

**A CRITICAL APPROACH TO KANT'S CONCEPTION OF EXPERIENCE
IN VIEW OF
LEIBNIZ'S ONTOLOGY**

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**by
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ABSTRACT

A Critical Approach to Kant's Conception of Experience

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In order for Kant's criticism of metaphysics which he calls 'speculative' to be valid and in order for his attempt to establish metaphysics as a science to be successful, experience which, in critical thought, determines the limits of knowing activity of human beings should be constituted within the framework of this thought. Kant's conception of experience is formed by preserving some aspects of that of Leibniz. However, since Kant's critical thought attempts to cancel Leibniz's conception of substance which is the basis of experience in Leibniz, experience cannot be constituted within the framework of critical thought.

ÖZET

Kant'ın Tecrübe Anlayışına Leibniz'in Ontolojisi Açısından Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım

Aliye Kovanlıkaya

Kant'ın spekülâtif olarak adlandırdığı metafiziğe yönelttiği eleştirilerin geçerli olabilmesi ve kendisinin metafiziği bir bilim olarak temellendirme girişiminin başarılı olabilmesi için, eleştirel düşüncede insanın tanıma faâliyetinin sınırını tayîn eden tecrübenin bu düşünce çerçevesinde tesîs edilebilmesi gereklidir. Kant'ın tecrübe anlayışı, Leibniz'in tecrübe anlayışının bazı cihetleri muhâfaza edilerek oluşturulmuştur. Fakat, Kant'ın eleştirel düşüncesi Leibniz'in tecrübe anlayışının zemîni olan cevher anlayışını iptâl etmeye çalıştığı için, tecrübe, eleştirel düşüncenin çerçevesi içinde kalınarak tesîs edilemez.

A CRITICAL APPROACH TO KANT'S CONCEPTION OF EXPERIENCE
IN VIEW OF
LEIBNIZ'S ONTOLOGY

Introduction	1
1. Kant's criticism of metaphysics	1
2. The role of experience in Kant's critical thought	7
2. The criticism Kant raised in his pre-critical period	11
I. Leibniz's conception of experience	28
1. The place of experience in Leibniz's system of thought	28
2. Dissection of experience	30
3. Experience as the soul's activity of sensing perceptions	33
4. Experience in view of the act of apperception	39
5. Experience in view of the act of preservation: Memory	46
6. Experience in view of the act of envisagement: Imagination	71
II. Leibniz's conception of substance	84
1. Substance in view of its being an indivisible unity	94
2. Substance in view of its being a Point of View	105
3. Substance in view of the independence of its activity	114
4. Substance in view of its creation	129
III. Kant's conception of experience	141
1. On the dissection of experience	143
2. Sensibility	146
3. Intuition	150
4. Transcendental apperception	155
5. Imagination	160
6. Understanding	171
IV. The problem of constitution of space and time in Kant's conception of experience	178
1. On space and time in view of transcendental aesthetic	178
2. The problem of constituting time as sensible intuition	195
3. The problem of constitution of space as sensible intuition	205
Appendix	211
An overall presentation of the literature on Leibniz and Kant	211
Works cited	221
Works consulted	224
Leibniz's and Kant's Works	224
Works on Leibniz and Kant	226

INTRODUCTION

The system of thought, the theoretical framework of which Kant determined in the Critique of Pure Reason¹ and developed in his subsequent works², constitutes the most significant step in the line of thought in the last two centuries after Descartes. Kant's critical thought not only influenced the ways of thinking in the sphere of thought as a theoretical activity, but also established the basis for the modern conception of human beings. Nevertheless, how Kant's ideas about morality and politics played a role in this determination can only be the subject of another full-fledged research, and falls out of the scope of this dissertation.

1. Kant's criticism of metaphysics

Kant's primary intention in the Critique of Pure Reason is to find out the necessary conditions which would define a science in the light of an analysis of sciences³ that fulfill these conditions, and as a result to find out the reasons for the

¹Kant, Immanuel, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781, Second Ed. 1787), nach der 1. und 2. orig. Ausg. hrsg. von Raymond Schmidt. 3. Aufl., Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1990. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by N. K. Smith, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1965. In our references to this work, we shall be using the page numbers in the first and second editions of the book, which will be designated with the letters 'A' and 'B', respectively.

²These works are Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), Werkausgabe in 12 Bänden, Suhrkamp, Band VII, 1994 (The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James Ellington, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1981); Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (1786), Werkausgabe in 12 Bänden, Suhrkamp, Band IX, 1994. (Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans. James Ellington, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1975); Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788), Werkausgabe in 12 Bänden, Suhrkamp, Band VII, 1994 (Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1956); Kritik der Urteilskraft, (1790), Werkausgabe in 12 Bänden, Suhrkamp, Band X, 1994 (Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1987).

³They are logic (Bviii), mathematics (Bxi-Bxii) and natural sciences (Bxii-Bxiv).

various inadequacies of metaphysics⁴, and thereby, to establish metaphysics itself as a science.⁵

The criticism Kant poses to metaphysical thinking preceding his thought is of particular importance for our approach to the subject. In his criticism, be it implicitly or explicitly stated, Kant mainly considers Leibniz's system of thought since it happened to be the dominant one that influenced the milieu wherein Kant's thought flourished.⁶

Kant's main objective is to turn metaphysics into a science like logic, mathematics, or natural science; and for metaphysics to become a science, it should fulfill the conditions, such as certainty⁷, universality⁸ and strict necessity⁹, which are

⁴Bxv

⁵What the framework and the content of the metaphysics are, for which he tries to establish foundations come to be clear only after the establishment. Since there is no room left for metaphysics within the limits set by Kant for the human's activity of knowing, Kant's effort to establish the foundation for metaphysics is actually a dismissal of metaphysics. Whether the basic principles of mathematics and natural sciences can be based on a foundation within the framework drawn by Kant constitute topics to be studied individually.

On this topic, see: A. Ayhan Çitil, The Theory of Object in Kant's Transcendental Thought and Some Consequences of a Deepening of This Theory, Boğaziçi University, 2000 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation).

⁶The criticisms Kant poses against Leibniz's system of thought have not started in his critical period. He criticizes different aspects and principles of Leibniz's system in his texts before the Critique of Pure Reason. (Our reference for Kant's pre-critical texts is Kant's gesammelte Schriften, which we shall designate by the letters 'AK' (ed. G. Reimer, Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1910). For translations of the texts into English, we will be referring to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770' (trans. and ed. by D. Walford and R. Meerbote, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992), which will be designated by the letters 'KTP'.) Therefore, if we look at from a different standpoint, the real reason underlying Kant's criticisms against Leibniz's system in general and against certain parts of this system in particular is not the method he developed in his critical thought. On the contrary, the method which formed the basis of his criticism against the metaphysical systems prior to him is developed by criticizing (if we disregard some other effects; primarily Hume's opinion about cause and effect connection), throughout his career, Leibniz's system in general and especially the concept of substance as it is within Leibniz's system.

⁷Ger. *Gewißheit*

⁸Ger. *Allgemeinheit*

⁹Ger. *strenge Notwendigkeit*

regarded as the necessary criteria for science.¹⁰ Therefore, any science with a claim to satisfy these criteria has to follow the pathway of these sciences.

It is impossible to determine from within experience¹¹ whether the generalizations reached through that very experience satisfy the criterion of universality necessary for a science.¹² Hence, the principles for science, Kant believes, must be independent from experience, i.e., *a priori*¹³.

¹⁰A1-A2/B3

¹¹Tr.tecrübe Ger.Erfahrung, Fr.expérience

¹²Experience tells us what is. It does not tell us why it is necessarily so and why it could not be otherwise. Therefore, it does not give the true universality. (A1-A2) System of critical thought created by Kant and the criticisms he poses against metaphysics prior to him depending on this system, in a way, is a continuation of the criticisms Hume posed against metaphysics, based on the claim that the apparent relation between cause and effect is not a necessary one. What Kant actually takes as the basis for his claim that generalizations which are reached only through experience can not be scientifically certain, is Hume's opinion about cause and effect relation.

¹³Each system of thought is built upon the distinctions it is based on, it emphasizes. One of the main distinctions in Kant's system is the one between *a priori* and *a posteriori*. "[...] independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses" is called *a priori* and "[...] distinguished from the empirical, which has its sources *a posteriori*, that is, in experience." (*ob es ein dergleichen von der Erfahrung und selbst von allen Eindrücken der Sinne unabhängiges Erkenntnis gebe. Man nennt solche Erkenntnisse a priori, und unterscheidet sie von den empirischen, die ihre Quellen a posteriori nämlich in der Erfahrung, haben*). (B2)

"[...] we shall understand by *a priori* knowledge, not knowledge independent of this or that experience, but knowledge absolutely independent of all experience. Opposed to it is empirical knowledge, which is knowledge possible only *a posteriori*, that is, through experience. (*Wir werden also im Verfolg unter Erkenntnissen a priori nicht solche verstehen, die von dieser oder jener, sondern die schlechterdings von aller Erfahrung unabhängig stattfinden. Ihnen sind empirische Erkenntnisse, oder solche, die nur a posteriori, d. i. durch Erfahrung, möglich sind, entgegengesetzt.*)" (B3)

When we consider Kant's conception of experience and the role of experience within his system, it will be more correct to understand *a priori* knowledge not as being independent of experience, but as being 'independent of all impressions of the senses' in view of its content. According to Kant, all our knowledge starts with experience. (A1/B1) Experience must have emerged in order to be able to talk about knowing something and also in order for this distinction to have a sense. In order for experience to emerge, on the other hand, the faculty of sensibility of the soul (*Seele*) should acquire material from its 'outside'. (Bx1) Therefore, in Kant's system, it is not really possible to talk about knowledge independent both of experience and of the material acquired through sensibility. If the distinction of *a priori* and *a posteriori* (which is essential for Kant's system) is to have a sense, then it must indeed depend upon the sources from which the material of the known object is acquired. As also stated by Kant, that which can be known *a priori* is that which the knowing subject can acquire from within himself only. (Bxxiii) Hence, what is *a priori* and what is *a posteriori* is related to how 'inside' and 'outside' are understood. Defining *a priori* knowledge as that which is independent of experience enables Kant to fulfill the conditions of universality and necessity, which cannot be derived from experience itself. Yet, the non-universal and contingent character of what depends upon the material acquired through the faculty of sensibility, does not guarantee by itself the universality and necessity of that which is independent from this material. Therefore, the congruence between that which is universal and necessary on the one hand and that which is *a priori* on the other according to

Metaphysics tries to answer the questions posed by human reason¹⁴ due to its very nature; the questions which go beyond experience.¹⁵ The reason why metaphysics fails is that it does not recognize any limits while applying the generalizations derived from experience to a field which transcends it, that it does not examine whether such generalizations have any possible employment¹⁶, and finally that it does not determine the borders of its own possibility.¹⁷ If metaphysics is to become a science, human reason has to determine what can be known *a priori*¹⁸ within its own scope, has to base its principles upon this ground, and has to accept to rule out of science everything that lies beyond its scope.¹⁹

In fact, for metaphysics to become a science, the legitimate basis and framework for this speculative act of reason that goes beyond experience has to be determined scientifically. Therefore, what has to be done first is to determine how, what and to what extent human reason can know independently from experience.²⁰ What Kant means by *critique*²¹ of *pure*²² *reason*²³ refers precisely to this. Therefore,

Kant, is not clear. This congruence certainly has a ground when the entirety of the system is considered; but, in view of the entirety of the system, there is no explanation for the reason *why* that which is independent, in view of its source, from the material acquired through sensibility could not be otherwise or *why* that which is dependent upon this material could be otherwise.

¹⁴Ger. *Vernunft* Fr. *raison*

¹⁵Avii, B21

¹⁶Axii, A3/B7

¹⁷Bxxxv

¹⁸Aviii

¹⁹Axiii-Axiv

²⁰B22

²¹Kant uses the term 'critique/criticism' (*Kritik*) to distinguish his own position from prior metaphysicians'. What is meant by 'critique' is not a criticism of prior systems of thought or books. (Axii) 'Criticism' is against 'dogmatism'. Dogmatism is employment of reason on the basis of concepts alone for pure knowledge transcending the limits of possible experience without inquiring into how these concepts are acquired; it is the procedure of reason without first determining the limits of its own powers. (Bxxxv) According to Kant, it is possible to name the totality of the principles that pure reason includes as the 'organon' of pure reason. A complete application of this organon could well form the system of pure reason. (A11/B24-B25)) Kant's aim with the *critique of pure reason* is to examine the pure reason itself only and to provide a determination of its source and limits as the *propaedeutic* to the system of pure reason. (A11/B25) This critique is also transcendental. (A12/B26)

the subject-matter of the Critique of Pure Reason is how the transcendental *a priori* grounds and proper limits of this speculative activity of reason are determined by this activity itself.²⁴

Transcendental knowledge inquires into how it is possible for us to know the knowledge *a priori*, rather than the object of knowledge. (A11-12/B25) Therefore, transcendental knowledge is pure *a priori* knowledge. Kant's aim is not to establish a complete system of transcendental thought, therefore a doctrine, but to determine *a priori* principles which make possible knowledge itself. (A12/B26)

²²Ger.rein.

Kant distinguishes that which is pure *a priori* from that which is only *a priori*. If it is not mixed with anything empirical, then that which is *a priori* is at the same time pure. (B3) For example, though 'each alteration has its cause (*eine jede Veränderung hat ihre Ursache*)' is *a priori*, it is not pure because the concept of 'alteration (*Veränderung*)' can be derived only from experience. (B3) Therefore, *a priori* should be understood as that which is independent from the material received through sensibility, and pure as that which is dependent not on the sensing aspect of the soul, but on its thinking aspect.

²³"[...] reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of *a priori* knowledge. Pure reason is, therefore, that which contains the principles whereby we know anything absolutely *a priori* ([...] *ist Vernunft das Vermögen, welches die Prinzipien der Erkenntnis a priori an die Hand gibt. Daher ist reine Vernunft diejenige, welche die Prinzipien, etwas schlechthin a priori zu erkennen, enthält.*") (A11)

²⁴Kant divides 'pure reason (*reine Vernunft*)' which 'is, indeed, so perfect a unity (*eine so vollkommene Einheit*)' (Axiii) into two in view of its activity:

"Now if reason is to be a factor in these sciences, something in them must be known *a priori*, and this knowledge may be related to its object {correspondent in intuition}* in one or other of two ways, either as merely determining it and its concept (which must be supplied from elsewhere) or as also making it actual. The former is theoretical**, the latter practical*** knowledge of reason. (*Sofern in diesen nun Vernunft sein soll, so muß darin etwas a priori erkannt werden, und ihre Erkenntnis kann auf zweierlei Art auf ihren Gegenstand bezogen werden, entweder diesen und seinen Begriff (der anderweitig gegeben werden muß) bloß zu bestimmen, oder ihn auch wirklich zu machen. Die erste ist theoretische, die andere praktische Erkenntnis der Vernunft.*") (Bix-x)

Kant talks about the theoretical activity of the reason also as 'speculative****' activity. Based on this distinction Kant claims that such concepts as God, freedom and immortality of soul, which form the main subject of metaphysics before him, cannot be the subject-matter of the knowledge of theoretical reason. (Bxxx) This is the most significant distinction in Kant's thought, in view of the effects it has on the modern conception of human being. Regardless of Kant's intention, this distinction forms the basis of conceiving *philosophy* and also science which are in fact a practical activity as the one which consists of reasoning, on condition that it remain dependent on experience. This distinction led the human being to feel himself as the sole ruler of the limited world which is the subject-matter of the knowledge of theoretical reason, and therefore, to know no limits (since there is no criterion in view of theoretical reason) in reshaping this world through its practical activity.

*Since both '*Objekt*' and '*Gegenstand*' are translated as 'object' in the translations of the Critique of Pure Reason into English by Norman Kemp Smith and J.M.D. Meiklejohn, we shall be using the term 'correspondent in intuition', which we shall be employing as the equivalent of '*Gegenstand*' to preserve this distinction, between { and } when we quote from the texts in English.

**Ger.theoretische: From Greek 'θεωρία' (from θεωρέω: be sent to consult an oracle; see; look at, behold, inspect, gaze, gape; observe; perceive)

***Ger.praktische: From Greek πράξις (from πράσσω: pass through, pass over; experience certain fortunes; achieve, effect, accomplish; effect an object, be successful; to be busy with; manage affairs, do business, act; transact, negotiate, manage; practise; study; deal with, finish off)

****Ger.spekulative: From *speculum* in Latin, which means mirror, reflector.

According to Kant, the knowledge of theoretical reason cannot go beyond the limits of possible experience.²⁵ The kind of knowledge that both metaphysics and the critical reason – which tries to find out how metaphysics is possible – aim at attaining is the knowledge reached independently of experience. Therefore, the question that demands an answer is what reason can know *a priori* without transcending the limits of experience.²⁶ If things which emerge in experience are completely independent from the one who experiences them, if one who experiences contributes nothing to experience, then, it is not possible for him to know something independently from experience, i.e., *a priori*.²⁷

Accordingly, Kant states, what we can possibly know are on the one hand things that arise in experience, and on the other, those conditions which they are subject to and which arise from the one who experiences.²⁸ It is not possible for one who experiences to know anything that is not subject to these conditions, or to know something as it is not subject to those conditions²⁹, i.e., in itself.³⁰ According to Kant,

²⁵Bxix

²⁶Axiv, Axvii

²⁷Bxx-Bxxiii

²⁸These conditions are space and time which are the forms of sensibility (Ger.*Sinnlichkeit*, Fr.*sensibilité*), and categories which are pure concepts of the faculty of understanding (Ger.*Verstand*, Fr.*entendement*).

²⁹The distinction that Kant accepts is between ‘things as appearances (*Dinge als Erscheinungen*)’ and ‘thing in itself (*Ding an sich, Sache an sich*)’. However these terms fall short of putting forth the matter properly. Things which can be known within the framework drawn by Kant are not appearances (appearance: the material the soul receives through the faculty of sensibility), but that which emerges in accordance with the conditions of experience. Second, it is not possible to talk about *a thing* or *things* that are not subject to these conditions. However, in order to avoid the absurd consequence that there can be appearances without something that appears, Kant talks about thing in itself or things in themselves which cannot be known, nevertheless which are the sources of appearances. (Bxxvi) He is forced to admit a thing which is not subject to the conditions of experience as the source of what emerges in experience when he states that a thing is knowable only insofar as it is subject to those conditions. However, since things which can be known are limited to the conditions of experience and to those which are subject to these conditions, it is not possible to say *knowingly* that a thing or things that are not subject to these conditions exist. Kant, insofar as he preserves this distinction, is obliged to distinguish either between things that can be known and that cannot be known, or between knowable and unknowable aspects of things. But such a distinction can

the reason why metaphysics fails lies in its attribution of the conditions of those which arise within experience to things which cannot arise in experience.³¹

2. The role of experience in Kant's critical thought

Kant's critical thought is based on experience both because it determines the limits of the theoretical activity of human reason depending on experience alone, and also because it tries to ground this activity taking experience as his starting point. Therefore, in order for Kant's criticism of metaphysics to be credible, experience should be constituted within the limits that Kant determined.

Kant takes experience as it emerges in intuition³² and accordingly he devotes himself to study the conditions that caused experience to emerge as such.³³ In the manner of a dissection he then goes on to examine the conditions of the emergence of what corresponds in experience in relation to the activities of the faculties of the

be based neither on experience nor on the conditions of experience. Furthermore, saying that 'thing in itself' is the source of that which emerges in experience in view of its material (appearance) is saying something, against Kant's claim, that transcends experience (A288/B344), because thing in itself is not one of the conditions of experience that comes from one who experiences.

³⁰What Kant attempts here is to do something for metaphysics that is similar to what Galileo (Bxii-xiii) and Copernicus (Bxxii) did in physics. Assuming concepts as conforming to things which emerge in experience is a blind alley for metaphysics. (Bxvi) The path that should be followed is the assumption that things which emerge in experience conform to the concepts that constitute the ground of experience.(Bxxii)

³¹According to Kant, reason's employment of the categories which are the pure concepts of the faculty of understanding and which are only for empirical employment in a manner to transcend the limits of possible experience is transcendental *Schein*. (A295-296/B352-353)

³²Ger.*Anschauung*

"In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects {correspondents in intuition}, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed. (*Auf welche Art und durch welche Mittel sich auch immer eine Erkenntnis auf Gegenstände beziehen mag, es ist doch diejenige, wodurch sie sich auf dieselbe unmittelbar bezieht, und worauf alles Denken als Mittel abzweckt, die Anschauung.*)" (A19/B33)

³³The fact that Kant deals with experience in this manner is not just a matter of method. When we consider the claim that knowledge starts from experience, the establishment of the foundation of the theoretical activity must also start from experience. Within the framework Kant draws for the theoretical activity of the human being, the only thing that the human being can immediately know and face with is the correspondent that emerges in experience. The human reason's being able to recognize its own faculties is possible only in view of the correspondents presented in experience.(B23)

soul.³⁴ Such a method of dissection, is *a posteriori* in that it takes what corresponds in intuition as its starting point and is analytical in that it explores the basis and conditions of experience through dissection of experience by faculties.³⁵ The correspondent in intuition is dissected into its elements by the discursive activity of reason³⁶ which is not spontaneous. Sensibility is a faculty³⁷ through which the soul is affected³⁸ in some way and receives representations.³⁹ And that which arises as an affection in this way in the faculty of receiving representation is sensation.⁴⁰ Sensation is a representation that arises as a result of affection. The raw material of

³⁴Ger.*Gemüt, Seele* Fr.*Âme*.

When Kant talks about soul in view of certain faculties he uses the word *Gemüt*. He talks about the faculty of sensibility both as the faculty of *Gemüt* (A19) and of *Seele* (A94-95). Faculty of understanding as spontaneous theoretical activity of reason is the activity of *Gemüt*. (A50-A52/B74-B76) Imagination (Ger.*Einbildungskraft*, Fr.*imagination* (A78/B103)) and the act of transcendental apperception (Ger.*Apperzeption*, Fr.*aperception* (A94-95)) is the activity of *Seele*. (A94/95) Kant states that sensibility, imagination and pure apperception which are original faculties of *Seele*, cannot be derived from any faculty (these can be nothing other than understanding and reason as a faculty of reasoning) of *Gemüt*. (A94) In addition, in the section where he discusses whether it can be known if the soul is a substance or not, if it is mortal or not, what is referred to is *Seele*. (A72/B97, A348-A351) When we consider all these, it can be said that that which lies at the ground is *Seele* with regard to receiving appearances, ability to represent, to envisage and to provide the unity of these activities. What Kant means by *Gemüt* is not different from *Seele*. *Gemüt* can be understood as *Seele* in view of the activity of faculties geared to knowing. All activities must belong to *Seele*.

³⁵The source of the view that Kant's dissection of experience is analytical and *a posteriori* is Schopenhauer's assessments regarding Kant's method.

On this topic see Nur Ateş; The Concept of Substance in Kant's and Schopenhauer's Ontologies: A Critical Comparison, Boğaziçi University, 1997 (unpublished M.A. thesis).

³⁶Ger.*diskursive*.

The activity in question is reasoning.

³⁷"The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects {correspondents in intuition}, is entitled sensibility (*Die Fähigkeit (Rezeptivität), Vorstellungen durch die Art, wie wir von Gegenständen affiziert werden, zu bekommen, heißt Sinnlichkeit*)." (A19/B33)

This should not be understood as meaning that the source of the representations the soul receives through sensibility are correspondents that emerge in intuition depending on the conditions of experience. Correspondents in intuition are not the source of these representations, but they result from the envisagement of these representations by the soul in intuition, in accordance with *a priori* conditions of experience. The source of the representations that the soul receives through sensibility is the thing in itself. (A30-A31/B45-B46, B164-165)

³⁸This affection cannot be subject to cause and effect relation within the framework of transcendental thought.

³⁹Ger.*Vorstellung* Fr.*représentation*

⁴⁰A20/B34

Ger.*Empfindung* Fr.*sensation, sentiment, sens*

representation is the appearance⁴¹ of that which creates this affection. The forms of representation are space and time, as conditions which belong to one who senses.⁴² Space is the condition only for the appearances in outer sense⁴³, whereas time is the immediate condition for appearances in inner sense, and the mediate condition for those in the outer sense.⁴⁴ Appearances which are thereby subjected to space and time are brought into intuition through the soul's⁴⁵ faculty of imagination in accordance with the schemata of the understanding.⁴⁶ The pure concepts of understanding which is the spontaneous activity of the faculty of thought, are the conceptualized schemata of imagination⁴⁷ which in turn are the transcendental determinations of time. The emergence of what corresponds in intuition depends on the imagination's activity of bringing into intuition, and its recognition thereby depends on the act of apperception "in the guise of the categories"⁴⁸ and on the unity of this act itself.⁴⁹

⁴¹Ger.*Erscheinung* Fr.*appearance*.

⁴²Kant uses the word 'appearance' in different meanings. In this dissertation what we mean by 'appearance', following Kant's definition, is the material received through sensibility. Kant uses the word 'appearance' also for correspondents as being representations in intuition. Although correspondents are appearances in some sense, since the emergence of correspondents in intuition involves something other than appearances, they are not the same thing.

⁴³A26/B42

⁴⁴A34/B50

⁴⁵*Seele*

⁴⁶Tr.*kalp* Ger.*Schema*

⁴⁷A138-A140/B177-B178

⁴⁸"*unter dem Namen der Kategorien*" (B153-B154)

⁴⁹A94-A95

Both the schemata of imagination and the pure concepts of the faculty of understanding are determinations of time. The imagination's activity of envisagement and understanding's activity of knowing should not be evaluated independently from each other. Determinations of time are conditions of both envisagement which is an activity of representing in intuition and of conceptualization (grasping representations through a concept) as an activity of apperceiving or becoming conscious. If the point is not understood in this way, the fact that the correspondent in intuition emerges in accordance with these conditions and the fact that it is being understood in this way will be only coincidental. Here what we would like to note is that the constitution of time is essential for Kant's transcendental system.

As we stated, for Kant's general criticism of metaphysics – which also attacks Leibniz's system of thought - to be credible, it should offer a constitution of experience within the framework that Kant himself has drawn. And for experience to be constituted, *a priori* conditions of experience should be provided with a foundation again within the same limits.

In this inquiry, we will try to show that space and time, which are *a priori* conditions for experience, cannot be constituted within Kant's system. In doing this, we will claim that Kant's conception of experience is similar to that of Leibniz in terms of its method (that is to say, in the sense that it provides an account of dissection of experience in relation to the faculties attributed to the soul), nevertheless we will try to show that it is impossible to constitute such an experience within the limits determined by Kant, basing our argument on the fact that the bond of this experience with its ontological grounds is broken, because the substance which constitutes the basis of Leibniz's conception of experience is ruled out of the sphere of the theoretical activities of reason.⁵⁰

Another point we want to emphasize is that Kant's objection to the concept of substance in Leibniz's thought is not limited to his critical period. From the very beginning of his career, at the heart of his thought lies the effort to reject Leibniz's ontology which considers the soul as a substance with an independent activity. Kant's ideas about space and time which belong to the period before his critical thought should be evaluated keeping this point in mind. This will not only provide us

⁵⁰Our aim in this dissertation is neither generally to defend Leibniz's views nor to reply to Kant's criticisms of different aspects of Leibniz's system of thought. What we aim at is restricted to what we stated above. Although we think that a critical evaluation of Leibniz's thought is necessary, we are of the opinion that such an evaluation can be made neither on the ground nor on the occasion of Kant's criticisms of it. We consider that a proper critical evaluation can be made in view of Plato's and Aristotle's thoughts, and by taking Christian theology into account.

with a key to understand how Kant came up with the account of space and time in his critical thought, but it also will help us to see the continuity in his thought, which is generally thought to consist of two different periods.

2. The criticism Kant raised in his pre-critical period

Substance, in Kant's system of critical thought, is one of the categories of the faculty of understanding.⁵¹ The schema of this category is the permanence in time.⁵² Substance in that sense cannot be regarded as the source of its own activity because it is subject to the unity of categories. Substance in Kant's critical thought is just one of the conditions for the emergence of what corresponds in experience, and is limited by the unity of categories.⁵³ Based on this reason, it cannot be known within the framework of critical thought whether soul is a substance or not.⁵⁴ Therefore, it is impossible to know the soul through the theoretical activity of reason. However, based on the fact that the faculties that provide the emergence of experience are the faculties of the soul within the framework of critical thought as well, all the activities are, in fact, activities of the soul, regardless whether 'substantiality' might or might not be attributed to the soul. Such an activity depends upon an *outer*⁵⁵ influence since the material of the correspondent in intuition is received from outside of the soul through its faculty of sensibility.

⁵¹A80/B106

⁵²A143/B183

⁵³On this topic see H. Bülent Gözkân, The Problem of the Constitution of "Self" and "Reason" in Kant's Transcendental Thought, Boğaziçi University, 2000 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation).

⁵⁴A348/351

⁵⁵Kant makes a distinction between transcendental outside and empirical outside. Those that are outside of us empirically are correspondents in intuition that we conceive as subject to space which is outside of our body. (A23/B38) And that which is transcendently outer is the thing in itself. (A372/373)

Leibniz's system of thought is based on a concept of substance which Kant tries to rule out of the theoretical activity of human reason. This system is based on a principle of God which, according to Kant, can only be reached by a reasoning that goes far beyond the legitimate limits of the employment of reason.⁵⁶

According to Leibniz, substance is an ontological unit which is simple,⁵⁷ and since it does not have parts it is also not subject to natural generation and destruction,⁵⁸ and bears the source and principle of its activity in itself⁵⁹. For Leibniz, substance performs its activity according to a harmony which is pre-established by God.⁶⁰ After all, the essential reason for its creation is to contribute to this harmony by actualizing it.

A substance⁶¹ is independent from other substances in terms of its existence and its activity.⁶² It is impossible for substances to affect each other in whatsoever manner.⁶³ The material that each substance will direct its activity at, the conditions that make this material emerge, and the principles of this activity are all innately

⁵⁶G VI 612/L 646 (M30)

The work we followed in reading Leibniz's texts is 'Leibniz, G.W., Philosophischen Schriften', edited by C.I. Gerhardt, which we will refer to with the letter 'G'. (7 volumes, Berlin 1875-1890). Unless otherwise stated, the work we will take as our basis for texts in English is the second printing of the second edition of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, translated and edited by L. E. Loemker (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1989), which we will be designating by the letter 'L'. What we designate by 'M' is Leibniz's text called 'Monadology'.

⁵⁷G VI 607/L 643 (M1)

⁵⁸G VI 607/L 643 (M4, M5)

⁵⁹G VI 608, 609/L 643-644 (M11, M15)

⁶⁰GV VI 616/L 648 (M59)

'Pre-established harmony (*l'harmonie préétablie*)' is one of the fundamental principles of Leibniz's system of thought.

⁶¹What we refer to here is created substance. According to Leibniz, God is uncreated substance. (Letter to Bosses, dated February 5, 1712, G II 439/AG 198)

The work we designate by 'AG' is G.W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays (translated and edited by R. Ariew and D. Garber, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1989)

⁶²The principle of the existence and activity of substances is God and the harmony constituted by God. For this reason, once the substance is created it is not possible to talk about any intervention of God on the activity of the substance. According to Leibniz, this would indicate a deficiency in God's original decision, which contradicts the perfection of God.

⁶³G VI 607/L 643 (M7)

given. Each substance exists in order to represent the entire universe to the extent of the perfection of its own activity.⁶⁴ Each substance innately bears the representations of other substances in itself.⁶⁵ The activity of the substance is to clarify and to distinguish that which is obscure and confused in itself in order to fulfill its share of the pre-established harmony.⁶⁶ In other words, the nature of the substance consists of representing or expressing what is given to it by creation. This is also what determines the degree of perfection of substance's activity.⁶⁷

Substance does not lack anything in respect of the representations of other substances. What distinguishes substances from each other is the degree of perfection in their activity of expressing these representations, in other words, their being created in order to perform their activities as they do.⁶⁸ The representations which are given by creation, in considered from the point of view of the substance's activity of expressing, are called perceptions⁶⁹. The representations of other

⁶⁴G VI 616/L 648, 649 (M56,62)

⁶⁵G VI 616/L 648 (M56)

⁶⁶G VI 616/L 648-649 (M60)

⁶⁷G VI 616/L 648-649 (M60)

⁶⁸G VI 616/L 648-649 (M60)

For substance, Leibniz uses the term 'monad' (Fr.*monade*, Gr.*μονάς*). This term emphasizes both the unity and the singularity of the substance.(G VI 598/L 636 (PNG1), 'PNG': 'Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce, fondés en Raison', 1714)) For this reason, it suits Leibniz's system of thought very well and in this respect, it is a technical term. This term also enables Leibniz not to define or explain the substance via things that emerge in experience or that can be reached starting from experience. Because even though Leibniz was obliged frequently to discuss which things can be or can not be substances, what really counts is the determination of the conditions of being a substance. The term 'monad' also enables talking about all substances at the same level, regardless of the degree of perfection of their activities, and saying that the source of the multitude that emerges in human experience is related to the plurality of substances. Each substance is at the same level with others only in respect of its containing in itself the representations of all other substances. The reason for existence for each is its performing a different activity than all others. Therefore, what we should understand from the term 'monad' is being substance only in view of its containing in itself the representations of all other substances.

⁶⁹G VI 608-609/L 644 (M14)

Perceptions at this level are confused and they correspond to appearances in Kant's conception of experience in view of the fact that they make up the material of that which is represented in experience.

substances and the confused perceptions that are innately in the substance are one and the same thing. And the internal principle of perception is appetite.⁷⁰

The substance which is simple and indivisible - because it is not composed of the coexistence of parts, but which still includes a multitude in itself -, which is not subject to natural generation and destruction, which is active and which is the source and ground of its own activity is the soul.⁷¹ Each soul has its own world.⁷² Anything that emerges in our experience takes place in our own world. What seems to us as interaction in experience is, indeed, nothing but the actualization of a pre-established harmony. In that sense, it is impossible for the soul to be subjected to an outer influence, because the 'outside' of soul is not. Leibniz's conception of space and time should be evaluated in the light of this conception of substance.

⁷⁰G VI 609/L 644 (M15)

Fr.*appetit*

⁷¹"If we wish to designate by soul everything which has perceptions and appetites in the general sense which I have just explained, all simple substances or created monads could be called souls. But since sentiment is something more than a simple perception, I agree that the general name of monads or entelechies is enough for simple substances which have only perception and that only those should be called souls in which perception is more distinct and accompanied by memory (*Si nous voulons appeler Ame tout ce qui a perceptions et appetits dans le sens general que je viens d'expliquer, toutes les substances simples ou Monades creées pourroient être appelées Ames; mais, comme le sentiment est quelque chose de plus qu'une simple perception, je consens, que le nom general de Monades et d'Entelechies suffise aux substances simples, qui n'auront que cela, et qu'on appelle Ames seulement celles, dont la perception est plus distincte et accompagnée de mémoire.*") (G VI 610/L 644 (M19))

According to Leibniz's system of thought, the fact that the correspondents in our experience emerge in such a manner, that is to say, the fact that the fullness in space and time are divided into parts in this way, has to depend totally on the soul's activity in accordance to harmony. Yet, those that emerge in experience, metaphysically, depend on other substances through the fact that their materials are representations that the soul contains in itself in view of the monad aspect of the soul. Leibniz's want to name everything (those that look nonliving, plants, animals, human beings) in the created world as substance in some sense, and to form a conception of substance which makes it possible should be evaluated from this standpoint. Such classification is one that is made from within experience. The only substance that human being can know starting from experience is his own soul; it is only through this knowledge that he can understand what it is to be substance and that he can see other things as substances. Therefore, entelechy, soul in its restricted meaning above and spirit (*esprit*) should be understood not as different classes of substance, but as different aspects of the activity of soul, similar to Kant who distinguishes faculties of soul, by dissecting experience. When we stop trying to take this as a matter of naming and classification, we will see that the substance which is the ontological unit of Leibniz's system of thought is the soul.

⁷²G VI 616/L 648 (M57)

According to Leibniz, space is the order of coexistence⁷³, and time is the order of succession⁷⁴.⁷⁵ The order of space and time determine the manner in which the representations in its monadic aspect will be expressed. This order is given to the soul in its creation by God.⁷⁶

Kant's conception of space and time before and during his critical period is derived from Leibniz's and Newtonians' thoughts concerning space and time. What is of concern for us here is to show that, during both periods, space and time are determined in relation to the outer influences between substances.

In his first published work⁷⁷, Kant bases space on the assumption that substances are open to the outer influences.⁷⁸ Hence, space is the mutual interaction of substances.⁷⁹ Soul can both influence and be influenced by the others.⁸⁰ The only

⁷³Fr.coexistence

⁷⁴Fr.succession

⁷⁵"As for my own opinion, I have said more than once that I hold space to be something merely relative, as time is: that I hold it to be an order of co-existences as time is an order of successions (*Pour moy, j'ay marqué plus d'une fois, que je tenois l'Espace pour quelque chose de purement relatif, comme le Temps; pour un ordre des Coexistences, comme le temps est un ordre de successions*).” (G VII 363/L 682)

The texts most frequently referred to when Leibniz's thoughts about space and time are in question are his correspondences with Samuel Clarke, one of the followers of Newton. (1715-1716, G VII 352-440/L 675-721) Leibniz's target in these texts is to defend against the Newtonians that space and time cannot each be a substance or an absolute existence on their own, nor can they be a characteristic of God or things. Space and time as ideas have not been the basic topic of discussion in these texts. But in the evaluation of these texts, it should be taken into consideration that space and time are two of the ideas that are innate in the soul. (G V 133-142/RB 146-151 (NE),

“RB”: G.W. Leibniz: *New Essays on Human Understanding*, translated and edited by P. Remnant and J. Bennett, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.

“NE”: *Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain*.

⁷⁶G V 136-137/RB 149-150

⁷⁷“Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte, und Beurtheilung der Beweise, deren sich Herr von Leibniz und andere Mechaniker in dieser Streitsache bedient haben, nebst einigen vorhergehenden Betrachtungen, welche die Kraft der Körper überhaupt” (1747, AK I 1-181). The source we used for the English translation of the text is the book titled *Kant*, edited by G. Rabel. (“Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces”, The Clarendon Press, 1963, pp.1-8)

⁷⁸“If substances had no power to act outside themselves, there would be no space and no extension (*Wenn die Substanzen keine Kraft hätten außer sich zu wirken, so würde keine Ausdehnung, auch kein Raum sein*).” (AK I 23 §9/G. Rabel, *Kant*, p. 5)

⁷⁹AK I 20 §6/G. Rabel, *Kant*, p.5

thing here which may seem to be against the Newtonians and near to Leibniz is that Kant does not regard space as having an absolute existence, but bases it on the interaction of things. However, when we regard this attitude from the point of view of the substance, it turns out to be just the opposite of Leibniz's conception of space.

In his work published in 1755⁸¹, though Kant preserves his conception of space as the outcome of substances' acting on their outside, and though, therefore, it should be regarded as a connection, he gradually starts opposing Leibniz in a more explicit way. In that text, he analyses the principle of sufficient reason⁸², which is one of the most important principles in Leibniz's thought. However, since he regards reason⁸³ in this principle not as sufficient, being the ground of what comes to be but as a ground, the positing of which makes reasonable the consequence, and thereby as a determining⁸⁴ ground⁸⁵ or reason, though he accepts this principle he argues that it does not include Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles⁸⁶:

⁸⁰“[...] we can also understand that the soul can act on other substances. It must be able to do this as it resides in a definite place, for by place or location we mean the mutual interaction of substances. The inner state of the soul is nothing but the sum of all its ideas and conceptions, and in so far as these refer to the outside, they are influenced by the forces of matter. (*Die Schwierigkeit, die hieraus entspringt, wenn von der Wirkung der Seele in den Körper die Rede ist. Und wie diese durch die Benennung einer vis activae überhaupt könne gehoben werden. [...] daß die Seele nach draußen aus diesem Grunde müsse wirken können, weil sie in einem Orte ist. Denn wenn wir den Begriff von demjenigen zergliedern, was wir den Ort nennen, so findet man, daß er die Wirkungen der Substanzen in einander andeutet. [...] Nun ist der ganze innerliche Zustand der Seele nichts anders, als die Zusammenfassung aller ihrer Vorstellungen und Begriffe, und in so weit dieser innerliche Zustand sich auf das Äußliche bezieht, heißt er der status repraesentativus universi; daher ändert die Materie mittelst ihrer Kraft, die sie in der Bewegung hat, den Zustand der Seele, wodurch sie sich die Welt vorstellt.*)” (AK I 20 §6/G. Rabel, Kant, p.5)

⁸¹“Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio” (AK I 385-416; ‘New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition’, KTP 11-45)

⁸²G VI 612/L 646 (M32)

Fr. le principe de la raison suffisante, Lat. principium rationis sufficientis.

This principle, according to Leibniz, is the principle of contingent things that are not subject to the logical necessity alone. Since the fact that those emerge in experience as they do depends on the will of God, and God's decisions depend on reason, reason is sufficient also for those things which are not subject to the logical necessity alone.

⁸³Lat. *ratio*

⁸⁴“Nihil est verum sine ratione determinante.” (AK I 393/KTP 13, Prop. V)

⁸⁵Lat. *ratio* Ger. *Grund*.

Nihil subesse dictitant rationis, cur Deus duabus substantiis diversa assignaverit loca, si per omnia alia perfecte convenirent. Quales ineptiae! Miror gravissimos viros hisce rationum crepundiis delectari. Substantiam unam voca *A*, alteram *B*. Fac *A* locum τοῦ *B* occupare, tum, quia notis internis *A* plane non discrepat a *B*, etiam locum ipsius obtinens per omnia cum ipso erit identicum, et vocandum erit *B*, quod antea vocatum est *A*; cui vero prius nomen erat *B*, nunc in locum τοῦ *A* translatus vocandum erit *A*. Haec enim characterum differentia diversitatem tantum locorum notat. Cedo igitur, utrum Deus aliud quicquam egerit, si secundum tuam sententiam loca determinaverit? Utrumque perfecte est idem; ideoque permutatio a te conficta nulla est [...]

It is constantly being said that if two substances agree completely in all other respects, then there is no reason why God should assign different places to them. What nonsense! It amazes me that grown men of the greatest gravity should take a delight in such frivolous arguments. Let the one substance be called *A* and the other *B*. Let *A* occupy the place of τοῦ *B*. Since *A* does not differ from *B* at all in respect of internal characteristic marks, it follows that in occupying its place, it will be identical with it in all respects, and what was previously called *A* will now have to be called *B*; and that which bore the name *B* beforehand will now, having been transferred to the place of τοῦ *A*, have to be called *A*. For this difference of characteristics indicates a difference only of places. Tell me, therefore, whether God would have done anything different if he had determined the places in accordance with your opinion. The two are exactly the same; accordingly, the change invented by you is nothing [...] ⁸⁷

According to Leibniz, if space is absolute, there is no criterion to distinguish any two parts of space when the things in space are disregarded. If space were absolute, God would have created a thing not here but there, on condition that the relative positions of things remain the same. However, in such a situation, God would have created two things having the same attributes without any rational ground. And this would contradict the principle of sufficient reason. When we regard space as relational, the place of the thing in question will remain the same since the

The point here is not understanding ‘*ratio*’, as cause, or ground, which means, among other things, reason, cause and ground in Latin.

⁸⁶“It is even necessary for each monad to be different from every other. For there are never two things in nature which are perfectly alike and in which it is impossible to find a difference that is internal or founded on an intrinsic denomination. (*Il faut même que chaque Monade soit différente de chaque autre. Car il n’y a jamais dans la nature deux Etres, qui soyent parfaitement l’un comme l’autre, et où il ne soit possible de trouver une difference interne, ou fondée sur une denomination intrinsèque.*)” (G VI 608/L 643 (M9))

The essence of this principle is that there cannot be *two* substances having the *same* activity, in other words, that which is one cannot be two.

⁸⁷AK I 409/KTP 35-36

relative position of the things will remain the same, and thus, the principle of sufficient reason will not be violated.⁸⁸

What Kant really objects to and wants to rule out here is the principle of pre-established harmony. Kant accepts that substances are independent from each other in respect of their existence.⁸⁹ However, he indicates that space and time are outer relations between substances.⁹⁰ He claims that God has created substances in such a way that they influence each other through the power they possess.⁹¹ Therefore, substances are independent in terms of existence, but interdependent in terms of their activities. According to Kant, the relation between the activities of substances is not harmony but interdependence.⁹²

Another pre-critical text in which Kant expresses similar views is 'Physical Monadology'⁹³. In this text, he claims that all things are absolutely made up of simple basic parts, that is to say monad.⁹⁴ The fact that a thing consists of indivisible parts does not contradict to the infinite divisibility of space, because space is neither a substance, nor something that is composed of substances.⁹⁵ Space is nothing but the appearance of the outer relations of substances. For instance, dividing space into two

⁸⁸G VII 363-364/682-683

⁸⁹AK I 413/KTP 40

⁹⁰AK I 414/KTP 42

⁹¹AK I 413/KTP 41

⁹²AK I 415-416/KTP 44

⁹³"*Metaphysicae cum geometria iunctae usus in philosophia naturali, cuius specimen I. continet monadologiam physicam*" (1756, AK I 473-487; 'The Employment in Natural Philosophy of Metaphysics Combined with Geometry, of which Sample I contains the Physical Monadology', KTP 47-66)

⁹⁴AK I 477/KTP 53

⁹⁵AK I 480/KTP 57

by drawing a line means dividing a relation into two, because space is the relation of substances. This does not violate the simplicity or unity of the substance.⁹⁶

The bodies which are made up of simple indivisible substances can fill the infinitely divisible space since each simple substance fills a part of space which is also infinitely divisible. Therefore, according to Kant, physical monad fills the space, but it “does not forfeit its simplicity.”⁹⁷

Since there can be no plurality in monad which could be subject to divisibility, Kant states, monad can fill a part of the space not through its existence as a single substance, but through its relation to other substances. Monad fills the space with its activity, and thereby prevents other monads from coming closer to itself. Therefore, it determines how close and how far they are to/from itself, i.e., its spatial position. Space filled through monads’ activities is a space determined from all directions.⁹⁸

Kant is fully aware of the difficulties posed by the claim that space is the outcome of the external activities of substance. He says the substance itself is not determined by this external activity. By saying this, he distinguishes between the substance itself and its activity. What is spatial is not the substance itself but its activity which relates it to other substances.⁹⁹

The reason why Kant seems to be near to Leibniz’s argument in these texts is that he objects to the Newtonians’ conception of space and time as Leibniz himself did. What is discussed is whether space or the things in space have priority when we look at the problem from the viewpoint of the things that come into existence in

⁹⁶AK I 480/KTP 57

⁹⁷“*salva nihilo minus ipsius simplicitate*” (AK I 480/KTP 56)

⁹⁸AK I 480/KTP 57

⁹⁹AK I 481/KTP 58

experience. It appears that Kant follows Leibniz here only in the sense that space and time are relational, but seems to be unaware of the fact that they also constitute the conditions of their occurrence in experience.

As a matter of fact, in his article published in 1768¹⁰⁰ he turns to claim that space is absolute. His conception of space in his critical period is also based on the problem of incongruence¹⁰¹ which he voices in this article for the first time.

The criticism in this article is closely related to Leibniz's concept of *analysis situs*. Leibniz thinks, unlike mathematical analysis which considers their magnitude, shapes can be compared on the basis of their spatial qualities through *analysis situs* (analysis of position).¹⁰² In such an analysis, what counts is the principle of congruence, which is defined based on the ability of covering the same place, instead of the principle of equality based on magnitude which constitutes the basis for mathematical analysis.¹⁰³

Kant claims that the concept of congruence, which establishes the basis of Leibniz's method of *analysis situs*, cannot explain why the right hand is incongruent with the left hand, because this conception disregards the directionality in space. According to Kant, even if the size, shape, and extension of the right and the left hand happen to be identical, there is an inner difference between these two hands which does not flow from them. It is because of this difference that the right hand is incongruent with the left hand. The inner difference in question is directionality

¹⁰⁰ 'Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume' (AK II 375-383); 'Concerning the Ultimate Foundation of the Distinction of Directions in Space' (KTP 365-372)

¹⁰¹ Ger. *incongruente*

¹⁰² GM V 178-183/L 254-258

The work we designate by 'GM' is Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, *Leibnizens mathematische Schriften*, ed. C.I. Gerhardt, 7 vols., Berlin-Halle, 1849-63.

¹⁰³ GM V 178-183/L 255

which is a characteristic of space. Therefore, spatial determinations are not the outcome of the positions of the parts of things in relation to each other, but vice versa. Therefore, space is not composed of the external relations of physical parts; on the contrary, these relations are possible only if space is absolute.¹⁰⁴ As can be easily seen, the target of Kant's criticism in this text is not Leibniz's understanding of space, but his own 'Physical Monadology', which regards space as the outer relations of physical things.

The claim that space is prior to physical parts of things and the relation of these parts to each other (logically speaking) is a preparation to the conception of space as it emerges in the Critique of Pure Reason. In the present work, Kant will claim that this would be provided only if space is defined as something absolute, and two years later, he will state that what makes the things in space incongruent is space as the form of sensible things.

In 'De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis'¹⁰⁵ (1770), which is the last work Kant published before the Critique of Pure Reason, is also the first text in which he voiced his conception that space and time are not abstractions made from senses, but senses themselves depend on space and time. Moreover, it is the first text in which he tries to set the grounds for metaphysics as a science, to determine the limits of human knowledge, and to establish the place of the subject in constitution of the world, all of which shape the critical thought. In this work, the

¹⁰⁴AK II 382/KTP 370-371

¹⁰⁵AK II 385-419/KTP 373-416 ('Inaugural Dissertation: Concerning the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World')

categorization of the world as 'sensible'¹⁰⁶ and 'intelligible'¹⁰⁷, and the determination of forms and principles are based on the faculties of man as a knowing subject.

Kant's basic objection to Leibniz's thought also remains the same in this text. While Leibniz rejects the interaction between the substances and emphasizes harmony, Kant tries to establish the grounds of interaction between substances. In this text, Kant mainly deals not with the question of the nature of substance, but with the problem of how they come to be together.¹⁰⁸

He views the world as the unity of form and matter¹⁰⁹. He refers to the parts¹¹⁰ of matter as 'substance'. Form, on the other hand, is the co-ordination of parts.¹¹¹ What constitutes the essence of the world is not subordination but co-ordination, because what falls within the relation of subordination is not the parts of the world but its transitory states.¹¹² While substances are not mutually related in terms of their existence, they tend towards each other by their activities.¹¹³ What provides co-ordination of substances is their transeunt¹¹⁴ forces.¹¹⁵

In this work, Kant talks about two different faculties¹¹⁶ of knowledge. Sensibility¹¹⁷ and intelligence¹¹⁸ are the faculties which make knowledge possible.¹¹⁹

¹⁰⁶Lat.*sensibilis* Ger.*Sinnen*

¹⁰⁷Lat.*intelligibilis* Ger.*Verstandes*

¹⁰⁸AK II 389-392/KTP 380-383

¹⁰⁹Lat.*materia* Ger.*Stoff* Fr.*matière*

Kant states that he uses the word 'matter' in transcendental sense, that is to say in the sense of 'material'. But it is not possible for him to talk about the parts of 'matter' in this sense as substance.

¹¹⁰Ger.*Teil*

¹¹¹AK II 389-392/KTP 380-383

¹¹²AK II 389-392/KTP 380-383

¹¹³AK II 389-392/KTP 380-383

¹¹⁴Lat.*transeunt* Ger.*übergehenden*

¹¹⁵AK II 389-392/KTP 380-383

¹¹⁶Ger.*Erkenntniskraft*

¹¹⁷Lat.*sensualitas*

¹¹⁸This faculty is expressed with '*intelligentia (rationalitas)*' in the text in Latin, and with '*Verstandesausstattung (Vernunftausstattung)*' in the text in German.

Sensibility is the aspect of the subject which enables him to be affected by presence of a thing in a certain way, allowing him to develop a representation.¹²⁰ Intelligence, on the other hand, is the faculty which enables the subject to represent things that could not come before the senses of the subject.¹²¹ While the representations based on sensibility provide us the knowledge of them as they appear, representations based on intelligence reflect them as they are.¹²²

The forms and function Kant attributes to the faculty of sensibility in this work may look similar to those he mentions in the Critique of Pure Reason. However, there are striking differences. Firstly, the material of a sensation is evidence for the presence of something sensible; its form, on the other hand, is the indication of there being something that corresponds to it in that which is sensed.¹²³ Secondly, the form of the soul's¹²⁴ faculty of sensibility, even when it is considered independent from all senses, is not *a priori* as it emerges in the critical thought, but is *sensitive*¹²⁵ despite being *pure*.¹²⁶ In accordance with this, the principles of sciences which deal with things that are sensible, including geometry, are basically sensitive.¹²⁷

In this work, Kant divides the activity of the faculty of intelligibility into two. The real employment of reason is its activity of constituting concepts. The logical employment of reason, on the other hand, is to relate concepts to each other on the

¹¹⁹AK II 392/KTP 384

¹²⁰AK II 392/KTP 384

¹²¹AK II 392/KTP 384

¹²²AK II 392/KTP 384

This is the intellectual intuition that Kant ruled out in his critical thought.

¹²³AK II 393/KTP 384-385

¹²⁴*Gemüt*

¹²⁵Lat.*sensitivae*

¹²⁶Lat.*sensuale* AK II 393/KTP 385

¹²⁷AK II 393-394/KTP 386

basis of the principle of non-contradiction.¹²⁸ The pure concepts of reason are not innate, but they are acquired not from the sensitive representations but from the laws inherent in the soul¹²⁹ through its acts on sensible representation.¹³⁰

In this work, although Kant accepts space and time as forms of sensibility, he does not give up the claim that only the interaction between the substances which are dependent on the same creator in terms of their existence is actual.¹³¹ Space and time are also the conditions for the soul to conceive the totality of substances as one world within a necessary unity depending on the same creative cause.¹³² The harmony in the world is not based on the idea that the states of individual substances conform to each other as stated in Leibniz's pre-established harmony, but it is rather a general harmony based on being dependent on the same cause. Therefore, the interaction between the substances, according to Kant, is not imaginary or ideal, as it happens to be in Leibniz's system, but actual.¹³³ As a result, in this work, what Kant objects to in Leibniz's system of thought, is the conception of substance possessing an independent activity.

The criticisms Kant makes in this text against Leibniz's conceptions of space and time, and his evaluations¹³⁴ of space and time which are almost the same as

¹²⁸AK II 394/KTP 386

¹²⁹ Ger. *Gemüt*

¹³⁰The science that investigates the principles of the employment of reason is metaphysics. (AK II 395/KTP 386-387) The activity which Kant calls real employment of reason in this text corresponds, to a great extent, to the faculty of understanding in his critical period. But here the activity of reason to constitute concept (or object) is not limited only to being directed at the material derived from sensibility. The signs of the limit to be drawn for the theoretical activity of reason come up also in this text. The reason why metaphysics could not become a science yet is the fact that the method to fully differentiate between that which is dependent on sensation and that which belongs to reason could not be developed yet. (AK II 411/KTP 407)

¹³¹AK II 409-410/KTP 403-405

¹³²AK II 409-410/KTP 404-405

¹³³AK II 409/KTP 404

¹³⁴AK II 398-406/KTP 391-400

those in the Critique of Pure Reason if we ignore the differences stated above, are both related to the problem of incongruence. The difference between the right and the left hand which makes them incongruent does not stem from the hands themselves or their being conceived through reason, but from space.¹³⁵ Kant, who previously abandoned the conception of space as relational due to the incongruence of hands and claimed that it is absolute, ends up saying in this work that space is not an objective or a real entity, but is a necessary condition of sensible representations.¹³⁶

The criticisms Kant poses to Leibniz's conception of space and time are due to the fact that Leibniz's views on this subject have not been clearly understood.¹³⁷ In Leibniz's thought, it is possible to take space and time into account in different levels with respect to the emergence of experience and the activity of reason.¹³⁸ When we approach the subject regarding both Kant's and Leibniz's conception of experience, space, which is *mekân*¹³⁹ of experience, has to be different both from the space that is the condition of experience, and from the concept of space which belongs to understanding and which is subject-matter of science. The empirical conceptions of space and time are subject to space and time as conditions of experience, as well as to the pure concepts of understanding. Those which originate neither from sensations nor from human beings' own intellectual activities are co-ordination and subordination.

¹³⁵AK II 402-403/KTP 396

¹³⁶AK II 403-404/KTP 397

¹³⁷This deficiency could be partially attributed to the fact that a substantial part of Leibniz's texts have not been published. However, when we consider the point which Kant fundamentally opposes, this deficiency will not provide an adequate explanation on its own.

¹³⁸The same counts also for Kant's system of thought.

¹³⁹Turkish word '*mekân*' comes from the word '*kâne*' in Arabic which means to be. It signifies the ground of existence of a thing.

In Leibniz's system of thought, the ground of co-ordination and subordination is memory which is one of the fundamental faculties of soul. The source of the plenitude in space and time is the representations of other substances that the soul is given by creation.

The order we observe in experience arises as soul clarifies these representations which are present in itself. The basis for spatial and temporal order as they emerge in experience is the ideas of co-ordination and succession that the soul carries in its memory since the creation. Accordingly, human beings becoming conscious of ideas through their intellectual activity and making them the subject-matter of science is dependent upon the emergence of experience as an actuality.

At this point, we need to make some evaluations concerning Kant's opinions about Leibniz's conceptions of space and time. As we have mentioned before, Leibniz's conception of relational space and time as a refutation of the Newtonian conception of space and time as absolute beings, has been widely misunderstood as claiming that space and time are concepts which are abstracted from the relations of things in experience. The relational conception of space and time based on an actual interaction, which Kant advocated for a while, is grounded on such a misunderstanding. The source of this ideal relation, however, is grounded in the principle of pre-established harmony which governs the activity of substances.

When he claims that the difference between the right and the left hand cannot be based on reason, and therefore, space cannot be a concept of reason, what Kant targets is Leibniz. However, as we mentioned above, this point is only one aspect of Leibniz's conception of space.

Kant's conception of experience in his critical period is very close to that of Leibniz both in respect of its method, in the sense that it urges a dissection of experience through faculties, and also in terms of the forms and functions attributed to these faculties. However, there are major weaknesses in Kant's conception of experience since it rules out from his critical thought the ontological ground upon which Leibniz's conception of experience is based. In Leibniz's thought, the material to which the activity of soul is directed and the order of this activity are given to the soul innately by the creation. Kant's system prevents soul from innate possession of the material of its activity, by making it dependent upon its 'outside' in the transcendental sense, and of the ideas which order its activity, by denying that memory is one of the fundamental faculties. In this study, we will try to show that Kant's failure in the constitution of space and time in his critical thought depends on these two points.

I. LEIBNIZ'S CONCEPTION OF EXPERIENCE

I.1. The place of experience in Leibniz's system of thought

In this section, we shall attempt to show how experience can be constituted¹⁴⁰ according to Leibniz's system of thought.

What we should understand by the constitution of experience is the determination of the conditions and grounds of the things, which are or can come to be the subject matter of our experience, as they emerge in experience, or of the conditions and grounds of our recognition of them as we do, and depending upon these grounds, the determination of experience, in a manner to make possible the reconstitution of it together with the variety it bears in itself.

Experience has priority also in Leibniz's system of thought, as it does in Kant's critical thought.¹⁴¹ Due to the conception that generally dominates the Western thought, a human being's being able to understand himself and the world is possible only on the basis of experience as starting point. Both systems of thought are *a posteriori* in view of the fact that they take that which emerges in experience as

¹⁴⁰Leibniz does not have a text in which he studies experience systematically, as similar to what Kant did in the Critique of Pure Reason. What we are attempting here is to form a unity based on various texts of Leibniz. We shall be basing attempt upon the text, in which Leibniz explicitly but intensely tells about his system of thought and which is later called "Monadology", and his work titled 'Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement par l'auteur du système de l'harmonie préétablie' in which he voices his own opinions against Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding.

¹⁴¹In Kant's system, the conditions of experience can be mentioned only in relation to experience. In this sense, experience has priority over its own conditions. With regard to Leibniz, this priority is applicable only for actual knowing:

"Although the senses are necessary for all our actual knowledge, they are not sufficient to provide it all, since they never give us anything but instances, that is particular or singular truths. (*Les sens quoyque nécessaires pour toutes nos connoissances actuelles ne sont point suffisans pour nous les donner toutes, puisque les sens ne donnent jamais que des exemples, c'est à dire des vérités particulieres ou individuelles.*)" (G V 43/RB 49)

their starting point, and analytical in view of the fact that they explore the grounds and conditions of experience through dissection of experience by faculties.¹⁴²

Comprehension of experience itself also happens through experience. Both systems of thought inquire into the conditions that lead to the emergence of experience as it does. Different aspects of experience are studied by attributing different faculties to the soul¹⁴³. The point that should certainly not be disregarded is that the activity of experience is, in fact, a whole, and that each faculty constitutes an aspect of this activity.

Though experience has priority in both systems of thought, for Leibniz such priority is only with regard to human being's actual knowing¹⁴⁴. In Kant's critical thought, the emergence of experience has priority over its own conditions and also the limits of knowledge are determined by being a possible experience. In Leibniz's system of thought, a human being's activity aiming at knowing himself and his world can in no way be limited by possible experience, and the role of experience is only about being a means for the activity of knowing. Furthermore, though experience constitutes the beginning of actual knowing, metaphysically, the conditions of experience have priority over experience.

In Leibniz's system of thought, the soul's activity of knowing, regardless of the means, essentially consists of expressing that which is present in its depths.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴²See: Introduction

¹⁴³Ger.*Seele Gemüt* Fr.*âme*

¹⁴⁴Fr.*connaître** Lat.*co-gnoscere***

**con-naître*: (being born together) to get to know, to become aware of, to learn, to understand, to distinguish, to judge, to know.

***Gnoscere* comes from the root *Γνω* which means 'to know' in Ancient Greek.

The word '*connaissance*' Leibniz uses means not the 'knowledge' as it is used in analytical thought, but the human being's knowing himself and the world.

¹⁴⁵G V 76/RB 79

The basis of both intelligible knowledge and the knowledge which depends upon experience is the ideas that are innate in the soul.¹⁴⁶ The function of the senses is to provide the opportunity for such an activity of expressing.¹⁴⁷

Experience, being an aspect of the human being's activity aiming at knowing himself and the world, in fact, in Leibniz's system of thought, is the activity that the soul performs in accordance with the pre-established harmony and that actualizes this harmony. The conditions and possibilities of experience are determined by this harmony. What we would like to note here is that the harmony mentioned is constituted by God in accordance with reason. Reason is, as opposed to Kant's critical thought, not only a faculty enabling the human being's activity aiming at knowing, but is also the ground of all kinds of orders including the order of the activity of experience.¹⁴⁸ That which enables the comprehension of that which emerges in experience by the activities of reflection and reasoning is this fundamental unity itself. This point should always be taken into consideration while evaluating Leibniz's conception of experience.

1.2. Dissection of experience

In Leibniz's system of thought, experience is the spontaneous¹⁴⁹ activity of soul as a created substance, performed in itself in accordance with pre-established

¹⁴⁶G V 77/RB 81

¹⁴⁷G V 76/RB 80

¹⁴⁸The main point that Kant opposed in the critical thought is the reason being a ground in this sense.

¹⁴⁹Fr.*spontanéité** Ger.*Spontaneität, Ungezwungenheit* Gr.*αὐτόματον*

*Comes from the word *spontis* which means 'in harmony with itself' in Latin.

According to Aristotle, it is the accidental cause that does not include opinion and decision; and the accidental cause that partially includes rational preference is chance (τύχη). The word in English also incorporates the meanings based on own decision, voluntarily. In French, though, it means that which is done without the intervention of anything including the human will. This meaning in French

harmony, independently from other created substances. The material of this activity and the conditions that determine the order of the activity are innately given to the soul.¹⁵⁰

The material of soul's activity of experience is the perceptions in the monad aspect of the soul.¹⁵¹ And the conditions of this activity are the ideas that are in memory.¹⁵² Therefore, in Leibniz's system of thought experience is the expression or

corresponds to its use both by Kant and by Leibniz. In Kant's critical thought, since there is no 'spontaneity' independent from experience, it is not possible to establish the foundation for the spontaneity. For Leibniz, on the other hand, the ground of spontaneous activity is the pre-established harmony, in other words, the will of God.

¹⁵⁰G V 67/RB 74

"[...] I believe indeed that all the thoughts and actions of our soul come from its own depths and could not be given to it by the senses. ([...] *et je croy même que toutes les pensées et actions de nostre Ame viennent de son propre fonds, sans pouvoir luy estre données par les sens, [...]*)" (G V 67/RB 74)

In addition, when Leibniz's conception of substance is considered, it is not possible to relate the activity of soul with anything apart from God, since that would require the violation of the soul's being a substance. The only outer object that the soul is directly in relation to is God:

"God is the only *immediate outer* object. (*Dieu seul est l'objet externe immédiat.*)" (G V 99/RB 109), "[...] there is no external cause which acts upon us except God alone, [...]" ([...] *il n'y a point de cause externe qui agisse sur nous, excepté Dieu seul, [...]*)" (G IV 453/321 (DM28), 'DM': 'Discours de Métaphysique')).

¹⁵¹Fr.*perception* Ger.*Wahrnehmung*

The word 'perception' is used in different meanings in Leibniz's texts. In this dissertation we shall be using 'perception' in its meaning stated in *Monadology*. Furthermore, we also believe that the confusion that revolves around the use of this word partially arises from the uses of the verbs *apercevoir* in French and *to perceive* in English. While in English *perception* is something that is received through *perceiving*, it is the thing at which the act of *aperception* is aimed, particularly in the French language as it is employed by Leibniz.

¹⁵²Fr.*idée* Ger.*Idee*

It is possible to think that the word 'idea' is also used in different meanings in Leibniz's texts. In *Nouveaux Essais*, in particular, the representations derived from senses are also referred to as 'ideas'. (G V 76-77/RB 81 and Book II) Since this work discusses Locke's conception of human being, unless otherwise stated, 'idea' is rather used in the meaning imposed upon it by Locke. In his text titled 'Explicandum ergo erat, quid sit vera idea' and dated 1678, Leibniz explicitly states that perceptions, thoughts and affections are not ideas. (G VII 263/L 207) In this dissertation, we shall be using the word 'idea' for representations that are in the memory aspect of the soul and that determine the order of the soul's activity, based on the definition given by Leibniz in his '*Discours de Métaphysique*' ("[...] the expressions which are in the soul, whether conceived or not, can be called *ideas*, but those which are conceived or formed can be called *notions* or *concepts*. ([...] *ces expressions qui sont dans nostre ame, soit qu'on les conçoive ou non, peuvent estre appellés idées, mais celles qu'on conçoit ou forme, se peuvent dire notions, conceptus.*)" (G IV 452/L 320-321 (DM27))) and in *Nouveaux Essais* "[...] an idea is an immediate inner object, and [...] this object expresses the nature or qualities of things (*c'est [idée] un objet immédiat interne, et [...] cet objet est une expression de la nature ou des qualités des choses.*)" (G V 99/RB 109).

re-presentation¹⁵³ of the representations in monad aspect depending on the ideas in memory. At the ground of all this activity lies soul's apperception of itself; that is, its being aware of itself as the one who perceives¹⁵⁴. Exploring this activity which in fact constitutes a whole is by way of determination of different levels of representation and establishing the interrelations between such levels. Different faculties can be suggested depending on the levels of representation that are different with regard to their conditions and possibilities.

Before we move on to how experience can be constituted through faculties in Leibniz's system of thought, we feel the need to clarify what is meant by 'experience'. In this text, we shall use 'experience' to express the human being's spontaneous activity of knowing. Though the Turkish word for 'experience' has a much broader use, and though Leibniz's thought allows room for such use, for the purpose of preserving consistency with Leibniz's texts¹⁵⁵, by 'experience', we shall understand spontaneous activity of knowing through senses.

¹⁵³Fr.*représentation** Ger.*Vorstellung* Lat.*representatio*

*This word derived from 'present', which also incorporates the meanings 'present' (opposite of 'absent'), 'now', 'gift' in English and French and which generally states 'that which is presented' (In Latin, from the '*sens*' that states *praesens* (the prefix '*prae*' meaning front, before, in front of, onwards, and '*sens*' which expresses any kind of awareness (sensitive, ethical, rational).

It is used in Leibniz's system of thought to express *that what is given* is presented again in different levels or its being represented by one who experiences.

¹⁵⁴Fr.*aperception** Ger.*Apperzeption* Lat.*apperceptio*** Ott.*idrâk-ı dakik*

*From *apercevoir*: to begin to see, to catch a glimpse of, to catch sight of, to descry, to foresee, to notice, to perceive, to see.

**From the prefix *ad* which states 'aiming at' and *perceptio*.

¹⁵⁵According to Leibniz, that which renders humans different from animals are the activities of reflection and reasoning. (G VI 610/L 644 (M19)) He claims, particularly against Cartesians, that animals also can have not only perception but also sensation (G VI 599-601/L 637-638 (PNG4,PNG5); G VI 608/L 644 (M14), G VI 611/L 645 (M26)). He often emphasizes that human being resembles animals with regard to his activity which depends upon experience (G VI 601(PNG5); G VI 610/L 645 (M28)), and therefore, animals are also able to acquire a kind of experience. Yet, it should be considered that the intellectual faculties that render humans different from animals in Leibniz's system of thought also render humans' experiences different than those of animals, and the human experience should not be evaluated at the same level with the animals' capability of having sensations.

One point that requires attention is that constitution of experience is at the same time the constitution of 'outer world' both in Kant's and Leibniz's systems of thought. Constitution of experience is the answer of the question how the world, which we understand as the coexistence and succession of variety, emerges as it does. If we assume that all we see is a lake in between the mountains, two islands on the lake and one tree on each island, that which needs to be established with a foundation in view of experience being soul's spontaneous activity of knowing, is how this image itself emerges. Division of this landscape, which emerges as a whole bearing variety, into different wholes such as mountain, lake, island, tree, etc. and comparison thereof are not the subject matter of experience.¹⁵⁶

Therefore, what we explore in this study is –not how we conceive the individual correspondents-in-intuition that are outside us- but how the world as a whole, together with the variety it bears, is possible, according to Leibniz's thought.

Experience, in Leibniz's thought, can also be described as the activity of turning perceptions into sensations. Now let us study how this activity is performed.

I.3. Experience as the soul's activity of sensing perceptions

In Leibniz's system of thought, experience is the spontaneous and inner activity of soul as a simple substance. The reason behind the creation of every

¹⁵⁶That which enables grasping of the whole intuition as the *mekân* of experience as different correspondents in intuition by way of separation into different parts, is the variety of perceptions on one hand, as the source of the variety in intuition and on the other hand, are the ideas that are the conditions of intuition. Yet, grasping of the parts of intuition as separate individual wholes is a consideration that transcends experience as an aspect of the spontaneous activity of knowing and it should be related to the intellectual and practical activity of human being. This will be better understood, when we consider that, according to Leibniz, things that are formed by coming together of parts are not substances; that contact, acting together and being the elements of a common plan has nothing to do with substantial unity, and that talking of any two parts of intuition with only one name serves only to summarize our thought (Letter to Arnauld, dated April 30, 1687, G II 96/AG 86).

substance is to actualize the harmony established by God, and to assume the role of a mirror that renders harmony visible, to the extent of the perfection of its activity. That which enables the simple substance in Leibniz's system of thought to reflect other creations through its activity is indeed that it innately bears in itself the representations of other created things.¹⁵⁷

According to Leibniz, perception cannot be explained mechanically.¹⁵⁸ There can be nothing in the coexistence and movements of parts that can explain perception, sensation and thought. Therefore, the source of perception should be searched for not in the compounds formed by the coexistence of parts, but in the simple substance.¹⁵⁹

The perceptions forming the content and activity of a simple substance¹⁶⁰, in Leibniz's system of thought, make up the grounds of spatial and temporal variety and plenum that emerge in experience.¹⁶¹ Perception provides the substance, which is simple and indivisible and which performs an activity independently from other substances, to bear a variety in itself in such a manner that this variety will not contradict its substantiality.¹⁶²

Perception, according to Leibniz, is "the representation of the compound¹⁶³, or of that which is external"¹⁶⁴, "the passing state which enfolds and represents a

¹⁵⁷G VI 616/L 648 (M56), G IV 453/L 321(DM28)

¹⁵⁸G VI 609/L 644 (M17)

¹⁵⁹G VI 609/L 644 (M17)

¹⁶⁰G VI 609/L 644 (M17)

¹⁶¹G VI 608/L 643-644 (M8, M11, M12, M13, M14)

¹⁶²G VI 608/L 643 (M8), G VI 598/L 636 (PNG2)

¹⁶³According to Leibniz's conception of substance, it is not possible for any compound to exist independently from simple substance. The term 'outer' used here, considering this point, should be assessed as an expression which is applicable for almost all texts of Leibniz and which he likens to the example of Copernicans, when they were able to speak the same language with those who talked about the revolving of the sun around the world (G V 67/RB 74).

multitude in unity or in the simple substance".¹⁶⁵ Intellectual faculties of man are not active but passive, in view of perception.¹⁶⁶

When perception is in question, what is active is the monad aspect of soul. According to Leibniz, what enables the representations, that are innate in the soul, to be perceptions at the same time is the activity of perceiving or appetite that relies on the principle of appetite¹⁶⁷ and that enables passing from one representation to the other.¹⁶⁸ This principle is also the basis of the variety and activity in substance.¹⁶⁹ One point that should be noted here is that neither the representations of substances nor the activity of perceiving which depends on the principle of appetite, are things that are subsequently transplanted into a substance. Substance innately includes these representations and aims at perceiving them. That substance envelops other substances in view of its monad aspect and that it aims at perceiving them are not two separate metaphysical levels, but the nature of a substance in view of its monad aspect. The whole material in monad consists of perceptions, whereas the only activity of monad consists of perceiving.

¹⁶⁴"[...] *les representations du composé, ou de ce qui est dehors, dans le simple [...]*" (G VI 598/L 636 (PNG2))

¹⁶⁵"*L'état passager qui enveloppe et représente une multitude dans l'unité ou dans la substance simple [...]*" (G VI 608/L 644 (M13))

¹⁶⁶G V 121/RB 134

¹⁶⁷Fr.*appétit** Ger.*Appetit* Lat.*appetitus* Gr.ὄρεξις**

*The word *appétit*, which is derived from the verb *petere* (*ad-petere*) that means trying to obtain in Latin, means, in the broadest sense the instinctive action aiming to fulfill an organic need. The Latin *petere* is the infinitive of *pēto* which comes from the sanskrit root *pat-*. The meanings of *pat-* include to fall, to shower attention on, to fly, to pursue, to find, to try to reach, to obtain something. The very same root is also present in the Ancient Greek words of *πίπτω*, which means to fall, and in *πέτομαι*, which means to fly. *Impetus* in Latin is also derived from the same root.

**longing or yearning after, desire for, propension, appetency.

¹⁶⁸Leibniz names this activity as '*appétition*' (to get an appetite for). (G VI 609/L 644 (M15)) Within the framework of Leibniz's conception of experience, we will be referring to this activity as 'perceiving'.

¹⁶⁹G VI 608/L 644 (M12), G VI 609/L 644 (M15), G VI 598/L 636 (PNG2)

The second point is, although we talk about moving ‘from one representation to the other’ or ‘from one perception to the other’, since there is no activity which is to distinguish one representation from others, it is not possible for there to be distinct perceptions at this level. The level of perception constituting the source of experience with regard to its material cannot be known by itself.¹⁷⁰ Before perceptions emerge in experience, that is when they are considered in themselves, they are obscure¹⁷¹ and confused.¹⁷² The material of each sensation is, indeed, made

¹⁷⁰G V 237/RB 256

¹⁷¹Fr.*obscur(e)* Ger.*obskur, undeutlich, unklar*, Lat.*obscurus*.*

*Derived from the word *sku* which means ‘to cover’ in Sanskrit.

¹⁷²Fr.*confus(e)* Ger.*konfus* Lat.*confusio*.*

*From *con* in Latin (from *cum* meaning together) and *fundo* which means foundation.

The definition ‘clear and distinct’, which Leibniz inherited from Descartes and which he very frequently employed in his writings, can sometimes lead to some confusion. The distinction between being clear (Fr.*clair(e)*, Ger.*klar*, Lat.*clarus*) or obscure, or the one between distinct or confused are attributed to different things (to perception (G V 45-48/RB 53-55), sensation (G V 47/RB 54), image (*image*, (G V 243/RB 262)) idea (G V 236-237/RB 255-256) concept (G IV 422/L 291), knowledge (*cognitio*) (G IV 422/L 291)) in different texts. Furthermore, when we forget that the examples he gives for explaining these concepts are only for the purpose of exemplifying and we consider them as such, they are no longer explanatory. We believe that it will not be really useful to dwell on individual definitions about this topic or to attempt to reveal the common points in the definitions, and that these concepts can be understood only when their relations to Leibniz’s conception of thought are disclosed. Accordingly, the perceptions that are innate to the monad aspect of the soul, as considered independently from the soul’s activity aimed at knowing, must be *obscure*. The essence of the soul’s activity to know is rendering clear and distinct that which it bears in itself in an obscure manner. Perceptions that are present in an obscure manner in monad aspect become *clear* when they emerge in experience depending on the soul’s activity of apperception. Within this framework, sensation, in view of its material, is the perception that emerges clearly in experience. According to Leibniz, in order for one thing (e.g. a color) to be clear, it must have been separated from others (other colors). (G V 237/RB 256) Leibniz says, in order to explain clear sensations, that these usually depend on one sensory organ. For example, a person that is blind from birth can in no way have a clear sensation regarding red. (G IV 422/L 291)

On the other hand, no sensation can indeed be *distinct*, in view of its material. (G V 236-237/RB 255-56; G IV 422/L 291. Also see: ‘Letter to Sophie Charlotte, the Prussian Queen’(1702) G VI 499-508/AG 186-192) Being distinct is related to concepts, in Leibniz’s system of thought. If we return to the example about the color (on condition to keep in mind that this is just an example), what enables us to distinguish between red and green that emerge in experience is the ideas that are present in our soul, being the conditions of their emergence as they do. Though green and red are clear as sensations, our conception regarding the ideas that distinguish them is *confused*; because it is impossible for us to distinguish the ideas that lie in the ground of our distinction between these two colors as *ideas* (independently from the red and green in intuition) from each other. (G V 237/RB 256) On the other hand, after we see one piece of each variety that emerges in experience in the form of cube and sphere, based on the ideas present in memory, we can distinguish between the concepts of cube and sphere independently from the shapes in experience. That is why the concepts of cube and sphere are *distinct*. (A person who is able to receive clear sensations that two intuitive parts are in the

of an infinite number of perceptions.¹⁷³ What is intended here is the description of the content of the experience, which cannot be derived from the soul's aspect which

shapes of cube and sphere through any sensory organ can clearly distinguish between the concepts of cube and sphere. A person who is blind from birth can clearly distinguish that which is in cube shape from that which is in sphere shape through contact; and based on this, he can have a clear comprehension regarding cube and sphere. That which provides distinct concepts to correspond to clear sensations in intuition is the faculty of imagination, which Leibniz sometimes defines as 'common sense' (*le sens commun*) or as 'inner sense' (*le sens interne*). (Letter to Sophie Charlotte, G VI 501/AG 188; G V 116/RB 128; G IV 423/L 292)

Therefore, clarity should be attributed to the representation of perceptions in monad aspect which is expressed in intuition by imagination depending on the ideas present in the memory, or to the sensation received on this ground, whereas being distinct should be attributed to comprehension, as the connection of the variety in experience to ideas through reflection. One point that requires attention here is the relation Leibniz establishes between clarity and distinctness. According to Leibniz, "clear knowledge [...] is either confused or distinct. (*Clara [...] cognitio est [...] vel confusa vel distincta.*)" (G IV 422/L 291) One should not, relying on this statement, see the distinction between clarity and distinctness as a difference of degree. When this statement is assessed within the framework of Leibniz's conception of experience, it states the requirement that in order for an idea to be comprehended distinctly, it must have been often represented clearly and previously in intuition and a clear sensation must have been received.

Yet, those which can be comprehended distinctly are not limited to those which are clearly represented in intuition. The concepts, the distinct comprehensibility of which depends on clear representations in intuition, are composites. Our comprehension regarding simple ideas is distinct, despite the fact that there can be no individual correspondent corresponding to them in experience; because comprehension thereof is not dependent on any means. (G IV 423/L 291) Our comprehension regarding simple ideas is at the same time *adequate*. For a composite concept comprehended distinctly to be *adequate*, all of its elements, composite and simple, should be comprehended distinctly. (G IV 423/L 292) For example for our comprehension of cube to be adequate, all elements that go into the composition of this concept should be comprehended distinctly. According to Leibniz, though human being's power to know gets somehow close to this point in relation to numbers, it is far from reaching such a comprehension. Performing arithmetic through representations, without a distinct comprehension of simple ideas that lie in the ground of arithmetic, is a *blind* and *symbolic* (G IV 423/L 292) or *suppositive* activity of knowing such as distinctly knowing that 10 times 100 equals 1000, without having a distinct comprehension of what 10 and 100 are (G IV 449-451/L 319 (DM24-DM25))), and therefore an *inadequate* comprehension. (G IV 423/L 292)

According to Leibniz, to *adequately* comprehend a composite concept that is comprehended distinctly, one needs to distinctly comprehend each of the composite concepts forming it, as well as to see *clearly* the simple ideas that *obscurely* lie in their ground, similarly to seeing the redness that emerges in sensitive intuition. (G IV 450-451/L 319 (DM25)) Such comprehension is possible only by intellectual intuition (In texts in French, *intuitive*); because simple ideas can be comprehended only in this way. (G IV 449-451/L 319 (DM24-DM25), L292) Seeing the ideas that lie in the ground of composite concepts *clearly* and capturing the relations between concepts by intellectual intuition is, according to Leibniz, *contemplation* (Fr.*contemplation* Lat.*contemplatio*) of ideas as a whole. (G IV 449-450/L 319 (DM25))

¹⁷³ "[...] each distinct perception of the soul includes an infinity of confused perceptions which envelop the entire universe, [...]" (*[...] chaque perception distincte de l'Ame comprend une infinité de perceptions confuses, qui enveloppent tout l'univers, [...]*)" (G VI 604/L 640 (PNG13))

Leibniz, from time to time, talks about '*minute/little/petite perceptions*' (*petites perceptions*). (G V 46-50/RB 53-59) He likens our inability to know little or obscure perceptions that make up a sensation (clear perception) in view of its material to our inability to hear or distinguish the sounds of individual waves that make up the sound of the sea, although we hear the sound of the sea. (G VI 604/L 640 (PNG13), G IV 458-459/L 324-325 (DM33)) This example, which Leibniz gives to explain that a sensation is made up of infinite number of perceptions in view of its material, led to the

experiences to the greatest extent possible, within the limits of language.¹⁷⁴ The level of perception, which is the deepest level in the constitution of experience, can be reached only by a dissection of experience that has already emerged. Therefore, 'monad' is, in fact, the name given to substance in view of its bearing in itself the perceptions which are the representations of other substances.

Perceiving is soul's spontaneous activity in view of its monad aspect. Substances, regardless of the degree of their activities to express those things which lie in their depths, share the same level, in view of their bearing in themselves the representations of other substances, that is to say, in view of the activity of perception.¹⁷⁵ Leibniz names substance as *entelechy*¹⁷⁶, with respect to the activity of perceiving on the basis of the principle of appetite.¹⁷⁷ In Leibniz's system of thought, what Leibniz seems to emphasize with the term 'entelechy' comprises two things: the one is that monad lacks nothing with respect to the representation of other

misunderstanding that the difference between perception and sensation, or between obscure perception and clear sensation is a matter of quantity; Leibniz was criticized that he never explained in what respect these perceptions were 'little'. (RB (Explanatory notes) lv) However, the difference between sensation and perception is not one's being bigger or smaller than the other one in some respect, but it is that sensation is apperceived perception.

¹⁷⁴The important point when compared with Kant's conception of experience is that this material is not received by soul from outside, on the contrary, the soul's activity which depends upon experience is the clarification of this material which is innate to it.

¹⁷⁵G VI 604/L 640 (PNG13)

¹⁷⁶Fr.*entéléchie* Ger.*Entelechia* Lat.*entelechia* Gr.*ἐντελέχεια**

*From the prefix 'ἐν' signifying in, 'τέλος' signifying end, final, purpose, achievement, attainment and the verb 'ἔχω' which means to have, to hold, to keep, to have charge of, to keep up, to maintain, to enclose, to hold or keep in a certain direction, to involve, to admit of, (*of a woman*) to be pregnant.)

"This word 'Entelechy' apparently takes its origin from the Greek word signifying 'perfect', and hence the celebrated Ermolao Barbaro expressed it literally in Latin by *perfectihabia*: [...] (*Ce mot, Entelechie, tire apparemment son origine du mot Grec qui signifie parfait, et c'est pour cela que le célèbre Hermolaus Barbarus l'exprima en latin mot à mot par perfectihabia, [...]*)" (G VI 150/H 170 (T:I-8))

'T': *Essais de Theodicée sur La Bonté de Dieu, La Liberté de L'Homme et L'Origine du Mal*. The book we referred to for translation of this work into English is *Theodicy* which we will be designating with 'H' (*trans.* E.M. Huggard, Open Court, Illinois, 1996).

¹⁷⁷G VI 609-610/L 644 (M18)

substances, therefore, it's complete and perfect¹⁷⁸; and the other is that it has sufficiency¹⁷⁹ in view of the fact that it bears in itself the principle of its activity .

Sensation¹⁸⁰ is, in Leibniz's system of thought, apperception of perceptions.¹⁸¹ In order for sensation¹⁸² to arise from perceptions, the soul should apperceive¹⁸³ what it perceives, the perceptions, which are passing states, should be preserved within a specific order, and they need to be envisaged in intuition in the same order. Apperception depends on the soul's apperceiving itself as the one who perceives, order depends on ideas in memory¹⁸⁴ and representation in intuition depends on the activity of imagination¹⁸⁵.

I.4. Experience in view of the act of apperception

In Leibniz's system of thought, the ground for the soul to know those that lie in its depths is the act of apperception. We would like to consider three points regarding this act: First, the act of apperception is a pure and original act ensuring that experience is a whole. Second, the subject of this act is not the empirical self, which is subject to time and space as a part of experience, but the soul being an ontological unit. Third, it is an intellectual act.

¹⁷⁸Fr.*parfait* Ger.*perfekt* Lat.*perfektum* Gr.*ἐντελής*

*From the prefix *par* meaning completely and the verb *facere* (to do) in Latin.

¹⁷⁹Fr.*suffisance** Ger.*Vollkommenheit*

*From the Latin verb *sufficere* meaning to support, to carry, to undertake and to resist.

¹⁸⁰In Leibniz's conception of experience, sensibility is not a faculty on its own, as opposed to Kant's conception of experience; sense is an outcome of the various activities of soul.

¹⁸¹G VI 608-609/L 644 (M14), G VI 610/L 644 (M19)

¹⁸²Fr.*sens, sensation, sentiment*. Ger.*Sinn, Empfindung* Lat.*sensus, sensatio*.

¹⁸³G VI 608-609/L 644 (M14)

¹⁸⁴G VI 611/L 645 (M26)

¹⁸⁵G VI 611/L 645 (M27)

The material, which the soul's aspect of knowing aims at by the act of apperception, is the perceptions in its monad aspect. Leibniz offers an explanation for the soul's activity of apperception by giving an account of its difference from the activity of perception.¹⁸⁶ What renders sensation different from perception is soul's being aware or conscious¹⁸⁷ of sensations. To explain the difference between perception and apperception, he uses the example of being in sleep and awake, or fainting and recovering from stupor.¹⁸⁸ Starting from these examples, one should not conclude that the act of apperception is subject to time, that apperception is an empirical act that emerges in experience. What Leibniz tries to explain with this analogy is that the soul's activity of perception and activity of apperception are separate levels, that sensation is possible only when one who perceives apperceives his perception.

Therefore, the act of apperception is an act that lies in the grounds of the emergence of experience as a whole, in a manner that enables not only apperceiving

¹⁸⁶“The passing state which enfolds and represents a multitude in the unity or in the simple substance is merely what is called *perception*. This must be distinguished from apperception or from consciousness, as what follows will make clear. (*L'état passager qui enveloppe et représente une multitude dans l'unité ou dans la substance simple n'est autre chose que ce qu'on appelle la Perception, qu'on doit bien distinguer de l'apperception ou de la conscience, comme il paroitra dans la suite.*)” (G VI 608-609/L 644 (M14))

“So it is well to make a distinction between perception, which is the inner state of the monade representing external things, and *apperception*, which is consciousness or the reflective knowledge of this inner state itself and which is not given to all souls or to any soul all the time. (*Ainsi il est bon de faire distinction entre la Perception qui est l'état interieur de la Monade representant les choses externes, et l'Apperception qui est la Conscience, ou la connoissance reflexive de cet état interieur, laquelle n'est point donnée à toutes les Ames, ny tousjours à la même Ame.*)” (G VI 599-600/L 637-638 (PNG4))

“I would prefer to distinguish between *perception* and *being aware*. For instance, a perception of light or colour of which we are aware is made up of many minute perceptions of which we are unaware [...] (*J'aimerois mieux distinguer entre perception et entre s'appercevoir. La perception de la lumiere ou de la couleur par exemple, dont nous nous appercevons, est composée de quantité de petites perceptions, dont nous ne nous appercevons pas [...]*)” G V 121/RB 134

¹⁸⁷Fr.conscience Ger.Bewußtsein

¹⁸⁸G VI 599-600/L 637-638 (PNG4), G VI 610/L 645 (M20), G VI 611/L 645 (M24), G V 47/RB 54, G V 51/RB 58, G V 105/RB 115

individual sensations, but also the emergence of individual sensations. Being an act determining the conditions of experience, it is an act which does not depend upon experience.

Though he accepts that the term 'soul'¹⁸⁹ can be used for all substances with regard to the activity of perception in general, Leibniz states that it will be used particularly for substances with regard to the activity of apperception.¹⁹⁰ Substances are at the same level with regard to their monad aspects, e.g. with regard to their bearing in themselves the representations of other substances.¹⁹¹ What renders substances different is the activity of expressing what lies in their depths. In more accurate words, the reason for the creation of each one of them is to perform a different activity and to actualize the harmony established by God. Leibniz's entitling substances as entelechy, soul and rational soul¹⁹² with regard to the degree of perfection of their activities is only in view of the different levels of perfection of soul's activity.

Leibniz's purpose in making these classifications is to ground everything that we are faced with in experience on the activity of substances through pre-established harmony, and to explain these activities that are different in view of experience as different activities of substances, taking experience as the starting point. Metaphysically, neither an activity of perception that is independent from the activity of apperception nor any *starting, stopping* and *restarting* of the activity of apperception which is itself not subject to time and space is possible.

¹⁸⁹Fr.*âme* Lat.*anima* Ger.*Seele*

¹⁹⁰G VI 610/L 644 (M19), G VI 599-600/L 637-638 (PNG4), G V 156/RB 170

¹⁹¹G VI 617/L 648-649 (M60), G VI 604/L 640 (PNG13)

¹⁹²Fr.*l'âme raisonnable, esprit* Eng.*rational soul, spirit*, (in translated texts) *mind* Lat.*spiritus** Ger.*Vernünftige Seele, Geist*

*the initial meaning being blow, breath

Therefore, waking up and recovering from stupor are not the revival of one who has fainted or is dead, but the soul's activity of expressing those which lie in its depths, pertaining to its aspect of knowing.

With respect to the second point, when the first point is taken into consideration, it is obvious that the agent of the act of apperception cannot be the empirical self. The soul's apperceiving its perceptions means, at the same time, that it apperceives itself as the one who perceives and it apperceives that which perceives as itself. As a result of this activity, the soul senses, by clarifying those perceptions that are, in view of their source, outside of its aspect towards knowing; it represents them externally as if they were outside of itself. The soul is active as that which perceives, in view of its monad aspect. Thus, what the soul apperceives through this act is that it itself is the agent.¹⁹³

The point to be noted here is that the ground of soul's apperceiving itself as an *agent* as a result of this act is not that it attributes to itself a subjectivity by distinguishing itself from what it experiences in view of the fact that it has acquired experience, but that it innately bears the idea of Self in itself,¹⁹⁴ that God created it as a unity, that it is agent in view of its creation. The soul, as it apperceives that it sensed what it had perceived, as a consequence of its act of apperceiving, also apperceives that it is an agent.

Therefore, the ground for the identity of that which perceives and one who apperceives is, in Leibniz's system of thought, not the act of apperceiving itself, but

¹⁹³Though it is with Kant's transcendental apperception act with regard to their functions in the constitution of experience, they are different with regard to their grounds. While Kant bases the unity of one who experiences on the unity of this act (which does not have a basis in Kant's system), in Leibniz's system, the ground of the unity of act is the unity of soul as a substance.

¹⁹⁴G VI 612/L 646 (M30)

the unity of soul.¹⁹⁵ Accordingly, 'Self' is not a representation that emerges as a result of the act of apperception, but is the idea that enables the act itself. If it is accepted that a representation of 'Self' emerges as a result of the act of apperception, this representation cannot be constituted as pure because the emergence of representation depends upon the perceptions in the monad aspect of soul, as well as the idea. That which is pure is the act and the idea that lies in the ground of that act.¹⁹⁶

The independence from experience of the identity of the agent of the act enables an activity of knowing which does not depend upon experience although it is related to the emergence of experience. Therefore, the act of apperception, in Leibniz's system of thought, is also the ground of reflection as recognizing simple ideas and of being able to reason without being limited by correspondents in experience, in as much as it is the ground of experience.

¹⁹⁵"What makes the same human individual is not 'a parcel of matter' which passes from one body to another, nor is it what we call *I*; rather, it is the soul. (*Au reste une portion de matiere qui passe d'un corps dans un autre, ne fait point le même individu humain, ny ce qu'on appelle Moy, mais c'est l'ame qui le fait.*)" (G V 223/RB 241)

Also see: G V 226-228/RB 244-245

¹⁹⁶In order to be able to talk about the unity of representation, object or concept in Kant's conception of experience, the apperception that gives unity to them must also have been constituted. In Kant's system, act of transcendental apperception is mentioned just to fulfill this need. (A105-A108) According to Kant, the unity of apperception and the unity of one who experiences is one and the same. (A108) Starting from the fact that one who experiences seems to be one in view of experience, Kant says that that which provides this is transcendental apperception. He states that without this act, we would never be able to *think* of one who experiences (*Gemüt*) as one and the same. (A108) In the ground of the unity of transcendental consciousness (and therefore of the unity of experience) lies the unity, which Kant refers to as 'transcendental object=x'. (A109) In Kant's system one who experiences must be that 'x'. There are no bases other than the unity of one who experiences, both for the unity of 'x', and also for the unity of transcendental consciousness. Since Kant's system bases the unity of experience upon the unity of one who experiences, and since there is no other basis for this unity other than experience, constitution of experience is not possible.

About this topic see: Gözkân, *ibid*.

The third point is that the act of pure apperception is an intellectual act. If we are to get the restricted meaning of the word 'understanding'¹⁹⁷ as it is employed in Leibniz's texts in relation to man, it will be more appropriate not to name this act as an 'understanding'. 'Understanding', in this sense, is the activities of reflection and reasoning in Leibniz's system.¹⁹⁸ Similarly, when some remarks of Leibniz are taken into consideration, it will not be appropriate to regard this act as an act of reasoning¹⁹⁹ either. Yet, the act of pure apperception that enables understanding or reasoning along with experience in Leibniz's system is an intellectual act.

In Leibniz's system of thought, an activity of knowing that is not based upon ideas given in the memory, and therefore, not based upon reason is not possible.

¹⁹⁷Fr.*entendement** Ger.*Verstand*.

Entendement* is derived from the verb *entendre* (to understand) in French, imported to French from the Latin verb, *in-tendere*.

***tendere*: to stretch, to spread, to extend; to aim

The word '*attention*' in French imported from latin '*ad-tendere*' and '*extension*' from '*ex-tendere*'.

¹⁹⁸"We are aware of many things, within ourselves and around us, which we do not understand; and we *understand* them when we have distinct ideas of them accompanied by the power to reflect and to derive necessary truths from those ideas. That is why the beasts have no understanding, at least in this sense; although they have the faculty for awareness of the more conspicuous and outstanding impressions [...] (*Nous nous appercevons de bien des choses en nous et hors de nous, que nous n'entendons pas, et nous les entendons, quand nous en avons des idées distinctes, avec le pouvoir de reflechir et d'en tirer des verités nécessaires. C'est pourquoy les bestes n'ont point d'entendement, au moins dans ce sens, quoyqu'elles ayent la faculté de s'appercevoir des impressions plus remarquables et plus distinguées [...]*)" (G V 159/RB 173)

¹⁹⁹"So 'understanding' in my sense is what in Latin is called *intellectus**, and the exercise of this faculty is called 'intellection', which is a distinct perception combined with a faculty of reflection, which the beasts do not have. Any perception which is combined with this faculty is a thought, and I do not allow thought to beasts any more than I do understanding. So one can say that intellection occurs when the thought is distinct. (*Ainsi dans mon sens l'entendement repond à ce qui chez les Latins est appelé intellectus, et l'exercice de cette faculté s'appelle intellection, qui est une perception distincte jointe à la faculté de reflechir, qui n'est pas dans les bestes. Toute perception jointe à cette faculté est une pensée, que je n'accorde pas aux bestes non plus que l'entendement, de sorte qu'on peut dire, que l'intellection a lieu lorsque la pensée est distincte.*)" (G V 159/RB 173)

**intellectus* is derived from the Latin verb *intellegere* (*in* (in, on, at (space); in accordance with/regard to/the case of; within (time); into; about, in the midst of; according to, after (manner); for; to, among;), *tel*-(from *tellus* which means the earth; ground, land, country) *legere* (gather, collect; pick out; read.) The root 'Λεγ' in ancient Greek word *λέγω* which means to gather, pick up; to say, speak and 'leg' in Latin word '*legere*' are the same.

The meaning of this word in Leibniz's system of thought is soul's expressing of those things which lie in its depths.

Since the act of apperception relies on the idea of 'Self', it must be an intellectual act. Essentially, as the activity of knowing, in respect of its material, is clarification of perceptions through expressing them, since the activity of expressing depends upon the ideas in memory, in respect of the ideas which are conditions of experience, it is also an activity of making the ideas comprehensible as distinct. The comprehension of the idea of 'Self', which is the ground of the act of apperception, is possible through this act again. Distinct comprehension of ideas through understanding as an intellectual activity is possible when the act, which brings them to a state in which they can be comprehended as such, is also an intellectual act.

In Leibniz's system of thought, the activities of substances are arranged in accordance with the harmony that God established in conformity with reason. The activity of a substance consists of actualizing the pre-established harmony.²⁰⁰ In this sense all activities of substances are subject to reason. Ideas which are those which shape the human being's activity of knowing are at the same time, in Leibniz's system of thought, the representations of reason in the soul, constituted by God's judgment as the order of the truth. To put it in more correct terms, 'idea' is the name of the representations given to soul of reason as the order of truth. Based on this, reason lies at the grounds of soul's activity of knowing, which is subject to ideas.²⁰¹ The act of pure apperception that lies at the grounds of any activity of knowing is an intellectual act in this sense.

If the soul which experiences can ascend to the level of understanding depending on its activity of reflection, in other words, if it not only distinguishes

²⁰⁰On this topic, see: II.4 Substance in View of its Creation

²⁰¹On this topic, see: I.5 Experience in View of the Act of Preservation: Memory

itself from that which emerges in experience but also distinctly comprehends that it is one and agent²⁰², then it does not only apperceive but it is also conscious²⁰³ of itself. The point to be noted here is that the thing the consciousness of which arises through reflection is not a representation that is the product of the act of pure apperception, but is the idea that lies at the grounds of this act, despite the fact that consciousness of it depends upon the condition of the emergence of this act. Therefore, this consciousness is pure consciousness. And it is possible for the soul to have a consciousness of simple ideas given to it depending on this consciousness.

I.5. Experience in view of the act of preservation: Memory

Activity which depends upon experience is a whole in Leibniz's system of thought. Leibniz describes the constitution of experience by relating the different aspects of experience to different faculties and explaining the emergence of experience the possibilities of language. Although activity is described as the activity of a faculty due to the use of language, that which is active is not the faculties, but

²⁰²G VI 612/L 646 (M30), G V /RB 235-237

²⁰³While talking about the perceptions in the monad aspect of soul, Leibniz says that perception needs to be distinguished from apperception or consciousness. (G VI 608-609/L 644 (M14)) It should not be concluded based on this statement that apperception and consciousness are the same under any condition. (For example, L.E. Loemker says that the term apperception is synonymous with the term consciousness, and even that consciousness is the same with reflection, that many interpreters are confused due to use of different terms, and that leads some of them to the extreme point of claiming that unconsciousness is not present in Leibniz's system of thought. (L 692)) According to Leibniz, it is the consciousness of 'Self' that elevates the human being to the level of consciousness, as opposed to animals, and that directs him to necessary truths through reflection and reasoning by turning to his inner side. (G VI 611-612/L 645-646 (M28, M29, M30)), 'Considerations sur les Principes de Vie, et sur les Natures Plastiques, par l'Auteur du Systeme de l'Harmonie préétablie', G VI 542-543)

Since there is no such distinction of levels in Kant's conception of experience, the fact that Kant mentions the act of transcendental apperception as 'original apperception' (*der ursprünglichen Apperzeption*) can be regarded as appropriate within its own framework. The real point is how it is not possible by this act to ground the faculty of understanding, how it can satisfy the functions of the faculties of apperception and reflection in Leibniz's system in a manner to have priority over the categories. We will be considering this topic in the section about Kant's conception of experience.

See: Chapter III. Kant's Conception of Experience

the soul.²⁰⁴ Furthermore, it is not possible to comprehend the faculties which make possible the emergence of experience independently from each other. Therefore, activities of the faculties of memory and imagination, and the original apperception should be thought of as different and interdependent aspects of the necessary activity of soul.

The faculty of preservation²⁰⁵ or memory²⁰⁶, with regard to Leibniz's conception of experience, is the aspect through which the order of experience is given to soul. Just as the material of experience is given to soul in view of its monad aspect, the conditions determining how experience will emerge are innate to the soul in view of memory. Just as the monad aspect of soul - as a substance independent from other substances in view of its activity- establishes the foundation for the independence of soul's activity of experience in view of its content, similarly, memory establishes the foundation for the independence of this activity in view of its order.

²⁰⁴When Leibniz discusses whether faculties are real (*réel*) and whether they are beings separate from the soul or each other, he explicitly states the following:

"[...] even if they [faculties] were distinct beings, it would still be extravagant to speak of them as real *agents*. Faculties or qualities do not act; rather, substances act through faculties. ([...] *quand elles seroient des Estres réels et distincts, elles ne sauroient passer pour des Agents réels, qu'en parlant abusivement. Ce ne sont pas les facultés ou qualités, qui agissent, mais les Substances par les facultés.*") (G V 160/RB 174)

²⁰⁵Tr.*hâfiza*

²⁰⁶Fr.*mémoire* Ger.*Gedächtnis** Lat.*memoria*** , *recordatio*, *retinentia* Gr. *μνήμη*.

*From the German verb *denken* meaning to think.

**Latin word *memoria* means both power of keeping facts in conscious mind and of being able to call them back at will and something that is remembered just like *mémoire* and *memory*. *μνήμη* is derived from the roots *Mev* or *Mvη* that mean to think in Ancient Greek. The word *μένω* which means to stay, to be stable and to wait is also derived from the root *Mev*. The equivalent of *μένω* in Latin is *māneō* which means to remain, stay, abide; to wait for; to continue, endure, last. It is claimed that the source of all these words is the word *man* which means to think in Sanskrit. It is claimed that the Latin word *recordatio* which means both memory and remembering could have been derived from *cor* (heart, mind, soul, rational soul/spirit (*esprit*)) and *datio* (to give, to appoint, assign, distribute, transfer). *Retinentia* in Latin, on the other hand, originates from the verb *retinere* (from *tenere* meaning to hold) which means to retain, to keep, to keep stable, to preserve, to protect. When all these are considered, memory is in relation to that which is given to the heart, mind, to retain and preserve them on one side, and to converting them into thoughts on another side.

In the 'Introduction', we mentioned that the difference between Leibniz's and Kant's conceptions of experience is, indeed, the difference between their attitudes towards substance. Kant's main opposition during his critical and pre-critical periods against Leibniz's system of thought is against Leibniz's attitude which connects being a substance to independent activity. Even if soul cannot be referred to as a 'substance' in Kant's critical philosophy, it is apparent that that which experiences is not independent in view of such activity. This dependence is at two levels in Kant's system. First, that which experiences is dependent on 'outside' with regard to the material received through the faculty of sensibility. Since the strict sense of being 'outside' cannot be determined within the framework of Kant's critical philosophy, although his attitude during his pre-critical period points out that the 'outside' is the transcendental one, when we consider Kant, from Leibniz's conception of experience, there is nothing to prevent this 'outside' in question being not the outside of the soul, but only the outside of the soul's aspect aiming at knowing. Therefore, although only on the condition that we transcend the limits of human reason as determined by Kant, one who experiences can come to be not dependent upon his outside in view of the material received through sensibility and Kant's conception of experience can be approximated to that of Leibniz; and the problems arising out of it can be avoided to a certain extent. But this can be achieved by going beyond the limitations Kant set over the activity of human reason and only on this condition.

In Kant's system, the main point that renders one who experiences dependent is that the conditions of experience that are claimed to originate from one who experiences are dependent on the reception of material through the faculty of sensibility. In Leibniz's system, the conditions of experience are given to the soul in

the memory, and they are in the soul as *idea*, independently in view of their source, from actually knowing.²⁰⁷ Furthermore, there is no reason for the content of memory to be limited only to the conditions of experience. When we remember that Kant's primary purpose in the Critique of Pure Reason is the determination of the limits of human reason's 'legitimate' activity, the significance of Kant's refusing to accept memory as a fundamental faculty will be better revealed.

There are certain considerations that need to be paid attention to, while assessing the expressions about memory in Leibniz's texts. We would like to consider these to ensure full appreciation of the fact that, in Leibniz's conception of experience, memory is not a faculty that preserves that which emerges in experience for enabling subsequent remembering thereof, but it is one of the fundamental faculties making experience possible.

First, there are his remarks expressing his own opinions against Locke's conception of memory which likens the human soul to an empty tablet and which claims that it is not possible for it to remember anything which it has not actually learned previously. Leibniz's aim here is to show that there are things in the soul, which have priority over the activity of actual knowing and which are not derived from experience:

Il semble que nostre habile Auteur pretend qu'il n'y a rien virtuel en nous et même rien dont nous ne nous appercevions tousjours actuellement; mais il ne peut pas le prendre à la rigueur, autrement son sentiment seroit trop paradoxe, puisqu'encor les

²⁰⁷ "[...] an idea is an immediate inner object, and [...] this object expresses the nature or qualities of things. If the idea were the *form* of the thought, it would come into and go out of existence with the actual thoughts which correspond to it, but since it is the *object* of thought it can exist before and after the thoughts. ([...] *c'est un objet immediat interne, et [...] cet objet est une expression de la nature ou des qualités des choses. Si l'idée estoit la forme de la pensée, elle naistroit et cesseroit avec les pensées actuelles qui y repondent; mais en estant l'objet, elle pourra estre anterieure et posterieure aux pensées.*)" (G V 99/RB 109)

In Kant's system of thought, space, time, categories and pure ideas of reason are forms exactly in this sense.

habitudes acquises et les provisions de nostre memoire ne sont pas tousjours apperçues et même ne viennent pas tousjours à nostre secours au besoin, [...] Il limite aussi sa these en d'autres endroits, en disant qu'il n'y a rien en nous dont nous ne nous soyons au moins apperçus autres fois. Mais outre que personne peut assurer par la seule raison jusqu'à où peuvent estre allées nos apperceptions passées que nous pouvons avoir oubliées, [...]

Our gifted author seems to claim that there is nothing *potential*²⁰⁸ in us, in fact nothing of which we are not always actually aware. But he cannot hold strictly to this; otherwise his position would be too paradoxical, since, again, we are not always aware of our acquired dispositions [*habitude*] or of the contents of our memory, and they do not even come to our aid whenever we need them, [...] So on other occasions he limits his thesis to the statement that there is nothing in us of which we have not at least previously been aware. But no one can establish by reason alone how far our past and now perhaps forgotten awareness may have extended, [...] ²⁰⁹

Secondly, according to Leibniz, even though it is sufficient to show that *certain* things, which are not received from experience, are present in soul, to refute Locke's claim, based on the fact that we are unable to determine how early our past dates back to, it can be considered that things that are not derived from experience we acquire in this life might have been actually lived in a prior life or lives.²¹⁰ But Leibniz carefully refrains from determining the content of memory as things that are previously and actually acquired, regardless of when and where (when he discusses the claim that,

tout ce que l'on sait, [...] il faut tousjours qu'on l'ait appris, et qu'on l'ait connu autresfois expressement.

whatever is known must have been learned, and must at some earlier stage have been explicitly known):

²⁰⁸Fr.virtuel*

*From Latin word 'virtus' meaning force, power, effort.

²⁰⁹G V 45/RB 52

²¹⁰Leibniz opposes this claim, which he attributes to Platonists:

"The Platonists thought that all our knowledge is recollection, and thus that the truths which the soul brought with it when the man was born – the ones called innate – must be the remains of an earlier explicit knowledge. But there is no foundation for this opinion; [...] (*C'estoit l'opinion des Platoniciens que toutes nos connoissances estoient des reminiscences, et qu'ainsi les verités, que l'ame a apportées avec la naissance de l'homme, et qu'on appelle innées, doivent estre des restes d'une connoissance expresse anterieure. Mais cette opinion n'a nul fondement.*)" (G V 75/RB 78-79)

Pourquoy cela ne pourroit il avoir encor une autre cause telle que seroit, que l'ame peut avoir cette chose en elle sans qu'on s'en soit apperçû? car puisqu'une connoissance acquise y peut estre cachée par la memoire, comme vous en convenés, pourquoy la nature ne pourroit-elle pas y avoir aussi caché quelque connoissance originale. Faut-il que tout ce qui est naturel à une substance qui se connoist, s'y connoisse d'abord actuellement? Cette substance (telle que nostre ame) ne peut et ne doit-elle pas avoir plusieurs propriétés et affections, qu'il est impossible d'envisager toutes d'abord et tout à la fois?

Why couldn't it be because of something different, such as that the soul can contain things without one's being aware of them? Since an item of acquired knowledge can be hidden there by the memory, as you admit that it can, why could not nature also hide there an item of unacquired knowledge²¹¹? Must a self-knowing substance have, straight away, actual knowledge of everything which belongs to its nature? Cannot -and should not- a substance like our soul have various properties²¹² and states²¹³ which could not all be thought about straight away or all at once^{214,215}

According to Leibniz, constitution of the content of memory by things that are not actually known previously is not only possible, as revealed in his remark above, but also necessary. Only claiming that things that are not derived from experience in current life are things that are inherited from a prior life or lives assumes memory as a fundamental faculty:

Et il est aisé de juger que l'ame devoit déjà avoir des connoissances innées dans l'estat precedent (si la preexistence avoit lieu), quelque reculé qu'il pourroit estre, tout comme icy: elles devroient donc aussi venir d'un autre estat precedent, ou elles seroient enfin innées ou au moins con-crées, ou bien il faudroit aller à l'infini et faire les ames éternelles, en quel cas ces connoissances seroient innées en effect, par ce qu'elles n'auroient jamais de commencement dans l'ame; [...]

[...] it is obvious that if there was an earlier state, however far back, it too must have involved some innate knowledge, just as our present state does: such knowledge must then either have come from a still earlier state or else have been innate or at least created with [the soul]; or else we must go to infinity and make souls eternal, in which case these items of knowledge would indeed be innate, because they would never have begun in the soul.²¹⁶

²¹¹Fr. *originale*

²¹²Fr. *propriétés*

²¹³Fr. *affections*

²¹⁴Fr. *envisager*

²¹⁵G V 75/RB 78

²¹⁶G V 75/RB 79

Third, relying on the fact that things that are derived from experience or that are actually known previously cannot constitute the content of memory as a fundamental faculty in Leibniz's conception of experience, one should not conclude that memory lacks content, that it is *just a faculty*²¹⁷. Leibniz likens the fact that the content of memory is constituted by things that are not actually known previously to the fact that there are things which are ours though we have never used them before:

Et avoir une chose sans s'en servir, est ce la même chose que d'avoir seulement la faculté de l'acquiescer? Si cela estoit, nous ne possederions jamais que des choses dont nous jouissons: au lieu qu'on sait, qu'outre la faculté et l'objet, il faut souvent quelque disposition dans la faculté ou dans l'objet et dans toutes les deux, pourque la faculté s'exerce sur l'objet.

Is having something which you do not use the same as merely having the faculty of acquiring it? If that were so, our only possessions would be the things we make use of. Whereas in fact it is known that for a faculty to be brought to bear upon an object there must often be not merely the faculty and the object, but also some disposition in the faculty or in the object, or in both.²¹⁸

Keeping these three points in mind, we can say that memory, in Leibniz's conception of experience, is a fundamental faculty that is not derived from experience, that preserves the ideas which are given by the creation and which are not actually known previously, and that makes possible the expression of these ideas through determining the order of experience. Therefore, in view of experience, the faculty of memory is the faculty that provides the conditions of sensing the perceptions in the monad aspect of the soul, through clarification and distinguishing

²¹⁷With regard to Leibniz's conception of experience, the faculties in Kant's conception of experience are just faculties, since there is no content that is different from the content received through sensibility and that has priority over it. And it is not clear, in Kant's system, what we should understand from such a faculty that contains nothing, before experience emerges.

²¹⁸G V 75/RB 79

thereof.²¹⁹ Indeed, it is the aspect in which the conditions of the soul's activities, including the activity of experience as a whole, are given to soul.

If we are to follow the analogy²²⁰ Leibniz used to oppose Locke's regarding human soul as *tabula rasa*, memory determines the order of the activity of the soul, just like the veins in a piece of marble determine what can be made out of that marble. Similar to Hercules's figure being present in the piece of marble, ideas are present in the memory "as inclinations, dispositions, tendencies, or natural potentialities²²¹, not as actualities"²²². The point to be noted here is that the innate ideas' being given to soul, as a substance, as natural virtualities is not independent from the activity of the soul. Ideas are given to substance to order its activity. And the reason why God created soul is to perform this activity. In brief, it is not possible

²¹⁹"If we wish to designate by soul everything which has perceptions and appetites in the general sense which I have just explained, all simple substances or created monads could be called souls. But since sentiment is something more than a simple perception, I agree that the general name of monads or entelechies is enough for simple substances which have only perception and that only those should be called souls in which perception is more distinct and is accompanied by memory. (*Si nous voulons appeler Ame tout ce qui a perceptions et appetits dans le sens général que je viens d'expliquer, toutes les substances simples ou Monades créées pourroient être appelées Ames; mais, comme le sentiment est quelque chose de plus qu'une simple perception, je consens que le nom general de Monades et d'Entelechies suffise aux substances simples, qui n'auront que cela, et qu'on appelle Ames seulement celles, dont la perception est plus distincte et accompagnée de mémoire.*)" (G VI 610/L 644 (M19))

²²⁰"For if the soul were like such a blank tablet then truths would be in us as the shape of Hercules is in a piece of marble when the marble is entirely neutral as to whether it assumes this shape or some other. However, if there were veins in the block which marked out the shape of Hercules rather than other shapes, then that block would be more determined to that shape and Hercules would be innate in it, in a way, even though labour would be required to expose the veins and to polish them into clarity, removing everything that prevents their being seen. (*Car si l'ame ressembloit à ces Tablettes vuides, les verités seroient en nous comme la figure d'Hercule est dans un marbre, quand ce marbre est tout à fait indifferent à recevoir ou cette figure ou quelque autre. Mais s'il y avoit des veines dans la pierre qui marquassent la figure d'Hercule preferablement à d'autres figures, cette pierre y seroit plus déterminée, et Hercule y seroit comme inné en quelque façon, quoyqu'il faudroit du travail pour decouvrir ces veines, et pour les nettoyer par la politure, en retranchant ce qui les empeche de paroistre.*)" (G V 45/RB 52)

²²¹Fr.virtualité

²²²"[...] comme des inclinations, des dispositions, des habitudes ou des virtualités naturelles, et non pas comme des actions, [...]" G V 45/RB 52

for the soul to have ideas and not to be active, according to Leibniz's conception of substance.

After determining, in Leibniz's conception of experience, that the content of memory is innate ideas²²³, we need to explore what the nature of ideas is in Leibniz's system of thought. But before doing so, there is one remainder we would like to make.

In Leibniz's system of thought, ideas preserved in memory determine not only the conditions of the soul's activity of experience, but also the order of all activity of soul. Therefore, there is no reason to limit the content of memory only to ideas determining the conditions of experience. But, since what we are exploring in this study is experience as spontaneous activity of the soul, that which has priority for us is ideas in view of the determination of the order of this activity.

Another point we would like to draw attention to is that certain tensions caused by expressions about memory contained in Leibniz's texts can be satisfied only by revealing what the nature of ideas is. As we stated previously, in Leibniz's conception of experience, memory is the faculty that, together with the act of apperception and imagination, turns perceptions in the monad aspect of the soul into sensations, by clarifying and distinguishing them. Leibniz' relating the constitution of experience to these three faculties has two aspects: First, as explicitly stated, the constitution of experience is impossible only in view of substance' innately having

²²³Fr.*idée* Ger.*Idee* Lat.*idea* Gr.*ἰδέα*.

**ἰδέα* (appearance, image) in Ancient Greek is derived from the verb *εἶδω* meaning to see.

When the distinction between *ἰδέα* and *εἶδος* in Plato's texts are considered, by image as the equivalent of idea, one should understand the image in view of that what is seen by the created soul.

About this topic see: Tarık Necati Ilgıcıoğlu, 'A Critical Consideration of Kant's Doctrine of Ideas in View of Plato's Texts', Boğaziçi University, 2000 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation).

Also see: Oğuz Haşlakoğlu, 'Technê in Plato's Thought', (Eflâṭun Fikriyatında Tekhne), Boğaziçi University, 1997 (unpublished M.A. thesis).

the representations of other substances without the activities of these three faculties; second, activities of reflection and reasoning, the intellectual faculties of the human being, are not involved in the constitution of experience.²²⁴

²²⁴That which makes it possible for Leibniz to claim that animals, which do not have the faculties of reflection and reasoning, can acquire a kind of experience and that human beings are not that different from animals in view of experience is this:

"So sense and thought are not something which is natural to matter, and there are only two ways in which they could occur in it: through God's combining it with a substance to which thought is natural, or through his putting thought into it by a miracle. On this topic I am entirely in agreement with the Cartesians, except that I include the beasts and believe that they too have senses, and souls [...]; whereas the Cartesians have been needlessly perplexed over the souls of beasts. Not knowing what to do about them if they are preserved [...], they have been driven to deny – contrary to all appearances and to the general opinion of mankind – that beasts even have sense. (*Ce n'est donc pas une chose naturelle à la matiere de sentir et de penser, et cela ne peut arriver chez elle que de deux façons dont l'une sera que Dieu y joigne une substance, à qui il soit naturel de penser, et l'autre que Dieu y mette la pensée par miracle. En cela donc je suis entierement du sentiment des Cartesiens, excepté que je l'étends jusqu'aux bestes et je crois qu'elles ont du sentiment et des ames [...], au lieu que les Cartesiens embarrassés sans sujet des ames des bestes et ne sachant ce qu'ils en doivent faire si elles se conservent, ont esté forcés de refuser même le sentiment aux bestes contre toutes les apparences et contre le jugement du genre humain.*") (G V 60/RB 67)

"Men act like beasts insofar as the sequences of their perceptions are based only on the principle of memory, [...] (*Les hommes agissent comme les bêtes en tant que les consecutions de leur perceptions ne se font que par le principe de la memoire, [...]*") (G VI 611/L 645 (M28))

"Memory provides a kind of *consecutiveness* to souls which simulates reason but which must be distinguished from it. (*La memoire fournit une espèce de Consecution aux Ames, qui imite la raison, mais qui en doit être distinguée.*") (G VI 611/L 645 (M26))

"It is in this same respect that man's knowledge differs from beasts: beasts are sheer empirics* and are guided entirely by instances. While men are capable of demonstrative knowledge [*science*], beasts, so far as one can judge, never manage to form necessary propositions, since the faculty by which they make sequences is something lower than the reason which is to be found in men. The sequences of beasts are just like those of simple empirics who maintain that what has happened once will happen again in a case which is similar in the respects that they are impressed by, although that does not enable them to judge whether the same reasons are at work. [...] The sequences of beasts are only a shadow of reasoning, that is, they are nothing but a connection in the imagination – a passage from one image to another; for when a new situation appears similar to its predecessor, it is expected to have the same concomitant features as before, as though things were linked [*liaison*] in reality just because their images are linked in the memory. (*C'est aussi en quoy les connoissances des hommes et celles des bestes sont differentes: les bestes sont purement empiriques et ne font que se regler sur les exemples, car elles n'arrivent jamais à former des propositions necessaires autant qu'on en peut juger; au lieu que les hommes sont capables des sciences demonstratives. C'est encor pour cela que la facultés des bestes ont de faire des consecutions, est quelque chose d'inférieur à la raison qui est dans les hommes. Les consecutions des bestes sont purement comme celles des simples empiriques qui pretendent que ce qui est arrivé quelquesfois, arrivera encor dans un cas où ce qui les frappe est pareil, sans estre capables de juger, si les mêmes raisons subsistent. [...] Les consecutions des bestes ne sont qu'une ombre de raisonnement, c'est à dire ce ne sont que connexions d'imagination, et que passages d'une image à une autre, parce que dans une rencontre nouvelle qui paroist semblable à la precedente, on s'attend de nouveau, à ce qu'on y trouvoit joint autresfois, comme si les choses estoient liées en effect, parceque leur images le sont dans la memoire.*") (G V 43-44/RB 50-51)

*What Leibniz means by the word 'empirical' is to behave like physicians, the so-called 'Empirics', who look down on theoretical work, who rely on their own experiences based on traditional conception of treatment. (AG 217, footnote 261.)

Experience is soul's spontaneous²²⁵ activity of knowing and is shaped according to innate ideas. Knowledge of the nature of ideas in question, according to Leibniz, is possible only through figuring out what creation is.²²⁶

According to Leibniz, things that emerge in experience do not bear in themselves the reasons²²⁷ of their existence^{228, 229}. In Leibniz's terminology, these are contingent²³⁰ things, the opposites of which are also possible. Since there is nothing that necessitates them to emerge as they do and in the order they do, in such things themselves or in the world²³¹ itself as the collection of such things, their reason should be sought "in the substance which carries with it the reason for its existence,

Also see: G VI 611/L 645 (M28))

²²⁵See: footnote 149

²²⁶We need to state that, though in general it applies to the entirety of this study, our assessments below in relation to God, truth and reason in Leibniz's system of thought aim at providing an establishment as much as possible of Leibniz's remarks regarding only these, within the same system, in a manner not to allow room for misunderstandings. The reason that we follow such a path is the constitution of experience according to Leibniz's system of thought. Apart from that we are in no position to claim anything regarding God, truth and reason, and in particular to make any assessment regarding Leibniz's theology.

²²⁷Fr.*raison*

What is in question here is not a cause that emerges in experience, but reason (*raison*).

²²⁸Fr.*existence*

²²⁹G VI 106/H 127-128 (T:1-7)

²³⁰Fr.*contingent* Lat.*contingens**

*From the Latin verb *contingere*. The meanings of *contingere* include to happen, befall, to turn out, come to pass, be granted to one; be produced; sprinkle, cover; wet, moisten; affect with a disease, infect; contaminate; touch; to be neighbours, to be next to each other; reach (to); border on, be connected with; affect, hit; take hold, seize; color/stain; lay hands on, appropriate; smite; affect emotionally, move/touch; to contact, to hold, to grasp; to fill (with something) and to determine).

In Leibniz's system of thought, the difference between those which are *contingent* from those which are only possible (*possible*) is the fact that the former are determined. This is the same with being created and actual (*actuel*).

²³¹"I call 'World' the whole succession and the whole agglomeration of all existent things, lest it be said that several worlds could have existed in different times and different places. (*J'appelle Monde toute la suite et toute la collection de toutes les choses existantes, afin qu'on ne dise point que plusieurs mondes pouvoient exister en differens temps et differens lieux.*)" (G VI 107/H 128 (T:1-8))

and which in consequence is *necessary* and eternal".²³² This substance should have understanding²³³ because:

[...] car ce monde qui existe, étant contingent, et une infinité d'autres mondes étant également possibles et également prétendants à l'existence, pour ainsi dire, aussi bien que lui, il faut que la cause du monde ait eu égard ou relation à tous ces mondes possibles, pour en déterminer un. Et cet égard ou rapport d'une substance existante à de simples possibilités, ne peut être autre chose que l'entendement qui en a les idées: et en déterminer une, ne peut être autre chose que l'acte de la volonté qui choisit. Et c'est la puissance de cette substance, qui en rend la volonté efficace. La puissance va à l'être, la sagesse ou l'entendement au vrai, et la volonté au bien. Et cette cause intelligente doit être infinie de toutes les manières, et absolument parfaite en puissance, en sagesse et en bonté, puisqu'elle va à tout ce qui est possible. Et comme tout est lié, il n'y a pas lieu d'en admettre plus d'une. Son entendement est la source des essences, et sa volonté est l'origine des existences.

[...] for this existing world being contingent and an infinity of other worlds being equally possible, and holding, so to say, equal claim to existence with it, the cause²³⁴ of the world must needs have had regard²³⁵ or reference²³⁶ to all these possible worlds in order to fix upon one of them. This regard or relation²³⁷ of an existent substance to simple possibilities can be nothing other than the understanding which has the idea of them, while to fix upon one of them can be nothing other than the act of the will which chooses. It is the power²³⁸ of this substance that renders its will efficacious. Power relates²³⁹ to being²⁴⁰, wisdom or understanding to truth²⁴¹, and will to good²⁴². And this intelligent cause ought to be infinite in all ways, and absolutely perfect in power, in wisdom and in goodness, since it relates²⁴³ to all that which is possible. Furthermore, since all is connected together, there is no ground for admitting more than one. Its understanding is the source of essences²⁴⁴, and its will is the origin of existences²⁴⁵.²⁴⁶

²³²"[...] et il faut la chercher dans la substance qui porte la raison de son existence avec elle, et laquelle par conséquent est nécessaire et éternelle." (G VI 106/H 127-128 (T:I-7))

²³³Fr.intelligent

²³⁴Fr.cause

²³⁵Fr.égard

²³⁶Fr.relation

²³⁷Fr.rapport

²³⁸Fr.puissance

²³⁹The verb used here in the text in French is the verb *aller* which means to go, to arrive, to reach, to fit and to suit.

²⁴⁰Fr.être

²⁴¹Fr.vrai

²⁴²Fr.bien

²⁴³Fr.aller

²⁴⁴Fr.essences

²⁴⁵Fr.existences

²⁴⁶G VI 106/H 127-128 (T:I-7)

According to Leibniz, the being which is the ground of itself; which is necessary, eternal, perfect and which has understanding is God.²⁴⁷ The point that bears importance with respect to our topic is the relation of God's understanding, will and power, with reason²⁴⁸.

According to Leibniz reason is "the inviolable linking together of truths"²⁴⁹,²⁵⁰ There are certain points we would like to emphasize in order not to lead to any misunderstandings regarding Leibniz's remark. Though it seems possible to conclude –by a superficial approach– that there are things which are possible in a manner to precede God's understanding, based on Leibniz's explanation regarding what reason is and his remark that God establishes relations with those, which are possible, through his understanding, within the framework of Leibniz's system of thought and the rational Christian theology²⁵¹ he is trying to establish, it is not possible for either the possibilities or the reason or the truths to be independent from God.

Leibniz's remarks that God is omnipotent²⁵² and omniscient²⁵³, and that he understands everything which is possible should be comprehended to mean that

²⁴⁷G VI 106/H 127-128 (T:I-7), G IV 427/L 303-304 (DM1), G VI 613/L 646 (M37, M38, M39)

²⁴⁸Fr.*raison* Ger.*Vernunft* Lat.*ratio* * Gr.λόγος.

*The meanings of the Latin word *ratio* include account, counting, plan, measurement, reasoning, aspect, relation, cause, ground, ratio and reason. Similarly, the Ancient Greek word λόγος means account, counting, measurement, relation, ratio, explanation, law, rule, ground, argument, thesis, hypothesis, formula, cause, thinking, reason, word, speech, discussion, claim.

²⁴⁹Fr.*enchaînement* (G VI 64/H 88 (T:D-23))

²⁵⁰“For I observed at the beginning that by REASON here I do not mean the opinions and discourses of men, nor even the habit they have formed of judging things according to the usual course of Nature, but rather the inviolable linking together of truths. (*Car j'ay remarqué d'abord que par LA RAISON on n'entend pas icy les opinions et les discours des hommes, ny même l'habitude qu'ils ont prise de juger des choses suivant le cours ordinaire de la nature, mais l'enchaînement inviolable des verités.*)” (G VI 64/H 88 (T:D-23))

²⁵¹The reason of Theodicée's being written is to establish the foundations for such a theology.

Also see: L49-53

²⁵²Fr.*omnipotent* (G VI 439 (T:CD3,4))

everything that God understands is possible; and that reason is the order of truth. Therefore, within the framework of Leibniz's system of thought, the ground of reason and truth should be God from his aspect of understanding.

The critical point here is to comprehend what it is that determines the limit of that which is possible. The principle determining the limit of that which is possible is, according to Leibniz, the principle of non-contradiction²⁵⁴ which is, first of all, not a logical, but a metaphysical principle. The ground of the principle of non-contradiction is God, which is the necessary being in Leibniz's system of thought. The principle of non-contradiction is the principle of not only understanding, but also of being and the truth. Similarly, it is the principle of not only necessary truths but of all truths. That something is not metaphysically possible means that it contradicts the unity of the truth, being and the reason, that it is the denial of these all.

The second point is related to Leibniz's defining reason as the inviolable order of truths. One should not conclude based on this remark that there is a plurality of truths and that reason is the order thereof. Talking about a plurality of truths is possible with regard to a human being's understanding different aspects of truth in view of his actual knowing. Since actual knowing depends on the emergence of experience and since the emergence of experience is subject to time and space, it is not possible for the human being to become conscious of the truth as one and as a

The meaning we should derive from this is God's power in view of his will, that is to say, his power to do or to create everything that he determines by his will.

²⁵³Fr. *omniscient* (G VI 439 (T:CD3), G VI 440 (T:CD13))

The point here is God's power in view of his understanding, that is to say his capability of knowing everything.

²⁵⁴G VI 612/L 646 (M31)

In Leibniz's texts, this principle is given as the principle of contradiction (*le principe de la contradiction*).

whole either by way of experience or through his intellectual faculties that are active as a consequence of the emergence of experience. A human being's actual knowledge of truth is mediate and partial with regard to both its horizon and its depth. He cannot know the truth as a whole, nor can he know an aspect of truth completely, since this requires knowing truth as a whole.

However, God's knowledge relying on a single act of understanding cannot depend upon experience and since it is not based on reflection and reasoning which are the human being's intellectual faculties; therefore since it is not partial and mediate, truth before God is single and one. Since there are no particular partial truths, reason as separate from them and as order of them cannot be suggested, either. Accordingly, reason and truth are one and the same thing metaphysically. Reason is the order of truth as the object of God's understanding and will; it is the order the source of which is God's understanding itself. Truths arising from a partial grasping of a single truth from different aspects and reason being their interrelation can be mentioned only in view of the human being's actual knowing which suffices to know neither everything nor one thing with all of its relations. Leibniz's distinction between necessary and contingent truths²⁵⁵ should also be assessed from this respect. The ground of those that are mentioned as necessary truths is the unity of the truth, which is single and therefore is the unity of God in view of his understanding. Since their opposites mean denial of the truth as a whole, they are not possible; in other words, their opposites are not included in God's understanding. With regard to contingent truths, the opposites of which are also possible, it is possible that both they are and also their opposites are truths. Neither they

²⁵⁵G VI 612/L 646 (M33)

themselves, nor their opposites lead to the denial of reason and the unity of God in view of his understanding.

Referring to ideas in Leibniz's system of thought is again in view of establishing the foundations for the human being's activity of knowing.²⁵⁶ In order for God to understand truth in line with the order of reason he does not need truths and ideas as the representations of reason as the order of the truth. Claiming that God understands truths through ideas means that the understanding of God, which is the ground and source of these ideas, is representative, and therefore, mediate, which contradicts the conception of God in Leibniz's system of thought.²⁵⁷ Ideas are not aspects through which God sees the truth, or aspects in which truth makes itself visible to God. They are representations of the truth and the reason as the order of the truth, which are innately given to substances by God in order to enable the created substances to reveal, apperceive and to know the truth, even if

²⁵⁶“That the ideas of things are in us means therefore nothing but that God, the creator alike of the things and of the mind, has impressed a power of thinking upon the mind so that it can by its own operations derive what corresponds perfectly to the nature of things. (*Ideam itaque rerum in nobis esse, nihil aliud est, quam DEUM, autorem pariter et rerum et mentis, eam menti facultatem cogitandi impressisse, ut ex suis operationibus ea ducere possit, quae perfecte respondeant his quae sequuntur ex rebus.*)” (the text Leibniz wrote in 1678, titled ‘Explicandum ergo erat, quid sit vera idea’, G VII 265/L 208)

²⁵⁷Though understanding of God is the ground of ideas, there are other points requiring ideas not in the understanding of God. Claiming that ideas are in the understanding of God would be to say that those which are created perform their activities through the ideas in God, which would contradict the conception of substance, which is based upon the point that, once created, that which is created is independent in view of its activity, and with the principle of pre-established harmony.

See: G IV 453-454/L 321 (DM29)

Furthermore, such a conception of idea would enable the claim that the ideas in human being are a part of the ideas in God, and the evaluation that the collection of the ideas in God forms a single world's soul, would have contradicted the Christian theology upon which Leibniz's system of thought relies.

See: G IV 453/L 321 (DM28)

representatively or partially, depending on the degree of the perfection of their activities.²⁵⁸

Just like the fact that truth and reason are based on God in view of his understanding, that which is good is also based on God in view of his will.²⁵⁹ God has the knowledge of all those that are possible in view of his understanding, and the only thing that God considers is the Good, when he determines which of those that are possible will be actualized by his will. While the world to be created should be created according to the Good, in order for God's choice depending on his will to be good, God should make this decision by evaluating all those that are possible in view of his understanding, so that this can really be a choice.

The reason why God chose this world is not that he is not capable of determining another one in view of his will and power, but that such a determination is necessarily based on reason, in order for it to be a *choice*. Accordingly, reason or understanding of God is not something that limits God's will and power which

²⁵⁸According to Leibniz, in order for something to represent (*exprimere**) another, representation should bear relations that correspond to those in that which is represented. For example, the plan of a machine represents the machine; speech represents thoughts, figures represent numbers. There is no necessity that the representation should be like that which is represented; similarity between their relations will suffice. (G VII 263/L 207) But representation of the truth by ideas should not be discretionary to an extent, as is the case of the representation of numbers by figures, or of thoughts by words, but it is natural as is the case in the representation of larger circle by a smaller one, of a geographical region by its map, or of God by the world. (G VII 264/L 208)

**exprimere*: squeeze, squeeze/press out; imitate, copy; portray; pronounce, express.

²⁵⁹"As the wisdom or knowledge of truth is the perfection of the understanding so the goodness or tendency to good is the perfection of the will. Every will has good as object, at least apparently; divine will has only that which is both good and true. (*Ut autem sapientia seu veri cognitio est perfectio intellectus, ita Bonitas seu boni appetitio est perfectio voluntatis. Et omnis quidem Voluntas bonum habet pro objecto, saltem apparens, at divina Voluntas non nisi bonum simul et verum.*)" (G VI 441 (T:CD18))

[“Comme la sagesse ou connaissance du vrai est la perfection de l’entendement, ainsi la bonté ou tendance au bien est la perfection de la volonté. Toute volonté a pour objet le bien, au moins apparent; la volonté divine n’a pour objet que ce qui est à la fois bien et vrai.” (‘La Cause de Dieu, plaidée par sa justice, elle-même conciliée avec toutes ses autres perfections et la totalité de ses actions’ (*traduit par Amédée Jacques, Œuvres de Leibniz*, Paris, Charpentier, 1842, tome II, p.365-388) dans Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, *Essais de Théodicée, sur la bonté de dieu, la liberté de l’homme et l’origine du mal*, Chronologie et introduction par J. Brunschwig, Garnier-Flammarion, Paris, 1969.)]

should be infinite and undetermined; it releases the creation of this world firstly from being necessary because he has all possibilities in view of its understanding, or secondly from being discretionary and despotic because his choice does not depend upon only will and power.²⁶⁰ Therefore, this world in view of its being created is based on God's power to create, in view of its being chosen is based on his will and understanding, that is on reason. According to Leibniz, that which makes necessary and reasonable the emergence of the things in experience in the manner they do, where these things are contingent things opposites of which are equally possible and have nothing which will make their emergence as such necessary and reasonable by themselves, is reason's being the ground of the creation. In other words, when we consider God's will that is good together with God's understanding, which is metaphysically prior to his will, another world that conforms to both the Good and

²⁶⁰“Then, too, when we say that things are not good by any rule of excellence but solely by the will of God, we unknowingly destroy, I think, all the love of God and all his glory. For why praise him for what he has done if he would be equally praiseworthy in doing exactly the opposite? Where will his justice and wisdom be found if nothing is left but a certain despotic power, if will takes the place of reason, and if, according to the definition of tyrants, that which is pleasing to the most powerful is by that very fact just? Besides it seems that every act of will implies some reason for willing and that this reason naturally precedes the act of will itself. This is why I find entirely strange, also, the expression of certain other philosophers* who say that the eternal truths of metaphysics and geometry, and consequently also the rules of goodness, justice, and perfection, are merely the effects of the will of God; while it seems to me that they are rather the consequences of his understanding, which certainly does not depend upon his will any more than does his essence. (*Aussi disant que les choses ne sont bonnes par aucune regle de bonté, mais par la seule volonté de Dieu, on détruit, ce me semble, sans y penser, tout l'amour de Dieu et toute sa gloire. Car pourquoy le louer de ce qu'il a fait, s'il seroit également louable en faisant tout le contraire? Où sera donc sa justice et sa sagesse, s'il ne reste qu'un certain pouvoir despotique, si la volonté tient lieu de raison, et si selon la définition des tyrans, ce qui plaist au plus puissant est juste par là même? Outre qu'il semble que toute volonté suppose quelque raison de vouloir et que cette raison est naturellement antérieure à la volonté. C'est pourquoy je trouve encor cette expression de quelques autres philosophes tout à fait estrange, qui disent que les verités éternelles de la metaphysique et de la Geometrie, et par consequent aüssi les regles de la bonté, de la justice et de la perfection, ne sont que des effects de la volonté de Dieu, au lieu qu'il me semble que ce sont des suites de son entendement, qui ne depend point de sa volonté, non plus que son essence.*)” (G IV 427-428/L 304 (DM2))

*In the draft text, there is an explicit reference to Descartes at this point. (AG 36, note: 69)

Also see: G VI 614/L 647 (M46)

the Truth is not possible. The principle of sufficiency of reason²⁶¹, which is presented as the ground of contingent things opposites of which are possible not in view of the actual world but in view of understanding, should be evaluated as such. While the ground of those which are named as 'necessary truths' in view of partial and representative knowledge of human beings, the activity of intellectual faculties of whom depends on experience in Leibniz' system of thought, and which are indeed only consequences of God's understanding is only the principle of non-contradiction, the ground of those named 'contingent truths, the opposites of which are also possible' is God's understanding, God's will that is in harmony with his understanding and God's creative power which is subject to his will.²⁶²

Therefore the foundation of the principle of pre-established harmony²⁶³ which Leibniz was many times obliged to present as the collection of the relations established among substances, in order to be able to speak the same language with his addressees, as if it was between the soul and the body, and as if substances were possible independently of harmony, that is to say, as if substances were metaphysically prior to harmony, is the harmony between God's understanding and will together with his creative power depending on his will.

Therefore, the harmony is established by God's understanding, will and power. The reason of the creation of substances is to actualize that which is good. The reason for being of each substance consists of its place within the harmony, where this place can be determined only with those of the others; and its existence which consists only of its activity is its share of the harmony.

²⁶¹Fr. *le principe de la raison suffisante*

²⁶²G IV 436-439/L 310-311 (DM13)

²⁶³Fr. *le principe de l'harmonie préétablie*

Therefore, reason lies in the ground of the activity of substances, since it is the pre-established harmony that determines the activity, and since harmony relies on reason. It is also through this way that reason lies in the ground of experience in the sense used in this study, where experience emerges without the contribution of intellectual faculties of human being. It is possible to see experience as the activity of spontaneous knowing only within this framework, because, in Leibniz's system of thought, the spontaneity of substance consists only of its activity, which is its share of the harmony that depends on reason.

Unfolding of truth by those which are created, to the extent of their shares of harmony, or their "imitating reason" being the order of truth is through ideas. Ideas are representations of truth, that are innately given to those which are created by God, to enable those which are created to know the truth depending on the understanding of God, or of reason being the order of truth. While such an activity of knowing is the imitation of reason in view of experience, that which is in question in view of the intellectual faculties of the human being is being included in the order of the truth and following it.

We have mentioned above that, in Leibniz's system of thought, memory's being one of the fundamental faculties not only enables the constitution of experience, but it also provides broader possibilities, compared to Kant's system, with regard to the human being's activity of knowing, and we have voiced the opinion that the reason why Kant denied memory's being a fundamental faculty is not only the possibilities it offers in the constitution of experience, but also the possibilities that it provides for human intellectual activity; because he wished to exclude these possibilities. At this point we need to state that, although Kant's

exclusion of memory which is a fundamental faculty in Leibniz's system of thought fits his desire for the limitation of the legitimate activity of human reason, this leads not only to his failure to provide a ground to constitute experience (where the constitution of experience is essential in view of the fact that it constitutes the limit of proper activity of reason), but also leads to a failure to provide a foundation for the activity of reasoning as the discursive activity of human reason which, according to Kant, is the only path for doing science.²⁶⁴ We would like to briefly consider the activities of reflection and reasoning, which indeed make up topics for separate full-fledged studies, and which we, in Leibniz's system, mention as the intellectual faculties of the human being, in order to ensure better realization of the considerations regarding Kant's system, and also of the possibilities offered beyond the constitution of experience by memory's being a fundamental faculty in Leibniz's system.

The ground of the human being's being spirit or rational soul, according to Leibniz, is his imitating God in view of his understanding.²⁶⁵ In Leibniz's system of thought, each substance represents God, and the world or the universe as a collection

²⁶⁴About this topic, see: Çitil, *ibid.*

²⁶⁵While establishing the foundation for the difference between, ordinary souls (*les âmes ordinaires*) and rational souls (*les esprits ou les âmes raisonnables*), Leibniz says:

"[...] souls in general are living mirrors or images of the universe of created beings, while spirits are also images of divinity itself or of the author of nature, capable of knowing the system of the universe and of imitating it to some extent by means of architectonic samples (*échantillons architectoniques*), each spirit being like a little divinity within its own sphere (*département*). ([...] *les Ames en general sont des miroirs vivans ou images de l'univers des creatures, mais que les Esprits sont encor des images de la Divinité même, ou de l'Auteur même de la Nature, capables de connoître le système de l'Univers et d'en imiter quelque chose par des échantillons architectoniques, chaque esprit étant comme une petite divinité dans son département.*") (G VI 621/L 651 (M83))

"It is that God, in giving him intelligence, has presented him with an image of the Divinity. ("C'est que Dieu luy a fait present d'une image de la Divinité, en luy donnant l'intelligence.") (G VI 197/H 215-216 (T:II-147))

of all those which are created.²⁶⁶ What we should understand by this is that it represents God, because each substance is created by God, and it represents other substances in view of its place within the harmony. The rational souls' representation of the universe in view of their place within the harmony is not only due to the fact that they are created by God but also due to the fact that they imitate God's understanding through their faculty of understanding. It is in this sense that rational souls represent God rather than the universe.²⁶⁷ Leibniz likens the difference between other substances and rational souls, to the difference between the mirror and those who see the mirror.²⁶⁸ While the human being, as a rational soul, is the mirror that renders visible the harmony in view of the representations in its monad aspect and its activity of experience, he is that who sees with regard to his intellectual faculties that resemble the understanding of God. But there is a reservation here; while God's understanding is immediate, that of the human being depends on ideas.

In Leibniz's system of thought that which prevent the human being's merely being a reflecting mirror and makes possible for him to see, although partially and representatively, that which lies in the ground of those reflected in the mirror, are the intellectual faculties of reflection and reasoning.²⁶⁹ Both of these faculties must be faculties of understanding, since they are aimed at grasping the ideas which are the representations of the truth (and of reason) in the memory of soul. Therefore, these two faculties are not in relation to those which emerge in experience, but to ideas including the conditions for this emergence.

²⁶⁶G IV 460-461/L 326 (DM35)

²⁶⁷G IV 461-462/L 326-327 (DM36), G VI 604-605/L 640 (PNG14)

²⁶⁸G IV 461-462/L 326-327 (DM36)

²⁶⁹G IV 459-460/L 325-326 (DM34), G VI 600-601/L 638 (PNG5), G VI 611-612/L 645-646 (M29, M30), G V 45/RB 51-52.

In Leibniz's texts, the activity of reflection²⁷⁰ is explained as the rational soul's turning to itself and to become conscious of the ideas in itself, after the emergence of experience.²⁷¹ What we should understand from this, taking Leibniz's system of thought and conception of experience into consideration, is the grasping, or the understanding of the connection of that which emerges in experience with ideas, once experience emerges in accordance with the ideas in memory, or once the representations in the monad aspect of the soul are apperceived depending on the ideas that are the conditions of experience. Becoming conscious of Self which is apperceived only as something separate from that which emerges in experience in view of the act of pure apperception; the soul's understanding that it is a being²⁷² and substance²⁷³; the comprehension of experience, which only contains a variety in view of its emergence, as a plurality by being broken it into parts by means of the ideas that lie in its ground. Our understanding of those which emerge in experience as being subject to space, time, form, motion, tranquility²⁷⁴, unity, existence²⁷⁵, cause and effect relation²⁷⁶ and to relation²⁷⁷ in general, must be through this way.

Therefore, in Leibniz's system of thought, the function of experience in view of the human being's activity of knowing based on his intellectual faculties is only to produce possibilities for intellectual faculties. When that which emerges in

²⁷⁰Fr.*réflexion* Ger.*Überlegung*, *Reflexion* Lat.*reflexio**

*From *re-flectere*: bend back; turn back; turn round (from *flectere*: to bend, curve, bow; to turn, curl; to persuade, prevail on, soften)).

²⁷¹G VI 611/L 645(M29), G V 77/RB 81, G V 96/RB 105, G V 107-108/RB 118

²⁷²G V 71/RB 86

²⁷³G V 94/RB 102-103

²⁷⁴G V 116/RB 128

²⁷⁵G V 116/RB 129

²⁷⁶G V 100-101/RB 111

²⁷⁷G V 129/RB 142

Fr.*relation*

experience is comprehended as a plurality through the activity of reflection in accordance with ideas, what is understood or what is recognized is not the content of the correspondent in intuition or something that belongs thereto independent from understanding, but ideas.²⁷⁸ And this is what enables the human being to know that which is universal²⁷⁹.²⁸⁰ And this is also why when one becomes conscious of *ideas* they become concepts,²⁸¹ and why being distinct is indeed related to concepts²⁸².

The activity of reflection is not important only because it establishes the relation between that which emerges in experience with ideas. When we remember the fact that ideas are representations of the truth innately given to the soul by God, we will see that the possibility for the human being to be able to know something about the reason or the truth is constituted through reflection. Every idea understood by the activity of reflection is the human being's grasping truth from an aspect and its participation in reason in this respect, reason being the order of the truth.

Reasoning, as leading of one concept to another, is in fact all about following the reason as the order of truth.²⁸³ Unless truth is grasped from an aspect, reasoning

²⁷⁸G V 132/RB 145

²⁷⁹Fr.universelle

²⁸⁰G V 129/RB 142

²⁸¹See: footnote 152

²⁸²See: footnote 152

²⁸³Though Leibniz does not use the terms 'reflection' and 'reasoning' in his text dated 1678 which we refer to above, he distinguishes between real (*de re*) and mediate or discursive (*remotus**) thinking in relation to the expression of ideas. In relation to the same topic, he talks about immediate or nearest understanding in his notes about Foucher's response. (1676, L 155) Real or immediate understanding corresponds to reflection, whereas discursive or mediate understanding corresponds to reasoning. The true faculty that provides the idea to be understood is reflection:

"In my opinion, namely, *an idea consists, not in some act, but in the faculty of thinking*, and we are said to have an idea of a thing even if we do not think of it, if only, on a given occasion, we can think of it.

Yet there is one difficulty in this view, for we have a 'remote' faculty for thinking of all things, even those of which we may, perhaps, not have ideas, because we have the faculty of receiving ideas of them. Idea therefore requires a *certain 'near' faculty or ability to think about a thing*.

has no ground; or such a reasoning is void in terms of the human being's knowing himself and the world.

In Leibniz's system of thought, what the faculties of reflection and reasoning aim at are ideas in memory. Therefore, both are, in fact, activities of remembering. While Leibniz limits the term 'remember'²⁸⁴ to that which is remembered depending upon the representation in experience, he names "remembering without being dependent on such a representation" as "knowing by reason"^{285, 286}. Therefore, provided that experience has emerged once, those which will be known by reason through reflection and reasoning do not have to be dependent upon the representation in experience. Accordingly, though they are not represented in intuition which depends upon experience in any manner, making judgments about God, universe and soul based upon reflection and upon reasoning²⁸⁷, the basis of which is reflection, is legitimate in Leibniz's system of thought.

When all these are taken into consideration, exclusion of memory from being a fundamental faculty in Kant's system is, indeed, the cancellation of the bond between reason and the truth. Memory is made vacuous in this way. In Kant's

This does not quite suffice, however, for he who has a method which will lead him to some object if he follows it does not therefore have an idea of the object. [...] Hence there must be something in me *which not merely leads me to the thing but also expresses it*.

(Idea enim nobis non in quodam cogitandi actu, sed facultate consistit, et ideam rei habere dicimur, etsi de ea non cogitemus, modo data occasione de ea cogitare possimus.

Est tamen et in hoc difficultas quaedam, habemus enim facultatem remotam cogitandi de omnibus, etiam quorum ideas forte non habemus, quia facultatem habemus eas recipiendi; idea ergo postulat propinquam quandam cogitandi de re facultatem sive facilitatem.

Sed ne hoc quidem sufficit, nam qui methodum habet quam si sequatur ad rem pervenire possit, non ideo habet ejus ideam. [...] Necesse est ergo esse aliquid in me, quod non tantum ad rem ducat, sed etiam eam exprimat.)" (G VII 263/L 207)

*remotus from re-movere: to bring back to movement.

²⁸⁴Fr. *souvenir*

²⁸⁵Fr. *réminiscence*

²⁸⁶G V 147/RB 161, G V 73/RB 77

²⁸⁷"And these reflective acts provide us with the principal objects of our reasonings. (*Et ces Actes Reflexifs fournissent les objets principaux de nos raisonnemens.*)" (G VI 612/L 646 (M30))

system, reason is a faculty. It has two types of activity. The spontaneous activity of reason is understanding, and it is limited to that which emerges only in experience, and to that which lies in the ground of experience to the extent it is dependent thereupon. Without ideas that are the content of memory, it is not possible to provide a foundation for understanding, as the spontaneous activity of reason in Kant's system, and therefore, for experience. The other activity of reason is reasoning. But in Kant's system, reasoning has no basis because the relation of the categories, which are, depending upon experience, stated to have constituted the ground of experience, to the reason is not established. As we have seen above, it is not possible to provide a foundation for the discursive activity of reason, either, without participating in reason as the order of truth through reflection or by a similar activity.

I.6. Experience in view of the act of envisagement: Imagination

As we have stated many times before, in Leibniz's system of thought the soul's activity of experience is grounded by activities of the act of pure apperception and the faculties of memory and imagination. We have investigated in the preceding sections the activity of experience, which is in fact a whole, in its aspects of pure apperception and the faculty of memory. In this section, we shall try to explore the grounds of experience in view of the faculty of imagination.

In Leibniz's system of thought, the faculty of imagination²⁸⁸ is, in view of the constitution of experience, the faculty that envisages, represents or makes intuitive the perceptions in the monad aspect of soul, in accordance with the ideas that are innate to the memory and determine the conditions of experience. Such a

²⁸⁸Fr.*imagination* Ger.*Einbildungskraft* Lat.*imaginatio* Gr.φαντασία, φαντασιαστικόν

characterization of imagination in a manner prepares the role of imagination in Kant's conception of experience.²⁸⁹

We would like to consider three points about the activity of imagination in Leibniz's system of thought: firstly, that imagination is not an empirical faculty, but is a fundamental faculty that enables unfolding of experience, as an aspect of the human being's actual knowing, as it does; secondly, that imagination is the representative faculty in intuition, and third, that the activity of imagination is not only aimed at producing representations in empirical intuition.

Due to the fact that certain statements contained in Leibniz's texts regarding imagination are about examples that emerge in experience, these statements²⁹⁰ may result in a misunderstanding that imagination is an empirical faculty, in other words, that the activity of imagination is the description or imagination of certain things that have emerged, or might emerge, in experience, by means of certain other things which have already emerged in experience again. However, all of these examples are

²⁸⁹Leibniz has expressed his opinions about imagination and the function thereof in various texts. But, as it applies also to other faculties which depend upon experience, he has produced no texts in which he systematically deals with, and investigates, this topic. Here, we shall try to establish a foundation for the contribution of imagination to emergence of experience, relying on Leibniz's remarks contained in his texts and assessing them on the basis of Leibniz's entire system of thought. The texts we shall take into consideration shall be 'Monadology', *Nouveaux Essais* and the letter he wrote to Sophie Charlotte, the Prussian Queen, in 1702. (G VI 499-508/L 547-553). This letter is included in G VI, with the title 'Lettre touchant ce qui est independent des Sens et de la Matiere'.)

²⁹⁰"The strong imagination which strikes and moves them comes either from the magnitude or the number of the perceptions which preceded it. For often one single strong impression produces at once the effect of a long-formed *habit*, or of many frequently repeated ordinary perceptions. (*Et l'imagination forte, qui les frappe et emeut, vient ou de la grandeur ou de la multitude des perceptions precedentes. Car souvent une impression forte fait tout d'un coup l'effect d'une longue habitude, ou de beaucoup de perceptions mediocres reiterees.*)" (G VI 611/L 645 (M27))

"Beasts pass from one imagining to another by means of a link between them which they have previously experienced. For instance, when his master picks up a stick the dog anticipates (*apprehendre*) being beaten. In many cases children, and for that matter grown men, move from thought to thought in no other way but that. (*Les bestes passent d'une imagination à une autre par la liaison, qu'elles y ont sentie autres fois; par exemple quand le maistre prend un baston, le chien apprehende d'estre frappé. Et en quantité d'occasions les enfans de même que les autres hommes n'ont point d'autre procedure dans leurs passages de pensée à pensée.*)" (G V 130/RB 143)

given to indicate the need to distinguish the knowledge a human being reaches through his intellectual faculties from the activity of knowing which depends upon experience.²⁹¹ Leibniz's likening imagination to intellectual faculties is only in view of the fact that imagination, just like the intellectual faculties, expresses the ideas in memory, as subject to their interrelations.²⁹²

What we should gather from these statements of Leibniz is not imagination's being a faculty that is active on those which have emerged in experience, but that relations being the condition of emergence of those which emerge in experience, are envisaged by imagination. To put it in simpler terms, impressions or traces in Leibniz's statements are not the traces left by those which are actually sensed in experience, but are representations given to the soul to enable sensibility.

For example the basis of a human being's knowledge that a stone that is thrown up falls down is not the fact that we expect the falling down, relying on our previous experience, but that the traces²⁹³ corresponding to the throwing up and falling down of the stone in memory are interdependent, similar to the emergence of one of the two events in our experience following the other, and its envisagement as

²⁹¹"There is a connection between the perceptions of animals which has some resemblance to reason, but it is grounded only on the memory of *facts* or effects and not on the knowledge of *causes*. (*Il y a une liaison dans les perceptions des Animaux, qui a quelque ressemblance avec la Raison: mais elle n'est fondée que dans la memoire des faits ou effects, et nullement dans la connoissance des causes.*)" (G VI 600-601/L 638 (PNG5))

Also see: G VI 611-612/L 645-646 (M29,M30); G V 65,130/RB 73,143; (G VII 328-332); 'Considérations sur les Principes de Vie' (G VI 539-46/L 588)

²⁹²"The sequences of beasts are only a shadow of reasoning, that is, they are nothing but a connection in the imagination – a passage from one image to another; for when a new situation appears similar to its predecessor, it is expected to have the same concomitant features as before, as though things were linked [*liaison*] in reality (*en effet*) just because their images are linked in the memory. (*Les consecutions des bestes ne sont qu'une ombre de raisonnement, c'est à dire ce ne sont que connexions d'imagination, et que passages d'une image à une autre, parce que dans une rencontre nouvelle qui paroist semblable à la precedente, on s'attend de nouveau, à ce qu'on y trouvoit joint autresfois, comme si les choses estoient liées en effect, parceque leur images le sont dans la memoire.*)" (G V 44/RB 51)

²⁹³This example or similar ones should be assessed always keeping in mind that they are examples only; we should not understand from these examples that memory bears traces of individual events.

such by imagination. That Leibniz states that a human being is not much different from animals in view of experience as the activity of his spontaneous knowing, is only in view of those which imagination envisages in empirical intuition. With his intellectual faculties, the human being can transcend the connections that imagination expresses in empirical intuition, and express the reason why the stone falls down when it is thrown up.

If we are to refer to another example frequently used by Leibniz, the basis of a human being's knowledge that sun will rise tomorrow is certainly not the fact that it has risen every day. But since the activity of knowing which depends upon experience cannot transcend those which are envisaged by imagination, we, in view of experience, cannot know why the sun looks rising and setting every day to us. To be able to know that, the laws of nature need to be discovered and astronomy should explain it.²⁹⁴ Leibniz, including such examples, likens the fact that that which is basic or that which is metaphysical is expressed using that which is empirical or that which is physical²⁹⁵ to the fact that Copernicans can still talk about the rising and setting of the sun.²⁹⁶ Therefore, expressions in which the activity of imagination is explained by empirical examples do not indicate that imagination is an empirical faculty; these should be assessed taking into consideration the explanations above.

Furthermore, leaving Leibniz's statements about imagination aside, the important point here is the necessity of the presence of a faculty, which will envisage the perceptions in monad aspect and represent them in intuition according to the ideas that are given in memory in a manner having priority over the actual knowing.

²⁹⁴G VI 611/L 645 (M28)

²⁹⁵G VI 602/L 638-639 (PNG7), G V 67/RB 74

²⁹⁶G IV 452/L 320-321 (DM27)

And this means that imagination is necessary as a fundamental faculty. Just like the fact that we need to re-envisage, and remember, something in our memory, in order to cognize that thing again, similarly, according to Leibniz's conception of experience, in order for those things, which are in the memory as a fundamental faculty, to emerge in experience and in order for the perceptions in the monad aspect to be sensed, they need to be envisaged by imagination.

The text that will guide us in relation to imagination's being, in Leibniz's conception of experience, the faculty of representing in experience, shall be the letter Leibniz wrote to Sophie Charlotte, the Prussian Queen.²⁹⁷ When this text is taken into consideration, it will be seen that experience, as the activity of knowing which is dependent on correspondent or image in intuition, relies upon imagination being a representing faculty.

In order to be able to comprehend the activity of imagination in Leibniz's conception of experience, it should always be kept in mind that the activity of experience is, in fact, a whole, and that it is nothing but the envisagement of the perceptions in the monad aspect by imagination, in accordance with the ideas in memory. While this activity is the activity of clarification of perceptions that are obscure in the monad aspect through sensing them, on one hand, on the other, it is a means for understanding the relation of the representation in intuition to the ideas, since it envisages perceptions in accordance with ideas.

²⁹⁷G VI 499-508/L 547-553

What Leibniz considers in this text is whether there is anything in our thought that is not received from sensations and whether there are immaterial things in nature. The activity of imagination is discussed with regard to the relation of things which are claimed to be received from sensations to those which cannot be received from sensations.

In Leibniz's text mentioned above, it is apparent that imagination is the faculty which envisages those things which we can know only depending on images.²⁹⁸ Therefore, while the activity of imagination is, with regard to the perceptions in the monad aspect, the clarification thereof, it is, at the same time, rendering the ideas comprehensible in a distinct manner, ideas being the conditions of this activity.²⁹⁹

The image which the imagination envisages is a sensation in view of the fact that it is cognized by means of a single sense, and it is a correspondent in intuition in view of the fact that it is represented in empirical intuition. Though sensations such as colors, smells, sounds, etc. which are acquired depending upon a single sense, are things that are met at the first step, they are the things the nature of which we can know the least in view of actual knowing.³⁰⁰ Yet, sensations, in view of actual

²⁹⁸In this text, Leibniz makes a distinction concerning concepts which can be known:

"There are thus three levels of concepts: those which are *sensible* only, which are the objects produced by each sense in particular; those which are at once *sensible and intelligible*, which appertain to the common sense; and those which are *intelligible only*, which belong to the understanding. The first and second together are imaginable, but the third lie beyond the imagination. The second and third are intelligible and distinct, but the first are confused, although they may be clear and recognizable. (*Il y a donc trois rang de notions: les sensibles seulement, qui sont les objets affectés à chaque sens en particulier, les sensibles et intelligibles à la fois, qui appartiennent au sens commun, et les intelligibles seulement, qui sont propres à l'entendement. Les premières et les secondes ensemble sont imaginable, mais les troisièmes sont au dessus de l'imagination. Les secondes et les troisièmes sont intelligibles et distinctes; mais les premières sont confuses, quoiqu'elles soient claires ou reconnoissables.*)" (G VI 502/L 549)

²⁹⁹Those which are conceived are not representations in intuition, but ideas as the conditions of these representations. The relation between imagination and understanding is not direct, but through ideas. Imagination's making possible the comprehension of ideas, the cognition of which is dependent upon images, is not with regard to its being a condition of this comprehension, but with regard to its envisagement of images.

³⁰⁰"[...] we use external senses as a blind man uses his stick, and they help us to know their particular objects, which are colors, sounds, odors, tastes, and tactual qualities. But they do not help us to know what these sensible qualities are or in what they consist. [...] So it can be said that *sensible qualities* are in fact *occult qualities* and that there must be others *more manifest* which could render them understandable. Far from understanding sensible things only, it is just these which we understand the least. (*Nous nous servons des sens externes comme un aveugle de son baston, [...], et ils nous font connoître leur objets particuliers qui sont les couleurs, les sons, les odeurs, les saveurs et les qualités de l'attouchement. Mais ils ne nous font point connoître ce que c'est que ces qualités sensibles, ny en quoy elles consistent. [...] Ainsi on peut dire que les qualités sensibles sont en effect des qualités occultes, et qu'il faut bien qu'il y en ait d'autres plus manifestes, qui les pourroient rendre explicables. Et bien loin que nous entendions les seules choses sensibles, c'est justement ce que nous entendons le moins.*)" (G VI 499-500/L 547)

knowing, provide the comprehension of more apparent and distinct things, which, according to Leibniz, belong to imagination³⁰¹ which is also called “common sense”.³⁰²

The claim that certain ideas, such as shapes and their numerical determinations, are dependent upon the representing activity of imagination for their cognition, and the fact that imagination is named as common sense in this respect, does not come to mean that such ideas are abstracted from particular sensations depending on the act of imagination. On the contrary, it means that numbers and shapes are the conditions of the act of imagination to envisage, and that sensations may emerge only as subject to these conditions. The ground that enables us to grasp these through sensations and to name imagination as common sense in this respect is sensations’ being subject to the ideas in memory; that is, the ideas’ being the schemata³⁰³ of the activity of imagination. Naming imagination as common sense is

³⁰¹G VII 500/L 548

³⁰²“We must do justice to the senses, however, by recognizing that besides these occult qualities, they enable us to know other qualities which are more manifest and furnish more distinct concepts. It is these which are ascribed to the *common sense*, because there is no external sense to which they are particularly attached and belong. [...] Such is the idea of *numbers*, which is found alike in sounds, colors, and the qualities of touch. It is thus, too, that we perceive the *figures* which are common to colors and to qualities of touch but which we do not observe in sounds. But it is true that in order to conceive numbers and even shapes distinctly and to build sciences from them, we must reach something which sense cannot furnish but which the understanding adds to it. (*Cependant il faut rendre cette justice aux sens qu'outre ces qualités occultes, ils nous font connoître d'autres qualités plus manifestes, et qui fournissent des notions plus distinctes. Et ce sont celles qu'on attribue au sens commun, parce qu'il n'y a point de sens externe auquel elles soient particulièrement attachées et propre. [...] Telle est l'idée des nombres, qui se trouve également dans les sons, couleurs, et attouchemens. C'est ainsi que nous nous apercevons aussi des Figures qui sont communes aux couleurs et aux attouchemens, mais que nous ne remarquons pas dans les sons. Quoiqu'il soit vray que, pour concevoir distinctement les nombres et les figures mêmes, et pour en former des sciences, il faut venir à quelque chose que les sens ne sauroient fournir, et que l'entendement ajoute aux sens.*)” (G VII 500-501/L 548)

³⁰³There is no mention of the schemata of the activity of imagination in Leibniz’s texts. Since the conditions of the activity of imagination are the ideas in memory, there is no need to mention schemata separately as opposed to the case in Kant’s system. However, just like the fact that the categories of the faculty of understanding in view of the activity of imagination are mentioned as schemata, being pure determinations of time by imagination, in Kant’s conception of experience, it is possible to name ideas in memory as schemata in view of the activity of imagination, in Leibniz’s

possible in view of the representation which imagination envisages, being a sensation.³⁰⁴

A similar assessment should be made with regard to Leibniz's mentioning imagination also as *inner sense*^{305, 306}. In Leibniz's system of thought, experience as the activity of apperceiving and sensing the representations in the monad aspect of soul is, in fact, an activity of internalization since they arise from the soul's aspect which aims at knowing. Imagination's being inner sense is with respect to the

conception of experience. Nevertheless we think that those which can more properly be called as schemata of imagination's activity are number and figure in Leibniz's conception of experience. For, according to Leibniz, number and figure are conditions of envisagement or representation. However, in order to determine this completely, the relations of number and figure to other ideas should be determined.

³⁰⁴While Leibniz talks about sensations such as smells, colors, sounds in *Nouveaux Essais*, he explicitly states that these are actually dependent upon the activity of imagination: "For the truth is that these ought to be called 'images' (*phantome**) rather than 'qualities' or even 'ideas'. (*Car pour dire la verité, ils meritent ce nom de phantomes plustost que celui de qualités, ou même d'idées.*)" (G V 384/RB 404)

*Gr. φάντασμα (from φαίνω: *act.* bring to light, cause to appear, make known, reveal, disclose, give light, shine, *pass.* come to light, appear, come into being, (*of events*) come about, appear to be so and so)

³⁰⁵Fr. *sens interne*

³⁰⁶"Since therefore our soul compares the numbers and the shapes of colours, for example, with the numbers and shapes discovered by touch, there must be an *internal sense* where the perceptions of these different external senses are found united. This is called the *imagination*, which comprises (*comprend*) at once the *concepts of particular senses*, which are *clear* but *confused*, and the *concepts of the common sense*, which are clear and distinct. And these clear and distinct ideas which are subject to the imagination are the objects of the *mathematical sciences*, namely arithmetic and geometry, which are the *pure* mathematical sciences, and their applications to nature, which make up *mixed* mathematics. It is seen also that particular sense qualities are capable of explanation and rationalization only insofar as they have a content common to the objects of several external senses and belong to the internal sense. For whenever one tries to explain sensible qualities distinctly, one always turns back to mathematical ideas, and these ideas always include *magnitude*, or multitude of parts. (*Comme donc nostre ame compare (par exemple) les nombres et les figures qui sont dans les couleurs, avec les nombres et les figures qui se trouvent par l'attouchement, il faut bien qu'il y ait un sens interne, où les perceptions de ces differens sens externes se trouvent reunies. C'est ce qu'on appelle l'imagination, laquelle comprend à la fois les notions des sens particuliers, qui sont claires mais confuses, et les notions du sens commun, qui sont claires et distinctes. Et ces idées claires et distinctes qui sont sujettes à l'imagination, sont les objets des sciences mathematiques, savoir de l'Arithmetique et de la Geometrie, qui sont des sciences mathematiques pures, et de l'application de ces sciences à la nature, qui font les mathematiques mixtes. On voit aussi que les qualités sensibles particulieres ne sont susceptibles d'explications et de raisonnemens, qu'en tant qu'elles renferment ce qui est commun aux objets de plusieurs sens extérieurs, et appartient au sens interne. Car ceux qui tachent d'expliquer distinctement les qualités sensibles, ont tousjours recours aux idées de mathematique, et ces idées renferment tousjours la grandeur ou la multitude des parties.*)" (G VII 501/L 548)

envisagement of these representations and their being represented in intuition, which is the activity of imagination. It is in view of the ground of the images which one who experiences senses as if they are outside of oneself in view of actual knowing, because the ground is in the one who experiences. In order for those things, which the imagination represents in experience as if they are outer to one who experiences to be sensation, they should first of all belong to one who experiences.

Therefore, what we should understand by outer sense is not sensing that which is outside of the soul that experiences or that which is independent from this soul, but apperceiving that which actually belongs to the soul, expression or externalisation -through sensing- of that which is inside. Therefore, inner sense is not something that combines the affections received from particular outer senses, but is the imagination which makes them possible.

In Leibniz's conception of experience, the activity of imagination is not limited only to the envisagement of correspondents in empirical intuition. The activity of imagination can be regarded as envisagement in view of sensible things (that is to say, the source of which, in view of its content, is the monad aspect of soul), and as representations in view of intelligible things. Those things, the source of which is the memory aspect of the soul itself, and the cognition of which depends upon the activity of imagination are mathematical objects.³⁰⁷ The point to be paid attention to is the fact that this dependence is applicable with regard to actual knowing. In order for the mathematical ideas in memory to be understood, they need to be represented through imagination.

³⁰⁷G VI 501/L 548

Yet, we should not mistake the envisagement of the mathematical object both in outer and in inner intuition -both depending upon the activity of imagination- with either the idea in memory or the concept or notion of the human intellectual faculties. Although, metaphysically, the envisagement of imagination in outer sense depends upon the representation in inner sense, the cognition of the representation with respect to actual knowing depends upon this or that sensation having been received; that is, upon the emergence of experience.³⁰⁸ For example, according to Leibniz, a blind person and a paralytic person, have different images of a sphere. But the ideas upon which both of them rely and the concept of sphere both comprehend through images and representations are the same.³⁰⁹ Furthermore, again in relation to the distinction between the images or representations which depend upon the activity of imagination and the ideas in memory or the concepts grasped by the intellectual activity, Leibniz states that a person's images and representations of, e.g., a triangle would not be sufficient for the constitution of the concept of triangle, had they not been based on the ideas in memory, and had the intellectual activity not grasped the idea in memory through them; because reaching the concept that is common in images in intuition or representations from images or representations is not possible in view of the activity of imagination only.³¹⁰

³⁰⁸G VI 505/L 551

³⁰⁹“These two geometries, the blind man's and the paralytic's, must come together, and agree, and indeed ultimately rest on the same ideas, even though they have no images in common. Which shows yet again how essential it is to distinguish *images* from *exact ideas* which are composed of definitions. (*Et il faut que ces deux Geometries, celle de l'aveugle et celle du paralytique, se rencontrent et s'accordent et même reviennent aux mêmes idées, quoiqu'il n'y ait point d'images communes. Ce qui fait encor voir combien il faut distinguer les images des idées exactes, qui consistent dans les definitions.*)” (G V 124-125/RB 137)

³¹⁰“Imagination cannot provide us with an image common to acute-angled and obtuse-angled triangles, yet the idea of triangle is common to them; so this idea does not consist in images, and it is not as easy as one might think to understand the angles of a triangle thoroughly. (*L'imagination ne nous sauroit fournir une image commune aux triangles acutangles et obtusangles, et cependant l'idée*

Therefore, while the activity of imagination is the clarification of the perceptions in the monad aspect of soul on one hand, it is at the same time that which makes ideas comprehensible in a distinct manner by intellectual activity, on the other, since this activity of representation is based on ideas. Representations of imagination are clarified perceptions in view of being images, and confused cognition of ideas in view of being representations. If we mention the ideas in memory as 'ideas' also in view of the imagination and intellectual faculties, according to Leibniz, representations are confused ideas whereas concepts are distinct ideas.³¹¹

In order for such ideas to be grasped in a distinct manner in view of actual knowing, ideas, the understanding of which does not depend upon the activity of imagination, should be recognized.³¹² These are what Leibniz refers to as only intelligible objects, and these constitute the subject matter of metaphysics.³¹³

What provides the grounds for a science of metaphysical concepts, in Leibniz's system of thought, and what ensures that the actual knowing of the human being is not limited to those things which can be cognized through images and

du triangle leur est commune; ainsi cette idée ne consiste pas dans les images et il n'est pas aussi aisé qu'on pourroit penser, d'entendre à fonds les angles d'un triangle.)" (G V 356/RB 375)

³¹¹G V 433-434/RB 451

³¹²"It is true that the mathematical sciences would not be demonstrative but would consist of a simple induction or observation which could never assure us of the perfect generality of the truths found in it, if something higher, which only the intellect can provide, did not come to the aid of *imagination* and *sense*. (*Il est vrai que les sciences mathématiques ne seroient point démonstratives, et consisteroient dans une simple induction ou observation, qui ne nous assureroit jamais d'une parfaite généralité des vérités qui s'y trouvent, si quelque chose de plus haut, et que l'intelligence seule peut fournir, ne venoit au secours de l'imagination et des sens.*)" (G VI 501/L 548)

³¹³"There are thus also objects of another nature, which are not at all included in what we have observed in the objects of either the particular senses or the common sense, and which consequently are also not to be considered objects of the imagination. Besides what is *sensible* and *imaginable*, therefore, there is that which is only *intelligible*, since it is the object of the understanding alone. (*Il y a donc encore des objets d'une autre nature, qui ne sont point du tout compris dans ce qu'on remarque dans les objets des sens en particulier ou en commun, et qui par conséquent ne sont point non plus des objets de l'imagination. Ainsi outre le sensible et l'imaginable, il y a ce qui n'est qu'intelligible, comme étant l'objet du seul entendement, [...]*)" (G V 501/L 548-549)

representations, are the ideas which can be recognized only through intellectual activity and the pure concepts as recognized ideas. According to Leibniz, the idea of Self which provides the unity of the human being's activity of knowing and which, at the same time, enables him to reach other metaphysical concepts, is an intelligible idea, which is recognized without depending upon any representation in intuition.³¹⁴

Cette pensée de moy, qui m'apperois des objets sensibles, et de ma propre action qui en resulte, ajoute quelque chose aux objets des sens. Penser à quelque couleur et considerer qu'on y pense, ce sont deux pensées tres differentes, autant que la couleur même differe de moy qui y pense. Et comme je conçois que d'autres Estres peuvent aussi avoir le droit de dire moy, ou qu'on pourroit le dire pour eux, c'est par là que je conçois ce qu'on appelle la substance en general, et c'est aussi la consideration de moy même, qui me fournit d'autres notions de metaphysique, comme de cause, effect, action, similitude etc., et même celles de la Logique et de la Morale. Ainsi on peut dire qu'il n'y a rien dans l'entendement, qui ne soit venu des sens, excepté l'entendement même, ou celui qui entend.

This thought of *myself*, who perceive sensible objects, and of my own action which results from it, adds something to the objects of sense. To think of some color and to consider that I think of it – these two thoughts are very different, just as much as color itself differs from the ego who thinks of it. And since I conceive that there are other beings who also have the right to say 'I', or for whom this can be said, it is by this that I conceive what is called *substance* in general. It is the consideration of myself, also, which provides me with other concepts in *metaphysics*, such as those of cause, effect, action, similarity, etc., and even with those of *logic* and *ethics*. Thus it may be said that there is nothing in the understanding which has not come from the senses, except the understanding itself, or the one who understands.³¹⁵

In Leibniz's system of thought, understanding is, first of all, the soul's understanding that that one who experiences is itself, in other words, its understanding itself as a Self. Since understanding of Self forms the ground of being able to understand other ideas, it cannot depend upon images or representations. Understanding of Self not only enables the comprehension of ideas, the understanding of which depends upon the activity of imagination; such an

³¹⁴“And such is the object of my thought when I think of myself. ([...] *et tel est l'objet de ma pensée, quand je pense à moy même.*)” (G VI 501/L 549)

³¹⁵G VI 502/L 549

understanding also opens the way for being able to comprehend other ideas, which constitute the subject matter of metaphysics.³¹⁶

As can be seen, these are exactly the topics which Kant desires to exclude from the limits of the human being's activity of knowing. Though the consciousness of Self is mentioned as the ground of experience, what is in question here is not that which is recognized, but Self as that which recognizes. In other words, in Kant's system Self is never the object of understanding. Therefore, in Kant's system of thought, those things which can be understood are limited to those which can be envisaged or represented by imagination. We shall consider the issues, such a limitation caused with regard to Kant's system of thought in the section about Kant's conception of experience.

³¹⁶“[...] it is thus, as we think of ourselves, that we think of being, of substance, of the simple and the compound, of the immaterial, and of God himself, conceiving of that which is limited in us as being without limits in him. These reflective acts provide us with the principal objects of our reasonings. ([...] *et c'est ainsi qu'en pensant à nous, nous pensons à l'Etre, à la substance, au simple ou au composé, à l'immatériel et à Dieu même, en concevant que ce qui est borné en nous, est en luy sans bornes. Et ces Actes Reflexifs fournissent les objets principaux de nos raisonnemens.*)” (G VI 612/L 646 (M30))

II. LEIBNIZ'S CONCEPTION OF SUBSTANCE

As we have stated in the preceding sections, Kant's main opposition to Leibniz's system of thought concerns Leibniz's conception of substance, which does not allow the interdependence of created substances in view of both their existences and their activities. Leibniz' conception of experience which we investigated in the preceding section is possible only on the basis of such a substance. In order to discover the ground of deficiencies in Kant's conception of experience and also to understand the grounds of Leibniz's conception of experience, in this section we shall be studying Leibniz's thoughts regarding created substance.

Before we move on to Leibniz's conception of substance we would like to emphasize one point once again. Leibniz's and Kant's systems of thought, both aim at establishing foundations for experience in general, and the human being's theoretical and practical activity in the manner in which they emerge depending upon experience, taking experience as their starting point, and in this regard, they both rely on experience. Leibniz's philosophy aims at explaining, and establishing foundations for that which does or may emerge in experience in a manner not to contradict experience, by means of intellectual activity. But there is no reason for this activity itself to be limited to that which may emerge in experience.

The purpose of Kant's critical philosophy, on the other hand, is to determine the grounds of such an activity within the limits of the conditions of experience. That Leibniz has tried to establish the foundations for this activity as an activity of a substance and that Kant's claim that there is no possibility of knowing such a

substance is the main difference between the two systems and is also the source of other differences.

When we take Leibniz's various texts into consideration, we cannot claim that the term 'substance' is used prudently and consistently.³¹⁷ Our purpose in this study is not to list what are substances according to Leibniz, but to determine what the conditions are for being a substance in Leibniz's system of thought. We believe that Leibniz's mentioning different³¹⁸ things as substance can be understood without leading to any confusion, as and when these conditions are revealed.

³¹⁷The most striking example of this, which is also the one that has caused problems, among others, in the interpretation of Leibniz's conception of substance, is his statements where he refers to those which are composite (*composé*) also as 'substances':

"Substance is a being capable of action. It is simple or compound. (*La Substance est un Etre capable d'Action. Elle est simple ou composée.*)" (G VI 598/L 636 (PNG1))

In 'Monadology', however, which he wrote in the same year with the above mentioned text, substance is defined as that which is simple. (G VI 607/L 643 (M1))

³¹⁸"Things are either concrete or abstract. Concrete things are either substances or *substantiata*. Every substance is alive. Substances are either simple or composite. Simple substances or monads are either intelligent or without reason. Intelligent monads are called spirits and are either uncreated or created. A created intelligent monad is either angelic or human and is also called a soul. Again, monads can be understood either as separated, such as God and, in the opinion of certain people, an angel, or they can be understood as connected to a body, that is, they can be understood as souls; we know of souls both with reason and without. Monads without reason are either sentient or only vegetative. Composite substances are those which constitute a *per se* unity, composed of a soul and an organic body, which is a machine of nature resulting from monads. *Substantiata* are aggregates that are either natural or artificial, connected or unconnected. (*Res sunt aut concreta aut abstracta. Concreta sunt substantiae aut substantiata. Omnis substantia vivit. Substantiae sunt simplices aut compositae. Substantiae simplices seu Monades sunt intelligentes vel irrationales. Intelligentes dicuntur Spiritus et sunt vel increatus vel creatus. Creatus est vel Angelicus vel humanus, qui et Anima appellatur. Rursus Monades intelligi possunt separatae, ut Deus, et quorundam ex sententia Angelus, vel accorporatae, seu Animae, et sunt nobis notae Anima rationalis et irrationalis. Monades irrationales sunt vel sentientes vel tantum vegetantes. Substantiae compositae sunt quae unum per se constituunt ex anima et corpore organico, quod est Machina naturae ex Monadibus resultans. Substantiata sunt aggregata sive naturalia sive artificialia, connexa vel inconnexa.*)" (The letter to Des Bosses, dated February 5, 1712, G II 439/AG 200)

Certainly this classification is based on the distinctions made from within experience.

*Leibniz states that he uses the word '*substantiatum*' for such things as army and herd in order to distinguish those which are *substantia* (substance) from those which are not, and that all bodies are, in fact, like that:

"Porro creaturae omnes sunt vel substantiales vel accidentales. Substantiales sunt vel substantiae vel substantiata. Substantiata appello aggregata substantiarum, velut exercitum hominum, gregem ovium < et talia sunt omnia corpora >. Substantia est vel simplex ut anima, quae nullas habet partes, vel composita ut animal, quod constat ex anima et corpore organico." (C 13)

The purpose of seeking a solution, within a system of thought³¹⁹, for the religious and scientific problems in his era lies in the ground of the fact that Leibniz developed a conception of substance in the manner we are going to examine. While developing his conception of substance, Leibniz criticizes the opinions of Descartes, Spinoza and atomists, primarily those of Gassendi, and determines their deficiencies. Leibniz's claims about substance, as the entirety of his system of thought, are put forth on condition that they are in accordance with the dogmas of Christianity.

Leibniz's conception is opposed to Descartes's conception of substance because of its dualism; to that of Spinoza because of its monism, to that of atomists because they are materialistic and because of the problems these lead to.³²⁰

³¹⁹*Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances, aussi bien que de l'union qu'il y a entre l'âme et le corps*, 1695 (SN,G IV 477-487/L 453-461)

In his article with the above title, he tells about this development.

³²⁰The thinkers who have been influential in shaping Leibniz's conception of substance are, of course, not limited to the ones named herein. In his texts, he often makes references to Plato and Aristotele. In his article dated May 1702, he compares his status in the discussions about the nature of the body that emerges in experience, with the status of other thinkers:

"But, not to mention other things for now, it was especially concerning the nature of body and the nature of the motive forces [*vis motricis*] in body, that I had to disagree. Cartesians, of course, place the essence of body in extension alone. But even though, with Aristotle and Descartes, and against Democritus and Gassendi, I admit no vacuum, and even though, against Aristotle, and with Democritus and Descartes, I consider all rarefaction or condensation to be only apparent, nevertheless, with Democritus and Aristotle, and against Descartes, I think that there is something passive in body over and above extension, namely, that by which body resists penetration. Furthermore, with Plato and Aristotle, and against Democritus and Descartes, I acknowledge a certain active force or entelechy in body. Consequently, it seems to me that Aristotle correctly defined nature as the principle of motion and rest, not because I think that any body can move itself or be put into motion by any quality such as heaviness, unless it is already in motion, but because I believe that every body always has motive force, indeed, actual intrinsic motion, innate from the very beginning of things. However, I agree with Democritus and Descartes, against the multitude of Scholastics, that the exercise of motive power [*potentia motricis*] and the phenomena of bodies can always be explained mechanically, except for the very causes of the laws of motion, which derive from a higher principle, namely, from entelechy, and cannot be derived from passive mass [*massa*] and its modifications alone. (*Sed imprimis (ut alia nunc taceam) circa naturam corporis et virium motricium quae corpori insunt, in alia omnia mihi eundum fuit. Nempe corporis essentiam Cartesiani collocant in sola extensione, ego vero etsi cum Aristotele et Cartesio contra Democritum Gassendumque Vacuum nullum admittam, et contra Aristotelem cum Democrito et Cartesio nullam Rarefactionem aut Condensationem nisi apparentem statuam, puto tamen cum Democrito et Aristotele contra Cartesium aliquid in corpore esse passivum, praeter extensionem, id scilicet quo corpus resistit penetrationi; sed et praeterea cum Platone et Aristotele contra Democritum et Cartesium in corpore aliquam Vim activam sive ἐντελέχειαν agnosco, ut ita recte mihi Aristoteles naturam definisse*

There are various criticisms Leibniz poses against a dualist conception of substance and systems of thought based on such a conception. Leibniz claims that Descartes and his followers³²¹, who claim that soul, the primary attribute³²² of which is thought, and matter, the primary attribute of which is extension, are two separate created substances, never fully demonstrated that thinking substance lacks extension, and that material substance lacks thought.³²³ Second, if this fact is put aside and it is accepted that soul and matter are two different substances, the nature of the apparent interaction between the two substances cannot be explained by Descartes and his followers.³²⁴ Furthermore, since even just claiming that there is such an interaction will come to mean that two substances are affected by each other (or only one of them (matter) is affected by the other (soul)), it will render one substance dependent on another in view of its activity, which, according to Leibniz, means the annihilation of being a substance.³²⁵

Therefore, according to Leibniz, the claim that there are two different created substances in Cartesian thought requires a foundation. When this claim is accepted, the interaction, alleged to take place between two substances, cannot, first of all, be

videatur principium motus et quietis, non quod putem ullum corpus nisi jam in motu sit moveri a se ipso aut ab aliqua qualitate, qualis est gravitas, incitari, sed quod arbitrer omne corpus vim motricem, imo motum intrinsecum actualem semper habere insitum inde ab origine rerum. Exercitium autem potentiae motricis et phaenomena corporum assentior Democrito et Cartesio contra vulgus Scholasticorum semper mechanice posse explicari, dentis ipsis Legum motus causis quae ab altiore principio, nempe ab Entelechia proficiscuntur neque ex sola massa passiva ejusque modificationibus derivari possunt.)" (G IV 393/AG 250)

³²¹What Leibniz means by 'Descartes's followers' is Malebranche in particular. (G IV 480/L 457)

³²²Fr. *attribute*

³²³G IV 365/L 390

³²⁴G IV 364/L 390, G IV 480/L 457

³²⁵G IV 477-478/L 457

explained; second, even if it can be explained, it requires annihilation of being a substance.³²⁶

Central to his opposition against Spinoza's monism is the fact that he thinks that no activity can be grounded as belonging to human beings and hence human beings cannot be taken as responsible for any such activity if only God is accepted as substance.³²⁷ In a philosophical system in which everything consists only of the modification of a single substance and is definitely determined in advance, such as Spinoza's philosophy, it is not possible, according to Leibniz, for the human being to be punished for his sins and rewarded for his good deeds. As opposed to the Jewish religion which does not talk about an afterlife, holding the human being responsible for his behaviors is essential for Christianity, according to Leibniz.³²⁸ Therefore, a philosophical system in accordance with Christianity should be able to establish the foundations for an activity for which the human being shall be held responsible.

Furthermore, in such a system where everything consists only of a single substance and its modification thereof, since only a single sequence of events can be possible, according to Leibniz, God would have created the universe not on the basis

³²⁶The most significant deficiency Leibniz observed in Cartesian thought is the problems concerning the source and preservation of the motion that is strictly dependent upon the Cartesians' conception of substance. In Cartesian thought, motion must be given to the matter which is reduced to extension, from outside. And this, according to Leibniz, means that God's intervention on the created world is needed for explaining all kinds of activities, including the interaction between soul and matter, and each motion. (L445 ; See: *Specimen Dynamicum*, 1695, GM VI 234-254/L 435-452)

³²⁷G VI 139/H 159-160 (T:I-67)

Also see: *De ipsa sive de vi insita actionibusque Creaturam, pro Dynamicis suis confirmandis illustrandisque*, 1698, G IV 515/L 507.

³²⁸"Nevertheless Moses had not inserted in his laws the doctrine of the immortality of souls: it was consistent with his ideas, it was taught by oral tradition; but it was not proclaimed for popular acceptance until Jesus Christ lifted the veil, [...], taught with all the force of a lawgiver that immortal souls pass into another life, wherein they shall receive the wages of their deeds. (*Cependant Moyse n'avoit point fait entrer dans ses loix la doctrine de l'immortalité des ames: elle estoit conforme à ses sentimens, elle s'enseignoit de main en main, mais elle n'estoit point autorisée d'une manière populaire, jusqu'à ce que Jesus Christ leva le voile, [...], enseigna avec toute la force d'un législateur, que les ames immortelles passent dans une autre vie, où elles doivent recevoir le salaire de leur actions.*)" (G VI 26/H 50-51)

of his own choice, but out of necessity.³²⁹ Since nothing else is possible apart from what goes on, everything would have been not determined according to God's choice, but would be absolutely necessary.³³⁰ When regarded from this perspective, according to Leibniz, there is no difference between the Cartesian thought and that of Spinoza. In the former matter is reduced to extension, and is thus deprived of its activity, whereas the foundation for the activity of soul was not properly established. In the latter, everything that happens is reduced to the activity of a single substance.

Il est bon d'ailleurs qu'on prenne garde, qu'en confondant les substances avec les accidents, en ôtant l'action aux substances créées, on ne tombe dans le Spinosisme, qui est un Cartésianisme outré. Ce qui n'agit point, ne merite point le nom de substance: si les accidents ne sont point distingués des substances: si la substance créée est un être successif, comme le mouvement; si elle ne dure pas au delà d'un moment, et ne se trouve pas la même (durant quelque partie assignable du temps) non plus que ses accidents; si elle n'opere point non plus qu'une figure de mathématique, ou qu'un nombre: pourquoy ne dira-t-on pas comme Spinoza, que Dieu est la seule substance, et que les creatures ne sont que des accidents, ou des modifications?

It is well to beware, moreover, lest in confusing substances with accidents, in depriving created substances of action, one fall into Spinozism, which is exaggerated Cartesianism. That which does not act does not merit the name of substance. If the accidents are not distinct from the substances; if the created substance is a successive being, like movement; if it does not endure beyond a moment, and does not remain the same (during some stated portion of time) any more than its accidents; if it does not operate any more than a mathematical figure or a number: why shall one not say, with Spinoza, that God is the only substance, and that creatures are only accidents or modifications?³³¹

When regarded in this respect, Leibniz's purpose is to establish the foundations for a conception of substance which dismisses the free will of neither God nor of human being, thus on which everything that happens depends not on blind power³³² and crude necessity³³³, but on God's choice, in a manner that will not bring about the

³²⁹G VI 335-336/H 347-348 (T:III-371), 'Conversation sur la Liberté et le Destin', 1703, GR II 478.

³³⁰GR II 478

According to Leibniz, the first of the two labyrinths in which the human reason goes astray is the issue of freedom and necessity particularly in relation to the source of evil. (G VI 29/H 53-54)

³³¹G VI 350-351/H 359-360 (T:III-393)

³³²Fr. *une puissance aveugle* (G VI 336/H 347-348 (T:III-371))

³³³Fr. *une nécessité brute* (G VI 336/H 347-348 (T:III-371))

necessity to deny the fact that God knows everything in advance, and that will not contradict the perfection of God.

As we have already mentioned above, according to Leibniz, in systems of thought, like that of Spinoza, which are based on absolute necessity, there is no possibility to distinguish those which are absolutely necessary from those which are contingent^{334,335} While the grounds of those which are necessary, in Leibniz's system, is the understanding of God, the grounds of those which are contingent is his understanding together with his will.³³⁶ That God chose this world is based not on indifference³³⁷ (that is to say that there is no reason for his having chosen this one rather than another one) or arbitrariness³³⁸, but on the fact that this world is the best one. Therefore, God's will is determined by his understanding. But this does not lead to the elimination of God's freedom because that which determines God's will is not external, but it is his own understanding. Similarly, a human being's will is also free, because it is determined not by something which is created, but from within himself, in view of his creation. Thinking that the condition of being determined eliminates freedom is confusing the condition of being determined with absolute necessity.

Therefore, while those things which are contingent are determined by God's will, the ground of those which are necessary is God's understanding. This establishes the foundations for God's knowing everything in advance without eliminating the freedom of his will. God has created the world having the knowledge

³³⁴Fr.*contingent*

³³⁵GR II 478

³³⁶For foundation of the distinction between absolute or metaphysical necessity and hypothetical or physical necessity (or, inclination without necessity), also *see*: G IV 454-457/L 321-324 (DM 30-31), Letter to Arnould, dated May 1686 (G II 37-47), G VI 50/H 74 (T:D-2), G VI 62-63/H 86-87 (T D-20).

³³⁷Fr.*indifférence* (G VI 122-123/H 143 (T:I-35))

³³⁸Fr.*arbitraire* (G VI 219-220/H 236-237 (T:II-176))

of everything that is both contingent and that is only possible, and the reason behind such a creation is this very knowledge of God. Furthermore the determination and the positing³³⁹ of this world as a collection of all the things that are contingent, through a single choice of God, will eliminate the need for God's continuous intervention in the world; it is also in harmony with the perfection of God. According to Leibniz, since continuous intervention of God with the world would indicate not his power, but the deficiency of the choice he made, that would be the cancellation of his perfection.

The criticism Leibniz poses against the atomists' conception of substance is in general related to two considerations: first, it is the failure of the atoms, which are claimed to be material, to explain motion in general similar to the case in the Cartesian thought, because of the fact that there is nothing in the matter on its own to explain motion, according to Leibniz. The second problem is, according to Leibniz, the fact that atoms, which are imagined as the indivisible building elements of material things, require the acceptance of void, and the fact that they render impossible the continuity of space, which is divisible infinitely in view of the geometry to which it is subject.³⁴⁰

The conception of substance in Leibniz's system of thought bears traces from Descartes, Spinoza and atomists. First, the uncreated substance as it is in the Cartesian thought, or God as it is the only substance in Spinoza's thought is the main ground of everything in Leibniz's system of thought, as well. Second, Leibniz's

³³⁹From Latin *pōno*: to put or set down *a person or thing*, to put, place, set, lay; to establish; to set, place, put, lay *a thing anywhere*.

See: footnote 495

³⁴⁰According to Leibniz, the second labyrinth of human thought is the relations between continuity, eternity and divisibility or indivisibility. (G VI 29/H 53-54)

system of thought as a whole is built to establish the foundations for the interaction among substances in the Cartesian thought without falling into Spinozianism, that is to say without reducing everything to a single substance. Furthermore, the point that, in such a case, the variety that emerges in experience is not all about a fiction is taken into consideration. In Leibniz's system of thought, an infinite number of individual substances³⁴¹, each of which is different from the others and accordingly, each of which is created singularly, is developed in accordance with the conditions we mentioned above.

The path that led Leibniz to develop such a conception of substance is explicitly stated in one of his articles from his early years.³⁴² There, Leibniz says that there are two things we can be certain of, when experience is taken into consideration: The first of them is that we think; and the second is the fact that our thoughts contain a wide range of variety. According to Leibniz, it is deduced from the first one that we are; and from the second one, that there is something that is the cause of the variety of appearances, other than that which thinks.³⁴³ The cause of variety should be something permanent and should be outside of that which thinks in so far as it is that which thinks because, according to Leibniz, a single thing, on its own, cannot be the cause of the changes and variety in itself.³⁴⁴ Relating all this variety directly to God, which is the original cause of everything, is not appropriate

³⁴¹F 22-70/AG 274

F: *Réfutation Inédite de Spinoza*, (*Animadversiones ad Joh. Georg. Watcheri librum de recondita Hebraeorum philosophia*) Edité, Traduit et introduit par A. Foucher de Careil D'après le Manuscrit original de la Bibliothèque Royale de Hanovre, Paris, 1854.

³⁴²Letter to Foucher dated 1675 (G I 369-74/L 151-155).

³⁴³G I 370/L 152

³⁴⁴G I 372/L 153

since that would bring God to the status of *ex machina*.³⁴⁵ Relying on this ground, and in order to establish the foundations for such a variety, we can conclude that –as secondary causes- there are individual substances or beings³⁴⁶, some activities of which we can apperceive, that is to say in which we see that some changes in them follow some changes in ourselves.³⁴⁷ It is not right to conclude based on the preceding sentence that substances are materials or bodies which exist outside of us. According to Leibniz, what we can say definitely about those things which emerge in experience is that they are, usually, connected in a manner to enable successful prediction of those which will emerge (for example, the stone's falling down, when thrown up) and the cause of this connection is something that is different from those things which emerge in experience and that is permanent.³⁴⁸ Therefore, what we need to do is to establish the foundations of the whole of experience and the variety in experience through activities of individual substances, without reducing everything to a single substance.

In this study, we shall investigate the conception of substance in Leibniz's system of thought in view of its four aspects, which are in fact interdependent: These are the considerations that substances have an indivisible unity; that each substance is a point of view that reflects God and other created substances; that substances are independent from each other in view of their existences and activities and that these aspects of substances are determined and posited through the creation.

³⁴⁵GM VI 234-54/L 441(SD)

³⁴⁶Fr.*des Estres (Etres) ou substances particulieres* (G I 372)

³⁴⁷G I 372/L 153

³⁴⁸G I 371-372/L 152-153

II.1. Substance in view of its being an indivisible unity

Leibniz's purpose is to assess the physical world that emerges in experience and all kinds of activities of the human being as a whole, and to establish the foundations for both in such a manner as to adhere to the same principles and not to contradict experience.

The world that we know through experience contains variety. A foundation for understanding of this variety, which is in a continuous change, in different wholes should be provided. The ground of the fact that corporeal³⁴⁹ things that emerge in experience bear a certain continuity and identity despite the fact that they change continuously, or the ground of our conceiving them as such should be determined. Leibniz, starting from the fact that material or physical things that emerge in experience cannot be substances because they are nothing but just aggregates in themselves, claims that only those which have indivisible unity can be substances.³⁵⁰ This view also provides a foundation of the fact that those things which emerge in experience are not merely appearances or fantasies, and that, in this sense, they are related to substance as the unit of existence.

³⁴⁹Fr. *corporel(le)* Lat. *corporalis**

*From *corpus*: body; person, self; virility; flesh; corpse; trunk; frame(work); collection/sum substantial/material/concrete object/body; particle/atom; corporation, guild.

³⁵⁰“At first, after freeing myself from bondage to Aristotle, I accepted the void and the atoms, for it is these that best satisfy the imagination. But in turning back to them after much thought, I perceived that it is impossible to find *the principles of a true unity* in matter alone or in what is merely passive, since everything in it is but a collection or aggregation of parts to infinity. (*Au commencement, lorsque je m'estois affranchi du joug d'Aristote, j'avois donné dans le vuide et dans les Atomes, car c'est ce qui remplit le mieux l'imagination. Mais en estant revenu, après bien des meditations, je m'apperceus, qu'il est impossible de trouver les principes d'une veritable Unité dans la matiere seule ou dans ce qui n'est que passif, puisque tout n'y est que collection ou amas de parties jusqu'à l'infini.*)” (G IV 478/L 454 (SN))

Accordingly, the first of the conditions for being a substance voiced by Leibniz is that substance is simple³⁵¹ (i.e., without parts³⁵²) and based on this, is indivisible³⁵³ and is a unity^{354,355}

We shall try to understand this claim within the framework of Leibniz's system of thought. We believe that Leibniz's ideas, which are expressed in the first principle of 'Principles of Nature and Grace' and in the first three principles of 'Monadology' shall provide guidance for us in this attempt:

1. La Substance est un Etre capable d'Action. Elle est simple ou composée. La Substance simple est celle qui n'a point de parties. La composée est l'assemblage des substances simples, ou des Monades. Monas est un mot Grec, qui signifie l'Unité, ou ce qui est un. Les composés ou les corps sont des Multitudes; et les substances simples, les Vies, les Ames, les Esprits sont des Unités. Et il faut bien qu'il y ait des substances simples par tout, parce que sans les simples il n'y auroit point de composés; et par consequent toute la nature est pleine de vie.

1. *Substance* is a being capable of action. It is simple or compound. *Simple substance* is that which has no parts. *Compound substance*³⁵⁶ is a collection³⁵⁷ of simple substances, or *monads*³⁵⁸. *Monas* is a Greek word signifying unity or that which is one. Compounds³⁵⁹, or bodies, are pluralities³⁶⁰, and simple substances – lives³⁶¹, souls, and spirits – are unities. There must of necessity be simple substances everywhere, for without simple substances there would be no compounds. As a result, the whole of nature is full of life^{362,363}

1. La Monade, dont nous parlerons icy, n'est autre chose, qu'une substance simple, qui entre dans les composés; simple, c'est à dire, sans parties.

2. Et il faut qu'il y ait des substances simples, puisqu'il y a des composés; car le composé n'est autre chose, qu'un amas, ou *aggregatum* des simples.

³⁵¹Fr. *simple*

³⁵²Fr. *sans partie*

³⁵³Fr. *indivisible*

³⁵⁴Fr. *unité* Ger. *Einheit* Lat. *unitas**

*From *unus*: alone, a single/sole; some, some one; only (pl.); one.

³⁵⁵G VI 607/L 643 (M1), G VI 598/L 636 (PNG1), G VI 55-56 (T D-10), G IV 433-434 (DM9), G IV 482/L 456 (SN)

³⁵⁶Fr. *la composée*

³⁵⁷Fr. *assemblage*

³⁵⁸Ott. *vâhide*

³⁵⁹Fr. *les composés*

³⁶⁰Fr. *les Multitudes*

³⁶¹Fr. *les Vies*

³⁶²Fr. *la vie*

³⁶³G VI 598/L 636 (PNG1)

3. Or là, où il n'y a point de parties, il n'y a ny étendue, ny figure, ny divisibilité possible. Et ces Monades sont les veritables Atomes de la Nature, et en un mot les Elemens des choses.

1. The *monad* which we are to discuss here is nothing but a simple substance which enters into compounds³⁶⁴. *Simple* means without parts.

2. There must be simple substances, since there are compounds, for the compounded is but a collection or an *aggregate*³⁶⁵ of simples.

3. But where there are no parts, it is impossible to have either extension, or figure, or divisibility. The monads are the true atoms of nature; in a word, they are the elements³⁶⁶ of things.³⁶⁷

In Leibniz's system of thought, the substance is essentially one or unity. Other theses on substance that we mention here are explanations based on experience and they only aim at a better comprehension of this unity.

Leibniz says that that which is one is simple and that simple substances lie in the grounds of composites³⁶⁸. He explains simplicity as being without parts. Comprehension of that which is without parts depends on the explanation of having parts or being divisible, based on the fact that the starting point in explanations is experience.

What Leibniz refers to as 'composites' are bodies as wholes-in-intuition that emerge in experience.³⁶⁹ When these are considered only as material or extensive

³⁶⁴Fr. *des composés*

³⁶⁵From latin word '*aggregare*' which means to collect, to include, to group, to implicate; to (cause to) flock/join together, to attach.

³⁶⁶Fr. *les Elemen(t)s des choses*

³⁶⁷G VI 607/L 643

³⁶⁸Fr. *composé, composed** Gr. *σύνθεσις***

*From latin *componere*: to compare; to place/put/add/collect together, to collate; to match (up); to store/hoard; to calm; to construct, to build; to arrange, to compile, to compose, to make up; to organize, to order; to settle.

**From *σύν* (together) and *θεσις* (to put).

³⁶⁹Though Leibniz wishes to use the term 'composite substances' only for organic bodies that he regards as the 'machines of nature', (See: Letter to Des Bosses, dated February 5, 1712 (G II 439/AG 200), the chart he attached to his letter to Des Bosses, dated August 17, 1715 (G II 506/L 617)) he often voices the fact that he names organic bodies as '*substantiatum*', when they are regarded only as

things, independently from one who experiences, they, themselves, are things that consist only of the collection of material or extensive things. It is impossible to divide any body, with regard to its matter or extension, and thus, to reach the elements with a unity, which will establish the grounds of its wholeness.

We can summarize Leibniz's opinions about this subject as follows: If it consists only of matter or extension, body is separable in view of its matter, or can be divided in view of its extension. If this breaking and dividing process does not reach an end, it cannot be claimed that the wholeness of the body comes from its parts; because there is the necessity of establishing the foundation for the wholeness of each part, in the same way. If it is claimed that this breaking and dividing process reaches an end, like atomists do, the indivisible parts reached cannot be material or extensive; because everything that is material or extensive is divisible. On the other hand, neither can indivisible things, which are not themselves material and do not

material or extensive, separately from the soul metaphysically, and that they are not different from the bodies he considers as a bulk:

"[...], in my opinion, our body in itself or the *cadaver*, setting the soul apart, can be called a substance only in an improper sense, just as in the case of a machine or a pile of stones, which are only beings by aggregation; [...]" ("*... qu'à mon avis nostre corps en luy même, l'ame mise à part, ou le cadaver ne peut estre appelé une substance que par abus, comme une machine ou comme un tas de pierres, qui ne sont que des estres par aggregation; [...]*") (Letter to Arnould, dated November 28 (December 8) 1686 (G II 75/AG 78))

The substantiality, which is attributed to organic body which is imagined as a unity of soul and body, does not come to mean that the body—together with the soul—has a substantiality separately from the soul, but that it is derived from the fact that they have a wholeness by themselves compared to other material things, when regarded from within experience, the ground of which is the harmony pre-established by God. In this respect, metaphysically, there is no difference between bodies that are, and are not, organic. While the distinction of those which are simple substances and which are not is a metaphysical distinction, the distinction of those which are composite substances and which are not is a distinction made from within experience. Furthermore, the reason why the topic of composite substances is mentioned in Leibniz's correspondences with Des Bosses, who is a Jesuit theologian, is the fact that in general Des Bosses investigates whether Leibniz's system is in accordance with Aristoteles's metaphysics, and in particular, whether it can explain the turning of bread and wine into flesh and blood of Jesus Christ in Holy Communion rite. What Leibniz tries to do here is to demonstrate that his system is not in conflict with the dogmas of Catholicism. Nevertheless, he frequently emphasizes that true unities are monads. Therefore, what is in discussion is not whether the so-called 'composite substances' are at the same level with simple substances, but to establish the foundation for the difference between those which constitute a whole by themselves in view of their existences within experience, and those which do not.

have an extension come together to form either the extension or the matter, nor can they provide the wholeness of bodies.³⁷⁰

Therefore, when those things which consist only of matter or extension are considered, the unity of bodies cannot come from themselves and there is no unity in them to provide their wholeness. Accordingly, they are not substances.

Our investigating what the ground of the wholeness of bodies is shall not only help us grasp in what sense simple substances are 'included in composites' at the same time, but also shall further reveal Leibniz's conception of substance, by enabling us to see the difference of the wholeness of that which is composite and the unity of the simple substance.

The ground of the wholeness of bodies in Leibniz's system of thought is the fact that they are composite, that is to say, that they are composed. Wholeness comes not from their being an aggregate formed of parts, but from their existence depending on a composition. Bodies as wholes-in-intuition emerge by soul's activity of experience. As we have already studied in the preceding section, the material and conditions of everything that emerges in experience are, in Leibniz's system of thought, innate to the soul. The source of the material of bodies as whole-in-intuition that emerge in experience is representations of other substances that are innate to the substance. What ensures that those things which emerge in experience do not consist only of a fantasy, in Leibniz's system of thought, is the fact that perception as the material of the soul's activity of experience is a representation of other substances.³⁷¹

Therefore, simple substances being 'composite' does not come to mean that

³⁷⁰G IV 478-479/L 454 (SN)

³⁷¹G VI 608/L 644(M13)

simple substances come together to form bodies and that bodies are composed of simple substances³⁷², but it means that other substances lie in the source of the material of bodies as wholes-in-intuition in view of experience, through their representations and in accordance with the pre-established harmony.

The point that requires attention is the fact that perceptions as the material of wholes in experience and accordingly, the representations of other substances do not lie in the grounds of the unity of bodies. The grounds of the unity of bodies as composites is not simple substances, which are included in the composition of composites through their representations and in accordance with the pre-established harmony, but the activity of composition of the soul who experiences.

As we have seen in the section in which we addressed Leibniz's conception of experience, the conditions of the variety that emerges in experience is the ideas that are innate to the soul in view of its memory aspect. The ground of the unity any one body has in view of experience is not the representations included in its composition, but the soul's activity of expressing the representations. Emergence of any body, which is nothing but an aggregate when considered independently from the soul's activity of expressing, as a whole-in-intuition and our conceiving it in this way depend upon imagination and intellectual activity of our soul.

The imagination's activity of envisaging the representations which are innate to the soul is, in fact, an activity of composition. The essence of such composition is to arrange, and then to envisage, the representations which are innate to the soul in

³⁷²“For we cannot say that monads are parts of bodies which touch each other, any more than we can say this of points or of souls. A monad, like the soul, is a world by itself, having no intercourse of a dependent nature except with God. (*Monades enim esse partes corporum, tangere sese, componere corpora, non magis dici debet, quam hoc de punctis et animabus dicere licet. Et Monas, ut anima, est velut mundus quidam proprius, nullum commercium dependentiae habens nisi cum Deo.*)” (G II 435-436/L 600)

accordance with the ideas in memory. Therefore, the order that emerges in the world which depends upon experience is the order that is derived from the imagination's composing representations according to ideas, and the ground of this order is the harmony pre-established by God.

In brief, since bodies as wholes-in-intuition are composites, they are not unities because the ground of the wholeness they have in view of intuition is not themselves. Therefore, they cannot be substances either. In Leibniz's system of thought, created substance is not a composite whole, but it is the soul which is the true unity.

Comprehension of such properties as simplicity and indivisibility that Leibniz attributed to substance as a unity is possible only given that substance is soul. Similarly, that the simple substance cannot be constituted and destroyed;³⁷³ that it begins only with creation and ends with annihilation³⁷⁴ also are possible with the created substance's being soul which is not subject to destruction contrary to the wholes-in-intuition that emerge in experience.

At this point we would like to emphasize once again one issue related to Leibniz's use of the word 'soul'. Leibniz distinguishes created substances as simple monads (or entelechies), souls and spirits depending on the degree of perfection of their activities in order to classify, on the basis of this distinction and in a comprehensive manner, the 'things'³⁷⁵ which emerge in experience or which are believed to exist due to religious reasons, and in this way to involve himself in the popular discussions of his time. Yet, even if such expressions of Leibniz seem to be

³⁷³G VI 598/L 636 (PNG2), G VI 607/L 643 (M4, M5)

³⁷⁴G VI 607/L 643(M6)

³⁷⁵These are things that, in view of experience, look like nonliving things, plants, animals, humans, and even angels. (G VI 439/AG 200)

conflicting to his metaphysical claims about substance in his own system of thought, when considered superficially, in fact they are in harmony with it.

First, knowing what substance is, is possible, according to Leibniz, only through knowing that we ourselves are substances.³⁷⁶ We can comprehend that we are substances only when we understand ourselves -depending upon the emergence of experience- as being different from those things which emerge in experience and as the ground of experience; only when we comprehend ourselves as *the one and the same*, that is as a soul. The word 'I' is the name given to the soul which is the agent of the activity which is expressed and recognized. Attributing substantiality to things which emerge in experience or to things the existence of which we discuss through reasoning depending upon the emergence of experience relies on the similarities that we can construct depending on our being souls, therefore, substances.³⁷⁷

³⁷⁶“I would like to know how we could have the idea of *being* if we did not, as beings ourselves, find being within us. (*Et je voudrais bien savoir, comment nous pourrions avoir l'idée de l'estre, si nous n'estions des Estres nous mêmes, et ne trouvions ainsi l'estre en nous.*)” (G V 71/RB 86)

³⁷⁷“There is as much difference between a substance and such a being as there is between a man and a community, such as people, an army, a society, or a college; these are moral beings, beings in which there is something imaginary and dependent on the fabrication [*fiction*] of our mind. A substantial unity requires a thoroughly indivisible and naturally indestructible being, [...], but which can be found in a soul or substantial form, on the model of what is called *me*. (*Il y a autant de difference entre une substance et entre un tel estre qu'il y en a entre un Homme et une communauté, comme peuple, armée, société ou college, qui sont estres moraux, ou il y a quelque chose d'imaginaire et de dependant de la fiction de nostre esprit. L'unité substantielle demande un estre accompli indivisible, et naturellement indestructible, [...], mais bien dans une ame ou forme substantielle à l'exemple de ce qu'on appelle moy.*)” (G II 76/AG 79)

Leibniz, in an article dated 1705, explains as follows what he understands by the term 'substantial form':

“When I am asked if they are substantial forms, I reply with a distinction. For if this term is taken to mean what Descartes meant in maintaining against Regis that the rational soul is the substantial form of man, I agree. But I say 'No' to anyone who takes the term in the sense of those who imagine that there is a substantial form in a piece of stone or in any other inorganic body. (*Quand on me demande, si ce sont des Formes substantielles, je reponds en distinguant: car si ce Terme est pris, comme le prend M. des Cartes, quand il soutient contre M. Regis, que l'Ame raisonnable est la forme substantielle de l'homme, je repondray qu'ouy. Mais je diray que non, si quelqu'un prend le Terme comme ceux qui s'imaginent qu'il y a une forme substantielle d'un morceau de pierre, ou d'un autre corps non-organique; [...]*)” (*Considérations sur les Principes de Vie, et sur les Natures Plastiques, par l'Auteur du Système de l'Harmonie préétablie*, 1705, G VI 539/L 586)

The point that we should pay attention to here is, just like the fact that it cannot be claimed that our body is a substance distinct from the soul, similarly, wholes-in-intuition that emerge in experience cannot be substances as they emerge in experience.³⁷⁸ What we should ask here is the question whether an indivisible unity, like the one we know from ourselves, lies in the grounds of the organic things which are wholes in view of experience.³⁷⁹

³⁷⁸“If my opinion that substance requires a true unity were founded only on a definition I had formulated in opposition to common usage, *then the dispute would be only one of words*. [...] I take things to a much higher level, and setting aside the question of terminology, *I believe that where there are only beings by aggregation, there aren't any real beings*. [...] I agree, Sir, that there are only machines (that are often animated) in all of corporeal nature, but I do not agree that *there are only aggregates of substances*; and if there are aggregates of substances, there must also be true substances from which all aggregates result. [...] the composite made up of the diamonds of the Grand Duke and of the Great Mogul can be called a pair of diamonds, but this is only a being of reason. And when they are brought closer to one another, it would be a being of the imagination or perception, that is to say, a phenomenon. For contact, common motion, and participation in a common plan have no effect on substantial unity. It is true that there are sometimes more, and sometimes fewer, grounds for supposing that several things constitute a single thing, in proportion to the extent to which these things are connected. But this serves only to abbreviate our thoughts and to represent the phenomena. (*Si l'opinion que j'ay, que la substance demande une veritable unité, n'estoit fondée que sur une definition que j'aurois forgée contre l'usage commun, ce ne seroit qu'une dispute des mots, [...], je prends les choses de bien plus haut, et laissant là les termes, je croy que là, où il n'y a que des estres par aggregation, il n'y aura pas même des estres reels; [...]* J'accorde, Monsieur, que dans toute la nature corporelle il n'y a que des machines (qui souvent sont animées), mais je n'accorde pas qu'il n'y ait que des *aggrégés de substances*, et s'il y a des *aggrégés de substances*, il faut bien qu'il y ait aussi des *veritables substances* dont tous les *aggrégés* resultent. [...] *le composé des diamans du Grand Duc et du Grand Mogol se peut appeler une paire de diamans, mais ce n'est qu'un estre de raison, et quand on les approchera l'un de l'autre, ce sera un estre d'imagination ou perception, c'est à dire un phénomène; car l'attouchement, le mouvement commun, le concours à un même dessein ne changent rien à l'unité substantielle. Il est vray qu'il y a tantost plus tantost moins de fondement de supposer comme si plusieurs choses en faisoient une seule, selon que ces choses ont plus de connexion, mais cela ne sert qu'à abreger nos pensées et à représenter les phenomenes.*”) (Letter to Arnould, dated April 30, 1687, G II 96/AG 85-86)

³⁷⁹“This thought of *myself*, who perceive sensible objects, and of my own action which results from it, adds something to the objects of sense. To think of some color and to consider that I think of it – these two thoughts are very different, just as much as color itself differs from the ego who thinks of it. And since I conceive that there are other beings who also have the right to say ‘I’, or for whom this can be said, it is by this that I conceive what is called *substance* in general. It is the consideration of myself, also, which provides me with other concepts in *metaphysics*, such as those of cause, effect, action, similarity, etc., and even with those of *logic* and *ethics*. Thus it may be said that there is nothing in the understanding which has not come from the senses, except the understanding itself, or the one who understands. (*Cette pensée de moy, qui m'appërçois des objets sensibles, et de ma propre action qui en resulte, adjoute quelque chose aux objets des sens. Penser à quelque couleur et considerer qu'on y pense, ce sont deux pensées tres differentes, autant que la couleur même differe de moy qui y pense. Et comme je conçois que d'autres Estres peuvent aussi avoir le droit de dire moy, ou qu'on pourroit le dire pour eux, c'est par là que je conçois ce qu'on appelle la substance en*

It is not possible for us to know whether a substance lies in the grounds of these, e.g. other living things, in the same way we know that we, ourselves, are substances. The reason why Leibniz thinks a soul lies in the ground of these as well is there being nothing in view of metaphysics to prevent this; the reason is that the foundation of the world which emerges in experience is possible only through the activities of infinitely many substances, whose activities are arranged by God within a harmony with each other. Due to similarities that can be grasped in experience and also due to metaphysical and theological reasons, and also because the opposite claim was not generally accepted during his lifetime, that other human beings have souls is something that is not worth discussing, in Leibniz's system of thought.

As opposed to the Cartesians' claim that other living things apart from human beings lack souls, Leibniz's thought is that there is no metaphysical reason preventing the view that they also have souls, considering that the fact that other living things are also wholes-in-intuition, and that that they behave as wholes is a sign that there lies a substance in their ground as well.³⁸⁰ Since Leibniz's claim that there lies substance in the ground of other living things is not merely based upon

general, et c'est aussi la consideration de moy même, qui me fournit d'autres notions de metaphysique, comme de cause, effect, action, similitude etc., et même celles de la Logique et de la Morale. Ainsi on peut dire qu'il n'y a rien dans l'entendement, qui ne soit venu des sens, excepté l'entendement même, ou celui qui entend.)" (Letter to Sophie Charlotte, the Prussian Queen, dated 1702, G VI 502/L 549)

³⁸⁰"I also think that to want to limit true unity or substance almost exclusively to man is to be as shortsighted in metaphysics as were those in physics who wanted to confine the world in a sphere. And since there are as many true substances as there are expressions of the whole universe, and as many as there are replications of divine works, it is in conformity with the greatness and beauty of the works of God for him to produce as many substances as there can be in this universe, and as many as higher considerations allow, for these substances hardly get in one another's way. (*Je croy aussi que de vouloir renfermer dans l'homme presque seul la veritable unité ou substance, c'est estre aussi borné en Metaphysique que l'estoient en physique ceux qui enfermoient le monde dans une boule. Et les substances veritables estant autant d'expressions de tout l'univers pris dans un certain sens et autant de replications des oeuvres divines, il est conforme à la grandeur et à la beauté des ouvrages de Dieu, puisque ces substances ne s'entrempechent pas d'en faire dans cet univers autant qu'il se peut et autant que des raisons superieures permettent.*)" (G II 98/AG 87)

their being wholes in view of experience, or their acting as a whole and their parts' being arranged as possessing a smoothly operating mechanism, according to him, one should not go too far in concluding that a substance lies in the ground of a thing that emerges in experience.³⁸¹

To summarize, created substance in Leibniz's system of thought is that which is indivisible unity. We can know what substance is and what it is to be substance only when we know that we, ourselves, are substances in view of our soul. The wholes which emerge in intuition are not substances themselves, because the wholeness of composites comes from the soul which composes. The question concerning which one of those emerging as a whole in experience has a substance in its ground cannot be answered from within experience.

[... que] ce qui n'est pas véritablement *un* estre, n'est pas non plus véritablement un *estre*.

[... that] what is not truly *one* being is not truly one *being* either.³⁸²

³⁸¹"Our mind notices or conceives some true substances which have certain modes; these modes involve relations to other substances, so the mind takes the occasion to join them together in thought and to make one name account for all these things together. This is useful for reasoning, but we must not allow ourselves to be misled into making substances or true beings of them; this is suitable only for those who stop at appearances, or for those who make realities out of all abstractions of the mind, and who conceive number, time, place, motion, shape, [[and sensible qualities]] as so many separate beings. Instead I hold that philosophy cannot be better reestablished and reduced to something precise, than by recognizing only substances or complete beings endowed with a true unity, together with the different states that succeed one another; everything else is only phenomena, abstractions, or relations. (*Nostre esprit remarque ou conçoit quelques substances veritables qui ont certains modes, ces modes enveloppent des rapports à d'autres substances d'où l'esprit prend occasion de les joindre ensemble dans la pensée et de mettre un nom en ligne de compte pour toutes ces choses ensemble, ce qui sert à la commodité du raisonnement, mais il ne faut pas s'en laisser tromper pour en faire autant de substances ou Estres veritablament reels; cela n'appartient qu'à ceux qui s'arrestent aux apparences, ou bien à ceux qui font des réalités de toutes les abstractions de l'esprit, et qui conçoivent le nombre, le temps, le lieu, le mouvement, la figure, les qualités sensibles comme autant d'estres à part. Au lieu que je tiens, qu'on ne sçauroit mieux retablir la philosophie, et la réduire à quelque chose de precis, que de reconnoître les seules substances ou Estres accomplis, doués d'une véritable unité avec leur differens estats qui s'entresuivent, tout le reste n'estant que des phenomenes, des abstractions ou des rapports.*)" (G II 101/AG 89)

³⁸²G II 97/AG 86

II.2. Substance in view of its being a Point of View

In this part, we shall be addressing the substance as the unit of existence of Leibniz's system of thought, in view of the fact that it is a point of view³⁸³ that reflects³⁸⁴ God and all those things which are created. We deem it useful to emphasize again and again that the aspects of substance are not independent from each other in Leibniz's system of thought. That we choose to assess the substance, which is in fact one, from its interdependent, however, different aspects aim only at a better comprehension of Leibniz's conception of substance.

We, in this section, shall investigate the fact that substance, in Leibniz's system of thought, is a point of view that reflects all those things which are created in relation to the following three considerations: first, establishing the foundations for the fact that substance is complete, and consequently unique in view of the material it comprises; second, establishing the foundations for its variety that emerges in experience so that it does not consist only of appearance or fantasy, or contradict the unity of substance; third, establishing the foundations for the independence of the activity of substance, in view of the source of the material it comprises.

When we take into consideration the fact that substance is a point of view that reflects all those things which are created, we should always keep in mind that the reason of creation of each and every substance in Leibniz's system of thought is to

³⁸³Fr. *le point de vue*

³⁸⁴“All individual created substances, indeed, are different expressions of the same universe and of the same universal cause, God. But these expressions vary in perfection as do different representations or perspectives of the same city seen from different points. (*Imo omnes substantiæ singularis < creatæ > sunt diversæ [impression] expressiones ejusdem universi, ejusdemque causæ universalis, nempe DEI; sed variant perfectione expressiones ut ejusdem oppidi diversæ representationes vel scænographiæ ex diversis punctis visus.*)” (C 521/L 269)

See: G VI 599/L636 (PNG3), G VI 616/L 648 (M55)

actualize the harmony pre-established by God, to the extent of their share of the responsibility. That one substance represents others that are created is not an additional claim about a substance, but is an aspect of the creation of that substance as it is.

In Leibniz's system of thought, each substance created in accordance with the pre-established harmony is a living mirror that represents all things which are created.³⁸⁵ Since a substance's containment of representations of other substances is not something separate from itself, that is to say, though the structure of language is prone to mislead us in this subject, there is not one substance and separately the representations of other substances that the substance contains in itself; one of the things that make a substance that particular substance is its innate containment of these representations. Therefore, a substance's being a 'living mirror' as that

³⁸⁵ "[...] each monad is a living mirror, or a mirror endowed with an internal action, and [...] it represents the universe according to its point of view and is regulated as completely as is the universe itself. ([...] *chaque Monade est un miroir vivant, ou doué d'action interne, representatif de l'univers, suivant son point de vue, et aussi réglé que l'univers luy même.*)" (G VI 598-599/L 636-637 (PNG3))

"[...] each living mirror which represents the universe according to its own point of view, that is, each *monad* or each substantial center, must have its perceptions and its appetites regulated in the best way compatible with all the rest. ([...] *que chaque miroir vivant representant l'univers suivant son point de vue, c'est à dire, que chaque Monade, chaque centre substantiel, doit avoir ses perceptions et ses appetits les mieux réglés qu'il est compatible avec tout le reste.*)" (G VI 603-604/L 640 (PNG12))

"Now this mutual connection or accommodation of all created things to each other and of each to all the rest causes each simple substance to have relations which express all the others and consequently to be a perpetual living mirror of the universe. (*Or cette Liaison ou cet accommodement de toutes les choses créées à chacune et de chacune à toutes les autres, fait que chaque substance simple a des rapports qui expriment toutes les autres, et qu'elle est par consequent un miroir vivant perpetuel de l'univers.*)" (G VI 616/L 648 (M56))

"Just as the same city viewed from different sides appears to be different and to be, as it were, multiplied in perspectives, so the infinite multitude of simple substances, which seem to be so many different universes, are nevertheless only the perspectives of a single universe according to the different points of view of each monad. (*Et comme une même ville regardée de differens côtés paroist tout autre et est comme multipliée perspectivement, il arrive de même, que par la multitude infinie des substances simples, il y a comme autant de differens univers, qui ne sont pourtant que les perspectives d'un seul selon les differens points de vue de chaque Monade.*)" (G VI 616/L 648 (M57))

particular substance is not something that is completely different from those things which are reflected in the mirror.³⁸⁶

Given that all substances reflect others, that reflecting the substances other than itself is an aspect of one substance's being that particular substance, and that this applies to all substances, what should we understand by a substance's containment in itself of the representations of all substances other than itself? Given that those things reflected in the mirror are involved in of the mirror and that the reflecting mirror is involved in other mirrors depending on its own reflection's being present on other reflectors, what does one mirror's reflecting other mirrors mean?

First, due to the fact that representation of each substance is involved in this sense in other substances and that the activity of each substance consists only of its share of actualization regarding the pre-established harmony, all of the substances are created together and by a single decision³⁸⁷ of God, according to Leibniz's conception of substance.³⁸⁸ Therefore, since no substance is created before the other and since each substance's containment of the representations of others concerns the creation of that particular substance, the representations of other substances contained in a substance can be nothing but the representations of their shares from the harmony which is given to them in order to actualize. The share from the harmony that each substance is given is how and how much of the representations will be expressed. Therefore, what we should understand by a substance's being a mirror or a point of view that reflects all those which are created is that it innately

³⁸⁶This dependence is not between one substance and the others, but between one substance and the representations of others. The ground of the relation between representing-being represented or reflecting-being reflected is not an interaction between substances or a determination, but it is the creation in accordance with the harmony pre-established by God.

³⁸⁷*Fr.un décret*

³⁸⁸G VI 147-148 (T:I-84)

contains in itself the representation of the shares from the harmony of all those which are created apart from itself, in order to be able to perform its activity which is in accordance with the activities of other substances due to harmony, but which is independent from the actualization of their activities by them. In other words, representations of other substances contained in a substance must be the representations of how harmony will be expressed by other substances.

We should evaluate in a similar manner Leibniz's explanation of each substance's being a point of view that reflects the entire universe in its own fashion, by likening it to the different views of the same city looking from different points. In Leibniz's thought, 'universe' and 'world' are words that are employed to express the sequence or collection of things which exist.³⁸⁹ There is no universe as a substance, by itself, which is independent from the activities of individual substances, or, if we assess the city in Leibniz's example as the universe, there is no city that is independent from its different views.³⁹⁰ Therefore, that which each substance expresses through its own activity is not a universe that exists independently from itself, but it is the pre-established harmony. And the representations, which a substance contains in itself are the representations pertaining to how the same harmony is expressed by other substances, that is to say, the representations of the

³⁸⁹G VI 107 (T:I-8)

³⁹⁰G IV 504/L 498-99

The existence of a universe that is independent from individual substances or of a universal soul (or a world soul) which is claimed to correspond to such a universe is an opinion that needs to be particularly contested, according to Leibniz, based on the fact that it reduces individual substances down to the modification of a single substance and thus melts the human soul within the universal soul to render needless the souls as individual substance and unit of existence or rendering them secondary; and also because of the fact that it sometimes leads to identification of universal soul with God.

See: G VI 53-56/H 77-79 (T:D 7,8,9)

Also see: "Considérations sur la doctrine d'un Esprit Universel Unique" (1702, G VI 529-538/L 554-560)

activity of other substances. Accordingly, the universe of each substance is the collection of created things which are expressed in its own activity and belongs to that particular substance only.³⁹¹ The source of the harmony between the different worlds of substances is not that they reflect a universe that is independent from their activities and that actually exists, but the fact that they are created in accordance with a single harmony.³⁹²

A substance's containment of the representations of other substances is not independent from the activity of that substance. According to Leibniz, the main activity of a substance is the activity of perceiving, towards which it tends on the basis of the principle of appetite.³⁹³ A substance's containment of other substances' representations and its having a tendency toward perceiving them are not two

³⁹¹“Moreover, every substance is like an entire world, and like a mirror of God or of the whole universe which it expresses, each in its own manner, about as the same city is represented differently depending on the different positions from which it is regarded. Thus the universe is in a certain sense multiplied as many times as there are substances, and the glory of God is likewise redoubled by as many wholly different representations of his work. (*De plus toute substance est comme un monde entier et comme un miroir de Dieu ou bien de tout l'univers, qu'elle exprime chacune à sa façon, à peu près comme une même ville est diversement représentée selon les différentes situations de celui qui la regarde. Ainsi l'univers est en quelque façon multiplié autant de fois qu'il y a de substances, et la gloire de Dieu est redoublée de même par autant de représentations toutes différentes de son ouvrage.*)” (G IV 434/L 308 (DM9))

³⁹²“[...] and there thus results from each perspective of the universe, as it is seen from a certain position, a substance which expresses the universe in conformity to that perspective, if God sees fit to render his thought effective and to produce that substance. [...] and it follows from what we have just said, that each substance is a world apart, independent of everything outside of itself except God. ([...] *le resultat de chaque veue de l'univers, comme regardé d'un certain endroit, est une substance qui exprime l'univers conformement à cette veue, si Dieu trouve bon de rendre sa pensée effective et de produire cette substance. [...] et il s'ensuit de ce que nous venons de dire, que chaque substance est comme un monde à part, independant de tout autre chose hors de Dieu; [...]*)” (G IV 439/L 311-312 (DM14))

“So only God, also, constitutes the link or communication between the substances, and it is through him that the phenomena of the one meet with and agree with those of the others and that consequently there is reality in our perception. (*Aussi Dieu seul fait la liaison ou la communication des substances, et c'est par luy que les phenomenes des uns se rencontrent et s'accordent avec ceux d'autres, et par consequent qu'il y a de la réalité dans nos perceptions.*)” (G IV 458/L 324 (DM32))

³⁹³G VI 609/L 644 (M15)

separate metaphysical levels.³⁹⁴ The substance's activity of perceiving on the basis of the principle of appetite is continuous.³⁹⁵ And the continuous flow in the substance is nothing other than this continuous activity of perceiving.³⁹⁶

Since the fundamental activity of each substance, according to Leibniz, is the activity of perception, representation of another substance in a substance is the representation of the activity of perception in the substance which is represented. What we call perceptions are the details taken from this continuous activity of perceiving.³⁹⁷ It is possible to name as 'appearance' the details which are called 'perceptions' with regard to the substance being the reflector mirror or point of view.

After explaining that one substance is the point of view that reflects all of the other substances, we can come back to the three considerations we mentioned above. First, every substance is complete in view of the fact that it bears in itself the representations of other substances, and is at the same level with the others in view of the activity of perception.³⁹⁸ But, because every substance bears in itself the representations of all other substances, it is unique on the basis that it, itself, is not something that is completely separate from these representations and that it contains these representations in relation to its activity, which is the very reason of its existence.³⁹⁹ Despite the fact that every substance represents all the others and is represented in each of the others, no substance contains the representation of itself.

³⁹⁴According to Leibniz's conception of substance, a substance cannot contain these representations in itself without being active.

See: the following section.

³⁹⁵G VI 609/L 644 (M15)

³⁹⁶G VI 608/L 643-644 (M10,M11)

³⁹⁷G VI 608-609/L 644 (M12, M13, M14)

³⁹⁸G VI 604/L 640 (PNG 13)

³⁹⁹As we shall consider in the following sections, what we should understand from Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles is, in its simplest terms, that it is not possible that two substances which will perform the same activity were created.

Therefore, each substance is complete in view of the representation of others, and unique in view of the fact that it is that which represents them.

What we should understand from the word 'monad' in Leibniz's system of thought is that it is the substance which is one, simple, active and unique, independently from the degree of perfection of its activity, that is to say, in view of the fact that it possesses activity of perceiving on the basis of the principle of appetite, and based on this, it bears in itself the representations of all other substances.

About the second consideration, the soul's activity of knowing which depends upon experience is the apperceiving of perceptions as the details of the continuous activity of perceiving in the monad aspect. The world that emerges in experience is the expression of the perceptions in its monad aspect, depending upon the possibilities and conditions of the one who experiences. What prevents the world that emerges in experience, in Leibniz's system of thought, from being a fantasy or a mere appearance, despite the fact that it does not have an existence independent from the one who experiences, is the fact that they are the appearances of other substances in the sense explained above. According to Leibniz, the world that emerges in experience is like a rainbow. Just like the fact that we see the rainbow as we do because of a certain refraction of light, that is to say, the rainbow is not a fantasy, things which emerge in experience do not consist merely of images, either.⁴⁰⁰ Since they, in view of their manner of emergence, rely upon the soul's aspect that

⁴⁰⁰Letter to Arnould, dated April 30, 1686, G II 97, G V 133/RB 146, G V 203-204/RB 219

experiences, and they, in view of their sources, rely upon the representations in its monad aspect, they are *phaenomenon bene fundatum*⁴⁰¹, according to Leibniz.

That, in Leibniz's system of thought, the substance is a point of view which reflects other substances enables one who experiences to feel itself as different from the world that emerges in experience, and also enables the foundations for the plurality which is based on the emergence of experience, in view of its material, without leading to the dismissal of the unity and simplicity of the substance.

The ground of the distinction between that which experiences and that which is experienced, in view of the material of experience, is the distinction between that which perceives and the material for its perceptual activity.⁴⁰² The unity of that which perceives is the ground of the unity of experience, and the completeness of the perceptual material is the source of the wholeness of experience.

Similarly, the point upon which the plurality that emerges in experience relies, in view of its material, is the perceptions as the details of the continuous activity of perceiving of the soul. Each of the perceptions as passing states in experience, which we consider to be corresponding to the sensation that is apperceived as a single thing because of the unity of the one who experiences, is the coexistence of infinitely varied perceptions, on the basis of the infinite plurality of substances.

In other words, although it is impossible⁴⁰³ to talk about a plurality subject to number at the level of the substance's activity of perceiving prior to the emergence

⁴⁰¹ 'well founded phenomenon'.

See: "De modo distinguendi phaenomena realia ab imaginariis". (1685, G VII 319- 322/L 363-365)

⁴⁰² See: I.4 Experience in view of the Act of Apperception

⁴⁰³ Emergence of the plurality in experience depends upon the imagination's envisagement of the perceptions according to the ideas in memory, and the comprehension of plurality depends upon the intellectual activity.

of plurality which is understood because of the emergence of experience and prior to the wholeness of sensations which is provided through the unity of the one who experiences, the source of the plurality that emerges in experience is, with regard to the material of experience, the continuous activity of perceiving that one substance performs in tending to the representations of other substances. Here we are not talking about one perception which corresponds to each of the sensations we acquire at the level of experience or of the wholes-in-intuition we conceive within experience. A one to one matching is possible neither between sensation and the perception that is the material of sensation, nor between the perception and the representation of any substance.

Each sensation is the clarification of the passing state, which we refer to as if it is one and whole in respect of the unity of the one who experiences, according to the conditions of the one who experiences. Since every perception is a detail of the activity of perceiving performed by the substance, directed to the representations that are innate to it as a whole, it is related to the entirety of the representations in question. And the sensation that emerges in experience is related not only to the detail which is clarified, but also to the entirety of the activity of perceiving including this state or the entirety of representations. Every clear sensation contains the obscure perception of everything in view of its material, and accordingly, every distinct perception contains the confused perception of everything which is created.⁴⁰⁴

See: 1.6 Experience in view of the Act of Envisagement: Imagination

⁴⁰⁴*See:* 1.3 Experience as the Soul's Activity of Sensing Perceptions

Therefore, in Leibniz's conception of substance, the substance's perceptive nature in view of its monad aspect provides the substance a variety in such a manner as not to conflict with its unity and simplicity. Since there are no perceptions separated from each other at the perceptive level, there is no plurality to violate the unity and simplicity of substance.

With regard to the third consideration, since one substance is related to other substances from within itself, the substance is not dependent on other substances, in view of the material to which its activity is directed. As we shall be addressing in the following section, in Leibniz's system of thought, no external interaction among the substances is in question, that is to say, the substances do not act upon each other. The conformity between the activities of substances is provided on the basis of their being created in accordance with the pre-established harmony and in a manner to contain the representations of each other.

II.3. Substance in view of the independence of its activity

In Leibniz's system of thought, substance should be independent in view of both its existence and also of its activity⁴⁰⁵. Substance as the true unity is independent since it does not have parts, in view of its existence. Just like the foundation for the plurality in the world which depends upon experience is established by the unity of the substance who experiences, the foundation for the change in the world which depends upon experience and the apparent interaction between things should be established by the independent activity of substance.

⁴⁰⁵Fr. *activité*, Lat. *actuositas**

*From *agere*: to drive, to urge, to conduct; to spend (time w/*cum*); to thank (w/*gratias*); to deliver (speech)).

What Leibniz takes into account is surely Aristotle's concept of *ἐνέργεια*.

As we have mentioned before, in Leibniz's system of thought, substances are units of existence that God created to actualize⁴⁰⁶ the pre-established harmony. Therefore, substances are active due to their nature.⁴⁰⁷ In order for the substance to be active in the real sense, the activity should belong to it; that is to say, it should be the agent⁴⁰⁸ at the same time.

What is meant by the independence of the activity of substance in Leibniz's system of thought is that once the activity is created, it is independent both from God and also from other created things. The activity of a substance's being independent from God, once it is created, is the same thing with God's not intervening subsequently with the world as a collection of things which he created.

The reason for Leibniz's insistence that the created substance is active and agent is the insufficiency of the claim that everything is created by God and everything arises out of God, for describing how any change occurred including the physical motion in the world which depends upon experience, when we put aside theological and ethical reasons^{409, 410}

⁴⁰⁶Fr.*actuel(le)* Lat.*actualis*

⁴⁰⁷"That which does not act does not merit the name of substance. (*Ce qui n'agit point, ne merite point le nom de substance [...]*)" (G VI 350-351/H359 (T: III-393))

⁴⁰⁸Fr.*agent* Lat.*agens*

⁴⁰⁹See: II.1 Substance in view of its being an indivisible unity

⁴¹⁰According to Leibniz, such a description should include both metaphysical and physical elements. Everything that happens in the visible world should have a mechanical explanation. But without the determination of the metaphysical principles upon which they rely, such description will remain incomplete by itself, even if it is comprehensive. The criticism Leibniz poses against Descartes and his followers is from a metaphysical point of view, if the problems in mechanical explanation are put aside. Attempting to explain those which happen in the visible world on the basis of various metaphysical principles put forth to establish the connection directly with God, or the connection between God and the physical world, as if no mechanical explanation is possible for them is not appropriate for Leibniz, either.

"And so, I think that the omniscient heat of Hippocrates, and Avicenna's Cholcodean giver of souls, the exceedingly wise plastic virtue of Scaliger and others, and hylarchic principle of Henry More are in part impossible, and in part unnecessary. (*Itaque et calidum omniscium Hippocratis, et Cholcodeam animarum datricem Avicennae, et illam sapientissimam Scaligeri aliorumque virtutem*

According to Leibniz, it cannot be explained in Descartes's system of thought how God transfers motion to matter, which does not have any principle of activity in itself because it consists only of extension, and how the quantity and direction of the total amount of motion in the universe is preserved.⁴¹¹

If we are to accept the claims of occasionalists, primarily of Malebranche who accepts Descartes's thought on matter, every motion or every change in general becomes a miracle, since they are explained directly by the intervention of God.⁴¹²

Since it is possible that God may change anything at any moment in such a case, there will be no possibility of establishing the foundation for the laws of nature, and accordingly for a natural science. Therefore, in order to establish the foundation for a natural science, according to Leibniz, first the laws to which those which are created are subject must have been determined by God at the very beginning⁴¹³, and the power they need for all activities they will perform as subject to these laws must have been given also at the very beginning.⁴¹⁴

plasticam, et principium hylarchicum Henrici Mori, partim impossibilia, partim superflua puto; [...]" (*De ipse Natura* (N), 1698, G IV 505/AG 156 (N2)/L 499)

Also see: 'Anti-barbarus physicus' (AB), 1710 or 1716, (G VII 377-344/AG 312-320)

⁴¹¹*Specimen Dynamicum* (SD), 1695, GM IV 234-254/L 440-441/AG 120, G IV 505-506/L 499-500/AG 156-158 (N3,N4), G IV 483/L 457 (SN)

⁴¹²G IV 505-507/L 499-500/AG 157-158 (N4, N5); also see: G IV 431-432/L306-307 (DM6, DM7)

⁴¹³G IV 431-432/L306-307 (DM6, DM7)

⁴¹⁴"And so, it is not sufficient to say that God, creating things in the beginning, willed that they follow a certain definite law in their change [*progressus*] if we imagine his will to have been so ineffective that things were not affected by it and no lasting effect was produced in them. [...] But if, indeed, the law God laid down left some trace of itself impressed on things, if by his command things were formed in such a way that they were rendered appropriate for fulfilling the will of the command then already we must admit that a certain efficacy has been placed in things, a form or a force, something like what we usually call by the name 'nature,' something from which the series of phenomena follow in accordance with the prescript of the first command. (*Itaque satis non est dici, Deum initio res creantem voluisse, ut certam quandam legem in progressu observarent, si voluntas ejus fingatur ita fuisse inefficax, ut res ab ea non fuerint affectae, nec durabilis in iis effectus sit productus. [...] Sin vero lex a Deo lata reliquit aliquod sui expressum in rebus vestigium, si res ita fuere formatae mandato, ut aptae redderentur ad implendam jubentis voluntatem, jam concedendum est, quandam inditam esse rebus efficaciam, formam vel vim, qualis naturae nomine a nobis accipi*

When these are accepted, one obtains the possibility to explain the interaction in the visible world; every phenomenon ceases to be a miracle of God and room is opened for a natural science. In addition, since the power they need to be able to perform their activities is innate to things which are created, they may deserve to be named as substances in the real sense.

Therefore, in Leibniz's thought, though the activities of created substances are subject to God's pre-established harmony or to God's laws and because they are subject to them, once they are created, they are independent from God and from each other since there is no interaction between substances.⁴¹⁵ Since the activity of each substance, which consists only of partial actualization of pre-established harmony, is arranged in a manner to contain the representations of the activities of other substances, neither God's intervention, nor the affections of other substances are needed for performance of these activities. Therefore, the activity of a created substance is independent both from God, and also from other created substances.

After explaining in this way what we should understand by the independence of the activity of substance in Leibniz's system of thought, it should be revealed through which means all kinds of activities of substances are connected to these principles, in order to avoid God and pre-established harmony in Leibniz's system of

solet, ex qua series phaenomenorum ad primi jussus praescriptum consequeretur.)" (G IV 507/AG 158-159 (N6)/L 500-501)

⁴¹⁵"We might say, then, in a way, and with good meaning, though not in accordance with common usage, that one particular substance never acts upon another particular substance, nor is it acted upon by it, if we keep in mind that what happens to each is solely the result of its own complete idea or concept, since this idea already includes all the predicates or events and expresses the whole universe. (*On pourroit donc dire en quelque façon, et dans un bon sens, quoique éloigné de l'usage, qu'une substance particuliere n'agit jamais sur une autre substance particuliere et n'en patit non plus, si on considere que ce qui arrive à chacune n'est qu'une suite de son idée ou notion complete toute seule, puisque cette idée enferme déjà tous les predicats ou evenemens, et exprime tout l'univers.*)" (G IV 440/L312 (DM14))

thought being subject to *ex machina* criticism, which Leibniz posed against other thinkers' thoughts on this subject.⁴¹⁶

Activity of substance in Leibniz's system of thought is, indeed, a single activity depending upon the unity of substance. We can talk about the different kinds of activities of substance only in view of the degree of perfection of the substance's activity. Our attributing a degree of perfection to substances which emerge in our experience to the extent that they emerge in our own experience should not come to mean that the degree of their activities is therefore fully known by us. Along with this and keeping this in mind at all times, the foundation should be established for all kinds of activities of the substance, to the extent that they emerge in our own experience, within the framework of the conception of substance established.

That which determines the degree of perfection⁴¹⁷ of the activity of a substance, in Leibniz's thought, is how active it is upon the representations that are

⁴¹⁶When he criticizes Malebranche's occasionalism, Leibniz says the following:

"It is quite true that speaking with metaphysical rigor, there is no real influence of one created substance upon another and that all things, with all their reality, are continually produced by the power of God. But problems are not solved merely by making use of a general cause and calling in what is called the *deus ex machina*. To do this without offering any other explanation drawn from the order of secondary causes is, properly speaking, to have recourse to miracle. In philosophy we must try to give a reason which will show how things are brought about by the Divine Wisdom in conformity with the particular concept of the subject in question. (*Il est bien vrai qu'il n'y a point d'influence réelle d'une substance créée sur l'autre, en parlant selon la rigueur métaphysique, et que toutes les choses, avec toutes leur réalités, sont continuellement produites par la vertu de Dieu: mais pour résoudre des problèmes, il n'est pas assez d'employer la cause générale, et de faire venir ce qu'on appelle Deus ex machina. Car lorsque cela se fait sans qu'il y ait autre explication qui se puisse tirer de l'ordre des causes secondes, c'est proprement recourir au miracle. En philosophie il faut tâcher de rendre raison, en faisant connoître de quelle façon les choses s'exécutent par la sagesse divine, conformément à la notion du sujet dont il s'agit.*") (G IV 483/L 457 (SN))

"Hence, since the Cartesians recognized no active, substantial, and modifiable principle in body, they were forced to remove all activity [*actio*] from it and transfer it to God alone, summoned *ex machina*, which is hardly good philosophy. (*Unde Cartesiani, cum nullum principium activum substantiale modificabile in corpore agnoscerent, actionem omnem ipsi abjudicare et in solum Deum transferre sunt coacti, accersitum ex Machina, quod philosophicum non est.*") (The text published in AG, with the title 'On Body and Forces Against Cartesians' (BF), 1702, G IV 397/AG 254)

Also see: G IV 499/ AG 148

⁴¹⁷The way to determine what can be a perfection according to Leibniz is to look whether these things can have a highest degree. For example, things like numbers and shapes which do not have a highest

innate to it.⁴¹⁸ One substance's action upon another is not emission⁴¹⁹ of something from that substance, nor is it transplantation⁴²⁰ of something to the other.⁴²¹ Created substance is unlimited in view of being a point of view, that is to say in view of the representations it aims at perceiving. It is its activity upon the representations that limits, and therefore determines, the created substance, and the degree of perfection of its activity.⁴²² The reason why the nature of the created substance is limited in Leibniz's system of thought is that the activity of the substance is dependent upon the limitations of the representations of other substances. The activity of a substance is its disposition to the representations that are innate to it and the effort it spends to perceive, apperceive and conceive them, in accordance with its share of the pre-established harmony and on the basis of the appetite, which is the internal principle of its activity.

When the substance directs its innate power to the representation of another substance, we say that the substance acts upon the representation and that the

degree are not perfections because the greatest number or shape lead to contradiction. Since the highest degrees of knowledge (*science*) and power (*puissance*) do not lead to any impossibility, each of them is a perfection, and they are unlimited when they belong to God. (G IV 427/L 303 (DM1))

⁴¹⁸“The created being is said to *act* outwardly insofar as it has perfection and to *suffer* from another insofar as it is imperfect. Thus *action* is attributed to a monad insofar as it has distinct perceptions, and *passion* insofar as it has confused ones. (*La créature est dite agir au dehors en tant qu'elle a de la perfection, et patir d'une autre en tant qu'elle est imparfaite. Ainsi l'on attribue l'Action à la Monade en tant qu'elle a des perceptions distinctes, et la Passion en tant qu'elle en a de confuses.*)” (G VI 615/L 647 (M49))

“One created being is more perfect than another if one finds in it that which will supply a reason a priori for what happens in the other. And it is because of this that it is said to act upon the other. (*Et une creature est plus parfaite qu'une autre en ce qu'on trouve en elle ce qui sert à rendre raison a priori de ce qui se passe dans l'autre, et c'est par là qu'on dit, qu'elle agit sur l'autre.*)” (G VI 615/L 648 (M50)) Also see: G VI 604/L 640 (PNG 13), G IV 440/L 313 (DM15)

⁴¹⁹Fr.*émission*

⁴²⁰Fr.*transplantation*

⁴²¹G IV 486/L 459 (SN)

⁴²²“Thus a substance which has an infinite extension, insofar as it expresses everything, becomes limited through the more or less perfect way in which it expresses each thing. (*Ainsi une substance qui est d'une étendue infinie, en tant qu'elle exprime tout, devient limitée par la manière de son expression plus ou moins parfaite.*)” (G IV 440/L 313 (DM15))

representation suffers from the act of the substance.⁴²³ For created substances, act and passion are reciprocal.⁴²⁴ Each act contains a passion and each passion contains an act. That upon which the substance acts or that which suffers is not another substance with regard to actual interaction, but the representations of substances. But since the activity to be performed by substances is subject to harmony, the activity of each substance is related to those of the others, through harmony. This relation is not actual, but ideal; that is to say, it is between the ideas of substances in God.⁴²⁵ The influence of a substance on another and the passion of the other are all in an ideal sense. Since the essence of the activity of a substance consists of expressing its relations to the others in view of the harmony, what determines the degree of the perfection of a substance's activity is how much of the representations in itself it will express and how it will do that; how it will act upon them; in other words, its share of the harmony.

⁴²³“Now it is the virtue of a particular substance to express well the glory of God, and the better it expresses it, the less limited it is. And whenever anything exercises its virtue or power, that is to say when it acts, it improves and enlarges itself in proportion to its action. Therefore when a change takes place by which a number of substances are affected (as a matter of fact, every change affects them all), I believe it can be said that any substance which thereby passes immediately to a greater degree of perfection or to a more perfect expression exercises its power and *acts*, while any substance which passes to a lesser degree of perfection shows its weakness and *suffers*. I hold too that every action of a substance which has perception* involves some pleasure, and every passion some pain, and vice versa. (*Or la vertu d'une substance particuliere est de bien exprimer la gloire de Dieu, et c'est par là qu'elle est moins limitée. Et chaque chose quand elle exerce sa vertu ou puissance, c'est à dire quand elle agit, change en mieux et s'étend, en tant qu'elle agit: lors donc qu'il arrive un changement dont plusieurs substances sont affectées (comme en effect tout changement les touche toutes), je croy qu'on peut dire que celle qui immédiatement par là passe à un plus grand degré de perfection ou à une expression plus parfaite, exerce sa puissance, et agit, et celle qui passe à un moindre degré fait connoistre sa foiblesse, et pat it. Aussi tiens je que toute action d'une substance qui a de la perception importe quelque volupté, et toute passion quelque douleur, et vice versa; [...]*)” (G IV 441/L 313 (DM15))

*In the texts in L and in AG, Leibniz's word '*perception*' in the original texts is replaced with the word '*perfection*'. Both translations are based on the text (*Discours de Métaphysique*, Paris, Félix Alcan, 1907) edited by Lestienne. (L 303, AG 347) This text, too, contains not '*perfection*' but '*perception*'. (p.52) Since what is referred to in DM 15 is perfection, though it seems more appropriate at first glance, when the whole sentence is considered, it is obvious that what is referred to is not the substance '*which has perfection*', but the substance '*which has perception*'.

⁴²⁴G VI 615/L 648 (M52)

⁴²⁵G VI 615/L 648 (M51)

In order for Leibniz's conception of substance which is independent in view of its activity to be comprehensive and complete, all kinds of changes that emerge in experience should be provided with a foundation on the basis of action and passion. The different degrees of perfection attributed to substances are related to our classification of changes, in the manner in which they emerge in our own world. Different activities of substances can be mentioned depending on the action and passion, which we conceive in our experience and use to classify them if they were different kinds.

In Leibniz's system of thought, the changes that emerge in experience are aimed to be provided with a foundation by attributing three kinds of activities, which are in effect different in view of the degree of perfection, to the substance; and on this basis, substances are classified from within the experience.⁴²⁶ Based on the principle of appetite, which is the ground of any activity in the substance, all substances are at the same level with regard to perfection, in view of the activity of perception.⁴²⁷ Leibniz names substances as monad, entelechy, substantial form, etc. with regard to this activity.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁶Leibniz is of the opinion that it is not really correct to separate and classify substances according to their degrees of perfection, with very definite borders and in a manner to leave gaps in between them:

"But I believe that the universe contains everything that its perfect harmony could admit. It is agreeable to this harmony that between creatures which are far removed from one another there should be intermediate creatures, though not always on a single planet or in a single [planetary] system; and sometimes a thing is intermediate between two species in some respects and not in others. Birds, which are otherwise so different from man, approach him by virtue of their speech, but if monkeys could speak as parrots can they would approach him even more closely. (*Mais je crois que toutes les choses, que la parfaite harmonie de l'univers pouvoit recevoir, y sont. Qu'il y ait des creatures mitoyennes entre celles qui sont éloignées, c'est quelque chose de conforme à cette même harmonie, quoyque ce ne soit pas tousjours dans un même globe ou système, et ce qui est au milieu de deux especes, l'est quelquesfois par rapport à certaines circonstances et non pas par rapport à d'autres. Les oiseaux si differens de l'homme en autres choses s'approchent de luy par la parole; mais si les singes savoient parler comme les perroquets, ils iroient plus loin.*") (G V 286/RB307)

⁴²⁷G VI/L 640 (PNG 13)

⁴²⁸L 436/AG 119 (SD)

The second activity attributed to substance is the activity of apperception, for which we established the foundation from within the soul in the preceding sections. According to Leibniz, it is possible to name the appetite of a substance that can reach this level, as passion^{429, 430}

The most superior among the activities of substance is intellectual activity. In Leibniz's system of thought, establishing the foundation for the intellectual activity of the created substance is, on its own, the subject matter of another full-fledged investigation. As we have mentioned before, both reflection and reasoning are activities of understanding. Speaking in general terms, understanding is the consciousness of substances which rise to the level of intellectual activity.⁴³¹ Furthermore, the principle named as appetite in view of its perceiving activity, and as passion in view of its apperceiving, is will in view of intellectual activity.⁴³²

This classification regarding the degree of perfection of the substances' activities depends on how much the substance clarifies and distinguishes those things which it perceives and therefore depends on how active it is upon the representations in itself.⁴³³

Therefore, any kind of activity of substance, as it emerges in experience, can be explained on the basis of action and passion. This also applies to the exposition of the laws pertaining to the motion that emerges in experience. For this, we need to take into consideration the activity of perception that each substance performs at the same level, as it is represented in experience. What is targeted with a natural science,

⁴²⁹Fr. *passion*

⁴³⁰Unsent letter to Rémond, dated July 1714 (*Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce, Monadologie*, editor C. Frémont, 1996, Paris, pp.263-264)

⁴³¹See: I.5 Experience in view of the act of preservation: Memory

⁴³²G V 158-159/RB 172-173. Also see: Unsent letter to Rémond, dated July 1714, *op.cit.*, pp.263-264

⁴³³G VI 615, 616-617/L 648,649 (M52, M60)

within the framework of Leibniz's system of thought, is the human being, as the substance having intellectual faculties, expressing the laws to which the activity of perception is subject, as this activity is represented in his experience.⁴³⁴

In Leibniz's system of thought, with regard to dynamics⁴³⁵, substance is that which is powerful.⁴³⁶ As there can be no action without a force for acting, similarly there can be no power which is not active.⁴³⁷ Therefore the power should be the one which is needed for the substance's activity of perception; that is, the principle of appetite which is the basis of the substance's activity of perception.⁴³⁸

According to Leibniz, the primitive power is a concept that can be reached not through the activity of imagination, but only by intellectual activity. Seeking the correspondent of the primitive power in experience is expecting that we picture sounds and hear colors.⁴³⁹ For establishing the foundation for the activity that

⁴³⁴One of the reasons why Leibniz developed such a conception of substance is the problems related to the measurement, source and preservation of motion in the Cartesian system. Comparison of the deficiencies Leibniz discovered in Descartes's equations of motion and the suggestions he developed against them, and evaluation thereof with regard to the physics of the present day make up the subject matter of another full-fledged study. The point we deem necessary to consider, in Leibniz's system of thought, is restricted to pointing out the way in which physics as a natural science can be metaphysically provided with a foundation from within the activity of a single substance.

⁴³⁵According to Leibniz, physics is subject to geometry and dynamics, geometry to arithmetic; and dynamics to metaphysics. (G IV 394-395/AG 251 (BF)) What is expected from dynamics as a science is to establish the metaphysical foundation for what is that which emerges as subject to number and figure and as having a direction, when observed, measured or conceived and how it becomes subject to number and shape.

⁴³⁶G IV 394/AG 251 (BF)

The term Leibniz uses in this text is to τὸ δυναμικόν, derived from δύναμις (Lat.*potentia* Fr.*puissance*, *potentiel* Eng.*potency*) which in Ancient Greek means virtuality, force, power. The word he used in SD for the same thing is the word *nisus* (Fr. & Eng. *effort*) meaning power, effort, challenge in Latin. (GM IV 234-254/L 435/AG 118). In the same book, Leibniz also suggests the word *conatus* which also has almost the same meanings. But since *conatus* will later be used for a derivative force, *nisus* is more appropriate for the metaphysical primitive force. In N, on the other hand, he talks about this force as *virtus* (Fr. *puissance* Eng.*power*) differently from other forces (Lat.*vis* Fr. & Eng.*force*). (G IV 504/AG 156) Regardless of the word used, what is in question is the original effort, power, strength or force God gives to substance innately, so that substance can be able to fulfill its share from the harmony.

⁴³⁷G IV 509/L 502/AG 160 (N9), L 435/AG 118 (SD)

⁴³⁸Letter to De Volder dated 1704 or 1705 (G II 275/AG 181)

⁴³⁹G IV 508/L 501/AG 159 (N7)

emerges in experience, the foundation for the substance's activity of perception should also be established. The primitive power is the metaphysical condition of the activity of perception. We can talk about the primitive power, which is the metaphysical condition of perception being the fundamental activity of substance, from two aspects, as a result of the dissection of the activity of perception: The primitive active force⁴⁴⁰ and the primitive passive force^{441, 442}. In the activity of perception, substance is the agent with regard to its being the agent of inclination towards perception, and is passive with regard to the representations (which are the traces of the activities of other substances) towards which it inclines. When it is considered that, for created, therefore finite substances, each action contains passion and that each passion contains action, it is apparent that the primitive power, which is the principle of the substance's activity, is the active force in view of the fact that the substance inclines towards perception, and is the passive force in view of the representations towards which it inclines.⁴⁴³

Leibniz states also in SN that power or potency, which is a metaphysical and intelligible concept, should be referred to for the foundation of physical force. (G IV 478/L 454/AG 139 (SN))

⁴⁴⁰Lat. *vis activa primitiva*

⁴⁴¹Lat. *vis passiva primitiva*

⁴⁴²G IV 395/AG 252 (BF)

Although it is possible, if we take into account only SD, to conclude that the primitive active force and the primitive passive force are two different forces (GM IV 234-254/L 436-438/AG 119-120), in N, he mentions "a force for acting and being acted upon (*[ipsam rerum substantiam in] agendi patiendique vi [consistere]: [...]*)" (G IV 508/AG 159/L 502), that is to say, a single force. In this text also, he says that the primitive force (*potentia*) is duplex (*duplex*) and that these are the primitive active force and the primitive passive force. Therefore, there are not two separate primitive forces, but only one.

⁴⁴³In his letter to de Volder dated June 20, 1703, Leibniz clearly states that these are not two separate forces, but the aspects of the activity of substance:

"What I take to be the indivisible or complete monad is the substance endowed with primitive power, active and passive, like the 'I' or something similar, and not those derivative forces which are continually found first in one way and then another. (*Substantiam ipsam potentia activa et passiva primitivis praeditam, veluti tò Ego vel simile, pro indivisibili seu perfecta monade habeo, non vires illas derivatas quae continue aliae atque aliae reperientur.*)" (G II 251/AG 176/L 530)

The primitive force is named as the first entelechy in view of its being active.⁴⁴⁴ The primitive active force is not merely a possibility. It is the activating force. Based on this reason, substance is always active. Leibniz often emphasizes that the primitive power differs from the first entelechy of Aristotle and the faculties of Scholastics in this respect.⁴⁴⁵

The primitive power is passive in view of the representations it inclines towards perceiving. The primitive passive force can be considered not in view of substance as agent but in view of the representations it inclines to perceive. What we should understand by the passive aspect of the substance is its aspect that resists the active force of the substance, that insists on not changing, that perseveres and that persists. While the substance, from one aspect, spends effort to perceive everything, it opposes that from another aspect. The substance's activity of perception is a result of these two insistences. The activity of perception is the modification of the primitive passive force in view of the primitive active force, and the limitation of the primitive active force in view of the primitive passive force. Therefore, the substance has not totally surrendered to the primitive active force. Though both aspects contain an act, what we name as the activity of the substance is how successful its aspect that inclines to perceiving is, how superior the primitive active force is to the primitive passive force.

⁴⁴⁴GM VI, 234-254/L436/AG 119 (SD), G IV 511/L 503/AG 162 (N11), G IV 395/AG 252 (BF)

Also see: G VI/L 644 (M18)

The reason why Leibniz employs the terms first entelechy and the prime matter is the fact that he tries to express his opinions by means of accepted terms of the history of thought. These and other similar terms derived from scholastic thought are not the direct terms of Leibniz's system of thought. He explains what he means by these in every case he uses them. (G IV 479/L 454/AG 139 (SN), G IV 511/L 503/AG 162 (N11), GM IV 234-254/L 436-437/AG 119-120 (SD))

⁴⁴⁵G IV 394-396/AG 252-253 (BF)

According to Leibniz, the primitive passive force is a force of diffusion⁴⁴⁶ or extension^{447, 448}. The prime matter is the diffusion of the primitive passive force that makes up the so-called bulk or mass^{449, 450}. Therefore, the substance's innate containment of representations is through the primitive passive force.

Bodies as wholes in intuition are the representations in intuition of the substance's activity of perception as a result of the activity of faculties which contribute to the emergence of experience. All physical force which the human being, as a substance with intellectual faculties, claims to be the cause of the motion of bodies is the comprehension of the first metaphysical force, in accordance with the conditions of understanding, depending on the emergence of experience. According to Leibniz, these are derivative forces.⁴⁵¹

Since experience as an activity of substance is representation of perceptions, and since perception is the activity of primitive active force and primitive passive force, derivative active force and derivative passive force coexist in bodies. Leibniz's claim that both active force and passive force are present in each material body should not be understood to mean that bodies exist and have certain forces independently from one who experiences. Within the framework of Leibniz's system of thought, both body as a whole in intuition and derivative forces that are present in

⁴⁴⁶Lat.*diffusio**

*From *diffundere*: to pour out/forth, to spread out, to diffuse; to cheer up.

⁴⁴⁷Lat.*extensio**

*span, hand-elbow; extension/stretching/spreading; swelling/tumor; strain.

⁴⁴⁸G IV 394/AG 251 (BF)

⁴⁴⁹Lat.*moles* and *massa*.

In some of his texts, Leibniz uses both words to state the diffusion of the original passive force. (GM VI 234-254/AG 122-123) Both include 'bulk' (*amas*) among their meanings. But later, he uses 'massa' for the secondary matter that goes into equations of motion and force, or for mass, and 'moles' for that which is named as the prime matter. (Letter to Bernouilli, with the estimated date August-September 1698, GM III 536-537/AG 167).

⁴⁵⁰G IV 395/AG 252 (BF)

⁴⁵¹Lat.*vis derivativa*

the body as the cause of motion, which is the sole activity of body, must depend on the emergence of the activity of perception in experience, and then also on their being conceived.

According to Leibniz, although primitive forces are, metaphysically, the foundations of the world of images⁴⁵², the motions of bodies should be explained by derivative forces.⁴⁵³ Body emerges in intuition as having two derivative forces. This is its emergence, in the experience of the substance having intellectual faculties, as secondary matter having mass, figure, and motion. Extension and figure as the space which is occupied by secondary matter, or mass, or body is the representation in intuition of the modification of the diffusion of primitive passive force by primitive active force.⁴⁵⁴ The derivative passive forces in the body are, according to Leibniz, inertia⁴⁵⁵ or resistance⁴⁵⁶, and impenetrability⁴⁵⁷.⁴⁵⁸ Inertia is the force that enables a body to persevere and persist in the state it is in⁴⁵⁹ and not to leave this state of its own accord, whereas impenetrability is the force that enables a body to oppose⁴⁶⁰ another body which tries to change its own state.⁴⁶¹

According to Leibniz, derivative active forces in the body are *conatus* and *impetus*⁴⁶². *Conatus* is the vectorial speed of the body, that is, its velocity.⁴⁶³ *Impetus*

⁴⁵²Lat.*phenomenon*

⁴⁵³According to Leibniz, the sole activity of body is motion, e.g. its changing place as subject to time. Everything that happens in the material world should be explicable by motion, that is mechanically. (G VII 343-344/AG 319 (AB))

⁴⁵⁴Letters to Bernoulli, with the estimated date August-September 1698 (GM III 536-537/AG 167) and dated November 18, 1698 (GM III 551-553/AG 169).

⁴⁵⁵Lat.*inertia*

⁴⁵⁶Lat.*resistentia*

⁴⁵⁷Lat.*impenetrabilitas*, *antitypia* Gr.ἀντιτυπία

⁴⁵⁸G IV 395/AG 252 (BF)

⁴⁵⁹Lat.*perseverare*

⁴⁶⁰Lat.*repugnare*

⁴⁶¹G IV 395/AG 252 (BF)

⁴⁶²Lat.*impetus** Eng.*impulse*

is, on the other hand, the quantity of momentary motion in the body and it is equal to mass times velocity.⁴⁶⁴ These forces result from the limitation of the primitive active force by the primitive passive force. All changes in the body⁴⁶⁵ and all other forces attributed to the body can be expressed in terms of derivative forces.⁴⁶⁶

According to Leibniz, as a result of substance's being active by its nature, bodies are always in motion, too; there is no absolute rest in nature.⁴⁶⁷ The cause of the change in the motion of the body is the forces in itself; in cases where we see a body causing another one to move, the cause of the motion of the body is not the other body, but its own inner force. The other body is just an occasion⁴⁶⁸ for this motion.⁴⁶⁹

According to Leibniz, when body, secondary matter, motion are considered as properties pertaining to the body, extension and figure belong to the world of images.⁴⁷⁰ The only thing that is real⁴⁷¹ in all of these is the power that can be grasped solely by intellectual activity.

*attack, assault, charge; impetus, vigor; violent mental urge, fury.

⁴⁶³GM IV 234-254/L 437/AG 120 (SD)

⁴⁶⁴GM IV 234-254/L 437/AG 120 (SD)

This magnitude, which is presently called momentum, is the amount of motion in the body, according to Cartesians, and it is this the total amount of which remains constant in nature. According to Leibniz, on the other hand, motion (*motus*) is the sum total of the motions (*motio*) of the body, which are dependent on the successive momentary velocity of the body. That the total amount of which remains constant is not motion, but force, and it is equal to mass times square of velocity. (GM IV 234-254/L 437/AG 120 (SD))

⁴⁶⁵According to Leibniz, the qualitative changes in the body can be reduced to motion. (G IV 400/AG 256 (BF))

⁴⁶⁶See: GM IV 234-254/L 438-441/AG 121-122 (SD), G VII 340/AG 313 (AB)

⁴⁶⁷GM IV 234-254/L 449/AG 136 (SD), G IV 509/L502/AG 160 (N9), G IV 393/AG 250 (BF)

⁴⁶⁸Lat. *occasio*

⁴⁶⁹GM IV 234-254/L 448/AG 134 (SD)

⁴⁷⁰The part which is included in the draft of the letter to De Volder, dated January 19, 1706 and which is later deleted. (G VII 281/AG 184)

In this letter, Leibniz claims that the properties attributed to the body are continuous magnitudes, that continuous magnitudes are ideal, that ideal things depend upon those which are possible and on those which are actual only in respect to their being possible. Therefore, that magnitudes we listed

In brief, in Leibniz's system of thought, motion of bodies as wholes that emerge in experience or as composite substances, is the envisagement of the activity of perception in the monad aspect of the soul and is also the comprehension of them by the intellectual faculties of the soul. Therefore, this activity is independent both from other substances and also from God's intervention.

II.4. Substance in view of its creation

In the preceding sections on created substances, we investigated substance in view of its independent existence and activity. But, in Leibniz's system of thought, that once the substance is created it becomes independent with regard to its existence and activity should not be understood as the substance being subject to no conditions. On the contrary, the independence of substance originates from the fact that the course of its activity is completely determined and posited prior to creation. In this section, we shall try to explain this point taking Leibniz's term of 'individual idea'⁴⁷² as basis, and to express the relation of individual idea with the basic principles of Leibniz's system of thought.

According to Leibniz, everything that the substance, which is a complete and indivisible unity, will express through its activity is in its individual idea.⁴⁷³ The idea

above and the like are contained in those which are actual is possible through determination of that which is real, e.g. the force, by those which are ideal.

⁴⁷¹ Lat. *realis*

⁴⁷² Fr. *l'idée individuelle*

In some of these texts Leibniz also uses the term 'individual notion' (*la notion individuelle*) instead of individual idea.

See: G IV 432-434, 436-439/L 307-308, 310-311 (DM8, DM9, DM13)

As we have emphasized before, depending upon the distinction Leibniz made between idea and notion (G IV 452-453/L320-321 (DM 27)), we shall use the term 'individual idea'.

⁴⁷³ "[...] it is the nature of an individual substance or complete being to have a concept so complete that it is sufficient to make us understand and deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which

of an individual substance contains everything that will happen to the substance.⁴⁷⁴ Everything that the substance will actualize is determined and posited through the harmony. Therefore, we should understand individual idea as the determination of the aspect through which the created substance will actualize the harmony, in accordance with the conditions to which it is subject.

Therefore, to understand the ground of individual idea in Leibniz's system of thought, one should look at the principles to which the harmony and the creation are subject. In Leibniz's system of thought, the ground for the human being's having the possibility to judge, through his intellectual activity, the ground of everything including this activity, is his being a spirit. What makes the human rational is that he can recognize eternal and necessary truths relying on ideas that are present as the representation of truth in his memory.⁴⁷⁵ That is to say, his being able, through reflection and reasoning which are his intellectual activities, to recognize himself and God by recognizing that that which is limited in himself is limitless in God.⁴⁷⁶ As opposed to other created beings, human being as the rational soul does not only represent others which are created, but also represents God himself, and is divine in

the concept is attributed. ([...] *la nature d'une substance individuelle ou d'un estre complet, est d'avoir une notion si accomplie qu'elle soit suffisante à comprendre et à en faire deduire tous les predicats du sujet à qui cette notion est attribuée.*) (G IV 432-433/L 307-308 (DM8))

⁴⁷⁴“[...] the concept of an individual substance once and for all includes everything which can ever happen to it and that in considering that concept, one can see everything which can truly be predicated of it, [...] (*la notion d'une substance individuelle enferme une fois pour toutes tout ce qui lui peut jamais arriver, et qu'en considerant cette notion, on y peut voir tout ce qui se pourra veritablement enoncer d'elle, [...]*)” (G IV 436-439/L 310-311 (DM13))

⁴⁷⁵G VI 611/L 645 (M29)

According to Leibniz, that some truths cannot be comprehended by the intellectual faculties of the created things and that they are beyond reason (*au dessus de la raison*) in this sense should not be confused with the fact that some truths can be against reason (*contre la raison*). Though some truths (e.g. Trinity, God's miracles, the creation) are impossible to be comprehended by the human being's intellectual activity, it is not possible for them to be against reason. (G VI 64/H 88 (T:D-23), G VI 135-136/H 156 (T:I-60))

⁴⁷⁶G VI 612/L 646 (M30)

this sense.⁴⁷⁷ Though, human being who is limited as a created substance cannot comprehend fully the truth, the conclusions he reaches will conform to the truth as long as he properly follows the reason, which is the order of truth.⁴⁷⁸

As we have emphasized previously, the world or universe as the collection of the activities of created substances is, in Leibniz's system of thought, neither coincidental, nor arbitrary nor necessary. Nevertheless, anything that has happened, is happening and will happen in this world is certain. Accordingly, that which establishes the foundation for the certainty of the substance's independent activity which is not coincidental, arbitrary and necessary, is the individual idea of substance.

In Leibniz's system of thought, the absolute⁴⁷⁹ and necessary being which is the ground and source of everything is God.⁴⁸⁰ The whole of Leibniz's system of thought can be seen as the effort to determine that the ground of all necessary and contingent truths which human being recognizes through his activity of knowing is Absolute Being.

The point that should be noted once again here is that Leibniz's starting point is experience. Through his activity of knowing, the human being recognizes that the opposites of some of his judgments are possible, whereas the opposites of some are not. According to Leibniz, since anything that is cannot come from that which is not and, and since the ground of the existence and truth of those the opposites of which are possible cannot be in themselves; if we want to avoid the consequence that

⁴⁷⁷G VI 621/L 651 (M83), G VI 197-198/H 215-216 (T:II-147)

⁴⁷⁸G VI 136/H 156-157 (T:I-61)

⁴⁷⁹Fr.*absolu* Lat.*absolutus*

⁴⁸⁰Leibniz has two proofs regarding the existence of God. First, the *a posteriori* proof based on the requirement that a necessary being must lie in the ground of those which are contingent (G VI 613/L 646 (M38-39)); second, the *a priori* proof based on the fact that there can be nothing to prevent the being of such an infinite being, the being of which is possible in view of understanding (G VI 614/L 647 (M43, M44, M45)).

nothing is true by accepting that something rather than nothing is, we must accept that which is possible, since it contains no contradiction in view of understanding, is necessary and absolute since there can be nothing which prevents its being.⁴⁸¹

Therefore, what needs to be done is to explain that the absolute existence, being the necessary ground for everything, of which the human being recognizes some to be necessarily true and some to be non-necessarily true through his actual knowing, is at the same time sufficient for everything that can be recognized, taking the absolute existence as the starting point.⁴⁸²

According to Leibniz, truth is the object of God's understanding, the good is that of his will.⁴⁸³ In Leibniz's system of thought, in order for the works of God not to be necessary, coincidental and arbitrary; that is, in order for God to create them in accordance with his infinite wisdom, freedom and power, although there must indeed be a distinction between understanding and will, since the absolute being is one and the same and since both of the acts of understanding and will are subject to reason, understanding and will must be one and the same. This distinction has a meaning only in view of the human being's limited actual knowing and is aimed at establishing the foundation for that which is created to be true and good without being necessary. Since truth and the Good cannot be separate from each other and

⁴⁸¹G VII 302-308/AG 149-155

⁴⁸²From time to time, Leibniz states that his own system of thought and the principles of it are 'hypotheses'. What he expects from such a system is to be able to explain as inclusively as possible everything on the basis of the least assumptions. (G IV 485/L 458 (SN), G IV 518/L 493(SN))

⁴⁸³G VI 106-107/H 127-128 (T:I-7)

Also see: Letter to Molanus, with the estimated date of 1679, G IV 299/AG 242.

from the absolute being itself, it is not possible for understanding and will to be distinct from each other and from the absolute being who is complete and perfect.⁴⁸⁴

According to Leibniz, everything finds its possibility in the understanding of God.⁴⁸⁵ The possibility in question here is the possibility of being⁴⁸⁶. Since God's wisdom is infinite, the source of everything which the human being thinks to be true through his limited activity of knowing is God's understanding.

The nature of the truth that God enables through his understanding is identity.⁴⁸⁷ For this reason, truth cannot be contradictory and cannot contain contradiction. The ground of the principle of non-contradiction that determines the limit of being possible, in Leibniz's system of thought, can be nothing other than the unity and identity of Absolute Being, and that of the truth, depending upon the understanding of God. Since everything originates from God and since everything can be possible only through God's understanding, it is not possible for anything which is possible to be in contradiction with the principle of non-contradiction; that is to violate the unity and identity of the truth.

Therefore, the principle of non-contradiction is the principle of understanding, of the truth which is possible through understanding, and of the reason as the inviolable order of truth.

In Leibniz's system of thought, since the limit of possibility is determined and posited by the principle of non-contradiction, human (as a created substance) being's

⁴⁸⁴According to Leibniz, it is difficult to understand how the distinctions we make about God, such as understanding and will, conforms to God's unity or simplicity. Opinions should not be suggested about God's knowledge and will, unless required. Yet, there is nothing to prevent the use of the conclusions derived therefrom as long as they are required, being conscious that these are distinctions made depending upon our own understanding. (Letter to Arnauld, dated May 1686, G II 44/AG 74)

⁴⁸⁵G VII 303/L 487, G II 45/AG 75, G VI 614/L 647 (M43), G VI 106-107/H 127-128 (T:I-7)

⁴⁸⁶Fr. *être*

⁴⁸⁷C 518/L 267

partial comprehensions (which are partial in respect of both their horizon and depth) of the truth, which is one and the same in view of God's judgment, can be true if they do not contain contradictions. Therefore, everything which does not lead to denial of the truth which is one and the same, is possible.

From amongst those which are possible, those the opposites of which contain contradictions and the opposites of those which themselves contain contradictions must necessarily be true.⁴⁸⁸ What we should understand from the term 'necessary truth' in Leibniz's system of thought is those judgments of God, which need for being true nothing other than being conceived by God; that is, those judgments truth of which is necessary in relation to God's unity and identity; in other words, the consequences of absolute being of God, the truth of which is necessary. According to Leibniz, the truths in metaphysics, logic and mathematics are of this kind.⁴⁸⁹ Since God should be able to make a choice from amongst those which are possible, in order for God's will to be free and his decision to create this world to be real, necessary truths, the opposites of which are impossible, are not subject to the will of God.⁴⁹⁰ Therefore they are not created at all. Hence, these are eternal truths.⁴⁹¹ They exist in God, and owe both their reality and truth to God's understanding. Of course they do not exist in the manner in which substances exist.⁴⁹² Compatibility with necessary truth is a condition of the possibility of truth, in the sense that anything that contradicts necessary truth is not possible.

⁴⁸⁸G VI 612/L 646-647 (M 31)

⁴⁸⁹G VI 50/H 74 (T:D-2)

⁴⁹⁰G IV 427-428/L 304(DM2)

⁴⁹¹G VI 50/H 74 (T:D-2)

⁴⁹²G VII 305/L 489

In Leibniz's system of thought, the pre-established harmony is the determination and positing by God, amongst his understanding's judgments, truth of which is not necessary, of the ones, truth of which will together be the best.⁴⁹³ Therefore, judgments constituting the harmony are the judgments of both God's understanding and will.⁴⁹⁴ They are subject to his understanding, because they find the possibility of their truth in God's understanding; they are subject to his will, because it is God's will which takes them out of being merely possible and renders them true. While necessary truths determine the framework of the harmony, judgments which belong to the harmony become certain and good because of God's will and power. Therefore harmony is the positive⁴⁹⁵ truth and good, which the substances actualize by their activities. It is the understanding that determines the possibility of the judgments constituting harmony, and it is the will that posits their truth.

At this point, we need to take into consideration the principle of sufficient reason which Leibniz presents as the ground of positive truths. The reason why Leibniz felt the need for such a principle is the problem that while necessary propositions could be reduced to identity in a finite number of steps on the basis of the principle of non-contradiction, this is not possible for the propositions, of which both themselves and their opposites are possible on the basis of the principle of non-

⁴⁹³G VII 304/L 488

⁴⁹⁴These judgements, according to Leibniz, are not of the particular events that each substance expresses by its activity. These are few in number and are what we call the laws of nature. (G II 40/AG 71)

⁴⁹⁵"There are others which may be called positive, because they are the laws which it has pleased God to give to Nature, or because they depend upon those. (*Il y en a d'autres qu'on peut appeller Positives, parce qu'elles sont les loix qu'il a plu à Dieu de donner à la nature, ou qu'elles en dependent.*)" (G VI 50 / H 74 (T: D-2))

See: footnote 339

contradiction. That is to say, it is not possible on the basis of the principle of non-contradiction alone to determine whether they are of the truth or not.⁴⁹⁶ Knowing why a truth which actually emerges in the human experience is such and not otherwise, or if it has not emerged in experience, knowing which of possible opposites is contingently true, is possible in Leibniz's system of thought only through knowing whether they are included in reason as the order of the truth. But since the human activity of knowing is limited, it is not possible for him to determine whether a contingent truth which has not (yet) occurred in experience actually belongs to reason as infinite chain of truths. What he can reach by his intellectual activity is that the ground for which one of the propositions which are equally possible in view of understanding, is of the truth is reason as the order of the truth.⁴⁹⁷

The issue is not only about the human being's knowing or proving whether some propositions are of the truth; the issue is, to be able to explain metaphysically how non-necessary truths arise from the absolute and necessary being, on the basis of reason and without distorting the contingent nature of these truths, and therefore, without denying the free will of the absolute being.

In Leibniz's system of thought, God is the absolute being in whom all perfections are present infinitely.⁴⁹⁸ Such a being must necessarily be good and free. Accordingly, the world God created is not necessary since harmony, being the order of this world, is preferred to other possible orders. All positive truths that may actually emerge are determined in accordance with harmony; that is to say by the free will of God. Therefore, the ground of all of the positive truths or of harmony is

⁴⁹⁶GR 302/AG 28

⁴⁹⁷See: G VI 134-135, 141-142, 143-144/H 105-106, 114-115, 117-118 (T:D-58, D-73, D-76, D-77)

⁴⁹⁸G IV 427/L 303-304 (DM1)

God's will which chooses the best among those which his understanding made possible. If God had not chosen the best, this would contradict his own goodness, and therefore, his own unity and identity. In this sense, it is necessary for God to choose and to create what it is the best. But, it should not be concluded from this that that which is created is necessary.⁴⁹⁹ Therefore, God's goodness lies in the ground of all positive truths. They are not themselves necessary; but God's goodness, which is necessary due to the principle of non-contradiction, lies in their ground.

As a result, constitution of the truth or of reason by God depend upon both God's understanding and also his will. It is in this sense that reason lies in the ground of all necessary and positive truths, which the human being can recognize through the activity of knowing. According to Leibniz, both necessary and positive truths are the truths of reason.⁵⁰⁰ The principle of non-contradiction is not the principle of only necessary truths, nor is the principle of sufficient reason the principle of only positive truths. The principle of non-contradiction, which finds its ground in the unity and identity of God, is the principle of the entirety of truth. The reason that this principle is rather related to necessary truths is that it alone is sufficient for reducing the propositions, which represent such truths in view of the human being's intellectual activity, to identity. That reason is sufficient for necessary truths in this sense is not even disputable. In respect of a contingent truth, since there is nothing in itself to make it reasonable why it is, rather than why its opposite which is equally possible in view of understanding, is, and since it cannot be reduced to identity in a finite number of steps on the basis of the principle of non-contradiction; that is, since

⁴⁹⁹(GR 287-91/AG 20 (Text titled 'On Freedom and Possibility' with the estimated date of 1680-82)), (C 518-523/AG 30 (Text titled 'On Contingency' with the estimated date of 1686))

⁵⁰⁰G VI 50/H 74 (T:D-2)

a human being cannot understand it completely, because such an understanding will be one and same with the understanding of the whole of truth; what a human can know is that reason which is constituted by God as the order of the truth, lies in the ground of this particular truth, as well. Therefore, all truths, which the human being can recognize, are the truths of reason, and the ground of all of them is the reason. Furthermore, based on this, that human being is rational soul is one and the same thing with his having understanding and will.

As a result, harmony is the order of the world, which is constituted by God's understanding and will. Its principles in this sense are the principles of non-contradiction and sufficient reason.

That which determines the course of a substance's activity, which consists only of actualizing harmony, is the individual idea of that substance. Therefore, the principles of contradiction and sufficient reason are also the ground of the individual idea as the determination of the aspect of the harmony, in accordance with which the substance will actualize the harmony. Contingent truths that the substance will express through its activity are posited in its individual idea. The activity of substance in this sense, consists only of actualizing some of the judgments which belong to the harmony and which are determined and posited by God's understanding and will; namely, those contingent judgments which are contained in its individual idea. Accordingly, all those judgments' being true, although not necessary, is certain.

The basis of Leibniz's so-called principle of the 'identity of indiscernibles'⁵⁰¹ is also the individual idea.⁵⁰² The principle of the identity of indiscernibles, which Leibniz often tried to explain⁵⁰³ through things which emerge in experience, indeed, states that two substances, the activities of which are identical, cannot exist. When we consider that the activity of substance is determined according to harmony and through its individual idea, and that the reason of its existence is to actualize those things which are in its individual idea, it is apparent that two substances, the activities of which are identical in all respects, cannot exist. As it is impossible for there to be more than one complete idea⁵⁰⁴ of a substance, it is equally impossible for there to be more than one substance with one individual idea.

The individual idea is also the basis of the principle of concomitance⁵⁰⁵ in Leibniz's system of thought. That which is regarded as interaction between things in view of experience is the actualization of one and the same harmony from different aspects, by all of the substances, in accordance with their individual ideas. The basis of conformity of actions and passions of things to each other, as they emerge in experience, or of the accord among them is not that accord's being among things, but their activities' being subject to the harmony.

Similarly, the basis of the principle of spontaneity⁵⁰⁶ is the individual idea.⁵⁰⁷ Since everything that the substance will actualize is contained in the individual idea of the substance, the source of everything, which a substance will express by its

⁵⁰¹Fr.*le principe de l'identité des indiscernables*

⁵⁰²G IV 433-434/L308 (DM9), G VI 608/L643 (M9)

⁵⁰³C 519-520/L 268/AG 32

⁵⁰⁴What we mean by this expression is the principle known as the principle of 'indiscernibility of identicals'.

⁵⁰⁵Fr.*le principe de la concomitance*

⁵⁰⁶Fr.*spontanéité*

⁵⁰⁷G IV 457-458/L 324 (DM 32), G VI 138/H 158 (T:I-65)

activity, is itself. All its activities are spontaneous. Since substance is determined and posited by its activity, it does not have a spontaneity independent from its activity, nor does it have an activity which is not spontaneous. Therefore, no created thing can act upon another one; it cannot be acted upon by another.⁵⁰⁸ That which is called concomitance with regard to the actual world is the unfolding of pre-established harmony.

⁵⁰⁸G VI 607/L 643 (M7)

III. KANT'S CONCEPTION OF EXPERIENCE

As we stated in the 'Introduction', Kant's primary purpose in the Critique of Pure Reason is to ground metaphysics as a science.⁵⁰⁹ Since, according to Kant, the field of metaphysics⁵¹⁰ is one at which the human reason aims due to its very nature and is one that transcends possible experience, and also since universal and necessary principles that are required for being named as a science cannot be derived from experience itself, what is to be done first, is to determine *a priori* the limits of what, to what extent and how the human reason can *a priori*⁵¹¹ know.⁵¹²

Kant has determined the limit of human knowledge by 'possible experience', that is to say by that which can be experienced. Accordingly, those things which the human can know are those which emerge in experience in view of the inside of experience⁵¹³ and their conditions which comes from the one who experiences.⁵¹⁴

⁵⁰⁹See: Introduction

⁵¹⁰Kant accepts that the field of metaphysics transcends experience. However, in order for metaphysics to be a science, it should not, according to Kant, transcend possible experience. Therefore, if any room can be left for metaphysics within the limits determined by Kant, this has to be limited only to, as for all *a priori* sciences or *a priori* principles of every science, the room constituted by *a priori* elements that make experience possible. As we shall be explaining in the following parts, since each *a priori* knowledge is indeed necessarily reduced to the knowledge of space and time each as pure intuition, *a priori* knowledge, which is not related to space and time directly or indirectly, is not possible in Kant's system. Based on this reason, even if we accept that the basic principles of arithmetic, geometry and natural sciences can be grounded within this framework, metaphysics, which Kant names as 'speculative', and metaphysics he attempts to build as a science are to be completely different with regard to their contents. Consequently, Kant's attempt to build metaphysics as a science is, in fact, a cancellation of it.

⁵¹¹As we shall be explaining in the following parts, as long as those things which are given or received in Kant's system are only appearances, it is impossible to ground the activity of *a priori* knowing.

Also see: footnote 13

⁵¹²See: Introduction

⁵¹³This knowledge is empirical in Kant's thought.

⁵¹⁴That which is claimed to constitute the basis of activity of *a priori* knowledge in Kant's thought, are the conditions of experience, which originate from within one who experiences.

Kant's thought depends upon experience with regard to its acceptance as the starting point of human's knowing activity⁵¹⁵, and also with regard to the determination of the limits of knowledge as that which can be experienced. Accordingly, the constitution of experience within the framework of Kant's critical system of thought is essential for this system. To do that, *a priori* conditions of experience according to Kant must be grounded within this system, and experience has to be constituted based on these conditions, together with the manifold it contains.

Though Leibniz's system of thought is the primary one among the systems of thought which Kant opposes by his critical system of thought, Kant's conception of experience and his method of inquiring into experience are similar to those of Leibniz in some aspects.⁵¹⁶ But this similarity is superficial. Kant's strives to build his conception of experience by breaking off the substance on which experience is based in Leibniz's system of thought, and ruling out the faculty of memory which can belong to one who experiences only in respect of being such a substance, and accordingly, by making some specific arrangements required by these cancellations in the activity of intellectual faculties. In this section, we shall try to present Kant's conception of experience and to demonstrate that the source of problems that arise in

⁵¹⁵A1/B1

⁵¹⁶Starting from the fact that our knowledge does not conform to the correspondents, and that *a priori* knowing cannot be grounded in this way, Kant claims that he takes, following Copernicus, the course of making correspondents conform to our knowledge. (Bxvi) This remark later caused Kant to be named as the thinker 'who realized the Copernican revolution in philosophy'. (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. L.W. Beck, MacMillan Publishing co., New York & Colliers MacMillan Publishers, London, 1989, Beck's foreword, p.xiii) We are not going to claim that Leibniz was the first one to take this course. However, Leibniz is the first one to have used the 'Copernicus' analogy to explain his own position. (G V 67/RB 74)

the constitution of experience stem from the cancellation of the faculty of memory, which, indeed, means the cancellation of substance.

III.1. On the dissection of experience

We deem it useful to emphasize once again that in both Leibniz's and Kant's systems of thought, the starting point regarding the constitution of experience is the experience that has emerged.⁵¹⁷ The sources and conditions that enable our knowledge are investigated in relation to the dissection of experience through faculties; and these sources and conditions are claimed to be necessary and sufficient for emergence of experience.

The starting point of the dissection of experience and that which is dissected at first glance in Kant's thought is the correspondent in intuition.⁵¹⁸ First, this dissection is indeed the dissection of the one who experiences, because the faculties that are mentioned as a result of the dissection of the correspondent in intuition are the faculties of soul. Secondly, it is essential for Kant's thought that the dissection which is possible only in relation to the correspondent in intuition, which can be performed only after experience has emerged, and which makes knowledge possible only insofar as it is dependent upon the correspondent in intuition should open room for both the ground and the source of *a priori* knowledge. If such a dissection remains only as the dissection of that which emerges in experience, this cannot be

⁵¹⁷In Leibniz's system of thought, experience's being the starting point for humans is only with regard to actually knowing. In Kant's system, there is nothing which is antecedent, in the metaphysical sense, to experience.

⁵¹⁸A19/B33

possible. In order for *a priori* knowledge to be possible in Kant's system,⁵¹⁹ the dissection should, at the same time, be the dissection of that one who experiences. Thirdly, the dissection of the one who experiences in relation to the correspondent in intuition should make knowledge possible empirically only in respect of what emerges in experience and *a priori* only in relation to the ground of experience.

Therefore, limitation of human knowledge to possible experience is a natural consequence of Kant's considering the human being with regard to his theoretical activity as having faculties that can produce only correspondents in intuition. Once the dissection of soul is made as such, it is not possible for the human knowledge to transcend the limit of experience at any rate. Even if the dissection seems to be the dissection of that which is experienced and of the human being with regard to his experiencing, the conclusion it reaches is that human being is, in respect of his theoretical activity, nothing but the one who experiences. Therefore the dissection is made in such a manner to provide a foundation for this, that is to say, the human being is dissected by taking into consideration only the correspondent in intuition, in a manner to make him able to synthesize only the correspondent in intuition.

The faculties mentioned in the Critique of Pure Reason are sensibility⁵²⁰, intuition⁵²¹, imagination⁵²², apperception⁵²³, understanding⁵²⁴, faculty of judgment⁵²⁵

⁵¹⁹We shall consider whether the conditions of experience which depend upon experience make *a priori* knowing possible in following sections.

⁵²⁰A19/B33

⁵²¹A19/B33

Kant does not define intuition as a faculty by itself. Yet, he employs the word 'intuition' (*Anschaung*) both for the medium in which the knowledge is immediately related to its correspondents (A19/B33) and also for things which emerge in this medium (A22/B37), and furthermore, for expressing the activity of seeing (*anschauen*) of the soul (*Gemüt*).

⁵²²A78/B103

⁵²³A94/B133

There is no difference between apperception and consciousness in Kant's system, as opposed to Leibniz's conception of experience. When Kant's thought is in question, we preferred, following

and reason⁵²⁶. In Kant's system, theoretical activity of human being is intended to be built through these faculties. Since the sources of the theoretical activity of the human being, according to Kant, are the soul's⁵²⁷ power⁵²⁸ to receive representations and to know the correspondent in intuition through these representations⁵²⁹, they are generally classified into two as faculty of sensibility and faculty of thought in Kant's system.⁵³⁰

General classification of the human activity of knowledge as sensibility and thinking is essential for Kant's system.⁵³¹ The basis of this classification is, considering experience as starting point, the acceptance that we can sense something that is involved in those things which emerge in experience and make them subject-matters of our thoughts.⁵³² However, this distinction is not inclusive with regard to

Kant, to use the words 'apperception' (*Apperzeption*) and 'consciousness' (*Bewußtsein*) as equivalents.

⁵²⁴A52/B75

⁵²⁵A131/B169

Ger.*Urteilkraft*

⁵²⁶A131/B170

Here what is meant by 'reason' (*Vernunft*) is the soul's (*Gemüt*) faculty of reasoning.

⁵²⁷Ger.*Gemüt*

⁵²⁸Ger.*Vermögen*

⁵²⁹A50/B74

⁵³⁰The faculty of receiving representations (appearances) is sensibility as stated by Kant. (A51/B75). Kant also stated that the act of apperception (B155) and the activities of faculties of understanding, judgment and reason, under the general name of understanding (A131/B169) are each acts of thinking. (A51-52/B74-75). Imagination, on the other hand, is generally presented as the faculty relating the faculties of sensibility and thinking. (A78/B151-152)

⁵³¹The foundation for this distinction must have been established in order for space and time, for example, to be solely the forms of sensibility, and not given as ideas as is in Leibniz's system.

⁵³²In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the only thing which can be claimed to be the ground for this dissection is the act of transcendental reflection (*transzendente Überlegung*):

"The act by which I confront the comparison of representations with the cognitive faculty to which it belongs, and by means of which I distinguish whether it is as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensible intuition that they are to be compared with each other, I call transcendental reflection. (*Die Handlung, dadurch ich die Vergleichung der Vorstellungen überhaupt mit der Erkenntniskraft zusammenhalte, darin sie angestellt wird, und wodurch ich unterscheide, ob sie als zum reinen Verstande oder zur sinnlichen Anschauung gehörend untereinander verglichen werden, nenne ich die transzendente Überlegung*)."(A261/B317)

Transcendental reflection is the act that ensures avoiding falling into transcendental *Schein*, which is caused by the employment of the concepts of pure understanding, which can be employed only in

the faculties Kant attributes to soul because it is not possible to name the activity of imagination⁵³³ as sensing or thinking. If we are to leave this point aside, within Kant's system, it is not possible to make this distinction when the whole system is taken into consideration, because neither thinking nor sensibility is possible independently from the other. While receiving representations through sensibility is required⁵³⁴ for any activity of faculties, in order for the appearance that is received to be a sensation, apperception is required as the original act of thinking.⁵³⁵ We can now start dwelling upon faculties individually, after stating once again that this distinction has no ground within Kant's system, though it is essential for it.

III.2. Sensibility

In Kant's system, those things which the human being can come face to face with immediately are the correspondents in intuition.⁵³⁶ In order for *a priori* knowledge to be possible, the correspondent in intuition should not be independent

relation to experience, in judgments in a manner to transcend experience. (A295/B351-352) Therefore, it is the ground of the whole of Kant's critical thought. Keeping in mind that Kant's starting point is correspondents in intuition and that these can be represented and can be known in the same sense only as a result of the imagination's activity of envisagement in accordance with the schemata of understanding; and leaving aside how it is possible to answer, or even to ask the question, within the limits determined by Kant, which faculty is the source of the connection together of correspondents in view of intuition; the target here is not to establish the foundation for the distinction between sensibility and understanding (or thinking), but is to attempt to confirm this distinction, on the basis of presupposing it, by claiming that since some of the connections of representations (e.g. those which are spatial and temporal), which can be known only to the extent they are grasped through concepts (since knowledge consists only of application of concepts to representations), are not merely conceptual or do not originate from pure understanding alone, then they must be connected through a faculty (sensibility) that is apart from pure understanding.

See: A260-261/B316-317

⁵³³It is not possible to explain imagination's remaining outside of this classification by the distinction between *Gemüt* and *Seele*. Just like sensibility and pure apperception, imagination is also attributed generally to *Seele* and sometimes to *Gemüt*. When he states that these three are original faculties containing the conditions of the possibility of the whole experience, he refers to them as the faculties of *Seele*, which cannot be derived from any other faculty of *Gemüt*. (A94)

⁵³⁴A86/B118

⁵³⁵A129/B131-132

⁵³⁶A19/B33

from one who experiences.⁵³⁷ Similarly, in order for the correspondent in intuition not to be completely a product of the one who experiences, it is essential that something in the correspondent in intuition must have been received by the one who experiences.⁵³⁸ Sensibility is the faculty through which the one who experiences receives representations, depending on his being affected⁵³⁹ in some way.⁵⁴⁰

First, this affection in Kant's thought is not to be subject to the cause and effect relation which is one of the categories of understanding, as pointed out by Kant, as well.⁵⁴¹ But, since there is no possibility to know such an affection or in general a relation which does not fall under the pure concepts of understanding, there is no possibility of claiming knowingly that the one who experiences is affected, or receives appearances through sensibility. What can be claimed within the framework drawn by Kant is that this representation which is required by the correspondent in intuition must be present in soul in a similar manner to Leibniz's conception of experience, since it is the source for experience in view of its material. That the soul receives these representations as a consequence of being affected is a claim that transcends experience at least as much as the claim that appearances are innately given to the soul.

Another point about sensibility is about the source of appearance. When we remember that, according to Kant, things can be known not as they are in themselves but as they appear to us⁵⁴² and that they are nothing for us insofar as they are outside

⁵³⁷Bxx-xxiii

⁵³⁸B69-B70, B276

⁵³⁹Ger. *affizieren*

⁵⁴⁰A19/B33

⁵⁴¹A494/B522

⁵⁴²A42-43/B59-60

of the human limits of knowing activity⁵⁴³, though it is necessary for transcendental thought that the source of the appearance received through sensibility should be outside of sensibility, since this source is not one of the conditions of experience which comes from the soul⁵⁴⁴ as the one who experiences, there is no possibility to determine knowingly whether this source is inside or outside of the soul^{545, 546}.

Thing-in-itself, as the source of appearances, is essential in Kant's thought. The correspondents in intuition themselves should not be understood to be the thing-in-itself, because these are the products of the activity of experience⁵⁴⁷. Thing-in-itself is a concept necessitated by the discursive activity of reason in order to establish the foundation of correspondent in intuition. That is why it is intelligible (*noumenon*)^{548, 549}. Therefore, the distinction between things as appearances and the thing-in-itself is a distinction which can be provided with a foundation depending upon not sensibility, but upon the determination of the limits of the discursive activity of the reason, as opposed to Kant's claim⁵⁵⁰. Since this limit is determined in Kant's system by the correspondent in intuition, and since a non-sensible intuition is not allowed, it is possible to talk about the thing-in-itself which is reached by way of

⁵⁴³A105/B158

⁵⁴⁴Ger. *Gemüt*

⁵⁴⁵Ger. *Seele*

⁵⁴⁶See: footnote 29

⁵⁴⁷In the exposition in 'Transcendental Aesthetics' of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant says that those things which affect us are correspondents. (A19/B33) However, what he means is not correspondents in intuition, but the transcendental correspondent which could be faced with only in an intellectual intuition and which should be accepted, within the limits of transcendental thought, only as the source of appearances, according to Kant.

See: A253

⁵⁴⁸According to Kant, *phenomena* is the name given to appearances when they are considered as correspondents in intuition in relation to the unity of categories. *Noumena*, on the other hand, is the name given to correspondents only if, though they can be given only in sensible intuition, they are assumed as things which could be given in an intellectual intuition (*intuitu intellectuali*). (A249)

⁵⁴⁹A249

⁵⁵⁰A249

thinking within the framework drawn by Kant neither as a transcendental object⁵⁵¹ or transcendental correspondent⁵⁵², nor as the ground or source⁵⁵³ of experience. Kant's claim⁵⁵⁴ that his doctrine of sensibility takes as basis the thing-in-itself as something intelligible⁵⁵⁵ only in the negative sense does not eliminate this problem. The concept of the thing-in-itself reached through the discursive activity of reason is, as stated also by Kant⁵⁵⁶, necessary both for limitation of intuition as sensible, and also for objective validity of knowledge that depend upon sensibility.⁵⁵⁷

The claim that space and time are the forms of sensibility cannot be grounded only through correspondent in intuition, either. What is known in view of experience is that correspondent in intuition is in space and time. Accepting that the source and the ground of correspondent in intuition, in view of its material, is the thing-in-itself and in view of the conditions of its emergence in experience as it does is the one who experiences does not demonstrate that space and time are forms of sensibility. Correspondent in intuition is subject not only to space and time, but also to imagination's envisagement in accordance with the schemata of understanding; that

⁵⁵¹A109, A250-251, A380

⁵⁵²A191/B236, A250

⁵⁵³A380

⁵⁵⁴B309

⁵⁵⁵According to Kant, that which is not the object of sensible intuition is an intelligible thing in the negative sense and that which is the object of an non-sensible (intelligible) intuition is an intelligible thing in the positive sense. (B307-309) That the correspondent of the concept of thing-in-itself is not sensible is not knowledge in Kant's system because, according to Kant:

"But there is no proper knowledge if I thus merely indicate what the intuition of an object is *not*, without being able to say what it is that is contained in the intuition. (*Allein das ist doch kein eigentliches Erkenntnis, wenn ich bloß anzeige, wie die Anschauung des Objekts nicht sei, ohne sagen zu kennen, was in ihr denn enthalten sei [...]*). (B149)

⁵⁵⁶A255/B310

⁵⁵⁷Kant's ability to reject idealism depends not on our being able to represent things as outside of us and inner sense's being possible only through outer sense, but on the source appearances' being outside of the soul, that is to say, outer sense's being a faculty which does not externalise things which are in us (this is an aspect of the activity of imagination in Kant's system), but a faculty of receiving appearances from outside.

See: B275-279

is to say, to categories. It is not possible to determine on the basis of the correspondent in intuition which of the subjective conditions of the correspondent in intuition belong to the faculty of sensibility and which of them belong to the faculty of thought.⁵⁵⁸ It is not possible to determine that space and time are forms of sensibility or are conditions of appearances directly through appearances either; because the human being has no access not only to thing-in-itself, but also to appearances.⁵⁵⁹

Therefore in Kant's thought, not only thing-in-itself but also the appearances cannot be known as they are in themselves. The only claim that can be made in relation to space and time depending upon correspondent in intuition is that space and time are the conditions not of thing-in-itself, but of the correspondent in intuition, if we leave aside how the distinction between thing-in-itself and appearance can have a sense apart from space's and time's being the forms of sensibility. Accordingly, the view that space and time are forms of sensibility cannot go beyond being a hypothesis in respect of 'Transcendental Aesthetics', as opposed to Kant's claim, which can be founded only in view of the whole system.⁵⁶⁰

III.3. Intuition

According to Kant, regardless of what we know and how we know it, the *mekân* in which knowledge is immediately⁵⁶¹ connected to correspondents is

⁵⁵⁸As we mentioned above, what could ground this is only the transcendental reflection.

⁵⁵⁹A120

⁵⁶⁰At the end of 'Transcendental Aesthetics' section, Kant tries to argue that space and time cannot be concepts in order to remove this from being a hypothesis and to make it indubitably certain. However, the point to be paid attention to here is that space and time are evaluated as *a priori* forms not of sensibility, but of intuition. (A46-49/B63-69) What is subject to metaphysical and transcendental exposition is space and time as concept or intuition.

⁵⁶¹Ger. *unmittelbar*

intuition.⁵⁶² In this sense, intuition is not a faculty by itself since it is the product⁵⁶³ of the activities of faculties that makes possible emergence of experience.⁵⁶⁴ Therefore, constitution of experience in Kant's system must be the constitution of correspondents with which we come face to face immediately and of intuition as the *mekân* of them. This should be such a constitution that intuition should be not intellectual but only sensible, and also should make possible *a priori* knowing. What shapes the entirety of Kant's critical thought is the search for such a intuition which should make *a priori* knowing possible although it is only sensible.

⁵⁶²A19/B33

When Kant's employment of the word 'intuition' (Ger.*Anschauung* Fr.*vision, intuition*) is understood as the human being's knowing through facing with immediately, it is closer to that of Descartes than that of Leibniz. According to Leibniz, knowledge of intuition (*la science de vision*) is in fact God's knowledge about those things which he creates, and in this respect, it is different than his knowledge of simple understanding (*la science de simple intelligence*), which is God's knowledge about possibilities. (G VI 124-125/H 145 (T:I-40)) Though the possibility of knowing intuitively is not totally excluded from the human being, since such knowledge is not partial but complete knowledge of those things which are created, it is a knowledge that is vouchsafed to very few people. (G IV 449-451/L 318-319 (DM 24-25))

Also see: footnote 172

By intuition Descartes understands the following:

"By 'intuition' I do not mean the fluctuating testimony (*fides*) of the senses or the deceptive judgement of the imagination as it botches things together, but the conception of a clear and attentive mind (Fr.*esprit*, Lat.*mens*), which is so easy and distinct that there can be no room for doubt about what we are understanding (*intelligere*). Alternatively, and this comes to the same thing, intuition is the indubitable conception of a clear and attentive mind which proceeds solely from the light of reason (Fr.*raison*, Lat.*ratio*).

(*Per intuitum intelligo, non fluctuantem sensuum fidem, vel male componentis imaginationis iudicium fallax, sed mentis purae et attentae tam facilem distinctumque conceptum, ut de eo, quod intelligimus, nulla prorsus dubitatio relinquatur; seu, quod idem est, mentis purae et attentae non dubium conceptum, qui a sola rationis luce nascitur, et ipsamet deductione certior est, quia simplicior, quam tamen etiam ab homine male fieri non posse supra notavimus.*)" (The Philosophical Writing of Descartes, Cottingham, John; Stoothoff, Robert; Murdoch, Dugald; Volume I (CSM I), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 14, Rule Three [368]; Descartes. Œuvres et Lettres, textes présentés par André Bridoux, Éditions Gallimard, 1970, Règle III, p.43; René Descartes: Regulae ad directionem ingenii: texte critique établi par Giovanni Crapulli avec la version hollandaise du XVIIème siècle, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

As can be seen, neither in Leibniz nor in Descartes, is intuitive knowledge a knowledge that depends upon sensibility.

⁵⁶³A141/B180, B165-166

⁵⁶⁴Attribution of immediacy to a knowledge which depends upon the activity of sensibility, understanding and imagination can have a sense only in view of taking the correspondent in intuition as the starting point of the dissection of experience. Otherwise, there is no meaning in attributing immediacy to such a knowledge. In Kant's system, the constitution of experience must indeed be the constitution of intuition and the correspondent in intuition.

We deem it useful to state first that the reason why human intuition is only sensible or why human being can know only depending upon sensible intuition in Kant's system is not the limitedness of human thinking activity, if we mean by thinking the intellectual activity in general.⁵⁶⁵ That which is limited is thinking so as to know. What determines this limit is whether thought has a correspondent in intuition, and in the same sense, whether a representation is given, which will constitute the correspondent in intuition together with the thought.⁵⁶⁶

It is possible to think of this limitation as pertaining to understanding if it is considered as a faculty of thought or knowledge⁵⁶⁷. This, however, is not correct. Kant expresses this limitation by saying that human understanding does not intuit, but thinks only.⁵⁶⁸ The only activity of understanding, according to Kant, is thinking and it is unlimited with regard to such an activity. What is limited is the activity of knowing. However what limits the activity of knowing is not something that pertains to understanding or that springs from the insufficiency of the activity of understanding, but the fact that representations which can be the content of thought, can be received only through sensibility.

The point that needs to be paid attention to is the fact that the reason why understanding does not intuit, in Kant's words, is neither the insufficiency of understanding nor of sensibility alone, but the fact that representations are received only and only by sensibility. Therefore, human intuition's being non-intellectual does not stem from a deficiency related to the intellectual activity of the human

⁵⁶⁵A96/B167

⁵⁶⁶B147

⁵⁶⁷A97/B137

⁵⁶⁸B139, B145

being, but from his receiving those things which will be grasped by understanding, as his spontaneous intellectual activity, in a manner which makes it possible to represent them only in sensible intuition.

Consequently, what determines the human intuition to be intellectual or sensible is that through which representations are given to human being. Human intuition's being only sensible in Kant's thought is one and the same thing with the human being's being dissected as one who receives representations only through sensibility.⁵⁶⁹ Depending upon this dissection, the source of the limitation of human activity of knowing is not the understanding's inability to intuit⁵⁷⁰, but the acceptance of correspondents in sensible intuition as the only things which can be intuited, that is to say, allowing understanding to intuit only insofar it depends upon the material received by sensibility.

Following Kant, let us accept that those things which the human being comes face to face through his activity of experience, which is indeed an activity of knowing, are only correspondents in sensible intuition and that their sources, in

⁵⁶⁹A19/B33, A109

⁵⁷⁰Kant states that the faculty of understanding is not only unable to see, but also to form its own intuition by taking up the representations that are received through sensibility into its own activity. (B153) However, since what is faced with immediately is the correspondent in sensible intuition, since emergence of correspondent in intuition is subject to the concepts of understanding and since it is not possible to know the correspondents in sensibility without understanding, it should be accepted that understanding sees in a certain sense, in Kant's thought as well. What Kant means by understanding's not seeing is that that understanding cannot know independently from the material received through sensibility, that is to say, it cannot know immediately. The equivalent of knowing immediately only by way of thinking, in the sense Kant tries to refute, is the activity of reflection in Leibniz's system of thought. This activity, according to Leibniz, is the faculty which makes it possible to know the ideas which are grounds of experience in view of one who experiences, though they do not emerge in whatsoever manner in experience, and which are innate in memory of the soul. If we name this activity as intellectual intuition in Kant's terms, what makes this possible is the ideas' being given to the soul. Another point to be noted is that those which are known by intellectual intuition are not things in themselves, but are ideas being the representations of the truth in the soul. Kant's claim that had we had intellectual intuition, we could have known the things not as they appear to us through sensibility, but as they are is not applicable, at least in Leibniz's system of thought, generally to ordinary humans.

respect of their material, are appearances which are received as being subject to space and time through the faculty of sensibility. In this case, what is to be grounded are the non-sensible elements of these correspondents, that is to say, the elements the source of which is not the sensing aspect of one who experiences.

In Kant's critical thought what the correspondent stands for in intuition is the object⁵⁷¹. According to Kant, each object is synthetic.⁵⁷² Synthesis of an object is bringing together the material⁵⁷³ provided by the sensing aspect of one who experiences, by the thinking aspect of the soul⁵⁷⁴ according to certain rules, and grasping thereof in a judgment⁵⁷⁵.⁵⁷⁶ Accordingly, a concept is the aspect by which the object is grasped within a judgment; an object is that which is grasped by a concept in a judgment, and a judgment is the unity of an object and a concept.⁵⁷⁷

Therefore, the determination of the elements in correspondent in intuition, which do not belong to sensibility, is the same as the determination of elements, which belong to the faculty of thought, within the synthesis of an object, and the same as explaining, within the limits of possible experience, how these elements contribute to the synthesis of objects. In order for the synthesis of the object and

⁵⁷¹Ger. *Objekt*

⁵⁷²That which distinguishes analytic and synthetic judgments from each other, which have no distinction in respect of their logical forms is whether they constitute objects or not. Only those judgments which constitute objects are synthetic.

See: A93/B126

Also see: A6-10/B10-14

⁵⁷³This material is *a posteriori* to the extent it depends upon appearances, and is *a priori* to the extent it depends only upon space and time.

⁵⁷⁴Ger. *Gemüt*

⁵⁷⁵Synthesizing object is an act of the faculty of judgment which is, according to Kant, one and the same thing with the faculty of thinking. (A 81) Understanding as the spontaneous activity of the reason is the name given to thinking in a manner to constitute objects and, in the same sense, to the faculty of judgment with regard to its synthesis of objects.

Also see: A126

⁵⁷⁶A93/B126

⁵⁷⁷For problems that arise in the synthesis of *a priori* and *a posteriori* objects in Kant's transcendental thought, see: Çitil, A. Ayhan, *ibid.*

related to this, the envisagement of its correspondent in intuition to be grounded in Kant's conception of experience, following three points should be grounded: the correspondent in intuition as a representation belonging to one who experiences; the accommodation to thought of the material which is foreign to thinking aspect of soul⁵⁷⁸ in respect of its source; and the conceptualization of the material which is accommodated. These are the activities of transcendental apperception⁵⁷⁹, imagination and understanding, respectively.

III.4. Transcendental apperception

In Kant's system, our knowledge about correspondent in intuition, indeed, consists only of the concepts involved in the synthesis of the object for which the correspondent stands in intuition. Knowing correspondent in intuition through concepts is possible only if these concepts belong not to the sensibility but to the faculty of thought itself. However, all of our concepts are empirical insofar as we become conscious of them depending upon the correspondent in intuition. Therefore, what is to be done in order both *a posteriori* knowledge of correspondents in intuition and *a priori* knowledge required for science to be possible is to establish that the source and ground of our concepts is thought itself and how these concepts enter to the constitution of correspondents.⁵⁸⁰ If we are to express it in the terms

⁵⁷⁸Ger. *Gemüt*

⁵⁷⁹Ger. *transzendente Apperzeption*.

The word 'Apperzeption' does not mean self-consciousness (*Selbstbewußtsein*) by itself. On the contrary, what is problematic in Kant's system is how this pure and transcendental apperception will be related to a 'self' or 'I', since the agent of the act must be left outside of the system though such a relation is required by the system. (About this topic see: Gözkân, *ibid.*)

⁵⁸⁰If the concepts did not originate with one who experiences in view of his thinking aspect, then, according to Kant, it would be impossible for us to know the correspondents which we faced first with in experience, because in such a case they would not be representations in intuition that belong

employed by Kant, this is the same thing as determining that pure concepts⁵⁸¹ which correspond to pure judgments⁵⁸² are the grounds of our thoughts⁵⁸³ as the acts of the faculty of judgment, and that these concepts are also conditions which make possible experience; that is to say, they are transcendental.

The correspondents in intuition that we face with in experience must, according to Kant, be seen as representations belonging to one who experiences, since they emerge depending upon his activity of experiencing. Each of them can be a representation only insofar as it belong to the one who experiences.⁵⁸⁴ Representations belong to one who experiences only insofar they are always accompanied by a representation of one who experiences.⁵⁸⁵ This representation, according to Kant, is 'I think'.⁵⁸⁶

What renders correspondent in intuition a representation of one who experiences is his becoming conscious of the material provided by sensibility,

to us, but would be 'things-in-themselves'. Since the ground and source of the concepts which make it possible to know the correspondent in intuition would be the correspondents that emerged in experience, the path to be followed would be deduction of the concepts from the experience itself, by abstraction. Since this path is a dead-end with regard to the fact that it fails to meet the conditions of universality and necessity, which are the requirements of science, it is essential for Kant to demonstrate that the source and ground of the concepts is the soul's activity of thinking. Therefore, Kant's aim is to establish the foundation on which ground what Locke attempted, but failed to do, can be accomplished. In order to deduce concepts from experience itself, by abstraction, it should be explained how concepts enter in the constitution of experience. (A86-87/B119) But this is, as stated by Kant, possible only when the concepts have an independent 'birth certificate'. (A86-87/B119) However, for this, the ground of concepts should be independent not only from sensibility, but also from actual thinking, which renders concepts possible by being involved in the constitution of experience. Since thought can be knowledge only in relation to possible experience in Kant's system, there is no possibility of talking knowingly about a source or ground which will precede and make possible thinking and therefore the concepts that are involved in the constitution of experience.

⁵⁸¹A79-80/B104-106

⁵⁸²A70/B95

⁵⁸³A68-69/B93-94

⁵⁸⁴A104/B131-132

⁵⁸⁵B131-132

⁵⁸⁶B131-132

Ger. 'Ich denke'

through an act of thinking.⁵⁸⁷ Since each representation is bringing to consciousness or giving consciousness and since each consciousness is thinking, each representation is possible only insofar as it is accompanied by the fact that the one who experiences as the one who represents thinks.

Therefore, what can be known with regard to the level of experience is not that individual correspondents in intuition are representations belonging to one who experiences (that is, the agent of the activity of faculties), but that we are conscious of them through singular acts and we have a representation which, beside making them our own representations, also makes it possible for us to think that that which is conscious of these representations is one and the same. Based on this reason, the 'I think' representation, which is necessarily one and the same in each representation according to Kant, is also the ground of that which experiences' acceptance of itself as one and the same within experience.⁵⁸⁸

At the level of experience, the representations of which we become conscious, the 'I think' representation accompanying all these representations, and the consciousness, the content of which is limited to these are empirical. Since the content of representations is constituted by appearances received through sensibility, both these representations and the 'I think' representation of which we are conscious insofar as it accompanies these representations, and also the consciousness which cannot have any other content at this level, must be empirical.

Therefore, since it is not possible to ground empirical representations that emerge in experience by empirical elements, what is to be done is to determine the

⁵⁸⁷A129/B131-132

⁵⁸⁸A117/B132

elements of those which we are conscious of through experience. These elements must be pure since they cannot be sensible and must also be transcendental since they would constitute the grounds for experience. The reason for the requirement of the transcendental act of apperception in Kant's system is the fact that experience cannot be grounded by those which emerge in itself.

This act should be such that: although it is different from our consciousness of each correspondent in intuition, it should make them possible; the 'I think' should be the representation of this act; the wholeness of experience and the unity of one who experiences, as the ground of thinking ourselves as one and the same in respect of experience, should be provided by this act; and all these should be carried out in a manner not to transcend the limits of possible experience.

As can be seen, in it is indeed impossible for us to be conscious of this act which is claimed to envelop the entirety of our consciousness. The requirement for such an act arises as a consequence of the dissection of the correspondent in intuition. Therefore, grounding this act depends on the one hand upon the validity of the reasoning, and on the other, upon the act itself not being a *Schein*. In Kant's system what saves the act from being a *Schein* is the act's being transcendental by definition, 'I think's being the representation of this act, and the whole experience's being, in a sense, a correspondent in intuition for this act.⁵⁸⁹

In Kant's critical thought, the ground of experience and of the entire activity of consciousness is not the agent of this act, but is the act itself. The agent of this act is a thing-in-itself, about which we can say nothing other than that it is transcendental

⁵⁸⁹On the evaluation of judgment in general, and of the inference that there must be a transcendental act of apperception in particular, and whether this act is *Schein* see: Çitil (*ibid.*) and Gözkân (*ibid.*).

subject=x.⁵⁹⁰ Therefore, this act, according to Kant, has priority over all particular experiences and the whole experience. Accordingly this act is transcendental in respect of its being the ground for experience⁵⁹¹, is pure in respect of its being prior to all that is particular, that is to say, to all consciousnesses of appearances⁵⁹², and is the original⁵⁹³ act of apperception in respect of its being prior to the whole experience and to the entire activity of knowing.

The unity of the transcendental act of consciousness, as long as it is constituted as a consequence of the reasoning starting only from the 'I think' representation which is one and the same in all representations in intuition, that is to say, as long as it is deduced from conceptual relations only is, as Kant states⁵⁹⁴, an analytic unity. Similarly, the act will be nothing but an empty logical judgment, since it cannot have any content insofar as it is regarded as such.⁵⁹⁵ Furthermore, the original and pure act of consciousness, as long as it is grounded only as the condition of experience in respect of one who experiences, will be a subjective condition only.⁵⁹⁶ Therefore, that transcendental consciousness is an act of synthesis, that it is not without content, and that it is not only the subjective but also the objective condition of experience should also be grounded. To do that, we must inquire into the activity of imagination.

⁵⁹⁰A109, A346/B404, B427

Also see: Gözkân, *ibid.*

⁵⁹¹A107/B132

⁵⁹²A123/B132

⁵⁹³A117/B132

Ger. *ursprüngliche*

⁵⁹⁴B133-135

⁵⁹⁵A95/B135

⁵⁹⁶B139-140

III.5. Imagination

In Kant's system of thought, thinking and sensibility are separate faculties that are foreign to each other.⁵⁹⁷ To know something, the concept which is the element of knowledge and which belong to thought should not be without a content, and we should become conscious of the material, which cannot be acquired other than through sensibility, through its being associated with the concept.⁵⁹⁸

Therefore, in order for the activity of knowing to be possible, another activity is needed, which connects or relates sensibility and thinking, which are foreign to each other. According to Kant, imagination is the faculty which performs this activity.⁵⁹⁹ According to Kant, the connection of sensibility and thinking, being two separate activities of the soul that cannot contact by themselves, is through a synthesis⁶⁰⁰. In Kant's system, imagination is the faculty that performs synthesis.⁶⁰¹ Accordingly, all human knowledge is possible only through the synthesis by imagination.⁶⁰²

⁵⁹⁷A50-51/B74-75, A137-139/B176-178

⁵⁹⁸“Without sensibility no object {correspondent in intuition} would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without thoughts are blind. (*Keine dieser Eigenschaften ist der anderen vorzuziehen. Ohne Sinnlichkeit würde uns kein Gegenstand gegeben, und ohne Verstand keiner gedacht werden. Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.*)”(A51/B75)

⁵⁹⁹A77-78/B102-103

⁶⁰⁰“By *synthesis*, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge. (*Ich verstehe aber unter Synthesis in der allgemeinsten Bedeutung die Handlung, verschiedene Vorstellungen zueinander hinzuzutun, und ihre Mannigfaltigkeit in einer Erkenntnis begreifen.*)”(A77/B103)

⁶⁰¹“Synthesis in general, [...], is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious. (*Die synthesis überhaupt ist, [...], die bloße Wirkung der Einbildungskraft, einer blinden, obgleich unentbehrlichen Funktion der Seele, ohne die wir überall gar keine Erkenntnis haben würden, der wir uns aber selten nur einmal bewußt sind.*)”(A78/B104)

⁶⁰²A77/B103

Synthesis by imagination is an activity of internalization⁶⁰³ with regard to relating the material received through sensibility with thinking or bringing it within consciousness, and an activity of externalization with regard to rendering it intuitable. Though both aspects of synthesis are transcendental with regard to their being the grounds of experience, since bringing the material, which is foreign to thought as it is in sensibility, to consciousness is more fundamental, then internalization has priority over externalization.

Related to this, in Kant's conception of experience what is meant by 'inner intuition' should be the reflection of the material in sensibility on consciousness, and by 'outer intuition' should be the representation of the trace on the consciousness as outside of our bodies, in a manner to make it possible to distinguish it from ourselves. Therefore, intuition is always together with consciousness and that which is outer in respect of intuition is possible only depending upon that which is inner.⁶⁰⁴

Imagination has two syntheses in view of the material it aims at. Bringing the appearances received in space and time in view of sensibility to consciousness by grasping through a concept and representing them in intuition; and holding space and time independently of appearances in a manner to make it possible for each of them

⁶⁰³In the second edition of the book, Kant took the activity of internalisation away from imagination and gave it to the act of pure apperception. It is apparent that it must be impossible, according to Kant, that the pure apperception, as the ground of every thought and as a pure act of thinking, can do this. In view of the first edition, the reason why imagination is required is indeed the fact that consciousness cannot by itself contact sensibility. We shall be explaining in the following part why such a modification was required in the second edition. According to B, imagination is the faculty that only externalises.

⁶⁰⁴As can be obviously seen, 'inner and outer senses' employed for the two aspects of sensibility in view of its forms, and 'inner and outer intuitions' corresponding to the two aspects of the activity of imagination are in no way interchangeable. With regard to sensibility, inner sense must always be dependent upon outer sense.

to be itself an intuition⁶⁰⁵.⁶⁰⁶ The first is the synthesis which makes *a posteriori* knowledge possible and this synthesis is empirical in view of the material it aims at. The second is the synthesis that makes both *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge possible, and thus it has priority over the first.

As a *priori* knowledge is possible only if it is independent from appearances, for the first synthesis to be possible, pure concepts of understanding must be constituted as the grounds of the concept which enters into the synthesis of appearances. The constitution of pure concepts of understanding is possible only in respect of the second synthesis⁶⁰⁷. The ground of pure concepts cannot be imagination's synthesis of appearances, because such synthesis must always be empirical with regard to its content. Consequently, in order to establish the foundations of any activity of knowing, whether it be *a priori* or *a posteriori*, the grounds of imagination's synthesis of space and time, which is the sole *a priori* material that can be provided by sensibility, as *a priori* intuitions, should be established.⁶⁰⁸

This should be such a synthesis that it should both be independent from appearances, the source of which is the outside of the soul⁶⁰⁹, and that it should contain the entirety of the manifold that emerges in intuition *a priori* with regard to its forms. In this way, the pure act of apperception would be saved from being an

⁶⁰⁵In Kant's texts, space and time, each as an intuition, are considered not as the outcome of the synthesis by imagination, but as the material which is to be synthesized. (A77/B102) But, since, according to Kant, nothing which we are not conscious of can be an intuition for us, it is not possible for the material which is to be synthesized by imagination, that is to say, for space and time as the forms of sensibility, each to be an intuition prior to this synthesis.

⁶⁰⁶A77-79/B102-104

⁶⁰⁷A78-79/B104-105

⁶⁰⁸See: A77

⁶⁰⁹Ger. *Seele*

empty judgment and it would be possible for it to have a content which is pure and *a priori*, and the pure concepts of understanding could be constituted as the aspects of this act's grasping the pure content. As can be obviously seen, constitution of the whole of intuition, as all of space and all of time independently of any empirical content, that is, as pure *a priori* manifold is of central importance to the whole of Kant's system of thought.⁶¹⁰

⁶¹⁰Kant explicitly states this point:

"What must first be given –with a view to the *a priori* knowledge of all {correspondents-intuition}- is the *manifold* of pure intuition [...] (*Das erste, was uns zum Behuf der Erkenntnis aller Gegenstände a priori gegeben sein muß, ist das Mannigfaltige der reinen Anschauung [...]*)" (A79/B104)

Furthermore, as we have considered in the immediately preceding section, in order for the pure act of apperception not to be empty but to have a pure and *a priori* content, the constitution of the whole intuition as *a priori* manifold is necessary. (See: A96-97)

In the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which we designate by 'A', Kant first describes how imagination synthesizes appearances in relation to threefold synthesis. What is described here is, indeed, the synthesis of the correspondent in intuition. In order for the correspondent in intuition to emerge, appearances should be subjected to a synopsis first in sensibility (this in fact must be in the form of space). (A97) Then, the appearances which are subjected to the synopsis should be apprehended (A98-100) and reproduced in order to be brought to a status in which they can be grasped through concepts (A100-102), and finally they should be grasped within concepts (A103-105). Though Kant states that a synthesis must always accompany such a synopsis (which is taking the appearances into the same *mekân* and keeping them together) (A97), he carefully abstains from expressing that this, too, is a synthesis by imagination, and therefore, it is dependent upon the pure act of apperception. (In this case, it is not possible for him to establish a foundation for sensibility and thinking in general, as two separate faculties.) He mentions two aspects of the imagination's synthesis of appearances. The first is the productive (*produktive*) synthesis of imagination (A118) and corresponds to the activity which we referred to as internalisation above. With regard to the first edition of the book, that which is transcendental and *a priori* is this aspect of the synthesis by imagination. The second, on the other hand, is the activity of reproduction, which Kant mentions in this edition as a totally empirical activity. (A118) Depending upon this distinction, he tries to deduce the intuition's being synthesized as a pure *a priori* manifold from the productive activity of imagination. But, since the point in question is the synthesis of appearances that are somehow subjected to synopsis by sensibility, it is not possible to obtain the synthesis of the whole intuition as pure *a priori* manifold from a *a priori* aspect of this synthesis (which should, in fact, not even be stated), regardless of how productive imagination is.

Kant completely changes this part in the second edition of the book. In the foreword he writes for the second edition, he states that this change is only about the explanation of some difficulties and some obscure points, which might not be his own fault. (Bxxxvii-xl) As we have pointed out in a previous note, Kant takes the internalisation aspect of the activity of synthesis away from imagination and gives it to the act of pure apperception. (B130-150) Though the activity of imagination is now transcendental, it consists only of externalisation and is obliged to perform acts depending upon appearances. Kant refers to this as the figurative (*figürlich*) activity of imagination. (B151-152) This *synthesis speciosa** (B151), in the sense of envisaging synthesis, must be distinguished from *synthesis intellectualis* performed by the act of pure apperception. Imagination has no involvement in intellectual (*intellektuell*) synthesis. (B152) Therefore, the way chosen in the second edition is to constitute the whole intuition as the pure *a priori* manifold through pure apperception's grasping time

We would now like to consider whether the whole of intuition can be synthesized as the unity of pure *a priori* manifold in Kant's system.

In Kant's system of thought, the ground of every unity is the unity of transcendental apperception and it is valid only to the extent that this unity can be grounded within the system. In order for this unity, which is not to be subject to pure concepts of understanding⁶¹¹, not to be an empty, conceptual or analytic unity, the content of the transcendental act of apperception has to be determined.⁶¹² In order for this unity to be a synthetic one, the manifold in question should be synthesized *a priori*; and in order to demonstrate that it is an objective and necessary unity, it should be shown that the unity of consciousness, which is the subjective condition of experience in respect of one who experiences, is, at the same time, the objective and necessary ground of the whole experience.

In Kant's system, that which is pure is that which indeed belong to thought, therefore that which is dependent upon the act of pure apperception and independent

independent from the traces of the appearances in space on inner sense (where the pure concepts of understanding are the aspect of this grasp).

First, attributing such an activity to pure apperception is denial of Kant's own system. Once the activity of soul is divided into two as sensibility and thinking in Kant's system, it is impossible for any activity of thinking to grasp something that is foreign to it without needing the mediation of something else. The reason why the faculty of imagination is needed in the first edition is apperception's being empty by itself and the necessity for this act to have a content in order for pure concepts to emerge. Pure apperception as an activity of thinking can perform no synthesis, whether it be pure or not, within the limits determined by Kant. Such an intellectual synthesis is possible only by acceptance of an intellectual intuition, that is to say, the activity of thinking being able to synthesize an object within itself. (See: Çitil, *ibid.*) This contradicts the essence of the system, because an intellectual synthesis is possible, not with pure concepts which are required to be derived from the activity of knowing but only with ideas which are innate to the soul. Therefore, intellectual synthesis is impossible as long as one remains within Kant's limits.

Second, taking away from the imagination the synthesis of whole intuition as a pure and *a priori* manifold and giving it to pure apperception did not eliminate the problems related to this synthesis. The problem is not that it is impossible to attribute a pure act to imagination, but it is related to material's being dependent, regardless of whether it is grasped by imagination or by apperception, upon appearances, in as much as it is dependent upon sensibility.

*From the Latin word '*speciosus*' derived from the root '*specio*' meaning to look, to see.

⁶¹¹B131

⁶¹²A79/B105

from sensibility.⁶¹³ Synthesis of intuition as *a priori* manifold is pure with regard to the act that synthesizes, regardless of whether that which synthesizes is imagination or pure apperception. In this sense, since the ground of concepts as the elements of synthesis must be the pure concepts of understanding, each synthesis has a pure aspect with regard to the act that synthesizes. But the synthesizing act's being pure is not sufficient for the purity of the product of the act. It is impossible for the content of the synthesis to be pure in view of the material which the act aims at, because this content is to be received from sensibility. Therefore, even if the constitution of the whole of intuition is possible as the unity of the synthesis of *a priori* manifold, it is not possible for this whole to be pure. In order for the synthesis in question to be pure, space and time should belong not to sensibility, but to the soul's act of thinking, which is pure. And since this would mean that the activity of thinking is capable of synthesis without requiring something that is foreign to it, it requires the acceptance of intellectual intuition. However this is opposed to the essence of Kant's critical system of thought. Consequently, it is impossible for each of space and time to be a pure intuition, as long as they are accepted as forms of sensibility.

Now let's consider whether this synthesis, which can be pure only in view of a pure act of consciousness, can be *a priori*. As we have previously stated, in Kant's system of critical thought, by *a priori* we must understand that which is independent not from experience, but from the material received through sensibility by way of

⁶¹³The distinction Kant makes between that which is only *a priori* and that which is pure and *a priori*, as it is expressed in the text (B3) is not sufficient to provide a foundation for that which is pure. Kant employs the adjective 'pure' for the concepts forming the ground of reason, consciousness, understanding; for the activity of imagination in relation to *a priori* synthesis, and for space and time each as a pure intuition. Talking about space and time each as a pure intuition is possible upon establishing the foundation for the synthesis which we discuss herein. Since it is impossible for sensibility to ever have a pure aspect, it is not possible for space and time to be pure, either, as forms of sensibility.

being affected from the thing-in-itself, that is to say; from appearances. In the critical thought which determines the limits of the human being's activity of knowing depending upon experience and in which knowledge always starts from experience, it is not possible for any knowledge to be independent from experience. Space and time which are independent from appearances as forms of sensibility, and transcendental activities and conditions of other faculties of the soul are *a priori*. Therefore, what we should consider is whether the synthesis of the whole of intuition as a manifold independent from appearances is possible.

At this point we need to state that activity of synthesis being *a priori*, that is to say synthesis' being made in *a priori* manner is not sufficient for the activity's product to be *a priori* too. In order for the whole of intuition to be *a priori* synthesis, its content should also be *a priori*. In Kant's critical thought, though only space and time as forms of sensibility can be the materials of such an *a priori* synthesis, it is actually only time, since in Kant's system consciousness can have a contact with the space as the outer form of sensibility only through time as the inner form.

In view of the section entitled 'Transcendental Aesthetic' of the Critique of Pure Reason, space and time are not grounded as *a priori* forms of sensibility.⁶¹⁴ The only thing which can be accepted to have been grounded in this section is that space and time are the conditions not of things themselves, but of correspondents in intuition, which belong to one who experiences. However, this is not sufficient to determine whether time and space are the conditions of sensibility or whether they belong to thinking in general. What can establish the foundation for time and space

⁶¹⁴See: IV.1 On space and time in view of Transcendental Aesthetic

as *a priori* forms of sensibility is the synthesis of the whole of intuition as an *a priori* manifold.

We should state that had the synthesis of the whole of intuition as a pure manifold been possible, then space and time would each be possible as a pure intuition. Since intuition must always be sensible according to Kant, space and time, as *a priori* conditions of appearance, should belong to sensibility as the sensible source of pure intuition of space and time. But since this synthesis cannot be pure with regard to its content, as we have seen above, it would not be possible to establish space and time as the forms of sensibility. This would still not go any further than being a hypothesis.

Let us assume that space and time are the forms of sensibility. In this case, let us see whether the constitution of the whole of intuition as a synthesis of *a priori* manifold is possible. Since time is the only thing belonging to sensibility that pure consciousness can contact, even if via imagination, let us consider whether the connection of consciousness with time through imagination would make possible the synthesis of the whole of intuition as *a priori* manifold. The content of time as the inner form of sensibility is the impressions of the appearances received as being in space, on the inner sense.⁶¹⁵ As long as time is considered together with this content, it must be empirical. Therefore, in order for the synthesis of the whole of intuition to be *a priori*, time must be handled not in such a manner but independently from its whole content. If we can do that, that is to say, if we can think of an empty time with no content, we should admit that this is *a priori* time form which is the inner condition of all kinds of senses, according to Kant. What is it that we think when we

⁶¹⁵A98-99

try to think of time as purified from its content, which must be empirical, in Kant's system of thought? It is indeed so far from being knowledge; it is not even a thought.⁶¹⁶

The ground of Kant's being able to think of a time purified from the whole of its empirical content is the preservation of the determinations belonging to time as a concept, and the attribution of them to time as the inner form of sensibility. But since pure concepts can emerge only through becoming conscious of pure schemata as the aspects of the imagination's grasping of time purified from its empirical content, time, which has no content at this level, can be grasped in Kant's system by neither time as a concept nor by any other concept.

Yet, supposing that being incapable of thinking time that is purified of its whole empirical content, which is necessary for the constitution of the whole of intuition in Kant's system, is our personal insufficiency, let us assume that time, which is named as *a priori* form of sensibility, makes possible the synthesis of whole intuition to be *a priori*. In this case, though the synthesis in question would be *a priori*, it would not be manifold any more.

In Kant's critical system, there can be two things which can be thought as the source of plurality in intuition. The first of them is the manifold of appearances, and the second is the manifold depending upon pure concepts which lie in the ground of concepts as determinations of thought. Manifold of appearances as representations in sensibility must depend either upon the source of appearances or forms of sensibility. Within the limits of framework determined by Kant, it is not possible to claim that

⁶¹⁶Given that there is no concept of time yet, claiming that we can think empty time at this level will be to claim that we can think without content and concept.

the ground of the manifold of appearances is the thing-in-itself.⁶¹⁷ Since the thing-in-itself is outside of the human being's activity of knowing, we cannot claim that the thing-in-itself is one or many.

Furthermore, even if appearances received in space as the outer form of sensibility have a manifold in view of their sources, this cannot be reflected in our knowledge. With regard to our knowledge, it is not possible for the material received in space, the outer form, to contain a manifold in itself. Therefore, this material, which we aim at knowing by our faculty of thinking, is to contain no inner difference, is to be all of a piece. Accordingly, the impression of the material received in space on time being the inner form of sensibility is an indeterminate total impression. Consequently, it is not possible to establish a foundation for the manifold in time, with regard to the content of inner sense. The real important thing is that even if time contains a manifold with regard to the material received through outer sense, this manifold must always be empirical.

If we return to whether the ground of manifold, which we assume in view of sensibility, can be the forms of sensibility, it is not possible for space and time as forms purified from their content which must be empirical, to contain a manifold, or a difference that could be the ground of manifold, in themselves. Consequently, thinking that space and time are the forms of sensibility is thinking of space and time as empty, in which case it would be possible to derive a manifold neither from an empty space and time nor from such a thought deprived of any kind of conceptual determination.

⁶¹⁷Kant's talking about not the thing-in-itself, but about the things-in-themselves or things themselves misleads us. It leads us to think of the appearance received in space as the outer form of sensibility, according to Kant, as if it constitutes a manifold of its own.

The ground of the plurality in intuition, in Kant's system of thought, is determination of whole intuition, which had to be synthesized as a pure *a priori* manifold, by judgments. Our concepts emerge in these judgments. The ground of our concepts are pure concepts; the ground of our judgments is the pure act of apperception. The constitution of the whole intuition as pure *a priori* synthesis through imagination is necessary in order for both pure concepts and the pure act of consciousness not to be empty thoughts. As we have studied above, the only thing that can be the content of this synthesis is time as an empty form.

In such a case, the constitution of whole intuition, which is necessary with regard to the constitution of experience, will be possible as the association of pure consciousness, which is an empty act, with empty time through imagination; and pure concepts will be possible only as the consciousness of the aspects of the imagination's grasping empty time. To put it in simpler terms, whole intuition as a pure *a priori* manifold will be the product of relating that which is empty to that which is empty, by imagination which is a blind faculty. That experience is constituted in Kant's system of thought is possible only by accepting this.

Since constitution of the whole intuition as the synthesis of pure *a priori* manifold is not possible, there is no ground left for the activity of synthesis aimed at the emergence of particular correspondents in intuition, which Kant attributed to imagination and which we name as externalization. Based on this reason, we shall not discuss the externalizing activity of imagination here. The reason why Kant considered the imagination's synthesis of producing correspondent in intuition in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason is that he attempted to deduce the synthesis of whole intuition from the aspects of the synthesis of correspondents in

intuition, which aspects are pure and *a priori* with regard to the faculties involved in the synthesis. As we have pointed out previously, this is not possible.

As can be seen, the main problem in Kant's system is the pure act of consciousness, having no content insofar as it is not related to appearances, being insufficient to diversify itself and to derive its pure concepts. In other words, the problem is Kant's system's ruling out the concepts of space and time, which are the grounds of Kant's conception of science and which should have certain content, from being ideas and making them forms of sensibility; i.e., that there is nothing given with some content to human being in respect of his intellectual activities. But as we have inquired above, space and time as forms of sensibility cannot have a content which is not empirical, nor can pure concepts be deduced as diversification of pure apperception. Therefore, constitution of experience is not possible.

The reason why this consequence arises is that while Kant sought to preserve certain aspects of Leibniz's conception of experience in his conception of experience, the conception of substance upon which they relied has been canceled. We shall be evaluating in the following parts the reasons for the failure to constitute experience within the limits determined by Kant, in view of Leibniz's conceptions of substance and experience.

III.6. Understanding

In the previous section, we demonstrated that pure concepts cannot be grounded since they cannot have a content, given the impossibility of the constitution of whole intuition as the synthesis of pure *a priori* manifold. In this

section, we would like to suggest that pure concepts, which cannot be provided with a foundation as such, are not possible as logical forms, either.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant primarily tries to deduce the pure concepts of understanding from the acts of thinking themselves.⁶¹⁸ Starting from pure concepts' being possible only as the aspects of the determination of *a priori* content, he investigates how pure concepts can have this content, since they are empty logical forms when they are considered apart from it.⁶¹⁹ With regard to the organization of the book, the deduction of pure concepts as logical forms has priority over their being possible as aspects of the synthesis of the pure *a priori* manifold. Now, let us inquire into whether pure concepts can be deduced through the possibilities of the activity of thinking.

The method Kant employed in relation to deduction of pure concepts includes the following three steps: determination of logical forms of judgments and classification of them accordingly⁶²⁰; determining that the acts of understanding producing these logical forms are the same with the acts of giving unity to representations, which makes the emergence of correspondents⁶²¹ in intuition possible; and classifying pure concepts in a way that corresponds to the classification of judgments⁶²².

According to Kant, the method employed in determination of elements belonging to any faculty is to look at the experience that has emerged and to inquire into the elements through which it is possible for the experience to emerge as it

⁶¹⁸A66-83/B91-109

⁶¹⁹A95-130/B129-169

⁶²⁰A66-A71/B91-95

⁶²¹A76-A80/B102-105

⁶²²A80/B106

did.⁶²³ However, this, by itself, is not sufficient for the complete determination of the elements of the faculty.⁶²⁴ The reason why no difficulty is faced with in the complete determination of pure concepts as the elements of the faculty of understanding, according to Kant, is that these concepts originate from the faculty of understanding itself, and that in this respect, they are connected to each other according to a single concept.

Die Transzendental-Philosophie hat den Vorteil, aber auch die Verbindlichkeit, ihre Begriffe nach einem Prinzip aufzusuchen; weil sie aus dem Verstande, als absoluter Einheit, rein und unvermischt entspringen, und daher selbst nach einem Begriffe, oder Idee, unter sich zusammenhängen müssen. Ein solcher Zusammenhang aber gibt eine Regel an die Hand, nach welcher jedem reinen Verstandesbegriff seine Stelle und allen insgesamt ihre Vollständigkeit a priori bestimmt werden kann, welches alles sonst vom Belieben, oder vom Zufall abhängen würde.⁶²⁵

Transcendental philosophy, in seeking for its concepts, has the advantage and also the duty of proceeding according to a single principle. For these concepts spring, pure and unmixed, out of the understanding which is an absolute unity; and must therefore be connected with each other according to one concept or idea. Such a connection supplies us with a rule, by which we are enabled to assign its proper place to each pure concept of the understanding, and by which we can determine in an a priori manner their systematic completeness. Otherwise we should be dependent in these matters on our own discretionary judgment or merely on chance.

Therefore, while the ground for complete determination of the pure concepts of the faculty of understanding is the absolute unity of the faculty itself, that which makes possible to think them as elements which originate from the unity of the faculty is their being subject to the unity of a concept. Now let us try to comprehend

⁶²³“When we call a faculty of knowledge into play, then, as the occasioning circumstances differ, various concepts stand forth and make the faculty known and allow of their being collected with more or less completeness, in proportion as observation has been made of them over a longer time or with greater acuteness. (*Wenn man ein Erkenntnisvermögen ins Spiel setzt, so tun sich, nach den mancherlei Anlässen, verschiedene Begriffe hervor, die dieses Vermögen kennbar machen und sich in einem mehr oder weniger ausführlichen Aufsatz sammeln lassen, nachdem die Beobachtung derselben längere Zeit, oder mit größerer Scharfsinnigkeit angestellt worden.*)” (A66/B91)

⁶²⁴“But when the inquiry is carried on in this mechanical fashion, we can never be sure whether it has brought to completion. (*Wo diese Untersuchung werde vollendet sein, läßt sich, nach diesem gleichsam mechanischen Verfahren, niemals mit Sicherheit bestimmen.*)” (A66/B91)

⁶²⁵A66-67

the connection Kant established between the absolute, in other words, the necessary unity of the faculty with the unity of the concept, by which the elements springing out of this faculty are combined.

In Kant's critical thought, necessity depends upon the unity of the transcendental act of apperception as the most fundamental condition of the human being's activity of knowing within this system.⁶²⁶ Therefore, the necessary unity of the faculty of understanding, also, must depend upon the unity of the transcendental act of apperception.

Kant claims that analytical unity of a concept depends upon the previous constitution and understanding of the concept within a synthetic unity, and that the synthetic unity in question, on the other hand, relies upon the unity of understanding:

Die analytische Einheit des Bewußtseins hängt allen gemeinsamen Begriffen, als solchen, an, z. B. wenn ich mir rot überhaupt denke, so stelle ich mir dadurch eine Beschaffenheit vor, die (als Merkmal) irgendwo angetroffen, oder mit anderen Vorstellungen verbunden sein kann; also nur vermöge einer vorausgedachten möglichen synthetischen Einheit kann ich mir die analytische vorstellen. Eine Vorstellung, die als verschiedenen gemein gedacht werden soll, wird als zu solchen gehörig angesehen, die außer ihr noch etwas Verschiedenes an sich haben, folglich muß sie in synthetischer Einheit mit anderen (wenngleich nur möglichen Vorstellungen) vorher gedacht werden, ehe ich die analytische Einheit des Bewußtseins, welche sie zum *conceptus communis* macht, an ihr denken kann. Und so ist die synthetische Einheit der Apperzeption der höchste Punkt, an dem man allen

⁶²⁶ "All necessity, without exception, is grounded in a transcendental condition. There must, therefore, be a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, and consequently also of the concepts of objects in general, and so of all objects {correspondents-in-intuition} of experience, a ground without which it would be impossible to think any object {correspondent in intuition} for our intuitions; [...] (*Aller Notwendigkeit liegt jederzeit eine transcendente Bedingung zum Grunde. Also muß ein transzendentaler Grund der Einheit des Bewußtseins, in der Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen aller unserer Anschauungen, mithin auch, der Begriffe der Objekte überhaupt, folglich auch aller Gegenstände, der Erfahrung, angetroffen werden, ohne welchen es unmöglich wäre, zu unseren Anschauungen irgendeinen Gegenstand zu denken:[...]*)" (A106)

That which can be grounded depending upon the unity of experience or apperception is not logical or metaphysical necessity, but hypothetical necessity which should actually be called requirement. The unity of transcendental act of consciousness as the condition of the whole of experience or of consciousness on its own constitutes the ground of not the necessity, but of the fact that it is a need or requirement for the unity of experience, at the most.

Verstandesgebrauch, selbst die ganze Logik, und, nach ihr, die Transzendental-Philosophie heften muß, ja dieses Vermögen ist der Verstand selbst.⁶²⁷

The analytic unity of consciousness belongs to all general concepts, as such. If, for instance, I think red in general, I thereby represent to myself a property which (as a characteristic) can be found in something, or can be combined with other representations; that is, only by means of a presupposed possible synthetic unity can I represent to myself the analytic unity. A representation which is to be thought as common to *different* representations is regarded as belonging to such as have, in addition to it, also something *different*. Consequently it must previously be thought in synthetic unity with other (though, it may be, only possible) representations, before I can think in it the analytic unity of consciousness, which makes it a *conceptus communis*. The synthetic unity of apperception is therefore that highest point, to which we must ascribe all employment of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and conformably therewith, transcendental philosophy. Indeed this faculty of apperception is the understanding itself.

As seen, when any general concept is considered, analytic unity of the concept relies upon the synthetic unity of it, whereas this synthetic unity relies upon the unity of transcendental apperception. It is obvious that the concept as the rule that would guarantee the completeness of the deduction of pure concepts as the elements of understanding must fulfill the same conditions. We believe that this concept is the concept of 'being the pure act⁶²⁸ of understanding'.

Kant inquires into the pure acts of understanding on two different levels with regard to their being performed on concepts and representations. When the pure acts of understanding are performed on concepts, they give us the logical forms of judgments, and when they are performed on representations, they give us pure concepts, as transcendental aspects of correspondents:

Dieselbe Funktion, welche den verschiedenen Vorstellungen in einem Urteile Einheit gibt, die gibt auch der bloßen Synthesis verschiedene Vorstellungen in einer Anschauung Einheit, welche, allgemein ausgedrückt, der reine Verstandesbegriff

⁶²⁷B133-134 note a

⁶²⁸Kant refers to this as 'function':

"By 'function' I mean the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation. (*Ich verstehe aber unter Funktion die Einheit der Handlung, verschiedene Vorstellungen unter einer gemeinschaftlichen zu ordnen.*)" (A68/B93)

heißt. Derselbe Verstand also, und zwar durch eben dieselben Handlungen, wodurch er in Begriffen, vermittelt der analytischen Einheit, die logische Form eines Urteils zustande brachte, bringt auch, vermittelt der synthetischen Einheit des Mannigfaltigen in der Anschauung überhaupt, in seine Vorstellungen einen transzendentalen Inhalt,[...] ⁶²⁹

The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general.

In the light of the opinions we expressed above, the point we should note here is the necessity that elements, which are thought as being subject to analytic unity of the concept of the pure act of understanding, that is, the logical aspects of judgments, and the transcendental aspects of correspondents must have been constituted and understood as belonging to a synthetic unity. Therefore, grounding the constitution and understanding of the synthetic unity of judgments and correspondents must have priority over classifications of logical aspects of judgments or transcendental aspects of correspondents.

When regarded from this perspective, the order followed in the Critique of Pure Reason in relation to deduction of pure concepts is misleading. The reader is misled to think as if that variety of pure concepts could be acquired through only the possibilities of understanding. Starting from the requirement that these concepts can have content only through a synthesis, ways or mechanism of acquiring this content are sought, as if it is previously established that pure concepts have content.

However, the problem here is not only about the organization of the text. As we have stated before, the constitution of synthetic unity of correspondents is not

possible anyway, within the limits of Kant's critical thought, given the fact that whole intuition cannot be constituted as the synthesis of pure *a priori* manifold. Since synthetic unity of the concept of being the pure act of understanding cannot be grounded, a table of judgments as the logical aspects of this act, or a table of pure concepts or categories as its transcendental aspects cannot go beyond, within the limits of Kant's critical thought, being generalizations reached as a result of an abstraction which depends upon the emergence of experience and which does not have a legitimate ground. Completeness and necessity of these tables cannot be constituted. Transcendental, original and pure apperception cannot vary itself. Human understanding itself cannot be the "lawgiver of nature"⁶³⁰ either.

⁶³⁰ "die Gesetzgebung vor die Nature" (A126)

IV. THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTION OF SPACE AND TIME IN KANT'S CONCEPTION OF EXPERIENCE

In this section, we shall try to show that the constitutions of space and time are not possible in Kant's critical thought. In Kant's thought, space and time are considered as forms of sensibility, as forms of sensible intuition, each as *a priori* intuitions, and also as concepts and objects. In this section, we shall first try to show that space and time, as *a priori* forms of sensibility, cannot be grounded in view of 'Transcendental Aesthetic'. Based this and also on the impossibility of grounding space and time as *a priori* intuitions without this, it will be revealed that space and time could not be grounded each as an *a priori* concept or object.

IV.1. On space and time in view of transcendental aesthetic

Starting the dissection of experience from the correspondent that arise in intuition, and after dividing the soul's faculties involved in the synthesis of correspondent into two in general as sensibility and thought⁶³¹, Kant dissects sensibility and exposes the forms of sensibility. 'Transcendental Aesthetic' is the name given to such dissection and exposition.⁶³²

According to Kant, sensation is the influence of a correspondent⁶³³ on us. Intuition is empirical as long as it emerges depending upon sensation.⁶³⁴ Appearance

⁶³¹A19/B33

⁶³²"The science of all principles of *a priori* sensibility I call *transcendental aesthetic*. (*Eine Wissenschaft von allen Prinzipien der Sinnlichkeit a priori nenne ich die transzendentale Ästhetik.*)" (A21/B35)

⁶³³This correspondent is not the correspondent in intuition but the transcendental correspondent which is the thing-in-itself, as we have explained previously.

See: III.2 Sensibility

⁶³⁴A20/B34

is the material of sensation, and that which provides for receiving appearance within a certain order is the form of appearance or sensation.⁶³⁵ While the material of all sensations needs to be necessarily given *a posteriori*, since that which enables the sensations to be within a certain order cannot itself be a sensation, this form itself needs to be available *a priori* in the soul⁶³⁶ and should be considered independently from all sensations.⁶³⁷

What we can deduce from the distinctions and definitions made by Kant is the presence of some material in correspondent in intuition, the source of which is not one who experiences and the presence of form, the origin of which is the one who experiences and which provides the ordering of this material. The conclusions that can be reached from these considerations are not that the source of the material is outside of the soul⁶³⁸ and that the form which orders it, is independent from thinking aspect of soul.

Kant states that the form of sensation, which is *a priori* by definition, is *pure*⁶³⁹ at the same time, and that this form can also be named as *pure intuition*.⁶⁴⁰ This form can be pure, by definition, on the condition that the form and its representation are not sensible. We should remember that, in Kant's system, something could be a representation if it belongs to consciousness. Those which can be pure are only the representations which do not contain anything empirical. If we accept that the form in question has a representation in our consciousness, either the form cannot be pure

⁶³⁵A20/B34

⁶³⁶Ger. *Gemüt*

⁶³⁷A20/B34

⁶³⁸Ger. *Seele*

⁶³⁹—I term all representations pure (in the transcendental sense) in which there is nothing that belongs to sensation. (*Ich nenne alle Vorstellungen rein (im transzendentalen Verstande), in denen nichts, was zur Empfindung gehört, angetroffen wird*)" (A20/B34)

⁶⁴⁰A20/B34-35

as long as it is the form of sensation or if we accept that it is pure, the distinction Kant makes between thought and sensibility cannot be held.

In order for us to accept that the form of sensation can also be named as a pure intuition, it needs to be synthesized, as stated by Kant⁶⁴¹, as a pure *a priori* manifold in Kant's system of thought, which is not possible, as we have emphasized before. There is another point that we would like to note. After determining that there must be a form of sensation, Kant refers to this also as the form of intuition.⁶⁴² This is legitimate in a sense, because the form of sensation has been reached as a result of the dissection of intuition. The form of sensation will be the form of intuition at the same time. But it cannot be claimed on this basis that the forms of intuition consist only of the forms of sensation. In Kant's system, the pure concepts and schemata of understanding are also forms of intuition, as the conditions for the emergence of correspondent in intuition, since it would not be possible otherwise to reach them through the dissection of the correspondent in intuition. However, this is never stated so explicitly; form of sensibility and form of intuition are used as if they are interchangeable terms.⁶⁴³

⁶⁴¹A20/B34

⁶⁴²A20/B34

⁶⁴³Kant gives an example to confirm that we have a pure intuition of the form of sensibility. He claims that when we take away everything that belong to understanding from the representation of a body which is a sensible intuition, there still remains something and that is extension and figure; and that this is present in the soul (*Gemüt*) as *a priori* form of sensibility without any actual sensible correspondent.(A21/B35) First of all, the claim that when we take away everything that belongs to understanding what remains is extension and figure cannot be grounded, because extension and figure are always subject to determinations of categories. Secondly, if we accept that a representation remains in consciousness, in order for this to be an intuition, we should also accept that it is the representation of something which is outside of consciousness. In this case, what remains cannot be the form of the sensibility of one who experiences; it would be impossible to distinguish it from *res extensa* of the Cartesians or from empty and absolute space which Newtonians claim to exist independently from that which exists in it. Thirdly, if this remains, it will remain not as an intuition, but as an empty representation that belongs merely to thought, and it will become quite difficult to claim that it is *a priori* form of sensibility, which is, according to Kant, a faculty that is independent

After determining that the sensation needs to have a material and form, Kant attempts to determine what this form is:

In der transzendentalen Ästhetik also werden wir zuerst die Sinnlichkeit isolieren, dadurch, daß wir alles absondern, was der Verstand durch seine Begriffe dabei denkt, damit nichts als empirische Anschauung übrig bleibe. Zweitens werden wir von dieser noch alles, was zur Empfindung gehört, abtrennen, damit nichts als reine Anschauung und die bloße Form der Erscheinungen übrig bleibe, welches das einzige ist, das die Sinnlichkeit *a priori* liefern kann.⁶⁴⁴

In the transcendental aesthetic we shall, therefore, first isolate *sensibility*, by taking away⁶⁴⁵ from it everything which the understanding thinks through its concepts, so that nothing may be left save empirical intuition⁶⁴⁶. Secondly, we shall also separate off⁶⁴⁷ from it everything which belongs to sensation, so that nothing may remain save pure intuition and the mere form of appearances, which is all that sensibility can supply *a priori*.⁶⁴⁸

According to Kant, there are two things that can be the forms of sensibility: Since all our outer intuitions are subject to space, space is a candidate for being the outer form of sensibility, whereas time would be the inner form thereof, since all our inner and outer intuitions are subject to time.⁶⁴⁹ This, alone, is not sufficient for time and space to be *a priori* forms of sensibility, because our inner and outer intuitions are subject not only to space and time, but also to concepts of understanding. What

from thought. Such a representation is necessarily sensible as long as it corresponds to an intuition, and necessarily belongs to thought as long as it is pure.

⁶⁴⁴A22/B36

⁶⁴⁵In 'Transcendental Aesthetic', that which belongs to understanding is not determined. Therefore, what it is that is taken away from sensation is also unclear. In addition, with regard to the whole of the system, since we can know through concepts which emerge to the extent our consciousness is related to an intuition, when concepts as determinations belonging to understanding are taken away, how will it be possible for us to say knowingly that something still remains?

⁶⁴⁶Since intuition is always subject to determinations of understanding, what remains cannot be an intuition; that which can remain is only sensation, provided that the distinction between sensibility and thought is accepted, which distinction is just an assumption.

⁶⁴⁷Had he named that which is left behind when it is separated from the determinations of understanding 'sensation', which is the proper thing to do, it would be very obvious here that nothing would remain behind, when we took away everything that belongs to sensation from sensation. Accordingly, we believe that the expression here should read 'we shall separate everything that belongs to the material of sensation'.

⁶⁴⁸When the explanations presented in previous notes are taken into consideration, it can be seen that what remains behind cannot be pure intuition, but merely the form of appearances. Yet, this would consist only of a repetition of the definitions made in the beginning.

⁶⁴⁹A22/B37

needs to be done therefore, first of all, is to establish the concepts of space and time as representations belonging to our consciousness, relying only on the assumption that they are forms of sensibility. This is what transcendental and metaphysical exposition of these concepts aim to do. But this, alone, is not sufficient to determine that the only forms of sensibility are time and space. It also needs to be shown that all the concepts other than space and time, to which our inner and outer intuitions are all subject, are independent from sensibility. And this is what is targeted by the 'Transcendental Logic' in the Critique of Pure Reason. Therefore, even if it can be determined by transcendental aesthetic that space and time are two forms of sensibility, it cannot be grounded that they are the only forms of sensibility, unless it is grounded that the origin and ground of the concepts other space and time is a faculty that is independent from sensibility. As we have inquired into in previous sections, this is not possible within the limits determined by Kant.

Now let us consider whether metaphysical and transcendental exposition of the concepts of space and time ground space and time as two forms of sensibility.

If details are to be put aside, metaphysical exposition⁶⁵⁰ of the concept of space by Kant reveals two points: (a) Space cannot be a property that belongs to the things in the intuition themselves, which is outside of us, nor can it be an empirical concept we can deduce through abstraction from their relations. It needs to be present in one who experiences so as to precede everything that arises in intuition.⁶⁵¹ (b) Space cannot be a concept, the origin of which is the faculty of thought of one who

⁶⁵⁰A23-25/B38-40

⁶⁵¹A23-24/B38-39

If space is an empirical concept, the space which is the object of geometry will be an *a posteriori* object, and then there will remain no possibility to ground the necessity of geometrical propositions.

experiences, because it is not possible to fill space, as an intuition, with concepts or thoughts.⁶⁵²

From these two points, Kant concludes that we have a representation, the origin of which is not the faculty of thought or empirical things, and that this is an *a priori* intuition.⁶⁵³ Yet, what must to be concluded is that space which is regarded as the condition for the emergence of correspondents in intuition and which cannot be acquired through abstraction from them must be distinguished from the sensible or empirical space which is regarded as filled with correspondents. Space is sensible in so far as it is considered as an intuition. Just as we cannot fill space by thinking, similarly we cannot empty or purify it by thinking, either. Even if we can represent to ourselves the space as intuition in thought as devoid of its contents, this does not mean that space can be intuited independently from them, as long as intuition is merely sensible. This means that space, which is the condition for the emergence of correspondents and which can be thought independently therefrom, is different than space which is empirical intuition.

As long as our intuition regarding space remains sensible, that space is *a priori* form of sensibility cannot go beyond being a claim. Even if we accept that it cannot belong to thought, in order to be able to claim that that which does not belong to

⁶⁵²A24-25/B39-40

Elements of a concept are partial concepts, and partial concepts fall not within, but under this concept. Yet, the parts of intuitive space are not under the concept of space but are in the space as a (sensible) intuition. While attempting to explain this, Kant has not made an obvious distinction between being the element of a concept and being part of a whole. What Kant means by the claim that space is not a general or discursive concept is, indeed, the following: It is not possible for the part of any correspondent in intuition (e.g. the foot of the table) to fall under the concept of that correspondent (e.g. the concept of table), nor is it possible for any part (whether the number of parts is finite or infinite has no significance whatsoever) of the space in intuition to fall under the concept of space. Similarly, the emergence of a correspondent in intuition is not possible by merely thinking of it.

⁶⁵³B40

thought belongs to sensibility, the distinction between sensibility and thought must have been grounded.

Kant's transcendental exposition of the concept of space relies upon space as *a priori* intuition which depends upon metaphysical exposition.⁶⁵⁴ Since we think that space cannot be grounded as *a priori* intuition, we shall not consider these issues. We should, however, state that the space, which Kant claims to be empirically real, is not the same with the space which he claims to be transcendently ideal. The space, which is the empirically real, is the space that is *mekân* of correspondents in intuition. That which is transcendental, on the other hand, is the space considered as the condition of correspondents in intuition and which is nothing to us, according to Kant, when it is thought as independent from them.⁶⁵⁵ The point we would like to emphasize is that as long as it is not grounded that we have a sensible but *a priori* and pure intuition of space, geometry will either be an empirical science or a science regarding that which is nothing to us, since the objectivity of space depends merely upon its empirical reality.

Kant exposes the concept of time metaphysically and transcendently in a similar manner. The two basic points that emerge as a result of the metaphysical exposition⁶⁵⁶ of the concept of time are also similar: (a) Time is not an empirical concept that can be abstracted from any intuition. It must be present in one who experiences so as to precede, and to make possible intuition of anything.⁶⁵⁷ (b) Time cannot be a general or discursive concept, the origin of which is the faculty of

⁶⁵⁴A26-27/B40-42

⁶⁵⁵A28/B44

⁶⁵⁶A30-32/B46-48

⁶⁵⁷A30-31/B46

thought of one who experiences. Even though different times can be determined only by thinking or consciousness, they are not partial concepts falling under the concept of time but are the parts of the same whole.⁶⁵⁸ The conclusion that can be derived therefrom is not that time is an *a priori* intuition, which is independent from thought or consciousness, but that the empirical representation of time derived from the succession of our particular sensations and the time which makes possible the emergence of them in succession are different from each other.

Furthermore, the claim that we have an *a priori* intuition of time is even more groundless than the claim that we have an *a priori* intuition of space, because emptying time from its empirical content by thinking⁶⁵⁹ is not possible since this thought itself would fill time unless it is accepted as something absolute which exists independently from one who experiences. If time is considered as something absolute, then it will be the condition of not only what emerges in experience, but also of one who experiences; and then the claim that it is a form which belongs to one who experiences should be rejected.

Apart from that, similar to what we expressed in relation to space, even if we could think time as void, it would be nothing but a thought and will not suffice to ground that we have a pure intuition of time. If we have any intuition of time, this must be sensible, not *a priori* within the limits determined by Kant.

⁶⁵⁸A31-32/B47-48

⁶⁵⁹“We cannot, in respect of appearances in general, remove time itself, though we can quite well think time as void of appearances. (*Man kann in Ansehung der Erscheinungen überhaupt die Zeit selbesten nicht aufheben, ob man zwar ganz wohl die Erscheinungen aus der Zeit wegnehmen kann.*)” (A31/B46)

Since awakening of apperception and its starting to think in Kant’s system depends merely upon an outer influence, it is not possible to think time as void of appearances, determined only by thinking, either. The reason why time is handled as a form of sensibility is, at any rate, the fact that it cannot be filled by way of thinking.

At this point we would like to consider the question what it is of which time is the form. Clarification of this point, indeed, depends upon the determination of what is meant by 'inner' and 'outer' in Kant's system, since time is defined as the form of inner sense and as the inner form of sensibility.

Given Kant's starting point, space and time are primarily the conditions to which sensible intuition is subject. The claim that these are the forms of sensibility, which is a faculty distinct from thought according to Kant, is an assumption reached, and meant to be grounded, by dissection of sensible intuition. Space, as the condition of sensible intuition, is what enables us to represent things as outside of ourselves, "that is, to something in another region of space from that in which I [we] find myself [ourselves]" ⁶⁶⁰. Since it is not possible to understand anything but what we name as our 'body' by the term 'in another region of space from that in which I (we) find myself (ourselves)', it is possible to divide the content of time, as the inner condition of sensible intuition, into two. Since representing anything in the outer intuition is possible on the condition that it has been represented in inner intuition, the content of time in view of intuition is to be those things which are represented in outer intuition and those which are not. The content of inner intuition, which is not represented in outer intuition is actually limited by the representations of those things which are in our body, since the distinction of inner and outer in view of intuition is made with respect to our body. Since our body is also subject to space, at least as much as things which are outside of our body, the content of inner intuition would have been completely reduced to that which is outer. In addition, our finding

⁶⁶⁰ "[...] (d.i. auf etwas in einem andern Orte des Raumes, als darinnen ich mich befinde), [...]" (A23/B38)

ourselves, and accordingly other things, in space becomes dependent upon our finding ourselves, as well as other things, in time. Thus, there remains no ground for the distinction of 'inner' and 'outer' made in view of intuition. Therefore, if such a distinction is to be preserved, the ground thereof should be sought not in sensible intuition, but somewhere else.

If we are to look at the sensibility level, "space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense"⁶⁶¹. And time, first of all, "is nothing but the mere form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state"⁶⁶² and "is the formal *a priori* condition of all appearances whatsoever"⁶⁶³. In Kant's system of thought, receiving appearances through outer sense has priority over not only inner sense, but also over the activity of every faculty. In order for the soul⁶⁶⁴ to have any activity, it must be stimulated from outside. That which is outer here is transcendental outside. Space is that through which we receive appearances by being affected from the thing-in-itself, which is outside transcendently. Synthesis and bringing consciousness of appearances is possible only through inner sensations, which are the impressions of outer ones on time. The point to be clarified here is whether time can have a content which does not originate from outer sense and therefore from the thing-in-itself, although it is dependent upon some appearances' being received through space, within the limits determined by Kant. Kant's description of inner sense as 'the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state' is, indeed, not an explanation. Since there is no intuition with respect to the level of

⁶⁶¹"Der Raum ist nichts anders, als nur die Form aller Erscheinungen äußerer Sinne, [...]" (A26/B42)

⁶⁶²"Die Zeit ist nichts anders, als die Form des innern Sinnes, d.i. des Anschauens unserer selbst und unsers innern Zustandes." (A33/B50)

⁶⁶³"Die Zeit ist die formale Bedingung *a priori* aller Erscheinungen überhaupt." (A34/B50)

⁶⁶⁴Ger.Seele

sensibility, we do not have an intuition of ourselves, either. If we leave that aside, we can never know what 'ourselves' are within the limits determined by Kant. What we can know are those things to which we can assign a correspondent in outer intuition within the limits of empirical consciousness which is subject to time.

It is not possible to claim that the content of time, which does not originate from outer sense, is related to the original and pure act of apperception, which is the transcendental ground of all acts of bringing into consciousness either; because this act does not have a content by itself and it is not possible for it to contact sensibility as an act of thought. Furthermore, in order to make possible the constitution of pure *a priori* intuition, Kant specifically tries to distinguish transcendental act of apperception and inner sense from each other.⁶⁶⁵ As long as it is not grounded that time has *a priori* content or, equivalently, we have *a priori* intuition of time, it cannot be grounded that time has a content which is not dependent upon outer sense, either. As such, time comes to be merely the form of the internalization of those things which are received through outer sense; in such a case, an inner sense which is distinct from the activity of bringing into consciousness and therefore the inner form of sensibility will not be possible, if the distinction between sensibility and thought is to be preserved.

Therefore, since the activities of sensing that which is outer and of internalizing it cannot be activities at the same level, the distinction between inner sense and outer sense cannot be provided with a foundation at the level of sensibility, either.

⁶⁶⁵B152-153

Thus, the distinction of inner and outer, which is applicable to Kant's conception of experience in view of sensible intuition, has no ground. The distinction of inner sense and outer sense, which could be a foundation for this, has no ground. Neither the faculty of sensibility as distinct from thought nor space and time as a *priori* forms of sensibility nor what space and time are, are grounded in respect of 'Transcendental Aesthetic'.

What is revealed by the exposition of the concepts of space and time is that these concepts are empirical as long as they are acquired through abstraction from the relations of things which emerge, as subject to space and time, in our sensible intuition, and that those concepts, as elements depending upon the activity of thought, cannot fill sensible space and time. These considerations remain as problems, also with regard to the whole of Kant's system of transcendental thought, since space and time could be grounded neither as forms of sensibility, nor as *a priori* intuitions.

What renders the constitution of space and time problematic in Kant's system of critical thought is essentially his cancellation of substance in Leibniz's system of thought. Also in his works preceding the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant tried to refute Leibniz's substance, as the unity actualizing, to the extent of its share, the harmony pre-established by God, and to constitute an interaction among substances.⁶⁶⁶

In critical thought, on the other hand, both substance⁶⁶⁷, and also the interaction between substances have been left outside of the limits of human

⁶⁶⁶See: Introduction

⁶⁶⁷This is not substance which is under the category of relation (*Relation*) in critical thought.

knowledge. What Kant tries to explain is the mechanism by which intuition emerges from this interaction, by preserving certain aspects of Leibniz's conception of experience. However, since substance in general is left outside of the limit of the human being's activity of knowledge and reduced to a category, and since Kant opposed Leibniz's conception of substance starting from his first works; the faculty of memory, which would have been possible only together with such a conception of substance, has been canceled. The reason why space and time could not be constituted in Kant's critical system is indeed the cancellation of substance.

The constitution of space and time does not present a problem in the conception of experience that depends upon Leibniz's conception of substance. The origin of the plenum in experience is the soul's monad aspect containing all the representations of other substances.⁶⁶⁸ There is nothing lacking in the soul with regard to its representing all other created things. All of these representations are given to the soul in the creation. The essence of the activity of substance is nothing but expressing the representations in it. The order in which these representations will be expressed is also determined in the individual idea of substance.⁶⁶⁹

In Leibniz's system of thought, the ground of space and time which have priority to the emergence of correspondents in intuition and which are, therefore, claimed to be the forms of sensibility in Kant's thought, is the individual idea of substance and the metaphysical principles to which this idea is subject.⁶⁷⁰ Space and time, as plenum and manifold that emerge as being subject to a certain order in experience, consist only of the expression of all representations and the activity of

⁶⁶⁸See: II.2. Substance in view of it being a point of view

⁶⁶⁹See: II.4. Substance in view of its creation

⁶⁷⁰For the relation of individual idea of substance with metaphysical principles, see: II.4 Substance in view of its creation

perception that the soul has in view of its monad aspect, in accordance with the order of coexistence and succession which are determined in its individual idea. The point that needs to be considered at all times is that the individual idea of a substance is, indeed, its own share of the pre-established harmony and that its activity consists only of reflecting the harmony in its own way.⁶⁷¹

If we are to distinguish, in Leibniz's conception of experience, space and time which are attributed to different things, as was done in Kant's conception of experience, space and time as plenum are with regard to the monad aspect of the soul. Therefore, filling space or time is independent from reflection and reasoning as the intellectual faculties of human. Representations which are given to soul with regard to its monad aspect are complete. The soul does not need to receive anything from 'outside', nor is this possible with regard to its being a substance. Since the content of space and time in intuition consists of the perceptions in its monad aspect, the ground of the plenum of space and time is the creation, that is, God's power which is subject to his understanding and his will.

That which determines the order of space and time in intuition or experience, on the other hand, is the relations of coexistence and succession in the soul's individual idea, which contains the order of all kinds of activities of soul and which is given to it in its aspect of memory. And this is what we meant by space and time being given as ideas in memory, in the sections about Leibniz's conception of experience.⁶⁷²

⁶⁷¹See: II.4 Substance in view of its creation

⁶⁷²See: I.5 Experience with regard to the act of preservation: Memory

That these relations are given to soul through its aspect of memory makes it possible to ground experience without referring to an empirical concept⁶⁷³ abstracted from things which emerge within itself, and it can also explain the necessity of those which the human being, as a spirit, knows about this order by his intellectual activities, due to the relation of his individual idea to the pre-established harmony as an order which depends upon reason. As will be remembered, in Leibniz's system of thought, the truths of geometry, arithmetic and metaphysics are necessary and the ground of them is the understanding of God. Through reflection and reasoning which are its own intellectual faculties, and with the possibility provided by the relation of its individual idea to the pre-established harmony which is an order that is subject to

⁶⁷³In his fifth paper against Clarke (G VII 389-420/L 696-717), Leibniz tells how the human being forms the notion (*notion*) of space: The human being observes that many things exist together in experience and that there is a certain order of coexistence among them. The order observed emerges depending on the situation of these things involved. If one of the things that emerge in experience, e.g. A, changes its relation to a multitude of the others, on condition that the relations amongst themselves remain unchanged, and another thing, e.g. B, is related to them in the same manner A was related to them previously, we say that B comes into the place where A was. The so-called space is that which we think of enclosing all these places. Here, Leibniz particularly stresses the distinction between situation and place. Though it is possible to say that the current place of B is the same with the former place of A, it is not possible to say that the situation of A as its relations to other things is the same with the situation of B at different times, because it is not possible for the determinations of A as something actual and those of B as something actual to be the same. (G VII 400-401/L 703-705(47)) The relation of A to others is not the relations established externally between A and the others, but the individual determinations of A itself. What enables us to think that their places are the same is that place or space is not something actual or real, but only something ideal or possible.

Leibniz's explanations here are in relation to how the human being acquires space as an empirical concept. It should not be concluded based on this that space, as the relation of coexistence making possible the emergence of experience, should be a concept abstracted from experience itself. In fact, according to Leibniz, it is not possible for something to change its relation to a multitude of other things and the others to remain unchanged.

Therefore, as it cannot be concluded from Leibniz's definitions of space as the order of coexistences and of time as the order of successions, that space and time are things that are actual, similarly, it cannot either be concluded that the truth of geometrical propositions depends upon things, or upon the relations of things, that emerge in intuition. If we are to refer to the order that is given in the individual idea of substance and that determines the activity of substance, when it is understood as coexistence and succession, as space and time, they themselves are not situations, nor is a collection thereof:

"I don't say, therefore, that space is an order or situation, but an order of situations, or an order according to which situations are disposed [...] (*Je ne dis donc point, que l'Espace est un ordre ou situation, mais un ordre des situations, ou selon lequel les situations sont rangées [...]*)" (G VII 415/L 714 (104))

reason, human as spirit can become conscious of these necessary truths. Since these truths depend only upon the understanding of God, that is, since their being truths is independent also from the will of God, they are necessary. Hence, since their being truths is independent from actuality, they are ideal. Since all contingent truths necessarily conform to necessary truths, all of things which emerge in experience, and therefore their relations conform to necessary truths.

As will be remembered, according to Leibniz, experience has priority in respect of human being's actual knowing. In order for a human being to perform the reflective and reasoning activities, experience must have emerged. But simple ideas that are brought into consciousness through reflection and that which is grasped through reasoning on the basis of simple ideas are neither something in experience nor a representation abstracted from them, but the ideas which also form the ground of the emergence of experience. Therefore, the role of experience is only creating opportunities.

Therefore, geometrical truths are not about the empirical or a concept that is acquired by abstracting from relations that emerge in experience, but are necessary truths that can be understood through the relation of coexistence given in the memory. Similarly, what makes possible our understanding of the necessary truths of arithmetic is the relation of succession which is given in memory and which is conceived as time in view of experience.

As can be seen, space and time as plenum that emerges in experience, the origin of the plenum that constitutes their content and also the necessity of geometrical truths can all be grounded in Leibniz's system of thought. What makes

these possible is Leibniz's conception of substance, which is independent from other created things in respects of both the material and the order of its activity.

As we have considered above, what determines the spatial and temporal order of those things which emerge in experience is, in Leibniz's system of thought, the relations of coexistence and succession that are given to soul through its aspect of memory. And this is what Kant desires to constitute as 'pure *a priori* intuition' in his system. The relations of succession and coexistence being given in the memory in Leibniz's system of thought determines the situations of things that will arise in experience independently from their emergence and from the perceptions in the monad aspect constituting the material. The reason that Kant also felt the need for pure *a priori* synthesis of intuition is the requirement that spatial and temporal situations be determined independently from appearances, if space and time are not to be properties of things that emerge in experience or general concepts that are abstracted from them. Accordingly, what Kant mean by space and time being *a priori* forms of sensibility should be that appearances are received as subject to the relations⁶⁷⁴ of coexistence and succession. However, since these, each as a relation cannot belong to sensibility which is a faculty distinct from thought, Kant suggests that these, being forms, belong to sensibility. Since the conditions of the faculty of thought, as well, must necessarily be –according to Kant- within the human being's activities of thought itself, it is not possible to say that the relations in question are given to the soul through its aspect which makes it think.

⁶⁷⁴In Kant's system, relation is one of the basic categories of understanding and like every category, it is possible only by determination of time.

We had determined that pure *a priori* synthesis of intuition, which is necessary for the constitution of experience in Kant's system, is not possible within the framework determined by Kant and stated that synthesis of appearances by imagination, is not possible, either.⁶⁷⁵ Now we would like to consider the reason for the impossibility of this synthesis and thus, to bring out into light that Kant's cancellation of the faculty of memory, because of which space and time cannot be constituted as pure relational determinations leads also to the consequence that neither correspondents in intuition nor space and time as sensible intuition can be grounded.

As will be remembered, in Kant's system, the contact of pure apperception as an act of thought with sensibility is only through imagination. And the only thing that imagination can touch is the inner form of sensibility. Therefore, constitution of space as sensible intuition together with its content, is possible only by the constitution of time. Representation of appearances in outer intuition is possible only on condition that they had been internalized or related in time, that is, on condition that time is constituted together with its content. Accordingly, we shall first consider the constitution of time.

IV.2. The problem of constituting time as sensible intuition

Emergence of any correspondent in intuition or sensible intuition in Kant's system of thought depends upon the activity of three basic faculties, as we have studied before. These are sensibility, imagination and original apperception. The

⁶⁷⁵See: III.5 Imagination

activities attributed to these faculties in Kant's system are synopsis, synthesis of those things which are made subject to a synopsis, and bringing into consciousness those which are synthesized.⁶⁷⁶ According to Kant, all these activities are at the same time activities of representing at different levels.⁶⁷⁷ However, since in order for something to be a representation in Kant's system, it must belong to consciousness and since such a thing is nothing to us as long as it does not belong to consciousness⁶⁷⁸, sensibility's activity of synopsis of and imagination's activity of synthesis cannot be thought independently from the original act of apperception. Similarly, sensibility's holding appearances together which is named as synopsis can

⁶⁷⁶“There are three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul (*Seele*) which contains the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind (*Gemüt*), namely, *sense, imagination, and apperception*. Upon them are grounded (1)the *synopsis* of the manifold a priori through sense; (2)the *synthesis* of this manifold through imagination; finally (3)the *unity* of this synthesis through original apperception. All these *faculties* have a transcendental (as well as an empirical) employment which concerns the form alone, and is possible a priori. (*Es sind aber drei ursprüngliche Quellen, (Fähigkeiten oder Vermögen der Seele) die die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit aller Erfahrung enthalten, und selbst aus keinem anderen Vermögen des Gemüts abgeleitet werden können, nämlich, Sinn, Einbildungskraft, und Apperzeption. Darauf gründet sich 1) die Synopsis des Mannigfaltigen a priori durch den Sinn; 2) die Synthesis dieses Mannigfaltigen durch die Einbildungskraft; endlich 3) die Einheit dieser Synthesis durch ursprüngliche Apperzeption. Alle diese Vermögen haben, außer dem empirischen Gebrauche, noch einen transz., der lediglich auf die Form geht, und a priori möglich ist.*)” (A95)

⁶⁷⁷“Sense represents appearances empirically in perception, imagination in association (and reproduction), apperception in the empirical consciousness of the identity of the reproduced representations with the appearances whereby they were given, that is, in recognition. (*Der Sinn stellt die Erscheinungen empirisch in der Wahrnehmung vor, die Einbildungskraft in der Assoziation (und Reproduktion), die Apperzeption in dem empirischen Bewußtsein der Identität dieser reproduktiven Vorstellungen mit den Erscheinungen, dadurch sie gegeben waren, mithin in der Rekognition.*)” (A115-6)

⁶⁷⁸“We are conscious a priori of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations which can ever belong to our knowledge, as being a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations. For in me they can represent something only in so far as they belong with all others to one consciousness, and therefore must be at least capable of being so connected. This principle holds a priori, and may be called the transcendental principle of the unity of the manifold in our representations, and consequently also in intuition. (*Wir sind uns a priori der durchgängigen Identität unserer selbst in Ansehung aller Vorstellungen, die zu unserem Erkenntnis jemals gehören können, bewußt, als einer notwendigen Bedingung der Möglichkeit aller Vorstellungen, (weil diese in mir doch nur dadurch etwas vorstellen, daß sie mit allem anderen zu einem Bewußtsein gehören, mithin darin wenigstens müssen verknüpft werden können). Dies Prinzip steht a priori fest, und kann das transzendente Prinzip der Einheit alles Mannigfaltigen unserer Vorstellungen (mithin auch in der Anschauung), heißen.*)” (A116)

be possible only with regard to the synthesis of imagination. Without the synthesis of imagination it is not possible to hold together the appearances received through outer sense,⁶⁷⁹ nor is it possible for pure apperception as an act of thought to contact sensibility immediately. Therefore, from amongst the activities of synopsis, association and bringing into consciousness which make possible the emergence of any intuition in Kant's system, the synthesis of imagination is the one that ought to be inquired into first. Kant studies this activity at three different levels and names it as a 'threefold synthesis'⁶⁸⁰. These are, in order, the synthesis of apprehension, reproduction and recognition.

The synthesis of apprehension⁶⁸¹ assumes that appearances are subjected to a synopsis by the forms of sensibility. To put it more explicitly, it assumes that appearances are apprehended as subject to coexistence and succession.⁶⁸² What is meant by 'apprehension' here is the combination by imagination of the impressions of the appearances in outer sense on the inner sense, thus rendering them suitable for the activity of thought. Therefore, it is the preparation of those which comes as coexistence into time as the form of inner sense, to be represented in time as sensible intuition.

⁶⁷⁹A97

⁶⁸⁰Ger. 'einer dreifachen Synthesis'

⁶⁸¹Ger. *Synthesis der Apprehension*

⁶⁸²·If each representation were completely foreign to every other, standing apart in isolation, no such thing as knowledge would arise. For knowledge is [essentially] a whole in which representations stand compared and connected. As sense contains a manifold in its intuition, I ascribe to it a synopsis. But to such a synopsis a synthesis must always correspond; receptivity can make knowledge possible only when combined with spontaneity. Now this spontaneity is the ground of a threefold synthesis which must necessarily be found in all knowledge [...] (*Wenn eine jede einzelne Vorstellung der anderen ganz fremd, gleichsam isoliert, und von dieser getrennt wäre, so würde niemals so etwas, als Erkenntnis ist, entspringen, welche ein Ganzes verglichener und verknüpfter Vorstellungen ist. Wenn ich also dem Sinne deswegen, weil er in seiner Anschauung Mannigfaltigkeit enthält, eine Synopsis beilege, so korrespondiert dieser jederzeit eine Synthesis und die Receptivität kann nur mit Spontaneität verbunden Erkenntnisse möglich machen. Diese ist nun der Grund einer dreifachen Synthesis, die notwendigerweise in allem Erkenntnis vorkommt: [...]*)' (A97-98)

The first point we would like note here is that unless time is given as succession, presence of appearances or their impressions in time will give possibility neither to a manifold, nor to a wholeness. The problem is not that its being known as a manifold or plurality is possible only upon the emergence of intuition.⁶⁸³ In so far as appearances do not contain a manifold in themselves and as space and time are considered as forms which can be filled only with appearance, one cannot think of any manifold that will appear as a manifold or plurality in intuition. As long as one stays at the level of sensibility, distinguishing space and time with respect to their contents is merely distinguishing that which make it possible to receive something from outside from that which makes it possible to provide something which imagination can contact from inside.⁶⁸⁴ If the distinction between sensibility and thought is to be preserved, with regard to consciousness, inner sense is also as outer as the outer sense.

Therefore, unless the consciousness is related with inner sense by imagination, even if there is a manifold in the content of time as claimed by Kant⁶⁸⁵, it is not possible to claim that the content of a single moment in time is an absolute unity. In Kant's system of thought, it is not possible for something, which is not related to consciousness even if indirectly, to be unity. Because of this reason it cannot be

⁶⁸³A99

⁶⁸⁴ "Whatever the origin of our representations, whether they are due to the influence of outer things, or are produced through inner causes, whether they arise a priori, or being appearances have an empirical origin, they must all, as modifications of the mind (*Gemüt*), belong to inner sense. All our knowledge is thus finally subject to time, the formal condition of inner sense. In it they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relation. (*Unsere Vorstellungen mögen entspringen, woher sie wollen, ob sie durch den Einfluß äußerer Dinge, oder durch innere Ursachen gewirkt seien, sie mögen a priori, oder empirisch als Erscheinungen entstanden sein; so gehören sie doch als Modifikationen des Gemüts zum inneren Sinn, und als solche sind alle unsere Erkenntnisse zuletzt doch der formalen Bedingung des inneren Sinnes, nämlich der Zeit unterworfen, als in welcher sie insgesamt geordnet, verknüpft und in Verhältnisse gebracht werden müssen.*)" (A99)

⁶⁸⁵A99

possible for the content of either individual moments or time in general to form a unity, since it is possible only depending upon the unity of consciousness. Consequently, to be a unity within themselves, individual moments of time are to depend upon the synthesis of apprehension, which is the lowest fold of the activity that imagination performs over time.

Kant assumes that the content of moments is a unity in view of inner sense, and describes imagination's activity of apprehension as running through the moments to hold them together:

Jede Anschauung enthält ein Mannigfaltiges in sich, welches doch nicht als ein solches vorgestellt werden würde, wenn das Gemüt nicht die Zeit, in der Folge der Eindrücke aufeinander unterschiede: denn als in einem Augenblick enthalten, kann jede Vorstellung niemals etwas anderes, als absolute Einheit sein. Damit nun aus diesem Mannigfaltigen Einheit der Anschauung werde, (wie etwa in der Vorstellung des Raumes) so ist erstlich das Durchlaufen der Mannigfaltigkeit und dann die Zusammennehmung desselben notwendig, welche Handlung ich die *Synthesis der Apprehension* nenne. [...] ⁶⁸⁶

Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a manifold only in so far as the mind (*Gemüt*) distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another; for each single representation, in so far as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity. In order that unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold (as is required in the representation of space) it must be first run through, and held together. This act I name *the synthesis of apprehension* [...]

First of all, even if absolute unity of a single moment is provided by its being taken into inner sense, as claimed by Kant, the essence of the imagination's synthesis of apprehension is holding together the representations in time in a single moment and rendering them recognizable, or it is the activity of internalizing them. And if we accept that this holding is accompanied by an act of consciousness, that which can be acquired is the consciousness of a single moment. This apprehension which is the holding of a single moment or the

⁶⁸⁶A99

Also see: A120

content of the consciousness of a moment which is an absolute unity, is either the whole of or a part of the impressions on inner sense.⁶⁸⁷ If it is the whole, then this apprehension does not provide an opportunity to recognize the moments in time as distinct from each other, because it is a single consciousness. If what is meant by the synthesis of apprehension is holding a part of the representations in inner sense, then this is not sufficient for this moment to be distinguished from other moments or for its content to be distinguished from other impressions on inner sense. What we are conscious of is the content of a single moment and neither imagination, nor therefore, consciousness has any contact with representations which are the contents of other moments (or which will constitute the content for other moments). Holding a part of the representations in inner sense within a moment and being conscious of them does not distinguish, or discern, that moment from others, in so far as it is consciousness of a single moment. As long as the consciousness of the moment is the consciousness of a part of representations, the remaining representations must necessarily be 'nothing to us', in Kant's terms. And when this consciousness is taken as the consciousness of the whole content of time, then it cannot be the consciousness of moments within time.

Therefore, the synthesis of apprehension, as imagination holding together either the whole or a part of the representations in time, which consist only of the impressions of the representations in outer sense on inner sense, can provide only

⁶⁸⁷If we take into consideration Kant's previous remarks and if we also consider his claim that the absolute unity of individual moments is provided in inner sense, we can think that what Kant means is holding a part of representations in a manner to correspond to individual intuitions. But when it is also considered that the wholeness of space as a sensible intuition depends upon the constitution of time as sensible intuition, it is obvious that imagination, by way of its synthesis of apprehension, has to hold together the entirety of the content of time.

the consciousness of a single moment. Therefore, it is not possible to run through moments and hold them together, or connect them, as a result of the synthesis of apprehension.

What Kant mainly aims to accomplish in terms of this act of imagination is, as he indicates in the name he gives to the act, to break the material in sensibility away from being subject to the conditions of sensibility and render it recognizable.⁶⁸⁸ It is the imagination's taking the impressions of inner sense up into its own activity, in order to prepare them for the acts of rendering recognizable, which acts it will perform later. But, consisting only of the consciousness of a single moment, the imagination's act of apprehension is not sufficient to break that material away from the conditions of sensibility and to synthesize it so as to provide the manifold in intuition.

For this, the whole content of inner sense must be taken up into intellectual activity in general, whether we name it as consciousness or thinking, and to be preserved there, so as to be ready for understanding or conceptualization. Discerning the content of inner sense according to the relation of succession can be possible only in this way. It is not possible for imagination to perform such an act. Therefore in Kant, the faculty of memory is necessary not only for the constitution of *a priori* intuition, but also for that of sensible intuition. Memory enables the connection of the material, which is provided somehow, to the human being's activity of knowing, by discerning that material according to the relation of succession. Therefore, the act which makes it possible to introduce the material

⁶⁸⁸“Since imagination has to bring the manifold of intuition into the form of an image (*Bild*), it must previously have taken the impressions up into its activity, that is, have apprehended them. (*Die Einbildungskraft soll nämlich das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung in ein Bild bringen; vorher muß sie also die Eindrücke in ihre Tätigkeit aufnehmen, d.i. apprehendieren.*)” (A120)

received by sensibility to thought is not the imagination's synthesis of apprehension, but must necessarily be the memory's act of discerning that material, folding it in its own *mekân*, according to its own conditions. We shall refer to this shortly as the act of preservation.

But, as long as we incorporate the faculty of memory within the activity of knowing through experience, or of human activity in general, it will no longer be possible for us to stay within the limits determined by Kant. It will not be possible to ground such a memory only in the limits of knowing of human being, which depends upon correspondent in intuition. One will need to state that a memory, which can never be a form devoid of content, is innate to the human. And this shows that attempting to ground experience by considering it as the activity in itself of the soul as a substance, and attempting to ground it in the activity of thought of an 'I', such that we shall never know what it is, are, indeed, very different from each other.

Memory or the faculty of preservation is necessary also for the synthesis of reproduction, which is the second fold of the synthesis of imagination.⁶⁸⁹ What Kant means by reproduction is re-synthesis of representations according to a certain rule, to render them suitable to be grasped by concepts, where representations, according to him, are held together by imagination's synthesis of apprehension:

⁶⁸⁹Even the example about empirical imagination Kant gives to explain the imagination's synthesis of reproduction shows that memory is required for imagination. In order that we can expect, depending upon our observation that certain things frequently arise following each other in experience, to see the succeeding thing when we see the preceding one, these things should have been taken up into our memory before the envisagement.

See: A100

Weil aber, wenn Vorstellungen, sowie sie zusammengeraten, einander ohne Unterschied reproduzierten, wiederum kein bestimmter Zusammenhang derselben, sondern bloß regellose Haufen derselben, mithin gar kein Erkenntnis entspringen würde, so muß die Reproduktion derselben eine Regel haben, nach welcher eine Vorstellung vielmehr mit dieser, als einer anderen in der Einbildungskraft in Verbindung tritt. Diesen subjektiven und empirischen Grund der Reproduktion nach Regeln nennt man die Assoziation der Vorstellungen.⁶⁹⁰

If, however, representations reproduced one another in any order, just as they happened to come together, this would not lead to any determinate connection of them, but only to accidental collocations; and so would not give rise to any knowledge. Their reproduction must, therefore, conform to a rule, in accordance with which a representation connects in the imagination with some one representation in preference to another. This subjective and *empirical* ground of reproduction according to rules is what is called the *association* of representations.

Kant states that the imagination's activity of reproduction cannot be objective, as long as it depends upon association which relies merely upon a subjective and empirical ground.⁶⁹¹ Being aware of the fact that grounding the rules (which will be named as categories when they come into contact with consciousness) of this association in view of thought only will not suffice for these rules to be the rules of the objectivity of the correspondent in intuition, Kant tries here to ground them also as the rules of objectivity as well. Therefore, in order that imagination synthesizes the material it apprehended, that material also needs to be reproducible and associable according to the same rule.⁶⁹² Kant names the ground of the associability of appearances as their affinity⁶⁹³, and states that the ground of this affinity is the original act of apperception.⁶⁹⁴

In this case Kant will also have to accept that the synopsis of appearances in sensibility depends upon the original act of apperception as an act of thought. It will

⁶⁹⁰A121

⁶⁹¹A121/122

⁶⁹²A121/122

⁶⁹³Ger. *Affinität*

⁶⁹⁴A122

be necessary to allow the original act of apperception, independently from and preceding the activity of imagination, to constitute an affinity and synopsis of appearances. As we have previously stated this will rule out the distinction Kant made between sensibility and the faculty of thought.

As seen, Kant, too, states that imagination's apprehension of the content of inner sense, holding it together and associating it does not suffice to constitute time as sensible intuition. In order that representations emerge in intuition in such a manner as to follow each other, there must be an affinity between the contents of these representations. Kant tries to provide that by relating them to a transcendental act of apperception, which is assumed to be one and the same. However, both because of the problems related to the foundation of the transcendental act of apperception, and also because this act has no immediate contact with sensibility in view of its being an act of thought, it is not possible to constitute any relationship among these appearances. Appearances, which we name as material with regard to experience, can have an affinity, if they belong to a substance, as is the case in Leibniz's system of thought. In this case, the origin of the conformity between the activities which depend upon experience of different humans will be the pre-established harmony, which the substances will have exposed by their activities.

If we return to the imagination's activity of reproduction, what is meant by this is carrying that which is held in a single moment to the next moment and reholding it in that moment, together with the content of that moment. Even if the affinity of appearances has been somehow provided, the activity of imagination will not suffice for reproducing the consciousness of one moment in the other. What is required from imagination is to associate one moment with another moment, which is, indeed, an

absolute unity completely different from the former; to envisage the former in the latter and synthesize the two together.⁶⁹⁵ To do that, the content of the first moment should be preserved and thus, it should be contained in the next moment, depending upon the relation of succession. In order that the content of the former moment be contained in the next one and thus, in order that experience may arise as the whole of the succession of moments, there must be an affinity among appearances; the relation according to which they will be disposed must be given; and in order that moments which are discerned in this manner be associated with each other, the representation in the consciousness of the content of one moment must be preserved and held together with that of the next one.

Therefore, in Kant's system, time as an intuition cannot be constituted together with its content which must necessarily be empirical. Constitution of time as sensible intuition requires the faculty of preservation. However, involvement of such a faculty in the constitution of experience is not possible within the limits Kant determined for the human being's activity of knowing.

IV.3. The problem of constitution of space as sensible intuition

As we have stated before, in Kant's transcendental thought, constitution of space as outer intuition depends upon the constitution of time as inner intuition. We have studied in the previous sections that in order for space to be constituted as outer intuition or as *mekân* of correspondents in intuition, first of all it is necessary that it should be synthesized as a pure *a priori* manifold, which is impossible given the fact that pure intuition of time is not possible as synthesis of *a priori* manifold. Similarly,

⁶⁹⁵B121

depending upon the impossibility of the constitution of time as a sensible intuition, constitution of space as the whole sensible outer intuition is not possible, either.

Yet, though related to the constitution of time, there are more outstanding problems that arise in the constitution of space as sensible intuition. In Kant's system of thought, constitution of space as sensible intuition has two aspects. The first one is to ground the aspects of space as sensible intuition or of the correspondents in intuition, which emerge in this *mekân*: those aspects which we can know by our concepts. These are, indeed, related to the constitution of our concepts and of the imagination's synthesis which makes them possible, of the pure act of apperception and of time, which is necessary for them to be possible. The other point is to ground the origin of plenum of space as sensible intuition. Since the plenum of space in intuition cannot arise out of concepts, Kant tries to ground space as the form of sensibility. We cannot fill and void space through thinking. We cannot affect things which emerge outside of us in intuition, merely through thinking. Therefore, though space, according to Kant, is dependent upon thought in so far as it is known, it must be something that is independent from thought with regard to the origin of the plenum it contains.

Furthermore, that those things which arise in outer intuition according to the conditions and possibilities of one who experiences are not completely products of the agent who experiences is necessary for Kant's thought to be able to distinguish its position from subjective idealism and to attribute empirical reality or actuality to things which emerge in outer intuition. Though objectivity and necessity are related to transcendental apperception as their grounds in Kant's system, in order for this act

not to be an act devoid of content. it must itself depend upon reception of material from outside, in the transcendental sense, through outer sense.

Accordingly, the origin of the plenum of space in experience, which cannot arise out of thought though it is subject to thought, is to be grounded at the level of space as the outer form of sensibility in Kant's system. The considerations Kant took into account here are those that are revealed by metaphysical and transcendental dissection of the concept of space. To repeat, these are that the necessity and universality, demanded by science, cannot be provided in so far as space is a concept acquired by abstracting from the properties or relations of things which we are faced with in experience and that it cannot objectively ground the plenum in experience, insofar as it is something that belongs merely to thought. To solve these problems, Kant concluded that space should not belong to things in themselves and should be a form which belongs not to the faculty of thought, but to the faculty of sensibility of one who experiences.

Just as that the ground of the plenum in experience should be the plenum of space as outer form of sensibility, since the plenum in experience is, indeed, nothing but the emergence of different correspondents in intuition in different places, the ground of the spatial differences in intuition should also be, according to Kant, space as the form of sensibility. Therefore, both the plenum and the multitude in space should be grounded at the level of sensibility.

In Kant's system of thought, appearances constitute the content of space which is the form of sensibility. Since the origin of appearances is the thing-in-itself, the

origin of plenum must necessarily be the thing-in-itself, as well.⁶⁹⁶ In this way space would have been filled with something, the origin of which must necessarily be outside of space, and it would have been allowed to be entered by something from outside of space. Once the space is opened to a material from outside of itself, grounding how this material is to be conserved will constitute a separate problem. In this case, new problems will arise also in the constitution of the wholeness of intuition.

Pointing to the thing-in-itself as the origin of the plenum of space, independently from the above considerations, will in fact mean that how space is filled cannot be known, since the thing-in-itself is outside of the limits of human knowledge. Therefore, the point that what the origin of the plenum of space is, which is revealed by the exposition of the concept of space, will remain ungrounded.

Furthermore, space as the outer form of sensibility will not suffice for objectively grounding the spatial relations of correspondents in intuition. If we assume that space as the form of sensibility holds appearances together, the only

⁶⁹⁶In the Critique of Pure Reason, while Kant explains the application of quantitative determinations of time to appearances, he relates reality (*Realität*), which is one of the quantitative determinations, to filling of inner sense. (A143/B182) But it is apparent that inner sense cannot be filled without receiving material through outer sense. In his work titled Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft in which he deals with all determinations of the concept of substance in view of categories (MAN AXX-XXI/MFNS 12(475-476)), he tries to ground that matter fills space through a repulsive force (*repulsive Kraft*) which is a moving force (*bewegende Kraft*). (MAN A36:Lehrsatz 2/MFNS 43(499)) Kant's purpose here is to constitute *a priori* everything that can be known *a priori* about matter, accordingly the basic concepts of natural science, in order to ground natural science metaphysically. (MAN AXX/MFNS 12(476)) For *a priori* constitution of these basic concepts within the limits Kant determined in the Critique of Pure Reason, these concepts should be synthesized independent from appearances filling the space, depending upon pure *a priori* intuitions of space and time. The objective validity of these concepts, on the other hand, rests on not transcending the limits of possible experience. Therefore, the space filled through the repulsive force of matter here needs to be the space of correspondents in intuition. Based on this, the explanations Kant offers in this work are not about the appearances' filling the form of space. However, based on the fact that the plenum of sensible intuition may not have any other ground but the plenum of the form of space, if we think that the form of space is also filled through a force in a similar manner, there is no possibility of knowing, and grounding, in any way such a force within the limits Kant determined for the human being's activity of knowing.

thing this could provide with regard to the correspondents in sensible intuition is the fact that their places in sensible intuition are different. That which should be grounded for correspondents in intuition, with regard to their spatial relations, is not only that their places are different, but also their situations with regard to each other. Space as the condition of sensible intuition is not something that merely enables correspondents in intuition to emerge in different places; it should also be an order. Since this order cannot originate from space merely as a form and since it cannot be related to appearances that fill the space in Kant's system, it will not have the objectivity and necessity, which Kant tries to constitute.

In Leibniz's system of thought, the origin of the plenum that arises in experience is the representations in the monad aspect of the soul. What makes it possible to comprehend that the plurality in experience is subject to an order is the relations of coexistence and succession in the memory aspect of soul. Their ground with regard to substance is the individual idea of the substance that determines the order of its activity. Monad, containing the representations, and memory, containing the ideas, are nothing but aspects of one and the same substance. The ground of the wholeness of representations, which is the origin of plenum in experience, is the unity of substance. There is no problem for things which emerge in a human being's experience to be the products of his subjective activity or to be associated to necessary truths, either. Human beings as spirits have the possibility of understanding the necessary truths through ideas in memory. The ground of all this is the creation which is subject to reason as the order of the truth.

Consequently, Kant's conception of experience is formed by keeping certain aspects of Leibniz's conception of experience. In doing so, however, Leibniz's

conception of experience is broken away from his conception of substance, which is its own ground. The most evident expressions of this in Kant's conception of experience are his statement that soul receives the material of experience from outside of itself and his attempt to derive the conditions of knowing this material from the human being's activity of thought. These, and the consequent cancellation of substance, are the reasons why Kant's conception of experience cannot be constituted.

APPENDIX

An overall presentation of the literature on Leibniz and Kant

The purpose of this section is to offer an overall presentation of Leibniz's works and their translations, of works we regard as significant with regard to the content of our dissertation on Leibniz's ontology and Kant's transcendental thought, and to emphasize that, to the best of our knowledge, an inquiry such as we have done in our dissertation has not been made.

Leibniz's works make up a long list. Our purpose here is not to present these works and their existing translations in an exhaustive manner. There are comprehensive studies that can be referred to about Leibniz's life and works. For an article that can be recommended in terms of content and scope, *see*:

Ariew, Roger and Daniel Garber, "G.W. Leibniz, life and works," in Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, ed. Nicholas Jolley, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995.

For a detailed presentation of works carried out until the first third of the last century, *see*:

Ravier, Emile, Bibliographie des Œuvres de Leibniz. Paris, 1937; *repr.* Hildesheim, Olms, 1966.

Since 1923, Berlin Academy of Sciences has been carrying out a study to cover all the works by Leibniz. In this study, the target is to compile Leibniz's works in about 120 volumes, under seven different series and in chronological order.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, ed. Preussischen (later: Deutsche) Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Darmstadt/Leipzig/Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1923- .

Most of the published works are accessible on Gallica website of Bibliothèque Nationale de France.

The works we have made particular use of during the development of our dissertation are stated below:

Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed. C.I. Gerhardt, 7 vols., Berlin, 1875-90; *repr.* Hildesheim. Georg Olms, 1978.

Leibnizens mathematischen Schriften, ed. C.I. Gerhardt, 7 vols., Berlin-Halle, 1849-63.

Der Briefwechsel von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz mit Mathematikern, ed. C.I. Gerhardt, Berlin, 1899; *repr.* Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1962.

Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz, ed. L. Couturat, Paris, 1903; *repr.* Hildesheim. Georg Olms, 1961.

Lettres et opuscules inédits de Leibniz, ed. L.A. Foucher de Careil, Paris, 1854; *repr.* Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1975.

Nouvelles lettres et opuscules inédits de Leibniz, ed. L.A. Foucher de Careil, Paris, 1857; repr. Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1971.

Essais de théodicée sur la bonté de dieu la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal, *chronologie et introduction* par J. Brunschwig, Paris, Garnier-Flammarion, 1969.

Principes de la nature et de la grâce: Monadologie et autres textes 1703-1716, *présentation et notes* de Christiane Frémont, Paris, GF-Flammarion, 1996.

Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain, *chronologie, bibliographie, introduction et notes* par Jacques Brunschwig, Paris, Garnier-Flammarion, 1990.

Recherches générales sur l'analyse des notions et des vérités: 24 thèses métaphysiques et autres textes logiques et métaphysiques, *introductions et notes* par Jean-Baptiste Rauzy, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1998.

The resources we have made particular use of from amongst Leibniz's works translated into English, on the other hand, are as follows:

Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. and trans. Leroy E. Loemker, Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 2nd ed. 1969.

Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1989.

New Essays on Human Understanding, ed. and trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Philosophical Writings, ed. by G.H.R. Parkinson; trans. Mary Morris and G.H.R. Parkinson, London, Dent, 1973.

The Leibniz-Arnould Correspondence, trans. H.T. Mason, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1967.

Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans. P. and A.M. Schrecker, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.

Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil, ed. Austin Farrar, trans. E.M. Huggard, La Salle, IL, Open Court, 1952.

The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, ed. H.G. Alexander, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1956.

De Summa Rerum: Metaphysical Papers 1675-1676, ed. and trans. G.H.R. Parkinson, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.

For metaphysical systems developed in the late 19th century and early 20th century under the influence of Leibniz particularly (and of Hegel to a certain extent),
see:

McTaggart, J.M.E., The Nature of Existence, edited by C.D. Broad, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1921.

Whitehead, A.N., Process and Reality (1929), edited by D.R. Griffin and D.W. Sherburne, New York – London, Free Press, 1978.

We could mention Ivor Leclerc as a name displaying a critical approach against Kant, starting particularly from Leibniz and partially from Whitehead:

Leclerc, I., The Nature of Physical Existence, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1972.

Studies carried out on Leibniz also form a huge amount of works. Here we will be content with naming certain works of the present time that guided the studies carried out on Leibniz. When regarded from this perspective, two significant works that have been determinative on discussions held about Leibniz in the past century belong to Russell and Couturat:

Russell, B., A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (1900), London, Allen & Unwin, 1937.

Couturat, L., La Logique de Leibniz d'après des documents inédits, Paris, Alcan, 1901; Hildesheim, Olms, 1961.

For a compilation of researches and discussions that originated from these two works named above and that reached the present time each in their relevant courses, *see*:

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Critical Assessments, edited by R.S. Woolhouse, London – New York, Routledge, 1994.

- Volume I: Metaphysics and its Foundations I: Sufficient Reason, Truth, Necessity.
- Volume II: Metaphysics and its Foundations II: Substances, their Creation, their Complete Concepts, and their Relations.
- Volume III: Philosophy of Science, Logic, and Language.
- Volume IV: Philosophy of Mind, Freewill, Political Philosophy, Influences.

The books mentioned below can be listed among some major works that are written about Leibniz and that are not included in the above compilation:

Parkinson, G.H.R., Logic and Reality in Leibniz's Metaphysics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965.

Rescher, N., The Philosophy of Leibniz, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1967.

Broad, C.D., Leibniz : An Introduction, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975.

McRae, R., Leibniz : Perception, Apperception, and Thought, Toronto, University of Toronto, 1976.

Kulstad, M., Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness, and Reflection, Munich, Philosophia Verlag, 1991.

For a detailed list of works on Kant see:

Kuehn, M. The Bibliography of Kant Literature, 1986-1996 Cumulative Issue, North American Kant Society.

Kant's works, which we have primarily taken into consideration during the development of our dissertation, are given below:

Kant, I., Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, nach der 1. und 2. orig. Ausg. hrsg. von Raymond Schmidt, 3. Aufl., Hamburg, Meiner, 1990.

Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K. Smith, second edition, MacMillan and Co., London, 1933.

Kant, I., Metaphysicae cum geometrica iunctae usus in philosophia naturali, cuius specimen I. continet monadologiam physicam (1756), Werkausgabe in 12 Bänden, Suhrkamp, Band II, 1994.

Kant, I., Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume (1768), Werkausgabe in 12 Bänden, Suhrkamp, Band II, 1994.

Kant, I., Die Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (1786), Werkausgabe in 12 Bänden, Suhrkamp, Band IX, 1994.

Kant, I., Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1970.

Kant, I., Theoretical Philosophy 1755 –1770, trans. and edited by D. Walford and Ralf Meerbote, Cambridge – New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

For a compilation of researches and discussions about Kant, which date until the present time, *see*:

Immanuel Kant Critical Assessments, Routledge, 1992.

- Volume I: Kant Criticism from his own to the Present Time, *edited by* R.F. Chadwick.
- Volume II: Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, *edited by* R.F. Chadwick and C. Cazeaux.
- Volume III: Kant's Moral and Political Philosophy, *edited by* R.F. Chadwick.
- Volume IV: Kant's Critique of Judgement, *edited by* R.F. Chadwick and C. Cazeaux.

The books below can be listed among some leading commentaries which are written about Kant but which are not included in the compilation above:

Smith, N.K., A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason', [1918], second edition, revised and enlarged, London, MacMillan and Co., 1930.

Strawson, P.F., The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Methuen & Co Ltd., 1966.

Bennett, J., Kant's Analytic, Cambridge University Press, 1966.

Bennett, J., Kant's Dialectic, Cambridge University Press, 1974.

For Kant's contact with Leibniz's ideas, and for Kant's view of Leibniz during the period Kant developed his transcendental thought, and on the status of studies carried out on Leibniz, see:

Wilson, Catherine "The Reception of Leibniz in the Eighteenth Century," in Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, ed. Nicholas Jolley, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Within all this literature, within the context of works we could have access to, the points that have been put forth in general, though they are opinions suggested on the relations between Leibniz's ontology and Kant's transcendental thought, remained restricted to either writing about the continuities between Leibniz and Kant based a non-critical approach, or to dealing with Leibniz on the basis of Kant's opinions. Eberhard's critiques can be named as an exception in this respect. See:

Allison, H.E. The Kant-Eberhard Controversy, Johns Hopkins, 1973.

As stated also by Allison, Eberhard's criticisms aimed at Kant are far from being systematic. Allison has gathered these criticisms under four different groups: Refusal of Kant's opinions regarding the limits of knowledge and the concept of transcendental *Schein*; proofs regarding the legitimacy of knowledge which is not sensible; criticism of Kant's opinions about sensibility and of his claims that mathematics relies upon synthetic *a priori* judgments; and last, opinions against the

philosophical significance and originality of Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments (*see*: p.6).

Eberhard's position against Kant's critical thought is to defend Leibniz and to show that Leibniz is either misunderstood or subjected to unfair criticisms by Kant. As we have already noted, our main concern in this dissertation is not to defend Leibniz's thought against Kant. Moreover, our view is that what Kant fundamentally opposes in Leibniz's thought is Leibniz's conception of substance and this opposition does not belong only to his critical period. Furthermore, we have to state that Kant's opposition to Leibniz is not so superficial as to be explained by misunderstandings.

Kant constitutes the critical thought, in a manner to form a continuity with his pre-critical period, by canceling Leibniz's conception of substance and the arrangements which such a cancellation requires. We think that this attempt of Kant is not related to his criticisms of the different aspects with respect to certain deficiencies he claims to be in Leibniz's thought, but rather that it originates from a choice.

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