

SOCIO-POLITICAL CONDITIONS OF DESIRE'S FREEDOM
IN SPINOZA AND HEGEL

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Thesis Abstract

Olcaý Çelik, “Socio-Political Conditions of Desire’s Freedom in Spinoza and Hegel”

In Spinoza and Hegel desire is defined as the very essence of everything and their philosophies provide us a perspective through which we can understand that the movements of our thoughts and bodies are taken actually movements of our desire. Besides, for both philosophers, freedom of desire can only be attained in an empowering social and political context. At this point, Spinoza and Hegel provide two different accounts of how desire becomes free in a socio-political structure. In Hegel, liberation is a process that starts with self-interested people’s struggle for recognition and reaches its climax in a society where different subjective wills, needs and abilities of people are integrated with each other through time and finally constitute a socially stratified Ethical Life in which every individual knows, wills and acts accordingly to the universal will. When it comes to Spinoza, we see that desire can become freer insofar autonomous individuals increase their joy by focusing on the commons. In this manner, Spinoza’s system suggests a political strategy, which eliminates unequal social conditions that make people torn by affects while Hegel takes differences as the basis and thus, freedom requires the integration of social classes that emerge from natural differences among people. Hence, it can be said that unlike Hegel’s recognition model that takes actual identity of individuals as *given*, Spinozian recognition focuses rather on what one *can become*. This suggests that Spinozian recognition model serves better for constitutive politics in practice because its socio-political ontology of desire always reminds us our being structures with a capacity to rebuild ourselves in a more liberatory way and avoid the risk of assuming asymmetrical subjection as freedom.

Tez Özeti

Olcaý Çelik, “Spinoza ve Hegel’de Arzunun Özgürlüğünün Toplumsal ve Siyasi Koşulları”

Spinoza ve Hegel’de arzu, her şeyin özü olarak tanımlanır ve geliştirdikleri felsefeler, düşüncelerimizin ve bedenlerimizin hareketlerini arzunun hareketleri olarak okumamızı sağlayan bir perspektif sunar. Bununla beraber, her iki felsefeci için de arzunun özgürlüğü ancak ve ancak uygun bir toplumsal ve siyasi bir bağlamda sağlanabilecek bir şeydir. Bu noktada Spinoza ve Hegel arzunun bir toplum ve bir siyasi yapı içerisinde nasıl özgürleştiğine yönelik iki farklı görüş öne sürerler. Hegel’de özgürlük, kendi çıkarını gözeten bireylerin onaylanma mücadelesi ile başlayan ve toplumsal düzlemde birbirinden farklı öznel iradelerin, ihtiyaçların ve yeteneklerin birbirleriyle entegre olduğu bir süreç sonucunda bireylerin artık evrensel iradeye göre bildiği, istediği ve eylediği bir etik hayat olarak karşımıza çıkarken; Spinoza özgürlüğü, kendi kendinin nedeni haline gelen bireylerin ortak varlıklarda buluşarak neşelerini beraberce arttırmaları olarak tanımlar. Bu anlamda Spinoza için politik strateji insanlar arasında çelişkiler yaratan eşitsiz koşulların ortadan kaldırılması ve devamlı surette ortak noktalara odaklanılmasıyla ulaşabileceğimiz bir durum olarak tasarlanır. Oysa Hegel’de farklılıklar esastır ve özgürlük, bu farklılıklar sonucunda doğal olarak oluşan sosyal sınıfların entegrasyonunun sonucu gerçekleşebilecek bir şeydir. Diğer bir deyişle, bireylerin halihazırdaki kimliklerini verili olarak kabul eden Hegelci onaylama modelinden farklı olarak, Spinozacı onaylama daha çok birinin kim olabileceğine odaklanır. Bu, bize Spinozacı onaylama modelinin kurucu bir politika açısından daha fazla işe yarayabileceğini gösterebilir, zira Spinoza’da arzunun sosyo-politik ontolojisi bize aslında kendini özgürleştirici bir şekilde yeniden inşa etme potansiyeli olan yapılar olduğumuzu devamlı olarak hatırlatarak eşitsiz koşulların yarattığı öznellikleri özgürlük zannetmemizi engeller.

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*Dedicated to all comrades
in the struggle for peace, democracy and freedom...*

ABBREVIATIONS

Internal References

| | |
|---------|---------------------------|
| Alt Dem | Alternative Demonstration |
| Cor | Corollary |
| Def | Definition |
| Dem | Demonstration |
| Exp | Explanation |
| P | Proposition |
| Pref | Preface |
| Schol | Scholium |

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that desire has always been a controversial issue in philosophy. On the one hand, as we all know, desire is an important part of our life that we cannot ignore. Most of our behavior is caused by various forms of desire like impulses, drives, emotions, motives, needs and affects. We love someone, hate our enemy, become sad when we get bad news, enjoy the happy moments, envy a friend, pity the poor, etc. On the other hand, we believe that it's not good for us to be driven by our desires because they may put us into trouble. Even if we are hungry, we ignore our 'inner voice' saying us to steal food from the grocery. If we are a diabetic person, we avoid sugar that we would be pleased to eat. If we don't like our boss and want to beat him, we know that it won't be a good idea considering our career and potential shame. Calls of desire is most of the time are blind – the only thing it wants is an immediate satisfaction. If we all had listened to our own drives, then, what kind of a place would our world have turned into? Thus, in order to prevent potential risks due to their one-sided blindness, we should and actually do check our desires by our reason. By reasoning, we can learn how to deal with our desires and direct them in the most proper way. This capability, in a sense, is the property that separates us from animals. No matter how many times we fail to behave rationally and surrender to our desires, we shouldn't obey solely what our desire says. We should also listen to our reason for our long-term benefits.

This reflects pretty much the commonsensical view in philosophy regarding the issue. According to this, human phenomena, in a sense, are defined as a struggle between our reason and desires in which philosophy is rather positioned on the side of reason. In fact, it can be said that our ethics and politics refer to nothing but a totality of rational formulations and strategies in order to moderate the conflicting desires between people for the sake of each. Such hierarchical positioning of reason above desire also tells us a lot about how freedom can be understood. Since only reason has the capacity to evaluate all aspects of a potential behavior, the one who follows the commands of Reason rather than calls of desire becomes freer. In other words, freedom is something that we can attain via reason and despite our desires. Here, the business of discovering ‘the laws of Reason’ is thought to be a cognitive process in which we conduct abstractions and deduce useful and consistent formulations through logical inference rules. Once we find proper principles and solutions, we only have to act accordingly.

This model of desire helps us to understand and explain a lot of facts in our social and political life. However, considering today’s social and political circumstances where most ears become deaf to liberating ethical and political principles, it’s easy to be desperate regarding the future of humanity. Even if reason is able to show why racism, exploitation, sexism and homophobia are bad for all of us, we can still act in contrast to reason or at best, we don’t usually struggle enough to eliminate these evils because our so-called shortsighted and even blind desires most of the time prevents all of us from constructing more rational and less conflicting lives. From a philosophical point of view, this may point to a limitation in our understanding of the relation between desiring, knowing and acting.

When we look at Spinoza and Hegel, we see a different perspective regarding the relationship between desire, freedom and reason. First of all, neither of them sees desire as a problem but as the very essence of human beings. In conjunction with this, desire and reason are perceived neither in an antagonistic, nor in a hierarchical relationship because movements of our thoughts and bodies don't interact causally either – rather, both are taken actually as different aspects of movements of our desire. At this point, reason is not defined as a transcendental faculty, but a phase or a form of desire. Hence, since our actions already show our thinking capacity and vice versa, there's no deliberate action for Spinoza and Hegel. In this sense, as Spinoza says, desire does not have a blind character – on the contrary, it has its own laws by which freedom has to be understood:

The affects, therefore, of hate, anger, envy, and the like, considered in themselves, follow with the same necessity and force of Nature as the other singular things. And therefore they acknowledge certain causes, through which they are understood, and have certain properties, as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing, by the mere contemplation of which we are pleased. (Spinoza, *Ethics* III Pref)¹

Besides, neither of them thinks that desire can reach freedom in isolation. One cannot be free only due to her behaviors – freedom of an individual necessarily presumes a good society that provides required context for it. In other words, a free society is not a mere aggregation of free individuals – people require each other. Of course Spinoza and Hegel are well aware of the conflicting character of desire. But these conflicts are not seen as eternally given. Rationality, which leads to recognition of the other desire in an ethical and political manner, develops co-existentially with these social interactions. In this sense, the reason is not defined as a transcendental faculty, but emerges as a phase of desire through the social practices.

¹ Hereafter *Ethics* will be referred as E, followed by Roman num. for part and internal references

Such formulation of desire, which naturalizes its relation to freedom, attracts me a lot. Since it takes reason as a form of desire in its sociality, it seems to provide an opportunity to comprehend social and political conditions of freedom not from the perspective of restrictions but that of education of desire. If we can understand how desire moves in a society and how it becomes educated in a way that they becomes reason itself, then it may be possible to draw a pathway for our struggle for freedom.

In this thesis, I will elaborate different socio-political conditions that Spinoza and Hegel propose for desire's freedom. In Chapter II and III, I explicate their unique philosophical methodologies and show how they argue about essence, knowledge, action and freedom of desire in terms of sociality by figuring out the internal relations among these issues. In these chapters I also look at the roots and forms of pathological sociality that Spinoza and Hegel elaborate. While doing this, I follow not an independent schema, but their own way and sequence of reasoning. Here, I also explicate their political theories regarding the best form of society. These two chapters will be rather descriptive when compared with the fourth one. In the fourth chapter, mostly benefiting from modern and contemporary commentators, I make a critical analysis of their accounts of liberating societies and try to determine which one of them seems to provide a more liberatory vision, by using counterfactual reasoning. In the conclusion chapter, I comparatively summarize the main differences between their systems and finally, I suggest a practical and theoretical action plan in order to draw a pathway for our struggle for freedom.

CHAPTER II

SPINOZA

Spinoza's methodology in *Ethics* is a geometrical demonstration. In each of his five books in *Ethics*, he starts with basic postulations, uses axioms and then deduces propositions from these. This constitutes the basic restlessness for his reader – he talks about affects in a demonstrative way, which can be mostly associated with psychology by a regular philosophy student. His claims about affects' having an order like the order of nature may make this structure intelligible. But the second restlessness is related with about the truth conditions of these postulates and axioms from which all his inferences are derived. If his whole system is based on these, how does Spinoza derive them? Are they mere beliefs or assumptions that are borrowed in advance, with a promise of payback?

Such a curiosity stems from the assumptions of the classical epistemological model where the subject tries to achieve knowledge of the its ontological other, namely, of object and expands knowledge further by using inference rules of logic. However, regarding the correct methodology for this business, Descartes' journey to knowledge starts with an inner conflict: considering all false beliefs once upon a time accepted as true, he becomes suspicious about whether every piece of knowledge he got so far might be false (Descartes 515). Descartes wants to find whether there's any knowledge, which is immune to doubt. So, he defines his strategy as demolishing the building of knowledge with the cannon-ball of doubt until he finds something indubitable (518). Later, one may rebuild all knowledge on this

foundation. Otherwise, if our basic beliefs are not fundamental but mediated, there remains room for error. Thus, according to this foundationalist approach, our first axioms and postulates have to be correct and indubitable. Spinoza reverses this model by emphasizing the practical character of knowledge. Method, for Spinoza, is not the way of reasoning that gives us the knowledge of causes, but “is the understanding of what is a true idea” (Spinoza, *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* §37).² Thus, to question methodology is to question how we know that we have a true idea. At first, he agrees with Descartes that the idea of a thing is different from that thing in practice.³ The idea of an apple is different from the apple itself, for sure. But later on, contrary to Descartes, he doesn’t prefer to question the method because he asserts that we already use it in our lives for knowledge production already contains some produced knowledge. This means, we cannot question whether the idea of an apple refers to truth since it already assumes the objective existence of an apple. Thus, the so-called reflexive thinking about our previous knowledge in order to determine whether we really have knowledge seems to be a bogus because

It follows that the true method does not consist in seeking a sign of truth after acquiring ideas; the true method is the path whereby truth itself, or the objective essences of things, or ideas (all these mean the same) is to be sought in proper order. (TEI §36)

As Macherey puts, such a reversal of the relation between idea and existence also reverses the priority of methodology over knowledge:

We see here that the traditional order of presences is inverted: the idea of the idea, the reflexive knowledge that has for an “object” the power of the intellect, is not the condition of the manifestation of the true but on the

² Hereafter, *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* will be referred as TEI, followed by Arabic num. for paragraph.

³ But this difference is not an ontological difference as the classical epistemological stance assumes. The relationship between of ideas and bodies in Spinoza will be explicated later.

contrary, its effect, its result. The method does not precede the development of knowledges, but it expresses or reflects it. (Macherey 43)

This suggests that if knowledge is prior to method, we should focus on how knowledge operates in order to comprehend our method. Then, the geometrical character of *Ethics* becomes not something to worry about, but something empirical and practical: Hence, The axioms and postulates become

(...) exactly equivalent to the rough-hewn stone that the first blacksmiths needed to 'begin' their work; these are notions that are still abstract, simple words, natural ideas that acquire no real significance except at the moment when they function in the demonstrations and where they produce real effects, thus expressing a capacity that they did not have at the beginning. (Macherey 51)

Affections of Substance

Such exclusion of doubt from philosophy in which the order of thoughts reflects the objective essence of things suggests a monist ontology where there is no dichotomy between subject and object. For Spinoza, only for substance essence involves existence and everything that exists is just a part of this substance (E I P6, P7). In fact, it's ridiculous to use a definite description here because there is nothing beyond the substance that we use 'this' to separate it from the rest. There's no before, later, other or outside of substance. It is what is "in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed" (E I Def 3). Ideas, physical objects, energy areas, feelings, societies, desire and perceptions are all included by substance and their existence, properties and motions is existence, properties and motions of substance itself.

Spinoza's use of the substance seems as a synonym with 'nature' or 'the universe' in their broadest senses.⁴

Surely, a single concept like substance is not enough to define all aspects of existence. Here, Spinoza gives us two sub-concepts: attributes and modes. Attributes are the ways in which we perceive the essence of substance (E I D4). Even if there are infinite attributes of substance, we, as human beings know only two of them – thought and extension (E I P16). The thinking substance and the extended substance are not reducible to each other: "Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself" (E I P9). Each of them follows their own laws, but this independence is a relative one. Since their common root is substance, there can be no contradiction but a parallel structure between them. Different attributes just reflect different aspects of the same reality, namely, of the substance (McShea 33).

Modes, on the other hand, are the characters, specifications and particular expressions and modifications of thought and extension attributes (E I P25). They are the only ways for us to know about substance (McShea 33). Actually modes have many different meanings in Spinoza. Beyond singular and finite things like trees, books, flowers (on extension attribute), minds (on thought attribute), there are infinite modes like motion (on extension attribute) and, intellect (on thought attribute) (E I D2, P21 Dem, P28). Spinoza adopts a relational ontology account regarding the definition of finite modes. All modes are defined only by other modes: "by mode I understand the affections of a substance, or that which is in another through which it is also conceived" (E I P5). According to Deleuze, Spinoza gives a distinction between nominal and real definitions and favors the latter, which "state

⁴ Spinoza uses God and nature interchangeably but they have different definitions. Substance is the signification of both parts. In this thesis it's preferred to use "Substance" for all of them.

the cause of the thing, its genetic elements” over the first which use abstractions and properties as given (Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* 61). Thus, Spinoza here talks about a dynamical, causal relationality regarding the definition of modes – to know a mode is to know its cause and effect profile. In this sense, modes can be understood as not things or parts of substance but rather ‘process’ or ‘situations’ (McShea 34).

Here, we see ‘striving’ as a sort of guiding principle under this causal process: Everything, “as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being” (E III P6; Spinoza, *Theological-Political Treatise* XVI §1)⁵ and this striving for preservation is “nothing but the actual essence of the thing” (E III P7). It’s the convenient usage of Spinoza’s *conatus*, which can also be translated as effort or endeavor. Spinoza calls this effort ‘appetite’ (*apetititus*) when it is related to the mind and body together, ‘will’ when it’s related to the mind only and ‘desire’ (*cupiditas*) if we are conscious about it (E III P9). This notion of striving power⁶ has nothing to do with mysticism, actually. It’s about the actual process of movement of all modes from their causes to the effects. Thus, it can be said that striving to preserve existence means striving to keep the movement. Basically, to posit this striving as the essence of everything is to say that it’s immanent to everything to have some causes and to produce some effects and everything has a strong tendency to stay in this net. Capacity to be caused and to produce an effect, namely, magnitude of this power differs with respect to the complexity of a thing. Furthermore there

⁵ Hereafter, *Theological-Political Treatise* will be referred as TPT, followed by Roman num. for chapter and Arabic num. for paragraph

⁶ In Spinoza, “*potestas* refers to power in its fixed, institutional or 'constituted' form, while *potentia* refers to power in its fluid, dynamic or 'constitutive' form” (Negri xv). All *potentia* is active and Substance has no *potestas* but *potentia* (Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* 97). I follow English translation of Negri’s *Subversive Spinoza* and use ‘Power’ for *potestas* and ‘power’ for *potentia*.

cannot be anything that exists, but has neither causes nor effects – such a situation means that thing does not exist anymore.⁷

Of course, this power has a quantitative character and it undergoes changes. Spinoza uses the term affect⁸ regarding these changes. Affect refers to a thing's particular state of power of acting, which can increase or decrease after affections (E III Post 1). For example, when I encounter with chocolate, we (chocolate and I) confront with a set of effects on each other that increase or decrease their power of acting. I become happy and start to take a positive stance towards my other problems for a while. Tomorrow, I can remember that I ate chocolate previous day and become happy again. Here, our state of power of acting resulting both from our bodily and mental affections refers to our affects (EIII D3). It's the velocity of our movement telling us how much our capacity of producing effects is increased or decreased. Regarding affects, Spinoza talks about joy and sadness as the two polar of this state: Joy refers to an increase in the power of acting while sadness is a decrease in it and our whole life is an oscillation between the affect of joy and sadness (E III P11 Schol).⁹ This is another important outcome of Spinoza's striving principle: to keep

⁷ At this point, McShea's modern scientific interpretation of striving and affects may help one to understand Spinoza's ontology better: "All things, iron tree, man, are more or less complex modes arranged in certain ways which constitute their being. If the arrangement is distorted beyond some critical limit, the thing as such perishes. The amount of force required to destroy it is the measure of its power of self-preservation. We may perhaps best understand Spinoza here if we think of him as attempting to synthesize three principles: the first law of thermodynamics, applied to all extended bodies; homeostasis, applied to organic creatures; and 'instinct of self-preservation,' as understood to apply man and animals". (McShea 36)

⁸ It's important to note that Spinoza holds a distinction between affection (*affectus*) and affect (*affectio*) where the first one is to be understood as a causal nexus of two modes of Substance while the latter is "affections of the body by which the body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections" (E III D3).

⁹ I prefer E. Curley edition where *laetitia* and *tristitia* are translated as 'joy' and 'sadness'

moving is to keep increasing one's power of acting. Everything strives to be joyful and to avoid sadness.

For Spinoza, every determination is a necessary determination and there's no contingency in its ontological sense (E I P29). Hence, like everything, our striving, has a specific cause that leads to its emergence: "each volition can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined by another cause, and this cause again by another, and so on, to infinity" (E I 32). Thus, by freedom, if one means being completely non-determined, not only our power of acting, but even Substance is not free because it is defined as autonomous – self-determined (P32 Cor. 1). People think that they have free will and could do otherwise given the same conditions because they are not completely aware of their own conditions that set them behave in a specific way: "In the mind there is no absolute, or free, will, but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so to infinity" (E II P48). In Spinoza, freedom and bondage is not about being located in a causal chain (which is inescapable) but about how one can be the cause of her own movement, how one manages to control the effects on herself. In other words, it depends on how one can act and acted on: "that thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone" (E I D7). But "the man who is subject to affects is under the control, not of himself, but of fortune [external causes – *O.C.*]" (E IV Pref). In this sense, we can say that only Substance has absolute freedom because by definition, Substance is its own cause (E I P17). It acts, but isn't acted on. Parts of substance can only be relatively free, insofar as they become more autonomous.

To Know and to Act

According to Spinoza, it is possible for a human being to be self-determined if they can form adequate ideas of the affections (EIII D3). We see that Spinoza always uses real definitions that refer to the genetic profile of things. Thus, ‘adequacy’ here is defined as having complete knowledge of cause-effect relations of one’s affections (Deleuze, *Spinoza Üzerine Onbir Ders* 38). Insofar an individual knows the objective correlations between external causes and her own affects, she knows how to evoke joy in her body by diverting causal mechanism according to her interests due to the level of her knowledge (E III P23). Since positive feelings imply an increase in the power of acting, adequate ideas that lead to this affect means that individual is freer. Inadequacy, then, presents itself as knowledge of effects only – not causes (Deleuze, *Spinoza Üzerine Onbir Ders* 25, 37). Insofar we cannot form adequate ideas, we stay bounded to passions: “we are necessarily acted on (by PI) insofar as we have inadequate ideas” (E II P56 Dem). This ‘being acted on’ should be understood in two senses. First, passions imply passivity and since our passivity implies mostly the activity of others, insofar we obey them we approve others particulars’ activity on us and this makes our power of acting decrease. We see the same relational ontology of Spinoza here:

The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our essence alone (by E III DI and D2), that is (by E III P7), the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power by which we strive to persevere in our being; but (as has been shown in E II P16) it must necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own, q.e.d. (E IV P5 Dem.)¹⁰

¹⁰ By ‘others’, it’s meant not only other humans but also the rest of nature. Human beings do not have to be torn by affects and thus, one’s increased power of acting do not necessarily expand other individuals’ power of acting. Human beings, who share many commons, are become passive and active together – one’s passivity/activity implies other’s passivity/activity in different scales. For example, a capitalist seems far more active than a wage-labor but in fact, he is also not in an active state in its true sense. Here, Spinoza

Second, passions “are not infrequently so opposed to one another that the man is pulled in different directions and know not where to turn” (E III Def. I). This means that self-preservation does not necessarily require us to chase every pleasure in a given time. Basically, subjection to passions can restrain our desire in the long run. As Spinoza puts, “pleasure can be excessive and evil, whereas pain can be good insofar as the pleasure or joy is evil” (E IV P43). To know what serves our striving in the long run requires the knowledge of the causes and only insofar we know this cause-effect structure we can be active. Thus, the process from inadequacy to adequacy, then, is not a farewell to our desires, but refers to a shift from ignorance to wisdom and by this way, from a passive state to an active state.¹¹

Spinoza talks about four difference among types of knowledge where in fact the first is not counted as a kind: First, knowledge from random experience, which refers to perceptions in which we haven’t yet apply concepts, but are mutilated and confused representations of nature; Second (first kind) is the knowledge of imagination (or opinion), which comes from signs (words), memories and ideas formed based on perceptions; Third (second kind), is the knowledge of adequate ideas and fourth (third kind) is intuitive knowledge which refers to the knowledge of the essence of whole nature (E II P40 Schol). Thus, only the last two kinds of knowledge signify true knowledge that is said to emancipate us by making us more active. Hence, for example, when we are subjected to passions, when we are being acted on instead of acting, we know a thing by its effects on us. A diabetic person who knows two or more chocolate bars is not good for him but don’t know why, in fact, knows about chocolate only by its effects on her and thus, this cannot be

mentions such relative situation from the perspective of the more passive one. This will be explained in detail later.

¹¹ So freedom is about being in an active state. Spinoza uses the word *action* (action) *passio* (passion) for these.

counted as the second or the third kind of knowledge. On the other hand, a healthy physician, who has complete knowledge of diabetes mellitus thanks to his books, doesn't have the true knowledge either, even if more than his ignorant patient. We see that truth and falsity of an idea in Spinoza are defined according to adequacy too – inadequate ideas are false while adequate ones are necessarily true.¹² Thus, knowledge coming from opinion and imagination is the only causes of falsity while the knowledge coming from reason and knowledge of essences are true (E II 41).

Here, reason is defined as the capacity to form adequate ideas, namely, the capacity of having knowledge of true and objective relationships of nature, which implies an increase in our power of acting. In this sense, having adequate ideas and reasoning is identical (E IV P27 Dem). Ontologically, reason is an affect in Spinoza's system (McShea 51). It describes the most increased state of our movement where we are at the top of our capacity of producing effects on ourselves – an affect that restrains other affects and seeks for long term benefits in order to sustain our power of acting at its highest level. As Balibar noted, it is “in the least transcendental but simply expresses the power of human nature as it manifest itself and develops its search for what is useful to each man” (Balibar 83). With this definition of reason, we eventually learn about Spinoza's visions regarding an ethical, virtuous life. It is a rational one: “Acting absolutely from virtue is nothing else in us, but acting, living, and preserving our being (these three signify the same thing) by the guidance of reason, from the foundation of seeking one's own advantage” (E IV P24).

The deviation of such a definition of reason from the orthodoxy stems from Spinoza's understanding of mind-body relations. As Balibar rightly puts, Spinoza

¹² But as Balibar also argued, falsity doesn't refer to the absence of knowledge but to an inadequate form of it – we know effects, if not causes. (Balibar 109)

gives an end to the hierarchy of the mind over body in history of philosophy - it takes on a new meaning that includes not only the mind but also body (Balibar 106). A human being owns a body, a certain mode on the extension attribute, and a mind, a certain mode on the thinking attribute of the same substance, but since she belongs to substance and as a complex part of it, which is made infinitesimals; she is subjected to the same laws as every part of nature. Thus, it can be said that, it's the substance itself, which perceives itself through the thought and extension attributes and, by modes. Here, neither mind nor body can completely constitute human beings by itself and they are always related to each other. If we look from the perspective of the extension attribute, mind is nothing but the idea of the body and from the perspective of the thinking attribute; the body is an object of the mind (E II P21, P13). There's nothing constitutive in mind beyond the ideas of body and a body's action can only be comprehended by mind – not through itself. Spinoza, on contrary to Descartes, sees no hierarchical relationship between mind and body. The causality between mind and body is also completely closed in Spinoza: “the body cannot determine the mind to thinking, and the mind cannot determine the body to motion, to rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else)” (E III P2). Thus, we cannot talk about the emancipatory role of a mind on a body. As different modes of on different attributes, they have their own laws. But as whole, human laws of motion, in both mental and bodily sense, is subjected to laws of substance anyway.

This requires us to read thinking and action relation from not a causal-interactionist but rather from a parallel perspective. In other words, being more active or staying passive is not only about body or mind or their so-called causal interactions – it's about substance. It is this unity of two different attributes that gives them a parallel movement: “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the

order and connection of things” (E II P7). This non-hierarchical and non-causal interactionist conception of the mind is extended to all its faculties: “there is in the mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, and the like. From this it follows that these and similar faculties are either complete fictions or nothing but metaphysical beings, or universals, which we are used to forming from particulars” (E II P48). For Spinoza, “no affect can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect” (E IV P14). As we have seen before, human beings can be affected through bodily affections (when I ate chocolate, I become happy) and through mental affections (i.e. when I remember our encounter, I feel happy again). If liberation is nothing but affection in a way that increases our power of acting, then, beyond mere knowledge, what we need is another affect in order to supersede the previous ones. But this affect must be of the same kind: As Spinoza says, “affection of the body (by P5) receives from its cause its force for persevering in its being, which, therefore, can neither be restrained nor removed, except by a corporeal cause (by E II P6) which affects the body with an affection opposite to it (by E III P5), and stronger than it (by A1)” (EIV P7 Dem). Similarly, “the mind will be affected with the idea of an affection stronger than, and opposite to, the first affection” (E IV P7). So, since ideas and bodily actions are not of the same kind, even if we think of better situations for us, it’s not enough to act. In this sense, mind and body cannot liberate each other.¹³

¹³ Some passages in Spinoza may lead us to think him as a causal-interactionist about mind and body. For example, consider this passage: “so long as the mind imagines those things that increase or aid our body’s power of acting, the body is affected with modes that increase or aid its power of acting (see Post. 1), and consequently (by PII) the mind’s power of thinking is increased or aided” (E III P12). But one should be careful here to read Spinoza’s grammatical precision. Adverbs that Spinoza uses frequently in order to explain body and mind relations like ‘insofar’ (*quatenus*) and ‘so long as’ (*quamdiu*) implies simultaneity rather than a temporal order. A proposition like “body’s power of acting increases only insofar we can form adequate ideas” tells about the parallel structure, namely, co-existence of both processes.

What Spinoza does is to show parallel developments of co-liberation of mind and body, which are modes of two attributes that reflect the movements of the same individual. Instead of an ontological order, mind-body relations become an issue of a change in perspective in Spinoza:

All these things, indeed, show clearly that both the decision of the mind and the appetite and the determination of the body by nature exist together-or rather are one and the same thing, which we call a decision when it is considered under, and explained through, the attribute of thought, and which we call a determination when it is considered under the attribute of extension and deduced from the laws of motion and rest. (E III P2 Schol.)

Thus, we need to understand an increase in power of acting from the perspectives of both mind and body. In this manner, forming adequate ideas, as knowledge from reason, is different from knowledge from imagination, which is based on memory reading signs (books). ‘Idea’, for Spinoza defines representations of bodies and representations of these representations. Adequate ideas, like other ideas, are formed via appropriate encounters that also involve bodies. The difference between inadequate and adequate ideas is not a fault of the mind, but refers to the number and quality of the encounters. Hence, in order to form adequate ideas in our mind, namely, in order to reason, our body has to encounter with other parts of nature and experience as many affections as it can. As Deleuze nicely puts,

The affects of joy are like a springboard, they make us pass through something that we would never have been able to pass if there had only been sadnesses. He solicits us to form the idea of what is common to the affecting body and the affected body. This can fail, but it can also succeed and I become intelligent (...) this requires one “to live on the edges, at the limit of her/his own power of being affected, on the condition that this must be the joyful limit” (Deleuze, *Spinoza Üzerine Onbir Ders* 41-2).

It means more appropriate encounters are accumulated, more action can it take and thus, more freedom can an individual attain. Thus, in a sense, reason, as a form of desire, is to be understood as the outcome of our actions rather than being the supreme faculty that determines our actions: As Spinoza says, “We desire nothing

because we judge it to be good, but on the contrary, we call it good because we desire it” (E II P39). At this point, we cannot talk about a person as rational who can think about truth but cannot act. In Spinoza, this implies a contradiction – a person, who is subjected to reason, necessarily acts according to it. Consider a person who can think about truth but cannot act on it because of a fear about her future. We know that fear implies contingency – a doubt about outcomes. Since “it is of the nature of reason to regard things as necessary, not as contingent” (E II P44), an inactive person who understands by reason seems to be impossible. As Spinoza puts, “The more the mind understands things by the second and third kind of knowledge [which requires reason – *O.C.*], the less it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less it fears death” (E V P38). An increase in affections of one implies an increase in others’:

(...) in proportion as a body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, or being acted on in many ways at once, so its mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once. And in proportion as the actions of a body depend more on itself alone, and as other bodies concur with it less in acting, so its mind is more capable of understanding distinctly. (E II P13)

Social Reason

Of course a single human being’s capacity is limited in a given space and time and it cannot suffice to form adequate ideas. First, Spinoza says that the number of modes of substance is infinite and a perfectly adequate idea regarding things requires the knowledge of all their cause-effect profile, which is also infinite. Thus, a single human cannot grasp all this knowledge with his finitude. In parallel with this, as Spinoza says, “the more affect arises from a number of causes concurring together, the greater it is” (E IV P8) but since “An affect whose cause we imagine to be with us in the present is stronger than if we did not imagine it to be with us” (E IV P9),

and since we can be affected only by a limited part of nature in a given time, this limited number of encounters become dominant in determining our affects. Second, other things being equal, the image of a future or past thing is weaker than the image of a present thing; and consequently, an affect toward a future or past thing is milder, other things equal, than an affect toward a present thing”. (E IV P9 Cor) Thus, this limited scope of a single individual does not suffice to live a virtuous life by which we can reach our maximum power of acting:

We can never bring it about that we require nothing outside ourselves to preserve our being, nor that we live without having dealings with things outside us. Moreover, if we consider our mind, our intellect would of course be more imperfect if the mind were alone and did not understand anything except itself. There are, therefore, many things outside us which are useful to us, and on that account to be sought. (E IV P18)

At this point, Spinoza’s metaphysical system demonstrates how human beings are important for each other’s liberation. Spinoza thinks that others are not just facts of nature that limit our actions but are also capable of creating a better life for us (E IV P35 Schol). This is evident when we consider Spinoza’s “vectorial account” (London 55) of power:

(...) for example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are joined to one another, they compose an individual twice as powerful as each one. To man, then, there is nothing more useful than man. Man, I say, can wish for nothing more helpful to the preservation of his being than that all should so agree in all things that the minds and bodies of all would compose, as it were, one mind and one body; that all should strive together, as far as they can, to preserve their being; and that all, together, should seek for themselves the common advantage of all. (E IV P18 Schol)

Cities, technology, economical relations which makes easier to satisfy our desires and measures to be protected from danger of nature itself are direct consequences of our collaboration – this is historically evident. Otherwise, we can get would be just a mess:

The formation of a society is advantageous, even absolutely essential, not merely for security against enemies but for the efficient organisation of an

economy. If men did not afford one another mutual aid, they would lack both the skill and the time to support and preserve themselves to the greatest possible extent. All men are not equally suited to all activities, and no single person would be capable of supplying all his own needs. Each would find strength and time fail him if he alone had to plough, sow, reap, grind, cook, weave, stitch and perform all the other numerous tasks to support life, not to mention the arts and sciences which are also indispensable for the perfection of human nature and its blessedness. We see that those who live in a barbarous way with no civilising influences lead a wretched and almost brutish existence, and even so their few poor and crude resources are not acquired without some degree of mutual help. (TPT V §10)

In other words, human beings have a tendency to socialize in their nature. They are sociable animals.¹⁴ Our desire can lead us to unify our powers, which in turn create an increase in each individual's power of acting. This sociability is not something transcendental or mysterious, but directly comes from the interest of individuals: "who is guided by reason is more free in a state, where he lives according to a common decision, than in solitude, where he obeys only himself" (E IV P73).

Spinoza explains the fundamental laws of sociability in terms of affects in his *Ethics* (Balibar 76). He indicates that when we see a body whose nature resembles ours, we identify it with ourselves and "consequently, if we imagine someone like us to be affected with some affect, this imagination will express an affection of our body like this affect. And so, from the fact that we imagine a thing like us to be affected with an affect, we are affected with a like affect" (E III P27). If this body loves/hates what our body love/hate, the resemblance increases. Here, "Love is a joy, accompanied by the idea of an external cause" (E II Def. VI) and "Hate is sadness, accompanied by the idea of an external cause" (E II Def. VII). As resemblance increases, we take the other more like us and we find more causes to love/hate the

¹⁴ Here, Spinoza criticizes those who praises pre-social merits of human beings. "So let the satirists laugh as much as they like at human affairs, let the theologians curse them, let melancholics praise as much as they can a life that is uncultivated and wild, let them disdain men and admire the lower animals. Men still find from experience that by helping one another they can provide themselves much more easily with the things they require, and that only by joining forces can they avoid the dangers which threaten on all sides". (E IV P35 Schol)

same thing. Thus, further compliance between two bodies creates bigger affects in our body also – our power of acting becomes duplicated, so to speak. This agreement in nature opens for further unities for individuals which increase their total power of acting:

The good which man wants for himself and loves, he will love more constantly if he sees that others love it (by E III P31). So (by E III P31 Cor), he will strive to have the others love the same thing. And because this good is common to all (by P36), and all can enjoy it, he will therefore (by the same reason) strive that all may enjoy it. And this striving will be the greater, the more he enjoys this good (by E III P37), q.e.d. (E IV P37 Alt Dem)

This means, by the imitation of affect mechanism (as posited in EIII P31), when others love the same things that we love, we find an extra cause to love it and experience more joy. This is the outline of empowerment. The key point is to recognize shared points among our natures. Spinoza named them as ‘commons’ and suggests us to focus on commons, which all individuals love and benefit. Since they are common causes, they have the potential to activate everyone’s joy by vectorial total of everyone’ power of acting in the same direction. Consequently, this creates a much bigger total vector of power which returns as bigger share from total joy for everyone: “The greatest good of those who seek virtue is common to all, and can be enjoyed by all equally” (E IV P36). That’s why it’s better for a rational individual to invest his love and actions on already common goods. Commons, by definition, cannot be possessed by one party. If an individual or a group appropriates them, they lose their empowering feature and pave the ways of hate, which restrains people’s power of acting in turn. Thus, it can be said that being common is not a quality of things but also individuals’ orientations toward them. It’s the sociality that makes those objects common. What are these commons? For a first approximation, we can generalize it as the shared points in human beings’ nature. But it’s not to be understood just as a resemblance between the cause and effect structure of

individuals' biology – it's much more than that. Here, according to Hardt, commons as “the earth and all the resources associated with it: the land, the forests, the water, the air, minerals and so forth (...) On the other hand the common also refers to the results of human labor and creativity, such as ideas, language, affects, and so forth” (Hardt 136). Elsewhere, Negri and Hardt include “production and productivity of the common through collective social practices” in definition of commons (Negri and Hardt 121). Thus, artifacts like the economy, city, science, culture, etc., social spheres are also included our commons because we construct them together, for our common needs and in communication. They're new cause-effect structures we create. In this sense, artifacts are also part of nature, so are of commons.

We discover new aspects of Reason here: it necessarily includes social interaction. As we know, reasoning is identical with forming adequate ideas. An adequate idea of an object, person, process, etc. includes all cause-effect relationships of it. One can discover and understand more about nature insofar as she experiences more joyful encounters with other parts of nature. But no matter how many joyful encounters one has experienced, an individual's capacity to form adequate ideas is limited in a given space and time. It can be increased only when people share their own encounters with others because it provides us the opportunity to multiply our affections. Beside our own affections with nature, every time we are joyfully affected by each other, we take a closer step towards big picture of nature's cause-effect structure by imitating other's affect. Thus, it's evident that reason is neither something each individual can achieve separately nor can a group of people show others how they are supposed to reason. On the contrary, reason, for Spinoza, is a process that is constituted together with people and it reaches its highest level only insofar as every single individual's power of acting reaches its highest level.

With Deleuze's words, it's not abstract but collective (Deleuze, *Spinoza Üzerine Onbir Ders* 45). Togetherness, here excludes all pathological forms of sociality where only privileged ones benefits from objects of desire most. The most rational society must be the one that all citizens are free and joyful. Because it is the only way commons becomes most useful: "each man most seeks his own advantage for himself, then men are most useful to one another" (E IV P35 Cor. 2). Thus, to want for others' freedom is a precondition of Reason by definition: "The good which everyone who seeks virtue wants himself, he also desires for other men; and this desire is greater as his knowledge of God is greater" (E IV P37).

However, Spinoza admits that people are moved more by opinion than true reason (E IV P17 Schol, P35 Schol). As he puts, "It is by no means the case that all men can always be readily induced to be guided by reason; for each is drawn by his own pleasure, and the mind is frequently so beset by greed, ambition, envy, anger and the like that no room is left for reason" (TPT XVI §8). This means in every society, risk of conflict and war is always and already given. This incompleteness of knowledge stemming from inadequate knowledge of things can make individuals' power of acting fluctuate and eventually lead us to conflict with each other in the first place. Trying to possess something one-sidedly is an example of this inadequacy. As a result of these conflicts, there emerge power asymmetries in life. Thus, even if individuals form societies in order to live in security and also for cultivating a better life by creating commons, these conflicts may lead to pathological forms of sociality in terms of individual freedoms. Human sociality, from basic levels (friendship, family) to the most complex structures (society, state) can take asymmetric forms where some individuals oppress other and others show obedience to them. History has shown many forms of oppression/obedience

relations: women and men, proletariat and capitalists, Turks and Kurds, heterosexuals and LGBTIs, etc. In pathological forms of sociality where power asymmetries reign, commons are defined only by privileged ones (i.e., homosexual relations are found against human nature, private property is preached as sacred, etc.). On the other hand, even if some commons (food, security, etc.) are produced together, they're appropriated asymmetrically (profit, honor, etc.).

Even if it's obvious that collectivization by agreeing on the commons is the most rational thing for the sake of everybody's good, it seems that in actuality this doesn't work. Thus we need a more dynamic philosophical comprehension that shows the way in which education of each desire takes place so that we can reach the best empowering society. Spinoza's system, which is far from being contented with positing abstract ethical schemas, does this by showing how Reason is about praxis. We see that if we want a better society, it's necessary to experience joyful encounters with our minds and bodies first. Furthermore, he provides a detailed 'user-guide' about the interaction of affects with each other. Hence, in order to understand how people can avoid conflicts, it is useful to understand both how joyful affects work, and how conflict and obedience are produced and reproduced via affect mechanism first.

Conflicts and Obedience

As we have seen before, the imitation of affect mechanism leads us to identify ourselves with others through commons and this yields a duplication of reason which means a duplication in joy. But if a body, which we first took as similar to our nature, behaves contrary to our nature, we start to take it as 'not like us'. Such a

person hates what we love and loves what we hate. Since what we love/hate increases/decreases our power of acting, that person is perceived as a cause of our restrained power of acting and we start to hate him. In return, the other individual “who imagines he is hated by someone, and believes he has given the other no cause for hate, will hate the other in return” (E III P40). This antagonism shows a state where one’s cause of joy becomes other’s sadness. So the conflict begins.

Beside joy (and love) and sadness (and hate), considering Spinoza puts that the human body can also be affected “in others which render its power of acting neither greater no less” (EIII Post I), one can ask whether it’s possible a third state – state of indifference regarding what the other individual loves and hates. This seems not so probable for Spinoza, even if not impossible. First, as Spinoza says, what creates both compliance and antagonism is resemblance between our natures: “Any singular thing whose nature is entirely different from ours can neither aid nor restrain our power of acting, and absolutely, nothing can be either good or evil for us, unless it has something in common with us” (E IV P9). Here, ‘common’ refers to shared aims of individual desires and what determines love and hate here is the scarcity of objects of desires. “If we imagine that someone enjoys something that only one can possess, we shall strive to bring it about that he does not possess it” (E III P32). This makes us envy her and hate emerges in us, since she is perceived as an obstacle to our joy and we hate her, because she possesses what we also love one-sidedly. But if the number of objects of desire is increased with the involvement of many individuals, this creates love regarding others, as a person becomes a cause of our joy. Thus, it follows that insofar people desire for the same things, depending on their scarcity their actions and affects have likelihood of conflict or compliance but not of indifference. Second, it’s a fact that “Different men can be affected differently

by one and the same object; and one and the same man can be affected differently at different times by one and the same object” (EIII P51). Thus, since the number of modes of substance and thus, number of affections are infinite, this inconstancy of affects play as a multiplier effect on conflicts and an antagonism seems to show up eventually.

The picture of this basic love and hate relationship may indicate that social sphere is just an arena of stable forms of enmity or fraternity. But we do not witness such continuous fights or eternal peace between the same individuals. Instead, as we have seen, there is always a social structure constituted because a person cannot be associated purely with sadness or joy alone. Social sphere is not an arena composed of individuals who love and hate each other completely (TPT XVII §2). Rather, we have a complex set of affects regarding each other – we like others’ certain points and hate some specific attitudes or actions. As Spinoza indicates, “If we imagine that someone loves, desires, or hates something we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall thereby love, desire, or hate it with greater constancy. But if we imagine that he is averse to what we love or the opposite [NS: that he loves what we hate], then we shall undergo vacillation of mind” (E III P31). But even if this vacillation creates a really complex inter-individual structures, it doesn’t lead to an eternal chaos in which everyone’s affects continuously changes toward others either. After a point, balance of power is established and different forms of sociality are constituted, of which pattern can be analyzed sociologically. As a consequence of power relations, affects of a group of people regarding others are reproduced continuously and this transform into new forms according to changes in the power balance. Here, obedience shows up as the abstract form of these asymmetrical affections.

In obedience, a group of people is acted on, namely, their power of acting and thus, affects of a group of individuals becomes subjected to other groups' power of acting and affects. Besides as in the case of discontented slave, where people know why and what they hate, obedience can take the form of voluntary and contented ones also. This subjection creates individuals who mistake their passivity as their activity. In this case their vacillation of mind stays more on 'love' side regarding the group of individuals who restrain their power of acting. Even if such a predicament seems like a contradiction that lies at the heart of Spinoza's system, actually, it's not. True, "he who hates someone [who restrains his striving – *O.C.*] will strive to do evil to him" but it is so "unless he fears that a greater evil to himself will arise from this" (E III P39). It's, again the same vectorial laws of action. In TTP, same law is asserted both for hope: "Now it is a universal law of human nature that nobody rejects what he judges to be good except through hope of a greater good or fear of greater loss, and that no one endures any evil except to avoid a greater evil or to gain a greater good. That is to say, everyone will choose of two goods that which he judges the greater and of two evils that which seems to him the lesser" (TTP XVI §7). In such a situation, "he will abstain from doing evil to hated person" (E III P39 Dem) because he thinks absence of him would lead to more evil. In other words, what directs people to obey others who do not agree with their nature is nothing but fear – fear of death, fear of hunger, etc. But how do we associate other's absence with evil in practice? Spinoza says, "We strive to affirm, concerning ourselves and what we love, whatever we imagine to affect with joy ourselves or what we love. On the other hand, we strive to deny whatever we imagine affects with sadness ourselves or what we love" (E II P25). In other words, we have a tendency to focus on our satisfactions even if we lost more than we gained and this leads us to be content with what the

oppressor provided us. After a certain point where one is convinced that she couldn't move more, she is forced to accept her given level of motion as given internally because the idea of joy weighs more. Even if she can think about a better future she cannot act because affects regarding future/contingent goods can be restrained by the desire of the moment/necessary (E IV P16, P17). Since we see them as the cause of our joy, we start to love them also. The, more we are acted on by them, more they are perceived bigger and stronger – so is our respect to them: As Balibar noted,

He must imagine the subject who commands as omnipotent, and above all as omnipotent with respect to himself. Then the orders he receives from this subject will not allow for any indecision on his part, and even though it may vary, they will remain beyond question. (Balibar 91)

It should be noted that, here, in obedience case, our fear turns into a joy in an unhealthy way. It's unhealthy because we miss the chance to be more joyful. Such an omnipotent master is also perceived as the source of both sad and joyful feelings because she is perceived as an individual who lets us survive. Thus, oppressed ones try to make happy the master because “he who loves someone will strive to benefit him” (E III P39). As a result, the person who we hate becomes a person whom we love.

We say that love and hate are joy and sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Spinoza names the situations where joy and sadness accompanied by the idea of an internal cause, as self-esteem and repentance (E II P30 Schol). Thus, it can be said that since magnitude of the idea of master's potency is inversely proportional to our idea of our own potency, obedience requires low self-esteem also, beside an exaggerated love to the master. This is the difference between discontented and contented slaves: even if they are both restrained by others' action, the first feels a hope, which is “an inconstant joy, born of the idea of a future or past thing whose outcome to some extent doubt” (E III Def VII) that later turns a hate about master

while the latter feels a fear, which is an inconstant sadness born of the idea of a future or past thing whose outcome to some extent doubt” (E III Def VIII) that later turns into love about master. That’s the situation of contended obedience: “he who wholeheartedly resolves to obey another in all his commands is fully under another's dominion, and consequently he who reigns over his subjects' minds holds the most powerful dominion” (TPT XVII §3).

Of course not all individuals experience this process in the same way, because their starting conditions are not same. One can be contended in long years while others born into a group who are already subjected. This time they become educated in this way. As Spinoza rightly puts, “Education itself adds to natural inclination” (E III P53). Moreover,

Experience itself also confirms this. For not everyone has the same custom and religion. On the contrary, what among some is holy, among others is unholy; and what among some is honorable, among others is dishonorable. Hence, according as each one has been educated, so he either repents of a deed or exults at being esteemed for it. (E III Def XVII)

In this obedience practice, sociology and history shows how

Bodily movements are ordered according to fixed rituals, a collective discipline which periodically brings the body back to the same basic postures, reinforcing its habits through present sensation. In parallel, within the soul, sequence of ideas are ordered according to models of action and thought that are provided by historical and moral stories, which are considered as revealed truths. (Balibar 90)

What resulted can only be named at best as “happy automats” (Lordon 84) whose striving is determined (and thus, restricted) not actively from inside but passively from outside. Regarding this point, it’s interesting to notice that Spinoza might be one of the earliest critics of ideology and bio-politics. In TPT, he mentions about reproduction conditions of obedience thought:

(...) although command cannot be exercised over minds in the same way as over tongues, yet minds are to some degree under the control of the sovereign power, who has many means of inducing the great majority to believe, love,

hate etc. whatever he wills. Thus, although it is not by direct command of the sovereign power that these results are produced, yet experience abundantly testifies they often proceed from the authoritative nature of his power and from his guidance, that is, from his right. Therefore there is no absurdity in conceiving men whose beliefs, love, hatred, contempt and every single emotion is under the sole control of the governing power. (TPT XVII §3)

Such an account of subjection provides powerful tools for criticizing superiority of “objective thought” as a mere mental practice and leads us to focus and question the role of culture and Power relations in given truths about what human nature consists. Spinoza uses the same criticism in succeeding sections also: “all men share in one and the same nature; it is Power and culture that mislead us” (TPT XVII 27).

From these criticisms of obedience one can think that Spinoza asserts a moralist and humanist vision. For example, from a moral perspective, one may infer that oppression is a bad thing which oppressor shouldn't have done it. In fact, it's not true. Spinoza does not adopt such a moralistic attitude regarding social forms of oppression – his system doesn't allow positing such transcendental values. But then, considering how human behavior toward others can take violent forms, then, it becomes a question how can we establish a society where people do not obey passions and each other but rather obey the reason in order to live joyfully while not restricting each other. In order to establish this connection, it's important to follow the pathway from natural right to civil right in Spinoza.

Natural Rights

First of all, even if he named his masterpiece as *Ethics*, Spinoza doesn't believe in ‘morality’ in its classical sense, which advises individual beings what they should do regardless of causes. Of course, this doesn't mean there's no moral value in Spinoza. The point is that moral values are defined by its conditions. As Deleuze pointed,

ethics, in Spinoza's dictionary can be named best as "ethology" where knowledge of the causes is to be discovered (Deleuze, *Spinoza Üzerine Onbir Ders* 123). Spinoza "never asks what we must do, he always asks what we are capable of, what's in our power, ethics is a problem of power, never a problem of duty" (124). Rights, in Spinoza's system are defined in a natural way. For him, right is equal to power:

By the right of Nature, then, I understand the laws or rules of Nature in accordance with which all things come to be; that is, the very power of Nature. So the natural right of Nature as a whole, and consequently the natural right of every individual, is coextensive with its power. Consequently, whatever each man does from the laws of his own nature, he does by the sovereign right of Nature, and he has as much right over Nature as his power extends". (Spinoza, *Political Treatise* II §4)¹⁵

In other words, since what a thing does, it does from necessity of determination of its nature and 'good' and 'evil' have a meaning only for parts of nature regarding their power of acting. Thus, what a thing can do shows what that thing has also right to do. If killing other people is among the capabilities of a human-being (which evidently is), then, she has a right to kill the others. In this manner, nature "does not frown on strife, or hatred, or anger, or deceit, or on anything at all urged by appetite" (PT II §8) because these are facts of human nature and determinate forms of appetite are nothing but necessity of its conditions just like others. To put it otherwise, there's no hierarchical order between actions, causes and individuals in this manner. Spinoza doesn't "acknowledge any distinction between men and other individuals of Nature, nor between men endowed with reason and others to whom true reason is unknown, nor between fools, madmen and the sane" (TPT XVI §3).

But from historical and sociological perspective, in every social unit, as a result of conflicts and established power balances, individuals have transferred their sovereign right of determining their own actions to somebody else to some extent

¹⁵ Hereafter *Political Treatise* will be referred as PT, followed by Roman num. for chapter and Arabic num. for paragraph

and this sovereign, uses its authority on behalf of society, group or family. Holding this authority, this Power determines what's good and what's bad for individual powers and takes decisions according to this. Individual powers, in turn, is said to have an obligation to obey these decisions for the sake of society's good. History has been showing many different forms, opportunities and limitation of this representation/obedience relation. A single individual or a group of people on behalf of God or people can represent this sovereign power. Limits of this representation can also change according to power balances of constituents.

If obedience is transfer of all rights to somebody or a definite group of people who are privileged, then, it's very clear that Spinoza rejects such a representation relation ontologically because no one needs it for joy. Actually, it harms joy (TPT XVII §1). As we know, everyone strives to preserve her *own* existence first. This striving can reach its maximum point when she become autonomous, namely, self-determined. But since political representation means a transfer of this right to be self-determined, it follows that our being represented contradicts with our striving by definition. Transfer of natural right to another individual makes one acted on rather than act, which means it refers to a situation that these individuals are subjected to passion rather than Reason.

As we have seen before, such obedience can only be the case if there's too much fear (which is a passion): "for men have never transferred their right and surrendered their power to another so completely that they were not feared by those very persons who received their right and power" (TPT XVII §1). But even this cannot last for all eternity. No matter how tyrant one can be, nature of the striving of others always constitute a threat to sovereign power of him: "This right he will retain only as long as he has this power of carrying into execution whatever he wills;

otherwise his rule will be precarious, and nobody who is stronger than he will need to obey him unless he so wishes” (TPT XVI §7). In this manner, there will be no “sovereign power that can do all it pleases” (TPT XVII §1) because “a whole people will never transfer its right to one man or a few if its members can agree among themselves” (PT VII §5).

One may argue for a case by giving historical examples where such an obedience relation is established but no one complains about it. Such an example might be misleading. Spinoza’s dynamical ontology doesn’t allow such cases in the long run because to preserve one’s own existence is to preserve increasing his motions, namely, velocity. Thus, it means that no matter how moderate it can be for now, every oppressor wants to increase its motion and this also implies a continuous shrinkage of oppressed ones’ power of acting. From a larger perspective, history has been showing infinite number of examples of this. For example, capitalist profit maximization motive seems to have no borders – enclosure of common goods kicks over the traces (Negri and Hardt 137). But hopefully, so does the resistance against it. As these example show, revolt is unavoidable in power asymmetries. Even if they can produce will and consent of their subjects, eventually, natural right of striving creates a tension between Power and powers. As McShea noted, “right of revolution could not be withheld from subjects” (McShea 82). Consequently, it can be said that complete and eternal transfer of sovereign rights to other people is neither possible, nor necessary from political perspective.

However, if we do not want a competitive authoritarian framework for our sociality where current oppressed ones take over the sovereign power and transform into new oppressors, there has to be a social governance model in which natural rights are not omitted. If Reason, as an affect, is a practical and political concept and

people are subjected to passion rather than Reason and also individuals have natural rights of striving which cannot be transferred to other individuals, then it becomes necessary to answer the question regarding political structure can meet these restraints.

Civil Rights and Democracy

Rejection of the transfer of natural rights makes democracy the best form of political structure for Spinoza, even if he could not have the chance to write on it so much. Besides, his words and arguments on democracy are not to be taken as a necessary path of history of humanity. Rather, as McShea puts, “it is a purely rational exercise in human relations” (85). But many authors agree that his system and methodology allow us to talk about basic dynamics of this exercise.

For Spinoza, like everything, democracy emerges from necessity. If it's the outcome of our praxis, it's better to start with premises of it. First, we admit individuals' need for a society where they live securely and in prosperity. We also see that this can happen only through collectivization on common. But, on the other hand, since they're subjected to passion rather than Reason, they are torn by affects and this leads conflicts and these resulted in the transfer of their natural rights of one to another. Finally, due to the fact that power does not know limits, revolt becomes inevitable and a new sovereignty is established. In this outline, it seems that Spinoza suggests somehow a progression throughout history because he first analyzes Monarchy and than Aristocracy, which is superior to the first regarding subjecting to Reason. But no matter how good it can be, it doesn't represent the most rational state

for Spinoza. Because both of them seem open to faults of governing individuals and because of this, none of them is sustainable.

Here, we see the first draft of best form of the state that Spinoza envisaged.

Its structure has to be well calibrated:

If the safety of a state is dependent on some man's good faith, and its affairs cannot be properly administered unless those responsible for them are willing to act in good faith, that state will lack all stability. If it is to endure, its government must be so organized that its ministers cannot be induced to betray their trust or to act basely, whether they are guided by reason or by passion. Nor does it matter for the security of the state what motives induce men to administer its affairs properly, provided that its affairs are in fact properly administered (PT I §6).

As we have seen, when people do not transfer their sovereign rights, they cannot form a society. On the other hand, when they transfer it to one or a group of individuals, it cannot be sustainable. At this point, instead of privileged ones, Spinoza asserts that governance of a society ought to be given to all of its constituents, namely, to the people (TPT XVI §8). In this manner, democratic society is defined “as a general assembly of men that possesses in its corporate capacity the supreme right to do everything it can” (TPT XVI §8). In this new form, people start to behave according to ‘civil rights’ which is constituted by everyone and where the individual citizen is “is subject to the rights of the commonwealth, whose every command he is bound to carry out, and he does not have any right to decide what is fair or unfair, what is righteous or unrighteous” (PT III §5). Here, civil rights are not to be understood as something that contradicts natural right. In fact, as Spinoza puts, “natural right (if we consider the matter correctly) does not cease in a civil order; for in a state of Nature and in a civil order alike man acts from the laws of his own nature and has regard for his own advantage” (PT III §3). Civil rights define shared

points in everyone's natural rights, namely commons, and it gives everyone equal liberty of defining, contributing to and benefiting from these commons.

In this sense, Spinoza offers us a participatory democracy. Beside, even if he never uses such an adverb, it can be interpreted also as a direct democracy also because he doesn't favor a parliamentary democracy where sovereign rights are transferred to others for a definite time:

For in a democratic state nobody transfers his natural right to another so completely that thereafter he is not to be consulted; he transfers it to the majority of the entire community of which he is part. In this way, all remain equal, as they were before in the condition of nature (TPT XVII §12).

Here, 'so completely' should not confuse one about whether he allows another form of democracy. As McShea puts, "there are several references 'to the right to vote in the supreme council', none to voting for delegates or representatives as happens in the monarchical constitution" (McShea 128).¹⁶

However, 'the majority of entire community' can be a confusing statement. Here, one can ask whether this is not a transfer of rights to a particular group anyway, like in aristocracy. But in fact, the difference between an aristocratic and a democratic state is clear. In the first, people transfer their sovereign rights to an already privileged group and they become bounded to what they said in advance – their privilege is given before the question. But unlike aristocracy, the people who constitute the decision-maker group, namely, the majority is not given in advance. In other words, unlike the aristocratic state, the pool of decision makers contains the whole community in democracy. Democracy has to be direct and participatory. By the natural right of striving of each, decision makers do not have to have any qualifications or competence – not even reason. Spinoza is very clear about that:

¹⁶ McShea cites from Spinoza here: "a democracy where all or most men are colleagues in the government" (TPT XX, 227-29)

Just as the wise man has the sovereign right to do all that reason dictates, i.e. to live according to the laws of reason, so, too, a man who is ignorant and weak-willed has the sovereign right to do all that is urged on him by appetite, i.e. to live according to the laws of appetite. (TPT XVI §3)

The ontological principle of democracy is to be subjected to Reason. As we know, Reason is an affect which can emerge insofar one can experience enough joyful encounters. Since cause and effect profile of modes of Substance is infinite while a single human life is finite, it can be reached more when more people experience more joyfully encounters. Here, the whole community represents the reason and majority of it refers the most rational action to take for the sake of society because majority's thoughts consists more joyful encounters, hence, more adequacy. Then, to obey the majority will be the best (or the least evil) for everyone:

There is the further fact that in a democracy there is less danger of a government behaving unreasonably, for it is practically impossible for the majority of a single assembly, if it is of some size, to agree on the same piece of folly. Then again, as we have also shown, it is the fundamental purpose of democracy to avoid the follies of appetite and to keep men within the bounds of reason, as far as possible, so that they may live in peace and harmony. (TPT XVI §9)

However, constitution of rationality needs a checkpoint also. There has to be some borders of society over individuals of which violation may demolish the order of society:

There are certain conditions that, if operative, entail that subjects will respect and fear their commonwealth, while the absence of these conditions entails the annulment of that fear and respect and together with this, the destruction of the commonwealth. Thus, in order that a commonwealth should be in control of its own right, it must preserve the causes that foster fear and respect; otherwise it ceases to be a commonwealth. (PT IV §4)

This basis also shows what really common is and what is not. Disregarding ones' needs that make them revolt against society implies that previous commons are not 'real' commons. According to Spinoza, majority of a society cannot decide on contrary to individuals' nature.

Although we say that men are not in control of their own right but are subject to the right of the commonwealth, we do not mean that men lose their human nature and assume another nature, with the result that the commonwealth has the right to make men fly, or-and this is just as impossible-to make men regard as honourable things that move them to ridicule or disgust. (PT IV §4)

What does our nature consist? Elsewhere, Spinoza gives another concrete examples – society cannot decide against physical integrity of one’s own and beloved ones’ bodies and basic logical truths, etc. (TP III §8). From these, we can infer that, society has no rights over basic physical and biological facts regarding bodies of individuals. This is quite consistent with Spinoza’s ontology. Since democracy’s aim is to maximize joy, physical and biological conditions that makes body’s affection possible becomes the ultimate condition for democracy also.¹⁷ From the passage, we also understand that deciding against these facts may cause a danger for commonwealth.

However, body is not a just borderline but the very aim of a democratic society. In other words, direct and participatory democracy is to make people joyfully affected while providing the basic necessary conditions of affection of bodies. At this point, as Negri and Hardt show extensively in *Commonwealth*, we see that commons are the true substance of direct and participatory democracy for Spinoza (Negri and Hardt 53). As we have seen, interpersonal recognition moves with imitation with affect mechanism that makes people duplicate causes of their joy. Since commons carry such a potential, a democratic structure necessitates people to contribute to and benefit from commons equally against the risk of individuals’ torn by affects. Nevertheless, people have direct and maximum benefit from democracy insofar lands, the forests production process, language, ideas, etc. is kept common. As Lordon also indicates,

¹⁷ Here, logical truths also refer to conditions of body’s motions since order of the things and ideas are the same for Spinoza.

For Spinoza, oppression ends insofar people are managed to learn how to direct their desires to the commons that cannot be possessed one-sidedly. Hence they should understand this: true benefit for one depends on her wishing the same benefit for others also. (Lordon 190)

If commons are so vital for democracy, then to provide equal liberty to people becomes the crucial point. As we know, for Spinoza, freedom requires not one's being undetermined but being not acted on. One is in a passive state insofar causes of its movements are outside of it, namely, insofar it's subjected to nature and other individuals. This means, in order to maximize everyone's power of acting, unequal conditions that make people subjected to other individuals should be eliminated as much as possible. In a democratic society, individuals cannot have any "hereditary rights to vote and to undertake offices of state, and no one can demand that right for himself by law" (PT XI §1). When we are using our hereditary rights as an unequal advantage over them, this becomes a violation of other's nature – we are blocking their self-realization. At this point, we see how Spinoza's insistence on commons requires such a radical equality. Existing asymmetrical power relations shows that commons are possessed one-sidedly: when we block a body's power of acting we at the same time prevents their right to contribute to and benefit from commons that makes her more joyful. This means such a society cannot be truly rational one because it avoids expanding commons with more people but keeping it open only to privileged ones. But here, considering Spinoza's definition of human nature, elimination of unequal conditions has to be taken in a radical sense. Those privileges come with family, property, wealth, culture, etc. must be eliminated in order to provide the broadest chance to individuals for their seeking the most joyful encounters that they can have. This is why direct democracy in Spinoza is not only about main businesses of the state but also about all social spheres from economy to culture. The asymmetrical structure that previous power relations created has to be

replaced with a vision of equal liberty for all in a radical way. This is the point where negative and positive accounts of freedom accomplishes each other – insofar a society sustains the conditions of negative freedom it becomes possible for people to agree on commons and multiplies the number of causes of their joy. Spinozian interpersonal recognition, then become the act of acknowledgement of others' being important for our own interests through commons. This is what reason teaches us. This recognition, however, has to be reciprocal because “insofar as men live according to the guidance of reason, they are most useful to man” (E4 P37 Dem).

CHAPTER III

HEGEL

At the beginning of his *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel reckons with the given model of western philosophy that posits an ontological separation between subject and object. According to Hegel, since the object is considered to be the sole carrier of the whole Truth, there arises the problem of reaching the Truth in its true nature and also the eternal doubt about whether inferences of our cognition can correspond to it. This problem of correspondence leads fear of error that in turn causes us to mistrust our knowledge and makes us doubt its conclusions (Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit* §74).¹⁸ According to Hegel, this is a natural consequence of ideas that take cognition either as an instrument or as a medium in our way to truth (PS §73). But once we take cognition as an instrument or a medium, this forces us to presuppose that beside the object, our cognition is also external to us, which in turn raises the question about knowledge of the nature of cognition *ad infinitum*. Moreover, since it is a fact that active instrument and medium always alters and reshapes its object, what we get at the end would not be the true knowledge of the object. For Hegel, even if the doubt stemming from this model carries the seeds of Truth, it cannot capture it as a progress or as a whole but has a one-sided view. And thus, it abstracts pure nothingness from this results and one collapses into general skepticism, which cannot go further here (PS §78).

¹⁸ Hereafter *The Phenomenology of Spirit* will be referred as PS, with Arabic num. for paragraph

Hegel also criticizes Spinoza's methodology that criticizes the idea of mediation. For Spinoza, object, as the bearer of truth, can now be grasped directly by the subject as it is in itself without mediation because subject and object are part of the same Substance. This philosophical method, however, involves a mistake, according to Hegel. For him, "Spinoza stops short at *negation as determinateness* or quality; he does not advance to the cognition of it as absolute, that is, *self-negating negation*; therefore *his substance does not contain the absolute form*, and the cognition of it is not a cognition from within" (Hegel, *Science of Logic* 472). As such an immediacy suggests, "the subject has not yet produced the universal object from within itself, and the object has not yet been reborn from within the subject" and thus, "the individuals have not yet attained subjective freedom within themselves but appear as accidental properties of the underlying substance" (Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction: Reason in History* 199). In other words, this relation is not comprehended as a process where each transforms the other via mediation.

If so, then what kind of ontology and epistemology does Hegel propose in order to explain the nature and movements of desire? Put it otherwise, how does desire know and how does it act? According to him, the subject-matter of philosophy should not be the concepts (universals) but the 'Idea' which includes both the concept and its concrete actualization (Hegel, *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right* §1).¹⁹ Its moments, namely, the concept and existence of actual world are neither separate ontological entities nor is there a correspondence relation among them. "The concept and its existence are two sides of the same thing" (OPR §1), namely, of the Idea. Thus, it cannot be counted as a causal structure. Rather, cognition and absolute

¹⁹ Hereafter *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right* will be referred as OPR, with Arabic num. for paragraph

knowledge interpenetrate each other: cognition is not independent from absolute knowledge and this knowledge alone doesn't contain truth independent of our cognition activity either. Truth is proposed as the combination of the aim and the journey of cognition both in and forward to it. In this sense, it can be said that truth, ontology of desire and its knowledge activity are not different domains. Desire, rather, constructs itself while knowing via determinate negation. The truth, then, refers not to the end point but the whole process.

These two-sides of the Truth, however, are subjected to temporality. For Hegel, the aim, i.e., the so-called absolute knowledge alone is just a lifeless, abstract universal and cannot be the truth unless one also considers the particular moments in the way through it, namely, the journey of philosophy. Aim of this journey is freedom: "The history of man is the history of man gaining self-consciousness through his interaction with the objective world surrounding him. This is education, *Bildung*; man becomes free" (Avineri 132). In this journey of desire, each moment shows itself in immediacy; but this immediacy is superseded by mediation of another moment. By this way, truth becomes "concrete universal" as a third moment by realization of all particular moments of cognition. In other words, it can be said that universal and concrete emerges as two different moments where the universal is actualized in concrete as a third moment throughout history. Here, it is the 'determinate negation' that governs the process that passes us from one moment to another. The journey of philosophy shows itself as a process (the exposition of knowledge) where natural consciousness moves by negating the previous model of knowledge by preserving its conclusions and rises up to a higher level until it reaches Absolute knowledge at the end (PS §2, §3, §20, §78). With determinate negation, antagonism between philosophies becomes necessary moments of our way to truth

(PS §79). In other words, every moment shows insufficiencies of just the previous model. This ‘mediation’ as a philosophical tool shows itself in every step of philosophy’s journey from our sensation of ordinary objects to the Ethical Life of a society. With this way, dialectical model of knowledge doesn’t yield despair but a progression to absolute knowledge. Reason and rationality in Hegel is also to be understood through this process. Reason in Hegel is not something given prior to movements of history but rather refers this very process of exposition of knowledge itself through time. What is rational consists the whole idea – its concept and actualization. In this sense each philosophical model that claims to be the voice of reason cannot capture whole of it but represent a part of it because,

(...) *what is*, is reason. Whatever happens, every individual is a *child of his time*; so philosophy too is its *own time apprehended in thoughts*. It is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it is to fancy that an individual can overlap his own age (OPR 15)

Other and Freedom

For Hegel, this determinate negation model first helps desire to find out its own movement principle. Here, Hegel uses the term ‘consciousness’ for desire that only knows what it negates and ‘self-consciousness’ for desire that becomes capable of reflexive thinking. It is obvious that the first immediate object of self-consciousness is ‘I’. ‘I’ want to eat, ‘I’ perceive the scene, and ‘I’ drink wine. Here this ‘I’ is nothing other than itself for self-consciousness. Thus, the matter becomes not-knowing the other but rather knowing itself. But this immediate object, namely, ‘I’ can only be understood with mediation (PS §176). Considering our relation with life is a subject-predicate relation, for Self-consciousness, it can be said that it’s this predication that makes self-consciousness understand its immediate object, ‘I’. For

Hegel, the immediacy itself is desire and self-consciousness understands it via mediation of an independent object, namely, object of Desire, which is not-I (PS §177). As Kojève briefly says, “what is other for it exists as an object without essential-reality, as an object marked with the character of a negative-entity” (Kojève 10). Since it is characterized as a prefix ‘not’, it can be said that it is, at least, less real than the immediate object, ‘I’. Desire is always directed to these unessential objects which are not-I. By destroying them, self-consciousness satisfies itself and tries to sustain its independence. In other words, it can be said that this satisfaction action aims to preserve its own existence.

At first look, this immediate negation of object through desire makes self-consciousness feel like she is authoritative on and independent of this object world. But later, she realizes independency of objects and her desire’s dependence on it. No matter how much she negate or consume, both desire and its objects cannot be negated ultimately but just the reverse – it becomes more and more dependent on the object world and this object world becomes independent (PS §175). It’s a vicious circle for self-consciousness: the more she negates the natural objects in order to be independent of them, the more natural objects show her their independency. Thus, self-consciousness “by its negative relation to the object, is unable to supersede it; it is really because of that relation that it produces the object again, and the desire as well” (PS §175). It resembles a thirsty man in the middle of an ocean. If he tries to drink water he becomes thirsty to death but cannot avoid the push inside. Hyppolite puts the lacking element nicely: “the end point of desire is not, as one might think superficially, the sensuous object-that is only a means-but the unity of the I with itself” (Hyppolite 160).

How can this 'unity' be gained? There seems to be two options for self-consciousness; either she stops to desire or, she has to find another object that gives him/her the independency she craves for. Since it is an essential form for it, the first option is not possible. What about the second one? As Pinkard puts, if the subject is to achieve satisfaction from an 'object,' there must be something that the 'object' *does* that *affirms* for the subject that it is indeed *he*, as the desiring subject, and not the object of desire who makes something into an authoritative reason for belief or action (Pinkard 52). In other words, by this way, self-consciousness needs an object that doesn't reproduce dependency of self-consciousness but gives independency to it. For Hegel, since immediate negation of objects by self-consciousness recreates them, self-consciousness can reach satisfaction if and only if this independent object negates itself on behalf of self-consciousness (PS §175).

Hegel thinks that such an object can only be another self-consciousness because self-consciousness, as a genus, is the only object that has the capacity of absolute negation (PS §177). Thus, it's this recognition of self-consciousness by another that makes the first independent. In other words, we are dependent on others in order to be independent. But this dependence is different from our dependence on objects of desire because what we desire is not an object here. Since desire is about negating, from a different angle, this can be interpreted as self-consciousness want to negate the negation. But it has to be a determinate negation of the negation since absolute negation of negation only means suicide. What gives it its determinateness is its preserving other self-consciousness' being-for-itself. Put it differently, a determinate negation of negation in recognition can only be sustained if negated object (here, other self-consciousness) has the capacity of absolute negation. The upshot here is that this process of recognition has to take place in both self-

consciousnesses: recognition must be mutual. The demonstration for this can be seen in the very process itself. This admittance of independence needs another self-consciousness and this other self-consciousness can become a complete self-consciousness only when it is recognized. Hence, in order to be set free and independent, namely, to be recognized, one also has to recognize the other: “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged” (PS §178)

When these two self-consciousnesses confront each other, they both see their selves as simple being-for-self while taking each other not as self-consciousness but just as one of the independent objects of Life (PS §186). They both know that in order to rise their self-certainty to the level of truth, they need to be recognized. As Pinkard says, each takes her own subjective point of view as being truth and she simply maps the other’s point of view onto his own, denying the validity of the other point of view when it conflicts with her own (Pinkard 56). It becomes a full recognition only after a struggle to death between two self-consciousnesses. In this struggle, one of the combatants gives up and surrenders in order to save her life. Fear of death eliminates one of them while the other is not afraid to risk her life. Since death means absolute negation of whole life for self-consciousness, one of them gives up the fight to save her life and thus, enslaved by the other (PS §188). The one who survives this struggle gains recognition and becomes the master that is a self-consciousness *for-itself*. Slave, on the other hand is not recognized and remains a self-consciousness *for-other*, for master’s self-consciousness.

But this servitude relation can make neither of them happy. In order for a self-consciousness to be independent from objects, she needs recognition of another self-consciousness who is a) a being-for-self and b) has the capacity of absolute

negation (PS §189-91). But what master confronts now, is that, the slave is neither a being-for-self nor has the capacity of absolute negation but rather a dependent individual being-for-another who also has no absolute negation power on things. Under the domination of his master, he becomes just a tool for him and one cannot talk about slave's actions because they are just the actions of his master. Even if the master is a being-for-self that is essential and pure, it cannot be said for slave anymore – he is now a being-for-other. The important point here is that it's not the pity for the slave's conditions but rather the lack of a proper moment that prevents complete recognition for the master (PS §191). The relation of the master to what surrounds him is that of a pure consumer; the hard task of transforming things and preparing them for consumption is that of the slave. As Taylor explicates, “the master's experience is of the lack of solid reality of things; the slave is the one who experiences their independence and resistance as he works on them” (Taylor 154). In other words, master's mediated negation of the object world (his enjoyment) cannot provide him the independency he needs because he eliminates slave's independent character which is necessary for recognition.

What about the slave? Is she predestined to be so miserable? Even if she chooses life and becomes a slave who is just a tool for her master's desire, Hegel says “through his service he rids himself of his attachment to natural existence in every single detail; and gets rid of it by working on it” (PS §194). This working on nature comes to a degree where he learns how to transform the objects of desire, it's “desire held in check” (PS §195). Pinkard nicely describe this opportunity as an “unintended form of independence” (Pinkard 62). By this way, she becomes conscious of what he truly is and the fear of the lord turns out to be the beginning of wisdom. It brings wisdom because “that consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in

the independent being (of the object) its *own* independence” (PS §195). Even if this independent world is external to him, it doesn’t matter because the entire world of natural objects now takes the shape of his personality, his self-consciousness. As Taylor puts, “the slave who is subject to the refractory existence of matter gradually turns the tables, turns this resistance to account by making it the standing reflection of himself as universal consciousness” (PS §195). The independent world outside her now carries the traces of her manual labor. Slave creates cities, designs machines, and produces enormous amount of goods and services that is absent in nature in its naturalness. Before, her servitude is only in relation to lordship and her self-consciousness is not for-itself but for the other, but now, by “fashioning the thing, he becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to *him*, that he himself exists essentially and actually in his own right” (PS §196).

Pinkard uses the concept of contingency in order to show how the slave becomes aware of herself. When she surrenders to the master, she learns that every bits of her own point of view is contingent, i.e., doesn’t have to be true. This is a disappointment. She was relying on his own truth but those truths didn’t make him victorious – everything becomes contingent. Then, it becomes so natural for the slave to think that master’s truths are essential. In other words, she becomes a consciousness for-other, not for-itself. But after she learns her transforming power over nature, she realizes that “this experience of the full contingency of everything is implicitly what puts him into the position to see the contingency of the master’s dominance over him” (Pinkard 61) In other words, slave, by realizing contingency of the so-called truth of the master, finds a chance to educate himself. It is her ‘chance’, because, she wouldn’t have rediscovered himself if he had not been enslaved. If her forming activity is one of the necessary conditions, so is the fear of death, namely,

her servitude. I think, it is the most striking part of Hegel's argument because, he points at the master's role in slave's development. What's the rationale for this? Let's look at Taylor: "the reversal is the more complete in that he owes his transformation to his subjection; only under the discipline of service would he have undertaken the work which has raised him above his original limits" (Taylor 157).

This transformation of the slave shows us another way for the truth of self-consciousness. While master understands (or should understand) that he needs to be recognized by a pure and essential self-consciousness in order to reach the truth of her own self-consciousness, the slave comes to the same position only she "come to see himself in the natural environment by making it over in conformity with his own project" (157) In these two different processes, it is obvious for Hegel that both need each other: the master needs the slave to realize his lacking moment and the slave needs his master in order to become aware of and build her capabilities. They liberate themselves and each other by superseding their mastery and slavery. Their situations at the beginning imply an immature moment for both of them. As Pinkard puts, "thus, neither the master, nor the slave ends up where he had intended. The dialectics of master and slave was initiated by each identifying his own project as authoritative for what counted as good reasons for belief and action, but each has now found that he cannot identify what is *his own* without reference to other's point of view – without, that is, reference to the sociality common to both" (Pinkard 62). Here we are talking about not a displacement mechanism but rather empathy to the other's position. We can understand this empathy as a determinate negation: they negate their previous role but also preserve themselves. They are different than a mere a master or a slave now. In other words, it can be said that, master and slave dialectics is an educating process for both master and slave. This struggle also

reveals another aspect of reason and freedom: For Hegel, both reason and freedom are necessarily social states – they are constructed throughout the history together.

Abstract Right and Morality

As we have seen, sociality is not a by-product but a necessary moment for individuals in the way of freedom. But sociality has many levels and even if it carries the image of truth, recognition model given in the master and slave dialectics exposes just a basic level of it. After two self-consciousnesses recognize each other as separate self-consciousnesses who are interdependently free, desire becomes truly reflexive about its own action. This reflectivity means intelligence at the same time because it becomes able to think with concepts. This is something that separates our desire from animal desire actually. As Hegel says,

We cannot have a will without intelligence (...) an animal acts on instinct, is driven by an inner impulse and so it too is practical, but it has no will, since it does not bring before its mind the object of its desire (OPR §4).

In other words, will is desire that gains capacity of thinking in abstraction. It's still a form of desire because will's basic motive doesn't disappear – the will wills to be free by negating the negation.

For Hegel, the true subject in societal level where individuals live together with many other ones is 'the will' and the subject matter of philosophy is the Idea of right i.e. "the realm of freedom made actual" (OPR §4). Exposition of the Idea of right is an experience of the will and will experiences it as moments of freedom: "the will is *free*, so that freedom is both its substance and its goal" (OPR §4). Here, the

concept of right becomes concrete and thus, freedom is actualized via moments of abstract right, morality and Ethical Life.

In the first moment of will in a society, in the abstract right sphere, freedom is taken as an abstract concept, “which means that all its determinations are contained within it; they are only implicit [*an sich*] and not yet developed to be a totality in themselves” (OPR §34). This definition defines will only from the angle of thought, which operates with mere concepts. And thought, by its nature, is limitless, universal and abstract – so is the concept of freedom it takes. From this perspective, it wills everything it wants. It is completely free and undetermined: she can eat this or that; she can be a surgeon or an engineer, etc. At this stage, will has the character of immediacy. It’s immediate because it refers directly to itself in its individuality as a pure indeterminacy – not the actual world that is always determinate (OPR §34). But this indeterminacy, for Hegel, also has a determinate character because will knows that it is this ‘I’ which is also separated from the rest of the world in various aspects.

As *this* person, I know myself to be free in myself. I can abstract from everything, since nothing confronts me save pure personality, and yet *this* person I am something wholly determinate, e.g. I am of certain age, a certain stature, I occupy this space, and so on through whatever other details you like (OPR Add. to §35)

This contradiction is an actual one. A person is a ‘simple infinity’. It contains infinite set of determinateness in a determined interval, like the infinite set of real numbers between two integers. In the abstract right, ‘I’, now is constituted in a society where everyone has already recognized the other as a self-consciousness, as a person. Other wills are perceived as other infinities between other integers and thus, like ‘I’, other persons are also abstracted from their simple infinities and everyone is installed onto the same plane. It’s a layer where everyone is treated objectively. Here, since ‘I’

objectifies itself from inter-subjective recognition, it is different than the 'I' of consciousness who takes other self-consciousness as the mere object of desire to be negated.

The main focus of rights in this moment is rather negative and it's understood with restrictions. It corresponds to the classical conception of legal and formal right: "be a person and respect others as person" (OPR §36). This moment of right has three spheres in itself through which a person translates itself into existence. First, in the first sphere, abstract right exists in the form of 'property' of things. Since "a person has a natural existence partly within himself and partly of such a kind that he is related to it as to an external world" (OPR §43), his possessions in outer world has to be respected by others. In this manner, property becomes different than possessions. This respect transforms possessions into ownership, namely, property. Property, for Hegel, is not a mere tool for satisfaction of one's own needs but a way to be recognized as a person: "the rationale of property is to be found not in the satisfaction of needs but in the suppression of the pure subjectivity of personality. In his property a person exists for the first time as reason" (OPR Add. to §41). As Westphal puts, "Hegel aimed to show that possession and other rights of property exist only on the basis of mutually recognizing the principles that constitute those rights" (Westphal 247). Thus, concept of right has to be mediated with a second sphere, which is 'contract'. On the other hand, since the actualization of terms of the contract also implies violation, these two spheres have to be supported with 'crime and punishment' which constitutes the third sphere of abstract right (OPR §56).

With this last sphere, the person reveals the insufficiency of abstract right moment. Since crime and punishment regarding violation of contract that secures everyone's property implies a possible disagreement among people and the

righteousness of only one side, will figures out his particular character, namely, its subjectivity beside the objectivity held by abstract right previously. It's not like every other person; there is something that's not shared with others. Even if the will takes itself as completely free and constitutes formal rights in order to protect everyone's rights at the beginning, it becomes apparent that, such a protection has to assume a distinction between particular wills of each. This is the moment of 'morality' which "will that is in itself returning into itself through superseding this opposition, has now itself come to be for itself and actual" (OPR §107). It's a stage where a person turns into a subject by revealing her own subjectivity that makes her so unique. In this moment, "the main thing is my insight, my intention, my purpose" (OPR §52) that is not dependent on external conditions but comes from the inside. Of course this is not a mere awareness of the inner world. She also wants to realize it. This moment of the Idea of right translates itself into existence: morality demands action (OPR §114). Thus, beside this freedom from external conditions, will also experiences a determinate moment in morality. In other words, it's at the same time exempt from these conditions and also has a determinate content: it's a self-determined action of the will. I choose to be an engineer – not a surgeon, I want not this apple but that one, etc. For Hegel, this is a higher stage in the way of freedom:

The uneducated person allows himself to be constrained in everything by brute force and natural factors (...) The educated person, however, develops an inner life and wills that he himself shall be everything he does. (OPR 110)

Like abstract right, moment of morality exposes itself in three spheres. First, particularity of the will discovers its uniqueness and this particularity is the 'purpose' of will's actions: its purpose is for will's self-interest. Immediacy of this self-interested activity is mediated within second sphere – 'intention', namely what the will is planning with this purpose. This intention signifies "the relative value of the

action in relation to me” (OPR §115). But purpose and relative value of the action needs a universal and objective ideal of ‘good’, which constitutes the third sphere (OPR §115). This objective character of good, in this sense, requires the subjectivity of a particular will to be approved by society. To sum up, it can be said that intention shows the aim of an action, the good implies how this aim is going to make the subject happy. Since it needs both self-interested activity and objective, law-like relations between action and happiness that is to be acknowledged by other individuals, Hegel defines the sphere of good as subjective universality.

As we have seen, the need for morality stems from the character of the third sphere of abstract right moment, namely, crime and punishment that refers to the particularity of every will and the abstractness of the universal person. When it comes to morality moment, the lack stems from the need for objectivity: since purpose and intention refers to one’s self interests, there needs for one needs to justify what they are good for in a society. In other words, subjective will wills its particularity to be acknowledged by others. Since it is “elevated to independent totality, then it becomes the indeterminate which ought to be determined” (OPR §151). Namely, subjectivity revealed by the moment of morality comes to a point where it suffers from its universal and therefore abstract character of subjectivity and craves for actualization. But this cannot happen inside morality. At this point, Hegel introduces ‘Ethical Life’ as the supersession of both moments of abstract right and morality:

The spheres of right and morality cannot exist independently [*für sich*]; they must have the ethical as their support and foundation, for right lacks the moment of subjectivity, while morality in turn alone possesses that moment, and consequently both right and morality lack actuality by themselves. (OPR §153)

Ethical Life: Family and Civil Society

Ethical Life, for Hegel is the moment where abstractness of the concept of right and subjective will is reconciled. In this moment, self-consciousness continues seeing everyone as a person as it does in the moment of abstract right but it doesn't require nullification of subjectivity anymore. On the other hand, while subjectivity of will is preserved as it is in morality, it doesn't conflict with others anymore. What is concrete, leaves behind its subjective one-sidedness while what is universal abandons its abstractness. Ethical Life is the moment of universal concrete becoming actualized. Good, in this moment, save itself from abstractness and becomes actualized:

Ethical Life is the *idea of freedom* in that, on the one hand, it is the living good – the good endowed in self-conscious action – while, on the other hand, self-consciousness has in the ethical realm its foundation in and for itself and its motivating end. Thus Ethical Life is the concept of freedom *developed into the existing world and the nature of self-consciousness*. (OPR §142)

Laws and institutions, which stem from the objectification of every will and treat them as respectful units by ignoring their diversity, meet morality. Now, will realizes how its subjectivity is (or can be) a part of objectivity. By this way, each subject completes each other and they form an ethical order. But this actualization is not a mere coincidence. The resultant ethical order at the same time governs individuals' lives so that every will knows and acts according to it (OPR §145). Practically, in this ethical order, objective relations, namely, laws and institutions are seen not as restrictions but as the conditions of well-being of subjects because laws and institutions are designed in a way that feeds the subjectivity of each. For individuals, there is no trust or faith to the ethical order anymore (which in a sense means that these laws and institutions are still alien and external to individuals) but an identity

relation (OPR §147). Such a relation implies that, ethical order cannot be just an aggregation of different individuals' aims but a complete interdependency of all constituents.

In Ethical Life, 'duty' of abstract right moment and 'virtue' of morality are negated while their core is preserved. Duties in Ethical Life lose their classical and restrictive character and gain constitutive and positive sense:

The truth is, however, that in duty the individual finds his liberation; first, liberation from dependence on mere natural impulse and from the depression which as a particular subject he cannot escape in his moral reflections on what ought to be and what might be; secondly, liberation from indeterminate subjectivity which, never reaching reality. (OPR §149)

Virtue in morality implies individuals' character and capabilities given by nature. In this sense, it can be contrasted with duty's external character; it requires one to obey some laws even if her subjectivity (inclinations, caprices, interests, etc.) doesn't favor such obedience. As Hegel puts, fulfillment of a duty "often seems to be something inferior" because "it finds consciousness of distinctiveness only what is *exceptional*" (OPR §150). But since an individual finds itself only when its subjectivity both constitute and is constituted by the ethical system, its exceptional character vanishes and gains validity – a virtue is a virtue insofar it conforms to the objectivity of ethical order (OPR §152).

Ethical Life itself also consists of three spheres: first, individual will finds itself in a nurturing circle, namely, 'family' in the most immediate phase. For Hegel, the basis of the family is love (OPR §158). With love, will recognizes that it is not and cannot be a self-subsistent unit without the other. This is exactly the same for the other will. Hegel's evaluation of love here resembles the resolution moment of the master and slave dialectics that he elaborates in phenomenology of the subjective spirit realm: individual will finds its independency in interdependency and both

figure out that they can become free insofar they depend on each other: “in loving, what one recognizes in the other is evidently only the other's individual independence. Thus, it might be thought that the love relationship is characterized solely by a type of recognition involving the cognitive acceptance of the other's independence” (Honneth 107). For Hegel, it's the most immediate phase for society because love teaches individual will the basis of the Idea of right by exposing how the other is vital for its freedom (OPR §158). But as Honneth indicates, “Love relationships are to be understood here as referring to primary relationships insofar as they – on the model of friendships, parent-child relationships, as well as erotic relationships between lovers – are constituted by strong emotional attachments among a small number of people” (Honneth 95). Hegel understands ‘proper’ family as heterosexual monogamy. It has to be monogamy, because only in such a marriage mutual surrender of personalities can keep symmetry and prevent unfair distribution of dependency (OPR §167). It has to be inter-sex, because women and men are different by nature. Both brings different and necessary features to the union – men come with reason, strategy that signs universality of the Idea of right while, women brings taste and elegance that marks particular and subjective parts (OPR §166). For Hegel, that is why men must be heads of families who represent it in inter-family relations and manage the funds of the family while women should be homemakers. A healthy unity of man and woman within a family, thus, constitutes the smallest rational entity that brings universality and particularity together. On the other hand, children are the embodiment of this rationality. They are born with an immediate, abstract freedom but later, through the education in family, this rationality appears to them as their very own subjectivity (OPR §175). But this dependency to parents doesn't last forever and by the dissolution of the family, fruits of rationality, namely,

children, thanks to love and caring relations together with material support of the family, gain their self-esteem and become persons before the law.

Later, this immediacy of family where the Ethical Life is still in its concept is mediated now with ‘civil society’ where children are treated as grown-ups. Now, there are communities of self-subsistent persons who leave their families behind. As Honneth puts, “this type of universal respect is not to be conceived of as an affective attitude but rather only as a purely cognitive accomplishment of comprehension, which sets almost internal limits on emotional promptings” (Honneth 110). But, even if family gives children rationality and makes them persons, it’s a fact that every grown-up still has different inclinations, needs and aims with respect to each other. Thus, it cannot be said that they are the actualization of ethical order but universality in its particular form (OPR §181). Civil society is a sphere where these particulars that are self-subsistent are still dependent on each other and have to interact in order to maintain their satisfactions. However, on contrary to family, these interactions are now external to them – others are means for particular ends (OPR §182).

Civil society is the free market where diverse and unequal abilities of self-interested individuals interplay in order to satisfy the diverse needs of the whole society (OPR §182). Here, people start to produce for others’ need in order to satisfy their own needs and value of their work is determined via supply and demand mechanism. However, civil society is not a linear aggregation of given needs. Even if there are some universal needs like food and clothing, total outcomes of the market also influence the shape of individual needs practically. Here, while increased exchange relationships lead everyone to meet with and create different objects of desire and new ways of satisfaction, hidden hand of market mechanism which produce a balance of supply and demand forces them to focus only on a limited

number of needs in a given time. In other words, society as a whole widens its needs and opportunities while sorting them out into a few due to practical abstraction process (OPR Add. to §189). Since needs have no limits by definition and people produce for others' needs in order to achieve satisfaction of their own needs, each production activity is take place to increase the profit. Here, what leads a profit for a producer is its ability to create the most appealing needs for society and objects that satisfies them:

When civil society is in a state of unimpeded activity, it is engaged in expanding internally in population and industry. The amassing of wealth is intensified by generalizing (a) the linkage of men by their needs, and (b) the methods of preparing and distributing the means to satisfy these needs, because it is from this double process of generalization that the largest profits are derived. (OPR §243)

For Hegel, since needs are now determined not only by natural needs but also by opinions abstracted from every particularity, this process means a liberation for individuals from the restrictions of nature (OPR §190). In this way, the edges of particular characteristics of individuals are also rubbed off and they become educated according the universality of Ethical Life (OPR §187). With this process, as Westphal indicates, individuals take an important step for their autonomy:

One of Hegel's most brilliant insights is how the development of commerce contributes to the development of human enculturation, a collective process whereby we liberate ourselves from our naturally given needs and desires. Political economy is thus crucial for overcoming natural heteronomy and to achieving autonomy. (Westphal 246)

Division of labor that civil society requires is actualized by the market mechanism and through long-term and reciprocal relations, people are divided into social classes according to their abilities. These abilities don't come only with birth, education, property, or other natural circumstances but with a contingent complex of them.

They tested and become actual in the market:

The infinitely complex, crisscross, movements of reciprocal production and exchange, and the equally infinite multiplicity of means therein employed, become crystallized, owing to the universality inherent in their content, and distinguished into general groups. As a result, the entire complex is built up into particular systems of needs, means, and the types of work relative to these needs, modes of satisfaction and of theoretical and practical education, i.e. into systems, to one or other of which individuals are assigned - in other words, into class-divisions. (OPR §201)

Given the contingent nature of ability sets in civil society, market produces qualitatively different classes – an agricultural class that is mostly bound to what nature gives and thus, inclined to subservience and a business class that is creative and mediates between people’s work and society’s needs with its free mind (OPR §203-4).

Even if civil society is a necessary moment for the formation of a universal will and freedom, Hegel admits that a properly functioning civil society is destined to create poverty due to its class-based structure. As we have seen, there is no limit for needs and everybody seeks for their own end in civil society. In such a market, the only rule of work for everyone becomes maximization of profit in order to satisfy desires more by creating new needs and appealing objects of desire. But since skilled ones are better at production of objects of needs and in associating them with needs, the profit of one group means loss for the other group²⁰:

When social conditions tend to multiply and subdivide needs, means and enjoyments indefinitely - a process which, like the distinction between natural and refined needs, has no qualitative limits - this is luxury. In this same process, however, dependence and want increase ad infinitum, and the material to meet this is permanently barred to the needy man because it consists of external objects with the special character of being property, the

²⁰ At this point, one may argue that when the volume of market is expanding, profit of one doesn’t have to mean a loss for others. However, Hegel rejects the idea of ahistorical and fixed level of subsistence. For him, poverty (and loss) is not about not being able to satisfy some basic needs but rather not being able to reach the existing balance of needs, which can increase or decrease year by year. (OPR §195) Thus, as Avineri rightly puts, “poverty, according to Hegel, grows in proportionate ratio to growth of wealth; they are the two aspects of a zero-sum equation, and poverty in one quarter is the price society pays for wealth in another” (Avineri 148).

embodiment of the free will of others, and hence from his point of view its recalcitrance is absolute. (OPR §195)

For Hegel, this process, together with other contingent circumstances (physical conditions, etc.) can create a predicament where we have “rabblés of paupers” who are forced to live under subsistence level on the one hand while it “concentrates of disproportionate wealth in a few” on the other (OPR §201, 241-4). Such an asymmetrical distribution of resources bears the risk of tension in the society insomuch that rabblés can lose their self-esteem and harm the riches and free-market system. At this point, Hegel faces with a dilemma as Avineri rightly puts:

If he leaves the state out of economic activity, an entire group of civil society members is going to be left outside it; but if he brings in the state in a way that would solve the problem, his distinction between civil society and the state would disappear, and the whole system of mediation and dialectical progress towards integration through differentiation would collapse. (Avineri 151)

Thus, Hegel proposes that civil society needs a government that seeks for interests of both classes but would not be external to civil society. Such a government should not take coercive measures but rather conducts supervision. On the other hand, each class should trust and internalize this role while checking it at the same time. With this way, external character of civil society should be superseded in order to maintain the universal contained within the particular. After family and civil society; it's the last sphere of Ethical Life that making universal concrete.

Ethical Life: The State

As Hegel clearly explicates, his concept of the state has nothing to do with a particular and historical institution or government. Rather, he is “dealing exclusively with the philosophical science of the state” (OPR §258). The State is defined as the

moment where the ethical idea, idea of right and freedom gains substantiality both in knowledge and activity (OPR §257). It has the rationality in its full meaning because; on contrary of rationality of subjective will which is in itself or in its concept before, particular point of views of individuals gains a universal and objective character not abstractly but actually now: “the state is rational in and for itself inasmuch as it is the actuality of the substantial will which it possess in the particular self-consciousness now rises to its universality in the state” (OPR §258). In Hegel not a general but a universal will shows itself in every individual so that every particular will thinks and acts according to that universal idea. Thus, in Ethical Life, people now internalize the role of government insomuch that there is no need for an external contract between the state and its citizens. This internalization means not a subjection but freedom in its true sense: individuals are now not obstacles to each other but realizes that they compliment each other’s needs and abilities so that liberation of an individual is depend on the liberation of the whole society. Idea of right, therefore, passing through the moments of concept and actualization, becomes concretely universal. Pure and determinate moments of freedom of will are also superseded and become concrete.

The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. But *concrete freedom* consist in this, that personal individuality and its particular interest not only achieve their complete development and gain recognition of their right for itself (as they do in the sphere of the family and civil society) but, for one thing, they also pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal, and, for another thing, they know and will the universal; they even recognize it as their own substantial spirit; they take it as their end and aim and are active in its pursuit. (OPR §260)

Immediate character of the family, which shows itself through feeling and care, is mediated with the self-subsistent personhood of civil society and both sphere gain the universal character with the state where is a new relation between individuals and the whole society is established:

The state, then, is based on rational freedom, organized in such a way as to enable each to realize his freedom in conjunction with others, while in civil society one can realize one's ends only by disregarding everyone else's aims. Hence the purely individualistic concept of freedom, which maintains no limits on one's arbitrary choice, has to be superseded by the ethical order which makes my freedom dependent on that of the other. (Avineri 179)

In practice, Hegel's Ethical Life where three spheres (the family, civil society and the state) are interpenetrated provides us a politically layered picture of society. But, politics here is not to be taken in its classical senses – concerns about sovereignty and arguments about democracy, monarchy and aristocracy are taken as 'old questions', for Hegel. They seem irrelevant with the issue, because, all takes sovereignty as an issue of mere aggregation of isolated individuals where the universal is not actualized in every particular through the required moments. They are just about numbers and numbers has nothing to do with rationality in and for itself:

The ancient division of constitutions into monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, is based upon the notion of substantial, still undivided, unity, a unity which has not yet come to its inner differentiation (to a developed, internal organization) and which therefore has not yet attained depth or concrete rationality (...) Purely quantitative distinctions like these are only superficial and do not afford the concept of the thing. (OPR §273)

Hegel's argument here is based on the distinction between virtue and self-consciousness that emerge as a rational law. Virtue, in its classical sense, is taken as a disposition of a particular will given by nature, as Hegel discusses in morality section. Thus, for Hegel, to build a constitution or transfer of sovereign rights to people is to vote for their virtue and this is an immature point of view since morality (i.e., aggregate of virtues) always leads to conflicts when it comes to sovereignty. From this point of view, there's no difference between classical monarchy and aristocracy since they are based on so-called superior virtues of some. On the other hand, democracy is not an alternative either. In democracy, aggregation of

everyone's virtues is thought to give best form of sovereignty but since people are not equal in virtue, it still lacks:

Another presupposition of the idea that all should participate in the business of the state is that *everyone has an understanding of this business* – a ridiculous notion, however commonly we may hear it put forward. (OPR §308)

Hence, no matter how many people governs the state, voting in virtue represents an immature phase of society. Instead, “a form of rational law other than the form of disposition is required, because virtue in the heads of the state is not enough” (OPR §273).

This ‘rational law for Hegel, shows the need for a ‘universal class’ that is capable of taking required measures for development of the commonwealth.²¹ But instead of ‘voting in person/s’ like in monarchy, aristocracy or democracy, rational law underlying the Ethical Life stands on ‘trust’. According to Hegel, voting is based on particular virtues given by nature while in trust “the principle of the individual subjective will disappears, since trust is placed in a thing, in a person’s principles, or his demeanour or his conduct or his concrete sense in generally” (OPR §309). On contrary to vote, trust is based “not on nature but on their *objective qualities* [emphasize added – *O.C.*]. Ability, skill, character, all belong to an individual in *his particular* capacity. He must be educated and be trained to a particular task” (OPR Add. to § 277).

As we know, in civil society, via market and property-based social production, everyone’s abilities and needs gain an objective character after infinite numbers of social interactions and as a result, division of labor and social classes emerge (OPR §201). However, even if competencies and needs gain an objective

²¹ ‘The State’ and ‘government’ are not the same, for Hegel: “He called the government the ‘strictly political state’ and reserved the term ‘state’ for the whole of a civilly and politically well-organized society” (Westphal 259). Government, in this sense, refers to the universal class.

character in civil society, it's still a result of interaction of classes that seeks only their own good. For Hegel, it is the third class – bureaucratic, universal class that remedies necessary sufferings of market-based civil society and binds the community together: it “has for its task the universal interests of the community” (OPR §205). On contrary to the first two, universal class “does not have its own interests as the aim of its activities but is motivated by the interests of society as a whole” (Avineri 158). In other words, it reconciles other two class' interests for the commonwealth. Since they don't have their own interest but universal ones, manners of this class stem from not subjective virtues but objective qualities that can be gained through a universal education and holistic point of view. In other words, they're educated in a way that they always think of the commonwealth of the society. That's why other classes 'trusts' this class. Membership to this class doesn't come from family or wealth either. As Hegel strictly puts, “functions and the powers of the state cannot be private property (...) hence an office may not be saleable or hereditary” (OPR §277, Add. to §277, §291). Such rejection of hereditary rights to govern the state provides transitivity of sovereign rights also: “it guarantees to every citizen the chance of joining the class of civil servants” (OPR §291). Trusting on universal class, then, becomes not a subjection to privileged ones but opens the door for a society where everyone can hold public offices insofar they are educated accordingly.

Anyway, the universal class is not alone in the administration of the society. Even if they're educated in a way that they think for the benefit of the whole, in order not to fall into despotism, there has to be a mediation between civil society and government (OPR Add. to §307). Otherwise, government remains external to the public and this creates a regulative tension between authority and society. An assembly of representatives of fundamental classes in civil society provides this

mediation. It's these classes where organized individuals of civil society classes explicate their own benefits: "Regarded as a mediating organ, the Estates [classes – *O.C.*] stand between the government in general on the one hand and the nation broken up into particulars (people and associations) on the other" (OPR §309). In other words, this mediation provides an opportunity for individuals to raise their voice against the universal class and thus, prevents citizens from falling apart from the state's decisions while it also keeps universal consciousness on track via continuous feedbacks. As a result, in this process, we cannot talk about power struggles or mere despotism but everybody's acceptance of the extension of their own powers and a voluntary calibration of diversified interests of these power groups accordingly:

In the structure of Hegel's political system, an interdependence of the various members of the organism is a necessary prerequisite for its proper functioning. The integrated state Hegel has in mind is a pluralistic structure in which corporations, assemblies of estates and other bodies jointly regulate each other, so that out of the warring interests of civil society, integration, leading to the state, may emerge. (Avineri 167)

Honneth evaluates this pluralistic integration in the mature form of ethical life from a similar point. For him, such a sociality is based on solidarity where people recognize each other symmetrically: "to esteem one another symmetrically means to view one another in light of values that allow the abilities and traits of the other to appear significant for shared praxis" (Honneth 129). In this way, everyone cares the others' roles in this integrated totality and this reciprocal acknowledgement makes people feel that they're important for the whole – not a mere part of it.

In conclusion, it can be said that Hegel's Ethical Life represents the moment where freedom attains the highest level for both society and the citizens. This integrated, rational society provides freedom and autonomy for all its citizens since everyone can realize and empower their own nature in accordance with others. This

integration doesn't stem only from duty or virtue – it comes with the superseding of both moments. Thus, abstractness of theoretical reason that excludes desire and diversity of subjectivities that leads to conflicts are not problems for the social and political existence of desire. In Ethical Life, both spheres are superseded and individual will now thinks, feels, wants and acts according to the universal will because, as Hegel said, “what happens here by inner necessity occurs at the same time by the mediation of the arbitrary will, and to the conscious subject it has the shape of being the work of his own will” (OPR §206).

CHAPTER IV

ETHICAL LIFE VS. DEMOCRACY

Although they share the same perspective regarding the importance of desire and its socio-political character, in the final analysis, Spinoza and Hegel proposes different models regarding the social and political context that liberates the individual desire. However, it appears that Hegel's Ethical Life carries the risk of mistaking obedience and subjection as freedom while Spinoza provides more liberatory account of sociality in terms of individual freedom. In this chapter, I present criticism that Marx, Foucault and Butler bring to conception of freedom in Hegel's Ethical Life and try to understand what causes Hegel have done such a mistake. Then, I try to show how Spinoza's conception of society as a liberatory context is immune to these criticisms and how it provides a better understanding regarding individual freedom in this manner.

Recognition and Subjection

As we have seen, in Ethical Life, after becoming self-esteemed individuals due to care and love provided by the family sphere, in the sphere of civil society, people get rid of their chains that tie them to mere biological needs and abilities through market mechanism of social production in civil society. In such a society, thanks to the system of needs, self-subsistent and self-interested people who were grown in a caring and loving family are divided into social classes according to their different

abilities but they at the same time recognize others' subjectivity as necessary for life. Finally, Hegel employs the concept of the state in order to remedy the sufferings stemming from civil society in which the idea of totality is internalized by all and thus, the bourgeoisie of civil society become citizens. This recognition mechanism is enacted under the supervision of the universal class (government) that does not seek for their particular ends but of the whole society. Here, we see that universal class', namely, governments' role is nothing but a supervision, which has to be checked by representatives, namely, assembly of classes: "a rational state and its government are obliged to secure the conditions for the success of individual actions; they are not obliged to secure success itself, and so not the happiness it brings" (Westphal 243). In this manner, it can be said that in Ethical Life, the true autonomy belongs to civil society and universal class is just a functionary to help civil society sustain itself – universal class' supervision is not seen as coercive, but helpful to agricultural and business classes, together with their corporations.

At this point, it can be said that individuals attain freedom through class-structure of the market since these classes because, Hegel thinks that an individual gains content and thus, achieves recognition by others only by becoming a subject in a social class:

When we say that a man must be a "somebody", we mean that he should belong to some specific social class, since to be a somebody means to have a substantive being. A man with no class is a mere private' person and his universality is not actualized. (OPR Add. to §207)

Thus, since classes are nothing beyond clusters of these actualized ability sets, one's tested abilities determine which class she belongs to in a given time. Here, for Hegel, a particular person's abilities are a complex function of contingent factors like property, biological heredity, education and other material circumstances (OPR §200, §206) but they can actualize only when they are tested and objectified in

market-exchange process. In other words, only insofar an individual starts to work in civil society; she realizes her own ‘distinct’ nature and finds what she really is capable of. In this manner, they are not hereditary in the strict sense. Such practical definition of abilities opens the possibility of mobilization between classes in Hegel. Thus, since these abilities help one to objectify its own subjectivity in universality, Hegel thinks that one gains recognition from both one’s own eyes and in the eyes of others only insofar she becomes a member of a class (OPR §207).

However, Marx criticizes the causal relation that Hegel established between abilities, class membership and income. According to Marx, neither property is just a mere co-efficient in ability function nor ability is a factor determining economical profit. Factually, what determines one’s class and income level is not his ability but his property in the first place:

The capitalist mode of production, for example, rests on the fact that the material conditions of production are in the hands of non-workers in the form of property in capital and land, while the masses are only owners of the personal condition of production, of labor power. If the elements of production are so distributed, then the present-day distribution of the means of consumption results automatically. (Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme* 11–2)

In fact, Marx thinks that economy has nothing to do with the interaction of so-called independent and skillful producers. What is given is rather oppressive relations where we have a propertyless class who has nothing to sell but its labor power in order to subsist on the one hand and those who hold the capital and wealth on the other. Besides, Marx also rejects Hegel’s view that prioritizes needs (demands) as the source of profit. Even if the classical economists has determined the source of all economic value in labor (Marx, *Karl Marx: Selected Writings* 549), it’s Marx, who manages to show the inner causality of how the capitalist exploits living workers by appropriating the surplus value created by them in the production process. It’s both

the creation of surplus value and the accumulation process of capital that obscures the role of capital in the subjection process. This is why Hegel is mistaken together with the classical economists. According to Marx's surplus value theory, even if the value of a commodity is measured not with the supply and demand in the long-run but with socially necessary amount of labor that workers put in, capitalist takes advantage of bargaining disadvantages of workers and treats their labor-power as a commodity. He then pays only exchange value (which is a subsistence wage) for their labor-power and the remaining surplus becomes the profit (Marx, *Capital* 128, 271, 274). Thus, capitalist's profit doesn't stem from the satisfaction of consumers' needs, but from the labor process itself.

Historically speaking, this appropriation first takes the form of formal appropriation where appropriators appropriate the final products of independent artisans by making them debtors (Marx, *Capital* 1019–20). Then the form the real appropriation starts where in large factories capitalists take full control of the labor-process and transform workers into servile proletariat, who have no other choice to subsist. In this period, means of production, which are the product of old labor, but owned by capitalist, appear as the most important part of the process and start to dominate the owners of living labor by creating an impression that capital itself has an ability to create new value (1023–4). This exploitation process is not a matter of personality, but rather a structurally necessary movement of capital. In this sense, a capitalist is just a personified capital (Marx, *Karl Marx: Selected Writings* 429). Hence, Hegel's business class that has a 'natural tendency' and task "essentially on the mediation of one man's needs and work with those of the other" (OPR §204), refers to this appropriator class. So-called 'mediation', on the other hand, refers to the appropriation of freshly created surplus value of others' labor. The crucial point

here is that neither people become wage-laborers because they are not skilled enough to manage a business, nor business people are in charge of the business due to their abilities. In other words, division of labor is hugely a result of the given property relations rather than one's physical and mental skills and abilities regarding work.

Furthermore, insofar as patterns of capitalist production relations are reproduced, skills and abilities start to become functions of property of workers in a negative way. With the introduction of machines into the labor process and with the increasing complexity of production, not only surplus-value creation becomes obscured, but also science stands before labor as something limiting workers' capabilities. As Marx puts,

The implements of labor, in the form of machinery, necessitate the substitution of natural forces for human force, and the conscious application of science, instead of rule of thumb. In Manufacture, the organization of the social labor-process is purely subjective; it is a combination of detail laborers; in its machinery system, modern industry has a productive organism that is purely objective, in which the laborer becomes a mere appendage to an already existing material condition of production. (Marx, *Capital* 508)

In other words, factories are places where these tools become so indifferent to abilities of users that while "in handicrafts and manufacture, the worker makes use of a tool; in the factory, the machine makes use of him" (548). This process, thus, degenerates workers' abilities, even if he creates the whole with her labor:

It is true that labor produces for the rich wonderful things – but for the worker it produces privation. It produces palaces – but for the worker, hovels. It produces beauty – but for the worker, deformity (...) It produces intelligence – but for the worker, idiocy, cretinism. (Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* 71)

These relations, then, far from being a manifestation and objectification of the particular natures of individuals, limit the options of the individuals and restrain them into specific roles and incomes while provide a fortune to others with non-work, thanks to their property.

From this perspective, beside power relations in work-life of civil society, Hegel's ignorance about the dynamics of division of labor also leads him to see family and the gender roles in it as given. But far from being a natural division of labor, this family, sexuality and gender models are already outcomes of division of labor constituted by power relations.

Furthermore, Hegel's notions of family and gender roles can also be evaluated from the perspective of a similar subjection process instead of accepting them as reflections of inner nature. As we have seen, Hegel sees marriage as a necessary moment in social life and praises ideal marriage as heterosexual monogamy. In a similar vein, roles of father and mother are justified by their natural abilities – since man has the capacity of objective reasoning and strategic planning, he has to be the head of the family. Woman, on the other hand, as the bearer of taste and elegance, should be the mother of her children and take care of them. But contrary to this naturalized picture, it can be said that formation of family and gender roles in a family are related with the oppression relations in production process. As Mies indicates, the notion of family as we know it today first emerges in the bourgeois class in order for Big White Men who dominate distant nations and also appropriate the surplus value of working class to keep the state, kinship and heritage safe (Mies 104). According to Mies, due to constant flow of luxuries from distant nations into Europe via colonization process, women emancipated from their economic and sexual independence started to build an “inner world” in their house by domestication and privatization of luxury which led to the creation of the housewife as a class (103). On the other side, due to the increasing need for reproducing the working class, bourgeoisie forced proletariat via church and legislation to marry and reproduce new workers for the production system because,

family, as an institution, had never existed among propertyless men and women (105). Abolishment of the marriage prohibition for propertyless people and criminalization of sexuality before marriage were some of the measures for guaranteeing the establishment of nuclear family among the proletariat (106).

However, working-class' and women's subjection process does not take place only through such coercive mechanisms and it becomes not limited to economic sphere either. In contemporary times, people also start to reproduce their subjections in daily practices themselves voluntarily. At this point, Foucault's analysis of power may help us to understand this side of subjection.²² Especially after the increase in production there emerges the necessity of calculation, planning and an increase in the efficiency of proletariat, productivity and other parameters in the production process in order to accumulate the capital. But, as expected, this increased production level and proletarianization of masses creates new needs for capital. In this age, where sovereign power becomes 'disciplinary power', bodies became controlled by surveillance, hierarchies, inspections, bookkeeping, reports, serializations and alignment for the efficient management of economy (Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended* 242). According to Foucault, in the second half of the eighteenth century, a new form of power (bio-power) superseded disciplinary power. Unlike disciplinary power, "the new non-disciplinary power is applied not to man-as-body but to the living man, to man-as-living-being; ultimately, if you like, to man-as-species" (242). But in bio-political era, rather, this subjection operates not with "a juridical rule derived from sovereignty, but a discourse about a natural rule, or in other words a norm" (38). Unlike law, norms can be adopted easily because norms refer to a self-

²² Even if it's true that Foucault only takes power in formal, methodological character and elaborates it as a fluid mechanism that has no locus, we use it here as 'power of master' for the sake of our argument.

authoritative structure with an emotional component. In other words, since norms are basic constituents of subjects, it becomes a more efficient way to control individuals directly. This power creates subjects via norms and truths.

This form of power that applies itself to immediate everyday life categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize him. It is a form of power that makes individuals subjects. (Foucault, *Power: The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. 3* 331).

Thus, at first, by coercive measures and later, by defining norms regarding labor, ability, sexuality and gender (and of course, by changing them perpetually), individuals become subjects of new desires. Especially, considering the role of sex and psychiatric medicine in our lives, it's not hard to imagine how power can operate so much easier when it functions on norms regarding these aspects of life.

This is the most dangerous way of subjection because it erases its trace by producing consent for existing oppressive relations. In a sense, it helps people to internalize and reproduce their misery. But if people are already subjected, then to talk about recognition of an identity becomes a bogus since there's no locus to be recognized. What there is, has already transformed according to power relations.

Regarding gender, Butler puts it clearly:

(...) the juridical formation of language and politics that represents women as "the subject" of feminism is itself a discursive formation and effect of a given version of representational politics. And the feminist subject turns out to be discursively constituted by the very political system that is supposed to facilitate its emancipation. This becomes politically problematic if that system can be shown to produce gendered subjects along a differential axis of domination or to produce subjects who are presumed to be masculine. In such cases, an uncritical appeal to such a system for the emancipation of "women" will be clearly self-defeating. (Butler, *Gender Trouble* 4)

Instead, as Butler suggests, identity is to be taken not as the manifestation of a hidden essence, but as the results of actual performances formed by power: "gender is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts proceed;

rather, it is an identity tenuously constituted in time -an identity instituted through a stylized repetition of acts” (Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory” 519). We can broaden this formulation to other sides of identity, like abilities and competencies: one’s abilities are constructed through a stylized repetition of acts in the labor process of capitalistic production relations. Thus, no point in identity formation is exclusive of power relations.

At this point, it can be argued that it wouldn’t be fair to blame Hegel with sexism and a heteronormative mindset, since neither a visible LGBTI movement, nor a feminist critique of gender were present in his time. Nevertheless, Honneth claims that even if Hegel’s thoughts about gender role are highly influenced from his time’s patriarchal model of the bourgeois family, it is possible to get rid of it and reach the core of his argument:

Once this misdirected concretization is removed, an idea remains (...): in the tense balance between fusion and ego-demarkation, the resolution of which is part of every successful form of primary relationship, subjects mutually experience themselves to be loved in their individuality only insofar as they are not afraid of being alone. (Honneth 176)

Similarly, Foucault’s analysis of bio-power in contemporary times may be said to be irrelevant with Hegel’s age where coercive and disciplinary power still reign.

However, first of all, regarding family and gender issues, even if we admit that there is a positive essence in the family section that we can sort through as Honneth claims, this apology doesn’t alter the fact that Hegel attributes well-defined roles to genders. Considering how these roles take central place in defining our identities in our daily practices, it cannot be accepted as a little mistake that we can adjust by ignoring some parts in one of Hegel’s major works. Second, regarding the charge of anachronism argument, we can say that considering a philosopher like Hegel, who

claims to reveal unfolding principles and laws of movement of history, it wouldn't be misguided to explore whether these so-called principles work in times that he hadn't foreseen. If philosopher is a child of his time, as these criticisms show, so is Hegel. Thus, far from being not fair, criticisms of Marx, Foucault, Mies and Butler enforce the subjection thesis – they show how people can be subjected to think in a certain way due to their era's power relations so much that even a great philosopher like Hegel writes tens of paragraphs in order to justify the gender roles and the family institution.

As a result, it can be said that Hegel's family and civil society doesn't represent social conditions of true freedom for individuals but rather institutional manifestations of their servitude. Thus, once these unequal distribution of property conditions and gender roles are justified by Hegel, poverty, sexism and heteronormativity resulting in Ethical Life cannot be remedied completely with his introduction of a universal class either because what the universal class thinks of, by definition, cannot destroy the superior role of men and business class which is the cause of poverty and discrimination in the first place since it takes this sexist and class-based society as a given and legitimizes its continuation. In other words, what universal class can do is at best to take measures against the creation of a rabble of paupers whose incomes goes below the subsistence level and against most brutal violence against women and LGBTI's but this is merely a means to protect the continuation of family and market-based civil society. Then, what the state in Ethical Life can do, at most, is to recover the brute extremisms in power-asymmetry with a limited remedy. In the final analysis, it turns out that internalization of 'universal will' via the state cannot be more than the internalization of fundamental sufferings

by oppressed class and gender.²³ In a sense Hegel's system does not annihilate, but keeps the voluntary servitude where the subject may not be aware of his servitude to others because "what happens here by inner necessity occurs at the same time by the mediation of the arbitrary will, and to the conscious subject it has the shape of being the work of his own will" (OPR §206).

Recognizing Causes

In fact, the reason for Hegel's mistaking the subjection of individuals in Ethical Life as the true manifestation of liberatory sociality is rooted at his conceptualization of the abstract right moment. Outcomes of obedience relations in master and slave struggle are not healed but protected in abstract right and morality moments and this causes Hegel to justify asymmetrical power relations.

In master and slave struggle, when a self-consciousness becomes the slave of a master's self-consciousness, as Hegel also admits, her own needs, definitions and actions become master's actions and this subjection in turn determines who one is insofar it continues. Moreover, even when the slave becomes stronger by working on the object world by her own labor, this doesn't make her liberated but she continues to be subjected because the conditions of her labor is already determined by the master. In other words, identity of the slave, from the beginning of her servitude to the dawn of her Hegelian salvation via recognition is constituted by master's desire - it's the master who wants her to work on the object world in a way that he wants. When she stands up against the master with the intention of being equals, what she already has a subjected desire. If there is no locus for the slave's desire that she can

²³ This is in line with the left-Hegelian critique of right-Hegelians. What is actual is not only rational but it also has irrational aspects.

turn back to satisfy after mutual recognition and if this subjection process is already a reflection of asymmetrical power relations, then, it can be said that Hegel's subjects, who finally recognize each other reciprocally, can, in fact, find nothing to recognize beyond an abstract personhood.

In fact, Hegel appears to be aware of this when he says that the idea of freedom is in its abstractness yet. She can be everything she wants. Besides, the mutual recognition gained at the end of it can be counted as a proceeding because people who has struggled with each other before are now starting to care about each other by assuming that they are equals. What's wrong with this? Why does it have to be a bad thing? Isn't this new intention sufficient for liberation? Then, it may be argued that this pure indeterminacy of the will, which is donated with this unique sight can liberate both her own and the master's consciousness. Regarding this issue Du Bois shows how this subjection process donates her with a double self-consciousness, which gives her the chance to establish a new world with his unique perspective:

After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world,—a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. (Du Bois 8)

It's to be admitted that Hegel is right in asserting that such a unique perspective of the slave has a liberating core inside. At least, there is an intention to be equally free persons. Nevertheless, Du Bois claims the slave has this integrative intention: "He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American,

without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his face” (Du Bois 9).

The liberating function of slave’s unique perspective has inspired many philosophers from Marx to Feminist standpoint epistemologies other than Du Bois and there’s an extensive literature about this issue. However, if we don’t stop at this point and follow Hegel’s *Outlines of Philosophy of Right*, we unfortunately witness the disappearance of this liberating core because, Hegel doesn’t take the issue of equality emerged in the dawn of abstract right moment radically enough and thus, misses the chance to see its liberatory potentials.

For Hegel, through labor, one finds the chance to externalize her self-consciousness. Thus, recognizing a person requires recognizing the products of her labor, namely, her property also. In the abstract right moment, than, right to property, which is protected by laws (contract and punishment), is taken to be fundamental. Here, Hegel seems to consider property in isolation – it’s assumed as a natural outcome of one’s own labor rather than being the outcome of social relation. But it seems unrealistic to envisage such a pre-social formulation of labor and property in any period of history even from Hegel’s perspective. As we have seen, people in the abstract right moment have passed through the master and slave struggle where their labor property relations and self-consciousness have already been formed in a social context. In other words, prior to the right to property, wealth and labor roles have already been distributed – propertyless slave formed the object world that master owns. What we have at the end of this struggle and at the dawn of abstract right is, again, asymmetrical distribution of property ownership, plus an intention of both sides to be equals. Thus, such a limited formulation of equality where people recognize each other merely through their existence as abstract individuals rather

than through class relations, questioning and balancing its material conditions, obviously, rather continues to reproduce the previous inequalities (and starts to produce new ones) for those who have already been propertyless. Thus, as Butler argued, the legal layer established after the so-called recognition means the continuation of their oppression in a different form: “In effect, the law produces and then conceals the notion of ‘a subject before the law’ in order to invoke that discursive formation as a naturalized foundational premise that subsequently legitimates that law’s own regulatory hegemony” (Butler, *Gender Trouble* 5).

After the abstract right, Hegel takes morality as the moment where undetermined (and thus, abstractly free) will become determined. In this moment, for Hegel, people discover their particularity and reach the other moment of the idea of freedom by being determined. Here, what he misses is the fact that the will is not so undetermined in abstract right moment – it is already a function of existing property relations. Once equality is taken in such a loose sense in abstract right, then, far from healing the inequality in the way of freedom, the moment of morality becomes nothing but the process of embodiment of these power asymmetries remaining from the previous moment. In this manner, it can be said that morality is not a moment where an individual, who is previously a slave, discovers her own ‘inner’ subjectivity. Rather, what she can discover at this point is limited to what her previous material conditions let her.

Thus, upcoming Ethical Life with its family, civil society and state cannot be a concretization of the idea of freedom in its true sense as Hegel intended, but becomes rather a continuation of asymmetrical power relations while justifying them, as critics show. Consequently, it can be said that Hegel’s abstract right, morality and Ethical Life moments where the idea of freedom realizes itself in a

sense justify the asymmetrical power relations and is unable to see the real liberating core inside mutual recognition because instead of providing equal liberty in all its aspects by deconstructing the substructure of power relations that are embodied in property, gender roles, etc., he chooses to see these institutions as the expressions of true freedom. As Markell clearly indicates, this involves rather a “‘misrecognition’ of a different and deeper kind: not the misrecognition of an identity, either one’s own or someone else’s, but the misrecognition of one’s own fundamental situation or circumstances” (Markell 5).

Hegel cannot provide us a proper understanding of our potentials because he ignores the role of power relations after the master-slave struggle. Thus, Hegel leaves us with unanswered questions about what could a subject have been if she had different subjection conditions. For example, what would have happened and which type of individuals would women/LGBTIs/working class become if they have not been subordinated? Such questions, besides being mere reflections about the past, also provoke envisagement of an alternative future. Since the causes of future are taking place today, thinking about different future alternatives has a constitutive character regarding today’s practices. This openness carries the core of deconstructing today’s inequalities and reconstructing our material conditions in a way that provide equal liberty for all of us such that we realize our true potentials. But, unfortunately, Hegel’s system doesn’t allow to deconstruction of the existing structures. For example, even if Hegel provides the chance for one to change her social class (if not the gender), her historical subjection usually doesn’t allow this in practice and moreover, even if she can, this remains an exception and the class-based structure of Ethical Life that reproduces asymmetrical identity formation conditions continuously remains intact because, it’s simply the form in which Hegel’s rational

law moves. In a sense, there is a necessary course of freedom and this course necessarily creates this social stratification in the society.

Unlike Hegel, Spinoza doesn't draw a necessary and well-defined path for how freedom has to take place in advance and this lets us think of different circumstances that we increase our power of acting and change existing conditions accordingly. One may argue against this formulation by pointing how Spinoza rejects contingency and free will and adopts every movement as necessary. Here, it's to be seen that Spinoza rejects contingency ontologically – not epistemologically. Since the adequacy of one's ideas always has to be limited due to her finitude, it's not possible for anyone, and even for Spinoza, to draw a necessary and well-defined path for history and freedom. In this sense, every attempt to know has destined to be a reflection from a limited point of view only. As we have seen, for Spinoza, no one can be restrained so much that she gives up her sovereign rights completely – people eventually revolt against tyrants to become freer by increasing their power of acting. Even if these revolts don't have to produce necessary, well-defined and gradual stages of mutual recognition as in Hegel, they let Spinoza envisage how desire can be free. Thus, what Spinoza does is to give approximations and guiding principles about the conditions of a free society based on his premises. In other words, to repeat McShea, Spinoza's visions "is a purely rational exercise in human relations" (85).²⁴ But this rational exercise should not be confused with the concept of duty. As we have seen, becoming active is not just a mere thinking in Spinoza. In order to be rational, body and mind have to experience enough joyful encounters so that "by

²⁴ It can be said that neither philosophers propose a difference between is and ought (see p.30, 43) but they take different point of views regarding the future anyway. In Spinoza, the future will be a product of today's necessities but it's not open to us. It's not something we can know today because nobody knows what a body can do exhaustively. This is in-line with Spinoza's stance that takes knowledge prior to method – no method can reveals future prior to its actualization. Hegel, however, draws a clearer picture regarding his confidence on his method.

increasing our power of active thinking, understanding generates forms of joy that make the experience of reasoning a pleasurable one” (James 74). Hence, Spinoza’s rational exercises are to be understood about thoughts on how we make and sustain reasoning a pleasurable experience and how desire evolves to think and act rationally. Here, it’s the trampoline effect of joyful affects that lead us to think and act more rationally – what brings joyful affects is another joyful affect.

At this point, it can be said that Spinoza’s account of democracy as a vision provides a much more liberating perspective for individuals. Since everything is a part of Substance and works under the same moving principle, there’s no antagonism between human beings and nature in the first place. Thus, human-nature relationship is not constituted as an alienating and traumatic relation as it was in Hegel. Moreover, contrary to Hegel’s model, desire doesn’t have to clash with other desires at the beginning either. Even when an individual is partly acted on, namely, in a passive state, there is still a chance for one to agree with others, which means, even in our immature form of sociality people have a direct interest to meet on commons anyway. Since our limited capacity doesn’t suffice to form adequate ideas, individuals need each other to live a better and secure life. That’s why we build cities, economy, science and culture. For Spinoza, this is possible due to the imitation of affects mechanism. As we have seen, body is defined as the object of mind and when we are affected, we have the idea of both our own body and the thing that we encounter. Thus, someone whom we have similar concerns is affected with an affect, our imagination of this other individual’s body reminds us of our own body and in turn it tends us to be affected with the same affect. As a result, compliance between two bodies creates bigger affects in our body also, which means a duplication of our power of acting. In other words, similar bodies that enjoy the same

things make us more joyful. This imitation model grounds for the collectivization and freedom of us as social beings. In order to increase the power of acting, then, people have to focus on commons that make all of them multiply the causes of their joy.

Democracy, here, appears as the best form of sovereignty for Spinoza because it provides the proper political structure for focusing on commons. In democracy, individuals transfer their natural rights to the whole society where no one has privileges of any kind. Political representation is something to be avoided because there are no experts who can decide on people's needs and sources of joy. Under such a direct form of democracy, since the majority of the society represents the most rational decisions, to obey the majority appears to be the most liberating choice for every individual. But this majoritarian rule does not lead to majoritarian despotism because right of society cannot decide on contrary to basic physical and biological conditions that make their affection possible such that it provokes revolt and may put commonwealth to danger. In other words, a democratic society that aims at the maximization of total power of acting has to guarantee the existence conditions of its citizens' affection. Focusing on commons also requires us to reject property and class divisions, which are praised by Hegel. Since property means a one-sided enjoyment of an object, this necessarily creates torn by affects for Spinoza. In other words, far from being a necessary step for self-realization and freedom, it's one of the greatest causes of conflicts – it sets limits for other's enjoyment of nature, provokes hate against the owner and lead the property owner to hate the others in turn. Property relations, then, cannot be constitutive relations by definition. It can be inferred, then, class-division is also something harms our agreement on commons

because it presumes property relations and implies a privilege to some on deciding what to produce and also how to produce.

Freedom and Infinity

But, what about the gender inequality? Regarding this issue, it can be said that both Spinoza and Hegel seem to be the children of their own times. Spinoza's last written words are on the gender issue. In the unfinished last chapter of his *Political Treatise*, he inquires the issue of women's subjection: "Perhaps someone will ask whether it is by nature or by convention that women are subject to the authority of men. For if this has come about simply by convention, there is no reason compelling us to exclude women from government" (PT XI §4). But later he decides that since there's no example of nations where women are in charge, this subjection must stem from their natural inability. This shows how a philosopher who praises direct democracy and joy of everyone in an equal manner can also be ignorant about the historical roots of gender inequality. However, his critical evaluation of this issue shows how Spinoza's system carries more liberatory core regarding gender inequality, even if he fails to evaluate women's conditions accurately. In other words, even if Spinoza doesn't admit women's historical subjection under the servitude of men as an inequality issue, unlike Hegel, his ontology can help us to reconsider the gender issue that has not been previously considered by him.

This necessity stems from Spinoza's account of definition. As we know, Spinoza uses real, genetic definitions for everything – modes are defined with their cause-effect profile. This makes every definition not empty, but dynamical. But since the number of modes of Substance is infinite, one requires knowing the whole causal

profile of a thing in order to know it adequately. This requires an infinite amount of time and besides, the actualization of movement from its cause to effect. Similarly, as a mode on extension attribute, what a body can do is also defined operatively. As we have seen before, it's apparent in Spinoza that the mind has no sovereignty over the body. They go in parallel with each other because the real movement belongs to Substance itself. From this, Spinoza demonstrates that nobody can know what a body can do exhaustively:

No one has yet determined what the body can do, that is, experience has not yet taught anyone what the body can do from the laws of Nature alone, insofar as Nature is only considered to be corporeal, and what the body can do only if it is determined by the mind. For no one has yet come to know the structure of the body so accurately that he could explain all its functions-not to mention that many things are observed in the lower animals which far surpass human ingenuity, and that sleepwalkers do a great many things in their sleep which they would not dare to awake. This shows well enough that the body itself, simply from the laws of its own nature, can do many things which its mind wonders at. (E III P2)

Even if the body is the object of mind, it's not a distant object which the mind can grasp and evaluate. On the contrary, mind only has affections of the body and its own affections. Thus, mind is not capable, or say, "has not the authority" to foresee body's laws before it moves. This means we can't find out what our true 'nature' is just by reflecting on it. Knowledge becomes adequate when the body moves and reveals its capacity. In other words, joyful encounters can be discovered insofar they are experienced. As we have seen, since the joy that we have through the commons increases in proportion to the number of its causes, the best political form is, then, the one that leaves the most broadest space to move for more individuals while securing their bodies' physical and biological integrity as the condition of these experiences. Thus, Spinozian democracy requires society to eliminate unequal social conditions not only regarding women, but also regarding LGBTIs, mentally diseased,

children, etc. and let them to contribute to and benefit from commons equally as men, heterosexuals, adults and intelligent people does in the first place.

This shows us how democracy as the most rational state must be an open-ended project in which sovereignty belongs to every single individual and by which commons always have to be expanded by the participation of more people through the elimination of unequal conditions step by step through time. In this sense, democratic rights are not a fixed set of rules but a living one. The sovereign power of society in democracies is to be thought of not as a given block of will of society but as a moving and expanding source. As Negri points,

Only the power of the many, by making itself collective constitution, can found a Power. In this framework, Power is not seen as a substance, but rather as the product of a process aimed at collective constitution, a process that is always reopened by the power of the *multitudo*. (Negri 15)

It's this checking of individual powers that helps us see hidden privileges and unequal conditions and to construct larger commons by eliminating them. Thus, a democratic society is said to be a society that doesn't put the commonwealth in danger but pursues everybody's utility dynamically.

Therefore, for Spinoza, even if we can count a society as democratic where the sovereignty belongs to the whole community in a political manner and it is subjected to the majority's decisions (which helps us to separate it from any form of aristocracy analytically in the first place), there can be more or less developed forms of democracy depending on how many individuals can really influence the reshaping process of commons. According to this, if any antagonism has resulted with the constitution of larger commons by a larger portion of the society, this means we now have a larger democracy and there's no end for the borders of it. Thus, it's expected from a democratic society to become more and more aware of their unequal

conditions through time and to increase the commonwealth by letting more individuals to participate it with their own natures.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I compare Spinoza and Hegel's accounts of socio-political conditions of desire's freedom, of which I believe can provide fruitful perspectives regarding the role and movements of our desires in our social and political life. Spinoza and Hegel are two of the philosophers who take both desire and sociality as ontologically fundamental to human phenomena. As we have seen, the basic element of Spinoza's ontology is striving (*conatus*). This striving is named as 'appetite' (*appetitus*) when it is related to the mind and body together; 'will' when it's related to the mind only and 'desire' (*cupiditas*) if we are conscious about it. When we look Hegel, it can be said that desire (*begierde*) covers the definitions of *appetitus* and *cupiditas* in Spinoza – it both refers to blind lust of ours and also to our consciousness about what we are striving for. Regarding 'the will', it can be said that, the two usages have something in common: In both philosophers, the will represents desire that gains capacity of conceptual thinking in abstraction. But in Hegel, the will also preserves the practical character of desire – it both refers to concept and its actualization. In other words, usage of the will in Hegel encompasses the usages of appetite, desire and will in Spinoza. Since these concepts in Spinoza and Hegel signify the different stages or perspectives of the same movement principle, I choose 'desire' to describe and compare the same true subject matter of individual movement in these philosophers.

According to Spinoza and Hegel, desire is the very essence of every individual and movement of our thoughts and bodies can be understood via desire's

laws of motion. In this manner, freedom, the ultimate good for desire, is also comprehended through these laws. As these laws suggest, freedom cannot be attained in isolation, but in a definite social and political context. At this point we can see that both philosophers' accounts of reason and rationality shows great similarities. For both Spinoza and Hegel, reason shows the way of liberation and it is constituted together and through time. However, even though Spinoza and Hegel have the same stance regarding the importance and sociability of desire, they propose a different accounts of the nature and dynamics of desire, which in turn lead they adopt two different social contexts for freedom of desire.

First, they propose different understanding regarding true objects of satisfaction of desire. In Spinoza, everything strives to persevere and increase its motion. Here, desire is defined as consciousness regarding this striving. Since motion refers to the dynamical relation between cause and effect, thus, everything strives to live an increase effects of which one can involve. The actual capacity of our striving shows our power of acting. Thus, the sole aim of desire is to experience joyful encounters in the world that increase its power of acting. In these encounters, another person is not different from an ordinary object in principle – there can be persons that decrease our power of acting while we can become joyful when we encounter with a chocolate, even if it's only another person that can increase our power of acting most potentially. Even if he also takes desire as a motion that seeks for satisfaction, in Hegel, however, there's a fundamental distinction between human beings and ordinary objects in terms freedom. Contrary to Spinoza, encounters with mere objects of desire cannot satisfy desire – they remind desire its dependent character and show their independence. In order to be free, desire also needs to be

recognized by another desire in Hegel. In other words, while it's a matter of degree in freedom, in Hegel, this distinction sets the limit between being free and not free.

This issue of 'the other', however, stems from the difference between Spinoza and Hegel regarding movement of desire. In Hegel, objects of desire stand out there as a negativity. Self-consciousness, which is the reflexive form of desire, figures out that it moves through negation of objects of desire. But throughout time, desire realizes that objects of desire are not exhaustible: no matter how much one consumes, they cannot be negated ultimately but just the reverse – he becomes more and more dependent on the object world and this object world becomes the one that is truly independent. Thus, what self-consciousness needs is to negate the negation in order to be independent. For Hegel, this can be held only via an independent object that can absolutely negate itself on behalf of the self-consciousness because only in this way desire can save itself from the authority of the regular object world. But since this other self-consciousness has to be independent by definition, only reciprocal, mutual recognition of both self-consciousnesses can liberate each. However, in Spinoza, desire reaches satisfaction with every kind of encounter that makes us joyful. In this manner, more joyful encounters mean more satisfaction. There's nothing alienating desire in this movement because, since the objects that we encounter are not taken as 'other' or as negativity, our joy resulting from our affections with them does not mean our dependence on independent object world. On contrary to Hegel's system in which desire reaches the object world through the mediation of others, Spinoza's desire continuously moves forward.

Here we see the direct reflections of two different ontologies. In Spinoza, it is the substance all there is we can know it via its attributes – thought and extension. Every particularity, property and individuals are defined as modes of the substance

and modes are defined by negation – we know every mode in relation to other modes. Thus, Spinoza provides us a relational ontology. As we have seen, Hegel criticizes Spinoza with not furthering his principle of negation. He should have taken it to the level where the subject, who knows and acts with negation, start to know itself via the negation of negation. However, subject cannot reflect on her own activity in a way that she cancels its own movement principle. Since what we are already defined with our knowledge activity, reflexivity can give nothing beyond what we already does – there is no center that is placed outside the substance. That's why Spinoza puts knowledge before the method. Since human beings, who are both a mind on thought attribute and a body on extension attribute, are not different than other modes of substance, object and subject cannot be in a mediation relation with each other. On the contrary, since there is a unity, the relation of modes to substance is an immediate one. Thus, even if we know other modes by negation, they don't stand out there as negativity to be superseded. In this manner, four kinds of knowledge in Spinoza don't refer to reflexive movements of mind but constitutes the stages of its linear movements. When it comes to Hegel, negativity is rather defined in an ontological sense. In this sense, it can be said that the unity of subject and object is not given in Hegel in advance – it is something to be achieved by superseding the separation at the beginning by determinate negation.

This negativity between the subject and the object also has its reflections in the intersubjective sphere. In Hegel subjects are defined by having different abilities, different needs and drives, etc. We see that pattern from master and slave struggle to the Ethical Life. At first, two hostile self-consciousnesses, who perceive the other as an alien character, force each other to accept their own point of view and want to be recognized. After they recognize each other as equal persons in the abstract right,

they discover their own particularity and differences again in the morality moment. When it comes to the Ethical Life, these differences among people are integrated but not faded out: Social classes are emerged according to different abilities; genders have their different roles in family and market becomes the place where different needs confront with each other. Here, it can be said that history of freedom in Hegel is the history of integration of differences among people by superseding the contrasts. The important point here is that far from being enslaving, these differences between people are praised as being the driving force of freedom because integration provides new abilities, new needs and new satisfaction opportunities to the people. That's also why Hegel doesn't believe in democracy – since people cannot be equal in terms of capabilities, democracy can produce nothing liberatory for a society. When it comes to Spinoza, we see that the guiding principle of freedom in a society is based not on difference but commons. First, there's no pre-social abstraction like master and slave struggle – in Spinoza's system, people are already social and thus, already have shared points. Second, in contrast to Hegel's civil society where needs diversify exponentially due to encounters of various needs in the market, Spinoza always throws us back to universal needs as the source of true commons because he has a strong belief regarding our being the same in origins. In Hegel, such needs are liberatory and justified because it is a result of market interactions, which is also a natural institution. However, for Spinoza, such needs that create conflicts among people shadow the common points and thus, cannot be liberating but enslaving. Thus, in Spinoza, we see that the guiding principle of liberating sociality is based on focusing commons instead of integration of differences. At this point we can see how Spinoza understands human relations ontologically. When someone who we have shared points is affected with an affect, our imagination of this other individual's

body reminds us our own body and in turn it leads us to be affected with the same affect. As a result, compliance between two bodies creates bigger affects in our body also, which means a duplication of our power of acting. This suggests that one necessarily has to focus on commons because it's the only way that we can duplicate the causes of our joy while not restricting each other.

It's true that Hegel takes particular nature of an individual as a complex function of factors like property, biological heredity, education and other material circumstances. It's also true that he sees how human beings can supersede their biological restraints through social interaction. In this manner, it can be said that Hegel provides a realistic and social account of human nature regarding the differences. But as critics show, influence of power relations that are embodied in property and gender roles on identity formation are ignored to a large extent in Hegel. As a result, differences are evaluated as contingent and random in essence. Since everyone is presumed equally free from others' influences in civil society, superiority of some is accepted as a manifestation of their inner nature. Thus, by accepting contingency regarding causes, subjects of desire are implicitly naturalized and gender and class differences become justified. Here, from the ontological point of view, it can be said that conception of otherness comes with negativity in Hegel's system veils the common roots that have formed both sides and this causes the Hegelian subject to take identity of the other as given in mutual recognition moment. In other words, when superseding otherness of subject, objective conditions creating this otherness are preserved. That's why Hegel takes equality only in a formal and limited sense in the abstract right moment and does not deconstruct the effects of underlying power relations embodied in property relations. This ignorance, in turn,

leads him to take obedience as true manifestation of freedom and rational law until the last moment of intersubjective relationships.

At this point, Spinoza's visions about how we increase our joyful affects provides much more liberatory picture from social and political perspective. For Spinoza, it's only through democracy that one can increase her joy. Here, democracy emerges not as a mere rational construct independent from desire's evolution but as a rational exercise showing the necessary conditions for freedom in Spinoza.

According to this, after enough joyful encounters, desire starts to learn to think and act in a more rational way. Here democracy plays the key role for those who want to build a rational society. In democracy, which is the best form of sovereignty, everybody transfers her sovereign rights to the whole society in a way that no one is represented by anyone ideally. This prevents asymmetric power relations among people while not restricting anybody's natural rights. Equality in democracy, however, is not limited to the administrative side of the society. It encompasses also the decisions of economic and cultural spheres. Since one's power of acting can increase only insofar as asymmetric power relations are excluded, Spinoza's system suggests a political strategy that eliminates unequal social conditions that have made people torn by affects and creates more causes for people in their enjoyment of commons. Spinozian recognition in democracy, then, requires each person caring about her own and other's power of acting by providing equal liberty to each, because such desire learns that one can increase her power of acting more insofar more commons are shared by more people joyfully – that's the most rational and also the most natural way for each. If we are subjected to the same laws with the rest of nature, then, the crucial point for Spinoza becomes to deconstruct all causal relations determining one's nature by revealing power relations that restrains our striving, so

that we can find out how we maximize our power of acting. This is a continuous act of recognition, which requires accepting human nature as both produced and reproducible. Thus, unlike Hegelian recognition that focuses on the actual identity of individuals as *given* to a large extent, Spinozian recognition requires acknowledging how equal liberty is important and focuses rather on what one *can become*. In this manner, Spinozian recognition of the other always considers the objective conditions that has formed the subject's identity and lets her reconstruct herself in a way that she maximize her own power of acting. It's also mutual process like in Hegel because one wants what is good for herself also for others in order to maximize total power. Remembering Spinoza's definition of adequate ideas, it can be said that to fully recognize the other means for him to recognize the Substance due to its being the totality of all causes – even if it's an infinite project for us.

Consequently, it can be said that Spinozian political strategy, namely, direct, radical and participatory democracy serves better for constitutive politics because its socio-political ontology of desire always reminds us our being living-structures with a capacity to rebuild ourselves in a more liberatory way. Its emphasis on conditions that constitute individual desires and abilities keeps us alert about asymmetrical power relations. Thus, Spinoza's ontology provides us a powerful tool for criticizing every social and political form in favor of individual freedom. Besides, unlike Hegelian state where we have the risk of mistaking our subjection as our freedom, the humility of Spinoza's philosophy about what a body can do regarding future posits freedom as an infinite aim and this definitely bears less risk regarding despotic delusions. However, even if it seems that it's the very negativity in Hegel's ontology that leads him to justify obedience relationships implicitly, it's to be admitted that Hegel's account of master and slave struggle carries a liberatory core inside. As we

have seen, the oppression relation in this struggle has an educating character for the slave regarding her potentials as Marx, Du Bois and Feminist standpoint epistemologies and other philosophers have underlined, though it remains only as an intention to be equals later in Hegel. At this point, even if Spinoza's account tells us how oppressions of tyrants necessarily cause revolts of the oppressed ones and how people strive for democracy after enough joyful encounters cannot provide us the unique perspective of slave's consciousness and master's role in her liberation comparing with Hegel's formulation. Thus, it can be said that if negativity in Hegel's ontology had been supported with a power analysis regarding how subjects are constructed, he would have been able to see the true liberatory core in history and he would have not to evaluate the issue of freedom inadequately in his *Outlines of Philosophy of Right*. In this manner, further studies that focus on blending Spinoza's accounts of the commons and democracy and Hegel's account of master and slave struggle in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* can provide us with a better understanding of desire's movement in society and more liberatory strategies at the same time.

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