

Challenging Isaiah Berlin's Distinction Between
Negative and Positive Freedom

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by

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ABSTRACT

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Isaiah Berlin is one of the key figures who has dominated the field of social freedom with his distinction between negative and positive conceptions of freedom. In this dissertation, I have argued that analyzing freedom in terms of various components of freedom would be able to provide a better framework than Berlin's categorization which places diverse theories of freedom into two pigeonholes.

First, I have offered four components of freedom, which are the interpersonal, institutional, mental dispositional, and exercise components. After evaluating these components, I compared different theories of freedom with respect to these components. Then, I have answered Berlin's charge against positive freedom that it paves the way for totalitarianism, by defending a minimal account of positive freedom. Lastly, I have argued that we can force people into freedom in some limited cases. So, being "forced to be free" is not necessarily paradoxical.

ÖZET

Isaiah Berlin'in Negatif ve Pozitif Özgürlük Ayırımına Karşı Çıkmak

Hakan Şikr  Doğru z

Bu tezde sosyal  zg rl ğ  analiz ederken, bu alanın  nde gelen isimlerinden Isaiah Berlin'in negatif ve pozitif  zg rl k arasında yapt ğı ayırım yerine farklı  zg rl k anlayıřlarının oluřturulabilmesine imkan veren d rt farklı  ge  nerdim. Bu  geler řunlardır: kiřlerarası  ge, kurumsal  ge, zihinsel hal  gesi ve eylem  gesi. Bu d rt  genin yardımıyla deėiřik sosyal  zg rl k anlayıřlarının daha derinlikli tahlil edebileceėini iddia ettim.

Berlin'in pozitif  zg rl ėe getirdiėi temel eleřtirileri cevaplandırmaya  alıřtım. Berlin'in pozitif  zg rl ė n totaliterliėe yol a tıėı iddiasının en azından bazı pozitif  zg rl k kuramları i in doėru olmad ėını g sterdim. Son olarak, bazı sınırlı durumlarda insanları  zg r olmaya zorlayabileceėimiz iddia edildi.

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Introduction

Freedom has a double life: a life as a conception and a life as a word (that marks a conception). The word 'freedom' is the property of politicians and publicists, who use it in their rhetoric, and the conception of freedom is the property of philosophers and political scientists, who analyze its meaning and its conditions. As a rallying cry in the mouths of politicians (even in the mouths of the worst tyrannies), the noble and worthy word 'freedom' features in speech acts which inspire men to brave endeavors because it has a powerful emotive force, that is, the power to arouse strong emotions. Not only it is used in speech acts but also many people laid down their lives in the name of freedom. Every political party or social movement seems to appropriate the loaded word 'freedom' which have almost exclusively positive connotations, for its own propaganda purposes. The IRA fights for freedom from British colonial rule; Americans fight with Iraq and Afghanistan in the name of eternal freedom and advocates of laissez-faire economy/capitalism speak of the virtues of the free market or free enterprise. Attach the word 'free' to any political banner and you assure your supporters of the sanctity of your cause.

Freedom is something more than a word or a signifier (or an articulate sound), but it is a philosophical conception. As a philosophical conception, freedom is a territory in which battles are fought about issues as positivity and negativity, determinism and the character of the will, virtue and so forth. Philosophers are dominantly concerned with the cognitive meaning of 'freedom' rather than its emotional meaning. A quick perusal of the philosophical writings about freedom will reveal the wide variety of approaches to the meaning of elusive word 'freedom' and abundance of competing conceptions of freedom that are constructed by political scientists and philosophers.

There are two main areas of investigation about the issue of freedom in philosophical analysis: metaphysical freedom and social freedom¹. Metaphysical issues are about the ultimate reality, what really exists and what it is that distinguishes that and makes it possible. So, the truth or falsity of metaphysical freedom depends on the ultimate reality of our nature and the world. The issue of metaphysical freedom asks whether we are completely governed by deterministic causal laws or not. Determinism claims that what we are and what happens to us is strictly determined or to be more exact, all our mental states and acts, including choices and decisions, and all our actions are effects necessitated by preceding causes. Those who support metaphysical freedom or freedom of the will, say that there are no laws that completely settle what we will choose and do. Metaphysical freedom also involves not just the absence of such laws but also our having a kind of power to choose which path the future will take². On the other hand, social freedom

¹ John Stuart Mill offers a distinction between these two areas of investigation in the following way: "The subject of this essay is not the so-called "liberty of the will", so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of philosophical necessity; but civil, or social liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual." Mill, John Stuart, (1985), *On Liberty*, Penguin Books, p. 19. But, such a distinction excludes some conceptions of social freedom because Mill defines social freedom in terms of negative freedom. Moreover, for the distinction between metaphysical freedom and social freedom in terms of negative freedom see Van Inwagen, Peter (1998), "The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom", *Metaphysics: The Big Question*, Blackwell. Lastly, it is important to note that Hobbes and Mill hold that an action can be both negatively free and also determined by laws of nature. That negatively free actions can be explained and predicted by the laws of the social sciences in the same way as the falls of the stones which can be explained and predicted by the law of falling bodies.

² Richard Taylor introduces two metaphysical notions: self-moving being and agent-causation. We can call this self-moving being as unmoved prime mover who is not merely a collection of things or

is the demand that in various areas, a man should be left alone to do what he desires to do or really wants to do or a claim on what a man should do. The subject of this dissertation will be about the issue of social freedom under which issues such as positive freedom, negative freedom, and self-realization will be discussed.

In this thesis two main arguments will be offered. Firstly, I will introduce four aspects of freedom: interpersonal, institutional, mental dispositional, and exercise. It will be suggested that analyzing the issue of social freedom by the using these components is better than Berlin's oversimplified distinction between negative and positive freedom. The offered components of freedom help us to realize the intersections and separations between different accounts of freedom. More importantly, such an analysis enables us to see that those accounts of freedom, which can explain more components of freedom, are more fruitful and comprehensive. So, by using the four components of freedom, we can make normative evaluations and see which accounts of freedom are better than others. Secondly, I will answer Berlin's accusations against positive freedom by arguing that positive freedom (roughly defined as the ability to rule and control our life on the basis of our own decisions), does not necessarily lead to totalitarianism. Lastly, I will specify some cases in which forcing someone to be free is acceptable and not paradoxical.

events but a substance. Agent-causation suggests that some events are caused or originated or initiated by the agent. The faculty of the agent is deliberation. Richard Taylor (1974), "Freedom and Determinism", *Metaphysics*, Englewood, pp. 48-57.

Chapter 1

The Distinction Between Negative and Positive Freedom

A. Various Classifications of Social Freedom

In a path-breaking lecture, the philosopher Isaiah Berlin argued that there are two types of freedom which have been defended by philosophers and political theorists: negative and positive freedom³. Negative conception and positive conception appear as the two main mental constructions encapsulating two differing contents. Berlin categorizes these two conceptions of freedom according to two related, yet distinct, sets of questions. The first set includes questions such as “‘Who is master?’ and ‘By whom am I to be governed?’”⁴ Or ‘Who governs me?’ and ‘Who is to say what I am, and what I am not, to be or do?’”⁵ Or more generally, “‘what, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?’”⁶. The answer to these questions points to positive freedom, which is to be your own master, and not subject to others’ will. As Berlin puts: “The ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of the

³ Kant is the first thinker who explicitly makes a distinction between negative and positive freedom in the following manner: “freedom, positively understood, is equivalent to autonomy, that is, the capacity of the will to determine itself to act on the basis of self-imposed principles of rational willing (moral requirements), which in turn entails the capacity to act from respect for the law... Freedom, negatively understood, is just... independence from “everything empirical,” which, given Kant’s psychological determinism at the phenomenal level, amounts essentially to independence from “pathological necessitation.” Allison, E. Henry (1993), *Kant’s Theory of Freedom*, Cambridge University Press, p. 240.

⁴ Berlin, Isaiah (2002a), *Liberty*, Oxford University Press, p. 39.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 177-178.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's acts of will."⁷ But, we can answer these questions in two possible ways: politically, I rule myself or I have the right to rule myself, and internally/inwardly, I have the power to control my desires, and rule my internal conduct. Berlin offers a plenty of candidates for positive freedom. He includes here all the doctrines of self-direction and self-realization, from self-mastery to the personal doctrines of salvation propounded by the Stoics, as well as the doctrines of self-realization found in Rousseau and Marx. An example of positive freedom is the Stoic conception of freedom as self-mastery. Epictetus says, 'No man is free who is not a master of himself', but as Oscar Wilde writes, "a man can be totally free even in that granite embodiment of governmental constraint, prison."⁸ According to this Stoic conception of freedom, a man who is in control of his desires, resistant to whim and habits, regulates his life through rationally adopted principles and plans is a paradigm of a free man even if he is imprisoned.

On the other hand, C. P. Macpherson has noted two valid kinds of positive freedom discussed by Berlin. The first kind is the liberty of self-direction or self-mastery (PL1). This is the basic sense of positive freedom involving conscious and rational self-direction: "PL1, which is basic, is individual self-directing or... self-mastery. It is the ability to live in accordance with one's own conscious purposes, to act and decide for oneself rather than to be acted upon and decided by others."⁹ The

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

⁸ Cooper, E. David (1983), "The Free Man", *Of Liberty* (ed. Griffiths, P.), Cambridge University Press, p. 131.

⁹ Macpherson, C.B. (1973), "Berlin's Division of Liberty", *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval*, Clarendon Press, pp. 108-109.

second is the democratic right to participate in the sovereign authority (PL3). PL3 suggests that a democratic structure exists in society for exercising political power: "PL3 is the democratic concept of liberty as a share in the controlling authority."¹⁰ An example of PL1 is the conception of self-realization: "Liberty may be defined as the affirmation by an individual or group of his or its own essence."¹¹ Freedom here means to live a kind of life that expresses one's own unique personality. In that case, freedom becomes a passion for self-realization. Jon Elster suggests that Marx holds a conception of freedom in terms of self-realization¹²: "Self-realization, for Marx, can be defined as the full and free actualization and externalization of the powers and abilities of the individual."¹³ Through self-actualization, we transform and deploy our potentials into an actual one and externalize our powers through self-

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 109.

¹¹ Fosdick, Dorothy (1939), *What is Liberty?*, Harber & Brothers Publisher, p. 41

¹² For Marx's ideas about self-realization see *German Ideology* where Marx constructs an utopia according to which under communism, there will be no more specialized occupations and people will be able to realize their potentials: "For as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while in communist society, where nobody was one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, cowherd, or critic." McLellan, David (1977), *Karl Marx, Selected Writings*, Oxford University Press, p. 169.

¹³ Elster, Jon (1986), *An Introduction to Karl Marx*, Cambridge University Press, p. 44.

externalization “whereby the powers of the individual become observable to other people.”¹⁴

On the other hand, positive freedom as PL3 claims that we can only be free when we have the right to participate in political matters. So, democracy is taken as an essential component of freedom: “...there is one general principle that distinguishes freedom from slavery, which is, that all hereditary Government over a people is to them a species of slavery, and representative Government is freedom.”¹⁵ Arguing for the development of democracy, Benjamin Barber suggests that ‘to be free we must be self-governing; to have rights we must be citizens. In the end, only citizens can be free.’ So, there are two main categories of positive freedom within which there is scope for a wide range of positions.

According to Berlin, negative freedom is identified by questions, which ask, “‘Over what area am I master?’ and ‘How much am I governed?’ or ‘How wide is the area over which I am, or should be, master?’”¹⁶ Or “‘How far does government interfere with me?’ and ‘What am I free to do or be?’”¹⁷ Or more generally ‘What is the area within which the subject-a person or a group of persons- is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?’”¹⁸. In contrast to the conception of positive freedom, negative freedom is concerned with freedom from interference of others and having an area for choice, and not with the source of power and not with doing some act. What are at issue are spheres of non-interference or the open doors for the exercise of choice. The extent of my negative

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

¹⁵ Fosdick (1939), p.31.

¹⁶ Berlin (2002a), p. 35-36.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

freedom is determined by how many possible choices lie open to me, or, to use one of Berlin's metaphors, how many doors are unlocked¹⁹. Negative freedom is a carving-out an external breathing space/arena or open doors for action, movement, exercise or self-expression.

However, not all restrictions on my possible choices are infringements of my negative freedom. Negative freedom is not limited by unalterable natural obstacles, which are not the result of human arrangements. There are unalterable obstacles such as being unable to bear a child as a male, being unable to fly and being unable to be in two places at once. But, we dream of being free to fly like a bird, being free to be in two places at once and so forth. This kinds of freedoms appear "in the dreams of many people in the form of the illusion that they can fly, that they are released from gravity and can move 'like a bird' to wherever they wish, or that they have the power to alter their environment to their liking",²⁰.

This might lead us to say that where an inability is not alterable/remediable by human intervention, then the question of freedom does not arise. As Helvetius said, "it is not lack of freedom not to fly like an eagle or swim like a whale"²¹ "This concept of 'unfree' (*such as concept of being unfree to fly like an eagle or swim like*

¹⁹ We can introduce many accounts of negative freedom from the history of political thought.

Negative freedom has been often associated with Hobbes, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Friedrich Von Hayek, Robert Nozick, and Milton Friedman. But, it is a matter of dispute whether all of these theorists support a pure conception of negative freedom.

²⁰ Hayek, F. A. (1960), *The Constitution of Liberty*, The University of Chicago Press, p. 16.

²¹ Flew, Anthony (1978), "The Philosophy of Freedom", *In Defence of Freedom* (ed. K. W. Watkins), Cassell, p. 156.

a whale, my note) is a non-concept. I am not unfree to fly because I lack wings, nor am I unfree to study dodo birds because they no longer exist.”²²

There really is something deeply misguided, even absurd and eccentric, in treating unalterable (natural) obstacles as a restriction of freedom. As Berlin puts it, “If I say that I am unable to jump more than ten feet in the air... it would be eccentric to say that I am to that degree enslaved or coerced”.²³ The unalterable obstacles, which are routine and usual effects of a natural force, do not obstruct action but, rather, they define the parameters within which action becomes possible. To elaborate, talking of gravity as being a restriction on our freedom is absurd; as to be bound by gravity is an essential part of how we operate as a species. Treating such phenomena as obstructions to freedom will carry the absurd implication of equating freedom with omnipotence. For instance, Hayek argues that it will be equating freedom with omnipotence.²⁴ That is namely a God-like freedom. Perhaps only some super being (such as God) can be counted as fully, utterly free because only such a being will be able to do all that he is free to do such as instantaneous movement across vast distances. So, we are dealing with an agent (chooser) deciding between opportunities presented under the unalterable constraints of nature.

But, in my opinion, only by concentrating on specific individuals in specific situations at specific time, we cannot call these obstacles as freedom-restricting in that they cannot be altered by human arrangements. We can assume that the laws of nature that governs human beings radically changes in the future. Then, there might be other relationships, which permit certain incapacities (which we now take as

²² Machan, R. Tibor (1986), *The Libertarian Reader*, Rowman & Littlefield, p. 217.

²³ Berlin (2002a), p. 169.

²⁴ Hayek (1960), p. 16.

simply the usual and routine operations of nature that do not obstruct our freedom) to be counted as unfreedoms.

Furthermore, it is important to note that there is no philosopher who claims that the routine and inescapable effects of nature restrict our freedom. Assigning our opponents or any philosopher the view that the routine and unalterable effects of nature restrict our freedom will be caricaturizing our opponents to refuse their ideas easily. Lastly, by extending this distinction between mere inability and unfreedom some philosophers (such as Hayek) claim that impersonal market forces do not restrict freedom.

This conclusion follows from assuming that impersonal market forces strictly resemble natural forces (i.e. that they are similarly inescapable and unalterable). But indeed, there is no such strict resemblance between natural forces and impersonal market forces. Laws and political decisions can alter those outcomes of these transactions and the framework within which the market agents operate. This seems to be the real agenda of discussion but this issue goes beyond the scope of this thesis.

Berlin quotes Helvetius: “The free man is the man who is not in irons, nor imprisoned in a goal, nor terrorized like a slave by the fear of punishment”.²⁵ This is the core-paradigmatic exemplar of negative freedom. That core-paradigmatic exemplar suggests that negative freedom is the freedom from external obstacles rather than freedom from internal obstacles. Parent puts the issue as follows: “We use the term ‘unfree’ to describe cases where a person is prevented from acting by the presence of external obstacles or restraints of a physical, as opposed to a spiritual, nature.”²⁶

²⁵ Berlin (2002a), p. 169.

²⁶ Parent, W. A. (1974a), “Freedom as the Non-Restriction of Options”, *Mind*, Vol. 83, pp. 433-434.

It is clear that Berlin is a part of that “we”. In his essay, ‘From Hope and Fear Set Free’, Berlin states that it can be suggested that impediments to freedom may be in the form of remorse, guilt, ignorance and obsession but he excludes these internal obstacles as impediments to negative freedom. He states his case as follows:

“The extent of freedom depends on opportunities of action, not on knowledge of them, although such knowledge may well be an indispensable condition for the use of freedom, and although impediments in the path to it are themselves a deprivation of freedom – of freedom to know. Ignorance blocks paths, and knowledge opens them. But this truism does not entail that freedom implies awareness of freedom, still less that they are identical.”²⁷

Moreover, Parent defines negative freedom as follows: “Freedom, then, is a negative concept: basically it signifies, not the absence of all impediments... but the absence of a certain class of impediments, namely those which are external to the agent and which, being physical in nature, prevent him from moving outside a given area.”²⁸ In a similar fashion, Berlin states, only restrictions imposed by other people affect my freedom; he defines coercion which he takes as the opposite of freedom in the following fashion: “Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act.”²⁹ So, negative freedom involves not being free from any external obstacles but it is being free from external obstacles that are created by another person or persons. One of the questions which negative freedom answers, ‘What is the area within which the subject-a person or a group of persons- is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without

²⁷ Berlin (2002a), “From Hope and Fear Set Free”, *Liberty*, Oxford University Press, p. 273. Another evidence which shows that Berlin excludes internal obstacles can be deduced from the following lines: “If I am ignorant of my rights, or too neurotic... to benefit by them, that makes them useless to me; but it does make them non-existent... To destroy or lack a condition for freedom... is not to destroy that freedom itself.” *Ibid.*, p. 272

²⁸ Parent, W. A. (1974a), p. 434.

²⁹ Berlin (2002a), *Liberty*, Oxford University Press, p. 169.

interference by other persons?’ suggests that negative freedom’s concern is the existence of an external area for the exercise of power of choice (or an external room for maneuver) rather than doing something and it is freedom from external obstacles that are created by other persons. Putting these conclusions together, negative freedom is freedom from external obstacles that results from the interference of others and having an external breathing space/having open doors to the exercise of choice.

Charles Taylor draws on the distinction developed by Berlin between negative and positive conceptions of freedom. However, he accords the two notions a somewhat different treatment than that of Berlin. Taylor seeks to distinguish the two concepts of freedom as being either exercise-concept or opportunity-concept.

“Doctrines of positive freedom are concerned with a view of freedom which involves essentially the exercising of control over one’s life. On this view, one is free only to the extent that one has effectively determined oneself and the shape of one’s life. The concept of freedom here is an exercise concept. By contrast, negative theories can rely simply on an opportunity-concept, where being free is a matter of what we can do, of what is open to us to do, whether or not we do anything to exercise these options.”³⁰

Taylor characterizes negative liberty as an opportunity-concept and positive freedom as an exercise-concept. The opportunity-concept says that you are free to the extent that you are not prevented from various courses of action by external obstacles. It doesn’t matter whether or not you actually take advantage of the opportunities open to you: you are still free to the extent that you could, if you chose, take advantage of them.

Benn defines negative freedom in a similar fashion: “Not that Alan’s freedom to Φ requires that he actually Φ all the time; indeed, he may never Φ at all, for one

³⁰ Taylor, Charles (1985a), “What’s Wrong With Negative Liberty”, *Philosophy and The Human Sciences*, Cambridge University Press, p. 213.

may possess the freedom to do something that one never chooses to do. Freedoms belong to class of modalities like potentials or capacities, which may exist whether or not they are exercised or manifested in action.”³¹ This sense of freedom states that freedom is determined by the opportunities you have rather than by what you actually do.

Berlin states his case as follows: “The freedom of which I speak is opportunity for action, rather than action itself. If, although I enjoy the right to walk through open doors, I prefer not to do so, but to sit still and vegetate, I am not thereby rendered less free. Freedom is the opportunity to act, not action itself.”³² If the state prevents me from going on strike by making my actions illegal, even if I don’t have anything to strike about, and even if I don’t ever intend to strike, my freedom is still curtailed.

So, negative freedom is a matter of the doors open to me, not whether I happen to choose to go through them. In contrast, Taylor labels the notions of freedom supporting theories, which emphasize actual self-realization as exercise-conceptions of freedom. This conception of freedom means not only freedom from external constraints but, exercising our power to order and evaluate our desires and acting upon our worthwhile/significant goals. That is the conception of freedom, which he favors.

Alternative distinctions are offered which can said to be more or less fitted into the distinctions offered by Berlin, Macpherson, and Taylor. David Miller suggests that there are differing “clusters of ideas held together by a family

³¹ Benn (1986), *A Theory of Freedom*, Cambridge University Press, p. 126.

³² Berlin, Isaiah (1969), *Four Essays on Liberty*, Oxford University Press, p. xlii.

resemblance among their members”³³ and offers three particular ideas of freedom: republican, liberal, and idealist³⁴. But, what makes Berlin’s interesting is not only the fact that it suggests a distinction between two types of freedom but, it also makes a case for the view that at least, some versions of positive freedom can lead to totalitarian consequences. That is the point where Berlin introduces his critiques about positive freedom. So, for Berlin, positive freedom can ripe into the official ideology of totalitarianism. But, how does Berlin ground his argument against positive freedom? In the next section, we will try to analyze Berlin’s charges against positive freedom.

B. Berlin’s Charges Against Positive Freedom

Berlin holds the view that the conceptualizations are not only intellectual toys to play with but, these conceptions have consequences for good and for ill in the real world³⁵. He warns us that the perversion of positive conception is at the root of the

³³ Miller, David (1991), “Introduction”, *Liberty* (Edited by David Miller), Oxford University Press, p.2.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-4, 10.

³⁵ Berlin’s position sometimes implies that when a conception of positive freedom, which is perverted into its virtual opposite falls into the hands of people who are sufficiently deranged, self-deceiving and opportunistic, can be used by them to rationalize their totalitarian system. As an example, according to Berlin, when Spinoza’s conception of positive freedom falls into the hands of Bismarck, it becomes a tool for justifying the totalitarian endeavors: “Bismarck, who is reported to have greatly admired Spinoza, could easily have defended his Kulturkampf against the (irrational) clericals in this way. Something needs to be added to, or modified in, Spinoza’s rational ethics if we are to be saved from this.” Berlin, Isaiah (1993), “A Reply to David West”, *Political Studies*, Vol. 41, p. 298. But, no conception of freedom including negative freedom can be immune from the misuse of opportunistic politicians. Berlin is aware of this fact and argues that “Negative liberty is twisted when I told that liberty must be equal for the tigers and for the sheep and that this cannot be avoided even if it enables

totalitarian project³⁶. He raises an alarm against positive freedom's liability to the temptation to 'force someone to be free'³⁷. The perverted versions of positive

the former to eat the latter if coercion by the state is not to be used. Of course unlimited liberty for capitalists destroys the liberty of the workers, unlimited liberty for factory-owners or parents will allow children to be employed in the coal-mines. Certainly the weak must be protected against the strong, and liberty to that extent be curtailed. Negative liberty must be curtailed if positive liberty is to be sufficiently realized; there must be a balance between the two, about which no clear principles can be enunciated. Positive and negative liberty are both perfectly valid concepts, but it seems to me that historically more damage has been done by pseudo-positive than by pseudo-negative liberty in modern world." Jahanbegloo, Ramin (1993), *Conversations with Isaiah Berlin*, Phoenix, p. 41. Or alternatively, he claims: "It is doubtless well to remember that belief in negative freedom is compatible with, and (so far as ideas influence conduct) has played its part in generating, great and lasting social evils. My point is that it was much less often defended or disguised by the kind of specious arguments and sleights-of-hand habitually used by the champions of 'positive' freedom in its more sinister forms." Berlin, (2002a), p. 37. So, Berlin is making a generalization about the misuse of positive freedom on the basis of his observation of history. This is a historical thesis rather than a philosophical one. However, philosophers don't generally put forward empirical hypothesis and their main concern is the analysis of the concepts. The argument of Berlin, then, becomes dependent on empirical evidence and its falsity or truth depends on facts, which are discovered by historical observation. But, it is not necessary for the conception of positive freedom to be an instrument of oppression. It is a contingent fact. This is just how it is according to Berlin, but it could have been otherwise. Then, it could turn out historically that conception of negative freedom was more often used as an instrument for oppression than positive freedom.

³⁶ In his book, *Freedom and Its Betrayal*, Berlin indicates six enemies of human liberty: Helvetius, Rousseau, Fichte, Hegel, Saint-Simon, and Maistre. He claims that "Although they all discussed the problem of human liberty, and all, except Maistre, claimed that they were in favor of it – indeed some of them passionately pleaded for it and regarded themselves as the truest champions of what they called true liberty, as opposed to various specious or imperfect brands of it – yet it is a peculiar fact that in the end their doctrines are inimical to what is normally meant, at any rate, by individual liberty,

freedom leads down the primrose path to totalitarian³⁸ conclusion of forcing somebody to be free³⁹. By transition from freedom to coercion, “what begins as freedom ends as its opposite, yet bears the same name.”⁴⁰ Berlin’s argument about the dangers or potential evils of positive freedom is at times overly polemical but is it sound?

or political liberty.” Berlin, Isaiah (2002b), *Freedom and Its Betrayal*, Princeton University Press, p.

5.

³⁷ Rousseau is the inventor of the expression of force-to-be-free. “Whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body: which means nothing other than that he shall be forced to be free.” Rousseau, J. J. (1983), *Social Contract*, Penguin, p. 64

³⁸ It must be stated that Berlin does not offer a clear conception of totalitarianism, which he at least associates, with the perverted versions of positive freedom. While talking about totalitarianism and the perverted versions of positive freedom, Berlin has in mind some historical experiences such as Communism and Nazism: “The Jacobins, Robespierre, Hitler, Mussolini, the Communists all use this very same method of argument, of saying men do not know what they truly want- and therefore by wanting it for them, by wanting it on their behalf, we are giving them what in some occult sense, without knowing it themselves, they themselves ‘really’ want.” Berlin, Isaiah (2002b), p. 41. Berlin is making a generalization about the conception of positive freedom and totalitarianism on the basis of his observation of history. It should be noted that Berlin’s influential essay, *Two Concepts of Liberty*, originally published in 1958 against the background of the cold war. So, what Berlin has in mind as an exemplar of totalitarianism is the Communist regimes. But, concepts need analysis. For a clear analysis of totalitarianism see Leonard Schapiro’s *Totalitarianism* where he identifies five contours/characteristic features of totalitarianism: “the Leader; the subjugation of the legal order; control over private morality; continuous mobilization; and legitimacy based on mass support.” Schapiro, Leonard Bertram (1972), *Totalitarianism*, Praeger, p. 20.

³⁹ Berlin’s claims about positive freedom and totalitarianism are commonly associated with Karl R. Popper’s *The Open Society and Its Enemies* and F. A. Hayek’s *The Road to Serfdom*. Berlin states that the study of Popper ‘gave me a fillip’. He also mentions that he is sympathetic to Hayek’s work.

⁴⁰ Reed, Gary Frank (1980), “Berlin and The Division of Liberty”, *Political Theory*, Vol. 8, p. 366.

Can Berlin give countervailing reasons for his claim that positive freedom leads to force-to-be free argument? Berlin finds it necessary to ascribe to his positive freedom totalitarians some metaphysical and psychological assumptions. Motivating much of Berlin's claim that positive freedom leads to force-to-be free argument is a pair of assumptions, which Berlin assumes usually, accompanies positive conceptions of freedom. Two slippery slopes⁴¹ down to totalitarian conclusion of force-to-be-free argument will be examined: (a) the belief in the final solution (b) higher and lower self-division.

Raymond Plant argues that there are "two concepts of positive freedom: one minimalist, one maximalist."⁴² On the maximalist account of positive freedom, freedom becomes the fulfillment of a specific set of goals or ends. Moreover, he claims that in the maximalist sense of positive freedom is "both paradoxical and dangerous." He continues as follows: "Paradoxical because it can justify the use of coercion to secure someone's freedom, or in the famous phrase of Rousseau 'to force someone to be free', and dangerous because of the licence which this gives to one group who believe that they know what the good for man is to force these values on

⁴¹ Slippery slope is the name of a reasoning, which argues, "Though a practice may be unobjectionable in one type of case, if it is once permitted, its use will inevitably be extended to other more dubious cases.... The inevitability here supposed is not logical inevitability, but is thought to result from people's always wanting more than they have." Warn (1995), "Slippery Slope", *The Oxford Companion To Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, p. 828. So, Berlin does not construct an argument which shows that adopting positive freedom and the assumptions which he associates with positive freedom necessarily leads to the totalitarian conclusion of force-to-be-free. He just claims that positive freedom accompanied with these two assumptions will probably lead to totalitarian conclusions. Berlin introduces a weak case for positive freedom's perversion into totalitarianism.

⁴² Plant, Raymond (1991), *Modern Political Thought*, Basil Blackwell, pp. 248-249.

others in the interests of freedom.”⁴³ While minimalist account of positive freedom refers to having certain opportunities, means and capacities, in the case of maximalist account of positive freedom, “positive freedom prescribes the goals to be pursued by a free agent; in the second case the minimalist account of positive freedom leaves the goals unprescribed and is concerned with means only.”⁴⁴

Macpherson makes Berlin’s and Plant’s case clearer by distinguishing among two senses of positive freedom: PL1 is the basic sense of positive freedom involving conscious and rational self-direction; PL2 is a debased form which imposes rational freedom on those said to be not fully rational. Macpherson seems willing to grant Berlin that PL1 becomes PL2 if a series of assumptions is made and quotes Berlin’s specification of those assumptions:

“First, that all men have one true purpose, and only one, that of rational self-direction; second, that the ends of all rational beings must of necessity fit into a single, universal, harmonious pattern, which some men may be able to discern more clearly than others; third, that all conflict, and consequently all tragedy, is due solely to the clash of reason with the irrational or the insufficiently rational – the immature and underdeveloped elements in life – whether individual or communal, and that such clashes are, in principle avoidable, and for wholly rational beings impossible; and finally, that when all men have been made rational, they will obey the rational laws of their own nature, which are one and the same in them all, and so be at once wholly law-abiding and wholly free.”⁴⁵

PL2 of Macpherson and maximalist positive freedom of Plant are the debased forms of positive which may lead to totalitarianism. What is common to these two models are that freedom is linked to an over-arching goal or a final panacea to the problems of human beings. Generally, this over-arching goal or final panacea is constructed according to a fixed understanding of human nature, needs, interests and

⁴³ Ibid., p. 249.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 249.

⁴⁵ Berlin (1969), p. 154

potentials. So, freedom is a good horse to ride, but to ride where? Thus, the answer is to the final solution, which is the idea that ultimately all different goals of human beings can be reconciled or there is a panacea to cure all the problems that arise as a result of conflicting aims.

“This is the belief that somewhere, in the past or in the future, in divine revelation or in the mind of an individual thinker, in the pronouncements of history or science, or in the simple heart of an uncorrupted good man, there is a final solution. This ancient faith rests on the conviction that all positive values in which men have believed must, in the end, be compatible, and perhaps even entail one another.”⁴⁶

That final solution is knowable by anyone who utilizes the necessary instruments for its discovery. The goals or interests of the self are reified to the extent that it is regarded as an object of knowledge, which can be known, in principle, as well or even better by a person other than that empirical self: “the ends of all rational beings must of necessity fit into a single, universal, harmonious pattern, which some men may be able to discern more clearly than others.”⁴⁷ Berlin believes that the notion of final solution has led to terrible consequences, often atrocities. That belief is “responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the altars of the great historical ideals –justice or progress or the happiness of future generations, or the sacred mission or emancipation of a nation or race or class, or even liberty itself, which demands the sacrifice of the individual for the freedom of society.”⁴⁸ Berlin is saying that the belief in a final solution, a way of harmonizing all the different goals that human beings have, has had disastrous consequences for those whose goals don’t happen to fitted neatly into the master plan of the final solution: “Any method of bringing this final state nearer would then seem fully justified, no

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

matter how much freedom were sacrificed to forward its advance. It is, I have no doubt, some such dogmatic certainty that has been responsible for the deep, serene, unshakeable conviction in the minds of some of the most merciless tyrants and persecutors in history that what they did was fully justified by its purpose.”⁴⁹ That is one of the metaphysical assumptions that lie at least in the heart of some positive conceptions of freedom, which leads to the totalitarian conclusions.

One of the assumptions that turn positive freedom to a totalitarian endeavor derives from conception of personhood. “Conception of freedom”, Berlin writes, “directly derive from views of what constitute a self, a person, a man.”⁵⁰ Berlin implicitly indicates as if the differences between so-called positive notions of freedom and negative notions of freedom stemmed from differing conceptions of personhood and moves his positive freedom fanatics to his fantasy/fiction of bifurcation of self into higher and lower elements⁵¹. This is the division of self vertically into higher and lower selves. He claims that the proponents of positive freedom rely on the belief that the self of the individual can be split into a higher and a lower self or rely on the assumption of psychic division of self (the bifurcation of the self) into higher and lower elements which will be called the divided self-theory.

According to the divided self-theory, the self is made of two selves: the higher/rational/real/true and the lower/irrational/simple/false self or nature. This catalogues of terms serves to construct of an inner hierarchy within the self between higher elements and lower elements. Positive freedom totalitarians took the higher

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

⁵⁰ Berlin (2002a), p. 179.

⁵¹ There are certain philosophical perspectives in which such an assumption is central. Take, for example, Plato who argued that human psyche was constituted of three motivations: reason, spiritedness and appetitive desires.

self (the ego-ideal) as the real subject of the predicate free. The freedom which concerns them is the freedom of the higher/rational self. Thus, they speak of the freedom of the rational part of individual rather than its lower and irrational part. Accordingly, a person is free if and only if he is ruled by his rational part rather than his lower irrational part. While the higher self directs us to path of freedom, lower self directs us to the path of unfreedom⁵².

“The dominant self is then variously identified with reason, with my ‘higher nature’, with the self which calculates and aims at what will satisfy it in the long run, with my ‘real’, or ‘ideal’, or ‘autonomous’ self, or with my self ‘at its best’; which is then contrasted with irrational impulse, uncontrolled desires, my ‘lower’ nature, the pursuit of immediate pleasures, my ‘empirical’ or ‘heteronomous’ self, swept by every gust of desire and passion, needing to be rigidly disciplined if it is ever to rise to the full height of its ‘real nature’.”⁵³

Obedying the commands, reasons of higher self rather than being slave to our irrational desires which the lower self gives rise is identified with freedom. So, freedom is taken as the freedom of the higher self rather than the freedom of the empirical self. Secondly, higher self is collectivized/expropriated (reification/dehumanization of the agent) by another agent.

⁵² D. H. Lawrence favors the lower/irrational self over the higher/rational self. He views freedom as acting and thinking with the blood. He identifies freedom with doing and desiring what your lower self says. ‘My great religion is a belief in the blood, the flesh, as being wiser than the intellect. We can go wrong in our minds. But what our blood feels and believes and says, is always true. The intellect is only a bit and a bridle. What do I care about knowledge? All I want is to answer to my blood, direct, without fibbing intervention of mind, or moral, or what not.’ ‘Be a good animal, true to your animal instincts.’ Berlin views D. H. Lawrence as one of the enemies of intelligentsia: “You defy the powerful, the rich, the wicked, the philistines, and the dry and critical and mean-spirited intelligentsia if need be- all the people against whom Rousseau hurled his early thunderbolts, followed by Carlyle and Nietzsche and D. H. Lawrence.” Berlin (2002b), p. 65

⁵³ Berlin (2002a), p. 179.

Collectivization/expropriation process is the identification of higher self with an entity above the empirical individual such as another individual (as an example a leader/a dictator) or a group of people (as example a group of governing elites) or a collective whole, which is said to be well established⁵⁴. “Presently the two selves may be represented as divided by an even larger gap; the real self may be conceived as something wider than the individual... as a social ‘whole’ of which the individual is an element or aspect: a tribe, a race, a Church, a State, the great society of the living and the dead and the yet unborn.”⁵⁵ So, the higher/ideal self is understood as an entity above the agent which can take variety of forms: a tribe, a race, a church, a state or as a leader’s actual self as being the true nature of the agent. So, we take three steps: contrast a higher rational self with a lower impulsive self, identify freedom with the hegemony of the higher rational self and set up the fiction that the higher rational self is an entity above the empirical agent who is the real subject of

⁵⁴ Some thinkers claim that this view is implied by the organic theory of society and state. According to the notion of the state as an organism, state is an organized body with connected interdependent parts sharing a common life. “The State is not defined as being ‘like an individual’ but actually as being one, and it is from the identification of the State with the community conceived in this way that consequences of the organic view, for better or worse, are derived... For the State is by definition not merely as real as, but more real, than are the individuals who belong to it.” Weldon, T.D. (1962), *States and Morals*, John Murray Publishers, pp. 34-35. The state, taken as a real individual is composed of parts in resemblance with a body which consists of arms, legs, brain and so fourth and the empirical individuals are apart of that. The state is above the empirical individuals who form the parts of the state by the virtue of being more real than its parts. It is “both ontologically higher and more valuable than its parts and such that the parts can be understood and valued as parts of their organic whole.” McCloskey, H. J. (1963), “The State as An Organism, As A Person, and As An End In Itself”, *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 73, p. 307.

⁵⁵ Berlin (2002a), p. 179.

freedom. At last, “This entity is then identified as being the ‘true’ self which, by imposing its collective, or ‘organic’, single will upon its recalcitrant ‘members’, achieves its own, and therefore their, ‘higher’ freedom.”⁵⁶ But, in reality, the absorption of the individual into an organic entity or a leader’s self is the construction/engineering of the individual according to pseudo higher self. In deep ironic twist, the emphasis on positive freedom, turns out into a situation in which individual becomes dependent on a deep way on the larger social whole or a leader and that ends up with the construction of the individual by the hands of the collectivity or the leader according to the their wish or plan.

To more exact, we can introduce Rousseau’s conception of positive freedom named as moral freedom, which is said to lead to the totalitarian conclusion of forcing someone to be free⁵⁷. Following the lines of Berlin, we can interpret as if Rousseau’s political theory and his conception of freedom pave the way to the totalitarian conclusion of force-to-be-free. Rousseau maintains that every person may be thought of as a man or as an actual, identifiable person and at least potentially as the citizens of a well-ordered society: “For every individual as man, may have a private will contrary to, or different from, the general will that he has as a citizen.”⁵⁸ Insofar we are men, each of us has a particular/private will, which aims at the fulfillment of our particular interests. As men with particular/private wills, we tend to satisfy our particular interests and grant precedence to our own interests and desires. On the other hand, general will “is a common will for a common interest, and, as

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

⁵⁷ Some alternative interpretations are offered for the dangerous expression: force-to-be-free. For those interpretations see J. Hope Mason’s “Force to be Free” and J. Plamenatz’s “Ce qui ne signifie autre chose sinon qu’on le forcera d’être libre”.

⁵⁸ Rousseau (1983), p. 63.

such, it is different from and may be opposed to the particular interests of individuals.”⁵⁹ Insofar as we are citizens, or to be more exact as the members of the public, we have a general will, which seeks to further the interest of the citizens, which is the interests of the society as a whole. Because the interests of all citizens are the same, the object of the ‘general will’ is the common good or public interest, which we share as the members of the public. General will is not simply an aggregate of the particular wills of the individual citizens since it is conceivable that people can be in unanimous agreement as to what the general will is, and yet be entirely mistaken. The general will is what is objectively in the interest of people and not what they believe to be in their interest⁶⁰: “The general will is always rightful and always tends to the public good; but it does not follow that the decisions of the people are always equally right. We always want what is advantageous but we do not always discern it. The people is never corrupted, but it is often misled; and only then does it seem to will what is bad.”⁶¹ Rousseau maintains that true freedom, moral freedom, “which alone makes man the master of himself”⁶², consists not in satisfying one’s private interests, but rather in obeying a moral law amounting to what he called the general will. One can require moral freedom by obeying to “a law one prescribes to oneself”⁶³ in accordance with the general will. The only way to achieve moral

⁵⁹ Weldon (1962), p. 79.

⁶⁰ For a good investigation of the conception of general will see Patrick Riley’s *General Will Before Rousseau*, Richard Dagger’s “Understanding the General Will”, W. T. Jones’ “Rousseau’s General Will and the Problem of Consent” and J. Cohen’s “Reflections on Rousseau: Autonomy and Democracy”.

⁶¹ Rousseau (1983), p. 72.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

freedom, which is the real freedom, is granting priority to general will over our particular will. Subduing the particular will to the 'general will' is the very condition of freedom since "to be governed by appetite" or particular will "is slavery"⁶⁴. So, the citizens of Rousseau can achieve moral freedom by placing themselves under the general will which is the will that they have as members of the public.

To summarize, it seems that Rousseau adopts the two assumptions, which Berlin finds dangerous: (a) there exists a final solution to the competing goals of human beings, the general will and (b) there is two distinct selves: the man with his particular will and the citizen with his general will. Rousseau posits a gap between the actual, empirical person and the citizen, which can be named as the higher self of the actual self and indicates that we can only achieve moral freedom by the guidance of the general will which is the panacea to cure the problems of human beings. What is striking about Rousseau's position is his belief that those who have achieved the path of general will may legitimately strive to raise those who have not up to that level. If an individual citizen found himself at odds with the general will, then that person must really be enslaved by his lower self or to be more exact, by his selfish desires/private interests and therefore not truly free. "When this opposition arises, the individual has an obligation to obey the General Will, since it and not the inclination to promote his own personal well-being is strictly his own real will."⁶⁵ Rousseau concluded that the community might well be justified in forcing the individual who is at odds with the general will to be free. Rousseau writes: "whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁶⁵ Weldon (1962), p. 79.

less than that he will be forced to be free.”⁶⁶ By being forced to comply with the general will, to act according to his higher self, the one which he has by being a part of the public/a member of the public, he actually increases his freedom: “To force a man to be free is to force him to behave in a rational manner. A man is free who gets what he wants; what he truly wants is a rational end.”⁶⁷ That is the totalitarian and paradoxical tract in Rousseau’s conception of freedom in terms of moral freedom, which is a positive conception of freedom⁶⁸.

Berlin acknowledges that positive and negative freedom has a common root, they “start at no great logical distance from each other.”⁶⁹ Later on, he speaks of the competition between positive and negative conceptions of freedom as involving “not two different interpretations of a single concept, but two profound divergent and

⁶⁶ Rousseau (1983), p. 64.

⁶⁷ Berlin (2002b), p. 47.

⁶⁸ Many philosophers, writers and intellectuals consider Rousseau as a totalitarian or as a proponent of totalitarianism. This interpretation has deep roots, stretching back to Rousseau’s own time. One of the first to point up the totalitarian potential inherent in Rousseau’s Social Contract was Edmund Burke. This interpretation was given new impetus by the writings of other philosophers and thinkers such as J. L. Talmon, Bernard Russell, Lester Crocker, Karl Popper, Robert Nisbet, T. D. Weldron, Hannah Arendt and I. Hampsher-Monk. Even Charles Taylor, who favors a positive conception of freedom, describes Rousseau as the origin point of the idea of self-determining freedom which is a form of positive freedom and in its political form of “a social contract state founded on a general will... has been one of the intellectual sources of modern totalitarianism.” Taylor, C. (1991), *The Ethics of Authenticity*, Harvard University Press, p. 28. In spite of the totalitarian readings of Rousseau, there is a plenty of other philosophers and political scientists, who views Rousseau as a man who favors freedom such as Carole Pateman, Alfred Cobban, R. Wolker, J. Pocock, John Chapman, and J. Miller.

⁶⁹ Berlin (1969), p. xlii.

irreconcilable attitudes to the ends of life.”⁷⁰ Berlin second charge against positive view is that “*some* positive conceptions mistakenly identify distinct political values with freedom or liberty”⁷¹ rather than “departing from his earlier claim that the concept of liberty has spawned two rival conceptions.”⁷² This complaint is against the unfortunate tendency for the conception of freedom to become radically extended by some proponents of positive freedom to whatever they seek to favour or whatever it is they approve. Berlin claims that positive freedom draws the attention towards things we approve such as having money, security, education, and having a certain level of food but these are the things, which should be kept distinct from the conception of freedom as the conditions of freedom and defined without the aid of a term borrowed from another area, namely freedom. So, Berlin removes the conditions of freedom from the definition/content of freedom and moves them from “the department of liberty into the department of justice or equality.”⁷³ Otherwise, warns Berlin, the conception of freedom becomes “so vague and distended as to make it virtually useless.”⁷⁴ Berlin offers a distinction between freedom and its exercise conditions, which establishes the value of liberty:

“It is important to discriminate between liberty and the conditions of its exercise. If a man is too poor or too ignorant or too feeble to make use of his legal rights, the liberty that these rights confer upon him is nothing to him, but it is not thereby annihilated. The obligation to promote education, health, justice, to raise standards of living, to provide opportunity for the growth of the arts and the sciences, to prevent reactionary political or social or legal policies or arbitrary inequalities, is not made less stringent because it is not necessarily directed to the promotion of liberty itself, but to conditions in

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. xliii.

⁷¹ Gray, John (1988), *Liberalism: Essays in Political Philosophy*, Routledge, p. 48.

⁷² Ibid., p. 48.

⁷³ Macpherson (1973), p. 102.

⁷⁴ Berlin (1969), p. 20.

which alone its possession is of value, or to values which may be independent of it. And still, liberty is one thing, and the conditions for it are another.”⁷⁵

Accordingly, there can be a normative connection rather a conceptual connection between freedom and the conditions of freedom. This view is suggested by Rawls when he says, “the inability to take advantage of one’s rights and opportunities as a result of poverty and ignorance, and a lack of means generally is sometimes counted among the constraints definitive of liberty. I shall not, however, say this, but rather I shall think of these things as affecting the worth of liberty.”⁷⁶ Thus, there may be freedom of the press in a country where most citizens are illiterate. In these circumstances, Berlin will insist that illiteracy does not amount to a lack of freedom but rather lack of conditions of freedom, which establishes the value of freedom and makes the exercise of freedom of the press possible. A basic education, which includes literacy, may be a good and its provision may be a matter of justice but we should distinguish a lack of freedom from conditions under which it is hard or impossible to exercise that freedom. So, while Berlin wants to keep differing conceptions distinct, he complains about positive freedom’s tendency to obscure the conception of freedom by assimilating other values and conditions of freedom into the conception of freedom⁷⁷.

⁷⁵ Berlin (2002a), p. 45.

⁷⁶ Rawls, John (1971), *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford University Press, p. 204.

⁷⁷ It is said that those who supports positive freedom are really talking about metaphysical freedom or freedom of the will, whilst imagining that they are talking about social freedom. D. D. Raphael states that positive conceptions of freedom fail to distinguish freedom of choice (freedom of the will) from social freedom: “The idealist theory fails to distinguish freedom of choice from social freedom... When the idealist theory of freedom confuses social freedom with freedom of the will, it simply obscures the issue about social freedom.” Raphael, D. D. (1981), *Moral Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, pp. 88-89. But, this critic seems to be mistaken. The view that a good and reasonable

Chapter 2

Components of Freedom

It shall be suggested that there are four types of properties or components or logical/formal conditions of freedom. While some philosophers can and does construct a complex conception of freedom constituted by these various components, others believe that some or even one of these components are necessary or even sufficient for being free. Accounts of freedom/conceptions of freedom typically involve components of one or more of the following types:

1. Interpersonal Component: having non-coercive relations between an agent and another social agent and non-restriction of options by others

man is free, even though he be a slave, is associated with Stoics and thus, with positive freedom. Still, the conception of freedom as the capacity to will what is reasonable and good, and the problem of metaphysical freedom and determinism are different issues since if one is caused to act reasonably and good, then one is necessarily free in virtue of positive freedom and if one has the capacity to act otherwise, then one has to choose what is reasonable and good to be free in terms of positive freedom. Thus, a man's 'will' can be free even if he is imprisoned but it is not the case that a prisoner is necessarily free regardless of his exercise. Moreover, freedom as the following of one's reason can also take the form of recognition of necessity. Seeing that things cannot be otherwise, we get rid of frustrating desires and irrational fears. Accordingly, freedom is brought about when we identify ourselves with the rational order of the world and understand the parts in which we play in it. Such a conception of freedom can be found in the works of Plehanov. It is important to note that some philosophers such as Spinoza hold that human beings can be both positively free and are also determined by laws of nature. For Spinoza's account of positive freedom and determinism consider the following sentences: "A free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason, who is not led by fear but directly desires that which is good...it is clear that we are driven about in many ways by external causes, and that, like waves on the sea, driven by contrary winds, we toss about, not knowing our outcome and fate" Arrington, Robert (2000), *Western Ethics*, Blackwell, pp. 188 and 205.

2. Institutional Component: having certain institutions that protect or promote freedom
3. Mental Dispositional Component: having some mental capacities to be a free agent
4. Exercise Component: exercising some mental dispositional capacities and acting upon reflected and evaluated desires

A. Interpersonal Component

Interpersonal component will be constructed according to Gerald MacCallum's triadic formula. MacCallum challenged Berlin's dichotomy of negative and positive freedom in an article, 'Negative and Positive Freedom', in which he claimed that there is just one conception of freedom, not two and that one conception of freedom is an open interpretable triadic schematic core-conception of freedom expressing a canonical form (a core mental construction as a formula): X is (is not) free from Y to do (not do, become, not become) Z.

"Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is always freedom from some constraint or restriction on, interference with, or barrier to doing, not doing, becoming something; such freedom is thus always of something (an agent of agents), from something, to do not do, become, or not become something: it is a triadic relation. Taking the format, 'x is (is not) free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z'"⁷⁸

This triadic formula suggests that freedom is always freedom for someone; it is also freedom from some obstacles; and it is freedom to do (or not to do) something⁷⁹. So, for example, any discussion of freedom of speech will, implicitly or

⁷⁸ MacCallum, Gerald (1991), "Negative and Positive Freedom", *Liberty* (ed. Miller, D.), Oxford University Press, p. 100.

⁷⁹ Berlin responded the MacCallum's triadic formula by pointing out that there are important cases, in which freedom is at issue, cannot be fitted into this triadic formula. Berlin argues that one can desire freedom in itself. We understand this best when we consider persons and nations struggling against

explicitly, refer to some person or persons who are or are not constrained by some obstacle to make some sort of public statement. What MacCallum is doing is arguing that there is a simple and useful core-formulation (core-conception as a formulation) of freedom available which embodies both the negative and the positive conceptions of freedom described by Berlin. What people who disagree about freedom disagree about is what counts as an x, what counts as a y⁸⁰, and what counts as a z.

fetters and oppressions. People who struggle against chains want freedom, plain and simple: "It has been suggested that liberty is always a triadic relation: one can only seek to be free from X to do or be Y; hence 'all liberty' is at one negative and positive or, better still, neither... This seems to me an error. A man struggling against his chains or a people against enslavement need not consciously aim at any definite further state. A man need not know how he will use his freedom; he just wants to remove the yoke. So do classes and nations." Berlin (1969), p. xliii. Following the line of Berlin, John Gray argues that "the basic sense of liberty is dyadic, not triadic, since an agent may wish to be without a constraint, and yet have no specific action he wishes then to perform." Gray, John (1994), *Isaiah Berlin*, Princeton University Press, p. 18. Skinner argues against Gray and Berlin by arguing that "But it is surely evident that the struggling man of Berlin's example is someone who wishes at once to be free from an element of interference, and at the same time to be able (freely, independently) to do or be or become something –at the very least, to become a man free from the constraints imposed by his chains and in consequence (and eo ipso) free to act should he choose to do so. It seems clear, in short, that the purported counter-example misses MacCallum's point, which is that, when we say of an agent that he or she is unconstrained, this is to say that he is capable of acting at will – or of choosing to remain inactive, of course." Skinner, Quentin (1984), "The Idea of Negative Liberty", *Philosophy in History: Essays in the Historiography of Philosophy* (Ed. Rorty, R, Schneewind, and Skinner), Cambridge University press, p. 194. A man struggling against his chains wants to become/be, at least, a free man even if he does not want to do anything with his freedom. So, Berlin's core-conceptions of freedom: negative and positive freedoms are consistent with the canonical structure mapped out by MacCallum.

⁸⁰ The sorts of obstacles on freedom can include prison cells, handcuffs, bayonets, lacking tools, poverty, irrational desires, ignorance, false consciousness, compulsions, habits and so forth. Each of

What is the subject of liberty: what is it whose freedom is in question? The subject of freedom can be animals, inanimate things, institutions, social classes, nations, societies, individuals and so forth. So, the range of subjects to which the predicate free can be applied is so diverse. We speak of rivers flowing freely, a rat freeing itself from a trap and an inanimate object falling freely in space. Thus, we speak of freedom of animals, freedom of rivers, freedom of Iraq, freedom of churches, freedom of proletariat, and freedom of individual persons. Following the

these things is capable of preventing or hindering a person from performing certain actions or a choice making. Steven Lukes suggest two dichotomies: one yields an external-internal dichotomy and the other yields a negative-positive dichotomy. For this distinction see Lukes, Steven (1998), *Marksizm ve Ahlak*, Ayrıntı Yayınları, p. 101. First, external restraints are those come from outside to a person's body and environment such as prohibitions, prison cells, lack of money, and lack of tools. All other restraints are internal such as irrational desires, lack of knowledge, compulsion, and habits. Second, these internal and external obstacles can be divided into positive and negative obstacles. A positive restraint is the presence of something and a negative restraint is the absence of something. The subdivision of external obstacles is positive external constraints, which can be listed as follows: prohibitions (laws that are prohibiting), barred windows, locked doors, bayonets, prison cells and other external impediments and the negative external constraints, such as lack of tools, lack of money, lack of transport, lack of weapons and so forth. The subdivision of internal obstacles are negative internal obstacles such as lack of knowledge, lack of skill, lack of rationality, lack of authentic desires etc. and positive internal obstacles are as follows: psychoses, obsessive thoughts, compulsive desires, headaches, neuroses, compulsion, cravings, habits and etc. But, this account assimilates all conceptions of freedom into 'freedom from' type. Accordingly, absence of war is identified with presence of peace. But, presence of peace can mean more than absence of war such as having some institutions that prevents and guarantees the continuation of peace. Lastly, we can always translate a positive obstacle to a negative obstacle (such as presence of prohibiting laws to absence of permitting laws) and vice versa (such as absence of money to presence of poverty). These translations by negation show that the boundaries between negative and positive obstacles are vague.

formula of MacCallum, Stanley Benn argues that there are not in fact two discrete conceptions of freedom, but one model within which all talk about freedom can be fitted. Benn proposes the following formula of freedom: "The free agent Alan is free to Φ in relation to some possible frustrating condition F."⁸¹ Benn's two variables Φ and F corresponds formally to MacCallum's acts and constraints. Differing from MacCallum's schema, Benn's model fills out the subject variable with empirical individual. In a similar fashion with Benn, we need to take the X variable as empirical individual as the freedom of the individuals is our proper subject.

Following the line of MacCallum, Felix Oppenheim adopts the following triadic model: "With respect to Y, X is unfree to do x, to the extent that Y makes it impossible or punishable for X to do x"⁸² or Y makes X unfree to do x if Y prevents X from doing x. Oppenheim's three variables X, Y, and x correspond to MacCallum's agents, constraints, and acts. The difference is that Oppenheim's model brings out the qualification that constraints cannot be internal to the agent himself while MacCallum leaves the range of the constraint variable relatively open. This means that a person cannot constrain his own freedom and freedom cannot be an intrinsic feature of an individual⁸³. According to Oppenheim's triadic schema above,

⁸¹ Benn (1986), pp. 125-126.

⁸² Oppenheim, Felix (1961), *Dimensions of Freedom*, St. Martin's Press, p. 81. "A makes B unfree to do x means that A makes it impossible for B to do x or A would punish B if B did x." Oppenheim, Felix (1955), "Interpersonal Freedom and Freedom of Action", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 49, p. 354.

⁸³ It is important to note that Oppenheim is a proponent of negative freedom. So, to make the issue more clear, we must state that for a negative conception of freedom, a person cannot constrain his own freedom. But, an account of positive freedom (such as Stoic conception of freedom which takes mental dispositional component as sufficient for freedom) can take freedom as an intrinsic feature of

X must not be the same person as Y. So, Oppenheim assumes that only preventive conditions relevant to an agent's freedom or unfreedom are those imposed by another agent. He takes only preventive conditions that are brought about by other agents into consideration. Following MacCallum's formula; person X is free or not free to do Z with respect to another person or with respect to obstacles (y) attributable to other person/persons. Oppenheim's model constructs freedom as an interpersonal conception to which we will attach to in this part.

i) Constraints on Freedom

Everyone agrees that not all obstacles (y) or preventive actions (Y) or frustrating conditions (F) to X's doing z constrain X's freedom to doing z. They disagree about which types of obstacles (y) or preventive actions (Y) or conditions (F) do constraint freedom. To categorize the obstacles, the following schema will be offered:

An obstacle y (or preventive action Y or condition F) is a freedom-restricting obstacle if and only if some other person or persons R creates an obstacle y (or Y or F) by Ping on X's doing of Z⁸⁴.

individuals. According to Oppenheim, when freedom becomes an intrinsic feature of agent, then, we are not dealing with the concept of social freedom but, with what Oppenheim calls freedom of action and freedom from want: "In both theories the word "free" designates a property of individuals, and has a purely normative meaning." *Ibid.*, p. 361.

⁸⁴ It is important to note that the offered schema focuses on the history of obstacles, or to be more exactly how another person brings about the obstacles rather than its nature. Consider the two examples below:

- (a) X1 is blind because of inherited glaucoma, and thus unable to play football.
- (b) X2 is blind because the one of the substitute players, R has damaged X2's eyes.

While few will hesitate to conclude that in (b) X2 was rendered unfree to play football, some philosophers such as Oppenheim, who claims that failure to remove/prevent an obstacle does not

The Ping relation between R and Y involves causal connections⁸⁵. The following list for Y will more or less exhaust the possibilities:

Ping:

- a) Simple coercion
- b) Legislation (that is backed up with a threat)
- c) Threat

restrict one's freedom, will conclude that X1 is not free to play football. But, note that X1 is unable to play football for the same reason that X2 is. They both lack the capacity to see or to be more exactly, they are both unfree from blindness. What distinguishes the two cases is the history of the obstacle rather than the nature of it. So, it can be misleading to classify obstacles according to their nature.

Classifying them with reference to their history seems more helpful and less confusing.

⁸⁵ We can also add an attribute component to this formula. Two candidates can be offered for this component: intentional responsibility view and causal responsibility view. A suggested analysis of the intentional component of ascriptions of unfreedom to X might be this: X is unfree from an external or internal obstacle created by a social agent deliberately. As a typical proponent of intentional responsibility view, Dryer argues that: "Someone who makes it impossible for another to do certain things is not said thereby to impair another's freedom, unless it is his intention to make it impossible to do them." Dryer, D. P. (1964), "Freedom", *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, vol. 30, p. 447. We can formulate this argument as follows: (1) R creates an obstacle Y for X deliberately, then, (2) X's freedom is restricted by R. We can introduce Oppenheim as a proponent of causal responsibility view. According to Oppenheim, R's intentions are irrelevant: "I accept a proposal Miller rejects, 'that any obstacle for which human agents are in some way or other responsible should be regarded as a constraint on freedom.'" Oppenheim, Felix (1985), "'Constraints on Freedom' as a Descriptive Concept", *Ethics*, p. 306. This idea can be showed as follows: (1) R creates an obstacle Y for X deliberately or accidentally, then, (2) X's freedom is restricted by R. As a last remark, see Miller, David (1983), "Constraints On Freedom", *Ethics*, Vol. 94, pp. 74-75 for the moral responsibility view, which is a remarkable alternative for the causal and intentional responsibility views. But, the attribute component will not be analyzed and so, will not be included in our discussion of freedom.

d) Manipulation

So, R can restrain an agent, X in four main ways: simple coercion, legislation, threat, and manipulation. Everybody agrees that coercion restricts one's freedom. Hayek who regards as freedom-restricting those actions which are coercive, defines coercion as follows: "By 'coercion' we mean the control of the environment or circumstances of a person by another such that in order to avoid greater evil he is forced to act not according to a coherent plan of his own but to serve the ends of others."⁸⁶ But, Steiner's definition of coercion gives more insight to understand the notion of coercion: "an individual is unfree if and only if his doing of any action is rendered impossible by the action of another person."⁸⁷ Here, R (the restraining agent) makes it physically impossible for X (the patient) to do a simple action, namely, moving out of prison.⁸⁸ "Physical violence or control of an incapacitating sort seems... to be the paradigm of coercion."⁸⁹ "Suppose that one man applies intense pressure to another man's wrist, forcing him to drop the knife in his hand. In this case, which involves what may be called "physical coercion", the victim is not made to act; what happens is that his fingers are made to open by the pressure applied to his wrist"⁹⁰. In that case, the victim's/patient's body is subject to the power exerciser agent's (R's) will and the patient (X) is restrained from not dropping the knife or keeping the knife in his hand.

⁸⁶ Hayek (1960), pp. 20-21.

⁸⁷ Steiner, Hillel (1974-75), "Individual Liberty", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. 27, p. 33.

⁸⁸ On the agent/patient distinction see Thomas Hobbes, *De Corpore*, chs. 9 and 10.

⁸⁹ Plant (1991), p. 229.

⁹⁰ Frankfurt, Henry (1998a), "Coercion and Moral Responsibility", *The Importance of What We Care About*, Cambridge University Press, p. 26.

Secondly, R can restrain X's freedom through legislation which is backed up with a threat. A despot can address to all citizens including X not to walk through the right side of the street and passes his command as law⁹¹. R creates an external obstacle (banishing law) by legislation. But, the bare act of legislation is not sufficient to coerce someone to do or not to do something. Hobbes tells us that laws gain their force not from their bare existence, but from the danger of disobedience: "Covenants, without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all."⁹² We cannot simply unfree because the despot/legislator urges/commands us not to walk through the right side of the street by legislation. R must back up his legislation (not to walk through the right side of the street) with a threat that he will punish any citizen (any X) who disobeys it by killing him (any X). In that case, it is the threat and not the bare legislation, which coerces all X. So, R, "the one person (P) proposes to bring about a certain (*undesirable, my note*) state of affairs (C) if the other person (*that is the patient X, my note*) performs a certain action (A)",⁹³ walking through the right side of the street. Through the effective threat, R restrains X from doing a complex action: both walking through the right side of the street and also

⁹¹ In the issue of legislation, we take the despot as the restricting agent because for instance, in the case of a parliamentary system, laws will be the outcome of interactions between the members of National Assembly and in that case, we should discuss the issue of laws under the heading of institutional component.

⁹² Hobbes, Thomas (1940), "Leviathan", *Hobbes Selections*, (ed. Woodbridge, F.J.E.), Charles Scribner's Sons, p. 335.

⁹³ Frankfurt (1998a), p. 27.

keeping his own life⁹⁴. So, it is the threat introduced by the legislation that restricts the freedom of the agent rather than the bare legislation itself.

That forces us consider the cases of threat more carefully. Consider the following example of threat: A person, X, is waylaid by a gangster, R who threatens X with a gun: 'Your money or your life'. X prefers staying alive to keeping the money and hands the money over. We generally conclude that when X hands the money over, X does not perform a free action and X is subject to the will of another. But, some philosophers (such as Steiner and Parent) have stated that threats do not restrict a person's freedom: "We can predict that T (*X, my note*) will almost certainly hand over his money, because we know that this is what almost everybody does in such a case. But it neither follows nor is it true that T (*X, my note*) is unfree to keep his money in this situation, as he would be if H (*R, my note*) forced him to hand it over."⁹⁵

The Hobbesian tradition, which is championed by writers like Steiner, Day and Parent, holds that freedom is constrained only when the action in question is made impossible. Hillel Steiner argues as follows: "An individual is unfree if and only if, his doing of any action is rendered impossible by the action of other individuals. That is, the unfree individual is so because the particular action in question is prevented by another."⁹⁶ Closely related to this position is the view that judgments of the freedom to do some particular action are all-or-nothing affair. X is

⁹⁴ It is important to note that threats do not only create external obstacles but they also create internal obstacles (fear). R creates an internal obstacle (the fear of death) by deterring (treating through punishment) X from doing the simple action, walking through the right side of the street.

⁹⁵ Day, J. P. (1977), "Threats, Offers, Law, Opinion, and Liberty", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 14, p. 260.

⁹⁶ Steiner (1974-75), p. 33.

either free or unfree to do Z; there are no degrees of freedom. Parent says, “perhaps feelings can be measured in degrees, but it is extremely doubtful whether unfreedom can be.”⁹⁷

There are two patterns of argument, which are generally advanced for this view. The first suggests that the opposite view leads to the possibility of the following contradiction: X does what X is unfree to do. Parent believes that it is self-evident that this expression is logically impossible. The only way to prevent this contradiction is to insist that X is unfree to Z only if it is impossible for X to Z. The second argument is about the effectiveness of obstacles. It suggests that threats creates surmountable obstacles which do not make us unfree, but rather they alter the desirability of the action in question. Steiner claims that threats only alter our desire to do something: “Interventions of an offering or a threatening kind effect changes in an individual’s relative desires to do certain actions. But neither the making of threats nor that of offers constitutes a diminution of personal liberty.”⁹⁸ But, some philosophers reject this position such as Oppenheim and David Miller. Oppenheim argues that “assuming the threat is credible then this becomes a threat of the ‘severest kind of deprivation’ and one makes it ‘practically impossible’ for the person to resist and that ‘makes him unfree to do so’.”⁹⁹ Practical impossibility implies that judgments of freedom admit of degrees. We say ‘X is unfree to do x’ when it is physically impossible for X to do Z and when X is not very free to do Z. The suggestion offers that the degree of X’s freedom to do Z is linked to the probability of X’s being able to do Z if X wanted to do Z. But, do we take subjective or objective

⁹⁷ Parent, W. A. (1974b), “Some Recent Work on the Concept of Liberty”, *American Philosophy Quarterly*, Vol. 11, p. 156.

⁹⁸ Steiner (1974-75), p. 43.

⁹⁹ Plant (1991), p. 232.

probability? The subjective assessments of probability will force us to make degree of freedom/unfreedom dependent on the subjective characteristics of a person. While an insecure person who has a low estimate of his own abilities is unfree to resist the threat, a person who has a high degree of self-esteem will be free to resist the same threat. In that case, freedom will change from person to person and we will be unable to have a well-structured formula of freedom, which is applicable in general terms. If we take the objective probability in a strict sense, it would seem that X is not unfree not to hand over the money when the gangster is pointing a toy gun at P and where X does not realize that the gun is fake. In that case, there will be no real/genuine obstacle in X's way. The gangster cannot possibly shoot X dead, and it will be open to X to walk away from the situation, as he likes. Then, even, a person, who has every reason to believe that it is a real gun, is free even if he feels that he is unfree. His feeling unfree stems from (or partly depends on) the fact that he fails to recognize the true nature of the gun rather than the fact that the gangster threatens him with a fake gun. But, this seems counter-intuitive because it easily shifts the responsibility/burden of X's feeling of unfreedom from the gangster to X.

To avoid such a strict formulation, rather than just dealing only with the nature of obstacle which asks whether the obstacle is a real one or not, we can establish a criteria of human normality and conclude that if that criteria establishes that a reasonable or normal person can easily fail to realize that the gun is fake, it remains the case that X is coerced. Then, if the person whose freedom is at stake is extremely naive according to our criteria of human normality to realize that gun is fake, he is not rendered unfree by the threat. But, this time, we are forced to give a proper answer to the question, which asks the proper criteria of normality of a human being. An empirical determination (descriptive) such as an empirical psychological

research¹⁰⁰ or a normative determination of human normality can be the two candidates.

Benn recognizes that a threat is posed to freedom not only by coercers, impellers and theaters, but also, by manipulators and propagandists: "The problem posed by propagandists, advertisers and public relations experts is quite different. They aim not at overruling contrary intentions by threats of coercion but, by persuasion, to create a willing –if possible an enthusiastic- accord. They seek to avoid or dissolve conflict, not to overrule it."¹⁰¹ Benn talks about exercising 'influence power'¹⁰² over an individual as freedom-restricting, which is consisted of non-rational persuasion, propaganda, indoctrination, deterrence, and manipulation¹⁰³.

¹⁰⁰ Determining the criteria of human normality by appealing to an empirical, statistical research seems very problematic. A simple descriptive determination given by an empirical research will constitute the criteria of normality by reference to the average men. The worry is that the members of the middle class will constitute the normal. This will simply be legitimizing the status quo and implicitly introduce normative measures under the guise of science. So, the alternative approach, a normative determination of human normality seems more reasonable. But, some philosophers (such as Oppenheim) do not want to do this since they think that freedom is a purely descriptive concept. So, this issue is closely related to the discussion whether the concept of freedom is bounded with normative considerations or not.

¹⁰¹ Benn, Stanley (1967), "Freedom and Persuasion", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, XLVII, p. 261.

¹⁰² For the term, influence power; see Lukes, Steven (1974), *Power*, McMillan Press, p. 32. Oppenheim defines influence power as follows: "'P influences R to do x' means that P performs some action y involving a communication which causes R to choose x." Oppenheim, Felix (1978), "'Power' Revisited", *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 40, p. 590.

¹⁰³ Robert Waelder in his article, "Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism" makes a distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism and claims that while an authoritarian rule only demands outward obedience to the orders of the system, totalitarianism insists on inward obedience to the orders and the

Leaving the question whether the other forms of influence power restrict one's freedom, we will focus on the issue of manipulation.

Manipulation is defined by Oppenheim as "the attempt at influence in which the influencer ensures that the influenced is unaware of the attempt."¹⁰⁴ There are two possibilities: one may not be aware that one is being influenced at all or one may be aware that influence is taking place, but he may be unaware that it contains elements of deception. Taking the former as our subject, we can introduce sleep-teaching method as an example. In Aldous Huxley's novel, 'Brave New World'¹⁰⁵, sleep

ideology of the system. He claims that authoritarian systems do not expect ideological conformity from its citizens. On the other hand, totalitarianism tries "to reshape the superego of its subjects through re-education." Waelder, Robert (1951), "Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism", *Psychoanalysis and Culture* (ed. Wilbur, G. & Muensterberger, W.), p. 189. In a totalitarian system, the government "is not only the lawmaker, law administrator and judge but also the keeper of the individual's conscience." *Ibid.*, p. 188. As Berlin suggests, "hence totalitarian insistence on education and indoctrination as opposed to mere outward obedience, a sinister process with which we have become all too familiar." Berlin (2002a), pp. 31-32 But, it is important to note that in all forms of political systems including liberal democracy, a threat is posed to freedom not only by coercer and impeder but also, by opinion manipulator: propagandists, advertisers, public relations experts, educators and so forth.

¹⁰⁴ Oppenheim (1961), p. 27.

¹⁰⁵ 'Brave New World' (BNW) is a dystopian fable (a possible future dystopian society) about a world state in the 7th century A.F. (after Ford) where everything is controlled by a group of people. BNW is a benevolent dictatorship where there are ten world controllers. BNW is centered on manipulation. This ends up with the distortion of the human psyche. While brainwashing and sleep teaching are different (the former being done while the subject is awake, and the latter being done while the subject is asleep), both methods employed by Huxley, which act upon the subconscious to obtain the same final results. Moreover, BNW is structured around the use of a mind-altering drug called soma and hypnopaedia. These two tools are used for creating a positive feeling towards the rulers and therefore,

teaching or hypnopaedia is introduced as a method of altering the Brave New Worlder's mind¹⁰⁶. While the subject of influence is at sleep, a voice under every pillow softly whispers moralizing and socializing slogans (words without reason) or (in reality) slogans that are put in use for supplying the adherence of the Brave New Worlders to the governing elite. This is a form of hypnotic influence and the subjects of influence are unaware of the fact that influence is taking place. The controllers of Brave New World (R) create desire to obey the commands of the rulers through the exercise of manipulation by the use of sleep-teaching. According to Benn, manipulation or hypnosis disables the subject to use his the proper mental capacities (which are a minimum degree of epistemic and practical rationality)¹⁰⁷ and that disqualifies the subject from being agent of freedom. In such a case, that person is a heterarchic or other-impelled person: "who is no more a decision maker...whose program has been implanted, whether deliberately or otherwise, by someone. The extreme case is a subject under deep hypnosis."¹⁰⁸ He is deprived of the capacity to deliberate and choose rationally by manipulation such as the inhabitants of Brave New World¹⁰⁹.

become the perfect tool of the dictator, as it creates a more submissive and conformist society, a society that is easier to control.

¹⁰⁶ Huxley, Aldous (1955), *Brave New World*, Penguin, Chapter 1.

¹⁰⁷ See Benn's conception of autarchy for a clarification of the proper mental capacities.

¹⁰⁸ Benn (1986), p. 164.

¹⁰⁹ Gary Watson makes a similar point about the inhabitants of Brave New World: "The subjects in the Brave New World cases lack freedom not because their decisions can be deterministically explained... but because their evaluations and volitional and other cognitive faculties have been impaired in certain ways. The crucial thing about their situation is that they are incapable of effectively envisaging or seeing the significance of certain alternatives, of reflecting on themselves and on the origins of their motivations, of comprehending or responding to relevant theoretical and

ii) Choice Set of Freedom

Up to this point, we have dealt with the freedom from part of MacCallum's formula. From now on, freedom to do Z part of MacCallum will be our subject of inquiry. We shall refer to the Z component of MacCallum or Φ of Benn or x component of Oppenheim as the choice/option set. If we assume that every individual is faced with a choice/option set denoted Z or Φ or x, we categorize the choice/option set according to quantity and quality. There are two quantity-based approaches. One defines the choice/option set in terms of desires of the agent (X), and the other one defines the option set by reference to the counterfactual desires of the agent (X).

The former is the simplest way of defining freedom in terms of want-satisfaction. Thus, Bertrand Russell holds that "freedom in its most abstract sense means the absence of external obstacles to realization of desires."¹¹⁰ Hobbes' conception of freedom resembles Russell's conception: "a FREEMAN, is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to do."¹¹¹ John Stuart Mill says: "liberty consists in doing what one desires"¹¹². Accordingly, X is free when X is free from constraints to actualize his desires if X desires so. This conception of freedom as want-satisfaction is "a ratio

evaluational criteria." Watson, Gary (1987), "Free Action and Free Will", *Mind*, Vol.46, p. 152.

Lastly, it is important to note that the issue of influence power or manipulation can be discussed under the heading of mental dispositional component since it is related with the issue of being a proper agent of freedom.

¹¹⁰ Russell, B. (1960) "Freedom in Society", *Skeptical Essays*, Allen & Unwin, p. 117.

¹¹¹ Hobbes (1940), pp. 369-370.

¹¹² Mill (1985), *On Liberty*, Penguin Books, p. 166.

concept: it is a matter of the ratio between what people desire to and what they are prevented by others from doing”¹¹³ or what options they have.

The trouble with this conception of freedom is that although it gives a meaning to feeling free, it does not give an independent meaning to being free. The slave, who has never imagined that he might be anything other than a slave and therefore, does not feel resentment about his lot, must be regarded as free. Suppose for the sake of the argument that there is a slave, X1 who does not want to do any of the things his master prevent him from doing and there is another slave, X2 who is the slave of the same master and is under the same restrictions that X1 faces and feels regret about the restrictions that he faces. Under this conception of freedom, while the two slaves are under the restrictions of the same conditions, one remains free and the other remains unfree. To be more concrete, while X1 is free because he can satisfy his desires, X2 is unfree because his desires remains unsatisfied. Freedom becomes dependent on the subjective conditions of the agent (namely, satisfaction of the desires that the agent has) rather than options that he has. So, it leads to a purely subjective definition of freedom. But, in reality, X1 is still unfree because if he were to choose to do what his slavery forbids, he would be frustrated. In short, ‘sour grapes’ don’t make people free. So, this conception of freedom confuses feeling free with being free¹¹⁴.

¹¹³ Williams, Bernard (2001), “From Freedom to Liberty: The Construction of a Political Value”, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, p. 4.

¹¹⁴ This sense of feeling free must not be confused with Nozick’s experience machine. Nozick argues against utilitarianism by positing what he calls an experience machine which produces whatever experiences you want/gives you any experience you desire to have: “Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making

Moreover, this view implies that there are two ways for X to increase his freedom. Somebody may remove the obstacles that prevent X from satisfying his desires. But, equally X may bring it about that X does not have desires that cannot be satisfied. "If degrees of freedom were a function of the satisfaction of desires, I could increase freedom as effectively by eliminating desires as by satisfying them: I could render men (including myself) free by conditioning them into losing the original desires which I have decided not to satisfy."¹¹⁵ So, X2, the discontented slave can

a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, preprogramming your life's desires? Of course, while in the tank you won't know that you're there; you'll think it's all actually happening. Others can also plug in to have the experiences they want, so there's no need to stay unplugged to serve them. (Ignore problems such as who will service the machines if everyone plugs in.) Would you plug in? What else can matter to us, other than how our lives feel from the inside." Nozick, Robert (2002), "The Experience Machine", *Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (ed. Pojman, L.), Wadsworth, pp. 118-117. He responds that we would not plug in because we want to do certain things, and not just have the experience of doing them. A conception of freedom, which states that freedom involves satisfying our desires can conclude that by plugging into that machine, a person can gain freedom. But, according to Nozick, we are not free in reality. In Nozick's example the experience machine supplies feeling of freedom. In the case of contented slave, the feeling of freedom is the function of his actual desires and the options that he has. While the subject of Nozick feels free because all his desires are artificially satisfied by the machine, but unfree because he really does not satisfy his desires, the contented slave feels free because the options he has corresponds to the desires he has but, in reality he is unfree because if he were to choose to do other things than he actually desires, the options are closed to him. It is also important to note that Nozick's experience machine argument is a refutation of mental slavery. Benn will call a person who is plugged into this machine as heterarchic or other-impelled and conclude that the heterarchic person who is plugged into the experience machine disqualifies as an agent of social freedom.

¹¹⁵ Berlin (2002a), p. 31.

free himself by eliminating the desires that he cannot satisfy. But, that will not make a real change in his objective situation; he still remains as a slave and if he were to choose to do what his slavery forbids, he would be unable to do¹¹⁶.

In a similar fashion, Berlin, in a formulation later retracted, defines freedom in terms of “absence of obstacles to the fulfillment of a man’s desires”¹¹⁷ or desire-satisfaction: “I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no human being interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense simply the area within which a man can do what he wants.”¹¹⁸ But, this formulation leads to a inconsistency with his core-paradigmatic exemplar of negative freedom which is quoted from Helvetius: “The free man is the man who is not in irons, nor imprisoned in a goal, nor terrorized like a slave by the fear of punishment...”¹¹⁹ Or as Berlin puts “it was inconsistent with the formulation with which I began.”¹²⁰ According to the first conception of freedom, the contented slave in chains who proclaims his freedom because he no longer desires to do what his master forbids may feel free but it is the paradigm case of a person who is not free.

¹¹⁶ It also leads to the reformers paradox. Suppose for the sake of the argument that there is a X who is a contented slave and X does not want to do any of the things his slavery prevent him from doing. Under this conception of the options, X is free. “If reformers appears and tell X what he is missing and make X discontented for the first time, it might even be said that it is the reformers who have taken away their freedom.” Williams (2001), p. 4. A concept that leads to this paradox might be questioned as inadequate.

¹¹⁷ Berlin (2002a), p. 30.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

Berlin declares that this common position “does not represent my position.”¹²¹ He reformulates/modifies his position as follows: “The sense of freedom in which I use this term entails not simply the absence of frustration (which may be obtained by killing desires), but the absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities.”¹²² Or he claims “The extent of my social or political freedom consists in the absence of obstacles not merely to my actual, but to my potential, choices- to my acting in this or that way if I choose to do so.”¹²³ Thus, this view talks of the absence of obstacles to actual and potential/possible choices. So, the deficiencies that are attributed to desire satisfaction formulation is corrected by saying an agent is free to the extent that he is unconstrained from doing what he wants or might want to do. This is the second quantity-based approach, which defines the choice set by reference to the counterfactual desires of the agent. According to this view, the contented slave “is unfree because, if (contrary to fact) he were to choose” to do what his master forbids, “he would be frustrated. That is to say, he is unfree, even though he does not now want to do anything forbidden by law, because he might change his mind at some time in the future.”¹²⁴

However, strengthening the counterfactual definition of options by extending the counterfactuals “to cover wants” a person “never in fact conceived”¹²⁵ commits us to claim that freedom is being free from obstacles to do anything or everything. Scott formulates this position in the following manner: “Our freedom of action

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹²⁴ Smith, G.W. (1977), “Slavery, Contentment, and Social Freedom”, *Philosophical Quarterly*, vol.27, pp. 236-237.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

throughout a field of activity over a period of time is more than the freedom to do whatever we want to do in that field; ... it is freedom to do whatever we may want to do in that field, and, as there is no knowing what we want to do, it is freedom to do everything in that field whether or not we will want to do it.”¹²⁶ Or as J. P. Day puts: “[A person is] unfree when he is restrained from doing anything that it is in his power to do, regardless of whether he wants to do it or not.”¹²⁷ My freedom is lessened when my actual and possible choices are constrained and my freedom is increased when options to satisfy my actual and possible choices are increased. Freedom is not just the absence of obstacles to implementation of an actual choice that has been made but also the absence of obstacles on options or on my possible choices.

This view presupposes that the ideal sense of freedom amounts to the unlimited and perfect freedom outside of society and government, the natural freedom, which is being free from interferences of others to do everything or anything in regardless of the desires of the agent. Robinson Crusoe, before man Friday has joined, was perfectly free in this sense. There was no boss or government, which could tell him what to do or not to do. He was free from interference of others to do everything or anything whether or not he wants to do. This view implies that more freedom requires more options and the ideal sense of freedom is the absence of external obstacles on any of our options such as the case of Robinson Crusoe. This is an quantity-based approach to freedom according to which we can enlarge freedom by expanding the alternatives or options that people have without considering not

¹²⁶ Scott, K. J. (1970), “Liberty, Licence and Not Being Free”, *Contemporary Political Theory* (ed. Crispigny, Wertheimer), Atherton Press, p. 105.

¹²⁷ Day, J. P. (1987), “On Liberty and the Real Will”, *Philosophy*, XLV (1970), p. 179.

only whether the agent desires having these options or not but, also, regardless of the significance or reasonableness of these options.

The difficulty with this view becomes clear if we imagine a situation involving two people, X1 and X2, in which X1 has several options (say 10,000 things) available but none of them is reasonable or valuable to do, while X2 has only one option, which is valuable or reasonable to do. So, according to the above view, X1 is freer than X2 even if X1 lacks significant and reasonable options. But, we “do sometimes describe a person as having had no choice when the alternative he chose was plainly superior to his other alternatives. What we mean then is that he had no reasonable choice –that no other choice than the one he made would have been reasonable.”¹²⁸ In a context where the agent has several options but none of them are worthwhile or reasonable to pursue, we beg the question: does the language/grammar of freedom properly apply here?

Some thinkers (such as Benn and Taylor) say that the human actor must have a meaningful range of alternatives to be called as free. Benn and Weinstein holds the view that being at liberty involves having reasonable opportunities. They put the matter as follows, “it is appropriate to discuss whether he is free to do it only if it is a possible object of reasonable choice; cutting off one’s ears is not the sort of thing anyone, in a standard range of conditions, would reasonably do, i.e., ‘no one in his senses would think of doing such a thing’ (even though some people have, in fact, done it). It is not a question of logical absurdity; rather, to see the point of saying that one is (or is not) free to do X, we must be able to see that there is some point in

¹²⁸ Frankfurt (1998a), p. 38.

doing it”¹²⁹. Accordingly, if the agent (X) has two choices, which are unacceptable such as cutting off his ear or drinking nitric acid¹³⁰, then the grammar of freedom does not properly apply. To put it more strictly, X is not free when X has no reasonable alternative course or options.

Charles Taylor establishes that a theory of freedom must discriminate between sorts of obstacles to different sorts of activities and options. As an example, Taylor considers a diabolical defense of Albania as a free country, which goes as follows: Albania has abolished religious freedom but almost certainly has fewer traffic regulations than Britain. If one added upon liberty without considering the significance of the nature of the restrictions, one could argue that Albania was as free or even freer than Britain. This Taylor suggests is manifestly absurd; so that, we have to discriminate between options as qualitatively:

“Consider the following diabolical defense of Albania as a free country. We recognize that religion has been abolished in Albania, whereas it hasn’t been in Britain. But on the other hand there are probably far fewer traffic lights per head in Tirana than in London.... Suppose an apologist for Albanian Socialism were nevertheless to claim that this country was freer than Britain, because the number of acts restricted was far smaller. After all, only a minority of Londoners practise some religion in public places, but all have to negotiate their way through traffic. Those who do practise a religion generally do so on one day of the week, while they are held up at traffic lights every day. In sheer quantitative terms, the number of acts

¹²⁹ Benn, S.I. & Weinstein, W.L. (1971), “Being Free To Act and Being a Free Man”, *Mind*, vol.80, p. 195,

¹³⁰ Benn: “Not that one would be guilty of logical inconsistency if one said, for instance, that one was unfree to drink nitric acid or, indeed, that one was free to do so if nothing stood in the way of one’s drinking it but lack of inclination. But why should anyone want either to drink it or to say that he was free to do so?” Benn (1986), p. 128. It is important to note that drinking nitric acid can be a reasonable and valuable option for those who want to commit suicide or cutting off ear can be a significant and reasonable option for Van Gogh. It seems that Benn’s claim is too restrictive concerning the issue of reasonable and valuable options.

restricted by traffic lights must be greater than that restricted by a ban on public religious practice. So if Britain is considered a free society, why not Albania?"¹³¹

In Taylor's example, we would scarcely be likely to describe commands to obey traffic signals and warnings (whilst constituting perhaps a philosophical example of interference with our liberty) as curtailing our freedom in serious political debate. In contrast to our response to commands about traffic (such as walk on one side of the street), we are more reluctant to speak a loss of liberty where laws forbid us particular forms of religious worship/forbid us from worshipping. Taylor concludes that freedom has a dimension which connotes that some options are of higher significance (such as freedom for worshipping) for us than do others (freedom to walk on any side of the street) and selects amongst obstacles those that restrict significant options. So Taylor argues that:

"Freedom is no longer just the absence of external obstacles *tout court*, but the absence of external obstacles to significant action, to what is important to man. There are discriminations to be made; some restrictions are more important than others, some are utterly trivial. About many there is, of course, controversy. But what the judgment turns on is some sense of what is significant for human life. Restricting the expression of people's religious and ethical convictions is more significant than restricting their movement around uninhabited parts of the country; and both are more significant than the trivia of traffic control."¹³²

So, the idea of freedom makes sense in relation to our understanding that some goals and activities (so some options) are more significant to our lives than others. Berlin makes a similar suggestion by stating, "Such freedom ultimately depends not whether I wish to walk at all, or how far, but on how many doors are open, how open they are, upon their relative importance in my life, even though it

¹³¹ Taylor (1985a), p. 219.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 218.

may be impossible literally to measure this in any quantitative fashion.”¹³³ Elsewhere he summarizes his position as follows:” The extent of a man’s negative freedom is, as it were, a function of what doors, and how many, are open to him; upon what prospects they open; and how open they are. This formula must not be pressed too far, for not all doors are equal importance, inasmuch as the paths on which they open vary in the opportunities they offer.”¹³⁴ While the question ‘how many doors are open’ is about the quantitative dimension of options, the question ‘What doors are open’ is about the qualitative dimension of options. So, Berlin is not only concerned with the quantity of the options but with their quality when he wants to measure the freedom of individuals. But, if what counts as a reasonable option as Benn and Weinstein puts or what counts as valuable/significant option varies from person to person, then, we are again forced to conclude that freedom depends on the satisfaction of our desires, which we personally value. That will amount to saying that the degree of freedom is a subjective matter. The issue then becomes whether such judgments about importance can be grounded independent of the subjective valuations of the agent. Berlin introduces his solution in the following fashion: “what value not merely the agent, but the general sentiment of the society in which he lives, puts on the various possibilities.”¹³⁵ It simply allows that if reading books is terribly important to the agent and to the society in which he lives in (or to put more exactly, is a value in X’s society), then if reading books are not closed¹³⁶, X remains more

¹³³ Berlin (2002a), p. 32.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

¹³⁶ To make the issue comprehensible, we can give Ray Bradbury’s science fiction book, *Fahrenheit 451* as an example. Bradbury’s book depicts a future society in which reading books are forbidden. Ironically, firemen are in charge of burning the books.

free than otherwise. Similarly, if killing and torturing people is a prime value for the society in which X lives in, X will be freer to the extent that his options to kill and torture people are not constrained even if he wishes to do or not. But, Berlin's comments imply no more than a descriptive account of the values that oneself and others in society actually holds. This view does not allow for a normative consideration of the options in question. Alternatively, we can end up with an objective normative theory of which opportunities are more valuable to fix the issue.¹³⁷

To summarize, interpersonal component consists of two parts: freedom from and freedom to. Being free from includes obstacles that are created by coercion, threat and manipulation. While some philosophers such as Steiner and Parent claims that only coercion restricts our freedom excluding threat and manipulation, some philosophers such as Oppenheim objects to that position and includes threats as a freedom-restricting acts. On the other hand, it has been argued that manipulation constrains people's freedom as well as coercion and threat. That is the position, which is held by Benn. To continue, there is a disagreement about the option component, Z of MacCallum's triadic formula. While some philosophers such as Hobbes, Mill, Day, and Scott concentrate on the quantity of the options, others such as Taylor and Benn claims that we have to take quality of options into consideration. There are two variants of the former position, quantity-based approach. According to the former, one is free to the extent that the options to satisfy his desires are not restricted. According to the latter position, our degree of freedom depends on the

¹³⁷ As an example, Charles Taylor explains the source of significance as our capacity for strong evaluation and accepts that one can be mistaken about them on the basis of an objective criterion of value.

quantity of options that we have regardless of our actual desires. The quality-based approach claims that the significance or reasonableness of options is important and measuring the degree of one's freedom requires considering the relative significance of these options. We are free to the extent that we are free from obstacles that restrict our significant options.

B. Institutional Component

While the interpersonal condition concentrates on the obstacles that are created by another person or persons and options that the agent has, the institutional component emphasizes the importance of having well-established rights and proper institutions. Institutional component is about our understanding of politics, which asks the following question: what kind of politically organized society is a prerequisite for freedom? Wilhem Von Humboldt thinks that a proper understanding of politics requires one to distinguish clearly between two different questions¹³⁸. The two questions are as follows¹³⁹:

¹³⁸ Raymond Geuss calls our attention to the similarities between the two set of questions that Berlin offers to distinguish between two conceptions of freedom and Humboldt's two distinct questions concerning the analysis of differing understandings of politics: "Berlin made a highly influential distinction between two concepts or two families of concepts, a distinction that can be seen as a generalisation from the concrete political conceptions that figure in the answers to Humboldt's two distinct questions." Geuss, Raymond (2001a), *History and Illusion In Politics*, Cambridge University Press, p. 89.

¹³⁹ "But in every attempt to frame or reorganize a political constitution, there are two grand objects, it seems to me, to be distinctly kept in view, neither of which can be overlooked or made subordinate without serious injury to the common design; these are – first to determine, as regards the nation in question, who shall govern, who shall be governed, and to arrange the actual working of the constitutional power; and secondly, to prescribe the exact sphere to which the government, once

- 1) "Who rules? That is, what structures exist in society for exercising political power -how is the government organized- and who actually controls these structures and how?
- 2) To which 'objects' (i.e. to which spheres of human life) ought the governmental power to extend its activity and from which ought it to be excluded?"¹⁴⁰

The first question is about the source of power, which answers the following question: 'Who rules me politically?' If we give the contested answer to the first set of questions the answer will be as follows: 'I am not ruled by a despot and by an group of power elites and free from masters and tyrants'. Or answering the question positively, the people are the rulers; they rule themselves and there are no kings, no tyrants, and no dictators. Thus, the contested answer to the first question is democracy. It is usual to link democracy with freedom. At least, freedom is one of the watchwords of democracy¹⁴¹.

The relations between freedom and democracy can be schematically summarized in terms of three combinations: (a) freedom and democracy are

constructed, should extend or confine its operations." Humboldt (1996), *The Sphere and Duties of Government*, Thoemmes Press, p. 2.

¹⁴⁰ Geuss (2001a), p. 88.

¹⁴¹ We can offer differing forms of democracy. C. B. Macpherson and David Held offer four models of democracy. While Macpherson's four models of democracy consist of protective democracy, developmental democracy, equilibrium democracy, and participatory democracy, Held's four models consist of classical democracy, protective democracy, developmental democracy, and direct democracy. On the other hand, Bobbio offers two main forms of democracy: Ancient Democracy and Modern Democracy. For these models of democracy, see C. B. Macpherson's *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*, David Held's *Models of Democracy* and Norberto Bobbio, *Liberalism and Democracy*.

necessarily interlinked in the sense that only democracy is able fully to realize freedom and only in a state of condition where freedom flourishes, democracy can be put into effect; (b) freedom and democracy are antithetical in the sense that democracy pushed to its furthest limits leads to the destruction of freedom (c) freedom and democracy are compatible and can therefore coexist, in the sense that a state can exist which is at both liberal¹⁴² and democratic. But, this does not exclude the possibility of a liberal but non-democratic, or a democratic but non-liberal state. In formal terms, the relation between freedom and democracy involves (a) a relation of necessity (b) a relation of impossibility (c) a relation of possibility.

The idea of freedom is frequently associated with having certain institutions such as a particular type of government. It is not the case that the contested answer is always a democratic state. Giovanni Gentile, who admired both Mussolini and Hegel, held civil institutions to be determinate of freedom; but not democratic institutions rather non-democratic institutions. He states his case in the following fashion: "Freedom can exist only within the State, and the State means authority. But the State is not an entity hovering in the air over the heads of its citizens. Fascism, indeed, envisages the contrast not as between liberty and authority, but as between a true, a concrete liberty which exists, and an abstract, illusory liberty which cannot exist. The maximum of liberty coincides with the maximum strength of the state."

For Gentile, freedom is something to be won by one's true self, which is opposed to the illusory self. The will of the state expresses the true self of

¹⁴² It is important to note that we use the term 'liberal' in the ordinary sense. Liberal is used to describe: "a person or institution that is tolerant of different kinds of behavior or opinions" or "a person who is in favour of people having a lot of political freedom or a system which allows a lot of it." Collins Cobuild (1988), *English Language Dictionary*, p., 833. It is not used to describe a person who belongs to the Liberal Party or who is the proponent of liberalism.

individuals: "Its meaning will be transparent, if each of you will appeal to his own consciousness and feel the sacredness of the country which commands you to serve it, by indisputable orders, without hesitation, without exception, even unto death." Thus, the individuals finds his true/higher self by losing his illusory/lower self by assimilating himself into the state's organic will and structure, so that his real self might be realized: "Liberty is to be sure the supreme end and rule of every human life; but in so far as individual and social education bring about its realization, actualizing this common will in the individual, it manifests itself as law and hence as state."¹⁴³ So, Giovanni Gentile's position involves a relation of impossibility between freedom and democracy who associates fascism with freedom.

On the other hand, Macpherson holds the view that there is a relation of necessity between democracy (PL3)¹⁴⁴ and freedom in terms of freedom as self-realization (PL1), which is a positive conception of freedom:

¹⁴³ Fosdick (1939), pp. 57, 70.

¹⁴⁴ While Macpherson offers PL2 as a debased form of PL1, which leads to totalitarian conclusions, he does not offer a debased form of PL3. Such a suggestion can be found in J. P. Talmon's book called *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*. J. P. Talmon suggests that there are two schools of democracy: liberal democracy and messianic/totalitarian democracy. Totalitarian democracy is a debased form of liberal democracy or PL3 of Macpherson. While the two traditions value freedom, the difference between the two stems from their attitude towards politics and their differing conceptions of freedom. "The liberal approach assumes politics to be a matter of trial and error, and regards political systems as pragmatic contrivances of human ingenuity and spontaneity." Talmon, J. L (1960), *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, p. 1. On the other hand, the totalitarian school "is based upon the assumption of a sole and exclusive truth in politics" and that truth can be discovered by the use of the reason and by collective endeavor. Whereas liberal tradition "finds the essence of freedom in spontaneity and the absence of coercion" totalitarian approach "believes it to be realized only in the pursuit and attainment of an absolute collective

“Their relation is that PL3 is a prerequisite of PL1 in two respects. First, without PL3, the man who cannot participate in the making of political decisions is governed by rules made entirely by others, i.e. is directed entirely from outside himself, which is inconsistent with PL1. Second, no political movement to enlarge men’s power (PL1) is likely to succeed nowadays unless it is strongly and effectively democratic (PL3).”¹⁴⁵

Macpherson suggests democracy enables people to define and form the laws that govern them politically. This connection suggests that if self-government means being guided by forces which are self-imposed and the political institutions in which one lives determines to a large extent person’s actions and values, then a man who is not permitted to participate in the making of political decisions cannot be self-governing because in that case, the laws that rules one politically do not emanate from his/her deliberation. Carole Pateman outlines a similar relation between self-development and democracy. Pateman sees democracy as intrinsically worthwhile, which enables individuals to develop themselves. It gives the opportunity for citizens to develop themselves and permits a growth towards the realization of their capacities. This stems from the educative effect of participating to democratic

purpose”. As Talmon, anticipating Berlin, put it: that absolute collective purpose becomes “a pre-ordained goal, towards which [the citizens] are irresistibly driven” by those who claim to know what this goal, or truth, is. So, in Berlin’s terminology, while liberal tradition defines freedom negatively, totalitarian tradition holds a positive conception of freedom. While Berlin finds positive freedom as dangerous and paradoxical, according to Talmon, totalitarian democracy is both paradoxical and dangerous. The paradox and danger of totalitarian democracy lies in its insistence on an exclusive pattern of political existence, which embraces the whole of human life and leaves no place for private sphere for individuals, is compatible and necessary for attainment of true freedom. Talmon thinks that the origins of totalitarian democracy can be found in the writings of Helvetius, Holbach, Rousseau, Morelly, Mably and Babeuf and in the political practices of Jacobins. Berlin’s views about positive freedom can be associated with Talmon’s ideas about totalitarian democracy. It is important to note that Berlin admires J. P. Talmon’s work on the origins of totalitarianism.

¹⁴⁵ Macpherson (1973), p. 109.

institutions: "As a result of participating in decision making the individual is educated to distinguish between his own impulses and desires, he learns to be public as well as a private citizen."¹⁴⁶ So, they take freedom as democracy as a necessary component of freedom as self-realization/self-development, which is a form of positive freedom. On the other hand, John Christman claims that there is no necessary relation between positive freedom of individual and democracy:

"To maintain the conceptual separateness of the notion of positive liberty and democratic participation, one need only point out the contingent nature of the linking premise that our attitudes and values are molded by our society (in some strong sense. In a modern (and large) industrial society, a good many of my concerns are not severely dictated to me by the reigning governmental institutions of the day. So insofar as this is true, I can be to a large extent (individually) self-governing even if the institutions of the state and I keep a respectful distance. But in any case my claim here is only that the notion of *individual* positive liberty is of a piece with the tradition and also does not make participation in democratic institutions a conceptual necessity."¹⁴⁷

While Christman suggests that there is no necessary relation (a) between individual positive freedom and democracy but rather a contingent relation (c) between the two, Berlin claims negative freedom (freedom from interference of others) "is not, at any rate logically, connected with democracy or self-government. The answer to the question 'Who governs me?' is logically distinct from the question 'How far does government interfere with me?'"¹⁴⁸ Berlin thinks that a liberal despot can provide people with an arena in which people are free to choose for themselves. Berlin puts the idea that a liberal despot can be sufficient as an institutional condition for a maximum degree of negative freedom. Berlin makes his case clear with the following lines:

¹⁴⁶ Pateman, Carole (1970), *Participation and Democratic Theory*, Cambridge University Press, p. 25.

¹⁴⁷ Christman, John (1991), "Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom", *Ethics*, vol.101, p. 345.

¹⁴⁸ Berlin (2002a), p. 177.

“It is that liberty in this sense is not incompatible with some kind of autocracy, or at any rate with the absence of self-government. Liberty in this sense is principally concerned with the area of control, not with its source. Just as a democracy may, in fact, deprive the individual citizen of a great many liberties which he might have in some other form of society, so it is perfectly conceivable that a liberal-minded despot would allow his subjects a large measure of personal freedom.”¹⁴⁹

That is not to say that democracy is necessarily hostile to negative freedom; it may even be helpful to it. Berlin notes that democracy: “may, on the whole, provide a better guarantee of the preservation of civil liberties than other regimes, and has been defined as such by libertarians.”¹⁵⁰ Then, while democracy can be compatible with negative freedom, it is not a necessary component of that conception of freedom. So, Berlin attaches to the third position (c), which involves that there is a relation of possibility between freedom and democracy rather than a relation of impossibility or necessity.

The second question is about the limits to the state, but not about the source of political power. There are two possible answers: protective minimal state and enabling welfare state. The second question concentrates on the following inquiries: What must be the role or responsibilities of the state? and what functions or responsibilities should the state fulfill? In that respect, we talk about welfare state¹⁵¹ counterposed to minimal protective state. While the protective minimal state is “merely a protective body, its core function being to provide a framework of peace

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

¹⁵¹ A benevolent despotism can be an enabling state while a democratic state can be a minimal state. Huxley's Brave New World is dictatorship where the inhabitants of BNW are ruled by a group of scientists to achieve and protect the motto of the world state: community, identity, and stability. BNW is a dictatorship but it is also a welfare state and society. There is no war, poverty or crime. So, there is no necessary connection between democracy and enabling state.

and social order within which citizens can conduct their lives as they think best”¹⁵², the welfare state’s responsibility is extended to “the promotion of social well-being amongst their citizens.”¹⁵³ The institutional apparatus of the minimal state is limited to maintain domestic order and protect the citizens against external attacks. On the other hand, welfare state is “dedicated to the principle of individual empowerment.”¹⁵⁴

There can be three possible combinations concerning freedom and welfare state: (a) welfare and freedom are necessarily interlinked in the sense that freedom can be realized only in a welfare state (b) welfare state and freedom are antithetical in the sense that welfare state pushed to its furthest limits ends in the destruction of freedom or freedom can only be realized in a minimal state (c) welfare state and freedom are compatible which means that there can be a state which is both liberal and welfarist. But, this does not exclude the possibilities of non-liberal welfare state and liberal (protective) minimal state. In formal terms, the relation between freedom and welfare state involves (a) a relation of necessity; (b) a relation of impossibility (c) a relation of possibility.

To concentrate on the limits of duties of the state, we need to ask the following question: does failure to prevent or remove an obstacle constitute a freedom-restricting obstacle on one’s path? Oppenheim claims that “Y makes X unfree to do x if Y prevents X from doing x, but not if Y merely *fails* to make it possible for X to do x.”¹⁵⁵ Oppenheim asserts that those obstacles to X’s action resulting from omitted acts described as failure to enable do not constitute constraints

¹⁵² Heywood, Andrew (2002), *Politics*, Palgrave Foundation, p. 95.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

¹⁵⁵ Oppenheim (1961), p. 71.

on X's freedom. But, so can claim "even if the government failed to make it possible for its citizens to escape from poverty in a setting where such enabling policies were feasible, we could not properly describe the poor as unfree with respect to government policy to escape poverty."¹⁵⁶ But, a 'politically motivated reluctance can say that removable though not humanly created obstacles can constrain people's freedom.' According to D. D. Raphael: "We may speak of freedom from want, or freeing mankind from the scourge of cancer, when we mean that the impediments to which we refer, although not imposed by human action, are capable (we hope) of being removed by human action"¹⁵⁷.

Suppose that even though no one prevented you from eating, no one helped you out either, when they perfectly well could have done. We can insist that it is an interference with the agent's freedom or a restriction on the agent's freedom that others didn't feed you when they could. The absence of food prevented the agent from doing what he wanted to do (say stay alive), and this absence was due to the non-supplying of food by others. This non-supplying is an action on their part, an action (an action as a non-action) that interferes with the agent's freedom. In most cases, the obstacles, which make an illiterate people unable to read, are removable though not caused. It may be wrong to conclude that just because some person or persons do not create these obstacles that illiterate are simply unable but not unfree to read. This idea allows that some uncaused but alterable obstacles constraint freedom¹⁵⁸. According to this idea, what counts, as a restriction is the failure or

¹⁵⁶ Connolly, William (1993), *The Terms of Political Discourse*, Princeton University Press, p. 162.

¹⁵⁷ Raphael, D. D. (1970), *Problems of Political Philosophy*, Macmillan, p. 115.

¹⁵⁸ Such an argument can be constructed on the basis of David Miller's notion of moral responsibility. Miller offers a moralized definition of freedom. Accordingly, an obstacle restricts freedom if and only if another person is morally responsible for the existence or continued existence of that obstacle. What

omission of some social agents to remove or prevent these alterable but not humanly created obstacles¹⁵⁹.

Oppenheim points to a risk in any view that includes the failure to enable as a constraint: “if were to say that a person is unfree to do something with respect to all those who do not help him to do it, we would have to include “practically everybody” as agents of constraint.”¹⁶⁰ But, it is important note that to say that the agent in question has failed or omitted to do something about the obstacle is to say, that agent could do something about it. That is to say that there is an agent in a strategic position to remove or prevent that obstacle. So, we do not assume that a failure to remove an obstacle restricts one’s freedom in relation to everybody but in relation to those who are in a good strategic position to help or to be more exactly, in relation to those who are able to remove/prevent that obstacle by the virtue of having the necessary means to prevent/remove that obstacle.

makes the creation of an obstacle unjustifiable? It seems that we need to hold a normative theory to determine unjustifiable obstacles. The idea introduced by Miller can be put in argumentation as follows: if R creates an obstacle Y for X unjustifiably, then X’s freedom is restricted by R.

¹⁵⁹ What are the obstacles, which are not created by humans? This is a matter of discussion. Is poverty natural or result of certain policies? It seems that this issue depends on our view of the causes of poverty. It is true that poverty is not always the result of the interactions/actions of human beings or political decisions. Poverty may have non-human causes. For instance, it may be due to the freak weather conditions leading to famine. But, is it always and necessarily the case? Or to put the issue more strongly, is it frequently the case? It is equally possible that a person’s poverty depends on the humanly created obstacles and in most cases, poverty stems from the operations of impersonal market forces. So, this discussion is closely related with the discussion about impersonal market forces: ‘Do the impersonal market forces restrict our freedom or not?’

¹⁶⁰ Connolly (1993), pp. 164-165.

Assume that X is a would-be football player. Let us suppose, Alan is prevented from playing football by his arthritis. A doctor (Dr. R) might be able to liberate Alan from his arthritis. Suppose that Dr. R could do this but has not currently done so. Can we say that Dr. R prevents Alan from playing football? Can we say that Alan is not free from the arthritis failed/omitted to be removed by the Dr. R to play football? We can conclude that Dr. R restricts Alan's freedom when Dr. R doesn't cure Alan's arthritis, though he could. So, we can claim that if some body is in a good position to help, then we can talk about restriction of freedom if that person does not prevent or remove the obstacle.

Turning back to the issue of government¹⁶¹, we can claim that "While it can be inappropriate to describe the poor as unfree with respect to everybody who could but does not act to relieve their poverty", the state "stand in a particularly strategic position with respect to enabling the poor to escape poverty"¹⁶². "If a government stood in a strategic position to remove impediments against those striving to escape poverty "but failed to make it possible for them to do so"¹⁶³, the government's failure could count properly as a constraint on the freedom of the poor citizens. So, people's freedom can be promoted not just by leaving them alone, but also by putting them in a position to do things they would not otherwise be able to do. Giving people money, education, and health increases their freedom. It can be claimed that a more active, and enabling state can be justified on freedom grounds and government action is needed to make people to take advantage of their freedom.

¹⁶¹ Considering the institutions (such as government), which are responsible for promoting our freedom, seems more reasonable than considering individual charity.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 165.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

Berlin claims that “the obligation to promote education, health, justice, to raise standards of living, to provide opportunity for the growth of the arts and the sciences, to prevent reactionary political or social or legal policies or arbitrary inequalities, is not made less stringent because it is not necessarily directed to the promotion of liberty itself, but to conditions in which alone its possession is of value, or to values which may be independent of it. And still, liberty is one thing, and the conditions for it are another.”¹⁶⁴ He makes a distinction between the content of freedom and “the conditions under which freedom can be effectively used or between freedom and empowerment”¹⁶⁵: “To provide for material needs, for education, for such equality and security as, say, children have at school or laymen have in a theocracy, is not expanding liberty.”¹⁶⁶ He takes enablement as exercise conditions of freedom, which constitutes the worth of freedom rather than the formal/logical conditions of freedom. Berlin denies that there is a conceptual connection between freedom and means that enables us to take advantage of bare options. One may be free but unable to take advantage of one’s freedom: “If a man is too poor or too ignorant or too feeble to make use of his legal rights, the liberty that these rights confer upon him is nothing to him, but it is not thereby annihilated.”¹⁶⁷ So, he does not think that enablement involves expanding people’s freedom. For Berlin, a failure/omission to remove or prevent an obstacle (such as lack of money,

¹⁶⁴ Berlin (2002a), p. 45.

¹⁶⁵ Geuss (2001a), p. 97.

¹⁶⁶ Berlin (2002a), p. 47.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

lack of education, lack of good standards of living) does not restrict one's freedom¹⁶⁸. So, his conception of freedom does not require an enabling/welfare state.

While Berlin denies that there is a conceptual relation between enabling/welfare state and freedom, Humboldt¹⁶⁹ claims that welfare state is dangerous for freedom to flourish. So, he thinks that there is a relation of impossibility between freedom and welfare state. He thinks that a protective minimal state is a sufficient condition for freedom to come into existence. Raymond Geuss summarizes Humboldt's position as follows:

"Because the highest human good, he claimed, is the self-activity and self-development of human individuals, and the state has no value in itself but it is merely a necessary means to individual self-activity, any positive provisions for individual welfare, whether spiritual, moral, or material, on the part of the state is inappropriate and in fact actively harmful because it preempts individual action. The state therefore ought to limit its sphere of activity to maintaining security, and it should otherwise allow its members to get on with their own private lives in whatever way they choose."¹⁷⁰

Humboldt starts from a normative goal of human life and a normative and positive conception of freedom: self-activity and self-development, which is "the self-initiated and self-guided development and deployment of human powers and capacities."¹⁷¹ He draws from the above conception of freedom, which is a positive

¹⁶⁸ Early Berlin's suggestion is inconsistent with late Berlin's following definition of freedom:

"Similarly absence of such freedom is due to the closing of such doors or failure to open them, as a result, intended or unintended, of alterable human practices, of the operation of human agencies; although only if such acts are deliberately intended (or, perhaps, are accompanied by awareness that they may block paths) will they be liable to be called oppression." *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹⁶⁹ It is important to note that Humboldt's view anticipates contemporary neo-liberal denunciations of the supposed ill effects of the welfare state and the libertarian's nightwatchman state, as in the case with Nozick.

¹⁷⁰ Geuss, Raymond (2001b), *Public Goods, Private Goods*, Princeton University Press, p. 4.

¹⁷¹ Geuss (2001a), p. 80.

conception of freedom in terms of self-development and self-realization, the conclusion that the realm of activity of the state (the function/role of the state, especially in respect of provision for the welfare of the members of the state) should be minimized and the only ultimate end of the state is security, which is defined as “the assurance of legal freedom”¹⁷². Humboldt draws the conclusion that “any state interference in private affairs, where there is no immediate reference to violence done to individual rights, should be absolutely condemned.”¹⁷³ Humboldt explains that when government intervenes outside its allotted or proper sphere of action, which is consisted of the maintenance of internal and external order or namely, security, the result is to create uniformity and homogeneity of behavior in society and thus, to diminish the variety of self-activity “what man does and must have in view.... –it is variety and activity.”¹⁷⁴ He puts his idea as follows:

“The first principle we eliminate will be, that the State is to abstain from all solicitude for the positive welfare of the citizens, and not to proceed a step further than is necessary for their mutual security and protection against foreign enemies; for with no other object should it impose restrictions on freedom.”¹⁷⁵

What is striking in Humboldt’s position is that the more a state intervenes for the positive welfare of its citizens, the more it prevents the self-development of its citizens. Therefore, he concludes that it is not the business of the state to provide the welfare of its members, but should be restricted to the assurance of internal and external security¹⁷⁶.

¹⁷² Humboldt, W. (1969), *The Limits of State Action*, Cambridge University Press, p. 83.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹⁷⁵ Humboldt (1996), p. 44.

¹⁷⁶ Is Humboldt’s position consistent? Doesn’t self-development require presence of material means, education, health, etc? This can be questioned and we will examine this in Chapter 3.

We can introduce Hayek as another proponent of protective minimal state who claims that the main function of the state is to protect individual freedom by ensuring a system of well-protected laws. He regards only coercive actions as freedom-restricting and defines coercion as follows: "By 'coercion' we mean the control of the environment or circumstances of a person by another such that in order to avoid greater evil he is forced to act not according to a coherent plan of his own but to serve the ends of others."¹⁷⁷

What is controversial about Hayek's formulation is that he thinks that freedom is restricted only by coercive interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act and the laws do not restrict one's freedom¹⁷⁸. He suggests, "when we obey laws, in the sense of general abstract rules laid down irrespective of their application to us, we are not subject to another man's will and are therefore free."¹⁷⁹ So, there is coercion and a restriction of freedom if a person threatens to inflict pain on a person but there is no coercion and so no restriction of freedom when laws force a man to do or not to do something. For Hayek, law does not diminish or limit freedom because it provides a private sphere, which is protected from external interference. According to Hayek, freedom "presupposes that the individual has some assured private sphere, that there is some set of circumstances in

¹⁷⁷ Hayek (1960), pp. 20-21.

¹⁷⁸ Hayek's position resembles the position of John Locke who claims, "law, in its true notion, is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes no farther than is for the general good of those under that law." Locke, John (1982), *Second Treatise of Government*, Harlan and Davidson, sect. 57.

¹⁷⁹ Hayek (1960), 153.

his environment with which others cannot interfere.”¹⁸⁰ Hayek puts his case as follows:

“Since coercion is the control of the essential data of an individual’s action by another, it can be prevented only by enabling the individual to secure for himself some private sphere where he is protected against such interference. The assurance that he can count on certain facts on being deliberately shaped by another can be given to him only by some authority that has the necessary power. It is here that coercion of one individual by another can be prevented only by the threat of coercion.”¹⁸¹

The solution to supply and protect the private sphere, which is the precondition of freedom, is “the recognition of general rules governing the conditions under which objects or circumstances become part of the protected sphere of a person or persons. The acceptance of such rules enables each member of a society to shape the content of his protected sphere and all members to recognize what belongs to their sphere and what does not.”¹⁸² So, Hayek holds the idea that the institution of predictable and uniform laws protecting the private sphere of the individual is a necessary condition of freedom¹⁸³ and reduces the role of the state to that minimum point:

¹⁸⁰ Hayek, F. A. (1991), “Freedom and Coercion”, Liberty (ed. Miller, D.), *Liberty*, Oxford University Press, p. 82.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 96.

¹⁸³ At this point, there emerges a contrast between Hayek and Berlin. While Hayek’s conception of freedom introduces the idea that laws do not restrict freedom but rather a necessary condition for protecting and supplying freedom, Berlin claims that every law restricts freedom. Quoting Bentham for whom law itself must be viewed as an invasion of liberty, Berlin approves the dictum of Bentham that “every law is an infraction of liberty.” Berlin (2002a), p. 41. This is the Hobbesian notion of freedom which suggests that the ‘greatest liberty of subjects, dependeth on the silence of the law.’ So, Berlin’s view assumes that torturers and murders exercise their freedom when they torture and kill and the laws restrict their freedom to kill and torture. The law that prohibits killing and torturing people

“Coercion, however, cannot be altogether avoided because the only way to prevent it is by the threat of coercion. Free society has met this problem by conferring the monopoly of coercion on the state and by attempting to limit this power of the state to instances where it is required to prevent coercion by private persons... The coercion which a government must still use for this end is reduced to a minimum and made as innocuous as possible by restraining it through known general rules.”¹⁸⁴

So, Hayek suggests that the role of the state is the protection of freedom rather than promoting the welfare of its citizens and objects to welfare state by making a distinction between the conditions of freedom (wealth) and freedom: “The confusion of liberty as power with liberty in its original meaning inevitably leads to the identification with wealth... Yet though freedom and wealth are both good things which most of us desire and though we often need both to obtain what we wish, they still remain different.”¹⁸⁵ From that distinction, he opposes to the demand for the redistribution of wealth or welfare state on the grounds of freedom. He suggests that identifying freedom with wealth or taking welfare state as a necessary component of freedom “makes it possible to exploit all the appeal which the word liberty carries in support for a demand for the redistribution of wealth.”¹⁸⁶ For Hayek, the sole duty of the state is to supply a protected sphere of freedom and extending the duties of state beyond this scope is dangerous: “instead of the promised greater freedom, it would mean the appearance of a new despotism.”¹⁸⁷ So, in a similar fashion with Humboldt,

also restricts the freedom of those who do not desire to kill or torture anybody. However, “since the law or social conventions did not give [such liberty] to them, they could only have acquired it from nature.” Parekh, B. (1983), “Review Article: The Political Thought of Sir Isaiah Berlin”, *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 12, p. 226.

¹⁸⁴ Hayek (1960), p. 21.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

Hayek thinks that there is a relation of impossibility between the welfare state and freedom.

On the other hand, Russell and Macpherson hold the view that a welfare state is a necessary component of freedom. While Russell¹⁸⁸ favors welfare state in terms of freedom from the “physical obstacles”¹⁸⁹, Macpherson view welfare state as necessary for freedom as self-realization/self-development or in terms of: “ability to form and follow one’s own conscious purposes.”¹⁹⁰ Russell asks a question that resembles Humboldt’s second question:

“How far should the community interfere with the individual, not for the sake of another individual, but for the sake of the community? And for what objects should it interfere?”¹⁹¹

Russell puts his answer to the above questions by identifying a bare minimum for individuals to be free:

“Although men’s desires vary, there are certain fundamental needs which may be taken as nearly universal: food, drink, health, clothing, housing, sex, and parenthood are the chief of these... Whatever else may be involved in

¹⁸⁸ Russell does not mention about the necessity of welfare state for self-realization or self-development of individuals. He takes welfare state as a necessary component for freedom, which he names as freedom from physical obstacles. Felix Oppenheim will call such as conception as freedom from want: ““Freedom from want” certainly does not mean only that everyone should be *free*, with respect to government and employers, to earn a certain minimum wage. Nor does it mean simply that government should make it *possible* for everyone to earn enough to be “be free from want” (e.g., by making both employers and employees unfree to settle for less than a certain wage). “Freedom from want” means absence of want and presence of a certain minimum living standards for all.” Oppenheim (1955), p. 362.

¹⁸⁹ Russell (1960), p. 120.

¹⁹⁰ Macpherson (1973), p. 117.

¹⁹¹ Russell (1960), p. 121.

freedom, certainly no person is free who is deprived of anything in the above list, which constitutes the bare minimum of freedom.”¹⁹²

It is the duty of the state to supply this bare minimum of freedom and this bare minimum consists of food, drink, health, clothing, and housing¹⁹³. He concludes in the following way: “such things as food, houses, and clothes are necessities of life... Therefore they are suitable for governmental action in democracy.”¹⁹⁴ It is important to note that Russell includes education as a component of freedom: “To secure the maximum freedom, it is necessary to form character by education, so that men find their happiness in activities which are not oppressive.”¹⁹⁵ So, Russell holds the view that an enabling/welfare state, which supplies the bare minimum of freedom and education for freedom¹⁹⁶, is a necessary component of freedom. In a similar fashion, Macpherson view welfare state as a necessary component of freedom: “For the point about welfare-state intervention is to open some doors (as well as to compensate for some others being closed). It is not merely to provide some conditions for freedom of choice, it is to broaden the area of choice for those who previously had few doors open to them.”¹⁹⁷ Moreover, Russell claims that the “above

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 118.

¹⁹³ We should exclude parenthood and sex from this bare minimum because a view, which suggests that it is the duty of state to supply sex and parenthood, is not comprehensible.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 124-125.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

¹⁹⁶ It will be misleading to suggest that when Russell talks about education, he means that education is an external condition of freedom, which maximizes it, rather than a component of freedom. This will be offering the view that Russell makes a distinction between the conditions of freedom and the concept of freedom such as Berlin and Rawls. But, he does not make such a distinction in his essay. So, it will be assimilating Russell’s terminology to Berlin’s terminology and that will be misleading.

¹⁹⁷ Macpherson (1973), p. 103.

minimum of freedom can be better secured in a society than by a Robinson Crusoe; indeed, sex and parenthood are essentially social.”¹⁹⁸ So, Russell does not think that Robinson Crusoe can be free even if he is free from interference of others to satisfy his desires or to do anything whether he desires or not because he suffers some sorts of deprivation. He is deprived of some of the minimum conditions of freedom, which can only be supplied, by the society and the state. But, the only question that is left is about the limits of governmental action.

“It is, of course, obvious that freedom is not to be increased by a mere diminution of government. One man’s desires are apt to be incompatible with another man’s, so that anarchy means freedom for the strong and slavery for the weak... The problem we have to consider is not how to do without government, but how to secure its advantages with the smallest possible interference with freedom...”¹⁹⁹

Russell declares that the government has no right in interfering to matters of personal morals and opinions. He champions “free competition in ideas”. Moreover, he states that “The liberty of the individual should be respected where his action do not directly, obviously, and indubitably do harm to other people.” So, according to Russell, state can interfere with the freedom of an individual to prevent harm to others: “The freedom we should seek is not the right to oppress others, but the right to live as we choose and think as we choose where doing so does not prevent others from doing likewise.”²⁰⁰ In a similar fashion, Macpherson states that “There must be interference to protect me from interference: interference by the state to protect me from interference by other individuals.”²⁰¹ Their conception of freedom excludes the freedom to harm others and thereby suggests both a protective and an enabling state.

¹⁹⁸ Russell (1960), pp. 118-119.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

²⁰¹ Macpherson (1973), p. 118.

To conclude the issue of institutional component, we can suggest three main positions: (a) Berlin's position which states that a liberal despot can be sufficient for maximization of freedom, (b) Humboldt's position which claims that a protective minimum state is necessary and sufficient for freedom, (c) Russell's position which takes protective welfare state as a necessary component of freedom, (d) Macpherson's position which favors a democratic protective welfare state as a necessary component of freedom²⁰². To conclude, while Berlin considers a liberal despot as a sufficient component of freedom in terms of freedom from interference of others, Macpherson makes a strong stress on the institutional component by suggesting that a democratic protective welfare state as a necessary component of freedom in terms of freedom as self-development.

C. Mental Dispositional Component

The mental dispositional component is about having some mental capacities to be a relevant agent of freedom. Some philosophers (such as Benn and Taylor) claim that if the person lacks some mental dispositional capacities (cognitive elements) such as rationality, power of choice, and capacity for strong evaluation, then the subject of freedom disqualifies as the agent of freedom and because of that the subject of freedom can be judged neither free nor unfree²⁰³. We can assume that a

²⁰² The crucial difference between Macpherson and Russell is about democracy. While Macpherson thinks that democracy is a necessary component of freedom, Russell does not mention about democracy as a necessary component in his article "Freedom in Society".

²⁰³ This discussion is related with the discussion of free agency. This view suggests that freedom presupposes a free agent and to the extent such agency breaks down, e.g. the person becomes paranoiac, we can no longer speak of his or her freedom. Watson, G. (1975), "Free Agency", *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 72, no.8. Moreover, Lindley makes a distinction between being autonomous and exercising autonomy: "To be an autonomous person is to possess certain intellectual and practical

considerable impairment of dispositional capacities will disqualify an individual and his behavior from counting as free or unfree. Mental capacities such as strong evaluation, capacity for choice/ability of choice, and a minimum degree of rationality can be thought as necessary for freedom. It can be stated that the subject of freedom must have the general mental dispositional capacities necessary to be a competent chooser/a decision maker.

As Gray suggests Berlin's conception of freedom "cannot be ascribed to animals, but nor could it have application to human beings who had been so conditioned that actions actually available to them could not be perceived by them as options."²⁰⁴ Berlin speaks of basic liberty, by which he means the capacity/power for choice. Thus he writes:

"Perhaps I ought to have said in my piece, in a sense, there are two kinds of [liberty]: (a) basic liberty of choice between x and not x. Creatures who cannot do this can scarcely be described as human- such wholly conditioned robots cannot be called fully human. (b) There is the liberty that Constant, Michel etc. value, i.e., no interference within certain limits... The root of both (a) and (b) is the same, but the basic liberty (a) underlines everything."²⁰⁵

Thus, Berlin takes the power/capacity of choice basic to all forms of freedom (negative or positive). All conceptions of freedom including negative and positive

capacities. However, it is possible to be autonomous in this sense, and yet have very little opportunity to exercise one's autonomy. A prisoner languishing in his cell may have a strong, well-ordered will, be a clear, active, rational thinker, under no illusions – and yet be able to do hardly anything. Is he more autonomous than someone who although less rational, is able to move freely about the world? The question perhaps rests on a confusion between being autonomous and exercising autonomy. " Lindley, R. (1986), *Autonomy*, Macmillan, pp. 68-69. The matters concerning the issue of necessary mental dispositional conditions to be a subject of social freedom overlaps with what Lindley calls being autonomous rather than exercising autonomy.

²⁰⁴ Gray (1994), p. 15.

²⁰⁵ Galipeau, Claude (1994), *Isaiah Berlin's Liberalism*, Clarendon Press, p. 86.

freedoms require that the agent must have the capacity of choose to be the relevant subject of freedom. He includes a mental dispositional capacity as necessary: power of choice. So, according to Berlin, the relevant agent to whom we can ascribe the predicate free is the agent who has the power/capacity of choice.

Stanley Benn claims that attributions of freedom or unfreedom (in terms of positive and negative freedom) are appropriate only to beings possessing at least a degree minimal kind of epistemic and practical rationality and psychic continuity who is called as autarchic (self-directing). So, an autarchic person has the minimum rationality and psychic continuity constitutions necessary to be a competent chooser.

Autrarchy requires the following conditions:

“(1) It must be possible to identify a single person, displaying continuity over time, and corresponding to a single physically acting subject. These conditions are not met in extreme cases of schizophrenia and perhaps of psychopathy.

(2) Whatever the subject’s other aims and objectives directing his inquires and the forming of his beliefs, they must be subject to concern for truth as an idea regulating the canons employed to select the propositions, hypotheses, and theories it is appropriate to believe; objectives such as the relief of his anxieties or the preservation of self-esteem are inappropriate as regulative epistemic principles. This condition is not met by the paranoid psychotic.

(3) The subject must have, and generally exercise, the capacity to recognize the action commitments of his beliefs and be disposed to govern his action in accordance with the commitments he acknowledges. This third condition is not met by compulsives.

(4) Changes in his beliefs must therefore be capable of effecting changes in his practical decisions and policies, a condition not regularly met by compulsives and psychopaths.

(5) The subject’s belief structure must yield a ranking of action commitments, and, aside from discounting for the uncertainty of future outcomes (which in troubled times could reasonably lead to a policy of living for the moment), the immediacy of an expected gratification must not be sufficient, as with the psychopath, to confer lexical priority. The psychic-continuity condition underpins the rationality of giving consideration to future gratifications which might outweigh present ones. The subject must have the capacity, therefore, to defer expected gratification.

(6) The subject must be capable of formulating a project or a policy, of forming now an intention to act for the sake of a preferred future state and of acting on that intention, now or later.”²⁰⁶

²⁰⁶ Benn (1986), pp. 163-164.

In short, being an autarchic person requires the capacity of a minimum degree of practical and epistemic rationality and psychic-continuity condition²⁰⁷. The agent could look for reasons, deliberate on them and make rational decisions when confronted by a range of options. A person can fall short of autarchy or person can be non-autarchic because of the following reasons: one who is a paranoid (that is a defect of epistemic rationality) or a compulsive (such as a kleptomaniac and that is a defect of practical rationality) or a schizophrenic person (that is lacking psychic continuity) or a psychopathy (which can be “presented as a defect of practical rationality, of epistemic rationality, of psychic continuity, or of all three”²⁰⁸). Benn and Weinstein make the issue more concrete by mentioning about a paranoiac person and a compulsive neurotic: “A paranoiac appears to make choices, but having a phantasy view of the world, he chooses between unreal alternatives; his choices are pseudo-choices. Again a compulsive neurotic –a kleptomaniac, say- is disqualified, because though he may appear to perceive the world as it is, the perception makes no difference to his behaviour. He has no choice, not in the sense that the alternatives have been rigged against him, but in that his behaviour is misdescribed if described in the language of choosing.”²⁰⁹ What these different causes of non-autarchy have in common is that they paralyze or impair the agent’s capacity for choice. Accordingly,

²⁰⁷ A similar point is made by Gary Watson in his article, “Free Agency”: “Frequently enough, we say, or are inclined to say, that a person is not in control of his own actions, that he is not a “free agent” with respect to them, even though his behaviour is intentional. Possible examples of this sort of action include those which are explained by addiction, manias, and phobias of various sorts.” Watson (1975), p. 205.

²⁰⁸ Benn (1986), p. 161.

²⁰⁹ Benn & Weinstein (1971), p. 209.

that person disappears as a proper subject of freedom in terms of negative and positive freedom²¹⁰.

Benn's conception of autarchy suggests that at least a minimum rationality requirement must be met before an agent can be considered free or to be more exactly, a person must be autarchic to count as the agent of freedom. A person is autarchic if he has a degree of practical and cognitive rationality and recognizes himself as continuous over time. The autarchy of a person can be impaired by defects such as paranoia, schizophrenia, and kleptomania. So, we should disqualify, as the subject of freedom a kleptomaniac who steals because of his failure to resist impulses to steal items even though the items are not needed for personal use differing from a person who steals items because of his poverty.

Accordingly, no conception of freedom can dispense with positive criteria needed to distinguish competent adults from various incompetent and mentally incapacitated subjects. The members of the former category by the virtue of possessing normal mental and intellectual capacities (practical and epistemic rationality and spiritual continuity) all qualify as agents of freedom. The autarchic person has to some degree the capacity to reflect upon, choose among, defer, formulate and shape desires to some degree. But, autarchic persons may still be conformists or slaves to fashion, conventions and desires. That is, an autarchic person may lack the ability to weigh and judge his desires and goals qualitatively. Suppose that a movie star appears on television and urges us to buy a product by just simply saying 'Everybody drinks Ice Tea'. Rather than appealing to reasons and arguments, the advertiser appeals to the emotions of a crowd and appeals to a person

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 209-210.

to go along with the crowd²¹¹. No reasons are offered by the advertiser to show that it is reasonable or healthy to drink ice tea. While an individual, who evaluates the desire that is imposed upon him, will be able to resist the non-rational appeal, another individual, who is autarchic, but lacks the capacity to evaluate his desires qualitatively, will be unable to resist the same non-rational appeal. The second person can conform to the suggestion of drinking ice tea because he lacks the ability to weigh his desire (that is his desire to drink that ice tea) to find out whether it is valuable to him or not or to be more exactly, he lacks the ability to question whether it is really healthy and significant to him to drink ice tea. Dissatisfaction with this thin conception of rationality can lead to conclude that an autarchic person must have the capacity to evaluate his desires and goals qualitatively. The capacity for strong evaluation offered by Charles Taylor allows for such a move.

Taylor argues that a concept of freedom must include pointers about intellectual capacities. Only in this way, we can imagine people judging between ends, considering some more significant than others. Taylor makes a distinction between two orders of evaluation. He calls them weak (or simple) evaluation and strong evaluation. Taylor speaks of 'strong evaluation' as a necessary mental dispositional condition of freedom. We are capable of experiencing and recognizing some of our desires as more significant than others. Taylor explains the source of significance as being our capacity as strong evaluation: "When we reflect on this kind of significance, we come up against what I have called elsewhere the fact of strong evaluation, the fact that we human subjects are not only subjects of first-order desires, but of second-order desires, desires about desires. We experience our desires

²¹¹ This is a typical version of ad populum. Weston, A (1987), *A Rule for Arguments*, Hackett Publishing Company, p. 85.

and purposes as qualitatively discriminated, as higher or lower, noble or base...”²¹²

That is the ability to reflect upon our desires and evaluate them qualitatively.

The language of first-order and second order desires comes from Harry Frankfurt: “Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call “first-order desires” or “desires of the first order,” which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.”²¹³ We don’t just have desires (known as first-order desires: a desire to do x or a desire not to do x) but we also have desires about our desires (known as second-order desires: a desire to desire to do x or a desire not to desire to do x or a desire to desire not to desire x or a desire not to desire not to desire x).

Taylor’s distinction between strong evaluations and weak evaluations is a further development of Harry Frankfurt’s distinction between first-order and second-order desires. The strong evaluations²¹⁴ concern the moral worth of the first-order desires, whereas the weak evaluations are morally neutral orderings of desires. The decision whether to take a holiday in the south or in the north is one of Taylor’s examples of weak evaluation. One holiday is more exhilarating and the other is more relaxing. In this evaluation, the worth of the desires is not in question. “I ultimately opt for the south over the north not because there is something more worthy about relaxing than being exhilarated, but just because ‘I feel like it’.”²¹⁵ Weak evaluation does not make any qualitative distinction between one desire and another but, rather,

²¹² Taylor (1985a), p. 211.

²¹³ Frankfurt, Harry (1998b), “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, *The Importance of What We Care About*, Cambridge University Press, p. 12.

²¹⁴ Taylor, C. (1985b), *Human Agency and Language*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 15-44.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

contrasts alternative courses of action only quantitatively. The weak evaluator knows only first-order desires distinguished by their strength or magnitude; he does not evaluate the worth or quality of desires, he lacks depth. A weak evaluator desists from the pursuit of a certain desire not because of the kind of desire it is, but because of considerations of the following sort: its time and place is not quite convenient; the pursuit of another desire will lead to greater overall satisfaction, the object of some other desire is more attractive. Unlike strong evaluation, weak evaluation is not based on considerations, which yield judgments of the following kind: desire x is intrinsically superior to desire y; there is something unworthy, reprehensible about having desires of a certain kind. The strong evaluations involve discriminations of right and wrong, better or worse, higher or lower. So, the strong evaluator distinguishes between desires according to their worth and not their strength.

We have four mental dispositional conditions: (i) ability to make a choice (ii) ability to choose among alternatives and understand these alternatives rationally (a minimum degree of cognitive and epistemic rationality) (iii) spiritual continuity (iv) strong evaluation. There can be some disagreement about the extent of the agent's dispositional capacities to be the subject of an ascription of free action. While we may include an exhausting list of mental capacities, others may be satisfied with only one dispositional capacity such as Berlin who introduces power of choice as a necessary condition of agency. On the other hand, Taylor broadens the minimum rationality requirements suggested by Benn by adding strong evaluation as a necessary competent of being a free agent. So, the degree of these dispositional requirements to be a proper agent of freedom is a matter of dispute. The things that we have discussed are about the conditions of being a subject of freedom to whom freedom or unfreedom can be ascribed. But, according to Taylor, the existence of a

capacity for strong evaluation is not sufficient to be free. He claims that freedom also requires exercising our strong evaluation. That is the exercise component of freedom, which we will discuss from now on.

D. Exercise Component

Exercise component requires an activity, a doing. It concentrates on the exercise of our mental dispositional capacities and our externalization or actualization of our significant ends and desires which are evaluated by our mental dispositional capacities. It is the exercise of our autarchy and/or strong evaluation and acting upon our evaluated significant desires. So, it assumes that the agents have some dispositional mental capacities and freedom is identified with the exercise of these. Through the exercise of our mental dispositional capacities and acting upon our evaluated significant desires, human beings achieve positive freedom in the form of self-realization. This is the model of freedom as authorship or being the author of our own life. Through the exercise of your dispositional capacities, speaking metaphorically, you write your own story/make your own bed: "...person is part of his own life. His life is, in part, his own making."²¹⁶ Thus, in this process, the agent/self appears twice into the notion of exercise: "first as the designer and then as the raw material of the process."²¹⁷

A person can fail to achieve positive freedom in terms of self-realization in a given situation because he does not bother to make the effort or following the line of Frankfurt; one may lack the effective desire (which is a desire that "moves (or will or would move) a person all the way to action"²¹⁸) to exercise his capacities even if that

²¹⁶ Raz, J. (1986), *Morality of Freedom*, Oxford University Press, p. 204.

²¹⁷ Elster (1986), p. 43.

²¹⁸ Frankfurt (1998b), p. 14.

person has the requisite capacities to evaluate his desires and act on those evaluated desires. So, exercising component requires that you have the proper motivation (triggering condition) to do something positive. So, this condition requires a precondition: "triggering condition"²¹⁹ which is the "presence of an intention"²²⁰ to exercise our proper dispositional capacities. A person who has the power to do Z will actually try to do Z if he has the intention to do so.

Charles Taylor would call an account of freedom made up of only interpersonal and/or institutional conditions as an opportunity-concept of freedom according to which "being free is a matter of what we can do, of what it is open to us to do, whether or not we do anything to exercise these options."²²¹ According to an opportunity conception of freedom, to be free is to be externally or/and internally in a good position to exercise your dispositional capacities. This is the conceptualization of freedom in terms of an opportunity-concept. Taylor thinks that the pure opportunity-concept of freedom is untenable: to be truly free, we need to exercise our strong evaluation at a level that allows you to realize some of our significant desires and act upon those significant desires:

"For freedom now involves my being able to recognize adequately my more important purposes, and my being able to overcome or at least neutralize my motivational fetters, as well as my way of being free of external obstacles. But clearly the first condition (and I would argue, also the second) require me to have become something, to have achieved a certain condition of self-clairvoyance and self-understanding. I must be actually exercising self-understanding in order to be truly or fully free. I can no longer understand freedom just as an opportunity concept."²²²

²¹⁹ Benn (1986), p. 127.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

²²¹ Taylor (1985a), p. 213.

²²² *Ibid.*, pp. 228-229.

According to Taylor, our capacity for strong evaluation allows us to make judgments of the relative significance of our desires. Some of the desires that we experience can overwhelm the ones that we nevertheless recognize more significant. So, Taylor suggests that there are cases in which freedom is restricted due to internal obstacles:

“They seem to be cases in which the obstacles to freedom are internal; and if this is so, then freedom can’t simply be interpreted as the absence of external obstacles; and the fact that I’m doing what I want, in the sense of following my strongest desire, isn’t sufficient to establish that I’m free. On the contrary, we have to make discriminations among motivations, and accept that acting out of some motivations, for example irrational fear or spite, or this too great need for comfort, is not freedom, is even a negation of freedom.”²²³

If you admit that some desires are more significant than others, this seems to lead to the view that strong yet relatively insignificant desires can be obstacles to our freedom. Another way of putting this is that less significant desires may prevent us achieving what we really want to do or achieving our more significant purposes. Imagine somebody whose fundamental interest or most significant desire is to be a politician but he is so terrified of public speaking that he cannot pursue this goal. While other people are not preventing him from becoming a politician, his fear, which is an internal obstacle, stops him doing what he really wants to do. So, sometimes, we experience our desires themselves as obstacles to our significant desires and while overcoming of which is freedom, the acting on which is unfreedom.

Taylor also argues that we can sometimes be mistaken about our significant desires and fundamental purposes. He mentions the example of Charles Manson, who presumably would have considered his desire to send his followers out to

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

commit murders as a significant desire. Taylor puts his ideas in the following manner:

“And indeed, we have to admit a kind of false appreciation which the agent himself detects in order to make sense of the cases where we experience our own desires as fetters. How can we exclude in principle that there may be other false appreciations, which the agent does not detect? That he may be profoundly in error, that is have a very distorted sense of his fundamental purposes? Who can say that such people can’t exist? All cases are, of course, controversial; but I should nominate Charles Mason and Andreas Baader for this category, among others.”²²⁴

In this case, Manson’s belief that this was one of his fundamental purposes was, Taylor maintains, “shot through with confusion and error.”²²⁵ In other words, Manson was mistaken to think that his desire was significant. This claim comes from the nature of strong evaluation. According to Taylor, it is strong evaluation that is at work when we judge the qualitative worth of different desires using categories such as higher and lower, virtuous and vicious, more and less fulfilling, more and less refined, profound and superficial, noble and base. Such judgments of strong evaluation are not rendered valid by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather stand dependent on standards by which such items are to be judged. That independent standards of strong evaluations consists of three axes: “(1) our sense of respect for and obligations to others, i.e. morality in the narrow sense, (2) our understanding of a full and meaningful life, what you value ethically, – whatever you think has intrinsic value outside of your choice, (3) our sense of our own dignity or status, i.e. our sense of ourselves as commanding the attitudinal respect of those around us.”²²⁶ Moral frameworks developed around these three axes necessarily

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

²²⁶ “The first has to do with our relations to other human beings – our sense of their worth and dignity, of what we owe them; the second has to do with our conceptions of the good life for human beings in

involve the notion of strong evaluation. So, Charles Mason is mistaken about his fundamental purposes because he did not evaluate his desires according to his respect and obligation to others (which is the first axis of strong evaluation). John Christman offers two forms of positive freedom by referring to two accounts of rationality²²⁷.

He puts his issue as follows:

“Notice, however, that this range of demands for rationality can be separated into what can be called “internalist” or “subjectivist” accounts of rationality and “externalist” or “objectivist” accounts. On an internalist account, the property by which an action is considered rational for an agent bears only those beliefs and desires actually “internal” to the agent, not on the relation between those beliefs and the world (i.e., a relation of fit or accuracy). Usually what is demanded is that the beliefs (upon which the person’s conditional desires are based) are consistent and the desires (whether conditional or “brute”) are transitive. This can be contrasted with externalist criteria, whereby an agent is rational only if she has gathered (objectively) adequate evidence to justify her beliefs (upon which desires she entertains rest). On this account, lacking relevant information upon which a desire is founded renders that desire irrational. The most stringent version of an external rationality condition... is one which requires that the agent conform her desires to the correct *values* as well as facts. One way to capture the distinction between internalist and externalist conceptions of rationality is this: the internalist would only demand that a person act for *reasons* (perhaps ones which meet some requirement of consistency), while the externalist

general – our sense of what a full or flourishing human life consists in; and the third has to do with our sense of our own dignity – of the characteristics by which we command or fail to command the respect of others.” Mulhall, Stephen & Swift, Adam (1997), *Liberals and Communitarians*, Blackwell, p. 104. Also, see Taylor, C (1992), *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*, Cambridge University Press.

²²⁷ There are two variants of exercise concept of freedom, which is offered by Raymond Geuss: exercising positive freedom in an outward-looking sense and exercising positive freedom in an inward-looking sense: “These two senses are each variants on the ‘positive’ concept of freedom for individuals. In other works I have called them ‘positive freedom of the individual in an outward-looking sense’- freedom as participation in the self-governance of society- and ‘positive freedom of the individual in an inward-looking sense’ -exercising psychological self-control and moral autonomy”. Geuss (2001a), p. 93.

demands that the free agent must act in accordance with *reason*, where that includes knowledge of the truth, both about the world as well as morality.”²²⁸

So, according to Christman’s distinction, we can say that Taylor’s account self-realization is the freedom to realize specific purposes singled out by means of some value-based external criteria. Taylor introduces an externalist account of rationality according to which we should evaluate our desires by conforming to the correct values given by the three axes of strong evaluation. So, self-realization becomes the freedom to realize significant desires and purposes singled out by means of some objective normative criteria. On the other hand, Christman advocates an internalist minimum account of freedom, procedural autonomy or a content-neutral account of autonomy. According to Christman, what makes a person free is not his acting on certain desires, which are strongly evaluated according to an objective normative framework, but, rather, his acting on desires that has come about in a certain way.

“For an individual to be self-governing it at least must be the case that she is not moved by desires and values that have been oppressively imposed upon her, even if she faces no restraints in performing actions such desires motivate. Her character must be formed in a certain manner. What is needed, then, is an account of how desire changes take place, which is an expression of the ideal of the fully free person. Preference changes cannot be the result of oppressive conditions or blind, unreflective conformity to limited choices. Self-mastery means more than having a certain attitude towards one’s desires at a time. It means in addition that one’s values were formed in a manner or by a process that one had (or could have had) something to say about.”²²⁹

A person can be free in terms of procedural autonomy as long as those desires were formed in a way that involved reflection about the origin of his desires and were not oppressively imposed upon him such as by hypnosis or manipulation or threat. So, Christman offers two conditions for autonomy: (a) being free from

²²⁸ Christman (1991), pp. 349-350.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 345-346.

externally imposed desires, (b) reflecting upon our desires²³⁰. According to second condition, you should reflect on your desires according to your belief structure or reasons that you form. What is demanded is a reflection on the basis of our belief structure. "This means that agents who are acting on the basis of inconsistent beliefs or intransitive desires are not acting freely."²³¹ This "content-neutral conception of positive freedom"²³² suggests that a person acts freely if he reflects upon his desires and not those desires are externally imputed in him even if he acts subserviently towards others. So, differing from Taylor's position, procedural autonomy does not suggest that our desires that we act upon contain "a requirement for conformity to the correct moral norms."²³³ Christman gives the following example to make his case clear:

"Imagine, for example, two agents who both perform similar morally wrong actions. One does so freely and deliberately and the second acts mindlessly, obediently carrying out the manipulative commands of her hypnotist master. Certainly the first agent is enjoying something of immense value that the second lacks: the capacity for self-generation and self-government. And this is so despite the equally evil outcomes of both actions."²³⁴

Now, imagine that Charles Mason who is an autarchic person acted by reflection and his desire to kill others is not imposed upon him by hypnosis or manipulation. Suppose that babysitter Laurie Dann who "killed several schoolchildren in Winetka, Illinois, in 1998"²³⁵, just carried out the manipulative commands of a hypnotist. In that case, Laurie Dann is a heterarchic, other-impelled

²³⁰ It is important to note that Christman talks about exercise component in a fairly weak sense.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 350.

²³² *Ibid.*, p. 359.

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 357.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 358.

²³⁵ Myers, G. David (1993), *Social Psychology*, McGraw Hill, p. 157.

person²³⁶. According to Christman, while Charles Manson was a free person in terms of procedural autonomy, Laurine Dann was unfree because she was manipulated to kill several schoolchildren despite the equally evil outcomes of actions of Charles Mason and Laurine Dann. On the other hand, Taylor will state that both are unfree persons because both did not strongly evaluate their significant purposes in conformity with the moral standards given by the three axes of strong evaluation. To conclude, in the either senses of positive freedom, working on my desires, goals, ends ordering them, eliminating them in line with a conception of what is right or good according to my reasons or according to an external normative criteria is the thing that should be done. So, they are both exercise conceptions of freedom.

E. Various Configurations of Freedom

In this chapter, we have introduced four components of freedom: (a) interpersonal component, (b) institutional component, (c) mental component, (d) exercise component. From these components, we can construct plenty conceptions of freedom.

Some claim that the mental dispositional capacities are sufficient for describing an individual as free who takes freedom as a monadic property of agents that have the capacity to form/evaluate desires. Such a view can be named as freedom as character: the agent is free because that agent has the capacity of choice. This is what Lindley named as being autonomous: "To be an autonomous person is to possess certain intellectual and practical capabilities."²³⁷

²³⁶ It is important to note that Benn will suggest that Laurie Dann is not a proper subject of freedom as she is heterchic, other-impelled.

²³⁷ Lindley (1986), pp. 68-69.

Some take freedom consisting of only institutional component. This conception of freedom takes freedom as a monadic property of agents: free agent is the one who has a proper status, proper rights and proper institutions. Such as conception of freedom can be named as freedom as status. Freedom as a status term arose in slave-holding societies. The man who was no one's slave was free. Freedom for the Greeks and Romans is not being a slave. Slaves were, legally speaking, property and under the command of a master. The Greeks characteristically posited natures or essences. They took their clue from the fact that slavery originated with defeat in war. Hence Aristotle's definition of a slave as holding a special kind of nature: "he who is by nature not his own but another's man, is by nature a slave."²³⁸

The Greeks asserted that slaves were typically cowardly, incapable of self-direction, fickle, subject to their passions, crafty, and given vulgarity. Freedom as a status (freedom as being a citizen) turns out to be freedom as having certain characteristics by nature. So we begin with an institutional based freedom (freedom as a status) and justify in terms of a dispositional-based freedom (freedom as a character): freedom as being virtuous, courageous and self-directed by nature. According to the conception of freedom as character, freedom is a monadic property of agents for whom a free agent is one who possesses the appropriate personality by nature (or an agent who is virtuous, self-sufficient, courageous and self-directed in any one of a number of senses of these characteristics in nature).²³⁹

'Outward looking sense of positive autonomy' (or positive freedom as collective self-determination) as via political activity is made of exercise and

²³⁸ Aristotle (1943), *Politics*, Random House, p. 58.

²³⁹ For more detailed investigation of this issue see Macmurray, John (1992), *Freedom in the Modern World*, Prometheus Books.

institutional components. According to this conception, freedom is identified with political activity (positive act), which is the privileged locus of the good life for human beings and the way to real freedom. This is freedom as living under laws you have made for yourself. Rousseau is a typical supporter of this variant of positive outward autonomy. For Rousseau, democracy is ultimately a means through which human beings could achieve freedom in the sense of “obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself.”²⁴⁰

Now let us classify the thinkers we have considered in this chapter, with respect to those four components of freedom.

1. Only interpersonal Component –Steiner and Parent
2. Interpersonal and Mental Dispositional Components –Berlin and Benn
3. Interpersonal and Institutional Components (in the form of protective minimal state) –Hayek and Humboldt
4. Interpersonal and Institutional Components (in the form of an enabling welfare state) –Russell
5. Interpersonal, Institutional (in the form of an enabling welfare state), Exercise Components –Macpherson
6. Interpersonal, Mental Dispositional, and Exercise Components –Taylor

Freedom as composed of only interpersonal component is supported by the hard-headed, pure negativists such as Parent and Steiner. This type of conception makes a person’s freedom depend solely on aspects of his environment or to be more exactly, being free from certain sorts of obstacles and interference of others²⁴¹. This

²⁴⁰ Rousseau (1983), p. 65.

²⁴¹ “What are we to make of Pure Negative Freedom? In its most uncompromising formulations, that is Steiner’s, Parent’s, and Michael Taylor’s, the constructive account of freedom that it offers limits

is the physicalist notion of freedom: "The theory embodies a kind of 'physicalist' view of liberty (see Steiner, 1974) which maintains that a person is free to the extent that he remains in motion. It is the most extreme of the 'absence of constraint' accounts of liberty, since it puts virtually no conditions, except physical ones, on the exercise of freedom."²⁴²

The second conception of freedom consists of interpersonal and mental component, which is a hybrid form of negative freedom. Benn and Berlin are typical proponents of this position, who reject the pure negativist tradition by suggesting that freedom "presupposes the capacity to choose among alternatives"²⁴³ or more strongly, freedom presupposes autarchy as Benn puts. Hayek and Humboldt construct another version of negative freedom by suggesting that interpersonal component and institutional component in the form of minimal protective state are the necessary components of freedom.

Russell's position, which suggests that freedom, is composed of interpersonal component and institutional component in the form of protective welfare state will be named as hybrid form of positive freedom. Following the line of Taylor who claims that the distinction between negative and positive freedom lies in the fact that while negative freedom appears as an opportunity conception of freedom excluding the exercise element, positive freedom requires a doing, an exercise, those who includes exercise component as necessary condition of freedom will be marked as positivists.

unfreedom to cases in which B makes it physically impossible for A to do X by depriving A of what Steiner calls the necessary physical components of one or more actions that A would otherwise be capable of performing" Flathman, R. (1987), *The Philosophy and Politics of Freedom*, University of Chicago Press, p. 31.

²⁴² Barry, Norman (1995), *An Introduction to Modern Political Theory*, The Macmillan Press, p. 212.

²⁴³ Gray (1994), p. 15.

Freedom, which consists of all of these four components, will be named freedom as a pure positive conception of freedom, which is held by Macpherson and Taylor. While Macpherson favors a conception of freedom which is defined in the following manner: "ability to live in accordance with one's own conscious purposes, to act and decide for oneself",²⁴⁴ Taylor advocates a conception of freedom which states that one is free only to the extent that one has effectively determined oneself and the shape of one's life. It is important to note that while Taylor misses the point about having an enabling state as a necessary condition (institutional component), Macpherson does not mention about the mental component. But, they agree on defining conception of freedom that they favor positive freedom in terms of freedom as self-realization or self-development, which makes a process of realizing one's projects through activity in the course of which one forms his character and develops capacities.

²⁴⁴ Macpherson (1973), pp. 108-109.

Chapter 3

Resisting Berlin's Criticisms Against Positive Freedom

A. The Unity of Freedom and Its Conditions

Berlin insists that providing people with the material conditions such as food, money, education, and means necessary for the enjoyment of freedom is not the same thing as freeing people. So, Berlin sharply distinguishes between “the content of (the concept of) freedom and the conditions under which freedom can be effectively exercised.”²⁴⁵ In a similar fashion, Hayek claims “The confusion of liberty as power with liberty in its original meaning inevitably leads to the identification with wealth; and this makes it possible to exploit all the appeal which the word liberty carries in support for a demand for the redistribution of wealth. Yet though freedom and wealth are both good things which most of us desire and though we often need both to obtain what we wish, they still remain different.”²⁴⁶ So, accordingly, if freedom and the conditions of freedom such as money, education, and food are seen identical, then, this becomes a powerful argument for welfare state which enables people with supplying the ‘conditions of freedom’ and for claiming that a welfare state as a necessary component of freedom. But, accordingly, that obscures the content of freedom with the conditions of freedom²⁴⁷. But, this reasoning which differentiates

²⁴⁵ Geuss ((2001a), p. 87.

²⁴⁶ Hayek (1960), p. 17.

²⁴⁷ Macpherson depicts in this distinction some sort of degeneration into laissez-faire (laissez-faire “is the policy which is based on the idea that governments and the law should not interfere with business, finance, or the conditions of people’s working lives” Collins Cobuild (1988), p. 807. He states that Berlin’s move “seems to me an unfortunate reversion towards the extreme liberalism of Herbert Spencer.” Macpherson (1973), p. 102. But, revised late Berlin states that “I should have made even clearer that the evils of unrestricted laissez-faire, and of the social and legal systems that permitted

the content of the conception of freedom from the conditions of freedom, is an opportunity conception of freedom as Taylor puts: “freedom is the opportunity to act, not action itself.”²⁴⁸ Or as Raymond Geuss puts, it is a permission conception of freedom: “‘Free to’ usually indicates either actual power or permission: ‘After the operation she is free to run again’ = her leg has been repaired and she is able to run, or ‘You are now free to go’ = you have permission to go.

Berlin specially wants to distinguish freedom from power”²⁴⁹ or from the conditions of freedom. On the other hand, these conditions are necessary for the exercise of freedom according to which freedom is realized by action and exercise. If freedom involves a doing, an exercise, an achievement that person must necessarily have the necessary means for performing that action. Thus, for example, although I am free to make the choice to travel America, without the money to pay for the trip I

and encouraged it, led to brutal violations of ‘negative’ liberty – of basic human rights (always a ‘negative’ notion: a wall against oppressors), including that of free expression or association, without which there may exist justice and fraternity and even happiness of a kind, but not democracy.” So, Berlin’s ideal is not a state where people are free but starving to death. Gerald Cohen claims that the supporters of laissez-faire policy make the following arguments: “(1) Freedom is compromised by (liability) interference (by other people) but not by lack of means. (2) To lack money is not (liability) interference, but lack of means. (3) Poverty (lack of money) does not carry with it lack of freedom. (4) The primary task of government is to protect freedom. (5) Relief of poverty is not part of the primary task of government.” Cohen, Gerald (2001), “Freedom and Money”, All Souls College, pp. 3-4 (You can find this article at www.utdt.edu/departamentos/derecho/publicaciones/rtjl/pdf/finalfreedom). He claims that while Berlin supports the arguments: 1, 2, and 3, he denies the latter ones: “Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls, in particular, and their many followers, have advocated the conceptual part of the right-wing argument, which culminates in (3), even though, because they do not accept (4), they have not endorsed the right’s normative conclusion, (5).” Cohen (2001), p. 5.

²⁴⁸ Berlin, (2002a), p. xlii.

²⁴⁹ Geuss (2001a), p. 89.

am lacking one of the conditions necessary to act on my choice. Exercise conception of freedom requires not only the absence of external constraints imposed by another person or persons or permission/opportunity to act on my choice but, also the availability of the conditions that are necessary if choices are to be realized. Thus, for example, although there may be no legal barriers to prevent me from entering university, I cannot make such a choice effective/actual if I don't have the money to afford the expenses of the university. Thus, availability of money to afford the expenses of university education is a necessary condition for making my choice effective or for realizing my purpose to have a university education. Exercise-concept of freedom becomes inadequate without the presence of the conditions for realization of our purposes. The lack of these conditions does not only make such a conception of freedom as useless and ineffective but also renders it unattainable. It will be wrong to separate these so-called 'conditions of freedom' from an exercise-concept of freedom.

To be more exact, we can introduce Macpherson's conception of freedom in terms of freedom as self-realization/self-development to show that the so-called 'conditions of freedom' are inseparable from the content of an exercise conception of freedom. Freedom, for Macpherson, is better understood in terms of the freedom of the man to develop his powers and capacities. According Macpherson, freedom is the "ability to live in accordance with one's own conscious purposes, to act and decide for oneself"²⁵⁰. That conception of freedom, which is a positive account of freedom, is concerned with the individual's ability to develop into a fully being: "positive liberty is liberty to act as a fully human being. A man's positive liberty is virtually

²⁵⁰ Macpherson (1973), pp. 108-109.

the same as what I have called a man's power in the developmental sense."²⁵¹ We cannot differentiate the so-called 'conditions of freedom' from such an exercise conception of freedom in terms of self-realization/self-development which states that freedom consists in effectively determining oneself and shaping of one's life. If someone lacks the necessary equipments/"means for self-realization"²⁵² or self-development, we cannot expect him to do the actions that contribute to his freedom in terms of self-realization/self-development. To affect our choices concretely a wide range of actual means need to be available to people, for only through such means is self-development is possible. Thus, this conception stresses the importance of the availability of the material conditions without which the purposes could not be achieved. This distinction between freedom and the conditions of freedom necessary for its exercise would empty freedom as self-realization of some necessary content. Or as Macpherson says "It becomes an abstraction, emptied of any content."²⁵³ Indeed, providing sufficient amount of food, money, education, and means is necessary for freedom in terms of self-realization. A welfare, which provides people with material goods, is necessary because people need these things to seek and realize their purposes.

Can't there be options but individuals lack the conditions of freedom to take advantage of them? Separating freedom from the conditions of freedom, which includes the necessary means for taking advantage of our options such as money, education, tools, security, a certain degree of food, bears the failure to see the connection between options and abilities. By the virtue of lacking these conditions,

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

²⁵² Peffer, R. G. (2001), *Marksizm, Ahlak ve Toplumsal Adalet*, Ayrıntı Yayınları, p. 136.

²⁵³ Macpherson (1973), p. 117.

we lack the power or the ability to take advantage of these options. The lack of the conditions of freedom disables a person to take advantage of his options. We cannot suggest that options do exist independently of the abilities or powers of individuals. Geuss suggests, "Marxism thinks it ridiculous to discuss freedom except relative to power. I am free must finally mean 'I am able to...', and I may fail to be able to..."²⁵⁴ either because other people prevented me from doing so or because I lack the power or means to take advantage of my options. I can fail to be free to have a lunch at Ritz either because I am prevented by the threat of a person or because I lack the money to afford the bill. So, I may fail to be able to take advantage of my options because somebody closed that option for me or I may lack the power or ability to take advantage of my options. It is false to suggest that because something is an option for someone, it is thereby an option for everyone, regardless of their power to take advantage of these opportunities. If Sabancı Center goes on sale at a relatively reduced price, while it is an opportunity for a wealthy businessman, it is not an opportunity for someone, who lives in poverty, to buy it. So, our freedom to do something is dependent on our ability or power to take advantage of that option.

At this point, we can adopt a minimalist account of positive freedom, which is offered by Raymond Plant which is related to "the socially conditioned needs and capacities, opportunities and resources which someone has to have to pursue a conception of the good whatever it might turn out to be."²⁵⁵ So, "the minimalist account of positive freedom leaves the goals unprescribed and is concerned with means only."²⁵⁶ This view implies that freedom requires enablement by the state or

²⁵⁴ Geuss (2001a), p. 97.

²⁵⁵ Plant (1991), p. 249.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

to put it in other words, a welfare state is a necessary condition/component of freedom. Enablement involves that individuals have various options and means required to carry out activities essential to their lives. But, what are these options and means? As Plant suggests, then, we “have to make some judgments about what needs, desires, capacities and so forth are of basic and fundamental importance.”²⁵⁷ We can put an end to this discussion by introducing Russell’s core minimum for freedom²⁵⁸. Russell introduces minima for freedom, which consists of the following things: food, drink, health, housing, clothing, and education. He concludes that it is the duty of the state to provide access to these bare minima of freedom. Then, a minimalist account of freedom will only suggest that supplying these minima will be sufficient to promote freedom to a person and goals/ends of the agent are up to him. On the account of minimalist conception of positive freedom, after a certain minimum degree of enablement is assured by the state, people develop in diverse and conflicting directions. There is no final solution or prescribed purposes, which are the same for all individuals.

Assume that X’s capacities and interests would be well fulfilled were he to serve as a lawyer. Imagine that after evaluating his desires qualitatively and provided with relevant information, X decided to be a lawyer. X decides to act upon his desire, which is formed on the basis of strong evaluation, and relevant information and the laws of his country allows him to realize his desire. In X’s country, there are now laws prohibiting X to have a university education in law. But, he lacks the material

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

²⁵⁸ Many thinkers such as Abraham Maslow have supposed that human beings have fundamental needs. The basic human needs placed by Maslow are these: 1) Physiological needs 2) Security, or safety needs 3) Affiliation, or acceptance needs 4) Esteem needs 5) Need for self-actualization.

means to have a university education to be a lawyer. Assume that X is living poverty, with barely enough money to feed himself and because of that reason, he is forced to work to earn money. In that case, the lack of material means stops him from actualizing his desire. According to an exercise conception of freedom in terms of freedom as self-realization/self-development, we cannot state that X is free. He must be able to act on his significant desire, which he arrives after strongly evaluating his desires, to be called as free. In that case, state might enable X to go to the law school by giving him a scholarship, which would be sufficient for satisfying her basic needs. So, a state can help its citizens towards freedom not by forcing them to live in ways which is rational according to a favored conception of good life, but by supplying the necessary material means for them to enable them to act upon their reflected and informed choices. That will not involve a controversial talk about forcing someone to be free²⁵⁹.

²⁵⁹ Those who are against welfare state (such as Hayek) might disagree by suggesting that enabling the poor people by supplying money and means for them would limit rich people's freedom to spend their money, as they like by imposing higher taxes for them. It can be suggested that redistribution reduces the freedom of those rich people who are taxed. A position, which claims that a minimal redistribution is necessary for freedom, can object to that position by suggesting a moralized definition of freedom. We can suggest that whether interference is a restriction on freedom, and whether it is justified amounts to the same thing. Taxing the rich to enable the poor people does not infringe their freedom because the claims about absolute property rights can be questioned in the first place. It can be claimed that rich people are not justified in holding that much property in their hands and in that case, the interference may be justified. Given the definition that only unjustified interference restricts people's freedom, the freedom of the rich people is not restricted when they are taxed to supply the poor people with the necessary means of freedom. So, the concept of freedom plays a pivotal role in the debates about redistributive taxation but this issue will not be discussed in this thesis.

B. Resisting The Slippery Slope Towards Totalitarianism

As we have seen the minimalist account of freedom leaves the goals or ends unprescribed and leaves goals/ends of the agent up to him. This is one of the obvious ways to resist the slide towards totalitarianism, which insists that it is always, and necessarily the individual who is the best judge of significant desires. John Christman's content neutral conception of positive freedom suggests such a view, which rejects an externalist or objectivist account of rationality and offers an internalist account of rationality:

"Now if, as we have argued, the extent of the rationality requirement for positive liberty was the internal sense of rationality, then it is clear that the tyranny objection (*my note, force-to-be-free argument*) is avoided. For no second party (much less a tyrant in a position of power affecting many individuals) will be in the epistemic position necessary to justify intrusions on the basis of failed rationality of this sort. For it would have to be the case that the intruder knows more than the agent about the internal structure of her set of desires and beliefs and judges them to be inconsistent in some way. The practical impossibility of this scenario undercuts the force of this difficulty."²⁶⁰

So, Christman talks about the privileged status of the agent about his/her significant desires and claims that another person other than the agent himself cannot be epistemic authority on the significant desires of the agent if we adopt an internalist account of rationality²⁶¹. So, he rejects "an external value requirement as one of the conditions for freedom"²⁶² and suggests that what makes a person free is not her acting on certain objectively significant desires but, rather, his acting on

²⁶⁰ Christman (1991), p. 355.

²⁶¹ But, it is important to note that the suggestion, which claims that nobody can know my significant goals better than myself, is not equal to the claim that I am never mistaken about my fundamental goals. So, Christman misses the point that his internalist account does not necessarily imply the conclusion that we are never mistaken about our fundamental purposes.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 356.

certain desires that have come about in a certain way: "For an individual to be self-governing it at least must be the case that she is not moved by desires and values that have been oppressively imposed upon her, even if she faces no restraints in performing actions such desires motivate. Her character must be formed in a certain manner. What is needed, then, is an account of how desire changes take place, which is an expression of the ideal of the fully free person."²⁶³ As we have discussed in chapter 2, section D, A person can be free whatever her desires as long as those desires were formed in a way that involved reflection on her part about the change in her own desires and were not oppressively imposed upon him. Being free from external impositions and reflecting our desires is the sufficient grounds of Christman's positive freedom. We are capable of reflecting our desires and of identifying with or disowning them. This is something that distinguishes us from other animals. We can reflect on them and check whether they cohere with our other desires. Then, to think that freedom consists in acting significant desires, we don't need to posit freedom as acting on objectively rational/significant desires. That should be enough to prevent the state justifying its coercion by appeal to the claim that, because it knows what people really want better than they do themselves.

To make Christman's case clearer, we can introduce a thought experiment. Imagine two people: X1 and X2. Assume that X1 wants to be a housewife because she thinks that being a housewife is pleasant and comfortable. She has no idea about what is really like to be a housewife. Assume that at a very early age, she saw a TV program featuring a glamorous housewife and has never considered any other possible careers. After watching that TV program, she decided to be a housewife because she has completely internalized the role expectations that ensure she never

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 345-346.

will pursue another path. X2 wants to be a lawyer. She has gathered a great deal of information about being a lawyer and being a housewife. She knows what is involved, the chances of her succeeding, what the life is really like, how much she is likely to earn. She has thought carefully about her various options and decided that, on balance and all things considered, being a lawyer is the thing for her. Suppose that X1 acts on the desire to be a housewife and X2 acts on the desire to be a lawyer. Are they both equally free? Isn't X2 is more free, more in charge of her life because her desire to be a lawyer has emerged from rational deliberation and reflection based on good information? If we take positive freedom in a fairly weak sense (in the sense of Christman), we can conclude that people, who reflect on their desires, have the appropriate relevant information and act on desires that are not imposed by other persons or by the socialization process are freer than those who don't.

X2 is freer than X1 because her desire to be a lawyer emerged from rational deliberation/reflection based on appropriate relevant information and not imposed upon her by socialization process. On the other hand, X2 is at the mercy of her desire to be a housewife because she has not been provided with the relevant information, nor taught how to think clearly about the relevant information she has got. It does seem that her desire to be a housewife which is the result of her socialization and non-exercise of deliberation and reflection stand as an obstacle to her genuine self-realization, to her being in charge of her life. Suppose that having being taught to reflect on her desires and provided with relevant information, she still wants to be a housewife. X1 decides to act upon her desire, which is formed on the basis of relevant information and reflection. Can we say that X1 is free if she acts upon her desire to be a housewife? Christman's position will suggest that this time X1 is free because the only requirements for the agent to be free are her acting on self-imposed

and reflected desires. X1 is free regardless of the equal outcomes. So, we are a very long way from any fear that state will come along and force people to be free. Secondly, this example shows us that educating X1 will promote her freedom without any attempt to force her to be a lawyer or a housewife. Education, giving cognitive means gives people a sense of what their options are and the likely outcome of any action they might take. This is the information-giving aspect of education²⁶⁴. It also teaches them to think, evaluate the different options available to them, to process and reflect upon the information they have. If being taught about the world and learning how to think about it promotes freedom, then supplying the cognitive means/education will be sufficient to promote one's positive freedom rather than forcing them to be free.

C. Some Legitimate Cases of Forced-To-Be-Free

It is worth noting that it is not always the case that everybody is always and necessarily the best judge of his/her significant goals. There is the possibility of error in self-evaluation. After all, most of us believe that parents are better judges of what is and is not rational for their children than those children are themselves. Suppose that a fourteen years old child goes out drinking every night rather than studying for her exams. Suppose that she hasn't made a careful, reflective judgment about her choice to go out drinking every night. She acts in such a fashion because that is a norm among a group of friends that she wants to be popular with. Her father knows

²⁶⁴ But, it is important to note that in reality education is not so neutral and freedom-contributing. It teaches us to be good citizens who respect their duties and to be nationalists who are ready to die when our state commands us to fight for the protection of the state. It tries to fix these beliefs so that we acquire unshakable beliefs. Or to be more exact, it tries to inculcate relatively unshakable beliefs in certain theories and doctrines. So, education not only helps us to develop our reflective thinking but also reshapes and manipulates us in some way.

her well enough to know that this is irrational for her. He knows that her wanting to be popular results from irrationally low self-esteem and going out drinking every night rather than studying for her exams will not help her because she can only overcome her low self-esteem with a good academic career. So, in the case of children, we judge that parents who know their children intimately can at least sometimes be better judges about their children's significant desires and goals. Might not the same apply, even if only to a limited extent, in the case of adults? Taylor holds the view that we, adults don't always correctly identify what our significant desires that will contribute to our self-development:

"For there may be good reasons for holding that others are not likely to be in a better position to understand his real purposes.... Some others, who know us intimately, and who surpass us in wisdom, are undoubtedly in a position to advise us, but no official body can possess a doctrine or technique whereby they could know how to put us on the rails, because such a doctrine or technique cannot in principle exist if human beings really differ in their self-realization."²⁶⁵

He argues that while we may make a mistake about our basic purposes, a person who knows us intimately (such as a close friend, our parents) may be in a better position to know our fundamental goals and he may advise us about our real purposes. But, according to Taylor, "no official body can possess a doctrine or technique whereby they could know how to put us on the rails."²⁶⁶ Suppose that a friend of mine spend the greater part of his time watching soap operas, playing bingo and drinking beer. Knowing him well, I judge correctly that he would be more fulfilled if he were to devote more of his time to learning to play piano, taking sociology courses and reading about philosophical issues. I might advise him to do so in the interests of what I conceive of as his freedom without in any way coercing

²⁶⁵ Taylor (1985a), p. 216.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

him to be free. This conception of positive freedom in no ways entails that one is justified in coercion people into freedom while our judgment about our freedom may be in principle at fault. The people who know us intimately can be in a better position than I am to judge, which are my significant desires. But, how about experts?

An expert on an issue can be in a better position than us to judge our significant desires that will contribute to our self-realization correctly because they have access to superior information or are better able to process information available to all. An adult can persuade himself that he really must be a basketball player without knowing that he has a heart disease. But, after medical check-up, a doctor (an expert) can tell him that he has a serious heart disease and it is not healthy for him to play basketball. So, a doctor can give advices to us to heal our illness, which we are unaware and that advice can require changing our fundamental purposes.

To conclude, to be positively free, we need to be knowledgeable about our ends. In addition, other people, our friends and experts can help us in this regard. A friend or an expert may be positioned to know what impedes my aims, help me shake my irrational sentiments and attain greater freedom to pursue my most significant and prized goals. Even in some cases, we sometimes prefer experts or our friends decide for us because we think that they know perfectly what we needed, might well dispose of our lives much more satisfactorily than we could. Oppenheim states that we sometimes prefer that a person (a friend or an expert) make the decisions for us:

“There are other situations in which we experience a prolonged state of uncertainty as painful and the task of decision-making as burdensome. The possibility of gaining practical certainty may exist, but either the effort of gathering and possessing the relevant information is too great to be worthwhile or we mistrust our reasoning or will power to lead us to a rational decision. In such cases, we often do not mind being told what to do; more than that, we actually welcome being relieved by others of the necessity of

deciding for ourselves. We disvalue our freedom and value being unfree (or required) to act in a certain way.”²⁶⁷

So, in some cases, it can be so difficult for us to choose between the alternatives that we have. It is not always true that having freedom to decide for myself is always a pleasure for us. To simplify, it might be difficult for me to make a decision whether to have a university education about philosophy or sociology. I can mistrust my own reasoning or I may believe that I am unable to solve the uncertainty and wish that somebody else (such as my parents or my teachers) decided for me to get rid of the prolonged uncertainty, which creates frustration. Thus, sometimes the necessity of choosing among alternatives becomes painful for us and we prefer a prescribed course of action to “the necessity of choosing among competing alternatives.”²⁶⁸ For instance, some people “prefer to put their money into closed savings rather than into checking accounts, not so much because of the higher interest rate, but because they prefer to be unfree to make withdrawals except at specified time.”²⁶⁹ So, we sometimes abdicate our responsibilities, turning to some experts, friends and parents who assume those responsibilities. That means we sometimes disvalue our freedom to choose among alternatives.

Jean Jacques Rousseau observes that everyone is in chains: “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.”²⁷⁰ If we assume that most people in the world are in chains, we are faced with the question of whether this results from the misfortune of succumbing of oppressive rulers or choice of people. The problem we face is what

²⁶⁷ Oppenheim, Felix (1960), “Evaluating Interpersonal Freedoms”, *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 57, p. 381.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 382.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

²⁷⁰ Rousseau (1983), p. 49.

sense can we give to the view that people love freedom. But, it is probable that some people do not, in fact, value freedom. Alexander Herzen complains about how little freedom meant to masses: "They are indifferent to individual freedom, liberty of speech: the masses love authority."²⁷¹ Only a set of people with a taste for the pleasures of speed would have invented car racing. In a similar fashion, freedom requires a taste for valuing and desiring it and some people do not have the taste of freedom. If we pay attention to some of human behaviors, then the proposition that all men seek freedom is simply false. For instance, some people prefer a life of service in which their lives are circumscribed within institutions such as the army and churches. When a soldier goes to the army he promises to obey his masters. In this way, he automatically gives away his freedom because he chooses to be ordered and commanded. So, some people delights receiving commands and ready-made plans such as a well-trained and well-drilled soldier. Another example of voluntarily giving up one's freedom is Hobbes's theory of the social contract which is based on the assumption that men want to get out of the anarchical condition of the state of nature in which everyman is at war against others. They surrender their rights and freedoms to an absolute ruler who "hath the use of so much power and strength conferred him, that by terror thereof he is enabled to perform the will of them all"²⁷², as a lesser evil than the war condition of state of nature. We can also think of a case in which a prisoner may become so accustomed to his imprisonment and his enforced regimen that upon release he will actually commit crimes in order to be returned to his constrained condition. In Zeki Demirkubuz's film, *Masumiyet*, after being released, Güven Kıraç goes to the jail officer and begs him not to release him from

²⁷¹ Berlin, Isaiah (1979), *Russian Thinkers*, Penguin Books, p. 88.

²⁷² Hobbes (1940), p. 335.

the prison: 'I don't know how to live outside. My home is inside, and I want to stay there for the rest of my life.' The responsibility for his own fate becomes so large a burden that he is ready to surrender his freedom for some security. So, some people are ready to surrender their freedoms totally. But, can we let people to surrender their freedoms totally?

John Stuart Mill makes a point about this issue in his book *On Liberty*. The main thrust of the argument of John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* is that individuals should be left free from interference, either by the state or by other citizens. He asserts a principle, which is usually known as the Harm Principle or sometimes as the Liberty Principle. Mill gives several formulations of it. For instance, he writes: "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant."²⁷³ On Liberty, he formulates Harm Principle in the following fashion:

"That principle is that sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, *against his will*, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant."²⁷⁴

So, according to Mill, the limit on freedom is where the actions of one individual harm someone else. Individuals should be allowed to choose any course of action among those whose consequences are not harmful to other people. So, individuals should be free from interference of others including the state to do what they want on the condition that they do not harm others. Only when there is a risk of harm to others is there any justification for interference. Society or the state is

²⁷³ Mill (1985), p. 68.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

justified in preventing someone from doing things which harm others but is not justified in compelling that person to do or not to do an act which it judges to be harmful to the agent. Thus, Liberty Principle denies that a person's own good is a sufficient condition for the infringement of his freedom. Mill explicitly rules out paternalistic intervention²⁷⁵, intervention for the good of the individual concerned. But, Mill cites an exception to the Harm Principle. The exception is the choice of becoming a slave:

"The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a person's voluntary acts is consideration of his liberty. His voluntary choice is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or at least endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it. But by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he forgoes any future use of it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. He is no longer free, but is thenceforth in a position has no longer the presumption in its favour that would be afforded by his voluntary remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his freedom."²⁷⁶

Mill believes that individuals should not be allowed to give up, their freedom:

"an engagement by which a person should sell himself, or allow himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null and void; neither enforced by law nor opinion."²⁷⁷ He decries any sense of a person's freedom to sell him/herself into slavery. Mill holds

²⁷⁵ Gerald Dworkin defines paternalism as follows: "By paternalism I shall understand roughly the interference with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced." Dworkin, Gerald (2000), "Paternalism", *Reading Political Philosophy*, Open University Press, p. 343.

²⁷⁶ Mill (1985), p. 173.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

the view that the society or the state should not recognize and legally enforce such a contract²⁷⁸. So, we cannot let a person to sell oneself into slavery.

One of the main characters in Aldous Huxley's novel defines freedom in such a fashion: "But if you want to be free, you've got to be prisoner. It's the condition of freedom- true freedom... I always love that kind of argument. The contrary of a thing isn't the contrary."²⁷⁹ Or in 1984 under Ingsoc (English Socialism) the telescreens blares out the slogan: 'Freedom is Slavery'. This is the process of redefining freedom into its exact opposite. Such as definition is against the criterion of familiarity. The criterion of familiarity is a simple requirement that the name, we are assigning to a concept be one which is ordinarily used to connote. This criterion is capable of scotching the definition of freedom as slavery. To talk of freedom as slavery is entirely in contradiction with established common usage of freedom and therefore freedom as slavery renders meaningful disagreement impossible. Someone who has just been released from slavery or other conditions of bondage really made free in a very elementary sense of that term. That elementary sense is that freedom is the opposite of slavery. In a similar fashion, Berlin offers a core-paradigmatic exemplar of freedom which is quoted from Helvetius: "The free man is the man who is not in

²⁷⁸ Feinberg suggests that Mill's solution to the problem of voluntary slavery is "paternalistic in spirit" Feinberg, J. (1985), *The Moral Limits to The Criminal Law*, Oxford University Press, p. 72. He argues "liberals must in principle tolerate slavery contracts, if the parties really enter into agreement on a voluntary basis... Interference with such contracts can only be justified, it seems, by casting doubt on the voluntariness of the agreement". Riley, Jonathan (1998), *Mill On Liberty*, Routledge, p. 200.

Gerald Dworkin thinks that a narrow paternalism is suggested by Mill: "This gives us a principle -a very narrow one- by which to justify some paternalistic interferences. Paternalism is justified only to preserve a wider range of freedom for the individual in question" Dworkin (2000), p. 350.

²⁷⁹ Flew, A. (1983), "Freedom is Slavery: A Slogan for Our New Philosopher Kings", *Of Liberty* (ed. Griffiths, P.), Cambridge University Press, p. 45.

irons, nor imprisoned in a goal, nor terrorized like a slave by the fear of punishment.”. But, what is slavery? We will define slavery in the following manner:

X is a slave to a master, R if and only if X is totally unfree with respect to R and X has no right to terminate the slavery contract.

The first aspect of slavery is that it is all-or-nothing issue. Contracts are “a specific kind of agreement, entered into voluntarily and on mutually agreed terms. To enter into a contract is, in effect, to make a promise to abide by its terms.”²⁸⁰ If a person enters into voluntarily on mutually agreed terms that he will be the slave of a person or a group of person, by signing that slavery contract, that person totally relinquishes his/her freedom. His freedom ends completely. By becoming a slave, that person is completely under the control of another person. You are under the obligation to do whatever your master wants and says. Master has the right to do whatever he wants to his slave, which means that the slave has the obligation to uphold that right and obey all the commands of his master. While the master is totally free with respect to his slave, the slave is totally unfree with respect to his master. The master gives commands and interferes with the actions of his slave, but receives no commands from his slave and not subjected to any interference from his slave. To proceed with the second aspect of slavery, consider Dworkin’s clarification:

“While it is true that *future* choices of the slave are not reasons for thinking that what he chooses then is desirable for him, what is at issue is limiting his immediate choice; and since this choice is made freely, the individual may be correct in thinking that his interests are best provided for by entering such a contract. But the main consideration for not allowing such a contract is the need to preserve the liberty of the person to make future choices.”²⁸¹

²⁸⁰ Heywood (1999), *Political Theory*, MacMillan Press, p. 201.

²⁸¹ Dworkin (2000), p. 350.

The point that Dworkin makes is about the second aspect of slavery, which is related to the first aspect of it. While employment contracts, international treaties and commercial treaties include automatic termination clauses on the basis of mutual agreement, the slavery contracts exclude such termination clauses. If your master is totally free with respect to his slave and the slave is totally unfree with respect to his master, then only the master has the freedom or right to terminate the contract. While the master has the freedom to terminate the contract, the slave has no right or freedom to renegotiate the contract. So, a person who enters into a slavery agreement is thereby permanently giving up his freedom. By choosing to be a slave, the person in question will be relinquishing future freedom. But, there is always the possibility that the voluntary slave will sooner or later change his mind and want to be free from his master. There is no guarantee that the slave will always wish to remain a slave and when he becomes a discontented slave, he has no right to terminate the slavery contract. So, if society or the state does not prohibit such a contract, then, there is the risk that society or the state will be forced to enforce and recognize involuntary slavery contracts. So, slavery contracts are by their nature irrevocable. Once you allow for a voluntary slavery contract, you are completely sunk into allowing every form of slavery.

We will try to consider the relation between conceptions of options and slavery issue. There are three main approaches to the options that the agent has: (a) freedom as want-satisfaction, (b) freedom as non-restriction of options or possible choices, and (c) freedom as non-restriction of significant options. The first position (a) claims that one is free to the extent that his options that satisfy his/her desires are not restricted by others and according to the other position (b), our degree of freedom depends on the quantity of options that we have regardless of our actual desires. The

last approach (c) claims that the significance or reasonableness of options are important as well as the quantity of options and measuring the degree of one's freedom admits of considering the relative significance of these options. We are free to the extent that we are free from obstacles that restrict our significant options.

Consider Bertrand Russell's definition of freedom in terms of want satisfaction, which is a quantity-based approach: "freedom in its most abstract sense means the absence of external obstacles to realization of desires."²⁸² This suggests that one is free to the extent that his options that satisfy his/her desires are not restricted. Such a conception of freedom leads to the idea that if a person wants to be a slave, his options to be a slave must not be restricted by other people or by the state. If freedom is being able to satisfy our wants, then, a person who wants to be slave cannot be prevented from satisfying his/her desire without restricting his/her freedom. Then, such an understanding of freedom becomes compatible with voluntary slavery. But, there is the uncertainty that the willing slave can change his mind and decide to be a free man at a future time. Given that definition that a slave has no freedom to terminate such a contract, this conception of freedom becomes self-defeating. If the contented and voluntary slave becomes a discontented slave or if he is to choose to become a free man or terminate the slavery contract at a future time, he will be frustrated because the slave does not have the right or freedom to do so. Then, the slave will be unfree with respect to his master to satisfy his new desires. By allowing an individual to choose to become a slave, such a conception of freedom becomes self-defeating since by choosing to be a slave the person in question will be relinquishing future freedom to satisfy his/her desires.

²⁸² Russell (1960), p. 117.

Now, let's consider the account of freedom in terms of freedom as non-restriction of options or possible choices (b). According to this account, a slave is unfree even if he is a willing or an unwilling slave and defines freedom in terms of non-restriction of options irrespective of the agent's desires to take advantage of them. So, if the state prevents you from signing a slavery contract by threatening you with punishment, even if you don't want to sign such a contract, your freedom is curtailed. So, this position does not allow any room for forcing someone to do or not to do something without admitting that the agent's freedom is restricted. There comes the objection the notion of force-to-be-free: a man cannot be forced to be free since freedom is the permission to choose to do anything not only regardless of the desires of the agent but also regardless of the significance of the options that the agent has, and if you coerce a person you cannot at the same time increase his freedom because you close at least one of the options of the agent. But, if freedom means non-restriction of options or to be more exactly, being free from any interference to do anything, then forcing someone not to sign a slavery contract becomes unacceptable. Since when you force that person not to sign the slavery contract or force him not to sell his freedom, you at least close one of the options that he has, namely the option to sell his freedom. But, when that person becomes a slave, almost every option is closed to him. So, freedom as non-restriction of options or possible choices states that when you force someone not to be unfree, you restrict his freedom.

If we define freedom as non-restriction of significant options, we get rid of the deficiencies attributed to the above conception of freedom. As Taylor argues: "Freedom is no longer just the absence of external obstacles *tout court*, but the

absence of external obstacles to significant action, to what is important to man.”²⁸³ Following the lines of Taylor, we can claim that only restrictions on our significant options restrict our freedom and claim that the option to sign a slavery contract or sell your freedom to a master is not a significant option. Accordingly, if we coerce a person who is prepared to sell his freedom to master or who wants to remain as slave, you do not restrict his freedom because that is not a significant option and only coercing or threatening a person not to do a significant option restricts one’s freedom. So, a law, which forbids entering into a slavery agreement, does not restrict one’s freedom because selling your freedom totally or signing a slavery agreement is not a significant option and one’s freedom is diminished when others close his/her significant options.

But, how can judgments about significance of options be objectively grounded? Berlin introduces his solution in the following fashion: “what value not merely the agent, but the general sentiment of the society in which he lives, puts on the various possibilities.”²⁸⁴ But, Berlin’s formulation is just a descriptive account of the values that oneself and others in society actually holds. It simply allows that if signing voluntary slavery contracts is considered as significant option in the society in which an agent lives, then if signing such a contract is prohibited, an agent who wants to sign a slavery contract with a master remains less free than otherwise. It seems that we must introduce a universal and objective normative consideration, which will enable us to suggest that restrictions on the option of selling yourself to a master is not freedom-diminishing.

²⁸³ Taylor (1985a), p. 218.

²⁸⁴ Berlin (2002a), p. 177.

But, why selling your self into slavery is not a significant option? We can propose a normative conception of self-development, which suggests that there are particular areas of life where what is contributive to the individual's self-development, is the same for all the people. So, there are some common core of things it is rational for all people to do and not to do. This view can suggest that it is clear that not all actions contribute to self-development. Some actions may be pernicious for self-development and some may inhibit it.

Freedom as self-development assumes that cultivation of our capacities that promotes our freedom is valuable. Those self-destructive actions such as giving great physical harm to ourselves cannot be held as freedom contributive. Suppose that an individual, acting alone and without harm to others, were to choose, as a means of his or her self-development, some course of action that is self-destructive. According to this understanding, that individual undercuts his own freedom because any course of action that is self-destructive or harmful to the agent in effect undercuts or destroys the very possibility of further self-development, by endangering either the life or health of the individual or by inhibiting the cultivation of capacities. Such debilitation of an individual as a result of his or her chosen activity cannot in any reasonable sense be taken as self-developing. The state or society can interfere with an individual's choice of such activity on the grounds that it is not contributive to his self-development. So, we cannot let individuals do actions, which harm them, and signing a slavery contract is among the things, which cannot be permitted. So, the state can force people to comply with some rules. Under this view, the state can make us not to do those in the name of our own freedom and not letting people to sign slavery contracts is among the things that the state can force not to do. The state or society can interfere with an individual's choice of such activity on the grounds

that it is not contributive to his self-development but rather it is self-destructive. But, this view can become a too determinate conception of self-development, and allow too wide scope for interference and force. Not only can it justify the legislation, which forbids voluntary slavery, but also it can be invoked in order to ban cigarette smoking, hang gliding and the ingestion of high cholesterol foods. A common failure of an extended notion of self-development is that it fails to safeguard the freedom of persons to choose and pursue life-plans that deviate from the prescribed pattern of self-development. But, assuming a narrow notion of self-development, which prescribes our fundamental goals, we can offer a wider conception of self-development which allows us to do anything except for a few harmful actions such as avoiding drug addiction, not killing other people, and not harming ourselves too much but now we will only focus on the issue of why we should not sell our freedom voluntarily.

But, can we find a ground for forbidding slavery contracts? Selling your freedom to a master is not a significant option because as Rousseau says freedom constitutes our humanity. Rousseau claims that slavery is contrary to what humans are: "Man was born free"²⁸⁵. For Rousseau, "liberty is identical with human individual himself. To say that a man is a man, and to say that he is free, are almost the same."²⁸⁶ Liberty for him is an absolute value and an absolute value means that you cannot alienate, give or sell your freedom: "To renounce freedom is to renounce one's humanity, one's rights as a man and equally one's duties... indeed such renunciation is contrary to man's very nature."²⁸⁷ Robert Paul Wolff makes a similar

²⁸⁵ Rousseau (1983), p. 49.

²⁸⁶ Berlin (2002b), p. 31.

²⁸⁷ Rousseau (1983), p. 55.

point: "Since man's responsibility for his actions is a consequence of his capacity for choice, he cannot give it up or put it aside."²⁸⁸ Rousseau links freedom with moral significance: our actions can only be moral if those actions were done freely. In giving up our freedom we give up our morality and our humanity. According to Rousseau, our freedom and our humanity are closely tied to our ability to deliberate and make choices. If a master has absolute power over us, we lose both our freedom and humanity, and become slaves.

"Thus, however we look at the question, the 'right' of slavery is seen to be void; void, not only because it cannot be justified, but also because it is nonsensical, because it has no meaning. The words 'slavery' and 'right' are contradictory, they cancel each other out. Whether as between one man and another, or between one man and a whole people, it would always be absurd to say: 'I hereby make a covenant with you which is wholly at your expense and wholly to my advantage; I will respect it so long as I please and you shall respect it so long as I wish.'²⁸⁹

According to the above passage, which is quoted from Rousseau, right must be based upon human freedom. Arguments to become the slave of a master cannot ever become principles of right. The words slavery and rights contradict each other and are mutually exclusive. A slavery contract is based upon force only and any such conventions are null, void, and illegitimate. According to Rousseau, a pact of slavery or pact of submission is unacceptable because it denies the essential characteristic of human beings: their freedom. "This means that for a man to lose his liberty is for him to cease to be a man, and that is why a man cannot sell himself into slavery, for once he becomes a slave, he is no longer a man, and therefore has no rights, no duties, and a man cannot cancel himself out, he cannot commit an act whose consequence is that he can commit no further acts. To do is to commit moral suicide..."²⁹⁰ A person who

²⁸⁸ Wolff, Robert Paul (1976), *In Defense of Anarchism*, Harper and Row, p. 14.

²⁸⁹ Rousseau (1983), p. 58.

²⁹⁰ Berlin (2002b), p. 33.

totally transfers or alienates his freedom to a master dehumanizes himself. “In short, human freedom – the capacity to choose ends independently, autonomously- is for Rousseau an absolute value, and to say of a value that one cannot compromise over it at all.”²⁹¹ So, signing a slavery contract is not a significant option differing from the other forms of self-destructive behaviors because it is dehumanization of yourself. It is not only selling your freedom but also selling your humanity, which cannot be considered as a significant option. Selling your freedom is not a significant option not only because it is an obstacle on your self-development but also because it is surrendering your humanity.

But isn't forcing someone to not to sign a slavery contract a dangerous and sinister idea? A law that prohibits slavery ostensibly coerces not only the masters of the slaves but also the willing and contented slaves. Assume that the slave does not desire his freedom because he has become so habituated to his condition of slavery, bondage and having his life directed by his master that he wants to remain in it. That slave acts upon his inclination to resist his emancipation. Then, we must say that the same law which forces masters to give up his slave also forces the bondsman to give up his master. But, we need to make distinction between forcing into a situation of bondage and forcing out of bondage. Forcing the slave in this sense does not involve *forcing him into* a situation of bondage, but it is a matter of *forcing him out of* bondage. So, the slave is not forced into a situation of unfreedom but forced out of the situation of unfreedom. Thus, forced into freedom. People must be protected against their own judgment only when they decide to be unfree or decide to live in the situation of bondage. So, people must be forced not to be unfree. The bare idea of forcing someone not to be unfree does not presuppose: “I know better what is good

²⁹¹ Berlin (2002b), p. 33.

for you than you do yourself. I know the final solution that will put you into the rails of good life". The men who emancipated the slave are saying, "I know better than you that it is good for you to have the conditions of freedom rather than being in the condition of slavery because freedom is what makes you a human being". There is nothing sinister about the idea of forcing to be free.

It will be suggested that while forcing someone not to sign a slavery contract does not restrict one's freedom, not preventing slavery contracts is restriction on one's freedom. Consider Oppenheim's claim which goes against our suggestion: "Y makes X unfree to do x if Y prevents X from doing x, but not if Y merely *fails* to make it possible for X to do x."²⁹² This view suggests that not removing slavery contracts does not restrict a person's freedom. So, the position of Oppenheim suggests if a person is under the condition of slavery even if involuntarily, the failure of other people to liberate that person does not constitute a restriction on the freedom of the subject. Oppenheim states that any view that includes the failure to remove or prevent an obstacle as a constraint bears the risk of claiming that a failure to remove an obstacle restricts one's freedom in relation to everybody and makes it an unattainable position. But, a government has the power to proscribe such a slavery contract and liberate the slaves from their masters. According to Oppenheim's suggestion, if the state does not prevent or remove a slavery situation, that state does not restrict one's freedom but only does not enable them. So, Oppenheim is forced to conclude that in a society where most of the people are in the condition of slavery, the slaves are unfree only with respect to their masters but not with respect to the government which refuses to proscribe slavery contracts. Or to put the issue differently, he is forced to conclude that only masters are responsible for the

²⁹² Oppenheim (1961), p. 71.

unfreedom of slaves and the government is not responsible. Then, such a conception of freedom implies that we can call a state, which does not proscribe slavery contracts, as a freedom-preserving state, which only fails to enable people. But, in my opinion, a state, which prohibits slavery contracts, is a necessary component of freedom and if the government does not proscribe the slavery contracts, the people remain unfree both with respect to the government and with respect to their masters. That is the responsibility of the state to prohibit slavery contracts. Hence, a freedom promoting state, which proscribes the slavery contracts, is a necessary component of freedom.

In its ordinary sense, slavery contracts concerns the issues of personal dependence. Generally, speaking, when we sell ourselves to a master, we authorize our master to coerce or threaten us to do or not to do some acts. The master simply commands his slave to stay at the room by backing his command with a threat (such as offering that if he moves out of the room, he will kill him with his gun) or makes it physically impossible for him to move out of the room by breaking his legs.

On the other hand, we can talk about mental slavery. Suppose that a person decides to go to a malicious scientist who has a manipulation machine and when you plugged into that machine that the malicious scientist can make you do whatever he wants by just pressing the bottoms of the machine and your actions will be totally dependent on that machine. To make the issue similar with the slavery case, let's suggest that once you plugged into that machine, you don't have the chance to regain your capacity for free choice because you have signed a contract with the hypnotist and agreed that you will remain plugged into that machine lifelong. Benn will suggest that after being plugged into that hypnosis machine, that individual loses his power to choose rationally and freely and become heterarchic or other-impelled

which means that he disqualifies as the proper agent of either negative or positive freedom. If we hold the view that freedom either in negative or in positive sense is incompatible with being heterarchic or mental slavery, we are forced to conclude that that person who is prepared to plugged into that machine must be forced not to sell his mental independence. We can force him not to be plugged into that machine to prevent him to loose his mental independence. Now, assume that we have discovered that a person has already plugged himself to that manipulation machine and because he is under the influence of the commands of our malicious scientist, he declares that he wants to remain plugged into that machine and he is happy with his condition. Again, we can coerce him and the malicious scientist to terminate the contract and unplug our contented mental slave from that machine if we hold the view that the continuation of his mental slavery disqualifies him as an agent of freedom. We have the right to force him out of his mental slavery to make him regain his mental independence.

The examples, which are given up to this point, are about the interpersonal component of freedom. They capture being free from coercion or threat or manipulation of others to take advantage of our options. But, can we let people to destroy totally their mental dispositional capacities and institutional rights? If you suggest that having a democratic state²⁹³ and a minimum degree of rationality are necessary components of freedom, then, we cannot let people to destroy these components of freedom as well as interpersonal component. We will offer the following condition for forcing somebody not to become or remain unfree:

²⁹³ It is important to note that whether we can take democracy as a necessary component of freedom is a matter of dispute like everything else in social and political philosophy. For a detailed analysis see institutional component part.

P: If the exercise of X brings about the destruction of interpersonal component of freedom or/and mental dispositional component of freedom or/and institutional component of freedom, then, we can force X either not to loose or gain his freedom, or to put in other words, not to destroy any of the components of freedom

As far as we have dealt with the interpersonal component in terms of slavery contracts, let's proceed by analyzing the destruction of mental and institutional components of freedom. First of all concentrate on the mental dispositional component of freedom. Assume that there is a drug, which makes people non-autarchic. When you take that drug, you totally lost your minimal epistemic and practical rationality. To be more exact, suppose that you become a paranoiac person. Now, a person is prepared to take that drug not because of the reason that there is a person who forces him to take that drug, but he just wants to experience that mental condition and there is no way to recover him from the bondage of paranoia. As Benn suggests that the non-autarchic people (such as paranoiacs, kleptomaniacs, and schizophrenics) disqualify as the subjects of freedom by the virtue of lacking a minimum degree of epistemic and practical rationality. Since I argue that nobody has the freedom/right to terminate the necessary components of his freedom, we can force him not to loose his autarchy or to put in other words, not to destroy his mental dispositional capacities, which are necessary to be a subject of freedom²⁹⁴. Now, this time assume that we have magical drug, which cures schizophrenic people after they take the drug for a certain time and enables them to regain their autarchy. Suppose

²⁹⁴ Can we argue that we can force someone not to take that drug when the effects of the drug would last a few days or there is only the risk that the agent will loose his autarchy? This can be a matter of discussion. But, we will only focus on the extreme cases to establish a bare minimum for force-to-be-free argument.

that there is a non-autarchic person, a schizophrenic person who resists taking the drugs. Remaining faithful to P, we can force him to take the drugs to regain his autarchy on the grounds that he will gain his freedom and humanity.

Lastly, we will consider the institutional component of freedom. Assume that the majority of the population wants to vote for a party who declares that when they seize the political power, they will abolish the elections and will not grant a considerable degree of sphere of non-interference or private sphere for its citizens. Consistent with the above condition, P, the state can proscribe that party and take the freedom of the majority to vote for that party. So, the state can force people not to give away their freedom to vote and their protected sphere of non-interference. Secondly, being ruled by a dictator who interferes with the private sphere of its citizens and does not allow political elections can content the majority of the population²⁹⁵. A revolutionary group can come up and overthrow the dictator and grant the citizens what the dictator does not give to them: democracy and a protected private sphere. In consistent with P, we can claim that the revolutionary group can force the contented majority out of the bondage of political unfreedom to make them gain their freedom, or to put in other words, to make them gain the institutional component of their freedom.

D. Limits of Forcing Someone into Freedom

But, what is the limit of that force? We will introduce three cases to make the issue clear. First of all, let's focus on the issue of suicide. Can we force someone not to suicide? We can surely try to stop our friends or even strangers from suicide. But,

²⁹⁵ Robert Waelder explains such a case by claiming the individual citizens can internalize external commands and prohibitions: "The individual shares the same creed, i.e., the values of the creed are the standards of his superego. In this case, no pressure is experienced by the individual except pressure of which he basically approves. In his estimation, he lives in a *free* society." Waelder (1951), p. 192.

the state cannot do this even if it wishes to do so. So, we will ask the following question: if society or the state has the right to force people not to destroy the necessary components of freedom, can we prevent our friends or even strangers from suicide on the basis of freedom? When a person deliberately kills himself because he does not want to continue living, doesn't that act bring it about the destruction of one's freedom? It will be suggested that our condition for forcing someone not to do an act, which brings about the destruction of the components of freedom, (P) does not require us to prevent someone to commit suicide.

To be more exact, we will introduce the following example: "Talk to Her", directed by Pedro Almodóvar, is a story about love of men for women. Marco is a journalist who has formed a relationship with bullfighter Lydia. Gored in the ring, she lapses into a coma. In the hospital Marco meets Benigno, a male nurse who has been tending Alicia, a dancer struck down by a car and also now in a coma. Benigno, in an effort to revive Alicia, decides to place his sperm into her vagina and makes love with her. But, when doctors learn that Alicia is pregnant, there can only be one cause, and Benigno is sent to prison. While Benigno is in prison, Alicia regains consciousness, just as Benigno hoped. Marco fails to tell Benigno of Alicia's revival and thus is unable to head off Benigno's determination to commit suicide. What is striking about the movie is that Benigno says that he will make himself a free man before he commits suicide. Benigno commits suicide to be a free man, which he thinks, amounts to be nearer to the woman he loves, Alicia. Talk To Her shows that some people can hold the view that suicide can be an expression of freedom²⁹⁶.

²⁹⁶A person can freely kill himself and terminate his pains. But, how can a dead man be a free man?

This seems mysterious. But, we can conclude that sometimes it is better to be dead, then to continue living as unfree even if escaping from unfreedom by committing suicide does not result with freedom.

Assume that Benigno is an autarchic person who rationally chooses to commit suicide. Can Benigno be at fault when he claims that he can only realize his freedom by committing suicide? Benigno's suicide does not bring about that he can no longer exercise his freedom or destruction of any components of the freedom, but his suicide brings it about that he no longer exists. When you destroy the components of your freedom, you commit moral suicide, which means that you dehumanize yourself while you are alive or to be more exact, you condemned yourself to an unfree existence. On the other hand, Benigno commits a physical suicide, which means that he renders himself non-existent. His physical suicide does not dehumanize Benigno but his suicide causes his non-existence. We claim that a free existence is superior to unfree existence because to renounce freedom amounts to is to renounce humanity. But, we don't claim that a non-existence is inferior to an existence whether it is free or unfree. So, to commit physical suicide is does not always means renouncing one's humanity. To proceed with the second case, consider John Christman's following example:

"Imagine, for example, a woman who is raised in a culture which fiercely inculcates in her the idea that women should never aspire to be anything but subservient and humble domestic companions to their husbands, no matter how unhappy this makes them or how abusive their husbands are. Imagine further that this person is suddenly placed in a new culture where opportunities abound for women to pursue independent activities. She nevertheless shuns these opportunities and remains married to an oppressive husband from the old culture. The only "restraint" she faces (to pursuing the opportunities for an independent life-style) are her desires themselves (which remain the sort she was taught to have). She simply does not *wish* to act in any other way, turning a deaf ear to reasons people give her to consider a less subservient posture. (Imagine that her husband abuses her but tells her she can leave him any time she wants, and she continues to want to stay.)"²⁹⁷

In Christman's example, we cannot say that the woman is in a slavery condition because she has the freedom to leave her husband whenever she wants

²⁹⁷ Christman (1991), p. 345.

even if she is contented with her situation. Assumes that she is autarchic and has the capacity to reflect upon her desires. So, she is a relevant agent of social freedom. Moreover, suppose that she is not totally brainwashed by his husband or his parents that being obedient to her wife is the thing that she should do. But, it is only the case that she does not exercise her capacity of autarchy (or strong evaluation) to reflect and discriminate between her desires and just goes along with the desires that her parents imposed upon her. She conforms to what her parents imposed upon her when she was a child: 'Do what your husband says. Be obedient to her.' We can claim that she is not positively free because she does not exercise her autarchy and her desire to be obedient to her husband are imposed upon her by her parents. Then, can we conclude that we can force her into freedom? We cannot conclude this because her choice to stay with her husband does not destroy any of the components of her freedom²⁹⁸. She is not under manipulation of anybody and she has the power to reflect upon her desires and if after that reflection, she decides to leave her husband, her option to do that is not closed. Since there is no destruction of any components of freedom according to procedural autonomy of Christman, we cannot force her to leave her husband.

To proceed with the third case, we have to introduce Locke's argument about the impossibility of changing one's beliefs by coercion. Within 'A Letter Concerning Toleration', John Locke includes an important argument as to why the state should tolerate or allow for religious diversity. Locke argues that intolerance by Christians isn't just unchristian but it is also irrational. According to Locke, the state is capable of forcing its members to behave in particular ways by use of laws that are

²⁹⁸ It is important to note that her choice to stay with her husband destroys dispositional component if we take it as strong evaluation as Taylor does.

enforced by the threat of penalties/punishments. But, powerful as such methods might be, the state can never bring about the expected change in religious belief:

“The care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force: but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the understanding that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward force.”²⁹⁹

If you try to persuade a devout religious Muslim of the truth of the New Testament, then no matter how horrible the tortures (coercion) you are capable of inflicting, you would possibly not be able to alter his belief in Koran. You might extort a verbal retraction of faith by torturing the devout religious Muslim and make him declare that he is a devoted Christian, but that will be the mere utterance of words, which does not in itself constitute a genuine religious belief. That doesn't amount to 'the inward persuasion of the mind' as Locke suggests.

“Neither the profession of any article of faith, nor the conformity to any outward form of worship... can be available to the salvation of souls, unless the truth of the one and the acceptableness of the other unto God, be thoroughly believed by those that so profess and practice. But penalties are no ways capable to produce such belief. It is only light and evidence that can work a change in men's opinion; and that light can in no way proceed from corporal sufferings, or any other outward penalties.”³⁰⁰

You can't simply decide to believe that the New Testament is the last book of God just because this would persuade your torturer and make him stop the torture. Without genuine belief, prayers and religious utterances are just empty words (articulate sound). Beliefs are not the sort of thing that you can simply adopt at will in the face of coercion or torture. This is just how the human mind, or 'the understanding' as Locke calls it, works. Torture or coercion can make you want to

²⁹⁹ Locke, John (1991), “A Letter Concerning Toleration”, *Locke: A Letter Concerning Toleration in Focus*, Routledge, p.18.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

believe something or alter your beliefs; but it can't actually make you alter your beliefs or believe something. As Locke points out: "To believe this or that to be true is not within the scope of the will."³⁰¹ In Essence, Locke is saying this:

- 1) Magistrates' only sanction is physical force (coercion)
- 2) Physical force (coercion) cannot change religious beliefs
- 3) So, magistrates cannot change religious beliefs

Locke claims that beliefs cannot be coerced directly by physical coercion. But this view can be challenged. Perhaps, in some circumstances can be changed. In the novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, George Orwell describes an imaginary case. The central character, protagonist of 1984, Winston Smith's life takes a horrifying turn when he begins a forbidden love affair and commits the crime of independent thought. As guilty of dissent, he has been caught and sent to ironically named 'Ministry of Love'. He is placed at the mercy of O'Brien, a sadistic agent of the ruling party determined to control his thoughts and crush his soul. The interrogator of Winston Smith, O'Brien tortures him to change what he actually believes rather than to change what he says he believes. O'Brien wants Smith to believe that two plus two equals five. Earlier, Smith had written in his notebook: 'Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four'. Gradually, through horrible tortures, O'Brien breaks down Smith's opposition to the idea that two plus two equals five:

"You are a slow learner, Winston", said O'Brien gently.
 'How can I help it?' he blubbered. 'How can I help seeing what is in front of my eyes? Two and two are four.'
 'Sometimes, Winston. Sometimes they are five. Sometimes they are three. Sometimes they are all of them at once. You must try harder. It is easy to become sane.'
 O'Brien tortures Smith, but still he can't help seeing that two fingers plus two fingers comes to four fingers when O'Brien holds them up in front of him. So far Orwell's novel corresponds to Locke's view of the nature of belief: it cannot be coerced; it can lead people to change what they say about their

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

beliefs, it can't change them directly. But, under intense torture, Winston Smith begins to believe that two plus two might equal five:

"O'Brien help up the fingers of his left hand, with the thumb concealed.

'There are five fingers there. Do you see five fingers?'

'Yes'

And he did see them, for a fleeting instant, before the scenery of his mind changed. He saw five fingers, and there was no deformity. But there had been a moment- he did not know how long, thirty seconds, perhaps- of luminous certainty, when each new suggestion of O'Brien had filled up a patch of emptiness and become absolute truth, and when two and two could have been three as easily as five, if that were what was needed."³⁰²

By the end of the novel Smith really does believe whatever O'Brien wants him to believe but at the price of the victim's mental health. This is perhaps Orwell's point when he has O'Brien say, 'It is not easy to become sane' because in the confused world of 1984 'sane' simply amounts to 'insane'. So, changing a belief such as two fingers plus two fingers amounts to four is only achievable by destroying the mental health of the person who holds that belief. If freedom presupposes the ability to exercise our power of choice and a minimum degree of rationality, autarchy to be a competent choose-maker, by the virtue of the mere fact that Winston Smith is dehumanized and lost his natural competence of choice and of reasoning (when he comes to love Big Brother and believe that two plus two equals five) by the torture of O'Brien, Smith disappears as a relevant agent of freedom. So changing a person's belief by physical coercion may be only possible at the expense of destroying the person as a competent chooser. Is Locke's argument watertight? If we do not add up the premise that magistrates cannot change religious beliefs without destroying the mental health or autarchy of a person as Benn puts, Locke's assumption that coercion cannot ever change or alter beliefs seems be false³⁰³. Now, suppose that Winston

³⁰² Orwell, George (1946), *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Penguin, p. 84.

³⁰³ The philosopher Jeremy Waldron has challenged John Locke's Irrationality Argument. Waldron, by distinguishing between coercion by direct and indirect means, declares that the situation is more

Smith wants to sign a slavery contract with a master and O'Brien is a kind-hearted person who wants to change Smith's mind about his decision to sell her freedom to a master. Does O'Brien have the right to torture Smith to change his mind to sign a slavery contract? As the example shows, we can only change people's beliefs at the expense of destroying their autarchy. So, kind-hearted O'Brien's torture to change Smith's belief to sell himself to master will be self-defeating because while kind-hearted O'Brien wants to prevent Smith not to destroy interpersonal component of freedom, his torture ends up with the destruction of mental dispositional component

complex than Locke has suggested. Waldron agrees that religious beliefs cannot simply be adopted at will under the oppression of coercion. However, since we always adopt our religious beliefs as a result of our experiences, there are other less direct ways through which a state or a magistrate can effect our beliefs, by restricting and directing our experience. Waldron puts his case in the following fashion:

"Suppose there are books and catechisms, gospels and treatises, capable of instructing men in the path of the true religion, if only they will read them. Then although the law cannot compel men coercively to believe this or that because it cannot compel the processes of the understanding, it can at least them to water and compel them to turn their attention in the direction of this material. A man may be compelled to learn a catechism on pain of death or to read the gospels every day to avoid discrimination. The effect of such threats and such discrimination may be to increase the number of people who eventually end up believing the orthodox faith. Since coercion may therefore be applied to religious ends by this indirect means, it can no longer be condemned as in all circumstances irrational." Waldron, Jeremy (1991), "Locke: Toleration and the Rationality of Persecution", *Locke: A Letter Concerning Toleration in Focus*, Routledge, p. 116. In other words, there are indirect ways in which religious beliefs can be altered. Waldron asks us to suppose that there are books, which are capable of altering the beliefs of those who currently believe in the orthodox beliefs. By banning these books, the state or the magistrates can reduce the risk of loss of faith or belief in the orthodoxy.

Waldron claims that by curtailing individual freedom of speech, and freedom to read what you want to read, the population's religious beliefs can be altered.

of freedom. So, we can only try to persuade people by offering good reasons to persuade them not to sell their freedoms.

Conclusion:

Berlin in his essay 'Logical Translation'³⁰⁴ criticizes methodological monism by introducing the myth of Procrustes. The myth of Procrustes goes in the following fashion: "Procrustes used to welcome travellers, feast them and give them a bed for the night. He had only one bed, and if the visitors were too long for it he cut off their legs to make them fit; if they were too short he put them on a rack to lengthen them."³⁰⁵ Berlin criticizes the unfortunate tendency of methodological monism to think like Procrustes: "one must cut off (or stretch) those experiences, those statements, which do not fit one's particular bed of formal or empirical rules."³⁰⁶ But, Berlin is not aware of the fact that he has a Procrustesian bed: negative and positive freedom. He gives a conceptual bed for philosophers and political scientists to analyze the concept of freedom in rest and peace. But, to make the conceptual bed comfortable, he deprives the concepts of their conceptual richness. He introduces two conceptions of freedom, which are made easily distinguishable, by introducing two sets of questions. The Procrustesian bed of Berlin, the two main questions to which rival conceptions of freedom more or less said to be fitted overlooks the deeper level of analysis. He suggests that differing conceptions of freedom agree upon the two core-conceptions of freedom and the two set of questions that are associated with these. But, Berlin's method of distinguishing between different accounts of freedom is oversimplified.

³⁰⁴ Berlin, Isaiah (1978), *Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays* (ed. Hardy, H.), Hogarth Press, pp. 56-80.

³⁰⁵ McLeish, Kenneth (1983), *Children of the Gods; The Complete Myths and Legends of Ancient Greece*, Longman, p. 252.

³⁰⁶ Galipeau (1994), p. 16.

On the other hand, MacCallum claims that there is just one conception of freedom, not two and that single formula of freedom is an open interpretable triadic schematic core-conception of freedom expressing a canonical form (a core mental construction as a formula): X is free from Y to do (or to become) Z. MacCallum introduces an open formulation of freedom rather than introducing two main accounts of freedom with specific contents. In a similar fashion, we have introduced four components of freedom (interpersonal, institutional, mental dispositional, and exercise) from which we can construct a plenty of conceptions of freedom. That move allows that there can be many consistent conceptions of freedom. We have ended up with the existence of a pool of conceptions of freedom as discussed in chapter 3, section E rather simply introducing two main conceptions of freedom. Moreover, such a framework seeks to understand the relations between the various conceptions of freedom through utilizing the components of freedom. But most importantly, it allows us to make a normative comparison between different accounts of freedom and decide which one of them is more comprehensive and fruitful. An account of freedom, which takes more components into account, can better explain the various aspects of freedom. So, our analysis is helpful in specifying a method to formulate a comprehensive account of freedom.

By giving priority to negative freedom, Berlin wants to deny his political opponents from the use of the loaded word 'freedom'. He builds a Maginot Line, a preventive border by the utilization of negative freedom against positive freedom. It is building a border to prevent offenders to hijack the loaded word 'freedom' to label their 'misconceptions' as freedom (counterfeit conception of freedom) and prevent them from supporting the political systems they affiliate themselves with. It is an exercise in politics of language, which deprives political foes of a whole range of

terms (including freedom) by means of an unnatural, mentally constructed conceptual frontier, the conceptual Maginot Line of negative freedom. He builds this Maginot Line/preventive border by asserting that two charges against positive freedom. Firstly, he claims that positive freedom obscures the issue of freedom by assimilating the conditions of freedom such as having a certain amount of money, education, means, and security into the content of freedom. But, we cannot make a distinction between the conditions of freedom and the content of freedom if we hold an exercise-concept of freedom, which suggests that freedom is evaluating our desires and acting on our significant purposes. That view suggests that being free involves realizing our significant purposes. Without the 'conditions of freedom', it is not possible to realize our significant goals and purposes. For example, if a person decides that his most significant purpose is having a university education on philosophy but lacks the money to act on this significant purpose, then that person is not free, according to an exercise-concept of freedom. So, making a sharp distinction between the conditions of freedom and the content of freedom illegitimately excludes the exercise-concept of freedom from the pool of various consistent conceptions of freedom.

Berlin's second charge against positive freedom is that the metaphysical assumptions underlying positive freedom easily leads into the totalitarian conclusion of forcing someone to be free. But, as I have shown in this thesis, a minimalist account of positive freedom, which suggests that freedom involves having some necessary means to be able to actualize our significant purposes, does not lead to such a conclusion. On such an account, an enabling welfare state, which supplies the necessary means and opportunities or the core minimum of freedom such as a certain amount of food and money, is necessary to be positively free. Such a conception of

freedom does not make a move towards the force-to-be-free argument but rather suggests that enablement is a necessary component of freedom. Moreover, a conception of positive freedom, which states that freedom, is not only having the power/ability to realize our significant purposes but also it requires reflecting on our desires and acting on our significant purposes need not lead to force-to-be-free argument since it can be suggested that the agent is the only epistemic authority about his/her significant purposes. Nobody other than the agent can judge which of his desires or purposes are his significant purposes or desires assuming that there is no external criteria such as a universal and objective moral theory about the purposes of the individuals to judge which of the desires or purposes of the agent are most significant for that person or which of his desires are more freedom-contributive. So, if there are no external criteria to prescribe the goals of the agent, we cannot make a move towards the totalitarian conclusion of force-to-be-free. That disables us to suggest that every conception of positive freedom leads to dangerous and totalitarian results.

Some philosophers such as Charles Taylor suggest that it is not the case that we are always and necessarily the best judges of our significant desires and purposes. We can sometimes be mistaken about our significant ends. That suggestion opens a door for forcing someone for the sake of his freedom which Berlin finds paradoxical and dangerous. Following the line of Taylor, if somebody decides to destroy his freedom, it cannot be claimed that his decision to destroy his freedom can be a significant purpose for that person since freedom is the thing, which constitutes our humanity. So, the option for such destruction is not a significant option for the agent. In such cases, there is a room for forcing someone for the sake of his/her freedom

and if we define freedom in terms of non-restriction of our significant options, there is nothing paradoxical about forcing someone not to sell or destroy his/her freedom.

On the contrary, allowing someone to destroy his/her freedom is self-defeating since by destroying your freedom, you relinquish your freedom to satisfy your future desires or your possible desires. If we define freedom as the non-restriction of our significant options and consider the option to relinquish your freedom as a non-significant option, then forcing someone not to destroy his freedom is not paradoxical anymore.

Furthermore, forcing someone not to be unfree is not a totalitarian menace since it is not forcing someone into a situation of bondage but it is forcing that person out of the situation of bondage. It is a move for the sake of freedom rather than for the sake of restricting someone's freedom. But, while it is legitimate to force someone not to be unfree, the force must be limited according to some principles. It is suggested that only when the person whose freedom is at stake attempts to destroy the necessary components of freedom, we can force that person not to do so.

The necessary components of freedom are composed of interpersonal component, institutional component, and mental dispositional component. Interpersonal component is about being free from the obstacles that are created by another person by coercion, threat or manipulation. Signing a slavery agreement with a master is a typical variant of destroying the interpersonal component of freedom, even when the contract is signed voluntarily. Mental dispositional component requires having the necessary mental requirements such as a minimum degree of rationality to be a proper subject of freedom. If someone decides to destroy his/her proper mental capacities by taking a drug, which creates that effect, it is legitimate to prevent that person not to do so. Institutional component of freedom concerns with

the issues such as democracy, minimal protective state and welfare state, which enables us with necessary equipments to take advantage of our options. If we assume democracy as a necessary component of freedom, we cannot let a group of people to vote for a totalitarian party, which declares that they will abolish the elections when they seize the political power. The destruction of these necessary components is the only legitimate grounds for forcing someone on the grounds of his freedom. Unless one's action destroys any of these components, we cannot force person for the sake of his/her freedom. Moreover, it is suggested that we can force people who lacks these necessary components of freedom to make them achieve their freedom. Accordingly, if a person wants to remain in slavery or under manipulation of machine or refuses to gain his capacity for understanding and evaluating his purposes and desires by not taking a drug, that person can be forced, so that he could acquire his freedom. So, we can force a person to do something, which would result in the recovery of his freedom.

Further studies about social freedom could address the question of whether impersonal social and economic forces can restrict personal freedom. While some claim that social structures or market forces can restrict an individual's freedom, others claim that only social agents with identifiable decision making processes can restrict freedom. According to the latter view, the blind operations of market forces do not restrict one's freedom. The libertarians claim that the social forces which are products of transactions between individuals resemble "natural" forces and it is absurd to claim that the effects of market forces are freedom-restricting as analogous to describing the routine effects of laws of nature, such as gravity as freedom-restricting. In Hayek's view since the outcomes (market transactions of individuals) are not intentional and as coercion requires the intentional actions of identifiable

agents, the negative effects of market forces do not restrict one's freedom. On the other hand, as an example, for Marxism, the proletarian is forced to sell his labour power because of the exploitative relations of production. This issue is a matter of dispute between clashing conceptions of freedom, which is left undisputed.

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