

***Precursory Comprehension of Being and Problem of Time***

***in Heidegger's Ontology***

Thesis Submitted to the  
Institute of Social Sciences  
in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts  
in  
Philosophy

by  
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## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I would like to express my deepest thanks to Prof. Dr. F. Pınar Canevi who has dedicated her time and effort for this project. She has given invaluable support and encouragement to me not only during this work but also throughout my philosophy education.

I would like to express my special thanks to Prof. Yalçın Koç for his valuable criticisms to this thesis and for the inspirations he has given to me during my studies.

I would like to express my special thanks to Prof. Dr. Stephen Voss for his valuable criticisms and for kindly accepting to be the member of the committee.

I would like to express my special gratitude to my colleague and friend Ela Akman for her help, motivation and for the discussions on Heideggerian philosophy.

I would like to extend my special thanks to my colleagues and friends Aliye Kovanlıkaya, Ayhan Çitil, Aslı Güner and Nur Ateş for the support and friendship they have offered during my hard times.

Lastly I would like to thank to my family for their encouragement, support and love.

*This work has been dedicated to my mother.*

## ***ABSTRACT***

The subject matter of this thesis is precursory comprehension of Being which is the point of departure of Heidegger's question of Being. Heidegger brings out a new conception of time as the possibility of this comprehension. This conception is grounded in an interpretation of transcendental imagination which forms time together with Being as the precondition of its comprehension. This study attempts to explore precursory comprehension of Being, on the basis of Dasein which is in the possession of this comprehension, in relation to time.

## **ÖZET**

Bu tezin konusu Heidegger'in Varlık sorusunun çıkış noktası olan Varlığın ön kavranmasıdır. Heidegger bu kavramın imkanı olarak yeni bir zaman anlayışı getirmiştir. Bu anlayış, zamanı Varlıkla birlikte ve Varlığın kavranmasının ön koşulu olarak kuran bir transandantal muhayyile gücü yorumuna dayanır. Bu çalışmada Varlığın ön kavranması kavrayıcı olan Dasein temelinde zamanla ilişkisi çerçevesinde incelenmeye çalışılmıştır.

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## INTRODUCTION

In this thesis I will try to explore Martin Heidegger's theory of Being in relation to the human comprehension of Being of all entities. Heidegger's thesis is that time exhibits a limiting function with respect to this comprehension. Our aim in this connection is to exhibit internal relations that this comprehension has with the time itself. In other terms we will try to show that possibility of human comprehension of Being of all beings lies in the possibility of time.

The first chapter is an introductory one. There we try to make explicit Heidegger's fundamental question, the question of Being, in connection with the special entity [Dasein] who asks the question, in so far as it has been explicated in *Being and Time*. Dasein's asking the question results from its precursory comprehension of Being. That is the reason why we enter the analysis of Heideggerian ontology from this comprehension. He gives an account of it in his interpretation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. He discusses *Critique* in terms of its ontological implications as a laying of the foundation of metaphysics in his later work called *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. He interprets Kantian theory of transcendental knowledge as the precursory comprehension of Being.

Heidegger's thesis in this work is that precursory comprehension of Being is formed by the faculty of pure imagination. Transcendental imagination while forming the Being of entities forms at the same time, time as pure now-sequence as the precondition of human comprehension of Being. Accordingly time is explicated as that which delimits this comprehension. Insofar as the transcendental imagination is the formative faculty of all human comprehension of Being, since this comprehension is delimited by time i.e., let it spring forth, it must itself be the primordial time. In this thesis we try to understand this argument in its full terms. As a result proceeding chapters is constituted by its explication.

The second chapter constitutes the explication of Heidegger's preliminary analyses of the faculties of the soul in so far as they have been given by Kant in the *Critique*. In this chapter we point out Heidegger's main premises concerning his interpretation of Kantian theory of transcendental knowledge as the precursory comprehension of Being.

The third chapter constitutes the interpretation of Heidegger's explication of transcendental imagination as the central faculty of the soul. The act of transcendental imagination has been analysed in relation to the act of pure intuition and the act of pure understanding. There we try to explain in what sense precursory comprehension of Being is "precursory" and also what Heidegger means by the term "Being" of all beings. Apart from this we try to give a preliminary insight as to how time is the limiting function of the act of transcendental imagination.

The forth chapter is a conclusive chapter and it has the intention to explicate how transcendental imagination forms time as pure now-sequence. In the last section we give the relation between primordial time and the precursory comprehension of Being.



In this thesis we excluded Heidegger's analysis of human comprehension of the Self in connection with the primordial time. The reason is that Dasein is an entity whose comprehension of Being of entities other than itself can not be set apart from its comprehension of its own self. Since our inquiry is concerned with the Being of all beings, we think it includes Dasein's comprehension of its Self as well. Explicit analyses of the Self in connection with the primordial time would constitute the subject matter of another thesis as one of the main implications of what is explicated in this thesis. Our subject of inquiry is limited with human Dasein in relation to the Being in general [of all beings], and time.

We must note that in Heidegger's writing in general and in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* in particular, there is a circular structure. He always starts with the preliminary analysis of his subject of inquiry and lays out his main premises. Proceeding from these premises he establishes his main argument. And then he returns to his main premises and under the light of his preliminary analyses he re establishes them. With the "new" premises he proves his argument. In this connection we constructed our thesis in the same way. The first chapter constitutes preliminary analyses of Heidegger's conception of Being, and time. The second chapter constitutes introductory analyses of the faculties of the soul in general and transcendental imagination in particular. In the third chapter we return to almost everything we already analysed in the second chapter and we re establish them. The forth chapter rests on what is explicated especially in the third chapter. This inquiry proceeds from the parts to the whole so that without an insight in to each part separately it is impossible to grasp the whole.

## CHAPTER 1

### **SIGNIFICANCE OF PRECURSORY COMPREHENSION OF BEING AND INTERPRETATION OF CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON AS THE POSSIBILITY OF PRECURSORY COMPREHENSION OF BEING**

#### **1. QUESTION OF BEING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF DASEIN IN HEIDEGGERIAN ONTOLOGY**

Heidegger starts his main work *Being and Time* with the introduction to the fundamental question of his philosophical inquiry. What is Being? What is the Being of the things that are? What is Being of all beings? Every question is guided by what is questioned. So the meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way. In other words we must have an understanding of what Being is, though this understanding is an obscure one. Out of this understanding there arises, the explicit question.

*We don't know what 'Being' means. But even if we ask, 'What is "Being?"', we keep within an understanding of the 'is' though we are unable to fix conceptually what that 'is' signifies. We do not even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed. But this vague, average understanding of Being is still a Fact. [B&T, p.25, H 6]*

If we reflect on this precursory understanding of Being we find out that Being is that which, determines entities as entities and on the basis of which, entities are already understood. It is, what gives to the entities, their being. Although the question pertains to Being of all beings, since we don't have an access to Being of all beings but a vague understanding of it, we must start with a special kind of an entity whose Being will bring us closer to Being in general. This special entity is the one who asks the question, for the very reason that, asking the question is one of the possibilities of its Being..

*Thus to work out the question of Being adequately we must make the entity -the inquirer - transparent in his own Being. [B&T, p.27, H 7]*

In this connection there is one and only one fact that Heidegger takes as a premise in the beginning of his ontology and that is this "vague, average understanding of Being". His fundamental concern is to give an explanation of this precursory understanding.

Having the question of Being at his disposal, the one who asks the question has a special status among other entities.

*The very asking of this question is an entity's mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about -namely, Being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term "Dasein". If we are to formulate our question explicitly and transparently, we must first give a proper explanation of an entity (Dasein), with regard to its Being. [B&T, p.27, H 7]*

Heidegger's proper explanation of Dasein is a consequence of his approach to ontological investigation in general. Ontology for him is the science of Being of beings. Being of beings can not be applied to some beings in a different manner than the others. Being is a fact which should be understood in its unity. He rejects classical metaphysical distinction of reality in itself and human knowledge about it. (object-subject distinction.) This distinction, for him reflects only one mode in which Being is exemplified. [B&T, p.87, H60] Hence it presupposes a certain type of Being without questioning its basis. This as a result not only leads ontology to misleading and inadequate consequences but also particular sciences into crises with regard to Being of their fundamental objects. That is why genuine ontology must start with the question of Being.

Question of Being for that reason has an ontological priority. Accordingly Dasein as that which raises the question, has priority over the other entities which do not raise the question. This priority is threefold:

i) Dasein has an ontical priority. Dasein is distinguished from all other beings in that Being is at issue for it in its Being. In other words it is defined by a relationship to Being, by *existence*. ii) On the basis of being defined by existence it is intrinsically ontological; it understands Being (in general) and thus has an ontological priority. iii) On the basis of its understanding of Being, it understands its own Being and the Being of the beings other than Dasein. This is Dasein's ontico-ontological priority. Dasein is the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of all ontologies. Ontico-ontological priority of Dasein established in this way arises out of its precursory comprehension of Being.

When Heidegger states that "Being is at issue for Dasein in its Being" he means that, it alone has a relationship to Being and therefore an understanding of Being. That is the reason why the Being or 'essence' of Dasein is "existence".

*That kind of Being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow, we call "existence" [existenz]. [B&T, p.32, H12]*

The Being of Dasein manifests itself as existing together with entities other than Dasein. However "the Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine". This means actually each human Dasein is unique in itself, so the sentence above should be understood as "my Dasein is in each case mine". This means Dasein can never be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities which is isolated from entities other than itself.

Further more, in each case Dasein's mineness occurs in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine. This decision is grounded in the possibilities of its own Being.

*That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself towards its Being as its own most possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it 'has' this possibility, but not just as a property, as something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so. [B&T, p.67, H 43]*

Heidegger explains Dasein's decision concerning the possibilities of its Being with two correlative terms, *authenticity* and *inauthenticity*. In so far as Dasein is something of its own it is authentic. In so far as it has lost itself and not yet won itself it is inauthentic. We must understand authenticity and inauthenticity of Dasein as the two different modes of its Being. When Dasein is aware of its own Being it is said to be authentic. On the contrary when it falls into everydayness of its life and can not be aware of its Being then it is said to be inauthentic. The two modes of Being gain meaning only relative to each other. Dasein can neither be completely inauthentic nor completely authentic. As far as it is authentic, it can be at the same time inauthentic. And this holds to be true in general for each Dasein. Hence inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being. Degree

of authenticity or inauthenticity is a characteristic of each specific Dasein. They both are grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterised by mineness.

The kind of Being towards which Dasein comports itself comes into light as a result of decisions concerning possibilities of its Being. Hence these decisions are what make up its *existence*. Dasein understands itself in terms of its existence-, in terms of the possibility of itself to be itself or not itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities or somehow finds itself in them. Only the particular Dasein can decide its existence, it does so by taking hold or by neglecting. This means that its understanding of its Being leads it to certain choices concerning its being, and these choices in turn makes it what it is.

Decision of existence can never be put into practice except by existing itself. This understanding of Dasein of its own self is called *existentiell* understanding. *Existentiell* understanding doesn't require theoretical understanding of the structures of existence. As opposed to this, the theoretical understanding of the structures of existence, Dasein's being transparent to its own Being is analysed in the context of structures which is called *existentiality* and this analytic in turn is an *existential* one. The distinction between *existentiell* and *existential* understanding of Dasein corresponds to pre-ontological and ontological comprehension of its Being respectively.

Heidegger's main concern as it has been stated above, is ontological inquiry into Being in general. Up to now precursory comprehension of Being is given as the only fact which such an inquiry takes as a premise. Since Dasein is that very special entity which has precursory comprehension of Being at his disposal, inquiry into ontological comprehension of Being must take its departure from *existential* analytic of Dasein. The existential analytic seeks to expose the structures of Being of existence. Structures of Being of existence are the structures of Dasein's different possibilities of Being. Analyses into these structures aims at disclosing its decisions concerning its very Being. To achieve existential analytic of Dasein, however requires to have an idea of Being of 'existence' beforehand. Now the question is where does Heidegger take his presuppositions concerning Being of existence? This will be clear when we take a closer insight into Heidegger's ontology in general and his method of philosophising in particular.

In the introduction of *Being and Time* he informs us that question of meaning of Being as a fundamental question of philosophy is the one that must be treated *phenomenologically* where *phenomenology* signifies primarily a methodological conception. [B&T, p.50, H28] In other words it signifies how philosophical research must be done. Accordingly, objects of this inquiry must be the phenomena. The expression *phenomenon* stands for "that which shows itself in itself". When he puts the definition of an object of ontological knowledge in such a way everything that which shows itself in itself for him becomes a being [*seiend*] of ontology. And the way it shows itself in itself (*phenomenon*) gives information about the Being of the entity in question.

*In the phenomenological conception of "phenomenon" what one has in mind as that which shows itself is the Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives.*

[B&T, p.60, H 36]

Furthermore he points out that from the phenomenological point of view behind the phenomenon there is essentially nothing else. This means Being of all entities as phenomena show themselves in themselves. This in turn means there is nothing which doesn't show itself in itself. Even when an entity in showing itself, shows something non-manifest and indicates that it essentially never manifests, this is its showing itself in itself. [B&T, p.53, H30] This is the very way in which Heidegger understands Kant's thing-in-itself.

In this connection, *phenomenology*, aims at the explication of phenomenon. It means -to let that which shows itself be seen in the very way in which it shows itself from itself. Referring to the Greek concept of logos (λογος), he explains logos as laying out, exhibiting, setting forth, making a statement. Considering λογος also as λεγειν he thinks of it as the faculty of reason which makes these activities possible.<sup>1</sup> Letting something be seen in this way depends on inquirer's understanding of "what shows itself in itself". In other words the concept of phenomenon delimits Being disclosed in this way. This delimiting is a derivation of the Dasein's interpretation of what shows itself in itself. That is why Heidegger states that meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in *interpretation*. Interpretation functions here as disclosure. By interpretation Heidegger doesn't mean to give to an entity in question a new signification but on the contrary he talks about laying out hidden signification attached to it.

*In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation.*

[B&T, p. 190-191, H 150]

In putting forward the necessity of existential analytic of Dasein for the working out of the question of Being, Heidegger is aware of the difficulty of taking a certain type of Being of 'existence' beforehand. His choice of structures of the Being of existence from the outset appears as an actuality of phenomenological method understood as interpretation. His aim in

<sup>1</sup>See B&T, p.58, footnote #1.

the analytic of existence is to expose the horizon within which Being can be understood as Being.

*...An analytic of Dasein must remain our first requirement in the question of Being. But in that case the problem of obtaining and securing the kind of access which will lead to Dasein, becomes even more a burning one. To put it negatively, we have no right.....to apply just any idea of Being and actuality to this entity, no matter how self-evident that idea may be; nor may any of the 'categories' which such an idea prescribes be forced upon Dasein without proper ontological consideration. We must rather choose such a way of access and such a kind of interpretation that this entity can show itself in itself, and from itself. And this means that it is to be shown as it is proximally and for the most part-in its average everydayness. [B&T, p.37-38, H17]*

In this way Heidegger begins the existential analytic of Dasein from the basic state of Dasein's average everydayness. This means actually that Heidegger speculates beginning with everyday life of human Dasein about Being of its existence. This is an introduction of interpretation of what he calls 'factual life' to his analysis. Phenomenological method of investigation is at work for the understanding of factual life.

## 2. DASEIN AS BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

Dasein is presented in its average everydayness as the fundamental structure of Being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world is the essential characteristic of Dasein. Structure of Being-in-the-world as unified phenomenon has been explicated as i) The meaning of the 'world' that Dasein is said to be in. Ontological structure of the world and defining idea of worldhood as such. ii) Being-in as such. Ontological constitution of inhood iii) Who of everyday Dasein. The Other.

i) World signifies here all the entities other than Dasein, in connection with Dasein's comportment to them.

*...to Dasein, Being in a world is something that belongs essentially. Thus Dasein's understanding of Being pertains with equal primordially both to an understanding of some thing like a 'world' and to the understanding of the Being of those entities which become accessible within the world. [B&T, p. 33, H 13]*

The 'world' of Dasein in its everydayness is the environment. Heidegger states that "the beings which Dasein meets everyday is not some isolated present -at- hand rather something ready -to-hand." When being is understood to exist in time independently of Dasein in its own significance apart from Dasein's involvement with its Being then it is isolated present-at-hand. Presence-at-hand signifies in general isolation of Dasein from its world or isolation of entities other than Dasein from the world of Dasein. As opposed to this if a being is that which Dasein meets everyday, like a piece of equipment with which it has a definite involvement then it is ready-to-hand. The piece of equipment mentioned here serves some purpose; one piece refers to another and thus has a practical meaning for Dasein.

The world as environment is the sum of contexts and significance. The being which achieves its existence (Being), from the occurrence of whatever is significant for its concern (from its world) is not isolated from it. What Heidegger consistently emphasizes in here is that Worldhood as such must be understood not as representing a constant present-at -hand but as circumspection of practical concern. Dasein in this connection must see itself in the world's relation of involvement. As opposed to this, he states, presentation of the world as constant present-at-hand is the natural conception of the world.

Dasein's relation to the world as involvement is understood better when the phenomenon of Being-in is explicated. Being-in-the-world for Dasein doesn't mean to occur in the so called world in the totality of beings just like other entities do. Being-in signifies rather "dwelling alongside", "being familiar with". To say Dasein is Being-in-the-world is to say it "is" its world; it is from out of familiarity with the world. This means actually Dasein is neither an object which occurs in the world in the totality of beings nor wordless subject from which one would have to find connection with the world. That is why subject and object do not coincide with Dasein and the world. [B&T, p.87, H60] There is continuous involvement between the world and Dasein so that one can not be conceived apart from the other. Phenomenological interpretation of Dasein as Being-in-the-world aims at unconcealment of this involvement:

*Dasein in its familiarity with significance, is the ontical condition for the possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with involvement (readiness-to-hand) as their kind of Being, and which can thus make themselves known as they are in themselves. [B&T, p. 120, H 87]*

Understanding its own Being, for Dasein paves the way for understanding the very entity which it comports itself (world) and this in turn affects the way Being of Dasein is interpreted.

The Who of everyday Dasein on the other hand can not be understood in terms of given subject "I". Because I is the one which maintains itself as something identical throughout



changes in its experiences. Ontologically it has been understood as something which is in each case already constant present-at-hand. [B&T, p.150, H114] "Not I" in this connection is understood as an entity which lacks its "I-hood", but is also a definite kind of Being which the "I" itself possesses. This way of conceiving Dasein is to accept it as something given and with no need of investigation. On the contrary Heidegger explains the Who of Everyday Dasein in terms of its Being-in-the-world. Dasein in its comportment with the world does not merely encounter the entities other than Dasein, it is with the Other. What he means by Other is that kind of Being which Dasein maintains itself :

*...the Who of everyday Dasein is to be obtained by analysing that kind of Being which Dasein maintains itself proximally and for the most part. [B&T, p.153, H 117]*

*By Others we do not mean everyone else but me -those over against whom the "I" stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part one does not distinguish oneself-those among whom one is too. [B&T, p.154, H 118]*

The Other is Dasein too; Dasein encounters the entities of its own kind. The other is not something separated from Dasein, rather Dasein is among other Daseins. For that reason Dasein's being with the Other has a counterpart on Other's side.

From the analysis of Dasein as Being-in-the-world it becomes explicit that Dasein can not be conceived apart from the entities other than itself. That is the reason why Heidegger introduced it as a special entity, so that its understanding of itself and of other entities is one and the same thing. The famous statement that "Being in general manifests itself in Being of Dasein" is not a conclusion that Heidegger arrives in *Being and Time*. But rather a premise that he takes in starting his ontology. His reason for taking this as a premise is not that he wants to reduce the question of Being to the question of Being of Dasein. But rather in his inquiry the former necessarily occurs as the latter for the very reason that Dasein is the one who has the disposition of the precursory comprehension of Being and accordingly who asks the question.

### **3. TEMPORALITY AS THE MEANING OF BEING OF DASEIN AND THE PROBLEM OF TIME**

Dasein is exhibited as unified phenomenon of Being-in-the-world, because it can not be thought isolated from world of its concern. Therefore its relation of involvement with its world

as total sum of all entities including itself is very important. Because they are strictly speaking what makes Dasein in the first place Being-in-the-world. In other words meaning of Being of Dasein can only be understood through going into the structures of these relations. In *Being and Time* Heidegger aims at giving the horizon of these structures as the ground which makes possible all the involvement of human Dasein. This horizon is both the precondition of Dasein's Being -in-the-world, and precondition of its understanding its Being-in-the-world as far as understanding its own Being is one of the possibilities of its Being. For that reason in the existential analytic of Dasein, as far as it appears in *Being and Time*, Heidegger introduces the phenomenon of *temporality* both as meaning of Being of Dasein and the horizon of its understanding of its own Being. Through temporality Dasein becomes transparent to itself and understands 'what it is' in and for itself. Furthermore to the extent that Dasein becomes transparent to itself question of Being finds a horizon in which Being in general can be understood in its Being.

In this thesis our subject of inquiry is Dasein's precursory comprehension of Being. We try to explore the ontological grounds of this comprehension. As we previously noted, Dasein's understanding of Being of every and any entity is subject to this comprehension. In Division Two of *Being and Time* Heidegger establishes "temporality" as the meaning of Being of Dasein. Hence he takes Dasein as an entity who is transparent to its own Being. And he goes into the roots of this transparency. Before going into the analysis of precursory comprehension of Being we want to give brief explanation of how Heidegger brings out temporality as an objective criteria i.e., as a horizon for an understanding of Dasein, of its own Being.

He states that, the answer lies in Dasein's *stepping outside itself* as a factual being.

*Temporality is primordial 'out side of itself' in and for itself.....[B&T, p.337, H 329]*

The essence of temporality is the processes of temporilising in the unity of the future, the past and the present. Dasein is always reaching out beyond itself; its very Being consists in aiming at what-it-is-not-yet. But it cannot move towards what-it-is-not-yet without moving backwards, towards its past, at the same time. After all, past is having-been of what-it-is-not-yet. Out of its concern of the future there arises its understanding of the past. And this understanding is the necessary condition of its directing itself towards future. Essential direction towards future manifests itself in its making the 'present', for itself. The past originates from the future so as to make the 'present'.

*The character of "having-been" arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which has-been (or better which is in the process of having-been) releases from itself the*

*Present. This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having-been; we designate it as temporality.* [B&T, p.374, H 326]

As a result unlike the ordinary understanding of 'being in time', Dasein does not move from past through present to future. But on the contrary, it moves out of future through the past to the present. Reaching out towards future it turns back to assimilate the past which has made the present. Heidegger's very claim here is that this process of temporilising, not only enables Dasein to understand its own Being, but also, as a result of this understanding, it is what makes Dasein what it is. In other terms he finds meaning of Being of Dasein in temporality.

Past, present and future interpreted such a way, i.e. the interpretation of time as temporality carries Dasein (interpreter) beyond time<sup>2</sup>; beyond what we understand from time ordinarily. And this is exactly what its stepping outside of itself is. Stepping outside of itself by passing beyond time enables Dasein to be transparent to itself, hence provides it with the objective ground of inquiry. By stepping outside of itself, through temporilizing, Dasein does not only pass beyond time but also, because temporality constitutes its very Being, it passes beyond itself to its Being.

For this reason Heidegger states in the introduction of *Being and Time* as the very target of this book:

*...Time needs to be explicated primordialy as the horizon for the understanding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being.*

[B&T, p. 39, H 18]

Interpretation of Time as temporality constitutes the heart core of Heideggerian ontology. It has two different consequences for proceeding any further in the question of Being. First of all time as temporality gives an understanding about Being of Dasein. When Being of Dasein comes to light then essential structure of its involvement can be laid out. The first and the most fundamental involvement of Dasein is its precursory comprehension of Being. If ontological analysis of this comprehension can be achieved, since the question of Being arises out of it, then an important step for the answer of this question will be taken. Heidegger's reasoning in this connection is such that if the meaning of Being of Dasein lies in temporality then temporality must manifest itself in Dasein's precursory comprehension of Being. The key question thus becomes *how time as temporality manifests itself in precursory comprehension of Being*. Accordingly this question constitutes the main problematic of our thesis. This is an important issue for bringing Heidegger's analysis from the question of Being of

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<sup>2</sup>See *The Concept of Time*, Martin Heidegger. (Trans. by William Mc Neill) p.2E

Dasein to the question of Being in general. The purpose of his later work, the one which came out right after *Being and Time*, viz. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* is to work out this problem. It was actually what he aimed to achieve in the second division of *Being and Time*, but this part never came out.

The second consequence of interpretation of time as temporality is that it gives the explanation of Being of time. Analysis of Being of time gives at the same time explanation of how temporality of Dasein is related to time. The time mentioned here is the ordinary conception of time. This conception is a result of conceiving entities as beings in time (within-timeness) or more adequately as beings present in time. This is, in Heidegger's terms, an understanding of time which belongs to Dasein in its average everydayness. Factical Dasein takes time into its reckoning. Dasein's reckoning with its time precedes any use of measuring equipment by which time can be determined. [B&T, p.456-457, H404] Both conceiving entities within time and reckoning with time as a result are grounded in Dasein's temporality. Reckoning with time is the consequence of conceiving time itself as presence-at-hand, i.e. conceiving it independently of Dasein's encounter with its world. Within-timeness on the other hand is a consequence of conceiving entities in general as presence-at-hand, i.e. conceiving entities independent from their involvement with Dasein.

In Heideggerian ontology, in relation to time itself, everything is dissolved into man's relation of involvement with its world. Human being in this relation conceives ordinary time as a measuring system or more adequately as infinite sequence of "nows". It has been put forward that, when man is interpreted as Dasein the form of this relation manifests itself as temporality. The answer to the question 'why Dasein is not man' or 'why the concept of man is lacking in nature to understand what Dasein is' is essentially hidden in these two different understandings of time. Putting it in other terms, if the average everyday Dasein were transparent to its own Being, hence transparent to its relation of involvement with its world then there would be no need for time as a represented line of infinite 'now' sequences. [B&T; p.464, H412] It is important to ask for our purposes, in bringing forth temporality as a horizon for understanding Dasein's involvement with its world, whether Heidegger comes up with a new kind of measurement system? If not why does he call this horizon "temporality" rather than some other term the meaning of which is totally independent from time? In what sense and to what extent temporality as a horizon for understanding Dasein's encounter with its world, involves a type of reckoning in its essence? With this new interpretation time is exhibited in its primordially as the unity of its modes- future, past and present. In what sense intrinsic relations of the components of this unity implies our understanding of it as a new kind of reckoning? Is reckoning with temporality possible at all? Or do we lose the originality of temporality by understanding it as a new kind of reckoning? These questions should be studied to be able to understand what Heidegger contributes to philosophical analysis ("laying") of Time.

Significance of the problem of Being of ordinary time, for Heidegger's main purpose (for the fundamental question, question of Being), comes from its importance for the understanding of Being adapted throughout the history of ontology. Heidegger states that in the history of ontology Being of entities is taken into consideration always as being in time not only without questioning what Being is in and for itself but also without questioning what Being of time is in which entities are supposed to exist. Interpretation of time as temporality, in its primordiality enables one to understand what is wrong with conceiving Being of entities as presence-at-hand. At this point one wonders, why for Heidegger in his new interpretation of Being, historical explanation of Being is so important. The answer lies in the historicity of Dasein.

#### **4. HISTORICALITY OF DASEIN AND DESTRUCTION OF HISTORY OF ONTOLOGY**

Historicity of Dasein has been established by proceeding from its temporality. Dasein's movement out of the future, through the past to the present was brought in as its fundamental state of Being. Heidegger called this temporilizing. Temporality in this connection was a unified phenomenon which discloses unity of these three modes of time in their essential meaning in Dasein's factual Being. *Each time Dasein temporilizes out of its future, it makes not only the present but also (for the next temporilizing) the past for itself.* This is what Dasein's historizing out of its future is. In this sense the past is already in the future. Historizing comes along with, and as a result of temporilizing. That is why historicity is only a state of Being whereas temporality is the fundamental state of the Being of Dasein.

*In its factual Being, any Dasein is as it already was, and it is 'what' it already was. It is its past, whether explicitly or not. And this is so not only in that its past is, as it were pushing itself along 'behind' it, and that Dasein possesses what is past as a property which is still present-at-hand and which sometimes has after-effects upon it: Dasein is its past in the way of its own Being, which to put it roughly, historizes out of its future on each occasion..*

*...Its own past -and this has always been the past of its 'generation' -is not something which follows along after Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it.*

[B&T, p. 41, H 20]

Heidegger's analysis of historicity, in the context of temporality, is merely pointing out where the past stands in the unity of three modes of time. He doesn't analyse this because past has an isolated place in Dasein's factual Being, but for the opposite, in order to show that it should be explained in terms of Dasein's temporilizing out of future. But this doesn't in any sense mean that the past is assimilated in temporilizing out of the future. Because temporilizing out of future requires Dasein to understand possibilities of its Being and this is impossible without its reflection into the past.

If Dasein is temporal and historical in essence then the question about Being which is at issue for Dasein in its very Being is also temporal and historical. What we mean is that just like Dasein's temporilising out of its future, through past to its present, question of Being must be constructed so that under the light of its future aim, it must turn back to the past and recapitulate its history and then with the new conclusion driven from this recapitulation must bring itself a new insight. The future aim of the question of Being is to find "what Being is in its Being". With the understanding of Dasein in temporality Heidegger wants to go back to the history of ontology and interpret the question of Being anew. This is what he calls *destruction* of history of ontology. For this reason, in the beginning of *Being and Time* he talks about "the twofold task in the working out of the question of Being", the one being fundamental ontology (existential analytic of Dasein), the other destruction of the history of ontology. [B&T, p.36, H15] The former corresponds to the future and the latter to the past of temporality of the question of Being.<sup>3</sup> He will attain from these the "present" of the question of Being.

Destruction doesn't mean to destroy previous formulation of the question of Being, but on the contrary it aims at freeing the origin of previous formulation from all concealment. And this requires to have some idea of Being beforehand.

*The destruction of history of ontology is essentially bound up with the way the question of Being is formulated, and it is possible only within such a formulation.* [B&T, p. 44, H 23]

The idea of Being which is required for the destruction of history of ontology has been established by Heidegger in preliminary analysis of Dasein, as far as it has been explicated in *Being and Time*.

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<sup>3</sup>Heidegger aimed at achieving the first task in *Being and Time*, and the second in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.

## 5. INTERPRETATION OF SYNTHETIC A PRIORY KNOWLEDGE AS ONTOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

### ("Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics")

Preparatory analysis of Dasein and temporality as its Being provides Heidegger with a guide line into the destruction of history of ontology. In other words, he finds stages of history which are decisive for the formulation of the question of Being by looking into history, with a view to finding the extent to which interpretation of Being and the phenomenon of Time are brought together.[B&T, p.44-45, H 23] He finds in this connection Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, specially the chapter on Schematism and his doctrine on time in general the most relevant piece of work for his purposes in the history of ontology. In what sense does Heidegger take Kant to be making ontology; in other words in what sense he thinks Kant is venturing in to the question of Being?

Heidegger states in the introduction of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* that " the following interpretation undertakes to interpret Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* as laying the foundation of metaphysics in order to bring in to view the problem of metaphysics as one of fundamental ontology." [K.b<sup>4</sup>., p.3]

Heidegger's understanding of Kant's work is different from Neo-Kantian understanding. In Neo-Kantian interpretation, Kant's transcendental philosophy is understood as a theory of knowledge which gives the ground for the possibility of experience or more precisely possibility of the positive sciences. His concept of being [seiend] is therefore understood as the bare concept of nature. (Things of nature as being independent from Dasein in their existence, as being present-at-hand) Heidegger on the contrary emphasises that Kant in searching for the possibility of experience goes into that which is beyond experience. So what he does is to search for the possibility of ontic knowledge. But possibility of ontic knowledge is in turn grounded on the possibility of ontological knowledge. That is to say without understanding Being of beings encountered in ontic knowledge, ontic knowledge can not be possible. According to Heidegger, this was also Kant's philosophical intention and he refers to Kant's original words:

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<sup>4</sup>K.b: Kantbuch stands for *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* which is the German name of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. See foreword written by Thomas Lagan p.ix.

...that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given<sup>5</sup>.

**By this Kant means : not "all knowledge" is ontic, and where such knowledge is given, it is possible only through ontological knowledge. [K.b., p.17]**

So Kant in searching for the possibility of the concept of the nature required in positive sciences in fact questions Being of beings considered as objects of these sciences and this in turn leads back to the question of Being as such. Heidegger from the very beginning takes *Critique of Pure Reason* not as a theory of experience only but more fundamentally as a theory of the inner possibility of ontology.

In this connection he points to the distinction between two different laying of the traditional concept of metaphysics with respect to their content. *Metaphysica specialis* has its object as being of God, nature or man. The disciplines theology, cosmology and psychology together form *metaphysica specialis*. *Metaphysica generalis*, which Heidegger calls ontology, on the other hand is concerned with the Being in general. [K.b., p13] From Heidegger's analysis it appears that general metaphysics is the necessary preparation to special metaphysics.

**The projection of the intrinsic possibility of *metaphysica specialis* has been led back beyond the question of possibility of ontic knowledge to the question of that which makes ontic knowledge possible. But this is precisely the problem of the essence of precursory comprehension of Being, i.e., ontological knowledge in the broadest sense. [K.b., p.16]**

Ontological knowledge in the broadest sense is the fundamental ontology, i.e., existential analytic of Dasein as Heidegger establishes it in *Being and Time*. In this way he points out the historical continuation between Kant's work on the possibility of *metaphysica specialis* and his own problematic of the question of Being and the specific form this question necessarily takes i.e., precursory comprehension of Being. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* is the work where Heidegger attempts to show this continuation. There he calls this interpretation of *Critique of Pure Reason* "Laying the Foundation of the Metaphysics". Laying the foundation of the metaphysics requires searching for the question of the essence of *metaphysica generalis*. [K.b., p.17] This question is inclusive of the question of the possibility of *metaphysica specialis* which Kant is specially concerned with. Heidegger once again

<sup>5</sup>See, Über die Fortschritte..., On the Progress of the Metaphysics, p.302.



refers to Kant's original work for the connection between *metaphysica specialis* and *metaphysica generalis*.

*...because metaphysica generalis provides the necessary preparation<sup>6</sup> for metaphysica specialis, laying the foundation of the former necessarily transforms the essential determination of the latter. [K. b., p.17]*

From the existential analytic of Dasein, it has been shown that precursory comprehension of Being can be understood in terms of temporality. Under the project of destruction of history of ontology his approach to *Critique of Pure Reason* is such that he makes use of this unique interpretation of phenomena of time in explaining pre-ontological understanding of Being. With this interpretation he takes one more step towards his fundamental problem, i.e. question of Being. And in this way his interpretation of time is exhibited as the hidden "foundation of the foundation" of metaphysics, i.e., temporality as the Being of Dasein.<sup>7</sup> Heidegger states that temporality in this sense discloses intrinsic the possibility of ontology. [K.b., p.21]

Possibility of ontology in Heidegger's interpretation of the *Critique* lies in the possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge. In other words, the grounds on which ontology becomes possible is established by a priori synthetic knowledge.

*Knowledge that brings forth the quiddity of the essent [being], in other words, knowledge which reveals the essent [being] itself, Kant calls synthetic. [K.b., p.18]*

Our concern in this connection is to understand how Heidegger interprets Kant's inquiry into the possibility of the priori synthesis so that it serves as the ontological analytic of the pre-ontological comprehension of Being of temporal, factual Dasein. In Heidegger's terms this is actually the question of how time as temporality manifests itself in pre-ontological comprehension of Being.

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p.302.

<sup>7</sup>See K.b, translator's introduction, p. xx.

## 6. INTERPRETATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SYNTHETIC A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE AS THE POSSIBILITY OF PRECURSORY COMPREHENSION OF BEING

Heidegger's laying the foundations of metaphysics is the search for the possibility of ontological knowledge. He claims in the beginning of his interpretation of the *Critique* that "Kant, understanding knowledge to be an act of judgement, reduced the problem of the possibility of ontology to the possibility of a priori synthetic judgements."<sup>8</sup> The problem of the possibility of ontology for Heidegger is the problem of the possibility of precursory comprehension of Being. [K.b., p.16] Within the Kantian system, he sees this possibility in "what is given a priori" in the synthetic human knowledge. The question of "What is given a priori" signifies his onto-logical problematic. Hence with the claim above he makes explicit that he identifies Kant's problem with his own ontological problematic. Actually the whole purpose of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* is to show that these two problematic are continuous with each other. Accordingly to show if this continuity is justified is one of our tasks in this thesis.

Heidegger notes in the beginning of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* that Kant explains "pure reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of knowing anything entirely a priori."<sup>9</sup> Therefore his search for the possibility of ontological knowledge will necessarily be the delimitation [definition] of the essence of pure reason. Thus, he says:

...the laying of the foundation of metaphysics is a "*Critique of Pure Reason*." [K.b., p.18-19]

Since the possibility of making ontology for Heidegger is the problem of the precursory comprehension of Being, now we must gain a preliminary insight as to how Heidegger reconciles this problem with Kant's problem of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements.

Heidegger states that judgements in general are an "I connect" of the subject term with the predicate term. In this sense even analytic judgements are synthetic, although the subject is implicit in the predicate. Accordingly synthetic judgements are synthetic in two sense. First they are synthetic as judgements as such. And second, the legitimacy of the "connection" of the representations requires that the judgement must refer to the being (object) itself with

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<sup>8</sup>See K.b, p.18.

<sup>9</sup>See K.b, p.19.

which it is concerned. In the synthetic judgements "a priori" however, there is a need for another type of synthesis which must bring something forth about the being not first derived from it through experience.

*This bringing forth of the determination of the Being of the essent [being] is a precursory act of reference to the essent [being]. This pure "reference to.." (synthesis) first constitutes the direction and the horizon within which the essent [being] is first capable of being experienced in empirical synthesis. [K.b., p.20]*

We see here what Heidegger means by the term "precursory comprehension". It is somehow related to the type of comprehension the origin of which does not lie in empirical, but lies in rational act in Kantian terms. We must note however Heidegger himself does not make such a distinction between empirical and the rational act. It will be remembered from our previous analysis that precursory comprehension of Being is the most fundamental performance (experience) of human Dasein.<sup>10</sup> Then how his reconciling precursory comprehension of Being with the possibility of a priori synthesis is justified?

Heidegger makes another distinction which is absent in Kant's inquiry and that is the distinction between the comprehension of the being [seiend] itself and the comprehension of Being of being [seiend]. The being [seiend] since it refers to any kind of being 'that is' is inclusive of Kant's object of empirical knowledge. Comprehension of the Being of the being on the other hand signifies comprehension of the possibility of existence of being.

Kant by searching for the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge is indeed searching for the possibility of the existence of empirical objects and he states that this possibility lies in the act of human reason. After all, for Heidegger reason is what belongs to human Dasein. Accordingly an act of reason, whether one calls it rational or empirical, is a possibility of the Being of Dasein. What we want to say is that Heidegger thinks, the possibility of the comprehension of the Being of the beings which lies in human Dasein coincides with the possibility of the knowledge of the empirical objects which lies in pure reason. This is so not because they are one and the same thing but because the former is continuous with, and inclusive of the latter. Accordingly what Heidegger understands from *transcendence* is the same as what Kant understands from it. For Heidegger transcendence is passing beyond beings to their Being. He states that Kant calls the kind of knowledge which is concerned with the possibility of synthetic judgements a priori *transcendental*. And he adds:

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<sup>10</sup>See Chapter 1, p.3-4

*Thus transcendental knowledge does not investigate the essent [being] itself but the possibility of the precursory comprehension of the Being of the essent [being]. It concerns reason's passing beyond (transcendence) to the essent [being] so that experience can be rendered adequate to the latter as its possible objects. [K.b., p.20]*

In this connection possibility of ontology for Heidegger is an inquiry into the possibility of this transcendence for the very reason that it characterises the comprehension of Being. Throughout his interpretation he makes us keep in mind that these two possibilities are continuous and the transcendence concerned is one and the same.

## CHAPTER 2

### *PRECURSORY COMPREHENSION OF BEING IN ITS REFERENCE TO TRANSCENDENTAL IMAGINATION*

In the proceeding chapters<sup>11</sup> of our thesis we will see how Heidegger re establishes synthetic a priori knowledge as ontological knowledge. In his work *Kant and the problem of Metaphysics* while he interprets this knowledge as precursory comprehension of Being, he shows at the same time that it is formed by transcendental imagination. Its being formed by transcendental imagination is the reason why it has been interpreted as precursory comprehension of Being. In other words the knowledge being "precursory" is a consequence of its being formed originally in pure imagination rather than in pure understanding. Accordingly, in coming two chapters, we are to demonstrate both how Heidegger re establishes synthetic a priori knowledge as a product of imagination and at the same time how the knowledge in question turns out to be "precursory" comprehension of Being. In so far as the meaning of the Being, to which finite human being has a precursory access, becomes more clear its comprehension as "precursory" manifests itself as "pre conceptual" and accordingly "pre ontological".

#### *1. TRUE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE LIES IN INTUITION*

##### *(Argument from the Finitude of Knowledge)*

Heidegger starts his interpretation of the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge with an analysis of essence of knowledge. As he points out, Kant in searching for the limits of human reason, presupposed, before everything else, that it is limited i.e., finite. He claims that true essence of knowledge can be understood only if it is considered from the point of view of this finitude. Finitude of reason is a consequence of its very essence. Accordingly knowledge arising from reason is a finite knowledge. The essence of finitude of knowledge, Heidegger argues, shows wherein lies true essence of knowledge itself. For an understanding of the essence of finitude of knowledge there is a need for better understanding of the nature of cognition required for this knowledge. Heidegger claims that cognition is primarily intuition and Kant in his definition of intuition points this out implicitly. [K.b., p.28]

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<sup>11</sup>Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.

***"In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate the objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them and from which all thought gains its material."*** [C.P.R, A19, B33, NKS, p. 68]

Heidegger thinks because "all thought gains its material from intuition", it must be mainly in the service of intuition.

***It [thinking] is not something which exists merely beside and in "addition to" intuition, but by its intrinsic structure serves that to which intuition is primarily and constantly directed.*** [K.b., p.28]

What is very important here is that Heidegger does not reject anything Kant put forward concerning the relation of thinking with intuition. The problem for him rather lies in the result Kant drives from this relationship. In other words he does not ignore the indispensable role of thinking in the emergence of knowledge, he just says that this role is not the primary one:

***...it must be maintained that intuition defines the true essence of knowledge, and that, despite the reciprocity of the relation between intuition and thinking, it is in the first that true centre of gravity is to be found.*** [K.b., p.29]

As a result, Kant's statement that "knowledge is thinking intuition" should be considered over and above the statement that "knowledge is an act of judgement." To see the true essence of knowledge in thinking violates the Kantian problematic. Kant's main problem is searching for the limits of human knowledge. Heidegger argues that since finitude of knowledge lies in the finitude of intuition true essence of knowledge is to be found in intuition.

Heidegger's defence of this argument comes along with his reflection on the comparison of the idea of infinite (divine) knowledge with the idea of finite (human) knowledge. He explains how finitude of knowledge lies in finitude of intuition by referring to Kant's remark on human intuition<sup>12</sup> at the end of *Transcendental Aesthetic*. There Kant contrasts human intuition with divine intuition and says that the former is "derivative" intuition and the latter "original". And the difference between the two is that divine intuition, in its immediate representation of the individual, can itself give itself its object. Heidegger states in this connection :

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<sup>12</sup>See C.P.R, B72, NKS, p.90.

*Absolute intuition would not be absolute if dependent on being already on hand in adaptation to which the object of intuition first became accessible. Divine cognition is the mode of representation which in the act of intuition first creates the object of intuition as such. Seeing right through the being in advance, such cognition intuitively it immediately and has no need of thought. [K.b., p.30]<sup>13</sup>*

From here thought manifests itself as the "seal" of finitude. This means that it is not the cause of finitude but the sign of the finitude.

Heidegger thinks that Kant implicitly puts emphasis on the distinction between divine and human intuition and takes the statement below as an example:

*But intuition takes place only insofar as the object is given to us. This again is only possible, to man at least, in so far as the mind is affected in certain way. [C.P.R., B72, NKS, p.90]*

The phrase "to man at least" was inserted on the second edition of *Critique* and it is for warning the reader that finite human knowledge is the subject of inquiry and not infinite, divine knowledge. Once the idea of divine knowledge is brought forth in such a way the definition of knowledge should be made anew. And he argues that, since infinite knowledge is intuition alone where finite knowledge is thinking intuition, true essence of finite knowledge must lie in intuition.

All though Kant explicitly states that Divine knowledge is intuition alone<sup>14</sup> he puts the emphasis on the role of thinking when he defines what human knowledge is. Kant's inquiry is the search for the possibility of human knowledge to the extent that it is the possibility of scientific empirical knowledge. Accordingly he is concerned with what is a priori (independent from the experience) in such knowledge. Therefore for Kant it not only irrelevant but also impossible to put emphasis on what for Heidegger is decisive, viz. knowledge in general i.e., totality of human and divine knowledge. When Heidegger for his part talks about the idea of knowledge in general he does not feel that he is bound to the limitations of human knowledge as it has been exhibited by Kant. His objects of inquiry in principle are not the objects [*objekt*] of synthetic a priori knowledge but beings i.e., "things that are" [*seiend*] which are not

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<sup>13</sup>See C.P.R., B139,145,NKS, p.157,161.

<sup>14</sup>See C.P.R., B72, NKS, p.90.

supposed to be 'known' in the Kantian sense<sup>15</sup>. Therefore when he puts Kant's remarks on Divine knowledge with his inquiry about human knowledge to equal footing we must not forget that he thinks Kant's system is permissive of such an interpretation.

What is important for our purposes at this stage is to have a preliminary insight of why Heidegger gives this primary position to intuition from the very beginning of his interpretation.

Heidegger knows that in Kant all knowledge begins with experience, but we have no way of an access to what intuition brings forth save through the process of understanding. For that reason Kant in *Critique* gives the primary position to the explicit analysis of pure understanding. When Heidegger develops his interpretation however he carries the intention that, if what is given in intuition does not in some way affect our being [mind] then we would have no need for the process of understanding. So the first task should be to analyse the character of that which is given in intuition. And to see how it requires involvement of understanding for its determination. That is the main reason why intuition is always prior to the understanding.

If we would not have some kind of comprehension of what is given in intuition before its determination in understanding then there would be no need for this determination. So what he actually rejects in Kant is that we don't have any kind of access to what is given in intuition save through the function of understanding. He thinks we have some kind of an access to what is given in intuition before its conceptual representation. And from the first he is concerned with this access which he calls "precursory comprehension of Being" in its full terms.

After his characterisation of finite knowledge as a mode of intuition which is receptive, (and hence in need of thought) Heidegger goes on to elucidate the essence of finite knowledge with reference to what is knowable. In this elucidation his interpretation of Kant's object of knowledge as being [seiend] comes into light in more appropriate a manner. He states that "if finite knowledge is receptive intuition then the knowable must show itself by itself". In other words what finite knowledge is capable of manifesting must be a being [seiend] which shows itself, i.e., which appears.

*The term "appearance" refers to the essent [being] itself as the object of finite knowledge. More precisely, only for finite knowledge is there such a thing as an ob-ject [Gegenstand].<sup>16</sup> Only such knowledge is exposed to the essent [being] which already is. Infinite knowledge on the other hand, cannot be confronted by any such essent [being] to*

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<sup>15</sup>See, Chapter 1, p. 7.

<sup>16</sup>J.S. Churchill in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* translates *gegenstand* as ob-ject and *objekt* as object. In the NKS translation of the *Critique* however the difference between *gegenstand* and *objekt* is all together neglected; they both are translated as object. In *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, *gegenstand* refers to the indeterminate object of intuition.



*which it must conform. Such a "conforming-to.." would be a "dependence on..." and, consequently a form of finitude.* [K.b., p. 35-36]

He makes a distinction between object of finite intuition and object of infinite intuition as ob-ject [Gegenstand] and e-ject [Ent-stand]<sup>17</sup>. Absolute cognition reveals the being itself in the act of absolute intuition and possesses it "only" as that which arises from this very act i.e., as e-ject. The being is manifest to absolute intuition in its coming-into-Being. Therefore e-ject is the being as being in itself, i.e., not as "object". He says "we fail to hit upon the essence of infinite knowledge if we say its "object" is produced in the very act of intuition." [K.b., p.36] By this he means, in case of infinite intuition, because it has a direct access to the being itself in itself, there is no need for the distinction between being as object of knowledge i.e., appearance and being in itself. Accordingly to talk of the "ob-ject" of infinite intuition is meaningless for it is one and the same with the being in itself. And that is the reason why it has no need of determination i.e., thought.

For Heidegger the best evidence of Kant's special emphasis on the distinction between finite and infinite knowledge is his pointing out the distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself. Kant said in the *Critique* that "the object is taken to be in a *two fold sense*, namely as appearance and as thing-in-itself." [C.P.R., B27, NKS, p.28] Heidegger criticises here the term "object" for to absolute knowledge no object is given. Furthermore he reminds us that Kant states in *Opus Postumum* that thing-in-itself is not something other than appearance:

*"The distinction between the concept of thing in itself and that of appearance is not objective but merely subjective. The thing in itself is not another object but another aspect (respectus) of the representation with regard to the same object."*<sup>18</sup>

Heidegger's interpretation of this statements takes Kant's investigation outside of its limits. He says "the being 'as it appears' [i.e., phenomenon] is the same as the being in itself and only this. Indeed only in so far as it is being can it become an object, although only to finite knowledge can it be such." [K.b., p.36] And he adds, Kant uses the term "appearance" in two sense. Appearance in broad sense refers to the "objects" of finite intuition which is receptive

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<sup>17</sup>Heidegger makes a further distinction between the ob-ject of finite intuition, *gegenstand* and the ob-ject of infinite intuition, *ent-stand*. Translation of *ent-stand* as e-ject belongs to J.S. Churchill.

<sup>18</sup>Kant's *Opus Postumum*, presentation and critique by E. Adickes, p.653 (Italics by the author).

and in need of thought.<sup>19</sup> Appearance in narrow sense however refers to the indeterminate object of empirical intuition.<sup>20</sup> Although it seems as though Heidegger discusses here appearance in the broad sense we must note that appearance as 'indeterminate object of empirical intuition' is also a being [seiend]. He considers its being undetermined as a determination too.

*Appearances are not mere illusions but the essent [being] itself. And the essent [being], on its side, is nothing other than the thing "in itself". The essent [being] can be manifest without being known "in itself", i.e., qua e-ject. [K.b., p.37]*

When Heidegger says "thing-in-itself" can be manifest without being known 'in itself, qua e-ject" he means that it manifests itself as what is knowable in finite knowledge. And this in turn means thing-in-itself takes justification of its being from the idea of Divine knowledge. For that reason he concludes that:

*The dual characterisation of the essent [being] as thing in itself and as "appearance" corresponds to the relation in which it stands to infinite and finite knowledge respectively, as e-ject and ob-ject. [K. b., p.37]*

Although Heidegger with this interpretation takes Kant's investigation outside of its limits, he points to the frame of reference of these limits. In other words he points to the importance of the idea of Divine knowledge in delimiting Kant's investigation concerning finite knowledge. Problem of the possibility of a priori synthesis takes its roots from this idea.

*Knowledge of the essent [being] is a precursory, experience-free knowledge of the ontological structure of the essent [being]. But finite knowledge (and it is finitude of knowledge which is in question) is essentially a receptive and determinative intuition of the essent [being]. If finite knowledge is to be possible, it must be based on a comprehension of the Being of the essent [being] that precedes every receptive act. Finite knowledge requires,*

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<sup>19</sup>C.P.R, A235 (heading), B249, NKS, p.259.

<sup>20</sup>C.P.R, A20, B34, NKS, p.65.

*therefore, a non-receptive (and apparently non-finite) mode of cognition, a kind of creative intuition.* [K.b., p.42]

When Heidegger asks Kant's fundamental question concerning possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge anew, he approaches to the problem from this perspective and asks "how knowledge of the essence of the finite knowledge is possible without being infinite?" In other words, what is the significance of calling this knowledge finite then?

*How can a finite being which as such is delivered up to the essent [being] and dependent on its reception have knowledge of, i.e., intuit, the essent [being] before it is given without being its creator? Otherwise expressed, how must this finite being be constituted with respect to its own ontological structure if, without the aid of the experience, it is able to bring forth the ontological structure of the essent [being], i.e., effect an ontological synthesis?* [K.b., p.43]

It is impossible to understand how the possibility of a priori synthesis coincides with the possibility of precursory comprehension of Being without seeing the importance of the idea of Divine knowledge in Kant's raising the question of the possibility of a priori synthesis. For the analysis of finite knowledge, consideration of Divine knowledge points to "what is not the case" in Divine knowledge. And that is "what is given" to the finite being [human pure intuition]. Because in case of Divine intuition nothing is given. This in turn is the very point where the possibility of the comprehension of Being takes its departure. "What is given" to the finite being in his comprehension of the beings (objects) independent from its determination in understanding, is the true subject of what Heidegger calls onto-logical knowledge. As we see from here Heidegger actually asks the question of Kant concerning knowledge from the opposite direction. Kant's question was "what is given *a priori*" [independent from experience] in human knowledge. Heidegger tries to re-establish the same problematic from the point of view of intuition. Accordingly in his interpretation he proceeds always from the intuition and arrives at determination of what is given in intuition in understanding. In this connection we will see first his analysis of pure intuition.

## 2. THAT WHICH DELIMITS INTUITION IS TIME

For proceeding to the explanation of transcendental imagination as the fundamental faculty of the soul, in formation of pure knowledge in general, it is necessary to look at Heidegger's preliminary investigations of pure intuition.

The pure intuitions are space and time. Heidegger thinks that Kant opens the discussions concerning space and time by pointing the negative characteristics of them simply because their positive characteristics are familiar to every one. Space is not an empirical representation and for any given thing to be able to reveal itself in definite spatial relations it is necessary that space must be already manifest before the receptive apprehension of the thing. Space must be represented as that within which any actual thing can be encountered. It is a pure representation and is necessarily represented in finite human cognition in advance. Heidegger also reminds Kant's remark concerning the singularity of space that 'many spaces are only limitations of the one unique space' and 'it is, as one and unique, wholly itself in each one of its parts'. In this connection he makes the distinction between pure intuition itself (or what is intuited in pure intuition) and the act of pure intuition. Pure intuition does not only give what is intuited immediately but also gives it as a whole. Its giving it as a whole is not the result of receptivity of what is intuited but (for we can not intuit space as a whole) the result of the act of pure intuition. Space is represented as a whole as "infinite extensiveness" and this representation is an act of pure intuition which gives itself its content. So he thinks in pure intuition there is indeed something intuited (although it is presented to us unobjectively and unthematically in preliminary insight) and it is given only through the corresponding act of intuition itself.

*That which is intuited in this mode of (pure) intuition is not absolutely nothing.* [K.b, p.51]

However space as pure intuition gives only totality of relations of how external sense is ordered. There are also the "givens" of internal sense which manifests themselves as the successions of mental states. And it is time that determines relations of representations of inner states. Although it looks like the two pure intuitions refer to the distinct regions of experience Kant makes clear that time is the one in which their unity is to be found. Heidegger calls our attention to Kant's statement that:

*Time is the formal condition a priori of all appearance whatsoever.* [C.P.R, A33, B50, NKS, p.77]

To the extent that external sense belongs to the modifications of mind (internal sense) time is the determination of external sense also. Hence time as pure intuition takes precedence over space and is presented as universal pure intuition. *If time is the universal pure intuition then as such it is that which delimits finite intuition itself.*

This point is made by Kant in the same way as Heidegger presents it. What is important here for Heidegger is the question "how does Kant justify the precedence of time as the universal pure intuition?" Because Kant in determination of time itself questions the role of external phenomena specially when this phenomena is the motions of the stars and natural events in general. But at the same time as he points out, in the above statement, he does not reject the temporal determination of external phenomena. One of his theses seems to deny intra-temporality to physical things and the other to admit it. Heidegger states that ambiguity arises out of Kant's using the expressions *representation* and *intuition*, that they refer both to the act of representation (or intuition) as states of consciousness and what is represented (or intuited) in such states as objects. Accordingly, so far as time is the universal pure intuition it is the condition of determination of the outer sense. For this reason, the act of representation of external phenomenon is determined by time immediately. But the external phenomenon itself is determined by space but not time. To the extent that space is determined by time one can say however that external phenomenon itself is determined by time mediately. [K.b., p.52-53] But this is so for the determination of any kind so far as determination itself is a modification of the mind.

In spite of these however Heidegger adds that universality of time as pure intuition is justified only if it can be shown that "although both space and time as pure intuitions belong to the 'subject', time is implanted therein in a more fundamental way than is space." [K.b., p.54]

*Time as immediately limited to the data of internal sense can be, ontologically speaking, more universal than space only if the subjectivity of the subject consist in being overt to the essent [object]. The more that time is subjective, the more original and extensive is the freedom from limitation of the subject.* [K.b., p.54]

In the last sentence it has been stated that "the more time is subjective the more it becomes free from limitation of the subject." This means the more time is the precondition of all modifications of mind (or all appearances whatsoever) the more it becomes impossible for the subject to be in charge of its determination. In consequence, he makes a remark that:

*...central ontological function given to time as universal pure intuition is justified only if time itself, (as essential element of pure ontological knowledge) forces us to determine the nature of subjectivity more primordial than heretofore. [K.b., p.54]*

With this last remark we see how Heidegger opens the way for the radical interpretation of time as that which is related to (in Kant's terms) nature of the subjectivity of the subject.

### **3. PROCEEDING FROM PURE INTUITION TO PURE THOUGHT**

Under the light of these investigations concerning the essence of finite knowledge we continue to elucidate its essential elements with the analysis of the nature of pure thought. Concerning the question of the possibility of pure thought Heidegger's main intention is to consider it not in isolation from pure intuition but in the context of the unity of pure knowledge. However following the order in the *Critique* first he reflects on Kant's analysis of those elements in isolation. We already exhibited his analysis of pure intuition. However we must remind that he starting with those elements in isolation arrives at the point that this isolation is indeed a pseudo isolation.

From Heideggerian point of view, what the analysis of human knowledge seeks to find out is not the object of such knowledge but rather "what is given" in the emergence of such knowledge. Kant's isolation of knowledge into its elements however is the result of making this knowledge itself an issue. Hence it reflects "relatively" an epistemological point of view. What we mean is that Kant establishes his ontology proceeding from what is an epistemological point of view for Heidegger. Because it is the only way to understand Heidegger's interpretation, in our analysis we will often make a reference to the difference between these two point of views.

Unity of thought with intuition is investigated through the analysis of that which unites them i.e., synthesis. This unity is not a simple consequence of their coming together but rather synthesis lets intuition and thought spring forth in their togetherness and in their unity.

In order to be knowledge finite intuition needs determination of what is intuited as "this" or "that". In this determination that which is represented by intuition, is further represented with reference to what it is "in general". This "general" representation makes that which is represented more representative in that it comprehends the many under one. And, on the basis of this com-prehension "one applies to many". Kant named this, representation by concepts. Act of this representation is the determinative act and as such it is representation (concept) of representation (intuition). Heidegger states that this representation in the unity of thought and intuition brings forth the true manifestation of the object. And he names threefold synthesis

a new. He calls the synthesis involved here *veritative* (true making) synthesis. Veritative synthesis coincides with that which brings forth the determinateness with regard to the content of the object itself. Apart from this, at the same time, the conceptual act of representation is in itself the assertion of something about something. (predication). This predicative representation is what gives "the general" as such in itself and the synthesis concerned with it he calls *predicative* synthesis. Predicative synthesis is what unifies a concept in its character as predicate. But predicative synthesis does not coincide with the act of unification in which judgement presents itself as the connection of subject and predicate. This synthesis Heidegger calls *apophantic*. [K.b., p.33-34]

What is important here from our point of view to understand Heidegger's interpretation is that veritative synthesis is the one which constitutes the essence of finite knowledge.

*...in the veritative synthesis, which constitutes the essence of finite knowledge the predicative synthesis and the apophantic synthesis are necessarily joined together in a structural unity of synthesis.* [K. b., p.34]

Veritative synthesis constitutes essence of finite knowledge means representation of intuition in concept, with which such synthesis is concerned, constitutes the essence of structural unity of synthesis. If the function of synthesis is unifying the two elements of finite knowledge namely thought with intuition and if we conceive this unity as three different representations which are in fact our abstraction (for the sake of understanding the nature of synthesis) from a single representation, how come Heidegger can claim that one of these representations is essential to finite knowledge rather than all three?

Conceptual representation is the representation of determination of only what intuition provides. Unlike the representation of predication and unlike the representation of the relation of predicate with subject in judgement, it is concerned with the content of the object. Content of the object comes from the receptivity of intuition. Heidegger argues that the most essential feature of finite knowledge is its being finite and finitude is directly related to receptivity of intuition (for infinite knowledge does not have such receptivity.) If by reason of this receptivity there is need for thinking hence there is need for the unity of intuition with thought then structural unity of that which unifies them (synthesis) lies essentially in representation of the determination of what comes from this receptivity.

Furthermore representation of what is intuited is singular but it is determined under "the general". So the essential determination of the singular under the general is the conceptual determination. In the infinite intuition however what is intuited has no need of determination for the very reason that divine intuition has a direct access to the singular in itself. Hence there is no need for the determination of the singular under the general. Accordingly the conceptual

representation of what is intuited is where the difference between finite and infinite intuition manifests itself. This representation thereby is the only one which contains in itself the idea of non-finite knowledge. And because such representation is given by veritative synthesis it is the one which constitutes the essence of finite knowledge. For that reason, Heidegger explicitly states that "pure veritative synthesis contains the idea of non-finite knowledge". [K.b., p.44]

Possibility of finite (i.e., ontic) knowledge when its essence has been put forward from the point of view of that which unites thought with intuition lies in the possibility of pure veritative synthesis. Pure veritative synthesis must be such that it determines *a priori* the element of pure intuition. Hence content as well as the form of this pure synthesis must precede all experience. In other words the representation provided by 'pure' veritative synthesis can not be conceptual representation of intuition but it must be connected with the act of such representation itself. This means possibility of pure veritative synthesis will come to light through understanding the "predicative synthesis". Understanding the predicative synthesis requires however inquiry into its possibility. This means the act of representation with which predicative synthesis is concerned, should be analysed in itself. That is the reason why the question of essence of *ontological predicates* (or in Kant's terms pure concepts of understanding) is central to the problem of *a priori* synthesis. [K.b., p.43]

In consequence the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge is predicted by reference to the possibility of its two elements, pure intuition and pure thought, in their unity. In statements above, we showed that Heidegger thinks the inquiry into the possibility of pure thought leads back to the analysis of pure predicative synthesis mainly because it is the one to which pure veritative synthesis belongs.

#### 4. PREPARATORY ANALYSES OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF UNDERSTANDING

##### *(Introduction of Categories as Ontological Predicates)*

*The object of an intuition (which is always a particular) is determined as such and such in a "general representation" i.e., through concepts. Hence, the finitude of reflective [thinking] intuition is a mode of cognition through concepts, and pure cognition is pure intuition through pure concepts. These pure concepts must be exhibited if the complete essential structure of pure knowledge is to be secured.* [K.b., p.55]



Heidegger's exhibition of pure concepts comes out in terms of the analysis of conceptual representation and the act of such representation. Representation in concepts takes place by reference to that which "applies to many". The property of "applying to many" as a derivative character is itself based on the fact that in every concept there is represented one element in which several particulars agree. Conceptual representation lets the many come to agreement in this *one*. In conceptual representation, therefore, the unity of this *one* must be anticipatively kept in view so that it can serve as a standard for all statements capable of determining the many. This anticipative keeping in view of the *one* in which the many can agree i.e., representation of the unifying unity itself, is the basic act of conceptualisation. [K.b., p.55] Heidegger reminds that Kant calls this "reflection." And he gives the definition of it in Kant's words: It is that which "enables different representations to be comprehended in one act of consciousness."<sup>21</sup> His point here is that such a reflection brings before itself a unity which as such represents the many so that with reference to this unity the many can be compared (comparison). And that which is not in accord with the *one* can be disregarded (abstraction in Kantian sense). When Heidegger says that act of conceptual representation brings before itself a unity he wants to make explicit that this act is different from the product of conceptual representation. And the meaning of the term "concept" itself should be understood in terms of both.

*A concept is not merely a presentation of something that happens to be common to many things; rather, it is this being-common-to in so far as it is common, i.e., in its unity.* [K.b., p.56]

He states in this connection that Kant said "it is a mere tautology to speak of general or common concepts".<sup>22</sup> Because their being-common-to does not arise from their content but arises from the basic act of conceptual representation. In other words, the conceptual character of representation- hence the fact that what is represented has the form of an element common to many- arises from reflection. Content of this conceptual representation however arises for the most part from an empirical act of intuition which compares and abstracts. Therefore the origin of such empirical concepts is not a problem. But as far as the pure concept is concerned the content of 'reflected' concept can not be derived from the phenomenon. Its content must be obtained *a priori*. Heidegger says that "concepts, the content of which [are] given *a priori* Kant terms notions"<sup>23</sup> [K.b., p.56-57] Kant also states that:

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<sup>21</sup>See *Logikvorlesung*, VIII, g6, p.401.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, g1, note 2, p.399.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, g4, p.401.

*Pure concepts in so far as their origin is in the understanding alone (not in the pure image of sensibility), is called notion. [C.P.R., A320, B377, NKS, p.314]*

Every act of conceptualisation is at the same time determination of something as something (judgement) and judgement contains "the unity of bringing various representations under one common representation"<sup>24</sup>. This act of reflective unification is only possible if it has a reference to a unity in itself.. If the act of representation itself is a representation of a unity it means that representation of a unity belongs to essential structure of the act of understanding. In other words in the act of the understanding there lies already prepared representation of the directive unity. These represented unities form the content of pure concept. And this content is, in each case, a unity by means of which a unification becomes possible. If the understanding in itself is to be the origin not only of the form of every concept but also the content of certain concepts then, this origin can only lie in the fundamental act of conceptualisation itself i.e., in reflection. The act of representation of unity, in case of pure concepts, by reason of this specific content, is already conceptual *a priori*. Hence a pure concept does not need to be endowed with a conceptual form; fundamentally it is itself this form. Therefore pure concepts do not result from an act of reflection. Instead, they belong from the first, to the essential structure of reflection. They are representations which act in, with, and for reflection; they are *reflecting* concepts. [K.b., p.58] As an evidence of his explanation Heidegger shows Kant's explanation of such concepts:

*All concepts in general, no matter whence comes their material, are reflective, i.e., representations raised to the logical relation of general applicability. But there are concepts the entire sense of which is nothing other than to be constitutive of such and such reflection, under which the actual representations as they occur can be subsumed. They may be called concepts of reflection (conceptus reflectentes), and since every act of reflection takes place in the judgement, they must, as the foundation of the possibility of judging, be in themselves, and in an absolute way, the pure activity of the understanding which in the judgement is applied to the relation<sup>25</sup>.*

<sup>24</sup>See C.P.R., A68, B93, NKS, p.105.

<sup>25</sup>Erdmann, *Reflexionen*, II, 554, *Kant's Posthumous Works in Manuscript Form*, vol. V, No. 5051.

This is the explication of the idea of pure concept qua notion, in other words the idea of pure concepts as derived from pure act of understanding alone. Obviously in case of such pure concepts (notions) the pure understanding itself provides a content (manifold)- the pure unities of the possibilities of unification. If these possible modes of unification form a closed continuity then there lies concealed in understanding multiplicity of pure concepts organised to a systematic whole. This totality is the system of those predicates which function in pure thought.

All kinds of predicates are assertion of something about something. It is important to note here that Heidegger for this reason claims "notions as predicates assert something about the Being of the being", and calls them thereby "ontological predicates".

From Kant's inquiry however it becomes explicit that these pure concepts which have the character of ontological predicates have been termed "categories". This means actually the table of judgements is the source of categories and their table. Heidegger, in this connection, disregarding the problem whether Kantian table of judgements are complete or not, states that not only are the categories not actually derived from the table of judgements, they can not be so derived. In other words he accepts the idea of pure concepts qua notion but he does not accept Kant's account of the pure concepts primarily as notions. Because he says, "when pure concepts are initially apprehended as notions pure thought loses decisive moment of its essence, namely its relation to intuition". In other words, if the origin of pure concepts of understanding is seen primarily in judgements then categories will be derived from notions. According to Heidegger on the other hand categories can not be derived from notions. For the very reason that it is not possible to derive the content from the form. From the content however it is always possible to abstract the form. Accordingly for Heidegger the essence of notions can be understood only proceeding from their actual applications to intuition.

He furthermore reminds that pure thought is essentially at the service of intuition, hence it is by its nature dependent on the latter. Accordingly the idea of the pure concept qua notion is only a fragment of pure understanding in pure knowledge. The table of judgements for Heidegger is not the origin of categories but simply the method of discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding. His very point here is that as long as pure understanding is not considered with regard to its essence i.e., its pure relation to intuition, the origin of notions as 'ontological' predicates can not be disclosed. This is an other way of saying that explication of pure concepts as "ontological predicates" is only possible through the elucidation of pure understanding in terms of its fundamental relation to pure intuition. [K.b., p. 59-60]

## 5. ESSENTIAL UNITY OF PURE INTUITION WITH PURE THOUGHT

### *(Interpretation of Pure Synthesis)*

After his reflection on the nature of pure concepts, Heidegger concentrates on the analysis of the essential unity of pure understanding with pure intuition. The problem of the unity of pure knowledge is a result of previous isolation of these pure elements. Thus the only way to understand this unity is to see how they require each other in fact. Hence the essential unity of pure thought can not be understood simply as a sub sequential bond linking the two. In other words their unity can not be later than the elements themselves but must be established earlier and serve as their foundation. The reason for this is that they first arise as elements in this unification and are maintained in their unity by means of it. So they both have an essential dependence on the unity that underlies them and as a result they have mutual dependence on each other. The finitude of knowledge manifests an original and intrinsic dependence of thought on intuition, this dependence is expressed by Heidegger at its best in the statement that, "a need for thought is determined by the intuition".

Heidegger thinks the isolation of these elements has concealed the fact and the manner of their dependence on the unity that underlies them. Because of the way isolation is carried out the second element of knowledge appeared even more prominent. In consequence, Kant did not succeed in making this primordial unity visible. And he adds that, since this isolation can not be completely undone, in spite of everything, the unity will not be expressly developed in its proper origin.

For that reason Heidegger tries to raise the question of unity anew; in terms of that which in unifying these two elements originates them i.e., synthesis. We already explained that as far as only the unity of pure knowledge is concerned veritative synthesis has a priority over the other syntheses.<sup>26</sup> And the other syntheses are necessarily included in it. The question of essential unity of pure (ontological) knowledge turns out to be the problem of pure veritative synthesis. He states that this is, at bottom, a question about the original unification of pure universal intuition (time) and pure thought (notions). Heidegger emphasises that both of these elements, in themselves are synthetic in origin. Pure intuition, because it is indeed the representation of a unified whole, has in itself a unifying character. Hence it is "synoptic" in nature.<sup>27</sup> Pure thought on the other hand, as a representation of pure unity is in itself a source of unity, hence in this sense synthetic in nature. The answer of the question as to how these two elements require each other lies in the fact that they both are synthetic in nature. Accordingly what veritative synthesis achieves is not only to dovetail these two elements by means of their synthetic nature but also to

<sup>26</sup>See Chapter 2, p. 32.

<sup>27</sup>See, C.P.R, A95, NKS, p.127.

make them first fit to be joined. [K.b., p.65] We look at Heidegger's analysis of Kant's statements below in order to make clear what he understands from the synthesis:

*Transcendental logic, on the other hand, has lying before it a manifold of a priori sensibility presented by transcendental aesthetic, as material for the concepts of pure understanding. In the absence of this material those concepts would be without any content, therefore entirely empty. Space and time contain a manifold of pure a priori intuition, but at the same time are conditions of receptivity of our mind- conditions under which alone it can receive representations of objects, and which therefore must always affect the concept of these objects. But if this manifold is to be known, the spontaneity of our thought requires that it be gone through in a certain way, taken up and connected. This act I name synthesis.* [C.P.R., A76f, B102, NKS, p. 111]

Heidegger states that dependence of pure thought on pure intuition is first introduced by Kant in these statements but in a rather superficial way. "Transcendental logic" he says does not have "lying before it" the pure temporal manifold.[K.b., p.65] Rather, this mode of presentation of manifold belongs to the essential structure of pure thought and this is analysed by transcendental logic. Similarly transcendental aesthetic does not supply the pure manifold; pure intuition is by nature "that which supplies", and furthermore for the sake of pure thought. What is thus supplied by pure intuition is 'affection' (not affection through the senses but affection in so far as it pertains to pure thought). This means actually what is supplied by pure intuition is the condition of minds receiving representations of objects. And these representations affect the concepts of these objects. Accordingly pure thought is always placed before pure intuition and pure intuition (time) affects it. In order that pure thought be determined by pure concepts however finitude of thought demands that manifold of pure intuition be accommodated to thought itself. And in order that manifold of pure intuition be determinable through pure concepts it must be freed from dispersion i.e., taken up and connected. This is a reciprocal adaptation, and it takes place in the operation which Kant calls in general "synthesis". Synthesis as a mediator between the intuition and thought is related to both and shares the fundamental character of both hence must be an act of representation.

Heidegger reminds that Kant notes "synthesis in general is the mere result of power of imagination"<sup>28</sup>. This means everything which has synthetic structure, in the nature of pure knowledge, is brought about by the imagination.

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<sup>28</sup>C.P.R., A78, B103, NKS, p.112. (Italics are Heidegger's)

Pure [ontological] synthesis is pure because the manifold is not empirical but is given *a priori*. This means actually the pure synthesis fits in with that which, as synopsis, unifies in pure intuition. But at the same time this synthesis needs to have a reference (in order to fit with that which unifies in pure intuition) to a directive unity. Therefore as an act of unification that is representative, the pure synthesis must represent in advance and as such, i.e., in a general way, the unity which pertains to it. And by this the general representation of its specific unity, the pure synthesis raises the unity, which it represents, to a level of concept and thereby gives unity to itself. Thus, Heidegger, in his interpretation of pure synthesis, re-establishes it as the one which acts in pure intuition in a manner purely synoptic and, at the same time as the one which acts in pure thought in a manner purely reflective. [K.b., p.66-67]

## 6. INTRODUCTION OF PURE IMAGINATION AS THE CENTRAL FACULTY OF THE SOUL

Proceeding from the double functioning characteristic of pure synthesis Heidegger introduces pure imagination as the fundamental faculty of the soul for its providing essential unity of thought with intuition. For the explicit understanding of this introduction we will take a look at his reflection on Kant's notes that the complete essence of pure knowledge is composed of three parts. [K.b., p.67]

*What must first be given- with a view to the a priori knowledge of all objects - is the manifold of pure intuition; the second factor involved is the synthesis of this manifold by means of the imagination. But even this does not yield knowledge. The concepts which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, furnish the third requisite for the knowledge of an object; and they rest on the understanding.* [C.P.R., A78f, B104, NKS, p.112]

Heidegger states that, of these three elements, the pure synthesis of imagination holds the central position. And furthermore this central position has a structural significance. In it pure synopsis and pure synthesis meet and fit in one another. This fitting one another is explained by Kant as the self-sameness of the pure synthesis in the syn-thetic character of the intuition and the understanding.

*The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgement also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. [C.P.R., A79, B104f, NKS, p.112]*

By this self same-ness of the synthetic function Kant points out the essential structural togetherness of pure intuition with pure thought. Heidegger interprets the self-sameness of the synthetic function in the statement below:

*This is to say, at the same time, that the modes of synthesis mentioned earlier, namely, the former, apophantic synthesis of the judicative function and the predicative synthesis of conceptual reflection, belong together in the unity of the essential structure of finite knowledge as the veritative synthesis of intuition and thought. [K.b., p.68]*

Fundamental role that Heidegger assigns to pure imagination as a third faculty of the soul comes from the peculiar character of what it achieves i.e., the pure synthesis. We must remind however that transcendental imagination satisfies this central position only if it is considered from Heidegger's point of view. That is to say when the whole project is put forward from the side of "what is given" into the manifold of intuition. He states that transcendental imagination receives this primary role essentially with its achieving "pure ontological" synthesis, i.e., pure veritative synthesis. Therefore before the elucidation of the transcendental imagination in this fundamental role it is necessary to go into details of Heidegger's interpretation of pure synthesis and the pure concepts of the understanding.

## **7. THE PURE CONCEPTS OF UNDERSTANDING AND THEIR TRANSCENDENTAL CONTENT**

Heidegger when he interprets pure concepts from the point of view of what is given in intuition arrives at their transcendental content.

*The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgement, also introduces a*

*The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgement, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general.* [C.P.R, A79, B105, NKS, p.112f]

This transcendental content which is introduced into pure concepts of understanding by means of the synthetic unity of manifold in intuition signifies "what is given" in pure intuition as far as pure knowledge is concerned. Hence this is the very point from which the interpretation of pure knowledge as ontological knowledge takes its departure. That is why Heidegger says in relation to Kant's statements above "this characterisation of the essential unity of ontological knowledge can not be the conclusion but, rather right way to begin, the laying of the foundation of this knowledge." [K.b., p.68] Transcendental content of pure concepts of understanding is analysed in the section of the *Critique* which is called *Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding*. It is no surprise that this is also the section which Heidegger finds the most relevant piece of Kant's work for his purposes.<sup>29</sup> [B&T, p.45]

It becomes explicit from here that when pure concepts are analysed from the point of view of "what is given" in pure intuition, this means actually they are supposed to be considered primarily in terms of their transcendental content. That is to say in such an interpretation they can not be initially apprehended as having their origin in understanding alone i.e., as notions.<sup>30</sup>

*If a category is not only, or even in its primary sense (as the name indicates), as a mode of "assertion" schema tou logou, and if it can satisfy its true nature, which is that of a schema tou ontos, then it must not function merely as an "element" (notion) of pure knowledge; on the contrary, in it must lie the knowledge of The Being of the essent [being].* [K.b., p.69]

This is taking categories as ontological predicates. The primary question here is not merely how they are formed in understanding but how they are formed in transcendental imagination in so far as pure imagination forms what is intuited. Because their formation in thought directly arises from their initial intuition, and because by Kant categories are primarily investigated as notions Heidegger states that "the pure intuitivity of notions becomes decisive for the essence of the categories". [K.b., p.69] In Kantian inquiry categories are always presented as notions

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<sup>29</sup>See, Chapter 1, p.16.

<sup>30</sup>See Chapter 2, p.36.



knowledge. For this reason, actually Kant assigned to the *Transcendental Logic* (to the *Analytic of Concepts* in particular) not only the explication of pure concepts as elements of pure knowledge [*Transcendental Deduction*] but also justification of the essential unity of pure knowledge as well. In this way *Transcendental Logic* came to have a unique priority over *Transcendental Aesthetic*.<sup>31</sup> From Heidegger's point of view however it is the intuition which is the primary element in knowledge. So it is important to see what he has to say on the priority of logic:

*All things considered, the priority of Transcendental Logic in the whole of the laying of the foundation of metaphysica Generalis is, in a certain sense justified.*

*If the essence of pure thought consists in its reference to intuition with a view to serving the latter, then, when properly conceived, an analytic of pure thought must introduce this reference as such into the development of its problematic. That this take place with Kant thus proves that the finitude of thought is the theme of the analytic. If the primacy of transcendental logic is understood in this sense, it in no wise effects a diminution of the role of transcendental aesthetic, to say nothing of its complete elimination. [K.b., p.70-71]*

Heidegger actually states that, if the analysis of pure thought is the one which discloses its essential dependence on intuition, at best, then transcendental logic, (because it analyzes pure thought) is certainly prior to transcendental aesthetic. What is interesting however, is that when this priority is understood in this sense it disappears.

The fundamental significance of *Transcendental Deduction*, in the way in which Kant presents it, is its drawing the limits of pure thought. According to Heidegger however finitude of pure thought (finitude of reason in general) is an essential consequence of the finitude of intuition. Hence before the elucidation of transcendental deduction he points out its basic purpose as the explication of finite being's transcending all beings to their Being. In other words he concentrates on the meaning of "transcendence" as such.

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<sup>31</sup>*Transcendental Aesthetic* is part of the *Critique* in which metaphysical exposition of pure intuition is given.

## CHAPTER 3

### ***PRECURSORY COMPREHENSION OF BEING GROUNDED IN TRANSCENDENTAL IMAGINATION***

#### ***1. INTERPRETATION OF OB-JECT AS BEING AND THE ACT OF OB-JECTIFICATION AS THE GROUND OF TRANSCENDENCE***

Human being is able to know an object which he is not and he has not created. In Heidegger's understanding finite being [human Dasein] with its ability of cognition is able to relate itself to being which it is not and it has not created. Kant puts the picture from the stand point of the subject's knowledge hence in his understanding this is only possible if the object is 'given' in certain sense. Heidegger tries to switch this stand point to the perspective of known object and says that "it is possible only if this being can by itself come forward to be met." [K.b., p.74] Finite being's relation to what is given or to the object would not be possible if this being does not come forward to be met. What is given in Kant's picture is always indeterminate. And he calls this indeterminate object of intuition *ob-ject* [gegenstand]<sup>32</sup>.

However in order for this indeterminate being to be realised as object of knowledge, it must be represented under a unity.

*However in order this essent [being] can be encountered as the essent [being] that it is, it must be "recognised" in advance as essent [being], i.e., with respect to the structure of its Being.*

And he continues,

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<sup>32</sup>See Chapter 2, p. 25, footnote #16.

*But this implies that ontological knowledge, which in this circumstance is always pre-ontological, is the condition of the possibility that an essent [being] as such can, in general, 'become an ob-ject'<sup>33</sup> for a finite being. [K.b., p.74]*

"Becoming an ob-ject" is the consideration of the unity of manifold of pure intuition from ontological point of view, from the perspective of what is given in intuition. This unity refers to the synoptic character of pure intuition. "Becoming an ob-ject for a finite being" is finite being's "letting become an ob-ject". Heidegger later calls this "the act of objectification".<sup>34</sup> Since ob-ject is the indeterminate object of intuition when he talks about "becoming an ob-ject for a finite being" he is breaking the rules of such indeterminacy. What he actually does is to talk about the ob-ject in itself. In Kantian picture however we know that the reason has no direct access to what is given in intuition. Only by means of the function of understanding is it possible to determine the manifold of intuition under a unity and to present it as object [*objekt*]. Hence the ob-ject is presented as the one which corresponds to this function as its mere content. Heidegger makes the point here that, our encountering this indeterminate object even as 'indeterminate' requires that it somehow shows itself in itself. For if this indeterminate object would not somehow affect our faculty of knowing there would be no need of its determination in understanding. This, Heidegger thinks, signifies "what is given" in its pure givenness. In this connection, the precursory comprehension of Being signifies in his system finite being's encountering of this indeterminate object of intuition before all kinds of conceptualisation what so ever.

What is very important here is that finite being [human Dasein] in "letting become an ob-ject" (in the act of ob-jectification) is neither absolutely active nor absolutely passive. It is not absolutely active because it has a dependence on that which is given. Without that which is given there is no way to talk about the ob-ject. Finite being is not absolutely passive because it is supposed to "meet" with the one which has at all times the possibility of coming forward to be met. Strictly speaking finite being is supposed to receive "that which is given".

In Heidegger's bringing forth the act of ob-jectification the real purpose is to say that it has an ontological priority over recognition of the ob-ject under a concept or the recognition of the being with respect to the structure of its Being. That is why act of ob-jectification is always pre-ontological. This is what Heidegger exactly means by precursory comprehension of Being. For

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<sup>33</sup>J.S.Churchill translates *entgegenstehen* as "become an ob-ject" or as "ob-jectification". Its literal translation, he notes, is "to take up a position opposite to". See K.b., p.74, footnote #71.

<sup>34</sup>Both "letting become an ob-ject" and "act of ob-jectification" are translated from *entgegenstehenlassen*.

See K.b., p.74, footnote #71.

the first time, here its being "precursory" is disclosed as "pre conceptual" and accordingly "pre ontological".

When he further states that "all finite beings must have this ability, which can be described as a turning toward .[orientation toward..] which lets something become an ob-ject" he alludes by this ability to the precursory comprehension of Being. [K.b., p.74]

In this connection Heidegger gives an understanding of what transcendence of finite reason is:

*In this primordial act of orientation, finite being first pro-poses to itself a free space within which something can "correspond" to it. To hold oneself in advance in such a free-space and to form it originally is nothing other than transcendence which marks all finite comportment with regard to the essent [being]. [K.b., p.74]*

The act of ob-jectification is revealed as the primordial act of orientation of finite being towards its object. Heidegger thinks that this act is at the base of finite being's *transcendence* whereby is revealed Being of all beings

From Kant's point of view before the emergence of object as an object of knowledge (under a concept, in a judgement) it is impossible to talk of something that which corresponds to the act of conceptualisation. Hence Kant does not speak of act of ob-jectification. Nevertheless his explication of the ob-ject enables Heidegger to see it from a totally opposite perspective. From where he stands the possibility of the act of ob-jectification brings forth the possibility of reception of indeterminate object of intuition. And the possibility of its reception in turn entails that it can come forward to be met, i.e., appear as ob-jective. [Gegensthendes]. But its presence is not subject to our control. Because we are not ontically creative. *If we are not able to create the being by ourselves then our being dependent on its reception requires that the being have in advance and at all times the possibility of becoming an ob-ject.* [K.b., p.76] The possibility of becoming an ob-ject is the possibility that provides an indeterminate object in the manifold of intuition. It signifies "what is given" in its pure givenness. This in turn enables Heidegger to talk about the possibility of pure correspondence:

*A receptive intuition can take place only in a faculty which lets something become an ob-ject in an act of orientation toward..., which alone constitutes the possibility of a pure correspondence.* [K.b., p.76]

For this to be possible that something in intuition can be set over against the function of understanding, it is necessary that receptive intuition has the capacity to correspond to related

function of understanding. If intuition would not be in disposition of this capacity then there would be no need for thought. The possibility of pure correspondence is the reason why "that which is intuited in pure intuition is not absolutely nothing"<sup>35</sup>.

In connection with this Heidegger questions the nature of the indeterminate object of intuition, as stated below:

*What is that we, by ourselves, let become an ob-ject? It can not be something essent [being]. If not an essent [being] then a Nothing. Only if the act of ob-jectification is a holding oneself into Nothing can an act of representation within this Nothing let, in place of it, something not nothing, i.e., an essent [being], come forward to be met, supposing such to be empirically manifest. Naturally, this Nothing of which we speak is not the nihil absolutum. [K.b., p.76-77]*

The origin of "that which we let become an ob-ject", is the origin of (in Kant's terms) "that which is given" in its pure givenness. In Kantian system this origin is concealed; all we know about it is that it is a transcendental object, just like thing-in-itself is.<sup>36</sup> Heidegger states that it can not be a being, because ob-ject itself is the being. Hence he asks that if it is not a being then it is a Nothing. But since from within this Nothing, something not Nothing comes out then it can not be absolutely Nothing.

This is actually Heidegger's consideration of finitude of the intuition. The possibility of pure correspondence, hence the possibility of the act of ob-jectification, is made an issue only when the finitude of intuition is considered in its innermost essence. In other words the finitude of intuition forces us to question conditions governing the possibility of the act of ob-jectification. To be able to understand the nature of the act of ob-jectification more explicit analysis of the ob-ject is necessary.

In this connection Heidegger states that Kant in *Transcendental Deduction* asks the question concerning the nature of the ob-ject:

*...now we must make clear to ourselves what we mean by the expression "an object [gegenstand] <sup>37</sup> of representations". [C.P.R, A104, NKS, p.134]*

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<sup>35</sup>See Chapter 2, p.29.

<sup>36</sup>Heidegger's analysis of thing-in-itself showed that it is the correlative of appearance, as the object of divine intuition.

<sup>37</sup>See Chapter 2, p.25, footnote #16.

It is a matter of investigating the nature of that which confronts us in the act of ob-jectification.

*Now we find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity; the object [gegenstand] is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion. [C.P.R, A104, NKS, P.134]<sup>38</sup>*

From Kant's statement above Heidegger understands that the ob-ject manifests itself as "which is opposed". And the translation of the statement above takes the form below:

*In this act of letting something take up a position opposite to.. ..... as such, is manifested something "which is opposed". [was dawider ist] [K.b., p.77]*

Heidegger furthermore states that this opposition is not a question of a character of resistance inherent in the pressure of sensation on us. But it is rather "the question of the precursory resistance of Being". What he means by this is that because finite human knowledge is not able to have object in its Being it is necessarily receptive and that which it receives stands opposite to the corresponding act of knowledge. This opposition is direct consequence of the finitude for in infinite knowledge there is no distinction between the ob-ject and object. Being of ob-ject manifests itself directly in its generality without a need of falling under a concept. Because in finite knowledge this is not possible Heidegger talks about the resistance of Being. Precursory resistance of Being is ob-ject's not giving itself immediately in its generality (in its conceptual representation). And ob-ject's not giving itself immediately in its generality is what causes the need for its opposition to that which represents it in its generality. If this opposition were not inherent in the essence of knowledge then the pure correspondence would not be possible. And if correspondence has not taken place then there would be no way to represent the ob-ject in a concept. And this means actually finite being's transcending the being

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<sup>38</sup> The expression "*was dawider ist*" ("which is opposed"), which appears in this statement of original *Critique*, disappears in NKS translation. Hence it becomes impossible to see what Kant originally stated on the nature of the ob-ject. So as the proper translation we refer to Heidegger's own comment on the statement in question, in J. S. Churchill's translation. See J. S. Churchill's footnote, K.b., p.77.

to its Being would not be possible. Heidegger explicitly states that finite being's "letting something to take a position opposite to...." is its transcendence. [K.b., p.92]

We see now that exact place of transcendence here makes a shift although it is still finite being's ability to determine what is given, this determination takes place before the conceptual representation and lies originally in somewhere other than understanding. Heidegger makes explicit that transcendence take place in the act of ob-jectification. And for that reason he states that "the act of ob-jectification is, the 'primordial concept'. [K.b., p.78]

We see from Heidegger's interpretation of origin of the ob-ject, that this origin is nothing but "being in opposition to" the unification of the object under a concept. We must be careful however, the argument concerning objective ground of the ob-ject is not that something must correspond to the *objekt* [..of understanding] in intuition. But rather in order for the manifold of intuition to be represented under a unity it is necessary that the act of unification of thought itself must stand in opposition to what it unifies. Otherwise it becomes impossible to realise, the manifold of intuition under a concept for a finite being. This is the logical dissolving of the act of unification and sensibility. Up to this point Heidegger is in agreement with Kant and this explains why Kant had chosen the term *gegenstand* for that which in intuition corresponds to the *objekt*.

In Kant's picture the act of ob-jectification is made possible by the faculty of pure understanding. All thought in relation to the ob-ject carries with it an element of constraint (necessity); and the determination of the ob-ject in understanding through this constraint prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard. Understanding presents to itself this constraint by representing unity originally and precisely as unifying. And this constraint in advance imposes its rule on all possible modes of togetherness. Kant states that "the representation of the universal condition according to which a certain manifold can be posited in uniform fashion is called *rule*." [C.P.R, A113, NKS, p.140] And the concept "may, indeed, be quite imperfect or obscure. But a concept is always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule." [C.P.R, A104, NKS, p.135] Pure concepts then are revealed as the ones which have such normative unities as their sole content. They not only furnish us with rules but also in them it is hidden inherent form of the rule as such. Understanding is characterised as *faculty of the rules*. [C.P.R, A126, NKS, p.147]

Heidegger by looking at this picture claims that Kant's assigning the act of ob-jectification to the faculty of understanding contradicts with its secondary position within the unity of finite knowledge. But he seems to forget that Kant does not assign the act of ob-jectification to the faculty of understanding. Kant does not even talk about the act of ob-jectification. Instead he talks about the act of representation of the ob-ject under a unity (conceptual representation). And he assigns this act to the faculty of understanding. So the function of the act of ob-jectification in Heidegger's eyes is what the act of conceptual representation achieves explicitly in Kant's picture i.e., determination of what is given. Just as Kant, according to

Heidegger, tries to assimilate the ontological point of view, Heidegger now tries to assimilate Kant's point of view within his ontology.

If the act of ob-jectification as Heidegger claims is put forward as the most essential function of pure understanding then naturally it is that which brings to the light, most clearly, the dependence of pure understanding on pure intuition. Because the pure concepts of understanding receive their transcendental content from pure intuition Heidegger states that:

*It is only in so far as the pure understanding as understanding is the servant of pure intuition that it can remain the master of empirical intuition.* [K.b., p.80]

This means actually if pure concepts of understanding do not take their transcendental content from pure intuition then pure understanding can not remain as the master of empirical intuition.

## 2. INTERPRETATION OF TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION

We see from these analyses that Transcendental Deduction while remaining to be the elucidation of the inner most essence of pure understanding in Kantian sense, turns out to be elucidation of the essence of the act of ob-jectification (hence the innermost essence of the ontological knowledge) in Heidegger's interpretation. But in both ways it is that which brings to light the meaning of transcendence to the extent that transcendence is finite being's determination of what is given in intuition. In the interpretation of Transcendental Deduction Heidegger puts a special emphasis on the part called *Of the Relation of the Understanding to Objects in General, and the Possibility of Knowing Them A Priori*<sup>39</sup>. This part he thinks is the one which explicates the meaning of the transcendence at most.

Transcendental Deduction analyzes the total structure of the pure synthesis. For that reason it shows how pure understanding and pure intuition united in advance require each other or how one is dependent on the other. Accordingly Kant presents the two ways in which intrinsic possibility of transcendence is conducted. i)The first way begins with the pure understanding and through the elucidation of its essence reveals its dependence on pure intuition. ii)The second way on the other hand begins with pure intuition and with analytic of its true nature shows its dependence on pure understanding. The unity which

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<sup>39</sup>This is the *Third Section* of the *Deduction of Pure concepts of Understanding*. [C.P.R., A115-128, NKS, p.141-149]



mediates these two extremes manifests itself in pure synthesis. Hence mediative capacity of pure synthesis should be analysed when the mutual dependence of intuition and understanding is made an issue.

i) Pure understanding is presented as the one which achieves the task of putting the manifold of intuition under a concept. The act of conceptual representation of the object is necessarily an act of representation of the unity and this act in itself presupposes the idea of unifying unity as such. In Heidegger's words "the act appears to itself as bound to unity i.e., as that which maintains its self identity even in the pure action of representing unity as such." He further states that "something can confront this act of representation only if the act of representation of unity as such is itself confronted by the unifying unity as regulative." [K.b., p.83] He calls this unifying unity "anticipatory pro-position of unity".

From Kant's analysis it becomes explicit that the representation of unity as an act of pure thought necessarily has the character of "I think". And the pure concept as consciousness of unity in general is necessarily pure self-consciousness. In other words consciousness of the identity of the self underlies the idea of the unity which makes conceptual representation of the object [act of objectification] possible. This pure self-consciousness according to Heidegger signifies this act's turning toward itself. He also states that only because this act turns toward itself that what is encountered is able to "concern" us.<sup>40</sup> The pure self-consciousness is presented as being present at all times. Kant calls this pure, original, unchangeable consciousness *transcendental apperception* and states that the act of representation of unity is based on this apperception "as a *faculty*". [C.P.R, A107, NKS, p.136] This means the principle of the idea of unity as such, which this act presupposes, lies in the original unity of apperception. Thus Kant says:

***..pure apperception supplies a principle of the synthetic unity of the manifold in all possible intuition.*** [C.P.R, A117, fn., NKS, p.142]

The first way of transcendental deduction starting with pure thought comes in this way to the disclosure of transcendental apperception. The pure understanding here in originally pro-posing unity to itself acts as transcendental apperception. Act of representation of unity which takes place as conceptual representation in understanding in order to realise the complete structure of this act (in pure understanding) must require an anticipation of unity. Hence Kant states that unity represented by transcendental apperception [the unity of self-consciousness] "presupposes" or includes the synthesis. [C.P.R, A118, NKS, p., 142] Heidegger states in this

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<sup>40</sup>See K.b., p.84. Heidegger refers here Kant's own words in *Critique* specially for his usage of the term

"concern". See also C.P.R, A116, NKS, p.141.

connection that "since synthesis in general is a product of imagination then transcendental apperception must have an essential relation to the pure imagination." Pure imagination can not re-present something already empirically given for this is the task of the faculty of reproductive imagination. Rather pure imagination is necessarily constitutive *a priori*, i.e., purely productive. Kant calls this pure, productive imagination "transcendental". If transcendental apperception presupposes synthesis and if synthesis is a product of imagination then productive capacity of pure imagination must be the ground of all kinds of objectification. In proceeding sections of our thesis this "productive" capacity of pure imagination is analysed and its connection with pure apperception is built. For the time being we refer to Heidegger's remark on Kant's phrases below,

*Thus the principle of the unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination, prior to [before]<sup>41</sup> apperception, is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience.* [C.P.R, A118, NKS, p.143]

Transcendental apperception is nothing but the act of representation of unity's turning toward itself. The same act which unifies all the manifold of intuition by turning toward itself discovers the anticipation of the unity represented in itself [unity of self-consciousness]. Hence the unity of self-consciousness can not be prior to the very act itself. Now, Heidegger's argument becomes more explicit. He argues that *what is presented in transcendental apperception, unity of the self-consciousness, can not be prior to the act of representation of unity as such. Because this act in itself has essentially in view (requires) unity, i.e., it is in itself unifying.* That is why transcendental apperception not only includes the synthetic unity of the pure synthesis but also "presupposes" it. Therefore when Heidegger interprets Kant's statement above he points out that pure synthesis of imagination not only precedes apperception but also it is "for" the apperception.<sup>42</sup> This means actually the consciousness of the identity of the Self needs also anticipatory pro-position of the unity.

Here an important divergence between the two philosophers comes into view. Heidegger thinks that although the unity of pure apperception supplies a principle of unity to the empirical synthesis it can not be in itself the origin of this principle for Self itself needs the same principle in order to realise its self-identity. In the Kantian picture original unity of apperception signifies the upper most level (the finitude) of pure reason in its act of unification. Kant does not question what is pure self-consciousness in itself or if it provides this principle

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<sup>41</sup>The term "before" does not appear in NKS translation of the *Critique*. J.S. Churchill uses this term from his own translation.

<sup>42</sup>See K.b., p.85.

of the idea of unity as such from itself. He is rather concerned with its relation with empirical consciousness i.e., how it supplies the principle of the idea of unity as such *a priori*.

Heidegger's interpretation of transcendental deduction is closely related to his attitude exhibited in his speaking of the object in itself. Because anticipatory proposition of unity can not arise from the unity of transcendental apperception, it must originate from the pure act of unification itself in relation to what pure understanding unifies *a priori*, i.e., from pure intuition. This means actually that pure imagination in relation to what it unifies *a priori* (pure intuition) must be the ground of all unification whatsoever. And this requires that the manifold of pure intuition has "something more" than what has been explicated by Kant.

We must remark here that Heidegger does not reject that unity of pure consciousness "provides" the principle of the unity as such. So he is completely in agreement with Kant that transcendental consciousness is the ground of empirical consciousness and he sees that this is the limit of Kantian theory of knowledge. He just claims that the origin of this principle does not lie in the synthetic unity of transcendental consciousness. Instead it lies in the pure act of unification itself. Pure act of unification is achieved by the pure synthesis of the transcendental imagination. In Kantian picture however pure act of unification is grounded in pure understanding for the very reason that pure understanding's reflection on pure Self-consciousness supplies the principle of synthetic unity *a priori*. So we see that determination of the origin of the principle of synthetic unity has a very important implication. When this origin is determined to be in synthetic unity of transcendental apperception pure understanding holds the central position in the determination of the object of knowledge in general, when the origin however is determined to be in pure act of unification itself (hence in the pure synthesis of imagination) then transcendental imagination holds the central position in the determination of the object of knowledge. Because principle of the idea of unity as such originates from pure act of unification (synthetic unity of transcendental imagination) in relation to what it unifies i.e. time as pure intuition, the right subject matter of transcendental deduction from Heidegger's point of view should have been the relation between time and transcendental imagination.

*However, the pure synthesis must unify a priori. Therefore, what it unifies must be given to it a priori. Now the universal, pure intuition which is a priori receptive and productive is time. Hence, pure imagination must be essentially related to time. Only in this way is pure imagination revealed as the mediator between transcendental apperception and time.*

[K.b., p.86]

In this connection Heidegger reminds Kant's phrases below:

*All modifications of the mind..... are..... finally subject to time.... In it they must all be ordered, and connected and brought in to relation. [C.P.R, A120, NKS, p.144]*

Nevertheless, Kant nowhere in the *Critique* explicitly discusses the essential relation between time and pure imagination. Instead he discusses the relation between pure synthesis of imagination and pure understanding. However the true nature of understanding is revealed only by means of the relation in which it stands to the imagination. Understanding is what it is only insofar as it "presupposes" or "involves" pure imagination.

ii-) The second way of transcendental deduction begins with the intuition and proceeds to the pure understanding. It aims at establishing the necessary connection in which understanding, by means of the categories, stands to appearances.<sup>43</sup> In this part Kant explains that,

*what is given first to us is appearance, and appearance when combined with consciousness is called perception. Without being in relation to the consciousness appearance can never be, for us, object of knowledge. Since every appearance contains a manifold and since different perceptions therefore occur in the mind separately and singly a combination of them is demanded. There must therefore exist in us an active faculty of synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty is titled as "imagination". [C.P.R, A120, NKS, p.143-144]*

Heidegger explains what he understands from this passage as follows:

*...although "sensibility" is receptive, it "has nothing" in itself corresponding to a connection between phenomena. However, this connection must be capable of being experienced in finite cognition, since a finite being never has the essent [being] as a totum simul; rather as Kant states explicitly, what is encountered is found "separately and singly" Therefore if the essents [beings] encountered are to be able to reveal themselves as connected, it is necessary that "connection" in general be understood in advance. To represent connection in advance means that one must first form, by representing it, the notion of relation in general. But this power of "forming" relations originally is pure imagination itself. [K.b., p.87]*

<sup>43</sup>See C.P.R, A119, NKS, p.143.

He states that "since the medium wherein joining and forming connections is possible is time, this possibility of combination of appearances is based on the imagination as that which is essentially related to time." [K.b., p.87] This possibility is, in Heidegger's terms, the possibility of encountering a being capable of revealing itself in its objective connectedness. This objective connectedness is the basis of the act of objectification.

Heidegger states in this connection that:

*In the pure act of forming determinate relations, the pure imagination proposes a mode of unification that is normative and opposed in advance to the arbitrary reception of what is encountered.* [K.b., p.87]

It is striking to see that what stands in opposition to arbitrary reception of what is given is not the pure understanding in pure act of unifying but pure imagination. Heidegger replaces pure understanding with pure imagination in the function of unification. Accordingly the unification is proposed by pure imagination not by the understanding but through the understanding to the extent that pure understanding originates in the pure imagination.

It is also important to see that arbitrary reception of what is given does not necessarily stand in opposition to this unification but rather from his point of view the opposite holds to be true. In other words unification proposed by pure imagination stands in opposition to the arbitrary reception of what is given.

Kant in the second way goes on to explain that imagination has to bring the manifold of intuition into form of an image. This is reproduction of the images out of the impressions given in intuition. Reproduction of images enables thoroughgoing identity of the perceptions. Kant at the same time states that thoroughgoing identity of perceptions does not supply any determinate "connection" between them but only accidental collocations. Their reproduction therefore must conform to a rule with respect to which a representation connects in the imagination with some one representation in preference to another. This subjective and empirical ground of reproduction according to rules is what is called association of representations and is done by pure imagination. (in so far as pure imagination is in the base of reproductive imagination) For the association of the perceptions to be possible they must in themselves be associable otherwise we can not talk about their conforming to human knowledge in general. They exist in empirical consciousness but in the state of separation without belonging to consciousness of myself. The ground of association of appearances Kant names "affinity". [C.P.R., A121-122, NKS, p.144-145]

Perceptions being associable in themselves is what Heidegger means by the "normative connection" supplied by pure imagination in relation to time. Affinity of appearances in this

circumstance is the "horizon" of the normative connection. Heidegger reminds Kant's phrases below: [K.b., p.88]

*That the affinity of appearances, and with it their association, and through this, in turn, their reproduction according to laws, and so [as involving these various factors] experience itself, should only be possible by means of this transcendental function of imagination, is indeed strange but is non the less an obvious consequence of the preceding argument.*<sup>44</sup>

[C.P.R, A123, NKS, p.146]

Heidegger states in this connection that the "precursory formation of affinity" in the pure imagination is necessary to all empirical intuition as that which lets the being be encountered in the order proper to it. He also adds that, this is so, "as time pertains to all the empirical intuition." Since time as universal pure intuition delimits the empirical intuition "precursory" formation of affinity in the pure imagination must be essentially related to pure intuition (time). We must look at Kant's statement below in order to understand what Heidegger means with this:

*All consciousness as truly belongs to an all-comprehensive pure apperception, as all sensible intuition, as representation, does to a pure inner intuition, namely to time. It is this apperception which must be added to pure imagination, in order to render its function intellectual.* [C.P.R, A124, NKS, p.146]

We see that in Kant appearances as all sensible intuition are dependent on the precondition of their being represented on the one hand and on the other is dependent on the pure apperception as the pre condition of these representations brought under a unity. These two take place at the same time and are indispensable for each other. Affinity of appearances refers to the first precondition and it is a precondition of appearances being a representation for the sake of their being brought under a unity. Appearances are on the level of affinity only in so far as related to empirical consciousness which in turn is grounded in pure consciousness. Because the real purpose of Kant's investigation is the human knowledge itself, the first precondition as association of appearances is necessary for the sake of the second precondition. Hence affinity of appearances is not the necessary condition of their being brought under a

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<sup>44</sup>By this Kant means argument of the objective ground of associability [affinity] of appearances, explained above.

unity but rather vice versa holds to be true. Heidegger is opposed here exactly to this point in that because he is mainly concerned with what an appearance signifies in itself, affinity of appearances is ontologically prior to their being brought under a unity in Kantian sense. To be able to justify what he says he states that their being brought under a unity presupposes affinity hence he talks about "precursory" formation of affinity. That is the reason why he doesn't take "original" unity of pure apperception as "original" ; in other words he does not see it as the final ground of all unification what so ever.

We must make one point clear namely that Heidegger is in complete agreement with Kant that the affinity of appearances is necessary for their conforming to human knowledge in general. But in Kant appearances in themselves signify nothing, hence this necessity constitutes final cause of their occurrence. That is the reason why Kant can not talk of the object in itself. In Heidegger however ontology begins exactly where Kantian theory of knowledge ends. Contrary to Kant the relation of appearances to consciousness is only the reason why they "concern" us but not the reason why they are put under a unity. They are in a sense put under unity ontologically before they are related to pure apperception. Kant when he talks about appearances, gives priority to their relation to consciousness for the very reason that this is what makes them objects of knowledge. Heidegger however gives priority to their relation to time, as the precondition of their becoming representations, for the very reason that even for them to be able to be represented in such a manner there is a need for the precursory unity. In connection with these we see how Heidegger relates pure imagination with pure apperception in his phrases below:

*...transcendental apperception which, through the essential mediation of pure imagination, must be joined to pure intuition does not exist in isolation , and, therefore, it is not coupled to the pure imagination merely because the latter occasionally has need of it. On the contrary, the transcendental apperception, in as much as it is an act of representation of unity, must in turn have at hand a unity which is formed by an act of unification. [K.b, p.88]*

Here Heidegger explicitly states that pure imagination has no need of transcendental apperception for the act of unification but on the contrary pure imagination in order to be pure act of unification must already have the unity as such. What is important to realise here is that all Heidegger does is to apply exactly the same reasoning that Kant used for his system. He says that unity of transcendental apperception requires anticipatory pro-position of unity. And because of this requirement it can not be in itself that which provides the principle of unity. The

main difference is that his understanding of the possibility of human knowledge over exceeds Kant's limits.

What is to be asked Heidegger in this connection is "where does the principle of synthetic unity lie if not in the unity of pure consciousness?" His answer to this question is "in the act of unification itself, hence in pure synthesis of imagination." That is why pure imagination is the one which forms the original unity of pure knowledge in general in its function of pure synthesis. Thus in his elucidation of the transcendental deduction everything leads to the emphasis on the imagination in its role as a mediator between intuition and understanding in so far as the both are grounded in imagination. He gives Kant's words below supporting his claim:

*A pure imagination, which conditions all a priori knowledge, is thus one of the fundamental faculties of the soul. By its means we bring the manifold of intuition on the one side [and] into connection with the condition of necessary unity of pure apperception on the other.*<sup>45</sup> [C.P.R, A110, NKS, p.138]

Thus, states Heidegger, "the triplicity of there elements - pure intuition, pure imagination and pure apperception - is no longer a mere juxtaposition of faculties." [K.b., p.89] From here it becomes explicit that on the mediative role of pure imagination, Kant agrees with Heidegger. They rather disagree in the exact function of the pure imagination. Kant sees the pure imagination as the faculty which achieves pure synthesis by reference to the "original" unity of pure apperception. Heidegger sees it as the faculty which achieves the same task having the principle of "original unity" in its very act of unification. Heidegger's taking the principle of synthetic unity outside of the limits of pure consciousness [reason] constitutes the hard core of his interpretation. Heidegger does not reject the unity of pure apperception being the ground of empirical apperception; he indeed excludes nothing of what Kant brings forth except its being the "original" ground.

In this interpretation the fundamental role of pure understanding which is explicated by Kant in transcendental deduction is transferred to the pure imagination. The pure understanding in this connection is presented by Heidegger as that which bears "witness" to the unification in general. And its capability of being the witness results from its reflection on the unity of pure

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<sup>45</sup>J.S. Churchill's exposition of this sentence is as follows ...*transcendental imagination on the one hand unifies pure intuition in itself and on the other unites the latter with pure apperception*. He notes that Smith's elimination of the "and" robs the exposition of its decisive sense. See K.b., p.89, footnote # 101.



self consciousness. Categories for that reason as pure representation of unities can not have their final ground in the pure understanding any more. That is why he says:

*They are not notions but pure concepts which, by means of pure imagination, are rendered essentially relative to time. Endowed with such nature, they constitute transcendence. They contribute to the act of ob-jectification. Because of this they are, from the first, determinations of objects, i.e., of the essent [being] itself insofar as it is encountered by a finite being. [K b., p.91]*

Heidegger states here that the pure concepts contribute to the act of ob-jectification. This is why the act of ob-jectification is the "primordial concept." This means actually the unification takes place at the level of the determination of the ob-ject itself and that is where the transcendence comes into view. What happens in the conceptual representation of the ob-ject by means of the unity provided by transcendental apperception in Kant's inquiry, happens in the act of ob-jectification by means of the unity provided by pure imagination in Heidegger's interpretation. As the act of unification is transformed from the conceptual representation of the ob-ject to the act of ob-jectification, the pure concepts of understanding as pure representations of unities leave their fundamental place to the categories. In other words from Kant's point of view, their applied version to intuition becomes prior to them.

In this connection we must take a look into Heidegger's analysis of pure concepts as initially understood as categories. He states that the true essence of categories can only be understood if they are considered as elements necessary to transcendence. And that is the only way in which their "objective reality" must be demonstrated.

*In order to understand the problem of objective reality of categories as the problem of transcendence, it is necessary that one should not take the Kantian term "reality" [Realitat] in the sense given it by modern "theory of knowledge" according to which "Reality" signifies what Kant denoted by the term Dasein or "existence". Rather, "reality" means, according to Kant's exact translation, "fact-hood" [Sacheit] and alludes to the quiddity of the essent [being] which is delimited through essentia. [K.b., p.91]*

Heidegger thinks that when Kant brings objective reality of categories into question he asks in what respect what is represented in pure concept is a determination of that which is ob-jectified in transcendental knowledge? This is actually the question of what manifests itself in ontological knowledge [in the act of ob-jectification]; being *qua* object. The categories are

objectively real in so far as they contribute to the ontological knowledge which produces the transcendence of the human Dasein that is the letting something take up a position opposite to.. Therefore the problem of origin and truth of categories is the problem of the possible manifestation of the Being of the being in the essential unity of ontological knowledge. Possible manifestation of the Being of the being is the possible manifestation of the concept in connection with [proceeding from] what is formed by transcendental imagination.

Therefore if their objective reality is understood as objective validity then their essence can not be grasped.

*...if one fails to interpret the expression "objective reality" from the point of view of the pure synthesis of the transcendental imagination as that which forms essential unity of ontological knowledge, if one confines himself exclusively to the notion of "objective validity", an expression which Kant employs only in the preliminary formulation of the transcendental deduction as a juridical question, and if, in addition, one interprets "validity" to mean logical validation of a judgement, an interpretation which is contrary to the sense required by the Kantian problematic-then the decisive problem is entirely lost to view. [K.b., p.92]*

Heidegger thinks that objective reality of the categories lies in their applicability to intuition. But their objective validity is a logical criteria and can be achieved purely in thought. Therefore if their objective reality is understood primarily in the sense of objective validity then they will stay as universals that understanding thinks. In other terms Heidegger makes a point that in explication of pure concepts as ontological predicates it is not possible to proceed from the pure concepts to the categories. Because pure concepts signify the forms and we can not have "what is" in their content. That is to say if we demonstrate their objective validity first we only come up with a mere form. On the contrary, in proceeding from the categories to pure concepts because it is always possible to abstract the form from the content, we can demonstrate true nature of ontological predicates.

In Heidegger's interpretation of transcendental deduction mainly the understanding -or more precisely its relation to the imagination as the unifying medium is discussed. Since from his point of view all knowledge is presented as primarily intuition, for the explication of the transcendence, the relation of the transcendental imagination to pure intuition and also that of pure understanding to pure intuition must be explicitly discussed. This will be actually the presentation of transcendental imagination in its unifying function and thereby constitution of the transcendence and exhibition of its horizon.

### 3. INTERPRETATION OF SCHEMATISM AND TRANSCENDENTAL SCHEMATISM

As we previously noted, Heidegger thinks that Kant discusses the essential ground of ontological knowledge in the part of the *Critique* called *Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding*. "However, [he states], Kant presents this fundamental problem in a form linking it to the question of possible subsumption of phenomenon under the categories". Kant's main intention in such a presentation is (in connection with transcendental deduction) to give the proof that, "notions must indeed be categories i.e. that they must belong essentially to transcendence itself, if they are to be capable of the determination a priori of the beings which are empirically accessible". [K.b., p.114] Problem of subsumption of phenomenon under the pure concepts makes, application of concepts to objects, an issue. Expressed otherwise what is called subsumption denotes the manner in which the objects are brought under the pure concepts.

Heidegger on the other hand as he explicitly states all throughout the interpretation is concerned with ontological knowledge of the ontological concepts. For that reason he interprets this part of the *Critique* by making objects corresponding to pure concepts an issue. He switches the picture so that he tries to give an account of how objects are reduced to concepts rather than how concepts are applied to the objects. Reduction of objects to concepts is achieved by the pure synthesis of imagination and according to Heidegger this is what takes place in transcendental schematism. Hence his question is to see how transcendental schematism forms the unity represented in the notion. So his point of departure is actually the manifold of pure intuition and he wants to show how this manifold is reduced to pure concepts. This he calls the question of "ontological subsumption" which is exactly opposite of what Kant alludes to by subsumption of intuitions under the pure concepts. When he presents the problematic discussed in schematism in such a way he argues that Kantian formulation of the problem of schematism does not consider the question as to how the categories are formed. But rather assumes that they are formed beforehand and then asks how they are applied to the appearances. For that reason he tries show in his interpretation of "transcendental schematism" that pure concepts are indeed categories. As we previously noted Heidegger argues that proceeding from pure concepts to the categories is not justified because pure concepts signify the pure forms relative to their application to intuition (categories.) In order to arrive at the complete formation of those concepts it is necessary first to show the relation in which they stand to appearances proceeding from appearances. Once you have categories at hand it is possible to proceed to their pure form by emptying their content. As a result intrinsic possibility

of ontology lies in the possibility of "formation" of pure concepts in general. Therefore Heidegger states that:

*...speaking of subsumption of phenomenon under the categories is not a solution of the problem [of their true essence] but conceals the very question at issue, namely, that of the sense in which one may speak here of subsumption "under concepts". [K.b., p.115]*

So the very question that should be asked is "in what sense one can speak of subsumption under concepts or what subsumption under concepts means" rather than "how the objects are subsumed under concepts." And this question requires an understanding of how these concepts are formed in transcendental imagination.

Heidegger's question as to how the objects of intuition are reduced to concepts is actually a particular version of the question of the possibility of comprehension of the Being of beings. This is in turn what he presented as the problem of transcendence. That is why he states concerning his interpretation on Kantian theory of schematism that it must let itself be guided by the fundamental problem of transcendence of a finite being. In other words he states that his interpretation aims at giving an account of the theory in the light of intrinsic development of transcendence.

For this he first wants to show that sensibilization of the pure concepts forms the transcendence. And then he makes explicit that aspects or images are to provide sensibilization of those concepts through the mediation of the pure schemata. At this point he analyzes intrinsic relation between schema of the concept and the given aspect corresponding to this schema. Then he affirms that sensibilization of concepts takes place as schematism. These analyses are supposed to give an account of how the manifold of intuition is reduced to concepts in general so that the nature of pure sensibilization and in accordance with it the nature of transcendence become explicit.

#### *a) Interpretation of Schematism*

If being in the sense of what is given is directly manifest to finite being in intuition that finite being must be able to receive it. Reception demands from the side of finite being that the precursory encountering of being must be possible and the same reception demands from the side of the being [which is received] that what is encountered must itself have the offering-character. We already noted that the reception presupposes finite being's [human Dasein's] act of orientation towards being. This act thereby must itself be an anticipatory proposition of something which has the nature of an offer. If what is given have the nature of an offer then

horizon within which it is given must have essentially an offering-character. In Heidegger's inquiry horizon within which being is encountered signifies the possibility of pure givenness in one sense and the possibility of pure reception in the other. Offering-character of this horizon indicates that being must be immediately received by intuition i.e., must be perceptible. According to Heidegger "this horizon which is in the character of perceptible offer presents itself as the *pure aspect*". [K.b., p.95] But in order for this horizon to be perceptible finite being must have the power of making it intuitive. This means actually that the finite being must be able to "form" spontaneously the aspect of that which is given. In this interpretation, transcendental imagination is the one which forms intuitive character of the horizon of the precursory encountering of the being.

Furthermore in this act pure imagination is "formative" in yet a second sense, namely in that it provides the possibility of the image in general. In other words in its forming the aspect out of the pure aspect (horizon) it give rise to the possibility of an image in general.

We must first understand in this connection what Heidegger means by the term aspect. He actually uses the terms aspect and image interchangeably and notes that "significance of aspect or image differs according to the nature of what is presented and the mode of this presentation".

As we previously noted human being has a precursory access of what is given. But this access is such a way that finite being in his encountering of what is given forms the aspect of it out of its offering character (pure aspect). We use the term aspect here in its literal sense. In other words aspect is what reveals us an *aspect* of what is given. Accordingly aspect reveals all the distinguishing characteristics of what is given.. Image on the other hand is what aspect is from the point of view of what is received. In other words once aspect of what is given has been formed that means it is received then we don't call its aspect "aspect" any more because it provides us with the image of the concept of what is received. The possibility of formation of aspect constitutes the first stage in making manifold of intuition sensible.

The manifold of pure intuition being sensible actually is the only way in which pure concepts of understanding becomes sensible for they do not have any given empirical manifold. This process of making them sensible by forming an image in general, Heidegger calls "sensibilization". Sensibilization denotes the manner in which a finite being is able to make something intuitive, i.e., is able to procure an aspect (image) of something. We must note that by using the term "sensibilization" Heidegger makes an issue of something being made intuitive. This is ontologically prior to the determination of what is intuited in understanding. In this sense object of sensibilization refers to what is constituted by the act of ob-jectionification.

To the extent that the act of ob-jectionification corresponds to the transcendence of the finite being, sensibilization forms the possibility of transcendence.

*If in the act of ob-jectionification, transcendence is to render intuitive the horizon formed in this way, finite intuition being equivalent to sensibility, then to offer an aspect is to make*

*this horizon sensible. The horizon of transcendence can be formed only in sensibilization.*

[K.b., p.96]

Because Heidegger is concerned with the comprehension of Being before its representation under concept [precursory comprehension], the transcendence of the finite being is transformed in his picture in connection with the possibility of the act of objectification. Hence essence of transcendence is characterised as "precursory", "objective" and also under the light of this last analysis "of the nature of an offer". Consequently, it is very important to explicate the character of what is intuited in pure sensibility starting out with that which presents itself as pure aspect.

Heidegger reports that Kant used the term image in three different senses. [K.b., p.97] Accordingly he explains that aspect which is formed by pure imagination can be in three different kind in nature. The term image can mean:

i) *Immediate Aspect of Being*: The aspect of a definite being so far as it is manifest as something actually present. The being offers an aspect of itself.

ii) *Given Reproductive Aspect of Being*: "Image" can also mean an aspect which reproduces something either now or no longer given.

iii) *An Aspect of Something in General*: Aspect is which provides a model for something yet to be produced. In this meaning "image" can have very broad meaning common to all these three and that is "aspect in general" wherein it is not stated whether something being or non-being is thereby made intuitable.

i) The most common mode of procuring an aspect (forming an image) is the empirical intuition of that which reveals itself. In this case what reveals itself always has the character of an immediately intuited particular. Heidegger calls this "a this-here". To be sure this does not exclude the possibility of intuiting a plurality of "this-here's".

ii) According to the second sense, to procure an image no longer signifies merely the immediate intuition of the being. Every image having the character of reproduction is only a copy of that which reveals itself immediately as the "image". This is image in the sense of a photograph (reproduction qua "a this here") But in revealing itself it also reveals that which it reproduces. Photograph is able to reveal not only object photographed, but also how a photograph looks in general.

From such a reproduction, it is possible to make a new reproduction. Heidegger makes an analogy here with the photograph of a dead mask. This second reproduction immediately represents the dead mask and thus reveals the "image" [the immediate aspect] of the deceased himself. The photograph of the dead mask which is the reproduction of a reproduction is itself an image but only because it provides an "image" of the dead, i.e., shows how the dead person appears or rather appeared.

Sensibilization according to meanings of the "image" thus far differentiated, sometimes refers to the mode of immediate empirical intuition and sometimes to the mode of immediate apprehension of a reproduction presenting the aspect of a being.

iii) But a photograph is also capable of showing how something resembling a dead mask appears in general. And the dead mask is also able to reveal in its turn how in general the face of a corpse appears. But a particular corpse can also reveal this. The mask itself is also able to show how a dead mask in general looks, just as photograph is able to reveal not only the object photographed but also how a photograph in general looks. It is always possible to think of abstractions from the first two kinds of images as to how something appears in general.

The question here is what do all these three aspects reveal? Heidegger asks specially what do they make sensible or which appearances do they furnish us with? And he gives the answer that "they reveal how something appears "in general" through the *one* which applies to many". [K.b., p.99] This is an explanation of how the essence [*eidos*] is hidden in the appearance. Aspect of the being brings about how it appears in general, and in this way reveals its essence. The unity which applies to many, is what is represented in a concept. These aspects then, are to provide for the sensibilization of concepts. i.e., the manner in which concepts are made intuitive. But a concept by its very essence can not be put into an image, for it is always a *represented universal whereas intuition is a singular representation*.

Therefore now the question is what does concept's being sensible-sensibilization- signify in general? How does the aspect of a being either empirically present or represented, or reproduced share in such a sensibilization? In other words *how do we arrive from the aspect to the unity which is represented in a concept?*

Heidegger analyses this question with an analogy of the appearance of the house. He takes a house and states that "the house which we perceive reveals how a house appears in general". [K.b., p.99] And this is that which we represent in the concept "house". The question is, in what way does the aspect of this house reveal the *how* of the appearance of a house in general? The house itself, indeed, presents a definite aspect. But we do not have to lose ourselves in this particular house in order to know how exactly it appears. On the contrary, this particular house is revealed such that, in order to be a house it need not necessarily appear in that way. It reveals to us "only" the "how" of possible appearance. It is this "how" of the possibility of actual appearance we represent to ourselves in connection with this particular house. By its appearance this actual house has restricted the range of possible appearances to one particular house. What is important is the range of possible modes of appearance as such: *more precisely that which delimits this range, i.e., that which regulates and predetermines how, in general, something must appear in order to be able, as a house, to present an aspect corresponding to its nature*. This predetermination of the rule is not description which enumerates characteristics one finds in a house, but "distinguishing characteristics" of the whole of that which is intended by a house.

What is thus intended can in general be so intended only if it is represented as something which regulates the possible insertion of this complex [the house] into an empirical aspect. The unity of a concept in so far as it is unifying, that is, applying to many, can be presented only by the representation of the way in which the rule prescribes the insertion of this pattern into a possible aspect.

We must remark that here the unity of the concept itself is not intended. In other words this unity can not be apprehended in itself. It is perceived as essentially determining the regulation only if it is not considered in itself, but in the exercise of its regulative function. The representation of this regulative action is true conceptual representation.

Accordingly what is represented in the process of making pure concepts of understanding sensible [in sensibilization] is neither empirical aspect nor isolated concept but the "index" of the rule. Index of the rule is what points out or manifests the rule in its regulation and for that reason it is the source of the image.

Kant calls this representation which takes place in sensibilization *schema*.

***The representation of the universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for concept I entitle the schema of this concept. [C.P.R, A140, B179f., NKS, p.182]***

Formation of schema so far as it is accomplished as a mode of sensibilization is called *schematism*. Schema is distinguished from the image. But it necessarily possesses the character of an image. This character however has its own nature, it is neither image as a simple aspect nor image as reproduction it is image in the third sense. For that reason Heidegger later calls image in the third sense schema-image and states that it is the image of the concept. [K.b., p.102] And he analyses the relation of schema to schema-image. These analyses is supposed to give an account of the essence of the relation between aspect of being immediately represented and that which is represented of it in the concept. In what sense the aspect is an "image" of the concept? This is the key question concerning the nature of transcendence hence the essence of the ontological knowledge. Heidegger treats this question with respect to two different kinds of concept. [K.b., p. 102-106] i) Sensible and empirical concepts and ii) Sensible pure concepts (mathematical concepts).

i) Kant stressed that "object of experience" (the aspect accessible to us of a thing actually on hand or an actual reproduction of the being) does not present empirical concept adequately<sup>46</sup>. This means actually empirical aspect contains everything in the concept, if not more. But the aspect does not contain its object in the manner in which concept represents it, i.e., as the one which applies to many. The content of the empirical aspect is presented as being one thing among many, i.e., as particularised. This particular has renounced the possibility of being just

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<sup>46</sup>C.P.R, A141, B180, NKS, p.182.



anything and, by this means has become a possible example for the one which regulates the indifferent many. In this act of regulation, however, the general has its own determination and is in no way contrasted with the particular which is indeterminate and confused "everything and anything".

Representation of the rule is the schema. As such it necessarily is relative to a possible schema-image to which no particular thing can claim to be only possible example. The concept of dog signifies a rule according to which imagination can delineate the figure of a four footed animal in a general manner, without limitation to any determinate figure. That the empirical aspect is not adequate to the empirical concept is an expression of the positive structural relation of the schema-image (image of the concept) to the schema. This means at the same time beyond the representation of this regulative unity concept is nothing. Concept always refers directly to the schema.

ii) In case of sensible pure concepts however it is different. Schema-image of a mathematical construction is valid whether or not it is empirically exact or crudely sketched. Because there is nothing but the general rule. In case of mathematical objects schema-image approaches nearer to the generality of the unity of mathematical concept. However it may be, image [in the first two senses] has the appearance of a particular, while the schema-image [the image in the third sense] has "as its intention" the unity of the general rule governing all possible presentations. The schema-image does not drive its intuitive character uniquely or in the first place from the content of this image. Rather this intuitive character results both from the fact that the schema-image comes into being and from the way in which it comes in to being from a possible presentation which is represented in its regulative function, thus bringing the rule within the sphere of possible function.

Schema-image results from the concern of bringing the rule within the possible function. Accordingly even in the absence of the empirical content when the rule is brought under a certain function it is possible to achieve the explicit schema-image.

When the image is taken in this sense then the five points taken one after the other can be called "an image of [the concept of] number five". The number itself never assumes these five points and also it never assumes the symbol five. The possibility of the image is already formed in the act of representing the rule of representation. This possibility itself is not the isolated aspect of multiplicity of points, it is the true aspect, the aspect structurally inherent in the schema, the schema-image. "Indeed it is schemata, not images of objects, which underlie our pure sensible concepts." [K.b., p.105]<sup>47</sup>

The image in the first sense mentioned above and the empirical perception related can take place only on the basis of possible sensibilization of concepts [by means of the schema-image]

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<sup>47</sup>See C.P.R., A 141, B 180, NKS, p.182

which is accomplished in schematism. That is why pure sensibilization takes place as schematism.

In addition to this we must remember Heidegger's point that "schematism takes place necessarily because our cognition is fundamentally a finite cognition." [K.b., p.106] This is because all conceptual representation is essentially schematism, and thinking intuition is necessarily conceptual. In other terms, in so far as the necessity of the understanding results from the finitude of intuition so does the necessity of schematism.

This means actually schematism belongs to the essence of finite knowledge. And finitude is the one which requires transcendence of human Dasein. Thus transcendence must take place as a schematism. That is the reason why when intrinsic possibility of transcendence is searched for "transcendental schematism" comes necessarily into the view.

#### *b) Interpretation of Transcendental Schematism*

In the explicit analyses of transcendental schematism Heidegger states that "it is matter of conforming now that pure sensibilization of the understanding and its concepts (notions) is brought about transcendental schematism." [K.b., p.107] This is the question of how transcendental schematism forms the unity represented in notion.

The function of sensibilization [which forms schemata] is to procure an image for a given concept. What is inherent in the concept for this reason needs an ordered relation to some intuitivity and first becomes perceptible in this intuitive character. Schema puts itself, i.e., puts the concept, into an image. Heidegger states in this connection that:

*The pure concepts of the understanding which are thought in the pure "I think" require an essentially pure intuitivity, if that which stands opposite as the result of the pure act of ob-jectification is to be perceptible as such.* [K.b., p.107]

This is to say pure concepts must be grounded in pure schemata which procure an image for these concepts. But Kant states that "the schema of the pure concept of understanding can never be brought into any image whatsoever" [C.P.R., B181, A142, p.183] Heidegger thinks that Kant means by the term image here not the pure schema-images but empirical aspects [image in first two senses] or in other terms schema-images which are attached to the schemata of empirical and mathematical concepts. Because notions do not have empirical content it is impossible for them to be in possession of empirical aspect. Hence notions can not be put into such images.

It has been explicated in the interpretation of transcendental deduction that pure concepts through the mediation of pure synthesis of imagination are essentially related to pure intuition).

As pure intuition time is that which provides an aspect prior to all experience. That is why pure aspect which presents itself in pure intuition is termed pure image. Kant states that "the pure image of all objects of the senses in general is time." [C.P.R., A142, B182, NKS, p.183] Thus even the schema of the pure concepts of understanding can be put into an image, provided that image is the pure image.

As a pure image time is schema-image, i.e., image of all concepts whatsoever and not merely pure intuition corresponding to the pure concepts of understanding. That is the reason why Kant thinks that the origin of pure concepts are both in the understanding and in the pure image of sensibility, time<sup>48</sup>. The schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding must necessarily introduce these concepts to time as the rules thereof. But as transcendental aesthetic shows, time is the representation of the single object. Different times are parts of the one and the same time.<sup>49</sup> Heidegger states that,

*...time is not only the necessarily pure image of all schemata of the pure concepts of understanding but also their only possibility of [presenting] a pure aspect. [K. b., p.109]*

The previous analyses of the aspect showed that "aspects reveal how something appears through the one which applies to many"<sup>50</sup> So time is manifested here as the very ground of this "one" which applies to many, which is the most essential characteristic of a pure concept.

*This unique possibility of presenting an aspect reveals itself to be nothing other than time and the temporal. [K.b., p.109]*

Unique possibility of presenting an aspect is the unique possibility of presenting the "one which applies to many". Therefore schemata are the ones which develop this unique possibility of pure aspect into a multiplicity of pure images. In this sense schemata of pure concepts of understanding "determine" pure images, i.e., time. Kant explicitly states that "schema of pure concepts of understanding are transcendental determinations of time"<sup>51</sup> and "as such transcendental product of imagination"<sup>52</sup>.

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<sup>48</sup>See C.P.R, A320, B337, NKS, p.314.

<sup>49</sup>See C.P.R., A31f, B47, NKS, p.75.

<sup>50</sup>See Chapter 3, p.64.

<sup>51</sup>C.P.R, A138, NKS, p.181.

<sup>52</sup>C.P.R, A141, B181, NKS, p. 138.

In this picture what is ontologically prior to everything else is the pure aspect of what is given, being the horizon of *appearing*, it signifies how something appears in general. Then there comes pure image of the concept of that which appears. Schemata are those which introduce pure aspect into plurality of pure images. The connection between aspect of that which appears and image of its concept (schema-image) has being built in the schematism.

We know that in the aspect of that which appears its essence is hidden.<sup>53</sup> When the pure aspect is introduced to the multiplicity of pure images essence is carried over to these images, in principle. That is actually how the problem of individuation is solved. In other terms transformation from the singular to the plural takes place exactly here in transcendental schematism.

In this connection, in Heidegger's analyses of transcendental schematism we come across two different conceptions of time and accordingly two senses in which the term "time" has been used. i) Time in the sense of pure aspect which corresponds to the "one" which applies to many. ii) Time as pure images of all concepts is what he calls "ordinary conception of time" or "time as pure now-sequence". It becomes explicit from these analyses that time as pure aspect is ontologically prior to time as pure images of all concepts.

Accordingly time mentioned in the first sense as the horizon of pure "one" which applies to many is not only the origin of the pure concepts of understanding but also the origin of their transcendental content. That is to say it is the origin of linear conception of time, i.e., time as pure now-sequence. And that is why it is called "primordial time."<sup>54</sup>

In this connection Heidegger states that,

*Ontological knowledge as schematising intuition renders distinguishable and, hence, receivable a priori the transcendental affinity of the rule of unity under the image of time. Because of its pure schema-image, the transcendental schema necessarily possesses an a priori correspondence-character.* [K.b., p.110]

Affinity of appearances is the result of schematising intuition. This means that appearances being made intuitive originally takes place under the image of time. Time here is that which gives unity to appearances. And while this takes place, time as the one which represents the unity of association of appearances through its transcendental determinations, itself is being brought under the unity. "Transcendental schema because it is related to its pure schema-image (the pure image of its concept i.e., time) necessarily possesses correspondence character" means that transcendental schema is bounded with time on one hand and with the rule of its

<sup>53</sup>See Chapter 3, p.64.

<sup>54</sup>In Heidegger's terminology primordial time is called *Temporality*.

determinations (primordial time) on the other. Hence schemata of pure concepts of understanding as the transcendental determinations of time must exhibit this character which is constitutive of correspondence.

Corresponding to the four modes of division of categories (quantity, quality, relation, and modality) pure aspect of time exhibits four possibilities of taking the form, "*the time-series, the time-content, the time-order, and the scope of time*".

To be able to clarify what Heidegger means by the correspondence character of transcendental schema, we look at his interpretation of a specific category, that of substance. "Schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time". "Reality, in the pure concept of understanding is that which correspond to a sensation in general; it is that, therefore the concept of which in itself points to being (in time)".<sup>55</sup> Substance as a notion signifies first of all that which underlies (subsistence). Its schema is the representation of subsistence so far as this schema is presented in the pure image of time. But time as the pure now-sequence, is ever now, meaning it is now in every now. Hence it is abiding and non-transitory "while all else changes". And because time is "now in every now" it provides the pure aspect of permanence in general. As this immediate aspect it presents the "underlying" in pure intuition Kant stated that, substance is a category of relation between subsistence and inherence. It signifies that which subsists for an "accident". Time as a schema of substance, forms its pure image, only if it presents the relation mentioned above, in the pure image. Now we must see how this presentation takes place.

Heidegger states that "to which the notion of substance refers, can be given a pure image a priori in time".

*By this means, objectivity, so far as substance belongs to it as a constitutive element, becomes visible and perceptible a priori in the act of ob-jectification.* [K.b., p.112]

Objectivity becomes visible in the of emergence of the ob-ject. Through the analysis of schematism it must be possible to perceive manifestation of being as that which offers itself to experience, as the one which remains invariable through change. That is possible by disclosing precursory view of pure image of permanence. Heidegger refers to Kant's phrases below in order to make explicit the emergence of the ob-ject.

*To time itself, non-transitory and abiding, there corresponds in the field of appearance what is non-transitory in its existence, that is, substance.* <sup>56</sup> [i.e., in the given essent (being)] [K b., p.113]

<sup>55</sup>See C.P.R., A 143, B 183, p.184

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

When schema of substance is defined as the permanence of the real in time, this involves the two different determinations: i) Determination of the abiding and non-transitory namely the substance [the being] and ii) the determination of the time itself. This is a mutual determination and one is exhibited in terms of the other. Substance is determined as the permanent being in time, in terms of time. And time is determined as the precondition of the permanence, in terms of the substance [being]

We previously noted that the ob-jectification of that which offers itself as ob-ject, i.e., that which is in opposition, takes place in transcendence. Now we see that transcendental schematism creates the object which takes up a position opposite to...in this pure act of ob-jectification in such away that what is represented in pure thought is necessarily given in an intuitive form in pure image of time. Time makes perceptible to a finite being [human Dasein] the "opposition" of ob-jectivity, which opposition belongs to the finitude of that act of orientation by which transcendence takes place.

## ***5. INTERPRETATION OF THE HIGHEST PRINCIPLE AS THE COMPLETE DETERMINATION OF TRANSCENDENCE***

Possibility of ontological knowledge is grounded in transcendental schematism. Transcendental schematism shows that what is represented in pure thought is necessarily given in an intuitive form, in pure image of time. Kant presents that which is given in intuitive form and the manner in which it is given, proceeding from what is represented in pure thought. This constitutes the ground of ontological knowledge. In this way transcendental schematism is at the same time the ground of synthetic apriori knowledge which is presented to us in pure thought. Heidegger's concern is to discuss this ground in its extension to what passes beyond the pure thought. Only in this way he believes the complete determination of ontological knowledge will be possible.

As we noted in the beginning of our inquiry Heidegger based his interpretation on the assumption that finite being [human Dasein] is in possession of some type of an access to that which passes beyond what pure thought determines. This is to say, actually indeterminate object of intuition is comprehended by the finite being. This very comprehension finds its expression in Heidegger's terms as "the act of orientation towards the being that is given". This is also what "the act of ob-jectification" achieves. The question here is not whether this comprehension of the Being takes place before its conceptual representation or at the same time. The question is rather how what is comprehended in this precursory act is related to that

which makes the conceptual representation possible. Heidegger calls this comprehension "precursory" because he simply thinks that it has an ontological priority to the conceptual representation. In other words for him it is that which gives us the inner nature of what is given in our experience.

As we previously noted, Heidegger is basically looking for an answer to his question that he presented in *Being and Time*. What is the Being of all beings? For that reason complete determination of ontological knowledge constitutes his main problematic. By this determination he actually questions how far this knowledge can take us. He asks implicitly "what is Being of all beings beyond our determinations of their concepts, presented so far?" This conception of ontology requires that the true ontology begins exactly where Kantian inquiry can not take us any further. That is why he is specially involved in the Kantian system with what passes beyond the pure thought. For Kant however his theory of synthetic a priori knowledge is at the same time is an ontological theory. There is nothing more of ontological knowledge than what pure thought presents as its determination. What he thinks that the analyses of the pure thought and its pure concepts in connection with the pure intuition constitutes complete determination of ontology. He presents this in the "highest principle of all synthetic judgements". The highest principle says that:

*"the conditions of possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of possibility of objects of experience."* [C.P.R, A158, B197, p.194]

This is to say conditions of possibility of synthetic knowledge are in general conditions of possibility of objects of this knowledge or conditions of possibility of ontology. If this statement is taken in literal sense, that is without taking in to account the nature of these conditions then Heidegger has no objection to it. The reason that Heidegger is able to proceed from Kant's highest principle to the complete determination of what he understands from ontology is that he takes this sentence in its literal sense. In other words he thinks that if he lays down the conditions of possibility of experience anew and more fundamentally then the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, the related ontology, will be exhibited in its original ground. This is actually what he tries to achieve throughout *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. To the extent that human being's encounter with the being passes beyond Kantian limits of conceptual determination, resulting analyses passes beyond what Kant presents as object [*objekt*]. The conceptual determination leaves its privileged place in Heidegger's interpretation to the pre conceptual comprehension. The object of this comprehension is not Kantian object [*objekt*] but is the "being" or more precisely the ob-ject [*gegenstand*] which is indeterminate object of intuition in the Kantian system.

Heidegger reminds in this connection, Kant, in the highest principle, (concerning the nature of synthetic judgements) makes clear that, "insofar as the predicate is an element of pure knowledge, it is not so much of a question of its 'relation' to the subject, as of its relation to *something all together different*."<sup>57</sup> Pure thought must necessarily refer to something which in the primary sense determines the ontological knowledge in its totality. Heidegger states that :

*This "something different" is the essent [being] itself, with which knowledge -and therefore judicative relation pertaining to it - must be in "accord". Knowledge, therefore, must "go beyond" that which pure thought, as isolated in itself, must necessarily "remain". [K.b., p.120]*

In Heidegger's understanding, this receptive, intuitive and finite knowledge of the being in Kant's terminology is "experience". And up to this point of his analyses he made clear that the experience is possible only with reference to the something totally different from what pure knowledge brings forth. Essential possibility of synthetic knowledge is in this way grounded in finite being's encounter of what is given. So Heidegger has to give an account of this very special mode of encounter [experience] which obviously is not based, in the pure thought alone.

Kant formulated the entire problem of finitude of synthetic knowledge under "the possibility of experience". And possibility of experience signifies that which makes experience "not necessarily but contingently real". Heidegger makes reference to Kant's phrases here that "the possibility of experience is that which gives objective reality to all a priori modes of knowledge." [A156, B195, NKS, p.193] In Heidegger's interpretation this possibility is the very meaning of the transcendence itself. In other words transcendence is the condition of the possibility of experience. Here experience for Heidegger in connection with his interpretation of finite knowledge in general, means receptive intuition which must let the being be given. To give an object to experience accordingly mean to present it in intuition immediately. Since from experience Heidegger understands mainly receptive intuition he interprets Kant's statement,

*...that the representation through which the object is thought relates to actual or possible experience..[A156, B195, NKS, p.193]*

as "in order for an object to be capable of being given there must take place in advance an orientation toward that which is capable of being 'called up' ". When from the term experience the act, not the content of experience is understood, then this precursory act of orientation towards being becomes the condition of possibility of experience.

<sup>57</sup>See C.P.R., A154, B193f., NKS, p.192.



In addition to this, the possibility of finite knowledge requires that in order for it to be true knowledge it must agree with its object. Heidegger states that "there must therefore be encountered in advance something which provides standard for this possible agreement." [K.b., p.123] This standard, according to him, is the horizon for the condition of the possibility of the object relative to its being able to take up a position opposite to...

In highest principle nothing but these two conditions are expressed. "That which makes the act of experience possible at the same time makes possible the content of experience i.e., object of experience." Accordingly Heidegger interprets this principle in the following way:

*The act of orientation which lets something take up a position opposite to .... forms as such the horizon of ob-jectivity in general.* [K.b., p.123]

These two conditions of the possibility of finite knowledge delimits the complete essence of transcendence and accordingly complete essence of ontological knowledge. Transcendence for Heidegger takes in the act of orientation towards being. As we noted previously as the true essence of knowledge is primarily in intuition, the true place of transcendence shifts to the finite being's comprehension of that which takes up a position opposite to.. from his representing it in understanding as concept. Transcendence taken in this sense makes the being in advance accessible to finite being. By this access Heidegger does not mean that finite being knows the being in the sense that Kant uses the term knowledge. But it has an experience of it. The term experience doesn't pertain to synthetic knowledge any more but receptive intuition.

Insofar as Heidegger grasps the true possibility of experience in what passes beyond "what pure thought relates" then the content of this experience (as indeterminate object of intuition) is necessarily a "being" whose essence lies in its precursory comprehension. Its precursory comprehension on the other hand implies its *existence*.<sup>58</sup> This is what Heidegger exactly means by the term being [*seiend*]<sup>59</sup>. It coincides in this connection with what stands in opposition to the act of understanding i.e., ob-ject in Kantian picture. That is why Heidegger states "highest principle of Kant is indeed the expression of the original phenomenological knowledge." [K.b., p.124] The true ontological knowledge is that which gives us the knowledge of this access which is strictly speaking our precursory access to Being of beings.

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<sup>58</sup>See Chapter 1, p. 3-4-5.

<sup>59</sup>Heidegger's term *seiend* is translated into English as "being" in *Being and Time* and as "essent" in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. It is distinguished from the *sein* which is also translated as "being". *Seiend* stands for the being [*sein*] whose essence lies in its existence.

The question here is, "does not finite being with its capacity of being accessible to being in itself become creative?" Heidegger's response is that "finite being does not become creative in the sense that divine intuition is".

*Not only does ontological knowledge not create the being, it does not even relate itself directly and thematically to the being. [K.b., p.125]*

To what then, ontological knowledge, in Heideggerian account, relate itself?

He reports that Kant calls it X and speaks of an "object". X is given by Kant in connection with the ontological ground of appearances. Appearances in themselves signify nothing. They are only representations, not things in themselves which in turn have their objects - an object which can not itself be given and which therefore is entitled as non-empirical, that is transcendental. In some of the passages in the *Critique* Kant mentions this transcendental object of appearances as "something" :

*All our representations are, it is true, referred by the understanding to some object; and since appearances are nothing but representations, the understanding refers them to a something as the object of sensible intuition. But this something, is only a transcendental object; and by that is meant a something=X, of which we know, and with the present constitution of our understanding can know, nothing whatsoever, but which as a correlate of unity of apperception, can serve only for the unity of the manifold of sensible intuition. By means of this unity the understanding combines the manifold in to the concept of an object. [A250, NKS, p.268]*

Heidegger states that X is unknowable not because as a being it lies hidden behind a layer of appearances, but because in principle it is not able to become an object of cognition, that is the object of knowledge. This means actually they are not intuited by us in the form of empirical intuition. Heidegger states that "this does not exclude -on the contrary -it includes the necessity of its being immediately perceptible in pure intuition." [K.b., p.126] He makes a point here that "to become an object of cognition is to become object of knowledge relative to being." [K.b., p.127] In other terms what he calls a being is something relative to our capacity to know. X can never become such an object because in principle it can not be a being for us. Thus, states Heidegger, "it is a Nothing". [K.b., p.127] By Nothing he means not the being nevertheless "something." It is obvious that Kant's "something" can not be a being in the sense of *seiend* for Heidegger. Heidegger sees Kant's "something" as something which has no facticity, that is to

say which is not real contingently. That is why it is a Nothing for him. Nothing in Heidegger's terminology amounts to pure non-sensible hence transcendental object of knowledge in Kantian system.

He states in this connection that because X serves only as a correlate of what an appearance represents, namely only as an object of pure thought, it is a pure horizon, pure horizon of all appearances whatsoever. And states that :

*Kant calls this X the "transcendental object", that which is opposed in transcendence and is capable of being perceived by transcendence as its horizon. [K.b., p.127]*

*The X is an "object in general", but this does not mean that it is a universal, indeterminate being which presents itself in the form of an ob-ject. On the contrary, this expression refers to that which in advance constitutes the passing over of all possible objects qua ob-jective, the horizon of an ob-jectification. [K.b., 127]*

This object in general is understood as a being apprehended merely by pure thought. Heidegger presents this as a horizon of all beings [seiend] whatsoever. From here we arrive at a better understanding of Heideggerian Nothing. Nothing is the horizon of being in the sense that it points to the possibility of the existence of being.

Furthermore Heidegger argues that disclosure of this horizon constitutes the true limits of ontological knowledge.

*Ontological knowledge "forms" the transcendence and this formation is nothing other than the holding open of the horizon within which the Being of the essent [being] is perceptible in advance. [K.b., p.128]*

Ontological knowledge may rightly be termed knowledge if it attains the truth. The truth here is given as "transcendental truth" in the Kantian sense.

*But the truth itself must be understood both as disclosure of Being and overtness of the essent [being]. [K.b., p.128]*

By the disclosure of "overtness of being" Heidegger alludes to our understanding of the horizon of all appearances or our encounter with the "being" which is given out of this horizon [out of Nothing]. This is actually what "finite being's passing beyond all objects qua ob-jective" is.

*If ontological knowledge discloses the horizon, its truth lies in letting the essent [being] be encountered within this horizon.* [K.b., p.128]

But we already noted that the being encountered here can at best be a transcendental object for Kant. Hence the ontology that Heidegger establishes is over exceeding the limits of what Kant permits of in his system. In other terms, Heidegger is in exact disagreement with Kant's point that ontological knowledge has only "empirical" use but never transcendental. But Heidegger does not talk about this apparent disagreement for he thinks that finite being's precursory comprehension of the being [or access to the ob-ject] amounts to an "empirical use".

## **6. EXPLICATION OF TRANSCENDENTAL IMAGINATION AS THE CENTRAL FACULTY OF THE SOUL**

It has been previously explained that imagination lies at the root of two fundamental faculties of synthetic knowledge, intuition and understanding. It does not only achieve the synthetic act of unification but also is inclusive of the principle of original unity; so that this principle comes along with imaginative act and constitutes the essential characteristic of this act. Now the question is how imagination carries this principle in its act? In other words, how both the act of pure intuition and pure apperception are inherent in the pure act of imagination? To claim that transcendental imagination is at the root of both pure intuition and pure thought is more than saying that it unites them in advance. Heidegger actually argues, imagination is the only source from which these two powers of the soul take their functional departure.

When Kant characterised imagination as a transcendental faculty he enumerated it amongst the powers of the soul which makes the essence of transcendence possible. Hence Heidegger states that imagination is that which makes essential structure of transcendence possible. This means actually transcendental imagination is not merely a mediative faculty between pure intuition and pure understanding, but it makes possible the original unity of the other two and thereby the essential unity of transcendence as a whole. This is why pure imagination is not reducible to the other two. Provided that it is the common root of the other two we can say that

they are reducible to transcendental imagination. He states however that this reduction only means to show that transcendental imagination can "imagine" something only through its structural unity with the other two.

Consequently in this section we will look for the answer to the question as to how the act of pure intuition and the act of pure thought inhere in the act of pure imagination. For this reason we will analyse Heidegger's reduction of both the act of pure intuition and the act of pure understanding to the act of pure imagination.

#### *a) Reduction of Pure Intuition to Pure Imagination*

Heidegger establishes the reduction of pure intuition to pure imagination proceeding from Kant's point in *Anthropologie* that,

*The imagination is a faculty of intuition even without the presence of an object.*<sup>60</sup>

Here imagination is presented as a faculty of empirical intuition, and it is stated that it belongs to the faculty of intuition. Imagination in this sense does not intuit the being that is present. This means actually that imagination has a peculiar independence with respect to being, and it is free in its reception of aspects. It is a faculty which gives itself aspects. Accordingly from the *Anthropologie* imagination can be said to be a formative faculty in two sense. i) As a faculty of intuition it is formative in the sense that it produces images. This is the function of imagination that provides an image as an immediate aspect of appearance. Heidegger states that imagination in this sense is purely receptive. ii) As a faculty not dependent on objects of intuition it produces, i.e., forms and provides, images. This is a function of imagination which provides reproduction of appearances or gives rise to the aspect in general. Heidegger states that this function of imagination is not only formative but also productive.

As a result imagination as formative power is at one and the same time receptive and productive (spontaneous). Heidegger states that in this "at one and the same time" is to be found true essence of imagination. Formation takes place in reception spontaneously. However because receptivity is identified with intuition and spontaneity with understanding, having the characteristics of both, imagination falls between the two in a peculiar way.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>60</sup>Heidegger makes a reference here to Kant, *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, W. W. (Cass.) VIII, p.54.

<sup>61</sup>Heidegger makes a reference to Aristotle's *De anima*, G3, that *phantasia* stands "between" *aisthesis* and *noesis*.

He further states that the intuitive representation of an object not present can take place in two ways:

- i) This intuitive representation can be the present recollection of something perceived earlier. In that case the aspect which it offers is dependent on the earlier one offered by preceding perception. Hence the content of this aspect will be derived from this earlier perception.
- ii) Imagination invents the form of its object. In this case presentation of the aspect of the object is "original". And imagination is said to be productive. But the productive imagination only forms the aspect of a possible object which under certain conditions, is capable of being made present. It is never productive in the sense that it can form the content of an image absolutely from nothing or from which has never been an object of experience either whole or in part. In this respect productive imagination is not creative in the sense of intellectual intuition (ontically creative) which creates its object in the act of intuiting it. And because it is not creative ontically it can never be merely "imaginary" or illusory. What is formed by transcendental imagination here is the horizon of objectivity.

Heidegger here claims that transcendental imagination forms the pure aspect. This aspect not only precedes this or that experience but is also prior to any such experience. In offering an aspect in such a way imagination is in no way dependent on the presence of the object. It is so far from being thus dependent, that its pre-formation of the pure schema, for example in case of substance brings in to view something on the order of constant presence. It is only in the horizon of this presence that, "this or that presence of an object" can reveal itself. Heidegger states in this connection that ability to intuit without constant presence is the most essential characteristic of imagination. And he stresses that in this "creative" function imagination has no need of empirical intuition. He uses this "most essential characteristic" as the main argument when he proves that pure intuition is rooted in pure imagination.

Kant named pure intuitions, space and time as original representations. They are formative intuitions in that they pro-pose in advance aspect of space and time as multiple totalities in themselves [plurality in unity]. Pure intuitions receive these aspects, but reception is in itself a formative act which gives to itself that which offers itself. Consequently, space and time as pure intuitions are original only in the sense that they are presentations which let the objects of intuition spring forth. Heidegger's very claim is that this act of presentation essentially lies in pure imagination.

Enrooting of pure intuition on pure imagination becomes clear when the character of what is intuited is examined closer. He states that what is intuited in pure intuition is not absolutely nothing. What is "seen" in pure intuition is a unified but by no means empty totality. The parts of this unified totality is its limitations. And because this unified totality is apprehended only relative to its inclusive multiplicity, it appears as indistinct. That is the reason why for the most part it is denied that something is intuited in pure intuition. Here Heidegger argues that, pure intuition as originally unifying i.e., giving unity, must perceive this unity. And he thinks,

that is actually the reason why Kant speaks of synopsis in intuition rather than synthesis. Because totality of that which is intuited in pure intuition does not have the unity which characterises universality of concepts. Hence unity of totality supplied by intuition can not arise from the synthesis of the understanding. The unity which is perceived in pure intuition as its content must be perceived, from the first, in the act of imagination. Because without this unity imagination can not form the image. This means actually the act of imagination is the source of all that is synoptic in nature.

Furthermore if transcendental imagination is the origin of the act of pure intuition then, space and time are indeed imaginative or more precisely what is perceived in pure intuition is imaginative. In other words what is achieved by the act of transcendental imagination must be manifest in the essential content of what is accessible to pure intuition. Now the question is how this is possible?

Heidegger first refers to Kant's phrases below to support his claim.

*The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no object, but merely formal condition of an object (as appearance) as pure space and time (ens imaginarium) [A291, B347, NKS, p.195]*

Indeed for Kant, space and time are qua forms of intuition, but are not themselves objects which are intuited. What is perceived in pure intuition as such is an *ens imaginarium*.

Heidegger interprets this *ens imaginarium* as the possible forms of Nothing, what is not a being in the sense of something actually present. Pure space and pure time are something but they are not objects in Kantian picture. If the object is understood here as the being that reveals itself in appearance then Heidegger has no objection to this. In other words he agrees that pure space and pure time are not beings that reveal themselves in appearance.

Pure intuitions as "forms of intuiting" are, to be sure "intuitions without things". But nevertheless they do have a content. Hence Kant gives an account of this content only negatively by saying that they are not objects but nevertheless they are something. Heidegger wants to give a positive explication of what is intuited in pure intuition. For this he first states that, in our cognitive relationships to given things, organised spatio-temporally, we intend only these things. Even under this condition, space and time in themselves should not be denied. So the positive question concerning their explication should be "How are space and time present in our cognitive relationships to given things?" Kant will reply that they are intuitions. But they are not intuited. Heidegger states that they are not intuited but only in the sense that they don't become the objects of apprehension. Accordingly he states:

*...but they are intuited according to modality of an act which is originally form giving. Precisely because what is thus intuited what and how it is , i.e., as essentially forming - in accordance with the characterised dual signification of a pure aspect of creating. [K.b., p.151]*

Content of what is intuited in pure intuition can be explicated positively by means of the act of productive imagination. This act as Kant stated in *Antropologie* is intuitive act of imagination. And it makes possible formation of an image of the object which is not present. In other words, because productive imagination is capable of forming the image of the object which is not present, it can form the image of pure intuitions i.e., pure time and pure space. Without considering this "creative" characteristic of pure imagination it is not possible to understand in what sense what is intuited in pure intuition is *ens imaginarium*.

#### *b) Reduction of Pure Understanding to Pure Imagination*

Heidegger states in his interpretation of the transcendental deduction and transcendental schematism that pure understanding in its act of conceptual unification originates in pure imagination. Our concern now is to have explicit understanding of this claim.

In order to understand how pure thought or pure reason originates in pure imagination we must analyse the original essence of the understanding. This original essence is already fundamentally determined as "pure apperception". Understanding as an act of representation, regulates all possible modes of unification and in this regulative act it requires an "abiding unity". The principle of an abiding unity is inherent in the categories. Categories are a posteriori to the activity of the pure ego. The representation of this abiding unity according to Heidegger is the fundamental character of the act of objectification. The act of objectification is at the same time an act of self-orientation towards.... . Heidegger states that in this act or more precisely in the "self" exteriorized with it, the "I" of the self is made manifest. It is in this way the "I represent" "accompanies" every act of representation. In other words the "I" goes with the act of pure self-orientation. So just like Kant Heidegger thinks that the essence of pure thought as well as the "I", which is what it is only in the "I think", is grounded pure self-consciousness. But Heidegger argues pure self-consciousness can only be explained by the Being of the self, not conversely. This means actually that self is taken to be just like any other object of knowledge and its Being is encountered by the act of orientation towards or by the act of objectification. Pure self consciousness can never be "pure" in the sense that it is the original ground of pure apperception (hence pure thought). Therefore it can never be at the very base of the empirical act of understanding. In as much as one's being conscious of his self requires



a principle of abiding unity, explication of pure self consciousness leads back to the explication of pure imagination as the source of all unities whatsoever in its pure act of synthesis.

Heidegger states in this connection that since I think is always "I think substance" or "I think causality". etc., pure ego here is the vehicle of categories. In other words categories are not inherent in the essence of pure understanding but they are constituted with the regulative act of understanding only when this act takes place. Hence self consciousness is not in possession of categories in itself but it merely becomes vehicle for them. In its precursory act of orientation, self, puts categories in a position where, as represented, they can be regulative unifying unities. Pure understanding forms spontaneously representative horizon of unity and that occurs in transcendental schematism. Hence Kant speaks of understanding in the schemata. But schemata as transcendental determinations of time is already produced in imagination. In Heidegger's interpretation of schematism we saw that it is schemata which develop the unique possibility of pure aspect into multiplicity of pure images.

Now the argument is that understanding does not produce the schemata but employs them. The reason is :

*The rules which are represented in the understanding, taken as the faculty of the rules, are not apprehended as actually given "in consciousness" but as rules of connection (synthesis) which compel as they connect. [K.b., p.161]*

This means that the rule exercises its function only in the receptive act of what is given to the understanding.

This way of explaining pure understanding is actually abstracting the function of its act from the act of pure imagination. Heidegger points to the receptive and spontaneous characteristics of the act of understanding; those characteristics that pure understanding owes to the pure synthesis of imagination. He already explained that receptivity and spontaneity are the essential characteristics of intuition. In this reduction (of both pure intuition and pure thought to pure imagination), they are actually unified in one and the same act. The argument is that, this act is primordially the act of pure imagination for the very reason that pure receptivity and spontaneity which necessarily comes along with, are indispensable functions of imaginative act. As we previously laid out in the interpretation of schematism, imaginative act achieves pure and free formation of images. Spontaneity here points to free formation of what is received in the very act of reception itself. Pure receptivity is the mode of receptivity which gives to itself (spontaneously) that which offers itself. Although Kant identified receptivity with sensibility and spontaneity with understanding, Heidegger thinks that this rules out neither possibility of spontaneity in pure intuition nor possibility of receptivity in pure thought, since these two, receptivity and spontaneity are indispensable to each other.

Accordingly in this picture, understanding is not the faculty of rules which has its own autonomy any more. Because this autonomous character is assigned to it by reason of its spontaneous act. Now Heidegger claims that the spontaneity which makes the act of pure thought a free act takes its origin from the act of transcendental imagination. Heidegger states that pure reason is free in its act not because it is spontaneous but because its spontaneity is a receptive spontaneity. [K.b., p.162] Freedom means here freedom from what is given (in its pure givenness) in determination of its being.

*In so far as freedom implies placing oneself under a necessity which is self-imposed, it is inherent in the essence of pure understanding, pure theoretical reason.* [K.b., p.162]

Spontaneous and receptive characteristics of understanding is what constitutes the horizon of its act. Transcendental imagination, just like it forms the horizon of pure intuition, forms here the horizon of pure thought.

## **7. KANT'S RECOIL FROM TRANSCENDENTAL IMAGINATION AND THE PROBLEM OF PURE REASON**

Heidegger reports that, in the second edition of the *Critique* imagination is not a third faculty besides sensibility and understanding any more. In this later edition pure synthesis is assigned to pure understanding. This means pure imagination is no longer indispensable as a faculty in its own right. Thus the possibility of making it the essential basis of ontological knowledge is eliminated. It is no longer a "function" in the sense of an autonomous faculty, but is now a "function" only in a sense of an operation of the faculty of understanding. While in the first edition, all synthesis, i.e., synthesis as such, arises from the imagination as a faculty reducible neither to sensibility nor to understanding, in the second edition understanding alone assumes the role of origin for all synthesis.

In the very beginning of transcendental deduction as presented in the second edition Kant states that "synthesis is an act of spontaneity of faculty of representation...[which] to distinguish, must be entitled understanding." [C.P.R., B130, NKS, p.151] There transcendental act of imagination is conceived as "the synthetic influence of the understanding". In the second edition also Kant states that "it is one and the same, spontaneity, which in the one case, under the title of imagination and in another case, under the title of understanding, brings combination into the manifold of intuition." [C.P.R., B162, NKS, p.171f.] And, "Synthesis is termed

imagination in so far as it refers to intuition, however it is a product of the understanding." [C.P.R., B151, NKS, p.164] The transcendental imagination no longer functions as an autonomous fundamental faculty, mediating between sensibility and understanding. Its function is transferred to the understanding. The question is why the fundamental role of imagination that is apparent in the first edition is eliminated in the second?<sup>62</sup>

Heidegger reminds that Kant distinguished between the two sides of deduction in the preface to first edition. One being "objective" side the other being "subjective" side. [C.P.R., AXVIff., NKS, p.11ff.] Subjective side points to the possibility of transcendence and objective side points to revelation of horizon of objectivity. Kant explicitly states again in first edition that his chief purpose is to find out revelation of horizon of objectivity. This is actually the question as to "what and how reason knows apart from all experience?" [C.P.R., A XVII, NKS, p.12]

So Kant was aware of the possibility of a more primordial elaboration of subjectivity of the subject. But this was not his chief purpose. He does not intend to give a more elaborate theory of subjectivity even though "deduction of categories compels us to enter deeply into the first grounds of possibility of knowledge in general." [C.P.R., A92, NKS, p.131] Not having carried out the subjective deduction, that is to say Kant continued to be guided by the notions of composition, characterisation of subjectivity of the subject provided by traditional anthropology and psychology. To these disciplines, the imagination was a lower faculty within sensibility. Kant's problem was how a sensible faculty be said to determine the essence of reason. Heidegger thinks that in his writing the first edition Kant had foreseen the danger that primacy of reason, which has a long history in metaphysics, begins to disappear. And for that reason, he recoiled from the transcendental imagination so that in second edition he had come more and more under the influence of pure reason as such. Kant did not go into the complete elaboration of the subjectivity of the subject. Because to him it is related with the moral action of the subject. So he thought before the elaboration of subjectivity of the subject, he should give the rational ground [affirmation] of moral action.

In addition, Heidegger states concerning his own interpretation that he oriented exclusively on the first edition keeping "the finitude of human transcendence" at the centre of his problematic. He also states that in the second edition Kant has enlarged the concept of a rational finite being where it no longer coincides with the concept of man and he posed the problem of finitude in more fundamental bases. Heidegger himself on the other hand, posed the problem with finite knowledge at the centre because for him what is decisive is specific finitude of "human nature", particularly human being's pre conceptual comprehension of Being. His problem is that, if transcendental imagination as the established ground, solid enough to determine primordially i.e., in its unity and in its totality the finitude human knowledge (and accordingly finitude of human subjectivity).<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>62</sup>See K.b., p. 166-170.

<sup>63</sup>See K.b., p. 170-176.

In this connection Heidegger argues that *Critique of Pure Reason* as a laying of the foundation of metaphysics treats from the first only of human pure reason. As an evidence to his claim he takes a passage from *On the Progress of the Metaphysics*. Kant states there concerning the problem of possibility of *Metaphysica Generalis* i.e., "How are synthetic apriori judgements possible?" that:

*The problem mentioned above may be solved only relative to those faculties which permit man to enlarge this knowledge a priori. These faculties constitute in man what may be properly termed his pure reason. For, if we understand by the pure reason of a being in general the faculty of knowing things independently of experience and therefore of sensible representations, we by no means determine thereby the manner in which such knowledge is possible for being in question (for example, for God or for any other higher spirit), and the problem, therefore, remains undecided. On the other hand, in so far as man is concerned, all knowledge is composed of two elements: concept and intuition.*<sup>64</sup>

Kant sees the act of pure reason as a distinguishing characteristic of human knowledge and human finitude. Thus his problem is basically finitude of human pure reason. In Heidegger's interpretation however the problem is the specific finitude of human Dasein which naturally leads back to the Being of human Dasein, taken in its totality. This finitude can not be introduced merely as a possible "case" of a finite rational being. For the very reason that finitude of human reason arises out of the finitude of human transcendence in general. Human finitude necessarily involves sensibility in the sense of receptive intuition. As pure intuition (pure sensibility) is a necessary element of structure of transcendence which is the characteristic of the finitude. Heidegger's argument is that human pure reason is necessarily sensible pure reason. There is no such thing as pure reason independent from the sensibility. Furthermore, pure reason must be sensible in itself not because it is connected with a body, but man in a metaphysical sense have his body only because transcendence as such is sensible *a priori*. [K.b., p.178]

With these analyses of Heidegger's interpretation of *Critique of Pure Reason* we tried to show that in Heidegger's ontology, ontological knowledge or more precisely Dasein's precursory comprehension of Being of all beings is grounded in transcendental imagination. Our fundamental question was *how Temporality [primordial time] as the meaning of Being manifests itself in the precursory comprehension of Being*. Accordingly we must now see the relation between transcendental imagination and the primordial time.

<sup>64</sup> *Über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik*, op. cit., VIII, p. 312. (Italics are Heidegger's)

Our thesis has received its departure from Heidegger's argument in *Being and Time* and in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* that precursory comprehension of Being is grounded in primordial time. To be able to explicate what he means by this argument we first showed that precursory comprehension of Being is grounded in the act of transcendental imagination. We now must show the act of transcendental imagination is the primordial time.

## CHAPTER 4

### PRIMORDIAL TIME

#### TRANSCENDENTAL IMAGINATION IS THE PRIMORDIAL TIME

##### *(Pure Act of Imagination Forms Time as Pure Now-Sequence)*

Heidegger's argument concerning the relation between transcendental imagination and time is that the act of transcendental imagination forms time as pure now-sequence and in so doing it manifests itself as the primordial time.

Time's being based upon transcendental imagination is explicated with the argument that what is intuited in pure intuition is not the reception of something actually present. He states that as pure succession of now-series time is "in constant flux." Pure intuition intuits this succession unobjectively. To intuit means to receive that which offers itself. But this reception is not act of receiving something present. If it were then it could at most only "intuit" the actual now but never now-sequence. The simple act of receiving something actually present could not even intuit a single now, since each now has essentially continuous extension in a *just passing* and *just coming*.

Now Heidegger states that since pure intuition is not reception of something actually present it must itself form that which it is able to receive. We already showed that pure formative act of intuition is indeed the act of transcendental imagination and what is intuited in pure intuition is *ens imaginarium*. This originally formative act should be in itself, at one and the same time an act of looking at, looking ahead and looking back so that it becomes possible for pure intuition to receive pure succession of now-sequence at once. Heidegger here states that Kant, in his lectures on metaphysics, has actually given an account of this formative act of transcendental imagination. He specifically set forth the three fold way in which the act of imagination is formative. There Kant states that "this formative power as a faculty", "produces representations relative to the past, the present and the future."<sup>65</sup> Accordingly faculty of imagination consists of:

- i) The faculty of forming images, the representations of which are of the present.
- ii) The faculty of reproducing images, the representations of which are of the past.
- iii) The faculty of anticipating images, the representations of which are of the future.

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<sup>65</sup>Heidegger makes a reference here to Politz, *Vorlesungen über die Metaphysik*, op. cit., p. 88, cf.

It becomes clear from here that "formation of images " by the imagination is in itself relative to time not in the sense of an actual "now" but in the sense of "now together with its essential extension in *just passing* and *just coming*". Time as pure intuition then is neither only what is intuited in pure act of intuition nor is this act deprived of its object. Time is at one and the same time formative act of intuiting and what is intuited therein. And this is a complete concept of time i.e., primordial time. Given the fact that this formative act originates in transcendental imagination, Heidegger states that :

*Pure intuition can form the pure succession of the now-sequence only if, in itself, it is imagination as that which forms, reproduces and anticipates.* [K.b., p.180]

Consequently, transcendental imagination, which lets time as the pure now-sequence spring forth is, its origin, i.e., primordial time.

If time as the sensible intuition is formed in the productive act of transcendental imagination then this act can not be subject to time. This means actually the act of transcendental imagination is itself temporal in nature. Now we must go into deeper analyses of this temporal nature. These analyses aim at giving an account of how imaginative act coincides with the primordial time.

Since imagination is the faculty of synthesis in general, for an exhibition of this temporal character, more elaborate analyses of the nature of pure synthesis is necessary. The pure synthesis is that which unifies originally the three elements of pure knowledge: pure intuition, pure imagination and pure understanding. Heidegger reports that Kant made the elucidation of synthesis relative to these three elements. In other terms these three elements of knowledge are unified with respect to their being temporally determined. As Kant pointed out "...all representations are subject to time...." whether intuitive, imaginative or reflective. This implies that all representations are unified through its subjection to the temporal character of the synthesis. This means actually there are three modes of synthesis because time appears in them and they express the threefold unity of time as past, present, and future.

Pure synthesis in its act of unification puts the objects of knowledge under a unity. This unity is nothing but identity through time. This is to say original unification of the essential unity of ontological knowledge takes place through time. If transcendental imagination is the basis of possibility of this knowledge then it necessarily follows that transcendental imagination is the primordial time.

We must remember however when Kant enumerates three elements of pure knowledge he talks of imagination as merely one of the elements. Heidegger interpreted it as the formative centre of all knowledge. Now we must see that working out of the inherently temporal character

of the three modes of synthesis provides decisive proof that the interpretation of the transcendental imagination as the root of both stems is not only possible but also necessary.

In Kantian analysis of pure synthesis, its three modes are given as synthesis "of" apprehension, "of" reproduction and "of" recognition. Heidegger interprets these terms "as" apprehending, "as" reproducing and "as" recognising. There is one and the same synthesis which takes place in threefold way, at once. Kant treated the faculty of synthesis, relative to these three modes, each of which characterises it in a specific way. In so doing he also showed that they constitute conditions of possibility of empirical synthesis.

In this connection Heidegger proceeding from empirical synthesis shows how in the three modes of pure synthesis pure aspects of the three modes of time are produced. This constitutes complete explication of how transcendental imagination as the faculty of synthesis forms time.

#### *a) Pure Synthesis as Pure Imagination Forms the Presence<sup>66</sup>*

Heidegger explains that, empirical intuition as immediate reception of "this here" always reveals a manifold. This manifold can be "represented as a manifold only in so far as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another". In order to be able to encounter "now this" and "now that" and "now all this at once", mind must constantly say "now and now and now". Only by distinguishing *now's* in this way it is possible to "run through" the impressions and hold them together. Since intuition is a *singular representation* it must, as receptive, take up and comprehend "directly" and at once the manifold which presents itself. This means actually empirical intuition is "synthetic" in itself. This synthesis is unique in that it directly takes an aspect (image) of the impressions which present itself as the pure succession of *now's*. This is immediate formation of an image. Accordingly empirical intuition is concerned with the 'being' present in the *now*.

It is also necessary that we have a pure synthesis of apprehension, because without it we could not have representation of time, i.e., pure intuition itself. Pure synthesis of apprehension does not first take place within the horizon of time. Because the aspect obtained by the pure synthesis of apprehension does not contain an empirical manifold. And without this manifold there is no need for now-sequence, in other words there is nothing that mind can count as "now this and "now that". Since pure synthesis does not take place in the form of pure now-sequence, the *now* and the *now*-sequence must be formed in the very act of such synthesis.

Pure intuition as original receptivity is an act of receiving what offers itself. Its mode of presentation is a productive one. In other words, pure intuitive presentation (as that which procures an image) creates immediate aspect of the *now* as such, that is, it produces at each instant the aspect of the actual present as such.

<sup>66</sup>See *Critique* A98-100, NKS, pp.131-2.



In so far as empirical intuition is concerned with the being present in the *now*; the synthesis of apprehension is concerned with the *now* (the present itself), but in such away that this concern with.. in itself forms that with which it is concerned. As a result the pure synthesis as apprehension since it forms "the present in general", is time-forming. Kant states specifically that synthesis in the mode of apprehension arises from the imagination:

*...there must exist in us an active faculty of the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the title imagination. Its action, when immediately directed upon perceptions, I entitle apprehension...* [C.P.R, A120, NKS, p.144; cf. also Kant's note.]

Therefore Heidegger considers the pure synthesis of apprehension as a mode of transcendental imagination and states that if this synthesis is time-forming then the transcendental imagination itself possesses a pure temporal character. He also notes that the imagination Kant mentions above can not be identical with the imagination he later designates in the second edition.

*b) Pure Synthesis as Pure Reproduction Forms the Past*<sup>67</sup>

Reproductive synthesis in empirical representation takes place in such away that mind can represent the being, i.e., something previously perceived "even in the absence of the object". Such representation as Kant says "imagination", presupposes that mind has the capability of bringing back the being previously represented, in the form of a new representation. This new representation however is in unity with the being actually perceived. Therefore this act of bringing back again (reproduction) is an act of unification. In other words for reproductive synthesis to be able to unify that which it brings back it has to include the power of retention. But the beings experienced earlier can be retained only if the mind distinguishes time and therefore grasps such temporal determinations as "earlier" and "in the past". A being experienced earlier would be completely lost with each additional *now* if it were not capable of being retained. Consequently for empirical synthesis to be possible *no-longer-now* must be capable of being brought back to the present and united with actual *now*. This occurs in pure reproduction as a mode of pure synthesis.

Kant stated that empirical reproduction is achieved by the empirical synthesis. Then pure reproduction must be an act of pure imagination. Heidegger in his interpretation designated pure imagination as productive. By that he meant that productive imagination with its capacity to procure an image of the object which is not present makes pure reproductive synthesis possible. Kant himself although he mentions reproductive i.e., empirical imagination as non-transcendental in general, states that,

<sup>67</sup>See *Critique* A100-103, NKS, p. 132-3.

*...a reproductive synthesis of the imagination is to be counted among transcendental acts of the mind.* [C.P.R., A102, NKS, p.133]

Ambiguity here arises from the fact that Heidegger attributed "productive" characteristic to the transcendental imagination which with its pure act makes pure reproductive synthesis possible. As we can see as far as Kantian enquiry is concerned this is justified, because Kant himself stated above that pure reproductive synthesis is a transcendental act. All Heidegger does is to show that this transcendental act is "productive" [creative] in its nature.

Pure synthesis as reproduction forms the past as such. Hence pure imagination relative to this mode of synthesis is time-forming. But we must be careful that formation of the past is actually united with that of the present in this very formation. The act which originally retains "the past" is in itself an act which forms and retains the no-longer-now. For this to be possible the act of formation as such must be united with *now*. Accordingly pure reproduction is essentially one with the pure synthesis of intuition as that which forms the present. For every *now* there is now already past.

#### *c) Pure Synthesis as Pure Recognition Forms the Future*<sup>68</sup>

Elucidation of pure recognition begins with explication of empirical recognition. Empirical recognition is analysed within the context of the unity provided between the two modes of the synthesis mentioned earlier, synthesis as apprehension and the synthesis as reproduction. Kant states that "if we were not conscious that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless." [C.P.R., A103, NKS, p.133] So the reproductive synthesis must maintain the unification of what it brings back with the being actually manifest in perception. Now the question is what assurance do we have that this being now present is the same as the one perceived before? In order for them to be the same, identity of the being with the one perceived earlier must be established *anticipatively*, [prior to the reproductive synthesis], in the pure thought.

This means at the basis of both synthesis and determining them there lies an act of unification of the being relative to its identity. The synthesis intending this identity Kant named synthesis in "concepts". He also states that "for this unitary consciousness is what combines the manifold, successively intuited and thereupon also reproduced, into one representation". [C.P.R., A103, NKS, p.133] Synthesis as recognition manifests itself as the one which governs the other two syntheses. Heidegger states for that reason "this synthesis which according to the description of the genesis of concepts, is the third is precisely the first". [K.b., p.191] Kant calls it synthesis as recognition, because it investigates that which must be proposed in advance as identical.

<sup>68</sup>See Critique A 103-110, NKS, pp.133-8.

As empirical, this prospective synthesis of identification necessarily presupposes a pure identification. This means actually pure synthesis as recognition provide a possibility for all identification. If it provides possibility for all identification then it can provide possibility of the identification of the objects which are of the future.

Just as that pure reproduction constitutes the possibility of bringing -back-again, so, correlatively, must pure recognition provide the possibility of all identification. We must note however this does not mean pure recognition with its prospective nature is concerned with a being which it can pro-pose itself as identical but that it prospects the horizon of proposition in general. As pure, its prospecting is the pure formation of that which makes all projection possible, i.e., the future.

Here we see that the formation of the future is brought about as the one which is inclusive of all three modes of time. In synthesis as recognition there lies pre-formation of the identity of the objects which are of the present, of the past and of the future. Accordingly pure synthesis as recognition forms in advance all three modes of time in their unity. For this reason Heidegger calls the function of pure recognition "pure pre-formation". Synthesis as pure recognition enjoys a priority over the other two syntheses. It is essentially connected with the other two. Kantian analysis of recognition in concepts brings Heidegger to the point where he finds the most primordial essence of time. Pure synthesis in concepts temporalizes itself primarily out of future.

We must be careful here that Heidegger does not construct the future out of the past and the present. On the contrary future is constructed from the possibility of all identification first and the past and the present arises out of the future. He states that possibility of pure identification must be formed anticipatively. Accordingly the formation of future anticipates the formation of other two modes of time. Pure synthesis of recognition forms the concept of the object which is "one applies to infinitely many". This infinitely many includes all the future objects.

*And in as much as Kant attributes the modes of forming, reproducing, and pre-forming images to the empirical imagination, the act of forming prospective horizon as such, pure pre-formation, is an act of pure imagination. [K.b., p.191]*

This is why the act of transcendental imagination is originally time forming. We can conclude now that inner nature of time as pure now sequence is hidden in the pure act of transcendental imagination.

## CONCLUSION

### *PRIMORDIAL TIME AS THE POSSIBILITY OF PRECURSORY COMPREHENSION OF BEING*

Heidegger's fundamental question in *Being and Time* was the question of Being of all beings. He in this work aimed at achieving preparatory analyses of this question through the analyses of the one who asks the question. Because of his asking the question Dasein is introduced as a special entity who is in possession of precursory comprehension of Being. As we previously stated at the beginning of our inquiry the precursory comprehension of Being constitutes Heidegger's very point of departure in starting out with the analysis of the question of Being.

From his investigation throughout *Being and Time* Heidegger arrived at the conclusion that primordial time is the meaning of Being of Dasein. If primordial time is the meaning of Being of Dasein then it must also be the meaning of Dasein's understanding of its own Being since understanding is one of the possibilities of its Being. Dasein is introduced from the very beginning as an entity whose comprehension of its Being is inseparable from his comprehension of Being in general. So if Dasein understands its own Being in the horizon of primordial time, this horizon must manifest itself in Dasein's precursory comprehension of Being. For this reason, in this thesis we tried to explore the ontological grounds of this comprehension so we would see how primordial time manifests itself in this comprehension.

From our analyses of *Kant and Problem of Metaphysics* we arrived at the conclusion that the act of transcendental imagination is the possibility of Dasein's comprehension of Being of all kinds of being. For this we first showed that Dasein's precursory comprehension of Being is actually pre conceptual comprehension and in so far it is a pre conceptual comprehension it is grounded in transcendental imagination. Later we found out, imaginative act while forming the images of the beings which are given, forms at the same time, time as the pure now sequence as the precondition of our intuiting them. These two formations that imaginative act achieves are inseparable from each other. That is to say one has a meaning only for the sake of the other. This means actually because we have this linear time conception in mind we are able to comprehend entities in their Being. Similarly imaginative act in so far it is the ground of Being is the ground of time. That is actually why these two comprehensions are the ones which we find the most common.

It becomes explicit from these analyses that the classical metaphysical problem which has been designated as "identity through time" loses all its meaning. In other words, meaning of Being of entities can not be analysed relative to linear time conception since this conception itself comes along with our comprehending what Being is. Apart from our encountering with

the entities in general there is no time even in the most original sense. The act of transcendental imagination is one and the same act which forms the entities in their Being and time as the precondition of our grasping their Being.

Heidegger's ontological analysis of time provides us with the ground on which we can grasp the Being in itself. Imaginative act is disclosed as the precondition of our being affected from what is given to us. Insofar as what is given to us includes human Dasein imaginative act is supposed to form self-affection. Since this act is the primordial time, formation of the past, the present and the future in their unity is nothing but the formation of self-affection. Then pure self is nothing but the unity of three modes of time as the future, the past and the present.

The conclusion is that in so far as it is *human Dasein* which encounters Being primordial time is the meaning of Being of all entities, and for that reason meaning of Being of Dasein.

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