

**METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FREUDIAN PSYCHOLOGY:  
A TRANSCENDENTAL RECONSIDERATION**

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## ABSTRACT

### **Metaphysical Foundation of Freudian Psychology: A Transcendental Reconsideration**

by

Ayfer Dost

In the present thesis we compare the metaphysical foundations of Kant's ontology (as it is given in Kant's First Critique) and Freud's psycho-analytic theory. This comparison involves an investigation of the understanding of soul in a theoretical framework in view of these two approaches. In that study we try to show that the foundations of psycho-analytic theory partially and ontologically rests on the elements of the transcendental philosophy and that psycho-analytic theory also contains elements which appear to be complementary to Kantian metaphysics.

We can summarize the conclusion of this investigation in the following way: In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant aims at an ontological investigation of the *Gegenstand(s)* whose source lies in the (outer) thing-in-itself. For this reason, his understanding and theoretical constitution of soul in the First Critique is limited to the consideration of the soul as the ground of the possibility of the knowledge of things that appear in space as substantial entities. Yet such a constitution renders the knowledge of the soul, that is the science of psychology as theoretically impossible. In this regard we conclude that by including the (inner) thing-in-itself, that is the id (it) into the theoretical framework of the constitution of the soul and by introducing the capacity of the memory as a transcendental capacity into the constitution of the mind, psycho-analytic theory extends the limits of transcendental philosophy and thereby provides a theoretical ground for the possibility of psychology as a science proper.

## ÖZET

### Freud Psikolojisinin Metafizik Temelleri: *Transcendental* Bir Yaklaşım

Bu tez Kant'ın *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi* adlı kitabında ortaya koyduğu şekliyle Kant ontolojisinin ve Freud psikolojisinin metafizik temellerinin bir karşılaştırmasını yapmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu karşılaştırma her iki yaklaşımdaki 'ruh' anlayışının dayandığı kuramsal çerçeveyi ele almaktadır. Burada amacımız psikanalitik kuramın temellerinin kısmen ve ontolojik olarak *transcendental* felsefenin unsurlarına dayandığını ve psikanalitik kuramın Kantçı metafiziği tamamlayan unsurlar içerdiğini göstermeye çalışmaktadır.

Bu karşılaştırmanın sonucunu şu şekilde özetleyebiliriz: *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'nde Kant, kaynağı (dışsal) kendinde-şeyde yatan temsillerin ontolojisine ilişkin bir araştırma ortaya koymaktadır. Bu sebeple buradaki 'ruh' anlayışı ve ruhun kuramsal olarak ele alınışı uzayda töz (cevher) olarak temsil edilen şeylerin bilgisinin olanaklarını sağlayan bir zemin olarak sınırlanmıştır. Fakat ruhun kuramsal olarak bu şekilde ele alınışı ruhun kendisinin bilgisini yani, psikolojinin Kantçı anlamda kuramsal bir bilim olmasını olanaksız kılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, psikanalitik kuram (içsel) kendinde-şeyi, yani 'id'i, ruhun yapısını ele alan kuramsal çerçeve, hafıza kapasitesini de *transcendental* bir kapasite olarak zihnin yapısı içine almakla *transcendental* felsefenin sınırlarını genişletmiş ve böylece de psikolojinin bir bilim olması için gerekli kuramsal zemini sağlamıştır.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

In the present thesis, we aim at an examination of the anatomy of soul<sup>1</sup> in view of the transcendental philosophy of Kant, as it is pictured in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and of the psycho-analytic theory of Freud. Our investigation is directed to see the theoretical ground of the apprehension of 'I' with respect to transcendental philosophy and Freudian psychology. In this examination, we will pursue the question what 'I' is, and whether we can attain the knowledge of the 'I', and if possible how can it be an *Objekt* of a science on theoretical grounds.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant aims at eliminating the dogmatic elements from the field of metaphysics. Kant states that the dogmatic trends which stamped the field of metaphysics up until his time, left the human reason in darkness, contradiction and obscurity as to solutions of the metaphysical problems. In fact, it is due to the nature of human reason itself that reason lost itself in these endless controversies in the field of philosophy. The nature of human reason is naturally disposed to ask questions and to try to find out the answers which transcend its limits and powers. Therefore, it is necessary that reason should first of all determine its limits and powers as to what it can know and to what extent it can expect to extend its knowledge, that is, it should give a 'critique' of itself as a faculty of grasping (knowledge).

Apparently, such a critique involves an ontological investigation into the nature of *Objekt*.<sup>2</sup> Kant states that the possibility of an *Objekt* rests on the constitution of human reason as

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<sup>1</sup> In its original German text, '*Seele*' is the correspondent term for the term 'soul'.

<sup>2</sup> In the original German edition, Kant uses the term 'object' in two different senses. For that reason he uses terms '*Gegenstand*' and '*Objekt*'; the difference lies in that, an *Objekt* is a unity within a judgement together with a concept. A *Gegenstand* on the other hand is that which corresponds to an *Objekt* in the forms of sensibility. Both of

a faculty of grasping (knowledge). Before Kant's First Critique, a dogmatic trend in metaphysics rested on the assumption that the mind<sup>3</sup> should conform to the constitution of a *Gegenstand*. However, regarding the *Gegenstand(s)* of experience as things-in-themselves brought about endless controversies as to how we attain the grasping (knowledge) of what is a priori in them. On the other hand, if we accept that a *Gegenstand* should conform to the constitution of the mind, this *Gegenstand* will not be viewed as a thing-in-itself but as an appearance of something which we do not grasp in itself. In that case: "*This would agree better with what is desired, namely that it should be possible to have knowledge of Gegenstand(s) a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given.*"<sup>4</sup>

The main aim of Kant's inquiry, in that sense, is to expose the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience and of synthetic a priori judgements. In that sense, it is mainly an ontological inquiry into the nature of the *Gegenstand*.

However, this inquiry -although ontology is its first concern- necessitates an inquiry regarding the nature of the constitution of the pure reason (*Vernunft*), since it is considered that a *Gegenstand* should conform to the constitution of the mind and in that sense, it must be viewed as an appearance, not as a thing-in-itself. This means that all our grasping is grounded in the soul; that is, all conditions that provide the ground for the appearances as a determinate *Gegenstand* be given in our intuition and lie a priori in the mind. Hence this is an investigation of what is objective within what is subjective.<sup>5</sup>

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these terms are translated into English as 'object'. In the present thesis, we want to preserve the distinction made by Kant, and for that reason we will use the original German words throughout the thesis.

<sup>3</sup> In the original German edition Kant uses the term '*Gemüt*' for the term 'mind'. It is necessary to note that in the contemporary usage, mind does not include the capacity of sensibility in the Kantian sense of the term. In Kant's ontology on the other hand, *Gemüt* (mind) includes the capacity of sensibility together with the capacity of thought.

<sup>4</sup> Kant Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. by Norman Kemp Smith, 1950, London, Macmillan, 1990, B-XVI

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, A-90

'Critique' of pure reason is, therefore: ".....a call to reason to undertake a new and most difficult of all its task, namely that of self-knowledge, and to institute a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims, and dismiss all groundless pretentions, not by despotic decrees but in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable laws..."<sup>6</sup>

This task necessitates the investigation of the soul with respect to its capacities which serve as the transcendental ground of the possibility of experience and of grasping. It involves determining the limits and the scope of the employment of pure reason, in order to determine what we can grasp independently of experience. In that connection, it has two parts; in Kant's own words: "*The one refers to the Gegenstand(s) of pure understanding and is intended to expound and render intelligible the objective validity of its a priori concepts. It is therefore essential to my purpose. The other seeks to investigate the pure reason itself, its possibility and cognitive faculties upon which it rests; so deals with the subjective aspect. Although this latter exposition is of great importance for my purposes, it does not form an essential part of it. For the chief question is always this:-what and how much can the understanding and reason know apart from all experience? not:-how the faculty of thought itself is possible?...*"<sup>7</sup>

Hence the task of self-knowledge in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is restricted to the exposition of the constitution of the mind as it provides the ground for the possibility of grasping a priori; that is, this task is an inquiry as to the function of the capacities in question in giving rise to grasping, but not as to their nature.

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<sup>6</sup> ibid.,A-XI

<sup>7</sup> ibid.,A-XVII



The critique of the faculty of grasping and the limits put to its employment brings about important consequences as to the possibility of the knowledge of the self, that is, the 'I' itself. In transcendental philosophy the apprehension of the 'I' has a fundamental place; it is the ground of the possibility of the faculty of grasping (knowledge), that is of the mind itself. The constitution of the subjective conditions renders the grasping of the soul itself impossible. Self as the pure *Objekt* of the reason can only be thought but cannot be given an intuition as a *Gegenstand* and therefore cannot be a subject matter of a natural (rational) science. This implies that psychology cannot be a natural science.

As opposed to this result, Freud claims that psychology is a natural science. Kant's conclusion that psychology is not a natural science is a consequence of his understanding of the soul and his constitution and of the limitation of human reason as the faculty of knowledge. The theoretical framework of transcendental philosophy of Kant does not provide the knowability of the soul itself, and therefore does not provide a theoretical ground for the possibility of psychology as a science. In this regard, Freud's claim as to the possibility of psychology as a natural science necessitates a critique of the anatomy of the soul and the limits of the constitution of the theoretical reason of the transcendental philosophy of Kant. Through the criticism of Kant's understanding of experience and his constitution of the anatomy of soul, the theoretical framework of transcendental philosophy is so extended by Freud that it embraces the theoretical grounds of the possibility of psychic experiences and thereby includes psychology as well as one of the natural sciences.

In that connection, our aim in the present thesis is to show how the psycho-analytic theory of Freud extends the theoretical framework of the transcendental philosophy of Kant and thereby to show the metaphysical grounds which the psycho-analytic theory as a science rests on.

In the second chapter, we expose the anatomy of soul in view of transcendental philosophy. In section II. 1, an exposition of the capacities of the mind is given as to their function in providing the ground for the possibility of grasping (knowledge). In section II. 2, the significance of the transcendental apperception in transcendental philosophy as the ultimate ground of the possibility of the mind is discussed. In section II. 3, the conditions and the limits of the theoretical employment of reason and in this regard the conditions of the knowability is shown; in that, the exclusion of the knowledge of the soul from the theoretical possibilities of reason is discussed.

In chapter three, the anatomy of the soul in view of the psycho-analytic theory of Freud is exposed. In section III. 1, the three agencies of the soul, that is the 'it', the 'I', and the 'above-I' are exposed as to their nature. In section III. 2, the three systems of the soul, that is the preconsciousness, the consciousness, and the unconscious, which characterizes the psychical experiences, are exposed. In section III. 3, the importance of the capacity of memory in view of psychic experiences, is discussed.

Chapter four involves a comparison of the views of Kant and Freud in view of the soul, and the criticism of the psycho-analytic theory against the theoretical framework of Kant. In the last chapter, we give a brief summary of our discussion.

## II. THE ANATOMY OF SOUL IN TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

### II. 1. THE CAPACITIES OF THE SOUL IN TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

In transcendental philosophy, grasping (knowledge)<sup>8</sup> of a *Gegenstand* is made possible through the objective conditions which lie a priori in the mind. Mind is the unity of the capacities of sensibility, imagination and understanding. An empirical representation can be a *Gegenstand* for us if it conforms to the objective constitution of the mind; that is, if it is subject to the threefold synthesis performed by these three faculties.

#### II. 1. 1. The Capacity of Sensibility

There exists no relation of mind to the thing in itself apart from the faculty of sensibility which is the capacity through which a *Gegenstand* is given to us. Only under the condition that *Gegenstand(s)* are given, is an intuition possible. For a *Gegenstand* to be given, the faculty of sensibility should be affected in a certain way. It is "*the capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by Gegenstand(s)..*"<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> In Kant's transcendental philosophy, understanding is entitled as the 'faculty of knowledge'. It is an active faculty and its acts are synthetic; in that act, it brings various representations under one concept and gives them a unity. The German word for 'understanding' is '*Verstand*' coming from the verb '*Verstehen*'. *Verstehen*, within the context of transcendental philosophy, rather means grasping, capturing or comprehending.

The main concern in transcendental philosophy is ontological; in that connection, in the present thesis, instead of the term 'knowledge', the term 'grasping' is preferred, since it connotes the ontological concern. *ibid.*, B-103

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, A-19/B-33

The effect of a *Gegenstand* on the faculty of sensibility is entitled sensation.<sup>10</sup> By means of this capacity, which is receptive in its very nature, we receive impressions from an *unknown* source. The intuition which arises out of this affection is called empirical and the *Gegenstand* of empirical intuition which is not yet determined is called an appearance.<sup>11</sup>

One of the most important presuppositions of transcendental philosophy is the claim that our mode of grasping is restricted to the constitution of the mind; hence, what we acquire through sensation cannot be regarded as something given as it is in itself but as conforming to the objective conditions of the capacities of the mind. In this sense, what is given in our intuition through sensation is called a *representation* and the capacity may be entitled as the *faculty of representation*.<sup>12</sup>

A representation can be pure or empirical; an empirical representation given by sensation has two aspects; one is the impression that comes from the thing in itself and the other is the objective conditions that lie ready in the mind to order the incoming impressions in a certain way. Kant calls the first constituent of appearances matter and the latter the form of appearances.<sup>13</sup> A pure representation on the other hand, contains nothing that belongs to sensation. However, it is the a priori forms of sensibility that make both pure and empirical representations possible.

In transcendental aesthetic, which is the science of the principles of the capacity of sensibility, Kant investigates the a priori forms of sensibility, their ontological significance in providing the ground for the possibility of experience and of a priori synthetic judgements.

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<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, A-20/B-34

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*

In that sense, space and time are considered to be the two pure forms of sensible intuition. As pure forms which lie antecedently in the mind, they condition synthetic a priori grasping and experience.<sup>14</sup> Space is the form of outer sense, by means of which *Gegenstand(s)* are represented as outside of us.<sup>15</sup> Space as a pure form gives the rule of coordination; any representation, be it pure or empirical in its origin, is given in the outer sense as being coordinated. The principle of coordination gives the rule in accordance with which representations are ordered alongside one another outwardly.<sup>16</sup> Since through the pure intuition of space every possible relation of coordination is given, "*the form of appearances can be given prior to actual perceptions.*"<sup>17</sup>

Through space only, things are given to us as outer appearances and we can have a priori representations only as determinations in space. Other representations that have their origin in sensations only, like color, taste, feelings of pleasure and pain can in no way be represented a priori. Space is the necessary condition that provides the ground for things to be given to us as *Gegenstand(s)*, whereas colors and tastes cannot provide such conditions.<sup>18</sup>

Time, on the other hand, is the form of inner sense. By means of inner sense, mind intuitively its inner states. All representations, be they *Gegenstand(s)* of outer sense or not, are determinations of mind and therefore belong to the inner sense. Time "*is the immediate condition of inner appearances (of our souls), and thereby the mediate condition of outer appearances.*"<sup>19</sup>

However, inner sense cannot give the intuition of soul as a *Gegenstand*. Although the determinations of outer sense have to be given as determinations of inner sense in order to be

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<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*, A-22/B-36

<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*, A-22/B-37

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*, A-23/B-38

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*, A-26/B-42

<sup>18</sup> *ibid.*, A 28-30/B 44-45

<sup>19</sup> *ibid.*, A-34/B-50

grasped as *Gegenstand(s)*, the very determinations of inner sense themselves, that is the inner states, cannot be given outwardly.<sup>20</sup> Inner intuitions are not conditioned by spatial relations.

Since inner sense stands under the formal condition of time, things are represented in time relations, that is, as being simultaneous with or after one another. Neither space nor time can be intuited in terms of the other. As different determinations of space are coexistent, different determinations of time are successive.<sup>21</sup> Time gives the rule in accordance with which different representations are given as one after the other.<sup>22</sup>

Space and time are not inherent in the thing-in-itself. They are not things in themselves either but only the objective conditions of human intuition which is always sensible.<sup>23</sup> They lie a priori for the possibility of *Gegenstand(s)* in the mind, and serve as the ground for the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements.<sup>24</sup> Space and time are not concepts but intuitions, since from mere concepts only analysis is possible and analysis cannot give us any *grasp* of a *Gegenstand*.<sup>25</sup>

These subjective conditions have objective validity insofar as they are considered as inhering only in representations and not in the thing-in-itself. In this sense, space and time have empirical reality. However they are transcendently ideal when we remove the condition that space and time have absolute reality.<sup>26</sup>

Things do conform to our mode of grasping them; hence we can only grasp them as they appear to us. Within the limits of the faculty of sensibility, things can be represented and grasped

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<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*, A-33/B 49-50

<sup>21</sup> *ibid.*, A-41/B-58

<sup>22</sup> *ibid.*, A-32/B-49

<sup>23</sup> *ibid.*, A-39/B-56

<sup>24</sup> *ibid.*, A-39/B-56

<sup>25</sup> *ibid.*, A 40-41/B-57

<sup>26</sup> *ibid.*, A 35-36/B 52-53

by us only under the condition that they do conform to the formal conditions of sensibility, that is, space and time.<sup>27</sup>

Space and time are the formal conditions of the receptivity of mind, and they contain a manifold of pure intuition. For this manifold to be an intuition, be it pure or empirical, it must be gathered, put together, and combined, that is, it must be synthesized. Kant calls this act as the synthesis of apprehension. In this act, synthesis is directed to intuition and through the unity of this act a manifold of intuition can be represented as a unity of intuition in space and be contained in a single moment of time. This synthesis is employed pure, if it is exercised upon the pure manifold of space and time.<sup>28</sup>

## II. 1. 2. The Capacity of Imagination

In the threefold synthesis, first, the mind is affected in a certain way. In this affection what is given first is an appearance.<sup>29</sup> As a result of being brought into consciousness, these appearances are perceived. Without being consciously recognized, appearances would not be determined as *Gegenstand(s)*.<sup>30</sup>

The capacity of sensibility, as we stated above, is receptive in its very nature and hence it is a passive capacity. The synthesis of apprehension, therefore, has to be performed by an active faculty. Kant states: “...to this faculty I give the title *imagination*. Its action when directed upon perceptions, I entitle *apprehension*. Since imagination has to bring the manifold of intuition into

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<sup>27</sup> *ibid.*, A 42-43/B-60

<sup>28</sup> *ibid.*, A 98-100

<sup>29</sup> *ibid.*, A-120

<sup>30</sup> *ibid.*

*the form of an image, it must previously have taken the impressions up into its activity, that is have apprehended them.*"<sup>31</sup>

Sensibility is the capacity which supplies only the material of impressions. However, sensibility cannot combine this material into a unity to form *Gegenstand(s)*. Such a synthetic act requires the act of the capacity of imagination. The manifold apprehended in this act has to be put together with the succeeding representations to form a unity. This act is called the reproductive synthesis of imagination.<sup>32</sup>

The act of reproduction is the result of the empirical employment of the capacity of imagination. Although sensible representations contain empirical elements as to their material as to their form they are grounded on a priori forms and rules. In that sense, the possibility of experience and grasping requires that which is apprehended in the form of inner sense, that is in time, to be reproduced. Otherwise, if what is apprehended through time is dropped and not kept in unity with the succeeding representations, no experience at all would be possible. Kant states: *"Their reproduction must,... conform to a rule, in accordance with which a representation connects in imagination with some preference to another. This subjective and empirical ground of reproduction according to rules is what is called the association of representations."*<sup>33</sup>

Association is not an accidental employment of imagination. Since it rests on an objective ground, in reproductive employment of imagination one representation associates with another in a certain way rather than in an accidental way.<sup>34</sup> Experience, the empirical rule of association, shows us that one representation is followed by another customarily. However, necessity cannot

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<sup>31</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> *ibid.*, A-121

<sup>33</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *ibid.*, A-122



be based on custom. All necessity should be based on a priori conditions. If so, what then is the underlying principle of association?

All appearances are subject to a rule which conditions this manifold in a uniform way. It gives unity to appearances. This universal condition is the *transcendental affinity* which makes empirical association possible, so that appearances stand in necessary connections with each other.<sup>35</sup>

This objective ground is what gives unity to all appearances, hence it is itself grounded on the principle of the unity of apperception. On the basis of the principle of the unity of apperception, all appearances are represented in the mind as belonging to a consciousness. Since they are connected in this synthetic unity, "*affinity of all appearances, near or remote, is a necessary consequence of a synthesis of imagination which is grounded on a priori rules.*"<sup>36</sup>

The function of imagination, insofar as it aims at the necessary unity in the synthesis, is entitled transcendental. If the synthesis is directed to the pure manifold of space and time, it is pure, and if there is an element in the synthesis that comes from sensation it is reproductive, that is empirical. Since the whole activity of the faculty of imagination is synthetic, all of its activity, be it productive or reproductive, rests on this transcendental function of it. And this function itself rests on the necessary synthetic unity of the pure apperception.<sup>37</sup>

For experience to be possible, pure concepts of understanding have to be applied to appearances; however, such an application is possible through the activity of the faculty of the

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<sup>35</sup> *ibid.*, A 113-114

<sup>36</sup> *ibid.*, A-123

<sup>37</sup> *ibid.*

imagination which is in relation to the two heterogeneous faculties of the mind. Only by means of these concepts appearances belong to a grasping.<sup>38</sup>

Imagination, as the faculty which gives a corresponding intuition to the concepts of understanding, is in collaboration with the faculty of sensibility. Its activity is spontaneous; in that sense what it produces or reproduces cannot be 'determinable' like sensible intuitions. Its activity is 'determinative' in accordance with the rules dictated by the understanding.

An intuition and a concept can be put in relation to each other by means of a third element which is homogeneous with both of them.<sup>39</sup> This representation is called a transcendental schema. Since it is homogeneous both with a concept and an intuition, it is both intellectual and sensible. It is pure and has no empirical content. By means of these pure schemata, which are the a priori elements of the pure faculty of imagination, an *Objekt* is said to be contained under a concept: "*Thus the empirical concept of plate is homogeneous with the pure geometrical concept of a circle. The roundness which is thought in the latter can be intuited in the former.*"<sup>40</sup> However, categories themselves cannot be intuited since they are heterogeneous with the sensible intuitions.

Then, what is a schema? The formal condition of sensibility, namely that of inner sense is the universal formal condition of the applicability of concepts of understanding to any *Gegenstand*. Kant states, "*this formal and pure condition of sensibility to which the employment of the concepts of understanding is restricted, we shall entitle the schema of the concept.*"<sup>41</sup> The schemata are the pure forms of the faculty of imagination. In schematism, no special image is

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<sup>38</sup> *ibid.*, A-125

<sup>39</sup> *ibid.*, A-137/B-176

<sup>40</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> *ibid.*, A-140

produced, since such an act aims at no specific image. Hence, “*a schema has to be distinguished from an image.*” It is schemata, not images of *Gegenstand(s)* which underlie our pure concepts.<sup>42</sup>

### II. 1. 3. The Capacity of Understanding

In the three-fold synthesis, the function of the imagination is to reproduce the images of representations through time. Nevertheless, if we are not conscious of the representations reproduced in each moment of time as the same representation, it would be a new representation that is apprehended in each moment of time. In that case it would be impossible to generate the apprehension of the same representation through time.<sup>43</sup>

Kant states: “*The word ‘concept’ might itself suggests this remark. For this unitary consciousness is what combines the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon also reproduced into one representation. This consciousness may often be only faint, so that we do not connect it with the act itself, that is not in any direct manner with the generation of the representation, but only with the outcome (that which is thereby represented).*”<sup>44</sup> Without this consciousness the grasping itself would not be possible.

What then is the function of the understanding in this picture in giving rise to grasping? Kant states that sensibility and understanding are the two main sources from which our grasping stems; in that, sensibility is the condition for the “*receptivity of impressions*” and understanding is “*the power of grasping a *Gegenstand* through these representations*”.<sup>45</sup> These two capacities

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<sup>42</sup> *ibid.*, A-141

<sup>43</sup> *ibid.*, A-103

<sup>44</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> *ibid.*, A-50/B-74

are indispensably related to each other such that without intuition, which is provided by sensibility, and without concepts, which are provided by understanding no grasping would be possible.<sup>46</sup>

Intuition and the concepts are the fundamental elements of the mind which makes grasping, be it pure or empirical, possible.<sup>47</sup> Kant claims that grasping necessitates that intuition and concepts be related to one another, since “*thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without content are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the *Gegenstand* to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts.*”<sup>48</sup>

Understanding, in its very nature, is an active faculty; and its act is spontaneous. What understanding does in its spontaneous act is to *judge by means of concepts*.<sup>49</sup> Kant states that all activity of the understanding can be reduced to judgements and accordingly understanding can be entitled as *the faculty of judgement*.<sup>50</sup> A judgement is a synthetic act of the understanding. For the understanding to perform its activity, the faculty of sensibility should present a manifold of appearances not yet determined as a *Gegenstand*. For the understanding to grasp this manifold, it is necessary that this manifold “*be gone through in a certain way, taken up and connected*”<sup>51</sup> Kant calls this act as synthesis: “*By synthesis, in its most general sense I understand the act of putting different representations together, and grasping what is manifold in them in one act of knowledge.*”<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> *ibid.*, A-50/B-74

<sup>47</sup> *ibid.*, A-51/B-75

<sup>48</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> *ibid.*, A-68/B-93

<sup>50</sup> *ibid.*, A-69/B-94

<sup>51</sup> *ibid.*, A-77/B-102

<sup>52</sup> *ibid.*, A-77/B-103

In a judgement, therefore, various representations are brought under a unity. Kant calls this unity *the pure concepts of the understanding*. They apply a priori to the manifold in intuition and thereby determine representations in a certain way.<sup>53</sup> Kant calls these pure concepts as categories and list them as follows:

The category of Quantity: Unity, plurality, totality

The category of Quality: Reality, negation, limitation

The category of Relation: Of inherence and subsistence, of causality and dependence, of community

The category of Modality: Possibility - impossibility, existence - non-existence, necessity - contingency<sup>54</sup>

Kant states that the enumeration of these categories of understanding is not a random listing of some concepts based on induction. On the contrary, they lie a priori in the mind just as the pure forms of sensibility, and therefore determine experience objectively.<sup>55</sup> Kant states: "*Indeed, it is because it contains these concepts that it is called pure understanding; for by them alone it can understand anything in the manifold of intuition, that is think an Objekt of intuition.*"<sup>56</sup>

In the threefold synthesis, first sensibility receives impressions. Then the manifold of intuition is synthesized by the imagination. However, for it be rendered as grasping the manifold

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<sup>53</sup> *ibid.*, A-79/B-105

<sup>54</sup> *ibid.*, A-80/B-106

<sup>55</sup> *ibid.*, A-81/B-107

Kant states that categories are the most primitive concepts of the understanding. From these pure concepts of the understanding it is possible to derive some subsidiary concepts. "*The categories, when combined with the modes of sensibility, or with one another, yield a large number of derivative a priori concepts*". (A82/B-108) Kant calls these concepts as *ontological manuals*, such as the concepts of force, motion, etc..

<sup>56</sup> *ibid.*, A-80/B-106

of intuition has to be recognized under a concept.<sup>57</sup> In this regard all appearances have a necessary relation to understanding. Kant states: "*Actual experience, which is constituted by apprehension, association (reproduction), and finally recognition of appearances, contains in recognition, the last and highest of these merely empirical elements of experience, certain concepts which render possible the formal unity of experience, and therewith all objective validity (truth) of empirical knowledge. The grounds of the recognition of the manifold, so far as they concern solely the form of an appearance in general, are the categories.*"<sup>58</sup>

The last step in the threefold synthesis is entitled as *the synthesis of recognition in a concept*; in that the manifold of intuition is brought under the unity of a concept. A concept is a unitary consciousness.<sup>59</sup> Through this unitary consciousness a representation is said to be grasped as a *Gegenstand*.

Understanding, as a capacity, in its very nature, is the spontaneity of grasping. Its activity is called spontaneous in distinction from the receptivity of sensibility. It is a power of thought, faculty of judgement and of concepts. It is also the faculty of rules: "*Sensibility gives us forms (of intuitions), but understanding gives us rules. The latter is always occupied in investigating appearances, in order to detect some rule in them.*"<sup>60</sup> In this regard understanding is *the lawgiver of nature*. However, nature defined as "*the synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances according to rules*" is possible through the unity of apperception.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> *ibid.*, A-78-79/B-104

<sup>58</sup> *ibid.*, A-125

<sup>59</sup> *ibid.*, A-103

<sup>60</sup> *ibid.*, A-126

<sup>61</sup> *ibid.*, A-127

It should be noted that in the ontology of Kant, synthesis, the act of understanding has an important place. It is through this act that a *Gegenstand* is determined in intuition, and the *Objekt* is thought. Through the combination of the manifold under the unity of the rule dictated by the understanding we grasp a *Gegenstand*. Combination requires a manifold and its synthesis. However, it also requires *the concept of unity of that manifold*.<sup>62</sup> Kant states: "*Combination is a representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. The representation of this unity cannot, therefore, arise out of the combination. On the contrary, it is what, by adding itself to the representation of the manifold, first makes the concept of the combination. This unity, which precedes all concepts of combination, is not the category of the unity; for all categories are grounded in logical functions of judgement and in these functions combination, and therefore unity of given concepts is already thought.*"<sup>63</sup>

Apparently, the unity of the concepts of the understanding and the synthetic unity of the act of combination itself is not original to the capacity of understanding. There is a higher principle which makes the concepts and their employment, that is, the capacity of understanding itself possible.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> *ibid.*, B-130-131

<sup>63</sup> *ibid.*, B-131

<sup>64</sup> *ibid.*, B-131

## II. 2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSCENDENTAL APPERCEPTION IN TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

In transcendental philosophy, mind is considered as the unity of the capacities of sensibility, imagination and understanding. The constitution of the mind is such that it provides the objective conditions that make experience and synthetic a priori grasping possible. In its very nature, mind provides the ground for the possibility of the grasping of a *Gegenstand*. In this regard mind is constituted in such a manner that it is directed to the apprehension of the representations whose *material* source lies *outside* of the soul.

As we stated in section II.1 of this thesis, apprehension and hence experience is possible through the activity of the mind. In that act, the manifold of intuition is provided by sensibility; however for this manifold to be grasped and thought, it is necessary that it should be related to the mere apperception '*I think*'.<sup>65</sup> Anything, to be a representation, should be accompanied by the consciousness 'I'; in that it must belong to a self-consciousness.<sup>66</sup> Kant states: "*All the manifold of intuition therefore has a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found. But this representation is an act of spontaneity, that is, it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it pure apperception, to distinguish it from the empirical apperception, or again, original apperception, because it is that self consciousness which, while generating the self consciousness 'I think' (a representation which must be capable*

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<sup>65</sup> *ibid.*, B-131/132

<sup>66</sup> *ibid.*, B-132



*of accompanying all other representations, and which in all consciousness is one and the same), cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation.*"<sup>67</sup>

An act of understanding is a judgement. In a judgement, the manifold of representations received by the sensibility and reproduced by imagination is brought under the unity of a concept, and thereby is grasped as a *Gegenstand*. Grasping requires that the manifold of intuition provided by sensibility be united under a concept. As we know, a concept is a unitary consciousness; in that the unification of representations under a concept through the act of understanding brings out the unity of consciousness.<sup>68</sup> Kant states: "*It is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of representations to a Gegenstand, and therefore their objective validity and the fact that they are modes of knowledge; and upon it therefore rests the very possibility of the understanding.*"<sup>69</sup> It is through this act that the self becomes conscious of itself, since to bring the manifold of intuition under concepts means to bring this manifold under the unity of consciousness. Through the threefold synthesis which is performed through the act of the mind therefore, experience and empirical consciousness arise. At this point it is, therefore, necessary to elaborate the relation between experience, empirical consciousness and the transcendental apperception.

In transcendental philosophy, transcendental apperception is the ultimate ground of the possibility of the capacities of the mind and the activity of it performed by means of these three capacities. Transcendental apperception "*is a condition which precedes experience and furthermore which makes experience itself possible.*"<sup>70</sup> Kant states that: "*This pure original*

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<sup>67</sup> *ibid.*, B-132

<sup>68</sup> *ibid.*, B-137

<sup>69</sup> *ibid.*, B-138

<sup>70</sup> *ibid.*, A-107

*unchangeable consciousness I shall name transcendental apperception.*"<sup>71</sup> There can be no grasping and thus no experience without this pure consciousness.

Apperception is the apprehension of the self itself. It is an act of thought; however, this thought should not be confused with the act of thinking performed by the faculty of understanding. In that act, neither is there a manifold that is to be synthesized in accordance with concepts, nor is the 'I' itself subject to the determinations of categories. The bare consciousness 'I' is prior to the possibility of categories which are pure forms of the faculty of understanding and to the a priori and a posteriori representations in the forms of intuition determined by means of the concepts of understanding. In that sense, transcendental (pure) apperception, that is, apprehension of the pure self itself is prior to experience. It is fundamental for the possibility of the a priori conditions of experience and of a priori grasping. In this regard it is the transcendental ground of the a priori forms of the capacities of the mind and the acts performed by it. What is apprehended in that act is the transcendental (pure) self.<sup>72</sup>

It is important to remember at this point that the main concern of transcendental philosophy is ontological; one of its aims is to render intelligible the nature of a *Gegenstand*. In this regard it is an inquiry into the nature of the soul only as to its constitution which provides the grounds for the possibility of a *Gegenstand*. Therefore Kant investigates the mind, with respect to its capacities; and this investigation involves an inquiry into their nature with regard to their functions as providing the ground for the possibility of experience and of synthetic a priori grasping.

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<sup>71</sup> *ibid.*, A-107

<sup>72</sup> We interpret the transcendental and the pure self as the same thing.; therefore, in this thesis, we use terms transcendental self and pure self as equivalent terms.

As we stated above, soul which is considered as mind (that is, when it is considered through its act) provides the conditions that serve for the possibility of *Gegenstand(s)*, and of synthetic a priori grasping. Soul considered as pure self, on the other hand, is the '*transcendental and original condition*' which makes the mind itself possible. In transcendental philosophy, soul is considered through the capacities of sensibility, imagination and understanding. Kant restricts the investigation of the soul to the constitution of the mind. Within the limits of transcendental philosophy, any further inquiry into the nature of the soul, is not possible.

In this regard, theoretically speaking, the apprehension of the pure self -that is, transcendental apperception- is restricted to the mind which is open to the impressions coming from a source which is *outer* to the soul. There is an original apperception of the pure self which is prior to the activity of the mind. The transcendental self is the ground of the possibility of the a priori forms of the mind. The apprehension of the pure self, in that connection, is the apprehension of the unity of the forms of space and time and of the unity of the categories; it is the apprehension of the unity of the mind. It is an act of soul, which is prior to the act which brings out experience. There is no further ground for the apprehension of the pure self in transcendental philosophy.

This pure apperception is prior to experience, and it is the transcendental condition for the possibility of experience. As we stated above, experience is possible through the activity of the mind. In such an act, a representation appears through the forms of inner and outer senses; it is grasped through the threefold synthesis. It is important to note that, in transcendental philosophy experience is considered to be the apprehension of an empirical determination through the forms of inner and outer sense.

An impression, whose source lies always *out of* the soul, once received by the sensibility appears both in the form of inner and the outer sense. An empirical determination in space is subject to the principle of coordination, and every empirical determination is subject to the principle of subordination in time. The form of inner sense, that is time, has a special place in transcendental philosophy. It is, on the one hand, a transcendental element that provides a ground for the incoming impressions to be ordered in succession relations, and on the other hand, a condition for the apprehension of the empirical self. Our inner states appear only in the form of inner sense. They are only subject to temporal relations; in the outer sense no correlative representations of inner states exist. An empirical determination that appears in the form of outer sense on the other hand, has to be represented in the form of inner sense as well, to be grasped and be rendered as belonging to a consciousness. In this regard, there is an asymmetry between the conditions that provides the representability of an impression whose source is the *inside* and the *outside* of the soul.

The *outer* thing-in-itself and the soul are related to each other through the capacity of sensibility. Through this capacity, taken in the general sense and through the activity of the mind, what is transcendently ideal gains empirical reality; what is received from the *outer* thing-in-itself, which is in itself ungraspable, appears in the forms of sensibility as a representation and becomes a *Gegenstand* of our grasping. However, how the *inner* thing-in-itself and its empirical determinations are related to each other is not a concern for transcendental philosophy. The theoretical inquiry into the constitution of the mind does not establish such a relation.

The transcendental self and the empirical self are related to each other by means of the form of the inner sense. Transcendental self is the ground of the possibility of the form of the inner sense. The pure self itself is not subject to any of the a priori forms which it underlies as the transcendental ground. The unity of these pure forms and the synthetic unity of the representations determined by these forms come from the original synthetic unity of transcendental self. The unity of this consciousness is transcendental in the sense that it is the ground of the possibility of a priori grasping.<sup>73</sup> In this regard, it is the principle of unity, a principle which is fundamental to transcendental philosophy. Its unity is synthetic such that it is through this synthetic unity of the pure apperception that the consciousness of diverse representations through time is rendered as belonging to one and the same consciousness.<sup>74</sup> *“For otherwise, I should have as many-colored and diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious to myself.”*<sup>75</sup>

In this regard, the pure self does not appear as it is, since what appears to us, can only appear as a representation which conforms to the pure forms of sensibility. The transcendental self, therefore, is not subject to time. It is what gives synthetic unity to the form of time. In this regard, the form of time does not change, since it is grounded on an unchanging and abiding entity; only those representations that appear in the form of time can flow away and change. Since forms of sensibility derive their synthetic unity from pure self, I am conscious, as a unity, of the flow in time and of my empirical consciousness flowing through time, and hold the representations that appear in it as a unity belonging to myself.

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<sup>73</sup> *ibid.*, B-132

<sup>74</sup> *ibid.*, B-133

<sup>75</sup> *ibid.*, B-134

Kant states: “*Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical and always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances. Such consciousness is usually named inner sense or empirical apperception.*”<sup>76</sup> The empirical consciousness appears only in the form of inner sense. The inner sense represents ourselves to our consciousness only as we appear to ourselves not as we are in ourselves.<sup>77</sup> The empirical consciousness originates as a result of the activity of the understanding. The self becomes conscious to itself through this synthetic act of the understanding. It is in that sense Kant states that understanding determines the inner sense inwardly and thereby we are affected inwardly.<sup>78</sup>

Transcendental self cannot appear as it is in itself but as it is represented in the form of inner sense as accompanying each and every representation; empirical apperception or empirical consciousness, therefore is an empirical determination of the pure self in the form of inner sense.<sup>79</sup> This empirical determination is possible through the act of the mind; that is through experience. As we stated earlier, in transcendental philosophy the act of experiencing is the grasping of a representation through the forms of outer and inner sense. The act of grasping brings out with itself an empirical determination in the forms of sensibility, since without such a determination we cannot talk about the act of grasping.

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<sup>76</sup> *ibid.*, A-107

<sup>77</sup> *ibid.*, B-153

<sup>78</sup> *ibid.*, B-153

<sup>79</sup> By the expression ‘pure self appears in the inner sense or pure self gains empirical reality’ we mean that the I apprehends itself as grasping a *Gegenstand* which appears in the form of outer sense or as thinking something. Hence the mere apperception ‘I think’ through the apprehension of a *Gegenstand* or thinking an *Objekt* gains empirical reality since there is empirical apperception which can be expressed through the expression ‘I think something=x’. That which is apprehended as thinking and grasping consciousness is the empirical consciousness.

In that act, what appears in the forms of sensibility is grasped by 'I' as a *Gegenstand*, and together with this grasping, 'I' also apprehends itself as grasping this or that representation. In this regard, an empirical determination of the self is possible through the mediacy of the determination of a *Gegenstand*. By means of this reflection, empirical consciousness arises.

As we stated above, inner states, that is empirical consciousness is subject to flow in time and only through the transcendental consciousness can I realize myself as one and the same consciousness throughout different determinations of inner sense. It is this original consciousness which provides the thoroughgoing identity of the self in experience:<sup>80</sup> "*For the mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think its identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of this act, whereby it subordinates all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, thereby rendering possible their interconnection according to a priori rules.*"<sup>81</sup>

In summary, the transcendental unity of apperception is objective as distinguished from the subjective unity of the consciousness, which Kant defines as *the determination of the inner sense*.<sup>82</sup> Empirical consciousness concerns an empirical determination, that is, it is the consciousness of an empirical determination. Therefore, it is diverse in content and depends on the circumstances. However, the transcendental apperception is nothing but the pure consciousness of 'I' which is abiding and remains the same through time. It is the transcendental ground of the possibility of the empirical consciousness.

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<sup>80</sup> *ibid.*, B-133

<sup>81</sup> *ibid.*, A-108

<sup>82</sup> *ibid.*, B-139

The apprehension of pure self is restricted to the apprehension of the unity of the mind within the theoretical structure of the transcendental philosophy, since what is considered as theoretical is restricted to that part of the soul which provides the conditions for the grasping of a *Gegenstand*. On the other hand, the empirical consciousness of the self is determinable as 'I' appears to itself through the form of inner sense. And a determination in the form of inner sense is possible if there is a corresponding determination in the outer sense. Only if there is the synthesis of empirical intuition can I be conscious of myself. In the transcendental unity of apperception, however, I am conscious of myself neither as I appear to myself nor as I am in myself but only that '*I am*'.<sup>83</sup> However, it is important to note that the consciousness of the self, be it pure or empirical, is far from being the grasping of the self.<sup>84</sup> Kant states that the pure consciousness is a thought but it is not a thought in the sense that there is a determinate intuition corresponding to that thought.<sup>85</sup>

As we tried to explain in this section, transcendental apperception has a fundamental place in transcendental philosophy. As it is clearly seen, the concept of unity<sup>86</sup> is fundamental to the critical philosophy of Kant; and the transcendental self is the ground of that unity. Space and time as the pure forms of sensibility and categories as the pure concepts of understanding derive their synthetic unity and possibility from the original unity of the transcendental self.

Therefore, without transcendental apperception neither mind, nor its activity, experience, grasping and empirical consciousness would be possible.

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<sup>83</sup> *ibid.*, B-157

<sup>84</sup> *ibid.*, B-158

<sup>85</sup> *ibid.*, B-157

<sup>86</sup> By the phrase '*the concept of unity*' here, we do not mean the '*category of unity*' but the transcendental principle on which all forms of capacities derive their synthetic unity.



### II. 3. WHAT CAN WE GRASP IN VIEW OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY ?

Anything graspable should conform to the objective conditions provided by the mind. Within the context of transcendental philosophy mind is the soul as considered mainly through the capacities of sensibility, and understanding.

In transcendental aesthetic Kant states that an intuition is possible only if a given manifold conforms to the formal conditions of sensibility, that is, if it is represented by means of space-time relations. The principle of the same possibility, that is, the possibility of an intuition with respect to understanding, can be stated as follows: The manifold of intuition has to be subject to the formal conditions of understanding and hence be subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception.<sup>87</sup>

Space and time provides the condition that makes the representability of the affections received by the sensibility. Anything given as a representation in the forms of sensibility is therefore a spatio-temporal determination. With respect to transcendental analytic, something graspable should be subject to the synthetic unity of the categories. However, at this point it is necessary to remember the distinction between the act of thinking and the act of grasping in order to elaborate what is meant by the act of grasping within the context of transcendental philosophy. In transcendental deduction Kant states that these two acts are by no means the same. By means of concepts an *Objekt* is thought, but for it to be grasped an intuition corresponding to this *Objekt* should be given. *"For if no intuition could be given to the concept, the concept would still be a*

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<sup>87</sup> *ibid.*, B-136

thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would be without any *Gegenstand* and no knowledge of anything would be possible by means of it.”<sup>88</sup>

Hence grasping is not possible by mere thought. For a grasping to be possible concepts should be related to a *Gegenstand*. “Through the determination of pure intuition we can acquire *a priori* grasping of *Gegenstand(s)*..”<sup>89</sup> Mathematics is an example of such a science, the representations of which are given in intuition in regard to their form; that is, prior to experience.<sup>90</sup>

However, even though in mathematics the pure concepts of understanding are applied to pure intuition, grasping can arise only when they are applied to empirical intuition. “Even, therefore with the aid of pure intuition, the categories do not afford us any knowledge of things; they do so only through their possible application to empirical intuition. In other words, they serve only for the possibility of empirical knowledge; and such knowledge is what we entitle as experience”.<sup>91</sup>

Pure concepts of the understanding, can extend beyond the limits of possible experience. However, such an extension of the application of the pure forms of understanding beyond the limits of the possible experience gives us no grasping of anything at all. “They are mere forms of thought, without objective reality, since we have no intuition at hand to which synthetic unity of apperception, which constitutes the whole content of these forms, could be applied, and being so

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<sup>88</sup> *ibid.*, B-146

<sup>89</sup> *ibid.*, B-147

<sup>90</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> *ibid.*

*applied determine a Gegenstand. Only our sensible intuition can give them body and meaning.*<sup>92</sup>

Therefore, within the limits of the transcendental capacities and their transcendental employment given in the transcendental philosophy, an *Objekt* can be graspable, if it is related to a *Gegenstand* in the intuition. In that connection, our main question is the following: Does the anatomy of soul, which is an inquiry into the nature of *Gegenstand(s)* of outer sense as to their possibility and grasping a priori, permit the grasping of the soul itself?

As we know, transcendental philosophy is an inquiry into the possibility of experience. This inquiry is an attempt to expose the a priori conditions that makes experience possible. In this regard, by exposing the transcendental ground of experience Kant exposes the possibility of grasping a priori. The question is the following: What can I grasp without the aid of experience? That is, how are synthetic a priori judgements possible?

Kant states: "*In solution to the above problem, we are at the same time deciding as to the possibility of employment of pure reason in establishing and developing all those sciences which contain a theoretical a priori knowledge of Gegenstand(s), and have therefore to answer the questions: How is pure mathematics possible? How is pure science of nature possible?*"<sup>93</sup>

In that connection, we can formulate our question in the following way: Is rational doctrine of the soul possible within the limits of transcendental philosophy?

Kant states that the judgement 'I think', which is the vehicle of all concepts and among them the transcendental concepts, is itself transcendental and in this regard it is free of any 'special

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<sup>92</sup> *ibid.*, B-148

<sup>93</sup> *ibid.*, B-20

designation', " because it serves only to introduce all our thought as belonging to consciousness."<sup>94</sup>

Kant states: "Meanwhile, however free it be of empirical admixture (impressions of the senses), it yet enables us to distinguish, through the nature of our faculty of representation, two kinds of *Gegenstand(s)*. I as thinking, am a *Gegenstand* of the inner sense, and am called soul. That which is a *Gegenstand* of the outer senses is called 'body'. Accordingly the expression 'I', as a thinking being, signifies the *Gegenstand* of that psychology which may be entitled the 'rational doctrine of soul', inasmuch as I am not here seeking to learn in regard to the soul anything more than can be inferred, independently of all experience (which determines me more specifically and in concreto), from this concept 'I', so far as it is present in all thought."<sup>95</sup>

In transcendental philosophy, both the doctrine of the soul and the doctrine of the body are possible as empirical sciences. In that connection, the empirical doctrine of the soul is considered as '*the doctrine of the physiology of the inner sense*', and empirical doctrine of the body as '*the physiology of the *Gegenstand(s)* of the outer sense*'.<sup>96</sup>

Kant states that even if much can be learned empirically from both of these sciences, there is a great difference if we compare them as to their possibility as a theoretical science. Kant states: "In the latter science much that is *a priori* can be synthetically known from the mere concept of an extended impenetrable being, but in the former nothing whatsoever that is *a priori* can be known synthetically from the concept of a thinking being."<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> *ibid.*, A-342/B-400

<sup>95</sup> *ibid.*, A-342/B-400

<sup>96</sup> *ibid.*, A-381

<sup>97</sup> *ibid.*

Kant investigates the possibility of the rational doctrine of the body in his book *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*.

As we stated above, empirical doctrine of the soul is possible. Kant states that such a science would be *"a kind of physiology of inner sense capable perhaps of explaining the appearances of the inner sense, but never of revealing such properties as do not in any way belong to the possible experience ...,nor yielding any apodeictic knowledge regarding the nature of thinking beings in general."*<sup>98</sup>

To develop the rational doctrine of the soul within the limits of transcendental philosophy, it is necessary to investigate the a priori determinations of the soul in view of the pure concepts of understanding.<sup>99</sup> Without the determinations of the categories nothing, be it a pure or an empirical determination, turns out to be a grasped entity. Only in doing this can we show its possibility a priori and the possibility of the doctrine of the soul as a pure science.

However, *"..in order to cognize possibility of determinate natural things, and hence to cognize them a priori, there is further required that the intuition corresponding to the concept be given a priori, i.e.; that the concept be constructed"*, since only by means of a corresponding intuition the objectivity of a concept is certified.<sup>100</sup> Kant states: *"'I think', is therefore the sole text of rational psychology, and from it the whole of its teaching has to be developed. Obviously, if this thought is to be related to a Gegenstand (myself), it can contain none but*

<sup>98</sup> *ibid.*, A-347/B-406

<sup>99</sup> *ibid.*, A-344/B402

<sup>100</sup> KANT, Immanuel *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* tr. by James Ellington, (1970; New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Company) p. 7

In the same book Kant claims that the *"..rational cognition through the construction of concepts is mathematical"*. In that connection, a doctrine of nature, be it the doctrine of the body or the doctrine of the soul, is considered to be a science proper if mathematics is applicable to it. Hence chemistry, 'the doctrine of animate nature', that is biology and psychology cannot be considered as science proper. Only the doctrine of body can be termed as science proper. pp. 3-9

*transcendental predicates of that Objekt, since the least empirical predicate would destroy the rational purity of the science and its independence of all experience.*"<sup>101</sup>

To investigate the a priori determinations of the soul it is necessary therefore to follow the guidance of the categories.<sup>102</sup> Kant states that in connection with the four categories, four paralogisms of pure reason related to the possibility of a transcendental psychology arise.<sup>103</sup> As a result of these paralogisms, the science of psychology is wrongly regarded as the science of the soul. Kant states the paralogisms of the soul as follows: With respect to the category of relation, soul is claimed to be a substance. In the critique of this first paralogism, Kant reminds us of the principle of the transcendental logic claiming that the pure categories and among them the category of substance have no objective meaning if a corresponding intuition in the form of outer sense is not related to them.<sup>104</sup>

To claim the substantiality of the soul, it is therefore necessary to represent it as a *Gegenstand* which is given in experience as permanent, so that it would be possible in this *Gegenstand* to distinguish what is permanent and what is transitory. Kant states: "*The 'I' is indeed in all thoughts, but there is not in this representation the least trace of intuition,*

<sup>101</sup> op.cit., A-343/B-401

<sup>102</sup> ibid., A-344/B-402

<sup>103</sup> In transcendental Dialectic Kant considers the dialectical employment of reason. In that part of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant states three pure concepts of pure reason, that is the transcendental ideas of soul, cosmos and God. He claims that these ideas give a systematic unity to the employment of the understanding as regulative principles. As being regulative principles they are different from the constitutive rules of the understanding. The treatment of the regulative principles of reason as if they are constitutive rules is a misuse of these ideas and such an employment is the dialectical employment of reason. When these transcendental ideas which never apply directly to experience but to understanding alone are considered as the *Objekt* of knowledge, that is when they are treated as substantial entities, three kinds of dialectical syllogisms arises from such misemployment of the reason. (ibid., A-340/B-398) In the first kind of these syllogisms which concerns the transcendental idea of soul, from the transcendental concept of the subject which contains nothing manifold the absolute unity of this subject itself is concluded; this kind of inference leads to the paralogisms of pure reason. Other two dialectical syllogisms of pure reason which concern the transcendental ideas of God and cosmos leads to the ideal of pure reason and antinomies of pure reason respectively.

<sup>104</sup> ibid., A-349

distinguishing the 'I' from other *Gegenstand(s)* of intuition. Thus we can indeed perceive that this representation is invariably present in all thoughts, but not that it is an abiding and continuing intuition, wherein the thoughts, as being transitory, give place to one another."<sup>105</sup> We cannot therefore, have a grasping of the soul as a substance.

The second paralogism states that the soul is simple; the simplicity of the soul is claimed in view of the category of quality.<sup>106</sup> Kant states that to say that something is simple is to say that the intuition of it is a unity and is not capable of being divided into parts. Although the assertion is true, it is an analytic assertion and claims nothing as to the nature of the soul. 'I think' already contains in itself the claim that the soul is the simple unity of the thinking being. The truth of the assertion cannot be proved by reference to a possible experience, but can be admitted provided that it is considered as asserting a merely formal truth.<sup>107</sup>

If we claim that the simplicity of the soul can be grasped, we would be in a position to determine synthetically that the soul has such a property. This would necessitate that we present to ourselves the soul as a *Gegenstand* which is simple. Otherwise, it would be a mere talk on the basis of concepts alone, but not a grasping.<sup>108</sup>

To put it in Kant's own words: "*If I call a thing in the [field of] appearance as simple, I mean by this that the intuition of it, although a part of the appearance, is not itself capable of being divided into parts, etc. But if I know something as simple in concept only and not in the [field of] appearance, I have really no grasping whatsoever of the *Gegenstand* but only of the*

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<sup>105</sup> *ibid.*, A-350

<sup>106</sup> *ibid.*, A-351

<sup>107</sup> *ibid.*, A-354-355

<sup>108</sup> *ibid.*, A-400

*concept which I make for myself of a something in general that does not allow of being intuited.*"<sup>109</sup>

It is not possible to have a grasping of something from mere concepts, without any relation to a possible experience. Without an application to a possible experience, it is not possible to extend our grasping regarding the *Objekt* in question. Kant summarizes the fallacy involved in this paralogism as follows: "*Here as little as elsewhere can we hope to extend our knowledge through mere concepts -still less by means of the merely subjective form of all our concepts, consciousness -in the absence of any relation to possible experience. For [as we have thus found I], even the fundamental concept of a simple nature is such that it can never be met with in any experience, and such , therefore, that there is no way of attaining to it, as an objectively valid concept.*"<sup>110</sup>

The third paralogism states with respect to the category of quantity that the soul is a person. It concludes the personality of the soul in the following way: That which is conscious of its identity of itself through time is a person. Thus the soul is numerically identical with itself , it is a person.<sup>111</sup>

Kant states that the condition under which we can claim the numerical identity of something is such that it should be given in experience as a permanent thing so that we can distinguish its identity through time throughout its changing determinations.<sup>112</sup> The 'I' appears in the form of inner sense, however in each determination, it is related to the unchanging and abiding 'I'. In this regard the numerical identity, of 'I' cannot be inferred from 'I think', since it

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<sup>109</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>110</sup> *ibid.*, A-361

<sup>111</sup> *ibid.*, A-361

<sup>112</sup> *ibid.*, A-362



already asserts in itself its identity through time; the mere apperception 'I think' is prior to experience, it provides a ground for the possibility of it.

The claim that the soul is numerically identical with itself states nothing but "*..that in the whole time in which I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of this time as belonging to the unity of myself; and this comes to the same whether I say that this whole time is in me, as individual unity, or that I am to be found as numerically identical in all this time.*"<sup>113</sup>

The personality of the soul can be shown provided that what is apprehended as permanent regarding the soul, that is the representation 'I' which accompanies all apprehension, is shown as an abiding *Gegenstand* in the outer sense, so that an outer observer can also grasp its personality objectively.<sup>114</sup> However such a permanence and hence substantiality cannot be given prior to the bare consciousness 'I' on which all the pure concepts are grounded.

Kant states that the concept of personality can be retained as the concepts of substantiality and of simplicity, provided that "*.. it is merely transcendental, that is concerns the unity of the subject, otherwise unknown to us, in the determinations of which there is a thoroughgoing connection through apperception.*"<sup>115</sup> Such a claim is necessary for the practical employment, however, it is not possible and legitimate to move one step further and claim that we can exhibit the thoroughgoing identity of the soul through time and thereby extend our grasping regarding the nature of the soul. To put it in Kant's own words: "*..but we can never parade it as the extension of our self-knowledge through pure reason, and as exhibiting to us from the mere concept of*

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<sup>113</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>114</sup> *ibid.*, A-365

<sup>115</sup> *ibid.*, A-365

*identical self an unbroken continuance of the subject. For this concept revolves in a perpetual circle, and does not help us in respect to any question which aims at synthetic knowledge.*"<sup>116</sup>

The fourth paralogism, with respect to the category of modality, claims that in all perception, I distinguish myself as distinct from the things *outside* of myself. Therefore, I am in relation to other things existing as distinct from me, among them my body.<sup>117</sup>

In the critique of this paralogism Kant states that the perception of other things *outside* me and the consciousness of myself comes together in apprehension. The grasping of a *Gegenstand* is impossible without the consciousness of the self grasping it; and similarly, the empirical consciousness of the self necessitates that a *Gegenstand* be apprehended in the forms of intuition. Therefore to distinguish my soul as distinct from the other things -among them my body- is not possible, since we make such a distinction within the limits of possible experience. However, experience does not show us that the soul and the body are separate and distinguishable entities and yet are in relation to each other. Therefore, we cannot pass beyond the limits of possible experience and say that my soul exists independently of my body or that all thinking beings are separate from matter. Such a distinction can only be made in thought but cannot be claimed to be true in reality.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> *ibid.*, A-366

<sup>117</sup> *ibid.*, B-409

<sup>118</sup> *ibid.*, B-409

As we stated before, Kant admits that empirical doctrine of soul is possible just as empirical doctrine of the body. An empirical doctrine of soul, that is empirical psychology is defined in critical philosophy as *the physiology of the inner sense*. In this regard, such a psychology provides us nothing but a list of inner states without any theoretical ground.

However, the rational doctrine of the soul is not possible given the anatomy of the soul presented in transcendental philosophy, while a rational doctrine of the body can be developed from the concept of an extended impenetrable being. Kant states that: "*Although both are appearances, the appearance to outer sense has something fixed or abiding which supplies a substratum as the basis of its transitory determinations and therefore a synthetic concept, namely that of space and of appearance in space; whereas time which is the sole form of our inner intuition has nothing abiding and therefore yields knowledge only of the change of determinations, not of any Gegenstand that can be thereby determined.*"<sup>119</sup>

The 'I' is represented through the form of inner sense as an empirical consciousness. In the apprehension of these inner states, there is an unchanging and abiding apprehension of the 'I' which accompanies every thought and of grasping.<sup>120</sup> The rational science of the thinking being 'I' would be possible if synthetic a priori propositions could be derived from its intuition.<sup>121</sup> Kant states: "*This 'I' is, however, as little an intuition as it is a concept of any Gegenstand; it is mere form of consciousness, which can accompany two kinds of representations and which is in a position to elevate them to the rest of knowledge only insofar as something else is given in intuition which provides a material for a representation of a Gegenstand.*"<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> *ibid.*, A-381

<sup>120</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> *ibid.*, A-382

<sup>122</sup> *ibid.*

When psychology is employed as if it is a rational doctrine, and expected to extend our grasping as to the nature of the soul, such an employment gives rise to the paralogisms of pure reason.<sup>123</sup> To the question what the nature of the soul is no answer in the form of synthetic a priori grasping can be given. Such an answer would necessitate a corresponding intuition in the forms of sensibility.

In summary, the investigation of the nature of the soul necessitates that its properties be determined with respect to the pure concepts of understanding. For a thing to be a grasped entity, its *Objekt* must fall under the relevant concept and a corresponding *Gegenstand* should be related to the concept in question. Kant states: "*In the absence of an underlying intuition the category cannot by itself yield a concept of a Gegenstand; for by intuition alone is the Gegenstand given, which thereupon is thought in accordance with the category.*"<sup>124</sup>

However, the pure self itself is the ground of all the a priori elements of the mind which provides the possibility of grasping a priori and experience. Therefore, the mind cannot grasp what is presupposed as the ground of its possibility. To put it in Kant's own words: "*We can thus say of the thinking 'I' (the soul) which regards itself as a substance, as simple, as numerically identical at all times and as correlate of all existence, from which all other existence must be inferred, that it does not know itself through the categories, but knows categories and through them all Gegenstand(s), in the absolute unity of apperception, and so through itself. Now it is, indeed, very evident that I cannot know as an Objekt that which I must presuppose in order to know any Objekt, and determining the self (the thought) is distinguished from the self that is to be*

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<sup>123</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>124</sup> *ibid.*, A-399

*determined (the thinking subject) in the same way as knowledge is distinguished from its Gegenstand.*”<sup>125</sup>

We can have a representation of a thinking being not through an outer appearance but through self-consciousness only.<sup>126</sup> This representation appears only through the form of inner sense in which a representation is subject to flow away. Inner sense cannot provide us with a condition under which a *Gegenstand* can be determined as a fixed and abiding representation. The pure concepts of understanding can be applicable to the manifold of outer sense only. Any claim as to the properties of the ‘I’ that appears in the form of inner sense has to be exhibited in the form of outer sense as a property of an abiding *Gegenstand*. However, such a determination would necessitate the application of the categories to the ‘I’ which makes the categories themselves and their application to a possible intuition possible.

According to Kant, therefore, psychology cannot be considered as a rational science within the limits of transcendental philosophy.

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<sup>125</sup> *ibid.*, A-402

<sup>126</sup> *ibid.*, A-347/B-405

### III. THE ANATOMY OF SOUL IN PSYCHO-ANALYTIC THEORY

Freud means by the term **psycho-analysis** two things: i) a method of treatment of certain psychic disturbances and, ii) the science of unconscious psychic processes.<sup>127</sup> He states that taken in the latter sense this science is named as **depth-psychology**.<sup>128</sup> In fact, by the latter sense of the term it deserves the name of a science because the methods of practical employment in the former sense are grounded on the latter sense of the term. Theoretically speaking, psycho-analysis considers psychic from three points of view which are complementary to one another in the whole picture: the dynamic, the economic and the topographical.<sup>129</sup>

From the dynamic standpoint psycho-analysis considers all psychical processes as derived from the interplay of forces which are in the nature of instincts from the origin. From the dynamic standpoint psycho-analysis rests on the assumption that psychic representatives of instincts have a charge of a certain amount of energy which is called the cathexis of energy. According to the economic principle, the psychic apparatus is so constituted that its aim is to keep the charge of energy at the lowest level possible, since any excitation gives rise to the feelings of unpleasure and this necessitates the removal of the excitation which is experienced as pleasure.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> In the original German writings, the original term for mind is '*Seele*', and for terms 'mental' and 'psychical' is '*Seelichen*'. The exact translation of the '*Seele*' and '*Seelischen*' into English is 'soul' and 'psychical'. For that reason, we prefer to use these latter terms in the present thesis.

<sup>128</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Standard Edition of Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, tr. /ed. by James Strachey, The Hogarth Press, 1957, London, Vol. 20, 'Psycho-analysis', p. 264

<sup>129</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 265-266

<sup>130</sup> *ibid.*

Topographically speaking, psycho-analysis regards psychic apparatus as an instrument like a microscope and in that connection it tries to determine the kind of mechanism of the psychic apparatus at work. According to this point of view, psychic apparatus is composed of three psychical agencies: the 'it', the 'I' and the 'above-I'.<sup>131</sup> The terms consciousness and unconscious which are used in descriptive and dynamic senses in explaining the psychical phenomena have also a topographical reference and a significance.<sup>132</sup>

### III. I. THE 'I', THE 'IT' AND THE 'ABOVE-I': THE THREE PROVINCES (AGENCIES) OF THE SOUL

The 'I' is that part of the soul which we grasp as our own self as it appears to us. Freud states that a persons own body is a place from where two kinds of sensations arise -internal and external. The body is seen as an external thing like other bodies; however, to touch it gives us a sensation which is different from the sensation that arises when we touch another body. Hence Freud states "*the 'I' is first and foremost the bodily-'I' (Körper-Ich); it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of the surface.*"<sup>133</sup> However in psycho-analysis, what we recognize as the 'I' is not constituted of only that part that is entitled as the 'I'; the self appears in

<sup>131</sup> In the original texts, Freud uses the German pronoun 'Es' for the term 'id' and the pronoun 'Ich' for the term 'ego'. The correspondent pronouns in English are as follows: 'it' stands for 'Es', and 'I' stands for 'Ich'. 'Über-Ich' is the original term translated as 'super-ego'. 'Über' means in English 'over, above' and 'Über-Ich' in that connection 'over the I'. It should be noted that the original pronouns and their English counterparts represent much more accurately what is meant by these three agencies within the context of the psycho-analytic theory than the terms 'id', 'ego' and 'super-ego' which sound as technical terms. Because of this reason, in the present thesis we preferred to use terms like 'I', 'it' and 'above-I' instead of the common translations of these terms. For that reason in this thesis we will use terms 'I', 'it' and 'above-I' instead of the common translations.

<sup>132</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 266

<sup>133</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 19, 'The Id and the Ego', pp. 25-26

the agency 'I' and is therein consciously apprehended. Then, what is the nature of that entity that I apprehend as 'I'? What is the ground of the apprehension 'I'?

According to psycho-analytic theory, soul is the unity of these three agencies- the 'it', the 'I' and the 'above-I'. Among them 'it' is the true origin of the self; it is the only agency ready at birth. 'I' and later the 'above-I' are subject to a development.

In psycho-analytic theory, Freud makes a distinction as to the inner foreign territory and the outer foreign territory; both of these territories are in themselves *unknown* to us and they can be grasped only if they are represented within the system of consciousness. The 'I' is that part of the soul which is related to both of these foreign territories; it receives impressions -in psycho-analytic terminology stimuli- from both of these regions. However, 'I' is not given as an agency from the beginning; it is subject to a formation and development. Freud claims that the true origin of our self and the 'I' is that part of the soul which is called 'it';<sup>134</sup> the 'I' is a modification of the 'it'. Through the modification of the 'it', 'I' originates and develops as an agency capable of receiving and ordering the arriving stimuli.

Freud states: "*Under the influence of the real external world around us, one portion of the 'it' has undergone a special development. From what was originally a cortical layer, equipped with the organs for receiving stimuli and with arrangements for acting as a protective shield against stimuli, a special organization has arisen which henceforward acts as an*

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<sup>134</sup> In his article 'The id and the ego' Freud makes reference to the writer Georg Groddeck saying that he follows him in calling that part of the soul with this pronoun. Freud states: "*Groddeck himself, no doubt followed the example of Nietzsche, who habitually used this grammatical term for whatever in our nature is impersonal and so to speak, subject to natural law.*" *ibid.*, p. 23



*intermediary between the 'it' and the external world. To this region of our mind (soul) we have given the name of the 'I'."*<sup>135</sup>

The 'I' is that part of the psychic apparatus, which is in direct relation to the external world. It is in relation to the external world through the outermost part of it which is called the perceptual system or perceptual-consciousness. The soul has no relation with the external world except through the mediacy of the 'I' and hence through the mediacy of the perceptual system. In that sense the perceptual system provides the representations of the inner and the outer worlds to the soul.<sup>136</sup>

Freud states that the '*actual I*', as distinguished from the psychic apparatus, can be described by examining the outermost part of the apparatus itself: "*This system is turned to the external world, it is the medium of the perceptions arising thence, and during its functioning the phenomenon of consciousness arises in it. It is the sense organ of the entire apparatus; moreover it is receptive not only to excitations from outside but also to those arising from the interior of the mind (soul).*"<sup>137</sup>

The 'I' is transformed in such a way that it receives the external stimuli through the perceptual system and the structure of that system is a shield against external stimuli. Freud states that this shield is comparable to the cortical layer of a small living substance.<sup>138</sup> The 'I', then, is the psychical agency which developed from the 'it' - the sole agency of the soul given at first.

<sup>135</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 23, 'An Outline of Psycho-analysis' p.145

<sup>136</sup> *ibid.*, Vol 19, 'The Id and The Ego', p.23

<sup>137</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 22, 'New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis', p. 75

<sup>138</sup> *ibid.*, p. 75 Freud states that the differentiation of the states and the id is not a characteristic peculiar to man but also to the much more simpler organisms and animals. It is the result of the inevitable influence of the external world. In his article '*Beyond Pleasure Principle*', Freud gives an elaborate account of this view regarding the whole living substances. He states that even a little fragment of a living substance is surrounded by the external world which is charged with much more powerful energies than that of this small living substance. If it would not provide for itself a shield against this source of excessive stimulation, it would be destroyed by it. To provide such a shield the outermost

The external world has its own rules and demands and the task of the 'I' in its relation to the external world is to render the stimulation coming from the external world manageable. 'I' as bodily- 'I' (*Körper-ich*) is already a part of the external world; it is a body among other bodies and with its bodily constitution it has a shield against external stimuli. 'I', as a psychical agency, has to adapt itself to that world by recognizing it. Without the mediation of the 'I', 'it' would not escape from annihilation, since the psychical processes in the 'it' are dominated by the will to satisfy its own demands and needs regardless of the conditions of the external world. In that connection, the 'I' takes into account the demands and the needs of the external world. In performing this task, the 'I' forms an accurate picture of the outer world by retaining memory-traces on the basis of its perceptions and experiences.<sup>139</sup>

The stimuli coming from the external world is ordered in accordance with the constitution of the perceptual consciousness. Freud states: "*as a result of certain psycho-analytic discoveries, we are today in a position to embark on a discussion of the Kantian theorem that space and time are 'necessary forms of thought'.*"<sup>140</sup>

In that connection, we do not acquire impressions coming from the inside and the outside of the psychic apparatus as they are themselves in space-time relations but as they conform to the constitution of the perceptual system. Spatio-temporality for outer representations and

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part of the living substance turns into an inorganic membrane. As a result of this transformation, the living substance receives stimulation in accordance with its own constitution in a diminished way. In that connection the protection against external stimuli is much more a fundamental function of the living organism than the reception of this stimuli: "*The main purpose of the reception of the stimuli is to discover the direction and the nature of the external stimuli; and for that it is enough to take small specimens of the external world, to sample it in small quantities.*" Freud states that this mechanism is the same in the highly developed organisms. Furthermore, in higher organisms the sense organs are differentiated as a shield against external stimuli the function of which is to receive stimuli and furthermore to provide protection against excessive stimuli. *ibid.*, Vol. 18., 'Beyond Pleasure Principle', p. 26-27

<sup>139</sup> *ibid.*, p. 75

<sup>140</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 18, 'Beyond Pleasure Principle', p. 28

temporality for inner representations are not inherent in their very nature, but they are the forms provided by the perceptual system for the impressions to be representations: *"This mode of functioning may perhaps constitute another way of providing a shield against stimuli."*<sup>141</sup>

The 'I' starts with the perceptual system. It is the nucleus of the 'I' and it is the conscious part of the 'I', and hence the center of the conscious perception. In psycho-analytic theory, not all psychical activities are considered to be subject to time relations. The unconscious processes, which characterize the psychical processes in the 'it', behind the conscious ones do not stand in time relations, but we acquire them in temporal order when they appear within the system of perceptual-consciousness.<sup>142</sup> The 'I' is the agency of the soul which gives temporal order to the impressions coming from both the inner and outer sources. Freud states: *"The relation to time which is hard to describe, is introduced to the 'I' by the perceptual system; it can scarcely be doubted that the mode of operation of that system is what provides the origin of the idea of time. But what distinguishes the 'I' from the 'it' quite especially is a tendency to synthesis in its contents, to a combination and a unification in its mental processes which are totally lacking in the 'it'."*<sup>143</sup>

The 'I' as distinguished from the 'it' is the center of rational activity. The psychical processes represented in the perceptual system, as well as, the impressions received from the external world are in an order imposed by the perceptual system in the 'I'. The 'I', by the activity of the perceptual-consciousness, is the seat of the acts of perception, apprehension and thought. As opposed to this, *"...the logical laws of thought do not apply in the 'it', and this is true above*

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<sup>141</sup> *ibid.*,

<sup>142</sup> *ibid.*,

<sup>143</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 22, 'New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis', p. 76

*all of the law of contradiction.*"<sup>144</sup> In that connection contradictory impulses can exist in the 'it' side by side without cancelling or diminishing one another. The 'it' is the willing agency of the soul; however it has no unified will. It cannot say what it loves or hates, since the content of its will is diverse. Its will has no coherent content.<sup>145</sup>

The 'I', which is the intermediary organization between the 'it' and the external world, has the task of self-preservation. In its relation to the external world, it performs this task by storing the experiences in its memory. It escapes from excessive stimuli, and it adopts itself to the moderate stimuli. It brings about changes in the external world through its activity. In its performances and acts, it bears in mind its own advantages.<sup>146</sup> It is the agency 'I' that represents the external world to the 'it'. However, the term representation should not be taken here as though these two agencies communicate with each other on the basis of the same terms. On the contrary, they are quite different in their very nature. 'It' cannot apprehend and know anything; there is no act in the 'it' that can correspond to a rational activity; apprehension is an act of the 'I'. 'It' can only will and the 'I' can grasp that it wills. The 'I' can take these wishes as if they are its own however the 'it' cannot understand what the 'I' thinks, grasps and decides. Sometimes the 'I' may postpone, or reject the accomplishment of the demands of the 'it'. In that case, the 'it' looks blindly for other ways to satisfy its needs regardless of the 'I's' conscious attention. In that connection, the 'it' can only blindly perceive that its ends will not be attained. The representation of the external world to the 'it' means for the 'it' that its demand will not be satisfied.

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<sup>144</sup> *ibid.*, p. 73

<sup>145</sup> *ibid.*,

<sup>146</sup> *ibid.*, 'An Outline of Psycho-analysis', p. 145

The external world has its own rules and its own demands. The 'I' receives and perceives them through its perceptual system. However, the 'I' is in relation with the internal foreign territory as it is with the external one, and the perceptual system receives impressions coming from within the soul itself. In that connection it is necessary to state the relation of the 'I' with its true origin, that is, its relation with the 'it'.

Although the 'I' is a modified part of the 'it', as the pronoun <sup>147</sup> states 'it' is in a sense alien and hence an *other* to the 'I'. Freud states that 'it' is the dark and the inaccessible part of our soul. We cannot describe its characteristics positively, since we have no direct access to the processes in the 'it'. Since all our knowledge is bounded with consciousness what we can grasp and think has to be consciously apprehended within perceptual consciousness. However, we can recognize representations here as they conform to the constitution of the perceptual system -as they are ordered in temporal relations. We can only talk about the 'it' in contrast to the characteristics of the 'I'. Freud states: "*We approach to the 'it' with analogies: we call it a chaos, a cauldron full of seething excitations. We picture it as being open at its end to somatic influences, and as there taking up into itself instinctual needs which find their psychical expression in it, but we cannot say in what substratum. It is filled with energy reaching it from the instincts, but it has no organization, produces no collective will, but only a striving to bring about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the pleasure principle.*"<sup>148</sup>

The 'it', knows no external world and none of its rules and dangers: "*The 'it', cut off from the external world, has a world of perception of its own. It detects with extraordinary acuteness*

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<sup>147</sup> See footnote 1 on page 1

<sup>148</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 22, 'New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis', p. 73

*certain changes in its interior, especially oscillations in the tension of its instinctual needs, and these changes become conscious as feelings in the pleasure-unpleasure series.*" <sup>149</sup>

Freud states that the philosophical view which claims that space and time are the necessary forms of psychical acts is not valid in the region of the 'it': *"There is nothing in the 'it' that corresponds to the idea of time, there is no recognition of the passage of time, and -a thing that is most remarkable and awaits consideration in philosophical thought-no alteration in its mental (psychical) processes is produced by the passage of time."* <sup>150</sup>

The 'it' has no judgment of value; it has no knowledge of good and evil and of morality. Since all the processes in the 'it' are directed towards the discharge of the charged energy, the psychical processes in the 'it' are dominated by the pleasure principle.<sup>151</sup> The 'it' is can have no grasp of the processes that go on in its content. It is the store of the wishful impulses; however it has no knowledge of what it wills. Therefore it has no unified will. <sup>152</sup>

It is necessary to note that the mental processes in the 'it' are not subject to rationality and that they all are unconscious. It is the 'I' that perceives the wishful impulses that originate from the 'it' and gives them an organization in a coherent context. 'I' is the only agency of the soul that can recognize and grasp, either consciously or unconsciously, the impressions that originate from the inside and the outside of the soul. Freud states: *"to adopt a popular mode of speaking, we might say that the 'I' stands for reason and good sense while the 'it' stands for the untamed passions."*<sup>153</sup>

<sup>149</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 19, 'An Outline of Psycho-analysis', p. 198

<sup>150</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 22, 'New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis', p. 74

<sup>151</sup> *ibid.*,

<sup>152</sup> *ibid.*, p. 73

<sup>153</sup> *ibid.*, p. 76

As stated above, instincts are the true content of the 'it', and they are the sources of the internal excitations. To elaborate the nature of psychical processes at this point, it is necessary to state Freud's instinct theory: Freud claims that an amount of energy is bound up with the instincts, and we recognize them as they exert a constant force upon the soul. If the instincts are charged by energy, that is if they are cathected, they tend towards discharging this energy. Any excitation is experienced as something unpleasurable and the diminishing of this excitation is experienced as a pleasure. In that connection, the ultimate aim of the instincts is to diminish the excitation and hence provide satisfaction.

Freud defines an instinct as: "*an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of the external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent in the organic life.*"<sup>154</sup>

Freud states that we distinguish our inner world on the basis of the instinctual stimuli which exert a constant force on the soul. It is distinguished from the external stimuli by the fact that it is carried within the soul and therefore to escape from it as we escape from a force whose source is external to the soul is not possible. Freud calls the internal stimuli coming from within the soul as 'need'.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 18, 'Beyond Pleasure Principle', p.36

Freud distinguishes two basic instincts -the sexual instincts and the death instincts-; in addition he introduces the postulate that instinct in their activity are conservative, that is they have a tendency to restore their earlier state. Freud thinks that inorganic matter is prior to the living substance and the latter originates from the former one which is unknown to us. In that sense the ultimate aim of the phenomena of life is death. The function of the self- preservative instincts and the apparent urge to live and restore life and the tendency towards perfection is the path only that an individual living substance follows on its own way to death. Freud states: "*What we are left with is the fact that the organism wishes to die only in its own fashion. Thus these guardians of life (the self-preservative instincts), too, were originally the myrmidons of death.*"

<sup>155</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 14, 'Instincts and Their Vicissitudes', p. 118-119

As to its nature each individual instinct has a pressure, an aim, an *Objekt*, and a source. The pressure of an instinct is the amount of force that is exerted on the soul. It is the force of the demand necessary for the activity, and is the very essence of the instincts. In that connection each instinct is a piece of activity. However, Freud adds that there are no passive instincts but only those whose satisfaction is accomplished through passivity.<sup>156</sup>

An instinct, aims at satisfaction and it is achieved through the removal of the stimulus. However, although the ultimate aim is satisfaction there might be various ways to achieve it. The *Objekt* of an instinct, on the other hand, is the thing through which the instinct accomplishes its end and attains satisfaction. The source of an instinct is the somatic processes that occur within the body. An instinct appears in the psychical life as a representation of that process. However, it is important to note at this point that psycho-analytic theory does not deal with anatomy of the body and tries to explain the human psychical phenomena in terms of the physical phenomena.<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> *ibid.*, p. 122

From the biological standpoint Freud defines the concept of instinct as follows: "*..an instinct appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the psychical and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli originating within the organism and reaching the soul, as a measure of the demand made upon the soul for work in consequence of its connection with body.*" p. 122

<sup>157</sup> *ibid.*, p. 123

It should be noted that although Freud considers the concept of instinct as the psychical representative of somatic processes, he, by no means, defends a view similar to psycho-physical parallelism, or to reductionism. In his article '*The Unconscious*' which he wrote in the same year with '*The Instincts and their Vicissitudes*' Freud admits that there exist a relation between the psychical apparatus and the anatomy. He states: "*But every attempt to go from there to discover a localization of mental processes (Seelischen Vorgänge), every endeavor to think of ideas as stored up in nerve-cells and of excitations as traveling along nerve-fibres, has miscarried completely. The same faith would await any theory which attempted to recognize, let us say, the anatomical position of the system consciousness-conscious mental activity (Seelischen Akten)- as being in the cortex, and to localize the unconscious processes in the subcortical parts of the brain....Our psychical topography for the present has nothing to do with anatomy; it has reference not to anatomical localities but to regions in the psychical life, wherever they may be situated in the body.*" *ibid.*, Vol. 14, '*The Unconscious*', p. 174-175



Each instinct is subject to a development; the *Objekt* of an instinct, the way it achieves its end may change in the course of development, but the ultimate aim, that is satisfaction by diminishing the excitation does not change.<sup>158</sup> Satisfaction of an instinct involves to bring out modifications in the external world. Through this modification "*it becomes possible to arrive at a real perception of the Objekt of satisfaction.*"<sup>159</sup> On the basis of the modification the need is realized and objectified.

Freud describes the life of an instinct with an analogy: "*We can divide the life of an instinct into a series of successive waves, each of which is homogeneous during whatever period of time it may last, and whose relation to one another is comparable to that of successive eruptions of lava.*"<sup>160</sup>

Freud thinks that instincts exist in the individual from birth. At the beginning of psychical life, the undifferentiated 'it'- 'I' is cathected with instincts and the aim of it is at this stage to satisfy the demands exerted by the instincts. At this stage the undifferentiated 'it'- 'I' and later the 'it' itself does not know the external world and its dangers. With the energy bound to these instincts, there occurs a cathexis in the 'it'- 'I'. Freud states: "*..we form the idea of there being an original cathexis of the 'I', from which some are later given to the Objekt(s), but which fundamentally persists and are related to the Objekt-cathexis.*"<sup>161</sup> What needs to be distinguished here is that a unity compared to the unity of the 'I' does not exist at the beginning in the undifferentiated 'it' - 'I'; what exists at the beginning is the totality of sexual instincts seeking for discharge. Hence the 'I' has originally no purpose of keeping itself alive and avoiding

<sup>158</sup> *ibid.*, 'Instincts and Their Vicissitudes', p.131

<sup>159</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 5, 'Interpretations of Dreams', p. 599

<sup>160</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 14, 'Instincts and Their Vicissitudes', p. 133

<sup>161</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 14, 'On Narcism: An Introduction', p. 75

dangers. However, what the 'it' demands, even when the 'I' separates itself from the 'it' later in the course of its development, is the true purpose of the psychical apparatus.<sup>162</sup> In the course of its development, through which the 'I' cathects *Objekt(s)* it thereby starts to apprehend a reality other than itself. As a result of the realization of the external world some of the original libidinal instincts turn out to be 'I'-instincts which aim at self-preservation. Apparently, the 'I' has no force original to itself, but derives all of its power and energy from the 'it' - the *reservoir* of sexual instincts.

As to their aim Freud distinguishes instincts into two: the sexual instinct or *Eros* and the death instinct (*Thanatos*).<sup>163</sup> The former aims at restoring and preserving life while the latter leans to returning back to the inorganic state.<sup>164</sup>

It should be noted that Freud assumes that there is a displaceable neutral energy which is at work in the soul. This energy is assumed to be present in the 'it' and in the 'I'. It is "*neutral in itself and can be added to a qualitatively differentiated erotic or destructive impulse.*"<sup>165</sup> Furthermore Freud assumes that this displaceable energy stems from the libido -the desexualized Eros; that is, it is a sublimated energy. As an energy which stemmed from the Eros it retains the

<sup>162</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 23, 'An Outline of Psycho-analysis', p. 148

<sup>163</sup> Freud states that what is meant by the term sexuality and sexual instincts within the framework of psycho-analysis is quite different from the ordinary usage of the term, and gives the following expression: "...what psycho-analysis called sexuality was by no means identical with the impulsion towards a union of two sexes or towards producing a pleasurable sensation in the genitals; it had far more resemblance to the all-inclusive and all-preserving Eros of Plato's *Symposium*." *ibid.*, Vol. 19, 'The Resistance's to Psycho-analysis' p.218

What is meant by Eros here exactly coincides with the love-force.

<sup>164</sup> Freud admits that his dualistic theory of instinct is parallel to the theory of the philosopher Empedocles concerning cosmology. He states that the only difference is that the former has a 'biological validity' while the latter is a 'cosmic phantasy'. Empedocles claims that the two principles-the love and strife- governs the life of the universe and the life of the soul, and these two forces are in an everlasting struggle with each other. The force of love has a tendency to unity while the force of strife, like the death instinct, is directed towards disunion and destruction. *ibid.*, Vol. 23, 'Analysis Terminable Interminable' p. 246-7

<sup>165</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 19, 'The Id and the Ego' p. 41

main purpose of the Eros. It has a tendency to unity which is a characteristic of the 'I'.<sup>166</sup> However, once attached to the death instincts, it functions as a destructive force.

In line with his instinct theory, Freud claims that all psychical activities start with an unpleasurable tension, that is, with a charge of energy and are directed towards reducing this tension, to discharge the cathected energy. In that connection, the psychical processes are regulated by the pleasure principle. This principle presupposes the principle of constancy stating that "*the mental apparatus (psychical apparatus) endeavors to keep the quantity of excitation present in it as low as possible or at least to keep it constant.*" Freud states that the latter hypothesis is another way of stating the pleasure principle about which we cannot speculate any further.<sup>167</sup>

The pleasure principle, as parallel to the development of the 'I' and as a complementary to the self-preservative instincts of the 'I' are replaced by the reality principle. However, if it is looked at as a whole, it is seen that the reality principle is nothing but an indirect way of obtaining pleasure by taking into account the dangers that is present on the way leading to attainment of the pleasure.<sup>168</sup>

As stated above, the 'I' is originally an 'it', it is a modified part of the 'it' through the influence of the external world. Therefore, although it seems to be dominated by different interests and inclinations, it is still an agency of the soul which is faithful to its origin. In that connection Freud states that the 'I' in its relation to the 'it' is in a position to transform the

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<sup>166</sup> *ibid.*, p. 44

<sup>167</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 18, 'Beyond Pleasure Principle', p.9

<sup>168</sup> *ibid.*, p.10

demands of 'it' as if they were its own and in that sense modify them taking into account the rules of the external world.<sup>169</sup>

To clarify the relation of the 'it' and the 'I' Freud uses an analogy: "*...in its relation to the 'it' it is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse; with this difference, that the rider tries to do so with his own strength while the 'I' uses borrowed forces. The analogy may be carried a little further. Often a rider, if he is not be parted from his horse, is obliged to guide it where it wants to go; so in the same way the 'I' is in the habit of transforming the 'it's will into action as if it were its own.*"<sup>170</sup>

The 'I' is the perceiving part of the soul, while the 'it' is the instinctual part. In carrying out the demands of the 'it', the 'I' takes into account the rules that dominate the external world and its demands. Hence, the 'I' performs its action in accordance with the reality principle. In the realm of the 'it', which knows nothing about the external world and its dangers which threaten its very being, the pleasure principle is at work. However in the realm of the 'I', which is aware of the demands of the external world, the pleasure principle is replaced by the reality principle.<sup>171</sup>

Freud states that the 'I', as the '*frontier creature*', tries to mediate between the demands of the external world and those of the 'it'. By its activity, the 'I' makes the world fall in with the wishes of the 'it'; as the mediator, it conceals the unconscious commands of the 'it' with its rationalizations. And often it conceals the conflict between the demands of the outer world and that of the 'it' behind these rationalizations. Freud compares the way the 'I' judges and acts with that of a politician: "*in its position midway between the 'it' and the reality, it only too often*

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<sup>169</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 19, 'The Ego and the Id', p. 25

<sup>170</sup> *ibid.*,

<sup>171</sup> *ibid.*,

*yields to the temptation to become a sycophantic, opportunist and lying like a politician who sees the truth but wants to keep his place in popular favour.*"<sup>172</sup>

Just as the external world, the 'it' is a source of danger for the 'I'. In the first place, an excessive stimuli coming from the inner world of instincts can damage the 'I', like those that are coming from the external world. It is true that the inner stimulus, even if it is excessive, cannot destroy the 'I' as a living being, but can destroy the coherent organization peculiar to it as an agency of the soul, and in that connection make it turn back into a portion of the 'it'. In the second place, satisfaction of some demands through actualization in the external world might in turn be a cause of threat of annihilation from the side of the external world. The 'I' has to defend its own existence from the threats of these two foreign territories. To preserve itself, to survive as a living being in the external world, and to preserve the psychical unity of its self the 'I' uses certain ways and methods of defense against both of them.<sup>173</sup> With regard to the external world, it can escape from excessive stimuli with its muscular act. By the activity of thought, taking into account the previous experiences and the present situation, the 'I' can decide to perform or postpone the relevant action. That is the essence of the reality principle.<sup>174</sup>

However, since 'I' *lives*, together with the inner foreign territory in unity, it cannot use the same methods of defense against the 'it'. In its relation to the inner world, the 'I' performs the task of self-preservation by controlling the demands of instincts and when necessary postponing their fulfillment or rejecting to recognize them consciously.

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<sup>172</sup> *ibid.*, p. 56

<sup>173</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 22, 'New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis', p. 200

<sup>174</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 19, 'An Outline of Psycho-analysis', p. 199

Instincts are wishful impulses, however, each instinct has wishes on its own account without regarding the others. In this regard, instincts can form no unified will. On the contrary, even if they are opposing impulses they can stand in the 'it' without contradicting, without destroying or reducing one another. Whenever their satisfaction and hence actualization through the activities of the 'I' is the case, those that are incompatible in their demands with the intentions of the 'I', undergo repression.<sup>175</sup>

In that connection, one *portion* of 'it' contains those wishful impulses that are rejected by the 'I'. Hence the repressed, which includes the unconscious wishes, feelings and thoughts is included by the inner foreign territory to the 'I'. What the 'I' recognizes at the level of consciousness as to the content of the repressed is only a representative of the repressed. The 'I' is the repelling and the repressing agency which is equipped with the repressing forces. The origin of these forces is the 'I' instincts, that is, self-preservative instincts. The conflicts of the psychical life are concealed by these forces.<sup>176</sup>

Repression is a defense mechanism which is adopted by the 'I' where the satisfaction of an instinctual impulse at one situation will cause unpleasure at another situation; that is, repression occurs where the satisfaction of an instinct is "*irreconcilable with other claims and intentions*".<sup>177</sup> Repressed impulses are those which are incompatible with the intentions and inclinations which the 'I' considers as its own. The source of these intentions which the 'I' owns is a grade in the 'I' which stands over and above the 'I'.

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<sup>175</sup> *ibid.*, 18, 'Beyond Pleasure Principle' p. 10

<sup>176</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 22, 'New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis', p. 57-58

<sup>177</sup> *ibid.*, 14, 'Repression', p. 147

The 'it' and the modified part, the 'I', are not the whole of the soul; Freud states that the considerations of psycho-analytic theory lead to the assumption that there exists "*a grade in the ego, a differentiation within the 'I', which may be called the 'I'-ideal' or 'above-I'*"<sup>178</sup> The mechanism of repression is a result of the conflicts between the 'I' and the ideal demands of the 'above-I'. This third agency of the soul, which stands for the conscience later in the life of the 'I', is not given as an agency at the beginning; it is not innate and like the 'I' it is subject to a formation.

In psycho-analysis, the formation of the 'above-I' is explained on the basis of biological and historical factors. Biologically, it is an outcome of the helplessness and the dependence of long childhood; historically, it is the outcome of the Oedipus complex.<sup>179</sup>

The development of the 'above-I' starts at the early ages of the individual in which the 'I' is still young and dependent on some superior 'I's in its relation to the external world. They are normally the parents. The development of the 'above-I' proceeds with the process of identification; that is, taking another 'I' as a model, and incorporating it within the 'I', hence, making it a part of one's own self.

At the beginning of the psychical life, where the 'it' and the 'I' are not differentiated yet, there is no differentiation in the *Objekt*-cathexis<sup>180</sup> and identification. The *Objekt*-cathexis

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<sup>178</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 19, 'The Ego and The Id', p. 28

<sup>179</sup> *ibid.*, p. 35

<sup>180</sup> Cathexis is an act of the soul through which a certain amount of energy is charged. In this act, an amount of energy is bound to the *Objekt*-representation (*Objekt-Vorstellung*), thing-representation (*Ding-Vorstellung*), and word-representation (*Wort-Vorstellung*). Through the act of cathexis the abovementioned representations are possible. Freud states that among these representations thing-representations are always unconscious. They are the first and the true *Objekt*-cathexises. When a thing representation is hyper-cathected, it is attached to its word-representation. Hyper-cathexis is an act which brings about a higher psychical organization. With the act of hyper-cathexis unconscious representations are attached to their conscious representations; that is to the word-representations and thereby consciously apprehended. *ibid.*, Vol. 14, 'The Unconscious', p. 201-204

proceeds from the 'it' the aim of which is to satisfy its needs. In that connection, its *Objekt* choice is directed by the instinctual impulses. In the course of its development, the 'I' becomes aware of its *Objekt*-cathexis and it either continues to achieve its aim through these *Objekt*(s) or remove them from itself through the mechanism of repression.<sup>181</sup>

Freud claims that when the 'I' learns to give up its sexual-*Objekt* (it is called sexual in the sense that the 'I' achieves satisfaction by means of that *Objekt*) there occurs an alteration in the 'I'. He describes this alteration as setting up the *Objekt* inside of the 'I' -a process whose exact nature is unknown to us. Freud further states that this internalization and identification is the only way the 'it' can give up its *Objekt*(s). Freud names this process as the transformation of the *Objekt*-libido into the narcissistic-libido which implies the abandonment of the erotic aims; in that sense, it is a process of desexualization -a kind of sublimation of these erotic aims.<sup>182</sup>

Freud thinks that in the origin of the 'I'-ideal there lies such an identification. Although the development of the 'above-I' is not a direct consequence of the *Objekt*-cathexis, it is related to it, since in case of the *Objekt*-choice relating to the parents in the early periods of the 'I', the core of an identification of this kind is determined.<sup>183</sup> By identification Freud means 'an emotional tie with another person'; it plays an important role in the formation of the Oedipus-complex and hence in the development of the 'above-I'.<sup>184</sup>

Freud describes the formation of the Oedipus-complex in case of a male child as follows: At the beginning of his life the little boy's first *Object*-cathexis is his mother through his relation with the mother's breast. Freud thinks that this is a prototype of the *Objekt*-choice. To deal with

<sup>181</sup> *ibid.*, 19, 'The Ego and The Id', p. 29

<sup>182</sup> *ibid.*, p. 30

<sup>183</sup> *ibid.*, p. 31

<sup>184</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 18, 'Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego', p.105



the father the boy identifies himself with the father. The identification with the father and the *Objekt*-cathexis towards the mother are the two psychically different ties. They exist together without being seen as incompatible with each other.

However, since the advancement of the psychical life is towards unification they come together as incompatible psychical ties.<sup>185</sup> Once the erotic wishes of the boy toward his mother get intensified, the father is seen as an obstacle. As the father is seen as a threat the boy gives up his first *Objekt*-cathexis. In place of it, the male child has two alternatives: either he can identify himself with the mother -the lost sexual-*Objekt*- or he can intensify the identification with his father. Freud states that the latter alternative is the one which is adopted normally, since it retains an affectionate relation with the mother in a considerable way.<sup>186</sup> Freud states: "*The broad outcome of the sexual phase dominated by the Oedipus complex may, therefore, be taken to be the forming of a precipitate in the 'I', consisting of these two identifications in some way united with each other. This modification of the 'I' retains its special position; it confronts the other contents of the 'I' as an 'I' ideal or 'above-I'.*"<sup>187</sup>

Freud claims that the 'above-I' is not only a residue of the *Objekt* choices of the 'it' but it is a reaction-formation towards them. The 'I' ideal has the task of repressing the Oedipus complex. The father was the obstacle on the way to the realization of the Oedipus complex;

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<sup>185</sup> *ibid.*, p. 105

<sup>186</sup> *ibid.*, 19, 'The Ego and The Id', p. 34

Freud uses the male child example in explaining the formation of the Oedipus-complex for the sake of simplicity and states that in a similar way, as an outcome of the Oedipus-complex the little girl may identify herself with her mother. The identification process explains also the procedure through which the child develops his or her masculine and feminine character. Freud states that the development of the sexual character depends on whether the *Objekt* of the identification is the father or the mother. Father-identification retains *Objekt*-relation with the mother, while mother-identification retains *Objekt*-relation with the father. In the present thesis, we will not give an explanation of Freud's account of how the identification and *Objekt*- choice proceeds in a certain way depending on the two sexes, in detail.

<sup>187</sup> *ibid.*, p.34

however, to deal with the Oedipus complex the child uses the power of the father by means of identification and hence imitation. In that way he internalizes the father as the prototype of authority which will later be replaced by other figures.<sup>188</sup> Once it becomes, as a grade in the 'I', the authority in the psychical apparatus, it dominates the 'I' and manifests itself in the form of a 'categorical imperative'.<sup>189</sup>

Through this formation, what is considered to be the lowest in human nature is transformed into a higher one. The values that are internalized through prohibitions continue to exist in the form of moral values and conscience. In that sense, "*religion, morality, and a social sense -the chief elements in the higher side of man- were originally one and the same thing.*"<sup>190</sup>

Freud claims that another function of the 'above-I', is to stand for what we call conscience later in life. With that function the 'above-I' stands as an agency which is over and above the 'I'. It has a separate existence within the unity of the psychical apparatus. It observes the 'I', judges its deeds and may condemn it. It may, in severe cases, be rather cruel in its relation with the 'I' and threaten the 'I' with punishments.<sup>191</sup>

Freud claims that the 'above-I' is the representative of the moral values and sanctions. It dictates the moral standards to the 'I'. The parental authority plays the role of the 'above-I' externally by threatening the child with punishments which means for the child a loss of those persons who are the most beloved. Freud states: "*So long as it is dominant there is no need to talk of a 'above-I' or conscience. It is only subsequently that the secondary situation develops (which we are all ready to regard as the normal one), where the external restraint is internalized*

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<sup>188</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>189</sup> *ibid.*, p.35

<sup>190</sup> *ibid.*, p.37

<sup>191</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 22, 'New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis' p. 60-61

*and the 'above-I' takes the place of the parental agency and observes, directs and threatens the 'I' in exactly the same way as earlier the parents did with the child.*"<sup>192</sup>

The 'above-I' directly proceeds out of parental authority. In fact, what the 'above-I' stands for is the authority, the origin of which is the parental one. In the course of its development, the parental authority is replaced by the other authoritative figures, like teachers, educators, or some other figures taken as an ideal. As it grows it becomes much more impersonal, and becomes an agency in the soul which dictates to the 'I' what is good and what is bad.<sup>193</sup> Freud states : *"It is also the vehicle of the 'I'-ideal by which the 'I' measures itself, which it emulates, and whose demand for ever greater perfection it strives to fulfill. There is no doubt that this 'I' ideal is the precipitate of the old picture of the parents, the expression of admiration for the perfection which the child then attributed to them."*<sup>194</sup>

The 'above-I', as it is the representative of the moral values, and as it impels the 'I' towards perfection through the attainment of the higher goals instead of seeking after pleasure; is considered to be the higher side of the human individual. However, those that are put as the higher goals are the ones that are appreciated by the parents and the other authorities that are later replaced by the parental authority. Since these authorities themselves are formed out of the 'above-I's of their own ideal figures, the appreciated ideals and values pass from generation to generation.<sup>195</sup>

Freud thinks that the content of these ideals constitutes 'the vehicle of tradition and of all the time-resisting judgements of value': *"Mankind never lives entirely in the present. The past,*

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<sup>192</sup> *ibid.*, p.62

<sup>193</sup> *ibid.*, p.62

<sup>194</sup> *ibid.*, p.65

<sup>195</sup> *ibid.*, p.67

*tradition of race and of the people, lives on in the ideologies of the 'above-I', and yields only slowly to the influences of the present and to new changes..."*<sup>196</sup>

The soul is the unity of these three agencies, each having a demand of its own. In that the 'I' has three masters to serve harmoniously. It has to bring the incompatible demands of the three regions in a way alien and other than itself into harmony. These three masters are the external world, the 'it', and the 'above-I'. The external world has its own demands and rules. The 'I' receives and perceives them through its perceptual system. However its true origin lies within itself; in that sense, it is the servant of its own 'it'. In that connection its real aim is to be on good terms with its own origin.<sup>197</sup>

However, in working as the mediator between the external world and the 'it', it is mostly in a position either to postpone or disregard and to conceal the demands of the 'it' by pushing them into the unconscious, and refusing to apprehend them consciously; the mechanism of repression works due to the ideal demands of the 'above-I', which are mostly incompatible with the wishes and thoughts that force themselves into consciousness. It sets up ideal standards of conduct and the conduct of the 'I' is followed by the eyes of the 'I' ideal. It threatens the 'I' by the sense of guilt and of inferiority.

The theory of the repressed, as Freud calls it, is considered to be the cornerstone of the psycho-analytic theory. It is contained by the 'it' and is separated from being in contact with the 'I' due to the opposing forces whose aim is to prevent their becoming conscious representations. The repressed is therefore totally unconscious. Before stating in detail the theory of the repressed,

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<sup>196</sup> *ibid.*,

<sup>197</sup> *ibid.*, p. 76

it is necessary to elaborate the systems of the preconsciousness, consciousness and the unconscious at this point.

### III.2. CONSCIOUSNESS, PRECONSCIOUSNESS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE SYSTEMS OF THE SOUL <sup>198</sup>

From the topographical point of view, the soul is dissected into the agencies of the 'I', the 'it' and the 'above-I'. Each of these agencies has its own function in the unity of the soul providing the ground for the psychical phenomena. These psychical phenomena can be described as being conscious or unconscious. To explain how these representations acquire these qualities, Freud considers them as systems having a topographical reference. It is not possible, however to set up a one to one correspondence between the systems of consciousness, preconsciousness and the unconscious and the three agencies of the soul. At this point we need to elaborate the relation of these three systems with each other and with the agencies of the soul.

Freud states that the division of the psychical phenomena as the conscious and the unconscious is a fundamental distinction of psycho-analysis. On the basis of this distinction and on the basis of the assumption of the unconscious, the processes in the soul, especially those that are pathological in their very nature can be understood in a scientific framework.

The claim of the psycho-analytic theory is that psychology of consciousness cannot go beyond the broken sequences of the conscious perceptions, since what is psychical does not include only the conscious perceptions; on the contrary, what is psychical in itself is

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<sup>198</sup> The original German terms for these terms are the following: *Bewusstsein* for consciousness, *Vorbewusstsein* for preconsciousness, *Unbewusste* for the unconscious.

unconscious.<sup>199</sup> This means that what is psychical might acquire the quality of consciousness or not but every psychical act begins as an unconscious one.

In the article '*The Unconscious*', Freud gives a justification of the concept of the unconscious which is the fundamental assumption on which the possibility of psycho-analysis as a science rests; he argues that such an assumption is both necessary and legitimate. The necessity of such an assumption arises from the fact that the psychology of consciousness provides us only with broken sequences of psychical phenomena; and on the basis of such conscious phenomena, we cannot explain the nature of the psychical life.<sup>200</sup> Freud states : "*..Our most personal experience acquaints us with ideas that come into our head we do not know from where, and with intellectual conclusions arrived at we do not know how. All these conscious acts remain disconnected and unintelligible if we insist upon claiming that every mental act (Seelischen Akt) that occurs in us must also necessarily be experienced by us through consciousness; on the other hand, they fall into a demonstrable connection if we interpolate between them the unconscious acts which we have inferred.*"<sup>201</sup>

On the other hand, when the recollection of the experiences that belongs to the past are taken into account, it becomes necessary to assume the existence of the unconscious. Since consciousness provides a space only for those representations which are perceived in the present

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<sup>199</sup> *ibid.*, '*The Unconscious*', p. 171

<sup>200</sup> *ibid.*, p. 166-167

<sup>201</sup> *ibid.*,

Freud argues that the identification of what is psychical with what is conscious though not explicitly stated, leads to the insoluble difficulties of psycho-physical parallelism. He states: "*It is clear that in any case that this question-whether the latent states of mental life, whose existence is undeniable, are to be conceived of as conscious mental states or as physical ones-threatens to resolve itself into a verbal dispute. We shall therefore be better advised to focus our attention on what we know with certainty of the nature of these debatable states. As far as their physical characteristics are concerned, they are totally inaccessible to us: no physiological concept or chemical process can give us any notion of their nature.*"

time, any representation can occupy the space provided by consciousness only for a definite length of time; in that connection, it is apparent that the incoming recollections cannot be explained by the system consciousness.

Freud says that the assumption that there are unconscious mental states is also legitimate; consciousness is a state of mind which we directly experience in our own self. The knowledge that other people have consciousness is only an inference that we make on the basis of apparent behaviors and utterances that we are familiar with in our own conscious experience. Freud states that, what psycho-analysis tries to do is to treat one's own self as an other. That is, as we make inferences on the basis of the manifest acts and utterances of other people and fill the gaps between the apparent phenomena, so with the assumption of the unconscious-a second or perhaps an unlimited series of psychical acts behind the apparent ones - we are in a position to disregard the internal opposition that prevents us from recognizing our psychical life as a whole.<sup>202</sup>

Freud concludes that the assumption which claims that whatever goes on in the soul can be apparently known in the state of consciousness is not a tenable position and to fill the gaps between the apparent conscious phenomena it is necessary to go beyond the limits of conscious experience. Our conscious experience consists of experiences regarding the outer world and the inner world as they appear to us. I can know myself so far as I appear to myself within my consciousness.

Freud claims that the assertion that psychical phenomena are unconscious in itself is fundamental to psycho-analytic theory and this assertion makes psycho-analysis take its place among other natural sciences. The psycho-analytic theory, like other natural sciences, deals with

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<sup>202</sup> *ibid.*, p. 169-170

natural phenomena which are in themselves unknowable: *"The processes with which it is concerned are in themselves just as unknowable as those dealt with by other sciences, by chemistry or physics, for example; but it is possible to establish the laws which they obey and to follow their mutual relations and interdependencies unbroken over long stretches-in short, to arrive at what is described as an 'understanding' of the field of natural phenomena in question."*

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Psychology resembles other natural sciences in its employment; on the basis and the guidance of the apparent phenomena, it is in a position to infer the underlying processes of which those phenomena are the representative. To state this in Freud's own words: *"In our science as in the others the problem is the same: behind the attributes (qualities) of the object (Objekts) under examination which are presented directly to our perception, we have to discover something else which is more independent of the particular receptive capacity of our sense organs and which approximates more closely to what may be supposed to be the real state of affairs."*<sup>204</sup>

Hence the assumption that the psychical processes cannot be described and be understood on the basis of the apparent conscious phenomena and the claim that what is psychical is unconscious in essence and the conscious state is a modification of it is a very fundamental assumption for the psycho-analytic theory. Freud argues that this fundamental assumption of psycho-analysis is an extension of the corrections made by Kant about the nature of our external perceptions.<sup>205</sup> Freud states: *"Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is*

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<sup>203</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 23, 'An Outline of Psycho-analysis', p. 158

<sup>204</sup> *ibid.*, p. 196

<sup>205</sup> *ibid.*, 14, 'The Unconscious', p. 171



*perceived though unknowable, so psycho-analysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means of consciousness with unconscious mental processes which are their Objekt. Like the physical, the psychical is not necessarily in reality what it appears to us to be. We shall be glad to learn, however, that the correction of internal perception will turn out not to offer such great difficulties as the correction of external perception-that internal Objekt(s) are less unknowable than the external world."*<sup>206</sup>

What characterizes then the system of consciousness and the unconscious? Freud states: "*Psycho-analysis cannot situate the essence of the psychical in consciousness, but is obliged to regard consciousness as a quality of the psychical, which may be present in addition to the other qualities or may be absent.*"<sup>207</sup> Freud claims that what we know as the state of consciousness is in fact a phenomenon that is clear to everyone in his own experience. In the psycho-analytic framework, it is purely a descriptive term; it describes the situation in which there is '*the perception of the most immediate and certain character*'.<sup>208</sup>

However, consciousness is a state which is transitory; a representation is conscious only for a length of time. A representation which was conscious a moment ago but not presently is said to be latent; that is, it is a representation that is capable of becoming conscious. It can also be said that it is unconscious provided that the term unconscious is used in the descriptive sense, that is as referring to '*the latent and capable of becoming conscious*'.<sup>209</sup>

In psycho-analysis the term unconscious has different senses. Descriptively speaking, the system of unconscious includes those psychical acts which are latent, and also those that are

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<sup>206</sup> *ibid.*, p. 171

<sup>207</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 19, 'The Ego and the Id', p. 13

<sup>208</sup> *ibid.*,

<sup>209</sup> *ibid.*, p. 14

rejected from being consciously recognized. The former is unconscious in the descriptive sense and is called preconscious, while the latter one is unconscious in the dynamic sense of the term. In the dynamic sense of the term unconscious, it is meant that an emotion, a representation, or a feeling is not conscious because it is repressed due to the repressive forces. Freud states that in such cases the goal of the psycho-analytic techniques is to remove these forces which prevent the idea or thought from becoming conscious.<sup>210</sup>

Psycho-analytic theory therefore, has three terms in determining the psychical phenomena: the conscious, preconscious and the unconscious. In that sense, these terms are attributed to the psychic as their qualities. Taken in the topographical sense, however, they are the three systems in the soul which work in accordance with their own principles. At this point we need to elaborate the communication of these three systems with each other, and the relation of these three terms with the agencies of the soul.

Freud states that every psychical act is unconscious. A psychical act may pass through the system of preconscious to the state of consciousness, or it may remain in the unconscious due to the repressive forces. When a representation is in the state of preconscious or consciousness, it should not be supposed that the unconscious is at rest; on the contrary it is always alive and active. In that sense it is always in relation to the other systems and constantly influences them.

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Freud states that in the psycho-analytic framework, we are talking about what is conscious and unconscious as representations. An instinct, which constitutes the true content of the agency 'it', cannot be grasped as it is; as such it cannot be an *Objekt* of consciousness, but

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<sup>210</sup> *ibid.*,

<sup>211</sup> *ibid.*, 14, 'The Unconscious', p.190

only a representation of it. An instinct, even in the unconscious, can be presented by a representation; it can be known only if it attaches itself to a representation.<sup>212</sup>

The representation of an *Objekt* can be split up into two components: the representation of the word - the linguistic entity- and the representation of the thing. The latter consists of either direct memory images of the thing or remoter memory-traces of it. On the basis of this distinction the difference between a conscious and an unconscious representation in one respect becomes illuminated. The unconscious representation is the thing representation of the *Objekt(s)*; it is the first and the fundamental cathexis. The preconscious representation is the thing representation hyper-cathected by being connected with word-representation which corresponds to it in the perceptual system. A representation which is not hyper-cathected or anti-cathected due to the mechanism of repression remains as an unconscious one. Apparently, what happens in the mechanism of repression is that an unconscious representation is blocked in order not to attach itself to the word which represents it in terms of consciousness.<sup>213</sup>

The system of unconscious contains in itself the representatives of instincts. They aim at the discharge of the cathected energy. This means that this system consists of wishful impulses. Two contradictory impulses can exist side by side without influencing each other; they neither diminish nor cancel one another, but come to a compromise. In the unconscious there are instinctual representatives which are cathected in a degree of strength, however, there is no denial, no doubt, no degree of certainty. All representations in the unconscious are in the same

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<sup>212</sup> *ibid.*, p. 177

<sup>213</sup> *ibid.*, p. 201-204

rank; a degree of certainty and a hierarchy of clearness of these impulses is a result of the censorship which is at work between the system of consciousness and of the unconscious.<sup>214</sup>

The mobility of the cathected intensities in the unconscious is a characteristic of that system. In connection with this fundamental characteristic, there are two basic processes that are at work in the unconscious. Freud says: "*By the process of displacement one representation may surrender to another its whole quota of cathexis; by the process of condensation it may appropriate the whole cathexis of several other representations. I have proposed to regard these two processes as the distinguishing marks of the so-called primary psychological processes.*"<sup>215</sup> An unconscious representation which is repressed can force itself into consciousness in a modified way; the modification is possible on the basis of the processes of displacement and condensation which are peculiar to the unconscious psychological acts.

Freud claims that the content of the unconscious cannot be known as it is; this content manifests itself in dreams and in some psychological disorders, such as neurosis. They can be known if they appear in terms of the system of preconscious.<sup>216</sup> Hence, translating itself into the terms of the system of the preconscious it manifests itself and thereby finds a way -often in a concealed way- to discharge and achieve satisfaction.

The system consciousness, on the other hand, is related to the part of the 'I' which is called the perceptual system.<sup>217</sup> "*Consciousness is the surface of the mental apparatus; that is we have described it as a function to a system which is spatially the first one reached from the external*

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<sup>214</sup> *ibid.*, p. 186

<sup>215</sup> *ibid.*, p. 186

<sup>216</sup> *ibid.*, p. 187

<sup>217</sup> Since Freud destroyed his article on consciousness together with six other metapsychological articles, we have limited information as to his views on the nature of the consciousness. St. Ed., Vol. 14, 'Editor's Introduction' to the 'Papers on Metapsychology', p. 106

*world-and spacially not only in the functional sense but, on this occasion, also in the sense of anatomical dissection.*" <sup>218</sup>

Freud states that the process of becoming conscious is linked with the perception of impressions that are received from the external world. And on the basis of this fact he infers that *"from the topographical point of view,..., it is a phenomenon which takes place in the outermost cortex of the 'I'."* <sup>219</sup>

Freud states: *"...all our knowledge is invariably bound up with consciousness. We can come to know even the unconscious only by making it conscious."* <sup>220</sup> The unconscious or 'the real state of affairs' which underlies the conscious processes cannot be known as they are in themselves. It is apparent that we can know the unconscious processes only in terms of the conscious material; that is as conforming to the constitution of the perceptual system.

Conscious processes are on the periphery of the 'I'. From the topographical point of view, next to it stands the preconscious which includes the thought processes which are latent and can easily be made conscious. Preconscious material is inaccessible only for a length of time, in cases we forget something or the state of consciousness is occupied by another thought. <sup>221</sup> The content of the system preconscious partly consists of the representations which originate in the unconscious and come into the preconscious state in a modified way, and those that are directly perceived without any censorship. Between the system unconscious and the preconscious, and the system preconscious and the consciousness there is a mechanism of censorship at work; hence a representative of an instinctual impulse may encounter a resistance at two levels. The mechanism

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<sup>218</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 19, 'The Ego and The Id', p. 19

<sup>219</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 'An Outline of Psycho-analysis', 23 p. 161

<sup>220</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 19, 'The Ego and The Id', p. 19

<sup>221</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 23, 'An Outline of Psycho-analysis', p. 161

of censorship between the unconscious and the preconscious works against the unconscious representations themselves, and the second one resists the derivatives of the unconscious representations, that is their concealed and modified form.<sup>222</sup> Anything preconscious can be pushed back to the unconscious state.

Freud states that it is a common supposition that the 'I' and the consciousness, and 'it' and the unconscious coincide. However, this is not actually the case; only the outermost part of the 'I' coincides with the state of consciousness; the inside of the 'I' is preconscious and as against what is often supposed, large *portions* of the 'I' can be unconscious. On the other hand, all the psychical processes in the 'it' are unconscious.<sup>223</sup>

In relation to the unconscious an accepted assumption that only the lower passions and the thoughts that express the wishes and that are considered to be immoral are unconscious. However, Freud claims that such assumptions are falsified by the psycho-analytic studies.

These studies show that some mental activities that are highly appreciated and have nothing to do with the moral issues can be carried out unconsciously, such as difficult intellectual operations, mathematical proofs and theorems. Just as with these intellectual activities, the psychical activities like self-criticism and judgments of the conscience which are considered to be the higher ones may be carried out unconsciously or preconsciously.<sup>224</sup>

Hence, in the 'I' what is lowest and what is highest can both be unconscious. In the realm of the 'above-I' which is the realm of the conscience and morality, judgments can be carried out

<sup>222</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 14, 'The Unconscious', p. 193

<sup>223</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 23, 'An Outline of Psycho-analysis', p. 162

<sup>224</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 19 'The Ego and The Id', p. 26-27

unconsciously which may results in an unconscious sense of guilt and unconscious sense of inferiority.<sup>225</sup>

The unconscious contains in itself the representations which are repressed. Repression is the mechanism of the psychical apparatus which is developed against the excessive stimuli whose source is the inner foreign territory of the soul. As stated in the previous parts of the present thesis the psychical apparatus is shielded against external stimuli. The perceptual system which receives excitations from the external world, receives excitations from the inner world as well.

To put it in Freud's words: "*Towards the outside, it is shielded against stimuli, and the amounts of excitation impinging on it have only a reduced effect. Towards the inside there can be no such shield; the excitations in the deeper layers extend into the system directly and in undiminished amount, in so far as certain of their characteristics give rise to feelings in the pleasure-unpleasure series. The excitations coming from within are, however, in their intensity and in other, qualitative, respects-in their amplitude, perhaps-more commensurate with the system's method of working than the stimuli which stream in from the external world.*"<sup>226</sup>

Against an excessive external stimuli, the appropriate method is flight; however the same method is not appropriate to the inner stimuli, since the 'I' cannot escape from itself. In that case the 'I' may refuse recognizing these representations consciously and push them back to the system unconscious: "*The essence of repression lies simply in turning something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious.*"<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>225</sup> *ibid.*,

<sup>226</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 18, 'Beyond Pleasure Principle', p. 28-29

<sup>227</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 14, 'Repression', p.147

The content of the repressed involves those wishes and thoughts that will disturb the coherent structure of the 'I'. Freud states: "*Repression proceeds from the 'I'; we might say with greater precision that it proceeds from the self-respect of the 'I'.*"<sup>228</sup> The same wishes and thoughts can be quite acceptable and manageable whenever it is consciously apprehended for one person, while for another it may be unbearable to realize those thoughts as its own. Hence, what is repressed as to its content, depends on the self concept of the 'I', which it formulates on the basis of its 'I'-ideal.<sup>229</sup> "*For the 'I', the formation of the an ideal would be the conditioning factor for repression.*"<sup>230</sup>

Repression may not prevent the representative of the instinct to persist in the unconscious. Furthermore, it develops its derivative forms in order to arise to the level of consciousness. What is repressed is in the borderline between the systems of preconscious and the unconscious. The repressed, on the one hand receive cathexis from wishful impulses, from which it originates, and on the other hand is rejected by the preconscious system; that is, it is not cathected -*anti-cathected*- by the preconscious system. Thereby, it is given no higher psychical organization. Freud calls this kind of repression, *primal repression*.<sup>231</sup>

A representation can be repressed after it is consciously apprehended. In this case, the cathexis given to the representation is withdrawn and furthermore it is anti-cathected. This kind of repression is called *repression proper* or *repression after pressure*.<sup>232</sup> What is theoretically important and common to both of these repressive attitudes is that their aim is to prevent the

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<sup>228</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 14, 'On Narcism: An Introduction', p. 93

<sup>229</sup> *ibid.*,

<sup>230</sup> *ibid.*, p. 94

<sup>231</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 14, 'The Unconscious', p.180

<sup>232</sup> *ibid.*, p. 180-181



representation receiving the quality of consciousness and be consciously apprehended by the 'I'. A repressed thought or wish retains its cathexis; in that sense it is dynamic and forces itself into consciousness by this charged energy. An impulse, once it is repressed, becomes subject to primary processes; and as being subject to these processes it tries to find an outlet.

Freud states that repression acts in an individual manner; each derivative of a repressed representation may undergo its vicissitudes in its own way. Another characteristic of the mechanism of repression in addition to its being individual in its operation is the fact that it is mobile. In repression, the repressive forces exerted by the 'I' are balanced by the forces of the instinctual impulses which resist the barrier erected against their expression. Therefore, it demands a permanent expenditure of energy. If the success of the repression is endangered, repression transform itself into another form. It should be noted that the aim of repression in the last resort is to avoid unpleasure.<sup>233</sup>

The ultimate aim of an instinct is satisfaction. To attain this end first an instinct forces itself into consciousness to be realized by the 'I', since the 'I' is the only means by which it can externalize itself and attain its end. In case of repression, the 'I' refuses performing the dictates of the 'it'; furthermore, it prevents their being represented by thoughts and feelings within consciousness. However, an instinctual impulse, even if it is forced to remain in the unconscious, never gives up its aim. It transforms itself in such a way that, it can conceal itself even from its own 'I'. In that way it can find a transformed and concealed way of expression. Freud thinks that this is the case that happens in the formation of jokes, dreams, slips of tongue and symptoms of psychological disturbances.<sup>234</sup>

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<sup>233</sup> *ibid.*, p. 154

<sup>234</sup> *ibid.*, p.151

Freud states: "*the mechanism of repression becomes accessible to us only by our deducing that mechanism from the outcome of the repression.*"<sup>235</sup> In repression the repressed leaves behind it symptoms or substitution-formations that are built out of the original repressed representation. They are not in fact the consequences of the repression, since the aim of repression is to conceal the undesirable representations totally. They are rather the result of the efforts of the repressed which pushes itself into the consciousness.<sup>236</sup>

The repressed may force itself into consciousness and be able to externalize itself in various ways. Jokes, dreams, slips of tongue and artistic works or symptoms of psychological disorders can be counted among the ways through which an unconscious thought manifests itself. In each of them the original representation conceals itself behind the manifest representation, which seems at first sight irrelevant to the original representation. The claim of psycho-analysis in that connection is that, by means of analysis on the basis of associative relations contained by the memory, the true motive that lies behind the apparent phenomena can be deciphered.

What is represented through dreams, jokes, and other psychical phenomena regarding the unconscious, instinctual impulse might have undergone vicissitudes peculiar to itself. In each case, therefore, the success of the analytical work depends on the adequacy of the psycho-analytical techniques.

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<sup>235</sup> *ibid.*, p. 154

<sup>236</sup> *ibid.*,

### III. 3. THE CAPACITY OF MEMORY

Freud thinks that the psychical apparatus resembles a compound microscope or a photographic apparatus. However, he mentions that he follows this analogy on metapsychological grounds without meaning that psychical locality corresponds to a physiological locality. To put it in Freud's own words: *"Analogies of this kind are only intended to assist us in our attempt to make the complications of mental (Seelischen) functioning intelligible by dissecting the function and assigning its different constituents to different component parts of the apparatus.....Accordingly, we will picture the psychical apparatus as a compound instrument, to the components of which we will give the name of agencies, or (for the sake of greater clarity) 'systems'."*<sup>237</sup>

All the psychical activity starts with the excitations coming either from the inside or the outside of the soul. Freud states that soul has an *"unlimited capacity for new perceptions and nevertheless lays down permanent-even though not unalterable-memory-traces of them."*<sup>238</sup> However this function has to be performed by two different systems of the psychical apparatus. The system perceptual-consciousness can receive but cannot retain what it receives. A capacity which will provide a limitless capacity for memory-traces of experiences is necessary for them to be permanent. Memory is the capacity which provides such a *reservoir* for all experiences of the soul. The perceptual system and the system of consciousness is open to new impressions; however these systems cannot keep permanent traces of them. Hence, what is received by them can be kept here only temporally. The perceptual system has no memory; it is like a screen for the passing of representations. In that connection, perceptual consciousness can constitute only a

<sup>237</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 5, 'Interpretations of Dreams', p. 536-537

<sup>238</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 19, 'A Note Upon Mystic Writing-Pad', p. 228

small part of the system of memory as a source of the impressions which then turn to be memory-traces.

Freud states that the nature of the memory-traces, left behind the perceptions, lies in the fact that they are permanent and not transitory; therefore they have to be contained in a system; *"...memory-traces can only consist in permanent modifications of the elements of the systems. But,...there are obvious difficulties involved in supposing that one and the same system can accurately retain modifications of its elements and yet remain perpetually open to the reception of fresh occasions of modification."*<sup>239</sup>

What, then, is the place of the capacity of memory within the topography of the soul and what is the relation between this capacity and the other systems and the agencies of the soul?

The psychical apparatus is constituted in such a way that it has no access to the external world in itself; it is shielded against it in order to diminish the strong stimuli. Physically this shield is constituted by the body and the organs. Behind this external shield against the stimuli, there lies the system perceptual consciousness which receives the stimuli. Freud states: *"Perceptual apparatus of the soul consists of two layers, of an external protective shield against stimuli whose task it is to diminish the strength of excitations coming in, and a surface behind it which receives the stimuli, namely the perceptual-consciousness."*<sup>240</sup>

In the previous sections of this thesis, we stated that the perceptual system, which is situated in the outermost part of the 'I', receives stimuli both from the inside and outside of the soul. What is perceived leaves a trace in the psychical apparatus: *"This we may describe as a*

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<sup>239</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 5, 'Interpretations of Dreams', p. 538

<sup>240</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 19, 'A Note Upon Mystic Writing-Pad', p. 230

'memory-trace'; and to the function relating to it we give the name of 'memory'." <sup>241</sup> By the function of the capacity of memory, experiences are kept as imprinted in the soul.

The 'I' is that part of the soul which stands in relation to the external world. It is also in contact with the willing part of the soul-the 'it'. The 'I' actualizes, in other words, externalizes the needs and the demands of the 'it' through its own activity to satisfy these needs and demands. This activity involves a modification of the external world in such a way that "*it becomes possible to arrive at a real perception of the Objekt of satisfaction.*"<sup>242</sup> In the course of the development of the 'I' the pleasure principle, which dominates the psychical processes in the 'it', is replaced by the reality principle. In acting in accordance with the reality principle, the 'I' can put a postponement between the demand and the action that satisfies it. In this interval the 'I' makes use of the mnemonic residues of its perceptions on the basis of which it formed an accurate picture of the external world. <sup>243</sup>

In that connection memory is a well developed organization, whose function is to facilitate the recognition of the external world and to help the 'I's' adaptation process. It is a means which serves for the 'I's' activity in accordance with the reality principle. In that regard, the external world, which is unknowable in itself, is pictured as representation and retained in the way it is experienced in memory-traces. Taken in its relation to the external world, the importance of the capacity of the memory lies in the fact that it is a reservoir of the experiences of the 'I' with regard to the external world; and in that connection, it is a capacity which is indispensable for the survival of the 'I' as living being.

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<sup>241</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 5, 'Interpretations of Dreams', p. 538

<sup>242</sup> *ibid.*, p. 599

<sup>243</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 22, 'New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis' p. 76

We know that the perceptual system receives stimuli not only from the external world but also from the internal world. All psychical processes, like thought processes, wishes and feelings, be they conscious or unconscious, leave permanent memory-traces in the memory.

What is apprehended has to be reproducible to be a permanent element. Its reproduction is possible if it is retained and kept in a container. If the perceptual system would be capable of retaining the previous representations, it would be incapable of receiving new impressions. Its function is to be like a *'blank sheet of paper'* for fresh representations. Memory is the system which lies behind the perceptual system. The perceptual system, whenever it receives an impression immediately sends it to the unconscious mnemic-systems. Freud states: *"It is as though the unconscious stretches out feelers, through the medium of the system of the perceptual consciousness, towards the external world and hastily withdraws them as soon as they have sampled the excitations coming from it."*<sup>244</sup>

It is important to note that what is retained from perceptions are not the mere content of them. On the contrary, Freud states that perceptions are linked with one another in accordance with certain relations which are called *'mnemic systems'*.<sup>245</sup> Freud explains: *"Our perceptions are linked to one another in our memory -first and foremost according to the simultaneity of occurrence. We speak of this fact as 'association'."*<sup>246</sup> The basis of association lies in the mnemic systems which record the new representation in certain relations.

In association, in case of recollection and as a result of the lessening of the repressive forces which prevent an unconscious representation to become conscious, one mnemic element

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<sup>244</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 19, 'A Note Upon Mystic Writing-Pad', p. 231

<sup>245</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 5, 'Interpretations of Dreams', p. 539

<sup>246</sup> *ibid.*,

attaches itself to a certain mnemic element rather than a randomly chosen one. The association of one representation to another is not arbitrary, on the contrary, they are determined in accordance with the way they are recorded by the mnemic element.

Freud states: *"Closer consideration will show the necessity for supposing the existence not of one but of several such mnemic elements, in which one and the same excitation, transmitted by the perceptual elements, leaves the variety of different permanent records. The first of these mnemic systems will naturally contain the record of association in respect to simultaneity in time; while the same perceptual material will be arranged in the later systems, for instance, will record relations of similarity, and so on with the others...Its character would lie in the intimate details of its relations to the different elements of the raw material of memory."*

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All psychical activity starts with inner or outer stimuli received by the perceptual system. Perceptual system gives them an order; memory, on the other hand, retains experiences of all kinds as memory-traces. The 'I' contains the perceptual system; it is the perceiving and apprehending agency of the soul. However, it does not apprehend most of the thoughts and wishes consciously. It apprehends them, nevertheless it may not permit them to manifest themselves in the consciousness and may not recognize them consciously.

In psycho-analytic theory, consciousness is not the essence of the psychical phenomena, but only a quality of such phenomena which may be present or absent. The term 'unconscious experience' pertains to wishes, thoughts, and perceptions which are apprehended but not consciously realized. The experiences which are consciously apprehended but forgotten later are

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<sup>247</sup> *ibid.*,

also among the unconscious experiences. All experiences, whatever their quality is, leave behind them permanent traces; they are imprinted in the soul.

Freud states: "*All excitatory processes that occur in the other systems leave permanent traces behind them which form the foundation of memory. Such memory-traces, then have nothing to do with the fact of becoming conscious; indeed they are most powerful and most enduring when the process which left them behind was one which never entered consciousness.*"

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If we describe the relation between the memory and the system of consciousness and the unconscious, it is easily seen that memory cannot contain in itself any representation which has the quality of consciousness. Hence, "*..memory and the quality which characterizes consciousness are mutually exclusive.*"<sup>249</sup>

All memories, then are unconscious, either taken in the dynamic or descriptive sense of the term; and they produce all their effects when they remain as unconscious in the dynamic sense. They can be made conscious, depending on the strength of the repressive pressure which pushes them back to the unconscious state. However, some of the experiences -among them the experiences of the early childhood-cannot be made conscious; they continue to affect the psychical activities constantly.<sup>250</sup>

We can have unconscious experiences, but we cannot have unconscious knowledge, since "*all our knowledge is invariably bound with consciousness.*"<sup>251</sup> An unconscious representation, to be an *Objekt* of knowledge has to be translated into conscious representations. An unconscious

<sup>248</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 18, 'Beyond Pleasure Principle', p. 25

<sup>249</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 5, 'Interpretations of Dreams', p. 540

<sup>250</sup> *ibid.*,

<sup>251</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 23, 'An Outline of Psycho-analysis', p. 19



experience externalizes itself and manifests itself in consciousness by means of its effects; that is, through its derivative representations behind which is hidden the true content.

However, to define the unconscious experience in terms of the conscious one, it is necessary to establish its connecting links to conscious experience. Memory of an unconscious experience, when it is repressed, is subject to primary processes. They can attach themselves to different representations and force themselves to consciousness in a quite different context. An unconscious memory manifests itself in conscious experience, when in the case of repressed representation it cannot be apprehended in its original representation due to the mechanism of repression. It transforms itself to a representation which can be considered by the 'I'. This transformation, on the other hand, is not an arbitrary one; it is subject to a mechanism. The psychological phenomena which manifest the unconscious experience, like dreams, jokes, and so on has a language that can be deciphered. On the basis of the deeper language of dreams, and all the psychological phenomena that manifest unconscious life of the soul, psycho-analysis is possible.

The contents of the psychological phenomena that manifest unconscious experiences derive their content from memory. Memory is the reservoir of 'I's experiences from its early childhood; and in that sense it provides them with a rich content. The cornerstone of the theory of the memory is the supposition that "*nothing which we have mentally possessed can be entirely lost*"<sup>252</sup> On the contrary, all experiences are retained as vivid as they are experienced for the first time.

Furthermore, since representations, once being rejected, are subject to unconscious psychological processes, they are not temporally ordered. Unconscious processes are timeless; there

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<sup>252</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 4, 'Interpretation of Dreams', p. 20

is no passage of time, no alteration and therefore no time order between unconscious representations. A communication between representations is provided by the perceptual system. In this system, they are given an order in time.<sup>253</sup>

All content of the memory is recorded on the basis of the mnemonic systems which lie at the basis of association. In that connection therefore, it is possible to arrive at the knowledge of the unconscious representation behind the manifest representation following the associative paths provided by the capacity of memory. Freud states: "*We fill what is omitted by making plausible inferences and translating it into conscious material. In that way we construct, as it were, a sequence of conscious events are complementary to the unconscious psychical processes. The relative certainty of our science is based on the binding force of these inferences.*"<sup>254</sup>

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<sup>253</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 14, 'The Unconscious', p. 187

<sup>254</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 23, 'An Outline of Psycho-analysis', p. 158

#### IV. TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY CRITICIZED FROM THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC STANDPOINT

The aim of the present thesis is to investigate the ground of the apprehension of 'I' in view of transcendental philosophy and of the psycho-analytic theory. In this study we try to understand what the theoretical grounds of the *Objekt* 'I' in our apprehension is with respect to Kant's critical philosophy and Freudian psychology, and in that connection, how they approach the question of the possibility of a theoretical inquiry into the nature of the soul.

Both transcendental philosophy and psycho-analytic theory are inquiries into the constitution of the human soul. Nevertheless, Kant's and Freud's approach to the question, their starting points and main concerns are quite different from one another when they direct their interest to the constitution of the soul. Transcendental philosophy does not concern itself with the nature of the soul as such but only as the ground of the possibility of experience. Psycho-analytic theory, on the other hand, directly concerns itself with the nature of the soul.

Because of the difference in their starting points, Kant and Freud give quite different answers to the question of the possibility of an inquiry into the nature of the self, and the possibility of psychology as a theoretical science. As we have seen, in transcendental philosophy the soul cannot be an *Objekt* of a rational science. However, the claim that soul cannot be an *Objekt* of a rational science and that we cannot grasp (know) our-selves within a theoretical framework is a consequence of Kant's understanding of graspability and in this regard, is a result of his constitution of the structure of the soul and of the theoretical reason which he establishes

as the ground of grasping. In opposition to this claim, Freud defends the view that psychology is a natural science.

In the previous chapters of the present thesis, we exposed the transcendental philosophy of Kant and psycho-analytic theory of Freud and how they approach the nature of the human soul, and in this regard, the theoretical ground of the apprehension of 'I'. In the present chapter, our aim is to show the grounds on which Kant's project of the 'critique' of pure reason excludes the grasping of the soul from the sphere of theoretical employment of the reason, and in that connection, how psycho-analytic theory criticizes this claim of transcendental philosophy while claiming itself to be a natural science.

In transcendental philosophy, soul is the ultimate ground on which the whole structure of pure reason, which provides the possibility of experience and of a priori grasping, is based. The limits of experience are determined by the limits of the theoretical framework and in that connection are determined by the limits of the theoretical employment of reason as pictured in *Critique of Pure Reason*. Before comparing these two approaches, let us give a brief summary of Kant's constitution of the soul in critical philosophy and recall how this constitution limits the theoretical employment of reason, so that this limitation leads to the claim of the ungraspability of the soul.

According to Kant, the soul receives affections that come from the thing-in-itself. These affections are received by the capacity of sensibility which is receptive in its very nature; it is the capacity which provides a relation between the mind and the thing-in-itself. Through the activity of the mind, what is transcendently ideal gains empirical reality; thereby the thing-in-itself is represented through the capacity of sensibility. An affection, to be a *Gegenstand* of experience,

has to be represented through the forms of space and time which are provided by the faculty of sensibility. As it is shown in *Transcendental Aesthetic* in *Critique of Pure Reason*, to be a grasped entity something has to be represented as conforming to the principle of coordination in the form of outer sense and to the principle of subordination in the form of inner sense. This is one of the fundamental conditions of graspability required by the *Transcendental Doctrine of Elements*.<sup>255</sup>

It should be emphasized that what is represented through these forms are affections whose source is *outer* in view of the soul. An affection, once received, appears both through the form of outer and of inner sense. Through the form of outer sense it is represented as a *Gegenstand*, and has the form of substance; through the form of inner sense, on the other hand, it is represented as belonging to a consciousness. The form of inner sense provides us with the condition through which an appearance, which is outwardly represented is apprehended and furthermore the consciousness which accompanies this experience; that is the empirical consciousness related to this experience, is apprehended.

What is represented in the form of inner sense, that is the inner states, on the other hand, cannot be represented as a *Gegenstand* through the form of outer sense. In that regard, they are subject to the flow in time; they have nothing abiding except the pure apprehension 'I' which accompanies every act of experiencing. The pure self, 'I', appears through the form of inner sense;<sup>256</sup> however it does not appear in the way the thing-in-itself appears through sensibility.

We stated above that the thing-in-itself is represented through the faculty of sensibility. This capacity provides a theoretical ground only for those representations whose source is the

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<sup>255</sup> Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B-136

<sup>256</sup> *ibid.*, B-157/158

*outside* of the soul, these representations are subject to spatio-temporal relations. However, neither the soul itself nor the consciousness of the self in time can be represented through spatial relations. In fact, what we entitled as the representation of pure consciousness, is the consciousness of an empirical determination in the form of outer sense; it is the consciousness of the empirical self which is apprehended through experience.

It is necessary at this point to remember the relation of soul to mind and the transcendental self to the empirical self. In transcendental philosophy, which is an attempt to determine the limits of human reason and in this respect to determine the conditions of a priori grasping, soul is the ultimate ground upon which the whole structure of human reason is built. It is the principle of unity which makes all a priori elements and their pure and empirical employment, that is experience possible. Considered in this way, that is, as a transcendental ground, soul is the transcendental self. When we consider soul in terms of its act and the capacities and a priori elements that make this act possible, we talk about it as mind. An act of mind provides the grasping of a *Gegenstand* whose source, in terms of its matter, is the thing-in-itself. If the grasped representation is pure, we talk about an *a priori determination* in space; if, on the other hand, the representation is partially or completely empirical, it is an *a posteriori determination*.

Both the grasping of a pure and an empirical determination in intuition necessitates the consciousness of the 'I' to be rendered as grasping, since grasping in Kant's transcendental philosophy is necessarily bounded with consciousness. As we stated in section II. 2 of the present thesis, transcendental unity of the self is the ultimate ground of unity of the structure of the mind. The possibility of the capacities of the mind and their employment rest on the unity of the

transcendental self; the unity of the transcendental self is original to itself and derived from no other source or entity. The pure forms of space and time and the pure concepts of understanding derive their unity from the transcendental self. Since all a priori forms that conditions experience are united under the original synthetic unity of the transcendental self and thereby constitute the unity of the mind, experience, which is an act of the mind, is rendered as belonging to a consciousness.

It is by means of the act of understanding, that is by bringing the manifold of intuition under a concept that a representation is said to be brought under the unity of consciousness. Kant states that a concept is a '*unitary consciousness*','<sup>257</sup> and for this reason, when a manifold of intuition is brought under the unity of a concept, it is grasped as a *Gegenstand*.

In the act of grasping, a *Gegenstand* is apprehended through the forms of sensibility and understanding as a unity. At the same time, the empirical self is apprehended in the form of inner sense; in that, the self apprehends itself as grasping a *Gegenstand*. It is in that sense only that the pure self is said to gain empirical reality and to appear through the form of inner sense. In this regard, the apprehension of the empirical self necessitates the apprehension of a *Gegenstand* in the form of outer sense. Therefore, empirical consciousness is possible through the mediacy of an outer representation. It is a determination in time through the activity of the mind. It is through its own activity that the pure self gains an empirical reality and apprehends its empirical determination in time.

The pure consciousness 'I', not being subject to time, remains constant and does not change; it is a unity which remains the same through time. Without the apprehension of the pure

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<sup>257</sup> *ibid.* A-103

self, that is, without transcendental apperception it is not possible to understand temporal relations. The apprehension of temporality presupposes the apprehension of pure self which provides the possibility of the pure forms of space and time. The form of time, since it is grounded on an unchanging and abiding ground, is not itself subject to relations of successivity; but what appears in time is represented as being subject to the rule of succession. The unity of the form of time and the unity of the representations that appear through time, therefore is the unity of the transcendental self. It is the transcendental self that unites diverse inner states and empirical consciousnesses into an unchanging and abiding consciousness. And thereby, the act of experiencing is rendered as belonging to a consciousness.

As we stated in the section II. 2 of the present thesis, within the theoretical structure established in the *Critique of Pure Reason* the apprehension of the pure self is the apprehension of the unity of the mind. The reason for this is that the aim of the 'critique' of pure reason in transcendental philosophy is to limit the theoretical employment of reason only to the grasping of a *Gegenstand* whose *material* source lies in the thing-in-itself.

Since the anatomy of the soul in transcendental philosophy provides a theoretical ground for the possibility of experience whose source lies *outside* of the soul, mind is considered through the capacities of sensibility, imagination and understanding. Taken in the theoretical sense, what we apprehend as 'I' in each act of experiencing as an accompanying pure representation, is constituted of three capacities which are mentioned above.

Within the limits of transcendental philosophy the anatomy of the soul makes possible the grasping of those *Gegenstand(s)* that can be outwardly represented or those representations that are a priori and have a sense (*Sinn*) in space. As apparently seen, 'graspability' necessitates that



a corresponding intuition to the concept in question be given in space. The representability of an appearance through the form of outer sense necessitates that the appearance be determined as a substance in space. It is through such a determination, that is, through the determination of the category of substance that an appearance can be given as an abiding *Gegenstand* in space so that what is permanent and what is transitory with regard to the *Objekt* in question can be distinguished.

Inner states, however, (that is, psychological states, empirical consciousness, thoughts, wishes etc., as representations in the form of inner sense) are the empirical determinations in time and they cannot be represented outwardly since they are not subject to the threefold synthesis of the understanding, unlike an affection received from the thing-in-itself is subject to. In this regard, the act of grasping is conditioned by the *Gegenstand(s)* which appears through the form of the outer sense.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant investigates the nature and the possibility of experience. In doing this, he starts from the examination of experience and dissects it into its theoretical elements which are grounded in the human soul.

However, experience in transcendental philosophy is considered from the outset as the grasping of a *Gegenstand* which is represented through the form of space. Since the term experience is presupposed to denote such a meaning from the outset, however, the 'I' is theoretically considered to be constituted of the capacities that make the apprehension of a *Gegenstand* possible. As a result of Kant's consideration of experience and in that connection, his understanding of soul, the grasping of the soul within the limits of transcendental philosophy

is not possible. In that connection, any attempt to exhibit such a possibility gives rise to the paralogisms of reason.

Such an employment of reason gives rise to the paralogisms because the pure concepts of the understanding are applicable to appearances that are represented in space.<sup>258</sup> Furthermore, since categories themselves presuppose as their ground the transcendental self, they cannot determine what is presupposed in their ground as a *Gegenstand* in space, because such a determination leads to a vicious circle.

Within this picture, one expects that only those appearances that can be represented outwardly and in this regard that can be subject to the determinations of the a priori forms of the capacities of the mind are graspable and are subject matter of a rational science. However, neither the soul itself nor consciousness of self in time are substantial. Substantiality requires that a representation be determined in intuition so that what is transitory and what is abiding with regard to the *Objekt* in question can be determined. The soul cannot be subject to the determination of the category of substance, since the category of substance already presupposes the soul itself, which is the bearer of all categories. Kant argues that to consider the nature of the soul within a theoretical framework, it is necessary that a *Gegenstand* be assigned to it in space as a substance.<sup>259</sup> What is predicated of the soul in order to make intelligible its nature will either be the pure concepts of understanding or be concepts derived from experience; however transcendental self is so situated in transcendental philosophy that both pure and empirical concepts rest on transcendental self; in that the former ones are grounded on it *prior* to experience and provide the possibility of experience and therefore the possibility of the empirical

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<sup>258</sup> *ibid.* B-148

<sup>259</sup> *ibid.*, A-349

concepts derived from experience. Kant states: "*Consciousness is, indeed, that which alone makes all representations to be thoughts, and in it, therefore, as the transcendental subject, all our perceptions must be found; but beyond this logical meaning of the 'I', we have no knowledge of the subject in itself, which as substratum underlies this 'I', as it does all thoughts.*"<sup>260</sup>

For a quality to be predicated of the soul, it must also be given as a substantial entity. However the claim of substantiality of the soul is not a legitimate claim in view of transcendental philosophy. Kant states that this claim treats the "*..constant logical subject of thought as being knowledge of the real subject in which thought inheres.*"<sup>261</sup> In this regard, it is beyond the determination of the categories; if categories are considered as applicable to it, this would be a fallacious employment of the reason, since the forms of understanding, as to its very nature, cannot be applicable beyond the possible limits of experience.<sup>262</sup>

In such a picture, the constitution of the mind does not establish a relation between the mind itself and that which lies behind the apprehension 'I'. As we stated in chapter II of the present thesis, the apprehension 'I' underlies the possibility of the mind and of experience. It is the apprehension of the unity of the mind. That apprehension is the pure apperception 'I'. It is an act of thought which is not performed by the mind; in that, it is an act of thought that further provides the possibility of the mind. In that act, the 'I' apprehends itself as a unity. Such an act is *prior* to the apprehension of the 'I' in experience. That which is apprehended in that thought, or pure apperception is entitled as the transcendental self. However, any inquiry as to the nature of the transcendental self is not possible within the limits of transcendental philosophy. Kant states

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<sup>260</sup> *ibid.* A-350

<sup>261</sup> *ibid.* A-350

<sup>262</sup> *ibid.* A-396/B-352, A-341/B-399

that the pure apperception 'I' is a representation and adds that: "*Through this 'I' which thinks nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject=X.*"<sup>263</sup> The apprehension of the soul is limited in this way, and therefore, those affection whose source is the soul itself and therefore are represented in the form of inner sense as inner states are left outside the concern of transcendental philosophy and given no theoretical significance. If the ground of the possibility of experience and of grasping, and of being an *Objekt* of a rational science is so pictured and limited in the way Kant does in the *Critique of Pure Reason* through the constitution of the mind, then it is an inevitable conclusion that the graspability of the soul and the possibility of the doctrine of the soul, that is pure psychology is rendered as impossible.

In that connection psycho-analytic theory can be considered as an attempt to extend transcendental philosophy in such a way that it can provide a ground which makes psychology a natural science. It is an attempt which investigates the grounds of the psychological experience. Freud investigates the nature of apparent psychical experiences, that is, he investigates the theoretical structure that makes psychical experiences possible. In transcendental dialectic, Kant concludes that psychology is not a science proper; in contrast to this conclusion, Freud claims that psycho-analysis is a natural science.

Both Kant and Freud are concerned with the anatomy of the soul. Kant's main interest is directed to the nature of a *Gegenstand*; in this regard, he investigates the soul since it is the soul which provides the possibility of a *Gegenstand*. Therefore, Kant's investigation of the soul does not aim at exposing the nature of and the possibility of the soul itself. Psycho-analytic theory, on

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<sup>263</sup> *ibid.*, A-346/B-404

the other hand, aims at an investigation of the soul in order to make intelligible psychic experiences.

To put it in Freud's own words: "*Psychology, too, is a natural science. What else can it be? But its case is different...*"<sup>264</sup>; Freud states that all sciences make their observations through the psychical apparatus; however, psychology has as its *Objekt* in this apparatus itself.<sup>265</sup> When he talks about psychology as a science, in analogy with the possibility of the natural sciences he claims that: "*The processes with which it is concerned are just as unknowable as those dealt with by the other sciences, by chemistry or physics, for example, but it is possible to establish the laws which they obey and to follow their mutual relations and interdependencies over long stretches - in short to arrive at what is described as an understanding of the field of the natural phenomena in question.*"<sup>266</sup> How then can psycho-analytic theory be said to extend the theoretical framework of Kantian philosophy? And on what grounds does psycho-analysis claim itself to be a natural science?

Kant states that as the thing-in-itself, which is represented through the pure forms of the mind, the true nature of the 'I', too, cannot be grasped as it is but can only be thought. Kant states: "*The 'transcendental Gegenstand' is equally unknown in respect to inner and to outer intuition.*"<sup>267</sup> In the same paragraph Kant makes a distinction between an external and an internal *Gegenstand*: Empirical *Gegenstand* "*is called an 'external' Gegenstand if it is*

<sup>264</sup> Sigmund Freud, Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, 'Some Elementary Lessons', p.282

<sup>265</sup> *ibid.*, 'An Outline of Psycho-analysis', p.159

<sup>266</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 23, p. 159

<sup>267</sup> Kant Immanuel, CPR, A-373

represented 'in space' and an 'inner' *Gegenstand* if it is represented only 'in its time relations'.

Neither space, nor time, however is to be found save 'in us'.<sup>268</sup>

Kant makes a clarification as to the expression 'outside us'. He claims that the term has a twofold sense; firstly, it refers to the thing-in-itself, and secondly, it signifies "*what belongs to outer 'appearance'.*"<sup>269</sup> Kant states that in order not to confuse the two, it is necessary to distinguish what is 'empirically external' from what is external in the 'transcendental sense', "by explicitly entitling the former 'things which are to be found in space'".<sup>270</sup>

In transcendental deduction Kant defines appearances as follows: "*..appearances are not things-in-themselves; they are representations, which in turn have their *Gegenstand(s)* - a *Gegenstand* which cannot be intuited by us, and which may, therefore, be named the non-empirical, that is, transcendental *Gegenstand=x**"<sup>271</sup> That transcendental *Gegenstand* can only be thought but cannot be a *Gegenstand* of experience. It is that which lies at the basis of appearances. What Kant calls an appearance is a representation of something which cannot be grasped as it is by us, since without something to appear no appearance at all would be possible.<sup>272</sup>

Similar to Kant, Freud makes a distinction between the inner and the outer world, both of which are unknown to us as they are. The *outer* thing-in-itself is represented to us through the activity of the mind; in psycho-analytic terminology, as conforming to the constitution of the 'I', and in particular, to the constitution of the perceptual system. As we know, in transcendental

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<sup>268</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>269</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>270</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>271</sup> *ibid.*, A-109

<sup>272</sup> *ibid.*, B-XXVII

philosophy the pure self can be thought of as an empirical consciousness only in the form of inner sense. However, Kant admits that the consciousness of the self is far from being the grasping of the self and therefore, within the theoretical limits of reason we cannot consider its true nature.

In *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant discusses the possibility of the appearances which are outwardly given. The aim of the 'critique' of pure reason, through the investigation of the soul, is to make intelligible the possibility of *Gegenstand(s)* which are outwardly represented. In that sense, Kant pictures how the thing-in-itself (the external in the transcendental sense) appears as a representation, that is, as something external in the empirical sense. That which is external in the *transcendental sense* gains empirical reality, that is, it becomes *empirically external* through the mediacy of the activity of the mind. That is why Kant's investigation of the soul is restricted to the construction of the relation of the *outer* thing-in-itself to the soul.

Although in his theoretical framework, Kant does not intend to establish a relation between what is transcendently inner and what is empirically inner in the way he establishes the relation between what is transcendently outer and its empirical representation, he still presupposes, without explicitly stating, that the '*transcendental Gegenstand*' which is thought as underlying those appearances which are represented only in the inner intuition is a thing-in-itself. However, it should be noted at this point that the distinction between the terms *inner* and *outer* are subject to the limits of possible experience. Therefore, even if the terms *inner* and the *outer* used here to distinguish that which underlies the *inner* and the *outer* appearances, as to the inner and the outer thing-in-itself, it is not a distinction that transcends the limits of possible experience and is made so that one takes for granted that these are two different entities. Kant's

philosophy does not permit such a distinction which considers the thing-in-itself as distinguishable into two distinct things even though we do not know what they are in themselves. In that picture, it is beyond the power of human reason to conclude that what appears in my outer intuition and what appears only in my inner intuition in themselves are the same or different from one another on the basis of the limits of its employment. With regard to this problem Kant states: "*Neither the 'transcendental Objekt' which underlies outer appearances nor that which underlies inner intuition, is in itself either matter or a thinking being, but a ground (to us unknown) of the appearances which supply to us the empirical concept of the former as well as the latter mode of existence.*"<sup>273</sup>

Kant's transcendental framework, therefore, includes soul, considered as transcendental self, the mind and the thing-in-itself (the *transcendental outer*) as theoretical elements. In this framework, the *transcendental outer* is the source which provides the *material* of our experiences. Soul, on the other hand, is considered as the ground of the possibility of that which is received from the *transcendental outer* and its representation through the necessary forms grounded on it. Although Kant makes a distinction between the *transcendental inner* and the *transcendental outer* in parallel to the distinction he makes between the *empirical inner* and *empirical outer*, he does not include the *transcendental inner* into the theoretical framework of the critical philosophy.

As a result of the exclusion of the *transcendental inner* from the theoretical framework, we can only consider the soul as the transcendental ground of the possibility of experience. As we know, grasping is an act of the soul, that is of mind, related to the apprehension of the

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<sup>273</sup> *ibid.*, A-380



representations whose source lies in the *transcendental outer*. The pure apperception, therefore, is the apprehension of the unity of the mind prior to experience. The *Objekt* 'I' in our apprehension is, theoretically speaking, limited to the apprehension of the mind. What is apprehended in that act of thought through which the 'I' apprehends itself as a unity, is the transcendental self, and in that sense that it is the ground of all activity of the mind. In that connection, the faculty of grasping, that is the mind, as to its constitution does not establish an explicit relation between the *transcendental inner* and the empirical inner.

The criticism of psycho-analysis in view of the anatomy of the soul in Kant's transcendental philosophy is directed mainly to the exclusion of the *transcendental inner* from the theoretical framework. In that connection, the psycho-analytic theory extends the theoretical framework of transcendental philosophy by including the *inner* thing-in-itself as a transcendental element into the theoretical picture. Freud's psycho-analytic theory can be said to consider it as thing-in-itself which is represented, though not outwardly, through appearances. That is, the *transcendental inner*, too, can be known through its representations as the *transcendental outer*. In this regard, we can consider psycho-analytic theory as arguing that what is considered as '*transcendental subject=X*' on which the possibility of representability of the '*transcendental Gegenstand=X*' rests in transcendental philosophy, is an *Objekt*; in that, the transcendental subject is not only a ground but is itself a source of the psychic representations. Similarly, to put it in the terminology of the transcendental philosophy Freud makes a distinction between the *transcendental inner* and the *empirical inner*; in that the former is the material psychic source of the latter.

Following Kant, Freud admits that both the psychical and the physical reality in themselves are unknowable (ungraspable). Freud states: "*The psycho-analytic assumption of unconscious mental activity appears to us....as an extension of corrections undertaken by Kant of our views on external perception. Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is perceived though unknowable, so psycho-analysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means of consciousness with the unconscious mental processes which are their object (Objekt). Like the physical, the psychical is not necessarily in reality what it appears us to be. We shall be glad to learn, however that the corrections of internal perception will turn out not to offer such great difficulties as the correction of external perception- that internal objects (Objekt) are less unknowable than the external world.*"<sup>274</sup>

Apparently Freud accepts the Kantian view that reality, which is in itself unknowable, should conform to the constitution of the soul to be known as a representation. In this regard, we infer that Freud agrees with Kant on the view that space and time are the forms of our grasping. Freud states: "*As a result of certain psycho-analytic discoveries, we are today in a position to embark on a discussion of the Kantian theorem that space and time are the 'necessary forms of thought'.*"<sup>275</sup>

In one of his letters Freud also states: "*...it might be that the idea of time is connected with the work of perceptual-consciousness. Kant then, would be in the right if we replace his old-*

<sup>274</sup> Freud Sigmund, Standard Edition, Vol. 14, 'The Unconscious', p. 171

<sup>275</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 18, 'Beyond Pleasure Principle', p. 28

*fashioned 'a priori' with our modern introspection of the psychical apparatus. It should be the same with space, causality, etc.*"<sup>276</sup>

In this regard, it can be claimed that Freud is on a par with Kant in the claim that those impressions coming from the *outer* thing-in-itself should conform to the forms of space, time and of categories which lie in the constitution of the soul. Neither space and time nor the categories themselves are determinations inherent in the material of the representations themselves. In that sense, psycho-analytic theory agrees with the principles of transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental analytic regarding the possibility of a *Gegenstand* whose source lies in the *outer* thing-in-itself. The capacities of sensibility, imagination and understanding, which provide the conditions through which the *outer* thing-in-itself is represented and thought, can be assumed to be located in the perceptual consciousness according to the anatomy of the soul of the psycho-analytic theory.

In doing this Freud opens the way that is closed by the shortcomings of the presuppositions of transcendental philosophy. The claim that the perceptual system is open to the affections that come from the soul itself opens the path that leads to the establishment of a structure providing a ground which makes the representability and graspability of psychic processes which are excluded from the transcendental philosophy, possible.

Freud states that we can answer the question '*what the psychical really means*' by enumerating its constituents: "*...our perceptions, representations, memories, feelings and acts of volition- all these form part of what is psychical.*"<sup>277</sup> Kant, too, admits the existence of psychic states; however he does not consider them within a theoretical framework: "*All practical*

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<sup>276</sup> Jones Ernest, Sigmund Freud Life and Work, Vols. III, The Hogarth Press, 1955, Vol. III, p. 466

<sup>277</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 23, 'Some Elementary Lessons', p. 282

*concepts relate to the Gegenstand(s) of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, that is, of pleasure and pain, and therefore, at least indirectly, to the Gegenstand(s) of our feelings. But as feeling is not a faculty whereby we represent things, but lies outside our faculty of knowledge, elements of our judgements so far as they relate to pleasure or pain, that is elements of practical judgements, do not belong to transcendental philosophy, which is exclusively concerned with pure a priori modes of knowledge.*"<sup>278</sup>

How, then, does Freud extend the limits of the pure reason (in addition to his inclusion of the *inner* thing-in-itself within the theoretical framework) so that the psychical, which is rendered as belonging to the practical employment in critical philosophy, is given a transcendental ground?

The *inner* thing-in-itself or the *transcendental inner* which is not included within the theoretical framework of the transcendental philosophy of Kant is determined as the agency 'it' in the psycho-analytic theory. It is not like the *outer* thing-in-itself in many respects. We need to clarify at this point that for Freud as well, the distinction between the inner world and the outer world is made in view of the limits of experience. In this respect Freud does not consider the relation between the two and does not discuss whether these two are separate entities or not. He only admits that our psychical apparatus receives stimuli from both *inside* and *outside* of itself; both these stimuli and their sources are unknown to us as they are in themselves. They can be known through this representation as conforming to the perceptual system of the psychical apparatus.

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<sup>278</sup> Kant Immanuel, CPR, A-802/B-830

In this regard, Freud does not make any claim as to the nature of the 'it' as it is in itself. Freud argues that the 'it', (the *inner* thing-in-itself), can be apprehended and be known through its representations, just as the *outer* thing-in-itself is known. As to the unknowability of these two worlds he states that reality will always remain as unknowable even if science makes progress, since all apprehension as to their nature of them has to be translated into the terminology of the consciousness to be considered as knowledge. To put it differently, reality can only be known to the extent it conforms to the constitution of our faculty of grasping (knowledge).

We can claim that Freud is on a par with Kant as to the establishment of the relation between the *transcendental outer* and the *empirical outer*. However, the relation between the *transcendental inner* and the *empirically inner* cannot be established in a way in which *transcendental outer* and its empirical representation is established. First of all, all the categories of the understanding are applicable to space. Since what belongs to the inner can only be represented in time relations only, those representations whose source lies in the *inner* thing-in-itself cannot be determined as a *Gegenstand* in space by the categories. To that which is determined by the categories, a substantial thing must be assigned in the form of outer sense. So, the only form that provides the representability of the inner world is the form of time.

Apparently, and in accordance with Kant, Freud does not treat soul as a substance. As we stated above, both the physical and psychical are as realities in themselves ungraspable. In transcendental philosophy, things that can be graspable and be a subject matter of a rational science must be representable in intuition as substance and such representations can be given only within the form of outer intuition. Substantiality is subject to the conditions of representability of an affection in space through the determination of the category of substance.

In this regard, Freud does not disagree with Kant, that soul and its representations cannot be represented by any means in space. Soul is not subject to the determinations of the pure form of space through the determination of the category of substance. In that connection, to try to find a place for psychology as a rational science within the limits of transcendental philosophy is not possible. The criticism directed from psycho-analysis to transcendental philosophy while claiming itself as a natural science focuses on the fact that what is graspable does not have to be connected to something in space which is a substance. It is apparent that nothing related to the nature of the soul appears through the form of space. According to Freud's standpoint, we cannot expect that which is psychical, in order to be graspable must be subject to the a priori conditions of external representations. Freud states that all our psychical life is dominated by the instincts and their vicissitudes, and by principles that govern the instinctual life.

As we have exposed in the third chapter of the present thesis, Freud dissects the human soul into the agencies of the 'it', the 'I' and the 'above-I'. Among these three agencies the 'it' is the only agency which is ready at birth, and in that sense it is the origin of the latter two which are subject to a development. The 'it' is the container of the instincts which are bound up some amount of the energy. The 'it' is the inner foreign territory to the 'I'; and is a realm which is unknowable in itself. Freud states: "*It is the most obscure and inaccessible region of the soul.*"<sup>279</sup>  
*"We approach it with analogies: we call it a chaos, a cauldron full of seething excitations."*<sup>280</sup>

The realm of 'it' is full of 'seething excitations'. It is the container of instincts, in themselves unknowable. They can be known if they attach themselves to representations. Freud states that all our psychical life is determined by instincts and their vicissitudes. Instincts are in

<sup>279</sup> Freud Sigmund, Standard Edition, Vol 18, Beyond Pleasure Principle, p. 7

<sup>280</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 22, 'New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis', p. 74

themselves without quality. They are bound up some amount of energy. Freud claims that in all psychical events there is an amount of energy which is at work. They are the only psychical elements which are ready at birth. However, it has no coherent will, since a coherent organization, a unity similar to that of the 'I' is not in the nature of the 'it'. In that sense, it cannot apprehend and know what it wills. The processes in the 'it' are not subject to rationality in themselves; there are no time relations and no determination by the categories in the 'it'. Freud states that the 'I' stands for reason, while 'it' stands for *untamed passions*.<sup>281</sup> Instincts, which constitute the content of the agency 'it', are too, in themselves cannot be apprehended and known. Freud states: "*An instinct can never become an Objekt of consciousness -only the idea*"<sup>282</sup> (representation) *which represents the instinct can. Even in the unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be represented otherwise than by an idea (representation). If the instinct did not attach itself to an idea or manifests itself as an affective state, we could know nothing about it.*"<sup>283</sup> We can apprehend and know an instinct if it attaches itself to a representation.<sup>284</sup> It is important to note that an instinct is not an a priori form that determines the psychical experiences in a particular way; it has no determinate *Objekt* or representation.

Freud states that the concept of instinct is basic to the understanding of the psychical phenomena. It is a stimulus which arises from within the soul<sup>285</sup>; in that it is in unity with the psychical apparatus as opposed to a stimulus whose source is the *outside* of the psychical apparatus. For this reason it exerts a constant force on the soul, and to escape from the stimulus

<sup>281</sup> *ibid.*, p. 76

<sup>282</sup> In the original text, for the term 'idea' Freud uses the term '*Vorstellung*' by which is meant 'representation' rather than 'idea'. The translator prefers terms 'presentation' and 'idea' respectively, instead of the term 'representation'.

<sup>283</sup> *ibid.*, 'The Unconscious', p. 177

<sup>284</sup> *ibid.*, p. 177-178

<sup>285</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 14, 'Instincts and Their Vicissitudes', p. 118

by flight does not work in case where there is internal stimuli. Therefore, the removal of a stimulus whose source lies inside of the soul necessitates a different action.

Instincts are bound up some amount of energy. If this energy is charged, this gives rise to a 'need' and it is experienced as the feeling of unpleasure whatever the content of the need and the *Objekt* of the feeling of unpleasure is. The charged energy necessitates that the tension which arises by the energy cathexis be reduced and thereby the cathected energy be discharged. The discharge of energy is experienced as satisfaction by the 'I'. In that sense, Freud claims that the governing principle of instinctual life is satisfaction. At this point it is necessary to remember two governing principles of the psychical which are closely related to one another.

Freud states that as instinct is the basic concept to understand and explain the nature of the inner world, so is the principle of constancy: "*The psychical apparatus endeavors to keep the quantity of excitation present in it as low as possible or at least to keep it constant.*"<sup>286</sup> The second principle which is at work in the psychical apparatus is the pleasure principle. Once an instinctual impulse attaches itself to a representation, that is, once it chooses its *Objekt* to achieve satisfaction, it is felt in the pleasure-unpleasure series as unpleasurable, since it stimulates the soul and urges it to activity and therefore violates the equilibrium demanded by the psychical apparatus in accordance with the principle of constancy. The removal of this stimulus through the activity of the 'I' in the external world reduces the tension exerted on the soul by the instinctual stimulus and is experienced as pleasure. It is the pleasure principle that governs our psychical life, our thoughts, wishes and judgements; in that connection the reality principle, which takes into account the demands of the external world is a modification of it.

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<sup>286</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 18, 'Beyond Pleasure Principle', p. 9



The satisfaction of a need necessitates an *Objekt*. An *Objekt* is a means through which an instinct accomplishes its end: "*It is what is most variable about an instinct and is not originally connected with it, but comes assigned to it only in consequence of being particularly fitted to make satisfaction possible.*"<sup>287</sup> Freud states that the *Gegenstand* is not necessarily something extraneous but it can be a part of one's own body. However, even if it is something related to one's own body, it belongs to the external world. In this regard, a collaboration of the agency 'I' is necessary for the instinct in question to be externalized and achieve satisfaction.<sup>288</sup>

Whenever an instinct attaches itself to a representation, it is related to an *Objekt*; in that thing-representation of the *Objekt(s)*, which is defined by Freud as the first and true *Objekt*, cathexis takes place. Freud states that the thing-cathexis is an unconscious activity. It is in the preconscious system that a representation is hyper-cathected and thereby connected with the word-representation corresponding to it.<sup>289</sup> "*When a hyper-cathexis of the process of thinking takes place thoughts are actually perceived* <sup>290</sup> - *as if they come from without- and are consequently held to be true.*"<sup>291</sup>

Kant was claiming that appears only in the form of inner sense cannot be a subject matter of a rational science, since inner sense does not provide us with an abiding representation. As to its very nature, time represents things in succession, so that what appears in time is subject to flow away; however, inner states are subject to flow away through time, if the activity of the mind is limited to the conscious activity. Freud is critical of those thinkers who identified what is

<sup>287</sup> *ibid.*, Vol 14, 'Instincts and Their Vicissitudes', p. 122-123

<sup>288</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>289</sup> *ibid.*, 'The Unconscious', p. 203

<sup>290</sup> Freud uses the term perception to refer to apprehension of representations which are psychical as well as those which are the physical.

<sup>291</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 19, The Id and the Ego, p. 23

psychical with what is conscious. He states: "*...the psychology of consciousness never went beyond the broken sequences which were obviously dependent on something else, the other view, which held that the psychical is unconscious in itself, enabled the psychology to take its place as a natural science like other sciences.*"<sup>292</sup> Consciousness is only a state of the activity of soul which characterizes the activities performed by the outermost part of the 'I'. As we stated in the section III. 2 of the present thesis, Freud entitles it as the perceptual consciousness. It is the center of the conscious perception and of grasping (knowledge). Freud states that grasping (knowledge) is invariably bound up consciousness; in this regard the grasping of something necessitates that it be consciously recognized by the 'I', through the act of perceptual consciousness.

All activity of perceptual consciousness is characterized as conscious activity. It is important to remember at this point that perceptual consciousness provides a place for the representations only for a limited length of time. Therefore, if the mind is limited to the conscious activity, then it is inevitable that those appearances that are represented through the form of inner sense are rendered as not permanent.

In transcendental philosophy, the act of understanding, that is grasping, brings out with itself the consciousness of the self, since without this consciousness nothing can be said to exist. To belong to a consciousness is a necessary condition for a thing to be an existing entity.<sup>293</sup> Therefore to apprehend something but not to have conscious recognition of it is impossible within the theoretical employment of reason. The very act of grasping, which consists of bringing the manifold of intuition under a unitary consciousness, that is under concepts, denotes such a

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<sup>292</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 23, p. 158

<sup>293</sup> Kant *immanuel*, CPR, A-118

meaning. However, in psycho-analytic theory, not all activities of the soul are apprehended consciously; on the contrary, most of them remain as unconscious. At this point, it is necessary to elaborate Freud's understanding of experience and in that sense, what the concept of unconscious experience is in psycho-analytic theory.

In the second chapter of this thesis, we preferred to use the term 'grasping' instead of the term 'knowing' in order to emphasize the ontological sense of the term which it carries within the context of transcendental philosophy. In transcendental philosophy, grasping, the act of capturing, and synthesizing a manifold of impression under the unity of a concept is possible if there is the consciousness of the self accompanying each representation, since consciousness is the principle of unity. In that sense, 'knowledge', 'grasping', 'apprehension' are terms which denote the same act, that is the conscious recognition of a *Gegenstand* in the form of outer sense. Theoretically speaking, Kant defines experience as the grasping of a *Gegenstand* through the form of outer sense. Experience is a unitary act, in that there is the synthesis of the manifold according to concepts. This synthetic act is entitled as judgement. When we talk within the context of psycho-analytic theory, on the other hand, we need to make a clarification as to the meanings of the terms 'grasping', 'knowledge' and 'apprehension'. In psycho-analytic theory, too, experience is an act of unity in which we apprehend something, be it a representation in the form of space or of time; in that sense, the act still carries out the ontological sense of the term 'grasping'. However, this act does not necessarily bring out with itself the conscious recognition of the representation in question. In that sense, in psycho-analytic theory we can talk about representations that are apprehended but not consciously recognized by the 'I'. However, Freud

states: "*Knowledge is invariably bounded with consciousness.*" To know something, therefore, we need to represent it to ourselves within the perceptual-consciousness.<sup>294</sup>

An unconscious experience, in this regard, is a judgement without the quality of consciousness. It is a unity, an act through which a representation, a thought, feeling or a perception originates. In that sense, Freud introduces into the picture an unconscious activity of soul.

The 'I' is an agency whose formation starts to develop through the apprehension of the external world. Through the mediacy of an external thing, be it the body of the individual itself or any other body, the self apprehends itself as an 'I'. In this regard Kant and Freud are on a par with each other. Both in transcendental philosophy and in psycho-analytic theory the apprehension of the 'I', in the empirical sense of the word, necessitates the apprehension of a *thing* other than the 'I'. The 'I' is the only agency of the soul which is in relation to the external reality, that is, only the agency 'I' has the knowledge of the external world. The 'it' has no relation to that world except through the mediacy of the 'I'. In this regard, it impels the 'I' to accomplish its own ends by modifying the external world.

Psychical phenomena, like physical phenomena, can be grasped through representations, not as they are in themselves. Apprehension is an activity of the psychical apparatus which is peculiar to the 'I', which is the center of rational activity. Therefore, we can talk about experience of the 'I' but not of the 'it' and of the 'above-I'. The 'I' is the agency of the soul which contains in its domain the rational faculties of the psychical apparatus. The 'I' can apprehend representations consciously or unconsciously. If the 'I' sees no danger to its psychical

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<sup>294</sup> From now on we will use the term 'knowledge' in that sense, when we talk about the conscious apprehension of a representation in psycho-analytic theory.

unity in the apprehension of the incoming representation then it apprehends it consciously. However, if the 'I' sees that the incoming thoughts, wishes, perceptions, and so on, are harmful to its psychical organization than, the representation in question undergoes repression but at the same time it is apprehended by the 'I' unconsciously.

This means that the 'I' has unconscious experiences; that is it has thoughts, wishes, judgements but it does not have knowledge of them. If a representation is repressed it remains as a thing-representation; however, if it is allowed to present itself to the conscious 'I', then it attaches itself to the corresponding word-representation. Freud states: "*We now seem to know all at once what the difference is between a conscious and an unconscious representation.....the conscious representation comprises the representation of the thing plus the representation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious representation is the representation of the thing alone.*"<sup>295</sup>

The 'I' is the agency of the soul in which rational activity is performed. The faculty of knowledge (grasping), is situated within the domain of the 'I'. It is receptive to the incoming representations both from the *inner* and the *outer* thing-in-itself. As we stated in the third chapter of this thesis in detail, the 'I' has to harmonize the demands of these three masters so that it can preserve its well being, since the 'I' is dominated by the aim of self-preservation. In this regard while the 'I' can defend itself from the external-world, it is open to the harmful effects of those impulses which come from inside of the soul. The only mechanism that the 'I' uses in order to preserve its psychical unity is the mechanism of repression. The repressed is contained by the system unconscious which constitutes a large portion of the experiences of the 'I'.

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<sup>295</sup> Freud Sigmund, Standard Edition, Vol. 14, The Unconscious, p. 201

In that connection, Freud extends the limits of theoretical reason by adding a new capacity to the constitution of the mind. In transcendental philosophy, mind is the soul considered through its activity. This activity is performed through the capacities of sensibility, imagination and understanding. Through this activity a *Gegenstand* through the form of outer sense and the empirical consciousness through the form of inner sense are apprehended. Freud introduces memory as a transcendental capacity in addition to the capacities of the mind. He considers soul, theoretically, not only as a ground that conditions experience but also as a thing-in-itself, a transcendental element that provides the source of psychic experiences. By adding the agency 'it' as a transcendent element into the picture and by adding memory as a transcendental capacity, he extends the theoretical constitution of the mind. In that Freud extends the scope of the experience which is presupposed from the outset as the apprehension of a *Gegenstand* in space in the critical philosophy of Kant. In that connection Freud's understanding of experience is much more comprehensive than that of Kant.

By the addition of the capacity of memory, an unconscious activity of the soul is introduced into the picture. As we stated in the third part of this thesis, Freud uses the term 'unconscious' in different senses; in that the term does not only refer to the processes that occur in the domain of the 'it'. Freud states: "*We shall now look upon an individual as a psychical 'it', unknown and unconscious, upon whose surface rests the 'I', developed from its nucleus the perceptual system. If we make an effort to represent pictorially, we may add that the 'I' does not completely envelop the 'it', but only does so to the extent to which the perceptual system forms its (the 'I's) surface, more or less as the germinal disc rests upon the ovum. The 'I' is not*

*sharply separated from the 'it'; its lower portion merges into the 'it'.*"<sup>296</sup> Freud states that "*The repressed merges into the 'it' as well and is merely a part of it. The repressed is merely cut off from the 'I' by the resistances of repression....*"<sup>297</sup>

The psychical processes in the 'it' are totally unconscious. The repressed, which is considered to be within the domain of 'it', differs from the other unconscious processes in the 'it'; in that, what is repressed is a representation, a unity, as opposed to chaotic processes of instinctual excitations of whose real nature we have no idea. The repressed is an impulse that is attached to a representation, that is, it is something that is experienced and therefore something apprehended by the 'I', since without the 'I' apprehending it, it cannot be a representation, be it conscious or unconscious. However, Freud considers the repressed as merged into the realm of the 'it', since it is subject to the unconscious, primary processes that characterize the psychical processes in the 'it'. Other psychical processes in the 'it' except the repressed are beyond our access, and are unconscious in the absolute sense. They can only be apprehended relative to the representation to which they attach themselves.

Perceptual consciousness, on the other hand, is dominated by the consciously apprehended representations. Being so, it is like a screen that provides a space only for the incoming representations. Memory, as the container of the experiences of the 'I', be it perceptual or psychical, retains both preconscious and unconscious experiences; in that sense, what is psychical and therefore represented in time, is rendered as permanent.

In psycho-analytic theory, the 'I' in the Kantian sense of the term, is knowable, but not through being connected by some means to the determinations of the categories in space. For the

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<sup>296</sup> *ibid.*, Vol 19, 'The Ego and the Id', p. 24

<sup>297</sup> *ibid.*

'I' to be knowable and be an *Objekt* of a rational science, it does not have to be subject to the rules of the categories and be connected to something in space which is a substance. We can consider the nature of the soul without claiming substantiality in the Kantian sense and without expecting that its representation be determined in space as a *Gegenstand*.

Psychical experiences, according to Freud, are subject to a mechanism which does not exist in Kant's transcendental philosophy. Freud is aware of the fact that what is psychical, in its very nature is different from what is physical, and therefore the conditions that provide the ground for their knowledge should be different from one another. Representations of the soul can be graspable on the basis of a different ontology, since the psychical experiences whose source is inside of the soul have a different nature than those experiences whose source lies in the outer world. The anatomy of soul in psycho-analytic theory, in this regard, is an attempt to extend the anatomy of the soul pictured in transcendental philosophy such that psychical experiences rest on a theoretical ground and that the soul can be an *Objekt* of a rational science.

Freud defines the place of the memory within the topography of soul as next to the perceptual system. Memory contains experiences that are consciously apprehended through the perceptual system; it also contains those representations that are not consciously apprehended by the 'I'. It retains them as vivid as they are experienced; in that sense all experiences are alive in memory. Therefore the mind as reconsidered and established by the psycho-analytic theory contains a capacity which keeps and preserves all experiences of the human soul.

It can be claimed that the capacities of the mind, as reconsidered in psycho-analytic standpoint, are subject to the a priori forms that provide the possibility of experience. Through pure forms of space and time things are represented in spatio-temporal relations; through the pure



forms of understanding appearances are determined as *Gegenstand(s)* in space having certain properties. Memory, on the other hand, is not assigned such an a priori form that conditions experience in a determinate way. It is a capacity that provides a reservoir for all experiences to be preserved. Its importance, as a capacity, lies in the fact that while keeping both preconscious and unconscious experiences alive, it records them in accordance with certain relations. Among these relations simultaneity in occurrence is the most important one; by means of the relations of similarity, simultaneity, and successivity in occurrence it records experiences so that in case of recollection, an unconscious and a preconscious representation associates with a certain representation rather than a random one. It is on the basis of these relations that association is possible as a plausible technique of psycho-analytic practice.

Through the introduction of the memory as a transcendental capacity into the picture drawn in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, psychical experiences of the soul are rendered as abiding. Furthermore, through such an introduction, psycho-analytic theory does not fall into the Kantian paralogisms. As we know, paralogisms of reason arises from the misemployment of the by assigning to the soul a substantial reality. However for the reasons we explain in the first chapter of this thesis, soul cannot be a substantial entity within the limits of transcendental philosophy and therefore cannot be an *Objekt* of a theoretical science. What is meant by the claim that psycho-analysis does not fall into the paralogisms of reason while establishing itself as a theoretical science is that Freud does not talk about the soul and psychological states as substantial entities in the Kantian sense of the term; in that they are not represented in space as *Gegenstand(s)*. However, the manifestation of what is psychical rests on a different mechanism. The psychical as representation that can be deciphered on the basis of the relations provided by

the faculty of memory which provides a reservoir for all kinds of experiences. What supports the claim that psycho-analysis is a natural science is the fact that experiences which are repressed are alive and dynamic; in this regard, they manifest themselves at the level of consciousness. However, since the aim of repression is to prevent an unconscious representation becoming conscious, the repressed manifests itself in a quite different context and in a quite different way than what it originally is.

The way an unconscious representation manifests itself has a language<sup>298</sup> of its own. Dreams, jokes, slips of tongue, artistic and literary works are among those manifestations in which an unconscious thought or a wish finds a way to express and externalize itself. Their formation is subject to the unconscious psychical processes and the associative relations which are recorded by the capacity of memory.

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<sup>298</sup> By the term 'language' here, we do not mean language in the ordinary sense of the term. What Freud calls language in its ordinary sense is something peculiar to the organization of the surface part of the psychical apparatus. Behind these processes which find their explication in words, there are more fundamental psychical processes which underlie them. Freud states that we can apprehend and know an impression coming both from the (inner) and the (outer) thing-in-itself whenever it attaches itself to a representation; that is whenever the 'I' apprehends it. The first attachment is called the thing-representation of the *Objekt*. It carries in itself something that is unknown by the 'coherent I'. Once a thing-representation is further cathected, it attaches itself to the word-representation which brings out a preconscious and a conscious representation. Freud thinks that word-representations are the residues of the memories. ('The Ego and the Id', p. 20). Anything to become conscious has to transform itself into these external perceptions and this is possible by the memory traces. (ibid.) He states: "*The part played by word-representations now becomes clear. By their interposition internal thought processes are made into perceptions. It is like a demonstration of the theorem that all knowledge has its origin in external perception. When a hyper-cathexis of the processes of thinking takes place, thoughts are actually perceived as if they come from without and are consequently held to be true.*" (ibid., p. 23)

Freud states that: "*In essence, a word is after all a mnemic residue of a word that has been heard*" (ibid. 21) He also stresses the importance of the visual components of word-representations, which are acquired through reading, as a secondary source for the acquisition of a word. However, thinking in words is peculiar to the perceptual system whose organization is much more coherent than the rest of the 'I'. Apparently thinking is not specifically related to words and verbal language. Freud states that thinking in pictures, as it is the case in dreams and preconscious fantasies, is also a form of thought, although an incomplete one: "*We learn that what becomes conscious in it (in visual thinking) as a rule is the concrete subject matter of thought, and that the relations between the various elements of this subject matter, which is what specially characterizes thoughts, cannot be given visual expression. Thinking in pictures is, therefore, only a very incomplete form of becoming conscious. In some way, too, it stands nearer unconscious processes than does thinking in words, and it is unquestionably older than the latter both ontogenetically and phylogenetically.*" (ibid. p.21)

In memory, there is no flow of time, all experiences even those that belong to early childhood are retained as vivid as those experiences that are recorded today. A repressed thought when it forces itself into the consciousness, makes use of other representations on the basis of associative relations. Through these relations, the language of dreams, jokes, and so on can be deciphered and the latent representation behind the manifest one can be inferred.

What is contained in the memory and what is recollected through the psycho-analytic techniques is something related to the 'I', that is to the experiences of the 'I'. The 'I', taken in the empirical sense, is the whole of these experiences. Psycho-analysis, in its practical employment, tries to complete the chain of experiences by making the unconscious experience rise to the level of consciousness. By making these inferences, it can explain the individual human behavior, and the psychical experiences peculiar to the individual in question. However, there is a theoretical structure that all human species are subject to; and on the basis of that structure that provides a ground for the possibility of psychical experiences and the mechanism which is at work therein, can psycho-analysis as a practical employment be possible.

In summary, the psychical apparatus in psycho-analytic theory is the unity of the agencies the 'it', the 'I' and the 'above-I'. However, as a result of the nature of the relation between these agencies, not all psychical experiences related to the self can be consciously apprehended. Due to the mechanism of repression, the psychical experiences of the 'I', which are clear to the consciousness exhibit a discontinuity. Repressed experiences have determining effects on the incoming experiences of the 'I', on its apprehensions, judgements and deeds. However, since they are retained in the memory, it is possible to detect them and to explain the reason behind the apparent behavior or thought and understand why a psychical experience is so apprehended.

The claim that soul is ungraspable and that we cannot investigate the nature of the apprehension 'I' is a consequence of the presuppositions of the transcendental philosophy; in that while the structure is established in order to exhibit only the nature of a *Gegenstand*, it is claimed that within this structure to investigate the nature of the soul, that is to grasp the apprehension 'I' is impossible. Psycho-analytic theory considers the nature of the soul by investigating it through its appearances, that is, through the psychical states. The anatomy of the soul established in the psycho-analytic theory is the ground of the apprehension of the 'I'. What appears as the apprehension 'I', is not, theoretically speaking constituted only of the mind as considered in transcendental philosophy. The soul reconsidered within the psycho-analytic theory provides a theoretical ground for the grasping of the psychical experiences through the addition of the *inner* thing-in-itself, that is the 'it' as a transcendental element and through the addition of the capacity of memory to the transcendental capacities of the mind. In that sense, psycho-analytic theory extends the limits of the theoretical framework of transcendental philosophy.

## V. CONCLUSION

The subject matter of the present thesis is the ground of the apprehension 'I' in view of the transcendental philosophy of Kant and of the psycho-analytic theory of Freud. We state our question as follows: Theoretically, what is 'I', and what does the apprehension 'I' consists of in these two approaches?

In *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant criticizes the dogmatic trends which dominate the field of philosophical discussion up to his time. Kant states that human reason is naturally disposed to deal with the questions that transcend its limits and powers.<sup>299</sup> *"It begins with principles which it has no option save to employ in the course of its experience, and which this experience at the same time abundantly justifies it in using. Rising with their aid (since it is determined to this also by its own nature) to ever higher, ever more remote, conditions, it soon becomes aware that in this way-the questions never ceasing-its work must always remain incomplete..."*<sup>300</sup> As a result of this fallacious attempt, the reason finds itself in contradictions and obscurities: *"For since the principles of which it is making use transcends the limits of experience, they no longer subject to any empirical test. The battle-field of these endless controversies is called metaphysics."*<sup>301</sup>

Kant states that to save metaphysics from being *"the battle-field of endless controversies"*, it is necessary to attain the knowledge of reason itself. That is, it is necessary that reason attempts to attain its 'self- knowledge', an attempt which involves a critique of itself by

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<sup>299</sup> Kant Immanuel, CPR., A-XVII

<sup>300</sup> *ibid.*, A-VIII

<sup>301</sup> *ibid.*,

determining its limits and powers.<sup>302</sup> In this regard, Kant's main attempt in *Critique of Pure Reason* is to establish metaphysics as a science. He sees that the establishment of metaphysics as a science leads to a thorough criticism of reason as the faculty of knowledge. Kant states: "*I do not mean by this the critique of the books and systems, but the critique of the faculty of the reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience. It will therefore, decide as to the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics in general, and to determine its sources, its extent, and its limits all in accordance with principles.*"<sup>303</sup>

In this regard, the inquiry into the nature of reason, in the first place, eliminates the material derived from experience in order to obtain the a priori sources which underlie experience. Kant states that for there be a science of reason, the reason should search for not only its own powers but also its *Objekt*.<sup>304</sup> In fact these two inquiries are the same, in that the constitution of reason is determined through the investigation of the possibility of its *Objekt*.<sup>305</sup>

Kant states that all necessity is grounded on the human reason independently of experience. Therefore an investigation into the nature of the *Objekt* necessitates an investigation into what is a priori in it. Since that which is a priori is grounded in human reason independently of experience, the investigation into the nature of the *Objekt* is an inquiry into the constitution of pure reason. Kant states: "*Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to Gegenstand(s). But, all attempt to extend our knowledge of Gegenstand(s) by establishing something in regard to, them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in*

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<sup>302</sup> *ibid.*, A-XI

<sup>303</sup> *ibid.*, A-XII

<sup>304</sup> *ibid.*, B-IX

<sup>305</sup> *ibid.*, B-XXIII

failure. We must, therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the task of metaphysics, if we suppose that *Gegenstand(s)* must conform to our knowledge.”<sup>306</sup>

In that sense, Kant's inquiry is directed to give an account of the possibility of *Gegenstand(s)* of experience. In that he asks how we attain to the knowledge of what is a priori in them. Therefore although this concern leads to an inquiry into the nature of human reason, it is mainly an ontological inquiry. Such an ontology rests on the assumption that the *Gegenstand(s)* of experience should be viewed not as things-in-themselves but only as appearances. This assumption claims that we cannot grasp (know) things as they are but only to the extent that they conform to the constitution of the mind. It is the mind that provides the representability of the (outer) thing-in-itself whose graspability transcends the limits of the faculty of knowledge. The forms of space and time through which the thing-in-itself is represented as a *Gegenstand* are provided by the capacity of sensibility. What is received by sensibility is represented as a *Gegenstand* in space only through the determination of the categories which dictate the rules in accordance with which a *Gegenstand* is determined in space having certain predicates. These two capacities, that is sensibility and thought are connected to one another through the faculty of imagination. In the act of experiencing, it is through the schema of the concepts of understanding, provided by the faculty of imagination, that the pure concepts of understanding are related to an intuition and thereby determine the *Gegenstand* of experience.

This is a spontaneous act of understanding; in that act, a *Gegenstand* is determined in space. However, for a *Gegenstand* to be determined in space as a unity, it is necessary that it belongs to a consciousness. In transcendental philosophy, without an apprehending and grasping

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<sup>306</sup> *ibid.*, B-XVI

consciousness, reality cannot be said to exist at all. Thus at this point, the crucial place of the act of apperception in transcendental philosophy becomes apparent. All experiences, to be an act of unity, must belong to a consciousness. However, experience, that is the act of grasping a *Gegenstand* in space, is an act of the mind. In that act a *Gegenstand* is apprehended through the apprehension of the self in time as a unity. To be a determination in time means to be represented in successive relations in the inner sense. In that sense, that which appears in the form of the inner sense has to be united under an unchanging and abiding consciousness which itself is not subject to the determinations of the form of time. This is the pure or the transcendental self whose apprehension is represented by the pure act of thought as 'I'. Although, it accompanies every act of grasping and of thought, it remains the same through time.

It is the ultimate principle of unity which is an essential concept in transcendental philosophy. Its source is the transcendental self whose unity is original to its apprehending itself. The fundamental apprehension, the self 'I' is the transcendental ground of the possibility of the mind as a unity and the possibility of experience as a unity. Within the theoretical framework of transcendental philosophy, belonging to the ground of the experience there are two transcendental elements: One of them is the *outer* thing-in-itself, which means nothing for us except as its representation is provided by the mind; the other is the transcendental self which is the ground of the possibility of the mind itself. Mind is the transcendental self which is activated through the affections coming from the *outer* thing-in-itself. In that, the transcendental self gains empirical reality in time only, that is, it apprehends itself as grasping a representation in space. Taken in that sense, mind is a constitution which provides the representability of the *outer* thing-in-itself, and transcendental self is the ground of the possibility of this constitution. Mind is the



unity of sensibility, understanding and reason. Its spontaneous act is what determines the *Gegenstand(s)* of experience. In that picture, the empirical external reality is grounded on the soul as to its form, since it is the category of substance that determines representations in space as a substantial entity.

Nevertheless, as we stated above, Kant's ontological concern directs him towards giving a critique of pure reason which involves determining its constitution which provides the possibility of a *Gegenstand*. Kant entitles such an inquiry as 'self-knowledge', since it aims at determining the powers and the limits of the faculty of knowledge. In that, the self knows itself as that which grasps the representations given outwardly.

If we ask what the 'I' is, within the limits of the critical philosophy of Kant, the answer is that: "*Consciousness is, indeed, that which alone makes all representations to be thoughts, and in it, therefore, as the transcendental subject, all or perceptions must be found; but beyond this logical meaning of the 'I' we have no knowledge of the subject in itself, which as substratum underlies this 'I', as it does all thoughts.*"<sup>307</sup> So, theoretically, what does the apprehension 'I' consists of? This apprehension consists only of the forms of space and time and of the categories; it is in that sense that the apprehension of the pure self is the apprehension of the unity of the mind. And that is why transcendental philosophy permits apprehension of the self, taken in the theoretical sense, in experience only as the grasping (knowing) self.

Since the constitution of the soul is theoretically pictured as the mind and the transcendental self only as a ground which serves as the principle of unity, grasping of the self itself, that is self-knowledge taken in the proper sense of the term is rendered as impossible. The

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<sup>307</sup> *ibid.*, A-350

reason for this impossibility arises from the fact that the conditions that provide the graspability of a representation rest on the 'I' itself. In this regard 'I' cannot be subject to the determinations of the a priori forms which are grounded on itself. In this picture, then, the constitution of the soul and the faculty of knowledge is established in a way that can provide a ground only for the possibility of representations whose source lies in the *outer* thing-in-itself. Likewise experience is limited to the grasping of an appearance which is represented outwardly.

Therefore, the 'I', and what the real content of the apprehension 'I' is left outside of the concern of the transcendental philosophy, since the grasping of it surpasses the limits and the power of human reason. As a result of these considerations, the true nature of the 'I', which underlies all inner representations, is as ungraspable as the (outer) thing-in-itself.

In that connection, Freud's criticism of transcendental philosophy is directed to the consideration of the 'I' as only the transcendental ground of the possibility of representations given outwardly. It is true that what is external (taken in the transcendental sense) should conform to the constitution of the mind. It is through the mind that what is transcendently external gains empirical reality for us as a representation. However, the 'I' is not only constituted of the mind; what underlies the apprehension 'I', which is an act of unity and of thought is itself a thing-in-itself. Through this criticism, the *inner* thing-in-itself is introduced into the theoretical picture as a transcendental element, as parallel to the *outer* thing-in-itself. Through the addition of the transcendental inner to the constitution of the 'I', the theoretical framework of soul is extended in such a way that mind is rendered theoretically as capable of receiving affections from both the *inside* and the *outside* of the soul.

Both of these transcendental realms are in themselves beyond our access. They can only be known (grasped) by us through representations. In that the transcendental outer is represented through the forms of space-time and is determined through the categories of understanding, while the transcendental inner is represented only in time relations.

The transcendental inner, is the agency 'it', which is ready at birth, according to psycho-analytic theory. It is through the acquisition of the external reality that the 'I' starts to develop as a second agency. The 'above-I', on the other hand, originates throughout the social relations of the 'I' with other people surrounding it, particularly with the parents. The 'it' is the reservoir of the wishful impulses. Once they attach themselves to representations and are thereby apprehended by the 'I', they impel the 'I' to modify the external world through related actions. In that neither the 'it', nor its constituents do appear or are represented in the form of space as a *Gegenstand*; it, however, manifests itself through the aim oriented acts, thoughts and wishes of the 'I', as the willing agency of the soul.

Yet the three agencies of the soul do not live together within the unity of the soul harmoniously. As a result of the tension between them most of the psychical experiences undergo repression and remain unknown to the conscious 'I'. The unconscious is contained by the capacity of memory. In that capacity, which provides, as to its very nature, the associative links for the communication of the unconscious representations, the representations are preserved as vivid as they are experienced. Through the introduction of the capacity of memory into the theoretical picture, as a transcendental capacity, the limits of the theoretical reason are extended. In that what is graspable should not be represented in spatial relations but what appears in time only can be grasped as well and be a subject matter of a science. The 'I', in the empirical sense,

is the totality of the experiences contained by the system of memory. The knowledge of the self, the behaviors, acts, thoughts and wishes and psychic disturbances peculiar to an individual can be deciphered on the basis of the associative relations contained by the memory, without falling into the Kantian paralogisms. Thus, in this particular sense, psycho-analytic theory can be considered as extending Kant's transcendental philosophy.

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