

MORAL AUTONOMY AND MORAL HEALTH IN KANT

SENİYE TİLEV

BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY

2021

MORAL AUTONOMY AND MORAL HEALTH IN KANT

Thesis submitted to the
Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Philosophy

by

Seniye Tilev

Boğaziçi University

2021

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Seniye Tilev, certify that

- I am the sole author of this thesis and that I have fully acknowledged and documented in my thesis all sources of ideas and words, including digital resources, which have been produced or published by another person or institution;
- this thesis contains no material that has been submitted or accepted for a degree or diploma in any other educational institution;
- this is a true copy of the thesis approved by my advisor and thesis committee at Boğaziçi University, including final revisions required by them.

Signature.....

Date 22.06.2021

ABSTRACT

Moral Autonomy and Moral Health in Kant

This study aims to show that Kantian autonomy is not only compatible with but further aims at moral health. To achieve this task, I focus on Kant's account of judging and show that judging provides the continuity from the universal first principles of moral autonomy to its actualization as moral health. I argue that autonomy as the inalienable rational capacity to judge morally, universally and in accordance with due principles makes the core of moral agency. This reading starts from universal, objectively necessary first principles of justice which are justified by our capacity for autonomy and designates comprehensive moral experience which embraces Kant's conception of moral teleology. In framing and talking about such moral health, we can have varying degrees and sorts of justification and communicability regarding our judgments, subjective principles, attachments, convictions, hopes or beliefs. Accordingly, the anticipated continuity from considering autonomy as an inalienable human capacity to be moral, to regard autonomy as the divine in us and the capacity to realize moral teleology depends fundamentally upon this scope of our judging. Therefore, my study proceeds on this axis and elaborates what we can justify to all universally to vindicate objective first principle of morals, and elaborates how upon this basis, we can legitimately, consistently, and rationally judge and believe in the dignity of our moral potential and in the actuality of a moral teleology which complements one's moral health.

ÖZET

Bu çalışma Kant'ın otonomi anlayışının bütüncül, sağlıklı bir ahlak anlayışıyla uyumlu olmaktan öte bunu hedeflediğini göstermeyi amaçlar. Bunu başarmak için Kant'ın yargı yetimize dair görüşlerine odaklanarak, ahlakın otonomluğunun evrensel temel prensiplerinden, otonominin bir ahlak sağlığı olarak gerçekleştirilmesine uzanan devamlılığın muhakeme yetisince başarıldığını gösteriyorum. Otonominin ahlakî, evrensel ve gereken prensiplere uyumla muhakemede bulunmayı mümkün kılan ve terk edemeyeceğimiz rasyonel bir kapasite olarak ahlak özneliğinin özünü oluşturduğunu savunuyorum. Bu okuma otonomi kapasitemizle ispat edebileceğimiz evrensel ve objektif olarak zorunlu olan adaletin temel prensiplerinden başlayıp, Kant'ın ahlakın erekselliği kavramını da kucaklayan kuşatıcı bir ahlak tecrübesine işaret eder. Söz konusu ahlak sağlığına işaret ederken ve ona bir çerçeve çizerken; yargılarımıza, özel prensiplerimize, bağlılıklarımıza, kanaatlerimize, umutlarımıza ve inançlarımıza dair muhtelif derecelerde ve biçimlerde ispatlara ya da iletişim araçlarına sahibizdir. Dolayısıyla, ahlaklı olmaya yönelik terk edemeyeceğimiz insanî bir kapasite olarak otonomiye ele alıştan; otonomiye aynı zamanda içimizdeki ilahî yanımız ve ahlakın erekselliğini gerçekleştiren bir kapasite olarak düşünmeye uzanan devamlılık en temelde yargı kabiliyetimizin kuşatıcılığına dayanır. Bu sebeple, çalışmam bu eksen üzerinde ilerleyerek, herkese evrensel olarak gerekçelendirebileceğimiz ahlakın objektif temel prensiplerini inceledikten sonra, nasıl bu zemin üzerine geçerli, tutarlı ve rasyonel bir biçimde ahlak potansiyelimizin onuruna ve ahlakî sağlığımızı bütünleyen bir ahlak erekselliğine hükmedebileceğimizi izah eder.

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME: Seniye Tilev

DEGREES AWARDED

PhD in Philosophy, 2021, Boğaziçi University

MA in Philosophy, 2014, Boğaziçi University

BA in Comparative Literature, 2004, Istanbul Bilgi University

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Kant's moral philosophy, Kant's aesthetics and philosophy of religion, history of modern philosophy, Sufism

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Project Assistant, Boğaziçi BAP, "Reflective Judgment and Moral Integrity" with Prof. Kenneth Westphal, (project number: 14721), 2018- 2021

Project Assistant, Boğaziçi BAP, "Normative Justification, Natural Law and Kant's Constructivism in Hegel's Moral Philosophy" with Prof. Kenneth Westphal, (project number:13220), 2017-2018

GRANTS AND SCHOLARSHIP

John Templeton Summer School Grant, Innsbruck, 2018

CEU Summer School Scholarship, Budapest, 2016

Bilgi University Graduate Scholarship, 2005-2007

Bilgi University Undergraduate Scholarship, 2000-2004

PUBLICATIONS

Journal Articles

Tilev, S. (2020). "Kant, Felsefe ve Din", *Arkhe-Logos*, 9, 437-449.

Conference Proceedings

Tilev, S. (2021). Kant's Two Conception of Autonomy. Forthcoming, In *13th. International Kant Congress Proceedings*, De Gruyter.

Theses

Tilev, S. (2014). *A Critique of Kantian Morality from Virtue Ethics Perspective*,
Boğaziçi University.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank to my dear advisor Ken Westphal, with all my heart. It has been a privilege to have his guidance and support at every step of my study. He has been a role model for me not only with his working discipline and diligence as an academic, but also with his open-mindedness and attentiveness as a philosopher. His contribution to my academic life extends the limits of this current study and I am ever so grateful that he has been such a wonderful teacher and friend: Thank you so much Ken!

I feel so lucky to have a wonderful committee too, who have been always supportive, encouraging and mind-opening with their comments in this long journey. I would like to thank dear Chryssi Sidiropoulou, who has been a constant source of support and love ever since my very first days in Boğaziçi. It has been a privilege to receive Ayhan Çitil's constructive feedback and to work with him; I am grateful to him for his support and encouragement. Another sincere thanks I owe to Lucas Thorpe, who has been my very first professor with whom I studied Kant, and who is also one of the most supportive professors I have ever known. And Saniye Vatansever: she helped me a lot to improve my study with her very useful feedback, but further than that, she has been a great companion and friend who has pulled me up whenever I felt discouraged. Thank you my dear Saniye!

Life bestowed upon me true friends whom I regard as my siblings, and I have always had the good fortune to consult their bright intelligence and clear conscience whenever I need. I would like to thank them sincerely: Yasemin İvacık, Nimet Karadağ, Gülnur Aslan and Emine Ertuğrul; without you not only this study but my life would lack so much! In this journey I learned a lot from my dear friends with whom philosophizing was an enlightening pleasure. I am ever so grateful to

each of them for our endless discussions. Thank you very much Umut Eldem, Nevim Borçin, Filiz Ağdemir, Merve Tapınç, Fatma Kaya and Elif Şimşek.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my family for their unconditional support and love: My dear sisters Hülya Arıkan and Şeyda Tilev, and my elder brothers (if not by blood, but in heart) Mahmut Arıkan and Radi Ajajı, and to my dear niece Hüma Arıkan (in the name of all my nieces and nephews!); Thank you!

This dissertation was supported by the BAP Commission of Boğaziçi University with two projects for which I am very grateful. (project numbers: 14721 and 13220)

For my beloved parents,
TÜRKÂN TİLEV and METİN TİLEV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2: CENTRALITY OF JUDGING IN KANT’S CRITICAL SYSTEM...	9
CHAPTER 3: AUTONOMY	42
3.1 Kant’s Ontology.....	43
3.2 Kant’s “New” Moral Metaphysics.....	47
3.3 Kant’s Moral Terminology.....	56
CHAPTER 4: JUDGING ABOUT JUSTICE.....	71
CHAPTER 5: JUDGING ABOUT VIRTUE AND SETTING ENDS.....	90
5.1 Introduction.....	90
5.2 What is virtue?.....	91
5.3 Duties of virtue: necessary ends.....	101
5.4 The Duty of Virtue.....	111
5.5 Ethical Community.....	123
5.6 Conclusion on Judging Virtue and Setting Ends.....	134
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION.....	137
REFERENCES.....	145

ABBREVIATIONS

All references to Kant's works are from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, unless stated otherwise. All details of publication are listed in the section entitled References.

A/B	Critique of Pure Reason
G	Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
KprV	Critique of Practical Reason
KU	Critique of Power of Judgment
MS	Metaphysics of Morals
PP	Towards Perpetual Peace
R	Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
RL	Doctrine of Justice
TL	Doctrine of Virtue
TP	Theory and Practice
WE	An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

This study aims to show that Kantian autonomy is compatible with – and even further – aims at moral health. To achieve this task, I focus on Kant's account of judging and show that judging achieves the continuity from the universal first principles of moral autonomy to its actualization as moral health. I argue that autonomy as the inalienable rational capacity to judge morally, universally and in accordance with due principles makes the core of moral agency. This reading starts from universal, objectively necessary first principles of justice which are justified by our capacity to autonomy and aims to embrace comprehensive moral experience which refers to a robust actualization of autonomy, namely to moral health.

Adopting Kant's perspective in morals raises several questions and concerns. One is required to answer these questions to clarify her stance. These questions include: Is Kantian ethics dependent upon an individualistic notion of agency and reasoning? Does Kant's universalism negate the possibility of valuing the given context of culture or singularity? Do we need a necessarily split (even schizophrenic (see: Stocker, 1976)) agent who acts for the sake duty in pain and desperation? If morality is cleared of all its transcendent and ontological baggage, can we still envisage a world other than the one to which we are simply thrown and do our best institutionally and personally not to interfere with one another? Apparently, it is not easy to provide convincing answers to these distinct questions all at once. I consider these questions as addressing certain worries regarding different aspects or layers of moral relations: one's relation to oneself, one's relations to others, one's relation to a

(possible) telos, *Nous* or Divinity, or its lack. In more specific terms, from within Kant's terminology, these worries seem to reflect the core question whether juristic (legal) relations, virtuous disposition and teleological assumptions can be thought consistently and whether they can be derived and justified from the same principles of moral judging. If so, what sort of justification(s) and/or disposition(s), commitments are required? Can we envisage the classical continuity of justice, goodness and beauty (*kalon*) within the uncompromising autonomy of morals Kant defends?

The apparent simplicity of these questions does not lead to simple and direct answers. That is, while answering Kant's moral question "what should I do?", we are also required to keep our fidelity to his answer what we can know, yet without ignoring and debasing the question of what we are allowed to hope for. This is the very approach Kant himself instructs us to understand what makes us human. Therefore, I argue that no matter how critically and cautiously it is involved into moral domain, religious disposition makes an inseparable aspect of moral experience. In this regard, the notion of moral health implies an integrity, a contented moral excellence. It demands an overarching continuity in distinct attachments of moral agency which is manifest in various domains and relations. Even though we talk about various domains, relations, and aspects (juridical, ethical, aesthetic, or religious), we in fact refer to one and the same agent as a "person". This same person is the citizen of a possible republic, a member of an ethical community, a sister, a colleague, and the awestruck beholder at the starry heavens. I contend that none of these aspects is less important for the integrity of moral agency and excellence of moral health because they all have their normative force from the same ground, namely, from our autonomy or the divine in us which we owe to ourselves to align

with. Accordingly, moral excellence is initially about treating justly our own humanity, i.e., dignity and complying with its requirements in all external or interpersonal relations. Through this awareness and perspective, one regards moral ideals, including one's own perfection, establishing a community of virtuous agents and a global system of justice, and ultimately the highest good on earth initially as a duty towards oneself. These ideals become constitutive of moral experience, and one's efforts to approximate them is corroborated by the trust (*fide*) in the divine providence.

Nevertheless, in framing and talking about these different aspects or layers of the moral domain, from universal principles of justice to faith in a moral telos, we can have varying degrees and sorts of justification and communicability regarding our judgments, subjective principles, attachments, convictions, hopes or beliefs. Accordingly, the anticipated continuity from justice to faith, which stands as the paradigm for robust actualization of moral autonomy, depends fundamentally upon this latitude in our judging. Therefore, my study proceeds on this axis and elaborates what we can justify to all universally – to ground objective first principle of morals–, and elaborates how upon this basis, we can legitimately – consistently and rationally– judge and believe in the dignity of our moral potential and in the actuality of a moral teleology that embraces all states of affairs. Therefore, my reconstruction of Kant's view, which is developed on the spontaneity and normativity of judging, proposes a perspective beyond the dichotomies of deontology and teleology, or moral realism and constructivism.

I contend that even though Kantian morals is initially concerned with our moral duties and acquired rights and whether or how they are justified on objective grounds, it always anticipates a moral teleology which involves not only the efficacy

of our morally willing and acting – in terms of its consequences – but also a broader sense of a telos that moral reasoning projects into nature and history to comply with its moral expectations. This critical, Kantian sense of teleology does not depict a Leibnizian, pre-established harmony which fixates our making sense of the universe through a metaphysical, transcendent narrative. Kant’s peculiar understanding of teleology is in a sense concerned with purposive origins¹ rather than being oriented towards a goal external to us. Accordingly, the moral telos I refer to is initially concerned with our own moral potential and its claim to actualize itself. What is prioritized in this moral view of the world, is not an anticipated, determined ideal of a future which regulates our moral attachments, it is rather about the “here and now” of the moral agent who considers – and experiences – her moral responsibility and dignity as the divine in her which substantially shapes her perceiving of reality and her making sense of the universe.

Therefore, a moral telos in Kant’s sense does not function as a consolation for the agent or merely as a future promise worthy of waiting for. In this moral-teleological perspective, morality belongs to the fabric of all things and thus enables one to stand by her duties (of justice and virtue) with a stronger commitment and hopeful resolution. And this is why moral health – which I shall show to be as a form of self-contentment, wellness, and integrity – is complemented by this moral-teleological view that does not detach one’s moral wellness from the moral wellness of her community or whole humanity. As Zuckert (2007) puts it, Kant’s concept of teleology aims “towards an indeterminate future end, and this new form of teleology

¹ See Teufel (2011), “Kant’s Non-Teleological Conception of Purposiveness”, in which Teufel argues for a “backward-looking, etiological conception of purposiveness” in the context of the third *Critique* in particular in relation to a teleological conception of nature. Teufel emphasizes that Kant’s understanding of purposiveness focuses on the origin of something which is defined by some prior concept of it. Nevertheless, this purposive origin does not exclude further purposes of that thing.

characterizes only and specifically human, judging subjects” (Zuckert, 2007, p. 10). Accordingly, in this moral perspective we are not isolated reasoners, but our judging, acting, and working towards moral ends are constituted together with other human agents and moral progress has a decisively collective character. This does not deny the significance of singular, first-person aspect of moral experience which finds its most comprehensive expression in religiously oriented virtuous disposition. On the contrary, as I shall argue these moments of reflection further vindicates one’s overall moral attachments to justice and virtue by provisionally epitomizing the ideal of a moral world. Therefore, my explication aims to cover all these different aspects of moral theory and experience without violating what Kant establishes as the autonomy of morals. Accordingly, I aim to show that moral health is both an activity that requires one to judge consistently, authentically, conscientiously, and critically in all domains (*KU* 5:294), yet also a disposition and attitude that requires responsiveness, openness, and humility.

In Chapter 2, I start my exegesis by arguing for the “Centrality of Judging in Kant’s Critical System”. I argue that according to Kant, judging stands at the very center of all reflective mental activities, deliberations, decisions, beliefs, conduct and attachments. Kant contends that not only in practical philosophy, but in any other domain; the possibility of necessary and universal knowledge is constituted (in part) by *a priori* principles. These principles enable human cognizers to think through concepts, to judge properly and to make true (if fallible) assertions. The consistency and integrity of various sources of knowledge (scientific, historical, or otherwise); and the different aspects of our moral attachments as human agents, from determining judgments about strict duties of justice to the reflective character of trusting in a moral teleology, is achieved by attending to the critical cognitive

boundaries we have. In this connection, I account for Kant's definition of judgment and types of judgments. I emphasize the significance of reflective judging for moral reasoning and agency. I account for the possibility of practical judgment as a type of determining judgment. Finally, I conclude that judging occurs as a unified-single activity over and above different types of judgments, which demands certain qualities for its mastery.

In Chapter 3 on "Autonomy", I elaborate Kant's notion of autonomy which stands as the backbone of his moral philosophy. Analyzing Kantian autonomy relates to questions about his ontology and metaphysics. Therefore, I start with a few remarks about Kantian ontology and argue that Kant's moral theory functions regardless of our interpretations of his ontological views. Second, I briefly discuss Kant's distinctive sense of 'metaphysics' which is concerned with our rational self-discipline and the epistemic limiting conditions to judge properly in the moral domain. These initial remarks about Kantian ontology and moral metaphysics enables me to develop an understanding of autonomy which is based on the spontaneity and constitutive normativity of judging. I argue that the rational, inalienable capacity of autonomy, which all healthy rational humans possess in potential, is vindicated without any further ontological assumptions or moral view of the world. This conception of autonomy suffices to justify universal basic principles of justice and virtue. Nevertheless, I argue that those objectively valid first principles do not suffice to embrace moral experience. In addition to this, autonomy is an organic experience of real moral agents, an ongoing, non-static and irreducible judgmental process of actualizing oneself. This further sense of autonomy provides a subjectively valid paradigm of a divine will for autonomy which invites teleological and value-laden considerations into moral experience.

In Chapter 4 on “Justice” I examine how moral law – its form as categorical imperative, as the synthetic *a priori* canon of moral reasoning –, operates initially as a limiting condition for moral agents not to violate freedom and rights of one another. In this connection I analyze Kant’s various formulations of the categorical imperative and prioritize the formula of universal law over the others. In my analysis, I endorse a “constructivist methodology”. I argue that constructivist methodology vindicates basic principles of justice and virtue universally, and these two aspects of morals make two sides of the same coin. In this chapter I also emphasize that even though Kant does not set any values or necessary ends to ground first principles of morals or their obligatory force, purposiveness of moral reasoning itself demands realizing a system of justice, a civil condition and global peace towards which we all have to work.

In Chapter 5, on “Virtue and Necessary Ends of Morality”, I elaborate Kant’s conception of virtue comprehensively. I argue that even though objectively valid first principles of justice and virtue can be justified by procedural reasoning of categorical imperative, it does not suffice to embrace moral experience, and the necessary ends of morality and purposiveness of moral reasoning demand a legitimate extension. I argue that virtue introduces a more personal or intrapersonal aspect of morals, and it resonates the importance of the collective aspect of moral wellness. Even though Kant considers “virtue” initially as a strength or resistance against inclinations, I argue that duties of virtue and “the duty of being virtuous” gives the guidelines for a morally healthy individual and community. I contend that Kant’s mature views on moral psychology enables us to envisage a moral integrity that can harmonize moral demands and demands of our sensuous nature. The virtuous moral health includes a constant self-reflection, judging authentically and critically about the motives of our

actions, about our actual conducts and about the ends we set for ourselves. I contend that according to Kant true virtuous disposition and effort provide a moral view of the world in which moral efforts are contextualized in a moral telos that enables us to envisage ourselves as instances in the order of all things that is oriented in morality. In that subjectively valid reflective state one considers her autonomy, or moral capacity as the paradigm of the divine to which she should align. Therefore, virtue as the robust actualization of autonomy is the locus of Kant's moral ideals (i.e., moral excellence, ethical community or the highest good on earth) and their attainability.

To conclude, this exegesis of the moral works of the critical corpus aims to demonstrate that Kant's moral theory aspires to or envisages a moral health which is achieved by a robust actualization of autonomy. This moral integrity encompasses the intrapersonal, inter-personal, public, communal, cosmopolitan, historical, and cosmic aspects of moral experience and regulates all these distinct attachments harmoniously by complying with the principles of judging. In all these regards judging, and judging morally, responsibly, and attentively constitutes the paradigm of being an autonomous moral agent. Judging does not only guide actions, conduct our social affairs and interpersonal attachments, but constitutes who we are. Therefore, I contend that judging is not only central to moral agency but also is the key to achieving moral health.

CHAPTER TWO

CENTRALITY OF JUDGING IN KANT'S CRITICAL SYSTEM

In this chapter I analyze the centrality of judging capacity for human agency in Kant's critical philosophy. This is significant to vindicate why chapters of this current study develop by explicating proper and permissible sorts of judging in different domains and aspects of morality. Accordingly, I start with an overview of how, according to Kant, human knowledge is initially about judging properly in conformity with the *a priori* principles of reason itself. Second, I give an account of Kant's definition of judgment and types of judgments. In doing so, I explicate the relevance of reflective judging to empirical cognition and then moral reasoning and agency in general. Third, I give a brief account of the possibility of practical judgment as a type of determining judgment. Finally, I conclude that judging occurs as a unified-single activity over and above different types of judgments, which demands certain qualities for its mastery.

In the "Editor's Introduction" of the first *Critique* for Cambridge (1998), Guyer and Wood state that "judgment is the fundamental form of all cognitive acts will be crucial to the *Critique*" (p.29) as Kant claims that the basic problem of the philosophy is to establish the very possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments. Namely, accordingly to Kant the initial challenge for human cognition in general is to vindicate how we are to know anything beyond "mere analysis of concepts yet also claim universal and necessary validity" (ibid. 29) both in theoretical and practical philosophy. In the first *Critique*, Kant focuses on the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge about nature (i.e., metaphysics of natural science), nevertheless he continues his inquiry in morals again to establish the synthetic *a priori* first

principles of morality (i.e., metaphysics of morals). As Kant puts it; “The former contains all rational principles from mere concepts (hence with the exclusion of mathematics) for the theoretical cognition of all things; the latter, the principles which determine action and omission *a priori* and make them necessary” (*KdrV* A841/B869). Famously, in the third *Critique*, as an unexpected extension in his critical project, Kant also develops new strategies to attribute again some sort of a synthetic *a priori* character to judgments of taste.² Accordingly, the locus of the whole critical project cannot be conceived without synthetic *a priori* judgments and the cognitive faculties and principles that are able to vindicate them. The exposition of these judgments, faculties and principles also shows us what we can legitimately claim to know (either in morals or in theoretical domain), that about which we may rationally have subjective convictions, and what we can communicate universally. Although my concern in this study is about morals and moral health, I must refer briefly to the first *Critique*’s foundational thesis about possibility and boundaries of human cognition in general.

Kant defines his critical project as “*a priori* cognition through concepts”, namely a critique of our reason itself. These *a priori* concepts are based in and acquired through higher faculties of reason. As in the tradition of Baumgarten, Kant considers sensibility and imagination as the lower faculties (*KU*, “Editor’s Introduction”, xxiii), and defines understanding, the power of judgment and reason as the higher faculties of thinking (*KU*, 20:202). Even though Kant designates different words, at different times for this tripartite unity (*KU*: “faculty of thinking”

² Kant writes about this unexpected discovery in his letter to Jena professor Karl Leonhard Reinhold: “I am now at work on the critique of taste, and I have discovered a new sort of *a priori* principles, different from those heretofore observe” (*KU*, “Editor’s Introduction”, xiv). Nevertheless, we shall see below beyond a mere critique of taste, the third *Critique* has a much stronger complementary role for Kant’s critical project both in terms of empirical knowledge and moral concerns (in particular relation to purposiveness in general).

(20:202), “faculties of the soul” (5:196), *KdrV*: “faculties of cognition” (A131/B170), “powers of the mind” or “understanding in general” (A131/B170)), he regards them as “reason” in general, as one of the two sources for our cognitive powers, namely rational and empirical (A835/B863). In the first *Critique* Kant correlates each of these higher faculty with a function. Understanding is the faculty of concepts; the power of judgment is of judgments and reason is the faculty of inferences (A131/B170).

Kant does not change his mind about the functions of these faculties throughout the three *Critiques*³: he considers understanding as the “the faculty for the cognition of the general (of rules)”, the power of judgment as “the faculty for the subsumption of the particular under the general” and reason as “the determination of the particular through the general (for the derivation from principles)” (*KU*, 20:202). Nevertheless, not until the third *Critique* Kant does believe that the power of judgment has its own *a priori* principle. There he claims that as these are the higher faculties of cognition, each of them (understanding, the power of judgment and reason) must have its own *a priori* principle (*KU* 5:345). On that condition alone, namely having its own *a priori* principle, a faculty can have autonomy, namely the constitutive principles of its own domain (*KU* 5:196). While understanding provides such principles for theoretical cognition about nature, (practical) reason provides constitutive principles of the moral domain. In this regard, understanding and reason relate their representations to objects, – either as actual, possible, or necessary

³ Even though the general functions of the faculties are kept the same, I need to mention two things. As I study below, in the context of the moral judgment Kant frequently uses the term “judgment of reason” to highlight immanent determination of the will via practical reason rather than referring to power of the judgment itself. Second, as we shall see in the third *Critique* the subsumptive function of the power of judgment has a reverse order in its reflective use: namely it starts from the given particular and search for a universal. Nevertheless, Kant continues to regard the power of judgment as the faculty of considering the particular under the universal (*KU* 5:179).

objects (i.e., of a good will) –, yet “the power of the judgment is related solely to the subject and does not produce any concepts of objects for itself alone” (*KU* 20:208).

The Critique of the Power of Judgment, by which Kant declares to “bring [his] entire critical enterprise to an end” (5:170), thus introduces the peculiar principle of the judgment which does not constitute cognition for any domain of knowledge. That principle even though it is also an “*a priori* principle for the possibility of nature”, instructs our cognition of nature only with relation to judging subject. Because of that, Kant calls that principle as “heautonomy” (*KU* 5:186, 20:225) unlike the autonomous laws of understanding and reason. Below I say more about the *a priori* principle of the power of judgment in connection with reflective judgment which can briefly be characterized as purposiveness of the nature for the judging subject. It is also important to emphasize that Kant claims the power of judgment to be the intermediary between understanding and reason in his discussion of the faculties of the mind and their functions. In the famous passage referring to the “incalculable gulf” between “the domain of the concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible”, Kant argues that the power of judgment regulates our experience of nature in such a way that it becomes possible to harmonize that two distinct lawfulness. The necessary ends that are imposed by the laws of freedom, at least seem possible to be realized in the domain of nature, because we conceive nature as suitable for our cognitive demands in general via the regulative principle of the power of judgment (*KU* 5:176). In other words, purposiveness of the will, namely our end-setting moral rationality, finds some correspondence in nature through the subjective purposiveness principle of judging that regulates our cognition of nature (see also Pollok, 2017, p. 305). Thus, we can make better sense of why Kant attributes such a complementary role to the third

Critique for his critical project. Nevertheless, that purposiveness of nature is never vindicated by objective assertions about empirical reality itself, yet it stands as a non-dogmatic, but legitimate maxim for the reliable use of our reason (*KU* 5:392).

Kant's concern about neatly differentiating our cognitive faculties, their functions, *a priori* principles and legislative domains make the core of his epistemic topography. So long as we observe the proper use of these capacities and principles, we can successfully assert universally communicable and necessary knowledge claims. In the scope of the first *Critique* Kant's inquiry into the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge embraces an analysis of our overall cognitive capacities including our sensibility. Kant states that general logic "gives only general formal rules of understanding yet does not include the content of a particular object thus cannot give truth by itself" (A60/B85). Therefore, it does not suffice to make merely conceptual analysis by following the rules of logic to have cognition about objects and events. Kant argues that logic thus makes only "canon for judging" whereas it is easily misused "as if it were an organon" in assertions about actual cases. In other words, Kant emphasizes that any knowledge claims about empirical reality is required to relate to some specified objects. On that condition alone, the content of that claim which is a product of a broad mental activity (starting from sensibility, and empirical intuition in the imagination) can be a candidate for truth value.

Kant's develops his exposition of synthetic *a priori* knowledge on the basis of his transcendental idealism. Thus, the first *Critique* advances first with an exposition of transcendental aesthetics – analyzing the *a priori* forms of intuition – and proceeds with transcendental analytic. It is not my concern whether, or how Kant's transcendental idealism works. What matters for my current purpose is that Kant establishes clear cut boundaries regarding the objects we may claim to cognize.

In other words, while Kant claims that his transcendental analytic, which he designates as the “logic of truth” is capable of beyond mere conceptual analysis and “expounds the elements of the pure cognition” (A61/B86), its legitimate use is limited to objects of possible intuition.⁴ Therefore, transcendental logic can be “a canon for the assessment of empirical use” only (A63/B88). Whenever we are tempted to use these *a priori* principles and concepts without limitation “to synthetically judge, assert, and decide about objects in general” (i.e., including those we are unable to intuit spatio-temporally at all), “the use of pure understanding” would be dialectical (A63/B88). Thus, understanding has its true use only for empirical objects (B303) and in the domain of nature which Kant designates as “appearances/phenomena”, i.e., nature as it is lawfully constituted by and through our cognitive capacities and limitations in our experience, rather than the totality of things in themselves (see A126, A302/B359).

Kant asserts that reason operates over the cognitions of the understanding, and as the faculty of inferences and syllogisms; “it links judgments constituted with concepts of the understanding into more complex, inferential structures” (*KdrV*, “Editor’s Introduction”, p. 40-41). In the second part of the transcendental analytic, namely “Dialectic”, Kant investigates pure concepts of reason, beyond merely “formal” or contentless use of it as in the case of traditional logic. Thus, he states that reason is “the faculty of principles” (A299/B356) which systematizes cognitions of the understanding. Kant claims that likewise we analyze judgments to reach the pure concepts of understanding, we must analyze the functions of syllogisms to reach the

⁴ For my current concerns, with respect to Kant’s thesis of transcendental idealism, it suffices to stick with its spatio-temporally characterized understanding of possible experience, since this makes the initial condition for any humanly possible cognition: “The conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and on this account have objective validity in a synthetic judgment *a priori*” (A158).

ideas of pure reason (see A69/B94, A70/B95). He asserts that the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive divisions of syllogisms contain the three ideas of reason which refer to the ideas of a complete subject, the complete series of conditions, and the determination of all concepts in the idea of a complete sum of the possible. (*Prolegomena* §40, 4:328).

Kant states that with respect to these ideas too reason is required to be used properly. In this regard, reason should limit its speculative use and should make legitimate inferences with reference to possible experience – though “it never applies directly to experience or to any object, but rather ... to the understanding's manifold cognitions” (A302/B359, see also A307/B363) –, to avoid “dogmatic illusions” (A794/B822). More explicitly, reason should abstain from attributing objective reality to the ideas that it arrives in the sum of its reasonings. These transcendental ideas or “pure concepts of reason” nevertheless “determine the use of the understanding according to principles in the whole of an entire experience” (B378/A321), only in terms of its “regulative unity” and operates merely as regulative principles of reason in its theoretical use (see A642/B670-A704/B732, § “On the regulative use of the ideas of pure reason”). Nevertheless, reason has its canon (i.e., “the sum total of the *a priori* principles of the correct use of certain cognitive faculties” (A796/B824) for synthetic *a priori* cognition) in its practical use.⁵ Accordingly, Kant transfers legitimate use of the ideas of pure reason (immortal soul, freedom, and God) to practical domain. That is, Kant expresses the humility proper for human cognitive capacities stating that rather than a limitless expansion towards truth, philosophy is to serve as a “discipline” to determine the boundaries we are to comply with in our knowledge claims (A795/823).

⁵ See the *Groundwork*, 4:424 for “*Canon der moralischen Beurtheilung*” i.e., “canon for moral judging” also *TP*, 8:277 for “canon of reason (in the practical)”.

In the context of the first *Critique* Kant considers the power of judgment and understanding almost in unison. Both have their objectively valid canon (i.e., synthetic *a priori* capacity) in the analytic part of the transcendental logic (B171/A132), although at times he designates transcendental analytic solely as the canon of the pure understanding (A796/B824). While Kant explicates the faculty of understanding itself, and its pure concepts in the first book of the “Analytic” (reserved for the concepts) (A66/B91), he develops “the analytic of principles” in the second book which is “solely a canon for the power of judgment that teaches it to apply to appearances the concepts of the understanding”. Accordingly, in the first *Critique* Kant elaborates the determining use of the power of judgment that functions in accordance with the pure concepts and principles of the understanding which he addresses as the “doctrine of the power of judgment” (A132/B171). Accordingly, the power of judgment, though without an *a priori* principle of its own, makes the backbone of all our cognitive acts. Both understanding and reason (which can be considered as the “faculty of complex judgments” (*KdrV* “Editor’s Introduction”, p. 29) conduct their conceptual activities via judgmental structures. Kant defines human cognition as discursive (rather than intuitive) which is possible only through the mediation of concepts. Sensible intuitions thus “make sense” for us only through various classifications of our cognitive faculties, including imagination, and ultimately via the concepts “grounded on the spontaneity of thinking”. The ultimate outcome of this spontaneous cognitive activity is then judgment (A68/B93).

Therefore, not surprisingly Kant states:

All judgments are accordingly functions of unity among our representations, since instead of an immediate representation a higher one, which comprehends this and other representations under itself, is used for the cognition of the object, and many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one. We can, however, trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the understanding in general can be represented as

a faculty for judging. For according to what has been said above it is a faculty for thinking. Thinking is cognition through concepts. (A69/B94)

Kant comes to equate understanding with thinking and judging as our spontaneous mental acts, “in contrast to the receptivity of the sensibility” (A126). In that cognitive topography, the power of judgment as “the faculty of subsuming under rules” (A132/B171) (those given by the understanding) produces the smallest units of our “knowledge claims” through which we can affirm or deny certain ascriptions or relations. Pollok in his very neat exegesis of Kant’s critical epistemology, *Kant’s Theory of Normativity*, emphasizes how the “focus of normativity” shifts “from the reality of ideas to the validity of judgments” in Kant’s thought (2017, 200, p. 209). In line with my current analysis, Pollok asserts that our thinking becomes meaningful only in judgments, and concepts can gain “epistemic value” (2017, p. 62). The following quotation summarizes well the key thesis of Pollok’s book:

On the interpretation presented here, the cardinal insight of the critical turn is the following: *Kant realized that it is not ideas but relations of ideas that are subject to norms*. It is only judgments that can be true or false, and it is only a set of synthetic principles a priori that make explicit our judgments’ objectivity. Synthetic judgments a priori serve as the laws in light of which the validity of all sorts of judgments – cognitive, practical, and aesthetic – can be assessed. (Pollok, 2017, p. 56)

Another significant point Pollok emphasizes is that making a judgment not only incorporates our reasoning into a public space of reason – i.e., makes it “normatively relevant” –, this also makes it accessible and intelligible for all other reasoners like us (2017, p. 65). Kant’s critique of our cognitive faculties vindicates the “fundamentally intersubjective” character of normativity, since all humans’ cognition is constituted by the same *a priori* concepts, principles, and sub-personal functions. The proper use of these concepts and capacities are to be governed by again what Kant designates as “the principles of judgments”, which I discuss below. In sum, Pollok claims that judgments “give the space of reason its democratic

structure” (2017, p. 68). In other words, so long as we achieve to reason, i.e., judge in conformity with the principles of reason itself in any territory of human experience, we are involved in the normative space, whether we agree or disagree about the content of our reflections.⁶ Our knowledge claims thus are made by assertions about the truth value of our cognitions which are communicable to other reasoners via judgments (see also Makkreel, 2015, p. 87). Therefore, judging and the way we judge, i.e., whether in compliance with the principles of judgment, as I analyze below, makes the archetype of proper or improper use of our reason.

So far, I gave a very brief account of Kant’s critical epistemology emphasizing how judging and judgmental structures make the core of all our reflective mental activities. As stated, in the first *Critique*, Kant considers our judgments about empirical reality as the functions that order and unify our representations of the objects which make unified knowledge possible (A69/B94). In this regard, judgments subsume the given particulars under the concepts and provide the “objective unity of apperception” (B141). Very briefly, this means that this sense of judgment specifies the cognition of the objects constitutively by the rules and concepts which are given by the understanding itself for any cognizant human being and at any time.⁷

Later in the third *Critique* Kant defines this type of judgment as determining judgments.⁸ Namely, in determining judgments we start from the given universal and

⁶ Pollok asserts: “In all relevant aspects of Kant’s metaphysics it is not the content but the form of our claims, i.e., their possible conformity to laws, that makes them normative” (2017, p. 141).

⁷ Empirical cognition and objective validity of it also requires critical assessment and use of our cognitive skills which is not my basic concern in this study. For a detailed and concise exegesis see Westphal (2020), *Kant’s Critical Epistemology, Why Epistemology Must Consider Judgment First*, in particular: PART II, “Kant’s Critical Epistemology”.

⁸ Cambridge UP (2002) translators of the third *Critique* translate “*bestimmend*” as “determining” and “*reflectirend*” as “reflecting”. They translate the verb “*beurteilen*” as “to judge” (rather than “to estimate” or “to appraise”) as it’s the transitive form of the verb “*urteilen*”. They prefer “the judging” for the noun (gerund) form of it, i.e., “*Beurteilung*”. All these preferences successfully “keep[s] the sense of activity that is present in Kant’s terms” (pp. xlvii-xlviii). For the same reasons, I

subsume the particular under it. Here, Kant introduces a new type of judgment: in the reflective use of the power of judgment we search for a universal to subsume the particular we encounter under it (*KU* 5:179). The determining use of the power of judgment is performed by the “objective principles of reason” whereas the latter use is conducted by the subjective principles of reflection (*KU* 20:218).⁹ In the unpublished first “Introduction” Kant also defines determining judgments as “cognitive judgments” which indeed helps to differentiate two distinct uses of the judging faculty (see *KU* 20:221, 223).¹⁰ In reflective judgment we do not expand our knowledge about the empirical constitution of the object, yet we relate it to our subjective experience. In other words, we regard it in a new relationality to enrich and systematize our experience of nature in general by devising or identifying a suitable concept for the particular(s).

Reflective use of judgment guides our experience in *a priori* sense which implies universality and necessity in Kant’s terminology. Therefore, it must have its own *a priori* principle to establish its synthetic *a priori* character. Kant states that the *a priori* principle of the reflective judging is “the principle of the purposiveness of nature” which is a transcendental principle “and contains nothing empirical” (*KU* 5:181). Based on a transcendental principle, reflecting on nature in regard to its purposiveness is then claimed to be a universal principle “for everyone who judges at all”, not valid only for some particular subjects, with a particular intentionality (*KU* 5:190). Nonetheless, unlike the constitutive or determining principles of the domains of nature and morals, the *a priori* belonging to the power of judgment itself “is

also mostly prefer the gerund form and adverbial forms of the words in the relevant terminology, e.g., “judging”.

⁹ So long as there are not any substantial disagreements between the first and the published introductions of the third *Critique*, I refer them without mentioning the version.

¹⁰ Even though in the published “Introduction” Kant does not use this designation, he uses it in the following sections, e.g., see *KU* 5:203.

neither a cognitive principle for the understanding nor a practical principle for the will” (*KU* 5:192, see also *KU* 5:385). Kant divides the third *Critique* into two parts of “Aesthetic” and “Teleological Judgment”, claiming each as a subset of reflective judgment in general. The question of how exactly each one of these two types of judgments can be tied to the same *a priori* principle of purposiveness leads to various interpretations and debates in the literature (e.g., see Zuckert, 2007; Allison, 2001). Nevertheless, roughly it can be summarized as follows: The basic function which Kant attributes to reflective use of judging is the following: “it is supposed to ground the unity of all empirical principles under equally empirical but higher principles and is thus ground the possibility of the systematic subordination of empirical principles under one another” (*KU* 5:180). Kant asserts that the principle of the power of judgment in general regards the “form of things in nature under empirical law” (*KU* 5:180). In accordance with this principle, in our cognition of nature, we consider nature as if purposive and suitable for our cognitive demands. Upon the basis of purposiveness principle, we can regard nature as if an understanding made it into such a systematic unity that in all its diversity and multiplicity there seems to be an underlying end. For this reason, Kant names the principle of the purposiveness also as “the law of the specification of nature” which regulates the limitless empirical laws in our research for a schema of empirical knowledge (*KU* 5:186).

Kant states that in aesthetic representation of the purposiveness, the representation of the of object is “immediately connected with the feeling of pleasure” even prior to the cognition of the object (*KU* 5:189). That is, the aesthetic judgment is characterized by the subjective or formal purposiveness, as it ties the form of the representation of the object with the subjective state (feeling of pleasure) of the agent. On the other hand, teleological judgment is characterized by objective

or real purposiveness, since in the cognition of the object it considers “the cause of the form as also end of that object” (*KU* 5:192, 193). In other words, in judging nature teleologically, purposiveness is judged to be found in the object itself, so that it is considered as a “natural end” (*KU* 20:221, see also *KU* 20:232). Surprisingly, in a single passage of the first Introduction Kant designates teleological judgment as “a cognitive judgment, but still belonging only to the reflecting, not to the determining power of judgment” (*KU* 20:221). Neither in the published “Introduction” nor in the main body of the text Kant repeats this designation which apparently contradicts his frequent equation of determining judgment with the cognitive one.

Even though Kant suggests that both aesthetic and teleological judgments are grounded in the same *a priori* principle of reflective judgment, aesthetic judgment seems to have a more independent and autonomous character. In several passages Kant implies that aesthetic judgment is “grounded in special principles of the power of judgment” (*KU* 5:194, 20:224; see also Pollok, 2017, p. 282). In other words, “of the two kinds of use of the reflecting power of judgment (the aesthetic and the teleological) that only the judgment which precedes all concepts of the object, hence the aesthetic reflecting judgment, has its determining ground in the power of judgment, unmixed with any other faculty of cognition” (*KU* 20:243).¹¹ Kant argues that we can never find any *a priori* ground “why there must be objective ends of nature” (*KU* 5:193), because of this teleological reasoning operates in accordance with the concepts of understanding and reason. Unlike this, aesthetic power of judgment substantiates its subjective necessity and universality for itself.¹² This

¹¹ In *KU* 20:244 also, Kant describes aesthetic judgment as “a judgment of *mere* reflection grounded on a principle *a priori*, i.e., a judgment of taste” requiring “*its own* transcendental principles to claim universality and necessity without presupposing a concept of its object”. [emphasis added]

¹² “In teleological purposiveness of things, as ends of nature, reason and understanding is related to one another” (*KU* 20:233).

might explain in part the above-mentioned discrepancy that in the unpublished first “Introduction” Kant considered teleological judgments as a cognitive yet reflecting type of judgment.

Kant elaborates in detail in the “Analytic of Aesthetic Power of Judgment” that there is no determinate concept underlying judgments of taste, but they are grounded in the affective state of the cognizing subject. Accordingly, aesthetic experience gains a privileged status for bridging our sensible and rational nature. Kant also divides aesthetic judgment into two sections of “Beautiful” and “Sublime”. Though he asserts their different characters in due sections, both operates without a determinate concept of the object, unlike morally good or agreeable (*KU* 5:266). While in some passages Kant assumes “the supersensible substratum of humanity” as the indeterminate concept underlying judgment of taste (i.e., beautiful) (*KU* 5:340), he considers the universality of sublime to be established by the moral feeling which we are to presuppose for everyone (*KU* 5:265). Despite their singular, first-person characters, both claim subjective universality as “the beautiful seems to be taken as the presentation of an indeterminate concept of the understanding” and “the sublime as that of a similar concept of reason” (*KU* 5:244).

Now let me highlight a few central issues with respect to teleological judgment very briefly before I explicate what sort of a role or function reflecting judging plays in our cognition and experience in general. Kant states that via the objective principle of purposiveness we conceive nature technically – as if it were an artifact – (*KU* 20:249, 251). Unlike the causality we observe in mechanical explanations, teleological judging conceives a reciprocal causality in the organization of nature (*KU* 5:376). That is, considering nature in accordance with a concept of reason, i.e., an end, its products are thought “as both cause and at the same time as

effect in that ordering” (*KU* 5:372). Nevertheless, Kant warns that such a causality in which “nothing is in vain or by blind mechanism” is not identical with any causality we happen to know. Namely, the analogy with art also holds only in a very limited sense because we cannot refer to any distinct agency or intentionality behind this “self-organizing” unity of nature (*KU* 5:374). Even though this purposiveness of nature with respect to its products is again merely subjective (i.e., imposed by the expectations of the cognizant subject upon her cognition) and regulative (not constitutive); Kant claims it to be “as necessarily valid for our human power of judgment as if it were an objective principle” (*KU* 5:404). This is because, he argues, without this “heuristic principle for researching particular laws of nature” (*KU* 5:411) which we necessarily presuppose, we would not discover any universal connection of empirical laws beyond mere aggregate of particular ones, in which case nature would be chaotic for us (*KU* 20:205, 209, 217, 5:414, 418, 426; see also Zuckert, 2007, p. 368). In sum, both uses of reflective power of judging, i.e., aesthetic and teleology, are based on the *a priori* principle which permits us to presuppose that we can discover necessity and universality within nature and in the connections amongst its causal laws and natural kinds. Nevertheless, this presupposition conducts only in a subjective and regulative sense.

Kant attributes various roles and functions to the reflective use of the power of judgment (Ginsborg, 2019) and not surprisingly there is a vast variation of interpretations of these roles and functions in the secondary literature. Those interpretations mostly focus on how reflective judging plays an indispensable function in empirical knowledge, or even in the very possibility of empirical cognition itself, and scientific enquiry. Providing an overview of these interpretations is significant to show that according to Kant, human knowledge and experience is

possible only in a holistic unity of all types of judging and rational principles. Nevertheless, my main concern for this study is to vindicate the significance of reflective judging in moral experience. Therefore, after I summarize the role of reflective judgment in empirical cognition very briefly, I consider its relevance to moral agency. Then, I focus on what it means to consider “moral judgment” as a type of determining judgment. Finally, I argue that judging is the spontaneity of practical agency, which is an authentic performance or act by the agent herself that stands above any compartmentalized analysis of judgments.

Though there are certain dissimilarities between the two, Kant’s account of the reflective use of the power of judgment reminds the reader the regulative principles of pure reason of the first *Critique* (for a detailed analysis see Guyer 1990; also, Pollok, 2017, p. 110) as both serve the architectonic unity of reason (see *KdrV* A786/B814, A797/B826, A800/B828, A832/B861, A833/B862). Nevertheless, being based on an *a priori*, transcendental principle, it is important to admit that reflective judgments, especially aesthetic judgments, play a far more central role in Kant’s theory of empirical cognition beyond *merely* regulating human experience of nature. Ginsborg summarizes it as follows:

In addition to being responsible for aesthetic judgments, and to supplying the concept of purposiveness which is required for teleological judgments, reflecting judgment seems to be ascribed the following cognitive tasks: the classification of natural things into a hierarchy of genera and species; the construction of explanatory scientific theories in which more specific natural laws are represented as falling under higher and more general laws; the representation of nature as empirically lawlike *überhaupt*; and the formation of empirical concepts *überhaupt*. (Ginsborg, 2019)

Ginsborg emphasizes that “the standard conception of reflective judgment” focusing on its systematic guidance for natural science is “too narrow” and suggests that it should be considered to partake in subsuming “particular objects under empirical concepts” (Ginsborg, 2015, p. 186). Most interpreters also agree that reflective judgment plays a substantial role in

the very formation of the empirical concepts (see Guyer, 2006a, pp. 112-113; Longuenesse, 1998, pp. 163-165; Zuckert, 2007, pp. 13-14, 45-48, 66; Allison, 2001, p. 36). Nevertheless, Makkreel objects to reducing reflective judgment in to a mere “mode of concept formation” (2002, p. 214). He argues that reflective judgment as a “coordinating mode of thought” achieves a task far beyond “reflection” which Kant defines as “the power to compare a representation either with other representations or with our own cognitive powers” (Makkreel, 2006, p. 223, p. 232). Makkreel considers that Longuenesse mistakenly regards reflective judgment as a failed determinant judgment, since she equates reflection (*Reflexion*) that is involved in the comparison of the concepts which is essential to any judgment, with the reflective (*reflektierende*) form of judging itself (Makkreel, 2006, p. 224)¹³. He claims that the reflection relevant to concept formation is a discursive task of the understanding, whereas reflective judgment as “a mode of inference relates to the more comprehensive aims of reason” (Makkreel, 2006, p. 225). Makkreel (2006) rightly asserts that “the fact that reflective and determinant judgments can at times intersect does not mean that their functions merge” (p. 244). He argues that in addition to being a precondition for determinant ones, reflective judgment also “provides a more general framework for the more delimited claims of determinant judgment” (Makkreel, 2006, p. 244).

Let me now focus on my central concern, namely the relevance of reflective judging to moral judgment and agency in general. There are several ways in which aesthetics and morality are connected in the third *Critique*, whereas here I focus on reflective form of

¹³ In another text Makkreel states:

Reflection (*Überlegung, Reflexion*) is the simple comparative procedure of noting commonalities among particulars, which in Kant’s view even animals are capable of performing. It can be added that for human beings such comparative reflection is also one of the conditions for empirical concept formation.

While reflection can contribute to the conceptual order of empirical apprehension, reflective (*reflektierendes*) thought goes further in aiming at interpretive comprehension of experience in general (Makkreel, 2015, p. 165).

judgment in general, without explicating issues about aesthetics and morals in that connection.

To start with, it is important to emphasize that reflecting judging is a peculiarly human form of judging; it is based on the cognitive and affective constitutions of agency peculiar to humans, for instance, unlike the moral laws which are binding for all rational beings *per se*. It is also the only synthetic *a priori* type of principle which does not exclude our affective states categorically in its operation. Furthermore, “the power of judgment makes a transition from the “sensible substratum” to the “intelligible substratum” and connects them through its own special principle” (*KU* 20:246). Accordingly, in its principle it connects not only our rational and nonrational natures to one another; but provides a model of how the supersensible and the sensible in general can be conceived in harmony. As Makkreel (2015, p. 59) puts it: “Reflective judgments about aesthetic harmony and teleological order thus distinguish themselves by appealing not only to the intellect, but also to feeling and purposive interests of will”. Namely, it treats agency as a unified whole caring to substantiate its expectations, cognitive or otherwise, in its inquiries. It conducts its reflections from a perspective which is peculiarly human-centered. Therefore, it necessarily and implicitly relates whatever it judges to the human condition, as a rational and affective this-worldly being.

Second, Kant relates reflecting judging to conscience. In *The Doctrine of Virtue*, he states that reasoning about whether something holds as a duty for us is an “objective judgment” about which we may err (*MS* 6:402), and it “belongs to practical understanding” (*MS* 6:438).¹⁴ Nevertheless, he ties “the internal imputation of a deed” to the faculty of judgment. Thus, in judging whether we really did the right thing, and through the right

¹⁴ Here Kant uses an uncommon phrase for his terminology, i.e., “practical understanding”. I surmise that he wishes to emphasize the rule giving character of understanding which is also operative in the so-called (semi-) schematization involved in the typic of determining moral judgments (see discussion below of Kant’s “Typic”).

motivation (i.e., respect for the moral law); the principle we consult is a “subjective principle”. Accordingly, that subjective principle given by the power of judgment should be its own *a priori* principle, in its reflective use. In sum, that inner trial which takes place in the court of conscience seems to be carried out in a reflective form directed to one’s self-assessment, even though the verdict is ultimately given by reason (as always is the case with moral judgment in general).¹⁵

Third, although Kant includes virtue as part of the doctrine of morals, which is derived from the same *a priori* principles of morals with justice; their applications differ (for a detailed discussion of virtue see Chapter 5). Judging about duties of virtue always involves a latitude in its application. Unlike the doctrine of right, ethics may require ever new judgments, and ask for new principles to be able to specify what is morally most advisable. In this respect it may even fall into casuistries “which has no place in the doctrine of right” (*MS* 6:411). Makkreel argues that this latitude and the effort to find new principles can be embraced by the reflective use of judgment (2002, p. 216). Thus, he concludes that Kant’s duties of virtue “are never determinate, but reflective” (2002, p. 217). While a strict duty involves legislative determination, a wide duty of virtue “leaves it for us to decide what is appropriate, by means of reflective interpretation” (Makkreel, 2015, p. 76).

Reflecting judging is also tied to the assessment of moral worth by several interpreters. For instance, Longuenesse (2005) in a footnote of her “Moral Judgment as a Judgment of Reason” states:

Kant does not make use of this distinction when he speaks of moral judgment, but it seems illuminating to me in respectively characterizing the (determining) application of the moral law in deciding to act, and the (reflecting) evaluation of a given action, that is, the search for the rule under which it was performed. Of course, “determining” and “reflecting” have a distinctively practical meaning here. (p. 237)

¹⁵ For a detailed analysis of the relation between conscience and reflective judgment in Kant; see Eldem (2020) “Kant’s Conception of Conscience”.

She considers that when we assess on which motivation a given (past) action was done, we try to find the universal (i.e., morally good or bad) it can be subsumed under. In the same lines, Makkreel also argues that to judge about the moral worth, we refer to “either a regulative use of ideas or reflection” (2002, p. 212).

Nevertheless, he proposes a totally different connection for his interpretation. He states that it is characteristic of reflective judgment to start from the given particulars and move towards the universal; likewise, “in judging the moral worth of a person we also proceed from particular deeds to his/her overall character or *Denkungsart*” (Makkreel 2002, p. 212; see also, Makkreel 2002, pp. 213, 218; 2015, p. 142).

Nevertheless, Makkreel observes the delicacies of Kantian humility with respect to moral worth and its unfathomable nature, and he asserts that for this very reason it can be at most a merely reflective assessment, i.e., we cannot claim to know anything sufficiently definite about it.

In one passage from the unpublished Introduction of the third *Critique*, Kant explicitly states that: “The reflecting power of judgment is that which is also called the faculty of judging (*facultas diiudicandi*)” (KU 20:211). In the light of what has been argued so far in relation to reflective judging and its various tasks and significance in general, this passage seems to epitomize the fact that reflective form of reasoning is indeed the ultimate and most comprehensive form of judging that it is associated with the very faculty itself. Reflective form of judging relates to such multiple aspects of human existence that its practice covers an extensive territory, and it is involved in principle in all critical, rational judging. “Beyond the standard reading of the world” via its interpretive character, reflective judging orients our experience in sociohistorical reality (Makkreel, 2015, p. 60). Makkreel (2006) considers that “as part of a more general process of orientation to the world at large,

reflective coordination allows for a differentiation of modes of intelligibility” (p. 232). He characterizes these modes with regional distinctions Kant specifies as field (*Feld*), territory (*Boden*), domain (*Gebiet*), and abode (*Aufenthalt*) (or habitat) (Makkreel, 2006, p. 228; see also Makrreel, 2013, p. 149). These distinctions designate the possible, the actual, the necessary, and the contingent modes of intelligibility respectively. They also stand for the “judgmental contexts” embracing our overall cognition and experience. In his reading, reflective judgment plays a transitive function among these contexts in interpreting our experience. It enables us to consider “the available context of the particular given” in relation “to other possible contexts” (Makrreel, 2015, pp. 114, 65). Accordingly, reflective judgment “suggests a reflective topology” (Makrreel, 2015, p. 63) without abstracting its inferences from the actual “life situation of the” individual (Makrreel, 2015, p. 115) and it serves the maturity of human sciences. Makkreel concludes that applied not only to nature but also to history of human culture in teleological terms, “reflective judgment can be developed to provide guidelines for all modes of hermeneutical inquiry into human life” (Makrreel, 2002, p. 215).

Considering the significant connections Kant develops in the third *Critique* (e.g., between beauty and morality, and purposiveness of morality and of nature and history) I contend that Makkreel’s emphasis on reflective judging’s centrality to human condition as a social and cultural being is very convincing. In reflective judgment we do not merely order and classify our objects of experience to systematize our empirical cognition. Neither the pleasure relevant to aesthetic experience nor its vitality for human experience can be explained merely by the fulfillment of our cognitive expectations. What is peculiar about reflective judgment is that, in this mode of judging we do not judge merely about things as distinct to us. On the contrary, we implicitly involve “ourselves” (as an affective and

historical being) into whatever we judge. In other words, in this mode of judging we embrace our overall worldly existence without compartmentalization into distinct domains of knowledge. Namely, in reflective judging, we consider and experience everything in a holistic relationality which enables us to judge about meta questions fundamental to human life.

As discussed above, we readily associate constitutive principles with determinate judgments and regulative principles with reflective principles. Nonetheless, as Pollok (2017) states: “. . . while it is true that most regulative principles relate to the reflecting power of judgment, there are in fact reflective judgments that are guided by some constitutive principles, as well as determining judgments guided by some regulative principles” (p. 107). This is very significant to emphasize because even though Kant provides us distinct doctrines for nature, justice, and virtue; the application or practice of these doctrines cannot be embraced only through determining types of judgments. Even though the first principles of these domains are constituted by synthetic *a priori* cognitions, those principles are instantiated through a process of reasoning which unifies types of judgments to provide a coherent and valid assessment of all relevant particulars, evidence, events, persons, and aspects. In other words, we cannot dissect our reasoning, i.e., judging to specify clear-cut boundaries between the types of judgments involved in it. Nevertheless, as stated above, only through determinate judgments can we claim to know something (theoretically) either in theoretical or practical domain and can provide reasons (or proofs) for others to agree with us. This is the core of Kant’s critical philosophy and in particular moral philosophy. I explicate how the synthetic *a priori* ground is operative (Chapter 3) in the doctrine of justice (Chapter 4) and virtue (Chapter 5) in the following chapters. First, I must address another challenge

for Kant's moral theory. Namely, even though I argue that judging is an organic and authentic first-person act in which types of judgment are involved in unison; it is still necessary to show how determining or cognitive judging is possible in morals. Only after I establish this point, I can consolidate further the centrality of judging in agency.

To vindicate the possibility and validity of determining judgments about empirical reality, Kant spills hundreds of pages of ink in the first *Critique*. Nevertheless, for the exposition of the same task in the moral domain, he spares only a few pages in the second *Critique*. Accordingly, in this section I give an account of "typic of pure practical judgment" (a very short section of the second *Critique*) to take a closer look at moral judgment.

In the *Groundwork* Kant states that "though capable of the idea of a practical pure reason, [the human being] is not so easily able to make it effective *in concreto* in the conduct of his life" (G 4:389). On the other hand, Kant constantly claims that likewise the constitutive laws of understanding for nature, "the principles of pure reason have objective reality in their practical use, that is, in the moral use" (A808/B836). Accordingly, it is required to explicate how these objectively valid moral principles can be concretized in our conduct of life. Kant seems to give us very little to theorize how the laws of "what ought to be" are instantiated in moral domain, unlike his vast inquiry on "the laws of what is" (A840/B868). In the beginning of the second *Critique*, he states: "Here the law of causality from freedom, that is, some pure practical rational principle, constitutes the unavoidable beginning and determines the objects to which alone it can be referred" (*KprV* 5:15). Namely, reversing the exposition of the determinant judging of the first *Critique*, here Kant

starts from the constitutive principles themselves to subsume (morally) necessary objects, i.e., morally good/right actions, aims or objectives, under them.

In *KprV* 5:78 Kant asserts that “the moral law determines the will objectively and immediately in the judgment of reason”.¹⁶ In *KprV* 5:68 he also uses the phrase “the judgment of pure practical reason” (“*Urteilstkraft der reinen praktischen Vernunft*”) and in *KprV* 5:61 “the appraisal of our practical reason” (“*Beurteilung unserer praktischen Vernunft*”) (see also *KprV* 5:93). In these passages Kant treats practical reason itself as the judging faculty. Not only in this context but in his later works also Kant uses the phrase “judgment of reason” or its variants (see *PP* 8:369; *MM* 6:378, 6:442, 6:489; A822/B850 (“judging from pure reason”)).¹⁷ I contend that this stems from the immediate determining of moral judging Kant characterizes in the “typic”. In other words, as I indicate below, we lack a detailed account of any schematizations achieved by our cognitive faculties in moral judging. For this reason, Kant seems to tie moral judging to practical reason itself directly, which he designates in distinct places as pure practical reason, moral law, good will, or the paradigm of a divine will in us (see Chapter 3).

Let me begin with quoting the long paragraph in the beginning of the “Typic” section which successfully encapsulates the core difficulty relevant to moral judgment:

Now, whether an action possible for us in sensibility is or is not a case that stands under the rule requires practical judgment, by which what is said in the rule universally (*in abstracto*) is applied to an action *in concreto*. But a practical rule of pure reason first, as practical, concerns the existence of an object, and second, as a practical rule of pure reason, brings with it necessity with respect to the existence of an action and is thus a practical law, not a natural law through empirical grounds of determination but a law of freedom in accordance with which the will is to be determinable independently of

¹⁶ “Zuerst, bestimmt das moralische Gesetz objektiv und unmittelbar den Willen im Urteile der Vernunft”.

¹⁷ Longuenesse titles “Chapter 9” of her book *Kant on the Human Standpoint* (2005) as “Moral Judgment as a Judgment of Reason”.

anything empirical (merely through the representation of a law in general and its form); however, all cases of possible actions that occur can be only empirical, that is, belong to experience and nature; hence, it seems absurd to want to find in the sensible world a case which, though as such it stands only under the law of nature, yet admits of the application to it of a law of freedom and to which there could be applied the supersensible idea of a morally good, which is to be exhibited in it *in concreto*. (*KprV* 5:68)

In our effort to judge about what we ought to do, we are required to act in compliance with the laws of freedom. In other words, we are required to judge if a certain way of acting in the given case can be considered as falling under the idea of morally good which is determined by the moral law. Nevertheless, “subsumption of an action possible to me in the sensible world” (*KprV* 5:68) under “morally good” denies any intuition for our cognition. This is because, neither the law of freedom nor its necessary object of unconditionally good, being supersensible and merely intelligible, can be used for schematization of a sensible outcome (i.e., for possible prospective ways of acting, or choosing to act). In other words, the task at hand seems to require us to present morally good concretely in the sensible world, though we cannot subsume sensible cases under a supersensible idea. Westra (2016) in his book titled *The Typic in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, Moral Judgment and Symbolic Representation* depicts this situation as follows: “This particular mismatch – between sensible intuitions and the supersensible Ideas of morality – constitutes the obstacle that will have to be overcome in order to enable moral appraisal” (p. 216).¹⁸

In our determining judgment of theoretical cognition, we are able to subsume sensible intuitions under the abstract /formal laws of the understanding. We can achieve this task, since the imagination, which is conditioned by the forms of sensibility, achieves the necessary schematization of our representations and get

¹⁸ Westra’s neat study provides a very extensive analysis of not only the “Typic” section itself, but also a very comprehensive literature review, classifying and evaluating various interpretations of this short, yet dense text. My current analysis highly benefited from Westra’s study and develops upon his central thesis. Accordingly, for a further detailed exegesis his work can be consulted.

them ready to be subsumed under the concepts of the understanding (Westra, 2016, pp. 46-48). As this sub-personal depiction of the cognition of what there is does not fit for the cognition of what ought to be; Kant suggests the following strategy:

Thus the moral law has no cognitive faculty other than the understanding (not the imagination) by means of which it can be applied to objects of nature, and what the understanding can put under an idea of reason is not a *schema* of sensibility but a law, such a law, however, as can be presented *in concreto* in objects of the senses and hence a law of nature, though only as to its form; this law is what the understanding can put under an idea of reason on behalf of judgment, and we can, accordingly, call it the *type* of the moral law. (*KprV* 5:69)

In this complex passage Kant states, we can use “form of lawfulness” itself which is available for us via the idea of the lawfulness of nature for our theoretical cognition, to relate it with the idea of morally good. Luckily, in the subsequent passage Kant “exemplifies” what he means, in a way we are familiar from the *Groundwork*. To judge morally, he advises us: “ask yourself whether, if the action you propose were to take place by a law of the nature of which you were yourself a part, you could indeed regard it as possible through your will” (*KprV* 5:69). Westra designates four criteria involved in this self-test, which he calls as “typic-procedure”: “(1) a sensibly uncontaminated representation (2) of the form of universal lawfulness (3) that can mediate the subsumption of particular actions given in sensible intuition under the supersensible moral law and (4) provide a procedure for moral appraisal” (Westra, 2016, p. 217). In other words, like the strategy of canon developed in the *Groundwork* we should test whether our maxim can be universalized (I discuss “Categorical Imperative” and its formulations in detail in Chapter 4 and 5). Accordingly, it is possible to consider typic as a new, yet more detailed elaboration of moral judgment first presented in the *Groundwork* as a canon (Westra, 2016, pp. 14, 62, 76-77, 91, 218).

Some interpreters focusing on *KprV* 5:70, in which Kant states that the typic serves as a symbol for moral appraisal, claim a basis for relating typic to “intuitive symbolism” and symbolism Kant develops in the third *Critique*. Nevertheless, not only is this anachronistic, but it also subverts the purity and formality Kant ascribes to the typic of moral judgment, which is strictly determining with respect to its principle rather than reflecting (Westra, 2016, pp. 159, 215, 218, 224). Typic aims to establish rationalism of moral judgments, against the threats of “empiricism” and “mysticism of practical reason”. Namely, it neither attempts to match the idea of the good with “experiential consequences” (i.e., happiness), nor goes astray by trying to subsume “non-sensible but real” intuitions (i.e., an invisible kingdom of God) under moral concepts instead of mere form of lawfulness (*KprV* 5:70). Kant argues that such “rationalism” is available even to the most common understanding and is implicit “at the basis of its most ordinary judgments, even those of experience” (*KprV* 5:70, see also Westra, 2016, pp. 112, 136). In the “Typic” Kant seems to provide a procedural account of what operates spontaneously in moral reasoning. I contend that Kant’s core theses that pure reason is practical of itself, and practical reason determines the will immediately are central to grasp typic section. Below in Chapter 3, “Autonomy”, I discuss the spontaneity of autonomy and moral self-legislation. In all these respects, the abstraction involved in the “Typic”, which serves as a canon for morals, should not be accused of failing to propose some mechanisms to capture moral cognition fully. It is one thing to vindicate our moral judgments and communicate our justificatory reasons with others; yet the very mental act of judging is another. While Kant’s doctrine of morals mostly serves for the former; the latter requires to focus on the centrality of judging itself with its

necessary qualities. So far, I have explicated judgment and types of judgment, I now consider the maturity of judging itself with its proper qualities.

As early as the first *Critique* in which Kant's central concern seems to be analyzing empirical cognition and merely determining types of judgments, he emphasizes how much it takes to achieve "maturity" of judging. Kant states that as "a special talent that cannot be taught but only practiced" the accuracy of judging is ultimately dependent upon the inborn capacity to judge (likewise "mother-wit") and on one's efficacy in improving that skill (A133/B172). No matter how well and detailed one is instructed with rules and principles, how to apply and make sense of these rules always requires one to reflect on them. We cannot think of a mature agency which is entirely dependent on the insights and prescription of others and fails to judge authentically for herself. In other words, without honing our skills in judging, even the most complete and straight abstract principles cannot guarantee rightful conduct *in concreto*. Similarly, in *Theory and Practice* Kant states:

It is obvious that between theory and practice there is required, besides, a middle term connecting them and providing a transition from one to the other, no matter how complete a theory may be; for, to a concept of the understanding, which contains a rule, must be added an act of judgment by which a practitioner distinguishes whether or not something is a case of the rule; and since judgment cannot always be given yet another rule by which to direct its subsumption (for this would go on to infinity), there can be theoreticians who can never in their lives become practical because they are lacking in judgment, for example, physicians or jurists who did well during their schooling but who are at a loss when they have to give an expert opinion. (TP 8:275)

Furthermore, juridical terminology is frequently involved by implication in the "Doctrine of Method" of the first the *Critique*. There Kant likens "the critique of pure reason as the true court of justice for all controversies of pure reason" in which reasoning is conducted fairly, without anarchy or despotism. In that analogy, the verdict of reason is ultimately dependent upon the authority of the laws of reason

itself which can secure a peaceful and lasting solution for all controversies (A751/B779). As every human reason has her share from that “universal human reason”, this also provides a democratic yet constitutional structure for human conduct or exchange of perspectives. Therefore, everyone’s right to investigate, confirm or reject any given principle should be considered “holy” and honoured (A752/B780, A838/B866). As any principle is to substantiate itself ultimately in the cosmopolitan space of reason, one should keep exercising “the talent of reason” with due attention to the universal and necessary principles of reasoning itself. On that condition alone can we expect that the power of judgment to be matured.

In the same lines, in the third *Critique* Kant specifies the necessary qualities of judging. Initially we are required to free ourselves from our prejudices (which is “abstracting oneself from the limitations that contingently attach to our judging”) and always consider possible judging of others (*KU* §40, 5:294). In sum, (i) one should think for oneself authentically, (ii) think in the position of everyone open-mindedly and (iii) think in integrity and consistency. Only in this way can we aspire to be proper human beings, so far as we thus actualize our humanity, as it is our capacity “to communicate” our “inmost self universally” that saves us from the limitations of animality (*KU* 5:355) so long as it is exercised.

Kant emphasizes that in our specific efforts to apprehend and distinguish morally good and bad; again, the cultivation and exercise of judging by moral examples, and reflections would improve our moral character and decision making (*KprV* 5:154, 5:160-163). In that contextualized attitude, our moral skills, namely, noticing morally relevant states of affairs and responding to them properly, would improve. Herman’s (1993) interpretation of “The Practice of Moral Judgment” elaborates very successfully how and why it would be a gross mistake trying to

conceive moral judging as algorithmic (pp. 73-94). She claims that the canon of moral judgment should be supplemented by what she calls as “rules of moral salience”. On her reading, the efficacy of moral judging is highly dependent upon the success of moral education provided by the institutions (formal or informal, e.g., school, family, or social networks) that are responsible to provide us with “moral literacy” and insight. Accordingly, Herman claims that without compromising the universal and objective basis of morality it becomes possible to embrace morally relevant cultural differences (Herman, 1993, pp. 91, 93).

Onora O’Neill also provides a strong defense against considering moral principles in a merely prescriptive modality that could suffice by themselves without critical assessment of a given case. She argues that principles “may constrain but do not regiment action; they are more likely to recommend types of action, policy, and attitude than to offer detailed instructions for living” (O’Neill, 2001, p. 18). Accordingly, the specification that is required to shape an action in prospect can be achieved only by substantive practical reasoning. Nevertheless, O’Neill claims that moral judgments are “neither subsumptive nor reflective” as they strive to determine, i.e., specify, an action or attitude which is yet to occur (O’Neill, 2001, pp. 19-20). In the case of reflecting judging, she seems to caution against comparing moral judgment to an effort of seeing or reading a moral case through intuitions, perception or given particulars. As argued above, I contend that so long as we differentiate “moral basic principles”, which we can analyze, justify, and communicate to all, from the singular and immediate judgmental activity, which occurs over and above of all types of judgments, pieces of knowledge and common sense-based feelings; there is no reason to deny Kantian terminology of judgments into moral reflection. As the “Typic” section argues, “the form of lawfulness” can guide us in determining

our deeds and enable us to claim that we know that something is morally wrong or impermissible. Moral judgments that we reach as an outcome of this procedural reasoning (particularly the rules that belong to the Doctrine of Justice: e.g., “Thou shall not steal”) hold as cognitive and determining judgments which Kant designates as universally valid, necessary, and objective. On the other hand, again as stated above, reflecting use of the power of judgement also plays an indispensable complementary role for moral cognition and experience in general. Though they are more likely to be associated with virtue, they still serve for the maturity of moral judgments and moral character in general.

In conclusion, the consistency and integrity of various sources of knowledge (scientific, historical, or otherwise); and the different aspects of our moral attachments as human agents, from determining judgments about strict duties of justice towards reflective character of judging about moral teleology and faith, is achieved by attending the critical cognitive limitations we have. According to Kant, not only in practical philosophy, but in any other domain; the possibility of necessary and universal knowledge is characterized by *a priori* principles which are necessary, though not sufficient. These principles enable cognizant human beings to think through concepts, and judge properly and make true (though fallible) assertions. Thus, I argued that judging stands at the very center of all reflective mental activities, deliberations, decisions, beliefs, conduct and attachments. I also gave an account of the different types of judgments in Kant’s terminology. Even though we nominate such distinctions in theory, I argued that according to Kant, human reasoning and experience is possible only in a holistic unity of all types of judging and rational principles.

Therefore, the following chapters of this study also are organized according to judgmental contexts. In Kant's critical system we are initially concerned with whether or how well we reflect on, assess, critically judge, and communicate with others a given case and our relevant approach. Kant's thought is based on the principles of rational self-discipline required in all domains – empirical knowledge, morals, aesthetics, and religion– to cognize, assess and make justifiable judgments. To reason in accordance with the implicit principles of judging and due to our limited capacities (epistemic and otherwise), we always need critical assessment of others and can only collectively construct our domains of knowledge. This involves being aware of our incapacities and following the precepts of humility and fallibilism. In moral domain also, it is the validity, justificatory status and communicability of our judging that constructs our “moral world” rather than what we may personally happen to adopt as a foundational, singular meta-perspective regarding all our affairs. This does not deny the plurality of what each embraces as her personal “moral view of the world”, communicability of which is also based on the same principles of reason and judging. We judge about each and every aspect of our moral responsibilities, commitments, preferences, objectives and convictions. We achieve varying degrees of justification for our judgments in each of these morally relevant aspects of human agency i.e., justice, virtue, aesthetics, and religion. Nevertheless, in all these aspects of moral experience one is always required to conform with the principles of judging itself (mentioned above) regardless of the context. In this regard, I paid particular attention to the efficacy of reflective judging in moral experience as it embraces the critical self-assessment of the judging subject and embraces the interpretive latitude regarding the most fundamental questions of human existence. Thus, one's personal conviction or attitude regarding the answers

to these existential questions – e.g., moral-rational faith– is also vindicated by her own reflections, assessments, observations, experiences and judging rather than demonstrative reasoning which make them no less viable. In this connection, I claimed that judging is the spontaneity of practical agency, which is an authentic performance or act by the agent herself that denies any compartmentalized analysis of judgments. And through judging, one adopts certain attitudes, dispositions, a supreme maxim in life and sets ends for herself, and via acting accordingly realizes her authentic agency and moral view of the world.

CHAPTER THREE

AUTONOMY

In this section I examine Kant's notion of autonomy which stands as the backbone of his moral philosophy. Interpretation of Kantian autonomy relates to questions about his ontology and metaphysics. Accordingly, I start with a few remarks about Kantian ontology to state that his moral theory holds regardless of our interpretations of his ontological assumptions. Second, I briefly discuss Kant's new sense of metaphysics. With reference to Chapter 2, I argue that this sense of moral metaphysics is concerned with our rational self-discipline and establishes the epistemic limiting conditions to judge properly in the moral domain. To elaborate the possibility of "auto-nomos" moral agency in this new Kantian framework, I summarize the interpretative strategies of Kantian moral realism and constructivism. I argue that Kant's distinctive strategy fits neither of the poles, yet he establishes the validity of autonomy as a rational capacity. Next, I reflect closely on Kant's moral terminology – freedom, *Wille* and moral law – to elaborate further his conception of autonomy which is based on the spontaneity of judging. Finally, I show that while the rational, inalienable capacity of autonomy is vindicated without any specific ontological assumptions or moral view of the world, the actualization of this (lawful) freedom, namely moral agency, and experience, involves further interpretive reflections and awe about the very possibility of autonomy itself. I contend that those reflections on one's own capacity of judging and willing morally makes the core of one's making sense of oneself and others as moral agents and the morally guided interpretation of her existence. Accordingly, in that moment of reflection we have an interpretive latitude, and freedom, to consider autonomy also as the divine in us to participate in

the moral order of all things. This is to say, a substantial use of this capacity refers to judging about who and where we are and what it means to be a free human agent.

3.1 Kant's Ontology

In the literature, any discussion of autonomy inescapably refers to Kant's transcendental idealism, either to ground some moral concepts through it or to deny its necessity. In this connection, interpreting Kant's notion(s) of freedom plays a crucial role. While freedom is the backbone of his moral theory (as autonomy), his overall analysis of freedom is also vital to his overall critical corpus. His theoretical philosophy is connected to the practical domain by antinomies, especially the third and fourth antinomies of free causality, natural necessity, and the question of the unconditioned first cause (*KdrV*; A444-5/B472-3, A452-3/B480-1). As is known, Kant offers his transcendental idealism to resolve these antinomies and provide a "room" for *noumena*, i.e., things in themselves, to which neither the forms of intuition – space and time – nor the categories of understanding apply.

There are various interpretations of Kant's theory of transcendental idealism. Some commentators regard it a two-world view, where we have an ontological dualism; others adopt a more moderate view of two-aspect understanding in which transcendental idealism functions more like an epistemic view rather than ontological.¹⁹ Some others prefer to ignore it altogether as they argue everything works just fine in Kant's moral theory without his unfounded theory of transcendental idealism (Westphal, 2004). For my current purpose in this study, namely in arguing for the continuity from moral objectivism towards a moral agent's subjective commitments and reflections; on the one hand I want to avoid various

¹⁹ For an overview of these discussions see; Redding, 2010, 2012 and Schulting, 2010.

forms of reductionism in ontology, on the other hand I opt to spare an esteemed room for one's ethical-teleological commitments without demanding her to deny what she claims to know. What I mean by avoiding reductionism is very roughly as follows: I do not adopt and argue for an ontological position in interpreting Kant's idealism. That is, in terms of his theoretical philosophy, whether he is the pioneer for an underdeveloped absolute idealism, or his theory is stuck in the deadlock of antinomies doomed to suffer in an everlasting dualism is not my focus of attention.²⁰ My strategy is to follow a judgment-based construction of knowledge claims, attitudes, commitments and experiences which leave ontological questions open. This is a Kantian way of figuring things out, as Kant prioritizes an agent-oriented morality over the questions about ontology and distances himself from traditional metaphysics by his peculiar definition of it. This is initially an acceptance about limited human cognitive capacities that prefers to start with what we can know about ourselves and universe, rather than primarily dealing with things as they are independent of our cognitive limitations.

One worry about this humility is that such a reading ends up deflating postulates of practical reason, as Redding attributes such a position to weak interpretations of transcendental idealism (Redding, 2012, pp. 6-7). That is, a complete human-dependence could shatter, say, grounding an idea of God who is free of being human-made. Nevertheless, I contend that from a Kantian point of view it is perfectly legitimate to apply varying degrees and types of justifications and judging in different domains which need not to end up with the above-mentioned worries. This is because, above all, according to Kant humility and fallibilism are inherent properties of human judging. Furthermore, it is significant to emphasize in

²⁰ For a detailed discussion see Redding; 2010, 2012, 2017.

this regard also that in the Kantian context judging is the moment of spontaneity where we both witness and construct ourselves. In theoretical reasoning this allows us to presume and judge about new possibilities regarding ontology, so long as we stand by rational self-discipline and principles of judging and comply with due evidence etc. In reflexive judging, we judge about all these possibilities and ourselves in these new contexts along with our overall experience. Accordingly, judging does not simply regulate our knowledge claims but accomplishes an untouchable freedom and responsibility for each about her own existence.

Accordingly, in my discussion of freedom I avoid focusing on its metaphysical or ontological possibility. That is, I shall not refer to *noumena* – as a transcendent ontic layer – and avoid regarding human subject/self from the dual perspective of *noumena* and phenomena,²¹ as I argue that Kant’s mature views on moral psychology transcends that dualism (§5.3, §5.4). A true analysis of free agency/self in this connection, and the possibility of a divine author of nature – also the debates about ontology and either idealism, dualism, or monism – requires a critical analysis of Kant’s notion of causality and substance, which exceeds the limits of this current study. For my current objectives in this study, I adopt an agnosticism about the true nature of things and contend that morality does not need to answer those ontological questions to establish itself.

Nevertheless, if I avoid prioritizing ontological questions and refrain from talking of freedom as *casusa noumenon*²²; I do not opt to reduce free agency into the narrow scope of imputability of one’s action (as external freedom). Apparently,

²¹ Kant frequently offers this dual perspective to get over the conflict of the antinomies. For instance, see *Groundwork*; 4:459 and *Critique of Practical Reason*; 5:43, 5:98, 5:104.

²² Kant himself asserts that practical reason does not deal with the validity or intuition of *causa noumenon*, it deals with the determining ground of the causality of human action, namely the principles of willing (*KprV* 5:49).

imputability and inalienable moral responsibility make the backbone of free agency. Nevertheless, along with an understanding of freedom as rights and duties towards others and ourselves; what is central to my exegesis is that freedom is initially a judgmental activity about how we regard and actualize ourselves. I develop my reading of Kant starting from moral autonomy to the moral health upon this emphasis. In this regard I consider autonomy initially as a natural and justifiable human capacity; but also, as the divine in us, the ground of human dignity which is not objectively demonstrable.

Therefore, to avoid reductionism and depict a holistic explication of human agency in all respects, following Herman's advice I am not worried about admitting the validity of rational causality of some sort in discussing human agency (Herman, 2011, p. 59; Allison, 1990, p. 51). But more importantly, despite the mainstream tendency, I prefer not to ignore Kant's repeated awe and wonder about how pure reason is practical of itself, how will determines itself immediately and how law can be an incentive on the heart. Standing by Kant's redline (avoiding dogmatism of rational metaphysics and foundationalism in morals); I emphasize the spontaneity of reason, i.e., our judgmental capacity, which is the lynch pin for reason, will, freedom, agency, self, moral character and finally one's worldview to overlap. In that moment of spontaneity some consider moral law also as a divine command or as the ground of dignity of humanity, whereas all are bound by it even without this aspiration. Accordingly, this spontaneity constructs not only one's understanding of the scope of human agency but shapes one's treating of oneself, others, and cosmos. Though this is at best a hermeneutical approach, it is no less real for the agent once compared with any metaphysical theory or dogma. To sum up, I set aside the

ontological questions and develop my study on Kant's irreducible account of spontaneity of judging and its implicit normativity.

3.2 Kant's "New" Moral Metaphysics

Kant's moral philosophy is based on the notion of autonomy; as he announces his aim to establish supreme principle of morality as autonomy (*G* 4:434, 440).

Nevertheless, the ground, content, and scope of what is meant by autonomy is controversial. In these regards, an inquiry into Kant's moral metaphysics is meant to investigate how both the content of moral imperative and moral obligation itself is valid in an autonomous sense. To start with the simplest definition, *auto-nomos* is the self-legislating capacity of reason. According to Kant, reason can be practical of itself, which means that it can immanently determine itself according to its own principles. This determination, being necessary and universal, thus owns a lawful status. That lawfulness and (moral) law, has both its content and ground of obligation, again, from reason itself.

In other words, a healthy moral agent can know (though fallibly) what (right) action to take and why it should be taken. The latter part is very simply answered that; because it is the right thing to do, one should and can act so, without looking for further motivations. That is, moral judgment owns its necessary normative force from itself, from pure practical capacity of reason. Nevertheless, the requirements for the possibility of actual mature moral judgment are vast and complex – for instance, healthy moral agents, proper education, and social upbringing is required –. Even though this complex relation between moral metaphysics and practical anthropology is a built-in one (*G* 4:388), here I am initially concerned with the pure, *a priori* part of Kantian moral autonomy.

An analysis of Kantian autonomy is possible by explicating his understanding of freedom, *Wille* / *Willkür*, practical reason and moral law. These concepts are not only dependent on one another, but at times they even sound to be interchangeable. Such an ambiguity relates to Kant's cautious and novel metaphysics in which epistemic and ontological claims are neatly separated from one another. "Doctrine of Method" of the first *Critique* provides a clear picture of this breakthrough from the tradition. Kantian metaphysic is not a claim about how things are independent of human cognition. According to Kant, metaphysics as "a rational cognition from mere concepts" (A850/B878), scientifically deals with the *a priori* first principles of *human* cognition; thus, it is not even about the most general principles or first principles in general (A843/B871). This is a critique that is in a sense reason's reasoning on itself, on its own capacities and resources to discover itself and its principles. This critique thus provides us either the constitutive or the regulative principles of our experience (of ourselves and experience of empirical reality in general) (A848/B876). Accordingly, Kant's metaphysics of morals embraces several concepts that confuses or perhaps liberates the reader about how to conceive their "actuality". Therefore, the basics of Kant's moral theory do not leave us with a fixed and closed system of concepts since they are to be used by us in actual contexts. It allows for a latitude ranging from what can be cognized objectively and determinedly towards the reflective judging of making the most sense of one's moral experience as a human agent. In this regard, unlike the foundationalism (or theism) of rationalist metaphysics, Kant's moral theory initially argues for an absolute independence from all sorts of givenness.

The vast connotations of this "absolute independence" of reason obscures Kant's theism, ethical community, and moral motivation. For instance, while Kantian

autonomy is a break from any divine command theory, from a certain perspective; it can still be considered compatible with the divine command once we consider his notion of regarding moral commands as divine command. All Kantian interpreters, almost without exception, agree on the Kantian idea of moral objectivism which stands in opposition to any sorts of moral relativism. Nevertheless, the ambiguity starts right after this very rough so-called consensus. This is because what is meant by objectivism is not obvious: does objectivity refer to some sort of mind-independent “facts” or stance-independent “entities”? Is it possible to conceive of moral objectivism in another way? Secondly, the scope of this – whatever sort it may be – objectivism makes another confusion. Is moral objectivism possible only on the issues of justice and jurisprudence? Can we consider some sort of objectivism about virtues? Can we have a derivative account of moral goodness or values? In other words, the effort to explain how universally valid basic moral principles are possible at all occasions different interpretive strategies.²³ Along with this concern about foundational queries to establish moral objectivism, Kant’s use of several value-laden concepts, such as incommensurable values, human dignity, moral teleology, sublimity of moral law, and practical postulates also spark controversies.

Some mainstream tendencies to vindicate Kant’s moral objectivism either refer to ideal/ actual consensus of the moral agents or attributing moral value to the nature of things and persons or applying to procedural constructions in moral domain. The outcome of these different approaches raises the popular question of whether Kant is a moral realist or constructivist.²⁴ There is an apparent confusion and lack of consensus on what exactly it means to attribute either realism or

²³ In particular, the third section of the *Groundwork* “Transition from Metaphysics of Morals to the Critique of Pure Practical Reason” deals with the shift from the *a priori* first principles of morality to a critique of their foundation (*G* 4:450, 4:459 – 463).

²⁴ For debates on this question see Formosa, 2010; Kain, 2004, 2005, 2006; Wood, 1992; Besch, 2009.

constructivism to Kant. This is because commentators apply distinct criteria in concluding either option. Even though my aim is not to resolve this ambiguity I contend that over-all Kant's views fit neither restrictive side of the dichotomy. Obviously, there are several distinct forms of Kantian realism and constructivism. Kantian moral realism in general implies a violation of human cognitive capacities which are vital to critical philosophy. On the other hand, hard core constructivism implies a deflationary reading of Kant in which all teleological and metaphysical or value-laden baggage is lost (Lipscomb & Krueger, 2010), regardless of whether Kant himself justifies these properly.

John Rawls is considered to be the pioneer of a constructivist reading of Kant even though he has been criticized in several ways even by those who are also sympathetic to adopt a similar strategy. As in the case of Rawls, most constructivist readings try to "account for objectivity without robust ontological commitments" (Kain, 2004, p. 258). Even though Rawls' views changed through his distinct works, as O'Neill puts it, he basically argues for constructivism as a procedure for agents to settle moral principles through public reasoning (O'Neill, 2003, p. 349). O'Neill depicts Rawl's position in reference to an "original position" which generates our considered judgments as a device without appealing to a social contract, moral values, or even hypothetical agreement. His model works in a democratic constitution where free and equal persons as rational and reasonable agents are elicited concepts (O'Neill, 2003, p. 356) almost like moral facts. O'Neill, who also argues for a constructivist reading of Kant, criticizes Rawls on this point. Her interpretation of Kantian constructivism claims a universal and cosmopolitan scope which is not restricted by fellow citizenship. Another important point is that, unlike

Rawls, O'Neill argues that not only for the principles of justice, but for ethics also, categorical imperative is operative in an inseparable manner (O'Neill, 2003, p. 354).

O'Neill throughout her distinct works rightly highlights the continuity between justice and virtue for Kant (particularly see; *Towards Justice and Virtue*, 1996). As she puts it, even though in today's globalization justice and virtue debate changed in scope and task, this does not require a substantial break between the two (O'Neill, 1996, p.28). I agree with O'Neill's estimations on this account which I discuss further in the following sections. Getting back to realism and constructivism debate; O'Neill seems to be sympathetic with associating her constructivism with some sort of moral anti-realism (O'Neill, 2003, pp. 348, 354). Her sound construction of justice and virtue which grounds solid guidelines for action, but not complete instruction as it should be, clearly announces a renunciation from any account of *summum bonum*. Her humble position does not argue for any reasons to reject either "*summum bonum*, or Kingdom of Ends or Good for Man", yet does not find any reason to accept them either. Therefore, rather than "fantasizing about imaginary foundations", or arguing for moral perfectionism; she proposes an earthly, practical, and vindicated constructivist ethics (O'Neill, 2003, p. 211).

Korsgaard also adopts a constructivist strategy and argues in its favor as a solution to a practical problem. According to her, moral realism; by sticking with the theoretical knowledge of the good, fails to function in problem solving (Korsgaard, 2008, p. 325). According to Korsgaard, different forms of constructivism have different normative objects constructed: for Rawls it is principles of justice but not the good; for Scanlon (2014), it is moral principles that are constructed but not the reasons to adopt them (Korsgaard, 2008, p. 324). Korsgaard's constructivism, or procedural realism, develops around the idea of "picking reasons" for action from

our impulses to determine our personal identity (Bojanowski, 2012, p. 5).

Nevertheless, in Korsgaard's procedural strategy, through which she argues that moral values are constructed, the Kantian answer to why we should be moral is blurred by over-emphasized subjective, identity projection which stands as the core motive for morality.

Bojanowski in his mind opening article "Kant's Solution to the Euthypro Dilemma" (2016), claims that constructivism of Rawls and Korsgaard fail to be alternatives to realism and anti-realism debate, as they both suffer from voluntarism and could provide weak grounds for objectivism (p.1220). He states that while Rawls could argue only for a historical account of objectivity in which freedom and equality are taken as moral facts (p.1218), Korsgaard cannot escape relativism and subjectivism as she grounds moral obligation on the inter-subjectivity of valuing one another's reflective capacity.

On the other side of the debate, moral realists argue that Kantian autonomy is built upon the intrinsic value of rational agency. Wood explicitly argues that Kant is a moral realist as Formula of Humanity²⁵ is the supreme principle of morality which provides us a "substantial value, for the sake of which it is rational for us to act" (Wood, 2006, p. 353; see also Wood, 2001). Even though he does not explicitly argue for a realist position, Guyer also regards Formula of Humanity as the most fundamental normative ground, as the sole formulation of the categorical imperative from which we can derive duties of virtue (Guyer, 2014, pp. 219-238). He states that Kant assumes morality to require more than conditional values, or even requires foundations yet indemonstrable (Guyer, 2014, p. 217). For Guyer, our recognition of

²⁵ "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (*G* 4:429).

the value of human freedom grounds morality which starts with the necessary end of actualizing freedom (Guyer, 2000, pp. 5-10). He argues that this objective end, with absolute value is prior to universalization procedure of categorical imperative, or “conformity to law” test which by itself fails to constitute any ends (Guyer, 2000, pp. 143-151).

Stern in his book; *Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel and Kierkegaard* (2012) attributes Kant a “hybrid model” in which Kantian autonomy is saved from emptiness via moral realism (Stern, 2012, pp. 220-9). According to Stern, Kantian moral revolution is not against moral realism of natural law theories but directed towards voluntarism of classical divine command theories. Therefore, Stern contends that the content of morality (right /wrong / good), value of free rational agents are moral facts (Stern, 2012, p. 90), intrinsic properties of things as they are. Moral obligation is derived from the structure of our wills which can be operative through value realism. He considers this to be a midway strategy to establish morality clashed between the poles of the divine command (Kierkegaard) and “social command theory” (Hegel) (Stern, 2012, p. 220).

My aim to give at least a brief account of the ongoing debate on the issue of constructivism and realism is apparently not to conclude and side with one of the camps. Apparently, all these analysis and interpretations emphasize one important aspect of Kant’s critical philosophy. Nevertheless, as Kain rightly argues some hardcore constructivist readings end up reducing moral law into a man-made positive law (Kain, 2004, p. 260). In other words, to avoid grounding morality in an external source or to avoid talking about discovering moral facts, norms, and values in a realist manner; they risk morality to suffer arbitrariness via being created by us. This apparently contradicts with Kant’s distinctive understanding of moral goodness

which is intrinsic to practical reason. On the other hand, moral realism via attributing mind-independent values to agents and acts violates the most central Kantian principle of establishing morality on the critique of practical reason itself. On the contrary, according to Kant moral normativity and obligation are necessarily constitutive aspects of practical reasoning. Only through moral reasoning we have access to the content of moral obligation, validate moral obligation itself and we can start talking about moral values, rather than picking or coming across with these facts as a part of mind-independent reality. Furthermore, another no less vital problem of moral realism is that, as Bojanowski puts it, “they decouple values and volition” so faces a “motivational” problem for moral action (Bojanowski, 2016, p. 1214; also 2012, p. 5). That is, once moral goodness is considered independent of our moral volition or reasoning, it opens a gap for the question of “why” to be moral even we are given the knowledge of the good.²⁶

I contend that a closer reading of Kant himself saves us from several deficiencies of both sides. Most importantly, Kant explicitly secures moral autonomy via not grounding it on our deficient ontological aspirations. On the other hand, I contend that Kant’s discovery of subjective universality does not receive due attention in these debates. I argue that Kant’s emphasis of non-derivative and universal notion of autonomy hints a constructivist “methodology” to initiate moral inquiry. Nevertheless, that initial point does not embrace moral experience in its totality about which Kant enables us to consider varying degrees of communicability

²⁶ Bojanowski argues that neither realism nor constructivism embraces the true Kantian alternative. He states that Kant is a moral idealist, and his position can be summarized as follows: “The reality of the moral law is independent of our individual choices, but it is not independent of the act of volition of rational cognizers” (Bojanowski, 2016, p. 1225). Unlike Rauscher who also argues for a moral idealist position for Kant (see *Naturalism and Realism in Kant’s Ethics*, 2015), Bojanowski rejects superiority of speculative over practical cognition and denies Rauscher’s naturalism (Bojanowski, 2017a, p. 470).

or justification. I endorse a “constructivist methodology” to validate basic moral principles without a necessary split between justice and virtue (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, I argue that completeness of Kantian moral view of the world is possible via explicating the richness of reflective judging and aesthetic experience. While constructivist methodology vindicates basic principles of justice and virtue universally, the necessary ends of morality and purposiveness of moral reasoning demands a legitimate extension by varying degrees of justifications. Accordingly, as I argue in the following sections, not only the teleological aspects of Kantian morality, but also the postulate of God and all value-laden vocabulary (dignity of human, holiness of law etc.) gain practical actuality through this judging-based strategy in which we can provide varying degrees of justifications for our further convictions beyond the necessary and universal first principles of morals.

To vindicate these necessary and universal first principles of morality in the next sub-section (§3.3) I start with Kant’s analysis of will and freedom. The initial analysis of these concepts exposes that autonomy is an inherent capacity of human agents. The further enquiry into autonomy, in conjunction of deontology and teleology, the following chapters disclose that autonomy can also be regarded as a divine paradigm of moral perfection for virtuous human agents. Therefore, in the basics of Kant’s “new” moral metaphysics, we have epistemic certainty about our moral imputability and responsibility. Further query into the very possibility of this undeniable and inalienable moral capacity and the possible limit of its actualization carries us to aspects of moral experience where we no more have the same, objective epistemic certainty. That broadness and range in interpreting Kantian autonomy, which always goes in line with varying degrees of justification plays a crucial role in embracing the robust actualization of autonomy as moral health.

3.3 Kant's Moral Terminology

Now let me elucidate the basics of Kant's moral terminology which constitute his authenticity as the inventor of autonomy. Famously, in his inauguration of "philosophical moral cognition", Kant declares good will to be the sole unconditional good, good without limitation (*G* 4:394). Thus, we are required to figure out what good and what will mean. Distinguishing himself from the ancient notion of virtues he states how even virtues such as moderation, courage and self-control could only have conditional worth. The goodness then is not attributed to will via what it achieves in consequence of certain actions or dispositions. Kant from the very beginning, in his first major work in moral philosophy; *Groundwork*, introduces a peculiar notion of the good. In the second *Critique*, apparently having received enough criticisms about this peculiarity Kant explicates more about how and why he sounds to have prioritized moral principle over the concept of the good (*KprV* 5:9-10). He argues for a conception of the good which is inherited neither from social customs, nor from an "external" divine authority. In the second *Critique* again, putting it in a specific form, Kant states that good, along with evil, are the only objects of practical reason (*KprV* 5:58). Nevertheless, this does not still disambiguate the emptiness of the concept good.

Kant provides a definition of good with reference to reason. He states that whatever action is in conformity with the pure law of practical reason is good, the will determined via that law is good absolutely and the supreme condition of all good (*KprV* 5:62). He argues that such good is valid for every rational being as it is determined by means of representations of reason objectively (*G* 4:414). This provides us an understanding of moral good which is inseparable from reason and its

necessary specification (*Bestimmen*) of the will. Accordingly, in this picture moral goodness appears as a command of reason which does not determine the will, on the contrary which is attributed to a certain form of willing / volition. Therefore, Kant's starting point, i.e., "good will" narrows down to an enquiry of *willing* itself.

Kant's major project in morals is to provide a necessary and universal ground for morals in the form of a metaphysics which shall constitute the counterpart of his enterprise for a scientific metaphysics of natural sciences. Kant argues that such strict universality requires *a priori* first principles (*MS* 6:215). Even though such a metaphysics of morals can never dispense with principles of its application where we are obliged to consult human nature (*MS* 6:217), the *a priori* part is derived from reason. Therefore, to understand what will means in his moral theory we need to keep in mind Kant's primary dictum for a universal and necessary first principles of morals.

Kant defines the faculty of desire as the capacity of a being to act in accordance with its own concepts and representations. That capacity to do or refrain certain actions can be determined by inclinations, impulses or by the conscious determination of reason. Animals, Kant states, have *arbitrium brutum*, as they act on their inclinations and instincts (*MS* 6:212-4). Thus, their power of choice (*willkür*) differs from human volition, which is affected by sensations, though is not determined by them. In this regard, humans ("*arbitrium sensitivum*, yet not *brutum* but *liberum*" A534/B562) are free of being determined by external causes. Nevertheless, as Kant frequently highlights this refers to only negative freedom, whereas he locates his moral theory and notion of autonomy on the idea of positive freedom. To clarify these terms and avoid possible contradictions in interpretation I need to analyze them closer.

In *Groundwork* 4:446, Kant states that freedom is the key to explain the autonomy of the will. He suggests that will is the causality of rationality, and freedom is the property of that will that it can determine itself independently of alien causes, and/or natural necessities. So far, the notion of freedom is negative. Further than that, Kant argues that this will also has the property to be specified by its own law. This refers to a truly free will or, as Kant puts it refers to positive freedom. That is, autonomy as “the sole principle of all moral laws” not only refers to independence from all material conditions (-); but it means will’s being law giving of itself as pure practical reason (+) (*KprV* 5:33). Here and in several other passages Kant constitutes almost an equation or at least a circularity between the notions of practical reason, moral law, autonomy, and freedom in the positive sense (e.g., *G* 4:450). Thus, we need to look closer at this circularity to understand how they function in Kant’s moral theory.

Allison in his classical work *Kant’s Theory of Freedom* (1990) provides a very clear account of Kant’s moral terminology with respect to autonomy. He builds his reading around what he calls “Incorporation Thesis”, that is “an inclination or desire does not of itself constitute a reason for acting” until the rational agent incorporates it into her subjective principle of action (Allison, 1990, p. 40). His explication provides a solution to driving quick equations between practical reason, moral law, will and freedom. If it were the case that rational will as the immediate determination of reason would always be in harmony with moral law; in which case morally deficient actions would count as irrational or not free. There are a couple of points to mention: first, as Allison argues; for Kant rational will is always principle governed which is a characteristic of its self-determination (Allison, 1990, p. 40). That is, even though when it determines itself according to inclinations and desires

(as Kant summarizes them all under self-love), rather than moral law, it is still rational and principled. Nevertheless, in this picture the agent's subjective principle of action (i.e., maxim) is not specified by the principle or the law of pure practical reason itself. When the power of choice (*Willkür*) for the action is determined by moral law; the agent looks for the norm that could legitimize her choice for any other rational agent. Looking for communicability with and consent from any other rational agency is the hallmark of moral law for Kant. In that volition *Willkür* is aligned with the will of any possible rational agent. Only in this sense will, which is the universalized form of rational volition, equates with moral law.

An agent who fails to incorporate universal principle of action in her decision making is still free in the negative sense. Besides, she is still an autonomous agent who is responsible for her actions which she determines by her spontaneous judging. This is because autonomy initially refers to reason's lawfulness (Allison, 1990, p. 95). An agent whose maxim is determined by self-love fails to be autonomous in a further sense, since autonomy is an unalienable human capacity likewise freedom or spontaneity of judging. For instance, one becomes truly autonomous and free if her volition is determined by moral law even it is against her self-interest. Apparently, demands of moral law does not necessarily contradict with the demands of self-love. Nevertheless, in such cases, as Kant at times gives the examples of how even self-sacrifice is possible by the simple awareness of the moral demand ²⁷, our independence from being determined by sensibility becomes far more evident. When we fail or prefer not to heed this moral demand, it is not that we disown autonomy as a capacity but we "lack autocracy" (Allison, 1990, p. 246).

²⁷ See *KprV* 5:30, where Kant narrates the accepting execution instead of false testimony.

According to Kant autonomy in its full sense means that the agent achieves to act and judge on the determination of reason itself. When we talk of reason itself, we do not refer to a set of moral prepositions and principles that are engraved upon reason innately. Kant argues that judging is normatively constituted, and morally lawful/good judgment is derived from the pure form of volition. He states that all maxims have i) “a *form*, which consists in universality” and ii) “a *matter*, namely an end” (G 4:436). If the volition is determined by merely its anticipated end or consequence of a possible action; it is not lawful, i.e., morally worthy. If the volition is determined by its form, then it is lawful. That determination is a categorical imperative on *Willkür*. The form of will, i.e., moral law commands *Willkür*. Accordingly, pure reason via “the mere principle of universal validity of all its maxims as laws (which would admittedly be the pure form of a pure practical reason), without any matter (object) of the will in which one could take some interest in advance” (G 4:461) can determine itself and this is pure reason being practical of itself, namely autonomous. Kant only points a simple and almost empty form for moral volition, which is nothing but universality and formulates it as categorical imperative. Categorical imperative and its various formulations are discussed in the following chapter (Chapter 4). But for the moment, as is seen, it is important to emphasize that universalizability is essential to autonomy. In this regard, moral law, the form of volition, good will, or pure practical reason; transcend above the singular, relative, *Willkür* or maxim of a particular reason. Thus, it becomes valid for every rational being with its anonymous and formal (empty) character.

Allison keeps the notion of transcendental freedom to provide a space for the non-temporal causality of reason, in this regard he also adopts transcendental idealism as two aspect view. That is, he does not necessarily argue for an

ontologically distinct domain for freedom, rather he considers transcendental idealism as an epistemic condition (Allison, 1990, pp. 4, 246). It is not simply the agent's being free of external causes, but what is manifest in the spontaneity of good / morally right willing is that the agent is moved to act according to demands of morality simply by recognizing this demand (Allison, 1990, p. 248). I rather focus on the notions of spontaneity and irreducibility than taking any stance on the issue of transcendental idealism as stated above. Therefore, true autonomy is the rational capacity to judge the universalizable course of action and act accordingly (though fallibly). Allison names that: "*motivational independence*, that is, a capacity for self-determination independently of", and even contrary to" one's needs as a sensuous being (Allison, 1990, p. 97). It is important to emphasize one more time, that moral law does not necessary require us to ignore our needs and desires yet demands them to be checked for their legitimacy.

This motivational independence, or self-motivating/moving power of reason (even to one's own expense) cannot be explained by any reference to empiricism. Kant brings forward the notion of respect and moral feeling to highlight this subjective effect of the moral law on the agent (*G* 4:401, *KprV* 5:73-77, 5:81, 5:117, 5:15). It is only when moral law determines the volition out of respect for the law; the action has moral worth. Therefore, it is not enough for the agent having acted in conformity with duty, (i.e., necessity of an action by moral law), but one should act from duty (*G* 4:399, *KprV* 5:81). One significant point is that the notion of respect, moral feeling and acting from duty and how they are possible at all cannot be explained.

At the end of the *Groundwork* Kant leaves the reader with his awe at how reason has the capacity to induce a feeling of pleasure or delight in the fulfillment of

duty, and states why morality interests us is incomprehensible (G 4:460). He proposes that it is sufficient to consider freedom as a necessary presupposition for practical use of reason and validity of categorical imperative (G 4:461). In his poetic final paragraph of the book, he refers to reason's unquenchable search for absolute necessity of its laws both in its speculative and practical use (G 4:463). Nevertheless, he states that in its search for an unconditioned and absolute necessity what reason ends up with is comprehending the incomprehensibility of any such foundation.

In the second *Critique*, Kant announces his project to establish the actuality of (transcendental) freedom in practical reason, which is the *ratio essendi* of the moral law – in turn moral law is the *ratio cognosendi* of freedom. Patrick Kain, quoting Karl Ameriks's view confirms "a great reversal" in the second *Critique* in Kant's philosophy (Kain, 2006, p. 452). Kain argues that "fact of reason" favors a realistic construal of morality which results in a requirement to believe in the postulates of reason as realities independent from us. This is because, he thinks, "fact of reason" hints a stance-independent starting point for morals (Kain, 2006, p. 460). Nevertheless, one needs to be careful about providing a direct relation between "fact of reason" and postulates. In the minimum, this notion could provide a hindrance for certain utterly constructivist readings of Kant. In this regard, I would agree with Kain. Nevertheless, Kant does not give up providing a deduction of moral law via introducing the notion of "fact of reason" as Kain implies.

Kant states that consciousness of the moral law "may be called a fact of reason because one cannot reason about it from an antecedent data of reason", instead it forces itself as a synthetic *a priori* proposition not based on any intuition (KprV 5:31). First, it is important to emphasize that Kant talks about a consciousness, not an entity. That is, what we immediately experience is a demand, an awareness, an

obligation in ourselves; from and within ourselves. In this regard it is better to separate foundational /ontological issues from this consciousness. As O'Neill argues (2002, pp. 96-97) fact of reason is not a point for giving up justification of the moral law or practical reason itself. It is rather to highlight how theoretical reason is incapable of doing this. She rightly claims that it plays a distinctive and indispensable role making moral law accessible for ordinary consciousness. On this specific point Kain also agrees with O'Neill's interpretation (Kain, 2006, p. 451).

Kant's moral theory clearly establishes that all healthy rational agents have autonomy i.e., the capacity to recognize the morally right thing to do and the capacity to act accordingly without looking for further reasons. In other words, Kant is very consistent about grounding both the content and obligation of the moral law in practical reason. Any interpretation which violates this basis; either by inserting the idea of God to justify the bindingness of the moral obligation, or by prioritizing the foundational questions over moral responsibility, ignores the essential concern of Kant about autonomy. Apparently, at times it is not that easy to provide such an irreversible reading because Kant himself insistently inserts further elements into morality such as practical postulates or hinting a teleological conception of morality. Nevertheless, I contend that these concerns (likewise all other value-laden considerations) are but complementary aspects of his basics of morality. While autonomy as a rational innate capacity is inalienable, the robust actualization of this given/embedded rational capacity requires a healthy upbringing, sound education and even an averagely healthy society. Nevertheless, even in a hypothetical case in which an agent is deprived of these, Kant would contend that she could still possess the capacity of an immanent critique of moral disposition at least in potential.²⁸ Besides,

²⁸ For instance, see *Groundwork* 4:405 where Kant talks of a moral compass that common cognition has before her eyes, for a similar position see also *KprV* 5:92.

Kant excludes any “material grounds” for morality very clearly. Neither education, nor feelings, nor the idea of perfection, nor the will of God can establish the universal and necessary basis that Kant demands for morality (*KprV* 5:40-41). Therefore, Kant considers only the necessary minimum qualifications to depict autonomy. How and in what ways the mentioned parameters are to be involved in morality is about actualization of autonomy in varying degrees.

In my reading of Kant, I consider autonomy initially as our rational/moral capacity, which we immediately are aware as a fact of reason or as the inborn skill / “mother wit” which is constitutively normative (Chapter 2). It is not a prescription about how to act in a moral case – as each case necessarily requires our reasoning and judging peculiar to it –, but an awareness about our possibility to act either right or wrong. In this regard, it is helpful to remember that for Kant the sole objects of pure practical reason are good and evil (*KprV* 5:58-62). Kant argues that we are equipped by nature with a capacity to distinguish between good and evil beyond the instrumental reasoning that serves our favors. Unlike agreeable and pleasurable, good, and evil have universal validity because what refers to good is the morally principled action. And only when it is universally communicable and justifiable it is saved from contingency and becomes lawful. Thus, moral law as a fact of reason is not an innate idea or a positive law that is engraved in us. It is the unalienable pure normative capacity and the very normativity of judging itself. Even before the Kantian formula of it as categorical imperative, or the further procedural judging process of it in application as in the first formula; this rational capacity is ever ready in us. Kant throughout his moral works establishes the validity of this capacity; locates autonomy in the heart of morality prior to and apart from further concerns.

In this regard, as Kain also explicates very neatly, moral law has no author (Kain, 2004, p. 260). Even God is not the author of the moral law because he states, “Kant insists that natural, non-positive laws can have a legislator, but they do not have an author” (Kain, 2004, p. 280). Thus, neither we, nor God is the author of moral law because, as I have just mentioned, moral law is initially an empty capacity.

Kant’s repeated claim about the validity of moral law for all rational being is dependent upon the idea is that the author of law, in a sense, is Reason or pure will itself (*MS* 6:227, *G* 4:432, 4:440).

Reason must regard itself as the author of its principles independently of alien influences; consequently, as practical reason or as the will of a rational being it must be regarded of itself as free, that is, the will of such a being cannot be a will of his own except under the idea of freedom, and such a will must in a practical respect must be attributed to every rational being. (*G* 4:448)

This quotation provides a good example of the mutual necessitation of practical reason, will, freedom and moral law in their anonymity. Moral law, for the rational beings like us whose willing is effected by sensibility, i.e. impure, has the form of an imperative: which makes us both the subject and the author of this law (*KprV* 5:32). Accordingly, even the concept of God, and his goodness, is derived from this moral basis through the idea of perfection (*G* 4:410, 4:443). Reason determines the idea of holiness, by moral perfection (*KprV* 5:131) and it is attributed to the idea of God as the supreme moral agent. The will of God thus overlaps with the moral law as the perfect form of moral volition. Two things are important to highlight here. First, Kant demands humans only to regard themselves as the author the moral law. Second, moral law (with its immediacy) has an epistemic priority over the idea of God. These two points and above-mentioned comments about how moral law does not enable us to consider an author for itself in a full sense, point us that it is

epistemologically impossible for us to answer who the author of moral law is. This is the core of Kant's repeated awe and wonder about the very possibility of autonomy itself.²⁹

That theoretical agnosticism about the foundation of morality also stays at the very heart of Kant's philosophy of religion. On the one hand, Kant attributes an indispensable role to the idea of God for his moral theory, on the other hand he refrains attributing any foundational role even to this idea. Accordingly, Kant is mostly considered as the inventor of autonomous agency and morality, in particular because of his divergence from classical divine command and natural law theories (Schneewind, 1984, 1998; Nuyen, 1998). Kant's concern about prioritizing what we can access within our epistemic limitations over what we fail to cognize in principle regarding ontological issues also has influence on his understanding of divine / holy will. As stated, in the Kantian picture the holiness is attributed to divinity because of his being perfectly moral. Therefore, whatever is morally good, is good not because it is contingently willed to be so by a divinity; but it is rationally embedded in itself to be so independent of the agents. That is, Kant seems to be an intellectualist in this regard. Nevertheless, Kant's peculiar strategy enables him to embrace certain aspects of both intellectualism and voluntarism regardless of his apparent tendency towards intellectualism (Schneewind, 2002, p. 88). Namely, as the concept of God in principle excludes any immoral willing, whatever he wills is also necessitated to be morally good. Nevertheless, Kant is very clear and consistent about priority of morals above all else which is, not only the source but also the backbone of his religious thought. Thus, God is initially the supreme moral agent whose will is the moral law itself without being its author.

²⁹ For instance, see *Groundwork* 4:447, 452, 456, 459, 460, 461 and *KprV* 5:43, 47, 72, 151.

Kant contends that what we are capable of accessing is our share of the divine in us, i.e., the capacity to will godlike. In this regard moral law is holy (*KprV* 5:32), and the moral human agent has incommensurable dignity by her capacity towards holiness. Accordingly, Kant states that to be virtuous (a robust actualization of autonomy) is literally to become like a Deity (*KprV* 5:82). This idea of holiness in us and autonomy as dignity provides a perspective through which we are not beings only shaped by the needs and demands of the sensible world but become a member or a part of an order of all things with a telos (*KprV* 5:87). In her efforts to harmonize herself with this order through the guidance of the moral law, moral agent's freedom resembles beatitude which is the contentment of a supreme being free of inclinations (*KprV* 5:119). The conjunction of teleology and deontology becomes possible when the divinity is considered as the one supreme-law giver (*G* 4:439). Only through this teleological perspective moral agent can consider herself to harmonize or align her limited willing with an absolute and perfect counterpart (*KprV* 5:130). In this picture, divine will becomes a paradigm, a perfect model for human autonomy. Only through this perspective moral will becomes an intrinsic element of the fabric of things. Besides, the home for human experience, i.e., nature is saved from being an enemy, from its mechanistic estrangement and inertness, or blind unresponsiveness and absolute contingency.

So far, I depicted Kant's understanding autonomy as our rational moral capacity and discussed that autonomy can be considered also as the divine in us. Now, I want comment on how and why we can only have an objective justification for autonomy as capacity; and then why and how autonomy considered as a divine paradigm is an essential part of moral experience in Kant. My reading of Kant, starting from moral objectivism towards regarding autonomy as the divine in us

depends on this differentiation. I argue that, even though all healthy rational humans possess the potential of autonomy, i.e., share the universal ground for the communicability of objective basic moral principles; the way one fully actualizes herself, her freedom, namely autonomy, is shaped by her initial conception of autonomy and moral view of the world. In other words, our basic assumptions about who we are and where we are, influence on our judgments and attitudes in ethics, aesthetics, and religion. Reciprocally, those judgments and attitudes open ever new possibilities about who we could be and about our way of relating ourselves to our surroundings. As shall be discussed in the following sections, our understanding of justice and virtue; also, the richness and the scope of our interpreting moral imperative, virtue and duties of virtue also depend upon what we attribute to the morally willing. This can be achieved without violating Kant's basic concerns and principles about the ground of moral obligation and the content which is to be derived through a universalizable reasoning. Nonetheless, once moral volition is considered also as an instantiation of a moral telos it substantially transforms the moral experience and attentiveness.

One valid objection could be that it is possible to adhere to an understanding of autonomy as capacity which is already inexplicable as a determination by reason's spontaneity. That is, to interpret Kant's famous invitation for recognizing all duties as divine commands (*KprV* 5:129) one need not to think of an actual god, as an external moral legislator. Accordingly, the irreducibility of normative judgment itself can become the ground of attributing dignity to autonomy and autonomous agents without further reference. Kant often considers autonomy to be what gives us dignity and incommensurable inner worth (*G* 4:426, 435, 439, 440). In fact, my reading does not exclude or negate such an interpretation. Nevertheless, I argue that even if we opt

to start from the inalienable rational capacity of autonomy; which brings forth also inalienable rights and duties for the moral agent; we can provide justification for those rights and duties (via the application of categorical imperative), yet we cannot provide any objective justification for values (incommensurable or not) that are attributed to them. One can still prefer to attribute dignity or holiness to moral law or recognition of its demand in us without the idea of God. This is still a valid option that Kant also allows for. Nonetheless, that would result in a very deflationist reading in terms of moral teleology. Clearly, in the third *Critique* Kant argues that our teleological judgments are a form of reflexive judgment and do not extend our knowledge of the world, yet only play a regulative role with respect to totality of them (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that according to Kant what is only regulative and transcendent in theoretical is; actual, constitutive, and immanent for practical (*KprV* 5:48, 104, 133, 135). Accordingly, I argue that actuality of a divine will truly matters for the rational completeness and the health of the soul in moral experience. But being faithful to Kant's "intellectualism", and with the limits he rightly sets for our intuitive capacities; we recognize this will initially through moral law which is not external to us.

In this section I argued for a latitude in interpreting autonomy. This latitude starts from the irreducible and inalienable rational capacity to be moral. This primitive base does not demand any reference to values or teleology. We can provide justification of basic moral principles of justice and duties of virtue via applying to categorical imperative: first with the procedural reasoning of contradiction in conception and then in willing tests (Chapter 4 and 5). That provides us a cosmopolitan and non-relativist basis for moral theory. Nevertheless, I argue that those objectively valid first principles do not suffice to embrace moral experience.

Beyond this, autonomy is an organic experience of real moral agents, which means an ongoing, non-static, irreducible and inexplicable judgmental process about one's actualization of oneself. This latitude provides the paradigm of a divine will for autonomy which invites teleological and value-laden aspects into moral experience. That mobility has significant implications initially on the scope of our understanding of duties of virtue. In the following sections, I explicate how autonomy is actualized initially in our judgments about justice, then respectively on virtue. In all layers, I follow a judgment-based reading with their due justificatory status (from objective universal necessity to subjective conviction with universal communicability) and I neither reduce one's ontological convictions into mere psychologism, nor adopt an epistemic arrogance of claiming cognition about them, nor violate autonomous character of Kantian morality by attributing any foundational status to any such convictions.

CHAPTER FOUR

JUDGING ABOUT JUSTICE

In Chapter 3, I discussed Kant's notion of autonomy which allows an interpretive latitude between autonomy as an undeniable and inalienable capacity, towards a sense of autonomy as the divine in us which designates the capacity for moral excellence. This reading suggests considering morality in a holistic unity that embraces principles of justice and virtue, and judgments regarding religion and aesthetics. In this chapter I discuss how moral law, its form as a categorical imperative, as the synthetic *a priori* criterion of moral reasoning, operates initially as a limiting condition for the moral agent not to violate freedom and rights of one another. In this connection I analyze Kant's various formulations of the categorical imperative and prioritize the formula of universal law over others. I also argue that justice and virtue make two sides of the same coin and principles of justice is the basis of all moral affairs (embracing not only external rights). Finally, I state that because moral purposiveness of reason demands realization of a system of justice, Kant sets constituting a civil condition and global justice as a duty towards which we all must work.

Kant asserts that the purely formal part of metaphysic of morals from which everything empirical is cleansed of (*G* 4:389) determines the laws of human being's willing, i.e., the "laws in accordance with which everything ought to happen" (*G* 4:388). In the very beginning of the "Preface" of the *Groundwork*, Kant reminds us again what his peculiar conception of metaphysics means: it is the *a priori* principles of reason regarding the determinate objects of understanding. In the case of morals, it is about *a priori* principles of reason which specify how things ought to happen.

Though their application always considers the relevant conditions in which they are to be applied, the practical basic principles themselves lie *a priori* in our reason (*G* 4:390). Kant claims to introduce basic moral principles which have universal validity and necessity of a law, and this differentiates them from any practical rule, or from simply the pleasant or advisable way of doing things. Accordingly, that law of morality implies a very strict, and narrow scope which functions as the basis of morals – i.e., canon for moral judgment – rather than embracing its applications.

On the other hand, Kant argues that he is not introducing or constructing a new understanding of morality, also in reply to his critics, but instead he claims to provide a new formula that vindicates morality (*KprV* 5:8). Before introducing his formula of the moral law, i.e., categorical imperative, Kant discusses how moral reasoning differs from prudential reasoning, by having the form of lawful universalizability. Kant's central argument is that moral reasoning, the formula of which he announces to introduce; namely, the formula of moral autonomy, is an inherent capacity for all rational beings. Nevertheless, in the beginning of the first section of the *Groundwork*, he states that even though moral reasoning, or duty can be inferred from common cognition it is by this means is never to be derived from experience (*G* 4:406). Only a metaphysics of morals, that is not derived from human nature, anthropology, physics, or theology can provide "the indispensable substratum" for theoretical knowledge of duty, and at the same time makes it apparent to us how reason of itself can be practical and induce actions (*G* 4:410). Kant argues that practical good as determined by representations of reason is valid for all rational beings. And if this determination holds unconditionally, that is not dependent merely on an anticipated end, it becomes an unconditional necessity.

Kant states that the ground of moral obligation is the immediate determination of the will through universalizability. He argues that the universalizability is the form of moral volition which is initially neutral with respect to any ends (*G* 4:415, 441, 439, 444). Even though Kant oftentimes visualizes a human telos or regards culture as the ultimate aim of nature (e.g., see. *KdrV* A801/829) which I discuss in the following chapter (Chapter 5), he makes no references to any ends or telos to justify our moral obligations. Kant defines categorical imperative as practical necessity of an action as objectively necessary of itself without a further end (*G* 4:414). This depiction seems to say something like “x should be (done by) for all rational beings”. This truly leaves us with an empty form highlighting only “should” and “all rational beings”. Thus, Kant asserts that only one necessity is valid for us in our volition (i.e., maxim formations) and it is universal validity. Then he concludes that there is only a single categorical imperative to derive all imperatives of duty and thus it is an empty one (*G* 4:421). This is what famously called as the formula of universal law: “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it becomes a universal law” or “act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature”. In sum, basically categorical imperative is an empty formula with respect to any possible end of one’s maxim, and in its first moment it functions to allow or prohibit certain actions. Thus, the first formula of the moral law, categorical imperative, demands free rational agency first to establish basic moral principles which are primarily embodied as external laws, or rules of justice to specify what types of actions are permissible or not.

Before introducing two other formulations of the categorical imperative, Kant exemplifies how formula of universal law functions in specifying types of duties. As

a side note, it is not an issue of consensus how many formulations Kant provides for categorical imperative and if they are all mutually inclusive. Paton (1946) argues that Kant gives at least five formulations, whereas some commentators take it to be four (Nuyen, 1993). I will follow Kant's own explication, which he asserts clearly in *G* 4:431 and 4:436 that "practical principles of the will" and "three ways of representing the principle of morality", and regard it as three formulations of the one and the same law. In the *Groundwork* 4:422-5, Kant discusses duties to oneself and to others, and perfect and imperfect duties, through four cases. These cases are (i) suicide, (ii) lying promise, (iii) neglecting one's natural gift /capacities (altogether) and (iv) rejecting to contribute happiness of others systematically. Kant contends that once we consider these examples through the "canon of moral appraisal of action in general", or in other terms, through reflecting on our possible maxims by asking whether we are "able to will that a maxim of our action become a universal law" (*G* 4:424), we shall see that (i) and (ii) cannot even be thought without contradiction, and (iii) and (iv) cannot be willed consistently. The universalized counterparts of the first set ((i) and (ii)) is generally named as contradiction in conception and it provides us duties of justice, the second set is designated as ((iii) and (iv)) contradiction in willing and base duties of virtue. (Westphal, 2010, pp. 115-6; O'Neill, 2004, p. 103). Below I discuss duties of justice and virtue in more detail.

Kant occasionally reminds the reader that the full articulation and division of duties is reserved for a future *Metaphysics of Morals* (e.g., see the footnote of 4:422) and these examples only show that "all duties, as far as the kind of obligation (not the object of their action) is concerned, have by these examples been set out completely in their dependence upon *the one principle*" (*G* 4:424). In other words, Kant argues that the formula of universal law successfully justifies the basis of

doctrine of justice and doctrine of virtue. This is important to emphasize because this makes a crucial point in the discussion of moral realism and anti-realism that is discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 3). Despite the interpretations of these commentators who tend to ascribe some sort of moral realism to Kant (value realism or otherwise), I contend that the above analysis show that the first formula of autonomy clearly provides the necessary basis to justify basic moral principles or the broad categories of duties.

Kant states that moral law demands us to consider the notion of freedom as a problematic first premise. This problematic first premise, free rational agency, does not involve any reference to agent's dignity or requires the necessary end of flourishing or actualizing rational agency to vindicate morality. On the contrary, the mere idea of freedom which can specify its volition lawfully substantiates the basis of moral obligation. O'Neill (2002) argues that for the basic principles of morality – of justice and ethics– the most fundamental basis is the affirmation of a non-derivative and lawful form of this rational agency (O'Neill, 2002, p. 91). In other words, it is the agent's capacity of autonomy, i.e., her capacity to judge about how she may, can and ought to act which is also her capacity to judge for justifying reasons for her actions. That capacity is implicit in the spontaneity of reason and constitute normativity of moral judging itself.

Reflecting on our capacity to judge (again through the activity of judging itself) the agent cannot conceive anyone but oneself as the author of her judgments (*G* 4:448). This is significant because it shows that without looking from two distinct standpoints at ourselves, i.e. as intelligible and empirical beings, the activity of judging is experienced as the "pure self-activity" (*G* 4:452). That spontaneity of judging suffices to establish the practical actuality of free rational agency, even if it

does not provide a theoretical explication or understanding. In these lines, I contend that Bojanowski (2017b) rightly argues that Kant does not make an illegitimate move from spontaneity of reason in its theoretical use to establish practical freedom (Bojanowski, 2017b, pp. 57-66). Judging is already an activity in which reason is unified as one and the same reason of theoretical and practical, so that it can become a moving force for the agent without further motivations. Thus, categorical imperative stands for the intrinsic normativity of judging in morals which is why it is synthetic *a priori*.

Therefore, without delving into the dilemma of whether Kant is a compatibilist or incompatibilist about freedom³⁰, we can focus on irreducible normativity and activity of judging which suffices to establish autonomy. That initial conception of autonomy as capacity that requires no reference to any essence or foundation, discloses the constructivist “methodology” Kant introduces to justify basic moral principles through universalization requirement of the moral imperative. That sort of methodological constructivism, or “Natural Law Constructivism” as Westphal puts it (2016), suggests a neutral / agnostic position with respect to moral realism and anti-realism, yet argues for the justification of basic moral principles universally. The advantage of this approach is that it provides an applicability of Kant’s core moral concerns by applying to necessary minimum of qualities of rational agency and human condition. As formulated by O’Neill (1989), the key move for this sort of moral reasoning is to provide sufficient justificatory grounds for all parties involved. O’Neill does not narrow down the practical capacity that Kant attributes to reason by interpreting it in individualistic terms that relativizes the

³⁰ Wood ironically states that “when we consider all Kant’s view together, it is tempting to say that he wants to show not only compatibility of freedom and determinism, but also the compatibility of compatibilism and incompatibilism” (Wood, 1984, p. 74).

implicit lawfulness of willing (O'Neill, 2002). Along the same lines, emphasizing moral objectivism, Westphal states that human beings can establish basic moral principles of justice artificially but not arbitrarily. In other words, even though these basic principles are vindicated by collective reasoning and through justificatory reasons they are not relative or contingent. This is because the implicit normativity of judging, and our mutual inter-dependence as the finite habitants of a globe with limited sources who have limited capacities necessitate these principles.

This interpretation of Kant allows starting from the possible broadest notion of moral objectivism without reducing moral law itself into a man-made positive law. That is, neither we are “given” a content for the moral law as a fact of reason, nor we create such content *ex nihilo*. What we find “given” in this human condition on earth, is our very capacity to reason, i.e., the normativity of assessment of reasons, analysis, and evidence, that cannot be reduced into or covered by any sort of explanation (either genealogic, empirical, or metaphysical). Accordingly, this initial methodology (NLC) meets the justificatory demand for universalism and objectivism. That epistemically advantageous method does not imply a foundational explanatory claim about how this rational-normative capacity is ontologically possible. Only because we are the sort of rational agents we are, who can act on principles which we legislate to ourselves, we adopt non-arbitrary and necessary moral principles.

I need to elaborate a few points about this methodology in vindicating basic moral principles. It is one thing to argue that Kant is a constructivist, yet another to emphasize how Kant provides a constructivist methodology in moral theory. There are a few points that require such distinction. First, most constructivist readings disregard that moral cognition is synthetic *a priori* (Bojanowski, 2016, p. 1223),

while Kant explicitly states that without the possibility of “synthetic use of pure practical reason” morality would be a phantom (*G* 4:445). Besides, unlike mind-independent values of moral realism, Kant argues for a reasoning-dependent practical cognition of good and evil. The universal necessity of such cognition is not based on an intuition of moral facts or our voluntary attribution of or consensus about them. Moral cognition is carried through the judgmental process of maxim formations.

Nevertheless, I contend that even the most voluntarism-free constructivist reading of O’Neill is problematic at least in two respects. First, she argues that determining ground of the will is a practical proposition or principle that the agent adopts, not an efficient cause of action (O’Neill, 2002, p. 84). While it is true that we cannot argue for and localize any efficient causality for human actions, the phrase “practical proposition” sounds pretty much deflationist considering Kant’s whole ethical concerns. Our ultimate epistemic incapacity to capture self-activity of agency and the teleological references of Kant (even starting with the third formulation of the categorical imperative) entail a deeper and broader understanding of our *true selves*, beyond mere imputability.

The second point, which is relevant to the first is that O’Neill argues that “Kant never writes of autonomous selves, or persons or individuals” (O’Neill, 2004, p. 107) yet predicates it to reason, ethics, or principles (see also O’Neill, 2002, p. 86). I contend that such an unnecessary split between reason and self, further problematizes our attributing at least some sort of causality to moral willing which could further be interpreted as an instantiation of telos in conjunction of teleology and deontology. Therefore, I argue that to be able grasp all Kantian concerns, as is the aim of this study, even if I anticipate the constructivist methodology Kant

proposes, it cannot be a reductionist one about agency, – or about our true selves – because of anti-realist false premises. In these regards, my explication of Kantian autonomy, in its first conceptualization as a capacity, adopts a constructivist methodology which prioritizes the first formulation of the categorical imperative over the others, as Kant himself does. Nevertheless, the subjective step of conceptualizing autonomy at the same time as the instantiation of the divine in us, or as a paradigm, provides the comprehensive moral experience that the overall Kantian corpus portrays. Our consensus on the basic moral principles and the initial derivation of duties of justice and virtue is possible with the first conceptualization of autonomy as a capacity to which we can ascribe objective validity or justification. In this regard, rather than excluding several passages of Kantian corpus for the sake of anti-realism or centralizing some others even at the expense of violating Kant's own redlines for autonomy; I propose to consider autonomy initially as an inalienable rational capacity yet argue that the actualization of this capacity opens a legitimate interpretive spectrum regarding the inexplicability of this capacity.

Now let me analyze briefly how the other two formulations of the categorical imperative is compatible with what has been discussed so far. In *G* 4:428 Kant states that:

But suppose there were something the existence of which in itself has an absolute worth, something which as an end in itself could be a ground of determinate laws; then in it, and in it alone, would lie the ground of a possible categorical imperative, that is, of practical law.

Right after this puzzling passage, Kant introduces the second formulation of the categorical imperative, i.e., Formula of Humanity (FH): *“So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means”* (*G* 4:429). After these passages he provides again four cases to exemplify how the formula of humanity is operative in

actuality to establish types of basic duties of justice and virtue (*G* 4:429-31). In these passages, Kant talks of rational nature as an objective end with an unconditional worth. Moral realists, like Wood, base their interpretation on the passages between *G* 4:427-429 to argue for the “substantial value” which is necessary “to motivate” us for morality (Wood, 2006, p. 16).

Between *G* 4:431 and 4:436 Kant introduces the third formula of the practical principle in a much loose, and far less motto-like style. It is usually formulized either as the “Formula of Autonomy” (FA)³¹ (e.g., see Paton, 1946; Nuyen, 1993; Wood, 2008) namely as “the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law” (*G* 4:431), or as the idea of the will that “could regard itself as at the same time giving universal law thorough its maxim” (*G* 4:434, for a similar phrasing see also *G* 4:432). In some other places it is also designated as the “Formula Realm (/Kingdom) of Ends”: “Every rational being must act as if he were by his maxim at all times a lawing member of the universal kingdom of ends” (*G* 4:438).

In *G* 4:436 Kant gives us the proper strategy about how to regard these “three ways of representing” the same moral law. He states that from the first to the third formulation, in each step we proceed towards a more intuitive and determined conception of the moral maxim. In the first formula we start with the “form”, the second formulation emphasizes further the proper “ends” and the third one gives a “complete determination” of the moral maxim that sets the “harmony” of all rational beings’ willing. Nevertheless, Kant asserts that it is better to follow “the strict method” and prioritize the first formula of universal law over others (*G* 4:437), since it provides the objective aspect of the moral principle and grounds all practical law giving (*G* 4:431).

³¹ In *G* 4:433 Kant introduces this title himself: “I will therefore call this principle the principle of the autonomy of the will . . .”.

I argued that judging about basic principles of justice does not require a reference to any necessary ends to vindicate itself, whereas the credibility of this reading needs to face the threat posed by the above-mentioned passages *G* 4:427-429. Even though Kant apparently talks of absolute worth, dignity of human agency or incommensurability; he neither achieves nor even tries to demonstrate or justify them. His general strategy of establishing moral autonomy, as argued thus far, advocates the absolute independence of practical reason to be practical of itself and justifies moral principles through the lawful form of volition. Therefore, under the light of this general picture, the necessary end of rational nature, or the emphasis of FH should be regarded initially as a “supreme limiting condition” between moral agents while setting their subjective ends (*G* 4:431, 438), or only as “a negative end” indicating what should be avoided (*G* 4:437). Besides, Kant constantly connects the idea of dignity of rational agents with their law-giving capacity (*G* 4:439), and explicitly states that “autonomy is therefore the *ground* of dignity of the human nature and of every rational nature” (*G* 4:436) rather than the other way around. Besides, the idea of being a member of an intelligible world (realm of ends) also functions initially as a negative thought which indicates that we are not determined by laws of nature (*G* 4:458). Accordingly, regarding ourselves as if we are members of such a realm is at best, only an idea that is “useful and permitted for producing in us a lively interest in the moral law” (*G* 4:462). Nevertheless, for the moral law Kant once again repeats that the only valid basic criterion we have is the formal condition i.e., “the universality of the maxims of the will as law and so of autonomy of the will, which alone is compatible with its freedom” unlike all other laws that are determined with reference to an object and suffer from heteronomy (*G* 4:458).

Now let me emphasize the distinction Kant draws between duties of justice and duties of virtue which has been sketched above as narrow/wide or perfect/imperfect duties in the discussion of the categorical imperative. Kant asserts that our subjective principle of action, i.e., maxim, is morally valid, if it is determined (or checked) by the objective principle of the moral law namely by the categorical imperative. An action can be legal (just), ethical (good), both or none. Additionally, an action can be legal but not ethical, however it is not possible for an action to be ethical but unjust. Kant excludes the last alternative because what is defined as duty of justice holds for both realms i.e., both for ethical and legal contexts. We are not given different principles to act in accordance with each. The basic difference lies in the idea that one is about the external (juridical) and the other is about the internal (ethical) aspect of actions.

In the introduction of *Metaphysics of Morals* Kant clearly argues for how and why these two aspects of actions are to be interwoven. For instance, one can be coerced to keep one's promise, say in a contractual relation. While the (external) act of fulfilling one's promise is about the legal/jurisprudential status of the action; the maxim that the agent adopts in keeping her promise embodies the ethical aspect of the same action (*MS* 6:221). If it is not done through fear of punishment, or with an expectation of a price, but the action is done because the agent judged it to be the right thing to do (namely if it is done from duty) then the action also has ethical worth. In this respect, the external status of actions is characterized by "rights and duties" which makes the first part of morals as "Doctrine of Justice" (*RL*). Our interpersonal relations are regulated by the "Universal Principle of Right" thus the coexistence of everyone's freedom of choice without violating others' rights or omitting our strict duties is possible (*MS* 6:231). The second part of morals, *Doctrine*

of *Virtue (TL)*, goes beyond the outer conditions of freedom to discuss wide duties towards ourselves and others. In the first sphere our duties are defined only with respect to their formal and external conditions and no specific ends for actions are specified. Nevertheless, in *TL* Kant specifies certain ends which are also duties in accordance with moral law. I analyze duties of virtue in detail in Chapter 5.

In *Doctrine of Justice (RL)* 6:229 Kant defines the content of this doctrine as follows: “The sum of those laws for which an external lawgiving is possible is called the Doctrine of Right (*Ius*)”. Kant’s use of the term *Recht*, throughout the *Rechtslehre* initially covers external relations:

The concept of right, insofar as it is related to an obligation corresponding to it (i.e., the moral concept of right), has to do, *first*, only with the external and indeed practical relation of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as deeds, can have (direct or indirect) influence on each other. . . . Right is therefore the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom. (*RL* 6:230)

Kant’s use of the term *Recht* corresponds to Latin *Ius* and therefore its translation renders both the meanings of right and justice. Accordingly, the term *Recht* has a moral ground beyond mere legality of actions. That sense of legality with a moral normativity nevertheless still deals initially with external relations.³² Thus, Gregor (1996) explains one of her reasons to opt for “right”, rather than “justice” in her translation of *Recht* that *Rechtslehre* which she describes as a treatise on legal justice rather than social justice (Gregor, 1996, pp. 358-359). Nevertheless, I prefer the designation of “Duties of Justice” to emphasize the alliance of justice and virtue for Kantian morals.

According to Kant, the duties of virtue are already grounded on the principles of justice, that is, no violation of rights of others or omitting of strict duties can be

³² See also *Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism* (2005), entry on “Right”, p. 239.

virtuous. Emphasizing this issue is significant to claim that legal/political and moral principles are derived from the same ground, political system and morality are mutually dependent and justice is the initial requirement for the moral health of the agent and society in general. A just political system serves as a necessary precondition to secure lawful use of freedom, so that virtuous people can set and realize their free ends, i.e., achieve their permissible understanding of happiness or good life.

It is important to emphasize again that in the *Groundwork* 4:424 Kant announces universalizability principle as the canon of moral judgment (see also Chapter 2). Namely, it is a formal *conditio sine qua non* for identifying and justifying obligatory, permissible, and forbidden kinds of actions (Westphal, 2016, pp. 81-91). Universalization tests also requires practical anthropology and sufficiently mature moral agency and moral literacy to “judge” and specify exactly what specific right action is to be taken at a specific circumstance (see again Chapter 2). The limiting conditions regarding the permissible / impermissible types of actions which are set by *RL* categorically excludes certain “types of action” (such as “extortion, deception, fraud, and exploitation” see Westphal, 2006, p. 85) from social-moral domain.

Therefore, rules of justice do not regulate merely some sort of a non-interference between the members of a society (by setting what should be omitted not to violate the rights of others), but it establishes just/fair principles of how each member of a society should be treated (e.g., never merely as a means). Accordingly, it is a mistake to consider *RL* only as a set of duties, but it should be regarded also as setting the forms of acquirable rights. Kant’s articulation in *RL* starts with asserting the “only innate right” to freedom (*RL* 6:237). He then articulates how this innate right of freedom allows us to acquire further rights which bring along certain duties

in turn. Therefore, the following section on “Private Right” establishes the juridical, rightful conditions for acquiring property, keeping contracts, or partaking in interpersonal relations such as marriage or parenthood (*RL* 6:246-308). To claim any such rights in principle involves one’s understanding and acceptance of the full obligations of that right, and the permissible ways in which that right can be used justly (Westphal, 2016a, p. 119). In this regard, doctrine of justice not only regulates the “negative” sense of freedom but also frames how we can “actualize” our freedom in just ways. Accordingly, all these practical aspects of the doctrine of justice cannot be dissociated from again mature moral judging and all social and institutional conditions that can pave the way for it. Therefore, one’s further subjective beliefs, reflections or hopes about moral teleology or coming of an ethical community is also inseparable from principles of justice which grounds the fundamental principles of the moral domain but also a moral view of the world.

Besides, there are several cases where outward and inward duties are intermingled, blurring the boundaries between strict duties of justice and broad duties of virtue as in the cases of “intentional murder vs. self-defense” and “lying vs. misspeaking without intention of deception” (Westphal, 2016, p. 89). In fact, as it is analyzed in §5.4 Kant does not categorize duties merely as groups of broad and narrow. In *TL* he introduces “strict” duties of virtue that are binding unconditionally even though there can be no external constraint regarding them. For these reasons, even though we cannot draw a strict boundary between justice and virtue, it is through the imputability of actions to agents, that in the domain justice, or external duties and rights, we can legitimately coerce one another to omit or commit certain actions. This is operative even without regarding oneself and one another as dignified members of a possible realm of ends or an ethical community. Though

character integrity does not set such compartments to one's moral reasoning in everyday life; moral theory requires us to notice what we can justify multilaterally or for all parties involved rather than simply with a group of people with shared values and hopes.

There are several recent works which highlights that according to Kant virtue and moral character is the backbone of morality.³³ This current study also aims to state the continuity of jurisprudence and ethics in the Kantian corpus. Nevertheless, this continuity apparently starts with the priority of moral cognition of the right action over the good or morally worthy ones. As shall be discussed in the following chapter, moral character, and the duty to be virtuous makes the core idea of Kantian virtue ethics, whereas categorical imperative initially operates not to guide us on what good life is but about what actions are obligatory, prohibited, or permissible. In that initial point, unlike the guidelines for virtuous action, it is even possible to think of a legitimate external constraint. This makes one of the most substantial aspects of Kantian autonomy, that is, as cognizant rational agents who live together and inescapably dependent on one another we can conduct our relations justly by universalizable laws and rules.

As a last point, I would like to discuss very briefly that Kant's basic principles of justice have a cosmopolitan spirit and his discussion of "private rights" is followed by "public rights" which ultimately projects a universal system of justice. To argue whether or how Kant's basic principles of justice also provide a basis for legal system – in terms of positive laws – requires a separate study. Nevertheless, my aim in briefly mentioning this continuity is to show that the idea of an ethical

³³ For instance, Louden's *Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings* (2000); and Baxley's *Kant's Theory of Virtue* (2010) very successfully explicate centrality of virtue in Kantian morals.

community (§5.5) or the ideal of realizing a highest good on earth, both of which symbolize a harmonious togetherness of moral agents in a just social system, have their normative force from the principles of justice. Therefore, it is significant to assert how principles of justice devise a political-legal order as a condition of morality.

Kant argues for the innateness of right for free action and to be able to actualize this capacity a civil condition is necessitated in which one's intelligible possession of something and one's mastery over one's own person is guaranteed. Kant envisages that this civil condition extends the limits of a single state and develops as a binding principle for the whole human race. Therefore, the transition from "private right" to "public right" and from "the right of a state" to "the right of nations (states)" and the "cosmopolitan right" displays a continuity (*RL* 6:354-5) where singular actions of an individual is either allowed or obliged by external laws.

In "What is Enlightenment?" [*WE*] (1784) and in his much later works such as "Towards Perpetual Peace" [*PP*] (1795) and "On the Common Saying" [*TP*] (1793) Kant emphasizes the importance of freedom of speech and belief. No authority other than the dictates of one's own reason is allowed to claim hegemony over human beings who are to set ends for themselves freely, so long as they act respecting the freedom of others. Kant points that only in a just political system to act morally and freely, and realization of one's moral and morally permissible ends which could serve for her happiness can be mobilized and secured. Therefore, moral individuals, who act "as if" they are members of a realm of ends – regardless of the moral deficiencies of the current society they happen to be in – are morally responsible to make such a just realm/system actual.

In other words, the fact that what is legal and what is moral appears in a continuity in Kant's thought demands the betterment of political condition as a requirement of ethical life. In "Towards Perpetual Peace", Kant underlines that it would be absurd to think of a contradiction between politics as a doctrine of justice and morals (*PP* 8:371). The crucial point for Kant is that so long as both are determined according to the formal principle of reason rather than the material principle of the human condition, they shall be legislating from the same ground. Practical consistency requires the compatibility of external relations and one's maxims. Therefore, public justice and ultimately global peace subtly manifests "as a condition arising from acknowledgment of duty":

The latter principle must undoubtedly take precedence; for, as a principle of right, it has unconditional necessity, whereas the former necessitates only if the empirical conditions of the proposed end, namely of its being realized, are presupposed; and even if this end (e.g., perpetual peace) were also a duty, it would still have to be derived from the formal principle of maxims for acting externally. Now the first principle, that of the political moralist (the problem of the right of a state, the right of nations, and cosmopolitan right), is a mere technical problem (*problema technicum*), whereas the second, as the principle of the moral politician, for whom it is a moral problem (*problema morale*), is far removed from the other in its procedure for leading to perpetual peace, which is now wished for not only as a natural good but also as a condition arising from acknowledgment of duty. (*PP* 8:378)

Kant takes both the idea of perpetual peace and even general will as a coming, evolving progress, a kind of dynamic development.³⁴ Even if at any specific moment of history, a complete achievement of this ideal cannot be actual, Kant is optimistic about maturation of people and societies. Maturation in this context refers to rationalization and "having the courage and resolution to use one's own" understanding without direction from another (*WE* 8:35). Accordingly, moral

³⁴ See also *PP* 3:386 : "If it is a duty to realize the condition of public right, even if only in approximation by unending progress, and if there is also a well-founded hope of this, then the perpetual peace that follows upon what have till now been falsely called peace treaties (strictly speaking, truces) is no empty idea but a task that, gradually solved comes steadily closer to its goal (since the times during which equal progress takes place will, we hope, becomes always shorter".

bindingness of aiming and working for a better and better system of justice and political order cannot be denied because of the corruption of the current states of affairs.

In this chapter, I discussed Kant's elaboration of the categorical imperative which is the formal principle of moral willing. Although Kant's different formulations of the moral imperative reflects different aspects of the same principle, I argued that in justifying universal basic principles of justice prioritizing formula of universal law which provides the most formal and strict canon for moral judgment is legitimate. It enables to justify and give justificatory reasons for moral action without reference to values, ontological assumptions, or teleological interpretations. Kant's conception of autonomy as the inalienable property of human agency (Chapter 3) and the implicit normativity of judging (Chapter 2) provides the necessary minimum basis to justify and even to enforce principles of justice to be in effect across all layers of moral domain (i.e., in the interpersonal relation and relations between agents and institutions and state, and between the states). In this connection, I also argued that purposiveness of moral reasoning itself, namely the practical capacity to set moral ends and to claim their possibility, also necessitates a just society and political order even without a reference to teleology. Nevertheless, one's attentiveness and adherence to justice and to the duty of working towards a reign of justice is consolidated even further if she judges that autonomy is the divine in us and the teleological order of all things are morally responsive. And as the following chapter argue, this subjectively valid way of judging enriches and consolidates one's adherence to and interpretation of her moral agency and responsibilities in every aspect of her moral experience including justice, virtue, aesthetics, and religion.

CHAPTER FIVE

JUDGING ABOUT VIRTUE AND SETTING ENDS

5.1 Introduction

This section aims to analyze the concept of virtue in its Kantian context and how it relates to notion of autonomy analyzed so far. Virtue introduces a more personal or intrapersonal aspect of morals. It also introduces the collective aspect of moral wellness according to Kant. Therefore, analyzing broad connotations of virtue gets us closer to consider what it could mean to talk of moral health along with Kantian autonomy. To achieve this, I proceed in four subsections. First, I start with giving a brief account of how Kant describes virtue in general as strength or some sort of strife. Second, I study “duties of virtue” in which Kant introduces us the “necessary ends”, i.e., matter of morality. Thirdly, I focus on “the duty of virtue” i.e., “virtuous disposition” that Kant introduces as the sole ever-necessary strict (/perfect) duty, holding for all actions. That aspect of virtue introduces the positive dimension of virtue beyond. Understood as such, virtue refers to more than mere moral strength or resistance, and it makes the core of a moral character and moral contentment. Finally, I reflect upon Kant’s idea of “realm of virtue”, in other words, his conception of ethical community which stands as the ideal to approximate for virtuous agents. In these four steps I argue that a robust actualization of Kantian autonomy aims at an upright moral character, a self-contented moral integrity, and a harmonious togetherness of moral agents in which inter-personal relations include care beyond indifferentism. In this moral collectivity, each can consider one another as the co-constructor of a better world. As it is explicated in the conclusion of this section, how to understand this intra and inter-personal aspect of virtue is also

significant as it shows how Kantian autonomy could relate to his moral teleology, i.e., the purposiveness of moral experience in its broad sense. Nevertheless, while our obligation to the duties of virtue can be justified universally, the further assumptions regarding moral teleology and moral view of the world – which are subjectively necessary – cannot be claimed objective and necessary.

5.2 What is virtue?

Kant provides a systematic conception of virtue which is distinguished from the ancient conception of virtue generally described as certain character traits, customized actions, reactions, habits, or behaviors such as courage, moderation, or temperance all which Kant claims have only conditional worth (*G* 4:394). In several places Kant's initial definition of virtue is a "strength" or a "resistance". It is the strength of the will, not to be guided or deceived by whatever stands against the command of the duty. This inner strength of the will with respect to one's moral motivation is about one's general disposition which necessitates one to reflect on her inner states and intentions continuously, rather than being relevant to single actions. This state is initially considered negatively by Kant, as it is basically built upon the idea of self-constraint or even self-denial. Now let me look closely at Kantian virtue from three aspects.

(1) First, virtue is about one's moral motivation, in other words, it is about acting from the moral ground of duty. This basically beckons us Kant's idea of respect for the law or its subjective counterpart moral feeling. As Kant states in *TL* 6:410, lawgiving in ethics "can be a law of . . . only for the maxims of the actions" and in this regard acting from respect for the moral law is the core formal aspect of ethics. Unlike the doctrine of justice, ethics does not specify certain actions of commission

or omissions. *Doctrine of Virtue* also sets obligatory ends to adopt, and this is the matter of ethics as discussed below in § 5.3.

It is obvious that Kant's overall moral philosophy (embracing both duties of justice and duties of virtue) is built upon the idea of universalizable maxims as is formulated in the form of categorical imperative. In *TL* 6:383 Kant asserts that what essentially distinguishes a duty of justice from a duty of virtue is that; in the former external constraint is morally permissible and possible, whereas in the latter only self-constraint is possible. This free self-constraint "involves consciousness of the capacity to master one's inclinations when they rebel against the law, a capacity which, though not directly perceived, is yet rightly inferred from the moral categorical imperative". This mastery is one's working on one's own intentions, motives, and inclinations. Apparently, as Kant's final position in *Religion* tells us, inclinations themselves are not evil (*R* 6:35, 6:58), whereas the possibility that they can be prioritized over the respect for duty, or they can become a setback from duty is the reason for demanding mastery over them. Therefore, beyond autonomy, which is the law-giving capacity of practical reason; virtue is autocracy (i.e., self-control or self-governance) of practical reason for the finite rational beings like us ("*arbitrium sensitivum*, yet not *brutum* but *liberum*", A534/B562) who are not holy and whose willing can be affected by sensations or inclinations. No one else but the moral agent herself can fathom into the depths of her heart (*TL* 6:441), namely into the true ground of her maxim. In this self-reflection, virtue is the effort to form or adopt maxims of actions from or through the idea of duty, morality, or virtue itself. Maxims should not be formed initially to avoid some pain or gain some pleasure.

In several passages Kant highlights that formal or internal aspect of morals by arguing that virtue is about one's use of her inner freedom which means one's lawful constraint of oneself through the representation of duty (*TL* 6:394, 6:410) and states:

. . . what others give us can establish no maxim of virtue. For, a maxim of virtue consists precisely in the subjective autonomy of each human being's practical reason and so implies that the law itself, not the conduct of other human beings, must serve as our incentive. (*TL* 6:480)

(2) Secondly, virtue as strength demands a continuous self-reflection from the agent likewise a meta-judging over her overall judgmental processes, decision makings. It is significant to emphasize two things at this point. One is that I contend that according to Kant virtue is initially a judgmental capacity which embraces and configures one's maxims, attitudes, dispositions, and actions. Kant argues that "virtue cannot be defined as an aptitude for free actions in conformity with law unless there is added "to determine oneself to act through the thought of the law"". Therefore, it is not simply a habit to make preferences in a certain way continuously, but about an aptitude to judge in a certain way (i.e., an aptitude of the "faculty of desire, in adopting a rule, also gives it as a universal law") (*TL* 6:407). In this regard, virtue is about our life principles governing not only our habits or actions but deep down our intentions, maxims, and attitudes. It is the "considered, firm, and continually purified principles" that make us ready and "armed for all situations and new temptations" (*TL* 6:384).

Kant states that not all habits are free actions in the moral sense, thus the inner freedom relevant to virtue demands to master over one's affects and govern one's passions through the thought of law. Therefore, virtue aims to "bring all his capacities and inclinations under his (reason's) control and so to rule over himself, which goes beyond forbidding him to let himself be governed by his feelings and inclinations" (*TL* 6:408). Accordingly, virtue is initially about one's self-reflective

mindset as Kant claims virtue presupposes apathy, “*a tranquil mind*” as the proper “state of *health*” in the moral life rather than a reflection-free set of habits or customs which are only in conformity with the law. In the same lines, Kant also underscores that virtue cannot be based on affection, not even on the “love of virtue” itself because “an affect, even one aroused by the thought of *what is good*, is a momentary, sparkling phenomenon” (TL 6:408). Therefore, the principles which are the basis of one’s moral disposition and character “must be built on concepts” rather than feelings that only have momentary effects (KprV 5:157). Therefore, the firm resolution of virtue demands a persistence achieved by our continuous self-reflective judging upon our principles of actions and upon the ends we set for ourselves.

The other significant point is that virtue is a strength that we can and should acquire rather than a natural predisposition likewise the respect for the law, or moral feeling. In the *Groundwork* Kant describes respect for the law as the representation of the law in a rational being, or the subjective effect of the law, or our consciousness of our subordination to law (G 4:401). In the second *Critique*, he further explicates respect as a human condition equating it with the moral feeling: “*respect for the moral law* moves hindrances out of the way lawful willing, in the judgment of reason this removal is esteemed as a positive feeling furthering the causality of law, it can also be called as *moral feeling*” (KprV 5:75-76). That is, “respect for the law, which in its subjective aspect is called moral feeling, is identical with consciousness of one’s duty” (TL 6:464) and any healthy, mature human agent has this consciousness or “natural predispositions” which provides us the “subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty” (TL 6:399). It causes awe or wonder that “pure respect for the law can have *more power* and be a *stronger incentive* than all other considerations” so that we act on it in specifying our volition (KprV 5:151). Thus,

our duty is not about acquiring this consciousness but cultivating it. Virtue, on the contrary, is continuously acting on this consciousness and gaining the strength, resolution, or aptitude of doing so through exercise. Therefore, in several passages Kant emphasizes that virtue is not innate (e.g., *TL* 6:477), but it is to be acquired by exercise or one's working on oneself. Kant states that "this capacity as *strength* (*robur*) is something he must acquire" through "contemplating the dignity of the pure rational law in us (*contemplation*) and by practicing virtue (*exercitio*)" so that the inborn moral incentive in us is enhanced (*TL* 6:397).

According to Kant, even though we can talk of particular "virtuous actions", what matters most is not the worth of singular actions and virtue is about one's comprehensive moral disposition that makes her moral character (*KprV* 5:152). For instance, whenever he discusses the notion of the highest good, the "virtue" component of the highest good stands for one's overall moral worth (e.g., see *KprV* 5:110-115). In *Religion*, Kant explicates further the idea that virtue is about one's overall moral worth with references to the notions of "supreme grounds of all our maxims", "universal maxim of the power of choice" or "supreme maxim" (*R* 6:36, 39, 46, 51).

In *Religion* 6:47, Kant makes a distinction between virtue in legal sense (i.e., being virtuous for prudential reasons) and virtue in ethical or true sense (i.e., being "morally good" or "pleasing to God"). In the former, virtue (*virtus phaenomenon*) has "the abiding maxim of lawful actions, no matter whence one draws the incentives that the power of choice needs for such actions" and in one's empirical character it is possible to consider this as a progress in time by the gradual accumulation of certain habitual actions. Kant argues that in such habitual picture the slightest change in the heart is not necessary because he seems to consider that in this case the reflective,

judgmental alertness that virtue demands on one's heart is lacking. In such cases, Kant states that one is motivated (or moved) not by "the supreme ground of all maxims, namely duty" but by prudential reasons such as avoiding some harm, gaining some benefits or just by the desire for a good fame. Kant asserts that we all have a fundamental maxim in life, as the supreme condition underlying all our singular maxims and actions, according to which we are either morally good or bad (*R* 6:39). According to this, the criterion for moral goodness is not about whether or which inclinations are involved in our determining of maxims, but what is decisive is our "prioritization" of (*R* 6:37) – or failing to prioritize– the moral incentive. In other words, what matters is whether the idea of duty is prioritized above the incentives from our inclinations which can be considered under the concept of "self-love" in general. So long as our "supreme ground of all our maxims, according to which the law itself is to be incorporated into the power of choice" stands "as the *self-sufficient* incentive of that power", rather than self-love (i.e., moral maxim being subordinated to other inclinations), we are morally good and virtuous in our intelligible character (*virtus noumenon*) (*R* 6:46-7). Accordingly, experience cannot expose the true ground of that supreme maxim. Thus, even though practicing virtue is a "path of constant progress from bad to better" from our own perspective, the change in one's supreme maxim is considered as a "change of heart", an inner "revolution as if one single act" (*R* 6:48) from God's perspective who truly knows all hearts.

Therefore, Kant states that "transformation of the disposition of an evil human being into the disposition of a good human being is to be posited in the change of the supreme inner ground of the adoption of all the human being's maxims in accordance with the ethical law" (*R* 6:51). Once such a change is achieved, it is "unchangeable". The full explication of Kant's distinction between our empirical and

intelligible character, or how to make best sense of it consistently is not my concern here. What is relevant to my explication of virtue is that our moral worth or virtue is about our authentic moral consciousness or disposition which is rooted deep down in our hearts. Thus, we cannot know even our own moral worth with certainty, let alone speculate vainly about the true moral worth of any other. Nevertheless, even the “depths of heart (supreme ground) is inscrutable” (*R* 6:51) for us, as Kant underscores in several other places (see *TL* 6:441-2, 6:447), through constant effort and attentiveness we have right to be hopeful about its goodness.

(3) Thirdly, Kant’s evaluation of virtue or acting from the resolution based on duty mostly involves a negative tone implying a suppression of oneself, a rationally oppressed or even denied sensitive nature. For this reason, acting from duty has been caricaturized not only by philosophers of today like Micheal Stocker³⁵ but it was mocked by Kant’s contemporaries like Schiller.³⁶ In fact, as discussed above Kant’s final position on the purity of maxims allows incorporation of our inclinations into our maxims, so long as acting from the idea of duty is not conditional upon them.³⁷ Furthermore, as this study argues moral autonomy embraces one’s moral health including her empirical wellness (or morally permissible happiness) and joyous state of virtue. (These two issues are discussed in §5.3 and § 5.4). Nevertheless, to be able

³⁵ Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories”, 1976, p. 454.

³⁶

Scruples of conscience
I like to serve my friends, but unfortunately I do it with inclination
And so I often am bothered by the thought that I am not virtuous.
Decision
There is no other way but this! You must seek to despise them,
And do with repugnance what duty bids you

Friedrich Schiller, Xenien, *The Philosophers in Goethe, Werke*, ed. Erich Trunz (Munich: Beck, 1982), Volume 1, p. 28. This translation is from Allen Wood’s *Kantian Ethics*, 2008, p. 281.

³⁷ In the *Groundwork* Kant seems to pursue a sterner attitude as he demands good will to be free of all empirical determinations (e.g., 4:413, 458). Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that in the *Groundwork*, Kant discusses the supreme principle of morality itself in its purity before it is applied to human nature, yet even in that context he points how such a groundwork for morals needs practical anthropology for its application (*G* 4:338).

to capture Kant's understanding of virtue in its completeness, now I focus on the sense of oppression involved in virtue and its possible background in Kant's thought.

Kant consistently argues that virtue is a never-completed progress for us humans who are imperfect rational beings. It is an unattainable ideal for us whereas it is a duty to approximate that ideal constantly. Considering our nature, "virtue can never settle down in peace and quiet with its maxims adopted once and for all but, if it is not rising, is unavoidably sinking" (*TL* 6:409). He further associates the effort for moral cognition of oneself with a "descent into the hell" in that journey as one initially comes across with obstacles against good, an "evil will actually present in him" (*TL* 6:441). Therefore, it could bring initially a rejoice only at having escaped from being found punishable. In this regard, Kant states that a virtuous inner state is not a blessedness found in "*positive* (joy) but merely *negative* (relief from preceding anxiety); and this alone is what can be ascribed to virtue, as a struggle against the influence of the evil principle in a human being" (*TL* 6:440). Furthermore, Kant contends that moral law "often requires a self-denial", being suspicious of self-conceit "with unceasing apprehension of relapsing" (*TL* 6:407, *KprV* 5:158). Considering all, a "dry and earnest representation" is more suited for duty (*KprV* 5:157). Thus, being in conflict (*KprV* 5:84), and a in a state of "negative feeling" (*KprV* 5:88) well depicts the burdensome and endless practice of being virtuous.

It is apparent that Kant adopts a substantial pessimism about human nature. The ground of this distrust can be found in his reference to "*radical* innate *evil* in human nature" (*R* 6:35) rooted in the Christian doctrine of the original sin. In *Religion*, Kant discusses at length how it is possible for human being not to follow moral law, even though we have an "original predisposition to good" (*R* 6:43), consciousness of the moral law is an inborn rational capacity for us and "the law

rather imposes itself ... irresistibly" (*R* 6:36). He states that "deviation of the maxims from the moral" is "a natural propensity of the human being to evil" which belongs to whole human species (*R* 6:29) and "is woven into human nature" (*R* 6:30). He depicts three grades of this propensity as frailty (to comply with the adopted maxim), impurity (to mix moral incentive with immoral ones) and depravity (to adopt evil maxims).

Kant considers two senses of the term "deed" to explicate how our faculty of choice can be deemed responsible for its evil deeds, even if it's a natural propensity in us and "belongs to whole human species without exemption" (*R* 6:25). First, he argues that this propensity is our own responsibility preceding every deed of us which is not a particular physical deed itself; but it is an intelligible, innate deed (that is not in time) seemingly an assumed "supreme evil maxim". Kant relates this to the Christian doctrine of *peccatum originarium* (original sin) and tries to fit it into his moral thought without undermining our freedom and moral responsibility and argues that it is our own deed as it belongs to our own nature. The second sense of "deed" relates to our misuse of our power of choice through our immoral choices "that resists the law materially" and relates to sensible and empirical world and is called "vice". He names the second deed *peccatum derivativum* or a (derivative, material) sin, continuing his use of religious terminology. Kant states that the former, intelligible deed, i.e., the original sin, makes the formal ground of every bad deed of the second sort. While it is possible to try to avoid the second sort of deeds as much as one can, it is impossible for us to free ourselves from the first. Kant insists that this natural "propensity" to evil never clashes with freedom and our accountability of evil doing and "always come about through one's own fault" as it is not a "natural predisposition" (*R* 6:30-2).

Nevertheless, in such a picture human always starts from some sorts of evil even when in good disposition, as “this is a debt which is impossible for him to wipe out” (*R* 6:72). Therefore, according to Kant perversity of the heart “can coexist with a will which in the abstract is good” (*R* 6:37). Even though the origin of this frailty, guilt or debt remains inexplicable and incomprehensible to us, the narrative of “The Fall of Adam” in the scripture tells how we lapsed through temptation. Kant states, it is not the historical cognition but the moral edification that matters in that narrative (*R* 6:43-4). In sum, “our deeds are always deficient, from a defective good to something better, so at a single instance we are never able to “be holy” as the law commands” (*R* 6:67) and “the original debt (radical evil) in us cannot be erased”, without divine grace, “consequently, every human being has to expect infinite punishment and exclusion from the Kingdom of God” (*R* 6:72).

Furthermore, Kant contends that evil principle is still the prince of this world so good humans are to brace several earthly sufferings and sacrifice of self-love (*R* 6:83). Nonetheless, through our hopeful holding tight of moral disposition, we can expect “a change of heart”, in other words with the “grace” of God salvation is possible. Though empirically we are the same beings, so long as we believe in our savior, the son of God, Kant asserts, we can convert into a new human, as Jesus Christ already paid for our sins (*R* 6:74).

I contend that no matter how densely Kant’s moral psychology suffers from the pessimism of this Christian doctrine, his ultimate interpretation achieves to reconcile this into a human-efforts’ based optimism. He states that “there is absolutely no salvation for human beings except in the innermost adoption of genuine moral principles in their disposition,” (*R* 6:83) and all corruption that lies in all human beings can be overcome through the idea of the moral good. Moreover,

Kant argues that our ultimate dependence on divine grace in a sense humbles our false self-conceit, so that “all our moral conduct is only a *becoming* (here and beyond) and it is by grace we are freed of guilt” (*R* 6:75). Even though we can never be certain of our goodness, so long as we try in that direction we are allowed to hope for grace. The issue of causality (between grace and our worthiness of it) “cannot be resolved theoretically”, but practically “we are to make our start . . . from what we ought to do in order to become worthy of it” (*R* 6:118). “In theoretical terms freedom itself is also incomprehensible for us, yet laws of freedom” are available to us. That is, nothing but “constant striving for a good life conduct” can be our petition or means to attach ourselves to this transcendent idea of grace instead of all sorts of delusions or miracle-seeking passivism (*R* 6:191). Accordingly, “the right way to advance is not from grace to virtue but rather from virtue to grace” (*R* 6:202).

5.3 Duties of virtue: necessary ends

In the “Introduction” of “Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue” Kant discusses not only how the doctrine of virtue is continuous to the doctrine of justice and is derived from the same *a priori* source of practical reason; but also, in what ways the two are different. In this section, I start with a brief explication of how these two parts of metaphysics of morals relate to each other. Then I discuss the notion of “necessary ends”. Following that, I overview the two sets of necessary ends, i.e., aiming at one’s own perfection and contributing to the happiness of others. Finally, I evaluate how duties of virtue is built into Kant’s moral telos. In this “personalized” phase of morals not only ethical duties themselves gain a subject-based latitude in their application, but also interpreting the ultimate meaning of virtue itself and *telos* of moral experience gains a singular character.

Kant makes the first distinction between the doctrine of justice and virtue by stating that in the former “the issue is the formal condition of the choice and limited to external relations” whereas the latter is primarily about “the inner principle of the will i.e., consciousness of the duty to be also incentive to actions” (TL 6:376).

Doctrine of justice depicts the formal condition of outer freedom, i.e., it is about the “consistency of outer freedom with itself if its maxims were made universal” so that external constrain is morally permissible. Kant states:

But ethics goes beyond this and provides a *matter* (an object of choice), an end of pure reason which it represents as an end that is also objectively necessary, that is, an end that, as far as human beings are concerned, it is a duty to have. (TL 6:381).

As it is impossible for one to adopt an end for herself by someone other than herself, only self-constraint is possible in ethics. Furthermore, ethics personalize the moral law. Kant states that in ethics the formal principle of duty, categorical imperative “is to be thought as the law of your own will and not of will in general” (TL 6:389).

Unlike the negative, limiting principle of right (not to come into conflict with others’ (external) use of their rights) which gives “laws of actions”, ethics gives laws for maxims of actions (TL 6:390). Accordingly, the specification provided in the doctrine of right, regarding the necessary omission or commission of actions gives us the concept of narrow duties (duties of right), whereas in ethics latitude in free choice of the actions: in what way and how much to be done to fulfill the duty (end) is not given in the law, thus duties of virtue are, in general, of wide obligation to be specified by the agent herself.³⁸

Both aspects of metaphysics of morals are derived from the supreme principle of morality, i.e., categorical imperative. The supreme principle of doctrine

³⁸ As mentioned in Chapter 3, there are strict duties of virtue too, I discuss them below.

justice is analytic because even the principle of contradiction in conception suffices to justify necessary omission or commission of actions. Nevertheless, the supreme principle of virtue³⁹ is synthetic as it goes beyond the conceptual abstraction of the use of external freedom and is tied to the idea of a necessary end – an end that is also a duty – which demands one to envisage an actual use of a will, i.e., setting an end for itself and how it could be universalized (*TL* 6:396). Kant surprisingly asserts that “basic principle of the doctrine of virtue, as a categorical imperative, cannot be proved, but it can be given a deduction from pure practical reason” (*TL* 6:395). Therefore, both the justification and the application of the duties of virtue lacks the “mathematical certainty and strictness of the doctrine of right”:

But ethics, because of the latitude it allows in its imperfect duties, unavoidably leads to questions that call upon judgment to decide how a maxim is to be applied in particular cases, and indeed in such a way that judgment provides another (subordinate) maxim (and one can always ask for yet another principle for applying this maxim to cases that may arise). (*TL* 6:411)

This ambiguity thus may lead even to a casuistry at certain cases where the final judgment of one is left suspended.

As discussed in the previous section, the formal aspect of duties of virtue is about one’s moral motivation. But the division of virtue is based on the necessary ends that we are morally obliged to have. Kant considers those ends which are also duties under two main groups. The first group of duties cover several ends, purposes that aim at our own perfection. The second group of duties are about various ends which serve to contribute happiness of others (i.e., enabling or helping them to actualize their morally permissible ends). Before getting into brief discussion of

³⁹ “The supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue is: act in accordance with a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have.” (*TL* 6:395)

these two basic ethical duties, it is significant to question how the very concept of a necessary end is justified.

In the *Groundwork* Kant develops the discussion of duty based on the form of willing and repeatedly highlights that material conditions are to be excluded, as discussed in Chapter 4. In that context “the empty formula” of the supreme principle of morality (G 4:421) is not yet specified to be a metaphysics of morals for human agents. Nevertheless, even the three formulations of the moral law, starting from the “formula of universal law” to the “formula of humanity” and “formula of the realm of ends” include proceeding towards a more intuitive and determined conception of the moral maxim (G 4:436). At this point, Kant associates the second formula (FH) with morally proper ends. Therefore, some Kant scholars like Allen Wood argues that the duties of virtue are derived from this second formulation as only it enables their derivation (see also Chapter 4). This is because, only in the formula of humanity (FH): “*So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means*” (G 4:429)” we are introduced to the idea of a moral end. Up to that point “emptiness” of the supreme principle was kept. Nevertheless, even at that point Kant asserts the concern about how to treat “humanity” is only a limiting or negative condition. Therefore, it is first time in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, i.e., the application of the *Groundwork* to human beings, Kant explicitly discusses the specific moral ends those human beings are obligated to adopt by their own practical reasoning. In *TL* 6:385 he states:

An end is an object of free choice, the representation of which determines it to an action (by which the object is brought about). Every action, therefore, has its end; and since no one can have an end without himself making the object of his choice into an end, to have any end of action whatsoever is an act of freedom on the part of the acting subject, not an effect of nature.

Therefore, it is contradictory to consider a faculty of desire to act without determining itself towards some ends. Then Kant argues that categorical imperative which prescribes duties unconditionally to our faculty of desire also relates to the idea of an end. Categorical imperative cannot be only a means for some other ends as morality needs its own ends set by again practical reason itself. Thus, categorical imperative is possible. In other words, morality is not only about omission, but it requires and obliges commission through positing its own ends. Accordingly, the doctrine of virtue is not about the ends that human being already adopts to survive by the impulses of his sensible nature, it regards “the objects of free choice under its laws, which he *ought to make* his ends”. Even the doctrine of justice leaves these ends empty and starts from the idea of “proper maxim” of actions that initially limits certain types of acting (TL 6:382). Rational nature, i.e., our humanity, the very ground of moral law itself is already an implicit end to respect, promote and flourish even in the supreme principle of morality (in its all three formulations), yet in the doctrine of virtue the two sets of obligatory ends specify how our humanity in us, as human beings living together, can and should be respected, promoted, and flourished personally and interpersonally.

Apparently, these two sets are not contingently picked by Kant. As the whole idea of the doctrine of virtue is about the end(s) of morality and one can set an end only for herself; while our perfection is the intrapersonal aspect of ethics, happiness of others refers to its inter-personal counterpart, i.e., caring about the humanity of others by contributing their possibility of perfecting themselves through attending their actualization of morally required ends (that they set for themselves).

“The first part of Doctrine of the Elements of Ethics” is on “Man’s duties to Himself” with two subsections of “perfect” and “imperfect” duties. Perfect duties to

oneself as an “animal being” is about omitting certain actions that would destroy or abuse ourselves such as suicide, over-lust and over consumption of food and drink. The other set of perfect duties to ourselves concern our “moral being”. Under that category, Kant mentions three perfect duties that do not seem to make a homogeneous list. The first one is avoiding lying, avarice and servility. The second is being one’s “own innate judge” and the third one is as the first command of all duties: “know thyself”. That section is followed by an “amphiboly” about mistaking a duty towards oneself for a duty towards another. Here Kant discusses “the duty of religion” as a perfect duty towards oneself not as a duty towards a supernatural being, i.e., God. Kant a couple of time asserts that moral duties (and rights) are only between human agents.

A human being can therefore have no duty to any beings other than human beings; and if he thinks he has such duties, it is because of an *amphiboly* in his *concepts of reflection*, and his supposed duty to other beings is only a duty to himself. He is led to this misunderstanding by mistaking his duty with regard to other beings for a duty to those beings. (TL 6:441)

Accordingly, the so-called duties towards animals, plants and all non-living things along with the Divinity are basically duties towards not those objects themselves. It is significant to highlight that Kant places “the duty of religion” just below the duties of “being one’s own innate judge” and “knowing oneself” all of which are our perfect/strict duties to ourselves as a moral being. This set of duties being “perfect” carries a certainty and a powerful, direct obligation (with respect to what exactly to be avoided or to be formed as a character) likewise the duties of justice.⁴⁰ In this

⁴⁰ In her footnote to TL 6:423, Gregor writes: “In the discussing perfect duties to oneself, as well as imperfect duties of respect to others, Kant often uses the terminology of *The Doctrine of Rights*, as, e.g., in the preceding paragraph he called killing oneself a *Verbrechen*, which in *The Doctrine of Right* was a “crime” (*crimen*)”.

regard, perfect duties towards ourselves also make the backbone of moral imputability and agency, and eligibility to claim any (acquired) rights.

Next, Kant introduces our “imperfect duties” to ourselves. Those duties are about ends serving to increase our perfection either as a natural being or as a moral being. Kant states that we are required to cultivate our natural powers and all sorts of natural capacities from a pragmatic perspective to be able to be “a human being equal to the end of his existence” (*TL* 6:445). The details of this cultivation (regarding the priority or selection of what capacities to develop and in ways to develop them) is to be determined by the agent herself according to her own rational reflection about the sort of life that she wants to live and her skills and tendencies that she naturally possesses. Imperfect duties to ourselves as moral beings include two commands of being holy and perfect. The former is about the purity of our moral disposition to duty (i.e., “the law being by itself alone the incentive”). The second is about “one’s entire moral end, such perfection consists objectively in fulfilling all one’s duties and in attaining completely one’s moral end with regard to oneself” (*TL* 6:446). Apparently, it is a duty to “strive for this perfection, but not to reach it”. There is no limit quantitatively for the possible perfections one can strive for, thus it always “remains only a progress from one perfection to another”. Likewise, the duty to be holy always remains deficient because of the frailty (*fragilitas*) of human nature. In such duties, which are relevant to our moral cognition of ourselves but also are necessary ends to adopt, we can never adequately tell whether our efforts are complete or deficient. What matters most is that these duties aim to upbuild “the end of humanity in our own person” (*TL* 6:447). The formal aspect of virtue discussed in the previous section, besides the “virtuous disposition” as the sole necessary duty

valid for all actions are thus consummated with the imperfect duties that advice almost the same moral ideals this time in the form of obligatory ends.

It is necessary to give a brief account of ethical duties towards others too, to be able to see how these two sets of duties of virtue in fact aim to actualize an implicit moral telos. The second part of “Doctrine of the Elements of Ethics” on the duties to others also has two categories. The first, which makes the essential part of the discussion is about “duties to others merely as man”. This section discusses interpersonal duties of virtue in general, unlike the brief second part which touches upon how these duties can be specified *ad infinitum* conditioned by the specific ways people relate to one another (e.g., as family member, spouses or colleagues). The general duties of virtue are divided into two groups of “duties of love” and “duties from respect”. Duties of love are commissions to promote permissible ends (happiness) of others. Kant considers these under the single duty of loving others, which is a practical love (“must be thought as the maxim of benevolence”) so that can be expressed as a duty rather than a “*feeling*, that is, as pleasure in the perfection of others” (TL 6:449). He further explicates the duties of love as duties of beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy. Kant concludes that failing in those duties is a “*lack of virtue (peccatum)*” (TL 6:464). The second set of duties arising from respect are based on omitting certain maxims which would result in disrespecting others, so violating their rights. Accordingly, attitudes including arrogance, defamation and ridicule are morally prohibited and failing in any of them is a “*vice (vitium)*” (TL 6:464). In committing other vices in the same manner, such as in envy, ingratitude, or malice, one keeps a “secret and veiled” hatred towards others “adding meanness to one’s neglect of duty to one’s neighbor, so that one also violates a duty to oneself” (TL 6:458).

Thus, Kant explicitly argues that all duties including duties of justice and virtue, no matter whether they relate to other people in practice, are in fact one's duty towards oneself grounded in the idea of humanity in her own person, i.e., her dignity. All duties aim at actualizing, flourishing, and perfecting – as much as we can – our moral-rational nature, i.e., our humanity. The idea of humanity stands as a paradigm for moral advancement. It is an abstraction that calibrates even the supreme principle of morality itself. Thus, Kant asserts that morality has its own “*final end*” (TL 6:376, 405, 441) which is initially about one's own “care of the soul” and stretches out and embraces each and every attachment she has with her body (as an animal being), with all other human beings, animals, nature and the Divine. “The ultimate wisdom” for us “consists in the harmony of a being's will with its final end”, so that we can actualize “the original predisposition to a good will” in us first by edifying our moral deficiencies which hamper us from this end. It is in that sense, humanity, good will or the idea of a divine will stand as different designations of the same moral paradigm; but also, they point us the same final end of morals. That is, the moral law in us, not only sets the limiting conditions for the lawful use of our freedom. Further than that, it is as the “divine in us” sets the purpose of moral experience, no matter how imperfectly we can align with it. In other words, I contend that singular duties of virtue serve for that telos from different aspects. That is why Kant also states: “The highest, unconditional end of pure practical reason (which is still a duty) consists in this: that virtue be its own end and, despite the benefits it confers to human beings, also its own reward” (TL 6:396).

Therefore, virtue, to put it differently, moral integrity or moral health; is the ultimate end of practical reason, so of morality itself and is achieved by harmonizing oneself with one's own (lawful/good) willing but also with others' morally willing.

Correspondingly, it embraces one's own happiness along with one's healthy relations with others based on love and respect. In several passages, Kant emphasizes how much it matters to care about one's health, wealth, or other ways of "permitted" wellness that are significant to preserve one's moral integrity which is our end and at the same time our duty (*TL* 6:388). Likewise, in *Religion* also he asserts that it is natural and rational to love well-being of oneself (*R* 6:44). Therefore, cultivation of our natural dispositions to virtue makes us both happier (in terms of freeing ourselves more and more from inner conflicts and continuous practice of willing permissible ends) and more virtuous. Correspondingly, one should make oneself "a useful member of the world, since this also belongs to the worth of humanity in his own person, which he ought not to degrade" (*TL* 6:446), and through keeping duties of benevolence it becomes possible to envisage the "world as a beautiful moral whole in its full perfection" (*TL* 6:458).

To conclude this section, it is important to underscore a few points. The discussion of Kant's ethics does not generally involve a telos. Furthermore, the necessary minimum to justify duties of virtue is derived simply from "contradiction in willing test" or procedure. For instance, it is argued that it is reasonably inconsistent to will to live in a world where no one helps another, knowing that we are imperfect beings who are mutually dependent on each other to actualize our ends. Thus, it is morally, i.e., rationally required to help others at least occasionally if we are able. A similar reasoning can be also developed to defend that we are morally obligated at least to cultivate certain capacities of ourselves, to perfect our beings gradually. Nevertheless, I contend that Kant develops a much more robust moral teleology than this procedural reasoning. As Kant himself asserts, it is not possible to demonstrate the supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue or such a telos in the

same certainty as the duties of justice. In that personalized phase of morals, which in fact grounds all duties in general; the inner disposition of the agent, making sense of oneself and of her humanity is parasitic upon her moral view of the world. That is, in this subjectively valid moral view of the world, our good willing is considered as aligning ourselves with the divine in us and the Divine will. Duties of virtue hold without this moral view of the world which is not objectively valid. In other words, it neither can be proved as a constitutive principle of the world, nor all moral agents can be obligated to adopt this moral view of the world. Therefore, being virtuous or holding on the necessary ends of morality can be interpreted in two possible ways: as nothing more than a social requirement to sustain human societies, or as a godlike state to actualize our humanity in unison. I believe that this very interpretation in return shapes how steadfastly one cherishes the virtue itself.

5.4 The Duty of Virtue

In § 4.2 I gave a general account of Kant's conception of virtue. In this section, I focus on a specific aspect of the same concept, namely the "duty of virtue" as the sole necessary duty holding for all actions. Here my aim is to explicate the positive aspect of virtue through studying the passages where Kant depicts a joyous state for the virtuous agent. After analyzing these passages, I discuss how virtue and happiness can be associated. I argue that even though Kant's moral theory always prioritize moral principles, necessitation of what we can justify to ourselves and to others, the complete picture of moral experience he depicts does involve the ideal of a moral agent who is in peace with herself and with her moral engagements. Nevertheless, I argue that such a peace or harmony can be achieved through extending Kant's conception of happiness beyond merely satisfying inclinations.

Therefore, I explicate four senses in which Kant writes about happiness to be able to see which of these could be morally relevant and support my interpretation. This is also important to be able to develop a more consistent and morally esteemed conception of the highest good that is meaningful for the “here and now” of the moral agent.

In *Metaphysics of Morals* 6:383 Kant distinguishes duties of virtue from the duty of virtue:

Similarly, to every ethical *obligation* there corresponds the concept of virtue, but not all ethical duties are thereby duties of virtue. Those duties that have to do not so much with a certain end (matter, object of choice) as merely with *what is formal* in the moral determination of the will (e.g., that an action in conformity with duty must also be done *from duty*) are not duties of virtue. Only *an end that is also a duty* can be called a duty of virtue. For this reason there are several duties of virtue (and also various virtues), whereas for the first kind of duty only one (virtuous disposition) is thought, which however holds for all actions.

Kant describes virtuous disposition which is the necessary formal aspect of all actions as the duty of virtue. While there are several morally necessary ends to adopt, there is only one duty of virtue that holds regardless of the ends of our actions.

Although the critical moral theory already depends on the idea of “good will”, on the moral value of our subjective principle of action, i.e., our maxims; at this point Kant treats “virtuous disposition” as a particular duty by itself. This is significant because, only so long as one consistently tries to conform with that specific duty, she can gain a virtuous moral character. That moral strength as discussed in § 4.2 which develops into a virtuous character, enables the agent to feel a contentment based on moral consciousness.

Kant explicates this moral contentment in several passages and relates it to the incommensurable dignity of moral character. He states that the virtuous disposition which is a human being’s duty to himself means keeping his maxims in

consistency “with the *dignity* of humanity in his person” (*TL* 6:420) and this means not to deprive oneself from inner freedom. That inner principle of the will is actualized when one can act only on the moral incentive, namely simply with the consciousness of moral necessitation. When there are no other incentives from self-love to motivate the agent in favor of the moral requirement or when the case is totally against one’s inclinations grounded in self-love; the moral agent can recognize more evidently “how pure respect for the law can have more power and be a stronger incentive than all other considerations in determining the will” (*KprV* 5:151). Kant argues even though one is unable to comprehend how indeed he is able to prioritize duty above all else, reflecting on this cognition “produce[s] an exaltation in his soul which only inspires it the more to hold its duty sacred, the more it is assailed” (*TL* 6:483). Thus, Kant asserts, it is in our constitution that the incentive of law can prevail against any other incentive for happiness so that we do not hate moral law and act hypocritically. Accordingly, we are worthy of respect in our own eyes and learn feeling our dignity (*KprV* 5:152).

Kant also argues that virtue is a sort of courage (*fortitudo moralis*) which provides “the greatest and the only true honor” that, through possession of this “wisdom” one becomes ““free”, “healthy”, “rich”, “a king”, and so forth and can suffer no loss by chance or fate” (*TL* 6:405). It is a duty not to disavow one’s own dignity thus one is required to act always “with consciousness of his sublime moral predisposition”. Kant asserts that “self-esteem is a duty of the human being to himself”. This is because, when we reflect upon ourselves, on our capacities and various drives in us; we feel both humility and exaltation at the same time. The strict holiness of the moral law in us reminds us how morally fragile we are. On the other hand, our lawgiving capacity, namely the capacity to align ourselves with this

holiness, which we again find in the very heart of ourselves, gives us “exaltation of the highest self-esteem”, a worth which is “above any price (*pretium*)” and “an inalienable dignity (*dignitas interna*)” (*TL* 6:435-436). Kant maintains his likening of virtuous disposition to such dignified, divine state that he resembles the freedom of this frame of mind to beauty befitting for a self-sufficient supreme being (*KprV* 5:119).

Beyond being the noblest state for human agents, the virtuous disposition also provides and even demands a cheerful frame of mind. Kant is aware and often asserts how virtue demands one to master herself and her inclinations even at times in expense of “the joys of life”. Nevertheless, he states:

But what is not done with pleasure but merely as compulsory service has no inner worth for one who attends to his duty in this way and such service is not loved by him; instead, he shirks as much as possible occasions for practicing virtue. (*TL* §53)

Therefore, contrary to moral ascetism and even asking more than a Stoic might ask; he claims a morally “agreeable enjoyment in life”, the sign of which is a “ever-cheerful heart”, is the proper state for virtuous disposition, as Epicurus would suggest (*TL* 6:484). Thus, rather than a “secret hatred for virtue’s command” cheerfulness is to accompany virtue. In *Religion* 6:23 also he repeats the claim that a courageous and joyous state (frame of mind, emotional constitution) fits for the virtuous in his famous lines: “a heart joyous in the compliance with its duty (not just complacency in the recognition of it) is the sign of genuineness in virtuous disposition”. So that the principled disposition and actions of virtue is tied to the idea of “love for the good i.e., of having incorporated the good into one's maxim”. Accordingly, the training or discipline that the virtuous disposition demands is “meritorious” and successful so long as it achieves that sort of moral cheerfulness (*TL* 6:484).

At this point, it is important to remember how Kant emphasizes that being virtuous is an end in itself, as “the highest, unconditional end of pure practical reason” and also it is its own reward “despite the benefits it confers to human beings” (*TL* 6:396). Therefore, Kant argues it is only when one truly tries to comply with the virtuous disposition and bring the wide obligation of ethical duties “as close as possible to the concept of narrow obligation”; the ethical reward, that is, “a receptivity to being rewarded in accordance with laws of virtue: the reward, namely, of a moral pleasure that goes beyond mere contentment with oneself” appears (*TL* 6:391). In other words, once the agent can achieve fulfilling the positive command of virtue, namely bringing all her capacities and inclinations under the control of her reason; she in fact frees herself and thus is able to experience a different sort of satisfaction (*TL* 6:408).

That being said, it is significant to emphasize that Kant clearly rejects either an identity relation or necessary causal connection between being virtuous and being happy, in particular if happiness is thought merely as one’s satisfaction of her inclinations. Kant asserts that there is not an analytic relation between virtue and happiness likewise Stoics’ claims that to be conscious of being virtuous is happiness. This approach equates morality to wisdom. On the other hand, he also denies the position of synthetic relation that he attributes to Epicureans in which “to be conscious of holding maxims for happiness is virtue” (*KprV* 5:111). According to Kant, this reduces morality into prudence. Therefore, it is important to elaborate the character or nature of the moral contentment which Kant’ attributes to virtuous disposition. Kant states that “the ground of pleasure felt by one’s consciousness of her will to be determined by the moral law is not an aesthetic feeling and remains as pure practical determination of the faculty of desire” (*KprV* 5:116). Even though

individuals have the tendency to take it as aesthetic feeling, unlike other empirical pleasures or gratifications “there is no antecedent feeling to it in reason” and it is the result of “consciousness of necessitation of the moral law” (*KprV* 5:117). In this regard, Kant always prioritizes the consciousness of moral necessitation, the outcome of which may or may not overlap with our self-interest or emotions. Therefore, moral feeling or contentment is in principle irrelevant of the consequences of actions. It is not because first we feel that rational feeling and then embrace the moral obligation. On the contrary, because we first recognize the moral demand and we judge and act accordingly, and through recognizing that demand we feel respect towards it as a subjective impression of it in us. Nevertheless, the more we heed that demand and attend to it, we train ourselves in judging and acting in compliance with it. Therefore, Kant asserts:

. . . continuous compliance with duty creates a certain feeling of satisfaction and it is a duty itself to cultivate this *moral feeling* although this feeling is never the ground of duty and always antecedent to it. Otherwise, Kant contends that it would be nothing but “mechanical play of refined inclinations. (*KprV* 5:38)

To capture Kant’s peculiar way of relating virtue and contentment, it is also significant to highlight that in his discussion of subjective effect of the moral law on the agent, – it is possible to consider this effect either as moral feeling, respect for the law or virtuous disposition –; Kant mostly talks about the power of moral incentive on the heart (“*Herz*” see: *G* 4:411; *KprV* 5:152, 156, 161; *TL* 6:392, 430, 439, 441, 473, 483). In the same lines, in his discussion of “natural predispositions” to virtue Kant uses the term “*Gemüt*” (*TL* 6:399 “*Ästhetische Vorbegriffe der Empfänglichkeit des Gemüts für Pflichtbegriffe überhaupt*”) likewise he uses “*Gemüt*” in his general discussion of moral consciousness or moral law as an incentive on “*Gemüt*” (e.g., see

KprV 5:72, 84 [in connection to “moral enthusiasm”], 162 [“*Gemüt*” as filled with awe, admiration or reverence] and 5:85⁴¹, 5:152).

I contend that Kant’s preference to use *Gemüt* in moral context is apparently in continuity with his preference of this word (rather than e.g., *Seele*) to refer mind in general as the area of the subjective and the mental without having committed to specific psychological or metaphysical assumptions.⁴² His use of *Gemüt* in practical context also in aesthetic states – he often uses also “*Gemütsstimmung*” – emphasizes further Kant’s non-dualistic approach that embraces broad implications of mental powers, ideas, concepts, mental activities, states and inner sense. Moreover, his use of the term at times also embraces meanings of life or movement likewise Latin term “*animus*”.⁴³

In the light of all of these, it is possible to argue that Kant’s understanding of practical reason and moral experience anticipates an integrity for the moral agent who is not left in an everlasting tension and uneasiness with herself, between her rational-moral attachments and emotive constitution. Practical rationality embraces the agent’s frame of mind in a holistic manner (*Gemüt*, *Herz*, *Gemütsstimmung*). It does involve and demand a continuous reflective self-discipline, whereas this attentiveness brings with itself the above-mentioned moral pleasure, self-

⁴¹ In this passage both Cambridge (1996) and Lewis Beck’s (1991- Library of Liberal Arts) translations prefer to translate “*Gemüt*” as *heart*: “... nicht moralisch (im Gesetze) setzen, so bringen sie auf diese Art eine windige, überfliegende, phantastische Denkungsart hervor, sich mit einer freiwilligen Gutartigkeit ihres Gemüts, das weder Sporns noch Zügel bedürfe, ...”.

Cambridge (1996): “... not morally (in the law); but they produce in this way a frivolous, high-flown, fantastic cast of mind, flattering themselves with a spontaneous goodness of *heart* that needs neither spur nor bridle ...”.

Beck (1991): “... not moral (located in the law); but they produce in this way a shallow, high-flown, fantastic way of thinking, flattering themselves with a spontaneous goodness of *heart*, needing neither spur nor bridle, ...”.

⁴² For a detailed analysis of Kant’s use of “*gemüt*” see Kant-Lexicon (2017) page 749, related entry.

⁴³ Kant himself provides at times the Latin counterpart to specify and emphasize his preference further. E.g., see *TL* 6:437: “*Gemüts-erhebung (elatio animi)*” which is translated as “elation of spirit” also *TL* 6:484: “*gehen auf die zwei Gemütsstimmungen hinaus, wackeren und fröhlichen Gemüts (animus strenuus et hilaris)*”; translated as “a frame of mind that is both valiant and cheerful” (Cambridge, 1996 Gregor translation).

contentment. Being virtuous also does involve one's taking notice of one's "long-term happiness", wellbeing plans (or prudence) which in fact falls under the set of duties Kant explicates as duties towards ourselves. Moreover, there is a reciprocal relation between the effort to keep up with virtuous disposition (including observing the duties of virtue) and cultivating the moral feelings in us. The more we judge and act virtuously, the more aptitude we gain for a moral character and the challenge from self-interest is weakened. Because of this, Kant considers virtue as an endless progress and the more virtuous a person is the more attached, she is to moral ideals and moral view of the world.

Accordingly, it is important to notice the difference among Kant's several uses of happiness. It is possible to detach four contexts in which he discusses happiness. First, Kant talks about happiness simply as the satisfaction of one's inclinations which might refer to an instant/temporal emotional state. Second, Kant frequently highlights how indeterminate is the concept of happiness so that it can never provide a universal consensus. Third, he depicts happiness as one's overall well-being, embracing her continuous or long-term health, wealth and prosperity which stands as a rational and natural demand. Fourth, he talks about some sort of moral happiness which he later clarifies as perfection. I argue that the last two conceptualizations of happiness do make a legitimate aspect of virtuous disposition – and an individual sense of the highest good. Now, let me briefly explicate each of them.

First, let me point at the totally empirical conception of happiness which Kant considers as a natural, physical given about which reason or rationality does not seem to be in effect. In the *Groundwork*, he speculates how in a sense reason and happiness (as satisfaction of instincts and inclinations) are even fall foul with one

another. He claims that “the more a cultivated reason purposely occupies itself with the enjoyment of life and with happiness, so much the further does one get away from true satisfaction” (*G* 4:396). This depiction of happiness as he puts elsewhere is the sum of one’s satisfaction of all needs and inclinations (*G* 4: 405) and yet it is more like a transitory, “particular feeling of pleasure” that is peculiar to everyone and even for the same person the meaning of this feeling changes over time (*KprV* 5:25).

The second sense in which Kant refers to happiness, i.e., how indeterminate is the concept of happiness apparently embraces the temporal or transitory character of the first. This sense of happiness even as “the sum of satisfaction of all inclinations” cannot be formed or conceptualized any further (*G* 4:399). Thus, Kant argues that it is a misfortune that although everyone wishes to attain happiness, no one could tell “determinately and consistently” what exactly and truly they wish and will. Kant claims that this unpredictability of happiness results from the fact that “all the elements that belong to the concept of happiness are without exception empirical, that is, must be borrowed from experience” (*G* 4:418). His focus on happiness as an empirical concept mostly relates to his discussion of the ground of moral obligation. Because of the unsystematic, *a posteriori* and non-universal character of the concept of happiness, he claims that it cannot ground the principles of morality. Considered as “pure inclination-satisfaction”, this emphasis of empiricism is understandable.

Nevertheless, it is important to point out that Kant also provides a more stable and prudential depiction of happiness which I discuss here as the third sense of the term in the Kantian context. Kant considers any source as “empirical” or “material” which is not derived from the pure reason itself, all of which fail to provide universal

principles for morals. For instance, in a footnote for the *Groundwork* 4:442, he states:

I count the principle of moral feeling under that of happiness because every empirical interest promises to contribute to our well-being by the agreeableness that something affords, whether this happens immediately and without a view to advantage or with regard for it.

Here Kant suggests, although elsewhere he clearly argues that “moral feeling” is a not an aesthetic feeling, it also counts as “empirical” falling under heteronomous principles and cannot establish moral laws. Likewise, in the second *Critique*, he lists moral feeling, perfection or obeying the divine will as “material grounds of morality” (*KprV* 5:40) all of which fall under the principle of self-love or one’s own happiness ultimately (*KprV* 5:22). We do not consider these concepts as empirical, material, or physical in the ordinary use of the word. Likewise, I contend that Kant’s empiricism emphasis about happiness generally aims to establish how happiness fails to give us universal principles.

Accordingly, the third way Kant handles the issue of happiness which mostly appears as a natural and rational demand, indicates a well-being of the agent beyond instant/temporal satisfaction of inclinations. In several places he amplifies it as health, wealth, power, riches, honor, complete or maximum well-being or satisfaction with one’s condition (*G* 4:395, 418, 439, 395, 418; *KprV* 5:93; *TL* 6:388). Starting from the *Groundwork*, he asserts that happiness can be presupposed as an actual end in the case of all rational beings (*G* 4:415). He argues that happiness holds as a special object of human faculty of desire and demanding it is a part of human nature as a rational animal (*KprV* 5:127). This is because, he states:

. . . our well-being and woe count for a very great deal in the appraisal of our practical reason and, as far as our nature as sensible beings is concerned, all that counts is our happiness if this is appraised, as reason especially requires, not in terms of transitory feeling but of the influence this

contingency has on our whole existence and our satisfaction with it (*KprV* 5:61).

Understood as the overall well-being then happiness is an innate demand for the moral agent, as reason does have “a commission from the side of his sensibility which it cannot refuse, to attend to its interest and to form practical maxims with a view to happiness in this life and, where possible, in a future life as well” (*KprV* 5:61).

The fourth sense Kant regards happiness is the moral contentment of the agent which he depicts at times as perfection, at times as moral pleasure. In the introduction of “The Doctrine of Virtue” Kant replies to a possible objection to his moral theory, that is, after establishing the principle of duty on rational grounds “how this principle could be reduced again to a doctrine of happiness” (*TL* 6:377). He states that it is a sort of moral happiness, not based on empirical causes and it is possible when a “thoughtful human being” masters over her inclinations and follows even the bitter duty, she finds herself “in a state that could well be called happiness, a state of contentment and peace of the soul in which virtue is its own reward” (*TL* 6:377). That contentment with oneself even though “does not denote enjoyment, as the word happiness does, but that nevertheless indicates a satisfaction with one’s existence, an analogue of happiness that must necessarily accompany consciousness of virtue” (*KprV* 5:117). In this context also Kant reminds that this contentment is an intellectual one which does not rest on any special feeling. Accordingly, it is unchangeable and based on one’s freeing oneself from the capricious flux of inclinations. Therefore, in *TL* 6:388 Kant even avoids using the phrase “moral happiness” and describes it as “perfection” which refers to one’s being satisfied with one’s person and moral conduct, and which is already a duty towards ourselves.

Kant always admonishes that even if happiness is an inborn, natural end for us the semi-rational beings; it does not have unconditional value or is not good in itself. Therefore, no matter how much understanding and reason may be involved in it, it belongs to lower faculty of desire and does not make the higher purpose human beings are meant for (*KprV* 5:24). The higher faculty of desire, which means pure reason being practical of itself; namely our actualization of our rational nature; initially demands us to “reflect upon what is good and evil” (*KprV* 5:62). It is only then, once the unconditional good or the true object of pure practical reason is established happiness comes as a rational complementary to this picture:

But it is not yet, on that account, the whole and complete good as the object of the faculty of desire of rational finite beings; for this, happiness is also required, and that not merely in the partial eyes of a person who makes himself an end but even in the judgment of an impartial reason, which regards a person in the world generally as an end in itself. (*KprV* 5:110).

As the quotation connotes, Kant’s presupposition of happiness as a reason-based demand or interest for human beings plays a significant role in his construction of the idea of the highest good. A consistent and morally esteemed conception of the highest good requires us to disambiguate what exactly the happiness component of the highest good refers to. As I argue, happiness understood as an overall wellbeing and as moral pleasure – the last two senses discussed above– appear as implicit outcomes of being virtuous. Accordingly, I argue that rather than focusing on an ambiguous proportionality between “inclination-satisfaction” and “virtue”, a reading of the highest good in which a morally-rationally valid interpretation of happiness is involved, does fit more to Kant’s reason-oriented-morals.

To sum up, I contend that even before the hope for a cosmic or teleological end such as the highest good, virtue and happiness can and do overlap in the virtuous disposition already in the here and now of the moral agent. In this regard, “the duty

of virtue” that is analyzed in this section is a primary condition of a moral character that can achieve a habitual moral contentment or moral health. While judging on virtue is a self-reflective attentiveness for the virtuous disposition, this disposition also reciprocally allows one to judge more optimistically on meta-ethical issues that enables the agent to hope for a teleological harmony between her singular virtuous efforts and others’. This is because, moral health in a sense epitomizes the possibility of the highest good on earth in a single moral agent, prior to its counterpart in the human race. Nevertheless, the immanent step to actualize such a telos is not only a matter of hope, but a morally necessary end – i.e., duty – for us which is embodied initially as virtuous disposition/ moral character and then as an ethical community. Therefore, I contend that Kant’s full articulation of virtue is not complete until the ideal of an ethical community is also included in the framework.

5.5 Ethical Community

In this section, I argue that Kant’s conception of virtue or moral wellness cannot be depicted completely without paying due attention to his emphasis on our mutual inter-dependence for moral flourishing. At the end of Chapter 4, I argued that principles of justice necessitate us to work collectively for creating a just and better social system. Here I argue that ethical community – even though it relates specifically to virtue – can be best understood in continuity with Kant’s overall conception of morality which aims at common good, in terms of morality. Therefore, I first focus on if and how the idea of an ethical community can be read into or relate to categorical imperative, especially to its formulation of realm of ends. As a result of this inquiry, I argue that even prior to his introduction of such an ideal community, Kant’s view of morality is already and always directed towards

collective human flourishing, embraces being a citizen or a member of a just society. Second, I look closer at Kant's exposition of the ethical community and propose a reading which focuses on the passages in which Kant considers it as a cross-cultural mission, embracing the whole human race rather than a close religious-organization. In all these regards, I contend that the realm of ends, the realm of virtue and the highest good on earth aspires derivatives of the same ideal, i.e., the collective moral wellness. This collective moral wellness or health is both the outcome and the bearer of the individual moral health, and such a reciprocal moral harmony between the individual and her community makes is the core of Kant's "moral teleology".

In the *Groundwork* 4:433 Kant states that regarding every rational being as giving universal laws through her maxims leads us to a very fruitful concept, i.e., "realm of ends" (*Reich der Zwecke*) which expresses the systematic union of rational beings through common laws. In this realm, only the ends that are universally valid (that is allowed by the moral law) and the rational beings who are ends in themselves are envisaged. In this "ideal" Kant demands us to abstract rational beings from their "personal differences" and from "their private ends". Even though it is not much clear what exactly this abstraction stands for, Kant further explicates, in this realm we are supposed to consider ourselves as law giving "sovereigns" by our autonomy, in other words, we are to consider ourselves as partaking in an intelligible world (*intelligibelen Welt*). So long as we judge ourselves from the viewpoint of our autonomy (i.e., dignity, humanity in our person, practical rationality), we are the law-giving sovereign of this realm. On the other hand, considering ourselves also as a member of the world of sense, which refers to our imperfect willing and possibly to our "personal differences" and "private ends"; we are subjects to our own law-giving nature and become a member of this realm who are charged with duties. Therefore,

Kant asserts that we cannot hold the position of sovereign just through the universalizability of our maxims, as we are not rational beings completely independent and “without needs and with unlimited resources' adequate to” our will” (G 4:434). Yet we can regard ourselves as if sovereigns because we are also not subject to the will of another, other than the law-giving capacity or dignity of ourselves. Thus, virtue makes us fit to what we are already destined to by our nature, to be a law giving member of a possible realm of ends (G 4:435).

At this point, Kant proposes his three formulae of the principle of morality, or alternately three steps to apply one and the same principle, and he explains how the idea of the realm of ends provides the complete determination of a moral maxim (G 4:436). He asserts how the formal, *a priori* moral principle comes closer to intuition, namely in a sense concretized gradually in our judging about our maxims. The maxim, i.e., subjective principle of willing first gains its proper universal form (FUL), then is checked for its proper matter, namely the possible ends of our maxims are limited (FH) to ones that treats humanity in our persons and in others never merely as means. Finally, uniting the form and the matter in our judging we envisage how our lawful maxim would fit with the totality of all lawful willing in a realm of ends (FRE). Even though such a realm of ends, he asserts “would actually come into existence through maxims whose rule the categorical imperative prescribes to all rational beings if they were universally followed”, the aim to actualize this ideal does not vindicate the moral obligation itself (G 4:438). Moral obligations command categorically. Namely, the command to “act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends, remains in its full force”; even though we cannot count upon others “to be faithful to the same maxim” or upon nature to harmonize with such a maxim (G 4:438-9).

The rest of Kant's discussion of the realm of ends, mostly revolves around the concept of the "intelligible world" to which we belong to only through our true selves, rationality or through the idea of freedom (*G* 4:454, 455, 457, 462). This ideal initially belongs to formal, *a priori* principle of morality to structure our maxims, rather than designating a particular "duty" in itself. In these regards, a direct connection between a realm of ends and the highest good or the ethical community (realm of virtue) seems problematic. This is because the ideals of the highest good and ethical community develop upon the sense of morality which is practiced by human beings (who are imperfectly willing sensuous beings), unlike the formula of realm of ends which as the formulation of the moral law addresses rational nature itself as such. Nevertheless, I contend that it is possible to detect a certain continuity in a couple of regards. It is obvious that realization of both the highest good and an ethical realm (as discussed below) is conditional upon the element of virtue, i.e., following the moral principles. Therefore, it is important to highlight in what regards the Formula of Realm of Ends could imply with or pave the way for the latter.

To start with, Kant's emphasis on the intelligible world does not refer to a distinct ontological domain other than the one, in which we, the human agents dwell together. Namely, it refers to moral relations in general, or judging about norms which are obviously intelligible, namely non-empirical or irreducible to empirical particulars. Secondly, the formula of realm of ends involves the synthetic *a priori* principle of a morally regulated realm in which the totality of morally permissible ends is possible to harmonize. Kant's overall discussion of it does consider it as a possibility for us, at least to strive for, or take into consideration in our willing. In the footnote of *G* 4:436 Kant states that while teleology considers nature as a realm of ends, morality considers a possible realm of ends as a realm of nature. While

teleological view of nature provides a theoretical idea to be able to explain nature – i.e., what exist–, morality takes its practical idea — i.e., what should exist – “for the sake of bringing about, in conformity with this very idea, that which does not exist but which can become real by means of our conduct”. That is, such a moral realm is possible through our maxims (*G* 4:438). Nevertheless, Kant right after this reminds us how that realization is never guaranteed (thus “admittedly only an ideal”) in a very similar way to his discussion of the highest good. He states:

It is true that, even though a rational being scrupulously follows this maxim himself, he cannot for that reason count upon every other to be faithful to the same maxim nor can he count upon the kingdom of nature and its purposive order to harmonize with him, as fitting member, toward a kingdom of ends possible through himself, that is, upon its favoring his expectation of happiness; . . . (*G* 4:438)

This passage is the only place where Kant explicitly includes the notion of happiness in the analysis of the realm of ends. In Kant’s terminology, agents who can realize their permissible ends can be considered happy. Therefore, the whole set of ethical duties towards others, namely contributing their happiness is based on the principle of supporting their morally permissible ends, so long as we can. Therefore, the idea of a realm of ends – in which all morally permissible ends are harmonized– implicitly involves a certain sense of happiness which is a rational demand for us human beings. This ideal as included in the formal principle of morality addresses all rational beings, not human beings in particular. Nevertheless, as the quotation above shows, Kant’s explication of the realm of ends is concerned with and questions if and how laws of what ought to be can harmonize with the way things are, even before he develops a metaphysics of morals exclusive to human agents. Likewise in his discussion of the highest good, in connection with the realm of ends also Kant ponders upon the possibility of unifying the realm of nature (*Reich der Nature*) and the realm of ends (*Reich der Zwecke*) under one sovereign which would save the

moral ideal from being a mere idea (*G* 4:439). He asserts that this would not make any change on the ground of moral obligation which is the criterion of moral worth of actions and agents, and which is nothing other than “the disinterested conduct” of moral autonomy “without any other end or advantage to be attained by it”. That is, in the *Groundwork* Kant considers the realm of ends as a possible moral collectivity to be achieved by us.

In the second *Critique* in which the different formulae of the moral principle are not mentioned, Kant refers to the same idea as a realm of morals (*Reich der Sitten*) of which we are lawgiving members (*KprV* 5:82). He states that our autonomy provides us to consider ourselves as members of an intelligible order, which is again not a transcendent domain. It is just the moral law that “transfers us in idea, into a nature” where our relations are regulated in such a moral way that we can produce the highest good (*KprV* 5:43). Accordingly, I contend that this “realm of morals” which also refer to the moral/ intelligible order cannot be disassociated from the *Groundwork*’s conception of realm of ends. This is because, the moral collectivity to be achieved by us (either with or without divine assistance) is now named as a realm of virtue. Kant designates that harmonious moral domain either as an intelligible world, as the highest good, or from the religious perspective as a kingdom of God (*Reich Gottes*) (*KprV* 5:128, 130). Not only he mostly equates the highest good with a realm of God, but he explicitly equates the intelligible world with a realm of God by giving it in parenthesis.⁴⁴ He asserts that “to think the exact harmony of the realm of nature with the realm of morals as the condition of the possibility of the highest good” is the only way that is conducive to morality. That

⁴⁴ See *KprV* 5:137; “If these ideas of God, of an intelligible world (the kingdom of God), and of immortality...”. “Wenn, nächst dem, diese Ideen von Gott, einer intelligibelen Welt (dem Reiche Gottes)...”.

Reich der Sitten refers to our moral inter-personal relations as human beings who are rational yet also sensuous beings with needs and who are mutually dependent on one another. In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant designates this moral domain again as an intelligible world: “laws of duty (not laws of nature) and among these, of laws for human beings’ external relations with one another, we consider ourselves in a moral (intelligible) world”⁴⁵ in which “respect (repulsion) and love (attraction) make the driving forces governing it in analogy with a physical world” (TL 6:449). In sum, although Kant’s designations of realm of ends, intelligible world, realm of morals or realm of God do have different implications in different contexts (from the *Groundwork* until the *Metaphysics of Morals*) and they do not match exactly, I contend that they all designate the significance of treating morality from a collective point of view.

Now, let me focus on the concept of the ethical community and elaborate what sort of a moral collectivity it aspires and how it can be considered in continuity with the realm of ends, intelligible world, or a realm of God. Kant himself directly ties the idea of an ethical community to the highest good, considering it as the way the highest good is possible on earth. In *Religion*, Kant designates ethical community (*ethischen gemeinen*) as human agents’ collectivity and often describes it in comparison with a political community. After his discussion of the problem of evil in human nature, he states that the good principle can triumph over the evil through a community of lovers of virtue. This is a necessary union “whose end is preventing the evil (resulting from human needs and even civil vices) and promoting the good”, since “human cannot achieve escaping from dominion of evil individually” (R 6:94). It is a togetherness “in accordance with, and for the sake of laws of virtue– a society

⁴⁵ “Wenn von Pflichtgesetzen (nicht von Naturgesetzen) die Rede ist und zwar im äußeren Verhältnis der Menschen gegen einander, so betrachten wir uns in einer moralischen (intelligibelen) Welt, ...”.

which reason makes it a task and a duty of the entire human race to establish in its full scope” (*R* 6:94). Beyond the moral legislation Kant asserts, which apparently implies observable duties and rights among human agents, a virtuous community aims at the non-coercible laws of virtue to be their constitutive principle. That is, not only the letter of moral law, but the spirit of it, and the “love of the good” is what could unite all human race in this ethical community or “ethical state, i.e., a kingdom of virtue (of the good principle)” (*R* 6:95).⁴⁶

This ethical realm takes place within political state(s) and is bound by its “juridico-civil” order, by its coercive public laws; thus, there occurs no contradiction between the laws of the two. Nevertheless, unlike a single “political state”, its possible citizens embrace the whole human race, and it operates through the laws of virtue across various political states (*R* 6:95). Kant considers joining to such a community, as “the ideal of a totality of human beings” (*R* 6:96) “an objective idea of reason” and as a duty, though we may not even hope that it will work (*R* 6:95). Because the duties of virtue concern the whole human race, the realm of virtue also does embrace all humans in general regardless of nation, culture, religion or race.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, this community has its own specific aim which is to strive “after the consensus of all human beings (indeed, of all finite rational beings) in order to establish an absolute ethical whole of which each partial society is only a representation or schema” (*R* 6:95). Therefore, Kant’s depiction of this community takes notice of the differences of the different societies but defends the possibility of them to be united around the principles of virtue or the love of the good which is beyond their disparities.

⁴⁶ “. . . ein ethischer Staat, d.i. ein Reich der Tugend (des guten Prinzips) . . . ”.

⁴⁷ Rossi (2005) in his book “*The Social Authority of Reason: Kant’s Critique, Radical Evil, and the Destiny of Humankind*” also argues for a global, cross cultural sense of common moral good which can constitute a true ethical commonwealth and enable human race to defeat the evil.

Kant considers striving for the highest good is a duty by reason and he argues that it is “possible only through a system of well-disposed persons rather than perfected individuals” (*R* 6: 97). Therefore, he considers a moral collectivity, “a universal republic based on the laws of virtue” (*R* 6:98) as necessary to bring about moral wellbeing of each and all. Kant’s initial concern to argue for the necessity of an ethical community is based on the idea that individuals are unable to defeat the propensity towards evil, namely their prioritization of self-love over the love of the law. Nevertheless, his overall discussion of this universal ethical state owns a far more significant and broader sense in Kant’s moral teleology. Apparently, a kingdom of God on earth is an important teaching of Christian theology and is mentioned quite often in the *New Testament*. Kant’s discussion of ethical community, especially in Part Three of *Religion* is interwoven with this religious teaching, and he initially discusses this ethical realm as a people of God united in a church. Nonetheless, Kant contends that in the course of history “true universal religion” of moral faith shall triumph over ecclesiastical differences and the whole human race will gather then in the invisible church of moral religion (*R* 6:136). Kant’s optimism regarding the possibility of such a progress sounds like an unsubstantiated prophecy, yet he asserts that there is nothing mystical about such a projection. Kant considers this as a task to be achieved by us on moral grounds. What is important is that Kant explicitly defines this advancement as an “approximation toward the highest possible good on earth” (*R* 6:136). Therefore, ethical community is a particular depiction of Kant’s moral collectivism and plays a significant role in actualizing what a virtuous agent may hope for, i.e., the highest good.

This conception of the highest good as an ethical community does have a religious character because Kant considers that a highest moral being is required to

unite the singular ends to cause the effect (*R* 6:98) rather than an accidental union of humans around the good (*R* 6:151).⁴⁸ Ethical community is religious in a further sense. Namely, Kant considers that its bringing about also can be hoped from the grace of God (*R* 6:101), even though we are required to consider ourselves as the sole responsible ones (*R* 6:105) to achieve it. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask how far such a faith-oriented concept of ethical collectivity can be considered fitting into the general picture of Kantian virtue and a universal sense of moral collectivity. In fact, Kant's final analysis of this ethical community does not have a sectarian character, or a sense of closed religiosity. Likewise, a delicate analysis of Kantian virtue always includes a universal, non-doctrinal sense of religiosity which is combined with Kant's idea of purposiveness either in morals or in aesthetics. In all these regards, Kant's idea of an ethical community, namely a realm of virtue (*Reich der Tugend*) should not be considered as alien to his previous ideas about realm of morals (*Reich der Sitten*), realm of ends (*Reich der Zwecke*) or intelligible world (*intelligibelen Welt*). In a single passage, Kant states:

. . . the idea of such a whole, as a universal republic based on the laws of virtue, differs entirely from all moral laws (which concern what we know to reside within our power), for it is the idea of working toward a whole of which we cannot know whether as a whole it is also in our power: so the duty in question differs from all others in kind and in principle. (*R* 6:98)

His aim in this passage is to argue for a highest moral being – i.e., God – who could make this duty possible and serve the purpose of our humanly need for moral wellness. Nevertheless, I contend that the element of (pursued) divine cooperation does not subvert the fact that Kant sets the idea of an ethical community as the ultimate moral end on earth which embraces the whole human race under ethical laws.

⁴⁸ For a coherent conception of the highest good beyond the dichotomy of secular and theological readings, see Vatansever, 2021.

Before concluding, let me encapsulate that Kant's moral theory always envisage a universal collectivity of moral agents towards a common moral good. Duties of virtue towards others explicitly aim to rule out all social vices and cultivate virtues necessary for a healthy society. Even though these duties first apply to the closest circle of one's friends, family or colleagues to whom one is attached by acquired rights and duties; that circle extends gradually and ultimately embraces the whole citizens of the world as Kant summarizes eloquently:

It is a duty to oneself as well as to others not to *isolate* oneself (*separatistam agree*) but to use one's moral perfections in social intercourse (*officium commercii, sociabilitas*). While making oneself a fixed center of one's principles, one ought to regard this circle drawn around one as also forming part of an all-inclusive circle of those who, in their disposition, are citizens of the world –not exactly in order to promote as the end what is best for the world but only to cultivate what leads indirectly to this end: to cultivate a disposition of reciprocity – agreeableness, tolerance, mutual love, and respect (affability and propriety, *humanitas aesthetica et decorum*) and so to associate the graces with virtue. To bring this about is itself a duty virtue. (TL 6:473)

Therefore, the ethical community functions as a remedy against Kant's pessimism about the human nature and at times about the world which he considers as under the dominion of evil (R 6:83). The idea of an invisible realm of God on earth (*eines unsichtbaren Reichs Gottes auf Erden ausmacht*) makes it possible for us to “consider the gracious consequences that virtue would spread throughout the world” and it becomes possible for the “morally oriented reason” to sense a joy through this imagination (R 6:23). Even though Kant considers the visible church as the initial step for such a universal formation, the pure religion of faith has an invisible church and needs no ecclesiastical laws and administrators or officials. Kant states that “the members of this community receive their orders from the highest lawgiver individually, without intermediary” (R 6:152). Accordingly, “the pure religion of reason will have all right-thinking human beings as its servants (yet without being

officials)”. And so long as the visible church and its officials serves for this final moral end, the “service of the church” is acceptable, yet those who reject this via basing everything on ecclesiastical or salvation are deserved to be called “counterfeit service” (*R* 6:153). Therefore, Kant’s aim is not to do away with all revealed religions. His discussion of Christianity provides the criteria of how and on what conditions teachings of a particular faith is reconcilable with morality and with morally oriented idea of rational faith. In other words, I contend that follower of any faith, for instance a practicing Muslim, could agree about orienting her religious attachments around the idea of a morally good life conduct that is harmonized with the wellness all fellow humans. Thus, it is significant to interpret Kant’s conception of an ethical community as a real possibility to approximate collectively regardless of religious, sectarian, cultural or other differences, rather than as a Christian myth or an impossible fantasy.

5.6 Conclusion on Judging Virtue and Setting Ends

This chapter depicts the Kantian picture of virtue in its completeness. As discussed, a robust articulation of virtue embraces all aspects and domains of one’s actualization of oneself. This pervades from the most intrapersonal aspects regarding our moral motivation, autocracy, towards the possibility of collective moral ideals where we can consider each adoption of our moral ends as serving to approximate to these moral ideals. Therefore, the virtuous moral health includes a constant self-reflection, judging authentically and critically about the motives of our actions, about the ends we set for ourselves.

Even though the end of morality or virtue is nothing other than itself, namely virtue is its own end and reward; considering this as something we owe to ourselves

and aligning with our true selves provides a rational and moral completeness for our virtuous efforts. From this subjective perspective or moral view of the world; virtuous disposition and necessary ends of virtue overlap with the possible real harmony between the way things are and should be. Nevertheless, virtue and the duties of virtue hold without embracing this teleological conception Kant aspires. This is because duties of virtue are already embedded in our law giving capacity of practical rationality that we find both the ground of their obligation and necessary content this obligation in the principles of human morality. Namely, the necessary minimum to justify duties of virtue is derived simply from “contradiction in willing test” or procedure. The contradiction involved in this reasoning shows that as imperfect, and mutually dependent social beings we cannot will consistently to live in a world where no one helps others and no one cultivates any of her capacities. The possibility of actualizing any permissible end or functioning of any human society necessitates to act in compliance with duties of virtue.

Nevertheless, I argue that beyond this justifiable objective ground, Kant depicts us a much more robust human agency and moral purposiveness. In this depiction, humanity in us stands as the divine in us, or what makes us bestowed or charged with an unalienable dignity. In this perspective, the singular moral experience is contextualized in a moral telos that enables us to envisage ourselves as instances in the order of all things that is oriented in morality. According to Kant, this moral view is what makes the moral experience rationally complete and moral ideals accessible. I contend that this perspective also transforms radically one’s resolution about how much and in what ways to perfect oneself, along with how much and in whatever ways to attend to the ends of others. This is because, considering humanity in one’s own person and in others as the divine in us, shapes

our making sense of ourselves and others along with the duties of virtue. Therefore, espousing a moral telos does not only function as consolation for the agent but enables her to stand by her duties (of justice and virtue) with a stronger commitment and hopeful resolution as purposiveness of moral reasoning demands such completeness.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

In this study I provide a holistic reading of Kant's moral philosophy to argue that Kant's account of moral autonomy is not only consistent with but supports one's commitments to moral excellence and moral ideals. While moral autonomy provides universal and objective first principles of justice and virtue, Kant also indicates strategies how moral teleology and moral values are to be introduced into comprehensive moral experience which I designated as moral health. Kantian autonomy has achieved a break from traditional morals (of divine command theories or teleological ethics). Kant distances himself from any foundationalism or meta-narrative about the universe that gives us reasons to be moral. Namely, autonomous morality does not obligate us to be moral because it is a divine command, or because we are dignified members of a harmoniously pre-established moral universe. Nevertheless, I argued that focusing on Kant's account of moral judgment and judging, we can see why and how rational completeness of morality is achieved by a robust actualization of autonomy which embraces a moral teleology without subverting autonomy of morals.

In Chapter 2, I argued that judging capacity is central to human agency in Kant's critical philosophy. I asserted that according to Kant judging is the core of all reflective mental activities, deliberations, decisions, beliefs, conducts and attachments. In Kant's critical system we are initially concerned with whether or how well we achieve to reflect on, assess, critically judge, and achieve to communicate with others a given case and our relevant approach. Kant's thought is based on the principles of rational self-discipline required in all domains – empirical

knowledge, morals, aesthetics, and religion – to cognize, assess and make justifiable judgments. Accordingly, first I analyzed Kant’s account of judgment and types of judgments. I emphasized that according to Kant moral judgments are determining judgments which are vindicated by categorical imperative. Nevertheless, judging is a holistic activity and reflective judging also inseparably built into moral reasoning. I demonstrated in what several ways reflective judging plays a central role in moral agency and moral integrity. Judging reflectively and conscientiously is integral to all aspects of morals from justice to aesthetics. Reflective judging also enables an interpretative space regarding the fundamental, meta, or existential questions. I also showed that according to Kant mature judgment in any domain requires judging in accordance with the principles judging. In this connection, I claimed that judging is the spontaneity of practical agency, which is an authentic performance or act by the agent herself. Through judging, one adopts certain attitudes, dispositions, a supreme maxim in life and sets ends for herself, and by acting accordingly realizes her authentic agency and moral view of the world.

In Chapter 3, on “Autonomy”, I argued that Kant’s account of moral autonomy operates regardless of his ontological assumptions. To show this I elaborated Kant’s peculiar sense of metaphysics which focuses on our rational self-discipline and our cognitive limits. I analyzed constructivist and realist readings of Kantian autonomy and I argued that none of these interpretive poles can encompass the richness and distinctiveness of Kantian morals. Accordingly, I proposed focusing on the spontaneity and constitutive normativity of judging as the core of autonomy. Autonomy is an inalienable rational capacity which enables moral imputability and acquiring any rights. I argued that according to Kant, autonomy, namely our capacity to judge, will and act justly and virtuously; is the divine in us and embraces all

aspects of morals from justice to virtuous-religious disposition. Having a religious disposition is initially an awareness that autonomy is the divine in us. Nevertheless, I claimed that Kant's moral theory provides an interpretive latitude in interpreting what autonomy is. Namely, the moral law or principle of autonomy holds regardless of whether one considers autonomy as aligning oneself with the divine. The rational-practical force of the categorical imperative achieves to justify basic moral principles of justice and duties of virtue without reference to any moral view of the world or religious disposition. In this regard, I defended a constructivist methodology which achieves to establish moral objectivism without anti-realism in morals. I avoided to consider autonomy merely as a rational principle and highlighted that autonomy is adopting and acting on moral principles so that it is an experience of real moral agents, which refers to an ongoing, and non-static judgmental processes and reflective attitude.

In Chapter 4 on justice, I elaborated Kant's conception of the categorical imperative and its various formulations. I argued that in justifying universal basic principles of justice prioritizing the formula of universal law which provides the most formal and strict canon for moral judgment is legitimate. It enables to justify and give justificatory reasons for moral willing and acting without reference to values, ontological assumptions, or teleological interpretations. I claimed that Westphal's (2016) constructivist methodology which prioritizes the formula of universal law and procedural reasoning achieves to justify basic principles of justice and virtue objectively and universally. I also argued that according to Kant, ideally justice and virtue make two sides of the same coin and principles of justice is the basis of all moral affairs (embracing not only external rights). Nevertheless, rational force of the categorical imperative can justify legitimate external constraint, if one

fails in such moral integrity and in abiding by the principles of justice. Finally, I claimed that because moral purposiveness of reason demands realization of a system of justice, Kant sets constituting a civil condition and global justice as a duty towards which we all must work. Even though justifying basic principles of morals does not depend on any necessary ends or moral teleology, I argued that robust actualization of autonomy, moral reasoning and experience expands the limits of procedural reasoning.

In Chapter 5 on virtue and setting ends, I analyzed Kant's account of virtue in detail. I showed that virtue is a reflective self-discipline and requires constant attentiveness on how and how well we judged and acted morally. I argued that even though Kant regards virtue initially as strength or resistance against prioritizing self-love over the moral principle, Kant's complete account of virtue, the duties of virtue and the duty to be virtuous, depicts a moral health individually and collectively. Accordingly, I showed that the duty of virtue paves the way for moral health and demands one's overall wellness and realization of her morally permissible and required sense of happiness (§ 5.4). In § 5.5 I argued that a cosmopolitan and universal sense of ethical community plays a crucial role for Kant's account of virtue. I defended that a robust actualization of Kantian autonomy aims at an upright moral character, a self-contented moral integrity; along with a harmonious togetherness of moral agents in which inter-personal relations include care beyond indifferentism and in which each can consider one another as the co-constructor of a better world. Interpreting this intra and inter-personal aspects of virtue is significant because it shows how Kantian autonomy could relate to his moral teleology, i.e., the purposiveness of moral experience. In this subjectively valid moral view of the world, Kant's moral ideals (moral excellence, ethical community or the highest good

on earth) and their attainability gains practical possibility. In this connection I argued that virtuous disposition, a robust actualization of autonomy, not only demands this moral world view, but reciprocally this perspective also enables one to conform with the principles of justice and virtue with a stronger commitment and resolution.

I covered several aspects of Kant's moral philosophy in the axis of judging. I believe that to embrace the richness and scope Kant proposes, it is significant to take judging seriously and how judging in fact constitutes who we are literally. I argued that once autonomy is considered as the divine in us as a reflective-religious disposition, the believer has the paradigm of a divine law without an author and has faith in a teleology that shapes her moral experience. Faith as the attentiveness of the heart and mind, provides a moral view of the world in which one's virtuous disposition and willing becomes an instantiation of the divine, without initially expecting a future success. Accordingly, faith enables one to stick with the principles of justice and virtue much more tightly not because the agent necessarily expects a divine interference into the natural courses of event, but rather in her perspective the natural courses of events already become a divine manifestation. The sincerity and humility of this perspective does not deny or claim to resolve the problem of evil. Nevertheless, the trust as the core of faith provides patience, hope and ever new ways of reading reality. This faithful perspective hints the possibility of moral excellence individually and collectively which is symbolized in each instance of natural beauty.

I argued that Kant's account of autonomy, our capacity to distinguish right from wrong, our self-scrutiny and all kinds of moral reflection and acting in accordance with justice and virtue make us conform with the divine and align our willing with the will of the Divinity who is the Supreme moral agent. Accordingly, autonomy is the divine in us and a robust actualization of this capacity depicts how

the initial requirements of morality which Kant elaborates as the canon of moral judging and the first principles of justice and virtue are inseparably and essentially linked to the ultimate ends of morality and a moral view of the world in which these ends can be and are realized. Thus, I argued that true religious disposition which is crucial to moral health is tied to virtuous disposition to complement actualizing autonomy. Therefore, I argued that our making sense of our autonomy, namely the authentic meaning we attribute to being a free, rational human moral agent can be considered as an initial instance of that judgmental spontaneity in which each of us judges about who we are, what we can and should achieve either individually and collectively and, what we may hope in and through our moral experience.

There are several works in the literature which successfully emphasize the essentiality of judgments and judging for Kant's critical corpus and especially in empirical cognition.⁴⁹ In the aesthetics and moral domain also several works vindicate how Kant's moral theory and aesthetics can be understood as a system of judgments and judging properly.⁵⁰ The present study aims to contribute emphasizing moral judgment and judging to understand Kant's sense of morality. It develops a reading of Kantian morals across all aspects of its totality – from justice to virtue – and it defends a continuity and coherence in all these aspects of morals by judgmental latitudes which embraces richness of moral judging from determining judgments of justice to reflective judging of faith in a moral teleology. This provides a holistic and consistent understanding of Kantian morals beyond the dichotomies of

⁴⁹ For instance, see Westphal (2020) *Kant's Critical Epistemology: Why Epistemology Must Consider Judgment First*, Pollok (2017) *Kant's Theory of Normativity: Exploring the Space of Reason*, Longuenesse (1998) *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, (2005) *Kant on the Human Standpoint*.

⁵⁰ For instance, see O'Neill (1989) *Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy*, (1996) *Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning*, Herman (1993) *The practice of Moral Judgment*, Makreel (2015) *Orientation and Judgment in Hermeneutics*.

deontology and teleology or constructivism and realism. To develop a consistent reading, rather than ignoring some essential aspects of Kantian morals (e.g., ignoring Kantian moral idea(s) such as God or the highest good or his teleological-religious conceptions) or prioritizing certain values or ends over moral principles (which results in either subverting Kant's conception of autonomy or moral objectivism), my exegesis focuses on what we can judge and justify objectively, or communicate with others rationally and legitimately.

I believe that Kant's philosophy of religion has a distinctive character, and it indeed can have significant contribution and relevance to our current crisis in politics and religion more than ever. I do not think that Kant's humble and critical theism subverts the moral significance of faith. On the contrary, he successfully develops the idea that true virtuous disposition takes one to moral faith. Further than that I contend that it is also significant to take seriously Kant's idea of universal moral faith which instructs a virtuous conscientiousness to whole human race, over and beyond all sort of rituals, disagreements over creeds, and conflicts between different religions. This idea does not necessarily refer to annihilation of historical creeds, or different religious traditions. On the contrary, it emphasizes the all-embracing character of true religious disposition as the Supreme moral legislator's will is engraved in all humans' hearts (*R* 6:104). Therefore, it is significant and timely to study Kant's philosophy of religion which can teach us a lot about what sorts of principles are to be enacted for justice, religious pluralism, and freedom of conscience.

I believe that Kant's moral faith is initially a faith in the human being and in her lineage to the divine through her true self, autonomy, and moral disposition. As Lessing advises us to quit asking "To whom does God belong?" (1992, p.70, line

1556) in his excellent play *Nathan the Wise*, Kant shows us that there is no point in drowning ourselves in endless argumentations or in religious, sectarian polemics. The divine speaks through moral reasoning and is ever closer to one than any priest, imam, theologian, or any authority could ever be. Kant liberates conscience from any such intermediators between the Almighty and the believer. It is not a liberation from the belief itself as Kant repeatedly asserts. Accordingly, I contend that Kant's philosophy of religion is also very resourceful for any comparative religious studies and to establish what is common in distinct religious traditions without melting them into one another or clashing them. I hope to further my studies on Kant in this direction and believe that there is a rich material to work on comparatively between Kant's perspective and Islamic-Sufi tradition which teaches us to have faith in the human being herself for mostly. So does advise the 13th century Anatolian mystic:

The Providence that casts this spell
And speaks so many tongues to tell,
Transcends the earth, heaven and hell,
But is contained in this heart's cast.

The yearning tormented my mind:
I searched the heavens and the ground;
I looked and looked, but failed to find.
I found Him inside man at last.
Yunus Emre⁵¹

⁵¹ Yunus Emre (2011). *A Millennium of Turkish Literature: A Concise History* (T. S. Halman Trans., J. L. Warner Ed.), p. 17.

REFERENCES

- Allison, H.E. (1990). *Kant's Theory of Freedom*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Allison, H.E. (2001). *Kant's Theory of Taste*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Baxley, A. M. (2010). *Kant's Theory of Virtue*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Besch, T.M. (2009). Kantian constructivism, the issue of scope, and perfectionism: O'Neill on ethical Standing, *European Journal of Philosophy*, 19(1), 1-20.
- Bojanowski, J. (2012). Is Kant a moral realist?'. *Kant Yearbook*, 4, 1-23, De Gruyter.
- Bojanowski, J. (2016). Kant's solution to the Euthyphro dilemma. *Philosophia*, 44 (4), 1209-1228.
- Bojanowski, J. (2017a). Naturalism and realism in Kant's ethics. *Kantian Review*, 22 (3), 463-474.
- Bojanowski, J. (2017b). Kant on the justification of moral principles. *Kant-Studien*, 108 (1), 55-88.
- Eldem, U. (2020). Kant's conception of conscience. *Con-Textos Kantianos*, No:11, 110-131.
- Formosa, P. (2010). Is Kant a moral constructivist or a moral realist?. *European Journal of Philosophy*, 21(2) 170-196.
- Ginsborg, H. (2015). *The Normativity of Nature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ginsborg, H. (2019) "Kant's Aesthetics and Teleology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = [<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/kant-aesthetics/>](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/kant-aesthetics/).
- Guyer, P. (2000). *Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Guyer, P. (2006a). Dialogue: Paul Guyer and Henry Allison on Allison's *Kant's Theory of Taste*. In R. Kukla (Ed.), *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy* (pp. 111-138). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Guyer, P. (2014). *Kant* (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge.
- Herman, B. (1993). *The Practice of Moral Judgment*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

- Herman, B. (2011). Embracing Kant's formalism. *Kantian Review*, 16(1), 49-66.
- Kain, P. (2004). Self-legislation in Kant's moral philosophy. *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 86. Bd., 257-306.
- Kain, P. (2005). Interpreting Kant's theory of divine commands. *Kantian Review*, 9 (1), 128-149.
- Kain, P. (2006). Realism and anti-realism in Kant's second *Critique*. *Philosophy Compass*, 1(5), 449-465.
- Kant, I. (1996). *Practical Philosophy*. (M.J. Gregor Trans.) New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, I. (1998). *Critique of Pure Reason*. (P. Guyer & A.W. Wood Trans.). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, I. (2001). *Religion and Rational Theology*. (A.W. Wood & G. di Giovanni Trans.). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, I. (2002). *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. (P. Guyer Ed. P. Guyer & E. Matthews Trans.), New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, I. (2004). *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science*. (G. Hatfield Trans.). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, I. (2007). *Anthropology, History, and Education*. (M. Gregor, P. Guyer, R.B. Louden, H. Wilson, A.W. Wood, G. Zöllner, A. Zweig Trans.). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Korsgaard, C.M. (2008). *The Constitution of Agency*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Krueger, J. & Lipscomb, B.J.B. (2010). Introduction. In Krueger & Lipscomb (Eds.), *Kant's Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality* (pp. 1 -23). Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Lessing, G. E. (1992). *Nathan the Wise*. (S. Clennell & R. Philip, Trans.). United Kingdom: The Open University.
- Longuenesse, B. (1998). *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Longuenesse, B. (2005). *Kant on the Human Standpoint*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Louden, R. B. (2000). *Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Makkreel, R. (2002). Reflective judgment and the problem of assessing virtue in Kant. *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, 36, 205-220.
- Makkreel, R. (2006). Reflection, reflective judgment, and aesthetic exemplarity. In R. Kukla (Ed.), *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy* (pp. 223-244). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Makkreel, R. (2013). Relating Kant's theory of reflective judgment to the law. *Washington University Jurisprudence Review*, 6 (1), 147-160.
- Makkreel, R. (2015). *Orientation and Judgment in Hermeneutics*. London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Nuyen, A.T. (1993). Counting the formulas of the categorical imperative: One plus three makes four. *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 10(1), 37-48.
- Nuyen, A.T. (1998). Is Kant a divine command theorist?. *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 15(4), 441- 453.
- O'Neill, O. (1989). *Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Neill, O. (1996). *Towards Justice and Virtue*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Neill, O. (2001). Practical principles and practical judgment. *The Hasting Center Report*, 31(4), 15-23.
- O'Neill, O. (2002). Autonomy and the fact of reason in the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. In O. Höffe (Ed.), *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (pp. 81-97). Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
- O'Neill, O. (2003). Constructivism in Rawls and Kant. In S.Freeman (Ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls* (pp. 347-367). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Neill, O. (2004). Kant: Rationality as practical reason. In A.Meele R. & P. Rawling (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Rationality* (pp. 93- 109). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Paton, H.J. (1946). *The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy*. London: Hutchinson's University Library.
- Pollok, K. (2017). *Kant's Theory of Normativity: Exploring the Space of Reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rauscher, F. (2015). *Naturalism and Realism in Kant's Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Redding, P. (2010). Two directions for analytic Kantianism: Naturalism and idealism. In Mario de Caro & David Macarthur (Eds.), *Naturalism and Normativity* (pp. 263-289). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Redding, P. (2012). Kantian origins: One possible path from transcendental idealism to a “post-Kantian” philosophical theology. In P. Redding & P.D. Bubbio (Eds.), *Religion After Kant: God and Culture in the Idealist Era* (pp. 1-20). Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Redding, P. (2017). What might it mean to have a systematic idealist, but anti-Platonist, practical philosophy?. In T. Brooks & S. Stein (Eds.), *Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: On Normative Significance of Method and System* (pp. 25-44). Oxford University Press.
- Rossi, P. J. (2005). *The Social Authority of Reason: Kant’s Critique, Radical Evil, and the Destiny of Humankind*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Scanlon, T.M. (2014). *Being Realistic About Reasons*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schneewind, J. B. (1984). The divine corporation and the history of ethics. In J.B. Schneewind, Q. Skinner & R. Rorty (Eds.), *Philosophy in History: Essays in the Historiography of Philosophy* (pp. 173-192). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schneewind, J. B. (1998). *The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schneewind, J.B. (2002). Why study Kant’s ethics?. In A. Wood (Ed.), *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals with Essays* (pp. 83-92). New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Schulting, D. (2010). Kant’s idealism: The current debate. In D. Schulting & J. Verburgt (Eds.), *Kant’s Idealism* (pp. 1-25). London: Springer.
- Stern, R. (2012). *Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stocker, M. (1976). The schizophrenia of modern ethical theories. *Journal of Philosophy*, 73(14), 453-466.
- Teufel, T. (2011). Kant’s *non*-teleological conception of purposiveness. *Kant-Studien*, 102(2), 232-252.
- Vatansever, S. (2021). Kant’s coherent theory of the highest good. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, 89, 263-283.
- Westphal, K.R. (2004). *Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Westphal, K. R. (2010). Practical reason: Categorical imperative, maxims, laws. In W. Dudley & K. Engelhard (Eds.), *Kant: Key concepts* (pp. 103-119). London: Acumen.
- Westphal, K.R. (2016a). Kant, Aristotle and our Fidelity to reason. *Studi Kantiani*, XXIX, 109-128.
- Westphal, K.R. (2016). *How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Westphal, K.R. (2020). *Kant's Critical Epistemology: Why Epistemology Must Consider Judgment First*. New York: Routledge.
- Westra, A. (2016). *The Typic in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Wood, A. (1984). Kant's compatibilism. In A. Wood (Ed.), *Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy* (pp. 73-101). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Wood, A. (1992). Constructions of reason: Explorations of Kant's practical philosophy by O. O'Neill. *The Philosophical Review*, 101(3), 647-650.
- Wood, A. (2001). The objectivity of value. *New Literary History*, 32(4), 859-881.
- Wood, A. (2006). The supreme principle of morality. In P. Guyer (Ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy* (pp. 342-381). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wood, A. (2008). *Kantian Ethics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Yunus Emre (2011). *A Millennium of Turkish Literature: A Concise History* (T. S. Halman Trans., J. L. Warner Ed.), New York: Syracuse University Press.
- Zuckert, R. (2007). *Kant on Beauty and Biology*. New York: Cambridge University Press.