

ON THE NATURE OF THE SEMANTICS–PRAGMATICS DISTINCTION

MUSTAFA POLAT

BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY

2020

ON THE NATURE OF THE SEMANTICS–PRAGMATICS DISTINCTION

Thesis submitted to the
Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Philosophy

by

Mustafa Polat

Boğaziçi University

2020

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Mustafa Polat, certify that

- I am the sole author of this thesis and that I have fully acknowledged and documented in my thesis all sources of ideas and words, including digital resources, which have been produced or published by another person or institution;
- this thesis contains no material that has been submitted or accepted for a degree or diploma in any other educational institution;
- this is a true copy of the thesis approved by my advisor and thesis committee at Boğaziçi University, including final revisions required by them.

Signature.....

Date20.01.2020.....

ABSTRACT

On the Nature of the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction

In linguistics and philosophy; *syntax*, *semantics*, and *pragmatics* are typically held to characterize some complementary yet distinct aspects (i.e. explanans) in a language with respect to some related significance (i.e. explanandum) such as meaning, language comprehension, communication, and cognition. In the last decades, the question of how to draw the semantics-pragmatics distinction in a principled way has become one of the most noteworthy, but equally most contentious, question in philosophy of language and in philosophy of linguistics. This dissertation questions the nature and the extent of the endeavors for drawing the distinction in a principled way in order that it outlines methodological warrants for a better understanding of the distinction. In this respect, the dissertation argues for the deflationary stance which contends that semantics and pragmatics are stipulative categories under which more fundamental theories underlying them are trivially abridged. For this matter, the dissertation critically analyzes the object-level interpretations of the distinction on the basis of some assumptions (derivativeness, integrity, autonomy, sharpness, and cursiveness) and the assumption schema (the Aspect Distinction Assumption) on which these object-level interpretations typically rest. Accordingly, the dissertation takes issue with the substantiality of the distinction by deflating its alleged significance in substantivizing some adopted explanandum about a given language.

ÖZET

Anlambilim-Edimbilim Ayrımının Doğası Üzerine

Dilbilim ve felsefede; *sözdizim*, *anlambilim* ve *edimbilim* genellikle bir dilin anlam, iletişim, dil kavrayışı ve bilişsellik gibi bir teorik önemi (*explanandum*) ile ilgili olarak bu dilin farklı ama tamamlayıcı yönlerini (*explanans*) karakterize etmek için kullanılır. Son yıllarda, anlambilim ve edimbilim arasındaki ayrımın ilkeli, yani belirleyici, bir şekilde nasıl çizileceği sorusu; dil felsefesinde ve dilbilim felsefesinde en dikkat çekici ama eşit derecede en tartışmalı sorulardan biri haline gelmiştir. Bu çalışma, anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımını daha iyi kavrayabilmemiz için gerekli metodolojik sınırların ana hatlarını çizmek amacını güderek bu ayrımı ilkeli bir şekilde çizme çabalarının kapsamını ve doğasını sorgulamaktadır. Bu bağlamda; bu çalışma, temel olarak anlambilim ve edimbilim kategorilerinin, arkalarında yatan daha temel teorileri ve bunlara ait tartışmaları önemsiz bir şekilde (*trivially*) kısaltan koşullu (*stipulative*) kategoriler olduğunu iddia etmekteyken ayrımın kuramsal önemini deflasyona uğratan bir görüşü savunmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda; çalışma, ayrıma dair birinci dereceden, yani nesne düzeyindeki, yorumların dayandığı bazı ilksel varsayımları (*türevsellik*, *bütünlük*, *özerklik*, *keskinlik* ve *gidimlilik*) ve varsayım şemasını (*Dilsel Yön Ayrım Varsayımı*) eleştirel bir şekilde tahlil edecek ve literatürdeki farklı anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımları ile örneklendirecektir. Sonuç olarak ise çalışma anlambilim-edimbilim ayrımının bir dil teorisindeki açıklayıcı önemini boşaltırken bu ayrımın felsefi sağlamlığına karşı bir tutum takınır.

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME: Mustafa Polat

DEGREES AWARDED

PhD in Philosophy, 2020, Boğaziçi University

MA in Philosophy, 2013, Boğaziçi University

BA in Philosophy, 2011, Bilkent University

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Philosophy of language, philosophical logic, the history of analytical philosophy, philosophy of science, meta-ethics, and logic.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant, Department of Philosophy, Gaziantep University, 2018 - present

Research Assistant, Department of Philosophy, Boğaziçi University, 2014 - 2018

PUBLICATIONS

Polat, M. (2013). *The critical assessment of the direct referentialist solutions to the semantic problems of empty names* (Master's thesis, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul). Available from YÖK Thesis Center and ProQuest database. (Thesis No. 399451)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Theoretical background.....	1
1.2 In defense of a deflationary account	4
1.3 Dissertation structure	10
CHAPTER 2: CHARTING THE BOUNDARIES	13
2.1 The basic triad and the cinquain.....	13
2.2 Suspending the question of syntax.....	19
CHAPTER 3: DRAWING THE SEMANTICS-PRAGMATICS DISTINCTION ...	23
3.1 What is the distinction?	23
3.2 Why the distinction matters	31
3.3 Concluding remarks	36
CHAPTER 4: DELIMITING THE DISTINCTION.....	37
4.1 Delimiting the distinction by dichotomies	37
4.2 Delimiting the distinction by natural language phenomena.....	44
4.3. A quest for criteria	48
4.4 Concluding remarks	90
CHAPTER 5: REPRESENTING THE DISTINCTION.....	91
5.1 Philosophical roots of the distinction.....	91
5.2 Carnap and the formal approach.	93
5.3 Gricean approach	103
5.4 Bach's semantic minimalist approach.....	121
5.5 The relevance-theoretic approach	127

CHAPTER 6: DEFLATING THE DISTINCTION.....	133
6.1 Aspect distinction assumption.....	133
6.2 Trivializing the semantics-pragmatics distinction	143
6.3 Higher-order triviality of the semantics-pragmatics distinction	148
6.4 Concluding remarks	154
REFERENCES.....	158

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Theoretical background

In linguistics and philosophy, the division of labor in language understanding is commonly schematized by *the basic triad* that consists of *syntax*, *semantics*, and *pragmatics* each of which stands for complementary yet distinct aspects of the language in question. These aspects, at face value, could provide us a methodological convenience by schematically representing the structure of a language with respect to diverse linguistic roles. Thus, the basic triad is often stipulated to show how natural and formal languages are, or are to be, analyzed in a schematic manner.

The aspects in the basic triad can be tentatively defined as follows: (i) syntax concerns with the formal body covering the code-to-code relations and the codification rules in a language; (ii) semantics works out the formal relations between codes and what content/information/meaning are encoded/denoted by them; (iii) pragmatics deals with the interlocutors' relations with these codes in their uses. The boundaries among the aspects might differ depending on what the aspects stand for and how they relate to each other. Such interpretative variations, at the bottom line, arise from some diversifying, and even competing, analyses of the following components: (i) codes (formal, natural, linguistic, non-linguistic, type-like, token-like, abstract, concrete, implicit/explicit and etc.), (ii) content (e.g. stable, unstable, literal, non-literal, representational, non-representational, propositional, non-propositional, assertoric, non-assertoric, truth-conditional, non-truth-conditional and so on.), (iii) relation (e.g. entailment, implication, relevance, decoding, inferential, and etc.), (v) use (e.g. speech acts, competence, performance, contextual, non-

contextual, conventional, conversational, speaker's intention, speaker's meaning and so on). Hence, the aspects of the basic triad might complement and relate to each other in varying manners depending on how a theory construes the above notions which are to characterize the boundaries amongst them. As a result, the boundaries among syntax, semantics, and pragmatics could be drawn in drastically diverse ways to the effect that the basic triad stands at the center of contentions. Hence, many philosophers and linguists have proposed differing characterizations of the division of labor in language understanding based on their disputes over the tentative characterization of the basic triad, along with its accompanying notions.

Particularly, the question of how to draw the boundaries between semantics and pragmatics has become one of the most disputed questions in the last decades. Although how to delimit the boundaries between semantics and pragmatics varies from one theory to another, there are at least two main strands to delimit the semantics-pragmatics distinction, namely *complementarism* and *reductionism*. The complementarist views typically preserve the semantics-pragmatics distinction in one way or another whereas the reductionist views melt one aspect into another.¹ These views engage with the question of how to draw the distinction through the first-order questions that pertain to the *domains/domain-specific functions* related to semantics and pragmatics.² For that matter, endorsing the semantics-pragmatics distinction, in one way or another, already implicates certain assumptions on the division of labor in language understanding. Behind such a classificatory division, there are five underlying assumptions which I call the *underlying cinquain* or simply the *cinquain*.

¹ In addition to *complementarism* and *reductionism*, I will later introduce Stojanovic's (2014) notion of *pre-pragmatics* by which she widens the basic triad. Thus, I label her treatment as *expansionism*.

² By *domain-specific functions*, I simply mean the adopted properties/processes/relations which are to define the domain of an aspect distinctively in a given language.

They can be listed as follows:

- *Derivativeness Assumption*: Proposing distinct aspects derives from the conviction that natural language phenomena can be distinguished and classified in a substantive manner.
- *Integrity Assumption*: The proposed aspects, as a whole, constitute an integrity to form a satisfactory language model accommodating with each natural language phenomenon.
- *Sharpness Assumption*: The boundaries among the proposed aspects are sharply definitive so that there are no borderline/anomalous phenomena.
- *Autonomy Assumption*: Each aspect entails a viable degree of autonomy in the sense that the proposed aspects have their own domains and/or domain-specific functions by which we can definitively distinguish one aspect from another. In this regard, each aspect has its own mark.
- *Cursiveness Assumption*: The proposed aspects contribute to one another in a cursive manner (e.g. symmetrical or asymmetrical) to the effect that all/most/some pragmatic phenomena rest on semantic components, all/most/some semantic phenomena rest on syntactic components and so on.

Although how the boundaries are drawn might vary from one theory to another, these competing theories fall within the borders of the *cinquain*. At this level, discussions and elucidations on the semantics-pragmatics distinction center around providing a coherent account in terms of the *cinquain* and the accompanying theories such as a theory of meaning, a theory of reference, a theory of truth and so on. Nevertheless, these competing philosophical stances depend on some questions underlying the distinction in the first place: (i) Is there a substantial ground in language or human cognition to draw such a distinction in a principled way; (ii) If not, what reason or

reasons there should be to make the distinction in our methodology of linguistic analysis? From this perspective, the question of the distinction must be grounded in two levels, i.e. the object (first-order) level and the higher-order level.

1.2 In defense of a deflationary account

As mentioned above, there might be several ways of drawing the distinction based on the preceding analyses of some notions which are prior to endorsing that there are such and such aspects of a given language. At the object level of analysis, a theory describes the semantics-pragmatics distinction with respect to some explanatory significance (i.e. *explanandum*) related to some given language; moreover, how the theory describes it depends on other related notions and theories which characterize the domains and the ranges of the domain-specific functions of each aspect. Hence, the distinction is thought to be defined in a principled way only if a definition of the distinction is coherent and empirically plausible for satisfying this adopted explanatory significance in virtue of the given language phenomena (e.g. natural language phenomena such as indexicals), the adopted notions (e.g. meaning, truth, position), criteria (e.g. context-sensitivity), theoretical commitments (e.g. the correspondence theory of truth, structured propositions) and such. In brief, the theories of the semantics-pragmatics distinction, at the object level of analysis, attempt to account for an adopted explanandum by means of some aspects which are claimed to satisfy this explanandum through their complementary, yet discernible, domains/domain-specific functions.

In most theories, explaining the language understanding amounts to the explanatory significance/explanandum in question. In some other theories, this explanatory significance corresponds to a more particularized notion, i.e. meaning.

Nevertheless, the most prevalent theories of the distinction, satisfactory or not, rests on the same fundamental assumption which is subjected to some higher-order evaluation for the sake of meta-theoretical concerns and questions that are basic to any postulation of the alleged boundaries between semantics and pragmatics.

Hereby, the fundamental assumption of the semantics-pragmatics distinction (which I call the *Aspect Distinction Assumption*) goes as follows:

The Aspect Distinction Assumption (ADA): In a language L , there are distinguishable n -tuple aspects (i.e. explanans) of L -related significance (i.e. explanandum) if and only if there are respectively n -tuple domains/domain-specific functions which have distinguishable ranges (outputs) that are substantial -to some degree or another- in accounting for L -related significance.

As my literature survey will reveal later on, there are numerous ways to put forward the distinction based on ADA. To illustrate such variations, the language L can universally include both natural and formal languages although it can also be restricted to natural languages in terms of some universally shared properties and phenomena. On the other hand, these two variations do not exhaust all alternatives by virtue of languages. For instance, one can fairly reduce it to a particular system of a formal language such as the first-order standard deductive logic. Furthermore, theories can also go into divergent ways based on the notion of L -related significance. Linguistics, for instance, typically takes this significance as the systematicity in the study of natural languages so that the aspects are taken to stand for methodologically substantial fields in the study of language. On the other hand, the complementarist philosophers such as Carnap often interpret L -related significance to provide a well-grounded understanding of meaning, and this sort of interpretation leads them to consider the aspects in terms of the substantiality of their roles in grounding their adopted notion of meaning. Finally, the *domain-specific functions*, per se, can vary with a theory although they are proposed to be discernable

at any rate. Most of the discussions amongst the complementarist views, along with their contentions with reductionist views, rely on how to define these domain-specific functions in a distinguishable way by which they are substantial to L-related significance such as language comprehension, communication, and meaning.

Regardless of how ADA can be interpreted at the object-level, there is one meta-theoretical question underlying each possible interpretation of ADA: What grounds the viability of ADA in terms of its general framework? There are at least three main strands to interpret this higher-order question: (i) Linguistic substantiality; (ii) Cognitive substantiality; (iii) Methodological convenience. According to the first two views, ADA, within its framework, is legitimate because there are substantial phenomena, processes, and facts to which these aspects correspond in the way that the framework of ADA stipulates. In other words, there are either linguistic or cognitive sorts of *stuff* (entities, features, properties, processes, and so on) that are substantial to drawing the distinction in terms of ADA.³ The first sort of substantiality view has been a mainstream stance in philosophy until Grice's contributions to intention-based communication, Fodor's modularity thesis, and Sperber & Wilson's relevance theory.⁴ Moreover, the viability of ADA can be grounded in its methodological convenience when these aspects are taken as stipulative categories to provide a systematic model for a given *L*-related significance. Many theories in linguistics and meta-semantics stipulate these aspects for the sake of some methodological clarity and theoretical progress.

³ Following Stojanovic (2014), I use the term *stuff* for not committing myself into a precise domain of discourse concerning with semantics or pragmatics. Here I have no intention commit myself into any technical use of the term as in *stuff ontology*.

⁴ These discussions will be explicated in Chapters 4 and 5. For now, it is worth mentioning that a philosopher can adopt both sorts of substantiality view as in the case of Robyn Carston's relevance theoretic account.

In addition to the above views, some further responses can be delivered by virtue of the question of what grounds the viability of ADA which commits one to characterize a language taxonomically. In my dissertation, I will defend one of these further responses which purport to deflate the notion of L-related significance to the effect that the semantics-pragmatics distinction has rather stipulative significance and methodological convenience at best.

For one thing, ADA, at the object level, underdetermines a principled distinction between semantics and pragmatics. First, L-related significance (e.g. language understanding or linguistic meaning) inherently underdetermines how many aspects there can be. For instance, the conceptions of the same significance can result in varying interpretations based on distinct theories of meaning (e.g. meaning as use, internalist accounts of meaning, externalist accounts, behavioristic accounts, and so forth). Based on the adopted theory of meaning, there could be an indefinite number of ways to postulate a criterion or criteria for drawing the semantics-pragmatics distinction. More importantly, these criteria are also derivative on how they are characterized in terms of selected notions such as context, truth, and conventional meaning. Thus, our taxonomy on the aspects of some significance in a language *L* is already the by-product of our theoretical notions that surround this significance and the adopted language itself. In this respect, if any given semantics-pragmatics distinction is taken to be viable or substantial then the preceding theories which result in positing such a schematic distinction must be substantial in the first place.

Still, what makes one account of the distinction preferable to another relies on its internal coherence and explanatory efficacy with respect to some linguistic phenomena that are relevant to the adopted notion of language in the preferred

account. Yet, I believe it is not the case that a robust or principled distinction between semantics and pragmatics leads to a robust theory of L-related significance such as a theory of meaning, but the other way around could be the case. Thus, the plausibility of ADA does not come from the substantiality which supposedly underwrites the given aspects and L-related significance but the substantiality of such empirical grounds or postulations rests on how we theorize L-related significance in the first place.

The semantics-pragmatics distinction, I believe, is rather stipulative in the face of ADA and the *cinquain*. Throughout my dissertation, I will posit some arguments for the deflationary interpretation of the semantics-pragmatics distinction although I also think that the distinction might have a great theoretical convenience for the analyses of many notions in philosophy of language. Yet, there are some other concerns to cast a doubt on the viability of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. First, the accounts of the distinction which entail to ADA form a taxonomy of somehow monotonic domains in terms of the cursiveness assumption and autonomy assumption in the *cinquain*. In other words, the ranges (outputs) of one domain-specific function are to be the inputs of the other domain-specific function to the effect that it is almost standard that syntax provides “input to semantics, which in turn provides input to pragmatics” (Huang, 2014, p.2). Hence, the input-output relation between the aspects is often proposed to explain the relations between them while they constitute a substantial ground for the given L-related significance. Nevertheless, one does not have to endorse this monotonic model nor appeal to the input-output relation. Levinson (2000), here, remarks:

There is every reason then to try and reconstrue the interaction between semantics and pragmatics as the intimate interlocking of distinct processes, rather than, as traditionally, in terms of the output of the one being the input of the other. (p. 242)

As ADA suggests, this input-output relation interconnects the defined aspects which have distinct n-tuple domains with distinguishable functions. In a model for any L-related significance, one can prefer a different characterization of the aspects in terms of their inter-connections. Instead of taking these aspects as distinct n-tuple domains, one can rest her model on a continuum that involves phenomena which partake of particular characteristics (conventionality, truth-conditionality, and context-sensitivity) in varying degrees. Then, the semantics-pragmatics distinction dissolves into surface problems depending on how to assign continuous degrees of characteristics and how to define them. Furthermore, one can also reject the input-output relation by providing an intersectional model where some phenomena concerning with L-related significance becomes a matter of one aspect to some degree and becomes a matter of another aspect to another degree. François Nemo (1999) offers such a model where phenomena are distributed on a Cartesian plane in terms of their varying degrees of divergence and convergence. Again, how this distribution works out depends on some definitions of the relevant axis, namely semantics and pragmatics.

Although I do not propose such models as the substantial ways to make the semantics-pragmatics distinction, they make my deflationary view tenable in the sense that the viability of the distinction is purely a matter of taxonomy and modeling. In this regard, I take the basic triad in its widest sense: Syntax concerns with linguistic codes, semantics concerns with encoded stuff (content, information, inference, or whatever) and pragmatics concerns with users' communicative relations with them. These aspects can be interrelated, distinguished or unified in a number of diverse but equally coherent ways; nevertheless, each one of these interpretations

remains stipulative in terms of some other notions and discussions prior to proposing the distinction.

1.3 Dissertation structure

In my dissertation, I particularly question how to ground the viability of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. In doing so, I will trace the distinction through two levels of interpretation, i.e. the object level and the higher-order level. In the first three chapters (Chapters 2-5), I will discuss the distinction at the object-level to derive some meta-theoretical conclusions from the object-level discussions in order for developing and discussing my deflationary account of the semantics-pragmatics distinction.

In Chapter 2, the boundaries between semantics and pragmatics will be charted on the basic triad while outlining the underlying assumptions, i.e. the *cinquain*, which typically follow from accepting the classificatory division such as the basic triad. In doing so, I will show how and why any distinction between semantics and pragmatics can vary from one theory to another at the object level analysis of them. In addition to my discussion on the basic triad, the aspect of syntax will be mentioned to show the reason why it can be withheld in the face of the question at hand.

In Chapter 3, I will survey how theorists typically draw the distinction and what stances they take on the distinction. In this respect, some stances will be renamed and re-grouped independently of some common depictions in the literature. Moreover, the question of why the distinction matters to philosophy will be explained and discussed in terms of the various appearances of the distinction in the

literature. Throughout the chapter, I will indicate why it seems contentious and why it is significant to seek out a clean-cut distinction between semantics and pragmatics.

The fourth chapter will survey common characteristics and the main types of criteria which are defended to delimit semantics and pragmatics. In this respect, I will survey the common dichotomies proposed for distinguishing these aspects. Moreover, the main types of criteria (conventionality vs. non-conventionality, context-sensitivity vs. context-insensitivity, truth-conditionality vs. non-truth-conditionality) will be explored by explicating the accompanying notions such as literal meaning, context, pragmatic intrusion and semantic underdeterminacy. Again, many examples will be provided from natural language phenomena that constitute overt challenges to certain accounts. In this chapter, I will present the criteria in their generic outlines irrespective of presenting how certain philosophers particularly postulate or justify them in the literature. Finally, a higher-order analysis will be provided in terms of why these main types of criteria seem to be irreconcilable in the face of certain linguistic phenomena. Throughout the chapter, I will emphasize why and how arduous to settle on a single formula for the semantics-pragmatics distinction.

In Chapter 5, I will complete the premise of Chapter 4 and represent what approaches are taken to draw the distinction by influential philosophers in the literature. First, I will analyze Carnap's account of formal semantics with reference to other formal semanticists' (Montague, Kaplan, Stalnaker, and Lewis) approach to the distinction. Furthermore, Grice's distinction between *what is said* and *what is implicated* will be discussed with specific respect to his notions such as *natural meaning/non-natural meaning*, *implicatures*, and *speaker's intention*. Then, Bach's approach to the distinction will be illuminated in terms of his notion of *impliciture*,

propositional radical and *pragmatic enrichment*. Finally, the relevance-theoretic approach will be discussed as the cognitivist approach to the distinction. In this chapter, I will generally discuss the internal coherency and empirical plausibility of each approach although I relate each chapter with my analyses on *the cinquain* and *the Aspect Distinction Assumption*.

In the concluding chapter, I will defend my deflationary position based on the assumptions and lessons drawn from earlier chapters. In doing so, ADA will be clarified in the face of philosophers' distinct object-level interpretations of the distinction. By analyzing ADA with respect to its elements and framework, I will argue that tackling the question of the semantics-pragmatics distinction has neither major nor primary import since making such a distinction ultimately hinges on some fundamental theories pertaining to the notions such as meaning, truth, context, communication, linguistic cognition and so on.

CHAPTER 2

CHARTING THE BOUNDARIES

2.1 The basic triad and the cinquain

In linguistics and philosophy, formal models in the study of a language (a formal or natural one) are often schematized by the triadic division that consists of *syntax*, *semantics*, and *pragmatics*, each of which stands for complementary yet distinct aspects of the language in question. Furthermore, the basic triadic division is often adopted to analyze how natural or formal languages can be or should be formed in a schematic manner; thereby, it might be stipulated in descriptive models as well as in prescriptive ones for the sake of given methodological convenience. The basic triadic model could be traced back into Charles Morris' (1938) and Rudolf Carnap's (1937, 1942) formulations, and it is plainly articulated as follows: (a) syntax: the study of formal relations of one lexical code with another; (b) semantics: the study of formal relations between lexical codes and what they encode; (c) pragmatics: the relations of lexical codes to their users and interpreters (Huang, 2014; Levinson, 1983).⁵

Endorsing the basic triad entails that each aspect has its own autonomous field of study in the sense that the aspects in language understanding include self-governing rules such as *domain-specific functions/roles* (i.e. a syntactic rule for using the hearsay particle “-miş/mış” in Turkish). How the boundaries amongst these aspects are demarcated and interfaced differ depending on various sorts of theoretical

⁵ This interpretation of the basic triad is Carnapian in character. Although both Morris (1938) and Carnap (1937, 1942, 1988) put forward the basic triad as a significant model for a study of language, they differ in how to construe the explanatory significance of this study and thereby how to characterize the aspects in the basic triad. By proposing the triadic model, Morris attempts to construct a conceptual framework for a general theory of signs, i.e. *semiosis*. Hereby, Morris employs a behavioristic understanding of language in which pragmatics, for instance, “deals with the origins, uses and effects of signs within the total behaviour of the interpreters of signs” (1938, p.7). For further discussions, see Chapter 5.

assumptions and arguments about a language (e.g. formal languages such as the standard deductive logic or natural languages such as English) and its accompanying components (such as linguistic, formal, content-laden and communicative ones). In this sense, the notion of a language which consists of three complementary aspects turns out to be a derivative notion that rests on preceding conceptions and theoretical discussions on the notion of language itself.

Still, if a theorist endorses the complementarity of all these three aspects in the study of language then she requires to sharply form the defining roles and characteristics of each aspect to the effect that she can also explain how domain-specific functions/roles of each aspect become relevant to the others in terms of linguistic understanding in general. In this respect, the theories, which endorse the basic triad, typically make a sharp and pertinent distinction amongst the aspects to be able to hold that each has its own subfield in a theory of language.

Leaving aside the main discussions on the issue for a moment, a tentative characterization about syntax, semantics, and pragmatics can be worked out as follows: (i) syntax is the study of linguistic codes (e.g. words, sentences and so on) in virtue of their formal occurrences and arrangements; (ii) semantics is the study of meaning in virtue of what information syntactic components formally encode (e.g. literal meaning, propositions and such); (iii) pragmatics, at last, studies the use of semantic components in virtue of what linguistic acts are performed by making use of these semantic components on an occasion of use. This tentative characterization will not explain away the discussions on how to draw the boundaries in the basic triad, nonetheless, it looks adequate to point out how the proponents of the basic triad typically relate each aspect with another. As the tentative characterization suggests, there is a transitive yet asymmetric relation between one aspect to another in the

sense that syntax provides “input to semantics, which in turn provides input to pragmatics” (Huang, 2014, p.2). As I will later discuss its distinct interpretations and implications in detail, the basic triad converges the notions of asymmetry and autonomy for being able to draw the boundaries of the aspects in a correlative yet distinct manner. In this regard, it is a standard conviction among the views on the basic triad that each aspect has its own autonomous domain and/or domain-specific function although an aspect retrieves their input from another aspect which is comparatively basic to it. Thus, the basic triad typically stands for a cursive model which suggests the asymmetrical division of labor in language understanding, even if each domain is recursive in itself for the sake of its autonomy.

Understanding the theoretical convictions behind the basic triad plays an integral role in understanding the nature of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. So far, I have underlined some general assumptions that any view, which commits itself to the distinct aspects in a language, could endorse in one way or another.⁶ There are at least five general assumptions which can be summarized as follows:

- (1) Derivativeness Assumption: Positing distinct aspects derives from the conviction that natural language phenomena can be distinguished and classified in a substantive manner. This is a higher-order or methodological assumption, yet the basic triad is also derivative at the object level of analysis. As a classificatory model for language understanding, the proposed aspects also derive from a general theory of language which needs to include prior analyses on the notions by

⁶ The above assumptions circumstantially accompany with some relatively minor presuppositions. Generally, they commit to the presence of universal semantics and pragmatics to the effect that every natural language more or less partakes of the same system of semantics and pragmatics. Moreover, the accounts often make a note on linguistic competence to describe interlocutors’ characteristics in a linguistic exchange.

which the division of labor in language understanding is determined. It inherently implicates the idea that there are sound and coherent accounts of the subjects such as sentence, proposition, utterance and so on.

- (2) Integrity Assumption: The proposed aspects, as a whole, constitute an integrity to form a satisfactory language model accommodating with each natural language phenomenon. For that matter, the proposed aspects in such a model have no redundancy in accounting for the given linguistic explanandum.
- (3) Sharpness Assumption: The boundaries among the proposed aspects are sharply definitive so that there are no anomalous/borderline phenomena. Any linguistic phenomena in a given language have the mark of at least one of the aspects depending on the criteria or criterion distinguishing one aspect from another. Thus, the aspect distinctions are modeled to exclude anomalous phenomena that do not conclusively belong to the domain/domain-specific functions of one aspect.
- (4) Autonomy Assumption: Each aspect entails a viable degree of autonomy. The proposed aspects have their own domains and/or domain-specific functions by which we can definitively distinguish one aspect from another. In this regard, each aspect has its own mark.
- (5) Cursiveness Assumption: The proposed aspects contribute to one another in a cursive manner (e.g. symmetrical or asymmetrical) to the effect that all/most/some pragmatic phenomena rest on semantic components, all/most/some semantic phenomena rest on syntactic components and so on. The basic triad, for instance, constructs the

interfaces between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics in a cursive (e.g. asymmetrical) way: The domain of discourse concerning with each aspect impinges on each other in one-directional and cursive manner to the effect that all/most/some pragmatic phenomena rest on semantic components, all/most/some semantic phenomena rest on syntactic components and so on.

Although these assumptions can be divided into more atomic parts or can be multiplied by adding more, they are sufficient for the sake of my argumentative progress. These assumptions, which I will revisit and scrutinize in the following chapters, can be called as *the underlying cinquain* for terminological convenience. It is important to notice that a theory of the semantics-pragmatics distinction does not have to commit itself to the entire cinquain. More importantly, many linguists and philosophers digress from others on how they particularly construe the assumptions (4) and (5) even if they also digress among themselves on the question of autonomy.⁷ However, the assumptions (1)-(3) are commonly endorsed by the complementarist views even though they differ in construing the last two assumptions of the cinquain. Not wishing to commit myself to an essentialist definition, I could only feebly suggest that (1)-(3) might be considered as the necessary conditions for defending the basic triad while (4) and (5) amount to the sufficient conditions. After all, the assumptions (1)-(3) reflect what it methodologically takes to propose an n-tuple division of aspects. On the other hand, the assumptions (4)-(5) concerns with

⁷ For different characterizations of the distinction, see Ariel (2010), Bach (1999b, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006, 2012), Bianchi (2004), Borg (2004), Cap (2010), Carnap (1942, 1988), Cappelen & Lepore (2003, 2005, 2007a, 2008), Carston (1999, 2002, 2007, 2008a, 2008b), Dever (2013), Gauker (2008, 2012), Gillon (2008), Higginbotham (1985), Lewis (1975, 1979, 1980), Peregrin (1999), Putnam (1970, 2013), Recanati (1989, 2002c, 2002e, 2010), Salmon (2005), Searle (1958, 1962, 1969, 1978), Stanley & Szabo (2006), Stalnaker (1970), Stojanovic (2014), Szabo (2006), Travis (2008).

interrelations amongst the given division of aspects. Moreover, it is also difficult to typify them under a certain sort of problematic because each assumption could be taken in a descriptive or prescriptive manner irrespective of each other.⁸ For instance, take the assumption (5). A formal semanticist in the ideal language tradition can regard it as a regimentation criterion by which she can discard anomalous phenomena that do not fit in its taxonomy. On the other hand, some other theorists could take the assumption (5) to accommodate with seemingly anomalous phenomenon to the effect that she can revise her taxonomy or she can devise a method of analysis to explain how the phenomena fit in one of the adopted sections of the triad.

The underlying *cinquain*, I believe, gives us profound reasons to cast a doubt on the plausibility and substantiality of the entire enterprise of taxonomical representation of language understanding. Consequently, it enables us to doubt the very nature of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. As I ground my reasons in the next chapters, I shall frequently utilize these assumptions in the face of different theories on the semantics-pragmatics distinction. In what follows, I address and outline how theories draw the distinction. In doing so, I firstly focus on the analysis of syntax by considering its connection with the basic triad. More importantly, I mainly lead this analysis to the point where I can visit the common ground questions underwriting the distinction, namely ‘What is the distinction?’ and ‘Why does it matter?’.

⁸ This could have coined as Gricean or Carnapian *cinquain* for the sake of how they comprehend the basic triad. Interestingly, both Carnap (1937, 1942, 1955, 1988) and Grice (1957, 1989) endorse each assumption of this *cinquain* although their conceptions of pragmatics evidently differ from each other in terms of what domain-specific functions belong to pragmatics.

2.2 Suspending the question of syntax

In the basic triad, the boundaries of syntax generally draw less attention and less controversy in the literature although it does not mean that there will never be genuine and significant theoretical concerns as to how to define syntax. Nevertheless, there could be some plausible reasons why it pertains to comparatively defensible concerns.

For one thing, syntax concerns with the lexicality of a language by delimiting (either by describing or prescribing) the configurational well-formedness of the relevant language in terms of what codification structures and codification rules underpin the codes in this language. Hence, it typically deals with the codificational/lexical bodies that we could pinpoint by observing some formal regularities and categorical similarities (or differentiations) which underlie beneath their actual or possible occurrences. In this respect, it is relatively easy to point out lexical bodies irrespective of their particular and typical connotations/denotations. All it takes is to abstract away any content (or extensional/intensional information) from lexical bodies.⁹ Thus, syntax, as contrasted with the other two aspects, is considered to have extensionally/intensionally less intriguing and less specifying subject-matter of linguistic comprehension due to the fact that syntax merely focuses on code-to-code relations irrespective of what information/content these codes and their relations convey in their typical or particular occurrences.

Consequently, syntax might be regarded as the most peripheral aspect of a language -especially of natural languages- if the basic triad, as a whole, stands out to

⁹ Here, I refrain myself from the discussions on the abstractness of syntax. As it is a matter of degree and perspective depending on what explanandum a theory of the aspect distinction attempts to meet. Philosophers such as Carnap (1988) hold syntax to be more abstract level of meaning with respect to speakers' linguistic comprehension. Again, Chomsky (1976, 2002) takes it to be a more abstract level of linguistic entities which are innate mental devices. My intention, on the other hand, is to indicate that syntax includes publicly comprehensible vehicles of linguistic significance.

explain what it takes to understand the relevant language in general. After all, a theory of language primarily aims to capture a model for general linguistic understanding in which language is taken to be a vehicle for informational processes and exchanges which hold amongst linguistically competent agents. In this fashion, syntax in the basic triad appears to play a peripheral role in answering the question of linguistic understanding.

I do not want to argue for or against whether these assumptions on syntax are correct for different conceptions of syntax in the literature. Nevertheless, it is somewhat intuitive for the speakers of a natural language to consider syntax as a peripheral way of language understanding, especially at the public language level.¹⁰ For non-native speakers “with a patchy knowledge of a language”, it is a common experience to have a sensible communication despite of their ungrammatical utterances (Szabo, 2006, pp.378-9). To enhance the commonsensical view on the status of syntax at the public language level, we can imagine a case in which someone overhears the following exchange between the interlocutors A and B in a comics convention:

A: [...utters an ungrammatical sentence in Klingon...]

B: [...utters a made-up string of sounds...]

If publicly accessible syntactic components are taken to have an integral role in linguistic comprehension, then the case can by no means be taken as a sensible conversational exchange. In that case, it would be merely considered as temporally ordered noises from two dissimilar sources. Nevertheless, the above case can fairly

¹⁰ Philosophers often appeal to a difference in the levels of linguistic comprehension. Carston (2008b), for instance, holds two distinct levels, i.e. personal and sub-personal levels. Linguistic comprehension, at personal level, includes conscious and publicly explicit processes. This level is also sometimes called as conscious level or public language level. Yet, linguistic comprehension, at sub-personal level, covers pre-reflective, automatic, and publicly implicit processes. Hence, this level is sometimes dubbed as unconscious level.

stand for a sensible conversation in which interlocutors exchange information with each other depending on their communicative intentions, background knowledge, pre-contextual inferences, and such. For instance, the interlocutor B might know Klingon and may make fun of A's grammatical mistake in Klingon even though B understands or conjectures what grammatical utterance A intends to articulate. Better yet, B might not know Klingon or how this language sounds but still she addresses her made-up expression to mock with A. Thus, language understanding, at the public language level, does not primarily rely on the disambiguation and delimiting the syntactic components.

Besides, non-verbal communication and pre-sentential constructions in a language could take a part in sensible linguistic exchanges. Imagine a case where a philosopher takes part in a poetry contest and submits three sheets of paper on which have no writing except for the title 'A Eulogy to Wittgenstein (I)' on the first sheet. In that case, this could be the philosopher's comment on how the early Wittgenstein construes the limits of language by excluding out the emotive or non-fact-stating expressions in natural languages. The philosopher, in this case, could have even chosen a different title such as 'Wittgenstein (I) vs. Wittgenstein (II)', 'Two Eulogies to Wittgenstein (I)', 'Wittgenstein (I) to Eulogy Two', 'Two Wittgenstein Eulogy to (I)' and so on. What makes such cases interesting in terms of language understanding cannot be cashed out by syntactic deconfiguration and analyses on how each code in the phrase stands in relation with other codes by virtue of some well-formedness rules in English. Thus, syntax at public language level concerns with a body of lexical vehicles that do not exhaust every means to convey information in a linguistic exchange or that do not fix every possible way to interpret the lexical bodies publicly apparent to the hearers or the addressees. It is an

unwarranted claim to hold that syntax at other levels of cognition does not play a genuine role in linguistic understanding. For now, it is sufficient to contend that syntax at the sub-personal level could function to constitute some expression schemas that are modularly embedded in the mind and causally connected with other modules that make possible the linguistic constructions and their decoding. Nonetheless, syntax at the public-language level appears to be a peripheral aspect of linguistic understanding. Thus, it is most likely one of the reasons why the philosophers of language and linguists have their focus on the semantics-pragmatics distinction.

CHAPTER 3

DRAWING THE SEMANTICS-PRAGMATICS DISTINCTION

3.1 What is the distinction?

In the last decades, drawing the semantics-pragmatics distinction has progressively become one of the most noteworthy, but equally most contentious, question in philosophy of language and linguistics.¹¹ Since it was first introduced on the basic triad by Morris (1938) in his book *The Foundations of the Theory of Signs*, the distinction has received a significant amount of attention amongst philosophers. Then, it has later become a central divergence point in the adversary between *ideal language philosophy* and *ordinary language philosophy* (Recanati, 2002c, 2002e).

More recently, the discussions concerning with the semantics-pragmatics distinction have heavily focused on the philosophical and meta-philosophical concerns related to the underlying *cinquain* which I have mentioned earlier. With specific regard to the semantics-pragmatics distinction, these discussions have taken issue with the plausibility of either some assumptions or of all assumptions in the *cinquain* that result in the discussions on how to draw the distinction in a principled way. To take the opposition even further, one could also take issue with the entire *cinquain* in a linguistic study by means of a higher-order analysis. Any theory that purports to account for natural language understanding and communication faces the requirement that any proposed account of the semantics-pragmatics distinction must be profound. As the basic triad suggests, both semantics and pragmatics are proposed

¹¹ Ariel, 2010; Bach, 1999b, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2007, 2012; Bach & Bezuidenhout, 2002; Bianchi, 2004; Borg, 2004; Cappelen & Lepore, 2005, 2007, 2008; Carston, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2008a, 2008b; Dever, 2013; Gauker, 2012; Gillon, 2008; Higginbotham, 1985; Jaszczolt, 2012; 2019; Katsos, 2008; King & Stanley, 2005; Nemo, 1999; Peregrin, 1999; Recanati, 1989, 1994, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2002e; Salmon, 2005; Stalnaker, 1970; Stanley, 2005, 2007; Stojanovic, 2008, 2014; Szabo, 2006; Travis, 2008; Sperber & Wilson, 2002.

to have significant roles in general language understanding and thus drawing a plausible line between them becomes an explanatory goal in the language study even if this goal could be conceptualized or achieved differently (i.e. proving a complementarist model for natural languages or proving that all linguistic phenomena fall within the domain of pragmatics). The discussions and divergences on the distinction can be grouped under two main questions: (A) what is the semantics-pragmatics distinction? (B) why does the distinction matter in the first place? (Gillon, 2008; King & Stanley, 2005; Carston, 2008a). In this section, I will visit the first question leaving the second question to the next section.

With respect to the first question, the divergences spring from the case that “there seem to be several equally plausible criteria for distinguishing ‘semantics’ from ‘pragmatics’ that converge often, but not always” (Stojanovic, 2014, p.312). In other words, the question of the distinction involves the criteria wars on two further questions: (A1) What criterion/criteria do distinctively mark linguistic components (phenomena, properties, structures, processes and so on) to be semantic, and in turn to be pragmatic? (A2) Is the proposed criterion/criteria plausible enough to meet with the borderline cases in natural languages? The literature on the semantics-pragmatics distinction, especially after Grice’s insights on it, has grown abundant with the discussions concerning with the distinctive marks of semantic and pragmatic in the face of some or other linguistic phenomena.

Additionally, the philosophical discussions that surround the question (A) along with (A1) and (A2) fall within the parameters of what the *cinquain* contends. Here, the question (A1) is associated with making a theoretically coherent criterion with respect to the *cinquain* while the question (A2) is rather affiliated with making an empirically plausible criterion in accordance with natural language phenomena

(Stojanovic, 2008). In the next chapters, I will extensively address this issue while critically surveying the insights and analyses of some key philosophers in the literature. Nevertheless, it is worth illustrating how the first question can be linked with the discussions on the semantics-pragmatics distinction.

For the sake of an argument, let someone take the distinction in the way that semantics concerns with what a sentence means while pragmatics concerns with what interlocutors mean by making use of a sentence. This tentative characterization might be introduced to hold a contrast between sentence meaning and speaker's meaning to the effect that these features are taken to be the criteria which distinguish the semantic phenomenon from the pragmatic ones. As it generically occurs in the literature, one can tackle the criteria by proposing some borderline cases. For one thing, the tentative characterization seems to restrict speaker's communicative intentions into linguistic structures, namely sentences. Thus, someone can propose the linguistic cases that intuitively seem to involve speaker's meaning by means of extra-linguistic signs such as gestures or pre-sentential expressions.

For the sake of brevity, one can consider the cases which I have laid out while discussing the role of syntax. The comics convention or the poetry contest cases do not even involve any sentence at all and yet the interlocutor, according to some interpretation of the cases, might still communicate some meaning to the addressee. Furthermore, the tentative characterization meets with the assumptions of the *cinquain*. To illustrate, this distinction is derivative in the sense that its viability is contingent on certain conceptions of sentence, meaning, communicative intentions and such. In this respect, if one accepts a theory of meaning such as *meaning as use* then she fairly steers her analysis of the tentative characterization with this adopted theory. In that case, she could argue against the given criterion for the semantics-

pragmatics distinction by holding that speaker's meaning incorporates sentence meaning and thereby there is no need for a domain of semantics in language understanding. This point also underlines that such a challenge to the tentative characterization above makes a case against integrity, autonomy, and sharpness assumptions in the *cinquain*. It leads us to reduce the divisions of labor in language understanding by ruling out the tentative criterion for the distinction. To wrap up the analysis of the question (A) so far, it should be noted that the question urges us to find out a coherent and empirically plausible criterion/criteria for the semantics-pragmatics distinction. It sticks to the explanatory goal in a study of language that indispensably rests on the analysis of the *cinquain*.

From this standpoint, the question of how semantics and pragmatics differ from each other needs to be explained more directly for the sake of conceptual clarity and progress for answering the question (A). Here, it is better for clarity and progress to categorically outline the proposed definitions of the distinction in the literature. Instead of prematurely specifying the particular characteristics of the relevant theories on the semantics-pragmatics distinction, it is a more productive strategy to categorize these theories in two respects: (i) generic positions on how to interpret the status of the distinction- at the object level of analysis; (ii) generic properties (dichotomies, convictions and such) to outline the distinction.

Considering the theoretical positions on the semantics-pragmatics distinction in virtue of their interpretations of the *cinquain*, two opposing stances are often suggested in the literature: *complementarism* and *reductionism* (Leech, 1983; Huang, 2014; Nemo, 1999).¹² As explaining the basic triad in terms of the *cinquain*, the first

¹² Leech (1983), Nemo (1999) and Huang (2004) have an agreement on how they apply the terms 'complementarism' and 'reductionism'. Nevertheless, they differ in labelling the competing views subsumed under complementarism and reductionism.

view, complementarism, has been mentioned earlier. According to it, semantics and pragmatics are thought to be complementary and/or they hold a degree of autonomy with respect to their domains/domain-specific functions. To expand this characterization, it can be further added that complementarism considers each aspect as equally indispensable for theorizing linguistic understanding. Complementarist philosophers, as contrasted with reductionists, principally preserve the distinction between semantics and pragmatics although their interpretations of the distinction differ in one way or another.

Due to such conflicts within complementarism, it forks in two further views: *pro-semanticism* and *pro-pragmaticism*.¹³ These extensions of complementarism conflict with each other considering the scopes of semantics and pragmatics. Thus, their conflict concerns with the comprehensiveness of the distinctive mark of each aspect in terms of the study of language in general. Based on this source of controversy, pro-semanticists argue that the major part of language study relates to semantics by virtue of its distinctive mark. Thus, pragmatics, according to pro-semanticism, seems to provide subsidiary or secondary effects on language understanding. Treating pragmatics as merely a subsidiary aspect commits pro-semanticists to the view which is known as *pragmatic waste-basket* notion. In the literature, several accounts of the semantics-pragmatics distinction embrace the pragmatic waste-basket notion. While Levinson (1983) overviews different

¹³ The terms ‘pro-semanticism’ and ‘pro-pragmaticism’ are my coinage. In the literature, such subdivisions under complementarism are often associated with the terms ‘semantic minimalism’, ‘moderate contextualism’, ‘radical pragmatism’ and so on. Such terms are rather confusing since they do not clearly denote how such views evaluate the distinction in terms of their commitments to the aspect distinction assumptions, i.e. the *cinquain*. Moreover, the terms ‘moderate’, ‘minimal’ and ‘radical’ are relative to the given interest and topic in a theory so that it is ambiguous whether radical pragmatics or minimal semantics refer to reductionist views instead of complementarist views. Here, I prefer to associate the notion of radicality with the views which refuse either one aspect of the basic triad or the entire aspects in it.

definitions for pragmatics, he presents a clear-cut example of such a pro-semanticist notion in the formula that pragmatics studies “all those aspects of meaning not captured in a semantic theory” (p.12). In a similar vein, Gazdar (1979) lays out this notion by his illustrious formula: “Pragmatics = Meaning - Truth-Conditions” (p.2).

On the other hand, pro-semanticist views differ in their interpretations of the pragmatic wastebasket when they endorse different criteria for making the semantics-pragmatics distinction. For instance, Gazdar’s above formula adopts truth-conditionality as a distinctive mark of semantic phenomena and thereby he takes all non-truth-conditional effects on meaning to be subsidiary or minor content, i.e. pragmatic content. To illustrate more, the philosophers such as Montague and Bar-Hillel hold indexicality/deixis to be the mark of pragmatics by claiming that pragmatic content only arises from indexical expressions and thus languages devoid of indexical expressions do not have any pragmatic aspect (King & Stanley, 2005). In this form of pro-semanticism, all indexical expressions receive a minor role in general language comprehension in comparison with what roles semantic components play. After all, there are infinitely many non-indexical roles and expressions in a language although indexicality includes a relatively restricted number of words in a language.

Standing in opposite poles with pro-semanticism, pro-pragmaticism becomes the second extension of complementarism, and it contends that semantics is subsidiary or minor to pragmatics. Many neo-Griceans (e.g. Levinson, 2000; Horn, 2006) and philosophers (Searle, 1989; Bach, 2005; Cappelen & Lepore, 2008) argue for pro-pragmaticism based on the conviction that much of the study of linguistic understanding is also attributed to pragmatic content and effects. In other words, pro-

pragmaticism assumes that pragmatics inherits major or primary importance in language understanding and its analysis.

Hereby, it is worth realizing two general points about pro-semanticism and pro-pragmaticism. Within complementarism, both views typically endorse that pragmatic content or semantic content, in some way or another, is some add-on content to what content linguistic expressions literally convey. In its connection with the *cinquain*, pro-semanticism interprets the cursive relation between semantics and pragmatics as asymmetrical relation in which pragmatic content does not intrude into the domain of semantics. On the other hand, pro-pragmaticism construes the relation between them in the way that pragmatic content not always but often intrudes into the domain of semantics.

Apart from complementarism, reductionism typically holds that the putative distinction between semantics and pragmatics in the basic triad should be downsized by reducing one of these aspects into another. Depending on the question of which aspect needs to be incorporated into another, the reductionist views could further split into two: *radical semanticism* and *radical pragmaticism*.

According to the first extension, pragmatics could be entirely incorporated into semantics to the effect that there are only syntactic and semantic aspects of language study. Many formal semanticists such as Montague (1970) and Lewis (1980) describe this sort of reductionism exclusively for formal languages. Adopting radical semanticism for natural languages puts theorists under the burden of explaining some allegedly troublesome phenomena such as conversational implicatures, speech acts, communicative intentions, and so on. By contrast, radical pragmaticism holds that pragmatics includes all so-called semantic phenomena and domain-specific functions allegedly attributed to semantics. Its typical representation

can be found in later Wittgenstein's ideas and in the proponents of his notion 'meaning as use'. In this respect, radical pragmaticism faces the burden of explaining some allegedly semantic cases such as logical entailment, compositionality, truth-conditionality, and so forth.

Here, it is important to point out a couple of facts related to reductionism in terms of the *cinquain* and the semantics-pragmatics distinction. First, reductionism thereby denies a characteristic mark or a conclusive criterion to distinguish semantics from pragmatics, because it entails that semantic properties (phenomena, mechanisms, processes or whatever) are exhausted by pragmatic properties or vice versa. Nonetheless, it does not follow that reductionism purports to refuse syntax related interfaces such as syntax-semantics interfaces. For instance, radical semanticism could disperse the domain-specific functions which are abolished from pragmatics into syntax and semantics in one way or another. Secondly, reductionism stands in direct opposition to the basic triad itself and its underlying assumptions. For one thing, it refuses the assumptions on integrity, autonomy, cursive-ness, and sharpness although it could hold a commitment to the assumption that defining an aspect of language understanding is derivative on prior notions and analysis on meaning and such.

To sum up, there are at least two main strands (i.e. complementarism and reductionism) to understand the semantics-pragmatics distinction at the level of first-order interpretations of the underlying *cinquain*. Nevertheless, they do not exhaust the other strands to understand the distinction at the meta-interpretative level of the underlying *cinquain*. There are more ways to tackle with the distinction by holding higher-order questions on the semantics-pragmatics interfaces with reference to the underlying assumptions. At the end of the chapter, I will posit and discuss the other

alternatives in my own terms and thereafter I will propose my deflationary notion of the semantics-pragmatics distinction.

In what follows, I will overview how semantics and pragmatics are correlatively defined in the literature. In doing so, I will determine what grounds the disputes on defining the distinction emerge from with reference to some adopted criteria and burdensome linguistic phenomena.

3.2 Why the distinction matters

As mentioned in the previous section, the question of why the distinction matters entails to the question of the distinction to the effect that it construes our pre-theoretical reasons and motivations to pursue any query on the distinction itself. In terms of the object-level uses of the distinction, there are some *prima facie* reasons why the distinction matters to us.

First, the literature has been overflowing with a considerable number of competing characterizations of the distinction. In this respect, the distinction, at its face value, requires us to deliberate the correct “assessment of the different attempts to draw it” (Carston, 2008a, p.321). Delimiting the semantics-pragmatics distinction might appear to be a significant query in order to settle the differing accounts for the sake of methodological simplicity and coherency in theories of language. Providing a robust distinction certainly illuminates methodological obscurities and discussions on them, nonetheless, this explanatory motivation in theories of language does not provide a genuine reason for believing that the distinction, at the meta-level analysis, is substantive and not a mere matter of terminological disagreement. In other words, the significance of the semantics-pragmatics distinction cannot be solely identified with its terminological role in the theoretical discussions in which it appears. The

distinction certainly leads to a large number of competing accounts, yet, it becomes significant by virtue of why we need such a distinction in the first place.

Furthermore, the question of the distinction, at object-level analysis, can be observed in a wide range of debates across philosophical disciplines (e.g. epistemology, ethics, logic, and metaphysics). In this respect, “appealing to a distinction between the semantic content of a sentence, and what a use of it pragmatically conveys” constitutes a common strategy to endorse in a philosophical discussion (King & Stanley, 2005, p. 112). In ethics, it is easy to spot this strategy in the discussions concerning with the normative force of moral reasons. The internalist stance, hereby, holds that moral reasons contribute to the semantic content of a moral sentence and this semantic content thereby induces agents to take the relevant moral action. On the other hand, the externalist stance regards moral reasons as the effects and features pragmatically attached to the use of ethical sentences. This meta-ethical debate seems to rely on many discussions and assumptions which are also fundamental to the semantics-pragmatic distinction. For instance, it rests on the question of what counts as a semantic content conveyed by an utterance of an expression.

Additionally, the semantics-pragmatics distinction also manifests itself in meta-ethics. In this respect, emotivism (non-cognitivism) contends that moral terms are merely expressive terms projecting non-cognitive states (emotive exclamations) towards facts, events, or actions in question. Thus, according to emotivism, moral terms have no semantic content to contribute to the sentences in which they are employed; however, they only function to invoke representational content which is purely expressive. Therefore, emotivism entails that moral sentences do not express a fully propositional/truth-conditional (so-called semantic) content. In this respect,

moral claims are nothing other than illocutionary speech acts in Austin's sense.

Again, emotivism also relies on a particular conception of the distinction between semantic content and pragmatic content.

Similarly, the distinction takes place in several epistemological discussions. The most apparent case comes from the epistemological contextualism which applies a certain conception of the distinction to the ascriptions of knowledge. According to the epistemological contextualism, the truth-conditions of a knowledge ascription vary from one context to another depending on the contextual parameters relevant to this knowledge ascriptions.

As King & Stanley (2005) point out, "one theorist's semantic content is another theorist's merely pragmatic effect" (p. 112). In this respect, it is worth seeking a well-established distinction between semantics and pragmatics in order to assess the philosophical disagreements across many disciplines. In other words, the philosophical discussions which appeal to particular conceptions of the distinction can be appropriately assessed only if we have a well-grounded conception of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that being well-grounded at the object-level analysis does not necessarily follow from being well-grounded at the meta-level analysis.

More relevantly, the distinction between *semantics* and *pragmatics* shows itself in various forms and degrees in philosophy of language. In one instance, Strawson (1950) criticizes Russell's notion of denoting expressions which pick out things uniquely (e.g. proper names, definite descriptions, and indexicals). Hereby, Strawson contends that speakers can use indefinite descriptions to refer to things uniquely although their "general directions for use" (conventional meaning) does not refer to things uniquely (p.327). Strawson seems to appeal to speaker's

communicative intentions in contrast with conventional meaning. In theories of reference, it is quite common to observe how philosophers appeal to the distinction in one way or another. In addition to Strawson's critique of Russell, Keith Donnellan (1966) later discusses the distinct uses of denoting expressions by distinguishing referential uses (semantic reference/meaning) of them from attributive uses (speaker's reference/meaning) so that he arrives at the conclusion that Russell's notion of denotation/reference is ambiguous. Here, Kripke (1977) further defends Russell by holding that Donnellan posits an unnecessary ambiguity into Russell's notion by claiming his notion of reference (semantic reference) to be ambivalent between semantic reference and pragmatic reference.

With respect to the theories of reference, some other uses of the distinction can be found in the debates over the referential status of empty names (i.e. proper names devoid of a referent). In this context, the direct referentialist accounts typically endorse that the semantic content/truth-conditional contribution of a proper name is its referent. Thus, the sentences which employ empty names (e.g. 'Santa Claus', 'Sherlock Holmes', etc.) lack a truth-conditional/semantic content so that they are supposed to patently lack meaning or a truth-value. Nonetheless, it looks counter-intuitive to accept this conclusion since the sentences such as 'Santa Claus does not exist' seem to convey a complete semantic/truth-conditional content. At this point, philosophers such as Braun (1993), Adams & Fuller (2007) appeal to the semantics-pragmatics distinction to resolve the above problem in favor of the direct referentialist views. According to them, what is said by an empty name sentence lacks a complete truth-conditional (semantic) content yet these sentences pragmatically convey a complete truth-conditional content that is saturated by

speakers' background information. As we will later see, this discussion heavily relies on how pragmatic effects influence semantic content.¹⁴

Leaving the theories of reference aside, Grice (1989) consistently appeals to his version of the distinction (what is said vs. what is implicated) while assessing several issues in philosophy. In one instance, he takes issue with Moore's uses of the verbs such as 'know', 'believe' and 'look' in some so-called paradoxical statements (e.g. 'There is a cat on the table, but I do not believe it'). Grice's response to such cases is often canonized by the constraint *Modified Occam's Razor* which simply states, "senses (linguistic meanings) are not multiplied beyond necessity" (von Heusinger & Turner, 2006, p.2). The constraint here relies on Grice's conviction to the autonomy assumption in the sense that what is pragmatically implicated by an expression cannot intrude into what is conventionally said by an expression. Thus, Grice often appeals to the distinction in his analyses of various philosophical discussions such as Moore's paradox, material implication and so on.

It is possible to proliferate the philosophical debates in which the distinction is entertained in one way or another. Nevertheless, what makes the distinction significant for resolving and assessing these debates do not amount to what grounds the plausibility of making such a distinction in the first place. After all, the object-level analysis of the distinction undoubtedly bears some significance to assess some philosophical discussions employing particular conceptions of the distinction. Nevertheless, they are still contingent on the meta-theoretical viability of proposing such a distinction (coherent or not). Even if the distinction turns out to be

¹⁴ Adams & Fuller (2007) consider that what is conveyed by an empty name sentence is some sort of Gricean implicature (conventional or non-conventional). As Piccinini & Scott (2010) point out, this picture does not cohere with Grice's notion of implicatures since implicatures do not intrude into truth-conditional contents. Perhaps, their strategy should rest on other sorts of pragmatic inferences as in the cases of Bach's pragmatic enrichment or Recanati's top-down saturation.

unsubstantial and purely terminological one, it does not mean that it deflates the entire significance of these particular debates and notions which are conceptualized around the terms *semantic* and *pragmatic*. In that case, these terms would turn out as the labels under which philosophers' distinct concepts, notions, debates, and theories are subsumed. As I will defend in my deflationary view, it is a matter of terminological convenience to claim that such and such discussion involves the semantics-pragmatics distinction. It is nothing more than saying that such and such discussion involves a distinction between some adopted aspects (of some related linguistic significance) in which a philosopher distinguishes them in terms of their adopted functions and roles with respect to the given linguistic significance.

3.3 Concluding remarks

In brief, I have outlined how theories, as they appear in the literature, draw the distinction at the object level. Moreover, I have presented two main strands (i.e. complementarism and reductionism) to present the semantics-pragmatics distinction at the object-level with respect to the *underlying cinquain*. On the other hand, the question of why the distinction matters have been discussed through surveying some of the philosophical discussions in which the distinction takes part. In this respect, I have also related the significance of the distinction to my meta-theoretical concern about the distinction. In what follows, I will discuss how to delimit the distinction by surveying several dichotomies and three main criteria.

CHAPTER 4

DELIMITING THE DISTINCTION

4.1 Delimiting the distinction by dichotomies

To recapture some general points which I have made earlier, there are distinct formulations of the semantics-pragmatics distinction based on the following points: (i) what attitudes are taken towards the underlying cinquain, (ii) what criteria are adopted to make the distinction with respect to the cinquain, and (iii) how varying sorts of natural phenomena are countervailed in terms of the adopted criteria. In a similar vein, Levinson (1983), in his book *Pragmatics*, introduces more than ten possible definitions for the distinction by underlining what seems to be problematic for each definition with respect to the given criteria and borderline cases from natural languages. Not deciding on one of these definitions, he arrives at the conclusion that it is difficult to conclusively define pragmatics, in addition to semantics. Hereby, it is also important to recapture that the diversifying distinctions between semantics and pragmatics, at least for the complementarist views, implicate different systems of semantics, each of which comes along with their own system of pragmatics. Thus, the question is how we are supposed to define the distinction regardless of committing ourselves to one sort of semantics or pragmatics systems. Here, Mira Ariel (2010) makes a similar point that “the definition problem became the delimitation problem” when the theorists in the literature could not come up with an “intensional definition by reference to a set of [distinctive] properties” (p. 94). For the sake of conceptual clarity, it is better to enlist such definitions categorically as they appear in the different theories.

Surveying the different conceptions of the distinction in the literature, the linguist François Nemo (1999), in alignment with the *cinquain*, makes the point that the semantics and/or other uses “of the two adjectives [semantic/pragmatic] are clearly dichotomous: what is *pragmatic* is what is not *semantic* and vice-versa” (p. 346).¹⁵ The distinctive marks of each aspect, namely being semantic and being pragmatic, must be understood in parallel with the *cinquain*. Thus, it is no surprise that pragmatics and semantics are often portrayed as being distinguishable in character by dichotomous representations. In the similar fashion, Lyons (1987) and Huang (2014), along with Nemo (1999), catalog the dichotomic ways through which the semantics-pragmatics distinction is to be defined. In order to elucidate the distinction, the following dichotomies have been commonly proposed by philosophers and linguists (Bach, 1999a; Carston, 2008b; Huang, 2014; Levinson, 1983; Nemo, 1999):

- (1) sign/world relation vs. sign/users relation; (2) abstract vs. concrete; (3) direct vs. indirect; (4) meaning vs. use; (5) code vs. use; (6) language structure vs. language function; (7) conventional vs. non-conventional meaning; (8) literal/linguistic vs. non-literal/non-linguistic meaning; (9) linguistically encoded vs. non-linguistically encoded meaning; (10) competence vs. performance; (11) content vs. force; (12) meaning vs. force; (13) constative vs. performative; (14) proposition vs. speech acts; (15) locutionary vs. illocutionary; (16) truth vs. action; (17) truth-conditionality vs. non-truth conditionality; (18) sentence (or proposition) vs. utterance; (19) compositionality vs. non-compositionality; (20) type vs. token; (21) context independence vs. context dependence; (22) context invariance vs. context variance; (23) context insensitivity vs. context sensitivity; (24) sentence’s meaning vs. speaker’s meaning; (25) saying vs. implicating; (26) what is said vs. what is communicated; (27) intention independence vs. intention dependence; (28) meaning vs. relevance; (29) explicit vs. implicit; (30) decoding processes vs. inferential processes

In this respect, it can be first noticed that the enlisted dichotomies are provisional although each of them has been proposed by philosophers in accordance with their

¹⁵ Here, Nemo (1999) adopts a higher order analysis of the distinction based on the question of how we decide on the semantics/pragmatics of the terms ‘semantic’ and ‘pragmatic’. I will address this point while discussing the higher order interpretation of the distinction.

theoretical commitments and arguments. Although the list looks comprehensive enough to envelop much of the proposed ways to delimit the distinction, it does not get through all the possible combinations such as any supposed dichotomy between *sentence's meaning* and *speech acts*. Moreover, the proposed dichotomies do not necessarily contradict with nor exclude each other in the sense that a philosopher can adopt more than one dichotomy to define the semantics-pragmatics distinction. For example, complementarist philosophers such as Carnap seem to hold the first four dichotomies together while Emma Borg (2004, 2005), pro-semanticist, stick to the dichotomies 'literal/linguistic vs. non-literal/non-linguistic meaning' and 'context-sensitivity and context-insensitivity'. Moreover, the relevance theorists (i.e. Deidre Wilson & Dan Sperber, 2002; Robyn Carston, 2002, 2008b) amalgamate the dichotomies (26)-(30) by emphasizing gradual or partial contributions of each dichotomy into making the distinction. As I will later discuss, those who adopt the multiple criteria for distinguishing semantics and pragmatics often face the problem of internal coherency with respect to how these criteria can be interpreted in a coherent way in the face of some counter-examples from natural language phenomena.

Additionally, it should be noted that some of the listed dichotomies might stand for unproblematically interchangeable terms for some accounts of the distinction. One might fairly hold that some of these dichotomies in the list are the same criterion and thus she might conclude that some of the dichotomies are redundant for the sake of terminological conciseness. To illustrate, some theorists - for instance, Huang (2014)- might reckon that the dichotomies (21), (22) and (23) which center around the notion of context say the same thing with different terms. Again, similar remarks can be made about the dichotomies (7), (8) and (9) if a

theorist believes that being conventional, being literal and being lexically encoded say of the same features of an expression. Nevertheless, some other theorists might also beg the differ and imbue these terms with some subtle differences in terms of their theoretical interests. For instance, Gillon (2008), Cappelen & Lepore (2005), King & Stanley (2005) attribute distinct senses to the terms ‘context-sensitivity’ and ‘context-variance’ based on the general idea that the context-sensitivity of what an utterance conveys does not necessarily amount to context varying interpretations of what the utterance conveys.

More importantly, the list is not only provisional in its entirety but also each dichotomy is rather broad to the effect that the given dichotomous terms do not capture how philosophers could conceptualize and account for each term in detail. In other words, it is not the case that the opposing terms have uncontroversial and ubiquitous meaning in each theory of language. Thus, how a philosopher interprets some dichotomous terms in the list might radically differ from another philosopher even though there is some degree of agreement on what dichotomy provides the best characterization of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. To illustrate, Bach, Carston, Grice, and Recanati all agree on the significance of the dichotomy (26) *what is said* vs. *what is communicated* in virtue of making the semantics-pragmatics distinction; however, each philosopher assigns different ranges of semantic/pragmatic roles onto them. Bach, for instance, believes that what is said by an utterance of an expression typically consists of the lexically encoded representation, pre-sentential or complete, in addition to lexically governed resolutions of indexical/referential expressions such as pronouns, demonstratives and such. Thereby, for him, what is said by an utterance does not have to be fully sentential and fully truth-conditional given that sentences are truth-bearers in truth assignments. For Bach, lexical encoding sufficiently depicts

where the semantic boundaries extend. On the other hand, he further believes that what is communicated by an utterance of an expression typically includes enriched/additional propositions that are conveyed by this utterance; moreover, it falls within the boundaries of pragmatics. Unlike Bach, Grice puts forward a standard picture of the dichotomy ‘what is said vs. what is communicated’ in which the former corresponds to a minimal, but complete, proposition carved out by lexically encoded meaning and/or disambiguating deictic/referential expressions. On the other hand, Grice believes that what is communicated by an utterance covers conventionally or conversationally inferred contents onto what is said. Thus, Grice, unlike Bach, does not divide ‘semantic’ structures into micro-levels of linguistic representation to the effect that pragmatics typically concerns with conventional and conversational implicatures in communication whereas semantics concerns with a complete thought which a sentence lexically conveys irrespective of its communicative implications.

Philosophers adopt distinct conceptions of the same dichotomy due to their distinct conceptualization of the same terms. Hence, it can further be emphasized that each philosopher could construe each enlisted dichotomy in a restricted manner. Again, Bach provisionally agrees on the dichotomy (23) *context-insensitivity* vs. *context-sensitivity* by making a further distinction between *narrow context* and *broad context*. According to him, semantics also deals with context-sensitive expressions in the narrow sense of the term which allows for referential resolutions of indexicals and deictic expressions while semantics has nothing to do with context-sensitivity in the broad sense of the term which allows only for communicatively salient components in the environment of utterances in a communication. Hence, there could be subtle differentiations in the construal of the listed terms, and such differentiations

are quite common to encounter in the literature on the semantics-pragmatics distinction.

Besides, the above dichotomies might be applied to pick out and to sort out various kinds of concepts that are thought to play a role in language understanding. In other words, the question is to what sorts of things constitute the domains of semantics and pragmatics. Deidre Wilson points out that there could be three approaches to the question of what pragmatics is, i.e. philosophical, linguistic, and cognitive approaches (Allott, 2010). For the sake of argument, these approaches can be embraced to delimit the application domain of the dichotomies. According to the philosophical approach, the listed dichotomies are taken to center around the notion of content/information/meaning. In this respect, the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is ascribed to distinct sorts of content. For instance, the dichotomy (29) *explicit vs. implicit* might be applied to ‘content’ exclusively by holding that what sentences mean correspond to more explicit content than what speakers mean by these sentences. On the other hand, if a theorist takes the linguistic approach to define the domains of semantics and pragmatics then she interprets the dichotomies by means of codified constituents and codificational rules so that she can interpret the dichotomy (27) *intention independence vs. intention dependence* in the sense that what a sentence encodes never depends on what a speaker intends to convey beyond the codified content and codificational rules of the sentence. Furthermore, if a theorist takes the cognitive approach in order to delimit the application domain of dichotomies then she typically adopts a dichotomy to differentiate distinct sorts of cognitive attitudes, processes, mechanisms, or rules. In other words, the cognitive approach equates the application domain of the dichotomies with cognitive determinants and functions which underwrite the language understanding and/or

communication. Sperber & Wilson (2002) account for the semantics-pragmatics distinction through associating each one of them with fundamentally distinct types of cognitive processes. According to them, semantics concerns with coding/decoding processes by which linguistic signs are linked with their meanings whereas pragmatics exclusively involves inferential process “one can integrate this meaning with other information available from the context to arrive at the interpretation of an utterance” (Szabo, 2006, p. 371). Thus, a philosopher can take the above dichotomies to apply to the distinct sorts of stuff which might include content, information, meaning, linguistic codes, codificational rules, interpretational processes, cognitive mechanisms, and so on.

For the sake of brevity, it is difficult to define the semantics-pragmatics distinction since each attempt for defining it requires us to ground some prior notions and distinctions which precede the distinction as its antecedents. Therefore, it is also difficult to give the impartial representation of it regardless of committing ourselves to one type of definition or to some underlying notion beforehand. Based on the distinct representations in the literature, the semantics-pragmatics distinction can still be described circumstantially by cataloging some dichotomies that are commonly affiliated or identified with the distinction. Although this contingent and circumstantial description does not exhaust all interpretations of the distinction, it gives us a space to delimit how distinctly one can conceptualize and entertain the distinction in a theory. In what follows, I will discuss another way to delimit the range of what the distinction is between semantics and pragmatics. I will thereby visit some extensional or stipulative definition which purports to delimit the semantics-pragmatics distinction based on some natural language phenomena.

4.2 Delimiting the distinction by natural language phenomena

As Ariel (2010) suggests, it is also common as a strategy to delimit the semantics-pragmatics distinction through listing some allegedly “canonized topics” concerning with some linguistic phenomena (p.93-4). She considers that the source of such a strategy relies on the *pragmatic wastebasket* notion which some formal semanticists such as Gazdar, Bar-Hillel, and Stalnaker defend. As we have already mentioned, the notion simply contends that the domain of pragmatics, unlike the domain of semantics, has no intensional characteristic to distinguish, and thus it solely serves to be a domain for disposing of non-semantic phenomena. It is important to notice that pragmatics has no domain-specific functions to entertain any elements in its domain of discourse.

In this respect, pragmatics, according to the proponents of pragmatic wastebasket notion, has no intensional definition yet it is merely a domain consisting of non-semantic elements. Therefore, pragmatics is considered to be exclusively extensional and some certain phenomena are deemed to be a primary subject matter of pragmatics. In this respect, some formal semanticists propose an extensional definition for the semantics-pragmatics distinction since they do not believe that any domain-specific function or distinguishing characteristic cannot be ascribed to pragmatics in the face of their definition of semantics. In this respect, Levinson (1983) formulates the following definition of pragmatics by crediting it to Stalnaker: “Pragmatics is the study of deixis, implicature, presupposition, speech acts, and aspects of discourse structure” (p. 27).

First, it can be noticed that the extensional definition only delimits the extensional boundaries of pragmatics while it does not take any issue with the boundaries of semantics. Secondly, it restricts the extensional boundaries with a

limited number of phenomena that are taken to be canonized. Nonetheless, what makes these topics canonized for delimiting pragmatics depends on the conviction that the adopted system of semantics has no explanation or place for these topics. Thus, these topics are canonized due to some semantic theory even though we cannot be certain if this theory is warranted or not in the first place.

How these canonized phenomena are picked out in the extension of a natural language is already laden with an unwarranted theory of semantics and therefore how they are enlisted to define pragmatics follows from a definition of semantics. In turn, this extensional definition gets into a vicious circle in the sense that the delimiting what phenomena fall under pragmatic analysis already presupposes a criterion to distinguish the domain of semantics from the domain of pragmatics. Thus, the list does not have to exhaust all possible linguistic phenomena which straddle our adopted definitions of semantics and pragmatics. If our definitions have no intensional character, then they do not signify a sharp distinction. Consequently, it is possible for us to face some linguistic cases which we can neither count as semantic nor count as pragmatic. Similarly, Levinson (1983) remarks:

For in common with all extensional definitions, it provides no criteria for the inclusion or exclusion of further phenomena that may come to our attention; at best one can say that what warrants pragmatic treatment for some new topic is simply linguists' consensus based on intuitive 'family resemblance' to more familiar topics. (p.27)

It is worth noticing that Levinson offers a 'family resemblance' approach to give an extensional definition for the semantics-pragmatics distinction if it cannot be characterized by an intensional definition that consists of necessary and sufficient conditions to mark each of these aspects in their own domain. Yet, as he also agrees, it is also a dead-end for any conception of the semantics-pragmatics distinction which is extensionally defined. After all, the notion 'family resemblance' suggests an

intransitive relation of partial overlapping amongst entities, but finding how one linguistic phenomenon overlaps with another in terms of their properties already presupposes that there must be some similar and some dissimilar properties in one way or another. Thus, our notions of what makes two linguistic aspects similar and dissimilar also require a principled way to define linguistic similarity and dissimilarity in the first place. In this respect, it is no surprise that the above definition does not contain some cases which also allegedly straddle the boundaries between many representations of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. For example; even though the aspects of discourse structure seem to include the cases such as metonymy, irony, understatement, loose use and so on, they do not include more troublesome cases such as *unarticulated constituents* which seem to override some common dichotomies such as ‘literal meaning vs. non-literal meaning’ or ‘truth-conditionality vs. non-truth-conditionality’.

From a more positive perspective, Bach (1999b) offers that one can still make use of extensional definitions as stipulative lists to sketch the gist of discussions on the semantics-pragmatics distinction. Surveying distinct troublesome cases for distinct definitions, Bach alternatively compiles some linguistic cases that philosophers and linguists often deal with as borderline cases straddling the adopted distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Adapting from Ariel (2010), Bach (1999b) and Levinson (1983); I can compile the following topics as the borderline cases for the alleged boundaries between semantics and pragmatics:

ambiguity, anaphora, adjectival modification, attributive vs. referential use, counterfactual conditionals, co-text, deixis, deference, emotive verbs, empty concepts, empty names, factive verbs, lies, loose use, implicatures, implicit arguments (unarticulated constituents), irony, overstatement, quantificational phrases, polysemy, presuppositions, reference, slips of the tongue, speech

acts, speech-act adverbials, understatement, vagueness, and so on and so forth.¹⁶

In conclusion, the list has only a descriptive role or a pictorial value by which we can merely envisage how far the boundaries between semantics and pragmatics stretch out in terms of their extensions in natural languages. Nevertheless, the list is insufficient to define the distinction in the principled way that semantics, along with its extension, can be distinguished from pragmatics and its extension with respect to such and such distinctive properties and phenomena. Thus, the question of defining the distinction can fairly collapse into the question of delimiting the distinction. Nonetheless, how to delimit the distinction also might be stifled with one's presuppositions on what makes a case relevant to the delimitation itself. As I have proposed in the last two sections, delimiting the semantics-pragmatics distinction seems to be legitimate only if it amounts to cataloging and thereby it is employed in a descriptive manner to compile distinct accounts of how to draw the distinction. Regarding the question of defining the distinction, Recanati, who favors a stance between pro-pragmatism and radical pragmatism, admits:

...it is futile to insist on providing an answer to the twin questions: What is the principled basis for the semantics/pragmatics distinction? Where does the boundary lie? Answers to these questions can still be given, but they have to rely on stipulation. (2002c, p.461)

While discussing the higher-order interpretation of the distinction, I will later point out whether making the distinction by stipulative definitions is plausible or not. For now, it is worth noticing that the distinction seems to revolve around seemingly irreconcilable and piled-up controversies which rest on some competing criteria for

¹⁶ Carston (2008b) puts such borderline cases under the following taxonomy: "(1) multiple encodings (i.e. ambiguities); (2) indexical references; (3) missing constituents; (4) unspecified scope of elements; (5) underspecificity or weakness of encoded conceptual content; (6) overspecificity or narrowness of encoded conceptual content" (p.28). It is possible to put the above cases under these general categories, yet there seems to be no theory-laden way to put these cases under Carston's categories and thus it would be unacceptable for some theory of the semantics-pragmatics distinction while being perfectly possible for some other theory.

the distinction and their plausibility in relevance with natural language phenomena. Still, many philosophers and linguists in the literature often mention three predominant types of formulations for making the distinction in a principled way: *context-insensitivity vs. context-sensitivity; conventional meaning vs. non-conventional meaning; truth-conditionality vs. non-truth-conditionality*.¹⁷ In what follows, I shall address these formulations in a relatively peripheral way in the sense that I am not going to put any special emphasis on their particular uses or presentations in the literature, which I preserve them for further discussion. In doing so, I will also elucidate some key notions - i.e. context, context-sensitivity, truth-conditionality, semantic underdeterminacy, lexicality, etc. - which have direct relevance to these formulations.

4.3. A quest for criteria

As discussed in the earlier sections, there are intractably divergent ways to make the semantics-pragmatics distinction in the literature so that delimiting the distinction becomes more convenient than defining it. Nevertheless, the question of whether it can be defined in any coherent and empirically plausible way has not been visited yet. In this respect, three main types of criteria, which have been commonly introduced in one way or another, can be proposed as an attempt to deal with this pending issue. Empirical plausibility here concerns with the extension of the domains of a given semantics-pragmatics distinction. On the other hand, the coherency question mostly concerns with how an account coherently theorizes the given

¹⁷ See Bach, 1999b, 2004a, 2004b; Bach & Bezuidenhout, 2002; Bianchi, 2004; Carston, 1999, 2007, 2008a; Gillon, 2008; Huang, 2014; Jaszczolt, 2012. Although the terms such as ‘literal meaning’ and ‘context-sensitivity’ vary in those formulations, they still share some degree of convention in their characterizations.

definition in terms of the adopted criteria or criterion. With respect to such theoretical virtues, three criteria, i.e. *conventional/non-conventional meaning*; *context-sensitivity/context-insensitivity*; *truth-conditionality/non-truth-conditionality*, could be analyzed.

4.3.1 Conventionality vs. non-conventionality

It will be recalled that semantics, as it appears in the basic triad, concerns with the relations between lexical codes and what they encode. In this characterization, what is semantic in a language amounts to some representations or content which are conventionally attached to given lexical codes in a stable manner in the typical uses of these given expressions. In other words, what semantics concerns is nothing other than any content/representation to which the expression type e in a language L attaches by some conventions in L . In that regard, many philosophers agree that any content or representation which is lexically encoded/decoded boils down to what the expression literally means in its typical occurrences in a language.

Some pro-semanticists (e.g. Carnap, 1942, 1988; Montague, 1970, 1974; Katz, 1972, 1981; Borg, 2004, 2005) defend the similar interpretation of semantics which exclusively pertains to conventional or lexically encoded aspects of meaning to the effect that what is said by compound expressions such as sentences becomes the conventional meaning of the linguistic expressions employed in it. Holding the conventionality constraint on what semantics concerns, pragmatics, on the other hand, is thought to study how and why speakers communicate beyond the literal/conventional meaning which an expression type e lexically encodes. Thus, what speakers pragmatically convey might not be the representations derived from what linguistic expressions lexically encode in their typical occurrences. If semantic

representations derive from what lexical items encode in virtue of some conventions on assigning a representation onto a code, then pragmatic representations could be regarded as extra-linguistic, non-literal or non-conventional aspects of meaning. As one might recall from the *cinquain*, the above picture of semantics and pragmatics relies on the asymmetry to the effect that pragmatic content ensuingly cling onto semantic content or representations. Therefore, the notion of non-conventionality comprises non-literal meaning including what speakers mean post-semantically by using an expression. In this respect, the cases of metaphors or irony are often thought to reflect non-literal and non-conventional aspects of meaning that become salient post-semantically only when one figures out what this given expression linguistically encodes in the first place.

Additionally, the conventionality criterion generally accompanies with further assumptions. The notion of conventionality is not only manifested in the question of what a code conventionally pairs with content or representation but also in the question of what rules or functions conventionally govern the relations amongst these code-representation pairs in a language. Generally, but not specifically, the proponents of this criterion extend the notion of conventionality, which involves stable contents, to the distinct types of stable rule-governed relations amongst expressions. For instance, the conventionality criterion can be construed to posit the relations between the literal meaning of a sentence and the meaning of its constituents. In other words, the conventionality criterion seems to implicate the principle of (semantic) compositionality which simply contends that the conventional/literal/linguistically encoded meaning of a compound expression is determined by the conventional/literal/linguistically encoded meanings of the linguistic constituents in the compound expression and the syntactic/semantic rules

holding them in the given structural order. Furthermore, the conventionality criterion appears to further include the rule-governed relations between linguistic expressions and what they denote as in the cases of reference and truth-making relations. For instance, Carnap (1988) defends that semantics studies the formal relations between words and what they denote while assuming an extensional link between language and the world. Drawing on Fregean two-layered aspects of meaning (i.e. sense and reference), the conventional meaning of an expression is generally considered to have two sorts of semantic properties (i.e. intensional and extensional properties); moreover, the former includes lexically encoded information about what is to be denoted while the latter stands for what is denoted (Carnap, 1988). In this regard, a proponent of the conventionality criterion can further implicate that semantics must also study the relations such as reference or denotation in the face of a multi-folded analysis of conventional meaning. From this perspective, pragmatics cannot be associated with any rule-governed relations which are salient at the semantic level. As pragmatics seemingly covers what is non-conventionally conveyed.

Moreover, there are some further suppositions that underwrite the conventionality criterion. First, the notion of conventionality implicates that literal meaning of an expression amounts to be a built-in content that philosophers often label as “standing meaning” or “stable meaning” (King & Stanley, 2005, pp.115-20). The question of stability primarily rests on how much stability a given conventionality criterion provides to linguistic expressions. For instance, proper names, number determiners and quantifier domain modifiers, logical connectives seem to have very stable meanings in terms of what content or functions they conventionally encode. In this respect, pragmatics, according to this implication, has a direct link with unstable content which we cannot attach to any linguistic

expression at the semantic level. In this respect, pragmatics, in a way, clings onto the semantic notion of stability.

In addition to the assumption of stability, the conventionality criterion rests on a sort of linguistic competency which primarily corresponds to speakers' knowledge about code-representation pairs and speakers' knowledge about the rules determining these pairs. Consequently, pragmatic representation/content turns out to be competent speakers' communicative performances which are subsidiary to what competent speakers satisfactorily encodes/decodes by an expression based on their knowledge at the semantic level. Thus, pragmatics in a way concerns with the appropriateness conditions of performance while semantics concerns with the conditions of competence (Szabo, 2006).

More obviously, the conventionality criterion further entails the thesis that expression types such as sentences determine what expression tokens such as utterances conventionally mean. According to the standard conception, a sentence is an expression type that consists of a well-formed string of words that are composed together by means of distinct sorts of well-formedness rules in a language. Combining this conception with the conventionality criteria, what a sentence literally says seems to be independent of its instantiations in different speakers' uses on distinct occasions of use. Here, one might appeal to the *type-token* distinction to the effect that the sentence types always correspond to the same stable (eternal) representations which amount to the composition of the conventional contents of the linguistic components entertained in the relevant sentence types. On the other hand, once a speaker utters a sentence type in the communicational discourse, she articulates a token of the given sentence and thereby she produces an utterance of a sentence that might be less stable depending on non-literal effects in

communicational discourse. Thus, an utterance of a sentence is an expression token that involves articulating a token of sentence type by a speaker in order for directing it to an addressee in a conversational exchange. In this respect, pragmatics is kept relevant to utterances although utterances as tokens of expression types owe their conventional meaning to sentence types to which semantics is thought to be relevant.

4.3.2 Some challenges to the conventionality criterion

Once one admits the conventionality criterion for drawing the distinction between semantics and pragmatics then she faces some *prima facie* troubles about the criterion and its accompanying assumptions. Firstly, possible semantic interpretations of deictic and ambiguous expressions put some explanatory burden on the proponents of the criterion. For one thing, the criterion contends that the interpretation of an expression at semantic level corresponds to decoding the representations which are encoded in the relevant expression type by some rule-governed conventions. Hence, semantics seems to have no room for extra-linguistic elements or conventions which might enable speakers to disambiguate or to determine what is literally said by an expression type. Nonetheless, some natural language phenomena hereby pose a direct opposition to the conventionality criterion. Most natural cases of such an opposition involve the cases of lexical and structural ambiguity. Consider the following examples:

- (1) The shop owner was arrested for selling contraband bats.
- (2) They are cooking vegetables.

In the first example, there is a lexical ambiguity about the word 'bat' which encodes more than one content. Thus, it is ambiguous whether the owner was arrested for selling either contraband solid sticks like baseball bats or contraband animals

belonging to the class of *Chiroptera*. In the second example, there is a structural or syntactic ambiguity about what the sentence literally conveys. It is ambiguous in the sense that the sentence either says that there are at least two people who are in the act of cooking vegetables or says that there are vegetables in the process of being cooked. The cases above seem to encode more than one standing meaning and yet the interpretation of them at the semantic level does not enable us to disambiguate which one of these encoded representations is the case in the given utterances of them. Such worries on the conventionality criterion are often accounted for appealing to further distinctions such as type-token or sentence-utterance. In the cases of lexical and syntactic ambiguity, a proponent of the conventionality criterion can simply hold that the sentence (1), for instance, encodes two distinct types of conventional meaning and any utterance of this sentence depends on either one of these built-in meanings.

More challenging cases for the conventionality criterion come from the deictic expressions by virtue of disambiguating their contents. In the case of deictic expressions, it is worth noticing that what a deictic expression, as an expression type, literally conveys seems to be unspecified if what an expression type means is what it linguistically encodes. The deictic expressions characteristically involve demonstratives (e.g. this, that), personal pronouns (e.g. I, you, yours), tense markers, some adverbs (e.g. here, yesterday), and some adjectives (e.g. local, present). As a defining feature, what representation/content a deictic expression conveys cannot be specified by what it linguistically conveys (Perry, 1997). In this respect, it is impossible to determine what specific content is built-in by a deictic expression and thereby it does not seem to have a stable meaning. Take the following examples:

(3) I love that cat.

(4) You and you, but not you, get in the line.

What the sentences above literally mean seem to change depending on different utterances of them on various occasions of use. The utterances of sentences will stand for distinct representations depending on who the speaker is or whom the speaker addresses to on the given occasions of use of these sentences. Nonetheless, there might still be room for dodging away from these concerns on the conventionality criterion. As I will later visit again, David Kaplan's (1989) analysis of standing meaning, which consists of his distinction between *character* and *content*, might come to help and it might provide some prima facie explanations for deictic expressions in favor of the conventionality criterion. According to him, the *character* of a deictic expression serves to be a stable function, in a sense conventional, which characteristically mediates the relation between a content of deictic expression and its occasion of use. For instance, the character of an indexical 'I' amounts to the first-person speaker of a given utterance and it is a stable function attached to the expression types which include it. On the other hand, the *content* of this indexical varies as the speaker changes. In this respect, the proponents of the conventionality criterion might appeal to such a distinction between character and content in order to maintain their stance. Still, the plausibility of such strategies can be questioned further. As I will discuss in the following sections, Kaplan's distinction between *character* and *content*, for instance, has its own limitations and problems. For the sake of brevity, I can cast a doubt on such strategies by one of the above examples. Considering the example (4), the built-in function of the indexical 'you' cannot fix the parameter of salient addresses in a given occasion of use if it does not already accompany with certain physical gestures or behavior of some sort.

In this regard, speakers' referential intentions seem to intrude into the conventional functions of expression types.

In a similar vein, anaphoric expressions can be brought forward to implicate that the conventionality criterion is insufficient to disambiguate proper referential values for each anaphoric expression. Anaphors, in their typical instances, are referential expressions whose referential values are bound to the local domain of discourse in which they occur. Take the examples below:

- (5) a. I love Hikmet.
- b. I love my mom.
- c. I love her.

The last two sentences, as contrasted with (5)a, do not have any stable referential value for the terms 'my mom' or 'her' once they are taken as expression types. Hence, they do not linguistically specify what value or content these terms have. The occasion on which these terms are used seems to determine to whom these terms refer. In that case, anaphoric expressions clash with the conventionality criterion since reference resolution processes would fall under the pragmatic aspect of language. Yet, the proponents of the conventionality criterion can meet with this challenge in order to refurnish the thesis that the linguistically encoded meaning or the role of an expression type falls within the boundaries of semantics. Just as Kaplan's recovery of the analysis of indexicals and demonstratives, Noam Chomsky brings forward a formal analysis of anaphora in his typology of noun phrases (Allott, 2010). According to his analysis, there are some binding conditions that comprise standing roles encoded in anaphoric expressions. Appealing to such a strategy, the proponent of the criterion can still stick to the notion of conventionality in the sense

that semantics concerns with the standing content or encoded conventions to specify occasional contents.

The conventionality criterion runs into more serious concerns due to the conviction that semantic interpretation works on expression types exclusively. This idea implicates that the semantic interpretation of a well-formed expression is not defeasible in the sense that what a well-formed sentence type literally says always encodes the same outcome resulting in the composition of the standing contents or roles of linguistic components employed in this sentence. Nonetheless, according to Bach (1999a, 1999b, 2004), there are some expression types whose standing meanings are intricately linked with their occasions of use. Following Grice's analysis on the adverbs such as 'however' and 'moreover', he presents deictic expressions which supposedly have conventional content or role only with respect to the discourse or text in which they are used. In this vein, Bach (1999b) states:

Grice's examples were limited to adverbs like 'however' and 'moreover,' but the list may be easily expanded to include such speech act adverbials as: after all, anyway, at any rate, besides [...] by the way, first of all, finally, frankly, furthermore, in conclusion, indeed, in other words, now that you mention it, on the other hand, otherwise [...] With these it seems that the only way to specify their semantic contribution (when they occur initially or are otherwise set off) is to specify how they are to be used. (p.2)

These expressions are called as *deictic discourse expressions* or *speech act adverbials* and they exploit a certain interpretation of context, i.e. *co-text*, in the sense that they change the force of a given sentence or subjugate the content of an expression to another (Bach, 1999b, Huang, 2014). Still, in the favor of the conventionality criterion, there could be explanations for these phenomena in terms of some rule-governed forms or schematic conventions underlying the expression types including deictic discourse expressions. Generally, the problematic cases for the conventionality criterion consist of the cases in which a type of an expression has

an underspecified content while a token of the very same expression has a specified content.

The proponents of the criterion, who are mostly pro-semanticists, incline to cope with such cases by a two-folded formal translational strategy: First, they determine a schematic convention or an algorithmic function underlying a type of an expression; then, they indorse this convention or function as a means for translating expression types into more specified content in distinct utterances of this expression type. The attempts such as Kaplan's distinction between *character and content*, Montague's *index-theory* for pragmatics, Katz's *semantic markers* follow this two-folded formal translational approach (Szabo, 2006; Allott, 2010).

Still, the conventionality criterion faces with the further burden of explanation when it clashes with Gricean conventional implicatures. Implicatures are communicative implications that are distinct from logical inferences and entailment relations which solely rest on logically or truth-conditionally relevant meanings in each well-formed expression. Grice's distinction arises from a common phenomenon that what speakers mean by an expression often exceeds what this expression linguistically encodes. Proposing this distinction between 'what is said' and 'what is implicated' with respect to what is meant, Grice divides implicatures into two main categories, i.e. conversational and conventional, depending on the sources of speaker's communicative implications. Conversational implicatures hinge on the salient and mutually recognizable characteristics of conversational context and they are not assessable nor governed by the linguistically encoded meaning of an expression uttered in the given conversational context. Yet, unlike conversational implicatures, conventional ones correspond to the implicatures which are generated or triggered by the conventional meanings of expressions although such cases do not

contribute to what this expression type linguistically encodes. As we see in Bach's contention about the adverbs such as 'after all', 'anyway' and 'any rate', Grice (1967, 1989) analyzes the adverbs and connectives such as 'moreover', 'but', 'therefore' and 'on the other hand'. Take a paradigmatic example as follows:

(6) a. He is a philosophy major but is funny.

b. [He is a philosophy major and he is funny.]

For Grice, the connective 'but' in use conventionally conveys a contrast between the expressions with which it connects. For instance, the example (6)a establishes a contrast between being a philosophy major and being funny. So, it conventionally overlays a contrastive force on the expressions. Yet, Grice thinks that this sort of conventionality does not affect the truth-conditional status of what is linguistically encoded in a given sentence. Later, I will revisit the truth-conditional effects of pragmatic processes while discussing the truth-conditionality criterion, yet what I want to emphasize here about the conventionality criterion is that Grice casts a doubt on the conventionality criterion by his notion of conventional implicatures. Since there are some pragmatic implications that are also triggered conventionally then it seems that the proponents of the criterion must differentiate what a sentence linguistically encodes from what a sentence conventionally conveys. As Grice points out, the conventionality of linguistic items might not be mutually exclusive with what content is linguistically encoded in those items. Yet, the conventionality criterion can still be discussed with the help of formal translational strategies covered earlier.

As I stated earlier, the conventionality criterion contends that what a well-formed sentence type literally says always encodes the same end product of the composition of the standing contents or roles of linguistic components employed in

it. In this respect, I cover certain challenges each of which shares the idea that there are some expression types that are inherently underspecified in terms of their linguistically encoded meanings or roles. Such a notion of underspecification comes with degrees and most philosophers restrict the idea of underspecification of literal meaning into certain types of phenomena. Yet, radical pragmatism and pro-pragmatism evolve this underspecification claim into the linguistic/semantic underdeterminacy thesis which contends that “the linguistically encoded meaning of a sentence radically underdetermines the proposition a speaker expresses when she utters that sentence” (Huang, 2014, p.7-8). In addition, the emphasis on the cases of underspecified contents, the linguistic/semantic underdeterminacy thesis might implicate further hypotheses: (i) Sentences, not always but typically, fail to encode standing meanings: there are no standing meanings embedded in the linguistic codes.; (ii) what is lexically encoded by the sentence always falls short of what speakers communicate by that sentence.¹⁸ The following case can be proposed to exemplify the linguistic/semantic underdeterminacy in the face of conventionality criteria:

(7) The police stopped the car.

The sentence above literally says that the police officer stopped a definite/unique car in some way or another. Moreover, this literal meaning does not give us a specified manner of stopping this definite/unique car. After all, it can either be used to mean that the police officer stopped the driver’s car issuing signals to the driver or to mean that the policeman was driving the car and then stopped its engine. The different manners of stopping the car can be specified only through particular uses of the sentence rather than the encoded meaning of it.

¹⁸ There are more examples to put forward to exemplify the linguistic/semantic underdeterminacy, but I preserve the rest for the other criteria and the case study on the notion of unarticulated constituents.

Still, we can pause for a moment to consider one further concern on the conventionality criterion. This concern springs from the formal translational explanations in the face of several cases from anaphoric expressions to unarticulated constituents. In order to deny the effects of use on the conventional meaning, such explanations appeal to the conventional mechanisms or decoding processes which are encoded structurally or lexically in the expressions in question. Yet, such solutions rarefy the boundaries between syntax and semantics in the basic triad due to the definition that syntax studies code-to-code relations and codificational rules governing those relations.

One further problem for the conventionality criterion is as to what sort of linguistic competency the conventionality criterion requires to explain language understanding. As I mentioned earlier, the criterion, at its face value, rests on a sort of linguistic competence which involves speakers' knowledge about the code-representation pairs and speakers' knowledge about the rules governing these pairs. More interestingly, the pragmatic representations and effects which the speakers entertain in communication are not part of this competency since they are neither conventional nor encoded in linguistic expressions. Nonetheless, this sort of linguistic competence is too restricted to account for language understanding beyond semantic competency. For one thing, interpreting utterances requires addressees to go under a cognitive process whereby they figure out what the received utterances mean. In this case, speakers, in the natural course of a regular linguistic exchange, process and produce linguistic expressions in an automatic, non-reflective and extremely fast manner. Thus, semantic interpretations as decoding/encoding processes, which rely on speakers' knowledge about code-representation relations and decoding/encoding rules, need to be grounded at conscious levels or public-

language levels. The relevance-theoretic accounts or Fodor's *modularity thesis* can give us a better account of linguistic competency in which speaker's internal mental framework and related cognitive faculties stand for such a competency (Ariel, 2010; Carston, 2008b). After all, it is worth emphasizing how this information can be grasped and circulated through communication. Any account which defends the conventionality criterion should explain away the cognitive picture behind acquiring linguistic contents and producing utterances. Hence, this notion of linguistic competence could boil down into a sort of cognitive competency in terms of encoding/decoding processes.

In what follows, I will move on discussing the context-sensitivity criterion for drawing the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. While discussing this criterion, I will also explicate some basic notions such as context and the semantic underdeterminacy thesis in order to show how the context-sensitivity criterion comes out to be a measure to draw the semantics-pragmatics distinction.

4.3.3 Context-insensitivity vs. context-sensitivity

The dichotomy between *context-sensitivity* and *context-insensitivity* has significance for making the semantics-pragmatics distinction, i.e. the context-sensitivity criterion, which has been commonly endorsed in the literature.¹⁹ According to the context-sensitivity criterion, pragmatics involves with contextual effects on how interlocutors use and interpret an utterance of an expression in a given context while semantics concerns with how interlocutors use and interpret an utterance of an expression irrespective of a given context and its effects. The context-sensitivity criterion further

¹⁹ See Bach 1994a, 1994b, 2004a; Travis, 2008; Recanati, 2002, 2004a, 2005; Stanley & Szabo, 2000a; Berg, 2002; Borg, 2004, Cappelen & Lepore, 2008; King & Stanley, 2005.

entails that the semantic interpretation/content of an expression is invariant or insensitive to the context in which this linguistic expression is uttered. On the other hand, the pragmatic interpretation of an expression depends on its context of utterance; and thereby, the pragmatic interpretation/content of the relevant expression varies from one context of utterance to another.

Based on how the seemingly recondite notions ‘context’ and ‘context-sensitivity’ are explicated, the context-sensitivity criterion can be posited in very distinct ways. Simply, it is considered to be an extra-linguistic circumstance or a set of such circumstances in which an utterance occurs. Besides, according to one standard conception, it is the physical setting/environment (thereby also an extra-linguistic circumstance) in which an utterance is made that can be saliently and mutually recognized by the interlocutors in this act of utterance and/or the interpretation of it (Allott, 2010; Caplan, 2003; Salmon, 2002). Philosophers and linguists often label this notion of context as *the physical context* in which the context of an utterance consists of all physical features (interlocutors’ identity, time, place, intonations, gestures and etc.) which become relevant to the interpretation of this very utterance (Caplan, 2003; Lewis, 1980).

In this vein, it is crucial to emphasize that there is a major point of disagreement on the question of what elements the context of an utterance encompasses in relevance to the interpretation of an utterance. On the one hand, a theorist can hold that the domain of context is strictly constrained to the elements which are present and salient in the given physical setting of an utterance. On the other hand, one can include every element which takes part in utterance interpretation regardless of whether such elements are present and salient in the local setting of the given utterance. The second notion of context is often called as *the*

bucket theory of context since it allows distinct sorts of distinct elements to become a part of contextual interpretations. In this respect, it might look too permissive and liberal account. Nevertheless, the former account of context is also too strict since contextual interpretations seem to engage with the elements which are not present in the physical setting of an utterance. Paradigmatic examples concerning with such a notion of context could be listed as follows:

(8) Hikmet left early. She said she needed to feed her cat. (Anaphora)

(9) I am not here. (Indexicals)

(10) After all, you bought this TV. (Discourse deictic expressions)

(11) You should do the Obama thing in your campaign. (Background)

In the examples above, it can be seen when the notion of physical context might fall short or how it might be recovered considering the question of what elements the notion of context recovers in the interpretation of utterances. According to this notion of context, the context of an utterance consists of all extra-linguistic features of the localized environment which are physically occurrent to the interlocutors in relevance to the interpretations of utterance. In that case, linguistic elements or linguistically encoded contents do not seem to contribute to the context of utterance. Nonetheless, there are some linguistic and extra-linguistic items that appear to contribute to the general setting of utterances although the notion of physical context does not include them as the relevant elements for utterance interpretations.

In the first example, the interpretations of pronouns ‘she’ and the pronominal ‘her’ in the given utterance (8) seems to depend on their occurrences in the sentence even if the relevant referent/referents, certain ostensive gestures and such are not occurrent or salient in the physical setting in which the utterance (8) occurs. Thus, it can be claimed that the notion of physical context excludes discourse-specific and

linguistically triggered features although they seem to be relevant to the interpretations of an utterance.

As discussed before, deictic expressions such as indexicals are thought to have their semantic value or content by means of the interpretations of the context. For the deictic expressions in a sentence trigger the search for contextual information. Yet, as Kaplan suggests, indexical expressions typically have one standing function embedded in them and yet the content of an indexical expression can be determined by the standing function of it in addition to the context in which it occurs. From Kaplan's perspective, it is possible for an indexical to denote something in the context of an utterance only if the standing (semantically encoded) function parameters are satisfied with the contextually salient value. Here, suppose that one sees the sentence (9) anonymously written on the noticeboard. In that case, he has no access to what each indexical in it denotes owing to the fact that it is not an utterance and thereby it has no surrounding setting in which it occurs. Nonetheless, there are still some standing functions governing how to make any referent relevant to the sentence. Leaving its own problems aside, Kaplan's analysis of indexicals suggests that the notion of a context, unlike the physical context, ought to include some linguistic contributions to the contextual interpretations.

Furthermore, examples such as (10) bring out some attention to the features of some earlier context of another utterance (of the same sentence/ another sentence) that has relevance to what is uttered by (10) in the present context. Imagine a case where the interlocutors had some earlier arguments over what to watch on TV and then the TV starts to malfunction at the time of utterance (10). Imagine further that one of the interlocutors asks the other to call the technical support and then the other interlocutor utters the sentence (10). In this respect, the notion of physical context

seems to run into a trouble since it rests on only one localized or specific setting relevant to the interpretations of utterance at hand. Conversely, there might be cases that require us to extend the settings which are relevant to the interpretations of a given utterance. Hence, there might be some revision onto the notion in the way that it also includes some other localized contexts of utterances that are relevant to the interpretation of a current utterance in its own context.

In the example (11), there is an interesting case of the interaction between context and interlocutors. The notion of physical context is often described to be static due to some stable parameters (time, place, addresses and physical setting and such) which are prior to utterances. In this picture, when an addressee receives an utterance which needs some contextual interpretation, she simply recovers what local values for these parameters are given in the context of the utterance. On the other hand, there could be some cases where such contextual values are not given in the local physical setting. Sometimes, our general knowledge about the world or linguistic practices constitutes the bulk of extra-linguistic information which makes the interpretation of utterances possible. For instance, the sentence (11) requires addressees to know who Obama is/was and what worth-mentioning relation he had with campaigning if they are to specify what is suggested by the utterance of the sentence (11).

In addition to the example (11), the example (10) also indicates that an interlocutor's beliefs, including beliefs about the other interlocutors' beliefs, also play a role in interpreting an utterance. In this respect, restricting the notion of context with physically and extra-linguistically salient elements would be incorrect since the interlocutors in (10), for instance, entertain some beliefs underlying the current context of utterance. Any notion of context which sets up a context to be a

localized environment is obliged to accommodate with the fact that interlocutors often appeal to some background information in order to interpret what is communicated by an utterance.

The notion of background information becomes integral to provide a better analysis of the notion of context. In this regard, Stalnaker (1970, 2014) offers an account of context which also entertains background information with respect to its role in contextual interpretation. In Stalnaker's analysis of context, the set of beliefs which underlie interlocutors' contextual interpretations is called *the common ground*. According to him, the context of an utterance is a set of (possible) worlds that consists of logically consistent assumptions, including interlocutors' "beliefs about what the others know and believe", in terms of the given "concrete situation in which a conversation takes place" (2014, p.14). Thus, the interlocutors in a conversation do not simply interpret an utterance at its face value. Nonetheless, they interpret an utterance in terms of its interaction with other salient and mutually recognizable interpretations pertaining to some other situations of utterances which include not only physical settings but also shared beliefs or some assumptions on it. That is to say, the common ground enables interlocutors to interpret an utterance in a logically consistent way.

In addition to Stalnaker's account, there are some other treatments on how the background information partakes in the interpretation of an utterance in a given context. According to Searle's conception *Background* (with a capital 'B'), there is a general knowledge framework which lies behind a language that consists of an empirically rooted set of our various sorts of practices and assumptions (social, behavioral, linguistic and so on) with respect to the world and the language. In this regard, Searle (1980) explains how the Background works in a language by showing

“how the literal use of common verbs, like ‘cut’, ‘open’, ‘close’, ‘clean’, ‘mend’, ‘play’, ‘bring’, ‘take’ and ‘make’ ” results in distinct interpretations irrespective of extra-linguistic contributions. (Carston, 2008b, p. 64). Take the sentences ‘Özgür will cut the ribbon’ and ‘Özgür cuts his own hair’. According to Searle, the occurrences of the verb ‘cut’ could have the same literal meaning. However, what they express in each occurrence vary because they reflect distinct parts of the background information concerning with the act of cutting- not because they occur in the distinct contexts of utterances of each sentence. After all, the act of cutting a ribbon and the act of cutting hair are constituted by distinct properties and know-hows and thus knowing how they express distinct ways of cutting can be grounded in some general knowledge framework. The *Background* implicates an extremely comprehensive notion of context in the way that background information not only contributes to the contextual interpretation of utterances but also it contributes to the conventional (encoded) meaning, namely the semantic interpretation of an utterance. In this sense, Searle’s notion of context, in addition to *Background*, can be regarded as a version of the bucket theory of context in terms of its comprehensiveness.²⁰ According to its standard representation, the context is a static domain that stores up everything which overtly or covertly helps to determine what is uttered to the effect that syntactic elements or speaker’s intentions are included as an element of the context.

In the literature, some philosophers take issue with such all-inclusive models in terms of their structure, and they propose the models, which consist of multi divisions and aspects of contextual interpretation. In this regard, Perry (1998) divides the notion of context into three by virtue of the linguistic levels in which it is

²⁰ Searle’s notion of context is dynamic and background assumptions, for him, are mostly contingent on social and cultural constructions.

operative, namely *pre-semantic*, *semantic*, and *post-semantic* contexts. According to the first level of analysis, there are pre-semantic (i.e. syntactic, phonological, and morphological) uses of context by which we can interpret linguistic elements just as in the cases of homonymy and ambiguity. In other words, pre-semantic use of context mostly concerns with syntax irrespective of any literal meaning or use. Moreover, the context, at the semantic level, enables us to determine the linguistically underspecified values which we assign to linguistic elements such as deictic expressions. Post-semantic context, just like Stalnaker's *common ground* and Searle's *Background*, includes all extra-linguistic components to interpret what is communicated by an utterance of a sentence.

As we saw in the previous chapter, Bach similarly posits two types of context, i.e. *narrow context* and *broad context*. The former includes any linguistically signaled contribution from the context that becomes relevant to "specify the speaker, the place, the time and perhaps the world" while the latter "includes that and all the rest" (Stojanovic, 2008, p.318). In this sense, Bach's narrow context seems to be implicit at the semantic level and it functions to recover reference assignments and referential disambiguation in the cases of indexicals and such. On the other hand, the broad context seems to be explicit at the pragmatic level, and it has a function to interpret what speakers mean by an utterance based on all extra-linguistic elements.

So far, I have shown the distinct conceptions of context considering the divergences on the scope and the role of context. Depending on how differently the notion of context can be postulated, the context-sensitivity criterion also takes on distinct interpretations. We can demonstrate how these definitions can change by comparing some definitions of context-sensitivity from the literature:

If c is a context, then an occurrence of ϕ in c is true iff the content expressed by ϕ in this context is true when evaluated with respect to the circumstance of the context. (Kaplan, 1989, p. 522)

Context sensitivity...can be brought about by words in a language whose semantic properties make their values dependent on either co-text or the circumstance of utterance; or it can be brought about by means different from those of a language's lexicon and grammar. (Gillon, 2008, p. 377)

To say that e is context sensitive is to say that its contribution to the propositions expressed by utterances of sentences containing e varies from context to context. (Cappelen and Lepore, 2008, p. 146)

A sentence is context-sensitive if and only if it expresses different propositions relative to different contexts of use. (Stanley, 2005, p.16)

In these definitions, the scopes and communicative roles which are ascribed to the notion of context determine what elements are taken into account and what roles they take in interpreting the utterances. As a result, the notion of context-sensitivity applies to various elements under distinct roles. More importantly, the notion of context-sensitivity further implicates some commitments pertaining to the notions such as propositionality and truth-conditionality. Moreover, philosophers sometimes characterize the context-sensitivity of expressions through the changes in the proposition expressed by an expression. Given the standard view that propositions constitute the truth-conditional content of truth-evaluable sentences, some philosophers further point out that the truth-value of context-sensitive expressions change from one context to another if the propositions expressed by them change depending on a context.²¹ To put it simply, it is often endorsed that the proposition or

²¹ Notice that there are opposing characterizations of proposition in philosophy. Throughout the paper, I do not commit myself into any one of them. Yet, some commonly defended properties related with this notion can be tentatively used to make explicit the proposals of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. Standardly, a proposition is thought to be a cognitive (i.e. non-expressive/non-emotive) representational content and it is thought to be what is meaningfully and truthfully asserted by a well-formed declarative sentence. Endorsing the principle of compositionality, a proposition is generally deemed to be a complete representational function composed of the representational contents of the constituents composing this very sentence. Moreover, propositions are also deemed to provide truth

propositional content which a context-sensitive sentence conveys varies with context and thereby each varying proposition might have different truth-conditions. To accommodate these diverse formulas, the context-sensitivity can be generically formulated as follows:

A linguistic expression *E* is context-sensitive just in case for some conceivable circumstances *C*₁ and *C*₂ with relevance to the language *L* in the world *W*, the representational content (propositional and/or truth-conditional) of *E* in *C*₁ conceivably differs from the representational content (propositional and/or truth-conditional) of *E* in *C*₂.

This definition, just like the other definitions above, does not account for any concern about how the context-sensitivity can be explained without any commitment to a certain type of context. Nevertheless, it combines diverse formulas into one so that the basic problems in the contextuality criterion can be easily addressed. In reference to the above formula, the context-sensitivity criterion already rests on some prior notions such as context, representational contents, word-to-world relations, and some further notions.²² If one adopts such a characterization of context-sensitivity to construe the criterion for the semantics-pragmatics distinction, then she encounters with some *prima facie* challenges. In the following section, I will discuss what challenges the context-sensitivity criterion has to deal with for the sake of coherency.

4.3.4 Some challenges to the context-sensitivity criterion

The context-sensitivity criterion for the semantics-pragmatic distinction suggests a very simple yet troublesome idea: Semantics concerns with context-insensitive expressions in terms of their stable representational (propositional and/or truth-

conditions for the relevant sentence since it posits what is meaningfully and truthfully said by a sentence. So, they are also thought to be the sole bearer of truth and falsity.

²² Conceivability here indicates the fact that speakers, at the public language level, have epistemic competency to conceive or imagine possible cases in which given utterances might occur. Such epistemic competency allows speakers to arrive at possible interpretations in the first place.

conditional) contents embedded in these expressions whereas pragmatics deals with context-sensitive expressions through their representational (propositional and/or truth-conditional) contents which vary with the contexts in which these expressions occur. Hereby, there seem to be several challenges with which the proponents of the context-sensitivity criterion have to meet. As we saw in the last section, the main challenge is to account for the adopted notion of context in terms of its structure, scope, and roles. Defining context-sensitivity requires a coherent definition of context.

This main challenge for the context-sensitivity criterion entails other troublesome cases to which the proponents of the criterion have to address for the sake of their argument. As shown by some examples in the last section, there are some well-formed linguistic expressions that implicitly or inherently require some degree of contextual contribution to be interpreted. In addition to the previous examples, there are many more examples to show. For instance, the linguistic expressions such as ‘immigrate’, ‘local’, ‘foreign’, ‘import’ and ‘to be on the left’ require to be interpreted in accordance with a context in which occurs (Donaldson & Lepore, 2012). If these linguistic expressions are not fulfilled with some contextual contribution it would remain underspecified about who speaks to whom, when and where. Thus, some linguistic expressions require referential disambiguation and resolution inherently in their uses. Hereby, such examples entail to the semantic underdeterminacy thesis which I have mentioned earlier. If the thesis is interpreted with some relevance to the notion of context-sensitivity, then the representational (propositional and/or truth-conditional) contents of some linguistic expressions are patently underdetermined without any contribution from context-relevant interpretations of those expressions.

At this point, the proponents of context-sensitivity might agree with such examples and they can simply consider such linguistic cases as a subject matter of pragmatics. Deictic expressions, anaphors, loose uses, pre-sentential or pre-propositional expressions could fairly belong to the domain of pragmatics while semantics can still deal with the context-insensitive aspects of linguistic expressions. Thus, the proponents of the context-sensitivity criterion do not necessarily get drawn into some troubles. Nevertheless, they face some challenges about their criterion when they commit themselves to a certain conception of proposition and the asymmetry assumption to which Gricean distinction between what is said and what is implicated also entails. It has been a mainstream view that a proposition typically corresponds to a determinate and complete thought which a well-formed declarative sentence expresses. With some minor differences, many ideal language philosophers such as Frege, Carnap, and Russell championed the idea that propositions are the determinate contents of sentences. Although there are numerous ways to postulate the representational content of a sentence regardless of restricting it into certain sentence forms or properties, it has been a mainstream conception of proposition in the literature. Drawing from this conception of proposition, Grice embraced that the semantic content of a sentence (what is said by it) provides some essential input to a conversation to start the pragmatic interpretation of this sentence (what is implicated by it). As a result of endorsing these two views, a proponent of the context-sensitivity criterion runs into some obstacles concerning with the semantic underdeterminacy thesis. If the representational content of a sentence does not stand for a determinate content, then it has nothing to contribute to the pragmatic interpretation of a sentence in a context. Yet, the context-sensitivity criterion has to account for how interlocutors can interpret the above examples and cases without

any essential input (e.g. unarticulated constituents). More importantly, the proponents of the context-sensitivity believe that semantic content determines pragmatic interpretation; but the above cases show that pragmatic interpretation of some sentences determines semantic content of them, not the other way around.

There are other obstacles that follow from endorsing the Fregean notion of propositions and Gricean asymmetry between what is said and what is implicated. One of these obstacles concerns with the principle of compositionality. If the context-sensitive sentences, which are pragmatically interpreted in given contexts, require determinate semantic contents in the first place, then these sentences cannot have any semantically indeterminate constituent in it. After all, the principle of compositionality, once it is embraced, holds that the semantic content of a sentence is determined by the composition held amongst the semantic contents of its constituents. So, if a sentence entertains a semantically unspecified constituent then the principle of compositionality does not hold for the above cases. In a similar vein, the context-sensitivity criterion, which combines with the asymmetry assumption and the traditional notion of proposition, faces the challenge that some context-sensitive sentences such as (8)-(11) have determinate truth-conditions which are traditionally ascribed to the contents of sentences (i.e. propositions). Provided that a proposition bears the truth-conditions of the sentence which expresses it, the criterion also needs to explain how the pragmatic interpretation of a sentence which varies with context can have determinate truth-conditions while the semantic content of this sentence lacks such determinate truth-conditions.

Still, it is possible to defend the context-sensitivity criterion if the proponents make some refinements about the underlying assumptions and notions. First, they do not have to commit themselves to the asymmetry assumption in the way that Grice

postulates his distinction between what is said and what is conversationally implicated. It might come with some costs such as blurring the autonomy assumption between semantics and pragmatics. Furthermore, the cursiveness assumption can be preserved by revising the notion of context and thereby the notion of pragmatic interpretation. As mentioned before, Bach divides the notion of context into two categories by virtue of distinct roles. In this regard, many context-sensitive expressions are determined in the narrow context which has semantic in character. Similarly, some other philosophers, who follow Kaplan and Montague's formal revisions about linguistically signaled context-sensitive expressions such as indexicals, distinguish the roles of context based on whether they have linguistic effects or extra-linguistic effects on the representational content of a sentence.²³ For example, Cappelen and Lepore (2006) put their treatment on the context-sensitivity at the semantic level as follows:

[F]or an utterance *u* of a well-formed sentence *S* in a context *C* if you fix the referents of the obviously indexical/demonstrative components of *S* [...] and if you disambiguate the ambiguous expressions, then what you end up with is a proposition. We call this proposition the minimal semantic content of *u*. (p. 425)

According to many proponents of the context-sensitivity criterion, certain sorts of contextual interpretations, which are linguistically governed or signaled to disambiguate referential or indexical values, belong to semantics. So, for them, not all contextual interpretations are pragmatic.²⁴ In this respect, the cursiveness and autonomy assumptions in the *cinquain* can be preserved. After all, semantic

²³ Montague (1974), Creswell (1973), Kaplan (1977), Lewis (1972, 1979) developed similar approaches to the analysis of deictic expressions.

²⁴ For instance, Gillon (2008) defends that both semantics and pragmatics concern with linguistic interpretation although they represent distinct modes of interpretation at distinct levels of language. Hereby, the former studies the features of linguistic interpretation grounded in the grammar and lexicons whereas the latter studies the features of linguistic interpretation which are not grounded in them.

properties are linguistic properties which “are on a par with syntactic and phonological properties” while pragmatic properties are extra-linguistic properties which “belong to acts of uttering sentences” in communication (Bach, 2004, p. 27).

Furthermore, the proponents of the context-sensitivity criterion do not commit themselves to the traditional notion of proposition. As mentioned before, the content of a context-sensitive expression is thought to be the focus of variation. The notion of content, in its standard uses, stands for representational inputs attached to linguistic expressions, mental states, speech acts, and some extensional things. In this regard, the content of a linguistic expression might or might not stand for a proposition represented by a linguistic expression. Similarly, the content of a linguistic expression might or might not contribute to a complete thought expressed by some linguistic compound in which it is employed. More importantly, the content expressed by a sentence does not have to express a determinate or a complete thought as long as it expresses a structured or schematic representation that seems to be sufficient to flesh out some general truth-conditions for a given sentence.

In this respect, Emma Borg (2004) underlines the idea that specifying the truth-conditions for an utterance of a sentence does not amount to describing the truth-conditions of a sentence. Take the sentence ‘I’ve had enough’. Not knowing under what circumstances the sentence has been uttered, the sentence seems to be underdetermined as to who has had enough of what. If the underdeterminacy thesis is true, then the sentence by itself seems to have no truth-conditional content. Since it appears to have an incomplete content requiring contextual factor to be fulfilled. We might focus on Borg’s discussion on the distinction between the description of truth-conditions and the specification of them. As her analysis follows, the sentence ‘I have had enough’ is true if and only if the speaker of the utterance of the sentence

has had enough of whatever the speaker refers to. Still, we cannot assign if it is true or false because it is underspecified without being sincerely uttered by someone in some context of use. Nevertheless, we can cash out some generalized truth-conditions for the sentence in a descriptive way.

As mentioned before, some philosophers revise the notion of what is said (semantic content/proposition) by allowing some contextual factors to contribute to what a sentence says. In doing so, they seem to accommodate with some cases of context-sensitivity which are linguistic in nature to the effect that not all contextual interpretations are pragmatic interpretations. Nonetheless, some other philosophers, in addition to their refinements in what is said, take issue with the other end of Gricean distinction, i.e. what is conversationally implicated. By what is conversationally implicated content, Grice takes his notion of implicatures into account in the way that implicatures, conversational ones, exhaust all extra-linguistic contextual interpretations (pragmatically inferred contents). When the competent and rational addressee receives an utterance of an expression, she -as a rational agent having some rational communicative means- attempts to recognize what the speaker intends to mean by uttering this expression. In this picture, what is conversationally implicated by an expression does not determine the representational content of what is said by a sentence. Hereby, some philosophers such as Recanati, Bach, and Carston objects to this picture based on the claim that some pragmatic interpretations are not conversationally implicated in the Gricean sense. In this regard, the cases of unarticulated constituents (e.g. 'I'm ready [for what]', 'She is not going to die [from that bruise]' and 'I have nothing [appropriate] to wear') pose a threat to the Gricean picture since their pragmatically interpreted contents seem to determine the proposition expressed by the sentence, not the other way around. In order to

accommodate with the cases whose semantic contents are pragmatically enriched, philosophers postulate some further processes or types of pragmatic inferences such as Bach's completion/expansion and Recanati's pragmatic saturation/modulation. On the other hand, some Neo-Gricean philosophers put efforts to deal with such cases by revising the conversational maxims or the taxonomy of implicatures.²⁵

Considering our discussions on the underdeterminacy thesis and some alleged pragmatic intrusions into semantic contents, I am now in a position to present the last main type of the criteria for the semantics-pragmatics distinction, namely truth-conditionality vs. non-truth-conditionality.

4.3.5 Truth-conditionality vs. non-truth-conditionality

According to the truth-conditionality criterion, pragmatics, as sharply opposed to semantics, has nothing to do with determining the truth-conditional content of a sentence nor with making any truth-conditionally relevant contribution into a sentence. The criterion is often presented as involving some relations with the other criteria. In this sense, the criterion contends that pragmatic aspects of a linguistic expression are truth-conditionally impotent. Still, pragmatics can be further taken to deal with appropriateness/felicity conditions of an utterance of a sentence. In this regard, pragmatics studies whether rational/competent interlocutors "pair sentences with the contexts in which they would be appropriate" in terms of what is intended to be communicated (Levinson, 1983, p.24). Those who hold the criterion generally appeal to the notion of proposition which is, in return, thought to give truth-conditional content. Just like the other criteria, this criterion also rests on some preceding commitments to some other notions. In the case of the truth-conditionality

²⁵ See Chapter 5.2 for Grice's notion of implicatures.

criterion, those notions are claimed to be propositionality, compositionality, and truth-conditionality. Nevertheless, the underdeterminacy thesis can also be applied to the notion of truth-conditionality to the effect that the criterion runs into some *prima facie* troubles in natural language phenomena.

As I remarked in the last section, it is often held that what is said by a sentence corresponds to a representational content (proposition or propositional content). As we will see in the following chapters, it has been a mainstream notion amongst the formal semanticists. They commonly consider it to be the intension (meaning) of a well-formed sentence that simply amounts a complete and determinate representational content which is composed of the meaning of each constituent in this sentence. Drawing from Russell's notion of structured proposition types, many formal semanticists also embrace that a sentence's syntactic structure (for Russell, not the syntactic but the logical one) is isomorphic to a proposition expressed by it in the sense that propositions map onto the structures of sentence types (Grayling, 1982). On the other hand, some philosophers such as Stalnaker consider propositions to be the representational content of a sentence in a context which is a function from possible worlds to the truth-values. Although there are variations about how to construe the notion of proposition, it is commonly assumed that a proposition is what is said (by a sentence) in the Gricean sense. Furthermore, it is also endorsed that a proposition expressed by a sentence manifests or bears the truth-conditions of a sentence. Here, Davidsonian truth-conditional semantics takes one further step by identifying propositions with truth-conditional content of sentences (Grayling, 1982).

On the other hand, the notion truth-conditionality, just like propositionality, has dissimilar representations and interpretations in the literature due to the fact that

there are contentions on how to define truth and how to relate it to its bearers or its relata. Most importantly, a definition of truth naturally reveals what the truth-conditions are and whether they are relevant to propositions. In this respect, the notion of truth-conditionality, thereby the truth-conditionality criterion, heavily relies on how to define truth and falsehood in a theory of truth. For instance, there are contentions as to what entities bear or can bear the truth-value. Here, some philosophers might defend linguistic entities (sentences) to be truth-bearers. Second, it is contentious whether truth/falsehood is a property or not. Thus, the theory of truth in which a philosopher adopts to define truth-conditions precedes the discussions on how truth-conditions relate to propositions. Nevertheless, the truth-conditionality criterion typically contends that a proposition expressed by a sentence fully manifests the truth-conditions of this sentence.

Briefly, there are several presuppositions and underlying notions that might undermine the truth-conditionality criterion. Nevertheless, the underdeterminacy thesis becomes the main threat to the plausibility of the criterion. Next, I will discuss the troubles for the truth-conditionality criterion.

4.3.6 Some challenges to the truth-conditionality criterion

The criterion simply construes the semantics-pragmatics distinction in terms of truth-conditionality in the sense that the domain proper of semantics exclusively includes fully propositional contents which manifest truth-conditions of the relevant sentences. That is to say, the semantic content of a sentence typically amounts to a complete/determinate propositional content whereby truth-conditions are acquired irrespective of any contextual effects.

Consequently, the truth-conditionality criterion categorizes some natural language phenomena under the domain of pragmatics either because they fail to represent a fully propositional content with respect to the adopted notion of propositionality or because these phenomena seem to be saturated by contextual interpretations in order to represent a fully propositional content. Apparent cases are ambiguity, anaphora, deixis, ellipsis, loose use, and some speech acts. Consider the following expressions:

(12) Why hello there!

(13) Look! That is exactly what I meant.

(14) I saw a boy with a telescope.

(15) A: Where is John's book?

B: On the left.

(16) Fulva weighs 4 kg.

(17) The kettle is black.

(18) The cup is not big enough.

If the truth-conditionality criterion is strictly understood, then the above cases might be considered to belong to pragmatics instead of semantics. For one thing, the speech acts such as the sentence (12) do not bear any propositional content by which we can assign truth-conditions for the given utterance. Although it has some expressive content in a conversation to pass on greetings with a surprise, what is said by an expression does not express fully propositional content. Furthermore, the sentence (13) includes many ambiguous and deictic expressions. Thereby, the sentence does not seem to express a fully propositional content independently of some contextual disambiguation. First, where the speaker induces the addressee to look is totally context-dependent. Second, the sentence also bears on speaker's intention to relate the given setting of utterance with the earlier discourse which the speaker and the

addressee supposedly share. Again, the sentence (14) inherits some structural ambiguity due to the term ‘with’ so that it is ambiguous whether the speaker sees a boy by looking through a telescope or sees him holding or using a telescope. Another layer of complexity in this sentence comes from the indexical expression ‘I’ since its content seems to be indeterminate without any contextual contribution. Similarly, the sentence (15), which contains ellipsis and ambiguity, seems to be the non-truth-conditional case since B’s response to A does not give us a propositional content since it is pre-sentential irrespective of any discourse oriented saturation from the context. Furthermore, the phrase ‘John’s book’ seems to be ambiguous because it is unclear as to whether it is the book John wrote or it is the book belonging to him. In some circumstances of utterance, it might even cover both of these interpretations considering John can own a copy of the book which he wrote.

Here, I can pause for a moment to mention how the proponents of the truth-conditionality criterion can deal with the cases like (12)-(15). Not expressing complete and determinate contents, these sentences are taken to be pre-propositional and thus to be non-truth conditional. The common strategy is to abstract away such cases from the domain of semantics to the effect that semantics, in turn, has a very restricted domain. After all, there are many cases in which pragmatic (so-called non-truth-conditional) factors intrude into sentences to compose a truth-conditional content. The cases of such pragmatic intrusion entail the underdeterminacy thesis. In our ordinary discourse of conversations, linguistically encoded contents of sentences are often not fully propositional and yet they, in most cases, are saturated with contextual interpretations such as disambiguation, reference fixing, context-sensitive completion, and so on. Thus, pragmatics can interact with the truth-conditions in the

sense that pragmatic effects and interpretations sometimes determine the truth-conditions.

Here, many opponents of the criterion such as Recanati, Travis, and Searle generally distinguish different sorts of pragmatic intrusion from each other. For example, Recanati (2002d, 2002e) considers that some cases of pragmatic intrusion, in which contextual factors influence the truth-conditions, are *bottom-up* processes in the sense that the pragmatic interpretations are geared in accordance with some linguistic elements such as deictic expressions. In these cases, the relevant extra-linguistic conditions seem to affect the truth-conditional contents minimally. On the other hand, according to Recanati, some further cases of pragmatic intrusion are *top-down* processes in which the given utterances express truth-conditional contents only by means of extra-linguistic contribution. The sentences such as (16)-(18) involve with the top-down process of pragmatic intrusion in truth-conditional contents. To illustrate, the sentence (16), as an instance of loose use, bears some degree of vagueness or proximity in terms of what linguistically encodes. Regardless of highlighting certain contextual information, it is unclear what I intend to mean by the sentence ‘My cat, Fulva, weighs 4kg’ when I utter it. I might use the sentence to convey ‘My cat, Fulva, approximately weighs 4kg’ or to convey ‘My cat, Fulva, exactly weighs 4kg’. In addition, what the sentence says does not reveal whether my cat weighs 4kg with her collar on her neck. Similar truth-conditional underdeterminacy can be ascribed to the sentence (17) by claiming that only extra-linguistic contribution determines what truth-conditions are plausible for the given sentence. Here, Travis, a radical pragmaticist, notes:

Suppose the kettle is normal aluminium, but soot covered; normal aluminium but painted; cast iron, but glowing from heat; cast iron but enamelled white on the inside; on the outside; cast iron with a lot of brown grease stains on the outside; etc. (1985, p. 197)

If such natural language phenomena, as they are defended, undermine the truth-conditionality criterion by exemplifying extra-linguistic contribution into truth-conditional contents, then the truth-conditionality criterion cannot sharply distinguish semantics from pragmatics in a principled way. After all, most sentences in natural languages fail to express a complete and determinate content. Thus, these sentences do not have well-defined truth conditions although they are well-formed, and they are devoid of indexicality and ambiguity. Nevertheless, even the philosophers who agree on the extra-linguistic effects on truth-conditional content split amongst themselves depending on the scope and manner of extra-linguistic effects. For instance, Travis extends such effects to various sorts of sentences to the effect that he believes that pragmatic interpretations exclusively determine truth-conditional contents (Donaldson & Lepore, 2012). On the other hand, other philosophers such as Bach retain some moderate approach to deal with both linguistic and extra-linguistic contributions in truth-conditions (Huang, 2014). Bach, for instance, believes that some truth-conditional contents are obtained from semantic interpretations while some pragmatic interpretations contribute to truth-conditional content. For instance, some cases of pragmatic interpretation do not involve with truth-conditional content just as in the case of Gricean conversational implicatures. Nevertheless, some cases of pragmatic interpretation directly contribute to truth-conditional content if the given sentence lacks determinacy and completeness in terms of its content.

4.3.7 The criteria compared

Regarding these criteria, there is still much to mention in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis. First, it is worth noting that these criteria have a restricted scope since they characterize the distinction between semantics and pragmatics by

appealing to the distinct sorts of the notion of content. If we, for the sake of argument, track these criteria from the characterizations of semantics, it can be said : (i) the conventionality criterion holds the mark of semantics as linguistically encoded meaning; (ii) the context-sensitivity criterion picks out this mark as context-invariant/standing meaning; (iii) the truth-conditionality criterion sets out the mark of semantics to be truth-conditional meaning.

The meaning-oriented interpretation of the criteria does not exhaust all the other ways to make use of these criteria in the sense that the relevance-theoretic accounts, for instance, construe them as distinct cognitive processes even if the distinction between these processes can also correspond to one of the above dichotomy represented in the criteria. For instance, Carston holds that the semantics-pragmatics distinction corresponds to a distinction between decoding and inference processes. The former “is performed by an autonomous linguistic system” that automatically and modularly implements some computational rules result in “an output representation, which is the semantic representation, or logical form, of the sentence or phrase employed in the utterance” (2008a, pp.321-2). On the other hand, the inference process is realized by integrating the outputs of the decoding process with contextual information in order to recognize what the speaker intends to convey. Thus, the criteria can also be grounded in cognitive processes rather than contents.

Additionally, it is further worth noticing that the criteria can be converged on several features. To illustrate, the context-sensitivity criterion and the conventionality criterion seem to converge on the idea that the lexically encoded meaning of an utterance of a sentence does not go under any variation and thus semantic meaning cannot be context-sensitive. Again, the same applies to the context-sensitivity and the truth-conditionality criteria in the sense that context-sensitive sentences do not

express a determinate and complete truth-conditional content and thus pragmatic content cannot be truth-conditional. Thus, it seems possible for a theorist to adopt a multiple-criterion definition for the distinction which converges one criterion with another. In fact, it is common in the literature to posit the definitions of the distinction which integrate one criterion to another. In this respect, Szabo (2006), for instance, portrays the standard view on the distinction by providing such a multiple-criterion definition that simply contends “linguistic meaning plus context determines the truth-conditional content” (p.381). As Carston (2008a) categorizes some ways of making the distinction, she also argues for the multiple-criterion definition which combines the dichotomic criterion -i.e. “context-independent linguistically encoded meaning (LEM) versus speaker meaning (or communicated meaning or utterance meaning)” - with another dichotomic criterion, i.e. “intuitive proposition expressed versus (the rest of) speaker meaning” (p.322). To put it simply, she integrates a particular conception of the conventionality criterion with a particular conception of the truth-conditionality criteria. Ariel (2010), hereby, accurately emphasizes that the complementarist views, in my terms, “focus on one or two criteria, context-dependence and nontruth conditionality being the favored ones”; furthermore, she notes that “there was always an implicit assumption, or hope, that different would converge, in that same phenomenon would be classified as pragmatic on all the criteria considered” (p.53).

Consequently, it can be fairly asked if it is plausible to unify these criteria under one single criterion. At first, the plausibility of such a unified account seems to be untenable for a few reasons. As Stojanovic (2008) indicates, the multiple-criterion definition for the semantics-pragmatics distinction seems to inherit a viable degree of incoherency since these criteria clash with each other in the face of certain linguistic

phenomena such as deictic expressions and unarticulated constituents. Firstly, there seems to be implicit incoherency between the notions of context-insensitivity and truth-conditionality. Considering the statement ‘I have had enough’, it can be said that the truth-assignment of the given statement not only depends on what it lexically encodes but also depend on the contextual factors saturating the propositional content. Thus, if we take the multiple criteria in which semantic content corresponds to context-independent truth-conditional content then we wind up with an anomalous case such as the above statement.

Furthermore, the conventionality criterion and the context-sensitivity criterion also seem to be irreconcilable under a single definition since the deictic cases such as ‘I’m not in London right now’ stands out to be an anomalous case for such an integrated criterion. For, what such cases linguistically encode is underdetermined by the context. At this point, it is significant to recall that these apparent troubles for a multiple-criterion definition arise from the semantic underdeterminacy claims. Thus, if a theorist proposes a multiple-criterion definition then she has to coherently explain away the semantic underdeterminacy thesis. More interestingly, adopting a version of the multiple-criterion definition leads a theorist to drop or revise the sharpness, autonomy and cursiveness assumptions.

Still, philosophers can argue for the plausibility of a multiple-criterion definition by restoring their accounts in order to explain away such borderline cases. As discussed earlier, philosophers can refine their treatment about some basic notions (content, context, truth-conditions, propositions) by proposing particular interpretations of them (e.g. Bach’s distinction between narrow context and broad

context, the relevance theorists' distinction between conceptual meaning and procedural meaning, Szabo's *context thesis* and etc.).²⁶

It is an arduous task to match up the semantics-pragmatics distinction with any of these criteria or with any integration of them. Although particular interpretations of the distinction have to be addressed for their own sake, any systematic characterization of the distinction seems to be an arduous task to deliver in a coherent and empirically plausible way. Nevertheless, it should be noted that any interpretation of the distinction must address one crucial point which Grice introduces and intensively discusses, namely the informative gap between what is said and what is communicated.

The emphasis here must be drawn onto the language understanding through communication if any account of the semantics-pragmatics distinction is to be considered as coherent and empirically plausible. After all, the gap between what is said and what is communicated finds its roots in how a linguistic expression can be grasped and circulated in a communicative discourse. If the semantics-pragmatics distinction relies on the gap between what is said and what is communicated by the very same expression, then any account which takes the distinction as tenable must hold that there is a calculable relation between what is said and what is communicated which interlocutors entertain. At this point, a theorist can ground the gap by a cognitive or a communicational theory about how interlocutors distinguish what is said from what is communicated, which amounts to the recognition of the semantics-pragmatics distinction.

In this vein, there is often supposed to be some sort of constraints (logical, psychological, rational, cognitive, etc.) underpinning our language understanding

²⁶ The principle contends, "The content of an expression depends on context only insofar as the contents of its constituents do" (Szabo, 2005, p.119).

through communication. First, it is often argued that what a speaker intends to communicate by a sentence must be accessible to her in the first place. In other words, the communicative intentions of a speaker are often thought to be transparent to the speaker herself even if she is not competent enough to successfully convey what she intends to say by the expression she utters. She can fail to recognize some contextual parameters available in the environment of the utterance, to produce the relevant phonemes, or to produce a completely ungrammatical expression. Yet, her intentions to communicate something by an expression are thought to be accessible to herself.

Second, successful communication inherits some degree of sharedness (mutuality) to the effect that speaker's intention to convey something by an expression presupposes dual communicative awareness in the first place. From a perspective from the public language level, a speaker can intend to convey *P* by uttering the expression *E* in an available context of utterance *C* only if she has some reflexive awareness that the hearer can recognize or recover what is intended to convey by uttering *E* in *C*. Although such communicative truisms can be grounded in distinct sources and at distinct levels (conscious/unconscious, public/sub-personal, rational maxims/internal cognitive modules and etc.), they are indispensable for any account which ultimately purports to explain the gap between what is said and what is communicated. Consequently, an account of the semantics-pragmatics distinction can be profound if it coherently characterizes not only the distinction in terms of the adopted criteria and borderline cases but also the grounds of communicative exchange.

4.4 Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I have covered how semantics and pragmatics are commonly delimited based on certain theoretical stances, dichotomies, linguistic borderline cases. In addition, I have explained what criteria are proposed to differentiate one aspect from another at the object-level. As many philosophers (Bach, Carston, Bianchi, Recanati) portray, I have mentioned three main types of the criterion for making the distinguishing mark of each aspect. In this regard, I have evaluated each criterion separately while discussing the related notions and problems with them. In what follows, I will critically survey the particular conceptions of the distinction by drawing some lessons and assumptions in favor of my deflationary account.

CHAPTER 5

REPRESENTING THE DISTINCTION

5.1 Philosophical roots of the distinction

At the end of the last chapter, it has been emphasized that there are some intriguing features related to linguistic understanding in communication to which any account of the distinction must address. I have only drawn special attention to the seemingly available gap (at the public language level) between what is said by an expression and what can be communicated by an utterance of this expression. At a conscious level of linguistic exchange, language is full of communicative means by which interlocutors can intentionally and sensibly outreach what is linguistically encoded (standing) content/standing formal function by an expression. When a speaker speaks figuratively by means of ironies, metaphors, understatements, and hyperboles, she overtly violates what is encoded in order to communicate something other than what the expression says. In addition to the gap between what is said and what is communicated, linguistic understanding in communication already displays equally important points to address. With respect to what is said by an expression, there are fundamentally formal features of languages to address so that one can account for linguistic understanding in communication. In a typical instance of understanding an expression in a language at the formal level, a competent addressee receives phonological or ostensive stimuli which stand for some representational content and then she acquires the relevant representational content through proceeding formally-driven operations over the syntactic elements, the contents conventionally encoded in them, and the compositional constitution amongst them. Thus, some features of linguistic understanding in communication are formal properties fundamental to

understand how one can comprehend what is said by a sentence in addition to the question of how she can recover the gap between what is said and what is communicated.

In this respect, a plausible account of the semantics-pragmatics distinction must address to the two horns of linguistic understanding in communication: (i) what is said and what is communicated; (ii) their relation in terms of the seeming gap between them. Therefore, the plausible account of the distinction must provide such a coherent criterion or criteria for drawing the distinction that it also plausibly accounts for these two horns of linguistic understanding in communication.

Considering these methodological concerns, there have been particularly influential accounts that have rooted back into the cleft between ideal language philosophers (Frege, Carnap, Tarski, the early Wittgenstein and etc.) and ordinary language philosophers (Austin, Ryle, Grice, Strawson). Subsequently, philosophers who involved themselves with this cleft attempted to revise the distinction as it appeared in the earlier discussions. In the footsteps of ideal language philosophy, philosophers such as Montague, Kaplan, Lewis, and Davidson attempted to explain language understanding by proposing formal semantic systems to interpret the distinction in favor of rarefied communicative effects onto language understanding. On the other hand, some other philosophers such as Bach, Levinson, Recanati, Searle, and Travis revised Gricean and speech-act theoretical accounts in order to ground the distinction by rectifying the significance of what is communicated in language understanding. From a distinct point of view, some linguists (i.e. Chomsky, Sperber, and Wilson) and some philosophers (i.e. Fodor, Carston) grounded the language understanding into automatic/modular systems internal to cognitive mechanisms. The cognitive approach brought a new angle to the distinction.

In what follows, I will critically survey some of these influential insights on the question of how to draw the distinction in the face of linguistic understanding in communication.

5.2. Carnap and the formal approach.

In his book *Meaning and Necessity* (1956), Carnap gives a formal analysis of semantics in natural languages by modeling it after formal systems of logic, which are constructed systems. As mentioned before, Carnap here endorses that semantics concerns with what linguistic expressions denote while he restricts pragmatics into the relations amongst linguistic expressions, the extensional objects to which they refer, and the users (Bianchi, 2004). Carnap's formal analysis of semantics reconciles natural languages with systems of logic to the effect that he approximates the analysis of a natural language to the analysis of formal systems of logic in terms of their intensional and extensional functions. This formalization project of natural languages indicates that we can describe and regiment the semantic boundaries of natural language in accordance with a constructed system of logic. It additionally displays that we may come up with new systems of logic in order to interpret a given natural language formally (Peregrin, 1999). Hence, Carnap's formalization project of natural languages reflects the general agenda purported in ideal language philosophy tradition that amounts to regimenting theoretical anomalies which are thought to arise from improper uses of natural language expressions. These formally grounded boundaries between semantics and pragmatics, which are demarcated in Carnapian formal semantics, implicate an alleged autonomy of the natural language semantics in the sense that there are semantic phenomena and functions irrespective of users'

communicative contributions. As semantics is held to have context-insensitivity in terms of ‘meaning’ analysis.

In other words, the semantic content of linguistic expressions does not depend on the extra-linguistic setting and circumstances under which those expressions are used. The idea of semantic autonomy directly follows from the conviction that semantics has nothing to do with varying settings in which the given expressions are uttered. Thus, the context-insensitive characteristic of semantics stands in a marked contrast to the characteristic of pragmatics. After all, Carnap holds that pragmatics becomes an extra-linguistic extension of semantics which has no contribution or effect on the analysis of meaning. Furthermore, it is worth emphasizing that the pragmatic aspect of language does not have its own autonomous domain-specific function to range over linguistic expressions; but it serves to be an extensional domain of what is non-semantic. Thus, Carnap’s distinction also implicates the pragmatic wastebasket notion which contends that pragmatics consists of what does not fall within the boundaries of semantics. Nonetheless, such an analysis of the boundaries faces serious challenges because there are several context-sensitive linguistic phenomena that seem to involve with semantics.

As pointed out through the conventionality and context-sensitivity criteria, there are *prima facie* cases in natural languages that overrule Carnap’s distinction between semantics and pragmatics which identifies semantic content with context-insensitive linguistically encoded meaning. First, indexicals (i.e. I, you, here, there, now, etc.) seem to pose a challenge to the autonomy of semantics grounded in context-insensitivity. Although indexicals might have some conventionally embedded functions such as picking out the place where the speaker is present, they

still seem to require the context or circumstances under which they are used in order to specify what they are intended to denote. Similarly, pronouns and demonstratives implicate that there are expressions whose values are specified only by means of contextual contributions available at the setting of utterance. Furthermore, as Peregrin (1999) mentions, *articles* (such as *a/an*, *the* and the zero/null articles in English) push the Carnapian boundaries of natural language semantics by resisting the context-insensitive characteristic of it. In Russell's (1905) paradigmatic analysis of them in his article *On Denoting*, definite articles have a semantic function to entail to the existence of a unique/definite object while indefinite articles entail to the existence of a non-unique/indefinite object. In other words, the definiteness or the uniqueness of denoting expressions becomes a matter of contextual assignment either in a context or a co-text. As we have discussed in the case of discourse deictic expressions, the definite articles, in the similar vein, are deemed to be "a means pointing at a specifically labeled individual present within the 'context'" (Peregrin, 1999, p.422). Furthermore, Carnap's distinction does not account for tense markers and modality which indexes truth-assignments of sentences to time and the world.

Regarding these *prima facie* challenges, the formal semanticists who are sympathetic to Carnap's formal analysis of the distinction revise and reconstruct the notion of semantic autonomy by trying to come up with a new system of formal semantics. Here, they share Carnap's idea that a natural language system can be formally modeled after a proper system of formal language. Moreover, modeling a natural language after a formal one requires a principled way to lay out similarities and dissimilarities in terms of what is to be constructed. Also, there must be strategies to account for dissimilar components in a system modeled after another one. Just as in the above cases, Carnap's formal system fails to meet with some

natural language phenomena due to the fact that he does not reserve any place for context-sensitivity neither in semantics nor in pragmatics. Appealing to this line of thought, the formal semanticists attempt to construct more refined formal systems to meet with such natural language phenomena. After all, indexical and context sensitive expressions illuminate how to model a natural language after a formal one and what the formal semanticists need to do is to devise a more suitable formal language as a model. As a result, some other systems of formal semantics are brought out to explain the relation between semantics and context-dependency as well as the related linguistic phenomena.

In this respect, Richard Montague (1970, 1974) offers another formal model based on the observation that natural languages, as opposed to formal languages, are overflowing with indexicals whose semantic values (denotation in Carnap's sense) cannot be identified without contextual (extra-linguistic) contribution. Thereby, Montague revises Carnap's distinction by adding the formal analysis of indexicals into the domain of pragmatics while he retains the context-insensitivity characteristic of semantics. In this regard, the semantics-pragmatics distinction, according to Montague, contends that "semantic values are not relativized to anything (or rather only to models or interpretations of the language), whereas pragmatic values are assigned relative to a context of use (as well as a model)" (Szabo, 2006, p.116). In this index-theoretical account, Montague (1974) also assigns a subsidiary role to pragmatics in terms of meaning and truth-conditional analysis and he thereby remarks:

It seemed to me desirable that pragmatics should at least initially follow the lead of semantics, which is primarily concerned with the notion of truth (in a model, or under an interpretation), and hence concern itself also with truth—but with respect to not only an interpretation but also a context of use. (p. 96)

As the cursiveness assumption in the *cinquain* suggests, semantics provides truth-conditional interpretations to pragmatics which in return evaluates the provided interpretation with respect to the context of use.

Moreover, Montague, unlike Carnap, seems to account for deictic expressions, tense markers, and the world. For one thing, his notion of semantics represents a formal model which includes non-relativized and categorical functions on contextual parameters (e.g. time, space, denotatum, speaker, and addressee); whereas his notion of pragmatics represents a formal model which includes the outputs (extensions) of semantic functions relativized to the contextual parameters available in a given context of use. Consequently, Montague keeps semantics and pragmatics apart by means of a function-argument model in which semantics provide standing categorical functions whose argument roles, in the case of indexicals, are filled with pragmatically specified values.

Considering the notion of indexicality in natural languages, some philosophers such as Kaplan, Lewis, and Stalnaker follow Montague's idea and strategy although each of them adopts a different system of semantics as a model for natural language semantics. According to them, semantics consists of context-insensitive categorical functions (truth and content assignment functions) and argument-roles while pragmatics only consists of the context of use which specifies the context-sensitive values of these functions and argument roles. Kaplan's (1978, 1989) formal analysis of demonstratives embodies this idea in his distinction between character and content. The former stands for a context-insensitive constant function of an indexical expression such as 'I' while the latter stands for a value assigned by mediating the character of an indexical expression to its context of use.

Hereby, the values of indexicals expressions vary with context although how they function to mediate indexicals with context do not depend on context itself.

Again, Lewis (1980) proposes an index-theoretical account of semantics in order to satisfy the notion of pragmatics which is characterized by the study of deictic expressions. According to him, semantics deals with the determination of content (referential values, conventional meaning) and truth-conditions in terms of constant categorical functions that are embedded in linguistic expressions.

Nonetheless, these functions categorically represent argument roles which can be respectively filled with the contextually specified values. For instance, Lewis offers a way in which we can formally restrict how a particular use of an expression within a context can be interpreted formally in accordance with some categorical (index-related) functions ranging over the given context. Lewis (1970, 1980) offers some index-related function categories as follows: (i) a possible world, (ii) time, (iii) place, (iv) a person (speaker), (v) audience, (vi) a set of objects (available for demonstration), (vii) a segment of discourse. Thus, the sentence ‘She will not be here tomorrow’, for instance, has a context-insensitive significance which consists of constant index-related functions, moreover, the sentence has an extension sensitive to the indexes such as time, place, speaker, audience, denotatum and the world. In the similar vein, Stalnaker (1981) also proposes model-theoretic resolutions for context-sensitive expressions that adopt possible-world semantics in which expression-types such as eternal sentences function from conventional meaning (content) to possible worlds in which these expression-types are tokened as utterances. He thereby endorses:

Formal pragmatic theory begins, as do the semantic theories that have been most fruitfully applied to natural languages, with possible worlds. Possible worlds semantics is an appropriate framework for pragmatic theory, not just because it has proved to be an elegant, flexible and technically fruitful apparatus, but because it makes possible an explanation of content and context in terms of an essential feature of discourse, and more generally of rational activity. (Stalnaker, 1981, p. 441).

Thus, the formal semanticists attempt to explain away context-sensitive elements of natural languages by implementing a system of formal semantics and pragmatics which accommodate with context-sensitive phenomena in natural languages. In doing so, they also attempt to preserve the Carnapian idea that pragmatics amounts to a subsidiary extension of semantics, i.e. non-semantics. In this regard, they agree on a function-argument analogy between semantics and pragmatics in which pragmatic contribution impinges on semantic functions.

Still, these depictions of formal semantics are not devoid of problems. First of all, they restrict the notion of context-sensitivity into indexicals or index-related forms which are lexically steer interlocutors to fix the contextually salient values. Nevertheless, it seems that there might be the cases of context-sensitivity which do not involve with lexically mediated functions. Consider the sentence ‘The ham sandwich didn’t leave a tip’. In this case, the formal semanticists might narrow down the context-sensitive contributions through some semantic functions ranging over contextual elements. At first, the expression seems to lack an index-related characteristic when it is compared with how indexicals and demonstratives pick out their referents. Still, the definite article makes it a definite noun phrase that might function to narrow down the denotatum of the expression. Nevertheless, the definiteness function will not suffice to pick out its value in the given context of utterance. To illustrate, a waiter might use the noun phrase to refer to the customer who has just ordered a ham sandwich or to the customer who regularly orders a ham

sandwich although he has had just a cup of coffee. In that case, its contextual value depends on speaker's communicative intention rather than a value assigned by a semantic function from context. Otherwise, the sentence would convey that a contextually definite ham sandwich does not leave a tip at time *t* which is prior to the time of utterance.

Secondly, the formal approaches not only restrict the notion of context-sensitivity but also restrict the entire notion of pragmatics into indexicals or index-related forms which lexically steer interlocutors to fix the contextually salient values. Nevertheless, the cases such as irony, implicatures, speech acts do not fall within the boundaries of pragmatics in the formal approaches. For they characterize the domain of pragmatics with a strict relevance to what is said, i.e. the domain-specific functions of semantics. Thus, pragmatics turns out to stand for what is communicated in a very narrow sense of linguistic communication. In this respect, the formal approaches to the semantics-pragmatics distinction also share Carnap's interpretation of pragmatics as a subsidiary aspect in the sense that pragmatic aspect of language does not have its own autonomous domain-specific function to range over linguistic expressions. Carston (1998) makes a similar point in her following remarks:

[In the species of formal pragmatics] there is no hint of a pragmatic principle, a conversational maxim, or any assumptions about communicative behaviour; such entities as conversational implicatures lie way outside the concerns of this truth-conditional, model-theoretic approach to natural language sentences. (p.2-3)

Thirdly, the above relation between semantics and pragmatics leads them to embrace that semantically anomalous/indeterminate/inaccessible expressions cannot say anything and thereby communicate nothing. If pragmatic conveyances or interpretations, according to the formal approaches, impinge on what an expression type linguistically encodes then no pragmatic conveyance follows from semantically

anomalous/indeterminate/inaccessible expressions. Nevertheless, this conclusion looks counter-intuitive in the face of many sub-sentential/pre-propositional expressions which intuitively communicate something meaningful. Consider the following cases:

(19) The less is more.

(20) Either one of those apples is an apple.

(21) It's raining.

(22) Elif arrived.

(23) Not this, but that.

Depending on a context of utterance, the above utterances seem to communicate contents that are not determined by their semantic contents. For instance, the statement (19) seems to have anomalous meaning in terms of what the terms 'less' and 'more' and yet speakers can use it to communicate that the fewer belongings you have the more happiness you have. Again, the sentence (20) seems to be patently false or semantically anomalous and yet it can be sensibly used to communicate a speaker's doubt or uncertainty about one of those apples in question. For instance, a speaker may intend to communicate that one of those things is possibly an apple-shaped candle. In the cases (21)-(22), the formal approaches run into the problem of unarticulated constituents in which there are lexically overt or determinable location indexes although speakers may use them to communicate that Elif arrived here/there depending on the context of utterance. On the other hand, the case (23) does not even correspond to a semantically determinate sentence. Yet, speakers can fairly use it to communicate something meaningful.

Finally, the formal approaches rest on the analogy between formal languages and natural languages that we in return can map natural language

semantics/pragmatics onto a suitable system of formal semantics/pragmatics.

However, it is doubtful as to whether such an analogy between natural languages and formal languages holds in terms of their matched-up parts. As Peregrin (1999) points out, there is no contentious point in formal languages for demarcating syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. There are three clearly distinguishable divisions in a formal language: “syntax proper (delimiting well-formedness, i.e., the class of the expressions of the language), proof theory or 'logical syntax' (delimiting provability, i.e., the class of the theorems of the language) and model theory or semantics (delimiting validity, i.e., the class of tautologies or analytic truths of the system)” (pp. 428-9). Interestingly, it seems that pragmatics has no corresponding part in this formal schema. Moreover, each aspect of a formal language corresponds to a domain that includes its own characteristic role (i.e. domain-specific function) in the general framework of this formal language. Hence, it seems to be illicit to model natural languages after formal languages which do not have any analogous domain for pragmatics.

To conclude, it can be said that the formal approaches fail to accommodate the semantics-pragmatics distinction since it does not satisfactorily account for linguistic understanding in communication. As they do not successfully address the question of how interlocutors can distinguish what is said from what is communicated in a context of utterance. Interlocutors’ pragmatic interpretations, in this picture, are nothing other than semantically driven resolutions in contexts of use such as recovering values of deictic expressions or of quantifiers. In what follows, I will discuss Grice’s insights on the semantics-pragmatics distinction. As will be discussed, Grice ascribes pragmatics to a wider domain which does not merely

amount to the contextually recovered values/arguments which are configured in the domain-specific functions of semantics.

5.3 Gricean approach

As indicated in the previous section, Carnap and other formal semanticists set a strict constraint on what speakers can convey by an utterance of an expression to the effect that pragmatics as a system of extra-linguistic interpretation has nothing other than recovering the contextually salient values which are algorithmically (semantically) necessitated by the domain-specific formal functions embedded in well-formed and truth-conditional expressions. When an addressee, for instance, receives the utterance of the sentence ‘The prime SINISTER[forced] has canceled my funding’, the addressee typically begins the interpretation of the utterance with the recognition of the utterance as a well-formed phonological or lexicalized construct in a given language, and then she decides on what the given utterance lexically encodes by getting steered through the corresponding semantic contents (e.g. literal/encoded meanings), rules (e.g. the principle of semantic compositionality) and constant functions (e.g. context-delimiting functions of deictic expressions and articles). In the end, she arrives at the interpretation of what is said by the utterance in a given context. In this picture, the formal semanticists endorse that the pragmatic level of interpretation has been determined and delimited by the given semantic function and it has been nothing beyond recovering the contextually salient values of the phrases ‘the prime sinister’, ‘my funding’ and the relevant tense marker. Hence, the formal semanticists implicate that the speakers cannot legitimately communicate an utterance that exceeds or underdetermines what is said by an utterance in terms of its

built-in content, roles, and functions. Nevertheless, it is easy to see how this implication goes wrong considering the above example.

First, the speaker can communicate an expressive and yet representational content that can also be translated into or expressed by some other well-formed sentences in the object language. For instance, the addressee may intend to communicate the sentences ‘I’m mad at the person who has canceled my funding’, ‘The person who has canceled my funding is sinister’, ‘Cancellation of my funding is sinister’, ‘The prime minister has canceled the funding for my project’, ‘I’m just mad and please don’t talk to me’, ‘I suspect you are involved with the cancellation of my funding’ and so on. What can be communicated by the utterance gets diversified in several ways depending on the interlocutors’ contexts, background knowledge, and communicative intentions. Thus, it does not seem to be the case that every single one of these communicated contents must be determined based on recovering the values from given contexts in the constant way through which the semantic functions algorithmically guide the addressees. Hence, how interlocutors can recover such communicated contents must be addressed.

Secondly, the formal semanticists just ignore accounting for how the gap between what is said and what is communicated can significantly widen in communication. Linguistic understanding in communication often involves with various linguistic acts such as intonations (e.g. non-assertoric force), intentional linguistic violations (e.g. metonymy, irony, simile) and so on. Hence, there is a significant use of language which the formal semanticists overlook, namely the communicative use. Unlike the formal semanticists, Grice recognizes the need for a theory that accounts for the communicative significance of linguistic understanding

in terms of the question of how to reconcile the gap between what is said and what is communicated in a coherent way.

5.3.1 Grice on the semantics-pragmatics distinction

Many philosophers (Huang,2014; Carston,2008b; and Recanati, 2002c) underline that there is somewhat terminological imprecision in representing Grice's take on the semantics-pragmatics distinction due to the fact he does not actually employ the terms 'semantics' and 'pragmatics' in his works. In any case, he proposes a fundamental distinction between saying and implicating (communicating) that lies within his theory of meaning -to be exact, non-natural meaning- which rests on inferential recovery of speaker's intentions in "the total signification of an utterance", i.e. what is meant by a speaker in a given token of communication (Grice, 1989, p.95). Although it is unclear whether Grice considers the saying-implicating distinction to be the exact counterpart of the semantics-pragmatics distinction, most philosophers agree that the distinction between what is said and what is implicated works out in that way.

Hereby, Grice purports to build up a theory of linguistic understanding that explains the communicative contributions with which the formal semanticists fail to meet by their narrow notion of what is communicated whose scope is exclusively constrained to the semantic content of an utterance. In this respect, he initially characterizes his theory of linguistic understanding as follows:

...the most promising line of answer lies in building up a theory which will enable one to distinguish between the case in which an utterance is inappropriate because it is false or fails to be true, or more generally fails to correspond with the world in some favored way, and the case in which it is inappropriate for reasons of a different kind. (Grice, 1989, p.4)

Hence, he, unlike the formal semanticists, endorses that there are semantic rules/principles (domain-specific functions) as well as pragmatic ones which account for understanding an utterance in communication at its totality. Thereby, semantics can be associated with the formally rule-governed appropriateness conditions of what a speaker means by uttering such and such, moreover, these conditions underlie how an addressee recovers the truth-conditional/ propositional content of speaker's utterance. Thereby, it seems that his notion of what is said corresponds to the semantic content of an utterance. On the other hand, pragmatics can be associated with the psychologically governed (rationality-oriented) conditions underlining how an addressee can recover what a speaker implicates by uttering such and such regarding what she means in its totality. In this respect, it seems that Grice's notion of what is implicated amounts to the pragmatic content of an utterance. At this point, Grice, unlike formal semanticists, holds that pragmatic conditions along with semantic conditions govern interpretations of utterances. After all, he adopts a more comprehensive goal in his theory of linguistic understanding, namely reconciling the gap between what is said and what is communicated. Still, the initial characterization of Grice's distinction between what is said and what is implicated rests on his theory of meaning and thereby it must also be addressed in order to explicate how his distinction works out for his explanatory goal.

His theory of meaning (i.e. *intention-based semantics*) begins by isolating two distinct types of meaning from each other. Appealing to some ordinary language uses of the predicate 'mean', he distinguishes *natural meaning* (e.g. 'Smoke means fire', 'Those spots mean measles') from *non-natural meaning* (e.g. 'Those three rings on the bus mean that the bus is full', 'Stanislaw meant that he didn't like the book') based on their distinct semantic characteristics. Most significantly, the cases

of natural meaning do not depend on speakers in the sense that ‘Smoke means fire’, for instance, does not entail ‘The speaker meant fire by smoke’. On the other hand, the cases of non-natural meaning depend on speakers’ intentional linguistic acts to the effect that ‘Those three rings on the bus mean that the bus is full’ entail that ‘The speaker meant that the bus is full by those three rings on the bus’. Furthermore, natural meaning involves with some causal-factual links held amongst natural phenomena irrespective of agents’ linguistic involvement. Here, Grice’s work focuses on the analysis of non-natural meaning which has linguistic significance particularly.

With respect to non-natural meaning, Grice (1957) holds that what linguistic expressions mean first boil down into the non-natural meaning of individual utterances of those expressions which in turn boil down into speakers’ intentions to make these individual utterances in particular occasions. In other words, what linguistic expressions mean are exhausted by what speakers intend to bring about by their utterance.²⁷ Consequently, Grice equates what an utterance type means with what speakers mean by them. In this respect, Grice also points out that speaker’s meaning rests on speaker’s intentions in a three-folded manner. This can be formulated as follows:

A speaker *S* means_{NN} some belief *p* by uttering an utterance *U* to an addressee *A* if and only if *S* intends:

- (i) produce some belief *P* in *A*
- (ii) *A* to recognize that *S* intends (i) and
- (iii) *A* to recognize that *S*’s intending (i) is achieved by (ii)

(Huang, 2014, p.29; Levinson, 1983, p.16)

²⁷ At this stage, Grice’s notion of meaning seems to be non-conventional since there seems to be no place for lexically encoded/standing meaning independently of speakers’ uses and their intentions for usage. Nevertheless, Grice does not reject what an expression-type linguistically encodes but he underlines that speakers’ meaning of an expression substantiates standing/encoded meaning of an expression because the former is analytically fundamental to the later.

Consequently, what is meant by an utterance (i.e. “the total signification of utterance”, for Grice) can be identified with Grice’s *non-natural meaning* which in return contends that a speaker *S* uttered *U* with the intention of inducing some belief *p* “by means of the recognition of this intention” (Grice, 1989, p. 95).

Hereby, Grice subsumes the saying-implicating distinction under what is meant in the sense that what is said and what is implicated are distinct but complementary components of what is meant. In this respect, Grice’s conception of what is said is often thought to include various formal features such as conventionality, propositionality, truth-conditionality, being assertoric and such. Although Grice does not explicate the exclusive criteria or criterion to single out the concept of what is said, he thinks that what is said is “closely related to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence) ... uttered” (1989, p.25). Moreover, he further contemplates that saying as a linguistic act (i.e. performing an utterance by virtue of intentions), which is a part of what is meant, can be formulated by means of the following picture of what is meant:

U [an utterance] did something *x* [induced effect in the audience] (1) by which *U* meant that *p* (2) which is an occurrence of an utterance type *S* (sentence) such that (3) *S* means ‘*p*’ (4) *S* consists of a sequence of elements (such as words) ordered in a way licensed by a system of rules (syntactical rules) (5) *S* means ‘*p*’ in virtue of the particular meanings of the elements of *S*, their order, and their syntactical character. (Grice 1989, p.87)

Thus, what is said can be cashed out by the claim that a speaker *S* says *p* by uttering a sentence *U* if and only if *U* means *p* in virtue of the conventionally attached meanings of the elements of *U*, their syntactical/semantical composition. Since what is meant by an utterance, for Grice, already inherits communicative character (speaker’s intentions), what is said also entails this characteristic. Nevertheless, his notion of what is said here aligns with the mainstream formalist approaches to the notion of proposition which corresponds to what a sentence asserts by virtue of the

conventional meaning of its parts and their composition. Based on Frege and Russell's accounts of proposition, it is commonly held that asserting a propositional content is to pair sentence types with representational/truth-conditional contents in accordance with the relevant contents of sentential parts and with sentential order. Grice here seems to agree with such a notion while holding that pairing an utterance-type with such content is a linguistic act that involves speakers' intention to convey what is conventionally attached to this utterance-type in a linguistic community. Thus, for him, it is still possible for speakers to intend to mean something else by producing a token of this utterance type on a particular occasion. However, what is said by an utterance typically constitutes a conventional, truth-conditional, and propositional features/contents/interpretations of what a speaker means by a given utterance. Hence, he appears to hold what is said as the semantic content (propositional/truth-conditional content) of an utterance while holding what is implicated as the pragmatic content (i.e., non-propositional/ non-truth-conditional).

Furthermore, once what a speaker says by an utterance is taken to be on par with the semantic aspect of a linguistic act then recovering what is said turns out to be semantic interpretation in which an addressee recognizes what a speaker intends to mean in terms of the semantic features of his utterance. Thereby, Grice discusses that such a semantic interpretation, i.e. the recognition of what is said, is essential for an addressee to interpret what a speaker means; nevertheless, he further underlines that it is not fully sufficient for an addressee to fully work out what a speaker means in terms of the total communicative significance of utterances. After all, speakers can use what they say to communicate more than what they say. Hereby, Grice's concept of what is implicated constitutes this explanatory role in grounding how interlocutors can work out the implications of utterances.

As Grice's conception of meaning suggests, what a speaker means by an utterance rests on recognition of speakers' communicative intentions in addressees. In this picture, a speaker can intend to communicate what his utterance conventionally says although she can fairly intend to implicate more than what her utterance says. Such a change in the speaker's intention completely depends on what intention she intends to be recognized by the addressee. Again, an addressee typically must interpret what the speaker means by this utterance that amounts to her endeavors of recovering speaker's intentions to figure out what the speaker communicates by the utterance. In this respect, communication becomes a co-operative enterprise involving with utterance interpretations by virtue of recovering communicative intentions behind the relevant utterances. Since it is not the case that the speaker must intend to communicate what his utterance conventionally says then her implications fall within this co-operative enterprise of recovering what else she can communicate in terms of the given context of utterance.

At this point, Grice's notion of what is implicated represents addressees' inferential endeavors of the implications of what a speaker says and these endeavors, according to Grice, are systematically explicable by means of some governing principles derived from more general principles such as principles of rationality (Allott, 2010).²⁸ Regarding Gricean concept of communication as co-operative in terms of making the relevant communicative intentions explicit, he lays out that the most fundamental principle which governs our recovery of implications is what he calls "the co-operative principle". As Grice (1989) posits, it simply contends:

Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. (p.26)

²⁸ These principles differ from a theory to a theory as in the examples of Griceans, Neo-Griceans and the relevance theorists.

To explicate what is to be required in conversational contribution, Grice further introduces four maxims (i.e. Quality, Quantity, Relevance and Manner maxims) with which accompany the co-operative principle. For the sake of brevity, these maxims are communicative precepts which constitute rational requirements on speakers to the effect that the competent speakers who intend to make their linguistic contribution and intentions explicit to the addressees are required to speak sincerely, relevantly, clearly while providing sufficient information. In short, they are means to converse in a maximally efficient, rational, co-operative way so that we are to make explicit what a speaker means by an utterance. For Grice, the maxims are not arbitrary conventions, but rather they represent rational ways of conducting cooperative exchanges including non-linguistic ones. Nevertheless, the maxims, within linguistic ends, constitute a framework that explains how implications can be produced and calculated in addition to the semantic content of utterances, i.e. what is said. Thereby, Gricean maxims incorporate ‘what is implicated’ into his theory of linguistic understanding in communication. By means of these end-driven rational maxims of co-operative exchange, what is implicated can be inferred from what is said in order to recover what is meant.

In Grice’s theory, these implications which fall under interlocutors’ recovery endeavors to make explicit what is meant are called as *implicatures*. An implicature corresponds to an inference from what is said in accordance with the above maxims if what is said is not fully adequate to make what is meant explicit in a co-operative sense. In this regard, implicatures are not semantic interpretations of what is said by an utterance which can logically entail to it, yet they are pragmatic interpretations arising both from the semantic content of what is said and from maxim-driven assumptions about what is said in a local environment of utterance. According to

Grice, there are two ways in which implicatures may come out in a co-operative exchange, namely conventional and non-conventional (conversational) implicatures.

The conventional implicatures arise from the encoded/conventional meanings of linguistic expressions that have no truth-conditional/propositional contributions. Grice hereby mentions the cases including the connectives ‘moreover’, ‘but’, ‘therefore’ ‘on the other hand’ and ‘so’ (Grice, 1989, pp. 361–2). To illustrate, the connective ‘but’ inherently implicates a contrast between linguistic entities connected by it and it has no truth-conditional contribution by contrast with its another conventional meaning whose contribution is akin to the truth-conditional function of the conjunctive ‘and’. As introduced before, there are many examples of this sort: ‘however’, ‘then’, ‘roughly speaking’, ‘as well’, ‘anyway’, ‘after all’, and such. Here, a conversational implicature fails to be a part of what is said since they have non-truth-conditional content and thereby have no role in semantic interpretation. Yet, they are distinct from conversational implicatures with respect to their conformity with the Gricean maxim-driven framework of implications. Gricean maxims only ground how to bring about conversational inferences on what is said while conventional implicatures cannot be conversationally driven from what is said based on any framework concerning with co-operation and rationality in communication. Although both sorts of implicatures are similar in terms of having no truth-conditional contribution and being interlocutors’ pragmatic inferences on what is said, the conventional implicatures “are not calculable via natural procedure [Gricean principle and maxims] but are rather given by convention, thus they must be stipulative” (Huang, 2014, p.75).²⁹

²⁹ For more discussion on conventional implicatures, see Potts (2005), Bach (1999a), Horn (2006)

On the other hand, interlocutors derive the other sort of implicatures, i.e. conversational ones, through working out what is said in accordance with Grice's co-operative principle and the accompanying maxims (i.e. Quality, Quantity, Relevance, and Manner). Furthermore, the conversational implicatures, just like the other sort, have no truth-conditional relevance to sentences. Thus, they differ from the logical entailment/implications which are inferable from the semantic contents of sentences. In its typical instantiation, addressees infer such implications from what speakers say by observing if speakers' utterances go accord with the co-operative principle and the maxims in a given context of utterances. The following sentences exemplify how implicatures may occur in terms of speakers' violations (deliberate or not) of the maxims:

(24) Mustafa did not pass the exam.

[e.g. Quality maxim: The speaker believes that Mustafa did not pass the exam, and he has enough evidence for it.]

(25) Özgür had two dogs.

[e.g. Quantity maxim: Özgür had exactly two dogs]

(26) Pass the salt.

[e.g. Relevance maxim: Pass the salt to me now.]

(27) Friedrich raised his hand and called the waiter.

[e.g. Manner maxim: Friedrich raised his hand and then called the waiter]

As Levinson (1983) suggests, the conversational implicatures can appear in two distinct ways regarding how the co-operative principle and the maxims are entertained. First, they arise when the speaker "may rely on the addressee to amplify what he says" although he "is observing the maxims in a fairly direct way" (Levinson, 1983, p. 104). Consider the following example:

(28) Hikmet: How is the weather today?

Mustafa: I haven't watched the forecast yet.

Secondly, the conversational implicatures can be brought about when speakers breach or flout the maxims deliberately and ostentatiously (Huang, 2014). For example, take the following sentences:

(29) Trump is the new Nixon.

[e.g. Trump follows Nixon's policies too closely]

Hereby, it is worth underlining that implicatures are derived as representational contents which are, in a defeasible way, supplementary to what is said. As it can be observed from the above examples, implicatures can be represented by truth-conditional sentences. Inferring an implicature is arriving at a level of representation; nevertheless, they are additional contents that have no truth-conditional contribution to what is said.

Furthermore, Grice divides conversational implicatures into two further categories: *generalized* and *particularized implicatures*. His rationale rests on the observation that some utterance-types generate standard implicatures irrespective of their particular occasions of use in which they occur. In this regard, generalized implicatures are those which "normally (in the absence of special circumstances) carry such-and-such an implicature or type of implicature" (Grice 1989, p. 37). For instance, some scalar or quantifying terms such as 'some', 'all' and 'every' generate typified implications in the way that the sentence form 'Some x is y' have the generalized implicature form 'Not all x is y'. On the other hand, a particularized implicature "is carried by saying that p on a particular occasion in virtue of special features of the context, cases in which there is no room for the idea that an implicature of this sort is normally carried by saying that p" (Grice 1989, p. 37). For example, the sentence 'Some of the students dropped the course' might be uttered in

different occasions of use with respect to some particular contexts so that it may fairly implicate one of the following implications: ‘Some of the students didn’t like the instructor’, ‘The course was boring for some of the students’, ‘The course was difficult’, ‘Some of the students reacted to their instructor’s discriminatory language’ and so on.

Consequently, Grice considers that implicatures as non-truth conditional implications impinge on the semantic contents (i.e. what a speaker says by an utterance) so that they account for how speakers can convey more than what they say by an utterance. Still, implicatures come about to be secondary in explaining what speakers mean by their utterances. As mentioned before, Grice’s *modified Occam’s razor* simply posits that senses should not be multiplied beyond necessity. Here, Grice particularly makes the point that lexically encoded and truth-conditional relevant meanings of a word or sentence should not be multiplied to the effect that “it is more generally feasible to strengthen one’s meaning by achieving a superimposed implicature, than to make a relaxed use of an expression” (Grice, 1989, p. 48). Hereby, Grice commits himself to the idea that what is said by an utterance provides input for pragmatic interpretations although how one can pragmatically interpret this input relies on either truth-conditionally inert linguistic indications (conventional implicatures) or the maxim-driven conversational inferences with respect to the given context of utterances (conversational implicatures). If the mainstream interpretation of Grice’s distinction between what is said and what is implicated is taken into account, then Grice’s take on the semantics-pragmatics distinction contends that semantics concerns with truth-conditional contents of sentences which are constituted by the conventionally attached meanings of their elements by virtue of their syntactical composition. Moreover, pragmatics then deals with non-truth-

conditional -yet representational- inferences from the semantic contents of utterances based on psychologically (rationally) driven recovery framework under which interlocutors' communicative intentions are recovered in given contexts of utterances.

In this respect, Grice's approach to the semantics-pragmatics distinction seems to be more advantageous than the formal approach in terms of explaining linguistic understanding in communication. Nonetheless, it does not mean that his account is devoid of problems. First, it can be questioned if his intention-based semantics which holds meaning as speaker's intended effects to be recognized is plausible or not. From the Gricean perspective, speaker's meaning at which the addressee attempts to arrive is nothing other than specifying speaker's intentions behind performing the relevant utterance. According to Grice, speaker's meaning is an effect in which speakers intend to induce the addressee to recognize what he intends. Grice here seems to build his model on speakers' first order and self-reflective intentions which are co-operative in character. As Szabo portrays, Grice thinks:

The speaker may utter something; have the first-order intention to bring about a certain effect in the addressee, and the second-order intention that this response come about by means of the recognition of the first-order intention – still, he may also have a third-order intention that his second order intention should remain unrecognized. (2006, p.376)

In the similar vein, there could be speaker's some higher-order intentions which intend to nullify the recognition of his earlier intentions and so on. Here, Grice relies on the assumption that speaker's communicative intentions are inherently co-operative. When a speaker utters something, she involves a deliberate linguistic act which is initiated to be recognized in the first place. So, even if the speaker's initial

intention behind her utterance is to remain unrecognized by this utterance, she has an intention to let the audience recognize her intention to be unrecognized.

Nevertheless, this explanation expands the earlier assumption and Grice, as a result, seems to presuppose that speakers' utterances are always deliberately and inherently co-operative even when they seem not to be. Such a presupposition may run into the problems about explaining speakers' unintentional mistakes (e.g. slips of the tongue), unaddressed random articulations (e.g. making noises) or articulating some sentences without any intention to generate a speech act (e.g. an agent's reading a sentence from a language which she does not know). Still, for Grice, such cases do not pose a problem since the unintended and unaddressed articulations do not entail to the rational linguistic agency which makes our utterances deliberate and inherently co-operative linguistic acts in the first place.

Again, it can still be discussed how Grice grounds this notion of rational agency. As we will see in the relevance theoretical account, Grice focuses on linguistic communication at the public language level and thereby his maxim-driven framework characterizes rationality in interlocutors' making use of co-operative means. Nevertheless, Grice does not provide any independent ground for his notion of rationality as if it is self-evident. Yet, interpretational processes at the public language level do not seem to be self-evident considering how linguistic exchanges are pre-reflectively /automatically produced and grasped.

Moreover, if speaker's meaning, as Grice suggests, amounts to the intended effects to be recognized then Grice may run into a problem about what sort of effects they are. According to his definition, speakers intend to produce some belief by their utterances which in turn corresponds to what speakers mean. Here, the intended effects simply boil down into recognizing some representational contents which

speakers intend to induce in their audience. Nevertheless, speakers, at least in some cases, intend to force their audience to act in a certain way in accordance with what they implicate. In other words, he seems to fail in capturing different sorts of speaker meaning based on the intended effects. Since there seems to be a distinction between what speakers intend to convey by an utterance (illocutionary acts for Austin) and what speakers intend to accomplish by an utterance (perlocutionary acts). Drawing on this point, Searle (1969) posits the following counter-example to Grice's speaker meaning: Suppose a case where an American soldier who was captured by an Italian soldier in the Second World War decided to portray himself as a German officer by articulating the only German sentence he knows 'Kennst du das Land wo die Zitronen blühen?'. For Searle, it is not intuitive that the American soldier simply intends to implicate that he is a German soldier since he does not know the semantic content of his utterance and thereby he does not know what representational contents the sentence might implicate based on what the sentence says. Yet, the American soldier, according to Searle, intends to induce the Italian soldier to let him go by intending him to recognize that a German citizen can produce this utterance. In doing so, the American soldier, for Searle, does not implicate something based on what the utterance says but "he must intend that his primary intention to convey something be recognized in virtue of the addressee's semantic knowledge" (Szabo, 2005, p.4). In other words, the speaker intends to produce some action based on the addressee's recognizing general semantic status of what he utters (i.e. being a well-formed question in German). Thus, his intention bypasses what a sentence linguistically means in the first place.

Leaving such discussions aside, Grice's take on the semantics-pragmatics distinction faces some immediate problems linked with the relation between what is

said and what is implicated. First, resolving the references of deictic expressions pose a threat to Grice's notion of what is implicated. As seen before, fixing the referential values of deictic expressions in utterances requires the interlocutors to involve with contextual interpretations relevant to the particular contexts of utterances. Hereby, such contextual interpretations come out after decoding what is said by an utterance. Yet, such contextual interpretations which are posterior to what is said are not pragmatic inferences for Grice since they are neither conventional nor conversational implicatures that are truth-conditionally inert. Hence, reference resolutions for deictic expressions constitute contextual interpretations which are posterior to what is said and prior to what is implicated. At this point, some philosophers such as Levinson accuse Grice of getting into a circular argument in terms of his conviction that pragmatic interpretations (implicatures, for Grice) require determinate semantic contents in the first place. Levinson thereby remarks:

Grice's account makes implicature dependent on a prior determination of 'the said'. The said in turn depends on implicature: it depends on disambiguation, reference fixing, . . . [etc.]. But each of these processes, which are prerequisites to determining the proposition expressed, themselves depend crucially on implicatures. Thus, what is said seems both to determine and to be determined by implicature. Let us call this 'Grice's circle' . . . the theory of linguistic meaning is dependent on, not independent of, the theory of communication. (Levinson, 2000, p. 186–7)

Here, Levinson's claim rests on the idea that all contextual interpretations such as disambiguation or reference-fixing are pragmatic implications that must, in turn, be Gricean implicatures. In this respect, it is not correct that Grice holds all contextual interpretations as implicatures. Nevertheless, Grice does not account for two significant questions: (i) Do all contextual interpretations are pragmatic (extra-linguistic) inferences; (ii) Do all pragmatic inferences are implicatures? As we will see in Bach, Grice's account needs to be revisited and refined in terms of these

questions. Particularly, the second question relates to the following concern to Grice which makes Levinson's circularity objection more sensible.

Holding pragmatic interpretations as truth-conditionally inert, Grice believes that implicatures do not contribute to the proposition expressed by utterances. Nevertheless, some implicatures seem to influence the truth-conditional contents. As Levinson points out, consider the following sentence: 'Driving home and drinking beers is better than drinking beers and driving home' (Carston, 2008b). If the sequentiality implication generated by the connective 'and' cannot be considered in terms of the proposition expressed by the above sentence, the sentence would mean something counter-intuitive. Thus, there might be cases in which what is said intuitively, at least, is determined by what is implicated. As a result, pragmatic inferences (implicatures) seem to intrude into semantic (truth-conditional) contents although it contradicts with Grice's commitment that implicatures are truth-conditionally inert and dependent on semantic contents in the first place.

Regarding Grice's assumption that pragmatic inferences depend on semantic contents, the cases of unarticulated constituents also challenge Grice's distinction between what is said and what is implicated. Some sentences such as 'It's raining' express propositional contents exceeding what they seem to encode in its sentential elements, and yet such sentences do not fall within the domain of implicatures. They cannot be conventional implicatures due to the absence of any lexical item at the surface level of the sentence. Moreover, they cannot be conversational implicatures either, because conversational implicatures already arise from complete semantic contents (the propositions expressed). The cases of unarticulated constituents thereby pose problems for Grice in two respects. First, we, in some cases, determine the semantic contents by pragmatic processes and it contradicts with the input-output

relation between semantics and pragmatics. Second, there might be pragmatic inferences that enrich the semantic contents of sentences although these inferences are not implicatures.

In the following chapter, I will explore Bach's approach to the semantics-pragmatics distinction which brings out some refinements to Grice's what is said and what is implicated.

5.4 Bach's semantic minimalist approach

Kent Bach (1999a, 1999b, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2012) endorses that the semantics-pragmatics distinction essentially follows the Gricean distinction between what is said and what is implicated although he offers major changes in Grice's distinction with respect to the Gricean circle which stems from the one-directional input-output relation between what is said and what is implicated.

First, he agrees with Grice on the characterization that semantic content is encoded in what is said by a sentence whereas pragmatic content (extra-linguistic content) "is generated by, or at least made relevant by, the act of uttering it" (2003, p.160). Furthermore, he posits that semantics concerns with sentences whereas pragmatics concerns utterances so that semantic content/properties which are encoded in linguistic items of a sentence are structurally licensed and isomorphically linked with syntactical properties of sentences. Based on their subject matters, he puts forward the semantics-pragmatics distinction as follows:

Taken as properties of sentences, semantic properties are on a par with syntactic and phonological properties: they are linguistic properties. Pragmatic properties, on the other hand, belong to acts of uttering sentences in the course of communicating. Sentences have the properties they have independently of anybody's act of uttering them. (Bach 2004a, p.37)

In these respects, Bach's account bears strong resemblance and sympathy to Grice's distinction between what is said and what is implicated. Nevertheless, his account differs from Grice's distinction in his treatment of pragmatic effects on the semantic content. First, he introduces the notion of *implicitures* that are lexically triggered implications that initiate contextual interpretations under a very narrow sense of context. In virtue of implicitures, Bach purports to claim that some contextual interpretations are semantic in character since they are not extra-linguistic contributions into the semantic content. Second, he endorses that some pragmatic implications, unlike conversational implicatures, do not necessarily impinge on what is said so that they even extra-linguistically determine or saturate the truth-conditional contents of sentences.

As discussed in the previous section, the semantic (truth-conditional or propositional) contents of sentences are requisite inputs for leading interlocutors to compute extra-linguistic/conversational implicatures that correspond to the interpretations of communicative principles and maxims with respect to given utterances in their particular contexts of utterances. Hereby, Grice's account runs into a circular dilemma since reference disambiguation and reference fixing processes, as in the case of indexicals, seem to be the processes of extra-linguistic/contextual interpretations that occur to determine what is said in the first place. Provided that such extra-linguistic interpretations which require us to specify contextually salient elements are pragmatic interpretations, the semantic contents of sentences which are supposed to determine pragmatic interpretations such as implicatures are determined by pragmatic interpretations in the first place. Thereby, the platitude that semantics provides inputs to pragmatics turns out to be false once it is held that these inputs are already outputs of pragmatic processes. Hereby, Bach attempts to rescue Grice's

distinction from a circularity by proposing an intermediary process of interpretation between saying and implicating. In this respect, he first denies the assumption that contextual interpretations are necessarily extra-linguistic and thereby necessarily pragmatic interpretations. For him, some contextual interpretations such as reference disambiguation and reference fixing are not extra-linguistic in the sense that they implicitly occur at the process of semantic interpretation owing to linguistically encoded roles in some context-sensitive terms such as indexicals. In this respect, he distinguishes two modes of context, i.e. narrow context and broad context. As he remarks,

There are two sorts of contextual information, one much more restricted in scope than the other. Information that plays the limited role of combining with linguistic information to determine content (in the sense of fixing it) is restricted to a short list of variables, such as the identity of the speaker and the hearer and the time and place of an utterance. Contextual information in the broad sense is anything that the hearer is to take into account to determine (in the sense of ascertain) the speaker's communicative intention. (Bach 1997, p. 39)

The narrow context includes any linguistically signaled contribution from the contextual interpretation that “specify the speaker, the place, the time and perhaps the world” while the broad context “includes that and all the rest” (Stojanovic, 2008, p. 318). In this sense, Bach's narrow context seems to be implicit in linguistic items at the level of what is said, and it is an intermediary level of semantic interpretation which differs from what is said due to its informativeness. For instance, what is said by the sentence ‘I will be there tomorrow’ provides lexically encoded input the addressee to mediate herself to find out the contextually salient referential values which accord with the standing roles of the terms such as ‘I’, ‘there’ and ‘tomorrow’. On the other hand, the broad context seems to be explicit at the pragmatic level, and it has a function to interpret what speakers mean by an utterance based on all extra-linguistic elements. Thereby, what is said provides input to the intermediary

processes of implications that Bach calls implicitures. In return, implicitures which bears contextual effects in the narrow sense may provide input to implicatures or other extra-linguistic implications.

Bach's notion of narrow context functions to constrain speakers' communicative intentions into disambiguating and fixing the referential values in accordance with the encoded roles of deictic expressions. In other words, the addressee ascribes referential values of the sentence 'I will be there tomorrow' irrespective of construing any contextual effects which come from independently of what is lexically encoded. Thus, speaker's meaning in a narrow context does not include speaker's over-arching communicative intentions.

Still, Bach's notion of implicature and narrow context seems to lack some explanatory efficacy to account for deictic and context-sensitive terms which also require broad context interpretations to assign referential values. As Carston points out, the scope of his account is restricted on pure indexicals such as 'I', 'here' and 'now' because only this sort of indexicals, as Kaplan characterizes, have their referential values exhausted automatically in a context of utterance regardless of thinking speakers' other communicative intentions. Moreover, the referents of pure indexicals are automatically determined only with reference to the contextually salient or directly accessible communicative facts like who utters the relevant sentence, when and where the utterance takes place. On the other hand, other indexicals such as *it/he/ she*, *this/that* and *there* seem to require certain contributions from the broad context in order to fix their referents. To illustrate, the different utterances of the sentence 'I will be there tomorrow' would refer to different locations when I utter the sentence in two distinct contexts of utterances but it would refer to me as the speaker in every context of utterance. In this regard, Bach's notion

of implicature has a very restricted scope in explaining some intermediary pragmatic process and thus he, at best, eliminates Grice's circle for some limited number of cases. After all, there might be some implicitly context-sensitive terms that require pragmatic interpretations based on the broad context. Furthermore, Bach's notion of implicature can be challenged with some other host of cases in which implicitly context-sensitive terms such as pure indexicals do not satisfy their implicit roles in a narrow context. Consider a restaurant board on which someone writes the sentence 'I serve the best falafel here'. In this case, the accurate referents of 'I' and 'here' would not automatically become relevant to the person who writes the sentence or the place of utterance.

In addition to the introduction of implicatures, Bach also reconstrues Gricean account of what is said so that he can dodge away from some problems concerning with semantic underdeterminacy. As mentioned before, Grice's asymmetry assumption held between what is said and what is implicated leads him to endorse that the pragmatic interpretations of sentences are truth-conditionally inert and they thus do not influence or contribute to semantic contents conveyed by sentences. Here, Bach's account differs from Grice's account of what is said in two respects: (i) some pragmatic implication *P* by an utterance *U* in a context *C* does not have to be a conventional or non-conventional (conversational) implicature, and (ii) what is said by *U* does not have to express a complete or determine proposition but it can express a pre-propositional content which Bach labels as a 'propositional radical'. Bach's divergences from Grice are somehow connected with each other in his analysis of unarticulated constituents. Consider the following sentences:

(30) John Stockton is short [for a basketball player].

(31) Elif has had enough [chocolate].

(32) Fulva cannot finish [her cat food].

Regarding the above cases, Bach holds that they lack some relevant syntactical elements to express a declarative sentence which bears a complete propositional content. Yet, what speakers mean by them could be complete thoughts that are enriched via communicative information from a broad context. They are conversationally enriched contents and still they are not conversational implicatures since conversational implicatures only impinge on complete propositions expressed by sentences. Thus, Bach, unlike Grice, endorses that pragmatic interpretations can take on some degree of truth-conditional effects.

On the other hand, Bach's analysis of pre-propositional contents via unarticulated constituents can still be criticized based on the hidden indexicalist conception of unarticulated constituents proposed by Stanley and Szabo. According to them, this sort of pragmatic enrichment which Bach defends rests on the idea that such content expanding interpretations are not mandated or mediated by any linguistic element. Stanley (2000, 2002) claims that so-called unarticulated constituents are present as unbound indexical values in the logical form of the sentences. According to him, if the alleged unarticulated constituents are not values of any components in the relevant utterances but they are purely pragmatic, then it is, for the advocates of the unarticulated constituency, natural to conclude that they cannot be affected by the logical operators (i.e. operators functioning as quantifiers) which takes their scope over these relevant utterances. In that case, Bach, for instance, seems to deny that binding occurs in such quantified sentences since he believes that allegedly unarticulated constituents are saturated by extra-linguistic values instead of linguistic ones. It leads him to the conclusion that there should not be any readings of "the relevant linguistic constructions in which these so-called

unarticulated constituents vary with the values introduced by operators” (Stanley, 2000, pp.410-1).

Hence, Bach keeps ‘what is said’ minimal to the effect that the semantic content conveyed by saying *P* does not have to be fully propositional. Moreover, speakers may mean complete thoughts even in such cases by means of pragmatic interpretations which are not conversational implicatures. In short, Bach dismantles Grice’s notion of what is said so that saying *P* by an utterance *U* corresponds to “a set of propositions or propositional radicals with some referents fixed and some not” (Carston, 2008b, p.181). By doing so, he also dismantles the inferential link between what is said and what is implicated to the effect that there are some pragmatic interpretations other than implicatures and they have some truth-conditional effects. At this point, Bach’s account seems to be insufficient because he does not provide any pragmatic inferential framework which accounts for how hearers recover or employ pragmatic inferences which are not conversational implications. So, it does not provide a systematic account for the linguistic understanding in communication.

In what follows, I will discuss the cognitivist approach to the semantics-pragmatics distinction which seems to provide a systematic refinement to Grice’s approach to the semantics-pragmatics distinction.

5.5 The relevance-theoretic approach

The relevance-theoretic accounts-which was first introduced by Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson (1986) and seconded by Robyn Carston (2008a, 2008b)- mainly construe the semantics-pragmatics distinction through associating each with fundamentally distinct types of cognitive processes. According to them, semantics concerns with *coding/decoding processes* by which linguistic codes are paired with

their conventional meanings whereas pragmatics exclusively involves inferential processes whereby “one can integrate this [conventional] meaning with other information available from the context to arrive at the interpretation of an utterance” (Szabo, 2006, p. 371). According to the relevance theorists, the former process “is performed by an autonomous linguistic system” that automatically and modularly implements some computational rules resulting in “an output representation, which is the semantic representation, or logical form, of the sentence or phrase employed in the utterance” (Carston, 2008b, p.57-8). On the other hand, the inferential process occurs through integrating the outputs of the decoding process with contextual information to recognize what the speaker intends to convey. Here, it is worth noticing that the relevance theorists do not restrict the inferential processes to the public/conscious levels of linguistic representations so that they differ from Grice’s account of implicatures or any such utterance interpretations. They believe that the inferential processes in utterance interpretation can equally operate at the sub-conscious cognitive levels of linguistic representations.

Furthermore, there must be some principled constraint on interlocutors’ decoding and inferential processes (at public language level as well as at sub-conscious level) otherwise interlocutors end up with infinitely many representations that can fairly be decoded and inferred from a simple utterance and its surrounding setting which might include various contextual parameters such as addressees, speakers, time, place, background knowledge and so on. Thereby, decoding and inferring must already be restricted by a recursive principle which excludes the arbitrariness and indeterminacy in the first place so that interlocutors acquire the most relevant information/representation pertaining to given utterances in given contexts. Thus, interlocutors’ communicative exchanges must rest on such a

recursive function which enables them to recover what to decode and what to infer additionally. Sperber and Wilson embody this function in their *principle of relevance*. Since they acknowledge two distinct levels of linguistic representation (i.e. sub-conscious/cognitive level of language and conscious/public level of language), they offer two modes of the principle of relevance: a cognitive principle and a communicative principle. According to a cognitive principle of relevance, human cognition is oriented towards maximizing relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 2002). In this case, it is our cognitive disposition to work out the acquired representations through some certain linguistic modules in order to make them relevant linguistically. On the other hand, a communicative principle of relevance contends that “every ostensive stimulus [of communication] conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance” (Sperber & Wilson, 2002, p.256). For Sperber and Wilson, these principles are descriptive in character in the sense that they are not norms that interlocutors consciously pursue. In this respect, they remark:

The principle of relevance differs from every other principle, maxim, convention or presumption proposed in modern pragmatics in that it is not something that people have to know, let alone learn, in order to communicate effectively; it is not something that they obey or might disobey: it is an exceptionless generalization about human communicative behaviour. (Sperber & Wilson, 1991, p.68)

Similarly, Sperber and Wilson explicate a communicative principle as follows:

[The communicative principle of relevance] is a generalization about ostensive-inferential communication. Communicators and audience need no more know the principle of relevance to communicate than they need to know the principles of genetics to reproduce. Communicators do not 'follow' the principle of relevance; and they could not violate it even if they wanted to. The principle of relevance applies without exception: every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of relevance. (1986, p.162)

Hereby, the relevance theory agrees on the definition that semantics concerns with linguistically encoded content although they further recognize that these encoded contents can correspond to mental representations as well as to logical forms and

functions. At this point, they make a distinction between conceptual meaning and procedural meaning so that lexical codes that have semantic significance must inherit at least one of them. In other words, linguistic expressions can encode either one of them or both. The former sort of encoded meaning corresponds to sentence meaning or Grice's *what is said* which pairs a lexical body with a concept. Interestingly, the relevance theorists consider that the conceptual meanings of linguistic bodies come with different degrees of representational saliency so that some linguistic items or bodies have truly little or no conceptual meaning. In this respect, discourse deictic expressions (e.g. Gricean conventional implicatures such as 'therefore', 'so' and 'but') and indexicals (e.g. 'he', 'she', 'there') can be introduced to exemplify the variations in conceptual meaning. Here, the relevance theorists differ from Grice's notion of what is said since Grice's notion of encoded meaning corresponds to a determinate and constant content. Regarding that some linguistic expressions do not have any conceptual content; the relevance theorist further introduces the notion of procedural meaning which governs the inferential processes. As in the case of connective 'but', the very same linguistic items could have both sorts of meaning, and again the very same items could have different meanings on unique occasions of use. In a sense, the distinction provides *prima facie* explanations for a number of borderline cases for the semantics-pragmatics distinction since the distinction converges Gricean conventional implicatures with Kaplan's character/content distinction.

On the other hand, the relevance theory characterizes pragmatics with the domain of "ostensive stimuli (the paradigm case being linguistic utterances), what they ostensively communicate, and how this is achieved" (Carston, 2008b, p.116). Following Grice's emphasis on communicative intentions in uttering a linguistic

expression, the relevance theorists endorse that pragmatics concerns with inferences from ostensive utterance to make interlocutors' intentions explicit. In this respect, they share the same spirit with Gricean characterization of pragmatics as what is implicated. Nevertheless, such inferences from utterances are not necessarily exhausted by conversational implicatures in the sense that there are other sorts of pragmatic implications which are geared by the principle of relevance with respect to what a speaker intends to mean by an utterance in a given context. Although they endorse conversational implicatures, they further introduce the notion of *explicature* to be another category of pragmatic inferences. In this regard, explicatures are inferentially enriched extensions of the linguistically encoded meaning (conceptual or procedural) of utterances. Thereby, they are different from implicatures since they intrude into the truth-conditional contents. Hereby, the borderline cases such as unarticulated constituents can be explained by the notion of explicature which may determine truth-conditional contents of utterances.

The relevance-theoretic approach to the semantics-pragmatics distinction purports to provide a systematic account for different cognitive processes involved in communicating and understanding linguistic representations. In doing so, the approach commits itself to some computational view of mind which needs to be substantiated in further fields of philosophy (e.g. philosophy of mind) and in further empirical fields of study (e.g. cognitive science, psycholinguistics). Considering this general line of the approach, it can be questioned if it is legitimate to account for the semantics-pragmatics distinction based on cognitive grounds and principles such as the principle of relevance.

The formal approaches to the semantics-pragmatics distinction may pose a challenge to the cognitive or psychological explanations of language use. As

mentioned before, the proponents of the formal approach such as Carnap and Montague hold that “there is no important theoretical difference between natural languages and the artificial languages of logicians” (Montague, 1974, p.222). Thus, their notion of pragmatics trivializes the psychological or cognitive principles of language use because linguistic expressions, at their formal characterization, are still comprehensible and available for use regardless of postulating any cognitive state or principle shared amongst language users.

Furthermore, the principle of relevance seems to bear internal incoherency due to its status as an exceptionless generalization. In this respect, the principle of relevance can be a generalization in the sense that it can be derived as a pragmatic regularity from the instances of utterance interpretations. Nevertheless, such a pragmatic regularity which generally appears in the instances of utterance interpretations can be achieved empirically by induction to the effect that it would be unwarranted to generalize that the principle of relevance underlies every case of utterance interpretation. Thus, if the principle of relevance can be achieved by pragmatic regularities that interlocutors commonly use in most of their utterance interpretations then the principle of relevance needs to be grounded in a more robust manner. For this reason, the relevance theorists hold the cognitive principle of relevance to be an exceptionless ground for an occurrence of the principle in communication (i.e. the communicative principle of relevance). Nevertheless, this explanation falls short unless they also ground the substantiality of the cognitive principle of relevance otherwise the cognitive principle looks rather stipulative and thereby supposed pragmatic regularities seem to be contingent on some unwarranted stipulation.

CHAPTER 6

DEFLATING THE DISTINCTION

6.1 Aspect distinction assumption

At the object-level analysis of the semantics-pragmatics distinction, it can be trivially said that semantics is the study of what is semantic while pragmatics is the study of what is pragmatic. This trivial portrayal of the distinction does not shed a light on why and how such and such characteristics, domains, and domain-specific functions have to result in different aspects of the study of language. Since the uses of the terms ‘semantic’ and ‘pragmatic’ entirely depend on how one theory defines semantics and pragmatics in the first place. In this respect, claiming that such and such linguistic characteristics, phenomena, mechanisms, and stuff are semantic and/or pragmatic sorts requires solid grounds to disambiguate one sort of linguistic aspect from another. As discussed in the previous chapters, such attempts for drawing the distinction are derivative on some preceding analyses and assumptions about fundamental notions of the language in question. In other words, the semantics-pragmatics distinction, at the object-level interpretation of the aspects, is drawn in terms of some explanatory significance which rests on some given language, a theory of meaning and other related notions composing the domains and the ranges of the domain-specific functions of each aspect.

In brief, the accounts of the semantics-pragmatics distinction, at the object-level, attempt to accommodate with some division of labor in the explanatory significance related to a language by means of some aspects which are claimed to satisfy this significance through their complementary yet discernible domains and/or domain-specific functions. In most object-level theories, explaining language

understanding amounts to the explanatory significance in question. In some other theories, this explanatory significance corresponds to a seemingly more particularized notion, i.e. meaning, communication, speaker's intentions, and language acquisition. Nonetheless, a definition of the distinction, satisfactory or not, rests on the same fundamental assumption which is subjected to some higher-order evaluation for the sake of meta-theoretical concerns and questions that are basic to any postulation of the alleged boundaries between semantics and pragmatics. Hereby, I can articulate the fundamental assumption of the semantics-pragmatics distinction (which I call the *Aspect Distinction Assumption*) and it goes as follows:

The Aspect Distinction Assumption (ADA): In a language *L*, there are distinguishable *n-tuple* aspects (i.e. explanans) of *L-related significance* (i.e. explanandum) if and only if there are respectively *n-tuple* domains/domain-specific functions which have distinguishable ranges (outputs) that are substantial -to some degree or another- in accounting for *L-related significance*.

In this vein, the assumption (thereafter, ADA) facilitates charting in what respects the accounts of the semantics-pragmatics distinction disagree with or diverge from each other. As elaborated through the criteria wars and the different approaches to the distinction, semantics and pragmatics could be characterized in innumerable ways by virtue of how a theory of language justifies some characteristics and constitutive notions which are ascribed to one of these aspects. Thereby, ADA lays out a framework for such divergences since there are numerous ways to construe the distinction with respect to ADA.

First, there may be disagreements over what language we should take into account while positing the semantics-pragmatics distinction. As earlier discussed, the formal approaches rest on the analogy between formal languages and natural languages to the effect that formal languages bear very few contentions about sharply demarcating syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Peregrin (1999) points out that there

are three sharply distinguishable divisions in a formal language: “syntax proper (delimiting well-formedness, i.e., the class of the expressions of the language), proof theory or 'logical syntax' (delimiting provability, i.e., the class of the theorems of the language) and model theory or semantics (delimiting validity, i.e., the class of tautologies or analytic truths of the system)” (pp. 428-9). Since formal languages are constructed systems in terms of the above framework, the semantics-pragmatics distinction becomes merely a matter of stipulation. Depending on construing the assigned language as formal one in ADA, the notion of L-related significance with which our divisions of labor in a language are mediated also diversifies. To illustrate, the formal system of standard deductive logic (e.g. first-order propositional logic) and the formal systems of non-standard logic (e.g. quantifier modal logic) do not share nor stipulate the same L-related significance such as truth-assignments or truth-evaluability. In other words, different systems of formal languages might have different divisions of labor with respect to L-related significance so that they may stipulate distinct domains and/or domain-specific functions for semantics and pragmatics.

Still, the formal approaches are accused of misconceiving the analogy between formal languages and natural languages. For one thing, pragmatics in formal languages is restricted into a seriously limited domain and it does not seem to account for various phenomena in linguistic communication in natural languages. To dodge away from such concerns, some proponents of the formal approach, as we have seen earlier, extend the domain of pragmatics to cover natural language cases such as indexicals and demonstratives. Some others such as Gazdar bite the bullet by endorsing that natural languages do not have semantics at all, but they only have syntax and pragmatics. Nevertheless, such refinements fail not simply because of

their explanatory inefficacy in the face of natural language phenomenon. They fail because they confuse the L-related significance (i.e. formal provability or validity) for a formal language with the L-related significance for a natural language (linguistic understanding in communication). In other words, they suffer from the explanatory inefficacy only because they adopt a new L-related significance with respect to a natural language while keeping the domain-specific functions and domains relevant to their initial L-related significance. To illustrate, a proponent of the formal approach can dodge away from the seemingly compelling natural language phenomena by holding that the formal notions of semantics and pragmatics do not have to account for such and such phenomena because they are stipulated or drawn from a natural language based on some other L-related significance which has no relevance to the adopted formal system of language. In this respect, a proponent of the formal approach may fairly retain the semantics-pragmatics distinction within the formally stipulated boundaries of a formal language so that she does not dissolve her theory into another L-related significance relevant to a distinct system of a language such as a natural language. For instance, she can appreciate the difference between a theory of communication in a natural language and a theory of provability/validity in a formal language so that she is only interested in accounting for the later in terms of her explanatory goal. Hence, the language, along with its significance, which we are to postulate or evaluate in ADA determines how to characterize semantics and pragmatics accordingly.

Yet, the theories of linguistic understanding generally seek out much more comprehensive explanatory goals and thus such a formally restricted L-related significance will be too narrow to satisfy them. Thus, ADA, in general, is interpreted for natural languages to explain linguistic understanding in communication.

Although there could be a consensus on this explanatory goal, ADA still rests on how the following linguistic categories and notions are conceptualized in a theory: (i) linguistic constituents (e.g. word, names, sentences and etc.), (ii) content (e.g. lexical meaning, proposition, speaker's meaning, truth-conditions and etc.), (iii) form (e.g. grammatical/linguistic form, logical form, quantification, composition, identity and so on), (iv) relation (e.g. logical entailment, implication, logical inferences, conversational inferences and etc.), (v) communicative components (e.g. utterances, linguistic community, context, force, extra-linguistic signs, intentions and so on).

At this point, the distinct conceptualizations of the above notions result in distinct criteria and ways for drawing the semantics-pragmatics distinction. After all, such conceptual differences in the interpretation of the same notion ultimately determine how an account of the semantics-pragmatics distinction depicts the domains and/or domain-specific functions of these aspects with respect to the given L-related significance. To illustrate, most of the discussions amongst the complementarist views, along with their contentions with reductionist views, rely on how to define these domain-specific functions in a distinguishable way by which they are substantial to L-related significance such as language comprehension in communication. Again, Bach's analysis of 'context' and Grice's notion of implicatures represent such conceptual divergences with respect to what is the mark of pragmatics (or semantics). Thus, semantic/pragmatic domains and domain-specific functions, per se, can vary with a theory although each theory proposes that semantic stuff and pragmatic stuff are discernable at any rate.

Such disagreeing conceptualizations, at this object-level analysis of the notions, rely on distinct theoretical treatments of the given assumptions in the *cinquain*. Therefore, they also rest on a cluster of other theories such as theories of

meaning, truth, propositions and etc. Nevertheless, what makes a proposed distinction viable and admissible for a given language in virtue of an L -related significance depends on whether the proposed distinction is theoretically coherent and empirically plausible. In this respect, if the definition of the distinction is coherent and empirically plausible for satisfying the adopted explanatory significance in the face of the given language phenomena (e.g. indexicals), the adopted notions (e.g. meaning, truth, proposition), criteria (e.g. context-sensitivity), theoretical commitments (e.g. structured propositions), then the distinction, at the object-level analysis, is thought to be defined in a principled way. For instance, Bach, as earlier discussed, casts a doubt on Grice's approach while he questions the coherence of 'what is said' with respect to Grice's treatment of propositions. Furthermore, Bach questions the empirical plausibility of 'what is implicated' in the face of natural language phenomena such as *unarticulated constituents*. Hence, a theory draws the distinction in a principled way in a language only if it is theoretically/methodologically coherent and empirically plausible in terms of the adopted language, the explanatory significance in this language and the notions accompanied by this significance.

At this point, empirical plausibility concerns with whether linguistic and/or cognitive phenomena in an adopted language L with respect to L -related significance are consistent with the proposed semantics-pragmatics distinction which follows from the theoretical characterization of L -related significance. Hence, if a theory T of the semantics-pragmatics distinction S in L with respect to some L -related significance cannot be consistent with a linguistic phenomenon P in L then T fails to be empirically plausible. In this case, the distinction S in T can still be defended so that one can fairly revise her background hypotheses concerning with L , L -related

significance, or *S*. For instance, *L* can be adopted to exclude phenomena like *P* in the way that there could be no such extensions of *L* with respect to *L-related significance*. Furthermore, one can extend the ranges of *S* to include *P* in *L* with respect to *L-related significance*. To illustrate, the alleged cases of unarticulated constituents constitute an anomaly for Grice's account of the distinction; nonetheless, a Gricean can explain away such cases by extending the range of implicatures. For instance, Levinson follows this strategy to rescue the explanatory significance of Grice's account. In this respect, the empirical plausibility of a theory *T* ultimately rests on whether the theory *T* coherently accounts for the distinction *S* in *L* with respect to *L-related significance* considering the underlying theoretical assumptions, commitments, and such in *T*. More importantly, it leads us to arrive at the conclusion that there is no definitive way to approve or disapprove of a theory of distinction by linguistic phenomena. After all, it is always possible for a theorist to revise his underlying assumptions in ADA to meet with given phenomena. Thus, any theory of the distinction which adopts a particular interpretation of ADA can be admissible as long as it coherently explains some phenomena relevant with a given language, its related significance and the distinction drawn with respect to this language and its significance. This concern can be called as *the indeterminacy problem*.

Furthermore, disagreeing accounts of the semantics-pragmatics distinction can be compared with each other based on their coherence and empirical plausibility. Nevertheless, the indeterminacy problem, which contends any proposed distinction is admissible by virtue of its own coherency and empirical plausibility, further leads to the parsimony of admissible accounts of the distinction. After all, each theory-in addition to some general theoretical virtues such as being logically coherent, comprehensive and sound- bears its own particularized standards of theoretical

coherency and of empirical plausibility which are relevant to some language *L*, its relevant explanatory significance and the other notions substantial for this significance.

Even if the theories of the distinction, at the object-level analysis, agree on the relevant language and its explanatory significance, they can vary in terms of their conceptualizations for drawing the distinction. Although each one of these different interpretations of the distinction in ADA disagrees on what relevant empirical scope and theoretical characterizations of the distinction are in play, they can be considered to be equally coherent and empirically plausible in terms of their own particular analysis of the relevant empirical scope and theoretical characterizations. In this respect, the theories of the distinction which endorse ADA seem to entail to the indeterminacy problem which is akin to the Quine-Duhem problem for scientific theories. For the relevant purposes, the problem can be highlighted as follows:

(P1) Assume that some adopted theory *T* of the semantics-pragmatics distinction which follows *ADA* with respect to some *L-related significance LS* in some language *L* coherently explains some linguistic phenomena *P*.

(P2) Another theory *T** of the semantics-pragmatics distinction which also follows *ADA* with respect to *LS* coherently explains *P* in *L*.

(P3) If both *T* and *T** coherently explain the same *P* in *L* with respect to the same *LS* related with *L*, then there is no reason to believe *T* to be a principled distinction and not *T**.

(C) Therefore, there is no reason to believe *T* to be a principled distinction and not *T**.

As this indeterminacy concern lays out, there could be no substantial difference in preferring one theory to another if they have the same explanatory efficacy for the given linguistic phenomena with respect to the same explanandum (i.e. *L-related significance*). In this regard, the disagreements on the semantics-pragmatics

distinction which occur amongst equally coherent and empirically plausible accounts may turn out to be merely verbal disagreements.

In this respect, there can be more than one viable theory such as the theories T and T^* which draw the distinction in equally satisfactory way if and only if they are taken to involve with verbal disagreements among T and T^* . Nonetheless, it is a matter of fact that the theories of the semantics-pragmatics distinction can still diverge even if they coherently and plausibly explain the same linguistic phenomena with respect to the same linguistic significance. Since the theories of the distinction generally diverge from each other depending on how they treat and analyze the same linguistic significance. As we have seen before, the relevance theorists and Grice share the same linguistic significance (linguistic communication) to explain it by the semantics-pragmatics distinction although they do not defend the same pragmatic inferential processes to define pragmatics. Recalling the derivativeness assumption, theories of the semantics-pragmatics distinction are consequently derivative on how to theorize the notions concerning with the relevant linguistic significance. Thus, the question of a coherent and plausible theory of meaning, for instance, becomes more fundamental than the question of a coherent and plausible theory of the distinction.

Then, it is worth questioning what sort of disagreement we have when we discuss the semantics-pragmatics distinction. Unlike what the indeterminacy problem implicates, philosophers generally take the distinction to rest on substantive grounds. Nevertheless, the distinction, which drifts the linguists/philosophers apart based on the very nature of it, becomes substantive when there is some commonly agreed and disambiguated ground on which the opinions diversify and conflict with each other. As Szabo (2006) states, “substantive disagreements require agreement on what the disagreement is about, which in turn requires mutual understanding” (p. 361). For

him, a disagreement is substantive if and only if each side recognizes and agrees on what facts relevant to their disagreement would make their disagreeing claims correct, and yet they still disagree with each other. Thus, such disagreements are matters of fact in the sense that the disagreement consists of how to account for the common subject-matter. On the other hand, a verbal disagreement occurs when the disagreeing parties fail to construct an agreement about their source of disagreement because of their diverging and discrepant uses of some linguistic terms which their claims entertain. Thus, verbally disagreeing parties fail to agree on what they differ and converge unless they determine and clarify the terms which they do not agreeably and coherently employ.

Considering the distinction between verbal and substantive disagreements, ADA displays how the theories which endorse it disagree with each other in a substantive manner. Theories can substantively disagree with each other on the given language, *L*-related significance, and the relevant notions/theoretical commitments that accompany with them. Thus, ADA also serves to crack down the verbal disagreements over particular interpretations of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. So, ADA finally serves to substantivize the disagreements amongst the theories of the distinction by displaying what to disagree in a particular interpretation of the distinction. Nonetheless, being a substantive disagreement does not guarantee that these substantive dimensions are sufficient to achieve one single principled formulation for drawing the distinction. In other words, substantive points in the question of the distinction do not necessarily entail to the single formulation of the distinction which is drawn coherently and the empirically plausible way that every disagreeing theory eventually agree on. As the indeterminacy problem suggests, there can still be various interpretations of ADA which constitute the distinction in a

coherent and empirically plausible way with respect to their particular interpretations of language, L-related significance and accompanying notions. In this regard, these theories can be equally admissible if there is no definitive way to settle on which characterization of ADA is coherent and empirically plausible.

To sum up, the theories of the semantics-pragmatics distinction- from Carnap's account to the relevance-theoretic account- commit themselves to the Aspect Distinction Assumption (ADA) which formulaically represents how each theory could particularly construe the distinction based on some general substantive points of interpretation. Thereby, ADA also implicates that the theories which commit themselves to ADA can formulaically diverge from each other depending on these substantive points of interpretation. Any theory which entails to ADA turns out to be coherent and empirically plausible inasmuch as it accords with the relevant interpretations of those substantive points in ADA. In this respect, there could be more than one viable theory that accounts for the semantics-pragmatics distinction in a coherent and empirically plausible way since the question of coherency and empirically plausibility becomes relative to how a theory construes ADA.

6.2 Trivializing the semantics-pragmatics distinction

As discussed in the previous section, ADA commits one to characterize a given language taxonomically with respect to some adopted significance related to this language. Hereby, the question of how to draw the semantics-pragmatics distinction becomes relative to how each individual theory which entails to ADA construes the substantive points of interpretation in ADA. Consequently, the semantics-pragmatics distinction in ADA seems to have no significance independently of how it is construed in a theory entertaining ADA. In this respect, the semantics-pragmatics

distinction in ADA seems to have rather stipulative significance. Once a theory posits the taxonomical categorization of the aspects of some L-related significance by endorsing ADA then it derivatively stipulates the semantics-pragmatics distinction depending on how the given theory construes the substantive points of interpretations in ADA. In this respect, the question of the semantics-pragmatics distinction boils down into the question of how a theory stipulates it with respect to its particular interpretation of ADA. Thus, the semantics-pragmatics distinction can be trivialized as a merely stipulative distinction which derivatively rests on how a theory taxonomically construes some language *L* with respect to some L-related significance. Consequently, I believe that the semantics-pragmatics distinction, as it appears in ADA, becomes a trivial matter of analysis. So far, I have hinted some of these reasons for it but now I am in a position to provide these reasons in a full-fledged manner.

For one thing, the substantive points of interpretation in *ADA* (e.g. a language *L*, an explanandum *L*-related significance and explanans *n*-tuple domain-specific functions) inherently underdetermine the question of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. First, a language *L* in ADA can fairly vary from one theory to another to the effect that theories holding ADA stipulate a distinct formulation of the distinction. As mentioned before, the semantics-pragmatics distinction for a formal system of language results in a distinct interpretation of ADA so that it defines the domains and domain-specific functions of the aspects with respect to that formal language. Secondly, how to interpret an explanandum, L-related significance, in ADA (e.g. language understanding, linguistic meaning, cognitive processes) also underdetermines how to draw the distinction. For instance, such an underdetermination might occur when one theory construes L-related significance

with respect to a theory of meaning such as *meaning as use*. Under such an interpretation, the L-related significance may be characterized as communicative understanding in virtue of the adopted theory of meaning to the effect that semantics is not even an aspect of L-related significance or it impinges on pragmatics. Hence, how many aspects there can be in a relevant language *L* in ADA are already underdetermined by how to theorize the notion L-related significance in ADA. After all, how to conceive the distinction depends on how some underlying theories (e.g. theories of meaning such as internalist, externalist, behavioristic, intention-based accounts and so on) are adopted to interpret L-related significance. Secondly, how many aspects of L-significance in ADA are delimited by how many domain-specific functions can be distinguished in a principled way, and it in return is delimited by how this L-related significance is theorized in the first place. As a result, there could be indefinitely many ways of postulating criteria or a criterion for drawing the semantics-pragmatics distinction. More importantly, these criteria would also be derivative on how they are characterized in terms of selected notions such as context, truth, and conventional meaning. Thus, our taxonomy on the aspects of some significance in a language *L* is already the outcome of our theoretical notions surrounding this significance and the adopted language itself.

The second reason why any theory endorsing ADA underdetermines the question of the semantics-pragmatics distinction concerns with the indeterminacy concerns which I have roughly mentioned in the previous section. Among the different theories which can be derived within the framework of ADA, we are to decide on what makes one theory more viable than another. At this point, the indeterminacy of ADA implicates that there is no single definitive way to viably formulate the semantics-pragmatics distinction by means of ADA. First, the

indeterminacy of ADA occurs in the sense that any proposed distinction in ADA is admissible by virtue of its own coherency and empirical plausibility. After all, the viability of a theory relies not only on its theoretical coherency with respect to the accompanying theories/notions but also on its explanatory efficacy with linguistic phenomena that are relevant to the adopted language. Thereby, each theory initially bears its own merits of theoretical coherence and empirical plausibility with respect to their particular construal of the substantive points of interpretation in ADA. Hence, it is possible to end up with distinct theories that are theoretically coherent and empirically plausible with respect to their own merits. On the other hand, ADA, within its general framework, faces some further indeterminacy concern which undermines the question of viability. A particular construal of ADA can always be revised and re-adjusted in order to meet with some empirical/linguistic anomaly which appears relative to the given construal of the substantive points of interpretation in ADA. In other words, some construal of the distinction within the general framework of ADA can be preserved against some relevant linguistic anomaly in indefinitely many ways inasmuch as the relevant assumptions which underlie the given construal of the distinction are adjusted to meet with the anomaly in question. As a result, the general framework of ADA entails to the parsimony of viable accounts in terms of theoretical coherence and empirical plausibility.

Finally, ADA underdetermines the semantics-pragmatics distinction simply because the general framework of ADA underdetermines the question of how many aspects in a language can be stipulated. In other words, the number of stipulated aspects in a theory vary depending on how the theory construes ADA with respect to the substantive points of interpretation. Therefore, the number of stipulated aspects can increase as well as decrease depending on a theory. To illustrate, Stojanovic

(2014) expands the basic triadic model by stipulating a further aspect ‘pre-pragmatics’ which stands in between semantics and pragmatics. In doing so, she attempts to account for the borderline cases which conflict with the criteria pertaining to conventionality, context-sensitivity, and truth-conditionality. In addition to Stojanovic’s expansionist view, the reductionist views, as mentioned earlier, reduces one aspect into another to the effect that they entirely rule out the semantics-pragmatics distinction. For the theories which adopt ADA, the standing concern here is that the general framework of ADA underdetermines how many aspects can be viably stipulated for the given language. In this regard, a theory can even divide- at least conceivably- the given language in a widening number of aspects if it coherently and plausibly establishes these aspects through the substantive points in ADA.

Considering how ADA underdetermines the question of the semantics-pragmatics distinction, the distinction seems to have no significance independently of how it is construed in a theory entertaining ADA. I believe it is not the case that a robust or principled distinction between semantics and pragmatics leads to a robust theory of language or L-related significance (i.e. a theory of meaning), but the other way around could be the case. As the general framework of ADA suggests, the semantics-pragmatics distinction is derivative on how the substantive points of interpretation in ADA are established. Thus, constructing the semantics-pragmatics distinction within the framework of ADA makes it rather a stipulative matter which eventually impinges on how to construe ADA with respect to a language *L*, an explanandum ‘L-related significance’ and explanans ‘n-tuple domain-specific functions’. Besides, the viability of particular formulations of the distinction also relies on how the relevant theories formulate them in terms of theoretical coherence

and empirical plausibility with respect to their particular conceptualizations of the substantive points in ADA. In this regard, the question of the semantics-pragmatics distinction becomes trivial because it is a stipulative by-product of more fundamental questions concerning with the substantive points in ADA. As the semantics-pragmatics distinction occurs within the framework of ADA, it trivially implicates the following definition:

For any theory *T* which interprets the semantics-pragmatics distinction within the framework of *ADA*, semantics/pragmatics in *T* concerns with whatever is semantic/pragmatic in *T*.

The above definition deflates the theoretical import of the question of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. At the object-level of analysis, this deflationary view of the semantics-pragmatics distinction is grounded by the idea that the theoretical import of the semantics-pragmatics distinction impinges on the theoretical import of more primitive questions which fundamentally underwrites the stipulation of such an aspect distinction. In other words, defining the semantics-pragmatics distinction -in a principled way- boils down into defining more fundamental theories that account for linguistic constituents, content, form, relation, and communicative components. Therefore, the semantics-pragmatics distinction (within the framework of ADA) in a theory has no genuine and primary significance in discussions independently more fundamental issues from which the distinction derivatively follows.

6.3 Higher-order triviality of the semantics-pragmatics distinction

In the previous sections, I contend that semantics and pragmatics, at the object-level of analysis, are nothing other than stipulative aspects that derivatively follow from how a theorist viably compartmentalizes the given language by virtue of some adopted theories concerning with the substantive points of interpretation in ADA.

Hence, any disagreement on the putative boundaries between semantics and pragmatics arises from theorists' distinct theoretical commitments and interests which are ascribed to ADA. Thus, there will be a viable account of the semantics-pragmatics distinction within the general framework of ADA if the substantive points of interpretation in ADA are viably grounded in each interpretation of ADA.

Still, any such viable account of the distinction requires its proponents to demonstrate why we need to adopt the general framework of ADA in the first place to establish a theory of language. In a theory of language, the framework of ADA represents the complementary aspects of a language and thereby it presupposes the plausibility of dividing a language into some complementary parts. Nevertheless, it must be asked what makes such a framework viable for understanding how formal and natural languages work and how they should be studied. In other words, it is worth asking what grounds the viability of ADA itself which commits one to characterize a language taxonomically with respect to such and such substantive points of interpretation.

Regardless of how ADA can be interpreted at the object-level, there is one meta-theoretical question underlying each possible interpretation of ADA: What grounds the plausibility or viability of ADA in the first place? Hence, my question here concerns with the higher-order analysis of the viability of ADA in terms of accounting for a given language. There are at least three main strands to interpret this higher-order question: (1) Linguistic substantiality; (2) Cognitive substantiality; (3) Methodological convenience.

According to the substantiality strands (1) and (2), adopting the assumption ADA is legitimate since there are substantial phenomena, processes, and facts to which these aspects in ADA correspond. In other words, there are either linguistic or

cognitive sorts of *stuff* (entities, features, properties, processes and so on) that substantivize drawing the distinction within the general framework of ADA.³⁰ The first sort of interpretation has been a mainstream in philosophy until Grice's contributions to intention-based communication, Fodor's modularity thesis, and Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory.³¹ According to it, the domains of formal or natural languages inherit these aspects intrinsically in themselves. On the other hand, the cognitive substantiality view of the aspects in ADA holds that cognitive structures/ mechanisms, which underlyingly steer a language, substantivize the aspect distinction assumption because such cognitive structures/mechanisms inherit the aspects stipulated in ADA. Moreover, such substantial joints with which the aspects drawn in ADA meet in language or human cognition also restrict how many conceivable aspects can be stipulated in each interpretation of ADA. Furthermore, the viability of the framework of ADA can be grounded in its methodological convenience when these aspects are taken as stipulative categories to provide a systematic model for a language understanding or a study of language. In many approaches in linguistics and meta-semantics, these aspects are stipulated for the sake of some methodological clarity and theoretical progress. Regarding these three strands concerning with what grounds the viability of the framework of ADA, I believe that this framework has a great theoretical convenience for analyses of many notions in the philosophy of language although there is no decisive reason to believe that it substantially corresponds to languages or their underlying cognitive structures in the structural joints of them.

³⁰ Following Stojanovic (2014), I use the term *stuff* to not commit into a precise domain of discourse concerning with semantics or pragmatics. Here I have no intention commit myself into any technical use of the term as in stuff ontology.

³¹ See Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

For one thing, the substantiality view begs the question since it assumes that linguistic/cognitive sorts of stuff have semantic and pragmatic stuff intrinsically. If someone can point out any distinction between semantic and pragmatic stuff in virtue of corresponding linguistic/cognitive stuff, then such a distinction already needs to be either self-evident or previously grounded. Otherwise, it is unattainable to mark such and such substantial stuff as semantic or pragmatic. So, how to substantivize semantics and pragmatics by some corresponding linguistic/cognitive stuff already presupposes a distinction between what is semantics and pragmatics. That is to say, there might be sharply distinguishable stuff in human cognition or languages (i.e. inferential vs. decoding processes, competence vs. performance, compositionality vs. non-compositionality and etc.); nonetheless, this seemingly distinguishable stuff does not evidently pair up with semantic and pragmatic stuff. As such a pairing is attainable only if we have already known what characteristics make semantic/pragmatic stuff coincide with cognitive/linguistic stuff. Recalling the derivativeness of the semantics-pragmatics distinction, such linguistic or cognitive stuff can be used to stipulate an interpretation of the semantics-pragmatics distinction; yet, it does not mean that they intrinsically inherit the distinction.

For another thing, the substantiality view of the semantics-pragmatics distinction does not conclusively determine what framework/model works most viably for these allegedly substantial aspects even if these aspects are inherent in cognitive/linguistic stuff. In other words, the general framework of ADA, for instance, does not exhaust all the other viable frameworks to stipulate some complementary aspects in a given analysis of language or linguistic cognition. Thus, it cannot be the single definitive framework to account for so-called substantial aspects plausibly. First, any semantics-pragmatics distinction which occurs in the

framework of ADA rests on a taxonomy of somehow monotonic domains just as the cursiveness assumption and the autonomy assumption in the *cinquain* suggest. In other words, the ranges (outputs) of one domain-specific function are to be the inputs of the other domain-specific function to the effect that it is almost standard that syntax provides “input to semantics, which in turn provides input to pragmatics” (Huang, 2014, p.2). In this regard, the input-output relation between aspects is often proposed to explain the relations between aspects while they constitute-in varying degrees- substantial ground for the given L-related significance. Nevertheless, one does not have to endorse this monotonic model nor appeal to the input-output relation. Levinson (2000), here, remarks:

There is every reason then to try and reconstrue the interaction between semantics and pragmatics as the intimate interlocking of distinct processes, rather than, as traditionally, in terms of the output of the one being the input of the other. (p. 242)

As ADA suggests, this input-output depiction rests on the depiction of aspects as distinct n-tuple domains with distinguishable functions. Instead of taking these aspects as distinct n-tuple domains, one can rest her framework on a continuum consisting of a set of things that have particular characteristics (conventionality, truth-conditionality, and context-sensitivity) to different degrees. In this continuum framework of aspect distinction in languages, the semantics-pragmatics distinction dissolves into some further object-level problems depending on how to assign degrees of characteristics and how to define them. Nevertheless, these problems are akin to the surface problems concerning with the ADA such as a quest for a suitable criterion. Thus, such a continuum framework can stipulate the so-called substantial aspects in the equally viable way with the framework of ADA if any interpretation of this framework coherently and plausibly accounts for the relevant continuum of the proposed characteristics. Furthermore, one can also reject the input-output relation

by providing an intersectional framework where some phenomena concerning with L-related significance becomes a matter of one aspect to some degree and becomes a matter of another aspect to another degree. François Nemo (1999) offers such a framework where linguistic phenomena are distributed on a Cartesian plane in terms of their varying degrees of divergence and convergence. Again, how this distribution works out depends on some definitions of the relevant axis, namely semantics, and pragmatics. In this respect, Nemo defines two domain-specific functions for each aspect so that semantics covers lexically encoded content and/or truth/representation while pragmatics includes communicated content and/or linguistic acts (pp.345-50). Here, these domain-specific functions constitute four axes of a Cartesian plane where each linguistic phenomenon falls within intersections of these axes. Consequently, the substantiality view can be attainable through distinct frameworks and thereby no framework is indispensable for drawing out some aspects of language which are thought to be substantial in languages and/or human cognition. Thus, the substantiality view of the semantics-pragmatics distinction does not pertinently determine how to disambiguate or interrelate these allegedly substantial aspects even if these aspects must be postulated in any framework for the semantics-pragmatics distinction.

Considering such problems related to the substantiality view, the higher-order viability of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics becomes a matter of taxonomical modeling in a methodologically convenient manner. Thus, it seems a trivial attempt to find out a substantial basis for the semantics-pragmatics. As discussed in the earlier section, the semantics-pragmatics distinction is a stipulation within a framework that endorses some distinguishable aspects of some related explanandum in a language, moreover, this stipulation can be viably attainable within

different frameworks as well as in different interpretations of them. Consequently, the question of how to distinguish semantics from pragmatics in a principled way ultimately rests on the question of how to theorize the substantive points of interpretation in an aspect distinction framework (e.g. ADA, continuum model, intersectionalist model) and the question of under what framework these substantive points of interpretation are subsumed.

6.4 Concluding remarks

The object-level interpretations of the semantics-pragmatics distinction, not always but typically, rest on the interpretations of some or all of the assumptions in the *cinquain* which consists of derivativeness, integrity, sharpness, autonomy and cursiveness assumptions. Furthermore, such object-level interpretations of the distinction also typically rest on the presumptive assumption schema *ADA* which construes a framework demonstrating what a theorist presumes when she endorses distinguishable aspects (i.e. explanans) of some linguistic significance (i.e. explanandum) in a given language.

Hereby, *ADA*, within its framework, cashes out the substantive points of interpretation (i.e. a language *L*, explanatory significance *L*-related significance) and the distinguishing characteristics of aspects (i.e. domains and domain-specific functions) on which the object-level interpretations of the semantics-pragmatics distinction diverge. Nonetheless, *ADA*, within its framework, implicates that we can formulate the semantics-pragmatics distinction in indefinitely many distinct ways. For one thing, the substantive points of interpretation in *ADA* can be characterized and adopted in a number of distinct ways. For another thing, some preceding

notions/theories on which the substantive points of interpretation fundamentally rely can be construed in a number of distinct ways.

Yet, we can still hope for finding out one viable formulation which stands out amongst the rest. Nonetheless, the distinct object-level interpretations can be equally viable in terms of theoretical coherence and empirical plausibility. After all, these interpretations bear their own merits of theoretical coherence and empirical plausibility with respect to their particular construal of the substantive points of interpretation in ADA. Thus, the distinct formulations of the semantics-pragmatics distinction can be coherent and empirically plausible with respect to distinct explanans and explanandum in some general theory of language. Consequently, the question of how to draw the semantics-pragmatics distinction in a principled way boils down into the question of how to theorize some preceding notions coherently and plausibly within a framework which posits distinguishable aspects of a given language.

Furthermore, ADA, within its general framework, does not exhaust all the other possible models which permit theorist to viably hold the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Instead of adopting ADA, a theory can posit the semantics-pragmatics distinction within an alternative framework (e.g. continuum and intersectionalist models) by which the semantics-pragmatics boundaries are viably explained away. Thus, there are various object-level and higher-order disagreements on how to posit the semantics-pragmatics distinction; moreover, each disagreeing theory can be equally viable in terms of its own theoretical coherence and empirical plausibility that pertain to the adopted language, notions, concomitant theories, and the framework in which to construe them.

In this sense, we end up with a trivial formula for the semantics-pragmatics distinction which deflates the theoretical import of the question ‘What is the semantics-pragmatics distinction?’:

For any theory *T* which posits semantics and pragmatics within any framework *F*, semantics/pragmatics in *T* concerns with whatever is *semantic/pragmatic* in *T*.

As the formula suggests, the viability of a characterization of the distinction is ultimately derivative on the viability of the relevant theory *T* and the relevant framework *F*. In this respect, ‘semantics’ and ‘pragmatics’ turn out to be the stipulative categories under which more fundamental theories and analyses which underlie a construal of *T* and *F* are trivially abridged.

Still, if a characterization of the semantics-pragmatics distinction *D* within *F* is brought forward as the substantial and conclusive formula then the underlying theories and analyses behind *D* within *F* must be fundamentally substantial and conclusive in terms of explaining some theoretical significance (i.e. linguistic cognition, language understanding, communication, meaning, productivity, compositionality and so on) which the formula *D* within *F* also entertains. Even in that case, the conclusiveness and substantiality of the formula *D* within *F* secondarily -and contingently- lean on the substantiality and conclusiveness of underlying theories. In this respect, it still seems possible for us to bring forward an alternative formula *D** within *F* or *F** which equally coheres with the same theories in question. Thus, if the formula such as *D* within *F* is adopted as the principled distinction between semantics and pragmatics then *D* within *F* must hold the canonized aspects which the robust results of some substantial and conclusive theories which underlie *D* within *F* necessarily entail. Otherwise, schematizing the uncanonized distinct aspects within an uncanonized framework becomes a matter of methodological

convenience, and thus drawing the semantics-pragmatics distinction in a principled way turns out to be a trivial dispute.

Consequently, tackling the question of the semantics-pragmatics distinction has neither major nor primary import considering theoretical significance behind making such a distinction ultimately hinge on some fundamental questions and theories pertaining to the notions such as meaning, truth, context, communication, linguistic cognition and so on. Thus, rather than concentrating our theoretical foci and endeavors on drawing the semantics-pragmatics distinction, we are to scratch the surface of the question in order to face the primary questions underlying behind such a stipulative distinction. In this respect, I hold the terms *semantic* and *pragmatic* as merely methodologically convenient abridgments which might overshadow the essential discussions that these terms are laden with in the first place. To be able to canonize or substantivize such a stipulative distinction, we must initially have canonized accounts and theories which are already supposed to ground the viability of such a division of labor in a theory of language. Instead of seeking out the criteria or criterion for such a stipulative distinction, I here offer to go back to *Gricean innocence* in our analysis of some explanatory significance with respect to language study. By *Gricean innocence*, I emphasize how Grice attempts to construe a robust theory of meaning with respect to the role and scope of interlocutors' communicative intentions although he never appeals to the classificatory terms such as semantics and pragmatics. Such innocence can be preserved for each theory of the relevant linguistic explanandum once theorists recognize how trivial to draw the semantics-pragmatics distinction from the perspective of their own theory about the relevant linguistic explanandum.

REFERENCES

- Adams, F. & Fuller, G. (2007). Empty names and pragmatic implicatures, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 37 (3), 449-461.
- Allan, K., & Jaszczolt, K. M. (Eds.). (2012). *The Cambridge handbook of pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Allott, N. (2010). *Key terms in pragmatics*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Ariel, M. (2010). *Defining pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Austin, J. L. (1964). A plea for excuses. In V. C. Chappell (Ed.), *Ordinary language: Essays in philosophical method* (pp. 1-30). New York: Dover Publications.
- Austin, J. L. (1966). Three ways of spilling ink. *Philosophical Review*, 75(4), 427-440.
- Austin, J. L. (1975). *How to do things with words*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ayer, A. J. (1936). *Language, truth and logic*. London: V. Gollancz.
- Bach, K. (1981). Referential/attributive. *Synthese*, 49(2), 219-44.
- Bach, K. (1994). Conversational implicature. *Mind and Language*, 9(2), 124-162.
- Bach, K. (1997). The semantics-pragmatics distinction: What it is and why it matters. In *Pragmatik* (pp. 33-50). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Bach, K. (1999a). The myth of conventional implicature. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 22(4), 327-366.
- Bach, K. (1999b). The semantics pragmatics distinction: What it is and why it matters. In K. Turner (Ed.), *The semantics-pragmatics interface from different points of view* (pp. 65-84). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Bach, K. & Bezuidenhout, A. (2002). Distinguishing semantics and pragmatics. In J. K. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & D. Shier (Eds.), *Meaning and truth – investigations in philosophical semantics* (pp. 284-310). New York: Seven Bridges Press.
- Bach, K. (2003). Speech acts and pragmatics. In M. Devitt & R. Hanley (Eds.), *The Blackwell guide to philosophy of language* (pp.147-167). New Jersey: Blackwell.
- Bach, K. (2004a). Minding the gap. In C. Bianchi (Ed.), *The semantics/pragmatics distinction* (pp. 27-43). Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
- Bach, K. (2004b). Pragmatics and the philosophy of language. In L. Horn & G. Ward (Eds.), *The handbook of pragmatics* (pp. 463-487). New Jersey: Blackwell.

- Bach, K. (2005). Context ex machina. In Z. G. Szabó (Ed.), *Semantics vs. pragmatics* (pp. 15-44). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bach, K. (2006). The excluded middle: Semantic minimalism without minimal propositions. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 73(2), 435-442.
- Bach, K. (2007). Literal meaning. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 75(2), 487-492.
- Bach, K. (2012). Context dependence (such as it is). In M. García-Carpintero & M. Kölbel (Eds.), *The Continuum companion to the philosophy of language*. New York: Continuum International.
- Berg, J. (2002) Is semantics still possible? *Journal of Pragmatics*, 34(4), 349-359.
- Bianchi, C. (2004). Semantics and pragmatics: the distinction reloaded. *The semantics/pragmatics distinction* (pp.1-11). Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
- Borg, E. (2004). *Minimal semantics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Borg, E. (2005). Saying what you mean: Unarticulated constituents and communication. In *Ellipsis and nonsentential speech* (pp. 237-262). New York: Springer.
- Braun, D. (1993). Empty names. *Nous*, 27, 449-469.
- Braun, D. (1995). What is character? *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 24(3), 241-273.
- Cap, P. (2010). Pragmatics, micropragmatics and macropragmatics. *Lodz Papers in Pragmatics*, 6(2), 195-228.
- Caplan, B. (2003). Putting things in contexts. *Philosophical Review*, 112(2), 191-214.
- Cappelen, H., & Lepore, E. (2003). Context shifting arguments. *Philosophical perspectives*, 17, 25-50.
- Cappelen, H., & Lepore, E. (2005). Radical and moderate pragmatics: Does meaning determine truth conditions? In Z. G. Szabó (Ed.), *Semantics vs. pragmatics* (pp.45-71). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cappelen, H., & Lepore, E. (2006). Precis of insensitive semantics. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 73(2), 425-434.
- Cappelen, H., & Lepore, E. (2007). *Language turned on itself: The semantics and pragmatics of metalinguistic discourse*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cappelen, H., & Lepore, E. (2008). *Insensitive semantics: A defense of semantic minimalism and speech act pluralism*. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.

- Carnap, R. (1937). *The logical syntax of language*. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.
- Carnap, R. (1942). *Introduction to semantics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Carnap, R. (1955). Meaning and synonymy in natural languages. *Philosophical Studies*, 6(3), 33-47.
- Carnap, R. (1988). *Meaning and necessity: a study in semantics and modal logic*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Carston, R. (1999). The semantics/pragmatics distinction: A view from relevance theory. In K. Turner (Ed.), *The semantics/pragmatics interface from different points of view* (pp. 85-125). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Carston, R. (2002). Linguistic meaning, communicated meaning and cognitive pragmatics. *Mind & Language*, 17(1-2), 127-148.
- Carston, R. (2007). How many pragmatic systems are there. In M.J. Frapolli (Ed.), *Saying, meaning, referring. Essays on the philosophy of François Recanati* (pp. 18-48). Basingstoke: Macmillan Palgrave
- Carston, Robyn (2008a). Linguistic communication and the semantics/pragmatics distinction. *Synthese*, 165(3), 321-345.
- Carston, R. (2008b). *Thoughts and utterances: The pragmatics of explicit communication*. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.
- Chomsky, N. (1976). *Reflections on language*. London: Temple Smith.
- Chomsky, N. (2002). *On nature and language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Davidson, D. (1965). Theories of meaning and learnable languages. In Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed.), *Proceedings of the international congress for logic, methodology, and philosophy of science* (pp. 3-17). Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing.
- Davidson, D. (1967). Truth and meaning. *Synthese*, 17(3), 304.
- Davidson, D. (1968). On saying that. *Synthese*, 19(1), 130-146.
- Davidson, D. (1984). On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. *Inquiries into truth and interpretation* (pp.183-189). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Davidson, D. (1994). The social aspect of language. In B.F. McGuinness, et al (Eds.), *The philosophy of Michael Dummett* (pp. 1-16). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Dever, J. (2013). The revenge of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 27, 104-144.

- Donaldson, T., & Lepore, E. (2012). Context-sensitivity. In G. Russell and D. Fara (Eds.), *The Routledge companion to philosophy of language* (pp. 116-131). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Donnellan, K. (1966). Reference and definite descriptions. *Philosophical Review*, 75(3), 281-304.
- Donnellan, K. (1974). Speaking of nothing. *Philosophical Review*, 83(1), 3-31.
- Ezcurdia, M., & Stainton, R. J. (Eds.). (2013). *The semantics-pragmatics boundary in philosophy*. Ontario: Broadview Press.
- Fletcher, L. (2013). Why it isn't syntax that unifies the proposition. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 43(5-6), 590-611.
- Frege, G. (1997). *The Frege reader*. M. Beaney (Ed.). New Jersey: Blackwell.
- Fodor, J. A. (1960). What do you mean? *Journal of Philosophy*, 57 (15), 499-506.
- Fodor, J. A. (1975). *The language of thought*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Fodor, J. A. (1990). Psychosemantics, or, where do truth conditions come from? In W. G. Lycan (Ed.), *Mind and cognition* (pp. 190-213). New Jersey: Blackwell.
- Gauker, C. (2008). Zero tolerance for pragmatics. *Synthese*, 165(3), 359-371.
- Gauker, C. (2012). Semantics and pragmatics. In G. Russell & D. G. Fara (Eds.), *The Routledge companion to philosophy of language* (pp.18-28). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Gazdar, G. (1979). *Pragmatics: Implicature, presupposition, and logical form*. New York: Academic Press.
- Gillon, B. S. (2008). On the semantics/pragmatics distinction. *Synthese*, 165(3), 373-384.
- Grayling, A. C. (1982). *An introduction to philosophical logic*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Grice, H. P. (1957). Meaning. *Philosophical Review*, 66(3), 377-388.
- Grice, H. P. (1989). *Studies in the way of words*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hall, A. (2008). Free enrichment or hidden indexicals? *Mind & Language*, 23(4), 426-456.
- Higginbotham, J. (1985). On semantics. *Linguistic Inquiry*, 16(4), 547-593.

- Horn, L. R., & Ward, G. L. (Eds.). (2004). *The handbook of pragmatics*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Horn, L. R. (2006). *Drawing the boundaries of meaning: Neo-Gricean studies in pragmatics and semantics*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
- Huang, M. (2017). A plea for radical contextualism. *Synthese*, 194(3), 963-988.
- Huang, Y. (2014). *Pragmatics* (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jaszczolt, K. M. (2012). Semantics and pragmatics: The boundary issue. *Semantics: An international handbook of natural language meaning* (pp.1-37). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Jaszczolt, K. M. (2019). Rethinking being Gricean: New challenges for metapragmatics. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 145, 15-24.
- Kaplan, D. (1978). Dthat. *Syntax and Semantics*, 9, 221-243.
- Kaplan, David (1989). Demonstratives. In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (Eds.), *Themes from Kaplan* (pp. 481-563). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Katsos, N. (2008). The semantics/pragmatics interface from an experimental perspective: The case of scalar implicature. *Synthese*, 165(3), 385-401.
- Katz, J. J. (1972). *Semantic theory*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Katz, J. (1981). Literal meaning and logical theory. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 78(4), 203-233.
- Kellerwessel, W. (1998). Katz on semantics and pragmatics. *ProtoSociology*, 11, 110-119.
- King, J., & Stanley, J. (2005). Semantics, pragmatics, and the role of semantic content. In Z. G. Szabó (Ed.), *Semantics vs. pragmatics* (pp.112-164). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Korta, K., & Perry, J. (2007). Radical minimalism, moderate contextualism. In G. Preyer (Ed.), *Context sensitivity and semantic minimalism* (pp. 94-111). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kripke, S. (1977). Speaker's reference and semantic reference. In Peter A. French, T.E. Uehling Jr. & Howard K. Wettstein (Eds.), *Studies in philosophy of language* (pp. 255-296). Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Kripke, S. (1980). *Naming and necessity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Levinson, S. C. (1983). *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Levinson, S. C. (2000). *Presumptive meanings: The theory of generalized conversational implicature*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Lepore, E., & Smith, B. C. (Eds.). (2005). *The Oxford handbook of philosophy of language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lewis, D. (1970). General semantics. *Synthese*, 22, 18-67.
- Lewis, D. (1975). Languages and language. In K. Gunderson (Ed.), *Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science* (pp. 3-35). Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Lewis, D. (1979). Scorekeeping in a language game. In R. Bauerle (Ed.), *Semantics from different points of view* (pp. 172-187). Berlin: Springer.
- Lewis, D. (1980). Index, context, and content. In S. Kanger & S. Ohman (Eds.), *Philosophy and grammar* (pp. 79-100). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Martí, L. (2006). Unarticulated constituents revisited. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 29(2), 135-166.
- Montague, R. (1970). Pragmatics and intensional logic. *Synthese*, 22(1-2), 68-94.
- Montague, R. (1974). *Formal philosophy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Morris, C. W. (1938). Foundations of the theory of signs. In O. Neurath, et al (Eds.), *International encyclopedia of unified science* (pp. 1-59). Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Nemo, F. (1999). The pragmatics of signs, the semantics of relevance, and the semantic/pragmatic interface. In K. Turner (Ed.), *The semantics/pragmatics interface from different points of view* (pp. 343-417). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Pagin, P. (2005). Compositionality and context. In G. Preyer & G. Peter (Eds.), *Contextualism in philosophy: Knowledge, meaning, and truth* (pp. 303-348). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Peregrin, J. (1999). The pragmatization of semantics. In K. Turner (Ed.), *The semantics/pragmatics interface from different points of view* (pp. 419-442). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Perry, J. (1979). The problem of the essential indexical. *Noûs*, 3-21.
- Perry, J. (1998). Indexicals, contexts and unarticulated constituents. In *Proceedings of the 1995 CSLI-Amsterdam logic, language and computation conference* (pp. 1-16). Stanford, CA: CSLI.
- Piccinini, G. and Scott, S. (2010). Recovering what is said with empty names. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 40(2), 239-274.

- Potts, C. (2005). *The logic of conventional Implicatures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Predelli, S. (1998). I am not here now. *Analysis*, 58(2), 107-115
- Preyer, G., & Peter, G. (Eds.). (2007). *Context-sensitivity and semantic minimalism: New essays on semantics and pragmatics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Putnam, H. (1970). Is semantics possible? *Metaphilosophy*, 1(3), 187-201.
- Putnam, H. (1973). Meaning and reference. *Journal of Philosophy*, 70(19), 699-711.
- Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of 'meaning'. *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 7, 131-193.
- Putnam, H. (2013). The development of externalist semantics. *Theoria*, 79(3), 192-203.
- Recanati, F. (1989). The pragmatics of what is said. *Mind and Language*, 4(4), 295-329.
- Recanati, F. (1993). *Direct reference: From language to thought*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Recanati, F. (1994). Contextualism and anti-contextualism in the philosophy of language. In S. Tsohatzidis (Ed.), *Foundations of speech act theory: philosophical and linguistic perspectives* (pp. 156-166). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Recanati, F. (2001). What is said. *Synthese*, 128(1-2), 75-91.
- Recanati, F. (2002a). *Literal meaning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Recanati, F. (2002b). Does linguistic communication rest on inference? *Mind & Language*, 17(1-2), 105-126.
- Recanati, F. (2002c). Pragmatics and Semantics. In L. Horn & G. Ward (Eds.), *Handbook of pragmatics* (pp. 442-462). New Jersey: Blackwell.
- Recanati, F. (2002d). Unarticulated constituents. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 25(3), 299-345.
- Recanati, F. (2002e). What is said and the semantics/pragmatics distinction. In C. Bianchi (Ed.), *The semantics/pragmatics distinction* (pp. 45-64). Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
- Recanati, F. (2003). Literalism and contextualism: Some varieties. In G. Preyer & G. Peter (Eds.), *Contextualism in philosophy: Knowledge, meaning, and truth* (pp. 171-196). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Recanati, F. (2006). Crazy minimalism. *Mind and Language*, 21(1), 21-30.

- Recanati, F. (2007). It is raining (somewhere). *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 30(1), 123-146.
- Recanati, F. (2010a). *Truth-conditional pragmatics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Recanati, F. (2010b). Pragmatic enrichment. In D. Fara & G. Russell (Eds.), *The Routledge companion to philosophy of language* (pp. 67-78). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Recanati, F. (2012). Contextualism: Some varieties. In K. Allan, & K. Jaszczolt (Eds.), *Cambridge handbook of pragmatics* (pp. 135-149). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Russell, B. (1905). On denoting. *Mind*, 14(56), 479-493.
- Russell, B. (1910). Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 11(5), 108-128.
- Russell, B. (1957). Mr. Strawson on referring. *Mind*, 66(263), 385-389.
- Salmon, N. (2005). Two conceptions of semantics. In Z. G. Szabó (Ed.), *Semantics vs. pragmatics* (pp. 317-328). Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Searle, J. (1958). Proper names. *Mind*, 67(266), 166-173.
- Searle, J. R. (1962). Meaning and speech acts. *The philosophical Review*, 71(4), 423-432.
- Searle, J. (1969). *Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language*. Cambridge University Press.
- Searle, J. (1971). *The philosophy of language*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Searle, J. (1978). Literal meaning. *Erkenntnis*, 13(1), 207-224.
- Searle, J. R. (1980). The background of meaning. In *Speech act theory and pragmatics* (pp. 221-232). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Searle, J. R. (1989). How performatives work. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 12(5), 535-558.
- Soames, S. (2005). *Philosophical analysis in the twentieth Century, volume I: The dawn of analysis*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Soames, S. (2009). *Philosophical analysis in the twentieth century, volume 2: The age of meaning*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1986). *Relevance: Communication and cognition* (Vol.142). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Stalnaker, R. (1970). Pragmatics. *Synthese*, 22(1-2), 272-289.
- Stalnaker, R. (1981). Logical semiotic. In E. Agazzi (Ed.), *Modern logic: A survey* (pp 439-456). Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Corp.
- Stalnaker, R. (2014). *Context*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stanley, J. (2000). Context and logical form. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 23(4), 391-434.
- Stanley, J., & Szabó, Z. (2000). On quantifier domain restriction. *Mind and Language*, 15(2-3), 219-261.
- Stanley, J. (2002). Making it articulated. *Mind & Language*, 17(1-2), 149-168.
- Stanley, J. (2005). Semantics in context. In G. Preyer & G. Peter (Eds.), *Contextualism in philosophy: Knowledge, meaning, and truth* (pp. 221-54). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stanley, J. (2007). *Language in context: Selected essays*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Strawson, P. F. (1965). Truth: A reconsideration of Austin's views. *Philosophical Quarterly*, 15(61), 289-301.
- Strawson, P. F. (1950). On referring. *Mind*, 59(235), 320-344.
- Stojanovic, I. (2008). The semantics/pragmatics distinction. *Synthese*, 165(3), 317-319.
- Stojanovic, I. (2014). Prepragmatics: widening the semantics-pragmatics boundary. *Metasemantics: New essays on the foundations of meaning*, 311-326.
- Szabó, Z. G. (Ed.). (2005). *Semantics vs. pragmatics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Szabó, Z. G. (2006). The distinction between semantics and pragmatics. In E. Lepore & B. Smith (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of philosophy of language* (pp. 361-390). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Travis, C. (2008). *Occasion-sensitivity: Selected essays*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Turner, K. (Ed.) (1999). *The semantics/pragmatics interface from different points of view*. Elsevier.
- Turner, K. & von Heusinger, K. (Eds.) (2006). *Where semantics meets pragmatics*. Amsterdam: Elsevier

- Wilson, D. & Sperber, D. (1991). *Pragmatics and modularity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wilson, D. & Sperber, D. (2002). Relevance theory. In L. Horn & G. Ward (Eds.), *The Handbook of pragmatics* (pp. 607-632). New Jersey: Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, L. (2009). *Philosophical investigations*. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.
- Wittgenstein, L. (2013). *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*. Abingdon: Routledge.