystical interpretation of the world possible. The metaphysical subject is determined as the constitutive condition of the world (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.68). Rorty states that the *Tractatus* serves for [preserving] “the philosopher's autonomy and self-sufficiency by letting him picture himself as somehow above, or beyond, the world” (Rorty, 1991, p.51). Similarly, the metaphysical subject wonders about the existence of the world and language. Although the possibilities of expression are not present for this subject, it witnesses the world as a whole and language as a totality. I will talk about the importance of the metaphysical subject in 2.4 and 2.5 for the mystical alternative that Wittgenstein presents for understanding the world. However, such a picture of the metaphysical subject undermines the sense of a transcendent subject position and replaces it with his understanding of the metaphysical subject which is the inexpressible condition of the mystical understanding of the world.

In this part, I discussed three reasons Wittgenstein raised against the expression of constitutive rules with sense. In the next part, I discuss how Wittgenstein manages to describe the logical form in the *Tractatus* by providing a logical syntax in the symbolic language that is devoid of sense and avoids three points that he raised against substantial accounts of constitutive rule.

2.2.3 Expressing the constitutive conditions in senseless symbolism

Wittgenstein's one of the main challenges is to show that the expression of the constitutive rule of language is not up to the same regime of sense with elementary propositions. Wittgenstein calls this his fundamental idea (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.26). Despite arguing against the possibility of expression of the logical form, Wittgenstein also states that it is possible to talk about formal and structural properties in a certain sense, but not by means of propositions (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.31). It is creating a notation/syntax devoid of meaning so that they are not nonsense but senseless. As he states, “all the propositions of logic say the same thing, to wit nothing (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.53).

Wittgenstein provides a senseless symbolism for constitutive rules that mark the limits of language. Senseless symbolism is created by symbolizing every element in the language other than propositions as logical variables. In order to do that, Wittgenstein articulates various elements of the language in senseless symbolism. First, he argues for the possibility of determining the limits of propositions as tautology and contradiction in a senseless symbolism since “the truth-conditions of a proposition determine the range that it leaves open to the facts” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.41). They are the limit cases for the truth conditions. Secondly, he formulates the logical constants such as quantifiers (every, all, some), connectives (and, or), logical identity (=), and logical negation as variables. For him, they do not have independent meaning on their own. Lastly, he symbolizes the translation rules, that are used for transforming complex propositions to elementary propositions as variables as well. The reason behind these symbolizations is because they are part of the general logical form, and the general logical form shall be devoid of meaning. Thanks to these symbolizations, he manages to formulate the general propositional form, in

which all terms are used as variables. Once he could formulate them as variables, he manages to write the general logical form as senseless. Laws of science and of ethics, which are constitutive of the world according to him, are the same.

The formulation of senseless rules for the constitutive conditions serves two purposes. First, Wittgenstein manages to create a notation that excludes certain confusions about propositions, such as confusing formal relations with genuine factual propositions. Symbolization of formal relations between concepts is composed of logical variables, such as “1 is a number” or “red is darker than pink.” In such statements, every part is a variable; 1, number, red, pink. On the other hand, according to Wittgenstein, propositions are functions of names, and they make reference to the world; they can be true or false (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.36). He thinks that many confusions in philosophy result from not realizing the difference between genuine propositions and formal symbolizations. Secondly, he manages to articulate the totality of language without creating any metaphysical statement about what is higher. So “the laws of thought” or the constitutive rule of making meaningful statements can be expressed without creating nonsense, i.e., conceptualizing them in senseless symbolism. He claims that he overcomes the difficulties in expressing the constitutive rules. In this part, I describe how Wittgenstein argues for the senseless conception of constitutive rules in the *Tractatus*.

2.2.3.1 Expressing the limits of language: tautology and contradiction

Wittgenstein claims that laws of language can be seen as senseless pseudo-propositions and can symbolize the totality of language. One needs to assume that language works according to calculus to do this. For Wittgenstein, the totality of

language is composed of elementary propositions, which conform to logical form. They are functions of names (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.36). They cannot be reduced to each other and are independent. In this sense, they all have equal value. The possibility of elementary propositions relies on the condition that their sense must be determinate. Every possibility in logical space corresponds to an elementary proposition. Elementary propositions' truth possibilities create the mapping in logical space (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.21). The mapping of possibilities is precise; vagueness cannot be allowed in the logical space. Thanks to the sharp and determinate distribution of sense, "a proposition has one and only one complete analysis" (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.15). Frege also presents this idea as a condition of the possibility of logic because if the concepts do not have sharp boundaries, the law of excluded middle will not hold (Frege, 2013, p.56). The determinateness of sense provides the idea that the logical form cannot be transgressed within meaningful utterances. In other words, there cannot be a meaningful proposition that is not logical. Hacker summarizes this requirement for simple objects and determinateness of sense as follows:

Unless there were simple objects, then sense would not be determinate. But if the senses of sentences were not determinate, then the law of the excluded middle would not apply...So unless there is an a priori guarantee of determinacy of sense, there could be no propositions—hence no representation, and no logic either. (Hacker, 2013, p.44)

But since, there are propositions, logic and language, then, they argue, the requirement for the sense to be determinate must be true. For Wittgenstein, the necessity of determinateness of sense is necessary as much as the law of excluded middle. He says:

A proposition can determine only one place in logical space: nevertheless, the whole of logical space must already be given by it. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.21)

After stating this conceptual requirement as true, Wittgenstein's strategy of symbolizing (the totality of) the language is to symbolize the limits of the elementary propositions. He says: "the truth-conditions of a proposition determine the range that it leaves open to the facts" (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.41). Wittgenstein notices that the two extreme cases limit the range of possibilities; tautology and contradiction (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.41). Wittgenstein sets them as the limit cases. They are not elementary propositions but the limit that mark the range of the totality of the elementary propositions. Various combinations of logical possibilities can be realized within that range. Pears states, "the limiting case is tautological combination, but tautologies are the outline of the structure, not part of it" (Pears, 1987, p.24). But they are part of the symbolism: "tautologies and contradictions are not, however, nonsensical. They are part of the symbolism, much as '0' is part of the symbolism of arithmetic." (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.41) Wittgenstein gives a function the tautology and contradiction in logical notation, unlike nonsense statements. He says:

Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing. A tautology has no truth-conditions, since it is unconditionally true: and a contradiction is true on no condition. Tautologies and contradictions lack sense [sind sinnlos]. The propositions of logic are not really propositions. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.41)

In his view, the limits are construed as void, zero that has no substantial meaning. He says:

"Tautology and contradiction are the limiting cases— indeed the disintegration—of the combination of signs" (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.42).
Admittedly the signs are still combined with one another even in tautologies and contradictions—i.e. they stand in certain relations to one another: but these relations have no meaning, they are not essential to the *symbol*. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.42)

The range of language is limited by tautology and contradiction. The limit can be marked by empty formal symbolism. Tautology and contradiction do not express or propose anything. When tautology or contradiction are symbolized, the symbolizations are not part of representational language governed by logical form. The limits of the possibilities of the elementary propositions are given between tautology and contradiction. Bearn notices the logical laws are also proper tautologies:

“P or not-p” is a tautology that is clearly related to the law of the excluded middle, but it says nothing. Rather it is a condition of making sense at all that all sensible propositions say nothing when put into this schema. It is not a generalization about propositions. It is not the pure foundation of sense. It is the first glimpse of its opposite: senselessness. (Bearn, 1997, p.57)

By determining tautology and contradiction as the limit cases of the elementary propositions, Wittgenstein manages to take save the “logical form is not a hostage of contingency” as Pears says, “because tautologies do not depend on anything that happens in the world” (Pears, 1987, p.22). In this sense, the domain of true and false propositions is contingent. Logical form is transcendent to being true or false.

2.2.3.2 Expressing the translation rules

Wittgenstein is aware that we use language in various ways, not necessarily as elementary propositions. However, for him, the divergence in linguistic use does not deviate from the logical form. The ordinary language becomes irrelevant for Wittgenstein, as long as statements can be translated into elementary propositions. In §4.002, Wittgenstein makes the differentiation between ordinary statements and elementary propositions:

4.002 Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is—just as people speak without

knowing how the individual sounds are produced.... The tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends are enormously complicated. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.22)

Wittgenstein aims to show that with proper analysis, the disguised form can be made visible. Then, the totality of language can be considered as the totality of the propositions with sense. Hacker states that Wittgenstein is aware of the fact that ordinary language "...contain complex concept-words, names of complexes, vagueness, and hence hidden generality" (Hacker, 2013, p.60). The complexity of language is a justification for Wittgenstein to build a symbolic language that moves the curtain away from the complexity of linguistic use and makes the logical form that is the structure of language. The irregular or complex propositions shall be brought down to elementary propositions. According to Wittgenstein, the irregularities conform to the general logical form.

Wittgenstein makes a simile between musical notation and language to make sense of irregular expressions. In musical notations the use of \sharp and \flat still conforms to the logical pattern of musical notation. Similarly, irregular descriptions are involved in the general logical form. He says:

And if we penetrate to the essence of this pictorial character, we see that it is *not* impaired by *apparent irregularities* (such as the use of \sharp and \flat in musical notation). For even these irregularities depict what they are intended to express; only they do it in a different way. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.23)

These complex or irregular expressions shall be translatable into elementary propositions. He shows that the linguistic space has no proposition that does not accord with the logical form. Logic is seen as the basis of language, thus, grammar that relies on the ordinary utterances must be doubted, as the first prerequisite for philosophizing (Monk, 1991, p.179).

The translation rules shall be symbolized as senseless to transform the irregular expressions into elementary forms. Indeed, there are two types of rules present in *Tractatus*; translation rules and the rules of logical syntax (Gottlieb, 1983, p.241). The rules help translate the ordinary statements to the elementary propositions by logical analysis. Moreover, the rules of logical syntax symbolize the general propositional form. So, when a schema for elementary propositions and the transformation rules that bring every complex proposition to the elementary propositions are given, then the totality of language can be thought of as composed of the elementary propositions, which are in accord with the general propositional form.

The crucial element in transforming irregular or complex propositions into elementary propositions is the identity relation. Wittgenstein does not provide any rule for the translation but articulates the logical identity as a senseless symbolism. He says:

When I use two signs with one and the same meaning, I express this by putting the sign '=' between them. Expressions of the form ' $a = b$ ' are, therefore, mere representational devices. They state nothing about the meaning of the signs ' a ' and ' b ' (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.37).

He continues:

Expressions like ' $a = a$ ', and those derived from them, are neither elementary propositions nor is there any other way in which they have sense (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.37).

The identity sign is taken as a variable. The translation rule from complex to elementary propositions is given without creating a different entity in the logical space. Indeed, after providing the limit cases and the translation rules in a senseless symbolism, Wittgenstein says "now" it is possible to give the most general propositional form because he says:

The existence of a general propositional form is proved by the fact that there cannot be a proposition whose form could not have been foreseen (i.e. constructed)

Suppose that I am given *all* elementary propositions: then I can simply ask what propositions I can construct out of them. And there I have *all* propositions, and *that* fixes their limits. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.43)

In Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, the propositions of logic are all of equal statuses; none is essentially primitive (an axiom), and none is essentially derived. As Hacker notes that this idea undermines "an axiomatic unification of the propositions of logic.... for a tautology has no truth-conditions, being unconditionally true (Wittgenstein, 2001, 4.461) (Hacker, 2009, p.312) So, there cannot be overarching meaningful laws of the totality of language.

Either elementary or complex, the form of propositions can be seen in advance. So, their form can be given. Wittgenstein constructs the general propositional form as a variable (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.43). However, before symbolizing the logical form, he needs to account for the senselessness of the logical connectives and quantifiers that are part of the symbolization of the logical form.

2.2.3.3 Expressing the logical form, logical connectives, and logical quantifiers

Other structural properties of the language that cannot be expressed as propositions are logical connectives, quantifiers, and general logical form. In this section, I show how he symbolizes them as senseless statements. His formulation helps us to write/show the formal relations as well.

Senseless symbolism can be related to musical language analogically. The musical notation relates written notes, sound waves, musical ideas, and gramophone

records. Similarly, language, reality, and thoughts relate to each other in the same way (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.24). Its analogy to the logical pattern in music suggests conceiving the logical form as a law of projection. Wittgenstein states:

4.0141 There is a general rule by means of which the musician can obtain the symphony from the score, and which makes it possible to derive the symphony from the groove on the gramophone record, and, using the first rule, to derive the score again. That is what constitutes the inner similarity between these things which seem to be constructed in such entirely different ways. And that rule is the law of projection which projects the symphony into the language of musical notation. It is the rule for translating this language into the language of gramophone records (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.24)

The general rule in music notation works like the logical form. In the context of music, it enables to represent the tunes in the symbolic order. Similarly, logical form is the law of projection and the general language rule. Language, with different purposes like in music, has different patterns, it seems that there is nothing materially common between the groove, sound waves, and the notes on a score, but the general form of production is their common formal element between them. The musical form underlies in score or the groove so that the musician can produce a symphony or the engineer can make a gramophone. Similarly, expressions have a mode of projection in language, i.e., logical form, as long as they are meaningful.

Wittgenstein understands “a proposition as a function of the expressions contained in it” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.18). However, in symbolizations, everything is treated in conceptual notation by variables, not functions or classes (as Frege and Russell believed). He aims to formulate the logical form in a formal sign language, where “the meaning of a sign should never play a rôle” so that the expression problems discussed in the previous section do not arise (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.19). The syntax does not refer to anything, so it cannot refer to itself either. The possibility of such an expression depends on the condition that “in this form, the

expression will be constant and everything else variable” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.16).

So, Wittgenstein works to construe various symbols as variables that are part of the logical syntax.

Thanks to this symbolization, it is possible to show the formal properties in language. The question for Wittgenstein is if, in expressing the logical form, one can use the tools that are used for expressing the formal concepts since the logical form can be articulated as a formal property. However, the formal properties of the objects do not have signifying or descriptive functions between language and the world.

For example, ‘1 is a number,’ ‘There is only one zero,’ and similar expressions symbolize formal relations. However, when they are taken as proper propositions, they are nonsensical (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.34). Wittgenstein states that the logical constants and formal concepts, such as object, thing, fact, function, and number, are used as variables. So, propositions like “1 is a number” or “there is only one zero” are pseudo-propositions since 1, number, and zero cannot be a name but a variable. Hacker states that a well-formed proposition with a sense cannot contain an unbound variable; hence a formal concept word cannot occur in a fully analyzed, well-formed proposition (Hacker, 2013, p.362).

As a part of the logical syntax, Wittgenstein refuses the idea that logical constants (such as, \forall , \sim , \exists) can be treated as if they signify something, they have independent meaning on their own. For example, Wittgenstein states

if there were an object called ‘ \sim ’, it would follow that ‘ $\sim\sim p$ ’ said something different from what ‘ p ’ said, just because the one proposition would then be about \sim and the other would not (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.53)

As Wittgenstein exemplifies with the negation sign, similarly function sign cannot have a meaning of its own. In other words, it cannot be thought of as its own argument in an expression $F(F(fx))$. If a function would be its argument, then two F

signs in $F(F(fx))$ would have different meanings. However, for Wittgenstein, it is clear that functions serve the same purpose and should be treated as variables in $F(F(fx))$. To avoid this implausible result, Wittgenstein states that “only the letter ‘F’ is common to the two functions, but the letter itself signifies nothing” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.19).

Wittgenstein disagrees with the conception of logical simples and laws, from which other statements follow or can be derived. According to his views in the *Tractatus*, logical rules do not have primitive meanings on their own. As Hacker states, Russell thinks that the logical connectives stand for logical objects, and Frege thinks they stand for “unary or binary functions” (Hacker and Baker, p.311, p.359). According to Wittgenstein, they signify operations. He manages to show the meaning of logical connectives by T/F notation, which symbolizes a proposition in the propositional calculus by its truth-table and hence renders the logical connectives redundant in this symbolism. There is no need to think that logical connectives as separate meaningful entities in the logical symbolism, but they are internally related to the inference rules. For example, in logic, one says “ $\sim \sim p = p$ ” double negation of p is equivalent to p . According to Wittgenstein, the equivalence is not derived from the meaning of the logical operator or logical connective, but the expression of “ $\sim \sim p = p$ ” is its grammatical rule and constitutes the meaning of negation sign (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.28, p.52). Rules of inference in logic are rules of grammar, and they do not have any independent meaning. His ideas in logic reflect his ideas in language. Hacker notes that Frege supposes that the rules for the use of words are “answerable to the meanings of words.” (Baker and Hacker, 1992, p.312) However, the logical constants do not have any independent meaning.

After stating that logical constants and formal concepts are variables, Wittgenstein states that the logical operations shall also be taken as variables, such as negation and logical addition (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.50). He states that “an operation manifests itself in a variable” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.50). He offers us to think of signs for logical operations as “punctuation marks” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.56). Consequently, it is not an expression in a meta-language but a symbolic simplification. As Hacker states, “they are not descriptions of anything, but rules of description,” in this sense, “they are partly constitutive of the meanings of the words we use.” (Hacker, 2013, p.74). According to Hacker, the logical form is symbolized by the rules of logical syntax (Crary, 2000, p.365). The symbolic statements about the logical form thus do not describe, picture, or represent the logical form.

Wittgenstein differentiates different kinds of descriptions. He says:

We *can* distinguish three kinds of description: 1. direct enumeration, in which case we can simply substitute for the variable the constants that are its values; 2. giving a function fx whose values for all values of x are the propositions to be described; 3. giving a formal law that governs the construction of the propositions, in which case the bracketed expression has as its members all the terms of a series of forms. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.58)

This third way of description gives us the general propositional form, which is the essence of the world. Wittgenstein says: “to give the essence of a proposition means to give the essence of all description, and thus the essence of the world” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.56).

At §6 we reach the general propositional form: “[p^- , ξ^- , $N(\xi^-)$]” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.70). What does this formula stand for? It symbolizes the possibility of all propositions without itself being a proposition. The constitutive symbolism of all possible propositions that lie between contradiction and totality is given by this

formula. Wittgenstein states the purpose of the general propositional form as giving the totality of elementary and complex propositions:

once a notation has been established, there will be in it
a rule governing the construction of all propositions that negate p,
A rule governing the construction of all propositions that affirm p, and a
rule governing the construction of all propositions that affirm p or q; and
so on. These rules are equivalent to the symbols; and in them their sense
is mirrored. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.60)

General propositional form (*GPF*) is not a genuine expression. Wittgenstein states, “...(A proposition is itself an expression.)... An expression is the mark of a form and a content” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.16). *GPF* does not have content, but it is a form without content. It is senseless; it wits nothing, and all the signs in it are variables. By symbolizing the general logical form, he claims that the essence of the language is given. So, the essence of the world is properly nothing. The significance of this determination is to show that theories that make a proposition of logic appear substantial are always false. Forming a substantial proposition in expressing the logical propositions would be improper. For Wittgenstein, even using empirical concepts in expressing tautologies can be confusing:

This now by no means appears self-evident, no more so than the proposition “All roses are either yellow or red” would sound even if it were true. Indeed, our proposition now gets quite the character of a proposition of natural science and this is a certain symptom of its being falsely understood. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.71)

So, saying that “it is either raining or not raining” does not make sense. It is a pseudo-proposition. It is improper to build a tautology in this form since it appeals to empirical concepts. Such expression creates the confusion that the logic has a contingent character like empirical propositions. However, the logical propositions shall be recognized from their symbol alone:

It is a peculiar mark of logical propositions that one can recognize that they are true from the symbol alone, and this fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of logic (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.72)

The symbols are arbitrary in §6, but “what is expressed is non-arbitrary in logic” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.76). He states:

The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent it. They have no ‘subject matter’. They presuppose that names have meaning and elementary propositions sense; and that is their connexion with the world. It is clear that something about the world must be indicated by the fact that certain combinations of symbols—whose essence involves the possession of a determinate character—are tautologies. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.76)

The symbolism of logical form does not inform us about what the world is.

Logical propositions, “without bothering about sense or meaning,” are constructed from others using only rules dealing with signs (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.76). Pears notices that *Tractarian* understanding of logic is “an anti-Platonic view because it denies that logic is something that we bring back from the exploration of a second world, and treats it, instead, as a peculiar extract from the results of exploring the one and only world of facts” (Pears, 1987, p.24). By symbolizing the logical form, Wittgenstein manages to show the general propositional form without relying on pseudo-propositions.

In this part, I exposed how Wittgenstein constructs logical propositions without creating a supra-level language. The symbolic language is differentiated from the regime of sense. Wittgenstein manages to express so-called constitutive rules of language by senseless symbolism. Wittgenstein formulates this by treating everything in the symbolic expression as a logical variable. Wittgenstein’s inquiry about formal relations, formal concepts, and propositions of logic affects the way he conceives some “necessary” statements, such as “every cause has an effect,” “ $2+2=4$,” or “red is darker than pink.” These necessary truths for Wittgenstein, as Hacker describes, are “no more than an inference rule in the guise of a description.” (Hacker, 2013, p.36) They are not genuine propositions since they are not a function

of names but relations between variables. For Wittgenstein, there is no necessity other than logical necessity, and the logical necessity is senseless; the allegedly synthetic *a priori* is a nonsensical statement, like mathematical propositions, “1 is a number” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.35) (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.78) (Hacker, 2013, p.45). For example, that $2 > 1.5$, which makes itself manifest by the statement that *a* (which is 2 m long) is 0.5m longer than *b* (which is 1.5m long) (Waismann, 1979, p.54). Similarly, one color is darker than another cannot be said as a proposition, ‘for this is of the essence of color; without it, a color cannot be thought.’ However, this makes itself manifest in the proposition that this (dark blue) suit is darker than that (light blue) one (Waismann, 1979, p. 55). Indeed, Wittgenstein thinks that, in some way, the scientific laws or ethical laws are constitutive of our world, like logic. In the next part, I discuss how Wittgenstein understands them, if not as substantial necessities about nature. Like the logical form, as the constitutive of language, scientific laws, ethics, and aesthetics are thought to be senseless symbolism, not nonsense pseudo-propositions.

2.2.3.4 Expressing the scientific laws

Logical laws are not expressed by means of representative language because logic is itself the possibility of language. Wittgenstein thinks that scientific laws have a similar role. They are not just general but constitutive of the world. As Wittgenstein argues, *a priori* truths cannot be propositions since any proposition can be true or false (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.12). The proposition must be laid down to reality, but he thinks that scientific laws cannot be laid down to reality.

Wittgenstein talks of the law of causality as an example. According to him, it cannot determine the content of the world *a priori*. In §5.1361, he states that “we

cannot infer the future events from those of the present. Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.47). According to Wittgenstein, the belief that the scientific laws are the explanation of the world as a totality is the constitutive belief for the modern conception of the world. However, this belief depends on an illusion and confusion about the scientific laws (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.85). The illusion results from taking the scientific generalizations as ultimate explanations of the world, not as senseless variables but as propositions. In that sense, science is replaced by fate or God (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.85). For Wittgenstein, scientific laws cannot guarantee their application. Future actions cannot be deduced. It would be only possible if causality were the inner necessity, as the logical necessity (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.47).

Wittgenstein’s point is that they cannot be used as the ultimate explanations of the world as a limited whole. Here, I want to note that scientific activity is not nonsense for Wittgenstein; neither ethics, religious life, nor philosophical activity, but if we interpret their propositions as the ultimate explanations of the world, then we fail to understand the way these generalities can serve for us. They are not axioms about the world. For Wittgenstein, these activities are to awaken our wonder for the world. They can feed the feeling of experiencing the world as a limited whole. Thus, Wittgenstein does not oppose the practice of scientific activity but its motivations and desires, similar to how he opposes logicians or philosophers when scientists desire to explain the content of the world with scientific laws. He argues against the belief that scientific descriptions of the facts can explain the existence of things. For example, there is a belief that if a scientist finds the relevant brain cells responsible for our linguistic abilities, then the fact that we use language is explained. However, for Wittgenstein, such an observation would be a general description of what

happens in our brains when we engage in linguistic activity, but it will not tell anything about the existence of the language.

In taking the causal laws as the final explanation of the world, we assume an accord between our actions and the law. However, this is not a deductive procedure; the perfect harmony of our actions with the causal law is a psychological assumption (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.84). The projections based on causal principles (law of movements) are hypotheses. We cannot deduce that “the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means we do not *know* whether it will rise” (Wittgenstein, 2001, 84). For Wittgenstein, once the scientific laws are taken to correspond to a particular picture, i.e., they have sense, they cannot imagine the world as a totality. They cannot embrace the world in the way that logical form does because they have content. The logical form scaffolds the possibilities of the world. The fact that the sun does not rise tomorrow is not against the logical form, but it is against the causal laws. The law of induction is about how the world is, not what the world is (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.80).

Wittgenstein talks about the laws of mechanics as another example of scientific laws. For him, they are not essential to serve as explanations. They shall be interpreted as the forms that are made to give the descriptions of the world in the most simple way. He states that “the law of causality is not a law but the form of a law” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.81). Like logical form, scientific laws are relations between formal concepts. Wittgenstein gives an example from a supposition of “the law of least action.” He says, “people even surmised that there must be a ‘law of least action’ before they knew exactly how it went (Here, as always, what is certain *a priori* proves to be something purely logical.)” (Wittgenstein, 2001,p/81). In other words, the law of least action was not about the events in the world, but it is a logical

statement in the logic of the mechanical understanding of the world. It is a logical supposition, not a scientific observation. In that sense, the law of least action is not designed to describe the facts. It is similar to the law of conservation; Wittgenstein states that “we do not have an *a priori belief* in a law of conservation, but rather *a priori knowledge* of the possibility of a logical form.” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p/81) The law-like statements of science are “*a priori* insights about the forms in which the propositions of science can be cast” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.81).

In Wittgenstein’s picture of the world, there is no *a priori* substantial order of the world. Science cannot control even how the world is because it cannot infer the necessity of future events. In the *Tractatus*, the world is something fundamentally contingent. Laws of physics shall be interpreted as nets that give the conditions for the unified formal possibilities of the descriptions in the world. He presents these formal possibilities that science draws as a net that covers the world, for example, the net of Newtonian mechanics. A net is a tool that creates a space for interpreting the formal possibilities of the world. He says, “laws like the principle of sufficient reason etc.

are about the net and not about what the net describes” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.83). If they were any laws of science that mark the limit of the world, then they would not be put in words either. They would have the same inexpressible conditions that logical form has.

6.36 If there were a law of causality, it might be put in the following way:
There are laws of nature. But of course, that cannot be said: it makes
itself manifest. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.83)

In this sense, scientific laws are like the logical form. They do not inform about the content of the world, but only its form. Unlike logic, they do not have the

absolute necessity. Anything outside of logic is accidental (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.80-81). Wittgenstein writes,

...The different nets correspond to different systems for describing the world. Mechanics determines one form of description of the world by saying that all propositions used in the description of the world must be obtained in a given way from a given set of propositions—the axioms of mechanics. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.81)

By interpreting scientific laws as a form to describe the facts, Wittgenstein gives the possibility of different systems such as quantum physics or string theory to provide tools to picture the world. The general forms of science become devoid of content, they alone do not say something about the world, but they are tools to interpret it. Thus, Wittgenstein infers that,

“the possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian mechanics tells us nothing about the world.” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.82)

Wittgenstein’s inquiry about the conception of the logical form spreads to the status and function of the scientific laws. They are not thought to be a general description of the world's facts, but they are “the norms of representation” formulated in a symbolic language or as pseudo-propositions. Wittgenstein’s analysis for the expression of the general propositional form holds for certain scientific statements, which serve as the constitutive conditions of the scientific system. Ethical laws have a similar status for Wittgenstein. Ethical laws are thought to be constitutive forms of representation in the *Tractatus*. In the next part, I discuss how he elaborates on them.

2.2.3.5 Expressing the ethical

Like logical form and scientific laws, Wittgenstein considers ethics as the constitutive condition of the world. Ethical statements are the concern of *Tractatus* since they propose a general rule on our actions. In this sense, similar to the

expression of logical form, they necessarily demand a subject position that is outside of the world. However, as we talked, making statements from this perspective is impossible without disintegrating their sense. Secondly, the ethical statements cannot be representations as if values are present and can be pictured. However, for Wittgenstein, only facts can be pictured since they share the logical form with the statements and the world. For these reasons, any ethical doctrine is regarded as nonsense in the *Tractarian* understanding of language. He says:

6.42 So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.) (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.86)

Like the general logical form of propositions, ethical laws cannot be said. What is transcendental, be it ethics, scientific laws, or logical form, is immanently and inexorable in our actions and expressions. But, on the other hand, they are transcendental to expression and representative language. In the sense that judgments have to conform to the logical syntax to make sense, our actions are differentiated from the bare movements of the bodies as long as they are mediated by ethics. In this sense, like logic, ethics is constitutive of our world. In §6.422, Wittgenstein discusses the form of ethical law and claims that ethics has nothing to do with commandments in the form of “you shall.” He says:

6.422 When an ethical law of the form, ‘Thou shalt . . .’, is laid down, one’s first thought is, ‘And what if I do not do it?’ It is clear, however, that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms. So, our question about the *consequences* of an action must be unimportant... (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.86)

It is clear from this passage that Wittgenstein refuses to see the normative propositions as a part of ethics because such propositions do not offer a picture of reality, nor do they inform insights about the necessities of this world. Ethics shows

itself like logic and science in the world. Then, ethics do not tell about the things in the world. Ethics cannot be expressed in the form of genuine propositions. They cannot be expressed in a symbolic language either, in the way that logical syntax is expressed. Still, ethics like logic, scientific laws, and aesthetics are considered at the limit of the world. Wittgenstein states that “ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic” (Wittgenstein, 1961, p. 77). Ethics is also considered to be the inexpressible constitutive condition of the world. So then, the world, which is “*my world*,” must be ethical; otherwise, it is not a world. In the sense that when we speak without complying with logical form, the sense disintegrates, *I and my world* disintegrate when ethics is not taken as a condition that shows itself.

The ethical point of the book is regarded as §7 when Wittgenstein writes to Von Engelman. Moreover, the modal auxiliary of §7 is not in the form “*shall*” but a “*must*.” The logical necessity overlaps with the ethical necessity.

In this part, I discussed how Wittgenstein shows the constitutive conditions of language, world, and thought in symbolic language. Marking the limits of the sensible excludes many statements from the sphere of the language. In the next part, I discuss the non-sense statements.

2.2.3.6 Excluding the non-sense from the language

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein does not only give an account of the totality of language, but he also excludes certain statements from the sphere of language. The domain of meaningful propositions contains observational report sentences about the reality that can be true or false (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.29). The ability to construct languages allows us to build ill-formed propositions that do not picture reality. However, because of the complexities and confusion in language, some of our ill-

formed propositions look like complying with the logical form, but if they are correctly analyzed, they are nonsense.

How can we make sense of the non-sense statements? Their nonsensicality is related to the inexorability of the constitutive condition of language. As Pears argues, it is non-sense to talk about the normative force of the logical form since the constitutive rule cannot be transgressed. Logic does not inform us how we should think since it is impossible to do otherwise. Wittgenstein states that “whatever is possible in logic is also permitted. In a certain sense, we cannot make mistakes in logic” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.57). The inability to make mistakes in logic does not mean that we cannot transgress the bounds of sense in language. To make sense of this idea, Hacker suggests that we understand the rules of logical syntax as the rules of making contracts. In this sense, they are not the type of rule that “prohibits something that can be done but should not be done.” (Crary, 2000, p.365) If one fails to follow the rules of contracts, they produce an invalid contract. It is not something prohibited but failed to follow. Constitutive rules such as contract law do not need a sanction. He argues that “their ‘sanction’ is nonsense, just as the ‘sanction’ of contract law is invalidity—and, to be sure, these are not properly speaking sanctions.” (Crary, 2000, p.367)

Logical form, in a sense, works like the rules in a contract. Hacker emphasizes that the “rules of logical syntax are constitutive rules.” (Crary, 2000, p.366) Failure to follow them does not result in the form of words that describes a logical impossibility, for logical impossibilities are expressed by logical contradictions—which *describe* nothing since they are senseless (limiting cases of propositions with a sense). Then he adds that “failure to comply with the rules of logical syntax does not result in a form of words that describes a logical or

metaphysical necessity either—for the only expressible necessities are logical necessities, which are expressed by tautologies that describe nothing since they are senseless” (Crary, 2000, p.366).

In this sense, like contract law, logic looks after itself. No further justification is needed for their validity. If we fail to comply with the rules of logical syntax, the result is not the expression of a *thought* that is illogical (since there is no such thing) but nonsense. By definition, nonsense is presented as a violation of logical form. In the case of violation, the sense of sentence disintegrates. Creating nonsense in the use of language is not limited to the doctrines in metaphysics, but they expand to aesthetics, ethics, and philosophy (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.86) (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.86) (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.23). Also, the propositions of mathematics and the laws of physics cannot be put in words simply because they do not picture facts (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.78-81). That is why “what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense.” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.4) According to the Tractarian understanding of language, any statement or theory that treats constitutive rules as genuine propositions is condemned to be nonsense.

Wittgenstein’s Tractarian conception of constitutive rules suggests a distinct possibility for philosophizing. I describe how his understanding of constitutive rules affects philosophical practice in the next part.

2.2.4 Possibility and function of philosophy

Showing the constitutive conditions of language can be seen as a task in the *Tractatus*, but equally, the task is to show that such a task is futile since any explanation given for the constitutive conditions of the possibility of language is condemned to be nonsense. The philosophical propositions, which aim to state the

essence of language, thought and the world, are the main category that Wittgenstein intends to criticize at the very beginning of the book. At 4.003 he declares that the statements in philosophical statements are nonsense. He states:

4.003 Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently, we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language.

(They belong to the same class as the question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful.)

And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact *not* problems at all. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.20-21)

Constraining the domain of meaning to the representative statements in language implies a transformation for the philosophical enterprise. If the philosophical enterprise is interested in the constitutive conditions, then the constitutive conditions are not representable entities that can be expressed in propositions. The rules of logical syntax that mark the essence of the world, thought, and language, are senseless. Thus, for Wittgenstein, the correct method in philosophy is

to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—*this* method would be the only strictly correct one. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.89)

The propositions with sense are classified under the study of natural science. In philosophy, one cannot produce a proposition with sense. Thus, Wittgenstein sharply differentiates philosophical activity from the practice of natural science. He states:

4.111 Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word 'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them.) (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.29)

The job given to philosophy is the clarification of thoughts. In §4.003, Wittgenstein says that philosophy is a critique of language. However, the language as defined with representational function, philosophy does not find itself a possible space of expression. Philosophy cannot produce any proposition, but the philosophers are supposed critically talk about propositions but not by propositions. Thus, Wittgenstein's understanding necessarily excludes not only philosophy but any theoretical activity from the sphere of sense. Wittgenstein states:

4.112 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.29)

Philosophical activity as clarification relies on two aspects of language. First, the logical form that sets every possibility gives a register to every possibility without vagueness in the logical space. There is an original form that the expressions could be asked to fit. Philosophers can be reminders of this form. Secondly, for philosophy to have a function, there should be a difference between the logical possibilities and the linguistic expressions. Philosophers' job is to show that a pseudo-expression has no place in logical space. Language users produce vague, complicated, or non-sense expressions because, as Wittgenstein states in §4.002, "man is able to construct languages." The languages work in the foreground of linguistic experience, written or spoken, whereas the logical background is more clear and sharper. So, the philosopher's job is to detect the deviance from the logical background. Philosophers can work on different forms of expressions from different

fields, including natural science. Wittgenstein states, “philosophy sets limits to the much disputed sphere of natural science” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.30). Here philosophers’ main job is to parcel the logical space through the coordinates of the logical form. The disputed spheres of natural science shall be aligned with the coordinates in the logical space. As Wittgenstein states in 4.114

4.114 It must set limits to what can be thought; and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought. It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards through what can be thought.

4.115 It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said.

4.116 Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly.

Everything that can be put into words can be put clearly.

(Wittgenstein, 2001, p.30)

The need for philosophical activity emerges “whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.89). As Baltas states, in such cases, philosophers engage in a provisional debate “in order to respond to the alternative views of radical immanence” (Baltas, 2012, p.6). For example, in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein tries to show that if someone tries to say something metaphysical about what is higher about language, such as construing logical laws as propositions or axiomatization language, then they necessarily fail to make sense. Wittgenstein works to undermine these views with an immanent critique by accepting their claims and undermining the claims by their implausible results. Anyone employing such a strategy should not hesitate in advancing philosophical content. The second strategy following the first is self-annihilation (Baltas, 2002, p.6). By appealing to this reactive strategy, Wittgenstein also justifies his strategy in the *Tractatus* to some extent. Wittgenstein undermines his claims in the *Tractatus* since his statements do not picture any state of affairs in the world. Russell notices

the self-destructive paradoxical structure of the *Tractatus* in the introduction that he writes for the book:

Everything, therefore, which is involved in the very idea of the expressiveness of language must remain incapable of being expressed in language, and is, therefore, inexpressible in a perfectly precise sense . . . What causes some hesitation [about this view] is the fact that, after all, Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.xxi)

Indeed, Wittgenstein does not deny that his inquiry ends up in self-annihilation. However, self-annihilation works as a way to show the impossibility of establishing doctrines about what is higher to language. This annihilation is made in the *Tractatus* in §6.54:

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.89)

Wittgenstein's argument not to speak about higher, and thus the self-annihilation of his statements are done in the name of ethics. In this part, I underline the similar treatment of the logical form, scientific laws, and ethics. In the next part, I will discuss the ethics of responsibility of not making any statements about what is higher.

To summarize, Wittgenstein argues that logical form is a constitutive condition of the world, language, and thought, relying on the logical impossibility of illogical thought. The constitutive condition cannot be made explicit in language, an expression, a rule, or a law. This idea relies on the radically immanent view of language. According to this conceptualization, language cannot refer to anything higher, and it cannot refer to its possibility. On the other hand, logical form is assumed to be language's constitutive condition and higher to the language. Thus,

expressing the logical form using language leads to a transgression of this very form and nonsense. Such a picture of the language and the world gives a special status and function to the logical form. It is the condition of any language; it is inexorable prior to any language. Linguistic and ontologic possibilities are prior to the practices in advance. The possibilities that are determined by logical form are not disturbed in time and by the actualities in the world. The order of the world is shaped according to the grid of this logical form. Not only logical form but scientific laws, ethics, and aesthetics cannot be put in words since they are given the same status as the logical form. The constitutive conditions are not accessible through propositions, but they show themselves.

Wittgenstein's radical immanence is not a simple criticism of metaphysics that aims to state what is higher to this world. His inquiry is an affirmation of transcendence because the higher cannot be propositional. He criticizes the exploitation of transcendence by language and logical tools. The higher cannot be deduced by logic; it cannot either be expressed by creating meta-languages. Moreover, expressing the constitutive rule is not possible because it imagines a subject position capable of imagining the world/language as a whole. Any expression from nobody's point of view lacks the conditions of making sense. The point is to prepare oneself for the mystical element by the voiding of eternity inscribed in the logical propositions.

What is higher is accessible through the metaphysical subject. This confrontation with the limits/constitutive conditions is realized through an ontological excess of the subject, which is mystical. Wittgenstein argues against subsuming the mystical element of the world in a formalized closed system. Because of this excess, propositional expression of constitutive conditions, which is a

superstition of the calculus conception of language, is logically not possible and ethically improper. Wittgenstein concludes at §7 that the higher *must* be left in mystical silence. The transcendental mysticism is the ethical and aesthetic part of the book and cannot be written but be witnessed or experienced. In the next section, I discuss how Wittgenstein describes the subject's relation with the constitutive conditions from an ethical point of view.

2.3 From the ethical point of view

In this part of the chapter, I talk about how the logical analysis of *Tractatus* gives an ethical responsibility to the practitioners of various discourses in making statements about the constitutive conditions or remaining silent about them. Wittgenstein critically discusses the ethical implications of forming general rules about the world. The ethics of stating general rules are closely related to Wittgenstein's account of nonsense in the *Tractatus* because all rule statements about constitutive conditions fail to make sense since they fail to picture possible facts.

Does *Tractatus* make its ethical point or fail to do it? Wittgenstein and its relation to the ethical point of the book, i.e., throwing away the ladder and passing into silence. I claim that *Tractatus* carries a mystical metaphysical baggage related to seeing language as a logical calculus and supposing an isomorphism of the world and language. In the next part, I articulate this metaphysical baggage of mysticism about the calculus understanding of language.

To draw the limits of the legitimate expressions is the main challenge for Wittgenstein in *Tractatus*. His logical analysis shows that thinking about the constitutive rules of language that are transcendent to language falls on the other side of the limit of sayable, and their expressions condemn to be nonsense. The challenge

to draw the limit of the sayable requires imagining language as a totality and going outside it. In such intellectual endeavors, Wittgenstein has the ethical concern that if such an inquiry conflicts with the integrity of thinking.

Wittgenstein dares to think about the world from a transcendental point of view. He talks about what the world, language, and logic are. However, in another sense, it has a humble claim. In the end, the book suggests ending the philosophical enterprise for good and refuses the will to form general constitutive rules by enjoying a transcendental point of view. He declares his work as nonsense.

Leaving this privileged position is the condition of ethical thinking, thus Wittgenstein writes later in *Big Typescript* that “philosophy does require a resignation, but one of feeling, not of intellect. And maybe that is what makes it so difficult for many. It can be difficult not to use an expression, just as it is difficult to hold back tears, or an outburst of rage” (Wittgenstein, 1993, p. 300e). In *the Tractatus*, he is after an institutional change of philosophy, which informs us what is possible about the totality of the world from an imagined transcendental point of view.

When Wittgenstein states that the main point of *Tractatus* is ethical, obviously, he does not mean that *Tractatus* includes an ethical theory or a book with expressions about specific ethical values. In his letter to Von Ficker, he says that the ethical point is sustained by keeping silence. Although the propositions of *Tractatus* are nonsense, Wittgenstein thinks that they do not fail to make the ethical point of the book. Wittgenstein implies in his letter that (a) being silent on what is higher is an ethical stance, i.e., to reject enjoying a transcendental point of view, and (b) *Tractatus* talks about what is higher without being unethical.

Once the impossibility of enjoying the transcendental privileged position is shown, a thinker is bounded by the responsibility of not trespassing the limits of sense. Wittgenstein attempts to adopt both a culture that does not attempt to form totalities, posit transcendental normative principles or general rules, and give a critique that such claims to totality cannot make sense. Recognition of the philosopher's finitude and choosing to stay silent is an ethical stance. The condition for (b) to happen is to pass to (a), as Wittgenstein states at §6.54:

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.89)

Secondly, apart from logical implications, there is an appeal to imagination to make the psychological point of view (to make the tendency of stating general rules unattractive to us). The author gives instructions in the preface of the book for the reader to take the nonsense statements as meaningful until the end of the book.

Scholars have different opinions on whether the *Tractatus* has a moral purpose. According to Hacker, ethics is not the primary concern of *Tractatus*. On the other hand, for Conant, both logic and ethics pervade Tractarian space (Conant, 2002, p.41-42). Indeed, I agree with Conant that Wittgenstein saw ethics as the condition of the world in *Tractatus*. Thus, when he talked about ethics, as Hacker points out, he does not mean ethical problems in moral philosophy. However, ethical understanding of the world, which is conditioned by logic, is related to the responsibility and ethics of making judgments. Aristides Baltas notes that Wittgenstein's understanding of language demands the responsibility of ethical thinking. He says: "ethics of radical immanence is purely an ethics of responsibility" (Baltas, 2012, p. 48). The immanent understanding of language does not let us posit

any transcendental ethical claims, but it makes us responsible for using the words. In such an interpretation, I want to note that ethics is used in the broadest possible sense of the word. Ethics in this context pervades our actions, like a logical condition. With such a broad understanding of ethics, every philosophical work is bound with the philosopher's responsibility. Baltas notes:

If every activity possesses an ethical aspect, if ethical intent precedes and presides over any activity, then ethical intent precedes and presides over philosophical activity as well. Each philosophical work then is thus a work of ethics. (Baltas, 2012, p. 48)

The ethical point is also related to the intentions of the writer. The writer aims to change how readers grasp the world, language, and thought. Thus, we can see a pedagogical process of learning, changing the mental structures that give us confusion and perplexities. Climbing up the ladder, then, is the process of learning a new way to look at the world.

The point is that the reader manages to climb up and experience a “eureka!” moment. Baltas suggests understanding the experience of “climbing up the ladder” or the therapeutic effect of philosophy as a eureka moment, an educational pedagogical purpose of making one understand a foreign paradigm. A feeling of liberation is akin to this eureka moment (Baltas, 2012, p. 85). Michael Kremer quotes Matthew Ostrow for a similar point; in the *Tractatus*, there is the essential “governing idea of an essential confusion from which we can be essentially liberated” (Crary, 2007, p. 155)

Bronzo, as well, calls resolute reading of *Tractatus* therapeutic since

therapy aims at the dissolution of intellectual difficulties in which we find ourselves entangled as the result of philosophical reflection. Our tendency to fall into certain forms of illusion of meaning, and to imagine that a philosophical perspective permits us to evade the responsibility that we have for the way in which we speak and act. (Bronzo, 2012, p.49)

In the broader sense of the term ethics, Wittgenstein aims for an ethical change in the readers' relation to the language. As Baltas states, Wittgenstein has pedagogical purposes for the cardinal problem of philosophy to dissolve. A change in a reader necessitates both perspective change and a particular pedagogy. Therapy, pedagogy, elucidation, and change are all correlated concepts.

However, I think attaching a therapeutic function to the *Tractatus* makes its metaphysical baggage invisible. The purpose of aspect change does not need to be interpreted as therapeutic. In any persuasion process, there is a process of putting one's feet in the shoes of the others. Empathizing with others' viewpoints and talking within their perspective (immanent critique) is present both in early and late Wittgenstein's thinking. Immanent critique alone is not a sufficient reason for the *Tractatus* to be therapeutic only. In the end, an immanent critique of Frege's understanding of logical laws or Russell's *Theory of Types* does not demand looking at the language mystically. The mystical understanding of the world and language is Wittgenstein's perspective, and after throwing the ladder, we are left with ineffable insights that come with metaphysical baggage. We climb the ladder to a higher point. We do not jump together back where we are with the ladder. One cannot throw the logical form or the distinction between saying and showing with the ladder away. The realization of nonsense forces us to throw the belief that we can state such statements meaningfully. As Hacker says

When one has thrown away the ladder, one is left with a correct logical point of view and that this point of view includes an understanding of why the essence of the world and the nature of the sublime—of absolute value—are inexpressible. (Crary, 2000, p. 382)

Moreover, Hacker also states that treating *Tractatus* as a self-consistent work is a mistake. Hacker states that *Tractatus* is "a baffling theory bafflingly presented" using Pears' words (Crary, 2000, p. 355). Russell also notices that Wittgenstein

manages “to say a great deal about what cannot be put in words” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.xxiii). Moreover, the silence reached at §7 is not a dumb silence. It is related to the replacement of our previous ideas with the mystic metaphysical way of looking at the world. However, even if we ignore the mystical aspect of the book, the reader in silence certainly knows about the limits of the world, limits of language, and incapability of language, so that he knows where to be silent.

At this point, Kremer suggests that the inexpressible metaphysics is know-how rather than propositional knowledge. He says: “The mystical is rather something unitary—a way of life, into which the *Tractatus* initiates us” (Kremer, 2001, p. 61). So then, it turns out the silence is endowed with a way of acting, knowing where to stop talking where only facts can show themselves. Thanks to this virtue, one can warn others how and where one crosses the line. I think this kind of interpretation brings us back to the question of ethics in terms of virtues. Being virtuous and managing to tame the tendency to say the inexpressible things about the essence of the world can be achieved when our community is formed with virtuous members. However, when we teach the virtue to someone who thinks there is no difference between saying and showing, a Tractarian type of pedagogy in the form of immanent critique is necessary. In such a case, I believe, if we want to teach the Tractarian virtue of being silent, we have to teach him the radical difference between saying and showing and its mystical character, elementary propositions, the impossibility of illogical thought, relating meaning to truth-conditions and many other conceptual assumptions about the language. Thus, again interpreting Wittgenstein’s metaphysics of language, world, and thought as know-how does not solve the problem of how to throw the ladder.

The things that show themselves and the propositions with sense are stated by the same means. Putting the inexpressible elements in the *Tractatus* brings the danger that such statements form a kind of transcendental idealism that Wittgenstein avoids in the *Tractatus*. His project can be thought as a form of transcendental idealism since the things that show themselves are reached by his inquiry are the constitutive conditions of the world. However, unlike deducing the transcendental conditions of phenomena, Wittgenstein claims that they are not genuine statements. They are senseless symbolisms. I agree that there is a particular critique of transcendentalism in the *Tractatus*. The transcendental field cannot be furnished with general conditions of possibilities of the world, or the general logical form cannot be formalized as the general rule of language. However, I believe that Wittgenstein, in the *Tractatus*, defends the position that there is a logical structure of the world and a calculus conception of language. The only possible solution to this is to look at it from a mystical point of view. The ethics of silence then is about not treating the general statements as meaningful and enjoying the higher realm.

“There are things that cannot be said but shown,” then there is a kind of commitment to transcendental elements, even if we say that these propositions are nonsense. Thus, we need to take §6.54 seriously from a logical point of view. However, in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein clarifies that the things that show themselves manifest themselves in meaningful expressions. They do not have an independent sense. Nonsensical propositions do not say anything since they do not picture the world. They do not show anything either since the structure of language (the mystical) is embedded in a meaningful proposition. The things that show themselves do not stand in a transcendent metaphysical realm. So, the metaphysical whistle of inexpressible things is heard in the propositions with sense. For example,

the expression that “general logical form pervades the linguistic space” is nonsense, whereas “Blue car crashed into the brown car in Paris” displays the general form of language, world, and thought. Moreover, if philosophers in a symbolic language manage to show us the form of meaningful propositions in a minimal way, the logical form of language becomes more visible. Hacker also finds the worry of transcendental idealism in *Tractatus* pointless; he states:

But this is curious, since no philosopher other than Wittgenstein had ever been tempted to think that necessary truths, or synthetic a priori truths, are ineffable. This is not a disease of which anyone had ever needed to be cured. For philosophers throughout the ages have thought that such truths could readily be stated in language—in the form of what have traditionally been conceived to be necessarily true propositions. The innovation of the *Tractatus* was to argue that the necessary truths of logic are senseless, and that all other putatively necessary truths cannot be said but can only be shown. (Crary, 2000, p. 370)

Hacker refuses that there is only one type of nonsense in *Tractatus*. He describes the four ways that gibberish is different from the nonsense statements in the *Tractatus*. First, formal concepts, such as the number or the object, use our language, unlike gibberish. Secondly, Tractarian nonsense occurs in trespassing the limits of logical form, such as taking formal concepts not as variables but as proper concepts. For example, “number is an object.” Here the number is taken as a variable, whereas it is a formal concept. Thirdly, they state the necessary insights of logical grammar, such as black is darker than white. Lastly, they attempt to show what cannot be said, “forms are not names but variables.” Hacker calls this type of nonsense illuminating nonsense (Crary, 2000, p. 365).

I agree with Hacker that the ethical point of *Tractatus* relies on the two regimes of sense. Wittgenstein differentiates between “the sense of the world” in §6.41 and the sense of a proposition in language. The former is not expressible in the Tractarian understanding of language. Saying, “the sense of the world must lie

outside the world” is a nonsense statement (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.86). However, Hacker claims that this nonsense is different from gibberish and classical piece of metaphysics. The nonsense is evaluated by its function. According to this understanding, this type of statement, such as “the logical form of language cannot be said, but shown, “ changes our conception of rules and the world without creating a substantial theory. That is why it is illuminating. Similar to Hacker, Badiou also articulates two regimes of sense from the ethical point of view. He writes:

“nonsense” is in fact, constructed as an impossible link between the two acceptations of the word “sense,” This obviously brings us back to the decisive point: anti-philosophy [Wittgenstein] declares the (unsayable) sense superior to sayable sense, a sense which is thus also superior to all possible truths, and accuses the philosophical act of wanting to invert this hierarchy, by subjecting to the rules of truth that which, while giving these rules their sense, in reality, cannot be made to comply with them. (Badiou, 2011, p. 116)

In short, the ethical point of the book is to reject the possibility of forming a transcendental theory about the world and language by providing a calculus of meaningful rules. I think the ladder is thrown by the writer of *Tractatus* with the ethico-logical demands of his thinking. Wittgenstein commits to a metaphysics about language, world, and thought, which is carried in the silent stance of the philosopher.

To conclude, I think Wittgenstein’s engagement in metaphysical assumptions about the world does not undermine the meaning and the ethical point of the *Tractatus*. We indeed enjoy the metaphysical ground that we raised through elucidation, and the view is not so different from being on the top of the ladder. According to Wittgenstein ethical point is achieved by the mystical interpretation of the logical form. The ethical responsibility relies on protecting transcendence from metaphysics. Once we recognize the limits of the sayable, philosophers shall be the guardian of silence and the aesthetic worker who makes the general logical form more visible in the statements from the ethical point of view. The philosopher figure

in the *Tractatus* transforms into a guardian of transcendence; his quietism is not a passive position but active in recognizing the limits of the world. Philosophy does not produce any truth. The philosophy is about the formal logical operations in the symbolic language of logic that aims for the mystical to become more visible.

According to Janik and Toulmin, “his world-view expresses the belief that the sphere of what can only be shown must be protected from those who try to say it.” (Janik & Toulmin, 1973, p. 195)

On the other hand, I stated that the nonsensical statements are provisional and designed for a specific confused reader about the logic of language. They do not alone form a substantial theory that furnishes the transcendental realm. Instead, the sense of the world shows itself in meaningful statements in the language. The ethical point of the book is not only made by throwing the ladder away but also by keeping the transcendental silence about things that are shown. So, in these two senses, Wittgenstein manages to realize the book's purpose. However, as he argues in his later writings, he cannot help relying on substantial metaphysical assumptions, which trespass the limits of language.

In the next part, I will discuss Wittgenstein's mystical approach to the general rules about the world, language, and thought, which Wittgenstein aims to awaken us to witness. I claim that his conception of language is shaped by a mystic relation between metaphysical subject and transcendence. This mystic relation is the wonder we experience about the existence of the language, the world, and their correspondence.

2.4 From the mystical point of view

The metaphysical subject is the key aspect that makes me imagine the world and the language as a totality (limited whole), as I witness it from the limit of the world (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.88). This possibility is the key to the mystic religious engagement with the general logical form of the language and the world in the *Tractatus*. The calculus conception of language can be apprehended by appealing to a mystic understanding. In this part, I articulate the mystical nature of this relation. I will claim that for Wittgenstein, the mystical interpretation of this encounter between metaphysical subject and the general logical form is the only way to see the world right, i.e., with wonder. Wittgenstein suggests replacing the mystical understanding of the language with metaphysical necessities, philosophical truths, or scientific laws. I first describe what mystical stands for in the *Tractatus*, then relate it to the wonder. At the end of the chapter, I show how Wittgenstein relates wonder, logic, mystical worldview, and silence together as the final solution to philosophical problems. What we witness in silence is the mystical isomorphic relation between world and language in wonder.

Wittgenstein thinks that expressing the general logical form is ugly (from the aesthetic point of view), wrong (from the ethical point of view), and nonsense (from the logical point of view). According to the *Tractatus*, “[logic] is prior to the question “how?,” not prior to the question “What?” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.66). Logic conditions how things are in the world and how language functions. Thus, the answers produced in language cannot answer the existence of logic, language, or the world. For Wittgenstein, this question of “what” cannot be answered, but we can wonder in our mystic witnessing of the world as a totality. Wittgenstein says that “it is not how the world is that is mystical, but that it is” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.88). The

expression of logical form is in contrast with its mystical understanding.

Wittgenstein states: “there are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.89).

Philosophy as an activity is supposed to make the manifestation of mystical things in the world more visible to us. For example, the *Tractatus* serves this purpose. According to Wittgenstein, witnessing the manifestation of the mystical things awakens a sense of wonder about their existence. Both early and late Wittgenstein sees one of the main tasks of philosophy as awakening the wonder (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 5) (Bearn, 1997, p. 12). What we wonder about is different in early and later writings. In the *Tractatus*, the subject imagines the world as a totality and witnesses its wonderful, mysterious existence.

In *Culture and Value*, he states that “Man has to awaken to wonder” (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 5). One can see that the modality of thought is normative. In *Tractatus* we do not lose our connection to transcendence, but we are asked to retune it. Actually, *Tractatus* is an act of clearance of the transcendental space for us to experience the limits of the world in peaceful wonder.

The wonder is the experience that Wittgenstein wants to replace with the anxiety of expressing the inexpressible through logical care. In his *Lecture on Ethics*, where he still writes with his Tractarian convictions in 1929, when he returned to Cambridge, he tries to make sense of this way of looking at things, i.e., with mystical wonder.

Wittgenstein starts his lecture by imagining a transcendental point of view of the world. He states that if an omniscient person wrote a massive book about everything in the world, the book would contain only full descriptions of the world and no absolute judgment of value. Within the logical apparatus of *Tractatus*, “there

are no propositions which, in any absolute sense, are sublime, important, or trivial” (Wittgenstein, 1993, p. 39). In other words, all the propositions stay on the immanent plane of language. Still, though, Wittgenstein talks about an experience that, according to him, is ethical, aesthetical, and at the same time, nonsensical. He describes this experience: “I wonder at the existence of the world,” or “how extraordinary that the world should exist” (Wittgenstein, 1993, p. 43). This experience requires seeing the world as a limited whole. Wittgenstein calls this experience mystical (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.88). Another similar experience he describes is when all worldly worries fade away, and one experiences absolute safety and says: “I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens” (Wittgenstein, 1993, p. 43). Such expressions of these experiences are nonsense since they do not conform to the general logical form of language. Wittgenstein suggests that these expressions are similes. However, saying that they are similes does not solve the problem. As Wittgenstein puts it, “simile must be a simile for something” (Wittgenstein, 1993, p. 43). One shall be able to express this something directly if one can describe it with similes. According to Wittgenstein, if we drop the simile, we can see that such facts drop as well. There is no way to make sense of them properly. Wittgenstein says we encounter another paradox: “it is the paradox that an experience, a fact, should seem to have supernatural value.” (Wittgenstein, 1993, p. 43) The paradox indicates that we are at the limits of the world, where both the metaphysical subject, logic, ethics, and aesthetics reside.

When one experiences the world at its limit, a safe explanation that justifies the existence of the world or language does not exist. It is a pure encounter with nothing. We cannot refuge under another propositional explanation. Positing substantial logical laws does not help since the logical form is senseless. Ethical

statements as well do not picture reality; thus, “it is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental.” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.86) Similarly, any religious doctrine could not make sense since it is not about facts. Religious statements are used to tell about the feeling of wonder and safety allegorically. However, metaphorical language still has the same problems. He writes in *Tractatus*: “How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.88). God is also mystical. There can be no signposts at the limit of the world of *Tractatus*, which informs us about the transgression of our will to nonsense. This propositional law requires measuring the world from a higher vantage point, but “propositions can express nothing that is higher” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.86).

The calculus conception of language fails to make sense in its attempt to explain what the world is like as a limited whole. Scientific expressions cannot help us articulate our sense of wonder at the existence of the world. Wittgenstein criticizes the idea that a body of knowledge can provide the semantic closure of the world by discovering the laws within the different spheres of life. In this sense, laws of language can explain how language works, not the existence of language. This kind of knowledge transcends human knowledge (linguistic practice).

Moreover, such theorizations produce blockages in human beings' relation to the “mystical” transcendence. These overarching propositions cut off our relation to transcendence. The God-like explanations given by science and philosophy are the hubris of theoretical enterprise that assumes the potency of the discipline on giving the essence of things. There is no scientific principle that can guarantee the content of the world. For Wittgenstein, science deals with facts that are in space and time. The totality of true propositions is the propositions of science, but the scientific

enterprise like philosophy, institutional religion, or an ethical doctrine cannot form a description of the essence of the world that responds to the question of what the world is. Wittgenstein writes: “We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.88).

All these remarks shall be read to clarify how we can relate to the world as a limited whole. As Bearn states: “Wittgenstein's logical cares concerned the non-accidental, and the *Tractatus* protects the non-accidental by revealing that nothing can be said about it. Nevertheless, the fact of determinate sense assures us that this nothing is there” (Bearn, 1997, p. 59). The only possible way to grasp the meaning of the world is to face it as a miracle. Wittgenstein denies reducing the totality of the world to be explained in factual and causal-scientific terms. “To see the world aright” requires to look at the world as a miracle. This understanding competes with various types of worldviews in how they conceptualize the world's limits. It means that one shall refuse to describe the world as a limited whole by the scientific, ethical, religious, logical, mathematical, or metaphysical enterprise. The question of “how the world is” can be described by science, but no discursive practice can meaningfully form a sentence about “what the world is.” That is why Lacan describes Wittgenstein’s philosophy as “nothing but an extraordinary parade, the detection of philosophical skullduggery” (Lacan, 2007, p. 61). The final solution to the problems of life and philosophy lies in perspective change. Philosophy in *Tractatus* only helps to reach and keep this mystical viewpoint. Philosophy shall not be a doctrine (*Lehre*) but an activity of clearance. If works in philosophy suggest *a priori* structures, the doctrine will fail to make sense and block our sight to see the

world properly. As I discussed in the previous part, we throw the ladder, but we gain a clear mystical logical view where we climb.

The silent witnessing to the transcendence of logical form offers us a picture where there is a continuous transition between transcendence and immanence. The limit between transcendence and immanence is an empty no man's land. Mystical elements do not locate in a different realm but are immanently embodied in language. Badiou states that by doing this, Wittgenstein is "proposing a regime for the immanent cessation of [theoretical] philosophy" (Badiou, 2011, p. 46). Philosophy replaces the mystical way of looking at things.

Indeed, the religious tone of *Tractatus* is also present in its structure. At the beginning of the book, the writer digs into the essence of logical form to express divine logic. He makes statements by imagining the world as a totality. In other words, he trespasses the rules of logical syntax and finds himself in deprivation of sense. As a result, he fails in his attempt to attain an overarching view of the world transcendently. However, in his heretic attempt to think about logic, he finds the true nature of logic.

When philosophical enterprise attempts to express what the world is, it exploits the unsayable. However, the exploitation creates disquietude instead of bringing peace to our concerns about how things are. First, this is because the statements would not serve their essential function of representing but are treated as if they can serve this purpose. Secondly, taking them as descriptions of the world creates an urge to compare them with reality. However, they cannot correspond to facts since they are nonsense. However, Wittgenstein defines this struggle to state the essence as ethics. Wittgenstein states:

To be sure, I can imagine what Heidegger means by being and anxiety. Man feels the urge (Trieb) to run up against the limits of

language. Think, for example, of the wonder (das Erstaunen) that anything at all exists. This wonder cannot be expressed in the form of a question, and there is also no answer whatsoever. Anything we might say is a priori bound to be mere nonsense. Nevertheless, we do run up against the limits of language. Kierkegaard too saw that there is this running up against something and he referred to it in a fairly similar way (as running up against paradox). This running up against the limits of language is ethics (Waismann, 2003, p. 68)

Seeking overarching doctrines is the reason for an anxious attitude. The *Tractatus* aims for a change in attitude in philosophizing. Wittgenstein states that the “difficulty of philosophy is not the intellectual difficulty of the sciences, but the difficulty of a change of attitude. Resistance of the will must be overcome” (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 300e). Tractarian silence promises to silence the disquietude of philosophy. Still, Wittgenstein respects the tendency to transgress the limits of sense. In his later writings, he accuses not saying nonsense but of not being aware of it: “don't, for heaven's sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your nonsense”(Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 56e). Similarly, at the end of *A Lecture on Ethics*, he states his respect for people's tendency to think about the limits of the world:

I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was their very essence. For all I wanted to do with them was just to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond significant language. My whole tendency and, I believe, the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it. (Wittgenstein, 2003, p. 44)

He demands resignation in producing theories, not thinking about the limits of the world. Wittgenstein expresses the importance of ethical nonsense for him. A

decent intellectual attitude is attained by this awareness and refusal to make totality claims. This perspective change is the critical aspect of Wittgenstein's suggestion to transform the way we see the world. It is both ethical, aesthetical, and religious at the same time. By throwing the ladder away, the insecure feeling fades away as well. With the clearance of the transcendental field with empty formal limits, the peaceful wonder is supposed to awaken (Wittgenstein et al., 1998, p. 5e). In a way, philosophy as an activity does not produce anything but keeps its intellectual decency. Cahill reports from Joachim Schulte that "for Wittgenstein genuine religiousness is always connected with decisions on how to lead a decent life. One might say that his view of religion was a profoundly ethical one" (Cahill, 2011, p. 32) So, philosophy does not start with wonder, but disquietude and perplexity. However, it shall end in peaceful, silent wonder in *Tractatus*. Philosophy can help us to encounter our limits thorough elucidation.

At the end of the *Tractatus*, our justifications and explanations come to an end. The rule at the limit we face is mystical. The solution to the problem of life about its meaning vanishes (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.88). As Bearn notes Wittgenstein's anxieties about expressing the limit of the world is calmed, not by the answer to his questions, but by the silencing of his questioning (Bearn, 1997, p. 61). The desire to see the world as a limited whole is not tamed, and the subject is not invited inside the limits again; instead, Wittgenstein's logical care shows us the impossibility of engaging in transcendence in the regime of language. Language has logic, and it works according to the general logical form. However, it cannot be expressed. The problem's solution is not to find a sacred entity but the recognition of radical immanence of language and impotence in front of transcendence. The philosopher or any tragic hero cannot produce a remedy by going beyond and finding its source

because there is nothing beyond. On the contrary, the solution is to accept and appreciate it. What we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.89). The only way is to relate it in a mystical silence with wonder. We reach from paradox to wonder.

Wittgenstein usually is thought to be the advocate of this idea by quoting his notorious claim, “The limit of my language is the limit of my world.” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.89) However, a few lines later, Wittgenstein would say that “There are things that cannot be put in words.” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.89) So, the totality of the world is more extensive than language. Rules do not serve for the semantic closure of the world. Calculus conception of the language suggests that the world, language and thought can be explained by the propositional laws, whereas in Wittgenstein’s view, the totality of the world cannot be referred to or explained by propositions. We can, at best, wonder at the existence of the predetermined logical order.

In this part, I described Wittgenstein’s critique of expressing the constitutive rule of language from a religious point of view. Next, I discussed why Wittgenstein rejects the propositional representation of the constitutive rule of the language because of ruining the mystical existence of the world. In my discussion, I contrasted mystical witnessing to the world as a limited totality with providing the constitutive rules as the ultimate explanations of the world. In the next part, I discuss the aesthetics of the encounter with the general logical form of language.

2.5 From the aesthetic point of view

In arguing against expressing the constitutive conditions of the world, language, and thought, Wittgenstein, suggests that this relationship shall be aesthetic. The aesthetic relation between the constitutive condition of language and the philosopher is an

essential part of the *Tractatus*. Manifestation of logical form is not a verbal but an aesthetic visual experience of showing itself. In this sense, Badiou states that Wittgenstein construes philosophy as an activity with aesthetic purpose. He thinks that Tractarian thinking is aesthetical because Wittgenstein chooses “an artistic provenance (visibility, showing) with a religious one (mysticism)” while describing the philosopher’s relation to the higher. He says:

If Wittgenstein's anti-philosophical act can legitimately be declared archiaesthetic, it is because this “letting-be” has the non-propositional form of pure showing, of clarity, and because such clarity befalls the unsayable only in the thoughtless form of an oeuvre (Badiou, 2011, p. 80).

Badiou labels Wittgenstein’s thinking not as philosophy but as anti-philosophy because of three determinations he attaches to a form of thinking that he calls “anti-philosophy.” Firstly, in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein reveals the impossibility for philosophy to posit itself as a meaningful form of thinking through logical analysis. A logical critique of the statements of philosophy is given and declared to be non-sense (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.22). As I exposed the argument, the philosophical enterprise is not endowed with the tools it wants to achieve. It is condemned to end in producing nonsense. Badiou notices that philosophy is not even a form of thinking because “the definition of thought is indeed precise: A thought is a proposition with a sense” (Badiou, 2011, p. 76). Badiou concludes, “philosophy, then, is a non-thought” (Badiou, 2011, p. 76). Through logical analysis, Wittgenstein unravels “the pretensions of philosophy to constitute itself as theory” (Badiou, 2011, p. 75). Constituting itself as an explanatory theory for what language relies on the calculus conception of language. However, if the language conforms with the logical form, it cannot be stated. According to Badiou’s description of anti-philosophy, its first act is to show the incapacity of philosophy in its attempt to build itself as a

theory. Secondly, the philosophy is negated by an authentic form of activity, which Wittgenstein calls philosophy, but it does not create any propositions. The second act of anti-philosophy is to reject the idea that the philosophy is propositional. As Wittgenstein states: “Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine, but an activity” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.29) The only way to relate oneself to the higher/transcendence is by clearing the way to the higher through philosophical activity. And thirdly, the new authentic philosophical activity overcomes/transcends the theoretical philosophy, and witnesses the higher (Badiou, 2011, p. 75). We can also argue that Wittgenstein shows that calculus conception of language cannot be attained without appealing to a mystic and aesthetic element.

Badiou states that *Tractatus* does not aim to replace philosophy with art. His thinking is archiaesthetic because it limits the propositional activity with the strict syntax of the sayable (Badiou, 2011, p. 80). The limit of the world witnessed by the metaphysical subject through art is not a scientific representation. In Wittgenstein’s description of the mystical, we can see that there is always a remainder, an ineffable, of the world. He says: “there are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They *make themselves manifest*. They are what is mystical” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.89). As I described in previous sections, ineffable shall not be interpreted ontologically, epistemologically, or propositionally. Badiou states:

[Witnessing to the remainder] is not captured in the specular relationship in which the ontology of the world and of language is constructed. It is obtained there where “something,” which is precisely not a thing, comes up as a remainder of this relationship. (Badiou, 2011, p. 94)

The remainder is a condition, which allows us the recognition of our finitude. The traditional metaphysical activity, science, or establishing a transcendental meta-

language blocks the encounter to the remainder in an aesthetic way. The transcendental closure of the higher with propositions stops human beings' relation to the higher. Philosophy clears the propositional metaphysical barricade to transcendence. According to Badiou, the realization of beauty and pleasure is the book's strategy. He says:

...Wittgenstein's strategic goal to subtract the real (what is higher, the mystical element) from thought, so as to entrust its care to the act which alone determines whether our life is saintly and beautiful.
(Badiou, 2011, p. 107)

Indeed, Wittgenstein, in the preface of the *Tractatus*, states that the purpose of writing the book “would be achieved if it gave pleasure to one person who read and understood it.” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.3) On another occasion with Russell, Wittgenstein refuses to write arguments in the name of beauty: “When Russell told him he ought not simply to state what he thought, but should also provide arguments for it, he replied that arguments would spoil its beauty” (Monk, 1991, p. 104).

Attempts to state the logic of the language with propositions can spoil the beauty of the general logical form. Ethics, logic, and aesthetics are subtracted from thought by the end of the book (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.78). They cannot be treated by language and expressed. The result for the philosopher is the ability to witness the higher without thought, the beautiful encounter to the limit of the world that is transcendental to thought. However, as Badiou puts it: “the result is a considerable extension of non-thought, which is unacceptable to the [traditional] philosopher (Badiou, 2011, p. 107).

The aesthetic is the act of clearance for more visibility of the mystical, i.e., the general logical form which sustains the isomorphism between language thought, and the world. When we do not speak about the logical form of language, it is more

visible. A proposition's general logical form can be witnessed but cannot be expressed. In the name of a clear view of transcendence, we hear a strong modality of thought. Carnap describes Wittgenstein's thinking like a prophet: "one must pass into silence" for not ruining the beauty of the world (Monk, 1991, p. 244). From the religious-aesthetic point of view, the logical form cannot be appreciated, recognized, or understood in terms of thought, representation, and expression in the form of a law or constitutive rule, but the aesthetic wonder in seeing the world aright.

To conclude, Wittgenstein's analysis of logic is not separable from the aesthetic, religious, and ethical dimensions. Indeed, in the *Tractatus*, proper understanding of the constitutive conditions can be attained through this aesthetic witnessing.

In this chapter, I discussed Wittgenstein's critique of the attempts to provide a logical calculus for the totality of language with substantial rules. The philosophers' demand to formulate the constitutive conditions in the form of propositions is criticized from four points of view. Following his criticism, Wittgenstein suggests that the proper engagement with the constitutive conditions is in aesthetic, religious, ethical experience of mystical silence.

In his later thinking, Wittgenstein's understanding of and insights about the nature of the world language and thought are criticized by himself. In the next part, I will focus on his inquiry on the calculus conception of language and rules in his *Philosophical Investigations*. In his later writing, Wittgenstein challenges his two assumptions; first, to challenge the calculus conception of language, and secondly, to provide an account of normativity that does not produce the absurdities of calculus conception.

One of the unbearable results of the *Tractatus* is the expansion of the domain of the non-sense statements. The absurdities resulted from two unquestioned assumptions in *Tractatus*. One assumption is that propositions can represent facts if and only if they share the logical form as a common entity. Secondly, he changes his idea that there is a strict isomorphism between world, thought, and language. The different linguistic games do not necessarily share a form between language and the world, but they are arbitrary and conventional. There is no conception of language that can be seen mystically as a limited whole governed by a hidden mystical form. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein thinks that the world has a logical order thanks to the logical form; language can be formalized, and complex statements can be reduced to their elementary constituents. So, he defends that the world has a logical order independent of our engagement with logic and the logical form is prior to the deeds; the logic of grammar is “perspicuous” from an eternal point of view, but he criticizes the belief that this order can be expressed in language. Wittgenstein rejects the calculus conception of language on different grounds in his later thought. So, in this sense, as Hacker states, the direction of his critique changes (Hacker, 2014, p.1271).

In the next chapter, I discuss how Wittgenstein questions his common-sense assumptions and thinks of normativity differently. Accordingly, the sublime status of logical form as the constitutive condition of language is understood as one of the language games. In his later thinking, Wittgenstein recognizes the multiplicity of different linguistic normativity governed by different logics. His critique is not focused on the inexpressibility of constitutive conditions but on the constitutive rules in general. His discussion is also correlated with his views on philosophical practice as well. In the next chapter, I will discuss Wittgenstein’s critique of the calculus conception of language in his later writings.

CHAPTER 3

CRITIQUE OF THE CALCULUS PICTURE IN LATER WRITINGS

In the previous part, I examined Wittgenstein's critique of the attempts at the expression of the constitutive rules of language, world, and thought (*WLT*). For Wittgenstein, no inquiry can give us explicitly the general constitutive condition of *WLT* expressed meaningfully in the form of a rule. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein argues that language is in accord with logical calculus. However, the calculus itself is inexpressible because language's constitutive conditions are not expressible. They are symbolized in senseless notations, which make a meaningful expression possible. The formulations to refer to the constitutive conditions can be, at best, pseudo-propositions, shown in symbolic language. The expressions of constitutive conditions must be understood as senseless (*Sinnlos*). The normative order of the world is rather implicitly present and visible in meaningful propositions, facts, and thoughts. The constitutive condition of language transcends linguistic expression. The attempts to state the logic of the *WLT* are also criticized from ethical, aesthetic, and religious aspects. The problem of expression is overcome in the way we interpret/see the world, and we change our expectations from philosophy, logic, ethics, aesthetics, and the sciences. Wittgenstein suggests that we should see the constitutive condition(s) as mystical and realize that it is not representable by language, and consequently stop theorizing about them since any content would be nonsense.

I discussed his arguments in the *Tractatus* in the second chapter. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein agrees that there is a perfect correspondence between the language and the world thanks to the logical order, but he disagrees that the

expression of this order is possible in the form of propositions that are formed by a theory. We can see that the problem of the expressibility of rules is a symptom of seeing language as a calculus. As he writes in *Philosophical Grammar*, Wittgenstein notes a fundamental error in Russell's, Frege's, and his own thinking. In this sense, his inquiry about rules is also a self-critique. He does not criticize his solution as providing a false calculus but as the very desire to conceptualize language as a calculus. He says;

I had the mistaken idea that propositions belong to just one calculus. There seemed to be one fundamental calculus, viz., logic, on which any other calculus could be based. This is the idea which Frege and Russell had [. . .]. If one has the idea of a single logic then one must be able to give one general formula of logic, the general formula of a proposition. I thought I had found this formula in the T-F table, an equivalent of the word "proposition" and the word "logic."
(Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 138)

Wittgenstein repudiates the conception of language as calculus altogether in his later thought. Transcendental logical mysticism and the expansion of the domain of non-sense do not follow only from the conception of the rules that Wittgenstein's argument relies on but also his assumptions about the nature of language, meaning, and normativity. Wittgenstein calls them the grave mistakes (Wittgenstein, 2009, pp. v-vi). The grave mistakes rely on the background of Wittgenstein's old way of thinking, which essentially commits to the idea that language operates according to a logical calculus. In the *Investigations*, objections against this conception of rules aim at transforming their function and status in language.

In this chapter, to argue against the calculus picture of linguistic normativity, Wittgenstein first provides a very simple form of linguistic exchange where the calculus picture's assumptions are vividly present. He calls these exchanges "primitive language games." In 3.1. I explicate what Wittgenstein means by primitive language games and calculus view of language. Then, I list the conceptual

assumptions about rules and normativity of language in these primitive language games since Wittgenstein's strategy for undermining the calculus conception of language shows the implausibility of these assumptions. After presenting the primitive picture of a particular essence of language and its conceptual assumptions about rules, I will discuss Wittgenstein's arguments against the calculus view of normativity and language in the next part.

3.1 Primitive picture and misconceptions about the language and rules

Wittgenstein's critique of normativity and rules rely on the primitive conception of language in his later thought (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.6e). In this part, I will describe what Wittgenstein means by the primitive language games, their relation to the calculus conception of language, and what he means by calculus understanding of language. Then in the next part, I will discuss Wittgenstein's arguments against the conception of rules and normativity that are presumed in primitive language games. Then, I will describe the misconceptions about normativity present in the calculus picture of language.

At the very beginning of his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein describes "a particular picture of the essence of human language" (Wittgenstein, 2009, 5e). To exemplify this picture, he quotes from Augustine's *Confessions* that a child learns the language by learning the names that stand for objects (Wittgenstein, 2009, 5e). The essential act of language is described in this ostensive relation. The complex expressions in language are thought to be derived from such simple ostensive relations. In such a picture, language is thought to be the collection of names that designate objects, which are thought to be their meaning (Wittgenstein,

2009, 6e). Similar to *PI*, In *Philosophical Grammar (PG)*, he notices the importance of this idea for his discussion. He states:

The concept of meaning I adopted in my philosophical discussions originates in a primitive philosophy of language. The German word for “meaning” is derived from the German word for “pointing” (Wittgenstein, 1974, p.56)

The primitive philosophy of language is the idea that the meaning of a word is related to its ostensive teaching. To exemplify this primitive picture of language, Wittgenstein focuses on a pupil-teacher interaction, where the teaching of words occurs. Linguistic exchange is described in its simplest form by the example of commercial exchange, buying “five red apples” (Wittgenstein, 2009, 5e). A pupil who does not know the language goes to the shop with a slip of paper on which “five red apples” are written. The shopkeeper acts upon the paper. We imagine that the shopkeeper does not know the meaning of the words by heart but finds from some drawers where rule charts for words are located. The shopkeeper looks to the rule charts for colors, numbers, and objects. He transforms the message according to the rules and gives the pupil five red apples. In the end, the exchange is over.

A similar example is given in §7, where Wittgenstein exemplifies a practice of teaching the use of a word in one’s native language. The teaching practice can be pointing to objects and saying the name of this object or just repeating the words after hearing them. Wittgenstein calls these practices primitive language games. For Wittgenstein, focusing on primitive language games helps us elaborate on the misconceptions about language, meaning, and normativity.

The particular picture of language suggests that names, colors, and numbers designate the objects, surfaces, and actions according to their rules which determine what they correspond to. In this picture of language, Wittgenstein depicts the meaning of names as rule charts (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.5e, p.39e). In the Augustinian

picture of language, interior ostensive definition determines the meaning of the words. The rules for words show, for example, [red ↗ ●] [5 ↗ IIIII] [apple ↗ 🍏]. Then, the normativity of language is sustained thanks to the collection of rules. In these examples, we see that words and judgments correspond to something in the world or mind. Secondly, this correspondence is determined by some rules in our minds. We seem to state platitudes about language and linguistic exchange in these examples.

Once this picture is seen as the primary and essential function of language, rules form a system that provides the collection of criteria for how language works. A definite set of rules form a calculus, which determines the use of words and expressions in this picture. The calculus view of language suggests a particular nature of the rules in language. I provide a non-conclusive list of conceptual assumptions that are presumed in this calculus picture of language games about rules and normativity:

- i. Rules sustain correspondence between the world and the language.
 - Any expression, including rules, in the language corresponds to something in the world.
 - The meaning of a word is its inner ostensive definition, which is related to its bearer.
- ii. The rules for the meaning of words are clear, distinct, complete, and strict, not having vagueness. They are the “foundations” of language in the form of definitions, principles, or axioms, thanks to which meaningful expressions are derived.
- iii. The rules are the judgments that inform us about the application of the words in two ways;

- Rules carry their possibility of applications in advance. Whereas the applications of the rules are meaningful thanks to their accordance with the rules, rules are seen to be meaningful in their own right, prior and independent from, and transcendent to actual linguistic practices(applications). The truth of some general rules is given (a priori) or self-evident.
- The rules correspond to a mental entity. The calculus of rules runs on the background of our normative practices implicitly (tacitly), even if they are not explicitly stated. The application of words is thought to be triggered causally by the rules' bearer, a mental entity. One might call this process interpretation of the rule or intuiting the rule. The meaning is thought to have a circulation that is analogous to a causal process or a computational process.

Wittgenstein repudiates all conceptual assumptions about the nature of rules and normativity of language in the *PI*. I will elaborate on his objections under four titles in the next part.

First, I start with his psychological critique of philosophers' mindsets in early and late writings. One of Wittgenstein's objections to the calculus conception of normativity and rules is the preoccupation with the method of science in thinking about normativity in language. According to him, the very idea of language as calculus is a product of psychological motivations that are derived from the demands for certainty and universality, which the natural sciences and mathematics can serve in their discourses. He adds that the symbolism in the sciences and mathematics inspires such a picture of language (Wittgenstein, 1998, p.25). This initial motivation

in philosophizing intervenes in producing false pictures of the normativity of language.

Secondly, he lays down his objections to (i). One of the reasons that motivate thinking of language as a calculus is supposing an isomorphism between language and the world because such an isomorphism requires a definite set of rules which sustain this relationship. Wittgenstein objects to the idea that ostensive definition is the essence of language. He shows different functions of language where ostension does not take place. Linguistic expressions serve different purposes; they do not always correspond to something.

Similarly, supposing that ostensive definition is the essence of language produces some further misconceptions, such as confusing the bearer of a name with its meaning. To show the absurdity of this confusion, Wittgenstein elaborates on the use of some mental concepts. For him, their meaning cannot be described by corresponding to an object. These counterexamples undermine conceptual assumptions that language is essentially an ostensive device, the product of the primitive understanding of normativity.

Wittgenstein's third main objection to the calculus picture of language is criticizing (ii); the idea that the rules for the meaning of words are clear, distinct, complete, and strict, not having vagueness, and that language operates according to them. The idea of strict rules suggests that any complex linguistic expression can be traced back to these rules. The strict rules shall also be all-inclusive, meaning that they are complete and they cannot be vague. Wittgenstein disagrees with these three points. First, he argues that the normativity of natural languages is not similar to that of the ideal constructed language. The dynamic, living and open character of normativity prevents us from forming some ideal and strict general rules for

language games. He criticizes the attempts to search for some common laws that subsume and ignore the differences between linguistic practices. Secondly, according to him, lacking a strict definition of a word does not undermine the possibility of making sense and of its normative use in the language. Thirdly, he gives examples to show that the rules of a normative practice do not have to be complete and actually cannot be complete. From all these three arguments he argues for the multiplicity of different linguistic discourses that have different grammars/logics, which cannot be surveyed completely and be reducible to one another.

Lastly, in his fourth and last argument against the calculus view of language, Wittgenstein criticizes the assumption that there is a strict divide between rules and applications. Once the calculus model is accepted as a proper way of conceptualizing the language, then the question of “how does a rule determine its applications?” or “how does one relate the application of a word to its rule?” appears. Wittgenstein shows that accepting such a picture produces an absurd result, that no rule can be said to be related to its application in the end. He aims to undermine the calculus view that gives ontological priority to rules as meaningful entities independent from applications and possibilities that are derived from a set of general rules. This assumption produces the misconceptions I listed in (iii), namely the idea that the rules determine their application in advance and act upon the applications by some process analogous to causation. These two misconceptions are intertwined.

I aim to show how he undermines the plausibility of these assumptions. After this, in 4. *Practice-Based Account of Rules*, I discuss his practice-based account of rules by focusing mainly on the paragraphs between §202 and §242 of *PI*. Between these paragraphs, Wittgenstein provides an account for grounding rules in regularities without supposing an isomorphic relation between world and language,

which is sustained by a transcendent or ineffable extra-linguistic entity that is referred to by formal laws of nature or logic. Additionally, he avoids relying on a causal picture of meaning or an underlying a priori order informing the practices. Let me start with his objections to rules and normativity in the calculus conception of language.

3.2 Psychological motivation for the calculus picture of language

Wittgenstein thinks that the expectations from philosophy are also responsible for picturing linguistic normativity as a calculus. I relate his criticisms about philosophizing to the calculus conception of language in this part. Wittgenstein thinks that conceiving philosophical inquiry and scientific activity as analogous to each other is one of the motives behind conceiving language as a calculus.

In *BB*, Wittgenstein asks, “Why then do we in philosophizing constantly compare our use of words with one following exact rules?” He answers, “the puzzles which we try to remove always spring from just this attitude towards language.” (Wittgenstein, 1998, p.26) He attaches this demand to the psychological attitude exhibited by the ethos and psychology of the practitioners of philosophy.

In both early and late writings, Wittgenstein criticizes the practitioners of philosophy as thinking their activity is analogous to natural sciences and mathematics. He thinks that the weak analogy between natural science and philosophy is the source of the misconceptions about philosophy. For example, in *BB*, he states

Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything or to explain anything. Philosophy is ‘purely descriptive’ (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.18)

Using the methodology of science creates two major misconceptions regarding the nature of normativity for Wittgenstein. The first one is to assume that language by nature is a static subject matter that can be formalized by discovering laws and classifying their elementary parts to which all the linguistic practices are reducible. Secondly, assuming that general rules can be provided for meaning, similar to the laws of nature. Wittgenstein regards these two assumptions as misconceptions because a proper understanding of philosophy does not deal with such projects. I will discuss Wittgenstein's critique of these misconceptions in the following sections. In addition to these two misconceptions about philosophy and the normativity of language, Wittgenstein claims that the expectations from philosophy are related to our psychological need for safety.

For Wittgenstein, there are psychological motivations behind conceiving language as calculus and philosophy as a scientific activity. He thinks that the power of science in supplying security for us, that is, the calming power of scientific rules, confuses the philosophers about the nature of philosophy. In *The Big Typescript*, Wittgenstein expresses the activity of making rules for ourselves (asking for general rules in philosophy) as a response to a psychological need for security, feeling secure, as opposed to being anxious. The philosophical activity of establishing the grammatical rule of a word emerges out of the need to calm down our insecurity about being in the world. He says:

The difficulty lies in understanding how establishing a rule helps us. Why it calms us after we have been so profoundly anxious. Obviously what calms us is that we see a system that (systematically) excludes those structures that have always made us uneasy, those we were unable to do anything with and that we still thought we had to respect. ...Isn't the establishment of such a grammatical rule similar in this respect to the discovery of an explanation in physics – for instance, of the Copernican system? There is a similarity. (Wittgenstein, 2005, 307e)

Like in different parts of his writings, the concept of the rule is understood and elaborated in a very general way; any rule of science, philosophy, mathematics, psychology, or politics calms us. They make us human beings feel secure. They show us our way around life in making decisions, questioning, in finding solutions. The absence of the rules is described as being in a state of anxiety and uneasiness. Indeed, for Wittgenstein, the search for absolute transcendent security in discourse is also responsible for having such a conception of rule (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.52e). Wittgenstein describes the wrong pictures of rules as a product of a tendency in the will formed in the cultural milieu. For him, the cultural demands of his era produce a misconception about an allegedly *a priori* character of the rules. He states:

(In 1931) It was characteristic of theorists of the past cultural period to want to find the *a priori* where it isn't. Or should I say a characteristic of the past cultural era was to form //to create// the concept, or non-concept, of the *a priori*. For it would never have created the concept if from the start it had seen things //the situation// as we do. (Then the world would have lost a great—I mean, significant—error.) But actually, one cannot argue like this, for this concept was rooted in the very culture itself. (MS 183, 81) (Baker and Hacker, 1992, p.243)

He associates scientific understanding of the philosophical practice with the possibility of producing explanations in the form of scientific generalities and laws and seeing the phenomena as instantiated from this general law. Organizing languages by creating hierarchies, axiomatic systems, or classifying them according to their elementary parts results from trying “to find *a priori* where it isn't.” For Wittgenstein, the philosophical problems appear not because of an intellectual lack but a wrong demand, which results from the rule statements about the normativity of the language. The problems in creating meaning, finding answers, and understanding the world will not disappear with a doctrine and body of truths about our existence.

He tries to show that the philosophical/scientific demand of transcendent security is a futile expectation that makes us more vulnerable to the ungroundedness of our language games since we demand more than what can be served by language. The perfect security of an expression is not because of its nature, but it “is only a matter of their attitude [Einstellung].” Thus, he states, “The fact that life is problematic means that your life does not fit life's shape. So you must change your life, & once it fits the shape, what is problematic will disappear.” (Wittgenstein, 1980, p.31) The sickness of philosophical problems to get cured only through a changed mode of thought and life.” (Wittgenstein, 1967, p.132) In the first part, I discussed his *Tractarian* critique of this demand. He shows its implausible results, which leads to solipsism and nonsense expressions. Similarly, in the *Investigations*, he discusses the absurdities of this demand for security.

I will not discuss if Wittgenstein’s general criticism of science is fair. His description of scientific expectations can be criticized in some aspects. The first is that Wittgenstein’s talk of science and philosophy is very general and vague. One might say that there is no one way of doing science and of doing philosophy, or Wittgenstein does not address particular methodologies and family resemblances of different sciences and philosophies in his criticism. In addition to this, many accusations against the philosophical practice by Wittgenstein are also concerns of philosophers. Many modern philosophers are fighting against the bewitchment of language, reason, or dogmas in various discourses. Still, the conceptual transformations Wittgenstein suggests about the expression of rules, their status, the description of rule-following practice, and their function help us to understand his psychological critique of philosophy.

Wittgenstein offers to redraw the area that philosophical practice occupies when he states that

philosophy does require a resignation, but one of feeling, not of intellect. And maybe that is what makes it so difficult for many. It can be difficult not to use an expression, just as it is difficult to hold back tears, or an outburst of rage (Wittgenstein, 2005, p.300e).

The psychological need for safety will be satisfied by transforming the conceptual assumptions about the normativity of language. After giving his account of practice-based normativity, he shows the way to the fly out of the bottle. In the following three sections, I will discuss how Wittgenstein repudiates the conceptual assumptions of the calculus picture of language. Then, in the next chapter, I will discuss his account of practice-based normativity.

3.3 Critique of seeing ostension as the essence of language

In this part, I articulated Wittgenstein's objection to the idea that ostension is the essence of the language. For him, seeing the language as an ostensive device feeds the misconceptions about the nature of normativity. First, such a view makes us blind to the different functions of language. Secondly, one tends to think that for rules to be meaningful, they need to point to something to make sense. However, Wittgenstein shows many non-corresponding uses in language, especially in mental vocabulary. For him, rules do not need to gain meaning thanks to referring to an entity.

The diversity of linguistic functions also shows that language is not reducible to one calculus. However, one can argue that there is not one but many calculi independent from each other. For Wittgenstein, conceptualizing languages (language games) as a collection of distinct calculi is also the wrong picture for language as well. He argues against such a view, again relying on the diversity of linguistic

phenomena in the *Investigations*. Accordingly, the calculus view of language assumes one calculus underlying all language or a collection of multiple calculi and assumes that expressions can be reduced back to strict rules. However, Wittgenstein argues that there are no strict rules and no strict borders of languages that can provide a distinct logic for each language game. He defends that language games lack complete surveyability. In the next part, I discuss Wittgenstein's second objection.

In this part, I will lay out his objection to seeing ostensive function as the essence of the normativity of language. Ostensive teaching of words and correspondence between names and objects can be a part of how we make sense. However, for Wittgenstein, the totality of language cannot be reduced to the act of ostension as a common criterion for normativity. This conception of language is also present in the *Tractatus*. The meaning of a proposition is its correspondence to the possibility of facts. The perfect harmony is thought to be sustained by the logical order. Wittgenstein criticizes the idea that language is essentially an ostensive tool. This critique serves to repudiate the idea of calculus because if there is not a necessary correspondence between world and language, then there is no need to suppose a set of rules that sustains this relationship once and for all.

First, to challenge this basic assumption present in the primitive understanding of language, Wittgenstein points out the variety of linguistic phenomena. There are countless kinds of linguistic expressions. Wittgenstein contrasts these differences in linguistic functions with logicians' attitudes, aiming to reduce the normativity of a linguistic practice to a set of general rules, which explains the correspondence between language and reality. There is a considerable gap between logicians' classifications in language and the actual diversity of

functions in language. The multiplicity in the language is not to laws of logic or any other type of laws. In *PI* §23, to emphasize the multiplicity in language, Wittgenstein gives a list of linguistic functions;

- Giving orders, and acting on them –
- Describing an object by its appearance, or by its measurements –
- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) –
- Reporting an event –
- Speculating about the event –
- Forming and testing a hypothesis –
- Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams –
- Making up a story; and reading one –
- Acting in a play –
- Singing rounds –
- Guessing riddles –
- Cracking a joke; telling one –
- Solving a problem in applied arithmetic –
- Translating from one language into another –
- Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.15e)

In many parts of his later writing, Wittgenstein gives examples for showing the non-descriptive functions of linguistic expressions. Similarly, in the *Blue and Brown Book*, he describes different functions of language without any attempt to present a conclusive list. He says:

giving and obeying orders; asking questions and answering them; describing an event; telling a fictitious story; telling a joke; describing an immediate experience; making conjectures about events in the physical world; making scientific hypotheses and theories; greeting someone, etc., etc.) (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.68)

All these ways of using language make sense, and they are meaningful. However, once one essentially relates the meaning of an expression to its truth conditions (correspondence and non-correspondence to the facts) as Wittgenstein does in the *Tractatus*, all of these functions of language appear to be nonsense through assimilation. In other words, the domain of non-sense expressions is inflated. Any expression that does not correspond to facts becomes nonsense. Because of the multitude of functions of language, Wittgenstein denies the

possibility of providing a calculus for all linguistic practice. In the *Tractatus*, logical calculus is thought to be the underlying (sometimes hidden) foundation of language. However, such a view ends up being blind to other functions of language.

Secondly, conceiving language as an essentially ostensive device feeds the misconceptions about the nature of meaning. One tends to think that for words to be meaningful, they need to point to something to make sense. For Wittgenstein, this idea confuses the bearer of a name with its meaning (Wittgenstein, 1998, p.17).

Additionally, the confusion between meaning and bearer of a name suggests the idea that rules point to the meaning of the word, which is an abstract mental entity. To undermine these misconceptions, Wittgenstein shows that many sentences are not meaningful by means of correspondence to a fact or an entity. Secondly, he shows that various mental concepts are still meaningful and do not correspond to a mental entity. Once one realizes the different functions of language, these two misconceptions, i.e. (a.i) and (a.ii), about the nature of rules and language are undermined.

In *Blue and Brown Books*, Wittgenstein lays out a misconception about meaning. He starts his discussion by stating that asking for the definition of words creates a mental cramp, saying:

The questions “What is length?”, “What is meaning?”, “What is the number one?” etc., produce in us a mental cramp. We feel that we can’t point to anything in reply to them and yet ought to point to something. (We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it..) (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.1)

Once we think that meaning is something substantive, then one tends to think that meaning of a word is something ostensible. In this picture, understanding a term usually means understanding the general term, but not its particular instances.

Wittgenstein gives the example of learning the meaning of “leaf”; one learns what it

means when one knows the general term, not the particular leaves. Additionally, since it does not refer to a particular leaf, the general term is considered to be related to an image, which is the collection of the common elements of particular leaves (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.17). In *Zettel*, he exemplifies Frege and Russell's views: "Russell and Frege take concepts as, as it were, properties of things. However, it is very unnatural to take the words man, tree, treatise, and circle as properties of a substrate (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.122e).

Another result of confusing the meaning of a word and its bearer is thinking of rule expressions as corresponding to some entity. They are treated as if they are expressing language-independent necessities and truths. The rules are thought to refer to order and have truth value thanks to this correspondence. A rule statement within a language looks like an empirical truth. This misconception can be described as confusing between descriptive generality and universal truths referring to the essences of things (Baker and Hacker, 1992, p.x). These rule expressions are seen to be a priori and strictly universal, such as "red is darker than pink" or "it is either raining or not raining now." Wittgenstein disagrees that rule expressions correspond to something in the world. The order of the world is a product of conceptual activity by which we impose an articulation of order on the world. So-called metaphysical truths are rather a product of the grammar of the language games. In *Zettel*, he states that "like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of language" (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.12e). In such a view, law expressions are seen to be a general description of regularity or a conceptual remark about the way we use language. They do not refer to language independent necessities. The rules do not have their meaning thanks to some correspondence to the essences.

Wittgenstein argues that assuming the meaning of a word is an ostensible mental image is unjustified. Because of this assumption, meanings are thought to be detached and independent from the words and located in our mental world.

According to this idea, the meaning of a word can be understood as corresponding to a mental state or event. Wittgenstein describes this attitude as similar to a disease in discussing mental states. He states, “there is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as from a reservoir” (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.143).

Secondly, he examines some mental expressions to exemplify how the bearer and the meaning of a word are confused.

For Wittgenstein, expressions about mental states shall not always assume a mental entity that they correspond to. Wittgenstein says

I describe my state of mind” and “I describe my room.” One needs to call to mind the differences between the language games (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.106e)

One does not report how their mind is when one talks about their state of mind. Wittgenstein gives examples of horror, being afraid, mourning, and crying. He asks: ““it horrifies me” is the gesture of horror. Now, why should the wordless gesture be the ground of the verbal one?” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.183). The same question appears when one says, “We mourn our...” or “I am afraid” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.198e). These expressions are not descriptions of something (an entity in my mind) that has already happened, but we do them by saying; their use signifies a kind of acting on our part. In the same paragraph, Wittgenstein gives the example of crying. He says:

isn’t the problem this: a cry, which cannot be called a description, which is more primitive than any description, for all that, does the service of a description of the psychological. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.198e)

A cry is not a description of a psychological state. Crying is the psychological state itself. Similarly, language does not always report facts. When we say, “I am afraid,” “we mourn our,” or “Ouch!” we do not report a mental state. Like in crying, the expression is the avowal of pain. Another similar example from a psychological state, i.e., hesitancy. He says: “Don’t regard a hesitant assertion as an assertion of hesitancy (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.202e). Similarly, in the following line, he gives the example of “I see... (to understand, seeing the object, noticing an aspect)” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.203e). This expression is not a description of something happening in my mind, but the expression itself is my state of doing (my deed). All this analysis is after a transformation of looking at language differently and changing our expressions. Linguistic expressions do not always point to something “out there” or “inside here.” The expressions themselves are the deeds¹.

He also notices that even if the formal structure of sentences is in the form of reporting facts, this does not mean that they do not have to be “used in the language-game of giving information,” such as poetry (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.28e). Instead, he suggests that we shall not see the meaning as a process that accompanies a word (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.106e, p.229e). The word itself is the meaning, or we can say that meaning something cannot be detached from the word. It is not mental states that give meaning to the words. He gives an example of confession or renouncement:

...Words can be *hard* to utter (Words are also deeds.): those, for example, with which one renounces something, or confesses a weakness (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.155e)

¹ His argument about mental states both undermines the idea that language is essentially a relation between our thoughts themselves deeds. and the world, and it also serves to argue for the practice-based understanding of normativity by claiming that they are I argue about the second purpose of the argument in the next chapter.

The meaning of a name does not have to be something ostensible in the mind of the speaker and listener. Wittgenstein challenges the idea that takes meaning as an ostensible third entity. In *Zettel*, he states: “Knowledge is not *translated* into words when it is expressed. The words are not a translation of something else that was there before they were” (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.33e). Wittgenstein also points out that, there are certain cases in which we differentiate what we mean and what we say. This difference suggests that utterance and thought are two separate entities that accompany each other, and something mental is prior to utterance. Wittgenstein challenges this idea since it brings back the idea of introspection as a method and the mental image as the criterion of meaning (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.7e). In explaining the normative order of language, the mental image cannot be counted as a criterion of meaning.²

He gives all these counterexamples against seeing language only as a descriptive device. The primitive conception of the normativity of language does not provide a proper understanding of different functions in language. The alternative picture is to see them as deeds. By talking about things, we sometimes do not only describe but do things. His argument against reducing language to a descriptive tool aims to dissolve the problem of seeing calculus as something that corresponds to an abstract or concrete entity located in the mind or an abstract realm, such as logical space. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the problem of expression of rules emerges from the *Tractarian* idea that language and the world are isomorphic thanks to sharing the structure, which is symbolized by general rules. Since rules do not refer to any picture in the world, they are regarded as senseless by the writer of the *Tractatus*. However, if we recognize the different functions in language and give up

² Assuming meaning as a mental act leads to other absurd results about the normativity of language. I will discuss these points in 3.5.

truth conditions as a criterion for meaning, then the rule expressions can be conceptualized to serve different functions. Similar to the expression of some mental states, stating the rules does not necessarily refer to some extra-linguistic entity, as we report on facts.

In this part, I articulated Wittgenstein's objection to the idea that ostension is the essence of the language. For him, seeing language as an ostensive device feeds the misconceptions about the nature of normativity. First, such a view makes us blind to the different functions of language. Secondly, one tends to think that for rules to be meaningful, they need to point to something to make sense. But, as Wittgenstein shows, there are many uses in language, especially in mental vocabulary. For him, rules do not need to gain meaning thanks to referring to an entity.

The diversity of linguistic functions also shows that language is not reducible to one calculus. However, one can argue that there is not one but many calculi independent from each other. For Wittgenstein, conceptualizing languages (language games) as a collection of distinct calculi is also a misleading picture of language. He argues against such a view, again relying on the diversity of linguistic phenomena in the *Investigations*. Accordingly, the calculus view of language assumes that expressions can be reduced back to strict rules. However, Wittgenstein argues that there are no strict rules and no strict borders of languages that can provide a different logic for each different language game. He defends that language games cannot be surveyed completely. In the next part, I discuss Wittgenstein's second objection.

3.4 Unsurveyable multiplicity of the logic of language

In this part, I discuss Wittgenstein's reasons for defending that the normativity in language cannot be reduced to a calculus of rules. In (b), I articulated the assumption

about the calculus conception of language as follows: the rules for the meaning of words are seen to be clear, distinct, complete, and strict, not having vagueness. They are the foundations of language in the form of definitions, principles, or axioms, thanks to which meaningful expressions are derived. For Wittgenstein, this assumption is ungrounded. The normativity in linguistic exchange can be vague, indistinct, incomplete, and unsurveyable. Thus, Wittgenstein argues that language cannot be conceived as calculus or a collection of different calculi.

Wittgenstein starts his criticism by focusing on the idea that language operates according to a definite set of rules(calculus) in *PI*, §81. He states that this idea is a misunderstanding of meaning and language. He says:

In philosophy, we often *compare* the use of words with games, calculi with fixed rules, but cannot say that someone who is using language *must* be playing such a game. — But if someone says that our languages only *approximate such* calculi, he is standing on the very brink of a misunderstanding. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.43e)

He does not specify which philosopher or theory is treating language as calculus, but we can see that the primitive conception of language implies the strictness of rules. In the previous chapter in the *Tractatus*, we also see that he assumes the strictness of sense in his account of language. There can be some strictly defined words, but strictness cannot be a condition of meaning. Wittgenstein states that calculus suggests a possibility of logic that can make sense in a vacuum as an *ideal* language (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.43e).

Against this picture, he suggests that languages form a multitude that cannot be complete and reduced to elementary forms. I describe his arguments given in later writings under four titles to argue for this. First, he suggests looking at language as a natural human activity instead of an ideal formal system. For him, natural languages are conceptually different from ideally constructed languages. They do not form

closed systems or are not dead languages but open, dynamic, and living. Because of this difference, they are not reducible to a definite set of strict rules. Wittgenstein appeals to different analogies, such as the ancient city, maze, and the games, to make sense of the difference between the calculus conception of language and natural language. Secondly, he states that finding something in common for all languages results from our attitude of “craving for generality.” He thinks that this attitude prevents us from seeing the multiplicity within language. He claims that one can look for the logic of a linguistic practice without supposing that it is calculus or that they share something in common. Thirdly, the completeness of rules is neither necessary nor possible for linguistic practice. The linguistic utterances cannot be enframed by rules completely. Two things follow from this idea; (a) ‘completeness of rules’ is not necessary for language, and (b) one cannot deduce the normativity of practice from the rules alone since they cannot enframe the practice completely. Additionally, there is no reason to argue that the formalization of a language is better or more complete than the ordinary way of using concepts. Fourthly, the strictness of rules is not a condition of normativity, either.

3.4.1 Language as a dynamic multiplicity

Wittgenstein argues that the normativity of language lacks complete surveyability because its subject matter is highly dynamic. He first points out that speaking a language is a natural human activity. For him, natural languages are conceptually different from ideally constructed languages. Wittgenstein suggests conceptualizing natural language as a part of our natural history (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.16e) as opposed to a formal system according to which one’s acts can be traced back to formal principles. The proper way to look at language is to see speaking a language

as an activity or a form of life. In *Zettel*, Wittgenstein provides another argument against the calculus conception of language. The variety of languages and pictures they provide about similar concepts. In *Zettel* §323, Wittgenstein states that

Being acquainted with many languages prevents us from taking quite seriously a philosophy which is laid down in the forms of anyone. But here we are blind to the fact that we ourselves have strong prejudices for, and against, certain forms of expression; that this very piling up of a lot of languages results in our having a particular picture (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.60e)

He uses the metaphors of the ancient city and the maze to make sense of the unsurveyable character of the linguistic multiplicity. In *PI* §18, he describes language as a maze and ancient city:

Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions of various periods; and this is surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight, regular streets and uniform houses. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.11e)

One can argue that artificial cities are planned according to some formal rules of design and architecture, but ancient cities lack such original plans. Even an artificial city would lose this accord with its design principles after its residents start interacting. Likewise, language reflects many historical practices of “various periods,” changes, transformations, inventions, and interactions that cannot be traced and reduced back to an origin.

His second analogy is to compare language with the games. By looking at different kinds of games, such as board games, ball games, and athletic games, Wittgenstein denies the possibility of finding a common law since, like cities, they are also living forms of life and continuously change in time and space. Additionally, they do not have a historical beginning tacitly at work underneath every game. To exemplify variations in what we call games, in §83, Wittgenstein gives the example

of people who start to play with a ball various existing games without any predetermined purpose. He says:

[They start] playing several [games] without finishing them, and in between throwing the ball aimlessly into the air, chasing one another with the ball, throwing it at one another for a joke, and so on. And now someone says: The whole time they are playing a ball-game and therefore are following definite rules at every throw. And is there not also the case where we play, and make up the rules as we go along? And even where we alter them as we go along. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.43e)

In this example, one can say that they are engaged in a game while playing a ball game, joking with the ball, or throwing the ball aimlessly. Without definitive rules, one can be engaged in a game. Wittgenstein's description of the games' diversity and width of concept does not comply with the idea that all games shall be contained in a common element. Instead of looking for definite rules, he states that there are "a complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing: similarities in the large and in the small." (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.36e) Prioritizing one similarity might cause one to neglect the other one. Any endeavor to find an element common for all would fail to grasp the richness of similarities between them.

He notices that even if a rigorous classification is made, one cannot argue that the classifications of different language games are complete, given once and for all, since, in time, some language games "become obsolete and get forgotten." (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.14e) The diversity of linguistic phenomena is not reducible to one calculus or multiple calculi. Being part of natural history prevents us from setting definite rules for something still dynamic and not dead. No linguist or philosopher can predict the complete flow of a conversation or what the speakers will mean by certain words in advance. No speech act is free of context. Language cannot be controlled by or subsumed under fixed laws. The contingency of linguistic practices assures that no philosopher can determine a theory that is free from its

practice. He states that the inquiry on the logic of languages shall change in time (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.15e).

Secondly, being a part of our natural history does not mean that the logic of language is a natural phenomenon. Wittgenstein thinks that linguistic normativity does not have a static subject matter. Thus, exact descriptions of meaning cannot be given. However, its dynamic nature does not mean that it is completely chaotic. On the contrary, formulating, discovering, and making up rules are widespread practices of human beings and an indispensable part of our thinking. Wittgenstein has no objection to formulating rules and describing regularities. He states that “following a rule is fundamental to our language game, it characterizes what we call description” (Wittgenstein, 1990, p.330).

The intellectual practices of sciences or philosophy are about discovering, inventing, positing, and interpreting patterns and regularities and then making rules and laws of their subject matter regulating the world. Such an activity necessitates that the phenomena that are investigated scientifically have a rule-governed structure waiting to be formulated. We, human beings, can formulate expressions(laws) that describe, explain, or prescribe the regularities and patterns or formulate explanations for natural phenomena. Similar things can be said for human practices; we formulate rules for using the concepts and practices, such as playing chess, buying-selling, talking or walking in the traffic.

However, the problem starts with the assumption of rule-governedness of natural phenomena thought to be analogous to the rule-governedness of human minds, society, or language (Wittgenstein, 1993, p.133). Wittgenstein notices that if rule-governedness of nature, mathematics, and language is thought to be one of a kind, then the expectations from rule formulations differ. Thinking that language is

analogous to natural science can create a tendency that is at work in different discourses in theorizing. According to this tendency, when subjects look at the phenomena, they look for regularities and describe them and go one step further and assume that the regularities that take place are unfolding from a calculus of laws that are there to be discovered. For Wittgenstein, this further step is assuming calculus as an ungrounded assumption. The idea of calculus assumes that linguistic exchange is like a causal phenomenon. By raising this objection, Wittgenstein attacks both the axiomatization of language like mathematics and understanding normativity in causal terms.

He says, “a word has no meaning given to it, as it were, by a power independent of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific investigation into what the word really means” (Wittgenstein, 1998, p.28). Because of the dynamic character of language, the logic of a word cannot be given once and for all. Once the regular patterns of the use of words are imagined as static entities, this conception of meaning prevents us from paying attention to the dynamic character of language games. Thinking language as a natural non-normative phenomenon or a predetermined axiomatic system is a misconception.

Wittgenstein’s next objection concerns the temptation to find a common entity for meaning. In the next part, I will discuss this objection.

3.4.2 Against looking for a common entity

Favoring the irreducible multiplicity of languages against strict common rules starts at *PI* §65. Wittgenstein disagrees with his *Tractarian* idea that linguistic normativity shall be determined by stating what is essential or common for the linguistic

expressions. He starts discussing this (stating what is essential) with the interlocutor's objection to Wittgenstein in §65:

[you] have nowhere said what is essential to a language-game, and so to language: what is common to all these activities and makes them into language or parts of language. So, you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you the most headache, the part about the *general form of the proposition* and of language.
(Wittgenstein, 2009, p.35e)

Wittgenstein answers the interlocutor's criticism in the *PI*. However, he argues against the desire to look for common elements once and for all, as in the Blue and Brown Book. According to him, philosophers tend to look for what is "in common to all the entities which we commonly subsume under a general term." (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.17) He calls this attitude "craving for generality" and sees it as the source of philosophical puzzles, which demand definitions and law-like formulations. Wittgenstein states: "the man who is philosophically puzzled sees a law in the way a word is used, and, trying to apply this law consistently, comes up against.... paradoxical results" (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.27). The expectation of forming a general rule is a conceptual supposition in our thinking for him. One looks for the common element in two uses of a word. For him, within the diversity of language, seeking a common element is over-simplification. For example, even the concept of "common property" has nuances of use in different language games one might easily neglect. He gives an example from food ingredients and abstract concepts to describe this way of thinking. For example, saying "alcohol is a common property of wine and beer" is a language game that we are acquainted with, but when one thinks that for other concepts such as beauty, one tends to say "beauty is an ingredient of all beautiful things" then one infers as in the case of material objects that there is "pure beauty, unadulterated by anything that is beautiful." (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.17) Conceiving "the common property" as a general concept prevents us from seeing the

differences in its use. The differences between substances and abstract concepts are neglected, and the meaning of “common property” is misleading. The investigation does not reach the common element, but the common element is already assumed conceptually before the investigation of the meaning of a word.

In later pages of *BB*, Wittgenstein gives the process of how the craving for generality produces philosophical puzzles. The first question starts by asking, “What is X?” such as “What is time?” Then, one tends to answer such a question by providing a distinctive property for time; “Time is the motion of the celestial bodies.” The third step is to see that the definition is unsatisfactory (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.27). Then one is tempted to find a complete, correct definition. However, “the motion of the celestial bodies” can be the one type of use of the word time. Instead of looking at one type of general term, one can provide different properties for different uses of the concept.

Here, Wittgenstein’s critique is twofold; first, he repudiates the idea that there shall be a calculus of calculi and a common definition that is the case for all different uses. The distinctions between the meaning of the words are not easy to determine, as he says, “they are used in a thousand different ways which gradually merge into one another. No wonder that we can’t tabulate strict rules for their use” (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.28).

Coming back to the investigation of a concept in the form of “what is X?” Wittgenstein’s suggestion is to discard the assumption that there shall be a common element for that concept, but instead, one shall look for multiple different uses for the concept, try to understand the gradually merging uses into one another. For this reason, instead of looking at what is common in language games, he suggests:

Instead of pointing out something common to all that we call language, I’m saying that these phenomena have no one thing in

common in virtue of which we use the same word for all a but there are many different kinds of *affinity* between them. And on account of this affinity, or these affinities, we call them all “languages.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.35e)

In *PI*, Wittgenstein states that he sees his way of looking at things differently from the *Tractatus*. The misconception about language for Wittgenstein is to imagine language as a unified totality that could be explained by general propositional form. However, in the *PI*, Wittgenstein takes our attention to the multiplicity of different ways that language is practiced.

Against Wittgenstein’s idea of family, the interlocutor says: “But then the use of the word is unregulated – the ‘game’ we play with it is unregulated.”) (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.37e). Wittgenstein argues that without a common element or an ultimate foundation the language is (can be) still regular and regulated. The multiplicity does not prevent us from talking about a totality called games, not because of common elements between them, but similarities. The totality of games can suggest a family. This relation is not like a logical or family tree, where differences are born/derived from a common principle. As he says in *On Certainty* (*OC*), “language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination” (Wittgenstein, 1972, 475). Similarities build a network without any *a priori* center or source, and he says that language is variously rooted; it has roots, not a single root (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.114e). However, he does not deny that they form family-like structures, like games.

Similarly, words form different families. Wittgenstein advises to focus on observed “similarities and affinities” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.36e) instead of looking for common and same elements. Wittgenstein suggests seeing life as a weave,

This pattern (pretense, say) is not always complete and is varied in a multiplicity of ways. But we in our conceptual world keep seeing the same, recurring with variations. That is how our concepts take it. For

concepts are not for use on a single occasion. (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.99e)

Then he adds that “one pattern in the weave is interwoven with many others” (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.100e). Looking at language in this way prevents us from describing clear-cut borders because the practices are interwoven. Surveying a common single path to the ultimate foundations would not be possible. He gives examples of fragments in surveying activity about the rules in language. He says, “surveying a path to a language game is analogous to a fragment of another. One space projected into a limited extent of another. A ‘gappy’ space” (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.113e). The multiplicity of language lacks complete surveyability in this sense (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.54e). On the other hand, the paths in calculus are already determined.

In all these lines, Wittgenstein argues that the calculus model does not fit how we use language. First, he rejects that logical calculus is the foundation of different language games. Secondly, he rejects the idea that language games can be defined as the totality of different calculi. Finding a common entity for all uses prevents us from seeing the logic of languages since the linguistic practices cannot be traced back to common strict elements or rules at each time.

His third objection against the idea of calculus is to argue that the logic of language games is not and cannot be complete. In the next part, I will discuss his argument against completeness.

3.4.3 Against completeness and superiority of calculus

Wittgenstein’s third objection to the idea of strict rules concerns the completeness of rules for a game. The completeness of rules is neither necessary nor possible for language games. Normativity does not necessitate the completeness of rules. For

him, in a language game, rules cannot enframe the totality of practices completely. He says, “speaking of the application of a word, I said that it is not everywhere bounded by rules.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.44e) He challenges this objection by giving an example of playing tennis. A tennis game, like a language game, is a rule-governed practice. Anyone who knows the game of tennis can tell if someone is playing tennis or not, in other words, if the person is acting according to the game's rules. However, the rules of tennis are not the justifications for the player's actions. They prescribe how the game is played but not determine players' actions. The rules guide the players, but they cannot bind the actions completely. The rules of tennis provide the criteria for who won the points, but they do not define any criterion for how high to throw the ball or how hard to hit the ball (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.37e). The rules cannot transform a practice into hard-wired mechanical movements. A practice, an activity in which we follow the rules, is always open-ended. The rules of a language game by themselves do not form a closed system. They leave open many ‘back-doors,’ which are closed, as it were, only in the actual practice of using language (Baker and Hacker, p.135).

To exemplify this point further, Wittgenstein makes an analogy between music and verbal language in *Zettel*. He states that the relation between the musical piece and the score is similar to that between rules and their application. He states that “soulful expression in music-this cannot be recognized by rules” (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.28e). He says that there is a strong musical element in verbal language. (A sigh, the intonation of voice in a question, in an announcement, in longing; all the innumerable *gestures* made with the voice.) (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.29e). Any rule that explains music will be insipid compared to the understanding of the music (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.29e).

In *Zettel*, he inquires further on demanding the completeness of rules. He asks: “How should we have to imagine a complete list of rules for the employment of a word?” (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.78e). He gives other examples from traffic regulation and chess, similar to his example of a tennis game. In normative activities, he claims there are always undecided cases in which we are not sure if they accord with the rules. Hypothetically speaking, if the rules can prescribe the total movement of a pedestrian, then normativity traffic regulations would lose their normativity (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.78e). There would not be a subject who decides and acts within a normative practice. The subjects engaged in practice follow or break, stretch, negate, reject, and negotiate rules within a normative practice.

Thus, a practice cannot be enframèd by the rules completely. One cannot deduce all possible “ideal” cases from the list of rules. The practice itself is more than the set of rules. Language is no different from a normative practice in this sense.

The definiteness and completeness of rules are not a condition for practicing a rule-governed game. A simpler version of a game is still a game. A simpler version does not mean that it is incomplete. In the *Blue and Brown Book*, to discuss completeness, Wittgenstein gives the example of the use of the word “kind.” The properties of things define what kind they are. The use of words calls for a common element between a variety of things. In a classification of natural properties, one can talk of completeness for inclusion, but for language games one cannot argue the completeness. Wittgenstein says: “a treatise on pomology may be called incomplete if there exist kinds of apples which it doesn't mention. Here we have a standard of completeness in nature” (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.19). However, he says that one cannot claim completeness in language games. Chess is not more complete than its simpler

version. (There are no subtle distinctions between logical forms as there are between the tastes of different kinds of apples.) (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.19).

Similarly, the creation of a precise language cannot be considered superior to the natural language. Moreover, claiming that the artificial language is better or more complete than natural one cannot be justified. There is no reason to assimilate our linguistic practices to such logic. Wittgenstein does not deny constructing ideal languages, but this possibility does not mean that ideal languages are better than natural languages. He is against the belief that there is a possibility of discovering or making an ideal set of more precise rules, more complete, and explaining the nature of language games.

3.4.4 Against strictness

Wittgenstein's fourth objection concerns the assumption that if there is a correspondence between facts and propositions, then the normativity of such correspondence cannot be imprecise. Thus, there shall be precise rules to hold this correspondence.

Wittgenstein argues that this assumption is not correct because usually, in imprecise occasions of linguistic practice, one can still engage in meaningful communication successfully. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein has the opposite assumption, and he states that "without philosophy, thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries" (Wittgenstein, 2001, p.30). This idea originates from Frege. Wittgenstein says, "Frege compares a concept to a region and says that a region without clear boundaries can't be called a region at all. This presumably means that we can't do anything with it." (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.38e) However, for Wittgenstein, a vague

concept is still a concept, in the way that a photograph that is not sharp enough is still a photograph. Additionally, it does not mean that replacing it with a sharp photograph is always better (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.38e). Similarly in *BB*,

Wittgenstein says:

But this is not a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p.27)

Wittgenstein does not argue against the possibility of forming definite rules. However, he rejects the idea that all meaningful expressions must be traced back to a definite rule. The definiteness is not a condition for having a linguistic exchange or for stating a rule in a language game. Any rule, definite or indefinite, can leave some region of possibilities that are not definite. In *Zettel* §441, he talks about the elasticity of the rules. One cannot claim that the elasticity must be definite even if the rule is elastic. For Wittgenstein, arguing this way is sticking to “*a form of expression*.” This form of expression again assumes that any normativity has to be definite. Wittgenstein’s examples are not rare counter-examples. For him, most of the time, the normativity in language appears with its indefinite regions. Language games with definite rules designed for an ideal special purpose are rare. He argues against the demand for ideal structures in language. The rules of some language games can be definite, but one cannot start with the assumption that they are always definite.

For Wittgenstein, there are no predetermined criteria drawn until they are made for a purpose, such as training for a language game. His view is to reject a predetermined boundary for a concept.

We don’t know the boundaries because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary for a special purpose. Does it take this to make the concept usable? Not at all! Except perhaps for that special purpose. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.37e)

General sharp rules can be given for explaining the way a concept works in language. However, for Wittgenstein giving examples can serve the same way as explaining the language game. As samples could be misinterpreted, general explanations can be misunderstood as well (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.38e). Thus, one cannot infer that sharp definitions are better than gestures or samples that aim to explain the logic of language games.

From all four arguments, Wittgenstein rejects the idea that completeness and strictness of common criteria are necessary conditions for the normativity of languages. These points prevent us from formulating calculi for different language games or providing a calculus of all various calculi. The multiplicity in the language is irreducible to strict and complete rules.

In the next part, I will discuss Wittgenstein's *reductio* arguments against the calculus conception of language. Accordingly, Wittgenstein argues that if the implications of the calculus conception of language are followed strictly, then the rules in the calculus cannot justify the uses of the word as being in accord with them. In other words, if the calculus view is correct, then no rule can justify any linguistic use as being in accord with the calculus.

3.5 The gulf between rules and practices

Seeing language as a calculus grounded in some principles, laws, and axioms, which have their meaning on their own, Wittgenstein creates more misconceptions about normativity. I listed this misconception in (c) at the beginning of the chapter. Let me summarize these misconceptions. In the calculus view, rules are seen to be the foundations of any correct application of the words. In other words, rules carry their possibility of applications in advance. Whereas the applications of the rules are meaningful thanks to their accordance with the rules, rules are seen to be meaningful

in their own right, prior and independent from, and transcendent to actual linguistic practices. In this sense, the rules are the conditions of the correct applications. In addition to that, the truth value of rules is seen as given, *a priori* or self-evident in the primitive picture of language. The relation between rule and its application is thought to be causal. The process of meaningful linguistic exchange is considered analogous either to a causal process, from the bearer of the rule of the speaker to the bearer of the rule of the listener, or to a logical process. Applications are thought to be followed by the rules.

In buying five red apples, once one understands the meaning of the words, one can apply the general formula for being five, red, or apple for the particular cases. In the primitive understanding of language, the rule charts for *to buy*, *me*, *5*, *red*, and *apple* are stored as mental images, and the rules are applied on the particular occasion of buying apples. Then, the application of the rule traveled to the shopkeeper's mind and matched with the rule charts in his mind. Then the exchange is over.

This image of rules creates problems for Wittgenstein about the relation between rules and their applications. We can relate this primitive picture to another sample of linguistic exchange that Wittgenstein raises in §185. In this part, I will problematize their relation by focusing on §185-202 of the *Investigations*. In these paragraphs, Wittgenstein critiques the causal and computational picture for the relation between rules and applications. The dialogue ends with the absurdity that no rule can sustain any employment of words as desired in the calculus picture. Thus, the calculus view is not a consistent picture of normativity.

In 185§, there is a sample of teaching counting in series. The teacher asks the pupil to write a series of the form “+1”. The pupil writes down until 1000. Then, by

the usual criterion, one can say that the pupil is mastered the series of natural numbers. Later, the teacher asks him to write a series of the form “+2.” Pupil starts to write “2, 4, 6, 8 ... 1000” until 1000. However, after 1000 he starts going “1004, 1008, 1012 ...” The teacher warns him: “you stopped going adding 2’s.” But the pupil answers: “But I did go on in the same way.” The pupil, by the usual criterion, i.e., counting until 1000 correctly, can be said that he understood the rule (understood what it means to add 2s). He can recite the rule and can write according to the rule. Can we say that the pupil follows the rule until the 500th step and then stop understanding it? Or when and how can we say that the pupil understands how to write the series? The pupil did not master the technique. The teacher might challenge this unexpected behavior by giving reasons to correct the pupil’s behavior, generating different formulations, or other examples, but still, the pupil might not produce answers that accord with the rule. The example may sound odd, but with this bit of case, Wittgenstein argues against some basic assumptions of the calculus view of language that I listed at the beginning of the chapter.

One reason for the oddness of the example of pupil counting is its cognitive conflict with this primitive image of normativity. The example is from mathematics, and the non-contingent nature of mathematics makes the case even harder for us to grasp. The example from the field of mathematics is related to a broader question about normativity. The normativity of mathematics is different from the normativity of using the word ‘red’ or normativity of an expression of a law of physics. Teaching a formula in mathematics and teaching a word are not the same. However, Wittgenstein aims to show the conceptual confusions rooted in conceptualizing language as a calculus, language game, or mathematics. For Wittgenstein, these different fields have crisscrossing similarities between them. They are not reduced

from one to another, but there is a similar tension between rules and applications. i.e., taking them as language games, and in each game, we follow the rules and give them certain roles and functions no matter if we talk about the colors of objects or play chess or calculate. Thus, this little instance of mathematics can be extended to any rule expression, which is thought to be inexorable in any discourse that is thought to be calculus. He states that discussing the understanding of a general rule boils down to understanding a symbol, like understanding 'red' or any other word in a language game (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.32e). Indeed, Wittgenstein states that the example has similarities to "that in which it comes naturally to a person to react to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction from fingertip to wrist, rather than from wrist to fingertip." (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.80e) Thus, the previous parts of *PI*, where the primitive picture of language is criticized because of seeing ostensive definition as the essence of language, can be seen as related to the rule-following argument.

According to the primitive picture of linguistic exchange, we think that we apply the words correctly thanks to grasping the rules. One function of rules can be said to be that they determine which applications accord with them and which not. One can say that the rule of the series determines the future possible right applications. The interlocutor states that the applications are somehow involved in the rule expressions; rules anticipate reality.

188. Here I should, first of all, like to say: your idea was that that act of meaning the order had in its own way already traversed all those steps: that when you meant it your mind as it were flew ahead and took all those steps before you physically arrived at this or that one. Thus, you were inclined to use such expressions as: 'The steps are *really* already taken, even before I take them in writing or orally or in thought'. And it seems as if they were in some *unique* way predetermined, anticipated-as only the act of meaning can anticipate reality. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.82e)

The calculus conception of language suggests that once we understand what is meant by the rules, the practice follows thanks to the act of meaning. Without application, by grasping the rule, we somehow “apply” them. However, Wittgenstein’s hypothetical case of counting challenges the attempt to conceptualize the relation between rules and application as analogous to a causal determination or logical computation. In addition, if Wittgenstein manages to undermine this picture of normativity, the conceptual assumptions regarding rules are also repudiated.

The main question is this: what is the criterion of using a word correctly in future applications if one knows the rule by heart without appealing to their practice? In the calculus conception of language, this problem is neglected by supposing the rules of the use of words are taken to be true on their own and determine the correct use of words. However, Wittgenstein rejects the idea of determination analogous to a causal process in the domain of language.

He criticizes four points in accounting for filling the distance between rules and applications. Firstly, Wittgenstein argues that the example shows that rules alone do not grant their application. They cannot be taken as criteria for applying. Secondly, he criticizes the relation between rules and applications as analogous to the design and execution of a machine or the relation between trains and rails. Thirdly, he shows the infinite regress once the distance between rules and applications is filled with some queer mental processes, an act of meaning, such as intuition or interpretation. Lastly, he argues that the idea that the rules determine applications by a queer mental act has an occult character. He attempts to demystify the nature of linguistic exchange; rule-following shall be seen primarily as a practice.

What is the criterion for understanding the word's meaning if the application is already present in the rule formulations? If the rule determines the applications,

then it should be easily said that the instances are not necessary for mastering the rule. Learning the rule alone would be sufficient for future applications, i.e., engaging rule-governed practice. The pupil can write the formula and count to 1000 in accord with the rule. How are we to judge that this pupil understood the rule and can write the series according to the rule in the 501st step? Even if it is thought to be true independently from the applications, the rule itself cannot be the justification of the rule-governed practice.

Similarly, in such a picture, writing down the numbers cannot be why the kid can go until infinity. In the teaching of the series, the pupil can write the rule on the board and can write according to the rule. However, still, from understanding the rule as an expression, the correct application of the rule does not follow. Applications are not determined by stating the rule alone. Understanding a rule, which knowing how the word is used could not be justified by the rule alone. Wittgenstein argues that expressing the rules or understanding the rules by no means determines the future possibilities of applications in advance. The only criterion of the correct way of being engaged to practice is looking at the practice of counting. So, judging whether one follows the rule cannot be understood without looking at its applications. The teacher could repeat to him the formula but saying “do the same way!” would work as much as the formula since “doing the same” is not an independent criterion. It is dependent on its previous applications as well. Any reference to the rule *per se* does not have a justificatory function alone and is a criterion for the practice to be regarded as in accord with the rule.

Secondly, another difficulty is caused by the grammar of the word “to determine.” Baker and Hacker note that the misconception about ‘determination’ fosters philosophical illusions. The grammar of “reason” and “cause” create

confusion. Determination does not have anything to do with the empirical field, like causation. In this picture, following a rule is assimilated to being causally determined” (Baker, Hacker, 1992, p.99). The confusion arises from what is understood by “rules determine the uses.” The expression sounds like it is the rule which makes the practice correct or meaningful, as if the rule was taking the steps in advance for us (Baker and Hacker, 1992, p. 108). Wittgenstein discusses two analogies that can be argued for what is meant by rules determine the applications. One is the machine analogy (logical machine). Saying that learning the rule determines its right applications prior to the practices is like saying that a machine, by its design, determines its possible future actions (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.83e). Analogously, the idle machine stands for the rule, and the future terms in the series stand for the machine's movements. Wittgenstein points out there is a tendency in the philosophical discussion that the design determines the execution in advance, or the formula for the series determines the steps. We tend to say the possible actions of a machine are determined like the steps in series (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.84e). Another analogy of rails for rules is given in §218: “the beginning of a series is a visible section of rails invisibly laid to infinity” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.91e). This analogy suggests that all of the applications follow once the rule is understood.

In both of these analogies, one shall not neglect the different possibilities in the actual working of a machine and the actual existence of the rails. Things can go wrong, break, and work differently from what is expected (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.84e). In machine analogy, Wittgenstein notices that the expression “possibility of movement” creates confusion about the nature of rules. “Possibility of movement” is not the movement; it is not a (physical) condition of moving. The possibility of movement is a supposition derived from the movement. If there is such a possibility,

it is only the possibility of this movement. Wittgenstein here suggests looking at “how we use the phrase “possibility of movement” when we are talking about a given machine” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.84e). He argues that the “possibility of something” is used similar to “being able to.” Wittgenstein argues that using rules to explain techniques and understanding is nothing but a skill. This practical ability becomes the possibility of movement. However, here the “possibility of movement” once interpreted as predetermined, the distortion starts in the way the word is used. Possibility shall be interpreted as an expression of ability, not the expression of the totality of all possible movements once and for all. In such cases, he suggests taking the notion of possibility as a logical concept (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.96e).

He says that the philosophical enterprise distorts the grammar of “possibility of” and drives “odd conclusions” from it, such as rules’ determination of the all-possible correct uses (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.84e). In addition to this, Wittgenstein suggests that the causal picture of normativity might be rooted in the way we use the verb *to follow*. The verb “to follow” suggests an empirical causal act is processed in the act of inferring the next term in the series. In other words, it is not the possibilities that involve the future acts, but the possibilities are derived from actual movements. The design does not determine the execution in advance. The design is understood by its execution, as he shows in the example of mathematical series. Execution does not follow from the design alone. The example of counting the series undermines the picture of logical machinery that works independently of practices. “To understand” the rule does not “determine” the actions to be taken in advance. Understanding the systematic relations between rules determines nothing about the meaning of the practice in advance.

Thirdly, Wittgenstein rejects a counter-strategy to fill the gap between rules and applications. According to this strategy, intermediary steps between rules and applications can be provided to build a connection between them. Such explanations suggest that some mental operations are triggered to understand the rule and fill the gap between rules and applications. However, Wittgenstein shows that this kind of explanation ends up with an infinite regress. The interlocutor appeals to this strategy in §186 of *PI*. He suggests that “intuition *a* is needed at every step to carry out the order ‘+*n*’ correctly.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.81e) At every step, one must intuit how to go on according to the rule. The future steps are anticipated before they are made, thanks to “a queer kind of mental act” (Wittgenstein, 1976, p.28). However, intuition shall appeal to the correct order of numbers. To apply the rule correctly, one needs to intuit correctly. However, that is just what is in question. In the sense that the rule can be applied incorrectly, similarly, an intuition can be heard incorrectly if it is something like an inner voice. Then, one would need another intuition to understand the intuition correctly, and this process will go to infinity. Wittgenstein makes another objection to intuition in *Zettel*. When the interlocutor says that “he grasps the rule intuitively.” Wittgenstein responds, “-But why the rule? Why not how he is to continue? (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.56e) Thus, intuiting the rule does not solve the problem of the gap between rules and applications in the calculus view.

Similarly, in §201, Wittgenstein lays another misunderstanding similar to §186. We think that by reasoning and interpretations of rules, we can reach an application of the rule or go against it (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.87e). However, he states that the attempt to fill the gap between rules and applications by interpretation leads to a regress. An interpretation of the rule is another expression of the rule that is to be understood or interpreted, and this goes to infinity. Interpretation is not an

application but another substitute for the rule expression. The source of regress is the misunderstanding that every action could be traced back to a law expression in a chain of reasoning. Wittgenstein just points out a misunderstanding in this line of thinking. He says:

That there is a misunderstanding here is shown by the mere fact that in this chain of reasoning we place one interpretation behind another, as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another lying behind it. For what we thereby show is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going against it”. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.87e)

However, this idea of the ability to grasp without intuition or interpretation does not help us to solve the infinite regress. The regress appears once we think that from the rule the application follows. According to this picture, the gap cannot be bridged between rules and actions unless, as Medina states, “*deus ex machina* invoked to bridge the gulf between rule and application” (Medina, 2002, p.106). We cannot reduce mental concepts and applications to such queer processes. So, the applications cannot be followed by the mental acts that cause our actions in particular ways that enable us to accord with the rule.

Wittgenstein’s last point is to argue that attaching power to some mental capacities to fill the gap between rule and application in the calculus picture of normativity is superstitious for Wittgenstein. The first reason for this sense of the concept of determination is related to seeing rules as entities that play a role in the circulation of words in the linguistic exchange. He says;

We meet again and again with this curious superstition, as one might be inclined to call it, that the mental act is capable of crossing a bridge before we've got to it. This trouble crops up whenever we try to think about the ideas of thinking, wishing, expecting, believing, knowing, trying to solve a mathematical problem, mathematical induction, and so forth. (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.143)

For him, the assumption of calculus first does not rely on reasonable justification. Moreover, there are inconsistencies in this picture of calculus. In *BB*, Wittgenstein says;

Now we are tempted to imagine this calculus, as it were, as a permanent background to every sentence which we say, and to think that, although the sentence as written on a piece of paper or spoken stands isolated, in the mental act of thinking the calculus is there--all in a lump. The mental act seems to perform in a miraculous way what could not be performed by any act of manipulating symbols. Now when the temptation to think that in some sense the whole calculus must be present at the same time vanishes, there is no more point in postulating the existence of a peculiar kind of mental act alongside of our expression. (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.42)

As we can see in the primitive picture of linguistic exchange, the calculus is accepted as an entity; however, once we try to understand its interaction in linguistic practices, it is regarded as invisible but present behind every normative act. This particular picture for Wittgenstein is what is precisely called occult. Appealing to non-practical ways for him is a way to create occult thinking. He says;

One of the, most dangerous of ideas for a philosopher is, oddly enough, that we think with our heads or in our heads... The idea of thinking as a process in the head, in a completely enclosed space, gives him something occult. (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.105e)

Wittgenstein renounces the idea that the meaning of the word can be explained by referring to mental schemes. Articulating rule-following as a practice renders the appeal to mental processes, such as intuition, in describing the relation of rules to their applications irrelevant. They cannot be taken as criteria. The primitive picture of linguistic exchange drops out of the picture. To discuss the irrelevance of the assumptions about the mind, we can quote Wittgenstein's example of teaching the word chair to a child by a realist and an idealist.

...the idealist will teach his children the word "chair" after all, for of course he wants to teach them to do this and that, e.g. to fetch a chair. Then where will be the difference between what the idealist-educated

children say and the realist ones? Won't the difference only be one of battle cry? (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.74e)

Similarly, placing the normativity on logical, abstract objects or mental schemes does not affect the practice of the language. The criteria of rule-following are based on the practices and shall be elaborated with practical terms. Ontological assumptions and scientific explanations are irrelevant to the meaning of a word. Thus, Wittgenstein focuses on the (external) practice of rule-following. In the example of the primitive picture of language (buying red apples or counting the series), a private mental scheme works as a calculus that determines the proper use of the words.

Wittgenstein gives another example of color recognition to discuss the practical account for normativity and show the implausibility of appealing to some private mental schemes. He gives another example of color recognition. One does not recognize color by looking at a patch and then comparing it to the color table in his mind. There is no yellow patch in my mind or her black patch. The example of color can be extended to any word, the meaning of which is taken to be grasped by charts of ostensive definition in mind. Even if the process of color acquisition is so, the chart that differentiates black patches from blue and red patches is informed by a public and sharable technique. If the mental image is taken to be a color chart, then it is necessarily sharable, and as being a chart, it is in the domain of language (non-verbal language). The experience of a red patch as red requires the color grammar and many other surrounding conventions (colors as the properties of objects) from the beginning to the end of the linguistic practice. In §381, Wittgenstein answers the question about colors with the skillful mastery of language, saying: “So how does one know that this color is red? One might answer: I have learnt English.”

(Wittgenstein, 2009, p.124e)

Once one understands a sentence as mastering a technique, then the understanding cannot be reduced/traced back to private mental schemes, where the rules are registered. The mental image drops out of the question both as an unconditioned private entity in a chain of reasons or a trigger that starts a causal chain in the brain. The causal or logical chain, that goes on in the body or mind, is irrelevant to the relation between rule and its application. The practice of language is always prior to the recognition of the color red. According to Wittgenstein, the assumption that the private mental event binds the rule and its application are not plausible. One cannot keep a special mental language for herself and at the same time report this mental state to others. Any rule-following practice cannot rely on the supposition of privacy of mind and the idea of a private language. Thus, counting the series cannot be explained by referring to such queer mental acts, which register the general rules for the use of words. Expressions in language or the rule-following practices cannot be elaborated as if they are in a vacuum. Wittgenstein says:

That's why 'following a rule' is a practice. And to *think* one is following a rule is not to follow a rule. And that's why it's not possible to follow a rule 'privately'; otherwise, thinking one was following a rule would be the same thing as following it.
(Wittgenstein, 2009, p.88e)

Similarly, in *Zettel*, he notices the difference between the understanding of the rule or the meaning of the rule by appealing to the shadow analogy. He says:

Being able to do something seems like a shadow of the actual doing, just as the sense of a sentence seems like the shadow of a fact, or the understanding of an order the shadow of its execution. In the order the fact as it were. "casts its shadow before". But this shadow, whatever it may be, is not the event. (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.15e)

Executing a rule or acting according to it, following a rule, all these expressions suggest that there is something prior to the practice that is the normative something that comes before the practice. This thing can be some mental entity or an

abstract entity that determines the correctness of the practice. However, teaching a rule-governed practice cannot be pictured as making inferences from a core law and following the logical path. Wittgenstein states that “none of the words would be explained by means of itself; there would be no logical circle.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.89e) Wittgenstein notices that practice is not the same as understanding the norm or meaning of something. To be able to talk about following a rule, there shall be a practice.

As I discussed in the previous parts, the calculus conception of language relies on some abstract entities or mental entities that trigger a chain of reasons that works analogously to causal chains. Wittgenstein shows that thinking to follow a rule and following a rule is two different practices. Thinking of following a rule cannot be equivalent to the rule-following practice. However, this does not mean that there isn't any mental process in our normative practices. They are irrelevant to the normativity of language. Wittgenstein does not deny the mental processes. He states;

This, of course, doesn't mean that we have shown that peculiar acts of consciousness do not accompany the expressions of our thoughts!
Only we no longer say that they *must* accompany them.
(Wittgenstein, 1998 p.42)

The calculus picture of rules leads to the absurd result in §198. Then, the interlocutor argues that if a rule does not determine the application, and if the rule can be interpreted or intuited in various ways, then any action by some interpretation could be brought in accord with the rule. Wittgenstein corrects him since it is not that anything can be brought into accord, but nothing supports as it is desired. He says: “No, that's not what one should say. Rather, this: every interpretation hangs in the air together with what it interprets and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.86e)

In the calculus picture of normativity, once their implications are followed, the normativity of language dissolves. Then, Wittgenstein rephrases the problem (paradox) about the normativity of language, “no course of action could be determined by a rule because every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.87e) And from this, it follows that “if every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule, then it can also be brought into conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.87e) This paradox is inherent in the calculus conception of language.

The rules are thought as having internal systematic relations independent from uses, as a result, thinking and understanding are cut off from practice since it is thought that the applications are inherent to the rules. Understanding the rule shall not be seen as a queer mental process that is the source of the correct use. Thinking that the future applications are determined by rules or mental acts makes one neglect an important part of the picture, that is “the experience or whatever you might call it; almost the world behind the mere words” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.98e)

Wittgenstein’s criticism of the calculus conception of language ends with these absurd results. After reducing its assumptions to absurd, he starts providing his account of normativity. In the next chapter, I will discuss his practice-based account of normativity. To give a summary, in this chapter, first in 3.1, I discussed Wittgenstein’s objections against the calculus view of language, which is presumed in the way linguistic exchanges are conceived in their primitive forms. Then, I discussed how Wittgenstein relates this picture to the psychological motives of philosophers. After that, I listed three main categories of misconceptions that Wittgenstein challenged in his later writings. As the first misconception about

normativity, I described Wittgenstein's critique of seeing language as an ostensive device in 3.3. To argue against this idea, I listed three main objections from Wittgenstein's later writings. First, he provides a diversity of functions of language that cannot be reduced to ostensive relation. Secondly, this misconception is rooted in thinking meaning as a mental entity that can be pointed to. Thirdly, rules in language are thought to refer to things and describe *de re* necessities. Then in 3.4, I explain why Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of giving a rule that is common to all linguistic practices and that unifies language as a totality. Next, I discussed Wittgenstein's arguments for seeing language as a multiplicity of various language games which cannot be reduced to discerned calculi. Lastly, in 3.5, I discussed how Wittgenstein repudiates the idea that rules have ontological priority over linguistic practices by determining the possible correct applications in advance and showing that rules and practices cannot be bridged by meaning such as interpretation and intuition. He criticizes such attempts by showing the implausible results that such attempts lead to ad infinitum/infinite regress and paradox.

After his critique of the calculus picture of language, in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein argues for recognizing language primarily as a practical activity that does not work according to a predetermined calculus. In the next chapter, 4. *Practice-Based Account of Rules*, I discuss his alternative picture to the calculus conception of language and present his practice-based account of rules by focusing on the paragraphs between §202 and §242 of *PI*. Between these paragraphs, Wittgenstein provides an account for situating rules in regularities without supposing a transcendent(al), tacit or ineffable extra-linguistic space that provides an *a priori* order to the practices. Then, the problem of bridging the gap between rules and

applications does not even appear since the rules do not act from a distance
(Wittgenstein, 1998, p.13).

CHAPTER 4

PRACTICE-BASED ACCOUNT OF NORMATIVITY

After presenting the regress arguments and the paradox that led Wittgenstein to repudiate the idea that normativity springs from the rules in calculus by determining the correct employments of a word, Wittgenstein presents his understanding of rule-following and normativity. In doing this, Wittgenstein does not provide an alternative explanation for how language represents things. For him, it is already given in practice, as he says:

If it is asked, “How does a sentence manage to represent?” – the answer might be: “Don’t you know? Surely you see it, when you use one.” After all, nothing is hidden. But when given the answer “But you know how a sentence does it, after all, nothing is concealed,” one would like to retort, “Yes, but it all goes by so quickly, and I should like to see it, as it were, more fully laid out.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.136e)

In his writings, he is not after creating an explanation of the normativity of language, but he looks at how language works without pointing out hidden explanations from sight. He aims to show that the normativity of meaning can be accounted for without appealing to the idea of calculus.

According to the calculus conception of language, a rule is strictly differentiated from its application. Wittgenstein argues that if rules are thought to be sharp definitions and are located in a privileged transcendental space, then the rules do not determine the applications as desired. The entity that is formed to provide normativity for language cannot serve its function as desired once its conceptual implications are strictly followed. Wittgenstein states that “this was our paradox” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.88e). The paradox and absurdities of calculus conception of

language result from assuming that rules play an *a priori* determinative role, which is similar to our picture of causal determination over our actions. However, according to Wittgenstein, there is no such primacy and we shall not attach rules such a role over our practices. Presenting the relation between rules and applications related to practice will help us to discuss the function and status of the rule statements of different language games and reconsider the conceptual assumptions on the normativity of linguistic practices.

In this part, I aim to provide Wittgenstein's account of practice-based normativity, which aims to transform our picture of linguistic normativity. In the first section, *Situating Rules in Practice*, I will discuss Wittgenstein's arguments that start at §198 for taking our attention to the role of rules in the practice of teaching and training. In the second part, *The Primacy of Practice*, I discuss Wittgenstein's arguments for arguing the primacy of the practice in accounting for the normativity of various language games. First, I focus on Wittgenstein's arguments for recognizing the primacy of practice in our claims about normativity. Then, I describe Wittgenstein's arguments for defending that agreement in applications is also needed for defining a practice. Wittgenstein states that this idea "seems to abolish logic, but it does not do so." In the third part, *Rules as Grammatical Remarks*, I aim to articulate Wittgenstein's conception of grammar, which provides practice-based logic and normativity of language games. First, I differentiate the concept of grammar from similar concepts such as its use in linguistics, analytic, and *a priori* statements. Then, I discuss its arbitrary and contingent character while still providing an account of logical necessity. Lastly, in *Necessity and Normativity of Grammar*, I argue that Wittgenstein's account of necessity is an internal relation, which does not

necessitate a calculus conception of the rules. I argue that the calculus model for language distorts internal relations between rules and applications.

4.1 Situating rules in practice: the context of training

Starting from §198 in PI, Wittgenstein starts discussing his account of practice-based normativity, which does not rely on a calculus conception of language. First, Wittgenstein suggests looking at the practices of linguistic exchange where rules are uttered for a purpose, such as looking at teaching and training practices.

After following the conceptual assumptions of calculus conception language, which takes us to the dead-end in absurdity, Wittgenstein makes a simple remark to start his account of normativity. He states that we are trained to respond to the rules in a particular way, similar to how we learned to respond to signposts in a particular way (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.86e). Formulation of rules plays a role in mastering a technique, and the use of rules in training gives him the possibility to talk about the practical character and function of rules. Rules in Wittgenstein's thought gain their importance in the practice of teaching and learning.

Wittgenstein discusses the conceptual issues about normativity in dialogical cases. Examples of training and teaching are one of them. The reason for this is his conviction that "any explanation has its foundation in training." (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.74e) Discussing the training practices and relating the status and function of rules to them can be seen against the nature of the philosophical inquiry since such practices are empirical. Wittgenstein is aware of such concerns; he asks himself in *Zettel*, "Am I doing child psychology?" He answers that he does not. "I am making a connexion between the concept of teaching and the concept of meaning" (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.74e). This point is important because Wittgenstein is not

interested in the training of children as an empirical pedagogical science but in the conceptual relations between rules and practices in training and teaching.

Situating rules in practical contexts is not limited to teaching practices. Similarly, situations of conflict and persuasion processes are also the contexts that Wittgenstein inquires to discuss the function and status of rules. Within these contexts, such as teaching-learning or persuasion, the actors aim to understand their language game by describing how words are used through rules. Conflictual points about the meanings of words can be seen in dialogical training contexts where subjects aim for others to understand what they mean. As Wittgenstein states, “to understand a language means to have mastered a technique.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.87e) The dialogical cases, such as teaching, training, and persuasion processes, where normative conflicts occur, are the place to look to understand the function of rules in language. Contextualizing rules in the training process does not mean that they are only applicable within the context of teaching and learning. However, this context helps us to understand their nature better.

The dialogical cases in the *PI* give us the possibility of a few things; first, Wittgenstein discusses the nature of rule-following in a contextualized practical activity. He also manages to describe our relationship to the rules in practical terms. Secondly, the subjects do not play the game but learn it; thus, they are not in it. Learning practice provides Wittgenstein an outside view for inquiring about the necessity of an explanation, a rule, a norm, or a law. This relatively outside view is not bound with the necessity of this norm since we are not in the game but learning the game. Then, the statement of rules serves a purpose; they are not taken for granted by the dialogue participants. The statement of the rule serves a purpose.

Lastly, training is the simplest and most neglected part of our engagement with practice. We learn how to eat, speak, walk, and many other activities by training. Those functions are what individuate us as human beings and which are only possible through training and social cooperation. By focusing on training, Wittgenstein situates the function of rules within a context. These three points help him to displace the discussion of normativity from a piece of logical machinery, biological causation, or an idealized relation between linguistic expressions and the world to a practical territory.

His suggestion is to look to teaching practices to determine the proper place of rules in language. Wittgenstein's primary emphasis is against the project of reducing a practice, a form of life, into an abstract axiomatic system. In *OC*, he states that language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination" (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.62e). One can see this in teaching-learning practice. Learning and understanding do not follow a logical path back to logical laws.

Using the concept of the rule can create confusion about their relation to training practices. In *PI* §208, Wittgenstein renounces the idea of teaching by pointing out what is beyond the examples and regularities. For him, learning is not a practice of grasping what lies beyond using a word and moving from limited examples to infinite applications. The role given to the rules in this picture of teaching is being the source of applications and labeling them together as belonging to the same practice. This expectation of learning and teaching what lies beyond produces the misconception that supposes an entity(rule) that 'gives birth' to applications, or the applications are somehow present in rules in advance. The law itself becomes a self-sufficient entity to explain the meaning of the practice alone.

Wittgenstein thinks this idea of teaching and the conception of rules feed the misconception about the function of rules in language.

For Wittgenstein, a proper sense of teaching “is not meant to apply to anything but the examples” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.89e). Against this idea, in §209, the interlocutor asks

But then doesn't our understanding reach beyond all examples?...
...But is that *all*? Isn't there a deeper explanation; or at least, mustn't the *understanding* of the explanation be deeper? (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.89e)

In his question, the interlocutor presumes that grasping general rules can solve the problem of moving from limited samples to infinite applications. The primacy of the logical truth (general rule) over applications is argued with our ability to grasp the logic of practice from limited samples. However, in the previous chapter, I described how Wittgenstein undermines this role of general rule by showing the absurdities and infinite regress it creates. Interlocutor demands the calculus of rules that refer to the structures beyond the applications and determine such applications possible in the first place. Attaching teaching such a function, i.e., pointing out something beyond the application, is quite a natural expression for Wittgenstein. However, there is nothing deeper. Then the interlocutor asks: “but then, whence the feeling that I have more?”

The expectation of having “something more” in learning practice is nothing but mastering a skill. Thanks to this mastery, one can be engaged in the language game infinitely many times with confidence. The grasp of a rule cannot be isolated from its skillful application. For example, once we learn the meaning of a “red”, we do not hesitate if our limited experience of seeing red in the past will be the same as the ones in the future. We use the word without any hesitation or doubt. This idea of something more can arise from the nature of mastering a skill. In other words,

understanding a rule means applying it correctly. However, this ability to use the words confidently does not need to grasp a law beyond.

Wittgenstein argues for recognizing the primacy of the practice in the discussion of normativity by focusing on the function and the status of rules in the context of training practice. The rules are thought of as norms of descriptions for the use of words. To account for this, Wittgenstein provides us with five points, which I discuss in the next part.

4.2 Nothing beyond: primacy of the practice

In this part, I will discuss how Wittgenstein argues for the primacy of practice in teaching and training. His analysis aims to repudiate the calculus conception of normativity and recognize the primacy of the practice in describing the normativity of the language games. He raises five points against the idea of teaching associated with grasping a rule beyond practice.

First, he argues that the rule expressions are about regularities of the practices; they do not refer to something before or beyond the regularities. Secondly, he argues that definitive rules do not need to play a role in learning practice. Thirdly, after one has mastered a language game, the practical function of rules in training is forgotten. Then they are treated as unique propositions which are taken to be metaphysical truths. He makes a reminder by contextualizing their function in the proper place of training practices. Fourth, Wittgenstein argues that practice is given in our inquiry of a practice. Justifications, reasons, or rule formulations have to come to an end. Lastly, he argues that the definitive rules are not enough to master a practice; agreement in applications is also necessary. For all these reasons, Wittgenstein suggests recognizing the primacy of practice. Without attaching any

ontological priority over rules, the practice itself can give us the ability to move from limited examples to infinite applications.

Firstly, to argue for the primacy of the practice, Wittgenstein states that “a person goes by a signpost only in so far as there is an established usage, a custom.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.86e) A rule statement is not valid once and for one person. One cannot talk about a rule in a solipsist way since whenever one speaks, he is already in the territory of language, which is a collection of customs, regularities, and techniques. Any technique in a language such as reporting, commanding, or understanding relies on a shared or shareable practice. Wittgenstein states that “to follow a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are *customs* (usages, institutions)” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.87e).

Thanks to the regular applications, one can formulate rules for the practices. To emphasize this point, Wittgenstein gives a hypothetical case of a tribe with no common communication patterns in this tribe (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.88e). The people in this tribe utter sounds and respond to these sounds, but neither sounds nor the things they do in correspondence form a regularity. Wittgenstein argues that we cannot say that they speak a language in such a case. The patterns and regularities are built through the multiplicity of actions.

The practices are not idiosyncratic. Wittgenstein asks himself, “am I explaining what “order” and “rule” mean in terms of regularity?” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.89e) His answer is certainly yes. In this sense, regularities are taken to be given in his practical account of normativity. Regularity, by definition, is something that happens repeatedly. In this sense, the formulation of learning as moving from finite samples to infinite applications is not adequate. In learning, we are not moving

from a unique application to infinite applications of regularities, but once we apply or try to apply, we are already in a territory of skill, technique, and practice.

Secondly, Wittgenstein points out that the rules are not indispensable in learning or understanding the meaning of a word. He shows that learning does not necessarily need to start or end in grasping the definitive rules. Anyone who learns a language does not start from atomic or axiomatic expressions to the more complex ones, but they start from similarities in other non-verbal or verbal practices. One of his convictions is that explaining rule-following with regularity is also related to producing similar outcomes to rules. We would not qualify something as regularity or practice without common reactions. He states that an unknown language game is not learnt by referring to the rules of this game but to “shared human behavior.”

(Wittgenstein, 2009, p.88e) Shared human behavior shall be seen as language games that help us learn a foreign language game. In the learning process, the rule does not trigger the causal or logical chain for transmitting rule expressions to someone; instead, one learns by observation, samples, repetition, or referring to other similar shared practices. Wittgenstein states that the “shared human behavior is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.88e) The practice of speaking a language game requires reference to shared human behavior, which is common among people.

A language game or any other rule-governed practice can be learnt by observation by appealing to shared human behavior. Wittgenstein, in §54 *PI*, gives the example of learning by samples of a game, by observing the play, and the background practices of shared references. He says:

The rule may be an aid in teaching the game. The learner is told it and given practice in applying it. Or it is a tool of the game itself. Or a rule is employed neither in the teaching nor in the game itself; nor is it set down in a list of rules. One learns the game by watching how others play it. But we say that it is played according to such-and-such rules because an observer can read these rules off from the way the game is played – like a natural law governing the play. — But how does the observer distinguish in this case between players' mistakes and correct play? There are characteristic signs of it in the players' behaviour. Think of the behaviour characteristic of someone correcting a slip of the tongue. It would be possible to recognize that someone was doing so even without knowing his language. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.31e)

Realizing mistakes in a foreign language such as a slip of the tongue without knowing the correct use of the words helps us learn about the language game's normativity. For Wittgenstein, inquiring on how one learns the meaning of the word and focusing on what kind of examples are useful for us, can help us understand the logic of this word better than definitions (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.40e). He uses the concept of sample to argue against the strict divide between rules and applications. In this sense, an example, sample, and observing the practice are important to make sense of the practice, maybe more than learning the definitive rules. Samples, in teaching practice, can serve as rules to teach the language game.

Learning by observation suggests that examples can serve as samples and rules in a language game. Wittgenstein gives examples where a sample is used as a rule or an example serves as a rule. Wittgenstein states that the concepts of uniform, regular, or the same are taught by referring to examples and samples (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.89e) In *Philosophical Grammar (PG)*, he states;

The ostensive definition of signs is not an *application* of language, but part of the grammar: something like a rule for translation from a gesture language into a word-language. (Wittgenstein, 1974, p.13)

Examples are not seen as the means to reach or discover the logical truth behind the practices. For Wittgenstein, we do not need to assume the primacy of

logical truth over practices, examples, or samples. The samples can be thought of as a substitute for rules that express the logic of practice. For example, he gives examples of learning the meaning of colors in *Blue and Brown Books*

If pointing to patches of various shades of red, you asked a man “What have these in common that makes you call them red?”, he'd be inclined to answer “Don't you see?” And this of course would not be pointing out a common element. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p.131)

Expressions, such as ‘don’t you see!’ and “look!” can serve as rules for learning. “Expressions of agreement, rejection, expectation, encouragement” are helpful for us to master a skill as much as a definitive rule (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.89e). Expressions, such as “*and so on*,” “*and so on ad infinitum*,” “*go on like this*,” are not secondary to the rules but they are equivalent to the formal rule expressions in the practice of teaching. In this sense, “*and so on*” is not an abbreviation but a replacement of the formal rule.

His examples of learning and teaching are not only related to natural languages but also mathematics. He says: “when someone is trying to teach us mathematics, he will not begin by assuring us that he knows that $a + b = b + a$ ” (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.17e). It does not mean that mathematical or logical simples/laws do not have a function in an axiomatic system, but they are not the foundation, condition of learning, or understanding of the practice. So, in the absence of definitive rules, one can master a skill (the ability to move from finite samples to infinite applications). In this sense, they are not *prior* to other practices. Their logical possibility of deriving a statement from the law does not tell us much about its meaning or the primacy of definitive rules over applications. The principles once learned do not mean that we know to apply them as well. In an axiomatic system like mathematics, Wittgenstein states that the logic of something can be best seen in its application. He states;

Let the use of words teach you their meaning. (Similarly, one can often say in mathematics: let the *proof* teach you *what* was being proved.) (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.231e)

Moreover, he notices that the logic of language games can be grasped by relying on the interrelations between the judgments in a language game. He says:

We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules: we are taught judgments and their connection with other judgments. A totality of judgments is made plausible to us. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.21e)

Similarly, in the case of believing something, Wittgenstein claims that it is not a single proposition one believes but the system of propositions that give mutual support to each other (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.21e). The obviousness of a single axiom is a consequence of these interrelations between applications (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.21e). Wittgenstein's claim that "I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me." (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.22e) They are patterns that are implicit in the practice. In other words, the explanation of practice by definitive rules is secondary to the practice itself. Applications of practice give each other support.

We continuously see the same argument that formulating a law is not necessary for learning the practice, and we can grasp the practice (move from limited applications to unlimited applications) by the practice itself referring to shared human behavior, similarities, and interrelations between applications. Baker and Hacker state that "Wittgenstein argued that we may often explain how to apply one rule by citing another rule (a rule for applying the first rule)" (Baker and Hacker, 1992, p.225). Similarly, "go in the same way" expresses the pattern or regularity. Wittgenstein states that the grammar of the same and the rule are interwoven (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.92e).

In *Zettel*, he points out that we do not consult the grammar of the word to use the word correctly. Without supposing another entity, meaning something by the words is knowing to apply them (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.55e). Wittgenstein rejects the necessity or the foundational role of the definitive rules as the unconditioned condition for being constitutive of the practice. However, this idea does not lead him to reject the normative character of rule-following, but it provides us with seeing the multiplicity of conditions that provide remarks for the normativity of practice, none of which are prior to one another. There is no foundational rule that is before any other rule. The rules can be in a variety of forms. The possibility of using samples as rules undermine the picture of a strict divide between rules and applications.

Wittgenstein's third point is a reminder against forgetting this complicated and variety of learning practices. He thinks that we forget the practice of learning after one is mastered the technique. In *Blue and Brown Book*: 'teaching, as the hypothetical history of our subsequent actions . . . drops out of our considerations' (Wittgenstein, 1998 p. 14). Indeed, after one is mastered a technique, the practical importance of rules in the teaching process disappears. The role of rules is sublimated as if they refer to a kind of essence behind the regularities. The 'must' of the technique transforms into the logical must of the world. Once one reaches the skillful mastery of a technique, there is the transformation of actions that we say "it must be so." However, the modality of expression does not refer to the necessity of the order of the world but the technique and regularity. The rule expression is helpful in training to point out the regularity. Once one forgets this conceptual remark, the norms of a technique or regularity transform into metaphysical truths (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.90e).

The fourth point against arguing for the primacy of rules over applications relies on the idea that language is not a closed system that ends in the general rule by constructing a circular argumentation. One acts with skillful coping with the previous practices without reason (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.90e). At §217, Wittgenstein says that rules cannot be the ultimate justifications for our actions. Rules as justifications of actions must be exhausted at some point. All justifications for the application of the rule must come to an end. Then, the agent will act without reason. One will give substitutes for rule formulations, but they will be again new rules formed to explain and understand the rule in question. Moreover, in the end, the chain of reasons will come to an end; the person who is teaching the technique would say, “this is simply what I do” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.91e). The practice is there without further justification. Wittgenstein argues that the justification by experience comes to an end. Exhausting the reasons is a good sign for the justification of a practice (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.144e). The endpoint is not a rule that will stop the discussion. The power to move from finite to infinite can be well formulated as mastering a technique or engaging in practice. Wittgenstein in *OC* states;

You must bear in mind that the language game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there-like our life. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.73e)

Similarly, in *PI*, he states that “what has to be accepted, the given, is – one might say forms of life (Wittgenstein, 2009, 238e). Practice or a technique does not need to be justified; it is there like our life (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.73e). Or we can also formulate it like this; if the rules can serve this function, why can’t the practice serve it? Instead of rules, we can take practice as given.

In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein acknowledges that certain propositions seem to underlie all questions and all thinking (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.53e). His discussion of

the propositions that we are certain of can be related to the rule-following discussions in the *PI*. Similar to the *PI*, in *OC*, Wittgenstein argues that giving grounds, justifying the evidence, comes to an end, but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.28e). He also states that the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.17e).

In the previous part, I discussed how Wittgenstein shows the infinite regress once we appeal to a linguistic rule that binds all the applications. However, the infinite regress disappears with recognizing the primacy of the practice over rules. As Baker and Hacker state, "a sure way of determining what steps someone is to make is to make the first" (Baker and Hacker, 1992, p. 109). The definitive rules and laws are not temporarily or logically before our practices. However, Wittgenstein does not claim that they mean nothing to us. His strategy is to undermine laws' central (primary, a priori, universal) role in learning, thinking, representing, believing, arguing, speaking, etc. For example, Wittgenstein criticizes a similar attitude in Augustine's confessions, for Augustine says ("They are most obvious and common, and still they are quite hidden and their discovery is something new") (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.136e). Given this line of thinking, one assumes to find something hidden behind the obvious. Wittgenstein thinks this produces "a dead-end in philosophizing" (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.136e) since it reverses the primacy of practice and the status of definitive rules for the practice. The attempts to go beyond the practices are useless, there is nothing behind the practice. He applies this logic to his *Tractarian* concern for the relation between language and the world. He states:

If it is asked, "How does a sentence manage to represent?" - the answer might be: "Don't you know? Surely you see it, when you use

one.” After all, nothing is hidden. But when given the answer “But you know how a sentence does it, after all, nothing is concealed”, one would like to retort, “Yes, but it all goes by so quickly, and I should like to see it, as it were, more fully laid out.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.136e)

Accordingly, the justification of an action cannot be given by reaching the core starting principles, or some mental entities that causally trigger an act of meaning. The starting point, if there is any, shall be again practical. In *PI*, §486, he argues that the inferences are also practices. He states;

... “From what one can see here, I infer that there is a chair over there”. That is an inference; but not one belonging to logic. An inference is a transition to an assertion; and so also to the behaviour that corresponds to the assertion. ‘I draw the consequences’ not only in words but also in deeds. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.144e)

Formalizing this behavior (practice) does not change its nature. He says, “our language-game is an extension of primitive behaviour. (For our *language-game* is behaviour.) (Instinct)” (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.96e). For Wittgenstein, seeing connections and similarities and discovering patterns is a primitive reaction that we cannot justify further. The exhaustion of reasons is a good sign of firm grounds (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.80e). We appeal to the cognitive skills that are part of our human form of life for him. Instead of formulating a definitive rule, there are exclamations such as “don’t you see!” “look!” referring to the regularities of the practices and aiming to point to the grammar(logic) of the language game.

The fifth point arguing for the primacy of the practice is that Wittgenstein notices an unconventional point that a language game cannot only be defined by rules, but the agreement in applications is also needed. So, to teach regularity, the need for examples is not complementary to understanding. The rule expressions on their own would not make sense without their relation to other meaningful sentences within the language game. He says:

What is true or false is what human beings *say*; and it is in their *language* that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life... It is not only agreement in definitions but also (odd as it may sound) agreement in judgments that is required for communication by means of language. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.94e)

For him, we agree not only on the rule but also on the practitioners' consistent agreement with the tool of measurement, how they measure, and the constancy in the results. For example, we agree not only on the name of the color but also on its samples. The agreement is about how we judge colors, logic, numbers, space, and perceiving objects. We agree on the explanations of the practice, what counts as correct application of it, and what words mean in our judgments. For example, a color name cannot be defined without its samples. The ostensive definition of a word is both the rule and its application, e.g., "this is (what we call) green." In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein states the same point similarly, saying: "not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leave loopholes open, and the practice has to speak for itself" (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.21e). The definitive rules alone are not enough for establishing a practice.

Once we accept Wittgenstein's line of reasoning, the concern that Wittgenstein states about logic emerge:

This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so. It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is in part determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.94e)

In §242, Wittgenstein argues for the necessity of agreeing on definitions and applications. He gives equal importance to applications and forms of life as much as the rules (definitions). And Wittgenstein is aware that this idea "seems to abolish logic" since practices can replace the role of definitive rules. Similarly, his notorious claim that "meaning is use", seems to bypass the need for the statements that mark

the logic of language games. However, he adds “but does not do so” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.94e). The remark about logic shall be understood not only as formal logic but on a broader scope; Wittgenstein refers to a practical logic that provides normativity of the language game. His account of practice-based normativity does provide a role and status for the definitive rules of practice. In the next part, I will discuss Wittgenstein’s understanding of grammar to understand their role.

To summarize, for Wittgenstein being engaged in a rule-following practice, the process does not start from a definitive rule that is transcendent to the application, and by certain mental capacities, we bridge this transcendent gap. Such mental acts, such as intuition, can refer to the mastery of a technique, not to a queer mental process. Hacker and Baker also state that

to know the meaning of a word is to have mastered the technique of its use. It involves being able to use it correctly, to respond appropriately to its use and to explain what one means by it.
(Baker and Hacker, 1992, p.78)

Once we think of speaking a language as a practice, there is no unbridgeable gulf between the rules and applications since normativity is embedded in the practices. In other words, as Wittgenstein puts it: “a rule, so far as it interests us, does not act at a distance” (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.14). As long as the rules guide one, as Baker and Hacker points out, “interpretations and explanations are in the end at the service of practice.” (Baker and Hacker, p.142) As long as there are practices, customs or regularities, there would be rules to follow or break to teach the practice. The question of how rules determine what action is to be taken does not arise in Wittgenstein. As Shaviro points out in Wittgenstein's thinking, the rules are situated in the context of practice, but the rules do not determine them. Relations and contexts are matters, not determination (Shaviro,1986, p. 225). There is no justificatory rule beneath every rule that informs us how to act. Instead, there is a regular practice from

which the rules are derived for different purposes such as training, teaching, describing, explaining, or prescribing. Understanding the systematic relations between rules determines nothing about the way we act. We formulate rules since we are acting within a custom (practice). What we call “following a rule” is a practice.

Once we recognize the primacy of action, there will be no rules as foundations that justify the understanding of the practice. As Wittgenstein states, “carrying out the order is now the criterion for his having understood” (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.132). The categorical difference between the logic of the practice and applying the practice blurs. However, For Wittgenstein, a rule and its applications in a language game are still different in the absence of calculus. In the next part, I will discuss the relationship between rule and rule-following practice in recognizing the primacy of the practice by discussing Wittgenstein’s account of grammar.

4.3 Rules as grammatical remarks

Once one says that she is engaged in a practice, we are committed to a regularity that discerns itself from other regularities/practices. The same is true for linguistic practices. The differentiating a language game from others attribute a kind of identity to it. The definitive rules can be seen in the descriptions of the identification of the language game. Wittgenstein uses the concept “grammar” to refer to the expressions (verbal or nonverbal) that give us the descriptions for using the words in a language game. The grammar of a language game describes how the words are used in a language game. In this sense, they are related to the essence of language games; as Wittgenstein states, “Essence is expressed in grammar” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.123e). Grammar is not the essence of the world, but grammar is the correlate of objective necessity in language (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.123e). In this sense,

Wittgenstein uses the term grammar with a particular meaning. He describes the domain of grammar in *PG* as follows;

What belongs to grammar are all the conditions necessary for comparing the proposition with reality-all the conditions necessary for its sense. (Wittgenstein, 1974, p.13)

In this chapter, I articulate Wittgenstein's conception of grammar as an alternative picture to the calculus conception of rules. First, I lay out the conceptual differences between grammar and similar concepts. Wittgenstein differentiates the use of "grammar" from its use in linguistics. He contrasts them with empirical propositions. Lastly, I explain its difference from *a priori* propositions. In the second part of the chapter, I discuss Wittgenstein's problematization of the border between grammatical and empirical statements by discussing Wittgenstein's analogies of riverbed and hinge. I argue that the main difference between the grammar and the calculus understanding of normativity is the dynamic character of the language games. Accordingly, the border between empirical and grammatical rules and applications is arbitrary and contingent. The impreciseness and the arbitrariness of the border between empirical and grammatical raise questions about what it means to be necessary. In the fourth part, I describe how necessity and contingency are understood with the concept of grammar. I explain how Wittgenstein articulates logic by conceptualizing normativity as an internal relation.

This discussion will lead us to discuss if his account of grammar opens a place for philosophical inquiry of grammatical expressions (inquiring for logos) in his later philosophy.

4.3.1 The concept of grammar and its differences

The concept of grammar has a particular meaning in Wittgenstein's thinking that is different from common use. He does not use the word grammar as a collection of syntax rules or sentence structures. For example, in Wittgenstein's sense of the term, an expression can violate the rules of syntax, but it can make sense since the grammar of a word has such a use in the language game. Reversely, a sentence can be syntactically well-formed but still be nonsensical. "Tables are dancing" is grammatically a well-formed expression. Verb follows the subject, the conjugation is correct, and a dot is at the end. However, if the sentence does not make sense, there needs to be grammar in which the proposition makes sense. The grammar of table and dance does not allow us to come up with such a sentence in a language game. For example, the form of the sentence can be in the form of a question, but it is a command, such as "Can I see your ID?" In this example, the grammar of the language game allows us to use sentences as commands. The grammar in Wittgenstein's thinking is related to the pragmatics of the word. However, I want to remark that Wittgenstein's account of grammar would not rely on the established distinctions between semantics, pragmatics, and syntax. Semantics and pragmatics are not mutually exclusive. We can say that semantics is not detached from pragmatics, as his notorious claim suggests that "meaning is use." The grammar includes rules that explain how we use a word. Every language game has a way of working, and any explanations of meaning (how the game is played) are regarded as the rules of grammar. In this sense, grammar is related to the normativity of the word. The grammatical propositions are like signposts of the territory of concepts; as Wittgenstein says, a grammatical proposition is "the determination of a concept" (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.21e).

Secondly, to better grasp grammatical expressions, Wittgenstein contrasts them with the empirical ones. Empirical propositions can be true or false according to their correspondence or non-correspondence to reality, e.g., “it is raining today,” “I feel tired,” or “he is waiting.” They are formed with the possibilities that are provided within the boundaries of their use. However, we cannot say that “the rain got tired and now waiting” unless there is an established use figuratively or literally in the language. Whereas empirical propositions are testable, they can be true or false; grammatical propositions are not testable because they are the instruments of testing. As Baker and Hacker state, such rules are not answerable to reality in the currency of truth (Baker and Hacker, p.19). The propositions that are answerable to the reality in the currency of truth are empirical; “this book is red,” “it is sunny today,” “You owe me 5 dollars,” etc. In this sense, describing grammar as “necessary truths” or “necessarily true” does not fit Wittgenstein’s understanding of such expressions. They are not true or false, but they are the conditions for forming true and false statements. Wittgenstein exemplifies his point by the use of the negation “not.” He states;

There cannot be any question of whether these or other rules are the correct ones for the use of ‘not.’ (I mean whether they accord with its meaning.) For without these rules, the word has as yet no meaning, and if we change the rules, it now has another meaning (or none) (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 147).

Rules for the use of the words are constitutive of meaning. Because of this reason, we cannot ask if they are true or correct rules. In this sense, the grammar of a word points out the techniques of how empirical propositions are made. However, one shall not conclude that grammatical propositions are prior to empirical propositions. Every language game has a way of working, and any explanation,

prescription, or description of meaning (how the game is played) is regarded as the rules of grammar. He says:

Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfill its purpose, in order to have such-and-such an effect on human beings. It only describes, and in no way explains, the use of signs. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.146e)

Thirdly, we can draw a difference from *a priori* or analytic statements. The demarcation between grammatical and empirical might sound like the distinctions between analytic and synthetic or *a priori* and *a posteriori*. There are similarities to these concepts but there are also radical differences from Wittgenstein's concept of grammar.

Many statements that are regarded as analytic or *a priori* are grammatical in Wittgenstein's thinking. For example, logical propositions are usually classified as *a priori* and analytic propositions. For Wittgenstein, logical propositions are propositions of grammar (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.9e). Similarly, 'arithmetic is the grammar of numbers' (Wittgenstein, 1980b, p.130), laws of mechanics are the grammar of physics, and the axioms of Euclidian geometry are the grammar of space. The classical categorizations and the debates around such classifications do not overlap with Wittgenstein's criteria for grammar. If mathematics and geometry are formed from *synthetic a priori* or *analytic* statements does not interest his notion of grammar. Some definitive rules, which are classified as *synthetic a priori*, can serve as grammatical propositions, such as "Every event has a cause" or "there is no such thing as reddish-green" (Forster, 2004, p. 11). However, there is no complete overlapping between them. The important criterion for grammar is if a statement provides a measure that allows us to engage in language games. Grammar in this sense is a wider concept. For example, the relations between colors form the color grammar. Statements such as "pink is lighter than red," and "there is no reddish-

green,” are “akin to the sentences that we use as axioms in mathematics” (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.64e). The similarity between the grammar of a language game and axioms does not mean that they function as axiom does in arithmetic or geometry. The similarity is that both analytical statements and grammar do not have their truth value by corresponding to the facts. However, unlike analytic or a priori sentences, Wittgenstein does not regard grammatical propositions as true. *On Certainty*, he regards grammatical propositions as the form of the propositions: “I want to say: propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and not only propositions of logic, form the foundation of all operating with thoughts (with language).” (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.51e) He attaches the grammatical propositions a logical role in language games. He says, “propositions [...] which have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions” (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.20e). However, they do not form a homogeneous mass; their multiplicity is not reducible to one another.

The concept of *a priori* is an epistemological category. For Wittgenstein, grammatical remarks are about practices. So, they shall be regarded as a posteriori. However, it is better to say that the epistemological conditions for a statement to be grammatical are irrelevant. The subject’s epistemological access to a statement is not a criterion for this statement to be grammatical. As I stated, the main criterion is its role in the language game.

Another difference is that *a priori* statements are thought to have strict universality and absolute necessity. The grammatical propositions, however might change according to the context. As Foster states, “the rules of games may in some cases be definite but in others vague or fluctuating, so the rules of grammar may be definite but in others vague or fluctuating” (Foster, 2004, p.9). As I discussed in the

previous parts, the general rules of language games do not refer to language-independent necessities. He says that “a priori or analytic proposition means that it is a form of account which is very convincing to us” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.69e).

In this sense, allegedly *a priori* statements are regarded as related to human practice and how the proposition functions in language. They are the norms of descriptions for linguistic practices. The misconception is taking them as the manifestation of a metaphysical order. In the *Investigations*, the correspondence between world and language is nothing but a linguistic rule, that is agreed upon techniques, judgments, and forms of life. It is not a part of the structure of the world that is independent of language.

In *Investigations*, Wittgenstein says that “language is not something fixed, given once and for all; but new types of language, new language games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten” (Wittgenstein, 2009, 15e). In *On Certainty*, he speaks similarly: “a language/game does change with time” (Wittgenstein, 1972, p. 34e). And the grammar of the language games lacks complete surveyability (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.51e). All these determinations about grammar are contrary to the concept of *a priori* or analytic statements.

In this part, I underlined some similarities and differences between grammatical, *a priori*, analytic and empirical statements. I will discuss the boundary between empirical and grammatical statements in the next part.

4.3.2 The boundary of grammar

After differentiating the concept of grammar from similar concepts, in this section, I want to discuss two analogies that Wittgenstein provides to clarify the concept of

grammar by differentiating it from empirical statements in his work *On Certainty*. I also talk of the lack of sharpness of the boundary between empirical and grammatical.

The first analogy Wittgenstein appeals to is the analogy of the river. Wittgenstein states the grammatical propositions can be understood analogous to the riverbed, through which waters, i.e., empirical propositions, flow. As the analogy suggests, I will discuss if Wittgenstein creates another form of calculus by differentiating between riverbed and river. The second analogy given in *On Certainty* is the similarity between the hinge concept and the grammar. Wittgenstein thinks grammatical propositions are similar to the hinges on which our doubt about the truth of empirical propositions turns. The analogy of hinge is discussed in the context of epistemology about the impossibility of doubt about fundamental beliefs about the world since they provide us with the very conditions of doubting. Wittgenstein discusses whether the impossibility of doubt can be counted as the criterion for being a grammatical proposition. After introducing these analogies, I will discuss the border and fluctuation between grammatical and empirical later in the chapter. This discussion will lead us to discuss in which sense grammatical propositions are necessary. Later, in the next section, I will discuss grammar's arbitrary and contingent nature.

First, I want to start with Wittgenstein's riverbed analogy in *On Certainty* to characterize grammatical statements. Wittgenstein uses the analogy of a river and its bed to differentiate between grammatical and empirical propositions. Analogously speaking, grammatical propositions can be seen as the riverbed.

This characterization of grammar can show its difference from the calculus conception. The riverbed analogy shall not be interpreted as the riverbed is prior to

the flow or that the riverbed is the condition of the possibility of the flow. Flow and riverbed shall not be seen as abstract ideal mutually exclusive entities in language. Still, one can say that both riverbed and river are both the result and the condition of each other. Wittgenstein's choice of organic matter as an analogy to understand the nature of grammar is important to differentiate grammar from calculus. There is a dynamic relationship between them. This dynamic tension suggests transitions between grammatical and empirical (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.15e). This interaction opens up a way to articulate the interplay between judgments and definitions. Because of these dynamic relations in linguistic practices, they cannot be fully separated from each other, grammatical remarks cannot be reduced to atomic propositions, and the demarcation between empirical and the grammatical is not given once and for all (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.41e) (Wittgenstein, 1972, 15e). We might treat a sentence as testable in one context and grammatical in another, or a proposition of grammar might change into an empirical proposition. Now, I will lay down Wittgenstein's reasons for arguing against conceiving them separated from each other, as in the case of calculus conception of language. Later I will discuss if their interaction prevents their differentiation.

First, to exemplify this interplay between the riverbed and its flow, Wittgenstein's discussion of the concept of mythology is a good example. Wittgenstein talks of the constitutive roles of mythologies in our world picture and their change in *OC*. He states that the role of mythology is like that of a game's rules; the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.14e). These mythologies change over time. He describes this fluctuation again by reference to the riverbed analogy between §96-§99 in *OC*. He states;

it might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.” (Wittgenstein, 1972, 15e)

This stability of the grammar is not definite, and the differentiation between the riverbed and the flux is not sharp (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.41e). In *OC* § 97, he talks of this relation in the context of mythology. He says that

the mythology may change back into a state of flux, river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between movement of the waters on the riverbed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from other. (Wittgenstein, 1972, 15e)

Secondly, grammatical statements are not homogeneous. Some of them are harder or softer than others. Some can be articulated often; some are less visible.

And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.15e)

The interaction, shift, or displacements between empirical and grammatical does not have the same logic for different language games. The grammar of the change between grammar and empirical cannot be given in advance either.

Secondly, the river analogy suggests a complex and dynamic relationship between empirical and grammatical. Wittgenstein argues that grammar is a multilayered concept to make sense of this complexity. He introduces the concept of depth grammar and distinguishes it from ‘surface grammar.’ Surface grammar is how the word is used in sentence structure and how it is heard (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.176e-177e). The depth grammar is, on the other hand, multilayered and sprawling. It is also connected to different modes of expression. The way the words are used comes with their temptations, conceptual assumptions, presumptions about their meaning, and their relation to other concepts. Thus, the use of words forms a depth

of grammar, that is not necessarily propositional. For example, Wittgenstein gives an example from mathematics; “what a mathematician is inclined to say about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts is not a philosophy of mathematics, but something for philosophical *treatment*” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.97e). Similarly, in §422, he gives examples of believing in a soul or knowing about atomic structures; he says

What do I believe in when I believe that man has a soul? What do I believe in when I believe that this substance contains two carbon rings? In both cases, there is a picture in the foreground, but the sense lies far in the background; that is, the application of the picture is not easy to survey. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.134e)

Wittgenstein points out that these beliefs or attitudes rely on certain conceptual assumptions. Moreover, once we agree on specific propositions, its normativity is related to many judgments of different language games that are interconnected with the language game we make judgments. These complicated relations between judgments on the foreground or background form a “world picture.” That is why grammar is not a complete set of propositions describing the language's surface relations. The grammar is similar to the concept of the worldview. Wittgenstein also uses the concept of “picture” to grasp the nature of grammar. He uses phrases such as the primitive picture of language, the picture of the world, the picture of the number, etc. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.134e). All these different concepts are used to make sense of the concept of grammar, not only a list of conclusive linguistic remarks but the complicated network within language and forms of life. He further suggests that grammatical and empirical are not completely discernable and surveyable in some language games. That is why for him, “no wonder one finds it difficult to know one’s way about” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.177e).

The notion of depth grammar can raise questions about whether some grammatical statements are transcendental, hidden, or more profound than others. Wittgenstein notices that “we are most strongly tempted to think that there are things hidden, something we can see from the outside but which we can't look into” (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.6). However, things that are thought to be hidden are not ineffable, but they are invisible to us because they are most familiar to us (Wittgenstein, 2009, 129). As Baker and Hacker state, any rule can be expressed. If it cannot be expressed it cannot “be consulted for guidance” (Baker and Hacker, 1986, p.62). Grammar, surface or depth, is not a hidden, ineffable concept; grammatical propositions are similar to other statements. Wittgenstein’s concept of grammar does not presuppose a different space for grammatical propositions. Grammar is formed and expressed within language.

Until now, I justified why the relationship between the riverbed and its flow is not the same as the relation between calculus and applications. I laid down the reasons why Wittgenstein thinks that there is a dynamic relationship between them. His second analogy to hinges takes this interaction even further, suggesting that empirical propositions can be part of our grammar. I will first describe the hinge analogy and then discuss the fluctuation between the grammatical and empirical further.

In *OC*, he states that certain empirical propositions can serve as grammatical or foundation of empirical propositions. To articulate his claim, Wittgenstein uses the concept of hinge analogous to grammatical statements. He describes the grammatical principles as the hinges in *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. He states that a grammatical principle is essentially “fixed, like a machine part, made immovable so that now the whole representation turns around it” (Wittgenstein,

1967, p.74). Wittgenstein discusses the concept of hinge within the context of doubting. For him, doubt is possible only if we take certain beliefs as indubitable. Making such statements is pointless as pieces of certain knowledge. They are redundant to utter. Wittgenstein gives examples for hinge propositions:

My body has never disappeared and reappeared again after an interval.
Objects do not disappear when we do not look at them.
The earth is a ball floating free in space and not altering essentially in a hundred years.
The earth kept existed for the last 100 years.
If someone's arm is cut off it will not grow again. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.15e-35e)

Such propositions are the ones that we must take for granted if we want to doubt certain things. Then, they are the grounds or hinges of language games. Wittgenstein says that

Experience can be said to teach us these propositions. However, it does not teach us them in isolation: rather, it teaches us a host of interdependent propositions. If they were isolated, I might perhaps doubt them, for I have no experience relating to them. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.35e)

I had no experience of the earth hundred years ago, or I have no experience of the earth as a ball floating in space. However, their negation makes many judgments that I commit to without doubt are in question, such as planes flying thanks to air resistance, or I will fall if I jump out of the window. He states:

We form the picture of the earth as a ball floating free in space and not altering essentially in a hundred years. I said “We form the picture etc.” and this picture now helps us in the judgment of various situations. I may indeed calculate the dimensions of a bridge, sometimes calculate that here things are more in favour of a bridge than a ferry,. etc.. .etc.,-but somewhere I must begin with an assumption or a decision. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.22e)

In making calculations about a bridge, we rely on the grammar of physics, which includes the fact that “the earth is round.” Because of the interdependency, hinges are related to the grammar of language games. The grammar includes

interdependent propositions. If a statement functions as a hinge or a riverbed that makes our other judgments possible in the language game or allows us to dispute or doubt some other propositions, they are part of the grammar of language games.

Wittgenstein states that some statements can be in the form of an empirical statement, but they can well serve as expressions of a rule. Similarly, a grammatical statement can transform into an empirical statement. He also notices this point:

Isn't what I am saying: any empirical proposition can be transformed into a postulate and then becomes a norm of description. But I am suspicious even of this. The sentence is too general. One almost wants to say "any empirical proposition can, theoretically, be transformed . . ." but what does "theoretically" mean here? It sounds all too reminiscent of the *Tractatus*. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.41e)

He further suggests that facts can be part of the grammar of a language game. He exemplifies his idea by factual epistemic hinges such as "I have two hands." Many empirical propositions "have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions" (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.20e). He regards such facts as proto-phenomena. In this sense, some samples, such as "this is green," and factual criteria, such as "water boils at 100 Celsius" take part in the account of the language game (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.175e).

The question appears if some factual truths shall be regarded as a part of the grammar of sciences. In *OC*, Wittgenstein points out the difficulty of discussing an empirical proposition of chemistry as something grammatical. It is, after all, an empirical science (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.24e). Wittgenstein thinks that empirical propositions do not all have the same status. He states;

...our empirical propositions do not all have the same status, since one can lay down such a proposition and turn it from an empirical proposition into a norm of description. Think of chemical investigations. Lavoisier makes experiments with substances in his laboratory and now he concludes that this and that takes place when there is burning. He does not say that it might happen otherwise another time. He has got hold of definite world-picture – not of

course one that he invented: he learned it as a child. I say world-picture and not hypothesis, because it is the matter-of-course foundation for his research and as such also goes unmentioned. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.24e)

As I discussed earlier, the concept of world picture refers to the grammar of language games. In the case of Lavoisier, Wittgenstein states that the empirical hypothesis can be tested by relying on factual propositions, which are part of the grammar of the language game of chemistry. Another example can be given by the statement “water boils at 100 C.” For Wittgenstein, this statement is an empirical “foundation” for our assumptions (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.38e). He states, “this fact is fused into the “foundations” of our language-game” (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.73e).

For him, in some territory of the language game, the rule and empirical proposition merge into one another (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.39e). This area is the grey zone between empirical and grammatical. If some empirical statements can serve as grammatical ones, how can we differentiate between them? Wittgenstein suggests that empirical propositions responsible for our judgments' background picture have a logical role in the language game. He states;

I want to say: propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and not only propositions of logic, form the foundation of all operating with thoughts (with language). (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.51e)

As the states for the grammatical propositions, the empirical propositions are also heterogeneous. Moreover, their differences are determined according to their role, which they serve in a language game.

we are interested in the fact that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is to be possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is one. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.39e)
Wittgenstein does not attempt to give a conclusive list of empirical

propositions which can have a logical role. However, their number is not rare. In *OC*

§600, He states that the book of physics provides us the foundation for our judgments. He says;

What kind of grounds have I for trusting textbooks of experimental physics? I have no grounds for not trusting them. And I trust them. I know how such books are produced-or rather, I believe I know. I have some evidence, but it does not go very far and is of a very scattered kind. I have heard, seen and read various things.
(Wittgenstein, 1972, p.79e)

These statements are in the form of an unquestioned belief, not because we never reflected on them, but because there is no such need. In other words, if they are taken to be an object of doubt, then the whole language game about physics would collapse. It is because he says

The experiences in physics are surrounded by others which combine with it to form a system. It is not just the falling objects but air resistance etc... (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.79e)

It is not a mere belief/faith that makes propositions of physics grammatical, but their indispensability and their connection to other judgments in the foreground. Their role is given by the systems that they take part in. He also states that “the limit of the empirical— is concept-formation” (Wittgenstein, 1990, p.29), where “concept-formation” is identical to grammar (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 230).

I started the chapter by giving Wittgenstein’s distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions. Now, I end up saying that for him, empirical propositions can serve as rules, postulates, norms of descriptions, foundations of all thinking, hinges, part of logic, etc. Two ideas are compatible because the logical role given to an empirical proposition is not related to its form or how it is learnt but to how we use them in language games. If factual statements can be part of our grammar, there is the question of whether logic is transformed into empirical science. Wittgenstein rejects this idea. He says:

But if someone were to say “So logic too is an empirical science” he would be wrong. yet this is right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.15e)

From this part, we can infer that being grammatical is not about the way we verify a proposition. A factual statement can serve as a grammatical statement. However, there is no definite criterion for serving this purpose. The concept of grammar is dynamic, contingent, and contextual and still marks the necessities in a language game. Moreover, for Wittgenstein, a fluctuation between grammatical and empirical does not undermine their difference. The transitivity between them does not mean that every expression in the language game is indeterminate of being empirical or grammatical. The impossibility of sharp differentiation does not prevent us from making differentiation (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.83e). Despite this ambiguity of normativity, we can make certain distinctions; for example, a statement cannot be empirical and grammatical at the same time. As Wittgenstein states, indeterminacy is not about determining if something is empirical or grammatical but rather the border between empirical and grammatical. He states that “the lack of sharpness is that of the boundary between rule and empirical proposition” (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.41e).

He also states that “the concept 'proposition' itself is not a sharp one” (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.41e). The boundary can be understood as a blurry region where the difference between empirical and grammatical is not easily discernible. However, this does not mean that there is no difference between them. Their distinction is spurious, arbitrary, and interest relative. Some expressions serve as grammatical as they were empirical, and some go out of the grammar of the language game, or our game is radically transformed. Some language games overlap, and a proposition that serves as a grammatical proposition in one of them serves as an empirical one for another language game.

We can assert that conceptual remarks, mathematical propositions, logical propositions or laws of natural science, and factual propositions that are responsible for the world picture are grammatical remarks. We can also infer that grammatical propositions do not form a homogeneous mass. However, in advance, we cannot infer the list of the empirical propositions that are part of our world picture.

Wittgenstein does not also provide a criterion for how far empirical propositions can have a logical role in our system. Another difficulty with his account of grammatical propositions is that they are inflated. The inflation of grammar is avoided by relating the grammatical propositions to the patterns, forms of life, customs, and regularities. Because of that, the grammatical propositions are not infinitely many.

To conclude, both analogies of river and hinge suggest an indispensable vagueness regarding the relation between the concept of grammar (logic) and empirical. River analogy suggests that part of the riverbed can turn into the flow, and liquid can be hardened into a rule. Similarly, hinge propositions as part of our grammar can be in the form of empirical propositions. The lack of strictness is about the border between empirical and grammatical. The analogy helps us differentiate between empirical and grammatical and understand the dynamic interaction between them.

In the next part, I will argue that this lack of strict differentiation is avoided by characterizing the border between grammatical and the empirical as arbitrary. Giving an account of the contingency of grammatical necessities is crucial since a consistent account of grammar will save Wittgenstein's conception of normativity from the concerns of "abolishing logic."

4.3.3 Arbitrariness of grammar

The changeable character of grammar and the lack of strictness of the border between empirical and grammatical bring the question of whether Wittgenstein's understanding of grammar abolishes the normativity of language. In Wittgenstein's account of grammar, we can say that what makes an expression a grammatical rule is neither its logical form nor its putative empirical necessity but its practical embodiment in practice which is always contingent and arbitrary.

In this part, I first focus on the arbitrary characterization of grammar. In his texts, Wittgenstein regards grammatical statements as both arbitrary and non-arbitrary. I describe in which sense they are both arbitrary and non-arbitrary. In the next part of the chapter, I discuss whether "the necessarily true" statements about the world, math, and logic as grammatical remarks are arbitrary as well. I will account for both the necessary and contingent character of grammatical remarks. In the end, I argue that the arbitrary nature of grammar is compatible with the normativity of language and necessary statements.

In discussing the arbitrariness of grammar, Hacker and Baker highlight some important distinctions about the meaning of the concept. They notice that arbitrary does not mean capricious or unimportant. Secondly, arbitrariness is not meant to be up to an individual choice. And lastly, it is not easily dispensable or alterable (Baker and Hacker, 1992, p.332-333). For them, in Wittgenstein's thinking, the arbitrariness of grammar "is directed against the idea that it can be justified as correct by reference to reality" (Baker and Hacker, 1992, p.333). This interpretation of arbitrariness is also in accord with Wittgenstein's challenge to repudiate the logical form as a part of the world and an ineffable entity. The discussion of arbitrariness also justifies his idea that rules do not refer to language-independent essences.

Wittgenstein, in later writings, accounts for both the arbitrariness and non-arbitrariness of grammar. In *Zettel*, between §354-359, Wittgenstein discusses the arbitrariness of color and number systems. We can discuss their grammar to understand the statement “the purpose of grammar is nothing but that of language.” Wittgenstein claims that their logic is “not in the nature of numbers or colours” (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.65e). There can be different techniques for labeling colors or counting. We project our technique into reality like a measure. Then, the interlocutor asks; “Then is there something arbitrary about this system?” (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.66e). Wittgenstein answers: Yes and no.' It is akin both to what is arbitrary and to what is non-arbitrary (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.66e). I will start first with examining in which sense grammar is arbitrary, and then I will talk about where Wittgenstein describes its non-arbitrary character.

Firstly, in *PI*, Wittgenstein states that grammar is arbitrary if “the purpose of grammar is nothing but that of language” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.146e). He says: the rules of grammar may be called “arbitrary” if that is to mean that the *purpose* of grammar is nothing but that of language... (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.146e) We can read his discussion of the difference between the symptom and criteria in *Zettel* within the context of arbitrariness. Wittgenstein states that there can be occasions where symptoms can be taken as the grammatical criteria and vice versa. On some occasions, they are not even completely discernible (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.24) (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.120e).

Nothing is commoner than for the meaning of an expression to oscillate, for a phenomenon to be regarded sometimes as a symptom, sometimes as a criterion, of a state of affairs. And mostly in such a case the shift of meaning is not noted. In science, it is usual to make phenomena that allow of exact measurement into defining criteria for an expression; and then one is inclined to think that now the proper meaning has been

found. Innumerable confusions have arisen in this way.
(Wittgenstein, 1970, p.77e)

In *Blue and Brown Books*, he also adds that in most cases, the phenomenon that is taken as defining criterion and as a symptom is an arbitrary decision (Wittgenstein, 1998, p.24). The difference between river and bedrock is an arbitrary convention, not a natural phenomenon. In *Philosophical Grammar*, Wittgenstein states that “the rules of grammar are arbitrary in the same sense as the choice of a unit of measurement” (Wittgenstein, 1974, p.29). For the color grammar, we choose certain names for the colors within a spectrum, and this choice is arbitrary. He also notices that their non-arbitrariness cannot be argued by showing that representations agree with reality in a language game because the arbitrary agreement (choice of the unit) is made precisely to establish the correspondence with reality (Wittgenstein, 1974, p.29).

However, Wittgenstein does not argue that the use of words is free of any constraint. On the contrary, the use of words makes sense as long as there are constraints for their use. In many senses, Wittgenstein talks of the non-arbitrariness of grammar. First, the arbitrary convention and agreement shall not be seen as individuals sitting around a table and deciding what a language game is like and then stipulating the technique's rules. Wittgenstein does not mean that the practitioners of a language game agree on the fixed general rules in a contract. Or we cannot infer from this fact that the validity of an argument is up to the consent of the community. Baker and Hacker suggest that agreement does not explain what rule-following is, but it is the agreement for the intelligible employment of rule-following (Baker and Hacker, 1992, p.226). This agreement or convention on which technique they use is more primordial. Hacker quotes from *Zettel*, that our language games are ‘characterized by what we can and cannot do’ (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.63e). In *OC*,

Wittgenstein calls this background for the intelligible employment of the rule-following an inherited background:

I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.15e)

The grammar of language games does not only tell us about the world but also tells about who we, we human beings, are. What we find natural, i.e., easily memorized, readily recognized, simple to repeat, provides the *foundations* for concept-formation (Baker and Hacker, p.341). In *OC*, Wittgenstein relates the natural history of human beings to the grammatical propositions, which are fundamental to our thinking (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.46e). Thus, there is no deliberate arbitrary choice of grammar. However, we cannot infer from this non-arbitrary aspect of the grammar that new techniques that appear unnatural to us are against nature or the world. They are just new techniques. And Baker and Hacker remind us that natural and unnatural can change in time. Saying a technique is natural to us does not mean that they are completely non-arbitrary.

Hacker and Baker also argue that “the technique of use of a word gives us an idea of *very* general truths about the world” (Baker and Hacker, 1992, p.340). For them, reflecting on color or number system may indeed ‘tell us’ various things about the world we live in (Baker and Hacker, 1992, p.340). In *PG*, his discussion of the non-arbitrary character of grammar can be thought as an example of this situation.

He says:

I do not call rules of representation conventions if they can be justified by the fact that a representation made in accordance with them will agree with reality. For instance, the rule “paint the sky brighter than anything that receives its light from it” is not a convention. (Wittgenstein, 1974, p.186)

This statement tells us about the grammar of light and color but also about the world. Secondly, Foster notices that Wittgenstein states that “concepts which occur in ‘necessary’ propositions must also occur and have a meaning in non-necessary ones”. For Forster,

for this reason, Wittgenstein can, despite his rejection of the notion that grammatical principles are justifiable or refutable by appeal to facts...nonetheless make the following claim on behalf of a sense in which grammar is non-arbitrary. (Forster, 2004, p.58)

A similar point is made in *PI*, §242. In a language game, there needs to be an agreement not only in definitions but also in judgments. In this sense, the concepts of grammatical propositions must be used in non-necessary statements. Then, it comes to saying that grammatical propositions are not made for language only. The use of concepts in empirical propositions is part of the grammar of language games. Thus, in this sense, they are non-arbitrary.

In Zettel §320, similarly, Wittgenstein talks of the non-arbitrary character of grammar in the context of cooking.

Why don't I call cookery rules arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of grammar arbitrary? Because 'cookery' is defined by its end, whereas 'speaking' is not. That is why the use of language is in a certain sense autonomous, as cooking and washing are not. You cook badly if you are guided in your cooking by rules other than the right ones; but if you follow other rules than those of chess you are *playing another game*; and if you follow grammatical rules other than such-and-such ones, that does not mean you say something wrong, no, you are speaking of something else. (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.59e)

The non-arbitrary character of grammar appears once the definition of a concept is defined by the factual ends, that is, cooking. As Wittgenstein states, the difference is in cooking; if one does not follow the rules, he cooks badly. However, if one classifies the species differently, then they offer a new taxonomy.

Baker and Hacker argue that the technical (means-ends) rules are non-arbitrary, such as the rules of cooking (Hacker and Baker, 1992, p.335). If a concept is defined by its technical ends, then nature has things to say, but as Wittgenstein states in Z §364,

she makes herself audible in another way. “You'll surely, run. up against existence and non-existence somewhere! “ But that means against *facts*, not concepts. (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.66e)

In the end, we can say that the arbitrary nature of grammar does not mean applying or constructing language free from any constraints. The grammar is arbitrary and non-arbitrary for different reasons. Then, we can ask if the perspective Wittgenstein offers here is different from that of other philosophers and commonsense views. We can say that any claims to objective reality are transformed into correlativity of the world and language. However, nature takes part in the grammar of language games.

To discuss this relation further, I will discuss Wittgenstein's elaboration about the encounters of people who follow rules of grammar that are incompatible with each other.

4.3.3.1 The arbitrariness of grammar and incompatible grammars

According to the arbitrary character of grammar, there is the possibility of forming different language games. And their different grammar can conflict with each other. In such cases, there is no possibility of relying on true and false propositions since according to Wittgenstein the grammar is not true or false, but it gives us the tool to form true/false statements. The possibility of the different grammars (multitude of grammars) raises the question if we are left without a criterion to judge the differences in grammar. In this part, I want to discuss whether it is possible to judge

one grammar to be superior to another if there are conflicting judgments that belong to different language games.

In Wittgenstein's texts, there are many encounters with people who are grammatically alien to our grammar of words. We can give a list of a few examples of grammatically alien people in his texts; a person who believes that he travels to the moon at night, someone who could not remember whether he had always had five fingers or two hands, a man who had been taught that the earth came into being 10 years ago, and therefore believed this, and someone who doesn't believe that train will arrive goes to the train station to fetch a train (Wittgenstein, 1972, 16e-43e).

Such hypothetical encounters of different worldviews are given to elaborate on the possibility of justifying the truth of one language game and falsifying the other. To discuss Wittgenstein's position on conflicting alternative grammars, I want to discuss Wittgenstein's elaboration on different grammars from §100-110 in *OC*.

In §106, Wittgenstein wants us to imagine a person who believes that he goes to the moon at night in his sleep and wakes up in his bed in the mornings. He says that even if it is not imaginable to believe in such things, one can believe in such statements and make claims of knowledge about them, expressing his certainty. Wittgenstein thinks that such ground beliefs are constructed through practice and training.

106. What reply could I make to the adults of a tribe who believe that people sometimes go to the moon (perhaps that is how they interpret their dreams), and who indeed grant that there are no ordinary means of climbing up to it or flying there? -But a child will not ordinarily stick to such a belief and will soon be convinced by what we tell him seriously.

107. Isn't this altogether like the way one can instruct a child to believe in a God, or that none exists, and it will accordingly be able to

produce apparently telling grounds for the one or the other?
(Wittgenstein, 1972, p.16e)

Following this discussion, the interlocutor in §108 raises the question,
“But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has
been on the moon?” (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.17e). Wittgenstein responds;

If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has
ever been on the moon. Not merely is nothing of the sort ever
seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system
of physics forbids us to believe it. For this demands answers to the
questions “How did he overcome the force of gravity?” “How could
he live without an atmosphere.?” and a thousand others which could
not be answered. But suppose that instead of all these answers we met
the reply: “We don't know how one gets to the moon, but those who
get there know at once that they are there; and even you can't explain
everything.” We should feel ourselves intellectually very distant from
someone who said this. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.17e)

Wittgenstein also acknowledges that their system of knowledge is poorer
compared to ours (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.37e). This idea suggests that we can
compare conflicting grammars and make judgments about their truth/superiority etc.
For example, in §185, he says that to be able to introduce a proposition such as “I
was at the moon last night” into our grammar, we need to doubt our whole system of
evidence (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.26e). The necessity of grammatical propositions can
be thought of as shaking the coherence of the system.

However, later in the text, he says that “Our 'empirical propositions' do not
form a homogeneous mass” (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.29e). In other words, they do not
need to form a coherent picture. To exemplify this heterogeneity, he gives an
example from his time and culture;

Men have judged that a king can make rain; we say this contradicts all
experience. Today they judge that aeroplanes and the radio etc. are
means for the closer contact of peoples and the spread of culture.
(Wittgenstein, 1972, p.19e)

§132 suggests that conflicting language games can be part of our forms of life. Thus, one does not need to leave the language game because it is not consistent with another one. In addition to that, in §609, Wittgenstein states;

Supposing we met people who did not regard that[physics] as a telling reason. Now, how do we imagine this? Instead of the physicist, they consult an oracle. (And for that we consider them primitive.) Is it wrong for them to consult an oracle and be guided by it? –If we call this “wrong” aren't we using our language game as a base from which to combat theirs? (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.80e)

The possibility of being engaged in competing grammars simultaneously shows that one can believe one grammar without falsifying the other. He states:

Here one must realize that the complete absence of doubt at some point, even where we would say that 'legitimate' doubt can exist, need not falsify a language game. For there is also something like another arithmetic. I believe that this admission must underlie any understanding of logic. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.48e)

At the bedrock of our grammar, Wittgenstein suggests that there is something similar to religious belief. Wittgenstein states that there is no such necessity that compels people:

Would it have to be what is called a scientific belief? Might it not be a mystical one? Is there any absolute necessity for him to be contradicting historical facts? or even geographical ones? (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.31e)

Wittgenstein thinks that it is not objectively justifiable that one grammar is superior to others. The impossibility of arguing against one language game over the other on objective grounds does not take us to a quietist or completely relativist position. For example, Wittgenstein himself argues against the possibility of private language, doubting everything, the possibility of doubt of the existence of other minds, or against justifying normativity with personal mental images. An encounter with people who have such beliefs, for Wittgenstein, they are in confusion, talk

nonsense, and need to clarify their conceptual assumptions. For example, if a person claims that we are all dreaming, Wittgenstein does not welcome this claim. He says:

The argument "I may be dreaming" is senseless for this reason: if I am dreaming, this remark is being dreamed as well and indeed it is also being dreamed that these words have any meaning.
(Wittgenstein, 1972, p.49e)

The change of one logic to another for Wittgenstein is again a practice of persuasion. For example, if one meets a man who believes that the earth came into being ten years ago, then for Wittgenstein, the instruction and training process introduces our picture of the world to this person (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.34e). He resists the idea that objective knowledge of grammar can be freed from its human practices. The necessity of logic/grammar is not a human independent necessity that forces us to follow a certain grammar.

Later he gives the example of conversion:

I said I would 'combat' the other man, - but wouldn't I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.) (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.81e)

Then he also adds that there is always some element in the language game that is taken as a factual criterion. As I discussed in the non-arbitrariness of grammar, Wittgenstein seems to start looking for consistency/correctness of the grammar from such factual non-arbitrary criteria. He says;

Certain events would put me into a position in which I could not go on with the old language-game any further. In which I was torn away from the sureness of the game. Indeed, doesn't it seem obvious that the possibility of a language-game is conditioned by certain facts? (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.82e)

He also adds later: We might speak of fundamental principles of human enquiry (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.89e). In such cases, Wittgenstein reminds our primitive behavior and our relations with facts in justifying the grammar of language

games. However, this is not to refer to language-independent necessities but to the basic conventions that are made in language. Wright suggests that some judgments that we most directly perceive are the basic judgments that are “attributive and relational concepts of form, pattern, color, loudness, pitch, texture, taste, smell, warmth and cold, temporal precedence, etc.” (Wright, 2001, p.59). He calls such judgments basic judgments which are introduced by ostensive means, incapable of definitional paraphrase, and whose applications in at least a large class of cases are directly recognitional (Wright, 2001, p.59-60). In this sense, grammar consists of empirical criterion. Ostensive definitions are conceptual criteria that are factual but have logical role. I think Wittgenstein’s understanding of normativity of language saves itself from not having factual grounds.

To conclude, in Wittgenstein’s account of normativity, there is the possibility of encountering two incompatible grammars with the same degree of certainty for their speakers. If such an encounter is even hypothetically possible, then, for him, there is no possibility of combatting their grammar except by showing the plausibility of our grammar. Consistency between the grammars of different language games can provide a basis for persuasion processes between different grammars. Additionally, some basic judgments that are conditioned by facts can play a role in discussing grammar. However, no grammar necessitates itself over the other. Human independent objectivity does not compel the rule-followers. The grammar of a language game is introduced to the person by training.

I will discuss how Wittgenstein argues for the necessity statements in the next part. Wittgenstein’s understanding of normativity is internal to the language.

4.4 Necessity and normativity of grammar

Understanding language primarily as a practice invites us to see the linguistic expressions, empirical or grammatical, as ultimately contingent. As Virno puts it, for Wittgenstein, “human practice sets up camp within the environment of the contingent” (Virno, 2008, p. 97). Claiming that rules are arbitrary linguistic conventions and related to forms of life raises the question of whether laws of logic, geometry or mathematics and other necessarily true statements are contingent or relative to cultures. If they are so, this idea implies that they can be objected to and refused on the same ground. Such statements are regarded as necessary truths, objective truths, or *a priori* truths. They are qualified as unchangeable, non-contingent, and necessary. Wittgenstein discusses this concern as the interlocutor in *RFM* says;

‘What you say seems to amount to this, that logic belongs to the natural history of man. And that is not combinable with the hardness of the logical “must”’ (Wittgenstein, 1990, p.352).

In this part, I discuss if Wittgenstein’s understanding of grammar can account for the hardness of the logical must, “the necessary propositions,” and grammatical necessity in general. To discuss this, first, I show how Wittgenstein conceives propositions of logic, mathematics, geometry, or other necessary propositions as grammatical. Then, I describe how he articulates logical necessity as an intra-linguistic concept. Thirdly, he argues that logical necessity as an intralinguistic concept is harder than causal and psychological necessity. Later in this part, I discuss how the necessity of grammatical remarks is articulated as internal relations by Hacker and Baker. They argue that Wittgenstein’s aim is accounting for the grammatical necessity of such rules within the language by articulating them as internal relations. I show how they account for necessary

propositions as internal relations within the domain of math, geometry, logic, definitions, analytic, *synthetic a priori*, and tautological statements. They also argue that some internal relations are defeasible, which contradicts the concept of necessity. I defend that their understanding of internal relations as defeasible does not undermine the sense of logical necessity. Lastly, I rearticulate the calculus conception of rules as a product of various distortions of the internal grammatical relations between rules and practices. Baker and Hacker present these distortions in their critique of the skeptical reading of the rule-following argument. I argue that these distortions of the internal relations are the same distortions that are supposed by the calculus conception of rules.

Wittgenstein differentiates the necessary statements in a language game differently from the common philosophical jargon. He regards “necessary propositions” as part of the grammar of language games. As Forsters rightly puts it, showing the grammatical status of a necessary proposition is one of the striking features of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. He says that “using the presence of (non-causal) necessity as a sort of heuristic litmus test for detecting the grammatical status of a principle” (Forsters, 2004, p.10). In this sense, logical necessity is the same as grammatical necessity. We may include the rules of arithmetics, geometry, logical laws, analytic, and a priori statements for the necessary statements. For example, basic rules for defining words such as “all bachelors are unmarried” are a grammatical necessity. On the same ground, he states that ‘arithmetic is the grammar of numbers’ (Wittgenstein, 1980b, p.130), and the axioms of Euclidian geometry are the grammar of space.

Similarly, logical laws such as “if equals are added to equals, then the wholes are equal” or “p or not p is always the case” are parts of the grammar of our

thinking. Wittgenstein states that “logic, mathematics, or science is part of our culture” (Wittgenstein, 1990, p. 61). Wittgenstein argues that his account of grammar is combinable with the hardness of the logical must and other necessary propositions. In addition to these necessary statements, as I discussed earlier, Wittgenstein thinks that certain seemingly empirical necessities are grammatical necessities, such as laws of mechanics are the grammar of physics. I will not discuss the grammatical status of seemingly empirical propositions since I discussed it in the previous parts. First, I differentiate logical necessity from causal and psychological necessity and discuss why he thinks that logical necessity is “harder” and more “solid.”

Wittgenstein differentiates the necessity of a rule within the language game and the necessity of the rule independent from its role in a language game. Grammatical propositions neither refer to language-independent necessities nor are unconditional truths. As Baker and Hacker put it, “grammar is antecedent to truth” (Baker and Hacker, 1992, p.98). In other words, grammatical remarks are not true or false, but they are the condition of forming true and false statements. In this sense, describing grammar as “necessary truths” or “necessarily true” does not fit Wittgenstein’s understanding of such expressions. However, they are necessary, indispensable, and constitutive for a language game to be practiced in some sense. Forsters remarks at this point that if grammatical propositions are necessary, then “is it not natural to suppose that to say that a principle is necessary is to say that it is necessarily *true*?” (Forsters, 2004, p.53) Stroud notes that something necessary does not mean that it holds necessarily.

There is a question of whether the truth of the laws of logic being a necessary condition of thought would really help explain the necessity of those laws if they do indeed hold necessarily. (Miguens, 2020, p.180)

Then, Stroud gives examples for the necessary conditions of thought that hold only contingently:

That there are thinkers is, I suppose, a necessary condition of there being thought or the possibility of thought. But that there are any thinkers at all is something that could have been otherwise. Certainly, each thinker can recognize that “I think” is a necessary condition of his or her thinking of anything, but that is not to recognize that what the thinker thereby sees to be true of himself is something that holds necessarily. The same is true for “I exist,” which is a necessary condition of “I think” and, therefore, of “There are thinkers” for each thinker. But that does not hold necessarily either. (Miguens, 2020, p.180)

Something being necessary does not imply that it is necessarily true.

Wittgenstein is reluctant to qualify such statements as necessarily true. Forsters notes that in the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* and the *Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Wittgenstein quite often himself applies the terms “correct” and “incorrect,” “true” and “false,” to grammatical principles such as those of mathematics and formal (Forsters, 2004, p.56). However, in many places, he says that “logical propositions are neither true nor false” (Wittgenstein, 1979 p. 109). Forsters also adds that Wittgenstein does not voluntarily call such expressions statements since the question if they are true or false arises once they are treated as statements. He calls them “ remarks “ in many parts of his texts (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.93e) (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.160e).

In this sense, the necessity of grammatical remarks does not imply being necessarily true. Their necessity is discussed within a language game. Whether they are unconditionally true or if the necessity of something implies that it is unconditionally true is a wrongheaded discussion for Wittgenstein. He criticizes the idea of unconditional truth. He says that “unconditionally the truth, seems wrong to me. – It is the truth only inasmuch as it is an unmoving foundation of his language-games” (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.52e).

A grammatical remark does not refer to a language-independent necessity. It is rather a linguistic concept that marks a linguistic necessity. In *PI* §251, Wittgenstein gives the example of “every rod has a length” as a necessary statement. He suggests that such grammatical statements can be expressed as “we call *this*...” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.224e). For example, “Every rod has a length.” means something like: we call something (or *this*) “the length of a rod” – but nothing “the length of a sphere.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.224e) In other words, such a statement is a part of the definition of being an object.

Another example can be given from arithmetics. 4 is the necessary result of $2+2$. This technique of addition is not relative to cultures. However, Wittgenstein argues that if we lived in a liquid world, the operation would not be helpful for us. The same is true for other propositions that are necessarily true or, by definition. Thus, the discussion of necessity or necessarily true can be discussed within a language game.

Any rule statement that seems necessary can start with the expression “we call this.” Similarly, he offers a new form of expression instead of the relating necessity to the imagination. In *PI*, he says that “instead of “imaginability,” one can also say here: representability in a particular medium of representation. And such a representation *may* indeed safely point the way to a further use of a sentence” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.127e). Hence there is something right about saying that unimagability is a criterion for nonsensicality (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.48e-49e). Unimagability is not related to psychological necessity but a logical one. He makes a similar point in *Zettel* to discuss the logical impossibility. Unimagability and inconceivability of the negation of a proposition are thought to be a criterion for being a grammatical remark. He says;

Do not say “one cannot,” but say instead: “it doesn't exist in this game.” Not: “one can't castle in draughts” but-“there is no castling in draughts”; and instead of “I can't exhibit my sensation”-“in the use of the word 'sensation,' there is no such thing as exhibiting what one has got”; instead of “one cannot enumerate all the cardinal numbers”-“there is no such thing here as enumerating all the members.” (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.24e)

What is the difference between expressing such statements as “we call this” or instead of unimaginability, we are suggested to say representability in a particular medium of representation? Obviously, in the first case, it looks like we say something about independent of concepts. It looks like we make an empirical determination about rods. In the second example, we introduce a linguistic rule about the use of length. Such rules are not about extra-linguistic necessary structures. The rationale behind the suggestions in the form of expressions is to protect us from the bewitchments of language. In the second form of expression, the expression is not about the facts but the use of the words. We contextualize our expression within a linguistic technique. Thus, grammar is an intralinguistic concept.

Wittgenstein's resistance to discussing logical necessity as an intralinguistic concept is not to enlarge the space of contingencies, but the opposite; necessity as a logical concept is much “harder” than psychological or physical necessity. His understanding of logical necessity does not make the necessary statements vulnerable to changes, unlike causal or psychological necessary statements. For example, he differentiates them in discussing the categorical difference between physical and logical impossibility. He states:

“ 3×18 inches won't go into 3 feet”. This is a grammatical rule and states a logical impossibility. The proposition “three men can't sit side by side on a bench a yard long” states a physical impossibility; and this example shows clearly why the two impossibilities are confused. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p.56)

Causal necessities can be a product of testing and discovery; however, for logically necessary statements, no experiments can be designed for testing. For example, one cannot discover that red is darker than pink, test if $2+2$ equals 4, or research if bachelors are unmarried.

Similarly, psychological certainties have an individualistic perspective. In Wittgenstein's discussions of necessity, he uses concepts such as doubt and certainty, which can be regarded as psychological concepts. However, Wittgenstein underlines the idea that doubt or being certain has a logical role in his discussion of meaning or grammar (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.58e) (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.39e). He adds that "all psychological terms merely distract us from the thing that really matters" (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.60e). He gives the expression "We are quite sure of [water boils at 100 degrees Celsius]" as an example. For Wittgenstein, this expression "does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education" (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.38e). The statement plays a role in the formation of the concept of water. For such propositions, doubt is logically excluded (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.232e). He is not interested in the concept of community in the sense of approval of the community but in the production of techniques and practices. The techniques and practices of science, education (training), or any other practice allow us to attach a logical role to the grammar of doubt and certainty. In *OC* §102 and §126 he says:

my convictions do form a system, a structure. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.16e)
my doubts form a system. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.19e)

In this sense, they have a logical role in language. This logical role gives a sense of universality to certain grammatical expressions. In his discussion of the

logic of practices, Wittgenstein distances himself clearly from an individualistic perspective. He takes a first-person perspective as an example: “I know that behind this door there is a landing and the stairway down to the ground floor” (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.43e). Even an individualist perspective on its background carries a network of practices that makes such a statement convincing, as he states that even in such statements, “there is something universal here; not just something personal” (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.57e). Another example he gives in *OC*, §104 is that “the sun is not a hole in the vault of heaven.” For such statements, Wittgenstein says,

all testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis take place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.16e)

Then, the statement that “the sun is not a hole in the vault of heaven,” “I have two hands,” or “I know that behind this door there is a landing and the stairway down to the ground floor” are not individual psychological belief. Instead, they form a system, and they are part of the logic of our language games or *Weltanschauung*. In other words, such certainty or necessity of such statements are not physical or psychological but logical/grammatical.

In this part, I described how Wittgenstein articulates logical necessity as a grammatical necessity. He differentiates such necessity from empirical and psychological necessity. He conceives of logical necessity as an intra-linguistic concept. I will discuss Baker and Hacker’s articulation of grammatical necessity as internal relations in the next part.

4.4.1 The necessity of grammar and internal relations

In their book, *Rule Skepticism, Rules, and Language* (1984), Baker and Hacker describe the grammatical necessity in terms of internal relations. I give two features of internal relations, then I discuss them with examples.

First, they state that “a relation between two entities is internal only if it is inconceivable that those two entities should not stand in this relation” (Baker and Hacker, 1984, p.107). For this first feature of internal relation, they give the example of tautology. In a tautology, they state,

it is necessarily true that these entities stand in this relation, that it would be self-contradictory to suppose that they did not do so or that it is not a genuine question of whether or not they do. (Baker and Hacker, 1984, p.107)

Another example can be given for the grammar of a bachelor. It is contradictory to suppose that bachelors are married. Similarly, asking if all bachelors are unmarried is not a genuine question. Being unmarried and being a bachelor are internally related. Baker and Hacker state the second feature of internal relations:

two entities cannot be decomposed or analyzed into a pair of relations with some independent third entity. Nothing external to the two related entities can mediate between them since this would make the existence of the internal relation dependent on the existence of a suitable third entity and its relations with each of the given pair of entities (Baker and Hacker, 1984, p.107)

We can give the example of colors to understand this relation. “Red is darker than pink” is a norm of description for making judgments about colors. We justify this rule, or how this rule is understood, by appealing to different judgments about red and pink objects by showing some samples of red objects. “Red is darker than pink” is explained by saying that “this book is red color, and this pen is pink, the book is darker than the pen. Similarly, if one asks why the color of the book is darker than the color of the pen, one responds that “red is darker than pink.” “Red is

darker than pink” or “if an object is green, it cannot be blue.” However, this is not about deducing the truth of the statements one from the other, as it is done in the circular arguments. Instead, the practice justifies the rule-following internally, without appealing to another entity. The rule and its application cannot be understood in isolation from each other. In internal relations, none of the related realities is taken to be more fundamental. They are redescrptions of each other (Baker and Hacker, 1984, p.157).

Now, given these two features of internal relations, I want to show how grammatical necessity for the laws of logic, the statements of mathematics and geometry, and other “necessary” statements can be understood as internal relations.

4.4.2 Laws of formal logic and mathematics as internal relations

We can articulate laws of logic, mathematics, geometry, and analytic statements as internal relations. Because of being an internal relation, a grammatical remark such as “all bachelors are unmarried” or “you can’t castle in draughts” is as much as necessary (within) the language game as the law of excluded middle since they are internal relations within their language games. However, this possibility does not mean that grammatical remarks are not heterogeneous and one of a kind. To underline the differences in their necessity, we can appeal to Wittgenstein’s analogy of “hardness.” The simile of the hardness of the river bed or his simile to fossils can be used to understand the differences in the grammatical propositions. For example, he uses the verb “fossilized” for the hardness of some grammatical propositions, but not for all. For the propositions of mathematics, he says:

657. The propositions of mathematics might be said to be fossilized. - The proposition “I am called . . .” is not. But it too is regarded as incontrovertible by those who, like myself, have overwhelming

evidence for it. And this is not out of thoughtlessness. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.87e)

One difference we can draw among grammatical remarks is their arbitrariness. For example, there is not much dispute on the arbitrariness of the definition of the “bachelor;” if a man is not married, then he is necessarily (by definition) unmarried. Imagining a world with different grammar for the word “bachelor” is easy. It is harder for us but not impossible to imagine a world with different necessary truths of science, such as water boiling at 100 Celsius. The rules in mathematics cannot be imagined otherwise, either. However, we can construct different geometries or algebra. Can we argue the same way for the propositions of logic? If so, then what is the difference between mathematical and logical statements?

Hacker and Baker think that logical propositions are different from other grammatical propositions for not being arbitrary. Their non-arbitrary character is justified by arguing that they are internal to thinking and language. The laws of logic are unlike other types of constitutive rules. We cannot discuss the dispensability of the law of excluded middle like we discuss the dispensability of castling in chess. To account for this, they argue that the laws of logic are both internal relations and non-arbitrary. Hacker and Baker state that

logic too belongs to the natural history of man (RFM 352f.); not, to be sure, the *propositions* of logic, but rather *that we use these propositions* as we do, that we mould our concepts thus, etc. – that is a feature of our natural history. In short, the natural history of man is the history of a convention-forming, rule-following, concept exercising, language-using animal – a cultural animal. And it is important for philosophers to remember these very general facts. (Baker and Hacker, p.221)

It is imaginable that some people might not invent any notation for the concepts of logic. However, for us it is inconceivable to imagine a culture where the law of excluded middle is not a norm of description. Violating such statements does

not make any sense to us. Once such rules are violated, one says “logically impossible,” “unimaginable,” and “inconceivable” to be otherwise. So, we cannot entertain our imagination by inquiring about different grammatical possibilities in the way we entertain our imagination about alien cultures with different logical laws. All language games would collapse of thinking laws of formal logic external to language. In this sense, they are necessary and constitutive.

It is nonsense to say that the logical propositions are norms of description for language since we agree on them. The strength of the logical necessity relies on the impossibility of disagreement in our play of any language games. We cannot have the sense of thinking, inferring, and judging without assuming that they are logical activities. For Wittgenstein, they are the constitutive condition of thinking, talking, making statements, etc. Wittgenstein, in his texts, provides examples of different mathematics and geometry or the possibility of different facts. However, for logic, we do not find any such contrasting examples. Fundamental conventions of logic are internal to thinking, judging, and inferring; however, “I am called L.W.,” or “water boils at 100celcius,” are not. In this sense, they cannot be arbitrary. In the previous parts, I discussed the notion of arbitrariness challenges the idea that rules refer to putative empirical necessities. The non-arbitrariness of logic is not justified because they are empirically necessary, but the language as an activity is internally related to being logical.

Similar to logical propositions, Wittgenstein thinks that the propositions in mathematics have, as it were officially, been given the stamp of incontestability.

We say: “If you really follow the rule in multiplying, it *must* come out the same.” Now) when this is merely the slightly hysterical style of university talk; we have no need to be particularly interested. It is however the expression of an attitude towards the technique of multiplying, which comes out everywhere in our lives, the emphasis of the 'must' corresponds only to the inexorability of this attitude, not

merely towards the technique of calculating, but also towards innumerable related practices. (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.55e)

As Hacker and Baker state, mathematics and geometry are connected to a system of propositions interwoven by ever more complex networks of proofs” (Hacker and Baker, 1986, p.245). As techniques, they are helpful for us in their application, but mathematics as a technique is not up to contingencies. For example, I cannot discover that 12×12 is or is not 144. For example, $2+2=4$ is internal to the addition operation, and no external entity is needed to justify this statement. However, we can invent new geometries and mathematics. As Baker and Hacker state, there would be no counting if we lived in a liquid world (Baker and Hacker, 1986, p.339).

In this part, I articulated different kinds of grammatical remarks such as logical laws, rules of mathematics and geometry, and analytic statements as internal relations. Logical necessity is conceived as an internal relation constitutive of the language game. Moreover, I argued that the logical laws' constitutive character is internal to thinking, language, and inferring; thus, they are not arbitrary. I think conceiving necessity as an internal relation, Wittgenstein's account of grammar provides a “hardness of logical must.”

By articulating grammatical remarks as expressions of internal relations, Wittgenstein manages to save himself from committing the metaphysics of the *Tractatus*. In the *Tractatus*, logical form is thought to be external to the possibility of language. In the *Tractatus*, to explain how language corresponds to the facts, he claims that logical form is the entity that makes the world and language isomorphic. However, in the *Investigations*, he does not need to provide an external criterion for the correspondence. Activities such as making an assertion, ostensibly defining something, and representing an object in language are internal to the grammar of the

language. They are not connected thanks to some third entity. What we call language is internally connected to these activities.

In the next part, I will discuss how internal relations can be multiple for different concepts and show how Baker and Hacker argue that some internal relations (or grammatical remarks) can be defeasible.

4.4.3 Internal relations and necessity

At first sight, two features of internal relations seem to be satisfied only with tautological or analytic statements. However, Baker and Hacker underlie that Wittgenstein repudiated the implication that any expression of an internal relation must be necessary truth or a tautology. Grammatical remarks about the words, such as pain, friend, red, or bachelor, do not have to be necessary truths, but they are still related to these concepts internally.

Baker and Hacker argue that internal relations are defeasible. They define defeasibility as “the absence of any entailment, while an internal relation must be a necessary connection.” Being internally related does not mean being entailed or being necessary. Some conceptual relations can be internal but not necessary. Baker and Hacker give the example of “being in pain.” They state that the relation of pain behavior to pain is an internal relation. Acting in specific ways is a criterion for being in pain. However, “if someone acts thus, he is in pain” is not a tautology (Baker and Hacker, 1984, p.110). One may be in pain without showing pain behavior, or he can show pain behavior without really being in pain. Although pain behavior does not entail being in pain, they are internally related. In different contexts, showing pain behavior might not be regarded as a criterion for being in

pain. In such contexts, the need for further criteria is also laid down in grammar (Baker and Hacker, 1984, p.110).

One can argue that pain behavior is not internal but external to being in pain. One can say: “this person shows pain behavior. However, he is in pain only if he has the mental state of being in pain.” In this statement, being in pain is explained as having an inner state. In such an explanation, one introduces the inner state as a third entity and distorts the internal relation that is established in language between being in pain and pain behavior. Recognition of the inner state is introduced as internal to being in pain. A third entity is introduced instead of the previous relation, and pain behavior becomes a symptom of being in pain. For Baker and Hacker, this explanation distorts the grammatical relation between being in pain and pain behavior since in making the judgment “he is in pain,” we do not need the recognition of an inner state as criterial support. Thus, recognition of pain does not mediate between being in pain and its expression. If one means that “but still there is something mental in pain, “ they simply say something redundant since being in pain and mental state are internally related concepts.

A scientific objection could be that being “really” in pain is having an inner state and its recognition by the subject in pain. However, such an objection displaces the subject of discussion. Wittgenstein discusses the meaning of the word. So, when one utters that he is in pain or shows some pain behavior, we can judge that he is in pain. We do not need further criteria gathered from their nervous system scans. If we are asked to define what pain means, its scientific description would not be the ultimate criterion for being in pain.

From this example, we can see that the internal relations can be multiple yet not necessary. Since there can be more than one criterion of being in pain, we can

say that showing pain behavior is sufficient but not necessary for judging someone being in pain. Since internal relations can be multiple, they are not always necessary but are constitutive of the language games. For example, in propositions such as “all bodies are extended,” “there is no reddish-green,” and “you cannot castle in draughts,” body and extension, red and not-green, draughts and not-castling are related internally and necessarily. They constitute the grammar of body, the grammar of colors, and the grammar of draughts. The conceptual determinations about the meaning of words are internal relations. They are constitutive of the language games. In other words, without following them or being in accord with them, one cannot play the game. They form the logic of language games. Their violation annihilates the practice. In this sense, these rules are different from rules concerning speed limits or table manners, the violations of which do not throw us outside of the practice, i.e., eating and driving. However, we shall also note that regulative rules are also norms of descriptions and part of the grammar of language games, such as rules of speed limits. Rules of traffic are constitutive of the legal way of driving, but they are not constitutive of driving.

The constitutive rules of the language games are not indispensable since concepts can change. For example, the game of rugby has different constitutive rules from football. However, the game has evolved out of changing the constitutive rules of the game of football. We can imagine an activity called football which is not played with foot and is still called football. Alternatively, both games can be regarded as the same game, the one that is played with foot and the one with hands. Similar possibilities are usually created hypothetically by Wittgenstein in encounters with alien grammars.

The constitutive rules of the games can be unusual, such as shaking hands before beginning the game in chess tournaments. This rule is not a simple manner of sportsmanship, but it violates a rule that ends the game. For the game of chess, in tournaments, the handshaking is constitutive. However, we can play chess without handshaking. In different contexts, this rule is not necessary. First, we can change the moves and pieces and still call the game chess. For example, the queen was introduced to the game in the 15th century. So, we can say that their necessity (the constitutiveness of the rule) is arbitrary. Secondly, they can change. Thirdly, this change can transform the practice, but practices with different constitutive rules can be regarded as the same. Lastly, we can well imagine a world without this game or a game without this particular constitutive condition.

The multiplicity of internal relations is also compatible with the idea of family resemblances and the irreducible multiplicity of the language games. We can argue that there can be a family of different constitutive rules internal to language games.

However, still, being constitutive can be problematized in Wittgenstein's thinking since I argued that for him, the words lack strictness and form a family-like network. If the constitutive rule can be given for a language game, then we can say that its borders can be strictly delineated. The multitude of constitutive rules would not prevent making rigorous classifications of language games. Then one can argue that the language games work similarly to multiple calculi. However, rigorous and sharp classifications would not give us the right to conceptualize the language games as calculus since linguistic practices that are regarded as belonging to a language game are connected with different criteria that are not valid for all games but some. Because of these partial overlappings, the borders of the family of language games

are not sharp. Wittgenstein parallels their connection to weaves. There are overlappings despite the clear distinctive constitutive rules. In the *PI*, speaking a language is seen as a wide range of complex, interwoven, interconnected techniques (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.36e).

Moreover, for some concepts, we can provide strict internal relations. However, one cannot claim that they are given once and for all. What is taken as a criterion for belonging to the family is arbitrary. The internal relation can be drawn for different purposes. As Wittgenstein states,

When one draws a boundary, it may be for various kinds of reasons. If I surround an area with a fence or a line or otherwise, the purpose may be to prevent someone from getting in or out, but it may also be part of a game and the players are supposed, say, to jump over the boundary; or it may show where the property of one person ends and that of another begins; and so on. So if I draw a boundary line, that is not yet to say what I am drawing it for.
(Wittgenstein, 2009, p.146e-147e)

Because of this indeterminacy, the grammatical remarks in advance cannot be thought to be forming a calculus for language games. In short, the multiplicity of internal relations does not prevent us from arguing the logical necessity. Secondly, the possibility of logical necessity does not make many language games work as a collection of discerned calculi.

In this part, I discussed how internal relations could be multiple and constitutive. In the next part, I will discuss how distortions of internal relations are present in the calculus conception of language. Baker and Hacker identify three distortions between rules and their application in the skeptic reading of the rule-following argument. I will argue that the same distortions are present in the calculus conception of language.

4.4.3.1 Distorting internal relations in calculus picture of normativity

In this part, I want to rearticulate Wittgenstein's critique of the calculus conception of language in terms of distorting internal relations. Then, I focus on how they can be distorted by giving theoretical explanations in different contexts.

Hacker and Baker describe the distortion of an internal relation as introducing a third entity to explain an internal relation between the two terms. Then in such a case, either the internal relation is distorted because of providing a third entity, or the third entity is related internally to them. But then, to state this third entity is redundant to state (Baker and Hacker, 1984, p.107). Let me give examples of redundancy and distortions in Wittgenstein's works. Focusing on these examples also shows that Wittgenstein's effort in philosophy can be seen as fighting against the distortions of the multiplicity of internal relations. For redundancy, we can give such statements as examples:

- A mental event happens in my brain when I remember something.

To utter such a redundant claim is innocent as long as it serves to teach the grammar of remembering. However, if the aim is to reduce remembering to the recognition of an inner state, then the recognition of this inner state is introduced as a third entity for the relation between the act of remembering and its expression. As a third entity, it distorts the internal relation between remembering something and expressing it. Wittgenstein attacks such a theorizing move, which explains the meaning of words with some pseudo-causal acts of meaning. Wittgenstein struggles to fight against such bewitchments because of the distortion, which serves to produce a theory about the nature of mind, human beings, or normativity by disturbing the practical meaning of things.

We can give further examples of the redundancies that are made to distort internal relations:

- There is a mind-independent world.
- World keeps existing when everyone is in sleep.

Such statements are redundant since the grammar of the world is internally related to having an independent existence from anyone's will, perception, or mind. However, there are philosophical works that aim to explain how and why the world exists and distort the internal relation between the mind and the world. For example, Descartes had to posit God's veracity (*veracitas Dei*) as a third entity to prove that the world is not an illusion, or Berkeley provided God's perception for arguing that there is a mind-independent world. However, for Wittgenstein, the world as a concept is internally related to "existing for a long" time and "existing while we are in sleep." Thus, there is no need to state it unless there is a conflict or training process about the concept of the world.

Another example occurs in *OC* and *PI*, where Wittgenstein contends the distortion of the grammar of certainty. For example, statements such as below distort the grammar of knowing for certain.

- Only I know for certain that I am in pain.
- I know that I have two hands.

This statement distorts the grammar of being certain knowledge. It creates a mythology of division between internal and external knowledge. Furthermore, it goes without saying that "I know that I am in pain." For Wittgenstein, no one but a philosopher would make such redundant claims (Z 405). Redundancy is an innocent claim, but the quest of creating a theory can distort internal relations.

Secondly, distortion of the internal relations in the calculus picture of language is one of his primary motivations. Wittgenstein inquires about the relation between rules and applications. Distortion of internal relations is made by providing a third entity between two internally related entities.

The internal relations between rules and applications are also distorted in the calculus conception of language. To do this, I will focus on Baker and Hacker's critique of Kripke's skeptic interpretation of the rule-following argument because I think the distortions made in the calculus conception of language are the same as the skeptic interpretation of the rule-following argument. Their critique determines three distortions of the internal relations in the skeptic interpretation of the rule-following argument. By discussing their critique of Kripke's interpretation, I displace their argument as well. However, I give both contexts (the calculus conception of language, and the skeptic interpretation of the rule-following argument) so that we see how the distortions are similar in both.

I first summarize Kripke's position for the rule-following argument, then I show the internal distortions in skeptical understanding of rules are also present in calculus conception of language. At the beginning of his work, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*, Kripke clearly states that his concern is not to find out whether Wittgenstein is a skeptic philosopher, but he suggests that as the rule-following argument strikes him, there is a possibility of forming a new skepticism and a skeptic solution to it (Kripke, 1982, p.ix). Here, my purpose is not deeply to discuss Kripke's argument, and nor is it to show why Wittgenstein's understanding of normativity is not a skeptical one.

Kripke's skeptic states that one cannot know if the present utterance of a word means the same as its utterances in the past since there is no fact that can grant

the same meaning detached from the actors of this language game. Similarly, rules cannot provide the necessary anchor for an utterance to mean the same as in the past since any rule can be interpreted differently each time. Thus any application of the rule can be in accord with the rule. Because of that, one cannot know for sure what they meant (Kripke, 1982, p.13). For Kripke, this paradox is overcome by a skeptical move with the appeal to the community's reactions. The community of speakers bridges the relationship between rule and application (Kripke, 1982, p.79). This solution is also a skeptical one since the community of the speakers can change and differ their minds about the correct application of the word. Hacker and Baker think that skeptical interpretation of the rule-following argument relies on distortions of internal relations between rules and applications (Baker and Hacker, 1984, p.99).

These distortions are created because of the demand for further grounds for the normativity of language. For Wittgenstein, the competent use of language is our ground for the normativity of meaning. As he states, “following according to the rule is fundamental to our language-game. It characterizes what we call description” (Wittgenstein, 1990, p.330). The grammar of the language games does not need further justifications since, as Baker and Hacker state, “what counts as *a priori* as grounds for or proof of a proposition is laid down in grammar.” (Baker and Hacker, 1984, p.99) Furthermore, they add that “any description of reality put forward to justify grammar presupposes the grammatical rules” (Baker and Hacker, 1984, p.99). The demand to justify grammar by external criteria produces the tendency to be skeptical about language's normativity. Similarly, in the calculus picture, the normativity of language is grounded in *a priori* foundations to soothe the concerns of a skeptic or solipsist. In doing so, the skeptic distorts the internal relation between grounds and grammar. Then, Baker and Hacker determine that three further

distortions of internal relations between understanding rules and their applications follow the distortion of demanding further grounds in Kripke's reading of the rule-following argument.

First, the internal relation between rule and application is distorted. Baker and Hacker states that "to understand a rule is to know what would count as acting in accord with it" (Baker and Hacker, 1984, p.100). However, in rule skepticism, it is presupposed "of separating the grasp of a rule from the knowledge of how to apply it (Baker and Hacker, 1984, p.100). In 4.2. *Primacy of the Practice*, I criticized the idea that the applications are present in the rule statements in advance and the demand to ask for further foundations that lie beyond the practice. This distortion relies on the idea that "A rule can be grasped in ignorance of how it is to be applied." (Baker and Hacker, 1984, p.101) However, understanding the rule and knowing how to apply it are internally connected.

The second move to justify the gap between the rule and application is to think that the application is a product of a correct interpretation, which binds rules and applications. This idea presupposes that the subject interprets the rule correctly whenever the subject applies it correctly. Such an understanding of rules and applications proposes a third entity between understanding a rule and applying the rule. Again, this idea distorts the internal relation between understanding a rule and being able to apply it. Skeptic understanding of rule-following rejects the process of interpretation since we might interpret wrongly, and to interpret correctly, we need another rule which we need to interpret correctly. Calculus conception of language similarly thinks that a similar move between rule and application is possible. By distorting the relation between understanding a rule and its applications, as Baker and Hacker state, "rule skepticism transgresses the bounds of sense in concluding that

there is no scope for objective knowledge about accord and conflict with rules” (Baker and Hacker, p.101). It is done by creating a demand for a third entity to justify their relationship.

For Baker and Hacker, the second distortion is to suppose that every act is an instantiation of a general rule. According to this supposition, if a person is engaged in practice then this person follows a rule explicitly or implicitly, or his act is an instantiation of some general rule. According to this idea, a rule can be opaque to its followers, but tacitly they are in accord with them. For example, in making bread, bakers use yeast to make bread, and in this action, it is supposed that “the formulation of a chemical reaction is implicitly followed” (Baker and Hacker, 1984, p.102) It is also refused that different rule formulations about practice can be reduced to a general rule which is more foundational than the others. However, for Wittgenstein, a rule formulation does not have a deeper or a special function than others. There can be many different formulations of rules (samples, ostensive definitions, etc.) Rules do not need to have the form of universal generalizations (Hacker and Baker, 1984, p.102). So, the calculus conception of language similarly supposes that logical calculus is special and deeper, general and tacitly present in every linguistic act. For Wittgenstein, in linguistic exchanges, there is no need to suppose a sublime and higher transcendent entity that can justify the normativity of a language game. A formal general definition functions the same way as when the rule is expressed as “this is the way we do,” “and so on,” “like this,” etc., in a craft, sports, or any other language game. For Wittgenstein, the definitive general rules have family resemblances with a simple arbitrary remark such as “this is the way we do,” “look!” marking of an eyebrow, etc. The expressions for the norms of the

practices do not refer to the order of the world, but they are just remarks for teaching techniques in a training process of our practices.

The third distortion of the internal relation between rules and application is that “it is assumed that one’s behavior is merely inductive” (Baker and Hacker, 1984, p.103). This idea suggests that one cannot be sure of one action with certainty because of the indeterminacy of future events. However, Baker and Hacker state that in rule-following, “one does not need to postulate one’s understanding based on one’s past behavior” (Baker and Hacker, 1984, p.103). Acting in conformity with the rule means that one understands the rule. There is no separation between a rule and a competent following of the rule, and there is no gap to be filled with induction. However, if we think that we infer the correct behavior based on our past behavior, then there is the possibility of breaking this connection at every attempt to follow a rule. Hacker and Baker state that “understanding a rule requires an outward criterion, not a probable internal hypothesis”(Baker and Hacker, 1984, p.104). The distortion about induction is not present in calculus picture, since in calculus picture we do not appeal to the past.

To conclude, Baker and Hacker’s account of internal relations can illuminate the problems (as distortions) of seeing language as a calculus. Additionally, Wittgenstein’s account of grammar can account for the logical necessity. His appeal to forms of life, use, or convention is not an external, third entity that explains the normative relation between rule and application. As Hacker and Baker state, rules do have normative power against a background of customs and regularities, but this power is not a causal force (Baker and Hacker, 1992, p.204).

The force is neither a social, causal, nor psychological pressure. In a skillful engagement in practice, normativity is not determined by the free will of the actors,

the majority of people, or an act of meaning that necessitate us to understand a sentence in the way we understand it. The connection between them is internal. Articulating the connection between rules and applications as internal gives the possibility of conceiving their connection as more reliable than causal or psychological necessity. As Baker and Hacker state;

A rule can compel in many senses (MS 127, 148): psychological, sociological, the force of habit or of the law. But these are not what he has in mind – rather, something much ‘harder’ – as if the rule already prefigured everything that one has to do, that it has already written it all down in *logical* script. (Baker and Hacker, 1992, p.204)

To describe the logical necessity as an internal relation between the practices and the rule, Wittgenstein says; “When I follow the rule, I do not choose. I follow the rule *blindly*.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.91e) Baker and Hacker note that “blindly” does not mean like an automaton but with complete confidence (Baker and Hacker, 1992, p.198). It is about being committed to a technique, which one does not decide or interpret at each step.

In this part, I provided Wittgenstein’s description of rule-following practices in a language without appealing to the calculus model of mathematics and geometry or the scientific model of causality. Still, he can describe their normative nature. In the last concluding chapter, I will discuss some possibilities for further research once the critique of the calculus conception of language is seen as one of the central problematizations in Wittgenstein’s philosophical endeavor. Then, in the absence of a logical calculus to clarify the use of language by logical analysis, I will discuss what is left for philosophical vocation (job description). Finally, I will discuss if his understanding of normativity can provide insights into the tools, techniques, and ways of doing philosophy.

4.5 Practice-based normativity and philosophizing

For Wittgenstein, practice-based understanding of rules also affects the methods and aims of philosophizing since philosophizing is a practice also related to the general rules. In this part, I describe a possibility for philosophizing that is aligned with Wittgenstein's understanding of linguistic normativity.

In his short text, *Philosophy*, Wittgenstein describes the relationship between philosophy and the rules:

When one asks philosophy: "What is – for instance – substance?" then one is asking for a rule. A general rule, which is valid for the word "substance," i.e., a rule according to which I have decided to play. (Wittgenstein, 2005, 307e)

Wittgenstein uses the word "substance" as an example. It may be any philosophical concept, such as God, a priori, essence, human being, meaning, proposition, or language. The example of substance can also be replaced with any concept; "what is a dog?" "What is the good life?" "What is color?" His general aim is to relate philosophical enterprise radically to rules. According to him, in philosophy, one asks for "a general rule" that does not allow us to understand a word other than it is meant; by saying "color," one cannot mean "dog," or by saying "good life" one does not mean "substance." So, we can say that philosophical inquiry is after finding a proper area for the legitimate uses of the concepts within the vast linguistic territory. The general rule describes the use and circulation of the words, for instance, "substance."

For Wittgenstein, philosophy is about understanding the uses of words. It aims to clarify various confusions about the uses of words by showing how they are used. Thus, philosophy is essentially related to linguistic rules and understanding the uses of the concepts. In other words, philosophy is about investigating the grammar of words. The idea of philosophy as grammatical research describes the philosopher's job

concerning the rules, which form the grammar of language games. Wittgenstein does not put forward strict stipulations on how a philosophical inquiry shall be conducted. However, his grammatical research of language games has certain discernible qualities.

The relationship between Wittgenstein's practice of philosophizing and his understanding of the normativity of language needs further elaboration and scrutinization. In this chapter, I want to express some insights into this relationship. In the end, I want to erect some general signposts for the philosophical practice that is inspired by Wittgenstein's view about grammar. Finally, I claim that Wittgenstein's ideas about grammar are in accord with his ideas about philosophizing and suggest some points for further research.

4.5.1 Subject matter and method of philosophy

Wittgenstein's views of grammar introduce certain possibilities for the practice of philosophy and set some limits for it. I want to start with two main characteristics that can help us describe a study in general; the subject matter and methods. First, Wittgenstein differentiates philosophical activity from that empirical science. Secondly, he does not prescribe a strict method for philosophizing, but his justification of the impossibility of a strict and fixed method can tell us about the methods of the practice of philosophy.

First, Wittgenstein differentiates the philosophical activity from scientific methods radically. He says that the subject matter of philosophy is not phenomena but the concepts:

We do not analyse a phenomenon (for example, thinking) but a concept (for example, that of thinking), and hence the application of a word. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.125e)

He calls the philosophical inquiry grammatical, and it aims “clearing misunderstandings concerning the use of words, brought about, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of our language” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.47e).

He also differentiates philosophy from analyzing the natural history of purposes. So, philosophy does not boil down to anthropology, ethnology, or psychology of concept formations. The limitation about the subject matter, i.e., working of language, breaks with the analogy with science, which discovers or explains the underlying causes of phenomena. Philosophical activity does not extract underlying causes. He says:

We are, indeed, also interested in the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.) But our interest is not thereby thrown back on to these possible causes of concept formation; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history – since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes. (Hacker, 2013, p.117)

His demand to distance himself from the space of causes is because of the autonomous character of the grammar. Logical necessity does not have to do with the causes but the criteria for the concepts. Analogously, the invention of a game has nothing to do with natural causes. He states:

To invent a language could mean to invent a device for a particular purpose on the basis of the laws of nature (or consistently with them); but it also has the other sense, analogous to that in which we speak of the invention of a game. Here I am saying something about the grammar of the word “language” by connecting it with the grammar of the word “invent.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.145e)

He thinks that the subject matter of philosophy is concepts, and the philosophers' job is to describe the workings of these concepts. The description of grammar is similar to describing the rules of a game. Thus, nothing is hidden, waiting for the philosopher to be explained. Philosophical inquiries, unlike scientific

research, do not extract tacit norms because, in the territory of language, the meaning of words “lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of *no interest to us*” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.55e). For Wittgenstein, concepts are formed not on the basis of natural causes but are determined by speakers' interests. Philosophy does not excavate anything tacitly known or followed. Nigel Pleasants states that “meaning is not hidden from us, and vagueness is not a cloud of unclarity hiding the essence of language, the reality of which is 'something that lies beneath the surface' and which analysis 'digs out'”(Pleasants, 2002, p.63). The idea of discovering a potentially hidden underlying structure is not compatible with the logic of the rule-following practice. As Hacker and Baker state, any rule can be expressed. If it cannot be expressed, it cannot “be consulted for guidance.” They also add that “expressions of some rules may require non-verbal instruments” (Baker and Hacker, 1992, p.62). Thus, we merely redescribe the grammar of language game. In §109 *PI*, he states that

All *explanation* must disappear, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light – that is to say, its purpose – from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; but they are solved through an insight into the workings of our language, and that in such a way that these workings are recognized – *despite* an urge to misunderstand them. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.52e)

Differentiating philosophical activity from natural sciences enables an area, the territory of grammar, for philosophy to be practiced. Wittgenstein states that his way of philosophizing “consists essentially in leaving the question of truth and asking about sense instead” (Wittgenstein, 1980, p.3). In this sense, “philosophy shall leave everything as it is.” Still, there are many things to be done by the philosophers. One thing to do for Wittgenstein is to separate the grammatical from empirical since it is one of the main confusions.

Philosophical investigations: conceptual investigations. The essential thing about metaphysics: it obliterates the distinction between factual and conceptual investigations. (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.82e)

How does philosophy survey the concepts? I want to discuss some aspects of the possibility of philosophical practice within this playground.

After determining the subject matter of philosophy, secondly, Wittgenstein discusses the methods for philosophy. The change in Wittgenstein's elaboration on normativity leaves us without a discrete method of describing the grammar of words. In the early writings, logical calculus serves to clarify nonobvious nonsense of metaphysical statements and show their nonsensicality. The aim of philosophy is a cure that saves us from metaphysical expressions, which prevent us from awakening a sense of wonder to life (Wittgenstein, 1980, p.5).

The confusions created by language are overcome by logical clarification eliminating nonsense. However, in his later writings, logical calculus could be just one method among many to detect instances of bewitchments of language (grammatical illusions). Describing the workings of language, in other words, describing the grammar, depends on observing how words are used in different language games that form a family of uses. Thus, there are many ways to formulate the norms of descriptions for different purposes. In this sense, there are many therapies (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.57e).

Another difficulty in describing the methods in philosophy is the futility of describing grammar since everything is open to the speakers. Wittgenstein thinks philosophers' work in describing grammar is similar to that of a cartographer or draughtsman (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.vi). The mapping of the grammar is done by making various grammatical remarks. However, these remarks are not theoretical observations. As Pleasants states: "they do not say anything that most people do not already know pre-theoretically. They are mere 'remarks on the natural history of human

beings” (Pleasants, 2002, p.73). When one is competent in the way the practice is performed, the rules become irrelevant to her, and the practitioner stops following the rules “—though his actions will be in accordance with the explicit rules” (Pleasants, 2002, p.70). Thus, when we hear the definitive limits of a word, we do not actually learn anything. Because of the redundancy of the grammatical remarks, Wittgenstein sometimes regards them as nonsense. For example, in *PI*, “Imagine someone saying, “But I know how tall I am!” and laying his hand on top of his head to indicate it!” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.103e). In this example, the statement can be regarded as true but more accurately as nonsense since there is no such use in the language game of measurements.

In §252, he says: “this body has extension.” To these words, we could respond by saying: “Nonsense!” – but are inclined to reply “Of course!” – Why?” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.97e). He uses nonsense not as a technical term but as an exclamation as well, close to the meaning “rubbish!” or “*quatsch!*” in German. For example, in §187, he states: “(Or is it like *this*: I believe that he is suffering, but am certain that he is not an automaton? Nonsense!)” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.187e). A general categorization of grammatical remarks can be rubbish, as he states:

One might simply say “0, rubbish!” to someone who wanted to make objections to the propositions that are beyond doubt. That is, not reply to him but admonish him. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.65e)

Even though Wittgenstein thinks that grammatical statements are redundant or nonsense, he appeals to such statements in his works; the examples vary from different language games, such as; “Sensations are private” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.223e), “Every rod has a length.” (Wittgenstein, 2009 p.97e), and “another person can't have my pains” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.97e), “a machine cannot think!” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.120e), “rule-following is a practice” (Wittgenstein,

2009§202). In addition, he sometimes writes in parenthesis that he makes grammatical remarks (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.38e).

For Wittgenstein, grammatical statements can make sense within a context in which such expressions are used for training or in a conflicting situation. He says:

Just as the words “I am here” have a meaning only in certain contexts, and not when I say them to someone who is sitting in front of me and sees me dearly,-and not because they are superfluous, but because their meaning is not determined by the situation, yet stands in need of such determination. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.44e)

The examples from his texts are responses to the interlocutor with whom Wittgenstein discusses the nature of meaning, normativity, and language. He makes grammatical statements about them since there is a misconception about their nature, exemplified in the primitive picture of language. Otherwise, the expression of a grammar rule is redundant and dull. It is a repetition of which is already known. A sentence might sound meaningless and then meaningful after grasping the context if there is any (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.61e-62e).

In *On Certainty*, between paragraphs §550-553, he gives an example of the proposition: “I know that that is a tree” (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.45e-46e). This sentence can make sense in many situations, such as when a philosopher tries to convince someone that we know more pieces of knowledge other than mathematical and logical truths. Or if we add some words to our expressions, “I know that that is a tree, I can clearly see it.” In such circumstances, there is a function and use this sentence as an empirical proposition. However, looking at a tree and saying, “I know that that is a tree,” would not make sense because a grammatical remark is treated as empirical without any purpose.

For example, Wittgenstein gives a hypothetical dialogue with a martian.

I meet someone from Mars and he asks me “How many toes have human beings got ?”-I say “Ten. I’ll shew you”, and take my shoes

off. Suppose he was surprised that I knew with such certainty, although I hadn't looked at my toes--ought I to say: "We humans know how many toes we have whether we can see them or not"? (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.56e)

In this case, making a logical remark serves to train someone in the language game. However, looking at a tree and saying that "I know that that's a tree," would not make any sense. Such a remark cannot be treated as a true empirical statement. Something taken for granted is asserted as if it is an empirical statement.

Wittgenstein calls such statements superfluous, absurd information and nonsense (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.60e). Wittgenstein asks if such remarks cannot be treated as superfluous though true. His answer is, "I feel as if these words were like "Good morning" said to someone in the middle of a conversation" (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.61e). Such claims are not always innocuous and redundant. They can also be misleading and rely on misconceptions about language games. For example, picturing language as a calculus, statements such as "only I know my pain," or "I know that I have two hands." To fight against such misleading pictures, philosophers can establish contexts and fight against such misleading pictures.

The absurdity of the dialogue appears when it is displaced from a specific context to a non-contextualized general point. Another way of making such statements non-sensical is attaching them a truth value or meaning without relying on any context.

The context for grammatical inquiry is situated in problematic situations. Thus, philosophical inquiry cannot aim to provide a universal map of concepts similar to dictionaries. For all these reasons, Wittgenstein denies prescribing limits by theoretical activity as a method. However, grammatical inquiry can help the "bewitched" people by showing how concepts work within linguistic exchanges if there is a need. In this sense, the philosophical activity

aims to create reminders, aspects, or comparisons that help us find our way in the vagueness of the language games (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.54e-55e).

In this part, I described the subject matter of philosophy, and I argued why the method of philosophy could not be a universalist perspective that prescribes the limits of concepts. In the next part, I will argue that Wittgenstein's contextualization of philosophical inquiry could be analyzed in four moments. I also argue that the philosophical inquiry proper in the Wittgensteinian sense is in accord with his understanding of normativity.

4.5.2 Four moments of Wittgenstein's philosophical practice

In this part, I describe four moments of Wittgenstein's philosophical practice that are in accord with his understanding of normativity. Later, I also show that these moments are present in his critique of the calculus picture of language.

The first moment of his practice starts with the problematization of an ordinary claim by creating a conceptual conflict. Wittgenstein uses different qualifications for conceptual conflicts, such as illness, mental cramp, bewitchment, being perplexed, confusion, misconception, superstitions or illusions, blindness, and misinterpretation of the forms of expressions to describe such situations (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.52e) (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.98e). He also uses the concepts of being lost in language or being captivated by a picture. Philosophical practice responds or reacts to such situations. Thus, the practice is essentially dialogical in many respects.

The response aims to diagnose and find out why the person “is irresistibly tempted to use a certain form of expression” (Wittgenstein, 1998, p.60).

The dialogical point is founded by creating a subject position, usually the interlocutor that Wittgenstein responds to in his investigations. The interlocutor usually is not a real person, but it is a figure, a persona. The interlocutor figure does not present comprehensive theories, explanations, or arguments; instead, he makes intuitive points. Wittgenstein gives an in depth critique of such judgements.

For example, in *PI*, interlocutor says: “I know pain only from my *own* case” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.107e). This expression is not a theory about mental or an epistemological account of introspection. However, such remark is the starting point of philosophical clarification of the grammar of the word pain. Another example can be given from Wittgenstein's use of Augustine in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Augustine does not present a theory of language, but his description of language acquisition implies that language can be seen as based on ostensive definition connecting names and objects. Similarly, Frege and Russell sublimate logic and think that all meaningful statements can be formalized by logic.

Wittgenstein uses the terminology of illness for the conflicts in the grammar of language games, but they do not have to be ill-formed forms of expression that need to be fixed. Instead, he thinks of such cases as allegorical paintings as well. They illustrate conceptual relations in speech and display “virtually a pictorial representation of our grammar” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.107e). He uses in the pejorative sense of the term, if one is stuck to a form of expression in language and over-expands its use. For example, in this dissertation the primitive picture of language provides the pictorial representation of grammar. It is not wrong to say that language is a relation between names and objects. However, once we stick to that description and are stuck in it, then Wittgenstein thinks that this picture of language needs to be inquired about.

The philosophical activity starts by developing a focus on conflictual points in the language. These conflictual points can be a product of a desire, ethos, misuse of the practitioners, or can be embedded in the forms of expressions of language. As Wittgenstein states: “concepts lead us to make investigations. They are the expression of our interest and direct our interest (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.158e). After this moment, Wittgenstein focuses on describing the use of concepts that are part of the conflict to find out why the person “is irresistibly tempted to use a certain form of expression” (Wittgenstein, 1998, p.60).

To do this, Wittgenstein does not criticize certain forms of expression or show that they are not appropriate. “What we must do is: understand its working, its grammar” (Wittgenstein, 1998, p.7). The second step of philosophical practice is to describe the working of grammar.

In describing the grammar, the philosophers' work is not oriented toward discovering and prescribing limits because the problematized points cannot and do not have to be solved by reminding the definitions. Wittgenstein warns against such an inquiry:

There is always the danger of wanting to find an expression's meaning by contemplating the expression itself, and the frame of mind in which one uses it, instead of always thinking of the practice. That is why one repeats the expression to oneself so often, because it is as if one must see what one is looking for in the expression and in the feeling it gives one. (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.79e)

In looking at the practice, the sources of the philosophical confusions can be various. Wittgenstein states:

Our ordinary language, which of all possible notations is the one which pervades all our life, holds our mind rigidly in one position, as it were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire for other positions as well. Thus we sometimes wish for a notation which stresses a difference more strongly, makes it more obvious, than ordinary language does, or one which in a particular case uses more closely similar forms of expression than our ordinary

language. Our mental cramp is loosened when we are shown the notations which fulfil these needs. These needs can be of the greatest variety. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p.59)

The philosophical activity aims to gain a synoptic view of the conflict. Thus, it focuses on the description of grammar within the context of the conflict. Wittgenstein says: “the work of the philosopher consists in marshalling recollections for a particular purpose.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.55e). This purpose is to loosen the conflictual points.

In describing grammar, the philosophical activity should recognize a certain primacy of action. If the philosophers gave up craving for generalities or doubting anything, they would have a more proper subject matter to study, i.e., ordinary practices. Wittgenstein states: “when you are philosophizing, you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there” (Wittgenstein, 1980, p.65).

Wittgenstein exemplifies the ordinary uses of the words to understand how the words are used and function in various language games. We aim to understand how the language game is shaped and how rival points are articulated. He does not develop a definitive theory. There is no privileged position that gives us *sub specie aeternitatis* aspect that would give us the solution to conflicts. The philosopher does not have a vantage point where he can understand the meanings of general terms in advance without knowing their use in different contexts. The language games cannot be learned from the theories and definitions alone but from the various practices of people who use these terms. Since he repudiates the idea of calculus, the philosopher does not proceed by definitions, axioms, or conditions, but with different uses of the words in the language, through different language games. She can provide definitions and conditions, but they are part of the descriptions.

Wittgenstein describes the uses of concepts in his philosophical inquiries, but it does not mean that he accepts any use of concepts uncritically. On the contrary, Wittgenstein highlights many misconceptions and confusions about the use of words. We can see in his critical approach to ordinary uses of the concepts. In *BB*, he states that the philosopher does not only enumerate the different uses of concepts. He is even sympathetic to creating ideal languages to replace some words. He says;

Whenever we make up 'ideal languages' it is not in order to replace our ordinary language by them; but just to remove some trouble caused in someone's mind by thinking that he has got hold of the exact use of a common word. That is also why our method is not merely to enumerate actual usages of words, but rather deliberately to invent new ones, some of them because of their absurd appearance. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p.28)

Moreover, in his early writings, he writes that “distrust of grammar is the first requisite for philosophizing” (Wittgenstein, 1979, p.93). For example, in his private language argument, he rejects a particular grammar of sensation, which has a fair amount of use in the ordinary context. He refuses them on the conceptual grounds. About the grammar of sensations, he says: “we've only rejected the grammar which tends to force itself on us here (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.109e). Again, in §311, he states that the “ordinary” treatment of the concept of private sensations as illusory; “this *private* exhibition is an illusion” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.110e). In other words, philosophers do not accept any uses of the words, they can problematize and inquire about certain misleading forms of expressions.

The philosophers are more like a surveyor, or a cartographer of the conceptual space, showing the “complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.36e). Philosophical surveying in the Wittgensteinian sense is a unique way of conceptual mapping and traveling without a *sub-specie aeternitatis* position. Wittgenstein uses the analogy of the city to illustrate

this feature of the language. He says: “our language can be regarded as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, of houses with extensions from various periods, and all this surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.11e). Language games are like the building and the streets of this city. They are related to each other with rhizomic connections rather than hierarchical ones (Robinson, 2011, p.96). The philosopher is the itinerant figure who surveys language games in the streets of this city (Robinson, 2011, p.27). She enlarges her vision through the motion from the street level, looking at the uses in other language games and families of uses. However, as Robinson states, “the explanations are avoided as a matter of trying to get beyond what we can see at the core of any form of metaphysical escapism” (Robinson, 2011, p.76).

The philosophical surveys “puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. – Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain. For whatever may be hidden is of no interest to us.” He thinks working with the messiness of the grammar is analogous to tidying a room. He says:

In sciences, what you are doing is like building, starting from foundations, which must be firm. In philosophy, as to-day, we are not laying foundations: you are tidying up, & for this you have to touch everything a dozen times. You can't put one thing in its place, till you've put another in. Philosophy like an organism has neither beginning nor end. (Wittgenstein, 2016, p.73)

Wittgenstein's simile of the city for language serves two things. First, the city does not have any natural predetermined limits. Similarly, linguistic topography is incomplete and can expand anywhere (Wittgenstein, 1998, p.6e). Secondly, the city expands horizontally. Also, language does not have a space for a transcendental theory detached from linguistic practice. In *CV*, Wittgenstein states

...if the place I want to get to could only be reached by a ladder, I would give up trying to get there. For the place I really have to get to

is a place I must already be at now. Anything that I might reach by climbing a ladder does not interest me. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 7e)

Surveying or tidying the language games lays the things that “are most obvious and common, and still they are quite hidden, and their discovery is something new” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.136e). “The problems are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar with” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.52e) (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.11e).

To look at the common and evident in a novel way requires further work for the philosophers. I want to describe it as the third moment in Wittgenstein's inquiries in describing the grammar.

Assembling reminders and tidying conceptual space are important parts of grammatical inquiries, but Wittgenstein also emphasizes some creative processes of relating different connections and offering new comparisons for surveying the logic of language games. As Robinson says, Wittgenstein offers, “returning to ordinary practices invites the philosophers to travel around various games, search for ways to escape from the pictures which hold them captive” (Robinson, 2011, p.21). For putting an end to captivity, different pedagogies might be needed. Wittgenstein sees his labor as offering “new comparisons” (Wittgenstein, 1980, p.16). The third moment of Wittgenstein's practice is creating new analogies and connections between language games; the philosopher creates new aspects. New aspects are created to change the perspective of the person in philosophical dialogue. James Tully thinks Wittgenstein's methods suggest a form of public philosophy. In Wittgenstein's inquiries, Tully states:

Participants exchange practical reasons over the contested criteria for the application of concepts in question (sense), the circumstances that warrant the application of the criteria, the range of reference of the concepts and their evaluative force, in order to argue for their solutions and against others (Tully, 2008, p.26).

In those dialogues between the interlocutor and Wittgenstein, Tully continues, “the forms of argumentation in which reasons are exchanged are equally complex, and their 'reasonable' forms too are not everywhere bounded by rules but are also open to reasonable disagreement.” (Tully, 2008, p.28) The parties are supposed to discuss until they reach a point where they confirm their agreements with “yes and no” questions. However, using Wittgenstein's remarks in *Investigations*, Tully thinks that imposing a certain form of dialogue prior to the practice of dialogue is not possible because of the very unbounded character of the dialogue practice. Philosophical activity is a practical dialogue because it is always possible to invoke a reason and redescribe the accepted application of our political concepts. Because of this, Tully states, “it is always necessary to learn to listen to the other side, to learn the conditional arguments that support the various sides, and so to be prepared to enter into deliberations with others on how to negotiate an agreeable solution” (Tully, 2008, p.30). So, any grammatical remark is open for contestation until it is acknowledged. Tully's public philosophy is mainly related to the conceptual debates in politics. However, Wittgenstein's philosophical method can even be extended to a wider range of language use. His interlocutor defends misleading pictures such as solipsism, having a private language, or doubting the existence of other minds. Moreover, in his examples of the encounters between people who have conflicting grammars on the very general facts of nature, such as object permanence or the age of earth, Wittgenstein suggests that only persuasion processes handle such conflicts.

Accordingly, understanding and clarifying concepts are always in the form of practical reasoning, of entering into and clarifying the ongoing exchange of reasons over the uses of our concepts. It will not be the theoretical activity of abstracting from everyday use and making explicit the context-independent rules for the correct use of

our concepts in every case.

When philosophers convey linguistic surveys in public, their activity is not different from the citizens', who participate in various language games. Tully states that the political philosophy is not a theoretical enterprise but “the methodological extension and critical clarification of the already reflective and problematized character of historically situated practices of practical reasoning” (Tully, 2008, p.29). I think same holds for Wittgensteinian philosophical practice. The similarity of the philosopher figure to an itinerant figure is significant because the philosopher cannot be stuck in one perspective of his own constructed language game. Wittgenstein states that “the philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher..” (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.81e). Giving away the requirement of looking at the language from a transcendent subject position enables the philosopher to create multiple perspectives through discourses. The God eye view confined him in his *TLP* in silence, but the street level view of the philosopher as a conceptual cartographer gives the possibility of making grammatical remarks.

In language games, family resemblances can be drawn in different ways. Any conceptual analysis or rule formation is situated and embedded in the speakers' contingent, finite, provisional practices. Language games are intertwined throughout our natural history. By providing family resemblances between words, philosophers help to find our way around the living city. Wittgenstein travels through different language games. He describes the different ways of using words, questions their legitimacy, and draws connections to other uses in different language games. In other words, he recommends various ways to get around the city of language. Wittgenstein uses similes to show how the grammar of the language game works. He provides multiple perspectives created by the similes between different language games. The

multiple perspectives provide seeing different invisible connections from one perspective but clear from the new one.

The meaning of words is understood by appealing to analogies and this can be misleading. Wittgenstein says that “by our method, we try to counteract the misleading effect of certain analogies.” He also adds that “no sharp boundary can be drawn around the cases in which we should say that a man was misled by an analogy” (Wittgenstein, 1998, p.28). Creating aspects works for dissolving these misleading pictures since, for Wittgenstein, the lack of variety of pictures is the problem. He states that “the main cause of philosophical disease – a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.164e)

The similes are essential to point out the logic of a language game, since, in *OC*, he says that the logic of a language game cannot be described. Instead, he suggests looking “at the practice of language, then you will see it” (Wittgenstein, 1972, p.66e). Comparisons cannot directly describe the language game's logic but help us see the logic of language games.

The network of relations, comparisons, and multi-perspectives aims for the aspect change if one is “held captive” in a linguistic picture. Like color-blindness, Wittgenstein thinks that a philosophical problem is not being able to see the logic of the language game from an aspect that makes the problem disappear. He considers the philosophical problems akin to aspect-blindness. He describes the “Aspect-blindness is *akin* to the lack of a 'musical ear'” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.225e). Aspect change is the fourth moment of Wittgenstein's philosophical practice.

The subject who experiences the conceptual perplexity is expected to change his aspect. Wittgenstein describes all these four moments in *Zettel*. We see the

moments in a row; drawing attention, putting this picture before the eye, comparing the picture with a series of pictures, and changing the way of seeing.

I should like you to say: “Yes, it's true, that can be imagined, that may even have happened!” But was I trying to draw *your attention* to the fact that you are able to imagine this? I wanted to put this picture before your eyes, and your *acceptance* of this picture consists in your being inclined to regard a given case differently; that is, to compare it with *this* series of pictures. I have changed your *way of seeing*. (I once read somewhere that a geometrical figure, with the words “Look at this”, serves as a proof for certain Indian mathematicians. This looking too effects an alteration in one's way of seeing.) (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.82e)

The shift from the third moment of creating comparisons to the fourth of aspect change is by the act of acknowledging. The philosophers cannot force subjects to change their aspects. The philosopher “cannot illuminate the matter by fighting against your words, but only by trying to turn your attention away from certain expressions, illustrations, images, and *towards* the *employment* of the words” (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.82e). However, changing the aspect or the acknowledgment is not easy.

Grasping the difficulty in its depth is what is hard. For if you interpret it in a shallow way the difficulty just remains. It has to be pulled out by the root; & that means, you have to start thinking about these things in a new way. The change is as decisive e.g. as that from the alchemical to the chemical way of thinking.--The new way of thinking is what is so hard to establish. (Wittgenstein, 1980,p.55)

He even says that sometimes the subject might need time to gain that new aspect. He states that “we may not *terminate* a disease of thought” It must run its natural course, and *slow* cure is all important” (Wittgenstein, 1970,382).

Changing the aspect is similar to paradigmatic changes. Wittgenstein regards the achievements of Copernicus or Darwin as creating “a fertile new point of view,” “not the discovery of a true theory” (Wittgenstein, 1980, p.26). He thinks his

achievement is similar to theirs, he says: My 'achievement' is very much like a mathematician's, who invents a new calculus (Wittgenstein, 1980, p.57).

Aspect change is related to “The substratum of this experience is the mastery of a technique.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, 219e) As he says the “wild conjectures and explanations” are replaced “by quiet weighing of linguistic facts” (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.80e). Thanks to that change, we learn to play the game. Once the aspect changes

the old problems disappear; indeed it becomes hard to recapture them. For they are embedded in the way we express ourselves; & if we clothe ourselves in a new form of expression, the old problems are discarded along with the old garment (Wittgenstein, 1980, p.55)

The final aim is not to prove the clarity, truth or correctness of one aim to another. As he states, he resists to

“The concept of an ideal exactness thought as it were to be given us a priori. At different times our ideals of exactness are different; & none of them is preeminent” (Wittgenstein, 1980, p.45).

Although he resists such a conception, he confesses that he does “often *give* words exact meanings in the course of our investigation” (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.83e). We can formulate what Wittgenstein states as a) he is not after one and only true description among others, but b) uses the concepts with exact meanings. These two are compatible claims since, in his approach, as he states, he strives “*not* after *exactness*, but after a synoptic view” (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.83e). He uses the synoptic view concept to inquire about “the pedigree of psychological concepts” (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.83e). In other words, we can say he attempts to draw family resemblances between them.

In building a synoptic view, as he states;

there is not one genuine, proper case of such description – the rest just being unclear, awaiting clarification, or simply to be swept aside as rubbish. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.210e)

He also states that philosophical problems

... don't have solutions but resolutions. If one doesn't want to SOLVE philosophical problems – why doesn't one give up dealing with them. For solving them means changing one's point of view, the old way of thinking. And if you don't want that, then you should consider the problems unsolvable. (*LWPP II*, p. 84e) (Hutto, 2003, p.216)

The resolution is untying “knots in our thinking; hence its result must be simple, but philosophizing has to be as complicated as the knots it unties”

(Wittgenstein, 1970, p.81e).

In changing aspects, there is a sense of liberation from such conflicts in the aim of philosophy. Wittgenstein answers the question “what is your aim in philosophy?” as “to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p.110e). Tully also points out this emancipatory function of philosophical inquiry. He thinks of his inquiries as “the cautious experimental modifications of our forms of life” (Tully, 2008, p.82). Indeed, Wittgenstein's rigor to provide new aspects that help us to question the limits which imprison us, which are seen to be the necessary, universal constraints, and try to find the ways, like pulling the door instead of pushing, to transform these constraints into practical, historical, local constraints. In *CV*, he states that “someone is imprisoned in a room if the door is unlocked, opens inwards; but it doesn't occur to him to pull, rather than push against it.” (Wittgenstein, 1980, p.48) The approach toward the ordinary practices is used both for cleaning the misunderstandings about the uses of the words and finding transformative possibilities in the way we think, act, and use the words. Tully states:

as we have seen such standards are internally related to the language games they purport to transcend. Rather, it is a non-transcendental yet transcending critique of the horizons of our practices and forms of thought by means of reciprocal comparison and contrast with other possible ways of being in the world. (Tully, 2008, p.35)

Philosophy conceived in this sense has a character formation effect by changing our attitudes in life. By reflecting on the function and limits of our expression, we can reconsider our engagement with the world, language, and thought as an ethical relation. Philosophy can empower its practitioners not to be easily bewitched by the forms of expressions in language. He states this point as his motto: “Let us not be bewitched” (Wittgenstein, 1970, p.119e). Philosophy gives us the strength to see how language works synoptically.

In this part, I pointed out some possibilities of how practice-based normativity and philosophizing are related. In the next chapter, I will make concluding remarks about Wittgenstein’s critique of the calculus picture of language and describe how the four moments of his philosophizing is present in his critique.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I argued that one of the main concerns of Wittgenstein in his intellectual life is his fight against the calculus picture, which expands and colonizes all fields of thought over others. Looking at language as a calculus creates a dichotomy between the rules and the actual practices. This dichotomy dictates ontological and temporal priority over normative practices. The calculus picture is a product of a craving for generality, transcendental conditions, and ontological infallible explanations. For Wittgenstein, proper philosophical practice works opposite to craving for calculus, challenging the mystification, reification, and sublimation of the rules in language games.

The way he challenged this picture changed at least two times in his works. The first one was in his *Tractatus*. I discussed that his critique does not just focus on logical analysis. Wittgenstein's critique in the *Tractatus* also reflects his understanding of religious, ethical, and aesthetic aspects of the world. The main focus of his critique is to argue that the logic of the world is not expressible; thus, forming a calculus by formalizing rules is non-sense. However, he also argues that formalizing language as calculus is unethical and ugly and limits us from seeing the language and the world as mystical.

In his later works, he realizes that his ideas in the *Tractatus* are also captivated by the calculus picture. He criticizes this picture by creating different aspects. First, Wittgenstein takes our attention to primitive language games. He notices some fundamental misleading assumptions in our picture of linguistic exchange. It is his

first moment of creating conflictual points in philosophizing. Secondly, he lays down the misleading inherent assumptions of this picture. He criticizes the idea that rules sustain correspondence between the world and the language. Then, he shows that meaning is not a product of an inner ostensive definition. He shows us the diversity of linguistic normativity, rejecting the idea that language can be reduced to the act of ostension, or to some “foundations” of general rules. Lastly, he shows the inherent absurdities of thinking that rules are the judgments that inform us about the application of the words by carrying their possibility of applications in advance or that rules causally determine their application by mental acts. He lays down the grammar of this calculus picture which produces absurd results. He sympathizes with the psychological need for having a calculus picture of meaning. In the third moment, he creates new aspects by providing new concepts and different analogies to break with the picture of calculus. He suggests we see it primarily as an activity, a practice. Moreover, rules are the tools that help us to learn about this practice. Recognition of the primacy of the practices dissolves the picture that gives primacy to the rules over the practices.

His critique of linguistic normativity and the loss of logical calculus does not leave the philosophers in a chaotic linguistic space. The philosophers can survey and describe the rules and meaning of words. Similarly, Wittgenstein works to create a perspicuous representation of normativity for the reader to gain a synoptic view of normativity.

At the end of his inquiry, we do not simply have a practical theory of normativity that overcame the calculus picture. The picture resolves and liberates the perplexed subjects by gaining this synoptic view. The liberating fourth moment is quitting the projects like giving a “final solution” to philosophical problems as he

did in the *Tractatus*, explaining the essences of things, reducing the language into logic, or eliminating metaphysics from language.

Wittgenstein's synoptic view of normativity gives us new approaches to philosophical problems. Wittgenstein's new way of philosophizing offers for the transformation of philosophical practice, which works under the scientific and calculus model. His way of philosophizing, with its demand of leaving the world as it is, is not to make the practitioners of philosophy cynical about the philosophical problems for two reasons. First, since there is no predetermined calculus, the philosopher shall recognize a certain primacy of practice over the rules and be attentive to the practice since the grammar itself is shaped within a practice. This way of conceptualizing philosophy saves the philosophers from an armchair philosopher's detached image. Instead, the philosopher becomes a down-to-earth figure and works closely with the discursive practices in different fields. In this view, the role of philosophers is similar to Socrates, who is a public intellectual, wanderer of the city, and offers new aspects to various conceptual problems of his fellow citizens.

Philosophers' thinking move is not in a vertical direction with a ladder to the transcendence in an attempt to understand the logic of the world. However, the logic of a language game can be understood by a horizontal movement of an itinerant philosopher figure on the linguistic topology. This way of philosophizing requires looking at rules, not as entities transcendent to language but they are immanent to practices. Second, philosophers become discursive fighters against the domination of one picture over the other discourses. Philosophers shall fight against mystifications of concepts and bewitchments of language. Philosophy is to help not to confuse the conceptual creations with natural properties of things, the linguistic necessities with natural necessities.

Philosophy aims to change the perspective of people who are captivated by various pictures, and being captive in the calculus view of rules is one major picture that captivates philosophizing.

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