

**The Problem of ‘Understanding’ in Martin Heidegger’s *Being and Time***

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**by**

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## ABSTRACT

### **The Problem of Understanding in Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time***

by

**Neren Alpar**

This thesis examines understanding as a fundamental existentials in Heidegger's *Being and Time*, and its grounding position to all activities of cognizing. The ultimate goal of the thesis is to reveal the metaphysical basis on which Heidegger constructs his claim that *logos* is existentially grounded in understanding.

The thesis begins with a presentation of Heidegger's approach to the phenomenon of understanding via analysing his interpretation of human being as Being-there (*Dasein*) and certain key concepts such as "existence" and "world". Next, how *Dasein* understands its world in everydayness and the existential structure of Being-in as disclosed in the phenomenon of worldhood is analysed. The structure of involvement, uncovered in this analysis, is then used to show the existential hermeneutical character of understanding as "thrown projection".

The inner structure of the hermeneutical character of understanding is analysed, in order to show how "*logos* as assertion" is grounded in understanding existentially, and that there is an "as-structure" in interpretation which recurs in assertion in a modified way.

Then, “*logos* as assertion” is contrasted with “*logos* as talk” to bring forth the inadequacy of assertion in expressing existential understanding.

The thesis concludes by showing that ‘possibility’ comes before ‘actuality’, on the basis of the analysis that *Dasein* existentially understands its Being by throwing itself toward possibilities and finding itself thrown into possibilities. Finally, it is suggested that the hidden “as” in the *copula* hides away possibilities as possibilities and it reminds us of our incompleteness as constantly coming towards our Being.

## ÖZET

Heidegger, *Varlık ve Zaman*'da, her türlü anlamının *varlığı anlamada* temellendiğini ve *logos*'un zeminini de bu 'temel anlama'nın oluşturduğunu öne sürer. Bu tezin amacı Heidegger'in bu iddiasının metafiziksel altyapısını araştırmak ve 'temel anlama'nın nasıl bir zemin oluşturduğunu açığa çıkartmaktır.

Öncelikle Heidegger'in insan kavramını orada-varlık (*Dasein*) olarak yorumlaması ve kendini dünyada anlayan bu varlığın üzerinden anlama fenomenine yaklaşımı ve bununla birlikte varoluş, dünya gibi kavramların nasıl ele alındığı tanıtılmaktadır.

Daha sonra, varlığı anlamının orada-varlığın dünyadallığını anlaması yoluyla gerçekleştiği savıyla, Heidegger'in dünya fenomenini orada-varlık açısından analizi ve bu analizin sonuçlarından anlamının temel döngüsel yapısına – kendini olasılıklara fırlatılmış ve olasılıklara fırlatan olarak anlama- varması ortaya çıkarılmaktadır. Bu tespitten sonra, anlamının döngüsel karakteri daha yakından incelenerek anlamının ön-yapısı ile yorumun, bu ön anlamaya dayanarak, 'bir şeyi bir şey *olarak*' seçmesi dünya analizi ile ilişkilendirilerek incelenmektedir. "Olarak" yapısının ("as-structure"), önermede de tekrarlanması analiz edilmekte ve böylece "*logos* olarak önerme"nin anlamada temellendiği gösterilmektedir.

Bu analizlerin sonucunda iki önemli nokta tespit edilmiştir. Birincisi, 'olasılığın' ontolojik olarak olandan daha önce geldiği ortaya çıkmıştır ve bu durum geleneksel

ontolojik yaklaşıma radikal bir deęişiklik sunmaktadır. ‘Olasılık’, olan’dan daha öncelikli bir yere oturmaktadır. Diğer sonuç ise Heidegger’in anlama ve yorum analizinde ortaya çıkan ve önermede deęişime uğramakla birlikte gizli bir şekilde bulunan ‘olarak’ yapısının tespiti orada-varlığın tamamlanmamışlığının ve daima varlığına doğru ilerleme halinde oluşunun formel bir kanıtı olarak saptanmıştır.

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## INTRODUCTION

In *Being and Time*, Martin Heidegger claims that *logos* is existentially grounded in understanding. How are we to understand and interpret this claim, in the broader framework of Heidegger's metaphysics? What is the nature of the relation between understanding and Being? And what is the basis of Heidegger's view about the relation between *logos* and understanding? These are the main questions I pursue in this thesis.

That *logos* is existentially grounded in understanding is one of the central claims in *Being and Time*. *Dasein* –which concerns each of us- is an entity who understands its own Being. Everything *Dasein* does is with understanding and the motivation towards any activity is provided by *Dasein*'s unique understanding of its Being.

In fact, understanding for Heidegger is always understanding of Being. And how *Dasein* understands its Being in the world comes before any theoretical assertion. Because of the centrality of this claim, I begin the thesis with its elaboration. In what follows, I will be also using the expression understanding as referring to 'understanding of Being'.

In this study, I follow Heidegger in using a hermeneutical approach to the phenomenon of understanding of Being, rather than trying to present a theory of understanding. As such, the explication of the phenomenological-hermeneutical method appears as an essential part of my exposition.

Heidegger starts from the basic, the most obvious way *Dasein* is in relation to its Being in everydayness and searches for the hidden structure of existence - as “thrown projection”- that is disclosed in understanding. The whole analytic of *Dasein* is guided by the aim of uncovering this disclosure. This is important because if it can be shown, then understanding as a mode of *Dasein's* Being will turn up as the foundation for all forms of cognizing. In order to bring forth the foundation we must take into consideration that thrownness is the facticity of *Dasein*.

“Thrownness” [*Geworfenheit*] is how *Dasein* finds itself in the world and “projection” [*Entwurf*] is its existentiality, its Being towards possibilities. “Projection” is the dominating principle of understanding as a thrust forward, towards the future.

“Thrownness” and “projection” are at the background and find their expression in everydayness. In this context, my goal is to show how Heidegger proceeds his analysis to uncover this basic existential structure as disclosed in understanding. Following this thread, the thesis eventually returns, in the end, to the question of *logos*, since according to Heidegger's claim *logos* is existentially grounded in understanding.

This thesis consists of five chapters, in addition to an Introduction and a Conclusion. In the rest of this Introduction, I give an outline of the thesis by presenting synopses of each of the chapters.

The first chapter is involved with the exposition of *Dasein's* special status as an entity to be interrogated for the inquiry into the meaning of Being. The conceptions of ‘ontology’,

‘existence’, and ‘world’ are interpreted in a special way by Heidegger. So the chapter opens with an explication of these fundamental notions as used by Heidegger in *Being and Time*.

Heidegger develops a hybrid method to interpret *Dasein's* meaning of Being. The issue is not to produce a theory of understanding but a hermeneutical approach to the phenomenon of understanding of Being. Thus, the explication of the phenomenological-hermeneutical method is presented, followed by an exposition of the phenomenon of *logos* as analysed by Heidegger. In this context, Heidegger's hermeneutics is introduced briefly in contrast to not only a pure theory but also with the hermeneutical tradition. In fact, existential analytic of *Dasein* is the fundamental ontology and *Dasein's* understanding is existentially hermeneutical. As such, a preliminary sketch of the scope of Heidegger's related work is also outlined in this expository chapter.

The main idea of hermeneutics is that interpretation is always with presuppositions and this brings together with itself a hermeneutical circularity between presuppositions and interpretation. The important issue is to be aware of one's own presuppositions while interpreting, as well as using them in a productive way and making them thematically transparent. Heidegger interprets the meaning of *Dasein's* Being as care [*Sorge*]. This comes up clearly in the second division of *Being and Time* but the whole inquiry is done under the guidance of this preliminary view. Care has the double structure – “thrownness” and “projection”- and it is disclosed in understanding. *Dasein's* existentiality lies in its understanding of its Being as “thrown projection”. This is the

background idea that guides Heidegger's inquiry into *Dasein's* understanding of Being, and hints of this idea lie in Heidegger's treatment of how "Being" and time are connected and his view that *Dasein* temporalizes rather than it is in time.

The nature of the unique difficulty of the project is brought into focus in the second chapter. The problem is that the structure of thrownness and projection is not something *Dasein* is aware of; it is not explicitly known by *Dasein*. The issue, therefore, is how to make it explicit. Existential analytic of *Dasein* starts from the basic, the most obvious way *Dasein* is in relation to its Being in everydayness, and searches for the hidden structure of existence -as thrown projection- which is disclosed in understanding. The existential analytic of *Dasein* is guided by the aim of uncovering this disclosure.

In this context, the second chapter is dedicated to the exposition of the two items "Being-in" and "world"- of "Being-in-the-world". First it deals with how *Dasein* understands its world in its average everydayness and "worldhood" of the world as discovered by *Dasein*. Heidegger searches for the primordial structures of "existence" and the question is about what the most primordial way it is that *Dasein* encounters entities in its environment. The exposition of "readiness-to-hand" as the Being of entities primordially encountered in environment is the phenomenon by which Heidegger reaches the existential structure of everydayness as disclosed in understanding.

The analysis of "readiness-to-hand" prepares the way to an understanding of *Dasein's* spatiality as an existential spatiality and that "Being-in" is to be understood in terms of

temporality. The second part of the chapter therefore lays out the issue of temporality as being foundational for the Being of the “there”.

The third chapter is interested in explicating the existential ground of hermeneutical character of understanding as based on the two structures – “significance” and “for-the-sake-of-which” - extracted from the structure of involvement in analysis of world in chapter two. I want to show how these structures embody the hermeneutical character of understanding.

In the context of the discussion in the third chapter, the exposition of “readiness-to-hand” leading to the structure of involvement (which was presented in the previous chapter) becomes important in terms of what has been extracted from this structure. As a related issue, “significance” and “for-the-sake-of-which” structure that comes out of the analysis of the “involvement” is explored in chapter three in terms of their significance how they lead to the character of understanding as projection. The backward and forward movement of understanding is to be shown in the double structure of thrownness and projection.

Furthermore the equiprimordial existential disclosure of state-of-mind [*Befindlichkeit*] is explored. The pursuit of this chapter is thus to bring to the fore the implicit existential structure of understanding and state-of-mind as “thrown projection” and the hermeneutical circularity taking place within the structure of projection. However, while *Dasein's* understanding of its Being is as such disclosed, the pursuit here is not yet



complete since my ultimate goal is to reveal the basis of why Heidegger claims that *logos* is grounded existentially in understanding. This will be pursued in the fourth chapter and as such is concerned with the inner structure of understanding and interpretation and to explore the structure of assertion in relation to them.

For the purpose of chapter four, the analysis related to “readiness-to-hand” in chapter two serves this time to uncover the existential roots of interpretation. The phenomenal description of *Dasein*'s primordial encounter with entities circumspectively is used to show how Heidegger carves out the “fore-structure” of understanding and “as-structure” of interpretation. Chapter three serves to supply the basis for the existential ground of hermeneutical character of understanding by showing the character of understanding as projection upon possibilities as significance and possibilities of *Dasein*'s own Being and the interconnection between them. Hermeneutical circle already takes place at such an existential level. With this background the closer look into the structure of understanding and interpretation is carried out in chapter four.

The analysis of interpretation takes place in the fourth chapter and Heidegger's discovery of “as-structure” of interpretation is explicated in relation to the “fore-structure” of understanding. The basis of these structures are tied to the exposition in chapter three. Understanding is existentially interpretative (hermeneutical) but the interpretation is grounded on understanding. The next issue is to give the analysis of assertion as a mode of interpretation in order to show that assertion is also grounded on understanding. The modification of the “as-structure” of interpretation – “*hermeneutical* ‘as’”- in the

structure of the 'as' of assertion – "*apophantical* 'as'" - is elaborated. The consequences of this modification in terms of how we interpret 'meaning' is discussed.

This discussion ties into the return of the question of *logos* in the final chapter. The discovery of the concealed 'as' structure is the central issue for the purposes of the discussion on *logos* as assertion in the fifth chapter. The two axes of analysing understanding in chapters three and four come together in the discussion of discourse in chapter five; the elaboration of "state-of-mind" (moods) in its equiprimordial structure to disclose the existential understanding of "Being-there" is the first point and the modification of "as-structure" from "*hermeneutical* 'as'" to "*apophantical* 'as'" of assertion to situate the "*logos* as assertion" in terms of its competence in expressing the disclosure of existential understanding is discussed.

The discussion is done further by showing the "(*logos*) discourse as assertion" in its contrast with "(*logos*) discourse as talk [*Rede*]" in order to show how each expresses what is disclosed in understanding. Chapter four is concerned in showing how "*logos* as assertion" is grounded in understanding and in what sense it is in connection with understanding. "*Logos* as talk" is to be shown in its relation to understanding, existentially, and how it functions in articulation of understanding. The comparison between "*logos* as assertion" and "*logos* as talk" in their difference in expressing understanding is brought to discussion and the discussion further goes into the inadequacy of assertion in expressing the existential understanding and the position of the logic of *logos* which is based on 'assertion'.

The thesis ends with a Conclusion chapter, where a broader project that the present study was part of is sketched, and directions for related discussions that remained outside the scope of this thesis for future research are proposed.

## CHAPTER ONE

### *DASEIN*

#### **I.1. What is Designated by the Term *Dasein*?**

Heidegger gives the two main characteristics of *Dasein* as;

- (i) *Dasein's* Being is an issue for itself
- (ii) *Dasein's* essence lies in its existence

These two statements are the keys for us to understand the peculiar situation of the entity, *Dasein*, and its being a source for “fundamental ontology” and thus supply a good place to enter *Being and Time*. The problem of understanding is already hidden in these characteristics and it will be the pursuit of this thesis to open them up specifically focusing on understanding. For the time being, I want to show how Heidegger sees at the beginning of the inquiry into Being these two characteristics.

(i) *Dasein's Being is an issue for itself,*

(1) *Dasein* as ‘the inquirer’ into Being: The inquiry into Being asks “what is the meaning of Being?”; the very fact of asking this question shows that one has somehow an understanding of “Being”. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes

inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, is denoted by the term "*Dasein*". The inquirer itself is to be questioned in order to make its understanding of Being become transparent in its own Being.

(2) *Dasein* in 'everydayness': In everydayness we always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being; "*Dasein* is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. It is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being its Being is an issue for it." <sup>1</sup>

Heidegger's diagnosis is that at both levels *Dasein* has a vague understanding of *Being*. In inquiring ; Heidegger traces backward the question of Being till Parmenides and studies in depth how Parmenides brings together thinking and Being <sup>2</sup> ; with the inquiry in *Being and Time* Heidegger searches toward a new start of Western Metaphysics by connecting in a deeper way to how the question of the Being had been treated at the beginning in ancient Greek. Starting with Aristotle, the inquiry into Being is left in the dark due to presuppositions such as ; Being is the most universal concept, because it is indefinable, because it is self-evident. All these presuppositions were handed over in the tradition so the question of Being has become concealed in such a way that Heidegger has to give pages of justification of why it needs to be revived and deals with revising traditional ontology taking the meaning of Being as the central issue.

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<sup>1</sup> *Being and Time*, p.32

<sup>2</sup> *An Introduction to Western Metaphysics*, p.138-147

In everydayness ; we always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being but we do not know what "Being" means. It is taken for granted. Everyone understands "the sky is blue" but what *is* signifies is not to be pondered on in everydayness. Furthermore, this vague understanding is *Dasein* in its averageness, "in understanding its own Being, it has a tendency to do so in terms of that entity towards which it comports itself proximally and for the most part- in terms of the 'world'." <sup>3</sup>

These two points come together in *Dasein*'s historicity; *Dasein* not only understands its Being in terms of the world but also falls prey to the tradition which keeps it from providing its own guidance, whether in inquiring or in choosing. This hindrance works at both levels; (i) for that understanding which is rooted in *Dasein*'s understanding the 'world' and (ii) for the possibility of developing it [for *ontological understanding*].

"Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial 'sources' from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn. Indeed it makes us forget that they have had such an origin, and makes us suppose that the necessity of going back to these sources is something which we need not even understand." <sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> *Being and Time*, p.36

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, p.43

Heidegger searches at both levels to understand how *Dasein* understands its Being and what gets passed over. *Being* is not a conceptual product of mind nor is it an entity; but rather it is the ground what makes possible the entities to be, then it needs a special treatment to have an access to it. The best way to have an access is to inquire that entity - *Dasein*- who has an understanding of Being. Heidegger develops his method in order to do the inquiry from within. The method and the content of the inquiry is interwoven so it will be discussed in section (1.4) to highlight the peculiar condition of *Dasein* in its relation to the question of Being and the special treatment of the method needed to lay out the difficulties originating from the nature of the inquiry.

(ii) *Dasein's essence lies in its existence [Existenz];*

Heidegger defines existence [Existenz] as "that kind of Being towards which *Dasein* can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow".<sup>5</sup>

*Dasein's* essence is not a "what" but rather its essence lies in the fact that in each case "it has its Being to be" and "has it as its own". It is due to this essential characteristic that the term "*Dasein*" is ascribed to this entity as a pure expression of its Being.

The comportment towards its Being signifies the incompleteness of *Dasein*, it constantly comes toward itself and does so with an understanding of its own Being but this understanding is primodially in terms of its world and thus is infiltrated by traditional

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<sup>5</sup> *Being and Time*, p.32

opinions. The first characteristic is together with the second one. While comporting itself toward its Being [existence], its Being is always an issue for itself and because its Being is issue for itself that it can comport itself towards its existence.

## I.2. The Ontological Inquiry:

The ontological inquiry does not arrive at what is ontically obvious for common sense but rather it aims to show how questionable everything obvious is.

At the very outset, we need to be clear about what Heidegger means by 'ontology'.

*Dasein* is the source for doing ontological inquiry. Ontology is the Interpretation of *Dasein's* understanding of Being. This is "fundamental ontology" for Heidegger. The scope of fundamental ontology is to make the entity (*Dasein*), that has an understanding of Being and inquires into the Being of entities, transparent to its own understanding. The aim is to exhibit this understanding in its own right and show the hindrances and obscurities standing on the way to the transparenence of *Dasein's* understanding of its own Being.

When we recognize *Dasein* as the source for ontological inquiry, the issue of *ontological difference* among Being and entities (beings) comes up<sup>6</sup>. Ontological difference is not to be understood as a logical difference which would imply a rigid separation or distinction

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<sup>6</sup> *Plato's Sophist*, see p.315-318 for "fundamental unclarities" between Being and beings



between Being and entities. Rather ontological difference holds Being and entities together as well as recognizing the different status of Being. *Dasein* holds together ontical and ontological; *Dasein* is an entity (ontical) and at the same time it has an understanding of Being (it is ontological). At this point, it will be useful to revise how Heidegger sets the priority of *Dasein* for fundamental ontology.

### **I.2.1. The Priority of *Dasein* for Ontological Inquiry**

*Ontical priority:* “*Dasein* is an entity whose Being has the determinate character of existence.”<sup>7</sup> *Dasein* is ontically prior to other entities because it is ontological; that means because *Dasein* has an average understanding of its own Being.

*Ontological priority:* *Dasein* is in itself ontological because it always understands itself in terms of its Being [existence].

*Ontico-ontological priority :* *Dasein* is the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of any ontologies because it has an understanding of the Being of all other entities as constitutive for its understanding of existence.

Although for convenience *Dasein* is designated as ontological, Heidegger warns us that if we reserve the term ontological for the specific inquiry "explicitly" devoted to the

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<sup>7</sup> *Being and Time*, p.34

meaning of Being, then *Dasein's* "Being-ontological" is to be designated as something "pre-ontological".<sup>8</sup> Pre-ontological then means "being in such a way that one has an understanding of Being" but this understanding is not interpreted explicitly or in other words its is not yet thematically transparent.

Heidegger's aim in doing fundamental ontology is to interpret *Dasein's* pre-ontological understanding and thus make it thematically transparent. Now the issue is to get to know what the expression "existence" means in this context so that we get the preliminary view to what it would possibly mean to say, *Dasein* understands itself in terms of its *existence*.

### I.3. Existence

We shouldn't confuse existence [Existenz], which Heidegger uses to designate *Dasein's* Being with the traditional term "existentia"; instead "existentia" is to be seen as proper to entities other than the character of *Dasein*. To avoid confusion, Heidegger uses *present-at-hand* instead of existentia to designate entities with the character other than *Dasein*.

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<sup>8</sup> *Being and Time*, p.32

Existence is *Dasein's* kind of Being; that kind of Being towards which it comports itself. "*Dasein* always understands itself in terms of its existence- in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself. *Dasein* decides existence either by taking hold or by neglecting."<sup>9</sup> The question of existence can be understood through existing itself, the particular *Dasein* understands somehow its existence- this understanding is what Heidegger calls *existentiell*.

We said that *Dasein* understands itself in terms of its existence. The issue is how to get to the ontological structure of existence; how *Dasein* understands its existence is to be made transparent. The context of structures that constitutes existence is called "*existentiality*" and the analytic of existentiality has the character of an understanding that is *existential*, not *existentiell*. Existential analytic is based on *Dasein's* ontical constitution. "Roots of the existential analytic, are ultimately, *existentiell*, that is ontical."<sup>10</sup>

*Existence* as such is devoted to *Dasein* as its kind of Being and the characteristics of *Dasein's* Being is designated accordingly by the expression *existentiale* whereas entities other than *Dasein* are studied in *categories*; i.e understanding is an *existentiale* whereas heaviness is a category.

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<sup>9</sup> *Being and Time*, p.33

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.* p. 33

### I.3.1. The Existential Analytic of *Dasein*

The issue is not to provide a theory of human nature but to understand how human Being in its averageness takes up its existence (how it interprets itself) and explicate this phenomenologically. The task is the exhibition of the ontological structure of everydayness (ontical dealings) and interpret the meaning of Being in general. "Existential analytic" takes as its theme *Dasein* in its undifferentiated averageness in everyday life and searches for the underlying phenomena - existential characteristics of *Dasein*- that makes everydayness possible.

"This average everydayness makes up what is ontically proximal for this entity, it has again and again been *passed over* in explicating *Dasein*. That which is ontically closest and well-known, is ontologically farthest and not known at all; and its ontological signification is constantly overlooked."<sup>11</sup>

To bring out the ontological structure of existence requires a special treatment. The hermeneutical-phenomenological method developed by Heidegger will be discussed in section (1.4) . It is in everydayness -ontical dealings that *Dasein* is concerned with everyday- that the ontological structure is hidden because *Dasein* comports itself towards the world with an understanding (of Being). Yet this understanding is an average understanding and it is not transparent to *Dasein* thematically.

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<sup>11</sup> *Being and Time*, p.69

Heidegger's project is to make this average understanding of Being (that *Dasein* has) transparent to itself by bringing the question of Being as a theme. But what does it mean to have an average understanding of Being (what Heidegger calls *Dasein's* pre-ontological understanding)? Ontology, for Heidegger, is the phenomenological Interpretation of *Dasein's* understanding of Being.

In the light of fundamental ontology then, four main types of understanding emerges;

(i) the first one is what Heidegger names *pre-ontological understanding*;

"..we always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being" <sup>12</sup>

*Dasein's* ontical structure is such that it has a pre-ontological understanding of Being.

(ii) *existentiell*: particular *Dasein's* understanding of its Being through existing itself

("existence - that kind of Being towards which *Dasein* can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow"). <sup>13</sup>

(iii) *theoretical understanding* namely traditional ontology; entities treated as objects for knowing the 'world' theoretically. <sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> *Being and Time*, p.25.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, p.32.

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*, p.95.

(iv) *ontological understanding*- thematical understanding of Being / existential analytic of *Dasein* aiming to make ontological structure of existence thematically transparent.<sup>15</sup>

#### **I.4. Hermeneutical - Phenomenological Method**

Heidegger develops a hybrid method. Both phenomenology and hermeneutics gains a special interpretation in Heidegger's approach. I will revise the structure of the method in the following way:

##### **I. preliminary conception of phenomenology**

- (1) analysis of phenomenon
- (2) distinction between formal and ordinary conception of phenomenon
- (3) analysis of *logos*

##### **II. ordinary conception of phenomena**

##### **III. hermeneutics**

#### **I.4.1. Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology**

Heidegger brings together the primordial senses of phenomenon ['showing itself in itself'] and *logos* ['letting something be seen from itself'] to define his method phenomenology as

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<sup>15</sup> See p.31 in *Being and Time*.

such; *letting something that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself*.<sup>16</sup> This is the formal meaning of Heidegger's interpretation of phenomenology. The structure of 'phenomenon' and the analysis of 'logos' is explicated in order to show how the method is received.

#### **L4.1.1. The Structure of 'Phenomenon'**

The formal conception of phenomena in Heidegger's sense can be understood by his interpretation of 'phenomenon' as an interconnected structure.

(i) *Phenomenon* is defined as "that which shows itself". Heidegger analyses the Greek term *phainomena* and concludes that it means that which shows itself; that which makes itself manifest. Phenomenon, put simply, is a kind of showing.

Heidegger points out that *phainestai* comes from the root *phaino* which means "to bring to the light of the day", and further traces *phaino* towards its stem *pha* (like *phos*) the light - "that which is bright, that wherein something can become manifest, visible in itself"<sup>17</sup> With this etymological tracing the conclusion is that '*phenomenon*' signifies *that which shows itself in itself*.

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<sup>16</sup> See p. 58 in *Being and Time*.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p.51.

(ii) *Seeming* [*Scheinen*] : seeming is one way - a privative way - that phenomenon shows itself as what it is not; this showing itself in a privative manner is designated as seeming or semblance by Heidegger. The structure of 'seeming' is grounded in the structure of the 'phenomenon'. "Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes a pretension of showing itself - that is of being a phenomenon- *can* it show itself *as* something which it is *not* " only then *can* it 'merely look like so-and-so'." <sup>18</sup> For example, a stick in the water seems crooked; the seeming of the crooked stick is structurally connected to the straight stick.

(iii.) *Appearance* [*Erscheinung*] : Appearance includes two elements; something announces something else, the appearance of something announces something else. There is a dual structure of *showing* in appearance.

How is appearance related to phenomenon? Appearance and phenomenon are sharply distinguished but also there is a sense in which they coincide. The formal inquiry related to the intricate relation between appearance and pheomenon will be useful to understand the relation between ontical and ontological levels and to what extent Heidegger's existential analytic of the ontical, point to the ontological structure, i.e world and worldhood of the world.

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<sup>18</sup> *Being and Time*, p.51



In the structure of appearance first the distinction between appearance and phenomenon is brought forth and then the complex structure of how appearance and phenomenon coincide to *show* is detected.

The distinction between showing and announcing is brought forth; the appearance of something does not show itself but indicate something which does not show itself, Heidegger gives the example of symptoms of a disease and the disease, the symptoms which appear announces the disease, x does not show x in appearance, but rather x announces y.

- (1) a symptom of disease y shows itself and as such announces a disease x; thus, in or through, x announces itself without showing itself
- (a) y's showing itself
- (b) x's announcing itself in and through y

Heidegger first states that (1b) is the proper sense of appearance and (1a) corresponds to the primordial sense of 'phenomenon': taken strictly appearing is not-showing itself and phenomenon is showing itself<sup>19</sup> but the later discussion on p.51 makes it clear that he takes (1) as corresponding to 'phenomenon' more accurately; appearance has a dual structure of showing, and this complex structure of showing connects it to the primordial sense of phenomenon.

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<sup>19</sup> See p.53 in *Being and Time*.

#### (iv) *Mere Appearance*

Mere appearance signifies ; that which does the announcing indicates something non-manifest and the non-manifest is essentially thought of never manifest. This is the Kantian sense of appearance, (Heidegger calls this mere appearance) according to which; that which does the announcing shows itself as an emanation of what it announces in such a way that it keeps this very thing constantly veiled in itself. Appearances according to Kant are objects of empirical intuition, they are what shows itself in such intuition. What shows itself (phenomenon) is at the same time an appearance as an emanation of something which hides itself in that appearance- an emanation which announces. Mere appearance is phenomena and the non-manifest is noumena in Kant's system.

#### **I.4.1.2. The Distinction between Formal and Ordinary Conception of Phenomenon**

The exhibition of different senses of 'phenomenon' brings forth the 'phenomena' of phenomenology that Heidegger is after, with the background of tradition in view.

The distinction between Heidegger's formal conception and the ordinary conception of phenomenon is drawn as such:

- (i) *Formal conception of phenomenon*: Phenomenon is that which shows itself in (from) itself. It leaves open whether what shows itself is an entity or rather some characteristic
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which an entity may have in its Being. In this conception, "*Phenomenon*" (showing itself in itself) signifies a distinctive way in which something can be encountered. "*Apearance*", means a reference-relationship which is an entity itself, and which is such that what *does the referring* (or the announcing) can fulfill its possible function only if it shows itself in itself and is thus a 'phenomenon'.

(ii) *Ordinary conception of phenomenon* : Phenomena as 'objects of our intuitions', that which we perceive, these are mere appearances as we ordinarily understand them. The phenomena as ordinarily conceived are not phenomena of phenomenology. Instead it is what accompanies all appearances in a non-thematic way. The phenomena in the phenomenological sense do not simply show themselves. They are unthematical and need to be brought to a direct self-showing, this is what Heidegger mentions as thematical transference. The phenomenon of phenomenology is the Being of beings.

"If the phenomenological conception of phenomenon is to be understood at all, regardless of how much closer we may come to determining the nature of that which shows itself, this presupposes inevitably that we must have an insight into the meaning of the formal conception of phenomenon and its legitimate employment in an ordinary signification."<sup>20</sup>

If we sum up what Heidegger pursues as phenomena of phenomenology it is to let the phenomena show itself in its unthematical state and articulate them or let them be seen thematically. *Logos* is what supplies the manifestation of understanding and Heidegger

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<sup>20</sup> *Being and Time*, p.55.

leads a discussion on the senses of *logos* in order to reach the full sense of what he means by phenomenological investigation.

#### **L4.1.3. The Analysis of 'Logos'**

Heidegger discusses four senses of *logos*:

(i) *Logos* is *Rede* (the basic sense of *logos*) : *Rede* (discourse) as making manifest what one is talking about; Heidegger anchors in Aristotle's explication of the function of discourse as *apophainestai* -as "letting something be seen"- and analyses other senses of *logos* departing from this point. *Logos*, according to Heidegger, in its primary sense is letting what is talked about be seen from the subject matter talked about.

(ii) *Logos* as Language (*Sprache*) : the fully concrete form of discoursing (letting something be seen) Heidegger states that language is *Rede* which is brought to voice; he argues that talk is more primordial than language talk includes non-verbal communication (silence and speech acts are structural items of talk and as such it is seen more primordial than language).

(iii) *Logos* as synthesis : "letting something be seen in its togetherness"<sup>21</sup>

(1) Synthesis is not in the sense of binding and linking together of representations.

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<sup>21</sup> *Being and Time*, p.56.

(2) Synthesis is to be seen in the *apophantical* sense of letting something be seen in its togetherness with something else.

(iv) *Logos* as Being-true or Being-false (discovering or covering up)

Because *logos* is letting something be seen it can therefore be true or false. Heidegger discusses the truth in its original sense *aletheia* and the conception of truth construed in the sense of agreement. “*Logos as alethein*” means that in “*legein as apophainestai*” the entities *of which* one is talking must be taken out of their hiddenness; one must let them be seen as unhidden. Accordingly Being-false is in the sense of covering up. But it supplies us with the understanding of what is covered up. For example the analysis of assertion which will take place in the fourth chapter will be discussed in this framework. Because *logos* has the double nature of both uncovering and covering up it cannot be the locus of truth. Heidegger's Interpretation of *logos* is '*apophantical* discourse' as the primary function of *logos*. In chapter five, “*logos as talk*” and “*logos as assertion*” will be discussed in their contrast in terms of what they show and what is hidden in their different kinds of showing.

#### **I.4.2. Ordinary Conception of 'Phenomenon'**

Phenomenology has to take into consideration ordinary conception of phenomenon:

Heidegger points out the relevance of ordinary conception of phenomenon to the preliminary formal meaning of phenomenology. Existential analytic of *Dasein* takes its

phenomenal departure from the ordinary conception of phenomena to uncover the underlying existential themes to show themselves in what is manifested.

**I.4.3. Hermeneutics** is necessary in order to move between the formal and ordinary conception of phenomenon. Thus the next step is explicating the third item of the structure of the method ; *hermeneutics*.

"In explaining the tasks of ontology we found it necessary that there should be a fundamental ontology taking as its theme that entity which is ontologico-ontically distinctive, *Dasein*, in order to confront the cardinal problem - the question of the meaning of Being in general. Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in *interpretation*. The *logos* of the phenomenology of *Dasein* has the character of a hermeneuin, through which the authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic structures of Being which *Dasein* itself possesses, are *made known* to *Dasein's* understanding of Being."<sup>22</sup>

#### **I.4.3.1. Background**

Hermeneutics is rooted in Greek (*hermeneutikos*) meaning interpretation and it comes from the name of the messenger God *Hermes*. Historically, the art of interpretation, has been oriented toward ancient texts, exegesis. F.D.E. Schleiermacher sytematized

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<sup>22</sup> *Being and Time*, p.61-62.

hermeneutics as a discipline; the art of understanding primarily of written texts. So with Schleiermacher it became a study of interpretation, a methodology. Modern hermeneutics with Wilhelm Dilthey was oriented towards the interpretation of the products of past societies and thus Dilthey expanded Schleiermacher's method towards human life; an interpretative but theoretical inquiry into understanding human culture, a methodology for social sciences.

#### **I.4.3.2. Existential Hermeneutics**

**Heidegger** uses hermeneutics as the necessary approach for interpreting *existence* and although he bases his assumptions on interpretation in the hermeneutical tradition his approach is radically different, such that, he doesn't see hermeneutics as a separate activity from one's Being and his aim is to show that understanding is interpretative existentially. In these lines, then, Heidegger is critical of Dilthey for example due to the treatment of hermeneutics as a theoretical inquiry about human Beings, human culture.

It has been established in hermeneutical tradition that every interpretation is done by presuppositions and that there is a constant move between presuppositions of the interpreter and his interpretation. This is the circularity of interpretative understanding and it is used in a productive way. Textual interpretation is developed scientifically on this basis by Schleiermacher and it is developed and applied by Dilthey as a method for social sciences. Dilthey showed the importance of this method for social sciences and

therefore supplied a methodological basis and legitimized the status of social sciences at a time when only natural sciences were accepted as science.<sup>23</sup>

Heidegger's hermeneutics is not theoretical but -that he aims so- existential. Because Heidegger wants to understand *Dasein's* "understanding of being". *Dasein's* understanding of Being is seen as an access to the meaning of Being in general.

Heidegger's view is that the inherent structure of *Dasein's* understanding is hermeneutical therefore the interpretation of *Dasein's* understanding can only be done hermeneutically.

*Dasein* understands its Being in terms of its existence and the structure of existence requires to be understood from within.

Heidegger's phenomenology does not concern the mind or consciousness and interprets the 'phenomenological call' to 'facts themselves' in a hermeneutical and existential sense. Thus Heidegger follows Edmund Husserl's phenomenology by sharing the search *Zu den Sachen Selbst* (to the facts themselves) but departs away from Husserl in terms of the notion of the facts to be discovered; for Heidegger these facts are not facts of mind but rather it is the factuality of existence which indicates a search for Being. Heidegger merges the two basic methods (phenomenology and hermeneutics) and synthesizes a hybrid method of his own which can be called a "hermeneutical phenomenology".

Gadamer also calls Heidegger's hybrid method "hermeneutical phenomenology" and he situates Heidegger's treatment of understanding in contrast to Husserl's eidetic approach

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<sup>23</sup> see Gadamer, *Truth and Method* p.230-251 for further discussion on Dilthey.



in his phenomenological method and Dilthey's hermeneutical methodology of human sciences;

“Understanding is not a resigned ideal of human experience adopted in the old age of the spirit, as with Dilthey; nor is it, as with Husserl, a last methodological ideal of philosophy over against the naiveté of unreflecting life; it is on the contrary, the original form of the realisation of There-being, which is being-in-the-world. Before any differentiation of understanding into the different directions of pragmatic or theoretical interest, understanding is There-being's mode of being, in that it is potentiality-for-being and ‘possibility’.”<sup>24</sup>

According to Heidegger, understanding has the possibility of developing itself. This development is in the sense of becoming explicit in itself - this is interpretation. His aim is to Interpret *Dasein's* understanding of its Being in general. *Dasein's* understanding of Being is pre-ontological, not yet transparent ontologically. In fact *Dasein* not only understands its Being but also interprets its Being. The interpretation is what shows what is understood, explicitly in *Dasein's* everydayness. This is a “circumspective interpretation” and it is not yet transparent to *Dasein* itself because it is pre-predicative but what Heidegger attempts to uncover through by using his original method. Heidegger brings to the fore the circumspective interpretation thematically. *Dasein's* circumspective interpretation in everydayness is pursued towards what makes interpretation possible, what lies implicitly in *Dasein's* understanding.

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<sup>24</sup> Gadamer, H.G., *Truth and Method*, p.230.

Interpretation is used in a broad sense by Heidegger and the argument is that all understanding is inherently interpretative and interpretation is grounded in the existential structure of *Dasein's* understanding. The phenomenon of understanding of Being is interpreted from within, it is to be shown in itself and from itself and the method is already hermenutical due to the nature of the inquiry. The circularity already takes place in Heidegger's Interpretation of *Dasein's* interpretation of its Being. The method as such is interwoven with the phenomenon to be uncovered. *Auslegung* and *Interpretieren* are both designated by the term interpretation<sup>25</sup>; now it will be useful to see how they are distinguished and yet interconnected.

(i) Interpretation (*Auslegung*) : There is no sharp distinction between understanding and interpretation in the broad sense. Our everydayness is pervaded by interpretation of both of ourselves and of other entities. Everyday circumspective interpretation is prior to 'Interpretation'- systematic interpretation.

Although the distinction between understanding and interpretation is not sharp, circumspective interpretation is dependent upon understanding. This will be surveyed in chapters three and four. Understanding is implicit and global and interpretation is explicit and local. The interconnected structure of understanding and interpretation is displayed in chapter four. Understanding of Being is the phenomenon to be uncovered, the manifestation of understanding is interpretation.

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<sup>25</sup> *Interpretieren* is distinguished by using capital letter; *Interpretation*, and *Auslegung* is designated by interpretation.

(ii) Interpretation (*Interpretieren*) : systematic interpretation.

Heidegger uses Interpretation (*Interpretieren*) in distinction from interpretation (*Auslegung*) to refer to the thematical Interpretation of *Auslegung*. Systematic interpretation is a development of *Auslegung* in the sense of making it transparent to itself not to mean developing something new out of it.

### I.5. 'World'

Heidegger starts the inquiry into world by revising the senses of the world that have been accepted traditionally and left unquestioned, in order to see whether the established concepts of world [first two senses] could satisfy his search for understanding the world itself [the fourth sense].

- (1) world as an ontical concept; the totality of things present-at-hand
- (2) world as an ontological concept which refers to the Being of the totality of entities as Nature
- (3) ordinary conception of 'world' that refers to ontical dealings in everydayness [it is from within this concept of world that the analysis takes its departure]
- (4) ontological existential concept of worldhood; this is the sense which hasn't been in the scope of traditional ontology and which Heidegger wants to uncover by exhibiting the structures that underlie and make possible the [third sense] everyday world.

First he looks at the possibility of describing the phenomenon of the world via entities within the world. Under this possibility the first approach is depiction of entities within the world but this is not a phenomenological approach since mere depiction of things cannot provide an ontological understanding of the world in which world could show itself. World is not a mere collection of things.

The second approach is to let entities show themselves through their Being something like a world. Following this line which seems to be proper phenomenologically, Heidegger brings forth the classification of entities as; (i) things of nature and (ii) things invested with value. The thinghood of the second category is also based on the thinghood of nature. Thus the inquiry starts with the Being of things of nature. Proceeding in this manner does not provide the way to reach the phenomenon of the world because nature is already in the world.

In both approaches, world is presupposed and therefore the problem emerges such that something in the world cannot yield the world itself. At this point, Heidegger gives a negative characterization of the world; (1) *world is not a totality of things in the ontical sense nor is it (2) the interpretation of their Being (nature) in the ontological sense.*

Both of these ontical and ontological senses of the world which have been set by traditional ontology do not serve the aim of understanding the world itself. The destruction of tradition bares the possibility of seeing what was missing. Heidegger indicates that world in the sense of worldhood is closely related to *Dasein*, that in some

sense world and *Dasein* are bound together. This essential connection is what was missing in traditional ontology. The shift is from ontologico-categorical sense of the world as *res extensa* to “ontologico-existential” concept of “worldhood” which is a characteristic of *Dasein*. Worldhood is an existentiale.

Heidegger puts forward an ontical and an ontological sense of the world by taking *Dasein* as the point of departure. In the ontical sense there is the sense of world wherein factual *Dasein* lives. This is *Dasein*'s everyday world. There are two domains in this world ; (i) public world and (ii) domestic environment [*Umwelt*].

It is from within this concept of world, environment [*Umwelt*], that the analysis will take its departure to uncover the fourth sense of the world, (the ontological concept) worldhood of the world. This final sense is the aim of the inquiry and what has been concealed and neglected in traditional ontology. Heidegger's diagnosis of the situation is as such;

"When it comes to the problem of analysing the world's worldhood ontologically, traditional ontology operates in a blind valley, if, indeed, it sees this problem at all. On the other hand, if we are to Interpret the worldhood of *Dasein* and the possible ways in which *Dasein* is made worldly [*Verweltlichung*], we must show *why* the kind of Being with which *Dasein* knows the world is such that it passes over the phenomenon of worldhood both ontically and ontologically. But at the same time the very Fact of this passing-over suggests that we must take precautions to get the right phenomenal point of

departure [*Ausgang*] for access [*Zugang*] to the phenomenon of worldhood, so that it will not get passed over."<sup>26</sup>

"Worldhood", traditionally passed over comes to the surface through this inquiry and to uncover this phenomenon, the phenomenal point of departure will be that 'world' which lies closest to *Dasein* -that world which is around it, the *environment*. The traditional picture is reversed by this new approach in terms of spatiality. In previous ontology an attempt has been made to start with spatiality and then to Interpret the Being of the world as *res extensa* which does not coincide with *Dasein* either ontically or ontologically. In Heidegger's approach spatiality is something to be discovered after analysing the fundamental structures underlying *Dasein*'s everyday world to uncover the worldhood of the world. While investigating the structure of "Being-in" (the next constitutive item of the phenomenon of "Being-in-the-world"), the problem of space - "inhood" - is focused in such a way that this reversed picture becomes clearer.

Worldhood of the world can only be revealed in *Dasein*'s understanding of its own Being, which is basically Being-in-the-world. The peculiar situation of *Dasein* is that it understands that it is *already* in a world and that also it constitutes the worldhood of the world. This becomes a problem in terms of which one - *Dasein* or world - to take as the ground for Being.

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<sup>26</sup> *Being and Time*, p.94.

### I.5.1. "Being-in-the-world" as disclosed in *Dasein's* understanding

Heidegger uses this expression "Being-in-the-world" in order to eliminate the possible falling back upon the framework of "subject and world" and more essentially in necessity of discussing *Dasein* as a whole structure. "Being-in-the-world" is divided into its constitutive items for analysis but each item is explored in its interconnection to the other items. For the purpose of this thesis I will work basically on the first and third item.

The constitutive items of "Being-in-the-world" are;

- (i) "in-the-world" : analysis of 'world'
- (ii) "Being-with" : the 'who' of *Dasein*
- (iii) "Being-in" : analysis of inhood of *Dasein*

Heidegger puts each item, constituting of the unitary phenomenon "Being-in-the-world", into relation with the ordinary conception of each item and accordingly ; the "inhood" of "Being-in" is contrasted with 'insideness', the 'who' of the entity that has "Being-in-the-world" as its state of Being is contrasted with 'I', 'World'; the third item of the structure is contrasted with the preconceptions of world and the phenomenon of 'world' is shown by pointing out what is presupposed in the ordinary conception of world. The mastery of tradition is confronted to reach the most primordial structures of our understanding of Being

“Being-in-the-world” is a unitary phenomenon and it is disclosed in understanding. What is the structure of this disclosure? Heidegger traces back to the most primordial disclosure in understanding which are covered up throughout the history and which as an essential nature of *Dasein*.

The “existential analytic” starts with the analysis of the ‘world’; how *Dasein* understands the world and the existential structures are carved out from their implicitness in understanding; this will be exposed in chapter two and based on these structures further analysis of understanding is pursued in chapters three and four.

Heidegger takes the phenomenal point of departure from our dealings with entities around us - in our environment [*Umwelt*]. Analysis of “Being-with” and “Being-in” is based upon the analysis of worldhood of the world. Accordingly next chapter will be concerned with the analysis of “Being-in-the-world” as the base to reach the existential structure of understanding.



## CHAPTER TWO

### BEING - IN - THE - WORLD

#### II.1. Introduction

Heidegger determines *Dasein's* state of Being as “Being-in-the-world” and that this unitary phenomenon as a whole is disclosed in *Dasein's* understanding. With the aim of understanding the disclosure of “Being-in-the-world” the analysis starts with how *Dasein* understands its world in its ‘average everydayness’.

The constitutive items of “Being-in-the-world” is as such:

- (i) “in-the-world” : in this item *Dasein's* Being-alongside the entities (“ready-to-hand”) in the world is analysed in *Dasein's* everydayness, focuses on *Dasein's* understanding of the world and uncovers the ontological structure of the world (worldhood of the world).
- (ii) the 'who' of the entity that is Being-in-the-world: *Dasein's* Being-with (Others) is analysed.

(iii) “Being-in” : “Being-in” as “Being-there”, the disclosure of the “there” is analysed, focuses on *Dasein*'s understanding of itself as “there”.

This chapter focuses on the first and third constitutive items of “Being-in-the-world” in search of bringing together the issues that would supply the background for analysis of “Understanding” in the next two chapters.

In analysis of worldhood, more specifically, in analysing the structure of *Dasein*'s involvement in the context of activities Heidegger brings out two main structures; (i) the “for-the-sake-of-which” structure and (ii) “significance”. Heidegger starts with the most obvious encounter of *Dasein* with entities in its environment and reaches to how world announces itself as a relational context and how *Dasein* signifies the totality of this context to itself as worldhood of the world. Within the analysis of “worldhood” Heidegger shows that somehow *Dasein* finds itself already in a context but at the same time it constitutes the world.

The structure of involvement reveals in this analysis a “for-the-sake-of-which” structure which ultimately leads to for the sake of *Dasein* itself. Because *Dasein* has this ‘for-the-sake-of-itself’ in its understanding implicitly it always comports itself towards activities (and in fact always towards its own Being), this ‘Being-towards’ will be studied in the analysis of understanding as projection. The other structure which is reached by the analysis of involvement is “significance”- “wherein” *Dasein* finds itself and understands the web of relations without such understanding it wouldn't be possible to be involved in

any activity, *Dasein* signifies to itself the totality of the context of relations.

“Significance” is the other implicit structure of understanding and it supplies the basis for us to understand the thrownness [*Geworfenheit*] disclosed in understanding.

In the analysis of “worldhood” existential spatiality of *Dasein* emerges and it prepares the way towards how to understand *Dasein*'s “Being-in”. Spatiality is founded upon temporality. *Dasein*'s “Being-in” lies in its understanding of Being as “temporal”. But this is not explicitly known by *Dasein* and the task is ultimately to uncover this structure in understanding with the analysis of “there” based on the findings of the ‘world’ analysis.

## II.2. The Ontological Structure of the ‘World’

"The kind of Being which belongs to *Dasein* is rather such that, in understanding its own Being, it has a tendency to do so in terms of that entity towards which it comports itself proximally and in a way which is essentially constant - in terms of the 'world'.

In *Dasein* itself, and therefore in its own understanding of Being, the way the world is understood is, as we shall show, reflected back ontologically upon the way in which *Dasein* itself gets interpreted." <sup>27</sup>

*Dasein*'s understanding of its Being is intimately connected to its understanding the world. But this understanding which Heidegger calls “pre-ontological understanding” is

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<sup>27</sup> *Being and Time*, p.36-37

implicit and the ultimate aim is to make this understanding transparent to itself. Ontology for Heidegger is the Interpretation of this “pre-ontological understanding”. This is the main task of *Being and Time* and therefore understanding is the central issue. Now since *Dasein* is basically in the world and understands its Being through its Being in the world how it understands the world will supply the first step toward the whole structure. The present task is then to uncover the peculiar interconnection of *Dasein* and world and see how Heidegger uncovers the worldhood of the world.

Traditional ontology does not supply us with the nature of this interconnection because it does not take into consideration the “ontological difference” between Being and beings. The purpose of this section is to give the exposition of how Heidegger reaches the phenomenon of worldhood and lay bare the significance of the analysis in terms of an access to *Dasein*'s pre-ontological understanding.

Heidegger starts the analysis of worldhood of the world by giving a negative characterization of the 'world' ; (1) world is not the totality of things; it is not the sum of entities “present-at-hand”, (2) world is not the Being of such a totality ; 'Nature' in the ontological sense.

The aim is to reach the phenomenon of the world in other words worldhood of the world and neither of these concepts “world as a totality of things” or “world as the Being of such a totality” are sufficient to uncover worldhood. The phenomenal point of departure to uncover worldhood of the world will be that 'world' which lies closest to us. Heidegger

calls it *Umwelt* [Environment]. The preliminary idea that directs the analysis is that *Dasein* comports itself towards the world with understanding. Worldhood is approached from the aspect of how *Dasein* discovers<sup>28</sup> the world instead of starting from a presupposed concept of world. *Dasein* has the priority among other entities because it has an understanding of Being of entities and *Dasein* has the understanding of something like a world. But what is disclosed in this understanding is not transparent. In fact, world and understanding disclose each other.

“Disclose” has a special meaning in Heideggerian usage. It means to lay open. It does not mean that one has a detailed awareness of the contents which are disclosed but rather that they are laid open to us in an implicit way in what is given so that they may be made explicit to our awareness by further analysis of the given but not by an inference from the given. It doesn't mean ‘to obtain indirectly by inference’<sup>29</sup>. Phenomenology for Heidegger is to make explicit the hidden structure of the obvious.

In this context, 'world' is a given but worldhood of the world is disclosed in understanding. The manifestation of what is already disclosed in understanding is to be made explicit by analysis of everydayness of *Dasein*.

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<sup>28</sup> ‘Discovering’ is an existentially; only *Dasein* discovers, entities in the world are discovered by *Dasein*.

<sup>29</sup> See p. 105 in *Being and Time* for more details on disclosure.

*Dasein* understands itself by understanding the world. What the essence of its understanding is therefore to be studied in the analysis of *Dasein's* encounter with the world. But what is this phenomenon of 'world'?

*Dasein* is essentially the whole state of "Being-in-the-world". World is one of the constitutive items of this unitary phenomenon. By analysing the world we will reach an understanding of *Dasein's* relation with entities other than itself. The other constitutive items are "Being-in" (*Dasein's* relation to itself by understanding its "there" ) and *Dasein* (the 'who' of *Dasein*).

### **II.2.1. Ontological Categories as uncovered by Heidegger in Analysis of Worldhood**

- (i) The Being of entities encountered in the world : "readiness-to-hand" [*Zuhandenheit*]
- (ii) The Being of entities whose nature we ascertain: "presence-at-hand" [*Vorhandenheit*]
- (iii) The Being of that ontical condition : "worldhood" of the world

The first two categories belong to entities with the character of other than *Dasein* and the third category belongs to *Dasein*. Here we will see the emergence of these categories and I will follow the order above in this exposition.

Before proceeding further, we need to note that Heidegger is discontent with the traditional ontology because the traditional treatment of the Being of entities have been

oriented towards the 'world' and 'Nature' and it is understood in terms of 'eternal presence'. Heidegger points out that, traditionally, entities are grasped in their Being as *presence*. They are understood with regard to the defined mode of time as 'present'. He challenges this attitude by taking our notice to consider *Dasein* as a "temporal" Being and as "Being-in-the-world" it includes in itself the past, present and future. The issue of "temporality" will come up later in the context of "Being-in" in more detail but for the moment we need to keep in mind that Heidegger is searching for the meaning of Being and this can be interpreted by Interpretation of *Dasein's* understanding of Being and that the ontological meaning of Being is "temporality" which is a unity of three moments of time. The departure point of the present inquiry is *Dasein* and the Being of entities gain their meaning as *Dasein* discovers them in the world.

The objective of the analysis in this section is to show that the primary discovery of entities that lies in the dynamics of existence, rather than in a theoretical grasp of entities as "present-at-hand". This is the summary of the following survey. We will see how *Dasein* 'discovers' entities primordially in existing and how the primordial Being of entities (as "readiness-to-hand") foundational for any theoretical grasp of entities (in their "presence-at-hand").

The general scheme of how Heidegger uncovers the phenomenon of world :

- (i) to show that the Being of entities encountered in the world is "readiness-to-hand"
- (ii) the exposition of the relational context - the structure of "involvement"

(iii) to show that “readiness-to-hand” is ontologically prior to “presence-to-hand”; the discovery of “presence-at-hand” in “readiness-to-hand”.

(iv) to show how “worldhood” of the world can be discovered in the structure of “involvement”

### II.2.1.1. The Being of Entities that *Dasein* encounters in the ‘World’

The guiding issues:

What is the being of entities discovered in the world? Equipment

What is the being of the equipment ? “Readiness-to-hand” [*Zuhandenheit*]

What is the being of readiness-to-hand? “Involvement” [*Bewandtnis*]

First we will see how Heidegger shows that the Being of entities encountered in the world is “readiness-to-hand”. *Dasein*'s encounter with entities is analysed in the 'world' that lies closest to it in its average everydayness; the *environment* [*Umwelt*]. *Dasein* is caught up in its environment in its *concern* and activities. The predominant way of “Being-in the world” is described by Heidegger as a certain kind of dealing [*Umgang*] with the world. What is the sense of this dealing with entities in the environment? This is to be investigated in order to uncover the Being of those entities encountered.



“..the entities we shall take as our preliminary theme are those which show themselves in our concern with the environment. Such entities are not thereby objects for knowing the 'world' theoretically; they are simply what gets used, what gets produced, and so forth.”<sup>30</sup>

How do entities manifest themselves in our everyday dealings with our environment?

Heidegger suggests that they do not manifest themselves as 'things' (*res*) but rather as 'tools' (Gr. *pragmata*) and the question is: "what is the Being of this *pragmata*?"

Tools in the wide sense of *pragmata* is taken as equipment and in the context of equipmentality. The structure of equipment is such that;

(i) first of all there is no such thing as equipment but rather an equipment is *bound to an equipmental totality* " in which it can be this equipment that it is" ink-stand, pen, ink, table, lamp, these things do not show themselves as they are and fill up a room..we first encounter a room (not as a geometrical space) as an equipment for residing and this leads to an arrangement of the room and it is in this arrangement that any individual item of equipment shows itself.

(ii) An equipment is essentially “something in-order-to” and an equipmental totality is constituted by various ways of the in-order-to such as usability, serviceability, manipulability. A hammer is in order to hammer a nail, this in turn in order to build a canopy, a canopy is in order to provide a shelter...

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<sup>30</sup> *Being and Time*, p.95

(iii) In the “in-order-to” as a structure there lies an “assignment” or “reference” of something to something, equipment is therefore involved in references and assignments. An ink-pen is involved in the context of a desk, a lamp, etc. this is the referential context. *Dasein* assigns a hammer in-order-to hammer a nail, this is the assignment context.

**Concern** is the key phenomenon to understand *Dasein's* encounter with entities. *Dasein's* kind of “Being-in” is hidden in this phenomenon. Concern has its sight and this sight is circumspective. The peculiar manner in which *Dasein* comports itself towards entities is “circumspective concern”. It gives directionality to *Dasein* and where concern directs its sight that is brought close (desevered) no matter how far it is geometrically. Our primary relation with the equipmental totality in our concerned dealings is *use*. The primordial encounter with equipment is in their “readiness-to-hand”.

The primary ontological category is “ready-to-hand” that Heidegger describes to entities that we deal with in our everyday environment. This category, “ready-to-hand”, is not something we have in mind in our comportment towards entities but rather it is hidden in the structure of our concerned activities. In fact Heidegger states that the more we are absorbed in our activities the less we could come to realize the sense of entities as such. This point becomes clear in the notion of work.

"The ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself the sort of thing that circumspection takes proximally as a circumspective theme. The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in

order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work - that which is to be produced at the time; and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered." <sup>31</sup>

If "readiness-to-hand" is not apparent to us in our concerned dealings then how can it be grasped phenomenally? Because the method of the investigation is to show "something in itself and from itself" we need to see the entity as "readiness-to-hand" primordially in such a manner. Heidegger reaches out to show circumspectively the concealed essence of the entity in our encounter with it. So after that the primary ontological category – "ready-to-hand" - is pointed out as concealed, the issue is to show how it can be spotted. We will come back to this point in the deficient modes of concern. For the time being we will deal with the notion of work as a concrete case to open up the nature of *Dasein's* encounter with "ready-to-hand", in its everyday dealings. In analysis of work, "environment" and the "in-order-to structure" of equipment come together.

'Work to be produced' has the structure of :

- (i) a "towards-which" : the "towards-which" indicates the work to be produced, a shoe, a book, etc. This production points beyond the immediate work environment to the larger context of materials (i.e leather, paper) and this involves the environment of animals,

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<sup>31</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 99.

those who raise them, nature, etc. The referential context is revealed. World is discovered as a referential totality.

(ii) “where-of” : purpose of the work; the purpose of writing a book, making a shoe, etc.

The purpose of the work points beyond the work environment to the user of the product, the public world. The *assignment* context is discovered in the process of work. *Dasein* has the kind of Being of *assigning* and as such let entities be freed for “involvement”. This ‘letting be freed’ is the central notion to understand both “for-the-sake-of-which” structure and the phenomenon of “significance”. *Dasein's* existential structure is hidden in this assigning.

#### **II.2.1.2. The Primordality of “Readiness-to-hand” over “Presence-at-hand”**

Which is primordial “readiness-to-hand” or “presence-at-hand” ontologically? This is the pursuit here. “Readiness-to-hand” of the equipment does not show itself during our concern with the work and while we are using the equipment; in fact the authentic way the equipment's showing itself is that it withdraws itself as “readiness-to-hand”, its withdrawal is what makes it “ready-to-hand”.

The concealed phenomenon of Being “ready-to-hand” becomes unconcealed when the equipment is not “ready-to-hand” (or become useless). The methodology Heidegger uses

(see section 1.4.1.1) to show the phenomenon when it doesn't show itself. The phenomenon shows itself in its deficient mode. Our concern is primarily in the work to be produced and due to the equipment's becoming 'unready-to-hand', our concern in work is oriented to the equipment itself. Only then we become aware of "readiness-to-hand" in its *unreadiness-to-hand*.

Only when there is a break in our concern that we might come to realize, when an entity is unready-to-hand because it is broken and we cannot use it and our work is interrupted that we become aware of the entity as useless. The "readiness-to-hand" of the equipment shows itself in its *unreadiness-to-hand*.

Furthermore, when there is such a break we start to *look at it and ascertain its properties* as an object -as 'something present-at-hand'- and so the secondary ontological category of the entity comes to the fore.

"Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment, but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of something with which one concerns oneself - that is to say, of the sort of thing we find when we put it back to repair. This presence-at-hand of something that cannot be used is still not devoid of all readiness-to-hand whatsoever; equipment which is present-at-hand in this way is still not just a Thing which occurs somewhere. The damage to the equipment is still not a mere alteration of a Thing- not a change of properties which just occurs in something present-at-hand." <sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> *Being and Time*, p.103.

### II.2.1.2.1. The Deficient Modes of Concern

Heidegger shows that the Being of entities encountered in our environment is primarily “readiness-to-hand” and when ‘something ready-to-hand’ becomes ‘un-ready-to-hand’ in the following ways that we realize the entity in its “presence-at-hand”. When there is a break in our concern with the environment, in deficient modes of concern, due to the following reasons that we come across the presence-at-hand of the entity. Furthermore in the deficient modes of our concern world also *announces* itself. Heidegger demonstrates in each case how the world *announces* itself. In the first case, “conspicuousness”, the analysis brings up the relations in terms of assignments, in the second case, “obtrusiveness”, the focus is on the relations in terms of references.

(i) “conspicuousness”; when ‘something ready-to-hand’ is out of work, when the pen is broken we come to realize its properties (in its “presence-at-hand”) and also at the same time the “readiness-to-hand” of the pen is realized when it is not “ready-to-hand” anymore.

(ii) “obtrusiveness” ; when something is missing - in the absence of something-ready-to-hand; “..when something ready-to-hand is found missing, though its everyday presence has been so obvious that we have never taken notice of it, this makes a *break* in those referential contexts which circumspection discovers. Our circumspection comes up against emptiness, and now sees for the first time *what* the missing article was “ready-to-

hand” *with* and *what* it was “ready-to-hand” *for*. The environment announces itself afresh.”<sup>33</sup>

(iii) “obstinacy”; when something stands in the way and becomes an obstacle we can't proceed our work and our focus is oriented towards what stands on the way and as such we look and ascertain the properties of the obstacle as ‘something present-at-hand’.

The analysis of deficient modes of concern is significant in terms of establishing the two ontologico-categorical structure of entities, the contrast between them and the announcement of the ‘world’.

We can witness how Heidegger's analysis of the interconnected structure of phenomenon that was presented in chapter one (section I.4.1.1) finds its expression in this analysis:

(1) The structure of “presence-at-hand” (*Vorhandenheit*) is announced. When our concern is broken our primary relationship to our dealing is broken and that which stands before us becomes an object in our way. As such we stop and ascertain its properties but this does not take away the primordially of entity as “readiness-to-hand”. It is an entity which is not “ready-to-hand” anymore and the discovery of it as something “present-at-hand” is secondary.

This situation discloses the interconnection between the two ontological structures “presence-at-hand” and “readiness-to-hand” and shows that “readiness-to-hand” is

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<sup>33</sup> *Being and Time*, p.105.

primary in the sense that our primary relationship to entities “within-the-world” is “readiness-to-hand”.

(2) In the breaking down of “readiness-to-hand” to “presence-at-hand” the structure of “readiness-to-hand” is lit up and as such the assignment and reference context with which the equipment was bound up as disturbed with the unusability of the equipment is lit up as well.

“When equipment cannot be used, this implies that the constitutive assignment of the “in-order-to” to a “towards-this” has been disturbed.”<sup>34</sup> Assignment is explicit only when something is unusable for some purpose. As such “towards-this” becomes explicit and along with it, everything connected with the work wherein concern always dwells - the context of equipment as a totality constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection- becomes explicit and with this totality ‘*world*’ announces itself.

With the phenomenon of work we saw the initial statements about equipment- as “something in-order-to”, as announcing an equipmental totality and the context of assignment or reference- become observable. An equipment does not come before an equipmental totality but rather it points to such a totality. Circumspective sight first discovers an equipmental totality and then points out the equipment and *Dasein* lets the equipment be freed for involvement.

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<sup>34</sup> *Being and Time*, p.105.



### II.2.1.3. The Structure of Involvement

*The character of the Being of "ready-to-hand"* is defined as "involvement"

[*Bewandtnis*]; "An entity is discovered when it has been assigned or referred to something. *With* any such entity there is an involvement which it has *in* something. The character of Being of "readiness-to-hand" is just such an **involvement**. The relationship of the 'with.....in' shall be indicated by the term "assignment" or "reference"."<sup>35</sup>

ex: with this thing "hammer", there is an involvement in hammering,  
       with hammering, there is an involvement in making something fast,  
       with making something fast there is an involvement in protection against bad weather,  
       this protection is for-the-sake-of providing a shelter for *Dasein* (for the sake of a  
       possibility of *Dasein*'s Being).

The totality of involvements constitutive for "readiness-to-hand" is primordial. It is before any equipment. The totality of involvements goes back ultimately to a "towards-which". The primary "towards-which" is a "for-the-sake-of-which" which pertains to the Being of *Dasein* for which, in its Being that very Being is an issue.

In the structure of involvement Heidegger uncovers the two structures disclosed in understanding:

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<sup>35</sup> *Being and Time*, p.115.

(i) *Significance* [*Bedeutsamkeit*]: *Dasein* is already familiar with the relational context of involvement ; with familiarity *Dasein* signifies to itself the totality

(ii) *For-the-sake-of-which* [*Worum-willen*]: *Dasein*'s Being is an issue for itself it always comports itself towards such a context 'for-the-sake-of -itself' ; the kind of Being that *Dasein* has as such is designated by "for-the-sake-of-which".

Both "significance" and "for-the-sake-of-which" is disclosed equiprimordially in understanding. *Dasein* assigns an entity to be involved in a context (ultimately) 'for-the-sake-of-itself ' because it has a sight that understands ( "circumspective concern" ) which gives the motivation towards the entities. It can do this because it already has signified to itself the totality of involvements. The two constitutive items of understanding, "significance" and "for-the-sake-of-which", function interconnectedly and makes possible the everyday dealing with environment. The simplest activities that *Dasein* is concerned in, hide in themselves such a structure of understanding.

#### **II.2.1.4. The Being of that Ontical Condition : "Worldhood" of the 'World' as arrived from the Structure of Involvement**

The exposition of the Being of entities encountered in our everyday dealings as "readiness-to-hand" will be highlighted in terms of the disclosure of understanding.

Heidegger analyses more specifically how equipment announces a referential context by

focusing on the relationship of sign to reference. The structure of sign is such that it is something “ready-to-hand” and it is able to indicate the phenomenon of “readiness-to-hand”. We've seen that hammer indicates the context that it is involved in as hammering. The issue now is to understand the structure of involvement and what it uncovers in terms of *Dasein*'s understanding of the ‘world’.

The Being of “readiness-to-hand” (involvement) is definable as a context of assignments (references). The relational character of relationships of assigning is signifying:

*Dasein* 'signifies' to itself in its familiarity with such relationships; “for-the-sake-of-which” signifies an in-order-to, this in turn signifies a “towards-this”, which signifies a “letting-something-be-involved” and that in turn signifies the “with-which” of an involvement.

These relationships are bound up with one another as a primordial totality; as **significance**. “Significance” makes up the ontological structure of the world - the *worldhood* of the world. “Significance” is wherein *Dasein* is. In “significance”, which is disclosed in understanding *Dasein* comes to the fore as the ontical and ontological condition for worldhood of the world.

In “significance”, lies the *ontological condition* which makes it possible for *Dasein* (that understands, interprets) to disclose significations. Disclosing significations is the existential state of *Dasein* (its “Being-in-the-world”) and as such the *ontical condition* for the possibility that a totality of involvements can be discovered.

"The significance disclosed is an existential state of *Dasein*- of its Being-in-the-world- is the ontical condition for the possibility that a totality of involvements can be discovered."<sup>36</sup> Worldhood of the world (the Being of the ontical condition) gives us an existential way of determining the nature of "Being-in-the-world", that is, of *Dasein*.

"The contexts of assignments and references, which, as significance, is constitutive for worldhood, can be taken formally in the sense of a system of Relations." <sup>37</sup>

If we summarize what we have seen so far, the being of entities that *Dasein* encounters in its environment is primarily "readiness-to-hand". The being of "readiness-to-hand" is "involvement". To 'let things be involved' requires a primordial 'understanding of a totality of involvements' - "significance". Heidegger refers to this understanding as a familiarity. *Dasein* is already familiar with the world and with its own Being. This familiarity is the pre-ontological understanding of *Dasein* or understanding as a fundamental existentielle, it is what constitutes worldhood of the world. *Dasein* signifies to itself a totality of involvements with familiarity.

What is reached in this section, in terms of an access to "pre-ontological understanding", is that in it worldhood of the world is disclosed and as such the ground for ontological interpretation (interpretation of one's Being). Still we don't know yet what the familiarity of this understanding amounts to. It needs further exploration and it will be done in chapter three. Understanding as a fundamental existentielle holds the whole state of

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<sup>36</sup> *Being and Time*, p.121.

<sup>37</sup> *ibid.*, p.121.

“Being-in-the-world” (“Being-in” together with ‘worldhood of the world’). We’ve seen the disclosure of worldhood of the world as such:

“That *wherein Dasein* understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself is that for which it lets entities be encountered beforehand. The wherein of an act of understanding which assigns or refer to itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements. This *wherein* is the phenomenon of the world. The structure of the worldhood of the world.”<sup>38</sup>

It will be helpful to look more closely to ‘letting something be involved’. Heidegger states that the ontical sense of ‘letting something be’ is in principle ontological due to *Dasein*’s kind of Being; ‘letting something be’ is the condition for the possibility of encountering anything “ready-to-hand”.

“.... within our factual concern we let something ready-to-hand be so-and-so *as* it is already and in order that it be such. ....Previously letting something ‘be’ does not mean that we must bring it into its Being and produce it; it means rather that something which is already an ‘entity’ must be discovered in its readiness-to-hand, and that we must thus let the entity which has this Being be encountered.”<sup>39</sup>

(i) the structure of involvement is tightly connected to the Being of *Dasein* ;

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<sup>38</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 119.

<sup>39</sup> *ibid.*, p.117.

The structure of involvement leads to the sole “for-the-sake-of-which” of *Dasein*.

(ii) *Dasein*'s kind of Being is such that it lets entities be involved ; it frees entities for involvement. This freeing is *Dasein*'s kind of Being to let entities to become “ready-to-hand”, to become equipment. This ‘letting’ is an ontological structure; it has its ground in *Dasein*'s understanding and as such *Dasein* is the ground for the Being of equipment and constitutive for worldhood of the world.

(iii) But in our everyday dealings with the environment we find ourselves within a context ‘previously freed’ before us. Ontically *Dasein* is not so much of a ground in this sense although it is still the ground for the world as a referential totality.

World can be seen as a shifting point. The interconnected relation of *Dasein* and world and how they disclose each other is spotted as such; *Dasein* is already familiar with the ‘world’ (its comportment towards the world pre-supposes ‘world’) and yet *Dasein* as “Being-in-the-world constitutes worldhood. The circularity of understanding can be seen as moving between the familiarity with the world and constituting worldhood.

Comportment towards the world is with understanding and it always returns to itself to understanding its own Being. This circular movement is explicated in the following paragraph:

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"That wherein *Dasein* already understands itself in this way is always something with which it is primordially familiar. This familiarity with the world does not necessarily require that the relations which are constitutive for the world as world should be theoretically transparent. However, the possibility of giving these relations an explicit ontologico-existential Interpretation [Heidegger's hermeneutic analytic of *Dasein*], is grounded in this familiarity with the world; and this familiarity, in turn, is constitutive for *Dasein*, and goes to make up *Dasein*'s understanding of Being. This possibility is one which can be seized upon explicitly in so far as *Dasein* has set itself the task of giving a primordial Interpretation for its own Being and for the possibilities of that Being, or indeed for the meaning of Being in general." <sup>40</sup>

#### II.2.1.4.1. Being-with : the 'Who' of *Dasein* as encountered in Involvement

In the analysis of worldhood we saw that with the phenomenon of world the context of relations already includes other *Daseins*. Work is produced for others to wear it, to read etc. or the materials used in the process of work are produced by others. The context of "work" points already to relations with others but the who of *Dasein* in relation to others haven't been analysed. This is the issue now but for within the framework of this thesis I want to point out only a preliminary view of this issue. "Being-with" is not something added to the picture but it is the primary situation of *Dasein*.

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<sup>40</sup> *Being and Time*, p.119.

“..significance, as worldhood, is tied up with the existential “for-the-sake-of-which”.

Since the worldhood of that world in which every *Dasein* essentially is already, is thus constituted, it accordingly lets us encounter what is environmentally ready-to-hand as something which we are circumspectively concerned, and it does so in such a way that together with it we encounter the *Dasein*-with of Others. The structure of worldhood is such that Others are not proximally present-at-hand as free-floating subjects along with other Things, but show themselves in the world in their special environmental Being, and do so in terms of what is ready-to-hand in that world.”<sup>41</sup>

The familiarity with significance disclosed in understanding and *Dasein*'s comportment towards its Being is tied to other *Daseins*. The referential totality of involvements consists of *Dasein*'s relations with others and as such *Dasein*'s understanding of its Being is existentially constituted by the “they”. Heidegger mentions that “ready-to-hand” is previously discovered and in this hidden the context of the “they”. What *Dasein* does in its comportment toward entities is to free the entity in its “readiness-to-hand”. *Dasein* is bound to understand its Being through its encounter with others and the existentiality of discourse has its foundation in the facticity of *Dasein* as “Being-with”. Although I won't discuss the ‘phenomenon of falling’ (the everyday Being-there) I think it is important to mention the manifestation of the “they-self” is phenomenally confirmed in “idle talk”, “ambiguity” and “curiosity”.

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<sup>41</sup> *Being and Time*, p.160.



*Dasein* is alongside entities within the world but *Dasein*'s relation to Others (not in the sense of other than me but others like me) is distinct from relation with entities.

Heidegger draws our attention to the ontological categorial difference between entities "ready-to-hand" or "present-at-hand" and *Dasein*. What is the constitution of the 'who' of *Dasein* in its everydayness? This question is ultimately answered as such; the 'who' of *Dasein* in its undifferentiated everyday manner is "they-self".

The phenomenon of "Being-with" others is already contained 'in our world of concerns'. "As something factual, *Dasein*'s projection of itself understandingly is in each case already alongside a world that has been discovered. From this world it takes its possibilities, and it does so first in accordance with the way things have been interpreted by the "they". This interpretation has already restricted the possible options of choice to what lies within the range of familiar, the attainable, the respectable - that which is fitting and proper." <sup>42</sup>

#### **II.2.1.5. The Existential Spatiality of *Dasein* as announced with the Phenomenon of "Ready-to-hand"**

The demonstration of the structure of the Being of what is "ready-to-hand" leads to a new understanding of spatiality. This structure has been set forth in the context of the modes of *Dasein*'s concern. As we saw the modes were unusability, missing and standing in the way and how world announces itself in each case. Now the search is to understand

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<sup>42</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 239.

how this characterization of ready-to-hand reveals *Dasein's* 'existential spatiality'.

"*Dasein*, in its very Being, has its Being as an issue; and its concern discovers beforehand those regions in which some involvement is decisive."<sup>43</sup> The region itself becomes visible -in a conspicuous manner- only when one discovers "the ready-to-hand" circumspectively and does so in the deficient modes of concern.

Equipment doesn't have a position in space as "present-at-hand". It has its place in the totality of places which make up the environment. An item of equipment belongs somewhere. The underlying condition is the "whither" which makes it possible for equipment to belong somewhere. This is called *region*. We circumspectively (nonthematically) foresee this region ahead of us. This can only be understood in relation to the ecstatic unity of temporality. "Whenever one comes across equipment, handles it, or moves it around or out of the way, some region has already been discovered. Region is the whither for the possible belonging - somewhere of equipment which is ready-to-hand environmentally and which can be placed."<sup>44</sup>

*Dasein* discovers space in its comportment towards its Being. The discovery of space is directed by *Dasein's* concern. The announcement of the environment is lit up when there is a break in the concern. The spatiality of *Dasein* has its foundation in *Dasein's* understanding of its Being.

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<sup>43</sup> *Being and Time*, p.137.    <sup>44</sup> *ibid.*, p. 420.

“Often the region of a place does not become accessible explicitly until one fails to find something in *its* place. Space is discovered as the totality of equipment. The bare space itself is still veiled. The environment does not arrange itself in a space which has been given in advance but rather articulates the context of involvements which belongs to circumspectively distributed places.”<sup>45</sup>

Now the issue is to understand in what sense *Dasein* is *in* the world.

### II.3. “Being-in” : the Disclosure of the “There”

At first, the constitution of “inhood” need to be revised in order to get an understanding of what sort of spatiality *Dasein* has.

(i) First we need to see that there is an ontological difference between “Being-in” as an “existential” and the category of insideness (that thing “present-at-hand” have with regard to each other i.e water is in the glass). *Dasein*’s “Being-in” is not a spatial ‘in’ as water in a glass but how is its inhood to be understood then? The following survey will be elaborate this issue. *Dasein* is not to be understood ontologically in terms of insideness but still of course ontically it is inside a room, etc..

(ii) “Being-in” is not to be explained ontologically by some ontical characterization because *Dasein*’s spatiality is possibly understood only on the basis of “Being-in-the-

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<sup>45</sup> *Being and Time*, p.138.

world” in general. With this outlook then this idea is challenged ; “Being-in” is a spiritual property and man's spatiality is a result of his bodily nature which always gets founded upon corporeality. With such ontical characterization it would be ‘Being-present-at-hand’ of some such spiritual Thing along with a corporeal Thing. What is the Being of this compounded entity? It remains obscure. Instead we need to understand “Being-in-the-world” as an essential structure of *Dasein* to have an insight into its existential spatiality.

After we distinguished inhood from the insideness (i) we can proceed further in what sense “Being-in” is an existentiale, a state of *Dasein*'s Being. Heidegger emphasizes this point by stating what it is not:

“One cannot think of it as the Being-present-at-hand of some corporeal Thing (such as a human body) ‘in’ an entity which is present-at-hand (i.e world).” <sup>46</sup> With this negative characterization we see that it is not an insideness but rather an “inhood” is understood by “Being-in”. Heidegger brings in the concept dwelling to describe “Being-in”. What does this dwelling amount to? This is the question to be pursued. The spatiality of *Dasein* is to be understood not primarily as water in a glass but rather as being between. But still this is not satisfactory for Heidegger to say that it is a between because it splits the phenomenon - *Dasein*'s wholeness and interconnectedness with the world. So he passes on to another description that wouldn't disturb the characteristic kind of Being of *Dasein* as “Being-in-the-world”. And he suggests that ;

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<sup>46</sup> *Being and Time*, p.79.

"The entity which is essentially constituted by Being-in-the-world *is* itself in every case its 'there'." <sup>47</sup> By stating that *Dasein* is in every case its there, with this emphasis on 'Da' this means further that *Dasein* is inseparable from its "there"ness.

"In the expression 'there' we have in view this essential disclosedness, this entity *Dasein*, together with the Being-there of the world, is there for itself." <sup>48</sup> We have seen in the context of worldhood of the world that significance is the 'wherein' *Dasein* is and "for-the-sake-of-which" as the ultimate point of "towards-which" to which the totality of involvements lead to 'for-the-sake-of-*Dasein*' itself. Now, in this context, these preliminary points come together to light up the 'Da' of *Dasein*.

### II.3.1. "There"

Heidegger goes further on and says that "*Dasein* is its disclosedness" <sup>49</sup> How should we understand "disclosedness"? The Being of disclosedness (the Being of "there") , the way in which *Dasein* opens up to the world and open up the possibility of the world, the way in which *Dasein* is its 'there' need to be investigated.

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<sup>47</sup> *Being and Time*, p.171.

<sup>48</sup> *ibidem*.

<sup>49</sup> *ibidem*.

Absorption in concerned activities (everyday Being of the “there”) comes to the fore as a relief, at the background there is the concealed existential constitution of the “there” (understanding as projection and *Befindlichkeit* as “thrownness”). During the absorption in our environment our awareness of the background is not explicit to us but we have an average understanding of it; Heidegger calls this “pre-ontological understanding”. It is “pre-ontological” because our understanding is not transparent to us, it hasn't become explicit to us, in Heidegger's terms we haven't interpreted our understanding of our own Being, the meaning of our Being thematically. Heidegger's task in *Being and Time* is to interpret the meaning of *Dasein's* Being. In order to be able to do it first he needs to bring *Dasein's* understanding of Being to the fore.

Heidegger suggests that there are three primary structural constituents of the Being of the ‘Da’. The existential constitution of the “there” has two fundamental moments and their articulation is in the third moment and they find their expression in the everyday Being of the “there” :

*Existential constitution of the “there”:*

- (i) Understanding / *Verstehen* (as the existential ground for interpretation and assertion)- disclosure of projection
- (ii) *Befindlichkeit* ( as the ground for moods) - disclosure of thrownness
- (iii) Understanding and *Befindlichkeit* are determined by Discourse / *Rede*

*Everyday Being of the 'there':*

## Fallenness / *Verfallen*

Understanding and *Befindlichkeit* will be focused in chapter three.

### II.3.2. Temporality as the Horizon of Understanding

In order to get a better grasp of the existential constitution of the “there”, first we need to see its connection with temporality; understanding of Being is temporal. Temporality is the horizon of the understanding (understanding of Being). The structure of “there” paves the way to a further analysis of care [*Sorge*] as the meaning of *Dasein*'s Being. Care can be understood when *Dasein* as a temporal Being is put forward. Within the limits of this study I want to give a general framework of temporality as the horizon for understanding.

Heidegger challenges the traditional ontology in terms of both space and time;

- (i) *Dasein* is not 'in' space
- (ii) *Dasein* is not 'in' time

Spatiality of *Dasein* is such that *Dasein* discovers space in its concerned dealings in everydayness. The theoretical understanding of space is founded upon this initial circumspective discovery.

Temporality of *Dasein* is that *Dasein* lives three moments of time - past, present, future - at once although past and future stay in the dark while *Dasein* makes its present.

Heidegger wants to uncover the past and future (in their mostly silent, unnoticed activeness) as disclosed in understanding while *Dasein* makes its present.

Temporality is essential in *Dasein*'s interpretation of its Being. We need to see *Dasein* as a structural whole. "The formally existential totality of *Dasein*'s ontological structural whole must be grasped in the following structure : the Being of *Dasein* means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the world)- as Being-alongside(entities encountered within the world)." <sup>50</sup>

Temporality as an ecstatical unity has something like horizon:

(i) "Being-ahead-of-itself" ; futurally the horizon is "for-the-sake-of-itself" ; "potentiality-for-Being".

(ii) "Being-already-in" ; thrownness (the schema in which *Dasein* is disclosed to itself in a state-of-mind [*Befindlichkeit*] as thrown)

(iii) Being-alongside ; the horizontal schema for the present is "in-order-to".

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<sup>50</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 237.



“*making-present* as the *primary* basis for *falling* into the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand with which we concern ourselves, remains *included* in the future and in having been, and is included in these in the mode of primordial temporality.”<sup>51</sup>

Heidegger's formula for temporality ; “This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as *temporality*.”<sup>52</sup>

Temporality is a synthetic unity and all three components operate together and future predominates. We need to be aware that past, present and future shouldn't be understood in the ordinary conception of time the detailed discussion on this issue is on (*BT*; p. 374-376) and it is important to note that according to Heidegger ordinary conception of time (as a sequence of 'now's) is a derivation of temporality. “The future, the character of having been, and the Present, show the phenomenal characteristics of the 'towards-oneself', the 'back-to', and the 'letting-oneself-be-encountered-by'.” Such phenomena “make temporality manifest as *ekstatikon*”<sup>53</sup> pure and simple. *Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself.*”<sup>54</sup>

The phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the present is therefore called the “*ecstases*” of temporality. The essence of temporality is a process of temporalizing in the unity of the *ecstases*.

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<sup>51</sup> *ibid.*, p.376.

<sup>52</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 374.

<sup>53</sup> standing out of one's Being

<sup>54</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 377.

I want to introduce at this point the overall scheme of Heidegger's project in the purpose of uncovering the existential structure of understanding. In the second division of *Being and Time* Heidegger reaches 'care' as the structural unity of *Dasein's* Being. *Dasein's* analytic in Division I of *Being and Time* is a preparation towards the most basic structure of *Dasein* as care.

"Care, as a primordial totality, lies 'before' ["*Vor*"] every factual 'attitude' and 'situation' of *Dasein*, and it does so existentially *a priori* ; this means that it always lies *in* them. So this phenomenon by no means expresses a priority of the 'practical attitude' over the theoretical. When we ascertain something present-at-hand by merely beholding it, this activity has the character of care just as much as does a 'political action' or taking a rest and enjoying oneself. 'Theory' and 'practice' are possibilities of Being for an entity whose Being must be defined as "care"."<sup>55</sup>

*Temporality* is the ontological meaning of Being. The horizon of understanding of Being is bound to *Dasein's* Being temporal.

*Care*: If we accept *Dasein* as temporal (in its ecstatical unity) then how *Dasein* essentially understands itself is that its Being is an issue for itself. Care is more primordial than concern. The double meaning of care is "thrownness" [*Geworfenheit*] and

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<sup>55</sup> *Being and Time*, p.238.

“projection” (Being-free for its ownmost possibilities). Care is a single basic state in its essentially twofold structure of “thrown projection”.

*Circumspective concern* : Being-towards-the-world is essentially concern and it has its ground in care. This concern is bringing-close (de-severing) which gives directionality to *Dasein* towards entities within the world.

With this background of temporality as the horizon of understanding, the issue now is to focus on understanding as a fundamental existentiale in which the neglected moments (in traditional ontology) past and future is brought to the fore in the analysis of understanding. We need to keep in mind that “thrownness” and “projection” are to be uncovered. The next chapter will be concerned specifically with the existential structure of understanding in which “thrownness” and “projection” is disclosed.

## CHAPTER TWO

### UNDERSTANDING AS AN EXISTENTIALE

#### III.1. Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to show that *logos* is existentially grounded in understanding. In order to show this we need to first see the existential structure of understanding. How is it that *Dasein* understands its Being there?

The purpose of this chapter is to show the existential structure of understanding based on the two structures extracted from the analysis of world; the "for-the-sake-of-which" and "significance" (worldhood). In the previous chapter we have seen the development from the analysis of world supplying the phenomenal ground towards the disclosure of "there" and the temporal character of "there". Now the issue is how the being of "there" is disclosed in understanding and state-of-mind.

There are two main issues pursued here then;

(i) Understanding is not to be understood as a cognitive activity but as an *existentiale*, the basic mode of *Dasein*'s Being. Heidegger distinguishes 'understanding something' (talking ontically), as being able to manage or being competent to do something, from understanding as an *existentiale* that is being competent over not a 'what' but over Being as existing. What does it mean to have competence over Being as existing?

(ii) That understanding and *Befindlichkeit* [state-of-mind] equiprimordially constitute the Being of the "there".

More specifically understanding is investigated in its connection with 'possibility'.

### **III.2. What is disclosed in Understanding in 'Being Towards the World'?**

The initial discovery of Heidegger is that the primordial encounter with entities is "readiness-to-hand". Heidegger starts the analysis of worldhood by the preliminary view that *Dasein* is concerned with its environment. The nature of this concern and why there is such a concern becomes phenomenally concrete in the course of the analysis with this initial claim and together with the character of *Dasein* as being purposeful, the clues for an understanding of the primordial encounter of *Dasein* with entities is reached and we see that it is "readiness-to-hand". This is a pivotal phenomena in terms of what it announces. The structure of "involvement" is reached from this initial uncovering; involvement is the Being of something "ready-to-hand"; i.e a hammer is involved in

hammering. Now for the purpose of the analysis of existential understanding, the structure of involvement will be of interest in terms of what it announces about the disclosure of understanding and state-of-mind. Heidegger reaches the ontological structure of understanding at a preparatory level by analysing the structure of involvement which announces a prior disclosedness. The prior disclosedness has two directions equiprimordially;

- (i) the “for-the-sake-of-which” structure
- (ii) “significance” (worldhood of the world)

I want to focus on each structure separately to see how each structure is begotten from the structure of involvement and how existentiality of understanding is uncovered in them. I think the two directions of projection (“thrownness” and “projection”) of understanding are hidden (can be uncovered by setting our sight) in these structures.

### **III.2.1. The “For-the-sake-of-which” Structure**

We have seen so far that the Being of entities primordially encountered in environment as “readiness-to-hand”. The next question was what the Being of the “readiness-to-hand” is and it has been analysed as involvement. Heidegger explains the relation between “ready-to-hand” and “readiness-to-hand” by giving the example of sign and reference. A sign “is an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our

circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself.”<sup>56</sup> Sign has an equivocal structure of being ‘something ready-to-hand’ and being able to indicate the phenomenon of “readiness-to-hand”. Signs show us a referential totality.

To say that “readiness-to-hand” is structurally constituted by reference and referential totalities and means that an item of equipment is somehow involved in those references. Equipment is not free-floating nor is reference and there is always a kind of involvement. Heidegger states that the Being which belongs to “readiness-to-hand” is involvement. The issue now is to understand the relationship of reference and involvement; what is the nature of this involvement which involves the Being of equipment?

An example will be useful to clarify this: an item of equipment is involved with other equipment - an equipmental totality- but it can also be involved in a series of involvements - in a totality of involvements- i.e hammer -has the structure of “in-order-to”- can be involved in a “towards-which” -building a house- thus hammer - hammering - making something fast - protection from bad weather - providing shelter for *Dasein*. In the last case, the “towards-which” of the totality of involvements reaches a point where there we can no longer speak of equipment but of *Dasein*. The ultimate point is for the sake of *Dasein*; for the sake of a possibility of *Dasein*.

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<sup>56</sup> *Being and Time*, p.110.

The being of involvement is dependent upon *Dasein's* understanding of Being and because its Being is an issue for itself, that for the sake of itself *Dasein* grounds the Being of involvement; in other words there is involvement because *Dasein* is there for itself and that it understands its Being. Starting from the equipment Heidegger winds the relations that is an equipment refers to and reaches *Dasein's* understanding of its Being and that its Being is an issue for itself so it purposefully comports itself towards the world.

In the structure of involvement- in which *Dasein* lets something ready-to-hand to be encountered in order to do something- the kind of *Dasein's* Being as assigning itself a work a towards-which structure is seen and the ultimate towards which is that there is no more involvement but for-the-sake-of *Dasein* itself becomes seen phenomenally. Because *Dasein's* Being is an issue for itself, for the sake of itself it lets entities be encountered and free them for involvement. The looking back to what originates the phenomenon of involvement Heidegger sees the for the sake of which structure. The "for-the-sake-of-which" structure is one aspect of the prior disclosedness which uncovers *Dasein's* understanding of its Being. Heidegger summarizes what we have opened so far as such;

"*Dasein* always assigns itself from a "for-the-sake-of-which" to the "with-which" of an involvement. *Dasein* understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself *that for which* it has let entities be encountered beforehand." <sup>57</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 119.



### III.2.2. Significance

The other aspect of prior disclosure is *significance*. Heidegger reaches the disclosure of significance by pursuing the sense of 'letting something be involved'. This phrase implies the manner in which *Dasein* lets entities be; a manner in which *Dasein* frees entities for involvement. It's *Dasein's* kind of Being that it lets entities be freed for involvement as we have seen above in the "for-the-sake-of-which" structure it is because it has an understanding of its Being .

The structure of involvement consists of a totality of relations. The "in-order-to" structure related to "towards-which" structure which is related to with-which of an involvement. All these relations are bounded up with a totality and now the issue is that *Dasein* must have an understanding of this totality so that it can let the entities be involved in other words what Heidegger calls it is that these relations must have been previously disclosed. *Dasein* signifies to itself this web of relations and as such these relations- which ultimately lead to 'for the sake of *Dasein* itself' - is grounded in this previous disclosure of the totality in *Dasein's* understanding. This signifying of understanding is called "significance" and it is where the "for-the-sake-of-which" is grounded in. Significance is worldhood of the world and it is the prior disclosure of the being of the world in *Dasein's* understanding. Heidegger following statement summarizes the situation.

“The previous disclosure of *that for which* what we encounter within-the-world is subsequently freed, amounts to nothing else than understanding the world- that world towards which *Dasein* as an entity always comports itself.”<sup>58</sup>

Significance is the understanding of the totality of involvements, the relational context of involvements and as such grounds the “for-the-sake-of-which” structure in everyday dealings. Now I want to focus on the issue of ‘familiarity’.

Heidegger emphasizes that *Dasein* is always familiar with significance and its familiarity with significance, it is the “ontical condition for the possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with involvement (“readiness-to-hand”) as their kind of Being, and which can make themselves known as they are in themselves [*in seinem Ansich*].....so along with its Being, a context of the ready-to-hand is already essentially discovered: *Dasein* in so far as it *is*, has always submitted itself already to a 'world' which it encounters, and this *submission* belongs essentially to its Being.”<sup>59</sup>

The equiprimordiality of the two directions and the circularity between them can be witnessed in this paragraph;

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<sup>58</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 118.

<sup>59</sup> See p. 120-121 in *Being and Time*.

“As Being-in-the-world *Dasein* has already discovered a ‘world’ at any time. This discovery, which is founded upon the worldhood of the world, is one which we have characterized as freeing entities for a totality of involvements. Freeing something letting it be involved is accomplished by way of referring or assigning oneself circumspectively, and this in turn is based upon one's previously understanding significance.”<sup>60</sup>

### III.3. The Projective Character of Understanding

The structure of involvement lays bare the mode of *Dasein*'s comportment towards entities in the world. *Dasein*'s lets entities be involved, it frees them for involvement. Having the analysis of “for-the-sake-of-which” and “significance” before us as the prior disclosedness of “Being-in-the-world” in understanding, now the issue is to explore the significance of them in opening up the character of understanding.

Heidegger sees in *Dasein*'s understanding its Being for the sake of itself a ‘potentiality-for-Being towards itself’. We have seen that all the relations that make up the totality of involvements ultimately leading to for the sake of *Dasein*. *Dasein*'s comportment towards these relations - which make up the worldhood of the world- is its comportment towards the possibilities of its own Being. *Dasein*'s “potentiality-for-Being” [*Seinkönnen*] is bound up with possibilities disclosed in its signifying the totality of involvements.

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<sup>60</sup> *Being and Time*, p.145.

The significance disclosed in *Dasein*'s understanding is the ontical condition for freeing entities "within-the-world" for involvement and because ultimately involvement is for the sake of *Dasein*, it frees entities for the possibility of its own Being.

"Not only is the world *qua* world, disclosed as possible significance, but when that which is within-the-world is freed, this entity is freed for its *own* possibilities. That which is ready-to-hand is discovered as such in its *serviceability*, its *usability*, and its *detrimentability*. The totality of involvements is revealed as the categorial whole of a *possible* interconnectin of the ready-to-hand." <sup>61</sup>

Heidegger concludes that *Dasein* is primarily "Being-possible" and by bringing together the disclosure of for the sake of which and significance with the disclosure of possibilities the two directions of understanding is unified as such; understanding is a disclosive potentiality-for-Being.

Possibilities has a special meaning in this context and will be surveyed in the next section but for the moment we need to know that possibility is discovered as an existientiale.

Heidegger asks the question why does understanding press forward into possibilities?

*Dasein*'s understanding has the character of projection. *Dasein* projects its Being upon the "for-the-sake-of-which" and "significance" equiprimordially. Projection as such moves in these two directions equiprimordially. 'Projecting' is not to be confused with

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<sup>61</sup> *Being and Time*, p.184.

comporting oneself towards a plan but rather towards possibilities. *Dasein* has always understood itself [familiarity with significance] and always will understand itself [will be towards, for the sake of its own possibilities] in terms of possibilities. Projection is the existential character of understanding holding together the two directions of understanding.

As we will see in (sec.3.2) *Dasein* finds itself there and thrownness will come up as the disclosure of Being there. As thrown *Dasein* finds itself thrown into projecting into possibilities. Being thrown into projection, familiarity with the world is the understanding the totality of involvements, *Dasein* projects its Being to this totality disclosed in its understanding and projects itself into possibilities 'for-the-sake-of-itself'. Projection has its sight and this is called circumspection.

### III.3.1. The Ontological Significance of Possibility

We need to understand what Heidegger means by possibility, in the sense of *Dasein*'s kind of Being - possibility as an *existential*- is distinguished from possibility as a modal category of present-at-hand. More specifically, possibility, ontologically speaking does not signify what is *not yet actual* and what is *not any time necessary*. It would be unhelpful to think of possibility in such terms but what is it then? Heidegger forces us to think of possibilities as themselves; possibilities as possibilities. We need to stop conceptualizing possibility but understand it in its primordially.

*Possibility as an existiale* is “the most primordial and ultimate positive way in which *Dasein* is characterized ontologically.”<sup>62</sup> If we can’t understand possibility via actuality, how can we get the sense of possibility as possibility? *Befindlichkeit* is useful at this point. As it will come up in (section 3.2.) the disclosure of moods is so powerful when compared to the means of cognitive grasp. We can’t grasp them conceptually but what mood discloses is right there with its bare disclosure. Moods disclose “being-there” and being a thrown possibility. “*Dasein* is Being-possible which has been delivered to itself - thrown possibility- through and through.”<sup>63</sup>

*Dasein* understands that it is to be thus or thus, the pure ‘that it is’ is disclosed with moods. *Dasein* understands that it is “Being-possible”. And that it has to be is disclosed as well *Dasein* has to be thus or thus. *Dasein* always understands itself in terms of possibilities but it doesn’t have a clue of possibilities. Understanding in terms of possibilities is that it is primarily moving towards possibilities not in the sense of a sorted out plan. Heidegger reverses the general understanding of reality: the established form is taking actuality as primary and possibility and contingency are derived from this point. Not only actuality has a dominant position in the common sense, in averageness of everydayness but also traditional ontology works with taking actuality at a higher degree than possibility for example. There is a parallel treatment of actuality in terms of levelling

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<sup>62</sup> *Being and Time*, p.183.

<sup>63</sup> *ibidem*.

as higher than possible both in everydayness and in traditional ontology. The consequence is that possibility is dimmed down to what we can handle in terms of not yet actual.

What Heidegger puts forward, radically reverses this levelling between 'actuality' and 'possibility'. Ontologically, possibility is more primordial than actuality and it cannot be understood therefore via actuality. Possibility has a transcendent structure and is the only way to our understanding of our Being as existence. When it is considered with the phenomenon of temporality it gives a fuller insight. *Dasein's* opening for possibilities is foundational for any possibilities (in the sense of not actual). Possibility gains its meaning from *Dasein's* opening into possibilities, future is not to be understood as the incoming possibility being the cause of (*Dasein's*) opening up to possibility but rather because *Dasein* temporalizes, throws itself into possibilities that we can have future as a concept. *Dasein's* being-towards possibilities is ultimately 'Being-towards-itself', 'Being-towards' possibilities of its own Being. "Potentiality-for-Being" is as such in direct connection with possibility.

Ontically possibility (as a modal category) in the sense of not yet actual is primary but ontologically possibility as possibility is more primordial than the first sense. The ontological categories that Heidegger uncovers as "presence-at-hand" and "readiness-to-hand" supplies the background for us to have a better understanding of this issue. An ontology which dims down entities to a uniform plane of "presence-at-hand" cannot capture the dynamics and *Dasein's* catalyst role in terms of its own possibilities and

possibilities of entities. World as a horizon of possibilities is before *Dasein* having-been thrown into possibilities and projecting into possibilities are disclosed in understanding equiprimordially.

Basic possibilities of understanding:

(1) Understanding is either authentic ; can be 'for-the-sake-of-itself '

(in terms of a "for-the-sake-of-which")

(2) Understanding can be inauthentic / can be in terms of the 'world' (significance)

But this is not a really either / or situation because in each case the other is also included only the weight of the focus is stronger on either side.

"In understanding the world, Being-in is always understood along with it, while understanding of existence as such is always understanding of the world. Because understanding, in every case, pertains rather to *Dasein's* full disclosedness as Being-in-the-world, this diversion of the understanding is an existential modification of projection as a whole."<sup>64</sup>

### **III.3.2. *Befindlichkeit*: the Existential State of 'Being-there' as Grasped**

#### **Phenomenally in Moods**

The underlying effect of mood is seen as the initiator of *Dasein's* directedness towards the 'world' and towards itself. All the exposition related to the structure of involvement,

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<sup>64</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 186.



structure of “for-the-sake-of-which” is to be put in relation with *Befindlichkeit* because of its grounding effect together with “significance” for them to be possible. Why is there involvement in anything? The hidden structure of “thrownness” will come to the surface in the analysis of *Befindlichkeit*<sup>65</sup>. How is understanding open to the world or to itself? World here seems to be taken as a separate entity but actually worldhood of the world is disclosed in understanding as significance.

*Befindlichkeit* is the ontological structure of ontic manifestation moods [*Stimmung*]; attunement to the world. This will be shown. Heidegger starts to reach the structure of *Befindlichkeit* from the disclosure of moods. Disclosure of moods are taken into consideration in terms of *how* and *what* of the disclosure;

(1) Moods disclose ‘how one is’ and ‘how one is faring’. They are what we are already familiar with in our everydayness. The disclosure of moods is not theoretical and they are not mere feelings but a certain kind of attunement with the world.

(2) What mood discloses; *Dasein* faces its “there”ness, it finds itself “there”.

(1) How mood discloses;

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<sup>65</sup> *Befindlichkeit* means how one finds oneself. *Befindlichkeit* is translated as state-of-mind but this can be misleading, because this term does not say anything about ‘finding’ness and also state-of-mind has other connotations that would be unrelated with what Heidegger is interested in. I would actually prefer to use, instead, ‘finding oneself there’ although the German word ‘there’ is not included, it can remind in which context it is used; *Befindlichkeit* as ‘Being-there’. Even so, I will use this term, ‘state-of-mind’, for convenience.

Heidegger brings up the changing of moods in everydayness and sees in this fact that we are always with a mood. (ii) Lack of mood means that *Dasein* is satiated with itself ; “Being has become manifest as a burden. Why that should be, one does not *know*.”<sup>66</sup>

*The possibilities of cognition falls short to know this and the primordial disclosure of moods brings Dasein before its 'there'.* This is the pivotal point by which Heidegger reaches the phenomenon of thrownness [Geworfenheit]. Heidegger finds the evidence of the manifestation of the burdensome character in another mood ; mood of elation. Heidegger moves from the disclosure of the burdensome character to the phenomenon of “evasion”.<sup>67</sup>

In the phenomenon of evasion from lack of mood or bad mood, when confronted with the disclosure of moods, Heidegger points to the disclosure of “there” as “thrownness”; “In having a mood, *Dasein* is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has been delivered over to the Being which, in existing, it has to be. “To be disclosed” does not mean “to be known as this sort of thing”. And even in the most indifferent and inoffensive everydayness the Being of *Dasein* can burst forth naked ‘that it is’ and ‘has to be’. The pure ‘that it is’ shows itself, but “whence” and the “whither” remain in darkness. The fact that it is just as everyday a matter for *Dasein* not to ‘give in’ [*nachgibt*] to such moods -.....not to follow up their disclosure- is no evidence *against* the phenomenal facts of the case, in which the Being of the “there” is disclosed moodwise in its “that-it-is”; it is rather evidence for it.”<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 173.

<sup>67</sup> Evasion is studied further in its manifestation in ‘everyday Being of the “there” as the phenomenon of “falling” in *Being and Time*; see p.210-224.

<sup>68</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 173.

Two points are to be noticed here;

- (i) The current situation of *Dasein* as 'That it is' and 'has to be' is disclosed in moods.
- (ii) Moods are phenomenally justified in the fleeing of *Dasein* (the evasion)

From this Heidegger moves from the "Present" toward uncovering the disclosure of what remains in darkness ["thrownness" and "projection" (directing towards the world) as the grounding structure of how *Dasein* makes its present] ;

"An entity of the character of *Dasein* is its 'there' in such a way that, whether explicitly or not, it finds itself [*sich Befindet*] in its thrownness. In a [*Befindlichkeit*] state-of-mind *Dasein* is always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but finding itself in the mood that it has." <sup>69</sup>

## (2) What is disclosed in moods?

These three characteristics show that *Dasein* already finds itself in a world from which it forms a directionality towards the world as a whole in which it encounters things that matter to it.

- (i) "Thrownness" of *Dasein*; "States-of-mind disclose *Dasein* in its thrownness, and proximally and for the most part in an evasive turning away" <sup>70</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> *Being and Time*, p.174.

<sup>70</sup> *ibid.*, p.175.

(ii) *Dasein's* Being-in-the-world as a whole and its projecting into possibilities;

"The mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something" <sup>71</sup>

(iii) Within its thrown directionality towards "Being-in-the-world" as a whole it becomes affected from something in the world; "Existentially, state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us." <sup>72</sup>

With significance disclosed in *Dasein's* understanding, the world which has already been disclosed beforehand permits what is within-the-world to be encountered. The togetherness of "significance" that is disclosed in understanding comes together with state-of-mind in this context. "This prior disclosedness of the world belongs to Being-in and is partly constituted by one's state-of-mind. Letting something be encountered is primarily *circumspective*; it is not just sensing something, or staring at it. It implies circumspective concern, and has the character of becoming affected in some way [*Betroffenwerdens*]; we can see this more precisely from the standpoint of state-of-mind.

But to be affected by the [what we have seen as deficient modes of concern] unserviceable, resistant, or threatening character of that which is ready-to-hand, becomes ontologically possible only in so far as Being-in as such a manner that what it encounters

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<sup>71</sup> *Being and Time*, p.176.

<sup>72</sup> *ibid.* p.177.

within-the-world can "*matter*" to it in this way. The fact that this sort of thing can "*matter*" to it is grounded in one's state-of-mind; and as a state-of-mind it has already disclosed the world-as something by which it can be threatened, for instance." <sup>73</sup>

Because something can matter to *Dasein* it is concerned in entities circumspectively and the prior disclosedness of the world is with state-of-mind and significance equiprimordially. Heidegger states that moods don't come from outside or from inside. Where do they emerge from then? What is it being affected? From moods to *Befindlichkeit* the uncovering of thrownness is as such; something can matter to us because we are concerned with it, the fact that we have concern lies in the kind of Being that *Dasein* is - *Dasein's* Being is an issue for itself so things can matter to it.

In the specific mood fear (as a mode of *Befindlichkeit*) Heidegger brings this structure forward more concretely;

(i) That in the face of which we fear ; it is something in the world, something *Dasein* is familiar with but indefinite.

(ii) The fear itself ; fear is possible because something can matter to *Dasein* and thus become threatening.

(iii) That which fear fears about; *Dasein* itself, *Dasein* fears for itself.

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<sup>73</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 176.

"Only an entity for which in its Being this very Being is an issue, can be afraid." <sup>74</sup>

Fear is about something in the world and existentially it forces *Dasein* to discover something more than ontical, *Dasein* realizes that it is and it is in the world... that it can get hurt....

Fearing about something discloses entities within the world as threatening and *Dasein* as threatened and something in the world can matter to *Dasein* becomes apparent

More specifically Heidegger compares the power of mood and what it discloses with what we can grasp by 'pure beholding' (theoretically). With the example of fear this point is emphasized;

"..from the ontological point of view we must as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to 'bare mood'. Pure beholding, even if it were to penetrate to the innermost core of the Being of something present-at-hand, could never discover anything like that which is threatening." <sup>75</sup>

*Dasein* doesn't know what the mood discloses in terms of its origin (whither) and its direction (whence) but only what it comes face to face is the pure 'that it is' and 'has to be'.

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<sup>74</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 180.

<sup>75</sup> *ibid.*, p.177.

“The ‘that it is and has to be’ which is disclosed in *Dasein*’s state of mind is not the same ‘that-it-is’ which expresses ontologico-categorially the factuality belonging to presence-at-hand. This factuality becomes accessible only if we ascertain it by looking at it. The ‘that-it-is’ which is disclosed in *Dasein*’s state-of-mind must rather be conceived as an existential attribute of the entity which has Being-in-the-world as its way of Being.”<sup>76</sup>

State-of-mind and understanding equiprimordially constitute the existential structure of *Dasein*. “State-of-mind always has its understanding” and “understanding always has its mood.”<sup>77</sup> What does Heidegger mean by saying that a state-of-mind always has its understanding? It is such an understanding that *Dasein* is delivered over to its there. It understands that it is faced with an unknown and it wants to evade from this burdensome situation and gets absorbed into activities and as such state-of-mind (moods) initiate *Dasein*’s concern. Heidegger detects the situation as suppressing the understanding of state-of-mind. The phenomenal grasp of the evasion can be seen in the manifested averageness of *Dasein* in its everydayness and its being lost in “they-self”; the ‘they’ as *disburdening Dasein* is shown as an existential characteristic of ‘they’. The disburdening in turn comes up as the dominion of the ‘they’<sup>78</sup>.

### III.3.3. Thrownness and Projection

The interconnectedness of the issues discussed above find their expression in this paragraph in a concentrated way.

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<sup>76</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 174.

<sup>77</sup> *ibid.* p. 182.

<sup>78</sup> ‘They’ is analysed in its transcendental structure in everydayness; see p.165-167 in *Being and Time* for ‘accommodation of particular *Dasein* in the ‘they’ and for further discussions on ‘they’ as an existentiale.

“As *existentialia*, states-of-mind and understanding characterize the primordial disclosedness of Being-in-the-world. By way of having a mood, *Dasein* 'sees' possibilities, in terms of which it is. In the projective disclosure of such possibilities, it already has a mood in every case. The projection of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being has been delivered over to the Fact of its thrownness into the 'there'.”<sup>79</sup>

“Significance” and “for-the-sake-of-which” have been the starting point to uncover the two directions of understanding. *Dasein* projects its Being upon each structure disclosed in understanding as the whole state of “Being-in-the-world”. Thrownness is disclosed in state-of-mind and this disclosure is equiprimordial with the disclosure of significance disclosed in understanding. Projection into possibilities is possible due to the disclosure of thrownness but at the same time because *Dasein* is for-the-sake-of itself it primarily projects its Being towards possibilities. Understanding is understanding of Being and it is an *existentialia* which grounds all other cognizing. Furthermore we can conclude that there is a circularity in understanding Being due to the existential structure of *Dasein*'s understanding its Being as “thrown projection”. The hermeneutical character of *Dasein*'s understanding is existentially grounded and as such it supplies the background for the discussions in the following chapter.

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<sup>79</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 188.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### HERMENEUTICAL CHARACTER OF UNDERSTANDING

#### IV.1. Introduction

As understanding, *Dasein* projects itself towards possibilities. 'Being-towards' possibilities is itself a "potentiality-for-Being" [*Sein-können*]. These disclosed possibilities exert their counter-thrust on understanding. This counter-thrust is interpretation. In interpretation understanding becomes itself, it does not become something different.

Projecting of understanding has its own possibility, that of developing itself. This development of understanding is interpretation. Development is in the sense of *working-out of possibilities projected in understanding* not in the sense of acquiring information from understanding. Interpretation is grounded in understanding existentially. If this can be shown the next step is to locate the status of *logos* as assertion as a mode of interpretation and as such assertion is already grounded in understanding. The present task is to show how this grounding occurs.

## IV.2. Hermeneutical Situation of *Dasein*

The hermeneutical situation of *Dasein* already appeared between the “for-the-sake-of-which structure” and “significance”. *Dasein*'s familiarity with significance implies that a totality is beheld in understanding in *Dasein*'s comportment towards itself for the sake of itself. Heidegger calls the totality of presuppositions the hermeneutical situation of *Dasein*.

The “fore-structure” of understanding refers to the explication of significance as the familiar understanding of totality of involvements disclosed as significance. Projection holds together an understanding of the totality and understanding of existence.

## IV.3. Everyday Circumspective Interpretation

We have seen so far that *Dasein* has an understanding of Being because *Dasein* always comports itself towards the world understandingly. This understanding covers more than an intellectual activity because *Dasein* circumspectively discovers its environment and it is competent over existing. It requires a complex process which is not explicitly known by us. The manifestation of the implicit structure of understanding is interpretation.

The inner structure of understanding is then the constant interplay between understanding and interpretation. Understanding holds the totality before itself and interpretation is the

choosing of something of that totality. The essential characteristic of Heidegger's method is to show something 'in itself' and 'from itself'. The method of phenomenology as interpreted by him is the systematic showing that which is concealed, by analysing the structure of what is manifested (what has come to the sight). Interpretation is what is pointed out by the sight that understands but the understanding becomes complete by the returning to itself accomplished by interpretation. The returning of interpretation to understanding is what Heidegger defines as the appropriation of understanding.

Although for the sake of analysis of understanding, Heidegger dissects understanding and interpretation they make up the essential characteristics of understanding such that understanding has the nature of returning to itself by choosing a direction and pointing out "something *as* something". Interpretation is already grounded in understanding. Existentially this is the case and interpretation in more specific sense (i.e textual interpretation) has the same structure based on the existential structure. Any understanding of something is already an interpretation and inherently it presupposes an initial beholding of a totality. This is the general picture and the issue now is to show how this is so.

#### **IV.3.1. The Phenomenal Ground for Interpretation**

Heidegger's method is to pursue the phenomenon of interpretation in understanding the world ; the structure of interpretation is analysed in everyday circumspective concern

with the environment. Heidegger's method is always moving from the *explicit* towards the *concealed* which transcends the explicit. The initial discovery of the entities encountered in everydayness as "ready-to-hand" supplied the basis to uncover the phenomenal ground for understanding the prior disclosure of understanding and the character of understanding as projection into possibilities is presented in the chapter three. The presentation so far has supplied the background for the analysis of interpretation.

Interpretation is taken in the sense of working-out the possibilities projected in understanding. This is the key point. The interwovenness between "significance" and "for-the-sake-of-which" and the possibilities of world and *Dasein*'s own Being are disclosed in understanding. *Dasein* signifies to itself a totality of involvements and as such *Dasein* understands the world and in the sense of its Being in the world . This makes it possible for *Dasein* in its concern with environment to understand whatever involvement that which is encountered (as "ready-to-hand") can have. Previously it has been stated that *Dasein* discovers its environment circumspectively. Heidegger uncovers this phenomenon of circumspective discovery with the phenomenon of interpretation.

"To say that "circumspection discovers" means that the 'world' which has already been understood comes to be interpreted. The ready-to-hand comes *explicitly* to the sight which understands." <sup>80</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> *Being and Time*, p.189.

Interpretation is then rooted in everyday circumspection and it is taking apart an entity out of the totality. And it is taken apart for a purpose, so, that which is *explicitly* understood (understanding becomes itself with interpretation) has the structure of “something as something”.

#### **IV.3.2. Hermeneutical ‘As’ of Interpretation as being founded upon the “Fore-structure” of understanding**

The issue now is to show the essential foundation of everyday circumspective interpretation. ‘Something ready-to-hand’ is always understood in terms of a totality of involvements that is held before understanding as “significance”. This totality does not need to be grasped by a thematic interpretation.

“In interpreting, we do not throw a ‘signification’ over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation.”<sup>81</sup>

Whenever something is interpreted *as* something, the interpretation will be founded essentially upon the “fore-structure” of understanding that holds the totality before itself.

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<sup>81</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 190- 191.

- (i) Fore-having : A totality of involvements which is already understood becomes unveiled by an act of appropriation (by interpretation). Interpretation is grounded in “something we have in advance”. “Fore-having” is a specific sense of “significance”.
- (ii) Fore-sight : Interpretation is guided by a point-of-view. It is grounded in “something we see in advance”. We take apart something out of the totality for a purpose and this is the “fore-sight”. “Fore-sight” can be understood on the basis of “for-the-sake-of-which” structure.
- (iii) Fore-conception : Interpretation is grounded in “something we grasp in advance” and as such makes it possible to conceptualize what is taken apart from the totality with a point-of-view. *Dasein* is always familiar with significance explains this “fore-grasping”.

Based on this “fore-structure”, interpretation picks something out of the totality beheld by the understanding and the structure of interpretation is “something *as* something”. Something is chosen out of the totality for a purpose. The intimate connection between understanding and interpretation is the inner link between “significance” and “for-the-sake-of-which”. We need to remember that significance is the totality of involvements and for-the-sake-of-which is the structure of the purposeful *Dasein*'s involvement - the ultimate point of the “for-the-sake-of-which” structure is for-the-sake-of-*Dasein* itself.

“Fore-structure” is the implicit structure of understanding and “as-structure” is the explicit structure of interpretation. Circularity comes into question here between the

“fore-structure” and “as-structure”. “As-structure” sends us back to the “fore-structure”, the inherent circular movement is brought to light in Heidegger's analysis. The important point is that it already takes place in our everyday concerned dealings.

#### **IV.4. Assertion as a Derivative Mode of Interpretation**

Assertion has been given the primary status as the *locus* of truth in traditional ontology. In discussing the character of assertion it will be kept as an introductory note to the problem of truth<sup>82</sup>. (Heidegger questions whether it is right to give the assertion such a primary status and it is important for the purpose of this thesis in discussing discourse as being grounded in understanding existentially to see the existential root of assertion.

Now I want to follow how the character of assertion is identified by Heidegger and see how it is shown to be a derivative mode of circumspective interpretation and ultimately a derivative mode of understanding the ‘world’ [understanding “Being-in-the-world”].

##### **IV.4.1. Significations of Assertion**

The significations of assertion is analysed to show the existential foundation of an assertion. The character of assertion is such that; (i) Assertion is a *pointing out*, what is

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<sup>82</sup> See section 44 in *Being and Time* for the discussion on the problem of truth, in particular p.262-269.

pointed out in saying “the hammer is heavy” is a certain property of a hammer. Here we deal with the primordial sense of “*logos as apophansis*” which means ‘letting an entity be seen’. In the assertion “The hammer is too heavy”, what is dis-covered for sight is not a ‘meaning’, but an entity in the way that it is “ready-to-hand” even though the entity is not around. *Pointing-out* has in view the entity itself. But although this is the sense the second characteristic of assertion, “predication” covers the essential status of the entity.

(ii) The pointing out indicates that it is involved in predication and as such we give the subject (hammer) a definite character (heaviness). The property of heaviness is predicated to the hammer. We bind together hammer and heaviness. Predication lets us see the hammer as heavy. Heidegger calls this the “*apophantical ‘as’*”. But we need to note that predication is founded upon pointing out. Every predication is what it is, only as a pointing out.

(iii) Assertion has a communicative character; it is what gets ‘passed along’ and others can understand it. Communication is directly related to the first two significations. It is *letting someone see with us* what we have pointed out in its definite character. Thus we share with the other, that entity pointed out. That which is shared is our *Being-towards* that entity which we see in common. This ‘Being-towards’ is “Being-in-the-world”. We encounter an entity pointed out from out of this very world.



Heidegger brings together these characteristics of assertion as “*a pointing out which gives something a definite character and which communicates.*”<sup>83</sup>

Why do we take assertion as a mode of interpretation? The point to be discovered is how the essential structure of understanding, upon which interpretation is founded, recurs in assertion:

(i) “Any assertion requires a *fore-having* of whatever has been disclosed; and this is so what it *points out by way of giving something a definite character*, in doing so, one is already taking a look directionally at what is to be put forward in the assertion.”<sup>84</sup>

(ii) Any assertion requires a “fore-sight”. *The function of giving it such a character* is done after we set our sights towards an entity.

(iii) When an assertion is made, some “fore-conception” is always implied; but it remains in the dark, because the language hides in itself a developed way of conceiving. In *giving something a definite character*, there is an Articulation of *what is pointed out*, in accordance with significations. What is this Articulation? It will be surveyed in the next chapter on discourse.

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<sup>83</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 199.

<sup>84</sup> *ibidem*.

Like any interpretation, assertion necessarily has a “fore-having”, a “fore-sight” and a “fore-conception” as its existential foundation. “The pointing out which assertion does is performed on the basis of what has already been disclosed in understanding or discovered circumspectively.”<sup>85</sup> In what sense is assertion distinct from interpretation? The next issue will be then how Heidegger detects a modification taking place in the hermeneutical as when we make an assertion.

#### IV.4.2. Modification in the “As-structure”

We need to notice a certain modification happening in asserting. In assertion there is a stepping back from the lived context of involvements. It points out a definite character of the entity. The stepping back from the ‘involvements’<sup>86</sup> announces a break in the ontologico-categorical mode of “readiness-to-hand”. In other words the entity is taken apart of its context and as such for example hammer as a *tool* becomes an ‘object of inspection’, treated as ‘something present-at-hand’.

The break from “readiness-to-hand” to “present-at-hand” shows how the *apophantical* ‘as’ of assertion (hammer as heavy) is derived from the *hermeneutical* ‘as’ of interpretation (hammer as a tool). What is the consequence of this in terms of meaning?

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<sup>85</sup> *Being and Time*, p.199.

<sup>86</sup> See chapter two (sections II.2.1.2.1. and II.2.1.3) in this thesis for the discussion on the referential totality of involvements.

How do we interpret the meaning of the entity pointed out in “*hermeneutical* ‘as’” and in the “*apophantical* ‘as’”? This will be discussed in the next section.

#### IV.4.3. The Significance of the Modification in the “As- structure” in terms of our Interpretation of ‘Meaning’

“*Apophantical* ‘as’” of assertion involves a fore-structure of understanding just as the “*hermeneutical* ‘as’” of interpretation. What does the modification in the “as-structure” show in terms of how we interpret ‘meaning’?

The “*hermeneutical* ‘as’”, the “as-structure” of interpretation by being based upon the “fore-structure” of understanding gives the ‘meaning’ [*Sinn*] as the entity. The entity is interpreted according to the “fore-structure” as “ready-to-hand”. The meaning of the hammer is a tool [*Zeug*]. ‘Meaning’ is the *Being* of the entity. ‘Meaning’ as such is an *existentiale*, not something given to the entity but it is existentially constituted.

“*Hermeneutical* ‘as’” is involved with the entity itself in the context of work for example. I take the hammer in the workshop in order to hammer a nail. What becomes explicit is the entity itself as an equipment, ‘something-in-order-to’. An entity is picked out of a totality (that is disclosed beforehand in understanding) because it shows itself to *Dasein* as something to put into use in the work to be produced. The meaning of the entity is a tool. Whereas in “*apophantical* ‘as’”, the meaning of the entity is taken as

‘something present-at-hand’; an object understood in an abstraction from the environmental context.

#### **IV.5. The Hidden ‘As’**

In the analyses up till here I pursued how Heidegger uncovers the hidden “as-structure” in interpretation and its modified recurrence in assertion. “As” is still in the assertion since it is existentially founded upon circumspective interpretation which is already grounded in the “fore-structure” of understanding. I think this is crucial in terms of its consequences in how we interpret entities.

I would suggest that the ‘forgetfulness of Being’ lies in this concealed “as-structure”. Our understanding is hermeneutical existentially. It is shown that we always understand “something *as* something”. The ‘hermeneutic circle’ is between the “fore-structure” of understanding and “as-structure” of interpretation. Heidegger exhibits that this circularity takes place in everydayness in our circumspective concern in our dealings with the environment.

“As-structure” indicates possibilities that are essential in understanding. Understanding projects itself into possibilities. The concealedness of “as” hides from us possibilities as possibilities and there is a shift from ‘possibilities’ to ‘actuality’ as seeming primary whereas with the analyses so far possibilities appeared as more primordial than actuality.

“Something *as* something” signifies possibility in its existential significance but

“something *is* something” conceals the existential structure and covers the transcendental horizon of possibilities and reduced to a narrow framework of reality.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### ***LOGOS* as ASSERTION versus *LOGOS* as TALK**

So far I have presented understanding as a fundamental existentials in two main lines;

(i) The first line emphasizes Heidegger's interpretation of *Dasein*'s understanding of its own Being as "thrown projection" and how the implicit existential understanding is interpreted phenomenally from the existential structures in everydayness of *Dasein*.

Heidegger's view that "understanding" and "state-of-mind" (moods) are always together in the disclosure of "there" and that moods actually yield the direct awareness of facticity of *Dasein* as being thrown have been elaborated. The grounding effect of moods and the inner unity of them with understanding radically changes how we normally treat understanding.

(ii) Secondly, understanding has existentially a hermeneutical structure. Heidegger uncovers the "as-structure" of interpretation based on "fore-structure" of understanding. Assertion is shown to be a derivative mode of interpretation but the existential (existential-hermeneutical) "as-structure" has gone through a modification.

The concluding point I would like to make in this chapter will be presented in this framework. The two analyses come together in the theme of discourse. In particular my

focus will be on how Heidegger treats “discourse as assertion” as an inadequate expression of understanding existentially.

Heidegger argues that discourse is existential in one sense. This primary sense of discourse is talk [*Rede*]. It is in Greek origin that discourse is treated as talk in its primordial sense but, even so, the logic of *logos* is based on “discourse as assertion” instead of “discourse as talk”. Traditional logic preferred the assertion to base the logic of *logos* on.

I want to discuss “discourse as assertion” in contrast to “discourse as talk” because I want to explore Heidegger's argument of “discourse as talk” being equiprimordially existential with understanding and state-of-mind - but at the same time discourse is grounded in understanding - that is the disclosure of understanding and state-of-mind is articulated in discourse. What is disclosed is *Dasein*'s whole state of Being- that is “Being-in-the-world”. If the discourse is analysed properly then the existential status of understanding will also become even more explicit.

The analysis of assertion is done in order to show that *logos* as assertion has its existential roots in understanding. The significance of this demonstration is that ;

- (i) Logic of *logos* is rooted in existential analytic of *Dasein*.
- (ii) Greek interpretation of *logos* has been ontologically inadequate and that the methodological basis on which ancient ontology arose was not a primordial one.

What does Heidegger point to by showing that “*logos* as assertion” is inadequate for expressing what is disclosed in understanding? This requires to explore the relation between the discourse and understanding. I want to discuss this question by considering the two aspects of my presentation on understanding; (i) understanding and state-of-mind equiprimordially disclosing ‘there’ness of *Dasein*, (ii) understanding is existentially hermeneutical and assertion is founded upon it.

The first aspect is that, understanding and state-of-mind are equiprimordially constituting the disclosure of “being-there” and that understanding is always with a state-of-mind and state-of-mind has its understanding. Heidegger's view and what he wants to discover is that *Dasein* is already ‘outside-of-itself’, it is always there and this view is what he embodies in the phenomenon of temporality. The *ekstase* points to the ‘standing out of oneself’ and the ecstatic unity of the three moments (past-present-future) make up the whole structure of *Dasein*. “Thrownness” and “projection” find its expression in the ‘present’. Assertion does not capture the temporality of *Dasein*. This point will become clear if we discuss “*logos* (discourse) as assertion” in contrast to “*logos* (discourse) as talk”. The axis of discussion is communication which is constitutive for discourse. The argument is such that “discourse as assertion” is inadequate for expressing what is disclosed in understanding.

Taking the phenomenon of communication at the center let's look at what comes out in either case. Communication is ontologically a broad phenomenon and ‘communication’ in which one makes assertions- giving information, for instance- is a special case of the



broad sense which is in principle existential. In “discourse as talk”, “Being-with” is explicitly shared, that means communication is not a conveying of experiences from the interior of one subject to the interior of the other. “Being-with-one-another” is manifested in talk in a co-state-of-mind and co-understanding. Heidegger makes the point even sharper in saying;

“In talking, *Dasein* expresses itself not because it has, in the first instance, been encapsulated as something ‘internal’ over against something ‘outside’, but because as Being-in-the-world it is already ‘outside’ when it understands. What is expressed is precisely this Being-outside - that is to say, the way in which one currently has a state-of-mind (mood), which we have shown to pertain to the full disclosedness of Being-in. Being-in and its state-of-mind are made known in discourse and indicated in language by intonation, modulation, the tempo of talk, ‘the way of speaking’.”<sup>87</sup>

What is to be emphasized is that “discourse as talk” is existentially foundational for assertion and it becomes clear in the phenomenon of communication. In talking, the expression of understanding and state-of-mind is communicated in various ways and making assertions is only one of these ways. This brings us to the phenomenon of language. Assertion is dependent upon language but communication in talk is partly constituted by language. As Heidegger points out hearing and keeping silent are constitutive for talk.

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<sup>87</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 205.

Heidegger states that language is founded upon discourse existentially. How should we understand this? I want to go over the issue of significance that is disclosed in understanding to explore this. Significance as we have seen is the totality of involvements disclosed in understanding. Significance is worldhood of the world. Significance is wherein *Dasein* dwells. *Dasein* dwells in a web of relations which is disclosed in understanding as significance. Heidegger warns us *not* to think of web of relations as something merely thought or “first posited in an act of thinking”<sup>88</sup> but rather these relationships are in which concerned circumspection dwells. When we say significance is wherein *Dasein* dwells it is in such a sense that it is to be understood.

The ontological *locus* of language will become clear after we survey the issue of articulation of understanding. The puzzling view for most linguists is that Heidegger argues that discourse is the articulation of understanding and that language is founded upon discourse.

Articulation of understanding is in the sense of articulation of the disclosedness of “there” -that is equiprimordially constituted by understanding and state-of-mind. According to Heidegger the significance disclosed in understanding is the totality of significations. This totality is that which gets articulated in discourse. The ‘totality of significations’ can be dissolved into significations and language is founded upon these significations.

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<sup>88</sup> See p. 122 in *Being and Time*.

That which gets articulated in discourse is the totality of significations and what can be articulated is 'meaning'. 'Meaning' is primordially articulated in discourse. Meaning is to be thought as an *existentiale* not a label put on entities. The "readiness-to-hand" versus "presence-at-hand" becomes useful to understand the ontological status of 'meaning'. To understand the special status of meaning I want to refer to what Heidegger states :

"When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the Being of *Dasein* - that is, when they have come to be understood - we say that they have *meaning* [*Sinn*]. But that which is understood, taken strictly is not the meaning but the entity, or alternatively, Being. Meaning is that wherein the understanding [*Verstandlichkeit*] of something maintains itself. That which can be Articulated in a disclosure by which we understand, we call "meaning". " <sup>89</sup>

What is meant by 'meaning' comes to the fore more explicitly when we witness the shift in meaning that takes place during the modification of "*hermeneutical as*" into "*apophantical as*" of assertion. The following paragraph summarizes the ontological origin of the assertion and how the 'meaning as an *existentiale*' turns into 'meaning as a property' given to something. "*Hermeneutical as*" is taking an entity out of a totality, "something *as* something", in order to perform a work; i.e hammer as a tool takes place in our concern, without calling it a tool, existentially it is what we perform a work with and it is a pre-predicative stage. Assertion is based on this existential situation.

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<sup>89</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 192-193.

Articulation of meaning has already taken place at this existential stage and this meaning is the *Being* of the entity not a 'property' about it.

"The entity which is held in our fore-having - for instance, the hammer - is proximally ready-to-hand as equipment. If this entity becomes the 'object' of assertion, then as soon as we begin this assertion, there is already a change-over in the fore-having. Something *ready-to-hand with which* we have to do or perform something, turns into something *'about which'* the assertion that points out is made. Our fore-sight is aimed at something present-at-hand in what is ready-to-hand. Within this discovering of presence-at-hand which is at the same time the covering-up of readiness-to-hand, something present-at-hand which we encounter is given a definite character Being-present-at-hand-in-such-and-such-a-manner." <sup>90</sup>

Here we can see more closely that the entity is cut off from the web of relations it belongs to and the modification of as structure the giving of definite character to the entity, the predication takes place to show the entity as an object with such and such property.

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<sup>90</sup> *Being and Time*, p.200.

“When an assertion has given a definite character to something present-at-hand, it says something *as* a 'what'. The *as* structure of interpretation has undergone a modification. In its function of appropriating what is understood, the 'as' no longer reaches out into a totality of involvements. As regards its possibilities for Articulating reference-relations it has been cut off from that significance which, as such, constitutes environmentality. The 'as' gets pushed back to the uniform plane of that which is merely present-at-hand.”<sup>91</sup>

The modification in *as* structure as shown by Heidegger is indicative of the gap between the fundamental ontology and the traditional (substance) ontology. The traditional ontology finds its expression in its logic. The logic of *logos* is based on the *logos* as assertion. Heidegger points out that this is the evidence and the result of the understanding of the meaning of Being as “present-at-hand” in ancient ontology.

By showing that assertion cannot be disowned from its ontological origin- that it is grounded in interpretation and understanding existentially- and its distance from its ground which is witnessed through the modification in “*as-structure*”, Heidegger brings the awareness that;

*"logos* gets experienced as something present-at-hand and Interpreted as such, while at the same time the entities which it points out have the meaning of presence-at-hand. This meaning of Being is left undifferentiated and uncontrasted with other possibilities of Being, so that Being in the sense of a formal Being-something becomes fused with it

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<sup>91</sup> *Being and Time*, p. 200

simultaneously, and we are unable even to obtain a clear-cut division between these two realms." <sup>92</sup>

Traditional ontology disregards the ontological difference between Being and beings and the logic of *logos* raises upon such an ontology and deficient of capturing the meaning of Being. Heidegger finds that the primary sense of *logos* is "discourse as talk" in Greek origin but parallel with the ontological framework the tradition is using, the logic of *logos* is built on *logos* as assertion. The discussion on "discourse as talk" as being the articulation of existential understanding and the awareness of assertion as being founded upon understanding but modifying the disclosure of "there"ness then could we think of basing logic on "discourse as talk"? Would it help us not to forget the meaning of Being?

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<sup>92</sup> *Being and Time*, p.203.

## CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have explored the nature of the relation between understanding and Being in Heidegger's *Being and Time*. My main focus was to open up understanding as a fundamental existentielle and its grounding position to all activities of cognizing. My overarching goal was to illuminate Heidegger's claim that *logos* is existentially grounded in understanding, and reveal the metaphysical basis of this claim in the framework of *Being and Time*.

### (i) Looking Back at the Thesis

In the first chapter, I presented Heidegger's approach to the phenomenon of understanding of Being, via analysing his interpretation of human being as "Being-there" (*Dasein*) and giving an exposition of the essential points of his fundamental ontology. In this framework, the explication of *Dasein*'s relation to its Being is drawn in a preliminary way, and the interconnectedness of Heidegger's method with the special status of *Dasein* in uncovering the understanding of Being is elaborated. The exposition of Heidegger's method and his interpretation of phenomenology and hermeneutics is laid out in order

to show on what basis the inquiry is pursued. Heidegger revises the concept of world and treats *Dasein* in a whole state of "Being-in-the-world". How he reaches this concept through the critique of established conceptions of world is also shown in this chapter. "Being-in" and "world" are the two constitutive items of this unitary phenomenon which I wanted to survey in terms of how the 'world' forms the phenomenal basis for "Being-in". This is in line with Heidegger's existential analytic. "Being-in" is the existential structure disclosed in understanding the world. World is not presupposed but the issue is to uncover how *Dasein* understands the world in its everydayness so I gave the exposition of basic issues, such as, "ready-to-hand", "circumspective concern", "the structure of involvement", in order to show how they form the phenomenal basis of the disclosure of "there" in understanding. "Being-in" is shown in its relation to the world analysis and the assertion that the spatiality of *Dasein* is based on temporality is also elaborated.

Within the structure of involvement, the two structures of "for-the-sake-of-which" and "significance" have been transferred into chapter three in order to uncover how Heidegger reaches the phenomenon of possibilities and the projective character of understanding. Heidegger introduces these structures as equiprimordially disclosing *Dasein's* state of "Being-in-the-world" in understanding. Although I didn't discuss the notion of equiprimordiality in a special way in the present study, this notion carries some difficulty in Heidegger's exposition. Heidegger introduces two phenomena as equiprimordial in such a way that one of them permits to be grounded by the other one.



Now, with “significance” and “for-the-sake-of-which”, the issue is that significance is the ground in the sense that it is the totality of involvements disclosed in understanding with the familiarity, and with significance *Dasein* projects itself toward the world ‘for-the-sake-of-itself’. From the other side *Dasein* understands its existence, it is concerned with activities for the sake of itself and together with the initiating effect of moods it comports itself towards the world. Moods are the ground for its concern, for its involvement in the world.

The problem of ground is therefore to be dealt with in a special way; however I refrained from pursuing this issue due to the limits of this work. Rather, the second chapter deals with the emergence of projective character of understanding and the grounding effect of moods as equiprimordial with understanding. The existentiality of understanding and that *Dasein* already hermeneutically understands its Being (or, put differently, that hermeneutical character of understanding is existentially grounded as witnessed in the togetherness of projecting forward and backward) is pursued.

In virtue of establishing the character of understanding by projecting into possibilities, hermeneutics of understanding is analysed into its inner structure in chapter four, which also helps to show how circularity takes place. In this chapter, I especially wanted to show the connection of significance to “fore-structure” of understanding and “for-the-sake-of-which” to the “as-structure” of interpretation. In this context, the interpretation as working out of possibilities is connected to the analysis of the

third chapter and the analysis of circumspective concern. Furthermore, the relation of “fore-structure” and “as-structure” is connected to the second chapter in its use of “ready-to-hand” in showing *Dasein's* hermeneutical movement in circumspective interpretation.

The question of how assertion is grounded in understanding existentially is explicated by showing Heidegger's analysis of “as-structure” in first circumspective interpretation and the recurrence of this structure in assertion. I think this is crucial and I wanted to highlight it, especially the modification of “as-structure”, in order to contemplate further on the consequences of this discovery. This is important because a proper understanding of this issue is essential in how we interpret entities and how we relate ourselves to our Being. The question of ‘meaning’ is therefore discussed in relation to this framework.

While in chapter five of the thesis I reached the point where I explore the assertion that *logos* is grounded in understanding existentially, I still wanted to explore the other sense of *logos*; “*logos* as talk [*Rede*]”. This is what Heidegger calls the primary sense of *logos* and I wanted to elaborate why it is the primary sense by contrasting it with the “*logos* as assertion” using the criteria of “state-of-mind” (the existential disclosure of “being-there” together with understanding). In this context, I discussed the primordially of talk over assertion in the context of communication, and from the aspect of assertion the modification of “as-structure” revealed that again it is less primordial than “*logos* as talk”. Heidegger suggests that “(*logos*) discourse as talk is equiprimordially constituting the being of “there” together with understanding and state-of-mind. He then further carries

the discussion to the phenomenon of falling as expressed in idle talk as a phenomenal confirmation of the analysis. I didn't cover this issue, as it falls outside the scope of my thesis; nonetheless I believe that it deserves to be studied in a separate work, in a framework which includes the discussion of "they-self" and the question of authenticity.

## **(ii) The Broader Project**

This study should be regarded as one piece of a larger project I am interested in, and it is clear that there are many questions that remain to be pursued in the framework of this broader project. In the following concluding paragraphs, I would like to sketch the outline of this broader project, and talk about the questions that remained outside the scope of my thesis, as possible future research directions.

Perhaps the ultimate question I am interested in exploring in Heidegger's *Being and Time* can be characterized as the problem of authenticity. What could be the authentic relation to Being? The temporality of Being is such that *Dasein* understands its Being outside of itself and *Dasein* comports itself towards its Being. The authenticity of *Dasein* is that it is inauthentic in the sense of "Being-one's self". *Being and Time* is an exposition of *Dasein's* inauthenticity. It is interesting to examine what Heidegger has to say about the authentic relation to Being in his late period and to see the link -or the gap- between the two periods.

There are also other pieces of the broader project that remained outside the scope of my thesis study. For example, the phenomenon of *Gelassenheit* (releasement, letting be) is one such piece. I dealt with understanding the link between “letting something be involved” with the existential structure of understanding but this is quite different in the sense of ‘letting be’ in late Heidegger.

Yet another piece is the modification of “as-structure”, from “*hermeneutical* ‘as’” to “*apophantical* ‘as’”, which can be seen as a shift from Platonic dialectic to propositional logic founded by Aristotle. In relation to this issue is Heidegger's treatment of “falling” and his analysis of *Plato's Sophist*. Although in *Being and Time* Heidegger says that by the expression of “falling” he doesn't mean ‘falling from a higher self’, both in *Plato's Sophist* and *An Introduction to Western metaphysics* there are proclamings by him in the contrary direction. I think *Being and Time* can be deciphered by a parallel reading of Heidegger's *Plato's Sophist* focusing on this issue.

I think it is worth exploring the issues, “*Dasein-with*”, “*Being-with*”, and “*Being-one's-self*” in a detailed way focusing on the notion of authenticity. *Dasein* is authentically outside of itself. This is the facticity of *Dasein*. Is there a possibility of authentic Being? Does it start with the awareness of the facticity of *Dasein*? Heidegger defines projection as Being-free for one's own potentiality-for-Being. So what is the relation between the modification of “as-structure” with its effect on closing *Dasein* off the possibilities of its own Being? What is the significance of this in terms of Being-free for one's own

potentiality-for-Being? If I'm outside of myself in Being in the world as my authentic existence, then how shall I connect this situation with "Being-with" and "Being-one's-self"? What is my relation with "Being-with" Heidegger describes the inauthentic situation of *Dasein* but leaves out the essential issues on the authentic relation to one's Being.

In this project, I mainly focused on the existential constitution of "being-there"- as disclosed in understanding- and didn't take up the issue of everyday Being of "there"- the phenomenon of "falling"- as a manifestation of the thematical analysis. The demonstration of Heidegger's project of showing that "discourse as talk" manifesting the existential state of *Dasein* "thrown projection" in idle talk, ambiguity, and curiosity in everydayness is left out of the scope of this work, because I limited the scope of the study to formal aspects of how Heidegger uncovers the existentiality of understanding and how it grounds the discourse.

### **(iii) Final Remarks**

I started this thesis by stating that Heidegger's claim that *logos* is existentially grounded in understanding is central to Being and Time. The issue of so-called 'actuality' and its connection with the 'linear conception of time' *versus* "possibilities as possibilities" and its connection with "temporality" must be reconsidered as an important result. The "as-structure" uncovered by Heidegger changes the traditional point of view radically. Of

course, the question of 'actuality' is a deep issue that has to be explored separately.

Nevertheless, in conclusion, I want to underline two related points that come out of this thesis study:

First, the exposition of assertion as being grounded in understanding together with state-of-mind (mood) shows a distorted picture in how we interpret ourselves in terms of 'rationality'. This is because theoretical assertions are also grounded in this existentials but the predominance of traditional logic is still there. I suggest that rationality in a real sense is the *awareness* of this fact and remember that logic is only a tool not an aim or a standard for objectivity.

Secondly and finally, the hidden 'as' in the *copula* hides away the "possibilities as possibilities". Awareness of the "as-structure" can be seen as the clue that nothing is determined and final. It reminds us the incompleteness of ourselves as constantly coming towards our *Being*. The hidden 'as' is a reminder of this fact.

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