

MUSICAL *PAIDEIA* IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*

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MUSICAL *PAIDEIA* IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*

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## DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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## ABSTRACT

### Musical *Paideia* in Plato's *Republic*

This thesis intends to unsettle, at least to some degree, the conviction that music, poetry and fine arts in general do not have a salient status in Platonic philosophy. To this end, the conception of musical education that we find in the *Republic*, in which there is a harsh criticism of poetry, is examined. First a picture of the education environment that harbors virtue is offered through a comparative review of dramatic and figurative examples from the dialogues that are involved with the themes of love and beauty such as the *Symposium* and *Lysis* in addition to the *Republic*. Then follows an articulation of Plato's imitation theory of fine arts together with its aesthetical, ethical and political outlooks. However in result of a scrutinization of the musical analysis that is expounded in *Republic III*, it is maintained that his understanding of fine arts is not limited with the notion of imitation and a conception of a type of fine arts, which stems from the virtuous soul rather than the appearances and which is based upon a knowledge of soul's nature, is detected in Platonic philosophy. In parallel, it is concluded that the birth of the virtue of moderation in the education community is obtained by the blending of the teacher's virtuous soul with the sensual desires of the student whose soul is by nature capable of virtue, in the context of musical practice. On the other hand, lastly, the virtue of courage is inspected to be generated in the community by the elements of sensual beauty that arise from the communal harmony and that represent virtue in a beautiful way so that they entice the student into virtue and preclude him from deserting true opinion.

## ÖZET

### Platon'un *Devlet*'inde Müzikal *Paideia*

Bu tez Platoncu felsefede şiirin, müziğin ve genel olarak bütün güzel sanatların önemli bir yeri olmadığı kanısını biraz olsun sarsmak niyetindedir. Bunun için, Platon'un metinlerinde şairlere getirilen eleştirilerin belki de en sertini bulduğumuz *Devlet* diyalogunda verilen müziğe dayalı eğitim anlayışı incelenmektedir. Önce *Devlet* diyalogunun yanı sıra *Semprozyum* ve *Lysis* gibi aşk ve güzellik temalarını barındıran başka diyaloglardan da dramatik ve imgesel örnekler verilip birbirleriyle karşılaştırılarak erdemın ortaya çıkacağı eğitim ortamının bir resmi çizilmeye çalışılmıştır. Ardından Platon'un güzel sanatlara ilişkin taklit kuramı içerdiği estetik, etik ve politik bakış açılarıyla beraber ele alınmıştır. Ancak *Devlet III*'e dair yapılan incelemeler ile beraber onun güzel sanatlar kuramının yalnızca taklit anlayışıyla sınırlı kalmadığı sonucuna varılmış, kaynağını görünüşten değil erdemli ruhtan alan ve ruhun doğasının bilgisine dayanan bir sanat anlayışının Platon felsefesinde bulunduđu tespit edilmiştir. Bu doğrultuda, ölçülülük erdeminin eğitim topluluğunda doğmasının, öğretmenin erdemli ruhunun, erdeme doğal bir yatkınlığı bulunan öğrencinin duyumsal güzelliğe duyduğu arzuyla, müzik çalışmaları ortamında bir araya gelmesiyle sağlandığı sonucuna varılmıştır. Diğer yandan, son olarak, topluluk ruhunun uyumundan doğan duyumsal güzellik öğelerinin, öğrenciyi erdemın güzel görünüşlerine aşık ederek, onun doğru sanıdan ayrılmasını önlediği ve bu etkenin de toplulukta cesaret erdeminin doğmasında önemli bir rol oynadığı saptanmıştır.

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I dedicate this work to all of my loves beginning from my early childhood yet mostly to the greatest and truest of all, D. I also dedicate it to all of my friends of music, philosophy and life, as well as my dear teachers. For this work, which is not a written one but of soul, is not mine at all but ours. I am grateful to my family for all the things that they have done for me and for all the love that we have shared. I also express my gratitude to TÜBİTAK for providing me with financial support during my graduate studies.

In the name of sweet Muses

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The question of fine arts is a much discussed topic in the Platonic scholarship. On the one hand, we observe that Plato makes significant use of poetical, allegorical language in his works, that he throws upon us myths, stories or imageries at the climax of thought, that he tries to communicate his meaning through the dramatic structure and on the other he charges and criticizes severely the tragedians, comedians and poets. It is a commonplace that the *Republic* clearly displays this awkward position of his towards the fine arts. In this dialogue, Socrates and his friends try to come up with the best possible city. In doing so, they leave out the tragedians, comedians and poets but they also agree that the education system is to be founded upon music. Hence we are at a loss as to the position of Plato with respect to fine arts and this work aims at resolving this issue.

Another concern is tied up with the first one. Since there is an obscurity cast upon the topic of music or poetry, it becomes troublesome to understand Plato's view on education in the first half of the dialogue as well. Whereas the pedagogy of the first half of the book is about the guardians who are the defenders of the state, the exposition of education in the second half is devoted to the proper philosophical education of the rulers of the just city. But the rulers are selected among the guardians. That is, the education of the guardians that Socrates constitutes by music and gymnastics is shared by the philosopher-kings who grow up to become the rulers of the just city. Since Plato preserves another type of education for the philosopher-kings only it is generally thought that the musical *paideia* (that is, education and culture in general) that is presented in the first half operates at a level of opinion (*doxa*). In other words it is claimed that the education of the guardians of the just city

is carried out either by the transmission of the morally purified content or by the impression of sober types of harmony or rhythm. I will try to demonstrate that although such affections are indeed at play in the doctrine of education of *Republic III* and even that it plays a unique role, it constitutes only one half of the education of virtue, that is, the persuasion of the correct moral beliefs which is characteristically pertinent to the virtue of courage. We will find out that Plato offers another way of education which is based upon a layered structure of love (*erōs*) and beauty (*kalos*), in order for the guardians partake of the virtue of moderation (*sophrosyne*) as well.

In chapter two we take a look at a bundle of dramatic scenes and some alleged historical facts about the ancient Greek culture and education from the corpus of Platonic dialogues, mostly middle period. Hence our entrance into the Platonic collection of *logos* is dominantly marked by a gaze into the theatrical and historical images of the dialogues instead of a direct theoretical exposition of Plato's philosophy and yet we are not philosophically unjustified for beginning our inquiry as such from a Platonic outlook. It is true that there is a sense in which Platonic knowledge (*episteme*) is free from both sensation (*aisthēsis*) and opinion; but it is equally true that, according to Plato, the way to knowledge commences at either of these levels, as we learn from the allegory of the divided line in the *Republic* (509d – 511e), the ladder of love in the *Symposium* (210a – 212a) or the praise on madness of love in the *Phaedrus* (243e – 257b).

In this way chapter two helps us to familiarize ourselves with some basic Platonic notions that are crucial to our discussion through their various manifestations in drama or imagery. Accordingly the first section of this chapter is devoted to the portrayal of part-whole relationship (or the concept of one and many) that will be the grounding principle of our analysis of music, in the dramatic action

of *Republic I*. In the next section we focus on the way in which the imagery of light is situated inside the drama of the first book and eventually compare it to the figure of light that is present in the *Phaedrus*' praise on the madness of love. We also reflect upon a particular instance of Socrates' self controlled conduct. It turns out that the imagery of light bears mainly ethical connotations and is associated with notions such as love, beauty, moderation and pleasure. We take a brief look at the *Lysis*, *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* to see how love and speech constitute a context for generation of virtue that will be interpreted as the environment of the guardians' education by the end of our thesis.

In the end of this section we introduce the discussion of poetry. Then, in section 2.3, beginning with *Republic II*, we bring into view the authoritative status of poetry together with public meetings, religious traditions and public opinion in the culture and education of ancient Greek period as is critically presented by Glaucon and Adeimantus, the main interlocutors of the dialogue apart from Socrates. Next section, expanding into book three, displays Socrates' effort to describe the elements of a culture, education and music that are free from Glaucon and Adeimantus' criticisms. We elaborate here more on the image of light viewing new instances and also consider the issues that pertain to the different types of dramatic characters. Through our discussion of books two and three we will see that Plato's criticism of poetry is not based upon an aesthetic framework that is concerned exclusively with the sensible aspect of a work but rather upon ethical and political considerations which involve matters of justice and social order. From this ethical and political outlook, poetry will be vulnerable to serious attacks given its powers of persuasion through sensible beauty and charm.

After presenting, in chapter three, the notions with which *mimetic* poetry is associated in *Republic X*, we carefully distinguish, in chapter four, the nature of educative music that is given in *Republic III* from that of *mimēsis*. Hence, discovering that Plato actually lays down the principles of what may be called *true* or *genuine* music, we conclude that there is indeed an important and esteemed place for fine arts in Plato's thought contrary to the widely accepted view. But this determination will prove to be problematic in purposes of education in contrast to the *mimetic* music that is aimed at affecting or charming the soul. Having seen, in chapter three, that purified *mimetic paideia* plays an important role in the realization of social order in the just city, it will be seen likely that the music that is employed in the guardians' education is essentially *mimetic*; but this will not hold as will be demonstrated in the last chapter.

Thus musical *paideia* is our final topic. We begin by introducing the character of the true musician and we find that, for Plato, the *genuine* musician does have knowledge of some kind, namely of soul, and therefore he is not epistemologically doomed to a level of appearances. This knowledge of the true musician will be understood as the effective factor for the guardians' progression towards virtue; but not the only one. Indeed we will learn from the *Symposium* that in order for virtue to arise, a balanced gathering of different types of soul (that is, the *erotic* student and the wise teacher) in the community of education, i.e. a beautiful environment, is required. *Erōs* and sensual beauty will prove to be the prerequisites for virtue to arise. Lastly we will see that in the emergence of courage, sensual beauty plays a more operative role than it does for that of moderation.

## CHAPTER 2

### INITIATION INTO THE PLATONIC DISCOURSE BY IMAGES

#### 2.1 Unity and multiplicity in the atmosphere of dialogue

The *Republic* opens with the scene in which Socrates who has gone down to the Piraeus, the harbor of Athens, is being coerced by Polemarchus, Adeimantus and couple of their friends not to head back home. He has descended there together with Glaucon in order to offer his prayers to the goddess Bendis and also to see the inaugural religious procession taking place in the name of this divinity. Although Socrates deems beautiful (*kalē*) both parades (*pompē*) of the Athenians and Thracians,<sup>1</sup> when the ceremony comes to an end, without wasting much time, he sets off for his hometown, Athens, accompanied by Glaucon; nevertheless, Polemarchus, having detected from afar that they are departing, orders his slave-boy to tell them to wait for him and his companions. Polemarchus lives in the Piraeus and there is going to be a gathering in his residence due to the religious festivities. The very first thing that he resorts to, in taking Socrates and Glaucon, who are most probably unawares that there will be a torchlight race and additional celebrations at night, to the gathering at his home is to draw attention, playfully and yet in a way that will prove effective, to the greatness of his group both in number and in physical power. In the face of this compulsion, Socrates answers thus: “Isn't there still one other possibility, I said, our persuading you that you must let us go?”<sup>2</sup> (327c)

It seems that, here, Plato indicates to us an ethical and political distinction.

That is, the difference between agreement through dialogue and imposition by force.

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<sup>1</sup> Goddess Bendis is originally a part of Thracians' religious culture, however, she is embraced by Greeks as well.

<sup>2</sup> I use the following edition of the *Republic* for direct quotations throughout this thesis: Plato. (1991). *The Republic of Plato* (A. Bloom, Trans.) USA: Basic Books. I cite, in a footnote, the edition of a dialogue that I employ in the thesis when I make a direct quotation from it for the first time; if I do not give a direct passage from the dialogue, I refer to the edition that I use in the references list.

This distinction may be considered in parallel with the ontological contrast between a whole whose parts stand together in a harmonious way and a multiplicity in which conflicting items merely stand next to each other by coercion. In the entirety of the *Republic* we find these two parallel oppositions as fundamental and decisive principles of explanation both explicitly in crucial points of theoretical discussion and implicitly in drama.

For example, the ontological structure of a city and human soul, as well as the features of their various kinds are examined by means of the contrast between harmonious whole and dispersed multiplicity.<sup>3</sup> Plato argues that justice in a city or a soul emerge when each part of them function properly with respect to its own purpose. Moderation is brought about, on the other hand, just when all the parts operate harmoniously by virtue of their willing agreement on the rule of the best part, that is, philosopher-king(s) and reason respectively. Accordingly Plato explains injustice in terms of the conflict between various parts that arises out of a domination of an inferior part upon the whole and their consequential failure to unify.

In parallel we see the ethical-political distinction through the vivacity of dramatic content and within the framework of human relations, in that part of the first book which begins with Thrasymachus' harsh and enraged renunciation of the reasoning that is carried out by Socrates and Polemarchus and especially of the manner in which it is put into operation (336b): Thrasymachus, having followed the conversation that investigates the nature of justice, for quite an amount of time, together with a group of acquaintances, displays a wild and obstinate attitude in articulating his objections and hence, behaves against the atmosphere of unity and

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<sup>3</sup> Analysis of just city and soul in which an understanding of injustice is also attained covers whole of *Republic IV*; various types of unjust government and man are inspected throughout *Republic VIII* and at the initial parts of IX. For explicit articulation of the said contrast, see 422e – 423d, 443d – e; 551d, 554d – e, 556d, 559e – 560a.

peace that is born of discursive activity. Until the end of this book, we witness how Socrates persuades him out of his view that might is right, through dialogue, by making him attend to *logos* and not by forcing him despotically to accept the opposite opinion. Socrates, instead of attempting a harsher denial than Thrasymachus, opts for trying to smooth his wild manners (344d – 346a, 348a – b, 349a, 350d – e, 351d) and incorporate him into the group of interlocutors (354a)<sup>4</sup> that may well be assessed to be characterized by a desire for learning the truth about justice.<sup>5</sup>

Thrasymachus, as we said, is marked by his stubbornness, discordance and fierce. He tries to impose his ideas and alter them unnoticed in order to win the argument. He is also unwilling to pay heed to the speech. The hot discussion between him and Socrates, who, on the other hand, puts forward an opposite mild attitude but without giving up *elenchos* in speech, reminds us of the exchange between Polemarchus, Socrates and Glaucon in the beginning of the dialogue. When Socrates, upon being forced to remain in the Piraeus, offers to discuss the issue, Polemarchus

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. 450a – b as a later evidence of Thrasymachus' integration into community where he joins in the effort to make Socrates elaborate further on the culture of the just city, and in a friendly manner alludes to his earlier dispute with Socrates. Also see 498c – d where Socrates speaks of him as a friend against Adeimantus' provocation.

<sup>5</sup> For listeners' keen interest in the conversation between Socrates and Polemarchus, we may note 336b where it is stated that those who were sitting next to Thrasymachus precluded him from interfering with the dialogue because they wanted to hear the argumentation till the end. See 332d ff. for Polemarchus' sensibly voicing of his objection, and parallel willingness to lend his ears to Socrates contrary to Thrasymachus. Also see the initial parts of *Rep. II* for Glaucon's desire for being *truly* persuaded rather than only in a seeming way (357a – b), Adeimantus' eagerness to present the antithesis of Glaucon's exposition so that it can be understood more clearly (362c – e) and Socrates' enthusiastic appreciation of their well-put speeches at 367e – 368a, specifically of Glaucon's at 361d. Finally (indeed not exhaustively), see 368c4 – 6 where Glaucon and the others, that is, the whole audience, convince Socrates to carry out a comprehensive investigation of the nature of justice. More importantly, though, note how Socrates emphasizes Glaucon and Adeimantus' internal attachment to justice against their own words favoring injustice at 368a5 – b1 and extends this love of justice (or truth) to himself in a passionate way ("it might be impious", "while I am still breathing and able to make a sound") at 368b7 – c3 and thus originates the whole *logos* of the just city by *erōs* of truth and justice rather than that of mere *logos*. In this way, at the outset of a major philosophical inquiry, he shifts the *erotic* focus of dialogue from its previous mode, that is, mere speech (which is exemplified by the cases of Polemarchus and Thrasymachus) to truth, trying to ignite a love of truth, particularly, a love of true justice, in the community.



responds as follows: “Could you really persuade, he said, if we don't listen? There's no way, said Glaucon. Well, then, think it over, bearing in mind we won't listen.” (327c) However, compared to Thrasymachus’ coercive and savage manners, Polemarchus’ imposition upon Socrates and Glaucon proves to be a friendly gesture that expresses a wish to be together with loved ones at a day of celebration, considering his backing up Adeimantus who tries to balance Polemarchus’ gesture by giving real reasons for them to stay. What is more, we see, at 321d – 336a, that he is willing to “listen to *logos*” in his conversation with Socrates contrary to his own words at 327c and contrary to Thrasymachus as well, although the argument does not proceed in favor of his suggestions. Further, in the beginning of the fifth book, he happens to be the one, together, again, with Adeimantus, who compels Socrates to elaborate more on the issue of community of women and children, and thus lead the *Republic* to be extended into its climax. Hence we may judge that Polemarchus, although he is associated with compulsion, represents a compatible part in the community of interlocutors which is administered by, at one instance, a desire to be together with friends and at another, a desire to learn;<sup>6</sup> whereas Thrasymachus’ coercion to convey his conviction that might is right to others is governed by a blind force, that is, a desire to dominate, and therefore, is to be restrained, though, not by taking severe measures against it or exclusion from society but by persuasion of reason that results in the integration of the marginal part as a positive element into public; and this is the course of action taken by Socrates. Indeed, under the supervision of Socrates, Thrasymachus’ original discordance results in Glaucon and Adeimantus’ further questioning the topic and hence, yielding indirectly further discussion (which, in turn, itself turns out to be prolific), contributes to the

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<sup>6</sup> Note that he is said to be oriented towards philosophy in *Phaedrus* 257b.

unification of the interlocutors' community. Noting that these examples from the dramatic aspect of the dialogue will serve as illuminative cases for our later discussions and that the ethical-political and ontological distinctions that we have drawn in the beginning will be fundamental in our understanding of community of education and music, let us now return to what Adeimantus and Polemarchus have to offer to make Socrates and Glaucon stay in the Piraeus.

## 2.2 *Erōs*, virtue and speech

Then Adeimantus said, Is it possible you don't know that at sunset there will be a torch [λαμπάς] race on horseback for the goddess? On horseback? I said. That is novel. Will they hold torches and pass them to one another while racing the horses, or what do you mean? That's it, said Polemarchus, and, besides, they'll put on an allnight [παννυχίδα] festival that will be worth seeing. We'll get up after dinner and go to see it; there we'll be together with many of the young men and we'll talk [διαλεξόμεθα]. So stay and do as I tell you. And Glaucon said, It seems we must stay. Well, if it is so resolved, I said, that's how we must act. (328a)

At the very beginning of the dialogue, we have seen Socrates as a pious person who shows respect and interest even towards a non-Greek goddess to such an extent as to offer prayers to her; as someone who is curious about great religious gatherings of public, and we have learned that he deemed the processions in honor of the goddess beautiful. It is understood, on account of Adeimantus and Polemarchus' quite long plans regarding the rest of the day, that this religious celebration has taken place during daytime. Furthermore, we can conclude, from the fact that the celebration included processions, that there were poetry, music and dancing involved in the festivity. Indeed, the same thing may also be said to be valid for the night festival (*pannykhis*) that Polemarchus speaks of. It seems that the basic difference of the activities that will occur at night from those that have taken place in the morning is that, apart from the fact that they will be veiled under the darkness of nighttime, they contain a sports event, that is, the torchlight (*lampas*) race on horseback. However, in

spite of all these events that are “worth seeing” and the pledge to converse with youngsters, which is what Socrates likes best, neither Glaucon nor Socrates seem to be excited or desirous for the upcoming affairs: “And Glaucon said, It seems we must stay. Well, if it is so resolved, I said, that's how we must act.” (328b) On the other hand, it would also not be quite accurate to assume that they submit to Polemarchus and his companions altogether unwillingly; because, there is a possibility to plausibly interpret Glaucon and Socrates’ show of unwillingness and unchallenging surrender as a participation, on their part, in Polemarchus’ tyrannical gesture.

Now, if we are to leave Glaucon’s case aside and dig further into the reasons as to why Socrates might be playfully participating in this gesture, we might think that he is acting with an effort to self-control when confronted with such pleasant and provocative plans. As I have noted earlier, Socrates likes to come together with young, good-looking and politically or philosophically promising fellows and to have discussions with them regarding the most important and serious issues in human life.<sup>7</sup> Yet, these conversations that usually take the renowned format of Socratic questioning do not come to mean merely attempts for reaching the truth regarding the particular topic at hand, but also signify for Socrates, as well as for his partner(s), a tension, an affair of love (*erōs*) which is distinct from, although neither

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<sup>7</sup> In *Theatetus* 142a – 144e and *Charmides* 153a – 156d, we observe Socrates being eager to be cognizant of and introduced to the most attractive or talented youngsters from his own perspective, as he himself inquires into the issue, interrogating other fellows in the community; whereas, in *Lysis* 203b – 204c and *Protagoras* 309a – 310a, we see Socrates is being treated and addressed by others as a lover of beauty of youth. For a comparison of Socrates’ love for physical beauty and for wisdom in the last passage, see Nussbaum (1986, pp. 91 – 94). Also see Alcibiades’ account of Socrates’ seeming desire for bodily beauty in *Symposium* 216d – 219e. Finally, for love of boys in general view *Republic* 474d – e.

exclusive of nor irrelevant to, love of wisdom (*philosophia*).<sup>8</sup> When Socrates engages in conversations with young people, especially with those who are endowed with a distinguished beauty, he, facing up to their glamour, tries to keep on with the discussion without losing his spiritual integrity.<sup>9</sup> Since there is a possibility of losing oneself (*mania*), challenged by charming beauties, it is fitting for someone to approach moderately towards his beloved in speech, thoughts and deeds and not be so much demonstrative and explicit in these respects. To wit, if we are to respond to our *erotic* side, which moves us in an irrational<sup>10</sup> and blind manner, with an approval of immoderate actions and excessively sentimental public declarations of love, then it would be much too difficult for us to win the favor of the beloved, let alone keeping our spirit integrated or managing our own business.

Such a lover, namely, Hippothales, who is troubled by *erotic mania*, is portrayed by Plato in the dialogue *Lysis*: The young Hippothales is desperately in love with Lysis, who is acclaimed for his beauty and outshines those who are of his

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<sup>8</sup> See *Charmides* 155c – e where Socrates can only stammer because of his ecstasy of love during his conversation with Charmides. At 156d we see that Socrates gains his confidence upon Charmides' positive responses and keeps on philosophical inquiry.

<sup>9</sup> See *Charmides* 155c – 156d for Socrates' description of himself as in ecstasy of physical love at the beginning of his conversation with alluring and poetically auspicious Charmides. The *Charmides* is, as the scholars are used to call it, an *aporetic* dialogue on moderation, i.e. *sophrosyne* (An *aporetic* dialogue is a dialogue which, typically, follows an *elenchos* and which ends in a puzzlement (*aporia*) on the part of the interlocutors as to what to approve or reject with respect to the matters that come up in the discussion.). Plato's choice of posing a poetically oriented student of Critias' school as the dramatic character in point is very much suggestive of the relationship between music and *sophrosyne* or self-control, as rendered by Waterfield (2005). The fact that this foremost student of poetry is, also, exhibited to be the most physically attractive young fellow among his age relates these two issues to that of *erōs*. This triple relation between fine arts, virtue and *erōs* is a main consideration in this thesis, which ventures to extract a Platonic doctrine of ethical and political education from the alleged connection.

<sup>10</sup> I take the widely used philosophical term, 'rational', having in mind its sense of mathematical ratio. In our specific application of the term, the mathematical ratio qualifies a motion on the part of the soul and it is not prone to generate order in the soul. Another connotation that is carried by the 'ratio' of 'rational', I take to be issuing from its Latin original, *ratio*, which means reckoning or reason. Thus, understood within the context of Platonic doctrine of soul, 'rational', through the mediation of its Latin root, would come to refer to man's reasoning part (as called in its original, *logistikon*). *Logistikon* may be referred to as the seat of *logos* in the soul and our 'irrational' part is not, generically, at peace with *logos* but has to be persuaded by *logos* via the powers of its beautiful mode for an agreement with *logos* (See the entire *Republic IV* for the analysis of soul. Indeed, as I have already mentioned, the whole *Republic* greatly feeds on the specific conceptualization of soul).

age. Not having the due courage to associate with his beloved and not knowing how to converse with him, he is in need of the counsel of Socrates, who is knowledgeable in matters of love. Socrates' advice is two-fold. First Hippothales has to give up chanting love poetry in honor of Lysis so that his beloved does not become haughty and harder to capture. Second he has to engage in serious conversations with him on important topics of life. This, Socrates does not say in words but shows, filling up the main body of dialogue, in actual practice by speaking to Lysis himself about friendship. Socrates chooses to engage in actual conversation with Lysis instead of directly counseling Hippothales for his troubles of love. By this, Socrates situates himself, Lysis, Hippothales and the other characters within a context of *erōs* and discourse. Of course the discussion is about human virtue. At this particular instance it is about friendship. In the last chapter of this thesis, we will come to learn that the reason for Socrates' opting for action instead of verbal instruction lies in the specific style in which moderation should be taught.

In his two major dialogues on love, the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, Plato exhibits the relevance of *erōs*, virtue and speech. Discourse with our loved ones on the topic of virtue provides us an ethical and political context in which we can reach *aretē*. The first step in the *Symposium*'s ladder of love which takes the soul towards virtue and truth is “to love just one person's body and to give birth in that medium to beautiful reasoning (λόγους καλούς).”<sup>11</sup> (210a) In the *Phaedrus* we are told that *logos* of the lover uncovers the beauty of his soul in the eyes of the beloved (255b). The relationship of love is described as a context in which the lover and the beloved becomes god-like (252d – 253c).

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<sup>11</sup> Plato. (1994). *Symposium*. (R. Waterfield Trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rendering of *logous* as “speech” instead of “reasoning” would be more proper here since *logos* at this level of the ladder of love probably includes poetry, myth or even music in general.

However this context of *erōs* and *logos* does not automatically bestow the lover and the beloved virtuous. Rather it is vulnerable to collapse into evil behavior and *hybris*, that is presumptuousness or unbridled conduct. The *Phaedrus* presents this idea by means of the imagery of light: A beam of light flows from the beloved into the lover and this light of the beloved's beauty either makes the lover initiate the journey of truth or stimulates him for uncontrolled sexual pleasure (250d ff.).

Although it has been argued contemporaneously that as the philosopher progresses in his assent to beauty itself, which is the ultimate stage of the ladder of love, he leaves behind the inferior objects of love and dismisses them, this is not our interpretation of the *Symposium's scala amoris*. Rather we hold, together with Nehamas (2007), that "Plato does not believe that philosophers, say, leave them [lower desires] behind." (p. 6) Nehamas argues that "the *Symposium* does not distinguish between the 'physical' and the 'spiritual' or the 'mental' nearly as starkly as we are often tempted to think. It is not even clear whether the desire to have children is absent from anyone, even from the most perfect philosopher." (p. 5) He goes on to point out that Socrates had two children and he even had a specific favorite, namely Alcibiades, when it comes to love of individuals (pp. 4 – 6). The togetherness of different levels of *erōs* in the philosopher will be an important notion for us in explaining the relationship of the musical teacher to the student. We will see, in chapter five, that the context of love and speech in which virtue is generated underlies the musical education of the guardians of the just city that is articulated in *Republic III*.

To return to our examination of the *Republic*, in the very beginning we observe an image of light, that is the morning sunlight under which the prayers and religious processions, which are assessed to be beautiful, take place. Again in the

introductory scene we find another instance of the figure of light. This time, however, it is not actually present like the direct morning sun but is situated inside an offer for the night plans: the imagery of *lampas* flaming in the dark. Further it might be suggested that sexuality and intoxication, differently from the religious festivities of daytime, are going to get into the picture on the occasion of evening celebrations and activities. Hence especially when we consider the two-fold possibility of the impact of beauty upon us, the torchlight seems to be indicative of numerous cases of sensual beauty, not just skillful bodily movement and the excitement of the huge crowd in the horse race with which it is associated, but also poetry, music, dance, food, intoxication and sexuality. Accordingly we should think of the horse race and the nighttime celebration as events that tempt Socrates but from which he stays away on account of their *erotic* nature.

Let us keep on reading the first book to see the first utterances regarding the poets before we pass on to the second book. The group of Socrates, Polemarchus and their friends arrives home, and Socrates begins conversing with Polemarchus' father Cephalus about old age since Cephalus seems to him pretty aged. Then Cephalus relates something that he heard from the tragedian Sophocles in his old age.

I was once present when the poet was asked by someone, 'Sophocles, how are you in sex? Can you still have intercourse with a woman?' 'Silence, man,' he said. 'Most joyfully did I escape it, as though I had run away from a sort of frenzied and savage master.'

Plato will elaborate on the repressive domination of *erōs* over the human soul and on that of a tyrant over his people in terms of the distinction between harmonious unity and scattered multiplicity throughout the whole dialogue. But what is more relevant for our purposes is that here we see, the first time in the *Republic*, the poet's

authority in the discussions of ethical matters.<sup>12</sup> Sophocles, the poet, is portrayed within a group of people commenting on the effects of *erōs* upon his personality and Cephalus, an ordinary citizen, is portrayed relating to his friends and children what he heard from the poet regarding an ethical issue.

Following Sophocles, Cephalus goes on to cite from another poet, Pindar. Cephalus seems to have a tendency to buttress his ethical views by referring to the poetical tradition. (As we will demonstrate in the next section, according to Plato, poetry has a great impact on society's *ēthos*, that is, character or disposition.<sup>13</sup> In section 2.4 we will see how Socrates discards various immoral qualities of poetry from the culture of the just city and in chapter three Plato's critical conception of poetry will be presented.) Then Polemarchus intervenes in the exchange between his father and Socrates by defending the view that "justice is doing good to friends and harm to enemies" (332d) on account of an ostensible testimony on the part of Simonides, and in this way Socrates begins to investigate his suggestion with him (331d – e). However this definition, which might be thought to be wide-spread among the ancient Greeks, is rendered untenable in the course of the discussion and Socrates states that it should be attributed to Homer rather than Simonides:

The just man, then, as it seems, has come to light as a kind of robber, and I'm afraid you learned this from Homer. For he admires Autolycus, Odysseus' grandfather on his mother's side, and says he surpassed all men in stealing and in swearing oaths. (334a – b)

Afterwards, he concludes that it is not right to impute to Simonides, whom he qualified earlier as "wise and divine" (331e), a view that associates justice with

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<sup>12</sup> To be sure, the first mention of a poet is when Socrates designates old age by the poetic phrase "the threshold of old age" at 329e. Bloom (1991, p.441) attributes the phrase to Homer in his footnote 12. Thus we observe that the first mention of the poetic tradition comes from Socrates, who will criticize Homer throughout the whole discussion of the *Republic*.

<sup>13</sup> I understand this term together with its shortened form *ethos*, which means custom or habit since customs and life-styles are closely related with character according to Plato.



faring evil towards whomever: “We shall do battle then as partners, you and I, I said, if someone asserts that Simonides, or Bias, or Pittacus or any other wise and blessed man said it.” and ascribes such a conviction to tyrants or to rich people who think highly of themselves (335e – 336a). At this point, let us briefly note that Socrates is depicted as an admirer of Simonides and a devoted student of his poems in the dialogue *Protagoras* (339a – 347a) as well. Nonetheless, having inspected two instances of parallelism with the Platonic world-view on the part of the poetic tradition (Sophocles and Pindar) and a favoritism towards the poet, Simonides, on Socrates’ behalf in *Republic I*, it seems fitting to highlight, as a balancing factor for the overall view of poetry of this book, Socrates’ more or less overt disapproval of another poet Homer, who portrays the cunning Autolycus as a righteous man; since, beginning with book two, attacks on poetry are going to be quite prevalent in the dialogue.

### 2.3 Effects of poetry and public gatherings on society’s *ēthos*

*Republic II* begins with Glaucon’s expression of his heartfelt craving for a praise of justice that presents it as both valuable in itself and beneficial. According to him, such an account of fairness is desperately needed because there is an abundance of the reverse position’s defenders in the society (358c – d). Thus, he sets out to expand their arguments that credit injustice, himself not being committed to those views. One of the things that is relevant to our discussion in this demonstration is his utilization of a myth, namely that of Lydian shepherd Gyges, in order to show that those who act fairly do so out of necessity and not willingly, i.e. had they had the power or the chance to cover for their unjust behavior, they would not care to pursue justice (359c – 360d). In addition to this, it is also important for our purposes to

mention his specific interpretation of a verse of Aeschylus mimicking the defenders of injustice (362a – b).

After him, Adeimantus, in response to his brother and as a complementary elucidation to his speech,<sup>14</sup> presents us with the publicly accepted views that take justice to be more worthy than injustice (362e – 365a). He points out, with the testimonies of Homer and Hesiod, to the fact that those who praise justice over injustice do so because of the good reputation, wealth and earthly happiness that justice bestows upon men, not because of the value that it has on its own. Although laymen and poets, he continues, regard justice and temperance praiseworthy, they submit to the idea that these values are unprofitable and hard to attain while injustice and immorality are beneficial and provide an easy way for what one wants to get. To this end, he alludes to a couple of lines from Hesiod that portray virtue as an arduous path to take but evil an easy and pleasant one. Poetic tradition, among which he mentions Homer and the Orphic cult, further promotes evil and wrong-doing by establishing the conception that gods are capable of being soothed by prayers, libations and sacred rituals, and thus purification from sins is possible by such bodily endeavor.

We observe that Glaucon and Adeimantus' treatments of the way in which justice is regarded in society are facilitated by mythical discourse and evidence from traditional/religious poetry in drawing to their conclusions. As such they set the stage for a comprehensive ethical-political examination of poetry, music and all types of fine arts that takes place in the second half of book two, whole of book three and the first half of book ten but whose repercussions are palpable in almost all the dialogue.

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<sup>14</sup> Socrates fondly approves of the cooperation among brothers, at 362d, that will enhance the clarity of the discussion, although he does not seem to be happy with the greater problems that will be posed by Adeimantus' exposition because he is going to be assigned to a still greater task than were he to reply to solely Glaucon.

The ethical and the political perspectives are enriched by an ontological one in book ten, though we will discover that it already underlies the analysis of book three. The aesthetic point of view, on the other hand, is to be curiously underrated by Plato.<sup>15</sup> It might be suggested that the disqualification of the aesthetic point of view is due to the ethical and political nature of the *Republic*, however it will turn out that the inadequacy of such an outlook arises out of the very essence of, what we will call *genuine* music (and fine arts in general), which is something primarily related to soul and not to outward appearance. The issues that revolve around the nature of *mimetic* art as opposed to true art will be considered in chapters three and four respectively.

One reason that renders epic and lyric poetry exposed to ethical-political evaluation is simply the fact that they abound with themes of right and wrong, good and evil, life and death, war and peace, military and leadership skills, human virtue, love, friendship, revenge, respect for the elderly and so on. At a theoretical level, Plato challenges the wisdom of epic-lyric poets on the issues of ethics-politics and the whole *Republic* is geared to demonstrate that there is something wrong in their conception of the very nature of human values. Again, let us merely note at this point that we will focus on the status of the knowledge of the *mimetic* poet in contrast to the true poet with respect to ethical and political matters in chapters 3 and 4.

As venturing to deal with the most important questions in human life, poetry is situated in a serious context of discourse and do not function solely for

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<sup>15</sup> Tolstoy (1978, p.24) suggests that there was no conception of beauty that is independent from the good for the ancient Greek philosophers. Therefore, he claims that they lacked a point of view towards beauty which might properly be called an “aesthetic” one. This observation seems to be accurate and in parallel with what we want to establish for Plato’s understanding of true beauty and art. But the merely aesthetic or perceptual perspective towards beauty and fine arts was being more and more dominant within the society, and Plato, being aware the actual injuries and anticipated dangers of such an understanding, worked against its further permeation throughout society for all of his lifetime just like Socrates. His rejection of a career as a play-writer and founding of the Academy, or, better put, his opting for a life of education, i.e. for beauty of soul, over a life of seeming epitomizes his efforts to preclude the promotion of the merely aesthetic point of view towards beauty and towards human life at large.

entertainment purposes but acquires an exceptional role in the education of community. It is, along with the dominant views of society, the standard to which the young appeal in directing their lives. Nevertheless, the impact of poetry and of the conventional moral or religious convictions upon the Greek society and especially the Greek youth is detrimental to their justice and development of virtue:

My dear Socrates, he said, with all these things being said—of this sort and in this quantity—about virtue and vice and how human beings and gods honor them, what do we suppose they do to the souls of the young men who hear them? I mean those who have good natures and have the capacity, as it were, to fly to all the things that are said and gather from them what sort of man one should be and what way one must follow to go through life best. In all likelihood he would say to himself, after Pindar, will I “with justice or with crooked deceits scale the higher wall” where I can fortify myself all around and live out my life? For the things said indicate that there is no advantage in my being just, if I don't also seem to be, while the labors and penalties involved are evident. But if I'm unjust, but have provided myself with a reputation for justice, a divine life is promised. Therefore, since as the wise make plain to me, “the seeming overpowers even the truth”<sup>16</sup> and is the master of happiness, one must surely turn wholly to it. As facade and exterior I must draw a shadow painting of virtue all around me, while behind it I must trail the wily and subtle fox of the most wise Archilochus. (365a – c)

In the midst of this passage we observe that Plato envisages the false belief that seeming unjust when being truly just is troublesome and laborious whereas seeming just while being in fact unjust is profitable as situated in the mind of a young man. The corrupt line of reasoning of the young lasts until the first lines of 366b, being concluded in favor of injustice. Ignorant poets poison society and more notably the youth by their groundless beliefs on ethics, politics, good ways of life, human values, happiness etc. that are transmitted via their well-put verses. In this way, the city faces the danger of extinction and man that of unhappiness, if not death. The fact that although the poets have a great power to influence the young and the multitude, they do not make use of this power for the good of the society but rather for their own

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<sup>16</sup> Shorey (1969) refers the sentence to Simonides, *Fragment 76 Bergk*, and Euripides, *Orestes* 236.

benefits or pleasures constitute Plato's criticism of traditional poetry and theatre; and the philosophical basis for his criticism, that is, the involvement in the seeming instead of the truth is articulated by Adeimantus with an allusion to the poets, which can be seen through the end of our quotation. This basis we will have to deal with in the third chapter.

Now, let us recall the distinction that we introduced in the previous section between the daytime and nighttime activities of the religious festivities. We have observed that the morning celebrations are more disposed of bodily pleasures and actions in contrast to the evening celebrations that will indulge in physical engagements; though, both are inclusive of poetry, music and dance. In parallel, we have recognized that Socrates, with an effort to maintain his spiritual integrity, approaches the activities that will take place at night hesitantly because of their comparatively *erotic* nature. Indeed, as we read from Strauss' commentary, *The City and Man*:

Owing to his [Socrates'] initiative, all sight-seeing and even the dinner are completely forgotten in favor of the conversation about justice, which must have lasted from the afternoon until the next morning... The action of the *Republic* thus proves to be an act of moderation, of self-control regarding the pleasures of seeing sights or of gratifying curiosity. This action too reveals the character of Socratic restoration: the feeding of the body and of the senses is replaced by the feeding of the mind. (1978, p. 64)

Hence we may conclude, on account of Socrates' unwilling attitude towards nighttime entertainments and their dismissal in favor of philosophical conversation, that Plato thinks seriously of public gatherings because they have a decisive effect on the soul of man, especially that of a youngster, and in consequence, determine the ethical and political standards of the city.<sup>17</sup> Particularly, when these gatherings are

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<sup>17</sup> Cf. the very beginning of section 3.3 where we quote 604e – 605a. In this passage Socrates states that the assembly of a theater composed of various types of people provides a context for the permeation of bad character in society. Having emphasized the importance of public gatherings, let us

religious ones, the ethical or political qualities that are associated with gods or mythical heroes become all the more effective, since they are the ultimate models of action or personality for human beings (*Phaedrus* 252d – 253c).

#### 2.4 Cleansing of poetry and religion: In drama and in mythical theory

In the second book, after Glaucon and Adeimantus' speeches that give us a historical picture of the ancient Greek culture with respect to the commonplaces and the poetic conceptions of justice, Socrates begins to construct the just city, which is the main project of the *Republic*, step by step together with, first, Adeimantus. Through the middle stages of the book, upon Glaucon's notice that the city being built is too primitive and devoid of every kind of bodily ease and luxury, Socrates admits various material things of comfort and luxury into the culture and so moves from the "healthy" city to the "feverish" city (φλεγμαίνουσιν πόλιν). Among the various components of a prospered culture, artists such as painters, embroiders, musicians, rhapsodes, etc. are also allowed in to the city (372c – 373d).

The feverish city, symbolized by *phlegma* (that is, flame, fire or heat), reminds us the *lampas* of the torchlight race. It is characteristically involved in bodily pleasures and pursuits just like the evening celebrations of the Bendis festival. As opposed to the healthy city, it is marked by an involvement in an unnecessary and limitless desire for wealth apart from other material desires for food, clothing or entertainment. This opens up the way for war against the neighboring cities. Hence, there arises a need for a whole class of soldiers (373d – 374a).

Socrates curiously steers his conversation with Glaucon towards the members of this particular class instead of directly delving into seemingly more relevant

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note that private gatherings are also crucial for Plato in terms of social affection as we will see from the examples of the meetings that take place at Cephalus' residence in the *Republic* and at Agathon's house in the *Symposium*.

questions to justice such as the mode of government or the legal system. He wants to focus on the kind of human nature that is fitting for the purpose of guarding the city. Though, he finds the task of assessing the appropriate nature not an easy one and says in the manner of a general in a war field and as if preparing for a serious task: “But nevertheless, we mustn't be cowardly, at least as far as it's in our power.” (374e) Socrates and Glaucon, despite faltering at one point in the investigation, come up with the conclusion that a guardian should be powerful and swift in terms of body and philosophic, spirited and gentle in terms of soul. By the philosophic side, Socrates explains, the guardian distinguishes between those who are his own and those who are alien (375a – 376c).

Then Socrates proposes to inquire into the way in which those who have the appropriate nature of a guardian are going to be educated, although he is suspicious of the contribution of this examination to the topic of justice; but Adeimantus assures him that this investigation will prove to be helpful for the manifestation of the nature of justice. Thus, Socrates begins a long conversation, at first accompanied by Adeimantus, in a mythical tone regarding the education, culture and life-style of the guardians with a view to the repercussions of these considerations for the city's overall order. The story-like feel of the conversation is sustained until the middle of the fourth book.<sup>18</sup> At that point, Socrates invites everyone to fetch an adequate light (φῶς ἱκανόν) from somewhere and to seek out where justice lies in the imagined city.

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<sup>18</sup> The myth of *paideia* is a story that is collectively composed by Socrates, Adeimantus and Glaucon within the community that is gathered at Cephalus' house in virtue of a religious celebration. In articulating this story, the interlocutors assume the role of a legislator (378e – 379a). They have the power of a founder of a state and they imagine various difficulties that such a law-giver might face (415b – c). In composing this myth, everyone brings in some part of his character and of course the contemporary cultural, social and moral norms constitute a powerful perspective. Socrates guides and organizes the myth so that serious *logos* can about where possible.

Here, we inspect yet another occurrence of the imagery of light. However this instance does not at all seem to connote the ethically negative usages and it is likely that Plato prepares us for the positive sense of the figure of light that is manifested in the simile of the sun and the cave. Accordingly, we might think that the *phōs hikanon* designates the upcoming vigor of reason in the discussion of the soul of the fourth book where we have definitions, ontological principles, logical reasonings, etc. at work, in contrast to the previous *logos* that was governed by a mythical tone and performed as if it were a free-time activity. Indeed *phōs* (light), by which the blurry images of the just city are to be illuminated, is not unqualified. The voice of reason that is brought into play in the examination of soul is *hikanon*, i.e. adequate. It is not violent. That is, in contrast to the alluring sensual beauty of the mythical or poetic discourse that should be considered in line with the *lampas* of the nighttime celebrations, *hikanon phōs* does not attempt to seduce us or compel us in any way, rather it is serious and earnest. Nor is it feeble. That is, it is not non-persuasive. We might remember how Socrates smoothed the wild manners of Thrasymachus by *elenchos* which is primarily associated with reason. “For it looks to me” Glaucon says at 358b “as though Thrasymachus, like a snake, has been charmed more quickly than he should have been.”

The distinction between types of discourses and the fact that Socrates addresses different kinds of *logos* to different types of character will be crucial for us in determining Socrates as a *technical* rhetorician. If we recall from the previous section, we have stated that all the interlocutors are persuaded by the offer of an investigation into the nature of justice and did not show the minutest willingness to participate in the amusing festivities outside. They have managed to avoid the attractiveness and coercive violence of *lampas* and to tune into *phōs hikanon*; though



Socrates had to pay special attention to the character of each and every one of them and apply different types of speech to bring this about. The same attunement has to take place for the fictive community of the *phlegmainousan polin* so that they can partake of moderation or self-discipline just like the dramatic community.

However this does not happen, as Socrates relates, without the utilization of the more charming and pleasant mode of *logos*, that is, *mythos*, within the society of the feverish city. The education of a nature that is fit for the guardianship of the just community should be founded by, other than gymnastics, the general field of μουσική. Apart from the melodic and rhythmic compound, *mousikē* includes *logos* as well, both the true kind and the kind that contains elements of truth and yet is false in its entirety, namely *mythos*.

In parallel, we should not forget that the community of the speakers is also engaged in a mythical discourse. Being notified of the mythical mode of the upcoming conversation and then learning, from that conversation, that the just education comprises myths, we are led to view the very discussion of the guardians' education itself in a context of education. In this way it happens that while Socrates discusses the pedagogical procedures of the just city with Adeimantus and the others in a mythical tone but with a theoretical flavor<sup>19</sup> as well, Plato additionally supplies us with the whole perspective of drama from where we can view the just teaching in practice and form opinions about it accordingly.

Thus situated within an educational environment, Socrates, addressing Adeimantus, states why *mythos* is of utmost importance in the development of

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<sup>19</sup> Of course the voice of Socrates, as the “wise man” in the community of the meeting and the arranger of the myth, is characteristically edifying. See our next quotation (377b) in the text for an instance. Consider the religious notion that “god is only the cause of the good” at 379c for another one. But we should not forget that this didactic tone is confined within the limits of the myth, if we want to adhere to the Socratic denial of knowledge.

children: “For at that stage it's most plastic, and each thing assimilates itself to the model whose stamp anyone wishes to give to it.” (377b) Therefore, the stories that are to be narrated to children should not be conducive to adoption of immoral beliefs:

Then shall we so easily let the children hear just any tales fashioned by just anyone and take into their souls opinions for the most part opposite to those we'll suppose they must have when they are grown up? First, as it seems, we must supervise the makers of tales; and if they make a fine tale, it must be approved, but if it's not, it must be rejected. We'll persuade nurses and mothers to tell the approved tales to their children and to shape their souls with tales more than their bodies with hands. Most of those they now tell must be thrown out. (377b – c)

In the previous section we have seen how Glaucon and especially Adeimantus were disturbed by poetry's favoring of injustice over justice. Following their observations regarding the poetic tradition, here, Socrates directly responds to Adeimantus' concern, at 366e – 367a, for the lack of praise, either in verse or in prose, of justice by itself. Adeimantus claimed that dominance of praise of justice for its own sake within the city would persuade the youth in favor of justice and thus make each citizen guard himself against the dwelling of greatest evils within himself.

Accordingly, until 392c we have a detailed discussion of the moral restraints that are to be applied to the content of any work of art circulating within the culture of the just city: the stories of Hesiod and Homer that portray the divinities as battling against each other, as behaving wickedly towards one another should not be allowed in the city nor should there be embroideries picturing gods engaged in immoral affairs. Neither in epic or lyrical poetry nor in tragedy or prose should the divinities be displayed as the cause of evil or as entities that appeal to lying or showing themselves in various shapes.

Whereas the limitations articulated in the second book seem to be more relevant to the development of the virtues of justice and wisdom,<sup>20</sup> those of *Republic III* are explicitly designed to advocate courage and moderation in the soul of the citizen. In particular the third book begins by the prohibition of items that might trigger fear of death (387b). Further there is no room for works that associate the divinities or the heroes that are akin to them with extreme laughter or wailing, or with indulgence in sexual desire, intoxication, food or wealth (387d, 389a, 389e, 390d). Instead of all these it is agreed that poetry should be merely inclusive of elements that direct man towards *aretē*.

Having regulated the semantic content of the musical components of the culture and education of the just city, Socrates proceeds with the discussion of formal qualities of speech (*lexis*) in poetry 392c onwards. In consequence of this examination that he undertakes together with, again, Adeimantus, it is agreed that imitative<sup>21</sup> narration and enactment are permissible only to a small extent and the manner of speech of a sensible man<sup>22</sup> is to be set as the standard *lexis* for poetic speech. This style of speech does not embrace excessive alterations in its rhythmic

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<sup>20</sup> Truthfulness of gods and their unchanging, simple nature may be connected to wisdom, which is something essentially related to truth and ultimately to the changeless and noncomplex *ideas*. Non-wickedness, on the other hand, together with truthfulness, may be viewed pertinent to the issues of impartiality or fairness.

<sup>21</sup> I.e. *mimēsis*. At this passage *mimēsis* is merely given as a term of literary theory. The philosophical analysis of this concept as a way of musical performance is deferred until book ten but it will turn out that this conception already underlies the analysis of melodic tunes in book three. These issues we will take up in the upcoming chapters.

<sup>22</sup> That is, καλὸς καὶγαθός, literally, beautiful and good. Bloom translates the phrase as ‘real gentleman’, which might be deemed a fitting rendering since it conveys the idea that someone that has good looks is good on the inside as well just like the sense of *kalos kagathos* in the ancient Greek culture. This rendering is suitable also for another reason. ‘Real gentleman’ is powerful in terms of its connotative imagery, that is, it brings into mind a vigorous image of a gracious, elegant and sensible person and Socrates’ mythical discourse on poetry really feeds on these common images of his culture. Since we do not yet know the nature of justice but strive for it we have to operate on these familiar images of the culture (392a – c). Socrates makes further visual qualification on *kalos kagathos* by μέτριος ἀνὴρ, that is, man within due limits, moderate man.

and harmonic aspects and employs imitation only when the speaker imitates a good man.

Now let us highlight some points regarding the drama of the part that deals with the style of speech just before we go on to the melodic component of music, i.e. lyrical songs. When Socrates introduces the concept of *lexis*, at first Adeimantus does not understand what he means. Then Socrates brings in the notions of simple and imitative kinds of narrative, concepts perhaps more alien to Adeimantus than is *lexis*, and expects him to apprehend. But of course Adeimantus is at a loss and Socrates remarks: “I seem to be a ridiculous teacher, and an unclear one” (392d). Once again the educational atmosphere of the meeting and Socrates’ role as the educator, as well as Adeimantus’ role as a young student are underlined.

Since the student is not familiar with the introduced notions, the teacher naturally goes on to explain until both agree on the same terms. On account of Adeimantus’ unfamiliarity with the literary concepts, we may infer that he is not that much of a musician. On the other hand, his brother Glaucon, as we learn from the teacher’s remark at 398e is a musical man. He shows, unlike Adeimantus, some familiarity with the musical concepts. He seems to be well at the particulars of musical theory, though he is not comprehensively knowledgeable about the relationship between soul and the other components of music (400a). Particularly he can say which harmonies are fit for which kinds of character but he cannot tell which rhythms are copies of which sorts of life. Socrates, on the other hand, although it is him who describes the spirits of the harmonies that are needed in the city, is not cognizant of their specific kinds. However he seems more knowledgeable about the musical instruments and their characteristic harmonies. He has also some blurred

ideas about various kinds of rhythm but refers the topic to the musician Damon,<sup>23</sup> who has knowledge of the correspondence between character types and rhythms, and all other constituents of music.

We have just noted that Glaucon is a student of music. He also showed his musical aspect when he employed the myth of Gyges. Further, he was the reason for the transformation of the healthy city into the feverish city in which the musicians, poets and other various artists become present. Nevertheless it was Adeimantus who encouraged Socrates to delve into the topic of education that turned out to be mainly related to music. We may think that Glaucon was not very happy with the fact that he lost the chance to converse on the topic he is interested in and familiar with. By the way, Adeimantus and Socrates discuss the various limitations that are to be brought upon the semantic content of artworks in parallel with the presentation of Adeimantus, which involves a criticism of the poetic tradition early in the second book. It must be that Glaucon is not comfortable with the conclusion of their discussion that multifarious styles of music are being reduced into a unitary style since he is an *erotic* character.<sup>24</sup>

Now if we remember that Socrates was at first doubtful about the benefits of the discussion of education for the inquiry on justice, it is likely that, after having finished with the examination of the content and style of speech, and also after having reached a considerable degree of consensus with Adeimantus (that is, he acquaints Adeimantus with some literary notions and appreciates his earlier moral

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<sup>23</sup> This particular musician will be our model for a music instructor, together with Socrates in chapter four.

<sup>24</sup> Let us briefly note that an interest in music and luxury corresponds to a sensually oriented *erōs* (cf. section 5.2, p.65 of this thesis where we mention his sexual desire). But this is not to say that he is a non-virtuous man. On the contrary as we saw in section 2.2, personal love and poetry constitute a context for the emergence of virtue according to Plato. However it always possible for sensual love to lead us to immorality.

criticism of poetry in his own words), he intends to leave aside the topic of musical education without analyzing songs and melodies: “Couldn't everyone by now discover what we have to say about how they must be if we're going to remain in accord with what has already been said?” (398c) But Glaucon is not satisfied on two accounts: first he wants to take part in the conversation on music; second he has to know why moderation in musical styles is good. Thus he laughs out and objects to Socrates: “I run the risk of not being included in everyone. At least I'm not at present capable of suggesting what sort of things we must say. However, I've a suspicion.” (398c) The way in which Socrates deals with Glaucon's second reason for his disappointment will play a suggestive role in chapter four when we explore the nature of *genuine* music. In this we will see that Socrates has to shift the tone of mythical discourse on education and music into a more serious one, i.e. he has to give a more philosophical account, foreshadowing the adequate light of the analysis of soul in book four, of the nature of music and musical education, in order to properly address to the musical Glaucon, that is to persuade him of the restrictions on music by revealing him the essence of true music.

The way in which the first reason why Glaucon is disappointed by the preliminary inquiry on music is dealt with is indeed subservient to the handling of the second reason. In order for the community to reach a deeper understanding and to give birth to a more genuine explanation, Socrates has to bring the *erotic* Glaucon, who wants to utter some words on music and probably to be acknowledged as a musical man in the public, into play. And this is what he does. He has recourse to Glaucon's knowledge in distinguishing and identifying various harmonic modes: “What are the wailing modes? Tell me, for you're musical.” (398e ff.)

But the shift in the tone of the discourse, which acquires a principled analysis of music as of 400a, does not occur explicitly (as it is comparatively the case in the previous examples we have given, namely Socrates' introduction of just education myth and the figure of *phōs ikanon*) nor is it a clear-cut distancing from figurative speech. Indeed as we shall see in chapter four, the relatively more rigid explanation of the true nature of music does not venture to banish figures or schemes from speech but embraces them as illuminative items. Further, the shift from Adeimantus to Glaucon as the respondent of Socrates does not correspond exactly yet correlatively and meaningfully to the alteration in the character of discourse (again, there is a one-to-one matching in the aforementioned examples as we will observe in chapter four). That is, the regulation of poetry that fed on the imagery of *kalos kagathos* is still continued when the conversation shifts from Adeimantus to Glaucon.

Now let us briefly mention the specifics of this last step of the cleansing of the feverish city (398c – 400c). In this we will also be acquainted with the basic notions of the musical theory that constitute a formal basis for the understanding of the nature of music in chapters three and four.

Socrates takes lyrical songs to be constituted by speech [λόγου], harmony [ἁρμονίας] and rhythm [ῥυθμοῦ]. The component of speech does not necessitate a new account. Everything that is agreed on for the cases of poetry and stories are valid for the lyrical component of songs. Similarly, since harmony and rhythm should follow [ἀκολουθεῖν] speech, the requirements of speech are to be extended over the musical components of harmony and rhythm. Shorey (1969) notes at 398d that it was a convention among the poets to compose their music to fit the words but this was eventually left behind: “The poets at first composed their own music to fit the words.

When, with the further development of music, there arose the practice of distorting the words, as in a mere libretto, it provoked a storm of protest from conservatives in aesthetics and morals.” Plato will make Socrates interpret this traditional rule of musical performance in a way as to reveal for us the nature of *genuine* music a few paragraphs later. We will see that Socrates’ mythical argument that lives on cultural paradigms will be transgressed by that interpretation. But now we should bring the mythical argument of education to an end.

According to the cultural model that Socrates wants to establish, the harmonies that encourage bravery and moderation are to be permitted in the city, at the exclusion of those that associate with drunkenness, softness, idleness, wailing and lamentation. Now there is no need for instruments that are capable of producing all types of harmony; so only *lyra*, *kithara* and herdsmen’s pipe remain. Finally solely the types of rhythm that imitate an orderly and courageous life will be allowed into the city.

And, by the dog, I [Socrates] said, unawares we've again purged the city that a while ago we said was luxurious.  
That’s a sign of our moderation, he [Glaucón] said.  
Come, then, I said, and let's purge the rest... (399e)

In this way the descriptive examination of music ends leaving its place to a philosophical one which will be considered in chapter four. After music, other elements of education, culture and government of the city will be arranged by means of the synthetic perspective that is involved in both figurative and principled argumentation until the analysis of soul in the fourth book. In the *Republic*, Glaucon and his friends partake of moderation and virtue by the instruction of Socrates; however in the *Symposium*, Socrates has to fight for the sake of truth in a community that indulges in sensual beauty, especially that of speech.



## 2.5 Rhetoric and its political context

The social setting of the dialogue of the *Republic* differs substantially from the speech-making atmosphere of the *Symposium*. To begin with, the discursive activity in that dialogue is hosted by a celebration of personal success, namely the victory of Agathon in the dramatic contest. Moreover, it is preceded by a banquet and accompanied by wine-drinking.<sup>25</sup> The dialogue of the *Republic*, in contrast, as we have observed, is situated within an occasion of religious gathering, and moderate religious activities and celebrations take place prior to it. The society of the *Symposium* eventually yields to disorder (223b); whereas that of the *Republic* engages in philosophical activity at the expense of bodily and superfluous pleasure, but not at the expense of pious and moderate entertainment in the daytime ceremonies and thrilling discursive activity. Be that as it may, it might be suggested that in the *Symposium* Socrates still tries to promote some resistance towards the pleasures of eating by arriving late at the banquet (175c); nevertheless it should not be forgotten that Socrates does not turn down Alcibiades' offer to drink a big amount of wine (214a). The real resistance of Socrates, in this dialogue, concerns another issue (though not an unconnected one) which is to be revealed in the next point.

In addition to not being free of pleasures of food and drinking, the main discursive practice of the *Symposium*, that is, the encomiums to Eros presented respectively by the symposiasts, does not originate in a love of truth on the part of the community in opposition to the situation in the *Republic*.<sup>26</sup> Instead, as Socrates, just before the first speech of Phaedrus, quite bluntly uncovers the tension in the air

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<sup>25</sup> Although the symposiasts cautiously opt for measured intoxication and, in parallel, send away the flute-girl (176a – e), upon the entrance of Alcibiades both excessive drinking and the flute-girl come into the picture (212c – 214b), canceling the convention of moderation.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. footnote 5.

among the speakers,<sup>27</sup> the speeches are made in an atmosphere of contest. This aspect of the assembly's character is explicitly manifested prior to Agathon's speech:

All right, said Eryximachus, I'll do as you say. In fact, I really enjoyed your speech [μοι ὁ λόγος ἠδέως]. If I didn't know that Socrates and Agathon were experts in the ways of love, I'd be very worried in case the wealth and variety of the speeches we've already heard left them with nothing to say. As things stand, though, I've got no worries.

That's because you've already acquitted yourself successfully in the *competition* [emphasis added], Eryximachus, said Socrates. If you were in my situation, however, or rather the situation I'm sure I'll find myself in after an excellent speech [εἴπη εὖ] from Agathon as well, then you'd have plenty to worry about and you'd be as terrified as I am now.

You're out to put a spell [φαρμάττειν] on me, Socrates, said Agathon. You'd like me to think that the audience has high hopes of a fine speech [εὖ ἐροῦντος] from me, so that I lose my composure.

I'd really have a bad memory, Agathon, Socrates replied, if I thought you'd be thrown by the tiny audience we constitute after what I've seen of your courage and self-confidence when you got up on stage with your actors in front of a huge audience. You were about to display your own work in front of them too, and you remained completely unruffled. (193e – 194b)<sup>28</sup>

According to Eryximachus, Aristophanes' *logos* is pleasant (*hēdeōs*). It seems that Socrates and Agathon, who have not yet spoken, are troubled by the fear of not being able to fare well in their speeches (*ey eroyntos*). Socrates claims Eryximachus would also be terrified, as he himself is now, if he were making a speech right after the eloquent and acclaimed speaker Agathon. Similarly, we might also say that some of the earlier speakers are in a position to be pretty distressed as well,<sup>29</sup> performing an oration in the presence of renowned poets or Socrates for that matter, whose *logos* is known to have a peculiar effect, indeed an effect that is in stark contrast to the poetic charm, upon his listeners.<sup>30</sup> In sum, we may conclude that the symposium hosted by

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<sup>27</sup> "I would like to point out that the arrangement [of the order of speakers' deliverances] isn't *fair* [emphasis added] on those of us whose couches come last, but we won't complain, as long as the earlier speakers do their job well enough." (177e)

<sup>28</sup> Also see, for the same effect, Socrates' remarks at 198a – c right after Agathon's praise of Eros.

<sup>29</sup> For example, Phaedrus whom we see as a lover and student of rhetoric in the dialogue, called by his name, *Phaedrus* (227e – 228e).

<sup>30</sup> See *Symposium* 215c – 216c for Alcibiades' account of his own experiences of conversing with Socrates. At 217e – 219e, Alcibiades relates us his love affair with Socrates. In this passage, Alcibiades describes himself as bitten by a snake from his heart or soul upon Socrates' philosophical

Agathon focuses on individual success: “Agathon’s speech was greeted with cries of admiration from everyone in the room, Aristodemus said; they thought the young man had done credit to himself and to the god.” (198a) What is more, the evaluation of a discourse’s accomplishment is made, as Socrates again uncovers, in terms of its sensual beauty regardless of its truthfulness:

I was so naive that I thought the point of any eulogy was to tell the truth about the subject! I thought that, with the truth before you, you were supposed to select from among the facts the ones that were most to your subject’s credit and then present them so as to show him in the best possible light. I was very confident in my ability to give a good speech, on the grounds that I knew the truth about how to deliver eulogies. But it now looks as though this isn’t the way to deliver a proper eulogy after all. What you do is describe your subject in the most generous and glowing terms whether or not there’s any truth to them. It needn’t bother you if you’re making it up. Our assignment apparently means that each of us is to deliver a specious eulogy of Love, rather than actually praise him. I suppose that’s why you all go to such extreme lengths to argue for the ascription of qualities to Love—to claim that he is like this and responsible for that. It’s to make him look as attractive and perfect as possible—and this is obviously not for the benefit of people who already know the facts, so it must be for those who don’t know any better. And yes, your eulogies are indeed attractive—wonderful, in fact. ... I’m not going to give that kind of eulogy—I can’t. Nevertheless, I am prepared to tell the truth, if you’d be happy with that, but I must do it in my own way, because if I try to compete with your speeches, I’ll just make a fool of myself. So, Phaedrus, would you accept that kind of speech as well, one which tells you the truth about Love and lets words and phrases [ὀνομάσσει δὲ καὶ θέσει ῥημάτων] tumble out in any old order [τις τύχη]? (198d – 199b)

Socrates is portrayed a bit aggressive and disharmonious towards the public in the *Symposium*. Several times he argues with Agathon (though these exchanges have a slight sense of *eroticism* and are not totally devoid of friendliness).<sup>31</sup> He occasions the uninvited arrival of Aristodemus (to whom we are indebted for the witnessing of the meeting in point of drama) to the symposium and himself attends pretty late

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words of refusing his seduction. Also consider Glaucon’s comment on Socrates’ dialogue with Thrasymachus at *Republic* 358b: “For it looks to me as though Thrasymachus, like a snake, has been charmed more quickly than he should have been...” Another similar image, numbing of the torpedo, is from the *Meno* (80a – d, 84b – c). Again the effect is on the soul with the addition of speech: Meno’s soul and mouth are torpid.

<sup>31</sup> 175d – e, 194a – e; for the *erotic* exchange between Socrates, Agathon and Alcibiades cf. 222c – 223a.

(174e – 175a, 175c). And now we see him harshly criticizing what he assesses to be the common nature of all the previous praises, as well as the very conception of praise-making as shared by everyone there except him.

Socrates is disturbed by the fact that the encomiums to Eros are composed and judged chiefly with a view to the excellence of their perceptual qualities devoid of a care for veracity. He favors a speech performance in which one does not primarily pay attention to the particular words (*onomasei*) or sounds nor to the specific positioning (*thesei*) of these elements, by which the reflections are articulated; rather leaving these auditory elements of language to chance (*tykhēi*), or better, without focusing on them any more than they deserve, one should always be concerned with truth when engaged in a discursive activity. (Nevertheless, he does not mean that the orations that are born out of a perceptual attention are never pleasant. Indeed, he acknowledges their charming quality. Plus, he assents that he is not skilled enough to be up to the task of creating that kind of speech.) Hence, he goes on to state his final conflict with the community of the symposium: unless he is allowed to praise Eros in his own way, he is not going to perform a praise at all.<sup>32</sup>

Socrates' discordant and protestant attitude towards the symposiasts brings to mind Thrasymachus' aggressive effort to abolish the interlocutors' consensus in the first book of the *Republic*. There Socrates avoided the slightest degree of fury and instead of directly rejecting Thrasymachus' views on justice, he tried to sustain *elenchos* with the hope of incorporating him into the community that is willing to listen to the *logos*; but here he is quite assertive and straightforward in his criticism,

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<sup>32</sup> To be sure, it would not be very accurate to assume that the tension of the assembly reaches an insurmountable level of disagreement by Socrates' harsh attack on the rhetoric performances and the speakers. Aristodemus does not inform us about the general ambiance of the community at this point but merely reports that Phaedrus and all the others approved of Socrates' wish. Phaedrus consents to his wish to ask a few brief questions to Agathon as well.

attempting to abandon the public unity achieved by means of an interest in the mere sound of *logos*. The reason for this variety of moods in the behavior of Socrates lies at the very formation of the communal setting. Although the conversations of the *Republic* are hosted by the prospered merchant Cephalus, they are supervised by Socrates,<sup>33</sup> whereas the symposium is hosted by the triumphant poet Agathon who is not a philosopher, and the discursive activity is fathered and organized by Phaedrus who is a keen student of rhetoric but not of, again, philosophy. Socrates has the political power (which he proves once again by persuading Thrasymachus into listening), i.e. the common assent of every member of the community to his government of the inquiry, as well as the proper social ingredients (such as the urge for truth and the courage to voice one's opinion) to *genuinely* philosophize in the *Republic*; however the social setting of the *Symposium* is not conditioned by the command of philosophy, instead it is determined by love of temporary sights and sounds (cf. *Rep.* 475d – 480a). Therefore, Socrates has to find a way to evade the indulgence in perceptual pleasures that characterizes the public of the symposium without having a lead or popular position in the community. Since there is no unanimous assent to the rule of reason in the community of the symposium but a

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<sup>33</sup> Note that Cephalus and Socrates have different roles in the community. Cephalus' leave in the initial parts of the dialogue may be viewed as an instance of hypocrisy given his statement, at 328d, that now that his bodily pleasures are withering away on account of old age, his desires and pleasures with respect to speech increase. However, if we consider his withdrawal together with his political role, as the master of the house who has to attend to religious business, then his action not only emerges as a pious one but also, since he fares responsibly in his own job, as a just one, indeed one that is moderate and courageous as well; because although he probably takes pleasure in his conversation with Socrates, talking about his happiness, reciting poetry and so on, he is aware of his social responsibility and is virtuous enough to take care of it without being lured into the pleasures of speech. As such Cephalus and Socrates appear to be in cooperation for political purposes. While Cephalus supplies the material needs, such as accommodation, tranquility (observe that although the discussion lasts quite a long time, it is not interrupted by external factors like the one we have in the *Symposium* by Alcibiades' entry) and food or drinks (though these are not mentioned we might, without harm, imagine their presence to some degree), of the meeting, Socrates takes care of the education of the household.

tyranny of *erōs*, sober and politically weak *elenchos* would not be of help to Socrates in his discourse on *Eros* that is governed by a search for truth.

Thus he first has recourse to his spirited anger in order to abolish, at least to a certain extent, the unification of the community on the basis of sensual pleasure. He then briefly engages in *elenchos* with Agathon. We might estimate that there are two reasons for this action on the part of Socrates, other than the theoretical ones. First, to make Agathon “listen to the *logos*”. Second, to balance his political popularity that he has once again gained by his marvelous *encomium* by attaining the upper hand in the *elenchos*. But in order to perform a beautiful speech, truly beautiful that is, on his part, Socrates has to abstain from the competitive and sensually oriented environment of the symposium. Therefore he invokes Diotima and shifts the political context of his discourse from the symposium to a context of education composed by an eager student and a wise teacher. Hence we come to the topic of education and music.

## CHAPTER 3

### *MIMĒSIS*: METHOD OF EDUCATION?

#### 3.1 *Mimēsis* and the *mimetic* poet

The tenth book of the *Republic* begins with Socrates' remark on the appropriateness of their exclusion of imitative poetry. He states that this move now seems to be the right one after having distinguished several parts of the soul (435c – 441c, 588b – 592b). Thus he proceeds with the discussion on the nature of *mimēsis* (595e).<sup>34</sup> It is said that the imitative painter produces an image of a couch, the craftsman the couch on which we lie and the god the form or class of couch. The painter imitates not the form itself but the appearance of the couch that the carpenter brings about. Since his work is produced by attending to appearance of something instead of its form, the painter and his product remain at the level of appearances not qualifying as unified entities such as a just person, a tree or a table. Forms constitute still another level of being, which is true being. Thus *mimetic* artist and his work are situated at the third level of reality. After putting forward that *mimēsis* is imitation of appearance by means of the example of painting, Socrates places Homer, the pioneer of the tragedians (595b, 598d – e), his life-style together with his accomplishments in life under scrutiny and investigates whether he has attained truth with respect to the ethical and political matters that he deals with in his works (599a – 601a).

Socrates reasons that had Homer had genuine knowledge in what he puts into his works such as wars and generalship, administration of cities and education of men, instead of dealing with semblances of these he would have ventured to tackle with real issues in his very own life with respect to these domains. Yet from what we

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<sup>34</sup> The notion of *mimēsis* that we encounter at 393 is a type of *lexis* whereas in book ten Plato formulates a broader conception about the manner in which art is performed. Cf. footnote 13, p.23 of this thesis.

know of his personal history, Glaucon tells, it is apparent that he was unremarkable in the military and political fields, and worse, he was a failure in educating his comrade Creophylos and their friendship was weak: “For it is told that Homer suffered considerable neglect in his own day, when he [Creophylos] was alive.” (600b) In contrast, Pythagorean tradition and life-style as well as the cordial bonds between the followers of this tradition are emphasized and we should in turn highlight the role of the friendship between Socrates and Plato, together with that of Plato and Aristotle, in their attaining a unique place in the history of philosophy so that we can appreciate the relationship between truth and friendship that Plato wants to uncover. Therefore, thinking on the basis of the example of Homer, we may conclude that the *mimetic* poet does not attain truth with respect to ethics-politics and does not partake of a virtuous or beautiful soul.

Expanding on the painter example a bit more, Socrates claims that let alone knowledge, the *mimetic* artist does not even have true opinion regarding the things appearances of which he imitates, in contrast with the flute-maker who, associating with the person that has user knowledge, i.e. flute-player, obtains true opinion. What is unfortunate, however, with respect to society and *paideia* is that although the *mimetic* artist has neither knowledge nor true opinion, according to some

these poets know all the arts and all things human pertaining to virtue and vice, and all things divine? For the good poet, if he is to poetize things rightly, must, they argue, create with knowledge or else be unable to create. (598d – e)

Now let us bring in the aesthetic point of view into the picture. We have seen that *mimetic* arts are capable of immense influence upon both the individual person and society. But if *mimetic* artist has neither knowledge nor true opinion regarding appearance of which he imitates then from where and by what kind of procedure



does he attain the power that brings about such major effects upon man and even the society? The obvious answer is given as follows: “The creator of the phantom, the imitator, we say, knows nothing of the reality but only the appearance.” (601b)

When the *mimetic* poet composes his works, he proceeds from either sensed or imagined appearances and organizing his words by meter, rhythm and harmony (and maybe further standards that are of a perceptual nature)<sup>35</sup> arrives at sensual beauty (601a – b). Similarly, we might say that the *mimetic* painter, devoid of knowledge and true opinion regarding what he draws but taking as his starting point appearances, brings about vivid and delightful paintings through appropriate coloring and emphasis. According to the theory that is famously attributed to Plato, music, poetry, painting, etc., i.e. what we call today fine arts, are *mimetic*, that is, they take their departure from appearance and arrange their work by means of various norms that will render the work pleasant to the senses; thus they lack an interest in truth.

This theory further suggests that the *mimetic* artist targets our desires, feelings, emotions and not that part of our soul which calculates and measures, (*logistikon*) in order to cast a certain spell on us. Paintings encourage us to judge by means of appearances and thus, weakening the authority of *logistikon* over our soul, causes us to be entrapped in an abundance of mistaken beliefs. Tragedy presenting us the experience of pain in a vivid setting and comedy that of irrationality make our soul lay down its guard against situations of sorrow and disorder and strengthen our blind side that does not know any limit or ratio to govern the whole soul. Therefore, on account of these harms that they give rise to in our souls, together with the wicked morality that they promote in society and culture, it does not seem possible to

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<sup>35</sup> We may infer that the standards of sensual beauty that Plato sets for the *mimetic* poet may change in time or differ in various cultures since they are of a sensual nature. The whole catalogue of the myriad schools of art can be put forward as a proof of this statement. From a Platonic perspective even the recognition of atonal music or chaotic drawing as beautiful would be perfectly natural.

accommodate the imitative artists in the just city where reason and virtue prevails (607a).

### 3.2 Ethical and political power by means of *mimēsis*: The dullness of virtue

We have seen that the *mimetic* artist grounds his works on appearance and not on knowledge. In other words, devoid of beauty of soul, he produces his works by means of various sensual patterns of harmony or measure.<sup>36</sup> As such the *mimetic* work embodies only sensual beauty and not true beauty. Thus we may say that mere sensual beauty emerges in virtue of a false or deceitful harmony among the various elements of appearance that the *mimetic* artist sets up without partaking of harmony itself either in his soul or more significantly in the community that he is addressing or performing with. Indeed we have already seen that the imitative poet neither attains truth regarding ethical or political matters nor is he a success in friendship or education. Nevertheless even though he is in want of a harmonious soul and friendship, the imitative poet is able to acquire authority in relation to ethical and political measures among people having recourse to the powerful attractiveness of the deceitful harmony in his speech and he can elicit the opinion that he is knowledgeable on these topics (601a – b).

Thus the *mimetic* poet breaks off the ethical and political standards from their original domain of true being, i.e. that of the virtuous soul or *ideas*, and brings them down to the level of mere appearance, that is, to a platform where irrational change and relativity hold sway. However, in so doing, he does not subject ethical and political problems to an absolute relativity or undecidability. Instead he substitutes

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<sup>36</sup> We will associate the beautiful and harmonious soul characteristically with true music in the next chapter; but this will not mean that the beautiful soul never engages in *mimēsis*. Accordingly, in chapter five we will see that there is indeed a unique function of *mimēsis* especially in earlier education and in the education of courage; however in the acquisition of moderation and self-control *mimēsis* will be determined as an extreme point from which the musician should stay away.

the criteria for truth and falsity in ethics, politics and even in philosophy, that is true beauty, goodness, justice, moderation, courage and wisdom by sensual beauty. In other words, he determines those aspects of the behaviors of gods, heroes or men that look beautiful as the ethical and political truths.<sup>37</sup> At this point, we see that the *mimetic* poet lays the foundations for the exercise of the rhetorician in law and that of the sophist in philosophy and *paideia*. The attractive and persuasive power of the sensual beauty that emerges by mere sensual ordering turns out to be the determinant that is abode by rather than true justice and impartiality in court and truth itself in philosophy. Socrates formulates the judicial aspect of the issue in the beginning of the *Apology* as follows:

I don't know, men of Athens, how you were affected by my accusers. As for me, I was almost carried away by them, they spoke so persuasively... they have said little or nothing true, whereas from me you'll hear the whole truth. But not, by Zeus, men of Athens, expressed in elegant [κεκαλλιεπημένους] language like theirs, arranged in fine [κεκοσμημένους] words and phrases. Instead, what you hear will be spoken extemporaneously in whatever words come to mind, and let none of you expect me to do otherwise—for I put my trust in the justice of what I say. After all, it wouldn't be appropriate at my age, gentlemen, to come before you speaking in polished, artificial language like a young man. (17a – c)<sup>38</sup>

Well then is not there any room, in Platonic philosophy, for a kind of fine arts that is not *mimetic*, which produces works that are thrice removed from the reality; closes our eyes to ethical, political, judicial and philosophical truths; arouses disorder in the community; and distances our souls from *aretē*? To be sure, Plato has founded the education of the guardians, out of which he will pick out the philosopher-kings in book six, upon music (together with gymnastics). In his work on Greek *paideia*, Jaeger (1943), states that Plato "...gives it [musical education] a new importance by showing that it is the indispensable preparation for pure philosophical knowledge,

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<sup>37</sup> 250b, 250d *Phaedrus*

<sup>38</sup> Plato. (2002). *The Trials of Socrates*. (C.D.C. Reeve Trans.). Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

which, without the foundation of musical knowledge, would be left hanging in the air” (pp. 229, 230). However, if music just like poetry or painting is merely a kind of *mimēsis*, then we will be facing the absurd claim that the main component of *paideia* of a just and truly beautiful city should be something that deprives the soul of virtue. Before we return to the third book where the characteristics of musical *paideia* are laid down, let us trace an answer to our question in book ten a bit further.

### 3.3 Social order by means of *erōs* and radiant true virtue

Now then, the irritable disposition affords much and varied imitation, while the prudent and quiet character [τὸ δὲ φρόνιμον τε καὶ ἡσύχιον ἥθος], which is always nearly equal to itself, is neither easily imitated nor, when imitated, easily understood, especially by a festive assembly [πανηγύρει] where all sorts [παντοδαποῖς] of human beings are gathered in a theater. For the imitation is of a condition that is surely alien to them... Then plainly the imitative poet isn't naturally directed toward any such part of the soul, and his wisdom isn't framed for satisfying it if he's going to get a good reputation among the many but rather toward the irritable and various disposition, because it is easily imitated. (604e – 605a)

In this passage the possibility of imitating a prudent and quiet character is being articulated. It is said that such an imitation is a difficult task and that it is still more demanding to obtain a proper comprehension on the part of a large audience that has gathered randomly. Nonetheless the possibility is left open. The mention of the political conditions is also noteworthy for our purposes. *Panēgyris* that has come together by an interest in sight is to be taken parallel with the community of the *pannykhis* that convene in virtue of the desire of bodily pleasures. But now let us qualify our question in the light of this passage and formulate it once again to make the case of *mimēsis* stronger: does the music of the guardians' *paideia* retain its *mimetic* character on the condition that it is limited by the imitation of *kalos kagathos* or *ethos phronimon kai ēsykhion* that is performed in a healthy political-pedagogical environment?

When we take a look at the following lines that are in the last parts of the discussion of *mimēsis*, it seems still more plausible that Plato suggests constrained and politically well-situated *mimēsis* as the nature of the music of the just city:

[Socrates says to Glaucon:] you must...agree that Homer is the most poetic and first of the tragic poets; but you must know that only so much of poetry as is hymns to gods or celebration of good men should be admitted into a city. And if you admit the sweetened muse in lyrics or epics, pleasure and pain will jointly be kings in your city instead of law and that argument which in each instance is best in the opinion of the community. (607a)

When we read this passage we recall two things that were mentioned previously. The first is that once again we have an instance of a reference to the purgation of music carried by means of social models, sensible opinions (such as moderation is good but brutality is bad) or Socratic-Platonic religious dogmas (such as gods are merely the cause of the good and not of evil or gods do not change) in books two and three. The second is Socrates' varying modes of approach with respect to the ceremonial activities at different times of day. Socrates joined and enjoyed (Plato writes, at the very beginning of the *Republic*, in Socrates' voice, that Socrates deemed the processions beautiful) the daytime religious celebrations. He also prayed to the goddess. On the other hand he did not seem to be willing or happy when he was offered to participate in the nighttime activities that were going to take place in the name of the same goddess, Bendis. Rather he fared cautiously confronting these activities that included a dinner, a torchlight race on horseback, a night festival and a chance for discoursing with the young, and which he may have a desire for. The last item, we know that he has. But leaving aside his worries about his own soul, we may think that he has greater concerns for the society's *ethos* that will be damaged severely. The evening activities, experienced under the name of religion, that is, as pertinent to the divinities are involved in the suffering of various appetites

collectively and excessively. So they are conducive to the promulgation of immorality. Moreover, on account of Adeimantus' statement, at 364e – 365a, that it is part of the religious custom to assume that one can escape punishment of evil deeds by performing sacrificial rites, we may assess that Plato thinks of religious values or at least the public take on them negatively to some degree. However we should also not forget that Plato does not drive religion out of the just city's *paideia* as he does it to the theatre. Indeed Socrates, as is the case with the *Republic*, is portrayed as a pious person, who is always respectful and thankful towards the divinities, as someone who incorporates piety into human virtue in all the dialogues.<sup>39</sup>

Having said that, we have also witnessed Socrates' efforts to alter the common notion of 'god' of his times in an allegedly positive way at the final parts of the second book (379a – 383c). He wanted the gods to be displayed as entities that do not occasion any kind of wickedness but merely goodness; which do not appear in disguise and have recourse to lying. Thus we may conclude that not only the education of the guardians, who have a certain natural gift for virtue (the properties of which Socrates and Glaucon have laid down), is being inspected and regulated in the myth of *paideia*, but also the religious customs as well as the festive affairs are taken into consideration. But these latter issues obviously connect to the whole city rather than to one of its individual classes, namely that of the guardians. Therefore the myth of *paideia*, in addition to the guardian class, takes into view the productive artisans and their culture as well.

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<sup>39</sup> Even though Socrates has been condemned to death on account of contempt for traditional divinities, that he is a truly pious person in real life is a highly credible judgment by the evidence of Plato's dialogues as well as Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (1965, pp. 3 – 7).

Implied is the notion that the artisans and farmers lack a nature that is gifted for virtue. They are not fit for guardians' education. Thus they prove to be problematic with respect to the concern for social order of the whole city. In contrast the guardians do have a potential for *aretē* nonetheless its birth is still a mystery for us that will be unveiled in the next chapter. But for the case of the artisan class and for the question of order within the whole city in relation to the artisans, we might be in a position to suggest an answer.

Although the members of the productive class lack a potentiality for virtue they are nonetheless full of various sensually oriented desires. Apart from basic bodily appetites such as sex, accommodation or food, they also have a sensual desire for sight and sound (cf. 475d). Indeed this was the reason why Socrates had to purge all the poetry of the culture of the just city. Furthermore Socrates supplies the city with a whole range of cleansed music and poetry that are to be circulated within the whole community. This means that sensually beautiful images of true values, such as virtue, reason, order or justice surround and dominate the whole geography of the just city. The religious ceremonies, sports events and in general massive public gatherings take place in conformity with the model of the daytime celebrations with which the *Republic* begins and not with that of *pannykhis*. Hence in virtue of the cultural activities that yields vivid and attractive images of virtue, there arises a sensual urge for true values in the productive class. The following instance of cultural *paideia* might be interpreted in the same manner.

And the one who on each occasion, among the children and youths and among the men, is tested and comes through must be appointed ruler of the city and guardian; and he must be given honors, both while living and when dead, and must be allotted the greatest prizes in burial and the other memorials. (413e – 414a)

Such political ceremonies serve to establish the truly virtuous citizen of the community as the most beautiful man in the eyes of the public. Thus they stimulate a political love for the truly virtuous and through this love aim at establishing correct political opinion.

Moss (2009) claims that, according to Plato “*only* ethically harmful poetry—poetry that reflects and reinforces the flaws in popular morality –can compel us and move us with its portrayal of human affairs.” (p. 442) However we have been speaking of a possibility that true virtue may appear radiant and become attractive to the productive class so that they can be guided by true opinion and do not put a threat on social order. Hence, according to Moss, Plato cannot be offering such an account of political order.

Her argument for the claim that solely immoral poetry can be attractive is based upon an aesthetic view that Plato occasionally expresses, particularly in *Philebus* 51b – c and also in *Republic* 557c, 561e: pure colors and simple shapes are sensually more beautiful than the multifarious and the complex although the multitude favors the latter more. Moss interprets this view as follows:

The genuinely beautiful is simple and uniform; the apparently beautiful is varied and contradictory. Thus, apparently *kala* things differ from genuinely *kala* things in just the same that the appearance of a bed differs from the material bed – and in just the same way that the Form of beauty differs from the many beautifuls. (p.427)

She argues further that since the truly virtuous character is simple and unchanging, it cannot be attractively portrayed by the poet. On the other hand, because the seemingly virtuous man is an irritable and multicolored man, the poet portrays him as the model of virtue so that he can charm his audience. (pp. 435 – 438)

In evaluating Moss’ argument firstly we should underline that her distinction between the apparently *kala* and the genuinely *kala*, that is, the simple and complex



beautiful appearance, refers solely to a level of sensuality, even visuality. However from a mere aesthetical point of view it is not easy to establish a rigid hierarchy within the appearances of the sensible realm in Platonic philosophy; because for Plato, in the sensible realm the appearances are pretty indeterminable or indefinable and relative, that is, anything can appear in any way to anyone at different times so much so that it is impossible for someone to persistently comprehend something on the basis of its appearance. Thus Plato's aforementioned statements in the *Philebus* and *Republic* regarding the simple appearances' superior beauty should be either considered with reference to a grounding at a higher level than the level of appearances (as we will see in the next chapter in order to speak of a true or genuine beauty of appearance, Plato refers to the good character of the musician, i.e. to the level of soul, which partakes of being) or understood as merely relative expressions that voices the general tendencies of attraction or various states of taste of a community or an individual with respect to the various modes of beautiful appearances (such as simple, complex, colorful, ordered, symmetric, chaotic or asymmetric) at a level of *doxa*.

If we take Plato's statements in point as mere *doxa*, then since the general opinion of society with respect to the different modes of beautiful appearance vary in time and geography, it would not be possible to claim that for Plato the multitude can only be attracted by multicolored and complex appearance. For example let us think of a community that have enjoyed for decades or centuries an abundance of extremely complex appearances in their culture until they get bored with such sights or sounds. Further let us suppose that the *mimetic* poets of this society eventually begins to create, themselves without partaking of *aretē*, specific pure colors and shapes. In consequence it is very likely that the community will gradually grow fond

of these new images due to the fresh and modern sensation they arouse among people irrespective of the fact that they convey moral or immoral content. Therefore we may conclude that we are not being unreasonable when we claim that the multitude can be in love with appearances of true virtue, or that true virtue can be radiant and appear attractive.

In sum we may conclude that the *mimetic* arts whose style and content are delimited by ethical and political truths play an important role in the realization or stabilization of social order by means of the sensual beauty and the morally convenient meaning of their works. This result suggests that the nature of the music that is employed in the guardians' education does not divert from the principle of *mimēsis*; and thus Plato in fact does not execute a major move when he abandons the *mimetic* arts from the city but he banishes merely a part of *mimēsis*, namely that part which is immoral. Now let us turn to book three to see the nature of the music of the guardians' education.

## CHAPTER 4

### TRUE MUSIC

#### 4.1 Structure of music

We have mentioned earlier that Socrates considers the task to engage in an explanation of the nature of a guardian a difficult one (374e), however he views the mythical account on the education of guardians as a free-time activity (376d).

Glaucon first receives a descriptive account of the nature of a guardian but at the same time he is informed of the curious dimension of human soul that it can indeed accommodate opposite aspects in it. Though the peculiarity of this fact is resolved on the surface by Socrates having recourse to a simple observation regarding the nature of the dogs, we may say that Glaucon is only being prepared for a recognition of soul as a principle and for a grand ontological analysis of it. The next step in his preparation, i.e. the analysis of nature of music, to that will be our next topic.

Socrates was addressing to Adeimantus at a level of myth or opinion. They were carrying out the discussion on poetry by means of cultural norms and some literary theory. Now that Glaucon was probably eager to speak about music and wanted to learn the reason why the restrictions on poetry were being affected, Socrates provides him with an explanation that transgresses the one which was feeding on cultural norms.

Now let us focus on the relationship that Plato sets up between speech and diction (that is, manner of speech) on the one hand and harmony and rhythm on the other (398d, 400a, 400c – 401a). He uses the terms *akoloytheō* and *hepomai* that mean to go after, to follow, to obey in order to express this relationship. Apart from these he uses *mimēma* when he considers rhythm as a copy or imitation of life-style (400a).

At 398d Socrates states that harmony and rhythm should follow (*akoloytheō*) speech. Next, at 399e – 400a, the same claim is repeated and its reverse is rejected: foot (*poys*, which we can think of as a component of rhythm) and melody (*melos*, which as that of harmony) should obey, should follow speech rather than speech following melody or rhythm. At the last lines of 400c it is said that grace (*eyskhēmosynē*, literally well-formedness) follows good rhythm and formlessness (*askhēmosynē*) follows rhythmlessness. Let us not ponder upon the senses of *eyskhēmosynē* and *askhēmosynē* now but merely note that they are the ending terms of two series one of which is good and the other is bad.

Socrates, having come down to the very lowest term, now moves upward. If harmony and rhythm obey speech and not vice versa, then good rhythm follows beautiful diction (*kalē lexis*), i.e. it becomes similar (*homoioō*) to it (in the same manner, lack of rhythm follows bad diction). Similarly, good harmony follows beautiful diction and lack of it follows lack of diction. From what is said, we may infer that grace follows good harmony and formlessness follows lack of harmony.

It is interesting that Socrates does not set up the relationship of following, obeying between harmony and rhythm, rather he regards them at the same level. In the same way, manner of speech (*ho tropos tēs lexeōs*) and speech (*logos*) are situated at the same level and it is not mentioned that there is an obedience relation between them. These follow the character of the soul and strive to obey it, to be similar to it (*tōi tēs psychēs ēthei hepetai*). Thus the following is concluded: good speech (*eylogia*), both content-wise and diction-wise, good harmony (*eyarmostia*), good rhythm (*eyrythmia*) and grace, that is, all of the terms of the series should follow good character (*eyētheia*). Good character, Socrates notes, is not in a negative

sense purity, simplicity or naiveté but having a truly beautiful and good character and intellect (*dianoia*).

It is possible to say that in our series that express parts of music in their interrelatedness, as we go down, i.e. draw near to the last term *skhēma* (shape), we attain parts that are of a more sensible nature. For example, if we compare speech and harmony, even though speech is something audible it would be meaningless to think of it independently from the intellect whereas it is possible to think of rhythm as something merely audible even though it is something intelligible as well. Relying upon the plausibility of this hypothesis, we may claim that Plato indicates with the last term *eyskhēmosynē* (well-formedness) not something pertaining to the character but an appearance that is audible. He seems to refer to the sensual beauty that is heard by the ear and which gives bodily pleasure.

At 401a, the series in which the parts of music is analyzed, is generalized to include all craftsmanship (*dēmioyrgia*) such as weaving, embroidery, architecture, manufacture of household furnishings, and all nature. For all these arts and nature embody grace and formlessness; the former is akin to a moderate (*sophrōn*) and good character whereas the latter is a sibling (*adelphē*) of bad speech (*kakologias*) and bad character (*kakoēthias*).

#### 4.2 Expression of *mimēsis* in terms of Socrates' musical analysis

Before leading to the more general results regarding the whole area of artisanship, let us scrutinize further the case of lyrical tunes and look for an answer to our main question. Is the music that Socrates employs in the *paideia* of the guardians founded upon the principle of *mimēsis*? We saw that Plato used the verbs *akoloytheō* and *hepomai* which mean to obey or to follow in order to denote the relationship between the elements such as rhythm-speech, character-speech, *skhēma*-harmony. He also

used for the same purpose *homoioō* (to make similar), *adelphē* (brother) and more significantly *mimēma* (copy, imitation). Therefore at first sight it seems that the nature of the music that is the foundation of the guardians' education is characterized by *mimēsis*.

There is an aspect of the obedience relation that Socrates frequently repeats and underlines. He does not allow the possibility that the upper term follows the lower one, e.g. speech following rhythm is not permitted. In other words, only the terms that are nearer to *skhēma* can go after the terms that are closer to the soul. Now let us see what happens in the discarded case that Socrates persistently rejects. I call this case the *reverse* reading of the series in terms of which Socrates analyzes the music of the guardians' education.

Let harmony imitate shape, speech imitate harmony and character imitate speech. In other words, let all the terms follow outward shape which we interpret to be something sensible. For example think of a musician who tries to imitate the chirping of the sparrows by the modes of harmony that he can articulate or a painter who tries to imitate the working of a cobbler employing various color patterns. But this arrangement of the series clearly gives us the characteristics of *mimēsis*: the artist takes its departure from a pleasant and arbitrary appearance and applies rules of sound harmonics or color harmonics (that are essentially perceptual) upon appearance. Now let us elaborate further on the example of musician by reading the series with all of its terms from reverse to see whether we encounter the non-virtuous soul of the imitator in our musician.

After expressing melodies that imitate the birds' sound, he goes on to match the rhythm of the song with the complex sequence of intermittent chirping. Next he voices versed lines that tell the swift movements of the sparrows but he does this in

spasmodic wailings that are in conformity with the rhythm and the harmony. For all this though he soothes himself, lightening and softening his soul state.

When music is executed in this way, we see that the sensual elements attempt at imposing themselves upon the soul and thus likens the character to themselves. Since our musician takes as his starting point and inflicts on his character the sensual aspects of anything that he enjoys at any time such as overindulgence, fame, hatred, unbridled sexuality, alcoholism or for that matter Platonic values like justice, friendship and so on –let us not forget that according to Plato anything might appear beautiful, indeed for him actually anything might appear in any way– his character may turn out in any evil way we might imagine. Socrates touches upon this issue when he discusses the manner of speech:<sup>40</sup>

...What is slavish, or anything else shameful, they must neither do nor be clever at imitating, so that they won't get a taste for the being from its imitation. Or haven't you observed that imitations, if they are practiced continually from youth onwards, become established as habits and nature, in body and sounds and in thought? (395c – d)

If our musician performs setting out from anything that he deems graceful, he will need all types of harmony and rhythm in order to deal with the range of various appearances. Furthermore, he will have to obtain a variable nature in his diction so that it is in accordance with the multifarious types of harmony and rhythm (397a – c). Lastly his character that obeys his changeable diction will make him an unstable person with inconsistent behaviors and attitudes.

Even though our musician whose soul goes after appearances starts his music occasionally from pleasant images of truly beautiful values such as justice, wisdom or moderate love, his soul that is impure with evil involvements cannot bear true beauty loyally and persistently. He remains as a person who praises truly beautiful

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<sup>40</sup> Cf. 395e – 396b

things with beautiful words but does so without partaking of their truth and as a coincidence.<sup>41</sup> Therefore it is impossible to say that he is a virtuous or just person.

Thus when we read the series in terms of which Socrates analyses the music that will be employed in the guardians' education backwards,<sup>42</sup> the type of poet that emerges does have the disfigured character of the *mimetic* poet that is articulated in book ten.

#### 4.3 Sense of true music and *mimetic* music

It now becomes evident that when we switch the terms of the obedience relations by which the nature of music in the guardians' curriculum is enunciated in *Republic III* so that the reverse reading is formulated, we get an expression of the nature of the *mimetic* arts. But does the correct rendering of the series give us a *mimetic* type of music as well? If we answer this question affirmatively then we will obtain the result that the classical view regarding Plato's take on fine arts, according to which the arts do not contain a knowledge that is valuable in itself and they have to be externally repressed and governed by philosophy so that they contribute to the order and welfare of society, is indeed accurate. We have to be careful in dealing with this problem since, as we have said, Plato, apart from the verbs *akoloytheō* and *hepomai*, uses *homoioō* and *mimēma* to express the relationships between different elements of music in book three.

Let us begin with the correct reading of the series whose last term is *eyskhēmosynē*. Speech should follow good character (*eyētheia*) or in other words it should be an imitation of it. As opposed to the *mimetic* rendering that begins with

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<sup>41</sup> Recall the *Symposium*'s Agathon and Socrates' criticism of the discursive performances.

<sup>42</sup> That is, when we read the true series in a way as to govern all of its higher terms by its lowest and terminal term, namely *skhēma*. The reverse reading begins by harmony (or rhythm) follows shape. This dual is constituted by the last terms that are related in the true rendering, but terms of the relation are switched, that is, instead of shape follows harmony, harmony follows shape. Thus the reverse rendering is reverse in two senses: first it begins by the last dual of the true rendering, second the terms of this dual is related reversing the last dual of the true rendering.



*skhēma*, i.e. sensual shape, the true reading starts the series from the element *ēthos*, which is essentially of the soul. To wit, in contrast with *mimēsis*, the true musicians, in Plato's terms, *moysikoi proteron* (402c), do not initiate their works by means of the most sensual element, rather their work stems from their good character. Thus their speech, both in terms of its content and its diction, strive to become similar to their beautiful soul. In contrast, this is not the case for *mimetic* music in which the character that tries to become like an appearance is a result of the artistic performance (as in the example of the musician who soothes and softens his soul when he imitates the chirping of the birds).

At this point we face a serious problem with respect to music's educational function: If good character is the source of genuine music and not the result of it, how will virtue become actualized in the young guardian whose virtue is merely potential?<sup>43</sup> Since *mimēsis* serves to determine the soul, it looks as if it is not to be dismissed from the pedagogical domain. In parallel Jaeger (1943), although he admits that "the real meaning of the reform of poetry by philosophy in *The Republic* is spiritual", claims that "in describing the education of the guards, he [Plato] is on a lower level— that of mere opinion, *doxa*, on which all 'musical' education moves." (pp. 215, 216) Indeed the method of the education of the young guardians has been understood by a majority of scholars solely on the basis of the soul's imitation of a sensible model. The great importance of music and proper education, according to Sallis (1996),

lies in the "imitative character" of the soul, that is, in the fact that the soul tends to imitate whatever is presented to it and in imitating it tends to become like it... The result is that music is a potent means of forming the soul because

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<sup>43</sup> Since true music can be performed merely by the musician who has a good character, it does not seem possible for the music student whose character is not actually good to engage in this type of music. In the next chapter we will see that the true musician, by virtue of his good character, assists the young guardian to become a contributive part of the performance of true music.

of its capacity to present a model vividly and to evoke from the soul imitation of that model. Especially in the case of the very young, the soul assimilates itself rapidly and thoroughly to whatever model is held before it in the tales of the poets. (pp. 359 – 360)

We find same view in Janaway's *Plato and the Arts* (2006):

The young guardians who will be responsible for the city's well-being must receive an education that properly forms their characters. In Plato's view the young soul is impressionable and capable of being molded by any material that comes its way...Unregulated, the arts cannot be trusted to impress the right form upon the soul or to be in harmony with reason and the good. (p.389)

Thus we see that the scholarly understanding of Plato's musical education rests on the transmission of true opinion or moral patterns to the young soul. But such affection of the soul, we saw, is characteristic of *mimēsis*. However true music have begun to dissociate itself from *mimēsis* at fundamental points and in the next chapter we will see that the *mimetic* way of education is not sufficient for virtue to come about, in particular the virtue of moderation. To repeat, in true music speech imitates character and not vice versa. Further whereas the initial term is the most sensible one, namely well-formedness, in the *mimetic* series, in the correct reading it is character.

We have been saying that both the content and the manner of speech should obey the good character in true music. What about the relationship between content and diction? Why does Plato keep Socrates silent in this matter? The same is valid for the dual harmony and rhythm. On this, one might think that Plato does not want to distance the dialogue from its ethical and political context by going into the details of music theory as in the case of the relationship between life-style and rhythm at 400c. However in this case there might be a genuine reason for the silence of Socrates. This question will be operative in our discussion till the end of this chapter.

Let us consider the more sensible dual, harmony and rhythm. One thing we recognize immediately is that to speak of a relationship of obedience between these components would subjugate the relation to elements that are of the same degree of sensibility as well. However, as we have observed, the obedience relation of the correct rendering of the series implies a difference of level between its terms: the ones that are closer to appearance should follow those that are nearer to soul. The elements that are at the same distance with respect to the soul have to obey an element that is closer to it and the accordance between them should be grounded in a higher level (so much so that this accordance shall not be conceptualized in terms of the lower point of view). If one attempts at imposing an element on another one that has an equivalent sensibility so that the whole appears beautiful or orderly, this would be an instance of *mimēsis* since the accordance is constituted by attending to appearance.

On the other hand if the artist, in accordance with the characterization of *genuine* music, attends to and strives for beauty of soul, this would mean that he pursues not any kind of sensual pleasure, satisfaction or objective but rather internal harmony, friendship or a harmonious community of musicians and listeners. (Ethical and political dimension of *genuine* music that will be demonstrated to be the fundamental and effective element of the guardians' education is the main issue of the next chapter.) Sensual aspect of beauty that overflows from that kind of soul harmony is like a secondary or insignificant consequence of the beauty in the level of soul (though it will prove to be beneficial and even necessary in terms of persuasion in education.) Neither the accordance between harmony and rhythm nor between speech and diction is a major issue in this type of music. In contrast the *mimetic* artist aims at sensual attractiveness. Since he neither recognizes nor appreciates the level

of soul in his art, he has to have recourse to the level of sensuality to satisfy his audience. In his appeal to the sensible realm, as we have noted earlier, the *mimetic* artist works with various sensible models or patterns such as the synthesis of high and low tones<sup>44</sup>, the unity of the visual parts<sup>45</sup> or for that matter kaleidoscopic (*poikilon*) visual patterns of clothing<sup>46</sup>.

Now according to the scheme that we have abstracted by reversing the relationships in Socrates' analysis of true music and recognized as a representation of the structure of *mimetic* arts, harmony and rhythm follow beautiful appearance; speech and diction follow harmony and rhythm; and finally character follows speech and diction. But if harmony follows one aspect of beautiful appearance and rhythm follows another aspect of it then there arises a need for a third principle that would synthesize the two. On the other hand if harmony and rhythm imitate the beautiful appearance in the same respect then there would be some kind of uniformity or similarity between harmony and rhythm that would not be very appealing to the senses. Thus it turns out that the *mimetic* artist has to pay special attention to the accordance between harmony and rhythm or speech and diction as well as organizing more holistic relations. It seems that he has to control and arrange each and every particular relationship between the components of his work. This would be the disadvantage and the required hard work that the *mimetic* artist has to cope with and manage in order to attain wide recognition and prominence. Socrates thus identifies the *non-technical* rhetorician in the following passage from the *Phaedrus*:

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<sup>44</sup> See *Symposium* 186a – 188e for an Eryximachus' exposition of the harmony between opposite qualities with respect to music, medicine and other arts as well as nature.

<sup>45</sup> See *Republic* 420c – e where Socrates uses an example of a statue whose eye has to have a particular color so that it is in harmony with the whole of the statue.

<sup>46</sup> See *Republic* 557c and 561e for a comparison between complex patterns of colors and democracy. The democratic city contains various types of man and life-style and the democratic man has various dispositions and a many-colored life. *Mimetic* poet is to be compared to the democratic man if not the tyrannical one. *Poikilon* is especially charming for women and children.

On the other hand, he who has nothing more valuable than the things he has composed or written, turning his words up and down at his leisure, adding this phrase and taking that away, will you not properly address him as poet or writer of speeches or of laws? (278d – e)<sup>47</sup>

Therefore it is to be concluded that our hypothetical formulation, although it gives us some insight into the nature of *mimēsis*, does not prove to be adequate and comprehensive. Indeed the reverse rendering of Socrates' analysis of true music does provide us with a scheme that explains how the *mimetic* method can be effective in terms of character by imposing upon the soul various sensible figures; but it uncovers neither the fact that the *mimetic* impact on the soul is contingent or susceptible to failure<sup>48</sup> nor the free, diverse and complex working methods of the *mimetic* artist. As opposed to the simple and invulnerable style of the *moysikoi proteron*, the method of *mimēsis* has to be analyzed into its complexity and contingency.

Let us consider the soul of the *mimetic* artist to understand his method in terms of Socrates analysis of *genuine* music. As we recall from book ten, the imitative artist is a person who does not partake of *aretē*. Accordingly, since he owns an evil character, for him there is no harmony or unity of soul upon which the unity and harmony of the lyrical component can be grounded. In turn, since there is no such lyrical component at his disposal, it is not possible for him to ground the unity and harmony of the lower component, that is, the level of harmony and rhythm, upon a more internal level. Thus we may conclude that the *mimetic* endeavor does not harbor an ontological structure with hierarchical strata. The components of *mimēsis*

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<sup>47</sup> Plato. (2001). *Plato: With an English Translation, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus* (Vol. 1). (H. N. Fowler, Trans.). Great Britain: Harvard University Press.

<sup>48</sup> *Mimetic* poetry, appealing to our irrational nature, displays the vices, e.g. foolishness, absurdity or overindulgence in desire and sorrow, as beautiful and makes us think that these are good things. Nevertheless when we listen to the *mimetic* poet, it is possible for us to resist its charms by reminding ourselves of its harmful nature (606c, 608a – b; see 603c – 606d for the impacts of *mimetic* poetry on the soul).

are interrelated and accorded with each other on an equal footing, i.e. at a sensible level that is thrice removed from truth, in such a way as to bring about external beauty. When the imitative musician performs, it is possible for him to take his departure from any one of the constituents of his work, namely bad character, speech, diction, harmony, rhythm and grace. He then goes on to pick out another item and tries to come up with an arrangement that will arouse favor on the part of the audience. The disorderly and bad character, which is unqualifiedly of the soul proper, might be regarded as sensible as grace or rhythm, because, according to Plato, the soul which has that kind of character is entrapped in the body and lives on merely with respect to his sensations, opinions, sensual pleasures and pains.

On the other hand, the accordance between elements that are equally sensible such as harmony and rhythm is brought about in *genuine* music by having recourse to a level that is less sensible. Thus in fact it is not the case that Socrates makes no comment on the accordance between equally sensible elements, but rather this problem is conclusively dealt with in his analysis of true music.

## CHAPTER 5

### MUSICAL *PAIDEIA*

#### 5.1 Knowledge of *moysikoi proteron*

In order to prepare for our question as to how true music whose consequential term does not refer to character but to well-formedness can be employed in guardians' education, we might want to take a closer look at the musician that has a good character. According to the statement at 401c, craftsmen (*dēmiourgoi*) of the just city are going to be people who have a natural ability to trace the nature of beauty and grace (*tēn toy kaloy te kai eyskhēmonos physin*). It is clear that the expression 'nature of beauty and grace' does not refer to mere sensible beauty. At 400e we have already seen that the man who has a good character possesses a *dianoia*. When we take into account that as well, we might think that the expression 'being capable of tracing the nature of beauty and grace' refers to a power to recognize and conceive kinds of beauty that are superior to sensual beauty such as beauty of virtue or, if possible, even that of *ideas*. In parallel, at 402c we see that, according to Plato, in order to become a true musician (*moysikoi proteron*), one has to attain ethical knowledge, i.e. one has to be able to distinguish and conceive virtues such as moderation, courage, liberality, magnificence and their opposites, both themselves and their images (*eikonas*) in the embodiment of man as well as human relations.

Hence we ought to conclude that the artist of the just city who engages in music or any one of the fine arts is not characterized by a skill in imitating appearance that neither involves knowledge nor virtuosity, but rather by an ability to acknowledge and distinguish ethical-political truths and fables in his own soul as well as in the city, and by a knowledge of the values themselves in these fields, i.e. a knowledge of the *ideas* which pertain to human *aretē*. The knowledge that is being conceptualized at

this point is not apparently a scientific knowledge of mathematics or dialectics that we encounter in the sixth and seventh books and yet it corresponds to an art (*tekhnē*) and a discipline (*meletē*) in the ethical and political domains as we observe in the last lines of 402c.

It will prove helpful to take a brief look at a passage from the dialogue *Phaedrus* to understand more clearly the type of knowledge that is attributed at this point to the true musician. In this dialogue, Socrates, after finishing his praise on the madness of love, together with Phaedrus, sets out to investigate the nature of rhetoric and try to find out the essential features which make rhetoric a *tekhnē* (270e – 272a, 273d – e, 277b – c). It is argued that the knowledge of the nature of soul is one of such characteristics. In addition to this cognition, the rhetorician has to be exhaustively aware of the different kinds of soul and he has to be able to recognize these various types within the context of actual life. Further he has to be capable of discerning the different types of speeches and the effect of each kind upon each type of soul. This much overlap with the knowledge of our true musician. But our musician, having in mind the example of Damon, also knows, in variation with Socrates (400a – c), who in contrast knows dialectic, all types of harmony and rhythm as well as their relationship with various types of character. Thus we may conclude that the *genuine* musician, i.e. the musician that is engaged in a *tekhnē* (as opposed to the *mimetic* artist), is characterized in the same way with the *technical* rhetorician with respect to their educative roles in the society. They both strive to guide the soul of the fellow citizens towards truth.

Of course Socrates is the one whom we well know to have embraced that political goal. (Then comes Plato and Aristotle with the schools they have instituted). Let us note some of the examples that we have laid down from chapter two. First we



have seen Socrates to successfully deal with Thrasymachus' great anger, not by responding in a similar manner but with a gentle and yet insistent attitude. Then we have observed that he offered meticulously different types of arguments to Glaucon and Adeimantus. He responded to Glaucon's *erotic* inclinations with explanations on soul, though himself promoted some *eroticism* in the community. When it comes to Adeimantus, we have noted that Socrates addressed him with explanations in terms of *doxa*, rules of conduct, laws and cultural models. It seems that, at 425b and 427a, by arguing that all cultural and political laws are ultimately in vain, Socrates wants to deprive him of his austerity at least to some degree; and by leaving only one law, that is the law of uniform music, he wants to lure him into music which he lacks. Besides Socrates explicitly states that he knows their character (368b).

As we see, the essential feature of the *moysikoi proteron* is not to recognize the audible beauties that pertain to the ear (though obviously this is a prerequisite) but the beauty of soul with respect to both the community and the individual; it is also said that they are people with a good character. Plato will expand on *eyētheia* throughout book four and explain it to be the reception of four cardinal virtues, namely justice, moderation, courage and wisdom into the human soul. Thus we understand, in retrospect, that the *moysikoi proteron* who are to be the educators of the guardians are among the virtuous men in the city. Having established the character of the musical teachers of the just city, let us proceed now with our reading in order to comprehend the nature of the guardians' education.

## 5.2 Musical *paideia* of the guardians: *Erōs* and virtue

Then, I said, if the fine dispositions [καλὰ ἦθη] that are in the soul and those that agree [ὁμολογοῦντα] and accord [συμφωνοῦντα] with them in the form should ever coincide in anyone, with both partaking of the same model, wouldn't that be the fairest sight [κάλλιστον θέαμα] for him who is able to see

[τῷ δυναμένῳ θεᾷσθαι]? By far. Now the fairest is the most lovable  
[ἐρασμιώτατον]? Of course. (402d)

One important thing that is to be noted in this passage is the extension of the ontological analysis of true music into the beauty of a human being. Just as true music has a part that is essentially of the soul, namely good character, and beautiful sensible components that obey the character, Plato distinguishes between man's beautiful character and his aspects of beautiful appearance that agree and accord with his character. The value of the convergence of a beautiful character and a beautiful body in a single human being lies in the political power that beautiful appearance enjoys. The most beautiful is the most lovable in the community; since everyone follows around him and he is the most popular,<sup>49</sup> the ethical-political stance of the beautiful person permeates within the community. This was the reason why Socrates invoked his anger just after Agathon was publicly received and honored greatly. He wanted, first by his open criticism of the speeches' sensual directedness that reaches its climax with Agathon's performance, and then by his small exchange with Agathon, to unveil the fact that despite all the radiant sensible qualities that surround him, Agathon was not a man of virtue or knowledge but merely knew how to appear beautifully, so that he can preclude the community from love of sensuality. If, on the other hand, that which looks beautiful convenes with true beauty, then that combination becomes a great benefactor for the welfare of community. The exhibition of virtue in an elegant manner, i.e. in a way that renders virtue beautiful in the eye of the public, as we saw in section 3.3, was utilized as a strategy for resolving

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<sup>49</sup> See *Charmides* 154b – c for Charmides' entrance into the wrestling-ground followed by a group of lovers and the attraction he arouses. See *Protagoras* 314e – 315b to see how Protagoras' fame and wise appearance attracts a bunch of people around him to be instructed on ethical and political matters.

the problem of social order that issues from the fragility and inadequacy of the productive artisans' virtue.

Another thing that we should mention in relation to our last quotation pertains to the true musician. It is clear that the expression *toi dynamenōi theasthai*, that is 'having the power to see', is not meant to refer to an ability to perceive the attractive beauty of appearance. After having elaborated on the ethical and political aspect of the true musician's knowledge, Plato now calls attention to his love of human beauty, especially the love that is directed towards the soul. Hence, in accordance with the fact that the analysis of human beauty is being carried out in the same manner with that of musical beauty, we understand that just like music, human beauty is a factor in the education of the guardians. As Socrates states at the end of the discussion on music: "Surely musical matters should end in love matters that concern the fair. [τελευτᾶν τὰ μουσικὰ εἰς τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικά]" (403c)

If Socrates and Damon are portrayed as the musical teachers then Glaucon is definitely the model for the musical student. We have noted several times that Glaucon is interested in music. Thus his nature embodies the gentleness that is required for a guardian. In section 2.3, we have also mentioned that he has a love of truth, specifically an urge for justice itself; in the beginning of *Republic II*, Socrates remarks that Glaucon is always courageous in everything. Thus his disposition partakes of bravery and wisdom as well, other requirements for guardianship in the just city apart from physical strength of which, to my knowledge, we do not have any conspicuous evidence in the dialogue.

In addition to his desire for music, at 468b – c we see him associated with temperate sexual love. Moreover at 474d – 475a he is described to be a lover of all types of bodily constitution of boys. Nehamas (2007, p.3) refers this passage to the

*Symposium*'s ladder of love, particularly to the stage where the lover discerns the beauty common to all bodies and looks down upon his desire for one body. Actually we may go on further and assess that, on account of the next passage, Glaucon is even at a point with respect to *scala amoris* where he can recognize beauty of soul independently of bodily beauty.

It's the musical man who would most of all love such human beings, while if there were one who lacked harmony, he wouldn't love him.  
No, he wouldn't, he [Glaucon] said, at least if there were some defect in the soul. If, however, there were some bodily defect, he'd be patient and would willingly take delight in him.<sup>50</sup> (402d)

Glaucon's contribution to Socrates' argument about education is crucial here. We have noted that Socrates always addresses the argument of soul to Glaucon. At this point Glaucon proves, by his response that the beauty of soul has to be favored over bodily beauty, that he has been together with Socrates throughout their investigations and that dialogue whose subject matter is education takes place positively and progressively with respect to the actual education of the community of speakers.

Noticing Glaucon's improvement, Socrates responds with an appeal to his *erotic* affairs and hence arouses an *erotic* ambiance in the community: "I understand, I said. You have, or had, such a boy and I concede your point." (402e) There are two more instances in the fifth book that we have just referred, namely 468b – c and 474d – 475a, where Glaucon is revealed in the community with respect to his *erotic* inclinations. Though this *erotic* air does not persist dominantly in the community of the *Republic* (both of Glaucon's *erotic* manifestations are within measures under the guidance of Socrates) as it does in that of the *Symposium*. Neither is there any explicit notice of actual love affair within the group as in many other dialogues (apart from the *Symposium* which abounds in love affairs within society and speeches on

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<sup>50</sup> Also cf. *Greater Hippias* 294a.

love) such as the *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Protagoras*. In the *Phaedrus* the love of *logos* is being displayed through the drama of Socrates and Phaedrus, and personal love is the subject matter of the discourse.<sup>51</sup> But if we come back to the *Republic*, we see, in the dramatic exhibition of the public, the perfect model of the manner in which an *erotic* education should occur, in line with the perfectionist nature of the dialogue. What is aimed at in a *genuine* philosophical activity or *genuine* music, for that matter, is the following: confronting the presence of the pleasure of *logos* or sound, the soul should not be directed towards that but rather it should be in search for truth.

We have noted, in sections 2.3 and 2.4, that the community of the *Republic* puts forward a virtuous conduct when they persist in philosophical discussion, favoring it over the characteristically *erotic* nighttime celebrations. In parallel the surfacing of *eroticism* in the community is not overindulgent but moderate. That is, the interlocutors, paying due attention to the importance of *erōs* in the journey towards truth and virtue in their conversation, manage to override their *erotic* inclinations as it should be in an auspicious and progressive group of students. However this does not come to mean a suppression of *erōs*. On the contrary *erōs* has a contributive presence in the very context of truth just as Socrates willingly provokes Glaucon's *erōs* to show itself and just as the interlocutors and the audience enjoy the pleasant and thrilling discussion on justice. In addition we might remember that they also enjoyed the pleasant sights of morning processions.

Thus we once again recognize that Plato, not only verbalizes the essence of his understanding of education to virtue in the *Republic*, but he also communicates it through the imagery of drama. According to him the context of musical education should contain and permit affairs of love. The true musician as the lover of soul's

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<sup>51</sup> See 227a – 228e for Socrates and Phaedrus love of discourse. At 230 we see Socrates as a passionate lover of written text. The discourses of Lysias and Socrates are on the madness of love.

beauty is the essential feature of education and the pedagogy of the guardians, who are selected in virtue of their natural inclination to virtue, feeds on the *erotic* interrelationships in the community of the teachers and students. As the guide to virtue, Socrates, having aroused some degree of *erōs* in the public, instructs his “students” on the subject of noble and moderate behaviors in *erotic* affairs.

But tell me this: does excessive pleasure have anything in common with moderation?  
How could it, he said, since it puts men out of their minds no less than pain?  
But, then, with the rest of virtue?  
Nothing at all.  
But with insolence and licentiousness?  
Most of all.  
Can you tell of a greater or keener pleasure than the one connected with sex?  
I can't, he said, nor a madder one either.  
Is the naturally right kind of love to love in a moderate and musical way what's orderly and fine?  
Quite so, he said.  
Nothing that's mad or akin to licentiousness must approach the right kind of love?  
No, it mustn't.  
Then this pleasure mustn't approach love, and lover and boy who love and are loved in the right way mustn't be partner to it?  
By Zeus, no, Socrates, he said, this pleasure certainly mustn't approach love.  
So then, as it seems, you'll set down a law in the city that's being founded: that a lover may kiss, be with, and touch his boy as though he were a son, for fair purposes, if he persuades him; but, as for the rest, his intercourse with the one for whom he cares will be such that their relationship will never be reputed to go further than this. If not, he'll be subject to blame as unmusical and inexperienced in fair things. (402e – 403b)

Hence we understand that the goal of the guardians' musical *paideia* is to teach them how to get along with their desires, that is to both make their appetitive nature happy and preclude its dominance over the entire soul (441e – 442e).

Now let us go over the range of factors that are operative in the pedagogy of the guardians. The initiate guardian can be attracted to the sensual beauty of music, the wise appearance of his teacher<sup>52</sup> or the bodily beauty of anyone in the school

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<sup>52</sup> For Lysis' arrival near “wise” Socrates see *Lysis* 207a – b.

community and as his soul is unrefined yet, he is inclined to be extravagant in his *erotic* engagements with these objects of love. In other words imitative music, which is proclaimed to be distinct from the true educative music, and music that is excessively sentimental or volatile, together with a fanatic devotion to a teacher<sup>53</sup> or to a fellow pupil are among the polar points that the wise and moderate teacher has to avoid within the school society. On the other hand sensual beauty of music<sup>54</sup> as well as the bodily beauty of the young students<sup>55</sup> are among the threatening features with respect to education's corruption to which the teacher might be tempted. However it is maintained that the moderate character of the musical teacher is such that it does not go for *mimēsis* in music or for sexuality in love.

Accordingly we discover that the measure, balance and order that permeate through the musical trainings and tensions of love and that issue mostly from the musical teacher's virtue constitute the effective principle that bestows virtue upon the community; and the virtue of the individual guardian depends upon his participation and contribution with respect to the generation of the communal virtue. In contrast factors such as the bodily beauty of the student or teacher, the appearance of the wise teacher, excitement of the student and the charming aspects of music are as requisite as the teacher's good character in the process of education; but they should be interpreted as the conditions that prepare the actual emergence of the social virtue rather than the operative ingredient. Hence the blind motion of sensual desire that issues chiefly from the student but to which the teacher, ultimately due to

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<sup>53</sup> We might think of the passionate followers of Socrates, namely Aristodemus and Apollodorus, whom we are familiar with from the *Symposium* and *Phaedo*. Also we have mentioned before the devotion for Pythagoras and the sophists at *Republic X* 600a – e and for the sophist Protagoras at *Protagoras* 314e – 315c.

<sup>54</sup> For Socrates' indulgent love for discourse see *Phaedrus* 227d – 229d, and view how, in consequence, he is forced into a speech that he does not want to make 238d – 241d.

<sup>55</sup> For Socrates' momentary sexual desire towards the young Charmides see *Charmides* 155c – e.

his physical embodiment, contributes as well, balanced by ratio and measure arising mainly from the virtuous teacher and to some degree from the student becomes the ground of the harmonious society.

Let us now take a look at the *Symposium*, particularly at a passage from Diotima's conversation with Socrates, to have a clearer understanding of the doctrine of education that is being propounded in *Republic III*. As we have mentioned in section 2.4, the guardians are being selected for their particular nature that is naturally prone to virtue. Plato articulates this idea of having a potential nature for virtue in the *Symposium* from Diotima's mouth (206b – 209e). In her conversation with Socrates, Diotima speaks of two different kinds of conception (κυῖσαι) and creation (τεκεῖν): with respect to body and to soul. Those who are pregnant in their bodies engage in procreation whereas the ones who are pregnant in their souls bring forth virtue. But the important thing that Diotima points out is that both of these creations take place only in beauty. That is, if we focus on the latter type of *tekein*,<sup>56</sup> those who have a nature that is conducive to virtue looks for beautiful people, more favorably with people who have a beautiful soul like himself, in order to bring forth his potential virtue into actuality. Indeed this is what Plato tries to establish for the pedagogical environment of the just city.

This is a person he immediately finds he can talk fluently to about virtue and about what qualities and practices it takes for a man to be good. In short, he takes on this person's education. What I'm saying, in other words, is that once he's come into contact with an attractive person and become intimate with him, he produces and gives birth to the offspring he's been pregnant with for so long. He thinks of his partner all the time, whether or not he's there, and together they share in raising their offspring. Consequently, this kind of relationship involves a far stronger bond and far more constant affection than is experienced by people who are united by ordinary children, because the offspring of this relationship are particularly attractive and are closer to immortality than ordinary children. (*Symposium* 209b – c)

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<sup>56</sup> Noting that this verb is the root of *tekhnē* would be helpful.



In the *Republic*, by means of the beauties of body and soul as well as the musical beauty, which takes the form of discourses on virtue and valuable manners of conduct in the *Symposium*, he wants to accommodate the students and teachers in beautiful context so that they can give birth to their virtues that are immanent in their natures. Another thing that we learn from the *Symposium* and which is in line with the *Republic* is that the education to virtue is a collective effort that is prolonged throughout a span of time and virtue is an accomplishment whose fruits are enjoyed communally.

### 5.3 Status of sensual beauty in the musical *paideia* of the guardians

We have demonstrated, in the previous section, that sensual beauty and *erōs* (both of body and of soul) constitute the prerequisite for the education of virtue; and that the musical teacher's virtue operates as the main factor in the realization of the communal *aretē*. But is this all there is to the guardians' education? Indeed not. It seems that we have only covered one half of their virtue since we have only dealt with moderation and neglected issues concerning courage. In the fourth book it is argued that moderation is a virtue that permeates throughout the entire soul whereas courage pertains to only one part of the soul, that is the spirited part (432a). This part of the soul is akin to the reasoning part and is naturally obedient to it (440b).<sup>57</sup>

According to the exposition of book four, courage is said to be to possess true opinion with respect to the things that are to be feared and not to be feared (429b – 430b, 442b – c, 425a).

As we recall from section 3.3, we have maintained that the sensual beauty of the musical *paideia* that circulates through the just society certifies that the

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<sup>57</sup> Also cf. the myth of the charioteer in the *Phaedrus*, particularly 253d – 254e, 256b. The white horse is noble and abides by the charioteer's directions.

productive class does not divert from true opinion. We may argue, similarly, that the sensual beauty of true music, apart from preparing the grounds for collective virtue, also makes sure that the guardians, being attracted to virtues' images, always abide by true opinion.

And the incapable craftsman we mustn't permit to practice his craft among us, so that our guardians won't be reared on images of vice, as it were on bad grass, every day cropping and grazing on a great deal little by little from many places, and unawares put together some one big bad thing in their soul? Mustn't we, rather, look for those craftsmen whose good natural endowments make them able to track down the nature of what is fine and graceful, so that the young, dwelling as it were in a healthy place, will be benefited by everything; and from that place something of the fine works will strike their vision or their hearing, like a breeze bringing health from good places; and beginning in childhood, it will, without their awareness, with the fair speech lead them to likeness and friendship as well as accord? (401c – d)

Lastly we should also highlight the insufficiency of the *mimetic* method of education. Had *mimēsis* been accepted as the sole model for the education of the guardians, then it could only preach them moral opinion without endowing them with ethical-political knowledge. Thus moderation, that is soul's harmony of its parts, could not emerge. For the guardian would only be aware of and in love with some abstract moral principle.

Furthermore, such a view would be overemphasizing the contribution of the sensual form in the soul's process of attaining virtue. Indeed it is true that, as Socrates mentioned in the very beginning of his description of just city's *paideia*, the soul is best shaped in the earliest ages. Nevertheless, although the sensual form is the major factor in the sensual directedness of the soul and hence its associations with evil, it cannot be the greatest compound in soul's progression towards *aretē*, particularly when the human being passes the age education in fairy tales and reaches an age of adolescence when the *erotic* desires emerge with vigor. For if one claims the soul derives its virtue from the sensual form, then his position would succumb to

a metaphysical error that is not in conformity with Plato's philosophy. In that, one would be employing a principle that is at a lower rank with respect to being as the major factor, in explaining the birth of soul's virtue. Jaeger (1943) gives us such an account:

In his system of education for the guards, Plato intends that after the work of the Muses has moulded them unawares into a certain intellectual pattern, philosophical teaching will later reveal to them in full consciousness the highest knowledge; and so philosophical knowledge presupposes musical education. (p.229)

According to Jaeger, musical education, which he conceives it to be operating at a level of *doxa*, shapes the guardian into a particular character and even intellectual model that is to function as a potential for philosophical knowledge. But as he thinks of the musical education at a *doxastic* level, his view comes to hold that a sensual form such as a piece of melody can by itself endow the soul with virtue. One has to refer to a higher principle than sensuality, particularly to the soul of music as Plato identifies in book three, in order to not to commit the aforementioned metaphysical mistake.

## CONCLUSION

In this work we want to show that Plato's understanding of fine arts is not restricted to a *mimetic* conception and that there is a kind of music, and fine arts in general, that he develops as essentially different from the nature of *mimetic* arts. This *genuine* conception of music is not based upon *mimēsis* but *tekhnē*. We have shown that, arguing on the basis of *Republic III*, true music stems from the beautiful soul and is not rooted in appearances as is the case for *mimēsis*. Further we have seen that neither a competitive ambiance nor a theatrical context is appropriate for true music but rather it has take place in an environment of education.

We learned that sensual beauty is not adequate for *paideia* because it by itself is prone to evil and cannot lead one to virtue. The love for sensual beauty has to be accompanied and governed by beauty of soul in order for it to result in true beauty and not in *hybris*. Further we demonstrated that for Plato *erōs* in general, that is including all of its gradations ranging from sensual to philosophical, is a prerequisite for the birth of true beauty. For if there is no *erōs* there is no gradation of beauty and thus no possibility for harmonization: either we have absolute unity in which case there is no *birth* of beauty but beauty *per se* or absolute multiplicity in which case there is no possibility for beauty and this option is not within the domain of Platonic discourse.

We also observed that Plato, in his dialogues, conveys us his meaning not only by instruction but also by dramatic imagery. However this fact should not be interpreted merely in terms of Plato's demonstrative intentions. One thing that Plato is probably aiming at through his dialogues, particularly with respect to the elements that abound in sensual beauty such as allegories or myths, is to charm the young and persuade them into truth. But one should take the following into account as well: It is

highly probable that enjoyed greatly writing the dialogues, constructing images, setting up argument schemes (*Phaedrus* 276d – 277a). In light of his doctrine of generation, we might think that the poetic exercise of composing the dialogues had provided him with a beautiful context in which virtue of soul and truth can come about. Plato sincerely may want the same for the reader: he wishes to set up a beautiful environment for the reader who, by means of his friendship with Plato and in his engagement with the book, can partake of virtue and truth.

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