

HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE:
PERCEPTIONS OF RECTORS, COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUCATION
MEMBERS, AND GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES

MELTEM AKBULUT YILDIRMIŐ

BOĐAZIĐI UNIVERSITY

2018

HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE:
PERCEPTIONS OF RECTORS, COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUCATION
MEMBERS, AND GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES

Thesis submitted to the
Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Adult Education

by
Meltem Akbulut Yıldırım

Boğaziçi University

2018

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Meltem Akbulut Yıldırım, certify that

- I am the sole author of this thesis and that I have fully acknowledged and documented in my thesis all sources of ideas and words, including digital resources, which have been produced or published by another person or institution;
- this thesis contains no material that has been submitted or accepted for a degree or diploma in any other educational institution;
- this is a true copy of the thesis approved by my advisor and thesis committee at Boğaziçi University, including final revisions required by them.

Signature.....

Date12/05/2018

ABSTRACT

Higher Education Governance: Perceptions of Rectors, Council of Higher Education Members, and Government Representatives

This qualitative study investigates the operation of the system governance model in Turkish higher education through the perceptions of state university rectors, Council of Higher Education (CoHE) members, and government representatives. It also examines the advantages and the challenges of this model and explores the suggestions for improvements in the model. The study is based on semi-structured interviews with fifteen rectors, twelve CoHE members, and four government representatives and informed by grounded theory. The data analysis is conducted under the conceptual framework that is derived from the literature review and coined as “Rhizomatic System Governance Process Framework.” Based on the findings, the structure operating in the system governance model appears to be law-bound, have power-centers, combine supervision of inputs and outputs, and deprofessionalize academic roles. Also, a suggestion for a pluralized coordination seems to indicate perception of system governance as a process, which is argued to be “Rhizomatic-Tree-like” in this study. The main contribution of this study to the literature is the development of the “Rhizomatic System Governance Process Framework” by taking a deconstructive and reconstructive perspective in the literature review. Although the sub-items in the framework can change from one context to another, the main items together with their sub-items as a whole can offer a new perspective in the study of the system governance of higher education.

ÖZET

Yükseköğretim Yönetimi: Rektörlerin, Yükseköğretim Kurulu Üyelerinin ve Hükümet Temsilcilerinin Görüşleri

Bu nitel çalışma, Türkiye’deki yükseköğretim yönetimi sisteminin işleyişini devlet üniversitesi rektörlerinin, Yükseköğretim Kurulu (YÖK) üyelerinin ve hükümet temsilcilerinin gözünden incelemektedir. Ayrıca, çalışmada yükseköğretim yönetimi sisteminin işleyişinin avantajları ve zorlukları ve bu işleyişin geliştirilmesi için alternatif modellerin neler olabileceği de ele alınmaktadır. Çalışma, on beş rektör, on iki YÖK üyesi ve dört hükümet temsilcisi ile gerçekleştirilen yarı yapılandırılmış görüşmelere dayanmaktadır ve çalışmada gömülü teori kullanılmıştır. Verilerin analizi, alanyazın incelemesi sonucunda oluşturulan ve “Rizomatik Sistem Yönetimi Süreci Çerçevesi” olarak isimlendirilen çerçeve aracılığı ile gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bulgulara göre, mevcut yükseköğretim yönetimi sisteminin kanunlara bağlı, güç merkezleri olan, girdi ve çıktıları birleştiren ve akademik rollerin içeriğini değiştiren bir yapıya sahip olduğu görünmektedir. Ayrıca, çoğulcu koordinasyon önerisi, bu çalışmada “Rizomatik-Ağacı” olduğu tartışılan sistem yönetiminin bir süreç olduğuna işaret etmektedir. Bu çalışmanın alanyazına temel katkısı, yapısökümcü ve yeniden yapıcı bakış açısı ile gerçekleştirilen alanyazın incelemesi sonucu oluşturulan “Rizomatik Sistem Yönetimi Süreci Çerçevesi” dir. Çerçevedeki alt ögeler bağlamdan bağlama değişebilir; ancak temel ögeler yükseköğretimin sistem yönetimi çalışmalarına yeni bir bakış açısı getirebilir.

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME: Meltem Akbulut Yıldırım

DEGREES AWARDED

PhD in Adult Education, 2018, Boğaziçi University

MA in Adult Education, 2011, Boğaziçi University

BA in Foreign Language Education, 2008, Boğaziçi University

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Governance of higher education, neo-institutional theory, leadership in higher education, educational administration, professional development, adult education, social psychology and human behaviors, and teaching English as a second language

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Research Personnel, Doctorate (D Code) Project Grant by Boğaziçi University

Scientific Research Projects (BAP), Boğaziçi University, August 2017 - August 2018

Editorial Assistant and Language Editor, Journal of Education and Humanities:

Theory and Practice, May 2017 - present

Professional Development Unit Head, English Prep Program, School of Languages, İstanbul Şehir University, September 2013 - January 2017

English Language Instructor, English Prep Program, School of Languages, İstanbul Şehir University, September 2011 - January 2017

Research Assistant, TÜBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey) Project on Leadership, January 2010

English Language Instructor, Preparatory School Program, Beykoz Logistics School of Higher Education, July 2009 - December 2010

AWARDS AND HONORS

Shortlisted in the Local Innovation Category with the project *Discuss With Us* (an online speaking website) in the ELTons, 2013

Highest Honors List, Boğaziçi University, 2018 (GPA: 4.00)

Highest Honors List, Boğaziçi University, 2011 (GPA: 3.81)

Highest Honors List, Boğaziçi University, 2008 (GPA: 3.75)

Ministry of Education Scholarship for success in the University Entrance Exam, 29th rank in Turkey, 1st in Giresun, Turkey, 2004 - 2008

Boğaziçi University Scholarship for success in the University Entrance Exam, 29th rank in Turkey, 1st in Giresun, Turkey, 2004 - 2005

Award for graduating from high school at first rank

Award for graduating from secondary school at first rank

Award for winning the writing contest as 1st in Giresun, 2nd in Turkey

Award for winning the writing contest as 1st in Giresun, Turkey

Award for winning the story writing contest as 1st in Giresun, Turkey

GRANTS

Doctorate (D Code) Project Grant by Boğaziçi University Scientific Research Projects (BAP), Boğaziçi University, August 2017 – August 2018

PUBLICATIONS

Journal Publications

Akbulut Yıldırımış, M., & Seggie, F. N. (2017) (Submitted to the *Yükseköğretim Dergisi / Journal of Higher Education* for consideration for publication). *Yükseköğretim Çalışmalarının Akademik Bir Alan Olarak Gelişimi: Uluslararası ve Ulusal Düzeyde Alanyazın İncelemesi [The Development of Higher Education Studies as an Academic Field: A Literature Review at International and National Levels]*.

Akbulut Yıldırımış, M., Seggie, F. N., & Börkan, B. (2015). Faculty member perceptions of department head leadership effectiveness at a state university in Turkey. *International Journal of Leadership in Education*, 18 (4), 440-463. DOI: 10.1080/13603124.2014.997799

Book Chapters

Akbulut Yıldırımış, M., & Seggie, N. (2015). Nitel Araştırmaların Desenlenmesi. In N. Seggie & Y. Bayyurt (Eds.), *Nitel Araştırma: Yöntem, Teknik, Analiz ve Yaklaşımları* (23-35). İstanbul: Anı Yayınları .

Akbulut Yıldırımış, M., Seggie, N., & Sart, G. (2015). Nitel Araştırmaların Raporlaştırılması. In N. Seggie & Y. Bayyurt (Eds.), *Nitel Araştırma: Yöntem, Teknik, Analiz ve Yaklaşımları* (371-384). İstanbul: Anı Yayınları.

Cameron, K. S., Quinn, R. E., DeGraff, J., & Thakor, A. J. (2015). *Creating value through new leadership behaviors [Yeni değerler ve yeni liderlik davranışları yaratma]* (M. Akbulut Yıldırımış and F. N. Seggie, Trans.) In *The Competing Values Framework: Creating value through purpose, practices, and people*. İstanbul: PEGEM Yayınevi. (Original work published 2008)

Cameron, K. S., Quinn, R. E., DeGraff, J., & Thakor, A. J. (2015) *Applying levers of organizational change [Örgütsel değişimin tekniklerini uygulama]* (M. Akbulut Yıldırımış and F. N. Seggie, Trans.) In *The Competing Values Framework: Creating value through purpose, practices, and people*. İstanbul: PEGEM Yayınevi. (Original work published 2008)

Conference Proceedings

Akbulut Yıldırımış, M., & Seggie, F. N. (2017). The Development of Higher Education Studies as an Academic Field at National and International Levels. In *The 2nd International Higher Education Studies Conference, Antalya, Turkey*.

CERTIFICATES

MAET (Educational Technology Certificate Program), Michigan State University,
GPA: A, Michigan, USA, from January to July, 2013

Trainer Education Program (SLTEP), Sabancı University, School of Languages,
Istanbul, Turkey, from June 24 to July 5, 2013

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This five-year bumpy and lovely journey marks the start of new journeys. I feel in debt to certain individuals who prepared me for new beginnings. I would like to thank my adviser, Fatma Nevra Seggie, who taught me how to be a good scholar and patiently guided me in evolving into a whole person. Also, I would like to thank my committee members, Sedat Gümüő, Bekir Gür, Zeynep Kızıltepe, and Ali İzzet Tekcan for their continual support, guidance, and encouragement.

I also received financial support from Boğaziçi University Scientific Research Projects (BAP) (Research Fund Grant Number 12749). I would like to thank the BAP Committee, BAP Administrative Coordinatorship, and BAP Financial Coordinatorship for all the support and guidance they provided during my studies.

Additionally, I would like to thank all the participants for spending their time in this research and sharing their experiences with me. Their experiences were not only instrumental in completing this study, but also provided me with many learning points about the system I will grow in.

I would also like to thank my friends who never held back their words of encouragement. Especially, thanks to Mehtap İnce, Aslı Abak Ően, and Yıldız Yıldırım Karlıdağ for offering me support and friendship whenever I was in need.

Finally, I would like to thank my mother, Nuriye Akbulut, my father, Murat Akbulut, my brother, Mustafa Umut Akbulut, and my husband, Emrah Yıldırımő for their belief in me in the face of all the sufferings and obstacles.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my heroine, to a real fighter.

To my mother

Nuriye Akbulut

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background.....	1
1.2 Statement of the research problem	3
1.3 Purpose of the study.....	5
1.4 Research question(s).....	5
1.5 Significance of the study	6
1.6 Structure of the dissertation	9
1.7 Summary of Chapter 1	10
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW	11
2.1 Part 1: System governance of higher education in the world	12
2.2 Part 2: System governance of higher education in Turkey.....	129
2.3 Conceptual framework for the study	175
2.4 Summary of Chapter 2.....	180
CHAPTER 3: METHODS AND PROCEDURES	181
3.1 The research approach	181
3.2 Research question(s).....	185
3.3 Research design	185
3.4 Sample	196
3.5 Interview protocol and data collection	206
3.6 Position of the researcher.....	215
3.7 Summary of Chapter 3.....	217
CHAPTER 4: SELECTED CASE NARRATIVES	218
4.1 Former rector	219

4.2 Former CoHE member	227
4.3 Current government representative	236
4.4 Current rector	241
4.5 Summary of Chapter 4.....	249
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH FINDINGS: PARTICIPANTS' UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM GOVERNANCE MODEL.....	250
5.1 Category 1: Structure of the system governance model	251
5.2 Category 2: Decision-making process in the operation of the system governance model.....	267
5.3 Summary of Chapter 5.....	282
CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH FINDINGS: PARTICIPANTS' ADVANTAGES, CHALLENGES, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS ABOUT THE SYSTEM GOVERNANCE MODEL	283
6.1 Research question 2: Advantages of the system governance model	283
6.2 Research question 2: Challenges of the system governance model	291
6.3 Research question 3: Suggestions for improvements in the system governance model.....	304
6.4 Summary of Chapter 6.....	322
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION	323
7.1 Findings and discussion.....	323
7.2 Limitations of the study	359
7.3 Suggestions for future research	360
7.4 Conclusion	361
7.5 Reflections	366
APPENDIX A: UNIVERSITIES IN TURKEY (1933 - 2018)	368

APPENDIX B: QUOTE: STRATEGIC PURPOSES.....	374
APPENDIX C: ETHICAL APPROVAL BY THE INSTITUTIONAL ETHICAL REVIEW BOARD FOR RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS (INAREK) ..	375
APPENDIX D: INFORMED CONSENT FOR CURRENT/FORMER SENIOR ADMINISTRATORS	376
APPENDIX E: INFORMED CONSENT FOR CURRENT/FORMER GOVERNING BOARD MEMBERS AND CURRENT MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVES.....	377
APPENDIX F: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL USED FOR THE PILOT STUDY: CURRENT/FORMER SENIOR ADMINISTRATORS.....	378
APPENDIX G: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL USED IN THE STUDY: CURRENT/FORMER SENIOR ADMINISTRATORS.....	381
APPENDIX H: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL USED IN THE STUDY (TURKISH): CURRENT/FORMER SENIOR ADMINISTRATORS.....	383
APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL USED FOR THE PILOT STUDY: CURRENT/FORMER GOVERNING BOARD MEMBERS	385
APPENDIX J: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL USED IN THE STUDY: CURRENT/FORMER GOVERNING BOARD MEMBERS	388
APPENDIX K: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL USED IN THE STUDY (TURKISH): CURRENT/FORMER GOVERNING BOARD MEMBERS	390
APPENDIX L: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL USED IN THE STUDY: CURRENT MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVES	392
APPENDIX M: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL USED IN THE STUDY (TURKISH): CURRENT MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVES	393

APPENDIX N: RENEWED ETHICAL APPROVAL BY THE INAREK.....	394
APPENDIX O: QUOTES: CHAPTER 4 SELECTED CASE NARRATIVES	395
APPENDIX P: QUOTES: CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH FINDINGS: PARTICIPANTS' UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM GOVERNANCE MODEL	407
APPENDIX Q: QUOTES: CHAPTER 6 RESEARCH FINDINGS: PARTICIPANTS' ADVANTAGES, CHALLENGES, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS ABOUT THE SYSTEM GOVERNANCE MODEL	415
REFERENCES.....	424

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. The Triangle of Coordination	62
Figure 2. Triple Helix I: Etatistic model of university-industry-government- relations	73
Figure 3. Triple Helix II: A laissez faire model of university-industry-government- relations	74
Figure 4. Triple Helix III: The Triple Helix model of university-industry- government-relations	74
Figure 5. System governance as a process in the medieval ages (1100-1500)	92
Figure 6. System governance as a process in the early modern period (1500-1800)	98
Figure 7. System governance as a process from the 19 th century to 1980s	109
Figure 8. System governance as a process from 1980s onwards	125
Figure 9. The number of universities in Turkey (1933-1991)	151
Figure 10. The number of universities in Turkey (1933-2005)	161
Figure 11. The number of universities in Turkey (1933-2017)	164
Figure 12. The organizational structure of CoHE	169
Figure 13. The size and composition of the Council	170
Figure 14. Rhizomatic system governance process framework.....	177
Figure 15. Rhizomatic-Tree-like system governance process for Turkish higher education	356

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Since the medieval times, the roles, functions, and responsibilities of universities have been reconfigured and recontextualized as intricately connected to social, political, and economic conditions of countries. As institutions “at the heart of societies”, they have found themselves in constantly changing conditions amenable to the social, political, and economic policies and concomitantly have been at the center of power relations (The Magna Charta Universitatum, 1988). In the nineteenth century, when the University of Berlin was founded, it drew on the principles of the unity of teaching and research, the freedom to teach, and the freedom to learn, and these principles became influential around the globe (Scott, 2006). On the other hand, the role, function, and responsibility of medieval universities were redefined in line with the formation of the modern nation-state. The “referential community”, “the community to which the individual university should be answerable”, had to be national (Neave, 2003, p. 145), defining the referential community of these principles as well. The demand for building national universities and national higher education systems necessitated “to not only regulate relationships between the state and an individual institution in a new way but to regulate the system, namely, to govern the national system of higher education”, representing a growing concern over governance of higher education at the system level (Zgaga, 2006, p. 42). With the emergence of neoliberal values and policies in the 1980s, the concern over system governance of higher education at the national level took a new turn. Universities were redefined by massification, marketization, and globalization,

leading up to the introduction of private sector management principles into systems of higher education (Engwall & Wearie, 2008). Since then, universities have been pressured to be answerable to not only national but also local, regional, transnational, and global communities. The fact that more than 18,000 universities hold more than 170 million students exemplifies the strategic positioning of higher education at multiple levels (UNESCO, 2017) and also massification and universalization trends in higher education systems (Trow, 2006). Pursuant to these processes, systems of higher education have extended their stakeholders from students, higher education institutions, governments, and Ministries of Education to include different voices of internal and external stakeholders such as “staff unions, professional associations, industry or regional authorities” (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000, p. 271). Today, they operate in competitive knowledge-based societies under changing conditions that demand innovation, international cooperation, productivity, and global effectiveness, in which stakeholders continually negotiate the operation of the system governance of higher education and are occupied by heightened concern over system governance. The integration of technology into teaching practices, generation and dissemination of world-class research, collaboration with private sector, engagement in self-funding activities, and development of quality assurance mechanisms are some of the expectations integrated into the system governance of higher education institutions. A consequence of such demands has been a search for appropriate system governance models and so restructuring of systems of higher education in order to ensure quality and hence to improve local, national, and global competitiveness and hierarchical positioning (Marginson & van der Wende, 2007). Yet such a macro-level actor-centered structure focus, a focus on the actors, institutions, and/or system governance models, may cause an overall analysis of

interactions between socio-political communities, states, and institutional processes in the system governance considering the embeddedness of higher education in the public sector and thus may abstract from a responsive restructuring in the system governance of higher education institutions. One such focus is argued to be exemplified in the system governance of Turkish higher education.

1.2 Statement of the research problem

Turkish higher education was constructed within the context of modernization connected to secularism. Engaging in the advancement of Republican reforms was a key responsibility attributed to educational institutions in the building of a modern nation-state (Barblan, Ergüder, & Gürüz, 2008), the emphasis upon which laid grounds for the 1933 University Reform. The reform replaced the Darülfünun with İstanbul University and the University was placed under the authority of the Ministry of National Education granted with delegated powers to establish the new university. This restructuring not only represented the need for state powers to be engaged in the governance of higher education for the provision and practice of the Republican reforms but also illustrated the implementation of the centralization within the system governance of Turkish higher education (Yavuz, 2012). This way of governing the higher education system became a focal point for the election campaigns as the need for coordination among the higher education institutions increased within the expanding system (Kafadar, 2002). In search of a new system governance model, the system governance of higher education was re-contextualized through legislative changes and from 1946 to 1981 four more legislative changes were passed either during the Single-Party Period or in the aftermath of the military interventions, bringing in the operation of system governance as a politicized and

polarized controversial aspect of Turkish higher education (Turan, 2010). Each altered university legislation constituted the context of varying structures in the system governance by undermining the legitimacy of existing structures and the search for a governance model continued in the system of Turkish higher education (Küçükcan & Gür, 2009; Seggie & Gökbel, 2015; Tekeli, 2009). After the third military intervention, the 1981 university reform started a new period in the system governance with the enactment of Higher Education Law 2547 and establishment of the Council of Higher Education (CoHE), YÖK, its acronym in Turkish (T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 1991).¹ On the other side, according to Gür and Çelik (2011), from 1983 to 1996 the restructuring of the system governance of higher education remained an open question in the power relations among the President of the Republic, government, the President of the Council, and universities, and the discussions, grounded in the centralization in the system governance revolving around CoHE, led up to a transition to the election system in the rector appointments rather than a change in the restructuring of CoHE. Since then, the country has moved from elite to mass to universal higher education with a growing concern for addressing local needs and taking global directions (Günay & Günay, 2017), raising questions about the sustainability of the system governance of higher education centered around the CoHE model so that the system remains responsive to the further growth at both national and international levels and continues to fulfill important services that foster social and economic development. However, these discussions have mostly revolved around the existence of CoHE and its centralized structure.

¹ Some studies (Erişen, Çeliköz, Kapıcıoğlu, Akyol, & Ataş, 2009; Gür & Çelik, 2016) refer to the Council of Higher Education as the Board of Higher Education and abbreviate it as BHE. In this study, the Council of Higher Education is abbreviated as CoHE based on the usage on the official website of CoHE.

For this reason, governments, studies, and strategy documents have discussed the need for a more comprehensive reform in the restructuring of the system governance of higher education (Batirel et al., 2014; Çetinsaya, 2014; Ergüder, Şahin, Terzioğlu, & Vardar, 2009; Gök & Gümüş, 2015; Gümüş, 2018; Gür, 2016; Gür & Çelik, 2016; Kurt, 2015; 61. Hükümet Programı [61st Government Program], 2011; T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı [Ministry of Development], 2013; Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2015a).

1.3 Purpose of the study

This study investigates how the current higher education governance model in Turkey operates according to the perceptions of rectors, CoHE members, and government representatives. With this question, it specifically aims to answer how the decision-making structure works, how the decision-making power is shared, and how the interplay between governmental steering and institutional autonomy works in terms of accountability, financing, appointments, and rule of law. This dissertation also aims to explore the advantages and the challenges of this model and to open up a discussion on alternative ways to improve the current governance model in Turkish higher education.

1.4 Research question(s)

The research questions are as follows:

According to the perceptions of rectors, CoHE members, and government representatives,

(1) how does the current higher education governance model in Turkey operate?

a. how does the decision-making structure work?

- b. how is the decision-making power shared?
 - c. how does the interplay between governmental steering and institutional autonomy work in terms of accountability, financing, appointments, and rule of law?
- (2) what are the advantages and challenges of this model?
- (3) based on the challenges, what are the alternative ways to improve the governance model in Turkish higher education?

1.5 Significance of the study

At both national and international levels, this interdisciplinary study might offer several contributions to the study of higher education governance and so to the higher education and public administration literature. To my knowledge, there is limited study that has taken a deconstructive and reconstructive perspective to the understanding of the conceptualization of the term governance and the identification of its constituent elements in the context of system governance of higher education. What makes incorporating a deconstructive perspective into the study of system governance of higher education a new approach is the power shifts in the balance of power strategy I utilized in the deconstruction process and Siverson and Miller's (1996) power transition theory and Cowen's (2009) transitology approach that guided me in patterning the power shifts in the balance of power. Taken together, such a perspective helped to explore the external authorities to the system governance of higher education along with the historical continuum of the changes in higher education governance. It further helped to trace the models that emerged in the system governance of higher education. Most importantly, the deconstructive perspective served not only to center the focus on the practices of multiple

authorities in the system governance of higher education but also on the logic behind these practices. Pursuant to this, it served to present how these practices of multiple authorities and the pre-discussed changes and the shifts in the balance of power were reflected in the models.

In the system governance of higher education in the world section of my literature review, I attempted to put these practices into action and attempted to partly deploy an analytics of government in the Foucauldian tradition to reconstruct the term governance and its constituent elements. My point of departure from the Foucauldian analytics of government was that I extended its territorially bounded historical and geographical focus to regional, transnational, and global frames of references. What makes incorporating such a reconstructive perspective into the study of system governance of higher education a new approach is that it goes beyond an actor-centric approach and helps to explore how different practices with different historical trajectories come together to shape the operation of the system governance of higher education in the present. Overall, an analytics of government rejects a taken-for-granted reading of the particular issue of study by mapping it over diverse practices in order to offer an alternative way of thinking to the construction of the issue of study.

A corollary of such rejection in the reconstruction process has been the development of what I coin a “Rhizomatic System Governance Process Framework.” By tracing a genealogy of the system governance of higher education starting from the medieval ages through an analytics of government, I gradually produced four system governance processes that start with the medieval ages (1100-1500) and lie to the present. Working on what these processes were evolving into I coined some new terms that seemed to come down to shape the operation of the system governance of

higher education and contextualized the others that have been discussed before. The last system governance process comprises modes of operation, strategies that might be associated with these modes of operation, forms of power, instruments, missions, governance indicators, modes of governance, mode of coordination, and models, which could be said to characterize the how of system governance as a process. Based on these tenets, employing Deleuze and Guattari's (2005) metaphor "rhizome", I have suggested that system governance has a rhizomatic character drawing on the principles of "connection", "heterogeneity", "multiplicity", and "asignifying rupture" (pp. 7, 9), which seem to have been embedded in the system governance as a process right from the beginning. Although the sub-items in the framework can change from one context to another, the main items - modes of operation, forms of power, instruments, missions, governance indicators, modes of governance, mode of coordination, and models – together with their sub-items as a whole offers a new perspective in the study of the operation of the system governance of higher education as they were brought together and contextualized after a broad review of literature and through a systematic deconstructive and reconstructive process. This is the very reason why I have taken a reconstructive perspective to explicate the operation of the system governance of higher education in Turkey through the perceptions of the research participants employing the "Rhizomatic System Governance Process Framework" and aim for a reanalysis in the Discussion chapter, so that, an idiosyncratic rhizomatic system governance process could be generated for the Turkish higher education through a recursive inquiry of the issue at hand. In addition, to my knowledge, limited research has proposed modes of operation and strategies that might be associated with these modes of operation for the study of the system governance of higher education

through such a deconstructive and reconstructive process. Therefore, bringing together modes of operation and strategies could offer insights into exploring how different forms of power such as states and socio-political communities impact the system governance of higher education and thus how human practices generate change at the system governance level. This could further offer a richer conceptualization of higher education governance and help to unravel how the practices in the restructuring of higher education system reverberate with the deconstruction and reconstruction of higher education governance, leaving us with a continuous process of higher education governance evolution within local contexts and across different contexts.

1.6 Structure of the dissertation

The structure of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 contextualizes the study in the relevant literature by organizing it into two parts: (1) system governance of higher education in the world and (2) system governance of higher education in Turkey. A conceptual framework is developed in Part I by deconstructing and reconstructing the system governance of higher education in the world. After deconstructing the system governance of higher education in Turkey in Part II, the chapter concludes with the conceptual framework employed in the study to reconstruct the system governance of higher education in Turkey through the perceptions of the research participants. Chapter 3 is an account of the research methods and procedures undertaken in this study. It presents the research approach, poses the research questions, and explores the design of the study. Chapter 4 presents selected case narratives of four research participants. Chapters 5 and 6 present the findings of the research. Chapter 5 explores the findings as regards the operation of

the system governance of higher education. Chapter 6 focuses on the findings with regard to the advantages and challenges of the system governance model, and based on the challenges, it explores the alternative ways to improve the model. The dissertation concludes with Chapter 7, which draws upon a discussion and an interpretation of the research findings, puts forward suggestions for future research, and reflects on the limitations of the study.

1.7 Summary of Chapter 1

To sum up, this study investigates how the current higher education governance model in Turkey operates according to the perceptions of rectors, CoHE members, and government representatives. The analysis of their perceptions also aims to explore the advantages and the challenges of this model and to uncover alternative ways to improve the current governance model in Turkish higher education. This analysis is conducted under the conceptual framework that I derived from the literature review and I coined as “Rhizomatic System Governance Process Framework.”

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The research questions of this study require an inquiry of the evolution of the system governance models of higher education. In the light of this, the literature review consists of two parts: (1) system governance of higher education in the world and (2) system governance of higher education in Turkey. My purpose in organizing the literature review into two parts is threefold: First, I aim to understand the conceptualization of the term governance and the identification of its constituent elements in the context of system governance of higher education. Second, I aim to reanalyze the term governance and its constituent elements reconstructed in the literature review through the perceptions of the research participants. Third, I aim to weave my findings together in the Discussion section with a purpose of explicating what they share in common and how they differ. I believe that such reanalysis will be helpful to examine the current position of higher education governance at both national and international level and to take local needs and international competitiveness into consideration in the developing of a model for the Turkish higher education governance.

In Part 1, I deconstruct and reconstruct the system governance of higher education in the world by dividing it into three sections. I first delineate the external authorities to the system governance of higher education along with the historical continuum of the changes in higher education governance. Second, I explore what models have emerged as a result of the pre-discussed changes and the shifts in the balance of power. Having finished the deconstruction process, in section 3, I reconstruct the system governance of higher education in the world using the patterns

and themes from the section 1 and section 2, and discuss the common characteristics of system governance of higher education in the world. In Part 2, I deconstruct the system governance of higher education in Turkey by organizing it into three sections. In each section, I discuss the evolution of system governance of Turkish higher education considering the dynamics of change and the power shifts between the authorities, trace the emerging system governance models along with the power shifts, and examine the evolution of the structure of CoHE and explore the role of CoHE in the system governance of Turkish higher education over a variety of historical trajectories. After summarizing the literature, I conclude by presenting the conceptual framework that I developed in the reconstruction process of the system governance of higher education in the world.

2.1 Part 1: System governance of higher education in the world

In Part 1, I first deconstruct the system governance of higher education in the world in two sections: Balance of power: Dynamics of change and System governance models of higher education. In the third section, I reconstruct the system governance of higher education in the world.

2.1.1 Balance of power: Dynamics of change

In this section, I explore the external authorities to the system governance of higher education along with the historical continuum of the changes in higher education governance. My strategy in this deconstruction process is patterning the power shifts in the balance of power. My approach is guided by power transition theory, which is “a theory of dynamics” (Siverson & Miller, 1996, p. 58), and what Cowen (2009) calls a transitology, which is like a “lightning flash, illuminates simultaneously the

forms of expression of social power (economic, political, and cultural) in the ‘educational system’ and it shows, briefly and brilliantly the *shifts* in those compressions of social power in educational form” (p. 1287, emphasis in original).

2.1.1.1 Phase I: Medieval ages and early modern Europe

The style of authority distribution in the medieval universities provides insight into the changes to the balance of power in the operation of governance in higher education systems. Indeed, many accounts of the dawn and development of the modern state point to the twelfth century for the concept and practice of self-regulation (Austin & Jones, 2016; Cobban, 1988; de Groof, Neave, & Švec, 1998; Gürüz, 2003; Rüegg, 2004a; Wissema, 2009).

University of Bologna

Basically, two archetypal models of university governance arose in Bologna and Paris. At the University of Bologna, the guild of scholars (students) was in control and this type of student-controlled governance prototyped the governance of other Southern universities (Cobban, 1988). That is, the masters (professors) were subordinate to the student rectors and the rectors to the student guild. Yet, it was not until the issuance of the *Authentica Habita* (The Scholar’s Statute)² by the Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa in 1155 that such governance model started to evolve (Nardi, 2004). The privileges granted to students were freedom of movement, imperial protection against the pressures of locals and local authorities, and trial by their professors or by the bishop of Bologna. Around the years 1180-1190, Nardi (2004) states, as a result of the violations to the Constitution *Authentica Habita*, the students started to organize themselves into “nations” according to their geographical origin

² See Otto of Freising. (1994). *The deeds of Frederic Barbarossa*. (C. C. Mierow, Trans.) Toronto: University of Toronto Press. (Original work published 1953)

and each group appointed their own representative. The purpose of these student groups was to protect themselves against the pressures of the local people and local authorities, and in their struggle to defend their interests, they became stronger with the support of Pope Honorius III.³ Although this type of governance lost its significance in Europe from the sixteenth century onwards (Scott, 2006), the collective efforts of the students to govern themselves have been exemplary to the today's student associations (Gürüz, 2003).

University of Paris

In contrast with the University of Bologna, the University of Paris was governed by the guild of masters (professors), setting an example in the governance arrangement of other Northern universities (Cobban, 1988). As the church was part of the University, an official of the church, named chancellor, had a “supervisory” role in the governance of these universities, leading to the disputes between the two different lines of authority (Gieysztor, 2004, p. 129). It is important to note that it was Pope Honorius III who in 1219 for the University of Bologna affirmed that only the ecclesiastical authorities could award the license to teach (*licentia docendi*) and only an official of the Bolognese church, called later chancellor, could confer the degree (Nardi, 2004). With the degree granted by the papacy, the recipient could teach anywhere in Christendom, so the degree was universally valid. From then on, the criterion to be considered a university was to be founded by the pope or emperor or at least to gain recognition by them in law, so anybody wishing to establish a university had to get a founding charter from the pope or emperor (Frijhoff, 2004).

However, the professors at the University of Paris demanded the right to award their degrees and to establish their statutes, so the tension between the external

³ For a detailed discussion on the relationships with the church, see Nardi, P. (2004). Relations with authority. In W. Rüegg (Ed.), *A history of the university in Europe, Vol. I, Universities in the middle ages* (pp. 77-107). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

authority and the internal body of the university resulted in the organization of the guild of professors, which is today known as the collegial model of academic governance (Austin & Jones, 2016; Clark, 1983; de Groof, Neave, & Švec, 1998; Verger, 2004).

Magna Charta of the University of Paris

During this time of struggle for power over the governance of the university between the chancellor and the professors, Pope Gregory IX sided with the guild of professors and issued the bull *Parens Scientiarum* (The Mother of Sciences) in 1231, which has been referred to as Magna Charta of the University of Paris (Rüegg, 2004a). Statutes of Gregory IX⁴, which set the norms and regulations for academic matters (i.e., rights and responsibilities of teachers and students, teaching procedures, coursebooks allowed, discipline issues, academic custom at gatherings and ceremonies, clothing, and degree-granting) manifested itself in the operation of the governance at the University of Paris in different ways: First, as discussed by Bazan (1998) in the book *Rethinking of the Future of the University*, the legal recognition conferred upon the university meant legal protections not only for the professors but also for the members of the University. Exemption from taxes and military service and going on strike could be given as examples to these rights and privileges.

Of importance among the rights and privileges given to the professors was the right to award degrees to the students, which was formerly in the powers of the chancellor. Thus conceived, the assessment of the students' performance and the very decision of recognition as a colleague were not left to the discretion of the external authority, to the chancellor. According to Verger (2004), the degree granting by an academic committee and the sovereign degree granting by the Pope evidence

⁴ Based on the translation from Dana C. Munro, *University of Pennsylvania Translations and Reprints*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1897), Vol: II No: 3, pp. 7-11.

the existence of delegation of authority in the medieval university. Other examples of the involvement of the professors in the decision-making process included recruitment, curriculum planning, and discipline issues.

Second, with the papal recognition, the professors gained the right to make their own statutes, to establish the authorities of the University, and to define their responsibilities (Bazan, 1998). Based on this, the University was organized into the faculties: Arts, Canon Law, Medicine, and Theology. The faculties, except the Arts, were run by deans, which are still present today, mirroring the continuity of the governance traditions over time (Austin & Jones, 2016). Compared to the other faculties, the Arts Faculty, divided into the four nations of the professors due to the large numbers of students, was headed by a rector, who then became the chief authority of the University as the council of professors of the University was formed of the four proctors of the Arts Faculty and the three deans of the other faculties (Gürüz, 2003; Rüegg, 2004a). At the end of their three-month term of office, the rectors gave an account of their actions to the council as part of collegial responsibility for decisions (Bazan, 1998).

One could then argue that the rector had a symbolic power at the University of Paris. They were neither the center of authority nor the decisive mechanism, but they were accountable to the council of professors for their actions. To Verger (2004) also, such type of loose control of the rectors was a key feature of the self-regulated universities. To exemplify more, the rectors did not have the right to vote, but major vote was the norm, that is, no individual administrator had the preeminence in the governance of the University. On the contrary, each member of the University was held responsible for protecting their rights and the common good of the University (Bazan, 1998), and as stated earlier, going on strike was one way of defending their

rights. Ingrained in the governance model of the University and protected with the Bull, the soul of collegiality could be noted as one factor that contributed to the existence of the University of Paris.

Autonomy and accountability

In his discussion on the predecessors for the autonomy and accountability, McLendon (2003), for example, points to the description of the medieval university as “independent republic of scholars” by some (p. 61). One could argue that there are two sides to this description: On the one hand, as aforementioned, both the student guilds of the University of Bologna and the professor guilds of the University of Paris were autonomous in the operation of the governance of the university. Their self-governance and institutional autonomy were also reflected in the following words of Cobban (1988): “In no sense were the universities of the pre-1500 era the monopolistic agencies of anyone privileged section of the community” (p. 16). Also, the teaching licenses granted by the universities were universally valid as the papal or imperial authority was the founder. That is, prior to the organization of states, there was a relatively equivalent division of power between these multiple lines of authority - the church, civil authority, and the university, and such division of power gave the university authority in its own affairs (McLendon, 2003).

On the other hand, as discussed previously, external authorities were not aloof from the operation of the governance of these universities, putting their complete independency into question. Popes, emperors, bishops, municipal authorities, students, and teachers were all struggling for existence and had different interests. Amidst this struggle between the church, civil authority, the students and the teachers, the medieval university, mission of which was “teaching of the rational pursuit of truth”, was regarded as of prime importance for various reasons (Rüegg,

2004a, p. 22). As Rüegg (2004a) discusses, while students and teachers were interested in the universities to gain status and privileges, the popes' interests in the universities drew from their wish to strengthen rationalism, their desire to increase their power, and their need for educated experts.

The issuing of the bulls and the founding charters by the pope or emperor bears mentioning here as it might have relevant arguments for today. These bulls and charters set the norms and regulations for the establishment of the programs of study and the methods of examinations (Bazan, 1998). The questions could be then asked in the context of norm setting for the policies of recruitment, degree-granting, curriculum, and program planning such as Who set the agenda for such policies?, What were their interests?, and How were they implemented?. To that extent, it may be said that the bulls and founding charters came with limits to the complete institutional autonomy of the medieval universities and the interests of the founders were reflected in the universities, making the members of them dependent on another higher level of authority and open to external regulation. One can then conclude that, just as self-regulation was apparent in the governance of these medieval universities, so was the existence of the external authorities in the governance and institutional dynamics of these universities.

As mentioned earlier, the professors at the University of Paris gained privileges on the same policies such as degree granting and making its own statute following the struggles of the members of the University with the chancellor and the citizens as well. Upon these, the pope recognized the University of Paris and issued the bull *The Mother of Sciences*. This resulted in the professors becoming the representative figures of the University and having strong collegial control in the running of the university. As for the University of Bologna, the *Authentica Habita* in

1155 and the papal recognition in 1219 helped students protect themselves against the outside acts of interference, suggesting another line of analysis to the discussion of the bulls and founding charters: The members of the medieval universities benefited from the conflicts between the different groups of authority and also from their interests to the university. According to Rüegg (2004b), recognition by the papacy, guaranteeing universally valid teaching licenses, for instance, stimulated a certain degree of unity in the medieval universities. Given that they were small in number and had right to move freely, they could travel from one city to another in pursuit of their rights and for protection against ecclesiastical and imperial authorities (McLendon, 2003), and such protection from outside interference paved the way for university governance and autonomy (Gürüz, 2011, p. 64). One could then state that medieval universities could take advantage of their “universal” nature, which they gained with papal or imperial recognition (Verger, 2004, p. 35), as they also could yield “universal” impact and diffuse ideas. The will of different interest groups to own knowledge was, then, what triggered the disputes, and as owners of knowledge, students and teachers showed collective responsibility in protecting their interests and gained authority over other interest groups.

Ideological and religious movements in the early modern period (1500-1800)

However, in the early modern period (1500-1800), the universities faced two major challenges to their authority, which one could describe as one of reshaping of universalist authority and weakening of status quo of the universities in the operation of the governance in the early modern period: Broadly speaking, the first wave of these challenges could be grouped under the important ideological and religious movements in the early modern era, each of which grew as a continuum of Humanism. Humanism, with its emphasis on the individual and common quest for

learning, became established in the universities of early modern times in 1453, with the invention of the printing press in 1454, and with the discovery of America in 1492, all of which called for exploration and questioning, and hence gradually replaced medieval scholasticism (Rüegg, 2004b). The entry of humanism into the universities at the beginning of the fifteenth century, for instance, eroded the strict boundaries between the professors and the students, leading to the use of the Greek term *academia*⁵ in the universities (Wissema, 2009). Humanism, which took many forms as Renaissance of the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries, as Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century, as Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century, and as Enlightenment of the eighteenth century led the renewal of all aspects of life and remolded the balance of power away from the medieval university (Frijhoff, 2004; Gürüz, 2003; Okçabol, 2007; Scott, 2006; Wissema, 2009).

For example, during the period of Reformation and Counter-Reformation in the sixteenth century, with dominating roles of theologians, Desiderius Erasmus, Martin Luther King, and John Calvin, the supreme authority of the church was questioned (Frijhoff, 2004). The foundation of the Geneva Academy (*Academia Genevensis*) by John Calvin in 1559 marked a shift away from absolutist power in the governance of public institutions. It was not recognized as a university, and so was not allowed to confer degrees, but the Academy still wielded an impact: Run by a lay board, the Geneva Academy not only patterned the governance of the Protestant Universities in Ireland, the Netherlands, and Scotland in the early modern Europe, but also of the colonial and modern U.S. higher education (Cowley & Williams, 1991; Gürüz, 2011). Paramount to this model was the Calvinist ideology that public institutions must not be in the hands of one man, but of many (Zabilka, 1989).

⁵ For further discussion on the importance of the term *academia*, see Frijhoff, W. (2004). Relations with authority. In W. Rüegg (Ed.), *A history of the university in Europe, Vol. II, Universities in early modern Europe (1500-1800)* (pp. 43-44). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Interlinking spiritual power, represented by the church, with temporal power, employed by the pope, king or emperor, Calvin defended a unity of both in an institutionalized structure for a well-organized society and defined the form it should take (Wolin, 1957). In Calvin's view, as Wolin (1957) writes, both the spiritual government and the civil government had to work together to prevent absolutist power of the church. In other words, while the civil government was also responsible for "civic conscience" objective of the church, the spiritual government was also responsible for "civility" objective of the civil authority (p. 434). That is the reason why, in Geneva, two parallel bodies, one of pastors (Protestant clergy) and the other including the academicians (laypersons) were held responsible for the governance of the Academy (Gürüz, 2003). Called College of Ministers and Professors, these two bodies advised to the Small Council on the appointments of the rectors and hiring of the new academicians. The Small Council included four members of the laypersons who were elected by the laypersons body. Founded by the Town Council, the faculty or the *Senatus Academicus* in the University of Edinburgh managed the affairs of the university with the city authorities (Carter & Withrington, 1992). The Trinity College founded in Dublin instituted the approach with a group of nonacademics, called Board of Visitors. The University of Leiden in the Netherlands also instituted the approach first with a group of nonacademics, but then with four members (*curatores*) of the town council and four professors (*assesores*) of the four faculties (Gürüz, 2003).

The advent of the new knowledge with the spread of humanism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the form of what is referred to as the Scientific Revolution was another important factor that precipitated the weakening of the ties between the medieval universities and the church (Frijhoff, 2004). The works of

great mathematicians and scientists such as Copernicus, Ramus, Galileo, Descartes, Huygens and many others in the sixteenth century and the seminal works of Bacon, Boyle, Newton, and Boerhaave on how nature was understood and studied pushed the boundaries of knowledge, and thus, new methods of scientific investigation were developed (Wissema, 2009). Yet, such works did not enter the territory of medieval universities easily as they saw the new knowledge as a threat to their established order, leading to diversification in the institutional patterns and establishment of alternative institutions to the university and also what de Groof et. al. (1998) notes as “the first serious challenge” to the authority and autonomy of the medieval universities over higher learning and teaching (p. 15). The first examples of these alternative institutions include polytechnics such as Inns of Court in London and Schools of Navigation in Portugal, Spain, and France and academies such as Académie Royale des Sciences (French Academy of Sciences) and the Royal Society of London (Gürüz, 2003).

There are two points to note about the foundation of these alternative institutions: First, what was taught in the medieval universities was not compatible with what was needed by the emerging nation-states, local rulers, or principalities on the grounds that these new lines of authorities needed a skilled workforce for the expanding economy, that is, professionalization of university curricula in accordance with the changing needs of the society was needed (Frijhoff, 2004; Smith, 1999). Second, unlike the Middle Ages, when only the pope or emperor authorized the foundation of universities, these new authorities had the right to found universities in the early modern Europe; hence, these institutions were mostly private initiative of the growing social force of bourgeoisie (de Groof et al., 1998). These all further suggest a link with the changing social, political, and economic context in European

countries, starting with the sixteenth century Reformation and taking the form of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, to what Delanty (2003) refers to as “republic of science”, “where knowledge producers would replace the church in order to save knowledge from the low cultures” (p. 72), to what Cox and Schechter (2002) refer to as a “civilizing process” based on the assumption of a universal human nature with universal reason and universal laws (p. 158). In his essay *An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?*, Kant (1784) defined the Enlightenment as:

Enlightenment is man’s [sic] release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man’s inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. It is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! “Have courage to exercise your own understanding!”- that is the motto of enlightenment. (Kant, 1992, p. 90)

Central to the Kantian subject was then rationalism. With its focus on individualism, making use of their own reason *without direction from other*, thus, the emergence of what Frijhoff (2004) refers to as public opinion, as a characterizing feature of the Enlightenment was an important driver of the explicit public unrest about the medieval universities. To add more, Balibar (2009) discusses that this process of civilization, having its roots in the city-states of the ancient times, resulted in the weakening of the Prince’s authority, leading to the “sovereignty of the people or the nation” (p. 191), pointing to another shift in the line of authority in the operation of the governance in the universities. That is, combined with the modernity of the Enlightenment, the development of new disciplines, the establishment of alternatives to the universities, the engagement of the laypersons in the decision-making and control of the universities, and the developing concepts for the structure and organization of the church and the state in the Reformation institutions gave way to the emerging nation-states and to the proliferation of lines of authority. Based on these tenets, the second wave of challenges to the authority and autonomy of the

medieval universities could be grouped under the beginning of state-building as “the project of modernity signaled the end of feudalism and absolutist authority, legitimated by divine rule, and announced the beginning of the modern state” (Smith, 1999, pp. 557-558).

State-building in the early modern period (1500-1800)

First, given that the “masters sitting at a senate or the ruler’s representatives” held the power and the church lost power, students lost their privileges and the student-controlled university governance model that started at the University of Bologna could not bear the fragmentation in political structures (Frijhoff, 2004, p. 65), leading to a similar pattern in the organization of the management with the guild of masters model (Ridder-Symoens, 2004). Second, as Scott (2006) writes, training the workforce focus of the newly-established nation states, particularly in “legal, diplomatic, parliamentary, and administrative matters”, contributed to the adding of the service to the state mission to the teaching mission of the medieval universities (p. 11), thereby, to that extent, the degree of institutional autonomy the medieval universities enjoyed systematically decreased. As Hammerstein (2004) writes, there was a significant increase in the founders’ influence over the universities and these were in the forms of regular visitations by government bodies and appointed commissions and detailed statutes. Also, while in the medieval universities the rector was still chosen among the professors by the council of professors (actually they took turns), in newly established universities the rector was generally appointed by the state. However, as the developing state took a loose centralization view and as the universities were attributed to a new mission, they still had a certain measure of independence, especially in the teaching appointments, program planning, and degree-granting (Ridder-Symoens, 2004). Finally, Frijhoff (2004) summarizes the

general character of the development of the universities in the early modern period with “expansion” for the high numbers of universities, “differentiation” for the founding of a variety of institutions, and “professionalization” for the universities’ new mission of responding to the market needs and demands, and adds that the last one has been the most influential in the development of universities since then (pp. 79-80).

2.1.1.2 Phase II: The modern university and the state from 19th century to 1980s

In the nineteenth century, forces unleashed by Humanism, Renaissance, Reformation, Scientific Revolution, and Enlightenment came to be strongly felt in state formation processes of the emerging nation-states, and, thus, the reconfigurations of the medieval universities went on with the formations of new systems of higher education. While in the previous period, for instance, the emerging state was loosely centralized in Europe, it took a different view as it evolved. As the state’s roles were questioned and formulated, so were universities, leading to the emergence of distinct patterns in the system governance of higher education. As in his essay, *The modern university: The three transformations*, Wittrock (1993) points out

it is only too obvious that this institutional process is intimately linked to another one, namely the rise of the modern nation-state, whether in newly formed politics on the European continent, such as Italy or Germany, or through the reform of older state organizations, such as France or the United States of America. (Wittrock, 1993, p. 305)

Hence, during this period, in Europe, modernization of the university was directly involved with the modernization of the state, prime mission of which was to construct a national education policy by building publicly accountable universities (Rüegg, 2004c), which led to the birth of two new university models. In France,

following the French Revolution, the medieval period or the ancien régime universities were abolished and only the Université de France (f. 1806-1808), also called the Napoleonic University was refounded on a centralized system of strict division of labor between the faculties and on the principle of the delinking of the teaching and research (Charle, 2004). On the contrary, in Germany, Wilhelm von Humboldt designed the University of Berlin (f. 1810) drawing on the principles of the unity of teaching and research, the freedom to teach, and the freedom to learn, and these principles became influential around the globe (Scott, 2006). According to Ferlie, Musselin, and Andresani (2009), the Humboldtian model also represented the conception of the Mertonian sociology of sciences⁶, for which the role of the state in higher education (science precisely as noted by the authors) is to grant higher education with high level of autonomy isolated from governmental intervention irrespective of its financial liability.

Bureaucratic revolution

According to de Groof et al. (1998), the establishment of the University of Berlin and Université de France was a “bureaucratic revolution” in the history of higher education governance as the development of the first examples of the modern European university was also a move away from the earlier dominance of collegial governance towards more state bureaucracy in higher education governance (p. 16). Enders, de Boer, and Weyer (2013) called this process in the reformation of the higher education in Europe a “social compact” between higher education, state, and society (p. 7). By placing the universities under the Ministries of Public Education, the state became a potent actor in the governance of public higher education in most

⁶ For the original essay, see, Merton, R. K. (1942). Science and technology in a democratic order. *Journal of Legal and Political Sociology*, (1), pp. 115-126. The essay is also available in Merton, R. K. (1979). *The sociology of science: Theoretical and empirical investigations*. University of Chicago Press. pp. 267-278.

countries of Europe and by placing the universities within the public domain, the state took steps in setting the accountability mechanisms in the universities (Gürüz, 2011; Neave, 2003; Rüegg, 2004c). Neave (2003) asserts that as part of the nationalization and hence as part of the nationalization of higher education as a state's service, the "referential community", "the community to which the individual university should be answerable", was different in mainland Europe than in the United Kingdom (UK) or in the United States of America (U.S.) (p. 145). In mainland Europe, the referential community was not regional or local, but national.

Henceforth, the ministerial administrators called *Kanzler* in Germany and *Secrétaire Général* in France became the decisive mechanisms for the construction of higher education (Rüegg, 2004c) and held responsibility over the procedural matters such as access to the university, curriculum planning, and examinations through the national legislations (Neave, 2003), leading to the academic, educational, and political dependencies in the governance on the side of the universities (Gerbod, 2004) and also "nationally standardized procedures" (Neave, 2003, p. 146). For instance, these state-controlled ministerial administrations were influential on the recruitment of faculty members and so had a control over education and research, which, according to Gerbod (2004), was a form of "academic dependence" (p. 90). Additionally, most universities were circumscribed by state interventions in their pedagogical independence (Gerbod, 2004). To quote a few examples, in Hungary, Spain, Germany, and Belgium, the regulations for the courses taught and course contents and examinations were common. In France, teaching was defined with the uniform legal framework of the central administration based on the principle of "legal homogeneity" (Neave, 2003, p. 144).

The intimate ties with the state also intensified the political dependency of the universities, thus, political deviances against the governments were taken under control via strict supervision, sanctions, and purges, which were legitimized with legislations, especially in the form of interventions in the content of the founding charters, yet with an emphasis on the freedom of teaching and learning (Gerbod, 2004). In other words, the transition to the state based on the rule of law changed the nature of authority exercised over the universities in most countries of Europe (de Groof et al., 1998). To Gerbod (2004), the main motive behind these three forms of dependencies was to hamper the contribution of higher education institutions to the disorder in the society. From another perspective, legislations were the instruments of the state, the “guardians” of the university, in protecting the freedom of teaching and learning and conducting research and in safeguarding against the manipulations of different interest groups (Enders et al., 2013, p. 7; Neave, 2003, p. 145). For instance, state protection as a public institution provided universities with modern buildings, laboratories, promoted the teaching quality, gave the academicians space for research, and employment security to its citizens, signaling the transition to the idea of the welfare state, for “the loyalty of citizens became something that had to be *won* by modern states: invariably this involved a claim by the state to be legitimate because it reflected and/or represented the views and interests of its citizens.” (Held, 1995, pp. 48-49, emphasis in original).

The welfare state

Yet, one important consequence of this transition to the welfare state in the twentieth century was, Rüegg (2004c) states, the “professionalization of university careers” on the European Continent, during which the role of teachers as one of the members of the university changed to “civil servants” of the state bureaucracy (p. 7).

The universities and the teachers were ascribed to the role of training the workforce for the growing needs of the emerging nation-states. As the state held the right to confer diplomas, the universities were filled with high numbers of students, whose aim was to gain a diploma for public sector employment, which, in return, discouraged the establishment of private higher education institutions while encouraging the establishment of state-initiated private higher education institutions (Wissema, 2009). Setting up of financially privileged elite specialized institutions by the state such as grandes écoles as in France could be given as an example to this. I would argue that, that professionalization during the modernization process of the state and the higher education institutions could be, then, linked to the Weberian Bureaucratic theory and his conception of rationalization as a process of modern society. According to the Weberian tradition, “normative appeal of rational-legal authority in modern life” (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, p. 707) and the very fact that “the primary source of the superiority of bureaucratic administration lies in the role of technical knowledge” may dominate societies so that professional roles are not subservient to the will of the interest groups (Weber, 1978, p. 223). In such legal authority, in Weber’s terms,

submission does not rest upon the belief and devotion to charismatically gifted persons, prophets and heroes, or upon sacred tradition, or upon piety toward a personal lord and master who is defined by an ordered tradition, or upon piety toward the possible incumbents of office fiefs and office prebends who are legitimized in their own right through privilege and conferment. Rather, submission under legal authority is based upon an *impersonal* bond to the generally defined and functional ‘duty of office.’ The official duty-like the corresponding right to exercise authority: the ‘jurisdictional competency’- is fixed by *rationally established* norms, by enactments, decrees, and regulations, in such a manner that the legitimacy of the authority becomes the legality of the general rule, which is purposely thought out, enacted, and announced with formal correctness. (Max Weber in Gerth & Mills, 1958, para.3, emphasis in original)

The rule of law, then, as the main instrument for regulating the universities also defined the nature and boundaries of the autonomy, which were previously defined by the guild of professors. The application of it was ensured by “government civil servants” or “intermediaries”, who were titled, for example, “curator” in Germany and Russia (Gerbod, 2004, p. 97). Yet, in the absence of these supervisory authorities, the rectors were responsible for acting in the interests of the institutions and for preventing the violations to the rule of law. However, Gerbod (2004) argues, the application of the legislations within the universities varied throughout Europe. As a case in point, although the total autonomy of the universities was not acceptable, rooted in their medieval traditions, the professors in university councils played an important role in the protection of autonomy and self-governance. On the other hand, governance by university councils led to what De Groof et al. (1998) calls “bi-cephalous control”, meaning a dualism between self-governance and top-down state bureaucracy (p. 18).

Modes of governance

To be more specific, there was a power struggle between the guild of professors and government officials (Clark, 1983). While the professors were the central decision-making mechanisms within the universities and exercised strong collegial control over the faculties by, for example, electing “amateur” deans and rectors on a short time basis, the Ministries of Public Education could intervene in the appointments of chair holders; however, there were variations from one state to another (p. 126). And that combination of state bureaucracy and academia, in Clark’s (1983) terms “academic oligarchy”, formed what he called the Continental European mode of governance (p. 126). That being said, according to Olsen (2007), even though the universities were financially dependent on the states and also were bound

by the procedural matters discussed above, they could still set their normative principles, for, as Clark (1983) discusses, there was not a strong mechanism between the external power and the internal power such as stronger rectors or presidents at the enterprise level and as stronger deanships at the faculty level. Considering that the states intended to protect the autonomy of the universities by allowing them to set their normative principles (Enders et al., 2013; Olsen, 2007), one could argue that power holders, in the aforementioned cases, misused their positions in the absence of a balancing power between the bottom-up and top-down authorities although that was one of the main purposes behind the initiation of the legislations.

On the contrary, in the UK, where the structure of higher education had been organized as federations of colleges in the medieval period based on the Paris model, the universities and colleges enjoyed greater degrees of autonomy until after the post-World War II period (Clark, 1983). As they were not placed under the Ministries of Public Education and were not assigned the role of training as in the continental Europe, the guilds of professors who formed the court, the highest policymaking organ with two councils – the “supreme body” and the “legislative body”, had strong power in the relations with the intermediaries called “chancellor” for Oxford and Cambridge and “visitor” for the Scottish universities (Gerbod, 2004, p. 119). The “trustee authority” in the form of chancellorship appointed by the supreme body and the “administrative authority” in the form of vice-chancellorship appointed by the legislative body and was not necessarily an academic constituted what Clark (1983) called the British Mode of governance (p. 128). Yet, in contrast to the Continental European mode of governance, the power struggle was not between the guilds of professors and the external authorities, but within the guilds of professors, and that was regarded as a weakness by government, leading to the

remolding of the line of authority starting from the 1960s with the formation of strong central forms of authority. This kind of weakness also led to some earlier deviations from the British mode of governance. The Universities (Scottish) Act of 1858, for instance, introduced a variant of the British mode, which came to be called as the Scottish Model, and also new type of actors into the British style of authority distribution (Austin & Jones, 2016). After the enactment of the Act, the court at each university was headed by a rector and was formed mostly of laypersons with strong powers, marking an important shift in the balance of power between the guilds of professors and the external authorities. According to Austin and Jones (2016), such power sharing led to “bicameralism in university governance” (p. 35). That is, as Carter and Withrington (1992) states “government had both a right and a duty to meddle in the universities” (p. 7), which was the opposite of the Oxford and Cambridge tradition, which today is also called as the Oxbridge Model.

Similar to the Scottish Model, the American mode of governance as named by Clark (1983) was a combination of the trusteeship authority, the administrative authority, and the faculty authority, yet the distinctive characteristic of this type of authority distribution was the weaker faculty authority (McLendon, 2003). One contributing factor for such distribution was that the first colleges were founded by the Protestant immigrants during the colonial period, and so were modeled on the roots of the governance model of the Geneva Academy (Cowley & Williams, 1991; Gürüz, 2011). Also, following the colonial period and the foundation of the United States (f. 1776), three historic events influenced the system governance of U.S. higher education (McLendon, 2003). First, state involvement in higher education through the establishment of a federalist system was encouraged by the U.S. Constitution. Second, high numbers of state colleges and universities were founded

as the emerging nation-states sought to have educated citizens. In line with this, in the eighteenth century, as Scott (2006) observes, “democratization” or “service to the individual of the nation-state” mission was promoted (p. 4). According to Green (1990), state formation process in the U.S. as in Europe was the main driver behind the intense formation of the systems of higher education. The third important historic event in the development of the U.S. higher education was the Supreme Court’s “Dartmouth College v. Woodward decision” of 1819, which prohibited the state of New Hampshire from intervening in the formation of the board of trustees and appointing public representatives, establishing the independency of private higher education sector (McLendon, 2003, p. 63). Yet, the decision spawned many reactions over autonomy and authority in U.S. higher education, which led some states, the first of which was in 1850 by the state of Michigan for the University of Michigan, to grant constitutional autonomy to their universities, affirming their self-regulating authority. During the period prior to World War II, described by Thelin (1982) as “false starts and forgotten experiments” (as cited in McLendon, 2003, p. 63), the most common system governance pattern in public higher education was one of lay boards of trustees exercising policy at the campus level free from formal regulatory systems (Gür, 2016; McLendon, Deaton, & Hearn, 2007). That is, system governance of higher education institutions was a cause for concern in most states in the United States as in Europe, against which, the literature suggests, states fought back after the post-World War II period, starting from the 1950s.

Post-World War II period and state intervention

One reason for expansion in state intervention was the explosion in the student enrollments, the financial constraints (Wissema, 2009), and the growing social problem of over-education, “the diploma disease” (Baker, 2009, p. 167). As

stated before, the welfare states guaranteed employment to their citizens to gain their loyalty; hence, providing their citizens with the same opportunities became one of their main concerns during the post-war period (Esping-Andersen, 1990). That concern was accompanied by extensive policymaking in mainland Europe, the UK, and U.S. through restructuring of institutions that were central to the social planning and knowledge production of the states, and this type of policymaking was referred to as “the development of evaluation” (Wollman, 2006, para.1) and the welfare states came to be called “the interventionist welfare states” (Simons, Olssen, & Peters, 2009, p. 6), though the degree and the nature of intervention varied from one nation to another. In the British mode of governance, for instance, as the lack of an organized system at national or provincial level was seen as a weakness because of the strong collegial control over higher education matters, starting from the mid-1960s, higher education institutions were organized into a national system as in the setting up of the Ministries of Public Education in the Continental European mode of governance. The Department of Education and Science (DES), which was formed of graduates of top universities, increased the central authority while decreasing collegial authority, leading to the nationally standardized procedures, for example, in admissions, pay scales, academic and administrative matters (Rhoades, 1983). Clark (1983) states that prior to the post-war period, professors had control over the University Grants Committee (UGC), which was the main financial source of the higher education institutions. Yet, following the war, being relocated within the government, the UGC started reporting to the DES and had more staff. Finally, national higher education policies were incorporated into the legislature, all of which changed the power struggle from within the institutions to struggle with state powers. Despite these changes, based on his comparative study of U.S., British, Swiss, and

French higher education institutions, Rhoades (1983) argues, the external authorities were strengthened in the system governance, so was the accountability of the internal powers, yet lay access to policymaking remained minimal and collegial governance still went on. In other words, as opposed to the decentralized character of the system, the system did not encourage the involvement of external powers in the governance. Actually, the increase in the central governmental authority and collegial authority seemed to be directly proportional.

In contrary to the creation of a national system of higher education in the UK, the system governance of higher education in the U.S. was not nationalized, but it remained at the state level and during this period, state intervention in the formation of governance models was high (Bowen, Bracco, Callan, Finney, Richardson, & Trombley, 1997; Glenny, 1985; McLendon et al., 2007). In order to increase the efficiency of the governance of higher education institutions, two new models were formed: consolidated governing boards and statewide governing boards. In other words, the balance of power shifted from campuses to state governments, characterizing rationalization and hierarchy in the system governance of U.S. higher education (McLendon et al., 2007). In Europe, bureaucratization and rationalization in the system governance of higher education institutions intensified as universities depended on state funding, in return, they became more subjected to state regulation (Halsey, 2011; Wissema, 2009). Thus, combined with the growing complexity of the system, professional managers such as “civil servants, politicians or corporate managers” were appointed to the administrative positions (Wissema, 2009, p. 18), leading to more state control over the governance of the institutions. One important triggering force of state interventions and intervention by policymaking was the change in the nature of the knowledge that evolved with the impact of the Industrial

Revolution. According to Delanty (2003), the knowledge society from the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century was “professional society” of the industrial society, which grew with the professionalization of careers, led to expansion in the middle-class professions, and was supported with welfare-state reforms (p. 72). Yet, starting from the 1950s, the professional society of the industrial society evolved into a post-industrial society, as Bell (1973) argues in his book *The Coming of the Post-Industrial Age: A Venture in Social Forecasting*. To him, knowledge was the key factor of production and theoretical knowledge or the knowledge of professionals was what made advanced industrial societies distinctive, for its application through science was crucial for economic development and its use for social planning was important for better management of social planning in welfare states. According to Bell (1973),

knowledge is that which is objectively known, an *intellectual property*, attached to a name or group of names and certified by copyright, or some other form of social recognition (e.g. publication). This knowledge is paid for in the time spent in writing and research; in the monetary compensation by the communication and educational media. It is subject to a judgement by the market, by administrative or political decisions of superiors, or by the peers as the worth of the result, and as to its claim on social resources, where such claims are made. In this sense, knowledge is part of the social overhead investment of society, it is a coherent statement, presented in a book, article, or even a computer program, written down or recorded at some point for transmission, and subject to some rough count. (p. 176)

That is, the Enlightenment’s knowledge based on “the man of learning” began to be viewed as technical and scientific knowledge and higher education had a central role in the production of this type of knowledge (Delanty, 2003, p. 72).

Based on the above-mentioned literature, it could be stated that this period was one of defining the roles, functions, and responsibilities of the universities pursuant to the process of state formation around the globe, so was one of reconfiguring the system governance of higher education institutions. It could be

then further stated that the locus for continuous change in the balance of power between the external powers and internal powers in the higher education institutions lied within the social, political, and economic conditions of mainland Europe, the UK, and the U.S. during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the approach of Giddens (1987), “a nation-state is . . . a bordered power container . . . , the pre-eminent power container of the modern era.” (p. 120), so in this state formation process, considering the power shifts between the powers, I think, it seems that the system governance of higher education institutions was a power container without borders, which needed to be controlled by the state powers.

2.1.1.3 Rhetorics from 1980s onwards

For the welfare state of the post-World War II period, higher education was a public good and there was a “social compact” between higher education, state, and nation (Enders et al., 2013, p. 7). There was a “direct connection between the larger societal crises and that in higher education. Universities were central to projects of both the ‘welfare state’ and the ‘developmental state’ during the decades after the World War II” (Calhoun, 2011, p. 15). Yet, the financial crisis of the 1970s when combined with the policymakers’ attempts to “decommodify” economic activities and with the changing social and economic conditions led to the transition from localized national economic activities towards global free trade and markets (Cerny, 1999, p. 10).

Concomitantly, the massification or in Trow’s terms (1970, 1973) the transition from elite to mass higher education process in higher education which had been encouraged by the welfare state came under scrutiny of the state due to increasing student costs, and what followed was budget tightening, increasing government regulation, and more bureaucratic involvement in the system governance

of higher education (Tilak, 2006). One could state that the nature of the state intervention to the massification process, which had a focus of extensive policymaking starting from the 1960s, was different during this period. It was not for the concern of employment promise to citizens as was prior to the 1980s, but for the concern of integrating market forces into higher education, marking the beginning of a new period in the nature of the power wielded over higher education systems, putting the way how they were governed into question. With the unveiling of neoliberal values and policies in the 1980s, for instance, they were further challenged by marketization, leading up to the introduction of private sector management principles (Engwall & Wearie, 2008). By the late 1980s, the rise of neo-liberalism as “a political project” and the advent of knowledge-based economy (Robertson, 2009, p. 26) culminated into the idea of, in Clark’s (1998) view, the “entrepreneurial university”. That is, it might be said that their medieval mission of “pursuit of truth” was once more challenged as this time they were directly involved with the needs of the markets, and so their governance mattered not only at the national level, but also at the international level. There seemed to be a move from closed state ideology with higher education to a more open one. Peters (2007) argues similar patterns within a number of countries:

First, a transparent alignment of the university system to reflect the needs of an emerging ‘post-industrial’ economy, with increasing demands for highly trained, multi-skilled, tertiary educated workers. Second, the introduction of new forms of corporate managerialism and the emulation of private sector management styles Third, the introduction of corporate or strategic planning and the move to institute a form of ‘ownership monitoring’ in order, allegedly, to reduce the financial risk of the State. Fourth, under neo-liberalism, there was an attack on faculty representation in university governance and the general attempt to discredit democratic forms of university governance on ‘efficiency’ grounds. Finally, the introduction of user-charges, student loans, and the creeping privatization of the system as a whole took place in varying degrees in countries like New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. (Peters, 2007, p. 160)

According to Bleiklie and Kogan (2007), an analysis of the effects of these forces on a supranational level indicates a shift towards “a business model” (p. 481), integration of stakeholders in the system governance of higher education, and “macro steering mechanisms, through national funding systems, evaluation and accreditation regimes or legislation” on a global scale (p. 479). It could, then, be stated that there was a pluralization of external authorities in the system governance of higher education, in different forms but born of globalization, suggesting that there was a lot more behind the idea of the entrepreneurial university, which could be linked to the replacement of the welfare state with the “regulatory state” (King, 2007). Thus, what follows discusses the external powers surrounding the macro environment of systems of higher education, which have changed the relationship between higher education and the state inexorably, and also examines how this linking of higher education to multiple powers have shaped the system governance of higher education, which, one could argue, presents itself as the one of the keys to the understanding of the evolution of system governance models in the current context of higher education.

Globalization

The literature points out that there is no agreed definition of globalization, rather it is better to focus on the nature and implications of it (e.g. Dodds, 2008; Lauder, Brown, Dillabough, & Halsey, 2006). Two definitions of globalization, actually, provide support to the literature, for they represent the circular and continuously changing, either positively or negatively, character of globalization: Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton (1999), in their book *Global transformations: Politics, economics, and culture*, define globalization in terms of

a process (or a set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions - assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or inter-regional flows and networks of activity, interaction and the exercise of power. (p. 16)

According to Cerny (1999), globalization is “a process (or a complex set of processes) made up of the addition or cumulative results of denser relations among states (“internationalization”), denser relations cutting across states (“transnationalization”), and the interaction effects of the two with each other” (p. 3). Following these definitions, it might be stated that globalization includes multifarious boundless processes and borderless relations, which take different forms indifferent to the constraints of time and space, and thus remains contested, making processes and relations contested. Irrespective of its complexity, Lauder et al. (2006) state that it is a “useful heuristic tool” to understand the dynamics surrounding education (p. 31). Dodds (2008), for instance, based on her content analysis of the journal articles, states that although there are different understandings of globalization across academia such as globalization as “global flows and pressures, trends: marketisation, and ideology”, there is agreement about its effect on higher education institutions (pp. 507-509). However, she further argues that the role of higher education institutions in promoting global flows, pressures, and trends such as marketization needs attention and such consensus undermines its role in policies, processes, and relations, indicating involvement of multiple powers and multiple dynamics in the system governance of higher education institutions.

Multilateralism

Yet, the question to be raised is how these multiple powers and dynamics re-contextualize and restructure the system governance of higher education institutions. One way of it has been multilateralism, which is “an institutional form which

coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of ‘generalized’ principles of conduct” (Ruggie, 1992, p. 571). Generalized principles of conduct are formed around the principles of “indivisibility of interests” (e.g. peace and security) (p. 571) and “diffuse reciprocity” (i.e. not demanding equal benefits for each action) (Keohane, 1986 as cited in Ruggie, 1992, p. 571), and the durability of multilateral agencies depends on their loyalty to these principles (Ruggie, 1992). Their past dates back to the modern era, first forms of which were established to overcome the problems over territorial sovereignty, for being a “bordered power container” was important for the states as discussed in the previous section (Giddens, 1987, p. 120). To exemplify, who would possess the world’s oceans was a problem back then, and that problem was solved with the setting up of multilateral organizations based on mutually agreeable rules (Ruggie, 1992). In Garrett Mattingly’s words, “by arrogating to themselves supreme power over men’s consciences, the new states had achieved absolute sovereignty. Having done so, they found they could only communicate with one another by tolerating within themselves little islands of alien sovereignty” (as cited in Ruggie, 1992, p. 576). That is to say, the functions of multilateralism before the twentieth century included solving collaboration and coordination problems. However, during the twentieth century, multilateral organizations took the form of “institutions”, meaning a shift from mutually agreeable rule making to rule making “in its own right” and a shift to a political order “capable of handling at least some collective tasks in an *ex ante* coordinated manner” (Ruggie, 1992, p. 584, emphasis in original). Such a shift pushed governments to promote these institutions’ policies, say, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations (UN), the important actors of global governance after the post-World War II period.

Their interest in the policymaking focused on the national development and modernization of developing nations succeeded in the Western societies, thus, through aid programs and the welfare states, they spread their policies. Mundy (1998) defines this process as “redistributive multilateralism” (p. 452) and marks the period between 1945 and 1965 as the start of educational multilateralism. During this period, for example, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was founded in 1947 as a specialized European Union (UN) agency and aimed to function as a “regulatory or norm-setting body” and “a provider of services and programs to member states” (Mundy, 1998, p. 456). Also, in 1961, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OECC) was changed to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2017). Starting with the 1970s, this rights-based aid-focused order of educational multilateral institutions has been displaced and replaced by globalization and neo-liberalism, which emphasize financial deregulation, privatization, decreased state intervention, and free trade and markets, for “the freer the market, the more the market will be self-correcting and self-regulating” (Cerny, 2014, p. 12).

The New Public Management

With the spread of neo-liberal approaches, by the end of 1980s, there was the rise of New Public Management (NPM), which emerged as a public sector reform in the government of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and aimed to reduce the public sector expansion that started with the welfare state (Ferlie et al., 2009).⁷ Vested in the neo-liberalism, the reform was given birth in the UK, but its impact has been beyond the UK. As knowledge and innovation were considered central to economic development and there was a concern to transfer public sector management

⁷ Hood (1991) coined the term New Public Management to refer to these managerial reforms.

structures from the private sector, systems of higher education were reconfigured to increase the “productivity, efficiency, and relevance” of academic work (Bleiklie, Enders, Lepori, & Musselin, 2010, p. 1). To illustrate, university leaders took on managerial roles and in order to increase “the executive leadership” in universities while decreasing the power of collegial governance, “managerial instruments (strategic plans, audits, etc.), [and] tools (management software for instance)” were introduced (Ferlie et al., 2009, p. 8). Although the impact of the reforms and the implementation of them varied from one country to another, among the common instruments of the NPM were performance based funding allocation and the creation of the intermediary bodies such as accreditation and quality assurance agencies.

That is to say, the role of the state in providing and funding higher education was redefined with these reforms and the state took an active role in transforming the development of higher education by treating higher education as other publicly funded services (e.g. health care) (Ferlie et al., 2009). This type of direct control was referred to as the rise of the “evaluative state” (Neave, 1988) particularly in continental European systems, meaning a shift towards “a *posteriori* [external] evaluation” (p. 9, emphasis in original), a “shift from process control to product control as a way of ‘steering’ higher education towards ‘national priorities’” (p. 10). In some countries (e.g. Portugal), new private institutions were established and in others (e.g. UK), there were serious cuts in public funding, resulting in a decrease in the number of academic positions (e.g. Germany) despite the ongoing massification of higher education.

In the early 1990s, Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) book, *Reinventing Government*, promoted a shift to “entrepreneurial government” using the metaphor “steering” from “rowing” as “those who steer the boat have far more power over its

destination than those who row it” (p. 32). That is to say, the state should take on a more strategic view in the controlling and planning rather than focusing on doing things. In the late 1990s, to mitigate the effects of neo-liberal approaches, the second wave of NPM reform, also referred to as post NPM, was introduced in Australia and New Zealand, and then has become widely around the world (Christensen, 2010). To exemplify, the NPM

tends towards universality in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, in much of Eastern Europe and Asia, and in parts of the developing world where reforms in higher education are often generated in World Bank loans-financed programmes. In developed nations and the relatively robust policy systems of emerging nations such as China, Singapore and Malaysia, the reforms are often motivated by desires for global competitiveness but generated from within the nation. The new public management has been applied less completely in Western Europe and North America. But it has influence everywhere. (Marginson & van der Wende, 2007, p. 9)

With the new reforms, Christensen (2010) notes, the state control has increased and “cross-sectoral collaboration and coordination” has been incorporated into the public sector management (p. 504). The changes in steering in the 1990s were also referred to as the rise of the evaluative state (Neave, 1998) or “remote steering at a distance” or “regulatory state” (King, 2007, p. 415), which could be said to imply less state intervention yet increase in *posteriori* evaluation and accountability. However, although there were commonalities about higher education-state-market relationships across the globe, it is important to note that the path dependencies differed from one context to another. For instance, King (2007) states that while the regulatory state bringing in the idea of “remote steering at a distance” was considered more appropriate in Continental universities, in Anglo-Saxon countries there was a move from “autonomy and self- to more state-regulation” (p. 416), that is, in Anglo-Saxon countries, state regulation was regarded as more intrusive. Within the political science discourse, in the 1990s, this shift to

collaboration with other sectors was referred to as “hollowing out of the traditional nation state” meaning a shift to the involvement of multiple powers in the implementation of public policies, where the state “had to steer through contract, alliance building and partnership and persuasion rather than hierarchy” (Ferlie et al., 2009, p. 336). And such multi-level governance was called network governance.

The knowledge-based economy

Rizvi and Lingard (2006) state that the OECD, with its report titled *The Knowledge Based Economy*, has been influential in promoting the concept of knowledge-based economy and the role of education, research, and innovation in it. The report published in 1996 defined knowledge-based economies as “economies which are directly based on the production, distribution and use of knowledge and information” and stated “the configuration of *national innovation systems*, which consist of the flows and relationships among industry, government and academia in the development of science and technology, is an important economic determinant” (OECD, 1996, p. 7, emphasis in original).⁸

One line of critique to the knowledge-based economy is that its focus on the economic value of the knowledge undermines “social-justice and social-democratic purposes of education” (Rizvi & Lingard, 2006, p. 253) and with such focus, knowledge becomes “no longer a public good available to all”, but becomes the responsibility of the individual (Kenway, 2006, p. 57). A second line of critique to the knowledge-based economy could be linked to Lyotard’s (1984) concept of “performativity”, in which the value of knowledge is taken over by performance measures and reduced to competitiveness. To exemplify, *Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators*, published annually, collects comparative data from the member

⁸ The report is available at <https://www.oecd.org/sti/sci-tech/1913021.pdf>

countries and the partner countries and aims to assist governments in their national policymaking and to promote public accountability of educational systems (OECD, 2017). Rizvi and Lingard (2006) call this type of international comparison as “global rationalization”, for countries’ relation to other educational systems depend on the assessment of the quality of “human capital” through standardized measurements (p. 257). Another example of the way in which indicators are used to produce international comparison is the World Bank’s *Knowledge Assessment Methodology* (KAM) benchmarking tool. The KAM is “a user-friendly interactive Internet-based tool that provides a basic assessment of countries’ and regions’ readiness for the knowledge economy”, which is based on four pillars: “(1) economic incentive and institutional regime, (2) educated and skilled workers, (3) effective innovation system of firms, research centers, universities, consultants, and other organizations, (4) modern and adequate information infrastructure” (World Bank, 2006, pp. 1, 4). Robertson (2009) argues that the tool serves the interests of the developed economies and education gains value as long as it contributes to the production of relevant workforce such as engineers and scientists, making education a subservient to the economy. Some researchers refer to such type of policymaking based on international comparison as “governing by numbers” (Ball, 2010; Rose, 1999), which could be traced back to *Governance in Transition: Public Management Reforms in OECD Countries* (OECD, 1995) report, in which the OECD urged governments to change their governance structures. The report states the reasons behind the call for this shift as follows: “Global transformations, caused by, among other things, developments in technology, communications and trade, demand new abilities. Flexibility and nimbleness have become key objectives. Inherited forms of governance appear outmoded and inflexible” (OECD, 1995, p. 21). Considering the

tone in the report, by urging the member countries to follow the new governance principles such as strategic planning, effectiveness, efficiency, performativity, accountability, and competition, Rizvi and Lingard (2006) argue, the OECD has contributed educational institutions to become similar in their structures and practices and educational systems to focus on centralized policymaking and devolution of responsibility. This is referred to as institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), which could be said to be driven by “a convergence of governance” around policymaking (Ball, 2010, p. 134). That is to say, new governance principles tied to knowledge-based economy, blurring the lines between public and private sectors, have led multiple powers with different interests to converge around policymaking with the goal of, in Ball’s (2010) terms, “governing knowledges” (p. 134). Considering the shift to rule making “in its own right” and being “capable of handling at least some collective tasks in an *ex ante* coordinated manner” (Ruggie, 1992, p. 584, emphasis in original), it could be then pointed out that multilateral institutions might not just act as policy advocates, but they might also act in their own right as political actors.

Ball (2010) argues that such convergence of powers have led public higher education institutions to be “enterprised” and “hybridised” (p. 134). That is, the OECD’s call has promoted the corporate managerialism as the new governance mode of educational institutions, and so encouraged privatization as a way of managing educational institutions. For instance, Bleiklie and Kogan (2007) state, two new knowledge regimes have emerged in higher education. The first is an “academic capitalist regime”, which takes its power from intimate relations between universities and industries and is led by marketization (p. 488). This could also be referred to as “academic capitalism” (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). On the other hand, Bleiklie and

Kogan (2007) argue, as most higher education institutions are dependent on public funding, the shift to knowledge-based economy seems not to yield much dispute over industry funding, for universities and academics have started to generate revenue from their core functions such as teaching and research due to the funding constraints and this is what Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) call “academic capitalist knowledge/learning/consumption regime” (p. 37). The second new knowledge regime is “public managerialist regime”, which is driven by the engagement of higher education institutions with industry and quasi-market mechanisms, which emphasize competitiveness and cost-efficiency (Bleiklie & Kogan, 2007, p. 488).

Transnational higher education

One multilateral agreement that has encouraged the introduction of quasi-markets into higher education is the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The agreement was signed in 1994 and aimed at liberalizing regulatory conditions of trading in services (Robertson, Bonal, & Dale, 2002). By providing a framework, it sets the policies related to markets in higher education and it is up to the countries to subscribe the agreement and to decide, if they subscribe, the extent to which they open up their systems to other countries (Marginson & van der Wende, 2007). The agreement has encouraged the internationalization of higher education by promoting cross-border mobility (Altbach, 2007), that is to say, higher education has been defined as a “commodity” in the free-trade context and commercial forces have gained power over systems of higher education (Altbach & Knight, 2007, p. 291; Altbach, 2015). One result of defining higher education in the market terms has been, Marginson (2006) argues, the emergence of “global university hierarchy” (p. 904). Since the advent of international rankings in 2003, - examples include the Academic Ranking of World

Universities (ARWU) by Shanghai Jiao Tong University, the QS World University Rankings, and the Times Higher Education World University Ranking - cross-border comparison has been an important concern of external authorities and building world-class universities have been a vital part of their national policymaking (Wang, Cheng, & Liu, 2013). To exemplify, international advisory councils (IAC), “advisory bodies formed primarily or exclusively by international members, external to the institutions, serving the upper levels of the administration and governance”, have been formed in different parts of the world such as France, China, the Russian Federation, Germany, and Saudi Arabia in the pursuit of being a world-class university and helped higher education institutions to “benchmark” themselves in relation to other best practices (Altbachi, Mihut, & Salmi, 2016, p. 14). Higher education institutions have formed these councils at their will or with a mandate in return for their added funds.

The emphasis on cross-border comparison and cross-border mobility has put pressures on the system governance of higher education institutions. One form of cross-border initiatives has been transnational higher education (TNHE) and defined as “any education delivered by an institution based in one country to students located in another” (Yang, 2008, p. 272). Some TNHE initiatives are joint programs, twinning programs, distance learning, and education hubs. Education hubs are formed through the establishment of branch campuses, which are then organized into hubs. For instance, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Singapore have invested in the development of education hubs and made these hubs a part of their national development strategy in order to generate regional capacity in higher education (Mok, 2011). Regulatory quality assurance mechanisms have been developed and corporatization have been embedded in the system governance of higher education

institutions. Public higher education institutions have been required to develop self-promoting funding programs or to engage in activities with their overseas partners for income generation. According to Mok (2011), it is not enough to engage in cross-border cooperation via regulatory quality assurance mechanisms and corporatization as TNHE may create funding scarcity and imbalance between opportunities provided to partners and hosts. That is to say, coordination problems between transnational initiatives and national higher education systems might in turn yield disparity in system governance of national higher education systems. To exemplify, Dobbins and Knill (2017) analyze national higher education systems in France, Germany, and Italy in their relation to transnational pressures such as international rankings and benchmarking and cultural, historical, national legacies. They state that the Bologna Process, signed in 1999, have challenged national higher education systems through a “highly stakeholder-oriented model” of transnational soft governance mode, which uses voluntary mechanisms and soft power rather than coercion and command in the promotion of similar policies (Dobbins & Knill, 2017, p. 68). Their analysis of the interaction between country-specific national higher education systems and transnational pressures show a mixed pattern of convergence and divergence around transnational pressures. The countries show increased similarity in the areas where there are stronger transnational pressures such as incorporation of a stakeholder-oriented model into the system governance. It could be argued that soft modes of regulation lead to institutional isomorphism as the governance arrangements across countries are less similar regarding personnel issues, which could be also due to their relevance to other issues such as civil service law. Dobbins and Knill (2017) further note that the national capacity of a country to embrace challenges strongly influences the degree of change in response to transnational pressures.

Noori and Anderson (2013) also state that little attention is paid to local context and conditions when transnational initiatives are exported. In the Persian Gulf region, one transnational initiative has been the establishment of American-style higher education institutions. These institutions are accredited by U.S. accreditation agencies, and are required to adhere to a particular set of organizational and cultural scripts specified by the agencies. This type of exporting one particular type of institution into a culturally and politically different context via transnational governance structures such as accreditation practices, though, has pushed higher education institutions to straddle the line between local authorities such as ministries of education and quality assurance organizations and other external authorities such as external accrediting agencies, creating a dispersed line of authority over the system governance of higher education institutions (Noori & Anderson, 2013).

Higher education regionalism

In addition to the complexities added to the system governance through the proliferation of transnational initiatives, countries have also joined forces at a regional level in promoting their international competitiveness through cross-border mobility. The OECD by setting agendas and UNESCO by organizing congresses and forums on higher education have played an active role in the restructuring of higher education on a global “scale” (Verger & Hermo, 2010, p. 106). It is important to note that regional level co-operation in higher education has developed irrespective of the GATS although the GATS holds greater power to impact higher education on a larger scale. According to Verger and Hermo (2010), the two reasons behind countries’ engagement in regional co-operation are either their unwillingness to open up their higher education services at the WTO level or the GATS’ slow action.

Two examples of co-operation through regional level in higher education are the Bologna Process in Europe and the MERCOSUR-Educativo in South America (Chou & Ravinet, 2017; Jayasuriya & Robertson, 2010; Verger & Hermo, 2010), and the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in South-East Asia is also stated as a “regional collaborative framework” (Mok, 2011, p. 14). Despite regional diversity, what is notable about these regional level developments is the emergence of regional governance and new modes of regional governance. Jayasuriya and Robertson (2010) explain this shift to regional governance using the notion of “rescaling” as external powers, that is, “political and economic actors”, have re-contextualized and re-constructed governance of higher education outside the national boundaries (p. 1). For instance, Dobbins and Leišyte (2014) state that the Bologna process, launched in 1999 by the Ministers of Education of 29 European countries with the goal of creating a common higher education area and market, focused on promoting “mobility, transparency, and labor market qualification and the harmonization of the overarching architecture of European HE [higher education]” (p. 989). Having analyzed the transformation of higher education governance in two eastern European countries, Bulgaria and Lithuania, Dobbins and Leišyte (2014) argue that the process has given legitimization to national reforms and the state has taken a more entrepreneurial approach to system governance of higher education institutions. The change in approach to system governance has led to “a new form of steering in which the state relinquished substantive, procedural and bureaucratic control, and instead became engaged in pro-active, result-oriented, and accountability-based governance” (p. 1004). Jayasuriya (2008) uses the concept of “regulatory regionalism” to explain such changes in modes of regional governance, which is an “approach [that] emphasizes the constitution of broad regional regulatory

projects within the institutional spaces of the state” (Jayasuriya & Robertson, 2010, p. 3). Taking a transnational lens, the process requires the involvement of “multi-level systems of regulation” such as local and regional regulatory bodies and regional partners, where policy networks are created through “regulatory webs” and regional regulatory projects are generated to be implemented by the regulatory state within the national boundaries (Jayasuriya & Robertson, 2010, p. 3).

Blending of the global, local, national, and international

One could argue that the multi-level and multi-actor world of system governance of higher education institutions have led to the studies which call for the blending of global, local, and national contexts in higher education in a globalized age. Actually, the relationship between the global and the local has usually been explained with two opposing theories: While convergence theory explains the globalization’s effects on the local level with the homogeneity of institutions or with institutional isomorphism (e.g. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) resulting from “top-down” processes, divergence theory puts an emphasis on the heterogeneity at the local level driving from “bottom-up processes” such as “interpretation” and “resistance” triggered by interactions with institutions from different contexts (Vaira, 2004, p. 484). On the other hand, other studies have argued for a blending of these two opposing forces to understand the effects and outcomes of globalization. “Glocalization” has been used in the social theory of globalization to argue that “homogenization” and “heterogenization” tendencies are “mutually implicative”, that is, the outcome of local global relations is neither local nor global but “glocal” (Robertson, 1997, p. 27). According to Robertson (1997), homogenization and heterogenization are “complementary” and “interpenetrative” (p. 40) and nation-states, since the late nineteenth century, have provided a good example to that with

their “selective learning” process of “copying” ideas and practices from other societies, but incorporating them into their contexts in a variety of ways (p. 41). That is to say, the outcome of globalization, in this case, has been glocal. Beck and Sznaider (2006), arguing that the global, the local, the national, and the international cannot be understood as distinct opposing ends, put forward that it is necessary to move from a nation-state focused outlook to a cosmopolitan outlook to explain the redefinitions of the global, the local, the national, and the international, and so “the re-nationalization or re-ethnification of minds, cultures, and institutions (p. 5). In Beck and Sznaider’s (2006) view, “reflexive” and “internalized” cosmopolitanism (pp. 6, 9), “global awareness” of “forced mixing” of cultures, peoples, institutions opens up a space to question the existing borders and to draw new borders, hence to form the glocal (p. 10). The impact of “forced mixing” of borders has also been studied in higher education. Marginson and Rhoades (2002) developed a “glonacal agency heuristic” to shape comparative higher education research in the context of globalization and to understand the simultaneous interplay between global political, economic, cultural, and educational forces and local and national forces in their significant role in shaping national higher education systems. According to them, not only the extension of global forces to the local and national contexts, but also the extension of local actors and institutions to the international stage matters to understand today’s multi-faceted governance structure. Thus, “glonacal” refers to global, national, and local and “agency” refers to established agencies (e.g. World Bank, Ministries of Education, and higher education institutions) and collective human action (e.g. international associations, Committees of Rectors, professors, and administrators) at the global, national, or local level. Building on glonacal and agency, Marginson and Rhoades (2002, p. 305) argue that agencies and actions in

higher education operate along three “interconnected and interdependent” “planes” - global, national, and local - where national and local agencies and actions can also shape global patterns, for the interaction between the three levels depends on simultaneous flows, not on linear flows from the global to the local, which could be said to bear a similarity with Beck and Sznaider’s (2006, pp. 6, 9) “reflexive” and “internalized” cosmopolitanism and Robertson’s (1997, p. 27) “glocalization” in terms of the dynamic dialogue between the global and the local forces. As a case in point, the dynamics between the global and the local have recently been analyzed in the sixth Higher Education in the World (HEIW) Report, entitled *Towards a Socially Responsible University: Balancing the Global with the Local*, where UNESCO’s Higher Education Chief, P. J. Wells (2017) has defined “*glocal university* . . . [as] higher education institutions and systems that strive to address the demands of the local community within the context of an ever expanding global reality for the good of all humanity” (p. 32, emphasis in original). In the report, blending of the processes of globalization and localization has been emphasized to achieve the glocal purpose of “globally focused and locally engaged” and also to contribute to the meeting of the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals that came into effect in 2016 (Moreso and Casadesús, 2017, p. 201).⁹ Therefore, integration of “glocal engagement” in glocal governance of higher education institutions through building relations not only with local authorities, social agents, civic representatives, but also with global and regional networks has also been suggested (Grau, Escrigas, Goddard, Hall, Hazelkorn, & Tandon, 2017, p. 49), culminating into a multi-level system governance structure with multiple powers “above, across, as well as within, state boundaries” (Cerny, 1997, p. 253). Noori and Anderson (2013), as previously

⁹ The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is available here: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E

discussed, have argued that the proliferation of authorities has led higher education institutions to struggle between local authorities such as ministries of education and quality assurance organizations and other external authorities such as external accrediting agencies, resulting in a fragmented line of authority over the system governance of American-style higher education institutions in the Gulf. They have further argued that the overall governance structure in the Gulf could be explained with the “New Medievalism” due to the similarity with the fragmented lines of authority in the Middle Ages (p. 160). Within the context of the political science, Cerny (1998) has called this as neomedievalism and stated that it evokes “the image of . . . ‘Think globally, act locally’” or “glocalisation” (p. 47). In Cerny’s view (1998), neomedievalism helps to understand “the governance gap” created by multi-level governance structures as neomedieval structures are “multi-layered” and “asymmetric” (p. 49).

Summary of section 2.1.1

The literature review has delineated the external authorities to the system governance of higher education along with the historical continuum of the changes in higher education governance. It has shown that since the medieval times, there has been a power struggle between the external powers and the internal powers over the system governance of higher education. During the Medieval Ages (1100-1500), the student guilds of the University of Bologna and the professor guilds of the University of Paris were autonomous in the operation of the governance of the university. The issuing of the bulls and founding charters by the pope or emperor contributed to their autonomy, providing them with protection against outside interference. Yet, the issuing of the bulls and founding charters by the pope or emperor came with limits to the complete institutional autonomy of the medieval universities and the interests of

the founders were reflected in the universities, making the members of them dependent on another higher level of authority and open to external regulation. That is, prior to the organization of states, there was a relatively equivalent division of power between the multiple lines of authority – popes, emperors, kings, municipal authorities and the university, and such division of power gave the university authority in its own affairs, resulting in the emergence of collegial model of academic governance.

During the early modern period (1500-1800), the universities faced two major challenges to their authority, which one could describe as one of reshaping of universalist authority and weakening of status quo of the universities in the operation of the governance. The first wave of these challenges was related to the important ideological and religious movements - Humanism, Renaissance, Reformation, Scientific Revolution, and Enlightenment. Combined with the modernity of the Enlightenment, the development of new disciplines, the establishment of alternatives to the universities, the engagement of the laypersons in the decision-making and control of the universities, and the developing concepts for the structure and organization of the church and the state in the Reformation institutions gave way to the emerging nation-states and to the proliferation of lines of authority. However, as the developing state took a loose centralization view and as the universities were attributed to service to the state mission, they still had a certain measure of independence.

The period from 19th century to 1980s was one of defining the roles, functions, and responsibilities of the universities pursuant to the process of state formation around the globe, so was one of reconfiguring the system governance of higher education institutions. In Europe, modernization of the university was directly

involved with the modernization of the state. In France, Université de France and in Germany, the University of Berlin were established. By placing the universities under the Ministries of Public Education, the state became a potent actor in the governance of public higher education in most countries of Europe and by placing the universities within the public domain, the state took steps in setting the accountability mechanisms in the universities. State protection as a public institution provided universities with modern buildings, laboratories, promoted the teaching quality, gave the teachers space for research, and employment security to its citizens, signaling the transition to the idea of the welfare state. Combination of state bureaucracy and academia formed the Continental European mode of governance, and as the state's roles were questioned and formulated, so were universities, leading to the emergence of distinct patterns in the system governance of higher education. In the UK, the British mode of governance and the Scottish model, and in the U.S., the American mode of governance arose. During the post-World War II period, the explosion in the student enrollments and the financial constraints led to expansion in state intervention. As the welfare states guaranteed employment to their citizens to gain their loyalty, that concern was accompanied by extensive policymaking in Europe, the UK, and U.S. through restructuring of institutions that were central to the social planning and knowledge production of the states. However, the degree and the nature of state intervention varied from nation to another. Broadly speaking, during this period, the locus for continuous change in the balance of power between the external powers and internal powers in the higher education institutions lied within the social, political, and ideological conditions of continental Europe, the UK, and the U.S. during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In the 1980s, the nature of the state intervention to the massification process, which had a focus of extensive policymaking starting from the 1960s, was different during this period. With the impact of the financial crisis of the 1970s, the concern of integrating market forces into higher education marked the beginning of a new period in the nature of the power wielded over higher education systems, putting the way how they were governed into question. By the late 1980s, with the unveiling of neoliberal values and policies and with the advent of knowledge-based economy, universities were challenged by massification, marketization, and private sector management principles. There was a pluralization of external authorities in the system governance of higher education, in different forms but born out of globalization. The external powers surrounding the macro environment of systems of higher education – e.g. multilateral institutions, transnational initiatives, regional level agreements - have changed the relationship between higher education and the state inexorably, and this linking of higher education to multiple powers have re-contextualized the system governance of higher education. New modes of governance such as corporate managerialism, network governance, transnational governance, and regional governance have emerged. The multi-level and multi-actor world of system governance of higher education institutions have led to the studies which call for the blending of global, local, and national contexts in higher education in a globalized age. Blending of the processes of globalization and localization has been discussed to achieve the glocal governance in the system governance of higher education institutions. New medievalism or neomedievalism has been used to provide an explanation to the fragmented lines of authority and the governance structure created by multi-level governance structures.

2.1.2 System governance models of higher education

In this section, I explore what models have emerged as a result of the pre-discussed changes and the shifts in the balance of power. I first examine the Triangle of Coordination developed by Burton Clark in 1983. Second, I examine the State Control and State Supervision steering models identified by Frans van Vught in 1991 and the four state models developed by Johan P. Olsen in 1988. Third, I explicate the Triple Helix models introduced by Henry Etzkowitz and Loet Leydersdorff in 1997 as it may be useful to exemplify changing governance relations among the university, industry, and state in seeking to investigate the system governance models of higher education.

2.1.2.1 Clark's Triangle of Coordination

The “triangle of coordination”, developed by Burton Clark (1983) in his pioneering work *The Higher Education System: Academic Organization in Cross-National Perspective*, has become one of the most influential models in higher education to shed light on system governance of higher education institutions (Austin & Jones, 2016; Enders, 2004; Jongbloed, 2003; Pusser, 2008; Salazar & Leihy, 2013).

Actually, in the late 1970s, Clark (1979) suggested four processes that explain the coordination of national higher education systems: (1) bureaucracy, (2) politics, (3) profession, (4) the market. In developing the four pathways of coordination, Clark (1979) argued that a broader understanding of the term coordination beyond its usual connotations of uniformity and harmony was required to understand the various processes and struggles involved in the systems of higher education. In Clark's view, the term's reductionist nature combined with the studies singling out one form of coordination based on formal plans and management yielded ineffective results in

understanding how different ways of coordination reconciled with one another to compose systems. Suggesting a plurality of different forms of coordination and an understanding of the ways in which they interacted with one another, Clark (1979) explained the function of each coordination pathway as follows:

The special function of political coordination is to articulate a variety of public interests, including justice, as these are defined by prevailing groups within and outside of government. The special function of bureaucratic coordination is to compose a formal system out of fragmented parts and to provide fair administration. The function of academic oligarchy is to protect professional self-rule, to lodge the control of academic work, including its standards, in the hands of those permanently involved and most intimately acquainted with it. And the special function of the market is to enhance and protect freedom of choice, for personnel, clientele, and institutions, and thereby indirectly promote system flexibility and adaptability. (pp. 265-266)

This oversight on the plurality of different processes of coordination involved in systems of higher education contributed to the development of the triangle of coordination. Clark (1983) initially constructed a continuum beginning with a tightly coupled system and ending with a loosely coupled system. At the tight end, highly formalized “unitary and unified state administration” with unitary goals formed the system (p. 138), and at the loose end, a “social-choice context” in opposition to central decision making (p. 137), market, which is “synonymous with nongovernmental and nonregulated” formed the system (p. 138). Between the two ends of the continuum lied federative or coalitional contexts with disparate goals and some formal collaboration among the parts of a system. He placed six national higher education systems (Sweden, France, Britain, Canada, Japan, and United States) on the continuum of state authority and market, with Sweden at the tight end as an example of state-controlled coordination and the United States at the loose end as an example of the coordination through market mechanisms. According to Clark (1983), movement along the continuum in either direction was possible as contextual shifts triggered movement away from tight controls to loose arrangements or vice versa.

Clark (1983) then argued that in the case of weak state or market influence, higher education systems might be coordinated by what he termed “academic oligarchy” (p. 140) and reshaped his system governance model from continuum to triangle by adding the academic oligarchy dimension as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. The Triangle of Coordination (Clark, 1983, p. 143)

Each vertices of the triangle as “ideal types – state system, market system, and professional system”, which together allow for a comparison of governance of national higher education systems, according to Clark (1983), shows the key actors or “the main interest groups” - the state, market and academic community and “. . . represents, then, the extreme of one form and a minimum of the other two, and locations within the triangle represent combinations of the three elements in different degrees” (Clark, 1983, pp. 136, 142). In the triangle, state authority was split into bureaucratic and political components, forming the four processes of coordination -

(1) bureaucracy, (2) politics, (3) profession, (4) the market – as discussed in Clark’s (1979) earlier work. That is to say, the interaction and competition among these three forces and four processes in the triangle of coordination lead to the governance of a higher education system in one form of state-control, market-oriented or academic self-rule models or different combinations of these three models. At the time of Clark’s writing, for instance, Italy (academic self-rule model), the United States (market-oriented model), and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (state-control model) set an example for coordination through the state, market, and academic oligarchy extreme. According to Clark (1983), academic oligarchy form of coordination, with which he means power of academics to build control as authorities at local and national levels over nationally key bodies of higher education systems, expands through the need for expert knowledge of academics in decision making at operating levels and through professorial unions that connect academics to each other, resulting in an expansion of professional authority in the system governance of higher education. Clark (1983) argues that some form of coordination by academic oligarchy is present within all higher education systems, which can be prominent in institutions with a chair system or can be formed through staffing intermediary bodies such as governing boards and other managerial boards with academics. For the market key element of the triangle, Clark (1983) built on Lindblom’s (1977) tripartite model of consumer, labor, and institutional markets. The consumer form of market, made up of students and tuition fees, affects decision making with regard to budget allocation to higher education institutions, thereby triggering competition between institutions for students and for financial aid. The size of the student enrollment then becomes an important determinant of resources allocated to an institution, and so an important market-like mechanism in the

governance of higher education systems. Labor markets, constituted by the faculty and administrative officials, are created for increasing scientific productivity of higher education systems through high-quality research, and hence act as a coordinator of higher education systems. Both the academic labor market and the consumer market are intertwined with the institutional market as this type of market is targeted at building prestige through interacting with other institutions for an exchange of high quality students and high-quality research. Then exchange rather than authoritative command is what coordinates and gives power to market type of interaction. According to Clark (1979), state authority, divided into bureaucracy and politics processes, produces “power markets in the sense of units struggling against one another” (p. 264). As a variety of government agencies such as ministries, boards, bureaus, departments, and committees are involved in the system governance of higher education institutions and as authority is divided among these agencies, each unit working independently from the other produces a market of interest-group struggle within the bounds of state authority. Clark (1979) argues

thus, it is no wonder that we come to know so little about how the actions of persons and organizations in higher education are concerted when we look only to the formal plan and the formal hierarchy. Much of the coordination is going on in other ways, including through the struggle and adjustment of officials at the higher levels. To know the score in the coordination of higher education means to know what is going on in the evermore extended power markets of governmental bureaus. (p. 265)

It could then be stated that higher education is not only subject to a plurality of different forms of coordination produced by the state, market, and academic oligarchy but also subject to a plurality of influences produced by power markets, through which multiple forms of coordination are produced, adding complexity to the system governance of higher education. That is to say, Clark’s triangle of coordination moves along three dimensions, in which power shifts and authority

relations in higher education systems among these three forces frame the system governance. Although in some countries one force may be more dominant, movement away from one force over time may take place, situating a system closer to other forms of coordination (Austin & Jones, 2016). Yet, while each of the forces impacts the final positioning of a system, the system, according to the triangle, cannot strongly represent two forces at the same time, such as the state and the market. In other words, the triangle is designed to portray tensions operating in the environment of higher education through the fixed vertices (Salazar & Leihy, 2013). Furthermore, while the triangle allows for a comparison between governance of higher education systems at a point in time, the model cannot explain the evolution of the system governance as it does not trace movement from one force to another (Salazar & Leihy, 2013). Based on these tenets, it could be said that the triangle of coordination is a fixed model, which cannot account for transformations in systems of higher education. Although Clark's triangle is still used for comparing system governance and authority relations in higher education as a comprehensive and useful tool, it is important to note that much has changed in higher education since it was developed (Austin & Jones, 2016; Salazar & Leihy, 2013).

2.1.2.2 Steering models

Steering models refer to “the approaches governments use to control and influence specific public sectors, such as higher education . . . [and] to the institutional context of policy processes” (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000, p. 268). Each steering model, according to Gornitzka and Maassen (2000), provides an example of the nature of the state intervention in a public sector and thus, helps to analyze the relationships between the state and higher education.

State control and state supervision models

Building on Clark's triangle of coordination, van Vught (1991) developed the state control and the state supervision models (as cited in van Vught, 1993) and identified the authorities involved in the system governance of higher education institutions as "higher education institutions, the academic professionals working within these institutions, governmental actors, intermediate organisations (between higher education institutions and government), and the various types of 'consumers of higher education' (students, employers, contractors)", for "a pattern of governance in higher education is the dynamic combination of the actions of, and interactions between several categories of actors" (van Vught, 1993, p. 18).

In the state control model, the state assumes full control over all aspects of the system governance of higher education institutions ignoring the loosely coupled character of higher education as "a collection of diverse disciplines and professions, each pursuing its separate goals, aims, and interests" (van Vught, 1993, p. 15), leading to the "top-down" type of systems, characterized by low institutional autonomy, low academic freedom, high state authority, and a limited space for change and innovation (van Vught, 1993, p. 20). Thus, it could be said to be a reflection of the traditional system governance model of higher education (Maassen, 2003). In the state supervision model, the state control is not direct, as it changes form to enhanced management processes in higher education institutions. In this new form, the state sets the broad parameters and supervision is set through a variety of changes in the structure of governing bodies, senates, and councils and in the decision-making through the integration of interest groups and strategic management approaches and through the diffusion of the decision-making power. Hence, supervision takes the features of the "managerial professionalism" model (van

Vught, 1993, p. 10). The state control model has been common in developing countries, where higher education was regarded as an instrument for national development. Due to this “forced adaptation” to local needs, the system governance of higher education in developing countries has been characterized by authoritarian governmental steering of the state control model (van Vught, 1993, p. 12).

van Vught (1993) suggested that a shift to governmental steering of state supervision or “steering at a distance” would contribute better to the performance of higher education systems and would mean more autonomy for higher education institutions (p. 28). That is, state supervision was suggested as an alternative to the “traditional, top down form of coordination” (Muller, Maassen, & Cloete, 2002, p. 301). Yet, this shift would also set different expectations for higher education institutions such as setting up of quality assurance and accountability mechanisms and strengthening internal efficiency and effectiveness adapting the features of the model of managerial professionalism. One way or another, in both cases, then, in van Vught’s (1993) view, “government tries to be in charge” (p. 23). Henceforth, with a purpose of influencing the behavior of actors involved in the system governance of higher education institutions, when steering, governments use instruments such as funding, planning, evaluation, and regulation in higher education. When moving away from the state control model towards state supervision model, governments ask higher education institutions to be self-funding and diversify their funding, take on a “remote control” approach to planning based on monitoring and feedback, put more emphasis on the quality of the output rather than the process of the input, and favor deregulation by reducing rules and regulations with a possibility of replacing them with “indicators, criteria, and targets” that could yield low institutional autonomy and push ambiguity in the system governance environment (van Vught, 1993, p. 31).

Other steering models

In addition to these two steering models, which have been argued to bring along a dichotomous view to the relationship between the state and higher education and hence to overshadow the other complexities in the relationship (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000), Olsen's (1988) state/steering models have been used to untangle more aspects of the state and higher education relations with respect to the system governance of higher education institutions. Differentiating between "voluntaristic" and "deterministic" views of decision making, that is, between if decisions are made by voluntary action on the part of the actors or by environmental or situational "forces", Olsen (1988) developed four state/steering models of governance and autonomy: the sovereign, rationality-bounded state, the institutional state, the corporate-pluralist state, and the supermarket state (p. 237). Olsen (1988) argues that the applicability of a model to a sector may change over time, from one sector to another, and different combinations of the elements of these four models may exist in a variety of countries over time.

The sovereign, rationality-bounded steering model: In this model, the role of the state is to shape the society in line with whatever on the political and policy agendas and the state is the decisive mechanism in the making and implementation of laws (Olsen, 1988). State power also manifests itself in the distribution of duties to public organizations as superiors of the subordinates, that is, as in the state-control model, one could argue that higher education is viewed as an instrument for national development and is forced to adapt to local needs. As Gornitzka and Maassen (2000) point out, higher education institutions are under tight control and are required to be accountable to political authorities and to be politically effective as foreseen in the political and policy agendas. Hence, decision-making structure is characterized by

“one single centre of control”, and thus, steering is based on hierarchy, in which unimportant decisions can be left to higher education institutions (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000, p. 270). Olsen (2008) states that an increase in autonomy and a change from tight coupling to loose coupling come with political leaders’ choice of “delegation” of decision-making authority in situations where expertise of an institution is needed. That is, change in the system governance of higher education is possible if there are changes in political leadership.

The institutional steering model: The role of the state in this model is considered as “political and moral”, aiming for the protection from political interference and increased autonomy of institutions in accordance with the defined rights and responsibilities, that is, the state does not act as an “architect” as in the sovereign, rationality-bounded steering model but takes a “gardener” approach to the steering (Olsen, 1988, p. 239). Governmental agencies in the institutional state are conceived as a cultural system and a carrier of institutional missions and values. In this steering model, then, the role of higher education institutions is to protect their traditions and academic freedom as cultural systems and to guarantee the transmission of knowledge (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000). As a result of the gardener approach to steering, autonomy is not dependent on leaders, but is derived from a shared understanding of noninterference in a political and moral order where the common organizational form is “the independent court” (Olsen, 1988, p. 240). In other words, higher education institutions are not subject to direct government interference, but there is a shared understanding between higher education and the state that higher education needs to be kept away from market-like mechanisms and political interests (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000). The relationship between the state

and the old elitist universities is, in Gornitzka and Maassen's (2000) view, sets example for this type of steering model.

The corporate-pluralist steering model: In this model, the state's role as the one and only holder of power and control is challenged with the involvement of other authorities (Olsen, 1988). In other words, according to this steering model, there are other actors exercising authority and control over the system governance of higher education (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000), and thus, this model marks the birth of the "Stakeholder society", in which "corporate networks" of the stakeholder society lead steering of higher education (Maassen, 2000, p. 379). Higher education is, then, a reflection of different voices of internal and external stakeholders such as "staff unions, professional associations, industry or regional authorities" and Ministries of Education are one of the stakeholders among multiple voices (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000, p. 271). "Bargaining" is the way of arriving at a consensus over public policymaking, through which multiple powers and interests are integrated into the steering of institutions; hence, decision-making structure is fragmented and works through negotiation and consultation (Olsen, 1988, p. 241), which could be said to lead to the defining of autonomy of higher education institutions in sync with powers and interests of multiple authorities. Gornitzka and Maassen (2000) note that government interference in higher education takes place as a result of the power relationships; thus, a change in the system governance of higher education is dependent on interests and alliances of multiple powers.

The supermarket steering model: In this model, state power is overshadowed by technological changes and market forces, so the state is considered as a "bookkeeper" in guaranteeing the integration of market forces into public institutions and public institutions are regarded as corporations in a competitive market where

there is no dominant actor in public policymaking as a consequence of the decentralization (Olsen, 1988, p. 242). That is to say, higher education institutions are expected to deliver services such as teaching and research and are assessed based on their efficiency, effectiveness, and flexibility in delivering services and adapting to changes in the environment (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000). Hence, the autonomy of higher education institutions is a result of their ability in being responsive to the market and their proactivity in taking steps for engaging in self-regulating, capacity building activities for survival in a competitive environment, also pointing out the reasons for government interference in higher education. Decision-making authority in the supermarket steering model is, then, delegated to individuals who have the required expertise to make well-thought-out impromptu responses, and change to the system governance of higher education is reliant on changes in the environment. Gornitzka and Maassen (2000) note that although there are similarities between the corporatist-pluralist steering model and the supermarket steering model in terms of stakeholder involvement in public policymaking, in the former stakeholder involvement is institutionally legitimized while in the latter stakeholders are involved due to their financial ability.

Also, the sovereign, rationality-bounded and the institutional steering models can be considered as representatives of the traditional system governance model of higher education while the corporate-pluralist and the supermarket steering models can be considered as reflecting the alternative system governance models of higher education (Muller et al., 2002). Yet, it is important to note that, according to Maassen (2003), neither van Vught nor Olsen explicitly presented their models as alternatives to the traditional system governance model of higher education. The governance shifts of the 1980s were mirrored in van Vught's two models and

Olsen's four models, marking a transition period when states were trying to find alternative governance models without abandoning the traditional approaches (Muller et al., 2002). Muller et al. (2002) argue that the transition period has come to an end, and so has the traditional system governance model of higher education.

2.1.2.3 The Triple Helix model of university-industry-government relations

In 1998, Etzkowitz and Webster stated that the first academic revolution in higher education was the introduction of research mission in the late nineteenth century and drawing on the first academic revolution, they contended that universities were going through a second academic revolution, "the translation of research findings into intellectual property, a marketable commodity, and economic development" (p. 21). In line with the second academic revolution, the Triple Helix model was posed by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff in 1997, for traditional university-industry-government relationship allowed for a one-way knowledge transfer from research to innovation based on publications, leading to disjointed relations (Etzkowitz & Webster, 1998). The Triple Helix model points out that universities can take on more entrepreneurial tasks in devising strategies to contribute to the innovation in knowledge-based societies, adding a third mission of economic development to research and teaching missions of academia (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000).

Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) suggested that the Triple Helix was the resultant of two other opposing Triple Helix models. In Triple Helix I, presented in Figure 2, the state holds monopoly over industry and academia and the three groups have separate relations from each other, that is, countries with state-controlled centrally planned models have etatistic university-industry-government relations, referred to as a "failed developmental model" (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000, p.

112). It could be argued that Triple Helix I is thus typical of top-down system governance, where hierarchical ordering of relations in the forms of detached units impedes innovation. The former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries exemplify the strong versions of this model while the weaker versions can be found in many Latin American countries and in some European countries such as Norway (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). According to Austin and Jones (2016), in Poland and Romania from the 1990s onwards, previously under the influence of communist ideology, the state influence has decreased and the market model has become more prevalent.




Figure 2. Triple Helix I: Etatic model of university-industry-government-relations (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000, p. 111)

In Triple Helix II model, referred to as *laissez faire* model of university-industry-government relations, industry takes the lead in coordinating the relations among the three groups. Similar to Triple Helix I, in this model, as shown in Figure 3, the relations are still separate. Yet, in contrast to Triple Helix I, this model presents strong industry and weak state roles, for which Sweden would be an example (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000).




Figure 3. Triple Helix II: A laissez faire model of university-industry-government-relations (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000, p. 111)

The third Triple Helix model brings the three spheres -university, industry, government- together as Figure 4 shows. As a consequence of close triple helix relations among the overlapping and mutually interacting spheres, the spheres take on each other's roles besides maintaining their traditional roles (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000).




Figure 4. Triple Helix III: The Triple Helix model of university-industry-government-relations (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000, p. 111)

According to Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000), the model has been popular in most countries, especially in the U.S, with the objectives of forming university spin-off firms, strategic alliances, and tri-lateral networks in an innovation focused

environment. As opposed to Triple Helix I and Triple Helix II, there is no directing control of either the state or the industry in this model. The state is that of a facilitator in the system governance of higher education and in Etzkowitz and Zhou's (2018) view, double networks without the state are likely to generate conflicts between the two sides, leading to a narrow development in university-industry relations. Therefore, it is better to find a balance between too much state and too little state for the emergence of triple helix governance models, in which the three spheres work cooperatively and create trilateral initiatives.

Four processes were identified in the working of the Triple Helix III model: (1) internal transformation, (2) trans-institutional impact, (3) interface processes, (4) recursive effects (Etzkowitz, Webster, Gebhardt, & Terra, 2000, p. 315). In the first process, universities go through a transformation by extending the teaching and research missions to the economic development mission. As a corollary, new goals are set and teaching and research missions are redefined to serve as a bridge between the university, industry, and state. Also, alliances and partnerships emerge as new governance tools among the three spheres. In the second process, trans-institutional impact, each sphere transforms one another by taking on each other's roles or by equipping the other with the lacking capabilities for the setting up of more productive relations and arrangements. In the third process, tri-lateral networks and hybrid organizations develop as a result of the relations among the three helices so that new entrepreneurial projects are discussed and new collaborations are established. For example, in universities, technology transfer offices are set up, having an intermediary role among the three spheres; however, Etzkowitz, Webster, Gebhardt, and Terra (2000) state that although these offices are centralized at the initial stages of the development of the relations among the three spheres, as the ties

are formed and the members of the university own the “entrepreneurial paradigm”, these offices become decentralized and their one and only role in the establishing relations with external powers gets shared among the members of the university (p. 316). In the fourth process, recursive effects, universities take part in the establishment of tri-lateral organizations such as the creation of research companies, which can also help to form regional ties and arrangements. Another example to this is the research centers in the universities, where members of university, industry, and government within and outside the country join forces and work collaboratively to foster innovation.

To exemplify, Mok (2005) states that the Triple Helix III model and the expansion of research and teaching missions to the third mission of economic and social development in pursuit of “academic entrepreneurship” have become a common practice in Australia, the U.S., and the UK and also in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan to deal with forces of globalization (p. 540). Implementing the policy of “positive non-interventionism”, for instance, which enables the state to facilitate the entrepreneurial environment as suggested in the Triple Helix model and allows for alliances and partnerships between multiple powers including the state, Asian countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan have changed the traditional “developmental state” model in the system governance of higher education to the “market facilitating state” model, shifting the state-controlled and centralized system governance models in these countries (Mok, 2005, p. 550). However, Mok (2005) argues that the change in the role of the state does not mean a weak state in the system governance; on the contrary, the Triple Helix through relations among the three helices may strengthen the role of the state in the system governance of higher education in these countries. That is to say, the transformation

in the system governance in these Asian higher education systems seems to be a state strategy “for retaining and enhancing policy control instead of weakening the state role in public policy domain”, leading to the adoption of new governance tools such as “partnerships, co-production, co-arrangements, and more society-oriented approach” (Mok, 2005, p. 551).

Summary of section 2.1.2

The literature review has focused on examining the system governance models of higher education. Clark’s Triangle of Coordination has suggested a plurality of different processes of coordination in the system governance of higher education, namely, bureaucracy, politics, profession, and the market. It has further presented that the interaction and competition among the three vertices –state authority, academic oligarchy, market- and four processes in the triangle of coordination lead to the governance of a higher education system in one form of state-control, market-oriented or academic self-rule models or different combinations of these three models. In other words, Clark’s triangle of coordination moves along three dimensions, in which power shifts and authority relations in higher education systems among these three forces frame the system governance. Yet, while each of the forces impacts the final positioning of a system, the system, according to the triangle, cannot strongly represent two forces at the same time, implying that the triangle is designed to portray tensions operating in the environment of higher education through the fixed vertices.

van Vught’s state control and state supervision models have presented two opposing system governance models of higher education. In the state control model, the state assumes full control over all aspects of the system governance of higher education institutions ignoring the loosely coupled character of higher education

whereas in the state supervision model, the state sets the broad parameters and supervision is set through a variety of changes in the structure of governing bodies, senates, and councils and in the decision-making mechanisms through the integration of interest groups and strategic management approaches and through the diffusion of the decision-making power. Olsen's state/steering models have also been used to untangle more aspects of the state and higher education relations with respect to the system governance of higher education institutions, which are the sovereign, rationality-bounded state, the institutional state, the corporate-pluralist state, and the supermarket state. These six models reflected the governance shifts of the 1980s, indicating a transition period when states were trying to find alternative governance models without abandoning the traditional approaches. Yet, the transition period has come to an end, and so has the traditional system governance model of higher education.

The three Triple Helix models have exemplified the changing relations between the university, industry, and state and changing governance strategies in aiming to examine the system governance models of higher education. In Triple Helix I model, the state holds monopoly over industry and academia and the three groups have separate relations from each other. In contrast, in Triple Helix II model, industry takes the lead in coordinating the relations among the three groups. As opposed to Triple Helix I and Triple Helix II, in Triple Helix III model, there is no directing control of either the state or the industry. The state acts as a facilitator in the system governance of higher education and universities take on more entrepreneurial tasks in devising strategies to contribute to the innovation in knowledge-based societies as a result of the extension of the teaching and research missions to the third mission of economic development mission.

2.1.3 Reconstruction of the system governance of higher education in the world

In this section, I reconstruct the system governance of higher education in the world using the patterns and themes from the first section, Balance of power: Dynamics of change, in which I delineated the external authorities to the system governance of higher education along with the historical continuum of the changes in higher education governance and from the second section, System governance models of higher education, in which I explored the models that have emerged as a result of the pre-discussed changes and the shifts in the balance of power.

My perspective in this section to the reconstruction process is partly characterized by an analytics of government in the Foucauldian tradition, which is “an analysis of the specific conditions under which particular entities emerge, exist and change” (Dean, 1999, p. 20; Foucault, 1991). An analytics of government in this sense goes beyond the state and its institutions as government in this type of analysis refers to the activities undertaken by a plurality of authorities and agencies - both political and non-political - that seek to govern by “employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge” (Dean, 1999, p. 11), placing the state as an integral part of analysis as one of the authorities (Lemke, 2011). Rather than taking an actor-centric approach, an analytics of government centers its focus on “regimes of practices”, which are “simply fairly coherent sets of ways of going about doing things”, to examine the conditions under which these practices of a multiplicity of authorities are realized, maintained, and reshaped, resulting in the construction of the particular entity under study (Dean, 1999, p. 21). By doing so, it seeks for the logic behind these practices, it seeks for the heterogeneous relations and elements constituted through different mechanisms and techniques and different forms of knowledge, rationalities, and expertise, which evolve over a variety of historical

trajectories and together inform and shape the practices of those who govern. Overall, an analytics of government rejects a taken-for-granted reading of the particular issue of study by mapping it over diverse practices in order to offer an alternative way of thinking to the construction of the issue of study as it aims to recognize how different ways of doing things –practices- belonging to different historical trajectories come together to shape the operation of the particular issue of study in the present. A corollary of such rejection is that an analytics of government abstains from what Foucault (1984) calls “global or radical” formulations of any issue under study (p. 46), that is, it rejects starting an analysis for a purpose of differentiating between what is good and what is bad with regard to the particular issue of study as such an analysis would lead to disguise the diverse relations and elements inherent in practices (Dean, 1999). That is to say, an analytics of government, according to Dean (1999), aims to create a thinking space taking the diverse relations and elements inherent in practices into account to think about how it is possible to form different practices in the present.

Having explored the external authorities to the system governance of higher education in the world using the power shifts in the balance of power, which simultaneously not only centered the focus on the practices of multiple authorities in the system governance of higher education but also on the logic behind these practices, on the multiplicity of relations and elements having diverse historical trajectories and having presented the system governance models of higher education, which served to present how these practices of multiple authorities and the pre-discussed changes and the shifts in the balance of power were reflected in the models, I now attempt to put these practices into action and attempt to partly deploy an analytics of government in the Foucauldian tradition to reconstruct the term

system governance and the system governance of higher education in the world. My point of departure from the Foucauldian analytics of government is that I extend its territorially bounded historical and geographical focus to regional, transnational, and global frames of references. My purpose is to understand the conceptualization of the term system governance and to identify constituent elements it could entail in the context of higher education in the world. I do not intend to offer a right way of reconstructing the system governance of higher education, but I simply intend to create a thinking space to offer an alternative way of thinking about the system governance of higher education. I intend to explore how different ways of doing things with different historical trajectories come together to shape the operation of the system governance of higher education in the present and attempt to understand the complexities that make the system governance of higher education complex.

Based on this, in this section, I argue system governance as a process in two sub-sections. In the first sub-section, I attempt to trace the genealogy of the term system governance and define it as a process. In the second sub-section, I reconstruct and interpret the system governance as a process in four periods: (1) 1100-1500, (2) Early modern Europe, (3) 19th century to 1980s, (4) 1980s onwards. In the reconstruction of each period, I utilize the deconstruction section from the first two sections of the literature review as my data and combining the data with my research questions and an analytics of government approach, I identify common themes involved in the system governance process of each period. Considering these common themes, I reconstruct and interpret the system governance of higher education as constituted of main items and sub-items, reconstruct and interpret them in each period, and present them in a framework at the end of each period. The sub-items under each main item are suggested as tools to study the main items.

2.1.3.1 Defining the problem and the key terms

The term “governmentality”, which Michel Foucault coins as a “guideline” for “a genealogy of the modern state” and covers in his analysis the historical trajectories from Ancient Greece to neo-liberalism, could be turned into one’s advantage for a genealogy of the system governance of higher education (Foucault, 1984/1997, p. 67). In his genealogy of the modern state, Foucault (1991) distinguishes between “the problematic of government” in general and “the government of the state”, “the political form of government” (p. 88), that is, he distinguishes between two meanings of the concept of governmentality. In its wider notion, government refers to “the conduct of conduct” (Gordon, 1991, p. 2), in which “to conduct” as a verb is “to lead others” and “conduct” as a noun is viewed as behavior (Foucault, 1983, p. 220), embracing “the government of one’s self and of others” as “a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons” (Gordon, 1991, p. 2). Governmentality in this sense focuses on

a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what of the practice of government), capable of making some of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practiced. (Gordon, 1991, p. 3)

It could then be argued that one could use the broadest sense of the term to define the problem as the starting point to an analytics of government and pose the system governance of higher education as the government of the system governance of higher education to open up the space for the seeking of an analysis of who can govern, what governing is, and what of the practice of government, and so for an analysis of how multiple authorities shape the system governance of higher education through diverse historical contexts in which the system governance of higher education is called into question.

The second meaning of the term governmentality is used in a narrow sense to refer to the political form of government, in which the frame of reference of the term is the territorially bounded nation state (Lemke, 2011), and in this sense, governmentality is

the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. (Foucault, 1991, p. 102)

Defining the government of the state as a form of power simultaneously helps to situate state as an integral part of analysis of the system governance of higher education, placing the focus on the practices of varying authorities, which in turn enables to explore the reciprocal interaction and constitution between techniques and forms of power and different forms of knowledge and rationalities (Dean, 1999). Such a relational approach to power means that state powers and all the other forms of powers are at a “strategic position” in realizing, maintaining, and reshaping of the practices of one another, hence in constructing the system governance of higher education (Lemke, 2011, p. 51). Concomitantly, it means that, as Foucault (1983) argues, a power relation is “a mode of action upon their [others’] actions: an action upon an action”, hence at the same time, a mode of action on others’ actions is what defines “the exercise of power” (p. 220). To govern in a relationship of power, then, is “to structure the possible field of action of others” (Foucault, 1983, p. 221), which in turn leads one to define the governing process of the system of higher education right from the first building of the system, from the establishment of the University of Bologna and University of Paris in the Middle Ages as governance, and such a perspective further helps to situate the government of the system governance of higher education in diverse contexts.

Governance at the system level or system governance, as a process, seems to entail a plurality of power relationships -actions upon actions of others-, is exercised by a plurality of authorities whose practices or ways of governing informed, shaped, and transformed by different techniques and forms of power and different forms of knowledge and rationalities over different historical trajectories lead to the constitution of modes of coordination, and thus is based on power to power interactions to coordinate the system. Following such a broad definition of the system governance of higher education, one could extend what Pierre and Peters (2000) use for the role of state government in governance, “an independent variable” (p. 26) “not a constant” (p. 29), to the role of authorities and accompanying techniques and forms of power (both political and non-political) and different forms of knowledge and rationalities in governance to explore how the shifts in the balance of power and the historical changes come to shape the system governance.

2.1.3.2 Reasoning of defining the system governance of higher education as a process

Medieval ages (1100-1500)

The establishment of the University of Bologna and the University of Paris and the emerging university governance models in the middle ages (1100-1500) provide insight into what has been embedded into both the system and the system governance of higher education right from the beginning. One key starting point is the power relationship among the church, the emperor, the professors and the students over the building of the higher education system and its governance, for it could be helpful to explain why higher education could be called as a system in the medieval ages.

According to Foucault (1983), power relationships can lead to the formation of “complex systems” (p. 223), which bear at its core the key concept system lying at the heart of systems thinking, “a whole entity which can adapt and survive, within limits, in a changing environment” (Checkland, 2003, p. 49). First, “the adaptive whole”, the system, must have “emergent properties” that separate it from its environment, “the properties which make the whole entity ‘more than the sum of its parts’” (Checkland, 2003, pp. 49, 50, emphasis in original), to which, in a narrow sense, the existence of individual universities and “apparent formal machinery” (Clark, 1983, p. 5), the church and the imperial authority –e.g. founding charters, authorization of universities for granting universally valid teaching licenses, and rights and privileges gained with the papal and imperial recognition - could be given as an example. In addition to this, Clark (1983) notes that a broader perspective that includes any of the population engaged in higher education could be taken to explain what makes the higher education system more than the sum of its parts, which further helps one to place students, teachers, and local authorities in the medieval ages into the system of higher education. Second, faculties embedded in medieval universities and medieval universities embedded in the higher education system exemplify another bedrock of systems thinking, which is the adaptive wholes with emergent properties that embrace the idea of “layered structure” (Checkland, 2003, p. 50). Then an important point to note about a layered structure is that each structure within the system has its own emergent properties, highlighting a key criterion to identify medieval universities as universities and as specific entities of the system: granting degrees that were valid throughout Christendom. Another emergent property of the existence of the layered structures could be said to be decision-making, that is, layered structures could be, “in theory”, viewed as the “decision

structure” within a system, for power holders could skip the levels to make decisions (Clark, 1983, 110) as in the guilds of medieval universities. Third, Checkland (2003) states that “processes of communication and control” are needed for a system as an adaptive whole to adapt to and survive in its environment (p. 50), for which founding charters, university statutes, bulls such as *Authentica Habita* (The Scholar’s Statute) and *Parens Scientiarum* (The Mother of Sciences), and rules within the universities set an example.

One could then argue that the higher education system that was given birth in the medieval ages emerged as a complex yet fragmented system with its emergent properties, layered interdependent structures, and processes of communication and control, dependent on interactions of multiple authorities and yet independent with their universal nature with the recognition from the papacy or empire, an authority of a universal nature. Thus conceived, one needs to question how the system was made adaptive and survived in the following centuries, which in turn concerns the government of the system governance of higher education and so the practices of those who govern and the power to power relations. First, the system governance was based on legitimate grounds. That is to say, when the University of Bologna and the University of Paris were established in the twelfth century, there were no rules to protect them from the outside acts of interferences of local authorities. Henceforth, legitimation by legitimate powers was an issue of concern for the guild of scholars (students) at the University of Bologna and for the guild of masters (professors) at the University of Paris. For instance, imperial protection gained with the issuance of the *Authentica Habita* (The Scholar’s Statute) by the emperor in 1155 granted the students at the University of Bologna with the freedom of movement (Nardi, 2004). Besides imperial power, what Foucault (1983) calls as “pastoral power”, i.e. a form

of power in Christianity, aimed at “individual salvation in the next world” (p. 214), concerned with the “welfare” of each individual and the whole community, and based on the “shepherd-flock relation” (Dean, 1999, pp. 74, 75), welfare function of which is said to spread outside the Church in the subsequent centuries in the form of political power (Foucault, 1983; Dean, 1999), was another form of legitimate power that affected the governing process of the higher education system. The two forms of legitimate power, which were universal in nature representing the interests of each individual and all members of the community, in turn gave medieval universities, mission of which was “teaching of the rational pursuit of truth” (Rüegg, 2004a, p. 22), a universal nature. Such universalization transcending all local divisions and reigning throughout Christendom shows how important it was to keep knowledge under control, for medieval universities could yield universal impact and diffuse ideas, setting a threat to the interests of the legitimate powers. The universalization, then, could be noted as a strategy for legitimation practiced in the system governance of higher education contributing to the survival of the system of higher education, which also enabled the production of two forms of legitimate power, collegial power and guild power. Collegial power and guild power, which could be said to be a form of traditional authority according to the Weberian classification of forms of authority, legal, traditional, and charismatic authority (Weber, 1978, p. 215), were formed at the University of Bologna and the University of Paris first as a result of the struggles for institutional autonomy and academic freedom. Therefore, one could define these two forms of power as forced cooperation power, formed by those who were forced to protection from the external influences in a system open to its environment. Collegial power could be said to mean that the members of the university (students at the University of Bologna and academics at the University of

Paris) negotiated on the issues with regard to the university and advocated the idea of taking responsibility in the governance of the university for protecting their rights and the common good of the university (e.g. faculty meetings). Guild power as a derivative of collegial power could be said to be the representation and the reflection of collegial power in the guild of students and in the guild of professors, where the rectors had a symbolic role and decisions were made together with the other academics or students in the guilds on behalf of the members of the university. In other words, collegial power could be said to act as checks and balances to ensure accountability and transparency so that no one had absolute power over decision-making and decisions were made to protect their rights. One could then conclude that how the power was distributed and legitimized mattered in the system governance of higher education in the medieval ages. Furthermore, taking the governance definition as a process into account, it could be suggested that these four forms of power denote the two of the four processes/pathways of coordination that Clark (1979) developed to explain the coordination of national higher education systems that emerged in the nineteenth century: politics (pastoral power and imperial power) and profession (collegial power and guild power). According to Clark (1979),

the special function of political coordination is to articulate a variety of public interests, including justice, as these are defined by prevailing groups within and outside of government. . . . The function of academic oligarchy is to protect professional self-rule, to lodge the control of academic work, including its standards, in the hands of those permanently involved and most intimately acquainted with it. (pp. 265-266)

Multi-layered power relationships among the four types of authorities and so the two pathways of coordination in the system governance bring forward the second point that could explain how the system was made adaptive and survived in the following centuries. Considering that each line of authority had different interests, the system governance had to be responsive to a variety of interests both within and outside the

universities for the continuity of the system, so it had to differentiate. The founding charters and bulls put into action following power to power interactions, for instance, created differentiations among the universities. The founding charters entitled medieval universities the right to grant degrees, yet they had to turn to the church authority or imperial authority for awarding of the degrees except some universities such as University of Bologna, University of Paris, and Oxford University. In these three universities, the assessment of students' performance and the decision of recognition as a colleague were not left to the discretion of the external authority, but they could award degrees without further intervention of the external powers. It could be then argued that creating competition through a differentiation process among the medieval universities was a strategy embedded in the system governance that supported the stability of the system. Being responsive to the interests seems to have further encouraged what van Vught (1993) calls an "informal process of differentiation" in the university governance (p. 15). The universities produced knowledge in the areas that were of interest and so organized themselves into the faculties such as Arts, Law, Medicine and Theology; thus, "the division of labour in higher education based on professional knowledge and professional expertise produced diversity and structural disintegration" (van Vught, 1993, p. 15), leading to the protection of the adaptive whole. On the contrary, processes of unification in the system governance were also common. For example, the founding charters setting the norms and regulations (Bazan, 1998) acted as a standardization strategy and unified the universities around the same ideals. Also, the University of Bologna prototyped the governance of other Southern universities and the University of Paris set an example in the governance of other Northern universities (Cobban, 1988). Therefore, "formal differentiation" processes, creation of different higher education

institutions with different sets of goals, were aloof at the system governance within this period (van Vught, 1993, p. 16). The number of universities in Europe in 1500 was sixty-three while it was thirty-one in 1400, and it had spread to all parts of Europe, aside from Russia and the Balkans (Gürüz, 2011). Legitimation, processes of unification, and informal processes of differentiation in the system governance could be argued to mobilize the system governance in the Christendom, so could be noted as some of the ways in which the system governance operated during this period.

This point could be taken one step further suggesting that self-regulation emerged as a mode of coordination exercised by four forms of authorities in their interactions to solve the government of the system governance of higher education, resulting in institutional steering model (Olsen, 1988) or what could be termed as student/academic self-rule model by expanding Clark's (1983) academic self-rule model, which in turn was reflected in the university governance models. Thus, relationships of "power as strategic games" in structuring the possible field of action of others, as Foucault discusses, could lead to "empowerment or responsabilisation of subjects" (Lemke, 2000, p. 5), suggesting that legitimacy of external influence was questioned within this period. Issuing of the bull *Parens Scientiarum* (The Mother of the Sciences) by the pope, which has been referred to as Magna Charta of the University of Paris (Rüegg, 2004a) could be said to be one of the first examples of empowerment of forced cooperation power, i.e. collegial power and guild power, as a result of their struggles to make their own statutes, to establish the authorities of the University, and to define their responsibilities (Bazan, 1998) and also to be an example of embedding of disputes over institutional autonomy, academic freedom, accountability, and transparency into the system governance. Hence, institutional autonomy, academic freedom, accountability, and transparency seem to have come

together as the governance indicators leading to the self-regulation as a mode of coordination. The reason for identifying institutional autonomy, academic freedom, accountability, and transparency as the governance indicators of the medieval ages could be explained as follows: Spinoza uses two terms to explain power, according to which, *potestas* refers to “the centralized, mediating, transcendental force of command”, which is, in this case, the church authority and the imperial authority (Hardt, 2003, p. xiii). On the contrary, *potentia* denotes “the local, immediate, actual force of constitution”, which could be designated as collegial authority and guild authority (Hardt, 2003, p. xiii). In Spinozian thought, in power relations, interactions of *potentia* with *potestas* could result in *potentia agendi*, “collective and cooperative capacity to act” (Rehmann, 2017, p.1), which in turn could produce “power-accumulation in each part of the aggregate” (Röttgers, 1980, pp. 597-98 as cited in Rehmann, 2017, p. 9). That is, *potentia agendi* produced in power relations may not only empower *potentia* but also *potestas*. Based on these terms, it could be said that the demands of *potentia* (collegial power and guild power) for institutional autonomy, academic freedom, accountability, and transparency from *potestas* (pastoral power and imperial power) led to *potentia agendi*, collective and cooperative capacity to act, empowering both *potentia* (collegial power and guild power) and *potestas* (pastoral power and imperial power), for embedding of these four indicators into the system governance seems to have protected the health of the system governance of higher education, and in turn the continuity of the system. A governance indicator could then be defined as an indicator that aims to boost the collective and cooperative capacity to act for the health of the system governance and the continuity of the system. How the system governance as a process acted within this period could be summarized as shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5. System governance as a process in the medieval ages (1100-1500)

Early modern period (1500-1800)

It could be stated that important ideological and religious movements on the one hand and state-building on the other created a double re-contextualization and restructuring process in the system governance of higher education in the early modern period. What united these two processes was the theme of European modernity, which started with Humanism. Humanism, with its emphasis on the individual, exploration, questioning, and the common quest for learning, Hardt and Negri (2001) discuss, was “the affirmation of the powers of this world, the discovery of the plane of immanence”, was the first mode of modernity, which created “a radical revolutionary process” (pp. 71, 74). Within this revolutionary process were the Renaissance of the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries and the Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Yet, the first mode of modernity also ignited a counterrevolution, the period of Reformation and Counter-Reformation in the sixteenth century and Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, which aimed to bring the order and transcendent power back in the society, and was called as the second mode of modernity (Hardt & Negri, 2001).

The commonality between these two distinct modes of modernity could be identified as the questioning of the dualism of the absolutist powers of the medieval ages, the pastoral power and the imperial power. The sixteenth century, argues Foucault (1991), was when “government as a general problem”, that is, “[h]ow to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people will accept being governed, how to become the best possible governor”, was at its peak (p. 87). The religious disagreements during the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, which interjected with the cultural transformations and instability in the society, seem to have created a struggle over central authority, resulting in a

governance gap, for new legitimate political powers (states, local rulers, and princes) emerged amidst this struggle for authority to reestablish authority and reduce the uncertainty in the society. The fragmented political power reflected itself in the system governance of higher education, leading one to question the stability and adaptability of the higher education system, thus the government of the system governance of higher education.

In the medieval ages, the higher education system emerged with no fundamental rules and principles, yet within an established order of the church authority and the imperial authority. Therefore, legitimation by one of these authorities was one of the ways in the operation of the system governance. Legitimation was still an issue of concern, yet with a difference. Within this period, new legitimate powers were also in need of legitimating themselves as the governance gap forced new political powers (states, local rulers, and princes) to justify their policies and to create universal values, rules, and rights (Nexon, 2009). One could then state that new powers employed strategies of rationalization to justify their policies and universalization to create universal values with a purpose of legitimizing their power. Thompson (1990) argues within the context of the operation of ideologies that legitimation as a mode of operation of ideology may be expressed through rationalization “to persuade an audience that it is worthy of support” and universalization, by means of which “institutional arrangements which serve the interests of some individuals are represented as serving the interests of all” (p. 61). Thompson (1990) further states that these modes and strategies could also be associated with other contexts as they are not “intrinsically ideological” (p. 61). Based on this, it could be stated that one way these strategies operated in the system governance of higher education was through expansion, that is, each camps

established new universities as an indicator of their legitimation and authority and did not impose strict policies on the medieval universities both to keep them under control and to extend their authority (Frijhoff, 2004), which could be argued to indicate the strategic power of knowledge produced in the universities and the strategic position of the forced cooperation power (collegial power and guild power) in the diffusion of ideas during this period.

In addition, religious differentiations combined with the impact of the market on new social and economic relations (Nexon, 2009) and the emergence of public opinion (Frijhoff, 2004) also contributed to the integration of a new type of power into the system governance of higher education in some parts of Europe. Trustee power, “supervision of an enterprise by outsiders” (Clark, 1983, p. 116), became established first in the Geneva Academy founded by John Calvin and spread to other Protestant Universities in Ireland, Scotland, and the Netherlands, which further patterned the system governance of modern U.S. higher education (Cowley & Williams, 1991; Gürüz, 2011). The outsiders took different names, lay board in the Geneva Academy, city authorities in the University of Edinburgh, board of visitors in the Trinity College in Dublin, and curators in the University of Leiden in the Netherlands (Gürüz, 2003). The responsibilities of the trustees included advising on the appointment of the rectors and on the hiring of new academicians. Considering the governance definition as a process, it could be suggested that these forms of power comprise Clark’s (1979) four processes/pathways of coordination, (1) bureaucracy, (2) politics, (3) profession, (4) the market, developed to explain the coordination of national higher education systems, bearing implications for the governance indicators identified in the previous period as the institutional autonomy, academic freedom, accountability, and transparency. It could be stated that these four

indicators were redefined in regards to the public interests, the market needs and demands, and the new legitimate powers. First, one important result of this revolutionary and counterrevolutionary process of modernity seems to have been “formal differentiation” at the system level governance, creation of different higher education institutions with different sets of goals (van Vught, 1993, p. 16) such as polytechnics (Gürüz, 2003; Okçabol, 2007), which de Groof et al. (1998) state as “the first serious challenge” to the authority and autonomy of the medieval universities over higher learning and teaching (p. 15). Therefore, competition could be identified as a strategy of legitimate powers in the system governance to hold higher education institutions responsive to the changes in the social, political, and economic contexts and to establish their authority over them. The medieval universities opposed the new knowledge characterized with new methods of scientific experimentation as they wanted to protect themselves in an unstable environment (Wissema, 2009). Yet, as a system open to its environment, they had to be responsive to the professionalization strategy of the legitimate powers, who needed a skilled workforce for the expanding economy (Frijhoff, 2004); hence, formal differentiation at the system level could be said to have led to processes of informal differentiation within the universities with the opening up of new disciplines in congruence with the needs and demands of the changing nature of the society and with the adding of service to the state mission to the teaching mission (Scott, 2006).

Furthermore, while universities had some degree of autonomy and freedom for instance in the teaching appointments, program planning, and degree-granting (Ridder-Symoens, 2004), different regulatory practices such as trusteeship, regular visitations by government bodies, appointed commissions, detailed statutes, and

appointments of the rectors by the state in newly established universities were common during this period (Hammerstein, 2004), suggesting more lines of authority in decision-making and efforts to increase accountability and transparency in the system governance. To put it differently, regulation could be identified as a mode of coordination emerging in the multi-faceted power relationships among the different lines of authorities and so the four pathways of coordination. All in all, while the newly defined governance indicators and the mode of coordination suggested a move away from universalist nature of the medieval university and the sole authority of it in its own affairs, academic self-rule model in the system governance as a sign of unification was still prevalent in European countries as shown in Figure 6, which could be attributed to the power struggles over authority and the cultural transformations in the society.




Figure 6. System governance as a process in the early modern period (1500-1800)

From 19th century to 1980s

Starting from the nineteenth century, two processes could be identified as being influential in the interactions of authorities through which practices of power holders in the system governance were realized, maintained, and reshaped, resulting in the construction of new systems of higher education and different approaches to the system governance around the globe.

First, it seems that the refounding of the Université de France drawing on the principle of the delinking of the teaching and research (Charle, 2004) and the setting up of the University of Berlin, called the Humboldtian model representing the principles of the unity of teaching and research, the freedom to teach, and the freedom to learn (Scott, 2006) affected the practices of the power holders, hence the restructuring of the system governance. Adding of the research mission as a consequence of the rise of industrialization to the responsibilities of the higher education institutions with the establishment of these two universities was called a “bureaucratic revolution” (de Groof et al., 1998, p. 16). As the change to the missions of the universities pointed to a move away from the dominance of the forced cooperation power towards more state bureaucracy in higher education governance, the state-building processes could be stated to be another essential process in the transformations in the system governance of higher education.

Thompson (1990) defines the emerging modern state as

a state based on a notion of sovereignty and the formal rule of law and justified by an appeal to universal values, rules and rights, rather than by an appeal to some religious or mystical value or being which would endow political power with the authority of a divine will. The modern state is distinguished from the political institutions of the *ancien régime* by, among other things, the fact that it is located entirely *within* the social-historical world, and hence the struggle for and exercise of power becomes a mundane matter which is embedded in the language of reason and science, interests and rights. (p. 79, emphasis in original)

Legitimation based on the rule of law, then, could be said to be a form of legal authority according to the Weberian typology of authority, legal, traditional, and charismatic authority (Weber, 1978, p. 215), which seems to have operated in the distinct systems of higher education through different processes of bureaucratization, universalization, and rationalization strategies during this period. Rule of law means that “government is limited to applying universal values announced in advance to an unknown number of cases and in an unknown number of future instances” (Dean, 1999, p. 158), one consequence of which is that laws might become the “playball of group interests” (Hayek, 1979, p. 99) as universal values are aimed to work for the benefit of the whole but not for the benefit or disadvantage of “any particular class of individuals” (Dean, 1999, p. 158). Bureaucracy referring to “formal hierarchy, with explicit delegation of authority to offices and positions, codified coordination of those units, and impersonality in recruiting personnel, judging individual worth, and deciding what will be done” forms bureaucratic power denoting the opposite of the forced cooperation power and trustee power (Clark, 1983, p. 118). In defining bureaucracy, Deleuze and Guattari (2005) distinguish between “rigid segmentarity” and “supple segmentarity” (p. 212). Operating both in the rigid and the supple segmentarity, the state, in the rigid segmentarity process, organizes hierarchies among “concentric” segments which “resonate” together, whereas, in the supple segmentarity process, it is characterized by a flow of networks and connections with a possibility of changing the existing segments and forming new segments (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 212). Despite indicating two distinct and different processes of segmentarity, rigid and supple segmentarities are, therefore, “inseparable”, overlapping, and “entangled” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 212). As a corollary, Deleuze and Guattari (2005) argue

[i]t is not sufficient to define bureaucracy by a rigid segmentarity with compartmentalization of contiguous offices, an office manager in each segment, and the corresponding centralization at the end of the hall or on top of the tower. For at the same time there is a whole bureaucratic segmentation, a suppleness of and communication between offices, a bureaucratic perversion, a permanent inventiveness or creativity practiced even against administrative regulations. (p. 214)

Thus conceived, it is important to identify who forms the bureaucratic power and at which level(s) and how rigid and supple segmentarities operate for a better understanding of how bureaucratic power together with the rule of law and rationality comes down to affect the system governance of higher education. For instance, that combination of rigidity and suppleness within state bureaucracy along with rational decision-making and universal values, rules, and rights formed distinct modes of governance in different parts of the world, where bureaucratic power, rule of law, and rationality acted differently.

Based on this, first, engagement of high bureaucratic power in the system governance could be identified in the Continental European mode of governance. Bureaucratic power in most countries of Europe was placed both at the ministerial and the institutional levels, resulting in “bi-cephalous control”, a dualism between what could be called as bureaucratic governmental power and bureaucratic forced cooperation power (de Groof et al., 1998, p. 18). That is, universities in Europe placed under the Ministries of Public Education as part of the nationalization of higher education as a state’s service were bound by the procedural matters such as access to the university, curriculum planning, and examination through the national legislations (Neave, 2003). They had to follow those national legislations imposed by the state, yet as part of the principles of the freedom of teaching and learning and conducting research, they had “substantial autonomy (that is, they can do what they want, but in doing so they have to follow those procedural rules established by the

centre of the system)” (Capano, 2011, p. 1627). Therefore, although there were variations from one state to another, at the institutional level, the professors had control over the decision making through the election of “amateur” deans and rectors on a short time basis (Clark, 1983, p. 126), forming the bureaucratic forced cooperation power. It could be then argued that the lack of a balancing power such as stronger rectors or presidents at the enterprise level and as stronger deanships at the faculty level in between these two levels embracing high involvement of bottom-up (forced cooperation power) and top-down (governmental power) bureaucratic powers led to the misuse of positions despite the rule of law, which one could identify as a resultant of the state control (van Vught, 1993) or the sovereign, rationality-bounded steering model (Olsen, 1988) of system governance employed in the Continental European systems of higher education. In both the state control model or the sovereign, rationality-bounded steering model, as the state assumes full responsibility over all aspects of the system governance of higher education, “top-down” type of systems, characterized by low institutional autonomy, low academic freedom, high state authority, and a limited space for change and innovation, emerge (van Vught, 1993, p. 20). In such systems, higher education is regarded as an instrument for national development as was the case in most countries of Europe during this period, and this type of what van Vught (1993, p. 12) calls “forced adaptation” to local needs through the nationally enforced top-down legislations may increase bureaucratic power involvement in the system governance as in the Continental European systems of higher education. It could be further suggested that even though national legislations aimed for increased institutional autonomy and academic freedom by setting the accountability and transparency mechanisms in the universities (Gürüz, 2011; Neave, 2003; Rüeegg, 2004c), top-down nature of power to

power relations in the system governance inhibited institutional autonomy and academic freedom and boosted high bureaucratic power involvement on both ministerial and institutional sides which worked for the benefits of some power interest groups. That is, the rule of law became the “playball of some group interests” (Hayek, 1979, p. 99).

Another pattern of bureaucratic power engagement in the system governance of higher education could be stated to act in the British mode of governance. As opposed to the Continental European systems of higher education, low bureaucratic governmental power engagement was common in the British mode of governance until after the post-World War II period (Clark, 1983), which could be linked to the academic self-rule (Clark, 1983) or the institutional steering model (Olsen, 1988) of system governance. In the institutional steering model, the state does not act as an “architect” as in the sovereign, rationality-bounded steering model but takes a “gardener” approach to the steering, where autonomy is not dependent on leaders, but is derived from a shared understanding of noninterference in a political and moral order (Olsen, 1988, p. 239). Yet, it could be suggested that such low bureaucratic governmental power engagement created another type of governance gap in the system governance, resulting in high bureaucratic forced cooperation power at the institutional and system level despite the existence of trustee power in the form of chancellorship appointed by the supreme body and the administrative power in the form of vice-chancellorship appointed by the legislative body and was not necessarily an academic (Clark, 1983). For example, besides other higher education matters, professors also had control over the University Grants Committee (UGC), the main financial source of higher education. That is why, after the post-World War II period, higher education institutions were placed under the Department

of Education and Science (DES), resulting in unification through nationally standardized procedures in, for instance, admissions, pay scales, and academic and administrative matters (Rhoades, 1983) as in the Continental European mode of governance. However, considering lay access to policymaking remained minimal despite the stronger external powers and the increased accountability of the forced cooperation power through setting up of governmental mechanisms (Rhoades, 1983), it seems that the shift to a national higher education system did not mean a shift in the system governance model, but it meant a shift to the exertion of indirect governmental influence as practiced in the American mode of governance defined by Clark (1983) in contrast to the direct governmental influence in the Continental European form of governance (Capano, 2011).

Under indirect governmental influence, Capano (2011) argues, government does not intervene in policymaking as higher education institutions are “left free to choose what they want to do, and how to do it”, yet intervenes when necessary by “changing the governance mode and policy tools” (p. 1628). It is important to note that indirect governmental influence did not imply that higher education institutions in the UK and the U.S. had total authority in the system governance, yet in the policy areas where government influence was indirect, it was replaced by other external powers. “Replacement of government influence” by trustee power and funding agencies, McDaniel (1996, p. 141) notes, could be given as an example to this. And it could be stated that in such systems, direct government influence was practiced when the other forms of government influence (e.g. trustee power and funding agencies) were found to be ineffective. State intervention in the U.S. in the formation of two new governance models (consolidated governing boards and statewide governing boards) to increase the efficiency of higher education institutions and the

placement of universities and colleges under the DES in the UK after the post-World War II period could exemplify this situation, for prior to the World War II period, in the U.S., trustee power exercising policy at the campus level free from regulatory systems (McLendon et al., 2007) and in the UK, high bureaucratic forced cooperation power at the institutional and system levels were causes for concern. Finally, delegation of government influence could be suggested to have prevented the formation of top-down higher education systems and the governance gap between the external and internal powers in the system governance, which emerged in the Continental European form of governance and was filled with high bureaucracy. Therefore, one could state that system governance in the emerging higher education systems during the state formation process within this period featured its own unique mix of bureaucratic governmental power and forced cooperation power through the interactions between the potestas (state power and governmental power) and the potentia (forced cooperation power), leading to variations in the potentia agendi, “collective and cooperative capacity to act” and so in the empowerment of potestas and potentia, impacting the nature and boundaries of the institutional autonomy, academic freedom, accountability, and transparency (Rehmann, 2017, p.1).

In addition to different processes of bureaucratization, universalization, and rationalization strategies of legitimation, state political power based on the rule of law bringing in rational decision-making in the power relations among the authorities involved in the system governance could be said to act as a unifying and differentiating mechanism through state interventions which took the forms of policy instruments such as national/federal legislations and rules and regulations and through other governmental powers, for the state power is “both an individualizing

and totalizing form of power” and so “. . . a tricky combination in the same political structures of individualization techniques, and of totalization procedures” (Foucault, 1983, p. 213). This point could be taken one step further suggesting that these national/federal legislations and regulations with their intrusive and protective nature combined with the individualizing and totalizing state power acted as the means of neutralization of resistance which operated through the dependency and empowerment strategies in the system governance of higher education institutions. On the one hand, these national/federal legislations and regulations created academic, educational, financial, and political dependencies on the side of the higher education institutions in the areas such as admissions, curriculum planning, and examinations (Gerbod, 2004). On the other hand, state protection as a public institution through legislations and regulations provided the protection of teaching and learning and conducting research and included policies on employment, healthcare safety, and pay scales (McDaniel, 1996).

Henceforth, regulation through policy instruments and other governmental powers could be identified as a mode of coordination in the system governance during this period. Two distinct patterns in the use of regulatory processes in the system governance seem to explain the aforementioned variations in the approaches taken towards the system governance. First, during this period, both prior to the World War II and after the World War II, state formation process in Europe, the UK, and the U.S. focused on policymaking to provide every citizen with employment opportunities as part of the welfare state policies (Esping-Andersen, 1990), pointing to the “liberal conception of society” in the welfare state as “a totality or unity” (Dean, 1999, p. 124) and so to the totalizing power of the state. That is to say, the states in the state formation process sought to legitimize their power within the

national territorial borders and to govern the risk in the populations against its power by codifying the problems of the individual into the social and the public under the theme of “social insurance” (Dean, 1999, p. 129) function of which could be defined as follows:

Insurance creates a new grouping of human interests. Men are no longer juxtaposed alongside one another in society. Reciprocal penetration of souls and interests establishes a close solidarity among them. Insurance contributes substantially towards the solidarization of interests. (Chauffon, 1884, p. 303 as cited in Ewald, 1991, p. 207)

One strength of the insurance, Gordon (1991) notes, is that it uses “expertise” (p. 40), to which one could also add knowledge. For Miller and Rose (2008) state, knowledge and expertise were required for the identification and the design of the devices needed and for the delivery of the services, and so for the production of the welfare states. To this end, the states invested in “insurance institutions” and used their expertise and knowledge in legitimizing their power, governing the risk in the populations, and solidarizing the interests (Ewald, 1991, p. 197). One could then suggest that during this period higher education institutions attained a new role as an insurance institution of the states, which may explain the operation of professionalization and differentiation in the system governance of higher education institutions. That is, prior to the World War II period, one way the welfare approach was embedded in the regulation of higher education institutions was through differentiation and professionalization. New disciplines in the existing higher education institutions as well as the new higher education institutions compatible with the needs of the population and with the requirements of the industrial society were established, for as Dean (1999) points out the establishment of representative institutions and disciplines was the key to the realization of the welfare state policies and so to the provision of the social insurance. Based on this, it could be suggested

that professionalization by means of the massification strategy or in Trow's terms (1970, 1973) the transition from elite to mass higher education and formal and informal differentiation processes by means of the competition strategy mobilized the system governance of different higher education systems during this period. Yet, as of the 1950s, massification strategy, which facilitated the professionalization, brought about explosion in the student enrollments, the financial constraints (Wissema, 2009), and the growing social problem of over-education (Baker, 2009), resulting in expansion in direct/indirect state intervention and so more bureaucratic involvement in the system governance of higher education (Tilak, 2006). State interventions seem to target at increasing direct/indirect governmental influence in different systems of higher education as the change from the professional society of the industrial society to a post-industrial society (Delanty, 2003), which had at its core the knowledge as the key factor for production and economic development (Bell, 1973), resulted in the "development of evaluation" (Wollman, 2006, para. 1), placing system governance of higher education institutions central to the social planning and knowledge production of the welfare states. The variations in the system governance as a process within this period, which were a reflection of the changes in the social, political, and economic conditions, could be summarized as shown in Figure 7.




Figure 7. System governance as a process from the 19th century to 1980s

From 1980s onwards

Since 1980s, systems of higher education around the globe besides the UK, US, and Continental European modes of higher education governance which were once identified as the most prominent forms of governance by Clark (1983) have been pressured to change, albeit at different times yet displaying a pattern of convergence in terms of the integration of market forces into their system governance (Austin & Jones, 2016; Capano, 2011). That is to say, “the market has ceased to be kept at arm’s length” from the public services (Dean, 1999, p. 172) which was, for instance, common with the welfare state approach to the higher education as a public good (Enders et al., 2013). The increase in public expenditures resulting in the financial crisis of the 1970s and the rise of neo-liberalism, the advent of knowledge-based economy, and the NPM policies by the late 1980s combined with globalization and technological changes have constituted the environment system governance of higher education institutions operates at the twenty-first century. Therefore, there seems to be a move from closed welfare state approach with higher education system governance to a more open one, which could be exemplified with the restructuring and re-contextualization through multilateralism, internationalization, transnationalism, and regionalism spurred with the rise of globalization. One could then track the conditions under which these multilateral, international, transnational, regional, and thus global practices of a multiplicity of authorities are realized, maintained, and reshaped through the operation of de/re territorialization in the system governance of higher education.

Deleuze and Guattari (2005) in their book *A thousand plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia* argue that deterritorialization and reterritorialization co-exist and act simultaneously. Deterritorialization is “the movement when one leaves the

territory”, which is simultaneously accompanied by reterritorialization (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 508). While the former changes the established meanings, the latter transforms the local, meaning a relativization and reconfiguration of the local practices through the deterritorialized practices. Within the context of the system governance of higher education, multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, UN, UNESCO, and OECD, “capable of handling at least some collective tasks in an *ex ante* coordinated manner” and so have in their powers rule making “in its own right” (Ruggie, 1992, p. 584, emphasis in original), seem to push governments to rescale higher education policies in accordance with these institutions’ policies which emphasize financial deregulation, privatization, decreased state intervention, and free trade and markets. For instance, the OECD *Governance in Transition: Public Management Reforms in OECD Countries* report published in 1995 and *The Knowledge Based Economy* report published in 1996 have been influential in the promotion of the changes to the functioning of the knowledge and the governance in the system governance at local and national levels (Rizvi & Lingard, 2006). Also, the GATS agreement signed in 1994 (Robertson et al., 2002), transnational initiatives such as opening of joint programs, twinning programs, distance learning, and education hubs (Yang, 2008), and regional level initiatives such as Bologna Process in Europe and the MERCOSUR-Educativo in South America (Chou & Ravinet, 2017; Jayasuriya & Robertson, 2010), and the formation of ASEAN in South-East Asia (Mok, 2011) could be given as examples to the cross-border co-operation and coordination and to the legitimation of deterritorialized practices through an expansion strategy, indicating a tendency towards system governance beyond the nation-state. Such deterritorialized practices, reterritorialized at the national level by means of the rescaling strategy, could be stated as a sign of the emergence of the new

modes of system governance. That is to say, system governance of higher education seems not only to operate at local and national levels but also to operate at international, transnational, and regional levels through the rescaling strategy of the deterritorialization and reterritorialization, suggesting a move from hierarchies of the welfare state to markets and to networks.

It also seems that legitimation strategies have been put into place to incorporate system governance beyond the nation-state into system governance within the national boundaries, indicating blurring of the boundaries in the operation of the system governance and so changing nature of the national outlook of higher education policy frameworks. This point brings forward displacement of state power in the system governance of higher education. In Pierre and Peters' (2000) terms, state power has been displaced "up" to multilateral organizations (p. 83), "down" to regions (p. 87), and "out" to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) since the World War II (p. 89). One could then state that patterns of displacement of state power within governmental power have also been correlated with the patterns of state power displacement in the system governance of higher education. Hence, the delegation of powers and responsibilities "either downwards (decentralization, localisation), upwards (inter-, trans-nationalisation) or to the side (de-regulation, privatisation, self-organisation)" has been embedded in the system governance of distinct higher education systems (Enders, 2004, p. 368), which could be linked to the replacement of the welfare state approach with the "regulatory state" approach (King, 2007). Dean (1999) discusses the critiques of the welfare state approach of totality or unity towards population as "a paternalist mechanism of social control, relying on a uniform provision that is bureaucratic, hierarchical, sometimes coercive and oppressive, and often unresponsive to the needs and differences of individuals

and communities” (p. 152). Yet, with the shift to “remote steering at a distance” following the NPM reforms (King, 2007, p. 415), encompassing a more strategic view of the states in the controlling and planning of the public services, the regulatory state approach, implying less direct state intervention yet increase in governmental involvement in the delivery of the public services, has been common in the system governance of higher education (Austin & Jones, 2016). While the steering approach in the wielding of the state power has been taken on as normalcy in Continental or Chinese higher education systems, in Anglo-Saxon systems, it has been regarded as more intrusive (Austin & Jones, 2016; King, 2007). One could then state that integration of market-based approaches into the system governance has changed the nature of the state power in the system governance, having different connotations in different higher education systems. State power displacement to multiple levels also mirrors the incorporation of stakeholder power into the system governance of higher education, creating “corporate networks” in the system governance (Maassen, 2000, p. 379) and reflecting different voices and interests of internal and external stakeholders such as “staff unions, professional associations, industry or regional authorities” and Ministries of Education as one of the stakeholders among a heterogeneity of voices and interests (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000, p. 271).

The interests from multiple levels integrated in the system governance suggest adding of the third mission of economic and social development to the research and teaching missions of higher education (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). As knowledge and innovation were considered to be the strategic levers in the attainment of national goals reflected with the promotion of knowledge-based economies, “governing knowledges” in the apparently interdependent policymaking

and so in the government of the system governance has been of importance (Ball, 2010, p. 134). Placing of knowledge and innovation strategic to economic and social development has not only spawned stakeholder interest but also public interest in higher education. For instance, more than 18,000 universities holding more than 170 million students set an example to the increased worldwide demand in participation to higher education (UNESCO, 2017) and so to the tendencies towards universal higher education (Trow, 2006). The increasing higher education enrollment rates from 10% in 1970 to 19% in 2000 and to 35% in 2015 further exemplify the strategic role of higher education in not only national development but also in individual development (UNESCO, 2017). Then, with the growing importance of application of theoretical knowledge or the knowledge of professionals with science in the path for national economic and social development in an increasingly competitive global arena (Bell, 1973; Task Force on Higher Education and Society, 2000), one way of solidarizing interests and mobilizing interest groups in the system governance could be said to be through the facilitation of professionalization by means of the massification strategy and formal and informal differentiation by means of the competition strategy. That is, higher education institutions as insurance institutions of the state have been charged with being responsive to economic and social needs by producing the required knowledge and professional expertise and skills in the existing higher education institutions and new higher education institutions have been established in sync with the needs of the people and with the requirements of the changing nature of the society.

Based on the recognition of knowledge and innovation as central to economic and social development, deprofessionalization could also be identified in the operation of the system governance. For instance, by the end of 1980s, the NPM

reforms, which encouraged the transferring of public sector management structures from the private sector and thus resulted in the reconfiguration of systems of higher education to increase the “productivity, efficiency, and relevance” of academic work (Bleiklie et al., 2010, p. 1) led university leaders to be assigned managerial roles (Ferlie et al., 2009). The emphasis on “the executive leadership” in universities and application of business methods through “managerial instruments (strategic plans, audits, etc.) [and] tools (management software for instance)” could set an example to the process of deprofessionalization (Ferlie et al., 2009, p. 8). Another aspect of this process could be suggested as relevant to the entrepreneurial roles of academics which connect with the second academic revolution, “the translation of research findings into intellectual property, a marketable commodity, and economic development” (Etzkowitz & Webster, 1998, p. 21) so that universities can take on more entrepreneurial tasks in devising strategies to contribute to the third mission of economic development (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). In other words, the second academic revolution, which could be also called as academic capitalist knowledge regime (Bleiklie & Kogan, 2007), academic capitalism (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997), or academic entrepreneurship (Mok, 2005), has taken place in “enterprised” and “hybridised” higher education institutions through the convergence of powers among a multiplicity of authorities (Ball, 2010, p. 134). There have been tendencies towards aligning disciplines and research practices with governmental policies and market demands and so encouraging academics to conduct research in congruence with governmental policies and market demands (Evans, 2009). Hence, deprofessionalization which seems to be expressed through corporatization and managerialism strategies in the system governance could be said to take its power from intimate relations between universities, states, and industries.

A corollary of close ties between universities, states, and industries has been a variation of the corporate-pluralist, supermarket steering (Olsen, 1988), and state supervision models (van Vught, 1993) in the system governance. That is, there seems to have been “a universal trend” towards the integration of more market-based models to governing of higher education institutions at the system level (Austin & Jones, 2016, p. 239), featuring the end of the transition period from top-down traditional system governance models to alternative system governance models (Muller et al., 2002). In such models, the state control is not direct, as it changes form to enhanced management processes in higher education institutions. In this new form, the regulatory state sets the broad parameters and supervision is set through a variety of changes in the structure of governing bodies, senates, and councils and in the decision-making mechanisms through the integration of interest groups and strategic management approaches and through the diffusion of the decision-making power. Hence, supervision takes the features of what van Vught (1993) refers to as the “managerial professionalism” (p. 10) or what Bleiklie and Kogan refers to as “public managerialist regime” (p. 488) and governmental steering of state supervision or “steering at a distance” model is encouraged in the system governance (Muller et al., 2002, p. 301). The state is thus considered as a “bookkeeper” in guaranteeing the integration of market forces into public institutions and public institutions are regarded as corporations in a competitive market where there is no dominant actor in public policymaking as a consequence of the decentralization (Olsen, 1988, p. 242). Hence, Triple Helix III model (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000) could be said to exemplify university-industry-government relationship in the adding of the third of mission of economic development to research and teaching.

Denoting a universal trend, convergence of powers at multiple levels in the policymaking seems to lead to “a convergence of governance” around policymaking around the globe (Ball, 2010, p. 134), which in turn could be said to lead to the operation of unification in the system governance of higher education institutions. For instance, Rizvi and Lingard (2006) state that the OECD has contributed educational institutions to become similar in their structures and practices with its emphasis on new governance principles such as strategic planning, effectiveness, efficiency, performativity, and competition and thus has stimulated what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) call as institutional isomorphism by unifying the universities around the same ideals through a standardization strategy for the engagement of new governance principles. Also, the establishment of American style higher education institutions in the Persian Gulf region via transnational initiatives (Noori & Andersen, 2013) and regional level initiatives such as Bologna Process in Europe (Dobbins and Leišyte, 2014; Dobbins & Knill, 2017) and the MERCOSUR-Educativo in South America (Chou & Ravinet, 2017; Jayasuriya & Robertson, 2010), and the formation of ASEAN in South-East Asia (Mok, 2011) could be given as examples to policy convergence over market-driven system governance of higher education which might trigger the operation of unification in the individual systems by means of the standardized procedures. Hence, via “regulatory regionalism” (Jayasuriya, 2008), which is an “approach [that] emphasizes the constitution of broad regional regulatory projects within the institutional spaces of the state” (Jayasuriya & Robertson, 2010, p. 3), besides a unification process through policy convergence outside the national boundaries, a unification process within the national boundaries through policy instruments such as national/federal legislations and regulations could be stimulated in the system governance in legitimizing what comes out of these new

modes of governance arising from power to power relations at different levels. One could then state that while formal and informal differentiation processes which aim for stratified systems with clear goals and objectives have been encouraged in the system governance (Task Force on Higher Education and Society, 2000), a counter process of unification could be driven by these differentiation processes as a consequence of the promotion of similar policies based on a legitimized policy convergence process. Therefore, legitimation based on the state power mobilized through the unique mix of bureaucratization, rationalization, and universalization strategies within the national boundaries could be said to act as a unifying and/or differentiating mechanism. As Dobbins and Knill (2017) argue, the national capacity of a country to embrace challenges combined with their cultural, historical, national, and political legacies strongly influences the way targeted changes emerging from deterritorialized practices of those who govern are reterritorialized in the individual higher education systems.

Concomitant with these processes and practices of multiple powers and adding of the third mission of economic and social development to the research and teaching missions has been a redefinition of governance indicators. To put it differently, the question left to be answered is, as Miller and Rose (2008) put it, “[h]ow can a few ‘make a difference’?” (p. 146). First, tendencies towards increased institutional autonomy and academic freedom could be identified in the system governance of higher education institutions pursuant to the engagement of stakeholder power and market-driven system governance models, directing attention to the delegation of powers. A shift to less direct governmental involvement through the three types of delegation of powers in recent higher education reforms within mass or universal higher education systems could be noted as stated by Fielden

(2008) in a World Bank report titled *Global Trends in University Governance*: “the delegation of powers by central government to another lower tier of government, delegation to a specialised buffer body, or delegation direct to institutions themselves” (p. 14). For instance, the Ministries of Education have taken on a more coordinating function in some European and transition countries as have been practiced in Australia, Canada, Germany, and the US. In many countries, one or more buffer bodies, intermediary organizations, have been established, which have mostly been given responsibility by the Ministries of Education in regard to “all matters relating to funding and operational management” as the coordinating and planning body in the system governance (Fielden, 2008, p. 15). Examples include councils on higher education and funding and quality assurance agencies. Hence, indirect governmental influence has not implied total authority of higher education institutions in the system governance, but has implied the “replacement of government influence” by buffer body power (McDaniel, 1996, p. 141). Fielden (2008) identifies the key areas in which the Ministries of Education or buffer bodies would maintain direct control as follows:

(1) review and approval of draft statutes/articles of incorporation before a university is given autonomous status, (2) grant of degree granting powers to a new public or private institution, (3) setting a cap on the total student numbers overall funded by the state and the totals in selected high cost areas. (p. 19)

Higher education institutions have been given “modified autonomy” in the areas such as pay scales and opening up of new academic programs while states have been reluctant to give up full control over the appointment or selection of university presidents or chairs of university boards (Fielden, 2008, p. 20). In OECD countries, eight areas have been identified as the key areas where different higher education institutions in different higher education systems have gained varying degrees of

autonomy, “(1) own their buildings and equipment, (2) borrow funds, (3) spend budgets to achieve their objectives, (4) set academic structure/course content, (5) employ and dismiss academic staff, (6) set salaries, (7) decide size of student enrolment, (8) decide level of tuition fees” (OECD, 2003, p. 63). Differing degrees of institutional autonomy and academic freedom could be said to concern by whom decisions have been made over public policymaking. For decision-making structure seems to have become fragmented with the involvement of bottom up (forced cooperation power), top-down (governmental power), intermediary (buffer body power), and multiple levels (stakeholder power) in the decision-making process and so seems to have aimed for an outward-looking decision making. This suggests that the autonomy of higher education institutions has been a result of their ability in being responsive to the market and their proactivity in taking steps for engaging in self-regulating, capacity building activities for survival in a competitive environment, also pointing out the reasons for direct/indirect government influence in higher education (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000).

As a corollary, tendencies towards increased accountability and transparency mechanisms with an emphasis on the quality of the output rather than the process of the input could be identified in the system governance of higher education institutions. Examples of this tendency are to be seen in the development of regulatory quality assurance mechanisms such as strategic plans, audits, performance indicators, performance-based funding, and reporting on performance and accreditation agencies (Ferlie et al., 2009; Fielden, 2008). In addition, international comparison to which Rizvi and Lingard (2006, p. 257) refer to as “global rationalization” has been a common practice in the efforts towards an increase in accountability and transparency. The OECD’s *Education at a Glance: OECD*

Indicators, World Bank's KAM benchmarking tool, and international rankings set examples to such type of comparison. Building world-class universities seems to have been critical to national policymaking (Wang et al., 2013). Such practices targeted at the promotion of accountability and transparency yet have been argued to decrease the value of knowledge in turn for the integration of performance indicators and competitiveness (Rizvi & Lingard, 2006; Robertson, 2009), suggesting a shift to defining higher education as a "commodity" in the free-trade context and increased stakeholder power in the system governance (Altbach & Knight, 2007, p. 291; Altbach, 2015). Then favoring of deregulation by the regulatory state's governmental steering approach and so by the reduction of detailed and strict rules and regulations in the system governance seems to have been replaced with "indicators, criteria, and targets", which could yield low institutional autonomy and push ambiguity in the system governance environment (van Vught, 1993, p. 31).

Thus conceived, financing has been an issue of concern in the operation of system governance within mass or universal higher education systems. It seems that increased enrollment rates in higher education have not been matched with a proportional increase in public expenditure, resulting in increased budget-tightening and governmental regulation (Tilak, 2006). That's why, in place of a solely state-based funding, with a purpose of ensuring efficiency in policy implementation, governments have asked higher education institutions to be self-funding and diversify their funding, and so hybrid financing systems benefiting from both public and private purse have been encouraged (Grau et al., 2017; Mok, 2011; Task Force on Higher Education and Society, 2000; van Vught, 1993). Income generation through tri-lateral networks and hybrid organizations developing in university-state-industry relations and overseas alliances and partnerships could set examples to this.

Also, increased governmental interest in the knowledge and expertise of academics for the attainment of national goals and policies could be noted as another source of creating revenue given that academics have “often” welcomed such governmental attention for extra funding possibilities (Bleiklie & Kogan, 2007; Evans, 2009, p. 288). This point could be taken one step further by suggesting that neutralization of resistance has been a part of the operation of the system governance through the dependency and empowerment strategies as was from the nineteenth century and to 1980s. On the one hand, new dependencies have developed in accordance with the changes to the regulatory policy instruments and national higher education frameworks. On the other hand, higher education has attained a critical role in the realization of national goals and interests, resulting in tendencies towards increased institutional autonomy and academic freedom.

It is important to note that these indicators may act differently and in different combinations within different higher education systems depending on the context and interactions of processes and strategies operating in the system governance arising from multi-layered and fragmented power relationships. As the Greek philosopher Heraclitus stated, “you can not step twice into the same river, because other waters are continually flowing on”; thus, states seem to have adapted their traditional policy instruments to the changing nature of the global environment so that they can protect their power not only at the national level but also at other levels (Morgan, 1986, p. 233 as cited in Pierre & Peters, 2000, p. 103). For the imposition of detailed and coercive instruments could produce inefficiency and create a counterproductive process, calling into attention a move towards “softer instruments” in the system governance (Pierre & Peters, 2000, p. 105). What could be termed as reflexive regulation could then be identified as a mode of coordination arising in the

multi-faceted relationships among the different lines of authorities. First, since 1980s, dynamics emerging from globalization, neoliberalism, knowledge-based society, NPM, multilateralism, internationalization, transnationalism, regionalism, and technological advancements have embedded new risks that have required taking actions beyond the national boundaries (Dean, 1999). That is to say, “reflexive modernization”, “self-confrontation with the effects of risk society that cannot be assimilated in the system of industrial society”, seems to have been practiced (Beck, 1994, p. 6), resulting in “forced mixing” of borders and hence cultures, peoples, and institutions (Beck & Sznaider, 2006, p. 10). Second, governments seem to have become reflexive in their practices, culminating into the emergence of what could be called as “reflexive government” (Dean, 1999, p. 193). Micro-economic reforms targeted at, for instance, increasing competitiveness of public sectors, integrating corporatization and privatization into the provision and delivery of public services, and financial deregulation could be said to be put into place due to the difficulty of building up a macro-economic policy in the face of multiple forces coming from different levels (Dean, 1999). Hence, in order to boost their performance relative to other countries, governments seem to have sought for increased efficiency, competitiveness, and relevance of institutions through micro-economic reforms. Besides, a proliferation of softer policy instruments via accountability and transparency mechanisms has been allied to the risk management giving way to the increased indirect regulation of institutions by means of, for example, devolution of powers and engagement of quality-assurance mechanisms such as strategic plans, audits, performance indicators, performance-based funding, and reporting on performance and accreditation agencies (Dean, 1999). For governments have been concerned with governing “the risks to taxpayers, shareholders and governments of

the activities of public servants, state professionals, community organizations and their workers, state-owned enterprises, and private companies and their management” (Dean, 1999, p. 195). Henceforth, one could state that system governance within mass or universal higher education systems since 1980s has faced the emergence of new types of power, stakeholder power and buffer body power, in power to power interactions between the potestas (state power and governmental power) and the potentia (forced cooperation power), leading to variations in the potentia agendi, “collective and cooperative capacity to act” and so in the empowerment of both potestas and potentia, impacting the coordination of the system and the nature and boundaries of the institutional autonomy, academic freedom, accountability, transparency, and financing (Rehmann, 2017, p.1). The variations in the system governance as a process since 1980s could be summarized as shown in Figure 8.




Figure 8. System governance as a process from 1980s onwards

Rhizomatic system governance

Borrowing from biology, Deleuze and Guattari (2005) famously use the metaphor “rhizome” to explain the connectivity between the things, which becomes clearer when compared with the concept of a tree. A tree has a clear starting point and all the branches come out of that starting point, indicating a centralized and hierarchical structure which forms an organic whole in a sequential one-directional manner. On the contrary, a rhizome is multiform, non-hierarchical, and has no center, for it operates by means of the principles of “connection”, “heterogeneity”, and “multiplicity” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 7). Hence, “any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an order”, given that it denotes an interwoven system which is constantly deterritorialized and reterritorialized and so “defined by the outside . . . according to which they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, pp. 7, 9). Although it can be broken at any point, it will “asignify rupture” and continue to grow in an uninterrupted manner by taking a new form (p. 9) Based on these tenets, it could be suggested that system governance of higher education has a rhizomatic character. Starting from the medieval ages, system governance was, and still is, complex and fragmented. Yet, its complexity and fragmentation have taken new forms despite the ruptures in it. It entailed, and still entails, a plurality of power relationships. Yet, the empowerment of both potestas and potentia has changed over time with the redefinition of the both and adding of the new lines of authorities. The system governance structure was, and still is, multilevel and multi-layered as also reflected in the discussions on new medievalism (e.g. Noori & Andersen, 2013), to which Cerny (1998) referred to as neomedievalism within the context of the political science. Pedersen (1997) in his

book *The First Universities* states “[t]he universities of our date are in many ways legitimate children of medieval parents, and many of our present difficulties on closer inspection, appear to have been built into the system right from the beginning” (ix). That is to say, a complex web of processes has taken place over time that reterritorialized multi-level governance structure and present difficulties in the system governance.

A suggestion of rhizomatic system governance character might offer an explanation for the move from tree-like traditional system governance model of higher education, the academic self-rule model, the state control model or the sovereign, rationality-bounded steering model to rhizome-like alternative system governance models and for the changing relations among university-state-industry as reflected through Triple Helix models. A genealogy of the system governance of higher education starting from the medieval ages has shown, for instance, that a multiplicity of intertwined relations and interests and constantly changing processes and practices with different historical trajectories have led changes to hierarchies, indicating embedding of a rhizomatic character in the system governance. Therefore, it might be suggested that a centralized, top-down, and interventionist approach to system governance of higher education might yield counterproductive processes, resulting in inefficiency in the running of a higher education system. In addition, the studies on the blending of the global, local, national, and international could be said to mirror a rhizomatic system governance character. According to Marginson and Rhoades’s (2002) “glonacal agency heuristic”, national and local agencies and actions can also shape global patterns, for the interaction between the three levels depends on simultaneous flows, not on linear flows from the global to the local, which could be said to bear a similarity with Beck and Sznaider’s (2006) “reflexive”

and “internalized” cosmopolitanism and Robertson’s (1997) “glocalization” in terms of the dynamic dialogue between the global and the local forces. This reminds that a rhizome has no center and “any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 7). Ignorance of one level, either global, local, national, or international then could yield inefficiency and create a counterproductive process in the achievement of national development in the face of continuously changing global reality which calls for “glocal engagement” (Grau et al., 2017, p. 49) and a “globally focused and locally engaged” approach (Moreso and Casadesús, 2017, p. 201) in the system governance of higher education institutions (e.g. Noori & Andersen, 2013).

Summary of section 2.1.3

The literature review has focused on reconstructing the term governance and its constituent elements within the context of system governance of higher education using the patterns and themes from the first section, Balance of power: Dynamics of change and from the second section, System governance models of higher education. An analytics of government perspective to the reconstruction process has been taken by extending its territorially bounded historical and geographical focus to regional, transnational, and global frames of references with an intention of exploring how different practices with different historical trajectories have come together to shape the operation of the system governance of higher education in the present. After defining system governance as a process, a genealogy of the system governance of higher education has been attempted starting from the medieval ages (1100-1500). The reconstruction process has culminated into identifying modes of operation, strategies that might be associated with these modes of operation, forms of power, instruments, mission, governance indicators, modes of governance, mode of

coordination, and models, which could be said to characterize the how of system governance as a process within each specific period. Based on these tenets, it has been suggested that system governance has a rhizomatic character drawing on the principles of connection, heterogeneity, multiplicity, and asignifying rupture, which seem to have been embedded in the system governance as a process right from the beginning.

2.2 Part 2: System governance of higher education in Turkey

2.2.1 Balance of power: Dynamics of change

In this section, based on the structural growth and the turning points in the history of Turkish higher education, I deconstruct the system governance of higher education in Turkey by organizing it into three sub-sections: Phase I: From 1923 to 1991, Phase II: 1992 to 2005, and Phase III: 2006 onwards. In each sub-section, I discuss the evolution of the system governance considering the dynamics of change and the power shifts between the authorities, trace the emerging system governance models along with the power shifts, and examine the evolution of the structure of CoHE and explore the role of CoHE in the system governance over a variety of historical trajectories. My strategy in this deconstruction process is patterning the power shifts in the balance of power. My approach is guided by power transition theory, which is “a theory of dynamics” (Siverson & Miller, 1996, p. 58), and what Cowen (2009) calls a transitology, which is like a “lightning flash, illuminates simultaneously the forms of expression of social power (economic, political, and cultural) in the ‘educational system’ and it shows, briefly and brilliantly the *shifts* in those compressions of social power in educational form” (p. 1287, emphasis in original).

2.2.1.1 Phase I: From 1923 to 1991

The Republic of Turkey was proclaimed on October 29, 1923. As a secular nation-state, it was targeted at a radical transformation in the social, cultural, political, and economic context inherited from the Ottoman Empire, leading to the redefinition of the notion of citizenship (Berkes, 1964; Köker, 2001). The type of nationalism described in the writings of Ziya Gökalp was not only driven by individualism and cosmopolitanism but also by locality and the newly constructed notion of citizenship was not only grounded in freedom but also in enlightenment in the absence of an Enlightenment period (Kadıoğlu, 2005). Within this modernization context associated with secularism, educational institutions had a key role for “educating the citizens of a nation-state turned secular, a state made of the former subjects of a multiethnic theocratic empire: it meant transforming an *ümmet* – a community of Muslims – into a modern society firmly grounded in lay Western values” (Barblan et al., 2008, p. 20, emphasis in original).

During the Single-Party Period that lasted from 1923 until 1946, with the enactment of the Law of the Unity of Education in 1924, all religious schools and madrasas¹⁰ were closed down, and the Darülfünun (The House of Sciences)¹¹ gained importance as the only higher education institution and was given corporate status in the same year (Erdem, 2012; Namal & Karakök, 2011). However, the existence of the institution spawned reactions mainly for two reasons: First, despite the given

¹⁰ Madrasa is derived from the Arabic word *madrāsah* and refers to a college where the curricular content heavily draws on religious sciences. The Nizamiye Madrasa founded in Baghdad in 1067 is accepted as the first madrasa that prototyped the later Ottoman madrasas (Gürüz, 2016; İhsanoğlu, 2010a; Makdisi, 1981).

¹¹ The Darülfünun was established in 1863 to meet the needs for a university and to raise the skilled workforce needed in the Ottoman period. It was given the name Darülfünun rather than university to prevent the reactions from the madrasas. Although it was closed down a few times, it was reorganized each time and reopened (İhsanoğlu, 2010b; Makdisi, 1981; Namal & Karakök, 2011). With the statutes issued in 1919 [Darülfünun-i Osmani Nizamnamesi], the institution was given scientific and administrative autonomy [ilmi, idari muhtariyet] (Çelik & Gür, 2014, p. 23). The rector [Darülfünun Emni] was to be elected from among the professors and to be appointed by the Ministry of Education [Maarif Nezareti].

privileges and the autonomy, it was argued to be academically away from relating to the challenges of the society and improving itself to stay responsive to the demands of the society. Second, it seemed not to be willing to take an active role in the advancement of the Republican reforms. For instance, it was criticized for standing against the launching of the Latin Alphabet in 1928, which changed the medium of written and oral delivery in higher education institutions. Upon the heated discussions, Professor Albert Malche from Geneva University in Switzerland was invited by Atatürk to prepare a report on the Darülfünun. In his report of 1932, Malche identified the accountability and autonomy as important issues for concern in the development of Turkish higher education (Yavuz, 2012). According to Malche, there was no mechanism to reinforce the accountability and the social relevance of the Darülfünun although these were as important as its scientific autonomy and corporate body status. There was a need for state powers to be engaged in the governance of the Darülfünun by means of the Ministry of National Education as self-regulation bore the risk of forming of academic oligarchy within the institution. Also, in Malche's view, the current way of election of the rectors by the professors needed to be changed with the appointment by non-academics to prevent fragmentation within the institution. Reading carefully the report of Malche, Atatürk took further notes on it in regard to the structural, academic, and organizational issues to be considered in the foundation of the new university, and in 1933 by Law No. 2252, the Darülfünun was closed and the opening up of İstanbul University was approved (Erdem, 2012; Namal & Karakök, 2011). For Atatürk, the purpose of the reform was to found a scientific university similar to the ones in the Western world (Berkes, 1964).

The 1933 University Reform

With the 1933 University Reform, İstanbul University was placed under the authority of the Ministry and the Ministry was authorized for the establishment of the new university. The President of the Republic and the Prime Minister together appointed the rector upon nomination by the Minister of Education and the rector was the central authority within the university as the representative of the Minister of Education (Doğramacı, 2007; Okçabol, 2007). Turan (2010) states that the government did not intervene in the University's daily affairs after its political stance reflected the Republican political spectrum and defines the period from 1933 to 1946 as one of "institutionalization" and "professionalization" (p. 145). The invitation of foreign professors by Atatürk to teach in Turkey contributed to the establishment of "quality, professional institutions" and so to the "institutionalization" of the university (Turan, 2010, p. 145). For the newly hired mostly Jewish professors who fled from Nazi Germany brought their experience with the systems of higher education to the newly built system of higher education and the increased numbers of publications from 1933 to 1946 indicated for an improvement in the higher education (Doğramacı, 2007). Hence, setting a model for the future changes, the University Reform has been considered a turning point in the history of Turkish higher education (Erdem, 2012; Namal & Karakök, 2011). On the other hand, within this period, the institutionalization and the professionalization of the new university were not free from the direct state intervention. Most of the faculty members were dismissed because of their ideological views, harming academic freedom (Günay, 2004; Seggie & Gökbel, 2015) and bringing conformity to the spirit of the Single-Party Period (Kafadar, 2002). In this sense, state Seggie and Gökbel (2015), some referred to the reform as "a liquidation operation" (p. 18). Furthermore, the new

university lost its institutional autonomy under the authority of the Ministry (Çelik & Gür, 2014). Henceforth, Yavuz (2012) notes, the period could be seen as the embedding of the centralization in the system governance of Turkish higher education.

The 1946 university legislation: Law No. 4936

By the year 1946, two new universities, İstanbul Technical University (f. 1944) and Ankara University (f. 1946) were founded, raising the issue of the system governance of these three institutions. On the one hand, as there was no countrywide coordination among the higher education institutions, a uniform common framework was a need (Turan, 2010). On the other hand, during the transition process from the Single-Party Period to Multi-Party Period in 1946, pressures for democratization and institutional autonomy against the centralization incorporated into the system with the 1933 University Reform became a focal point for the election campaigns (Kafadar, 2002). Although the representative government did not change, a new university legislation (Law No. 4936) was passed in 1946.

Law No. 4936 conferred institutional autonomy to the three universities. According to the new reform, besides the university itself, each of the faculties was also recognized as having a corporate status and was granted the right to select their own rectors and deans and to form university senates (Yavuz, 2012). With the law, academic appointments and promotions and also academic ranks were standardized, and research was defined in the law as one of the missions of the universities. Henceforth, with its emphasis on autonomy, research, and corporate status, the law has been considered an important move in the restructuring of the modern higher education system in Turkey (Kafadar, 2002). Nevertheless, the granted scientific and administrative autonomy was argued to have led to a re-interpretation of autonomy

as having full powers in the election of rectors and deans from among the faculty members, meaning an “artificial immunity” on the side of the faculty and an absence of the accreditation, transparency, and supervision mechanisms on the side of the government (Doğramacı, 2007, p. 16). On the other hand, the ministerial tutelage over the three autonomous universities went on and the Minister of National Education was empowered as the head of the system with the supervisory authority as the representative of the governmental power (Barblan et al., 2008; Turan, 2010). With such supervisory authority, the Minister had the right to return decisions to university senates and decisions of university senates were subject to the approval or disapproval of the Minister. The Minister also held the power to send the decisions to the Inter-University Board (Üniversiteler Kanunu [University Legislation], 1946, p. 10780). The Inter-University Board, chaired by the Minister, was established by the same law to set standards and was composed of the rectors and deans and also one representative from each senate, where the Minister had “veto powers” (Barblan et al., 2008, p. 32). Hence, the limits of autonomy were defined by “the limits of republican ideology” (Turan, 2010, p.147). Also, such dualism in the system governance between the top-down and bottom-up authorities was harmful to the coordination of the system and such practice of institutional autonomy led to the arbitrary dismissals of faculty members by university senates, creating imbalances in the system governance and damaging the academic freedom (Seggie & Gökbel, 2015). It is important to note that expulsion of faculty members from the universities did not seem to invoke reactions within the universities, indicating that violations in the academic freedom of the faculty members were not viewed as violations in the institutional autonomy of the universities, where institutional autonomy was mainly framed around having administrative powers (Gür & Çelik, 2011).

New governmental policies

Following the elections of 1950, which represented a change in the government and ended the rule of the Republican Peoples' Party (CHP), the Democrat Party (DP) came to power. The new government policies supported the free market system, which Barblan et al. (2008) called as the entrance to “an era of true multiparty democracy and mixed economy” accompanied with such developments as joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (p. 33). Pursuing international alliances not only meant closer ties to the western world but also meant an intellectual integration beyond the territories of the nation-state.

On the one hand, within the universities, there were oppositions against the government in power, impairing the operation of the system governance of higher education (Karakök, 2011; Turan, 2010). While the government defended their policies to be in favor of a “bureaucratic-intellectual elite”, the “defenders of the republican revolution” within the universities and the previous government’s relations with the “universities as a natural ally” seemed to have formed the basis of the fragmentation in the system (Turan, 2010, p. 147). As a response, in 1953, the government prohibited faculty members from political activity (Turan, 2010) and in 1954 with the Law No. 6435, the Minister of Education was given the powers to remove faculty members from their positions, increasing the ministerial tutelage over the universities (Yavuz, 2012). On the other hand, in spite of the politically volatile environment, in congruence with the expansion policies in economy, the government took steps in furthering the higher education to respond to the need for a skilled workforce, resulting in the opening up of four new universities from 1955 to 1957: Atatürk University (AU) in Erzurum, Ege University (EU) in İzmir, Karadeniz Technical University (KTU) in Trabzon, and Middle East Technical University

(METU) in Ankara. The newly established universities represented the biggest step in the expansion of higher education to the smaller cities of the country (Günay & Günay, 2011) and METU also represented a significant change in the system governance of Turkish higher education (Gürüz, 2008; Kurt, 2015).

METU model

METU is the first university in the country governed by a board of trustees of nine members (Kurt, 2015; Yavuz, 2012). The members were appointed by the President of Republic upon nomination by the Minister of Education and were responsible for the running and the supervision of the university and so acted as the decision-making mechanism in the system governance typical of an Anglo-American tradition. The rector was appointed directly by the Board from among academics or nonacademics and the Board had the powers to terminate or maintain the length of the duty. A third of these Board members' terms of duty were renewed every three years, contributing to the continuity of the governance and preventing the appointing mechanism from mobilizing their interests into the running of the Board (Gürüz, 2008). Other than the appointment of the Board members, the board-government relation was based on the financial matters of the university. The Ministry had the final say over the budget prepared and managed by the Board and the financial reporting process was accompanied by the ministerial oversight during the year over the use of resources, creating a balance between decision making powers involved in the system governance of METU (Yavuz, 2012). METU's budget was based on a lump-sum approach to budgeting by the government, leaving discretionary powers to the Board, while a more specific line item budget approach was taken in the budgeting of the other six universities. Such an approach to the system governance was discussed to have contributed to the development and recognition of METU way

faster than the other universities (Doğramacı, 2007). Yet, the approach to the system governance in METU placed it at the center of debates, for the existence of an external body appointing the rector and the deans was seen as a threat to the institutional autonomy, heralding a direct link between elections and institutional autonomy (Gürüz, 2008).

The 1960 military coup

Upon the military coup on May 27, 1960, the National Unity Committee, consisting of the members of the junta, assumed powers over the elected DP government, which was followed by superseding of the 1946 university law and enactment of Law No. 114 and Law No. 115. The former resulted in the expulsion of 147 faculty members from the universities on the basis of their inadequate qualifications and the later terminated the wielding of the ministerial powers over the universities (Gür & Çelik, 2011). Thus, the changed law removed the head of the universities position of the Minister. Also, Article 120 of the 1961 Constitution which came after the university law redefined the institutional autonomy and re-contextualized the system governance of higher education, providing that “Universities are public corporate bodies enjoying academic and administrative autonomy” and “Universities shall be administered and supervised by organs consisting of qualified members of the teaching staff elected from among themselves” (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası [Constitution of the Republic of Turkey], 1961, p. 4650). That is to say, the 1961 constitutional protection for the practice of institutional autonomy granted the universities full autonomy in the system governance of higher education without further questioning of their practices. For instance, university senates only reported their decisions to the Minister without being subject to the approval/disapproval of their decisions, which also had been

made clear in the Constitution (Yavuz, 2012). The Minister could return decisions, yet did not have any powers in the decision-making process of university senates or the Inter-University Board, resulting in disengagement among the state, public, and the universities, and thus a governance gap in the absence of an accountability mechanism. This liberal outlook combined with the universities' role in the military coup, argues Turan (2010), gave way to the mistrust and notoriety as "partisan institutions" for the universities on the side of the public (p. 149).

Hacettepe University model

Another important change that came with the 1961 Constitution and deepened the system governance gap was related to the appointment of the Board of METU (Gürüz, 2008). While a third of the Board members' terms of duty were renewed every three years previously, it was changed to the renewal of all the members every three years and also the appointment of professors from other universities as the head of the Board became possible. In search of a new system governance model, in 1967, Hacettepe University was founded (Doğramacı, 2007). Within other universities, except METU, the rector was elected for two years from among the professors, and at the end of the two-year term of their office, a new rector from another faculty was elected. However, in Hacettepe University, the rector was to be elected by the Senate for five years in place of the involvement of all the professors within the university in the election process. At the end of their five-year term of office, they could be reelected every year, but there was three-year limit to the reelection. That approach to the election process of the rectors contributed to the integration of the University in the system and prevented the election campaigns, focusing the institutional preferences on the improvement of the University, which had been evident through its success in a short period of time after its establishment.

Boğaziçi University model

Another example of the search for a model in the system governance was experienced during the integration process of Boğaziçi University into the higher education system. The University was founded in 1971 as a public institution transformed from Robert College, and what made its establishment different was the three-year transition period given to the University before its full engagement with the Law No. 4936 (Yavuz, 2012). During the transition period that lasted until 1978, the University was placed under the Ministry, which had the powers to appoint the rector and to approve/disapprove the decisions of the administrative body of the University. Budgeting approach was similar to that of METU and so budget transfer from the previous to the following year was possible. Although a three-year transition period was planned, the University's full engagement with the system was realized in 1978.

The 1971 military intervention

By the end of 1960s, the system governance gap was also felt through campus unrest, student boycotts of classes, and so through a breakdown of order in campuses, providing the grounds for a restoring order back explanation to the military intervention of March 12, 1971 (Çelik & Gür, 2014). The intervention, “a coup by memorandum”, led the Justice Party (AP) government to be replaced by “an above-party, or technocratic government” (Özbudun, 2000, pp. 33, 34). Among the objectives of the technocrats were the addressing of political violence, strengthening of the authority through the amendments to the 1961 Constitution, and implementation of social reforms (Özbudun, 2000). Hence, amendments to Article 120 of the 1961 Constitution were released, having implications for the system governance. First, “academic” and “administrative” components of autonomy were

excluded from the sentence describing autonomy and universities were defined as “public corporate bodies enjoying autonomy” (Üniversiteler [Universities], 1971, p. 3). Second, the sentence “Universities shall be administered and supervised by organs consisting of qualified members of the teaching staff elected from among themselves” was changed with the insertion of the statement “under the supervision and observation of the state...” at the beginning of the paragraph (Üniversiteler [Universities], 1971, p. 3). Third, the government, with the approval of the Parliament, was given the powers to take over the university administration provided that freedom was in danger in universities (Günay & Günay, 2017). Such detailed description in Article 120 was illustrative of the misuse of institutional autonomy by the universities, for academic freedom of both students and faculty members was under threat within this period (Gür & Çelik, 2011).

The 1973 university legislation: Law No. 1750

Turkey went through an interim period following the 1971 military intervention and during this period that lasted until parliamentary elections held in fall 1973, a new university law (Law No. 1750) was passed in June 1973. As it was binding for all of the universities except METU, it removed the unique status of Hacettepe University in the system governance of higher education (Doğramacı, 2007). Another critical point about the 1973 law was the establishment of two new supreme bodies, the Council of Higher Education and the University Audit Board, detailed in the Supreme Bodies section under the title of State Supervision and Observation (Üniversiteler Kanunu [University Legislation], 1973), indicating a search for a system governance model. First, the Council of Higher Education (CoHE), also referred to as the First CoHE, was specified as the supreme body responsible for the coordination and steering of the university sector. Chaired by the

Ministry of National Education, it was to include one representative from each university elected from among professors by university senates and an equal number of members appointed upon recommendation of the Minister of Education by the Council of Ministers, who were to serve for two years (Barblan et al., 2008). The criteria for the latter included the appointment of at least one member from the Ministry of Finance, the State Planning Organization, and the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey.

Second, the University Audit Board, affiliated to the Prime Ministry, was to ensure the state supervision and observation over the universities and was in legal terms provided with broad rights competent of – e.g. requesting oral or written information from universities and proposing initiation of disciplinary proceedings against university members, and taking action themselves if there were delays in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings (Üniversiteler Kanunu [University Legislation], 1973). It was to be headed by the Prime Minister and, on a permanent basis, the Minister of National Education, the Minister of Justice, and the Under-Secretary of the State Planning Organization (SPO) had to be included in the Board. Besides these two new bodies, the Inter-University Board, formed with the 1946 university legislation, was confirmed as the third supreme body and given advisory powers in academic matters. The Board was formed by the rectors of all universities and two professors elected by their senates. Hence, different from the 1946 university legislation, membership did not include the participation of deans. Additional to these arrangements was the change to the term of duty of the rectors, which was increased to three years with the possibility of reelection for one additional term while the system of rotation among faculties in the elections was terminated. That change was criticized for putting faculties with higher numbers of faculty members

in an advantageous position, strengthening the authority of some faculties in the system governance of higher education (Gür & Özoğlu, 2015).

Constitutional Court decisions

Soon after its enactment, in 1975, the Constitutional Court ruled the establishment of CoHE and University Audit Board on the basis of institutional autonomy upon the formal appeals of some universities (Doğramacı, 2007; Günay & Günay, 2011). The Court decided that these two arrangements would lead to external power exertion over the universities as it consisted of government-appointed members and that would be contrary to institutional autonomy specified in Article 120 of the Constitution (Yavuz, 2012). That is to say, the 1961 Constitution, even with the exclusion of administrative and academic components of institutional autonomy in 1971, provided universities with a legal foundation on which to claim authority in the system governance of higher education. Another critical judicial intervention regarding the system governance of higher education was about the special status of METU that had been reserved in Article 120 of the Constitution. The powers of the Board of trustees stipulated in the law setting the METU were abrogated in 1976, impairing the system governance model of METU and thus pushing the university into a state of chaos (Gürüz, 2008).

Reasons for the establishment of CoHE

Henceforth, the 1961 Constitution, while granting the universities with institutional autonomy, was regarded as a way of power bargaining, a way to assure the operation of self-governance in the higher education system, developed independently of accountability and transparency mechanisms (Gür & Çelik, 2011). To put it differently, the 1973 university legislation, in this sense, came under pressure to adapt and the intended supervision and observation of the higher

education could not be realized. Pursuant to the absence of supervisory mechanisms, the universities grew isolated from each other and from a governance perspective, there was no integrity in the system. Erosion of state authority in the 1970s indeed was spread around the country. The two major parties, the CHP on the left-wing and the AP on the right-wing, and the two minor parties, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the National Salvation Party (MSP) were, among themselves, divided and their political and ideological polarization amplified the crisis in the country (Özbudun, 2000). Besides the polarization in the country in general and the nationwide protests which mainly started in the universities and turned increasingly violent (Kafadar, 2002), the coordination within and among universities and between universities and governments was politically and ideologically polarized and there was a marked decrease in the credibility of all institutions in the late 1970s (Turan, 2010). The governance gap in the politicized and polarized country system, as a corollary in the higher education system, was also reflected in the election system for the rectors, rendering it ineffective (Doğramacı, 2007; Gür & Çelik, 2011). For through such practices of institutional autonomy, power bargaining came to be placed inside, impeding academic freedom (Seggie & Gökbek, 2015).

On the other hand, in the 1970s, there was a growing demand for enrollment in higher education and a variety of governments tried to meet the demand by setting up new institutions of higher education around the country. From 1973 to 1978, as shown in Table 1, ten new universities were founded, amounting to nineteen, most of which were placed in the Central Anatolia (seven) and Marmara Regions (four). Distance education by correspondence, called YAYKUR in Turkish, was also set up in 1974 affiliated with the Ministry of National Education (T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2003). In addition, in 1974, the Student Selection and Placement

Center was established by the Inter-University Board as a mechanism in responding to the public interest in higher education, transforming the university entrance system into a centrally prepared and administered test (Barblan et al., 2008).

Table. 1 Universities in Turkey (1933-1978)

Region	City	University	Foundation date
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul University	1933
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Technical University	1944
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Ankara University	1946
Aegean	İzmir	Ege University	1955
Black Sea	Trabzon	Karadeniz Technical University	1955
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Middle East Technical University	1956
Eastern Anatolia	Erzurum	Atatürk University	1957
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Hacettepe University	1967
Marmara	İstanbul	Boğaziçi University	1971
Mediterranean	Adana	Çukurova University	1973
Southeastern Anatolia	Diyarbakır	Dicle University	1973
Central Anatolia	Eskişehir	Anadolu University	1973
Central Anatolia	Sivas	Cumhuriyet University	1974
Marmara	Bursa	Uludağ University	1975
Eastern Anatolia	Elazığ	Fırat University	1975
Central Anatolia	Konya	Selçuk University	1975
Eastern Anatolia	Malatya	İnönü University	1975
Black Sea	Samsun	Ondokuz Mayıs University	1975
Central Anatolia	Kayseri	Erciyes University	1978

Source: Compiled by the author from Yükseköğretim Bilgi Yönetim Sistemi [Higher Education Information Management System]

Previously, admission decisions had been made by individual faculties responsible for the preparation and administration of their own entrance examinations. Yet, neither the previous nor the changed system met the demand as the decisions relating

to places available were at the discretion of individual universities (Çetinsaya, 2014) and according to the *Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1979-1983)* prepared by the SPO, “especially autonomous institutions” were operating below their work capacity (T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, DPT [SPO], 1979, p. 449). For example, the gross enrollment ratio in higher education in the period 1974-1981 was 5.9 percent and the number of admissions had decreased from 49,542 to 41,574 (Gür & Çelik, 2011). Also, although the system included different types of higher education institutions such as academies, teacher colleges, and two-year vocational schools tied to a range of ministries (T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2003), a legal framework encompassing the entire higher education system was lacking, creating further problems concerning the system governance (Tekeli, 2009). Such fragmentation was said to have led higher education institutions to fall short of adapting to the amplified demands of an economy in need of a qualified workforce in various work areas, putting a balanced and sustainable social and economic growth in danger (DPT [SPO], 1979). Moreover, by the end of 1970s, the economy of Turkey had been severely roiled by the economic crisis in the country (Pamuk, 2008).

The 1980 military coup, the new university legislation, and the new Constitution

On September 12, 1980, the third military intervention took place and the new university legislation, Higher Education Law (Law No. 2547), enacted on November 6, 1981 and followed by the addition of Articles 130, 131, and 132 in the 1982 Constitution, inaugurated a new period of system governance of higher education in Turkey with the establishment of CoHE, YÖK, its acronym in Turkish, and was called as the 1981 university reform (T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 1991, p. 9). The literature points out that all the changes in the university legislation

were passed during extraordinary periods: Two legislative changes in 1933 and 1946 occurred within the Single-Party Period and the others enacted in 1960, 1973, and 1981 followed the military interventions (Barblan et al., 2008; Günay, 2004; Günay & Günay, 2017; Gür & Çelik, 2011; Gürüz, 2008; Küçükcan & Gür, 2009; Seggie & Gökbel, 2015; Tekeli, 2009).

Accordingly, the system governance of higher education was reorganized under the title of “Institutions of higher education and their higher bodies” in the 1982 Constitution, in which “Institutions of higher education” and “Superior bodies of higher education” were covered in Articles 130 and 131 respectively and CoHE was given powers and duties within the framework of these two Articles (The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, n.d., pp. 53-54). Therefore, the authorities of the first CoHE, which did not come into force upon the cancellation of Article 120 by the Constitutional Court in 1975, came into effect with increased powers and responsibilities (Yavuz, 2012) and CoHE was established as an autonomous body with public legal personality

to plan, organize, administer, and supervise education provided by institutions of higher education, to orient teaching activities, education and scientific research, to ensure the establishment and development of these institutions in conformity with the objectives and principles set forth by law, to ensure the effective use of the resources allotted to the universities, and to plan for the training of the teaching staff. (The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, n.d., p. 53)

As detailed in the new university legislation (Law No. 2547), in 1981, CoHE consisted of twenty-five members: (1) eight directly appointed by the President of the Republic – from among former rectors if possible (2) six selected by the Council of Ministers from among high-level civil servants either active or retired, (3) one selected by the Chief of the General Staff, (4) two selected by the Ministry of National Education, (5) eight selected by the Inter-University Board from among

professors who were not members of the Council. The appointment of the latter four categories of those members required the approval of the President of the Republic who also directly appointed the President of CoHE from among the Council members for four years (CoHE, 2000; Yükseköğretim Kanunu [Higher Education Law], 1981, p. 4). The first members of the Council were appointed on December 21, 1981 (Tekeli, 2009), and of those twenty-five members, all were men.

Two arrangements that were directly affiliated to CoHE were identified as the Higher Education Audit Board and the Student Selection and Placement Center (CoHE, 2000; Yükseköğretim Kanunu [Higher Education Law], 1981, p. 4). The Higher Education Audit Board consisted of ten members: (1) five nominated by the Council, (2) three selected and nominated by the Council from among nine candidates proposed by the Supreme Court, the Council of State, and the Court of Accounts, (3) one selected by the Chief of the General Staff, (4) one selected by the Ministry of National Education. The Board was to ensure the supervision over the universities on behalf of the Council and was competent of – e.g. requesting oral or written information from universities and carrying out investigative procedures upon the request of the Council. As for the Inter-University Board, it was confirmed as an academic organ with advisory powers and consisted of (1) the university rectors, (2) one professor selected by the Chief of the General Staff from among the Armed Forces, appointed for a four-year term of duty, and (3) one professor selected by each university senate (CoHE, 2000, pp. 11, 13; Yükseköğretim Kanunu [Higher Education Law], 1981, pp. 6, 7). That is to say, CoHE was designed as a board of governors similar to the state systems of governance in the U.S. higher education that function as a buffer body (Doğramacı, 1984; Gürüz, 2008), the organs of which were specified later in 1987 in the decree (No. 301) issued by the government as the

General Assembly, the Executive Board, and the President. Upon the issuance of the decree, the number of Council members who also formed the General Assembly was reduced to twenty-four from twenty-five (Tekeli, 2009).¹²

With the enactment of Law 2547, all higher education institutions were tied to CoHE and institutions such as academies, teacher colleges, and two-year vocational schools were incorporated into the university framework of the previously founded nineteen and the newly established eight universities (Doğramacı, 1984; CoHE, 2014; Mızıkacı, 2006). YAYKUR was abolished and the responsibility for implementing distance education programs was delegated to the Faculty of Open Education at Anadolu University (T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2003). The rectors of twenty-seven universities were appointed on August 1, 1982, replacing the existing nineteen rectors to build the system on loyal grounds (Tekeli, 2009). Universities were defined as public corporate bodies with scientific autonomy carrying out high-level education, teaching, research, and publication (CoHE, 2000, p. 2; Yükseköğretim Kanunu [Higher Education Law], 1981, p. 2). The aims of higher education were defined in Article 4 as follows:

- a) To educate students so that they:
 1. will be loyal to Atatürk, nationalism and to Atatürk's reforms and principles,
 2. will be in accord with the national, ethical, human, spiritual and cultural values of the Turkish nation and conscious of the privilege of being a Turk,
 3. will put the common good above their own personal interests and have full devotion to family, country and nation,
 4. will be fully conscious of their duties and responsibilities towards their country and will act accordingly,
 5. will be objective, broad-minded, and respectful of human rights,
 6. will develop in a balanced way, physically, mentally, psychologically, morally, and emotionally,

¹² The number of members directly appointed by the President of the Republic was decreased from eight to seven as was the number of members selected by the Inter-University Board. On the other hand, the number of members selected by the Council of Ministers was increased from six to seven.

7. will promote to be good citizens contributing to the country's development and welfare and at the same time acquire the necessary knowledge and skills for their future vocations.
- b) To enhance the welfare of the Turkish state as a whole, conducive to national and territorial indivisibility; to implement programs contributing to and accelerating the economic, social and cultural development of the country; to ensure that students are constructive, creative and outstanding participants in contemporary civilization.
- c) As higher education institutions, to carry out studies and research of high academic level, to promote knowledge and technology, to disseminate scientific findings to assist progress and development at the national level, and, through cooperation with national and international institutions, to become recognized members of the academic world and contribute to universal, contemporary progress. (CoHE, 2000, p. 5)

Henceforth, the goals of Turkish higher education, with further elaboration in Article 5¹³, were framed around a particular ideology, reflecting the mindset of the 1980 military coup (Ergüder, 2008; Ergüder et al., 2009; Gür & Çelik, 2011; Küçükcan & Gür, 2009; Okçabol, 2007; Seggie & Gökbel, 2015). Based on such “heavy emphasis on Atatürkism, nationalistic and militarist discourse, exclusionary and discriminatory approach toward the non-Turkish” in the important legal documents, Turkish education system was discussed to gain a “monocultural” character (Çelik, Gümüş, & Gür, 2017, p. 104). According to Kafadar (2002), under the military rule of the 1980s, all socio-political institutions were restructured as a reaction to the previous period, resulting in a kind of loss of identity and freedom, and universities viewed as “scapegoats” by the National Security Council were at the center of this restructuring process (p. 367, my translation), bringing the issue of institutional autonomy to the table centered around the election/appointment of the rectors and deans.

Hence, one critical change that came with the establishment of CoHE was the replacement of the election system of the rectors and deans with the appointment system (Çelik & Gür, 2014; Gürüz, 2008). According to the new law, the rectors

¹³ See Article 5 of Law 2547 at http://www.yok.gov.tr/documents/10279/30217/the_law_on_higher_education_mart_2000.pdf/bb86b67f-2aea-4773-8c21-43c10384f883

were appointed by the President of the Republic from among candidates selected by the Council and the deans were appointed by the Council from among candidates nominated by the rectors, indicating a move towards a more hierarchical system in the system governance of higher education (Turan, 2010). In Dođramacı's (1984) view, the purpose behind the move to the appointment system was to increase autonomy granted to universities. As a case in point, new requirements were introduced to the appointments of professors such as publishing in internationally recognized journals and applying to a vacant position in another university, and universities were also part of the decision-making process (CoHE, 2000, p. 26; Yükseköđretim Kanunu [Higher Education Law], 1981, p. 14). On the other hand, the appointment system in general led to disputes and yielded resistance on the side of academia due to the arbitrary preferences of the Council in the decision-making which was mainly structured around the dynamics between the powers of the state, the Council, and the rectors in place of a system specified by law (Barblan et al., 2008). Furthermore, pursuant to the invoking of the law on the state of emergency (Law No. 1402) and/or the pressures of the rectors, dismissals or resignations were spread at the level of academia (Gür & Çelik, 2011; Hatibođlu, 1998; Tekeli, 2009). By the end of the 1980s, there were some amendments to the new law allowing professors to be appointed to a professorship position in their own universities and the appointment powers of the Council were delegated to the universities, which was stated to lead to a marked increase in the promotions to full professorship (Barblan et al., 2008). As of November 1991, out of 7,208 professors and associate professors, 1,797 were placed outside the three big cities. Within this ten-year period, there were also improvements in the number of admissions to higher education with an increase from 41,574 students in 1981 to 199,571 students in 1991, and the gross enrollment

ratio had increased from 5.9 percent in 1981 to 9.6 percent and to 15.3 percent including distance education in 1991. Besides, the number of articles published in internationally recognized journals went up from 352 articles in 1981 to 1080 in 1990 (T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 1991). In 1984, the first non-profit foundation university in the country, Bilkent University, was established, and thereby the total number of the universities in the country reached to twenty-nine, as shown in Figure 9.¹⁴




Figure 9. The number of universities in Turkey (1933-1991)

Source: Compiled by the author from Yükseköğretim Bilgi Yönetim Sistemi [Higher Education Information Management System]

2.2.1.2 Phase II: From 1992 to 2005

The discussions on the system governance of Turkish higher education restarted as the military power involvement decreased and competitive politics steadily expanded (Turan, 2010). The *Sixth Five-Year Development Plan (1990-1994)* also expressed the view that the system governance of higher education was still of concern and

¹⁴ In 1987, Gaziantep University was founded and the number of state universities in the country increased to twenty-eight. See Appendix A for more information on the universities founded within this period.

there was a need for increasing university-industry relations (DPT [SPO], 1989). As mentioned previously, in 1987, there grew a demand on the side of the government to change Higher Education Law 2547 and so to restructure the system governance, ending with a change in the size and composition of CoHE's general assembly.

Another development in lieu with this restructuring process that received support from the President of the Republic, the government, and the President of CoHE took place during the period 1989-1991 (Ergüder et al., 2009; Gür & Çelik, 2011; Gürüz, Şuhubi, Şengör, Türker, & Yurtsever, 1994; Tekeli, 2009). Adopted by decree on April 3, 1991, Law No. 3708 introduced differentiation among higher education institutions through developing state universities with special status and setting up institutes of technology, and thus brought up the issue of institutional diversity and quality to the forefront of higher education discourse with state universities, state universities with special status, institutes of technology, and non-profit foundation universities. Relatedly, the law reintroduced the lay governance model in the system governance of higher education, which had been once adopted at METU but had been by-passed by the Constitutional Court in 1976 on the basis of being in violation of institutional autonomy defined in the 1962 Constitution (Barblan et al., 2008). According to this model, five state universities granted with a special status by the Council of Ministers would have a lay governing board called Higher Administrative Board, consisting of nine members including the chair of the Board and the rector, who were to be appointed by the President of the Republic and to be delegated with financial and administrative powers. The rector was to be selected by a Search Committee formed by the Board who would then, adding their opinion, nominate the candidates for the President of the Republic in the final process.

Law 3708, “The Law on Amending Certain Articles, Including Four Additional Articles and Repealing One Additional Article of Law No 2547 on Higher Education”, was published in the Official Gazette of Turkey on July 4, 1991, but the decree itself was not (Ergüder, 2008, p. 179; Ergüder, et al., 2009).¹⁵ For as it was an election year, the government of that time did not want to create any feelings of frustrations by nominating five state universities with special status. Moreover, Law 3708 was taken to the Constitutional Court by the opposition party, and was annulled on June 29, 1992 while the establishment of institutes of technology remained in effect. The Court decision was grounded in Article 130 and Article 131 of the 1982 Constitution: University with a special status did not match the university definition specified under Article 130 and a Higher Administrative Board was not defined in Article 131 as a higher body (Barblan et al., 2008; Kurt, 2015; Tekeli, 2009). That decision was referred to as a “missed golden opportunity” for the Turkish higher education system in a 1994 TÜSİAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association) report (Gürüz et al., 1994, p. 160).

Change in the appointment of rectors and new universities

Following the elections of 1991, the restructuring process of the system governance of higher education was a priority to the newly formed coalition government including center-right and center-left parties. The latter, formed under the leadership of academics, was discussed to be in strong opposition to the structure of CoHE and to play a direct role in the shift from the appointment system of rectors to the election system, which eventually led to the enactment of Law No. 3826 in 1992 and thus a turn back to the pre-1981 (Barblan et al., 2008). Pursuant to the change, the President of the Council resigned from his position after more than a

¹⁵ The full text of Law No. 3708 in Turkish is available at <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/20919.pdf&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/20919.pdf>

decade of service, stating the appointment system was central to the health of the system (Doğramacı, 2007). It was argued that CoHE's not building a systematic way in the appointment of rectors provided the grounds for the 1992 law which hampered the dynamics between accountability and autonomy severely (Barblan et al., 2008). Within this procedure, which was also noted to be very complex (Günay & Kılıç, 2011), in state universities in the country, all faculty members (assistant professors, associate professors, professors) participated in the election of the rectors, where they selected by secret ballot six members from among full professors who were then again by secret ballot reduced to three by the Council. In the final process, the Council submitted the short list of nominees to the President of the Republic for the final decision. The rectors were appointed for a four-year term of duty with the possibility of reelection for one additional term.

Meanwhile, in 1992, twenty-four new universities were founded, twenty-three of them being state and one of them being non-profit foundation university. That change meant a rise from twenty-nine universities in 1981 to fifty-three universities in 1992, and the setting up of new universities was called a “turning point” in the Turkish higher education system, characterizing the move from elite to mass higher education and the growing importance of higher education around the country (Günay & Günay, 2017, p. 162; T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 1994).¹⁶ These twenty-four universities were considered in the founding stage, to which “interim rectors” were appointed by the President of the Republic upon recommendation of the coalition government, representing a change in the implementation of the new law and signaling the start of “politicization” in the system governance following the change in the appointment system (Ergüder, 2008,

¹⁶ See Appendix A for more information on the universities founded within this period.

p. 162). As a case in point, the interim rectors were pressured to follow the interests of the local authorities and politicians in the shaping of the newly founded universities (Tekeli, 2009). The change to the election system of rectors also reelected factions within the state universities, demonstrating a pattern of expansion of power through obtaining control in the university governance (Kafadar, 2002). So in tune with these struggles, Kafadar (2002) discusses, were the efforts of state universities in urban areas to assume power over the newly-founded universities' governance structures and processes, for their self-development tendencies were seen as "ideological" and "reactionary" (p. 368, my translation). According to Gür and Çelik (2011), what preceded and led the system governance of higher education from 1983 to 1996 were the power relations among the President of the Republic, government, the President of the Council, and universities, taking its core institutional autonomy and the centralization in the system governance revolving around CoHE. The size and composition of the Council members and the rector appointments set the parameters of those relations, leading up to a change in the election system rather than a reform in the restructuring of CoHE.

The *Seventh Five-Year Development Plan (1996-2000)* elaborated on the power dynamics in the system governance of Turkish higher education and defined it as "bureaucratic" and "centralized" inconsistent with competitiveness required at both local and international levels (DPT [SPO], 1995, p. 30). Moreover, in the section Education Reform, the report proposed the how of restructuring of the system governance of higher education as (1) a move from a centralized and bureaucratic structure to a structure with coordinating and planning powers, (2) delegation of authority from the center of CoHE to universities, (3) financial flexibility on income generation and investment ability, (4) maximizing university-industry relations, and

(5) flexibility in opening up institutions other than non-profit foundation universities to be realized via changes to Higher Education Law 2547 and Article 130 of the 1982 Constitution (DPT [SPO], 1995, p. 221). The 1996 CoHE report also proposed changes to the system governance of higher education in response to the demographic projections and continuous expansion of the system and the “challenge of reconciling quantity with quality” especially placed on state universities due to the scarcity of public resources allocated to higher education and line-item budgeting system (CoHE, 1996, p. 6). Thus, the report suggested delegation of authority and financial flexibility identifying two areas for action:

- a) State universities must be equipped with the same financial and administrative decision making powers as those of their competitors [sic];
- b) academic assessment and evaluation mechanisms, eventually leading to a full accreditation system, must be established so that funding can be linked to performance, and that potential consumers can be properly informed about the alternatives. (CoHE, 1996, p. 6)

Draft legislation on the issues above was submitted by CoHE for consideration to the government in 1996 and an “Academic Assessment Board as an advisory board”, consisting of ten academics and five lay members, was founded in the same year (CoHE, 1996, p. 6). The pilot project, supported financially by the World Bank and assisted by the British Council, was launched in 1997 and based on an external quality assessment model. It was run in thirteen departments of eight universities, yet did not lead up to a national accreditation system (T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 1998, 1999). According to Barblan et al. (2008), the project was not supported by a majority of academics, for it was conceived as a threat to academic freedom and institutional autonomy. In Tekeli’s (2009) view, the project took an external quality assessment oriented view rather than an internal quality assessment oriented view, and that was in harmony with CoHE’s hierarchical approach to the system governance.

Post-modern coup of February 28, 1997

What re-contextualized the system governance of higher education was another military memorandum that took place on February 28, 1997 also known as a “post-modern coup” (Aydınlı, 2011, p. 228). Different from the 1960 and 1980 military takeovers of power, what was peculiar to this form of coup was the process through which it gained a momentum. Aydınlı (2011) stated that the militarily coordinated process, which worked “to galvanize like-minded affiliates within the media, higher education, the business chambers, unions, and even politicians”, promoted nationwide protests against the government led by the Welfare Party, and thus strengthened the hand of the National Security Council for the February 28 statement (Aydınlı, 2011, p. 228). The statement published at the end of the National Security Council meeting and announced to include a set of measures “to balance democracy” against emerging threat of “religious reactionism”, forced out the Prime Minister of the Welfare Party from power due to the measures on the statement asking for restrictions on individual freedoms of people with Islamic sensitivities (Ataman, 2017, pp. 149, 163). Some consequences of the February 28 process reflected in the power dynamics of higher education system governance were the enforcement of the headscarf ban on university campuses which had been first imposed by CoHE in the 1980s through the issuance of a mandatory dress code (see Seggie, 2011) and the coefficient system in the university admissions (see Gür & Çelik, 2016). These two policies severely impaired freedom to learn and freedom to teach and also resulted in dismissals and resignations of faculty members (Seggie & Gökbel, 2015). That is to say, political and ideological conflicts threw the universities into the center of “secularism-oriented ideological contestations”, curtailing the restructuring process of the system governance of higher education

(Gür & Çelik, 2016, p. 308). In Kafadar's (2002) view, in the post-February 28 period, "modernization" and "Kemalism" seemed to determine the approach taken towards universities (p. 368, my translation).

Regional and global cooperation

Along with this escalating struggle, however, there was also concern over economic and social policies critical of local and global context. Similar to the policy recommendations in the *Seventh Five-Year Development Plan (1996-2000)*, in the *Long-term Strategy and Eight Five-Year Development Plan (2001-2005)*, higher education was announced to be at a strategic position in economic and social development as regards the need for competitive and qualified workforce - "higher educated manpower"- in building up regional and global cooperation (SPO, 2000, p. vi). Pertaining to the needs and demands not only at the local level but also at the international level, a more responsive higher education system governance model was suggested, for

[h]igher education institutes could not be freed from bureaucratic and centralised structure; competitiveness within and among universities could not be established; the powers of faculty and university administration could not be increased; participation of lecturers and research assistants in the administration, scientific autonomy and university-industry cooperation could not be ensured. (SPO, 2000, p. 89)

To this end, building on the *Seventh Five-Year Development Plan (1996-2000)*, yet with a specific reference to components of autonomy, the new development plan proposed the enhancement of "administrative, financial, and scientific autonomies of universities" and the transformation of CoHE into a coordination and planning body in the restructuring of the system governance (SPO, 2000, p. 91). To increase regional and global cooperation and also its competitiveness in the global arena, in 2001, Turkey became a signatory country to the Bologna Process and so a member of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA). As a corollary, quality assurance

activities were given a start, yet the Council reported that universities had limited administrative and financial powers to strengthen their position in the EHEA and to engage in transnational initiatives (T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2003, 2004, 2005). “The National Bologna Experts Team” was established in 2004 to coordinate the implementation of the Bologna Process and an independent commission including ten members for “Academic Assessment and Quality Improvement in Higher Education” was set up in 2005 (CoHE, 2017, pp. 16, 17). The commission called as YÖDEK consisted of nine academics selected by the Inter-University Board and one student appointed by the Turkish Student Council (CoHE, 2017). Besides, Turkey’s membership to the EHEA led to a change in the size and composition of the Council. The Council was required to be all-civilian, so the membership designated for the military’s Staff-General was removed from the structure of the Council in 2004, reducing its size to twenty-one (Mızıkacı, 2006; Yavuz, 2012).¹⁷ In the meantime, in 2002, there was a change in the government. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), a party with Islamist background, came to power. European integration of Turkey received more attention and a recovery in the economy started (Aydınlı, 2013; Pamuk, 2008). Promoting reforms critical of transformation at both local and international level and being allied with internal and external forces, the government followed moderate policies to show a move from marginal aspects of their Islamist past (Aydınlı, 2013). In this sense, the government proposed a reform in higher education also included in the government programs and suggested the transformation of CoHE into a coordination and planning body and the strengthening of academic, administrative, and scientific autonomies of the universities (58. Hükümet Programı [58th Government Program], 2002;

¹⁷ In 1997, the Constitutional Court canceled the Ministry of National Education’s right to select two members to the Council (Yavuz, 2012).

59. Hükümet Programı [59th Government Program], 2003; Gür & Çelik, 2016). Yet, the restructuring process of the system governance was shelved in 2004, for against these attempts to make a change in Law 2547 ran concurrently concerns on the side of CoHE and the universities if the government was trying to diffuse a hidden agenda to shape the system governance of higher education to their own ends, pointing to the political and ideological setbacks hampering important reforms in the restructuring of the system governance of higher education in Turkey (Barblan et al., 2008).

Quantitative Developments

Within this period, following the establishment of twenty-three state universities in 1992, there was an expansion of non-profit foundation universities between 1994 and 2003. Twenty-two new non-profit foundation universities were founded, amounting to seventy-seven universities as Figure 10 shows.

Concomitantly, the student enrollment in higher education increased from 900,875 students in 1992 to 2,309,918 students in 2005 (Çetinsaya, 2014, p. 54)¹⁸, and the gross enrollment ratio increased from 17.76 percent in 1994 to 34.46 percent in 2005 including distance education (T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı [Ministry of National Education], 2007, p. 1).¹⁹ The total academic staff increased from 38,483 in 1992-1993 to 79,555 in 2004-2005 (T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2007). Besides, the number of articles published by academics improved significantly. The number of articles published in journals covered by the Science Citation Index went up from 1,895 articles in 1993 to 15,666 in 2005, increasing Turkey's ranking from 35th to 19th in the list of countries with the highest number of articles (Gürüz, 2008, p. 203).

¹⁸ The student enrollment data from 1974 to 2013 is available at <http://www.yok.gov.tr/documents/10279/2922270/B%C3%BCy%C3%BCme+Kalite+Uluslararası%20B11a%C5%9Fma+cetinsaya-19x27-12%2C5forma.pdf/e5681887-1560-4fc3-9bab-0402e7f3ec2b>

¹⁹ The gross enrollment ratio for higher education in Turkey from 1994 to 2006 is available at http://sgb.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2012_12/06020711_meb_istatistikleri_orgun_egitim_2006_2007.pdf




Figure 10. The number of universities in Turkey (1933-2005)

Source: Compiled by the author from Yükseköğretim Bilgi Yönetim Sistemi [Higher Education Information Management System]

2.2.1.3 Phase III: From 2006 onwards

In the context of an on-going demand for enrollment in higher education, the year 2006 commenced another period when Turkey moved in the direction of expanding higher education to the masses in the least developed provinces of the country by establishing new state universities. In 2006, the government passed a law setting up fifteen new state universities and one private university, and that was referred to as the start of an “aggressive growth strategy” (Özoğlu, Gür, & Gümüş, 2016, p. 22) and another “turning point” in the history of Turkish higher education (Günay & Günay, 2017, p. 162). As a corollary to the new expansion policy, the number of universities in the country rose from seventy-seven in 2005 to ninety-three in 2006, sixty-eight of them being state universities and twenty-five of them being non-profit foundation universities. While CoHE opted for four new universities after assessing

the probable long-term consequences of high numbers of universities, following the governmental decision establishing fifteen universities, the appointment process of founding rectors became high on the agenda of the both sides (Gür & Çelik, 2016). According to the governmental decree (No. 5573), six nominees were to be selected by the Council, who were then to be reduced to three by the Ministry of National Education. In the final process, the Ministry of National Education was to submit the short list of nominees to the President of the Republic for the final decision.²⁰ The decree was vetoed by the President of the Republic, which was later confirmed by the Constitutional Court saying that it was to CoHE to wield the responsibility of nominating candidates for rector appointments.²¹ On the other hand, along with this growth in the number of higher education institutions, according to the *Ninth Development Plan (2007-2013)*, there was still unmet demand for higher education (SPO, 2006). Thus, in addition to the other expansion strategies such as increasing the number of open and distance education programs and increasing the intake capacity of existing universities by introducing new programs through introduction and dual/evening programs and through two-year vocational programs, setting up of new universities was again adopted as a policy of expansion to cope with the disparity between demand and supply in higher education (Özoğlu et al., 2016). By 2008, twenty-six more state universities and eleven more non-profit foundation universities were founded, bringing the total number of universities in the country to 130 and by the end of 2008, there was at least one state university in each of Turkey's eighty-one provinces, being a major contributor to access to higher education (Çetinsaya, 2014). With this new expansion strategy, Turkey moved from

²⁰ Law No. 5573 in Turkish is available at <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2007/01/20070117-2.htm>

²¹ The decision of the Constitutional Court in Turkish is available at <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2007/03/20070324-6.htm>

a higher education system with seventy-seven universities in 2005 to 185 universities in 2015. However, after the coup attempt of July 15, 2016, fifteen non-profit foundation universities were closed down by a governmental decree (No. 667)²², reducing the number of universities in the country to 170, and the students of these non-profit foundation universities were placed in the coordinating universities.²³ Following the establishment of new universities, the number of universities increased to 177 by the end of 2016 and to 180 as of February 2018, as shown in Figure 11 (Yükseköğretim Bilgi Yönetim Sistemi [Higher Education Information Management System], n.d.).²⁴ In addition, total student enrollment went up from 2,309,918 students in 2005-2006 to 7,198,987 in 2016-2017 (Yükseköğretim Bilgi Yönetim Sistemi [Higher Education Information Management System], n.d.); total academic staff increased from 79,555 in 2004-2005 and to 151,763 in 2016-2017 (Yükseköğretim Bilgi Yönetim Sistemi [Higher Education Information Management System], n.d.); the gross enrollment ratio rose from 34.5 percent in 2005 to 103.28 percent in 2016 (T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı [Ministry of National Education], 2017, p. 1).²⁵ Besides, compared with the 2005 budget, 5,218,465,000, the budget allocated to higher education from the central government increased by a factor of five in 2017 and the share of higher education in the central government budget rose from 3.34 percent in 2005 to 3.97 percent in 2017 (Ministry of National Education, 2007, 2017, pp. 170, 239-240).²⁶

²² Decree Law No. 667 in Turkish is available at <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/07/20160723-8.htm>

²³ The list of coordinating universities is available at http://www.yok.gov.tr/documents/10279/26935027/Yabanci_uyruklu_Ogrenciler_Hakkinda_kapatilan_universite.pdf/

²⁴ See Appendix A for more information on the universities founded within this period.

²⁵ The gross enrollment ratio for higher education in Turkey from 2001 to 2016 is available at http://sgb.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2017_09/08151328_meb_istatistikleri_organ_egitim_2016_2017.pdf

²⁶ The share of higher education in the central government budget for the year 2017 was calculated by the author using values on the pages 239 and 240.




Figure 11. The number of universities in Turkey (1933-2017)

Source: Compiled by the author from Yükseköğretim Bilgi Yönetim Sistemi [Higher Education Information Management System]

Reconciling quantity with quality

Thus, currently, the Turkish higher education system comprises 112 state universities and sixty-eight non-profit foundation universities and together with the five post-secondary vocational schools, these higher education institutions are tied to CoHE according to Higher Education Law 2547 enacted in 1981. Yet, questions have been raised about the sustainability of the system governance of higher education centered around the CoHE model so that the system remains responsive to the further growth, aspirations of those seeking for admission, and demographic projections and global directions for the years ahead. For instance, similar to the *Seventh (1996-2000)* and *Eight Five-Year Development Plans (2001-2005)*, the *Long-term Strategy and Ninth Development Plan (2007-2013)* proposed the restructuring of the system governance of higher education as a policy goal in safeguarding “human development and social solidarity” and eliminating the risk of disparities across regions in face of the challenge of reconciling quantity with quality (SPO, 2006, p. 99). Within this context, characterizing the 2007-2013 as an era of globalization, multi-dimensionality, competitiveness, and risks and setting the vision of “Turkey, a country of information society, growing in stability, sharing more equitably, globally competitive and fully completed her coherence with the European Union”, the plan envisaged that

[t]he Higher Education Board will be restructured to be responsible for setting standards, coordination and planning. By ensuring administrative and financial autonomy of higher education institutions in line with the principles of transparency and accountability, and by ensuring their specialization in line with the local characteristics, attainment of a competitive structure will be supported. (SPO, 2006, p. 101)

Likewise, in 2007, CoHE published a strategy document titled *Turkey's Higher Education Strategy* proposing for a multi-pronged higher education strategy and a restructuring in the system governance (T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2007).

Identifying the functions of higher education as education, research, and service to the public, the report put forth the basic principles in preserving the interests of higher education institutions as (1) “academic freedom and administrative autonomy”, (2) “productivity and quality”, (3) “efficient use of resources”, (4) “financial autonomy”, (5) “transparency”, (6) “accountability”, (7) “differentiation”, (8) “flexibility”, (9) “participation”, (10) “close ties with the local context”, (11) “international relations”, and expressed the need of a restructuring in the system governance of higher education around these principles (T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2007, pp. 159-161, my translation). Yet, with reference to the limitations and setbacks integrated into the system through the Constitution, Law 2547, budget legislation, collegial governance tradition of academics and to the possibility of nepotism that might result from the transition to a self-governance model, the report suggested the process of change from the centralized system to a decentralized system to be realized in a gradual manner without overthrowing the pre-existing system governance (T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2007). Accordingly, a coordinating and planning role with regulating and supervising functions within the decentralized system was conceived for CoHE and displacement of some of its responsibilities to the Inter-University Board and the universities was suggested. Nevertheless, lack of communication between CoHE and the government excluded initiation of the change in the system governance of higher education and (Çelik & Gür, 2014). However, the 2009 TÜSİAD report expressed the view that reconciling quantity with quality required urgent attention in the complex scene of higher education and the centralized and hierarchical structure of CoHE was not compatible with such substantial growth in the system (Ergüder, et al., 2009). Similar to the 2006 long-term strategy and development plan and the 2007 CoHE report, the

TÜSİAD report proposed a move towards decentralization in the system governance of higher education conducive to differentiation among universities and advocated the Constitution to be amended so that “a framework law” away from detailed rules and regulations could be built around the principles of academic freedom, institutional autonomy, accountability, and transparency and universities could be powered by the responsibility to form their own regulations (Ergüder, et al., 2009, p. 39, my translation). Accordingly, the new CoHE was suggested to be designed as a coordinating and planning body responsible for setting standards and long-term policy formulation and to be restructured so as to allow the integration of stakeholders in the Council (Ergüder, et al., 2009). In 2011, the government announced that the higher education system would be reformed at all levels as part of a long-term strategy to eventually lead up to a system responsive to institutional autonomy and local characteristics and CoHE would be transformed into a coordinating and planning body responsible for setting quality standards, ensuring integration of accreditation mechanisms into the system, and building inter-university relations (61. Hükümet Programı [61st Government Program], 2011, my translation). In lieu with the governmental strategy, further studies and strategy documents expressed the need for the restructuring of the system governance of higher education and the transformation of CoHE into a coordinating and planning body (Batirel et al., 2014; Çetinsaya, 2014; Gök & Gümüş, 2015; Gümüş, 2018; Gür, 2016; Gür & Çelik, 2016; Kurt, 2015; T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı [Ministry of Development], 2013; Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2015a). In this respect, for example, the *Tenth Development Plan (2014-2018)* set two policies of the economic and social development in the years ahead as transformation of higher education into an “autonomous, performance-oriented, quality-oriented and competitive structure”

and restructuring of CoHE “so as to be responsible for setting standards, planning and coordination” (T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı [Ministry of Development], 2013, p. 33). Parallel to the latest development plan, the CoHE *Strategic Plan (2016-2020)*, referred to as the “new CoHE” term by the President of the Council, stated that the demands and expectations for the restructuring of the higher education system set an “opportunity” to strengthen the system governance of higher education and came to the conclusion that stalled progress in the restructuring process would introduce a “threat” to aligning CoHE’s institutional capacity with the demands and expectations from different segments of the society (Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2015a, pp. iii, 19, my translation). For the plan pointed out that the institutional capacity of CoHE, according to the stage they were currently at, seemed not to have developed concurrent to the growth in the higher education system (Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2015a). Building on these institutional characteristics, it was expressed that CoHE adopted “academic and scientific freedom, institutional autonomy, equality, nondiscrimination, diversification, participation, cooperation, accountability, transparency, scientific competition, and quality” as its core values, which constituted a basis for the strategic purposes for the 2016-2020 period (Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2015a, p. 22, my translation):

(1) to plan and govern higher education in an effective and efficient manner in line with the national and international standards by taking the issue of quality and quantity into account, (2) to improve the institutional capacity and functioning of CoHE, (3) to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of supervision for the higher education system, and (4) to improve the overall functioning of the Inter-University Board. (Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2015a, p. 23, my translation)²⁷

The organizational structure of CoHE and the size and composition of the Council are presented in Figures 12 and 13, respectively.

²⁷ See Appendix B for the Turkish version of the quote.




Figure 12. The organizational structure of CoHE
 Source: Drawn by the author using the chart from CoHE (n.d.)




Figure 13. The size and composition of the Council
 Source: Drawn by the author using the information in CoHE, 2017, p. 10

Within this context, in 2015, CoHE and the Ministry of Development initiated a project called *Mission Differentiation and Specialization of Universities Aimed at Regional Development* for the universities founded after 2006 in order to ensure their specialization in sync with the local dynamics and to encourage their contribution to the regions they are located at (CoHE, 2016). On that basis, meetings were held in two different cities of Turkey with the invited rectors for the purpose of exchanging opinions on the project. A Commission consisting of representatives from the Ministry of Development, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Science, Industry, and Technology and academic experts was formed in CoHE to coordinate the process and to decide on five model universities. In the first round of the process, the Commission evaluated the twenty-four volunteer universities in three main categories, “the present state of the region, potential of the university, and region-

university relation”, reducing the number of universities to fifteen (CoHE, 2016). In the second round of the process, self-assessment reports of the selected universities were evaluated and meetings were held with the rectors, and Bingöl University, Burdur Mehmet Akif Ersoy University, Düzce University, Kırşehir Ahi Evran University, and Uşak University were chosen as the five model universities (CoHE, 2016). These universities are to submit their projects to CoHE for agreement and also for coordination of the implementation of the project. It was also announced that differentiation among universities around the research mission would be soon on the agenda of the new CoHE (CoHE, 2016).

For the development of a national quality assurance system, in 2015, a Higher Education Quality Board was established in place of YÖDEK (Yükseköğretim Kalite Kurulu [Higher Education Quality Board, n.d.]). The new regulation published in 2015, “The Regulation of Quality Assurance in Higher Education”, assigns each higher education institution the responsibility to set up an internal and external quality assurance system within the university and to ensure the implementation of self- and external assessment processes.²⁸ The process starts with self-assessment and is complemented by external assessment. For self-assessment, all higher education institutions produce their own strategic plans and annual development reports. For external assessment, on-site investigations are performed at least once in every five-year by assessors selected by the Higher Education Quality Board or by independent third parties approved by the Higher Education Quality Board. The Board comprises five academics selected by CoHE, four members elected by the Inter-University Board, one representative from each of the five Ministries (Ministry of Development, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health, Ministry of National

²⁸ See the full text of the Regulation of Quality Assurance in Higher Education in Turkish at <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2015/07/20150723.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2015/07/20150723.htm>

Education, and Ministry of Science, Industry, and Technology), one representative from each of the six different institutions (Turkish Academy of Sciences (TÜBA), The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK), Health Institutes of Turkey (TUSEB), Vocational Qualifications Authority (VQA), Turkish Accreditation Agency (TÜRKAK), and The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB)), and one representative from the Student Council, and is responsible for “external evaluation of higher education institutions, assessment of applications of quality assurance agencies for registering and proposing the results to CoHE General Assembly, and dissemination of quality assurance culture in Turkish higher education system” (CoHE, 2017, p. 17). Self- and external assessment reports are open to the public and institutions publish the reports on their website. In 2016, twenty state universities, six non-profit foundation universities, and one post-secondary vocational school underwent the process. The new CoHE announced that CoHE proposed a “bill that would strengthen the Higher Education Quality Board with administrative and financial autonomy as an independent Board from CoHE and that in turn would be an important legislation for Turkey’s higher education-focused development in the globally competitive arena” (Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2015b, my translation). With respect to quality assurance, another new project called *Implementation and Sustainability of EHEA Reforms in Turkish Higher Education System* was introduced by CoHE on February 6, 2017. TURQUAS, its acronym, was stated to be a project accepted by European Commission under Erasmus+ Program and planned to be finalized by 2018. The project aims to raise awareness towards quality assurance practices and to help ease the building of quality-oriented culture in higher education institutions (Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2017).

In addition, in 2016, there was a move from the election system of rectors to the appointment system. According to Higher Education Law 2547 amended with the governmental decree (No. 676), three rector candidates are designated by CoHE through a search process and the President of the Republic appoints one of them as the rector for a four-year term, with the possibility of reappointment for one additional term (Olağanüstü hal kapsamında bazı düzenlemeler, 2016). In the designation process, the Council members visit the universities, converse with academic and administrative staff and students and also with outsiders such as governors, business chambers, and representatives from development agencies, and then report their observations from the on-site visits to the Council. The reports are used for the creation of a rector profile, according to which applications of professors are evaluated and a short list of three candidates is prepared (Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2016). In non-profit foundation universities, upon nomination of Board of Trustees and approval of CoHE, the President of the Republic appoints the nominee as the rector (Olağanüstü hal kapsamında bazı düzenlemeler, 2016). As I completed my data collection in the second week of June 2017, I discussed the changes to the system governance of Turkish higher education from that time on in the Reflection section, placed after the Discussion chapter.

Summary of section 2.2

The literature review has deconstructed the system governance of higher education in Turkey by organizing it into three sub-sections. It has shown that from 1923 to 1991, all the changes in the university legislation were passed during extraordinary periods: Two legislative changes in 1933 and 1946 occurred within the Single-Party Period and the others enacted in 1960, 1973, and 1981 followed the military interventions. Yet, each altered university legislation proceeded to establish different structures in

the system governance, indicating a search for a governance model and creating a governance gap in the system of Turkish higher education by undermining the legitimacy of existing structures. Following the third military intervention, a new period started in the system governance with the enactment of Higher Education Law 2547 and establishment of CoHE, terminating the controversies over disintegration in the system. On the other hand, from 1992 to 2005, the centralized structure of CoHE continued to face demands for restructuring in the system governance, and that, for example, led to a shift from the appointment system of rectors to the election system. Along with this struggle for power, there grew concern over economic and social policies central to addressing local needs and taking global directions. New state and non-profit foundation universities were found, and thus, there was a move from elite to mass higher education pertaining to the growing importance of higher education around the country, which in turn created further demands for restructuring in the system governance of higher education. From 2006 to 2008, Turkey followed an aggressive strategy to expand higher education to the masses in the least developed provinces of the country and since then, the country has moved from mass to universal higher education, raising questions about the sustainability of the system governance of higher education centered around the CoHE model so that the system remains responsive to the further growth at both national and international levels and continues to fulfill important services that foster social and economic development. For this reason, governments, studies, and strategy documents have discussed the need to amend Higher Education Law 2547 to restructure the system governance of higher education and to transform CoHE into a coordinating and planning body.

2.3 Conceptual framework for the study

This study aimed to explore the operation of the current higher education governance model in Turkey. On this basis, three research questions were formulated:

According to the perceptions of rectors, CoHE members, and government representatives,

- (1) how does the current higher education governance model in Turkey operate?
 - a. how does the decision-making structure work?
 - b. how is the decision-making power shared?
 - c. how does the interplay between governmental steering and institutional autonomy work in terms of accountability, financing, appointments, and rule of law?
- (2) what are the advantages and challenges of this model?
- (3) based on the challenges, what are the alternative ways to improve the governance model in Turkish higher education?

In order to answer these three questions, it was necessary first to elaborate on the evolution of the system governance models of higher education. With this in mind, at the onset of the literature review, I attempted to deconstruct and reconstruct the system governance of higher education in the world taking an interdisciplinary approach. Using my findings from the previous two deconstructive sections, where I examined the power shifts in the balance of power and the system governance models of higher education through a broad review of literature, I attempted to partly deploy an analytics of government in the Foucauldian tradition to reconstruct the term governance and its constituent elements in the Reconstruction of the system governance of higher education in the world section of my literature review. My point of departure from the Foucauldian analytics of government was that I extended

its territorially bounded historical and geographical focus to regional, transnational, and global frames of references. The reconstruction process enabled me to identify the modes of operation, strategies that might be associated with these modes of operation, forms of power, policy instruments, missions, governance indicators, modes of governance, mode of coordination, and models involved in the system governance process of higher education. The resulting perspective was rhizomatic, culminating into the “Rhizomatic System Governance Process Framework” presented in Figure 14.

My first research question, how does the current higher education governance model in Turkey operate?, demanded an exploration of the word operation, and thus, connected with the modes of operation and strategies presented in the framework. Rather than taking a macro-level actor-centric approach, that is, an approach that might lead to an analysis of the data collected based on the position of the research participants, the modes of operation and strategies helped to center the focus on the practices of those who govern or governed and the logic behind these practices.

Placing the research participants as an integral part of analysis in turn opened the way for an exploration of all the other forms of power engaged in the system governance of Turkish higher education. Deploying the forms of power lens in the framework was guiding in tracing these possible forms of power and in taking a relational approach to power, in which state powers and all the other forms of powers are at a “strategic position” in realizing, maintaining, and reshaping of the practices of one another, hence in constructing the system governance of higher education (Lemke, 2011, p. 51).




Figure 14. Rhizomatic system governance process framework

As I aimed to answer the sub-questions (a) how does the decision-making structure work? and (b) how is the decision-making power shared?, such an approach enabled to explore the reciprocal interaction and constitution between different forms of power and different forms of instruments that structures the decision-making process and power-sharing in the decision-making process (Dean, 1999). By doing so, I hoped to gradually lead to build the functions of the policy instruments in the decision-making process of the system governance and so to discuss variations in reasoning. Pertinent to the exploration of this research question was then the missions that might lead to a variation in the implementation of the policy instruments. For this reason, I employed the policy instruments and the missions I built in the reconstruction process to focus on the practices that shape the decision-making in the system governance of higher education.

The third sub-question, how does the interplay between governmental steering and institutional autonomy work in terms of accountability, financing, appointments, and rule of law?, necessitated an understanding of the what and how of governmental steering, institutional autonomy, accountability, financing, appointments, and rule of law. The modes of operation and strategies and the forms of power in the framework helped to explore governmental steering and rule of law while governance indicators in the framework (institutional autonomy, academic freedom, accountability, transparency, financing) helped to point to the interplay within and among them. Developing an understanding of power relations in reference to Spinozian thought, I proposed that a governance indicator aims to boost the collective and cooperative capacity to act for the health of the system governance and the continuity of the system, which in turn helped to shed light on lines of authority in decision-making in the areas such as appointments. Based on these

tenets, my analysis of the third sub-question was informed by the presented framework. Employing the “Rhizomatic System Governance Process Framework” for the first research question and for the three sub-questions of it in my exploration of the system governance model of higher education in Turkey according to the perceptions of the research participants simultaneously guided me to systemically decipher my second research question, what are the advantages and challenges of this model?, through modes of governance, models, and mode of coordination presented in the framework.

For defined as a process in the reconstruction process, system governance entails a plurality of power relationships, is exercised by a plurality of authorities whose practices or ways of governing informed, shaped, and transformed by different forms of power and different forms of instruments and rationalities over different historical trajectories that lead to the constitution of modes of coordination, and thus is based on power to power interactions to coordinate the system. As a corollary, such exploration of the advantages and challenges of the model/s gradually led me to present the perceptions of the research participants on alternative ways to improve the current governance model in Turkish higher education, which formed my third research question: Based on the challenges, what are the alternative ways to improve the governance model in Turkish higher education?

But it is important to note that the items in the framework are not fixed in stone, which is the very reason why I took a reconstructive perspective to explicate the operation of the system governance of higher education in Turkey and aimed for a reanalysis in the Discussion chapter, so that, an idiosyncratic rhizomatic system governance process could be generated for the Turkish higher education through a recursive inquiry of the issue at hand. Such revisiting of my conceptual framework

based on the perceptions of the research participants, I believe, was also helpful to examine the current position of higher education governance at both national and international levels and to take local needs and international competitiveness into consideration in the developing of a model for the Turkish higher education governance.

2.4 Summary of Chapter 2

This chapter contextualized the study in the relevant literature by organizing it into two parts: (1) system governance of higher education in the world and (2) system governance of higher education in Turkey. The chapter concluded with the conceptual framework employed in the study to reconstruct the system governance of higher education in Turkey through the perceptions of the research participants. The following chapter gives an account of the methods and procedures I employed in the study.

CHAPTER 3

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

This chapter gives an account of the research methods and procedures undertaken in this study. First, it presents the adopted research approach by elaborating on the theoretical perspective and strategy of inquiry that informs the study. Second, it poses the research questions. Third, it explains the research design by describing the research sites, the pilot study, the sample, and the instrument. Furthermore, it presents the data collection, recording, and analysis procedures. Fourth, it provides background information about the researcher relating to her identity and position in the research.

3.1 The research approach

3.1.1 Theoretical perspective

This dissertation adopts an exploratory qualitative approach to investigate how the current higher education governance model in Turkey operates according to the perceptions of rectors, CoHE members, and government representatives. As a corollary to the first question, the study specifically aims to answer how the decision-making structure works, how the decision-making power is shared, and how the interplay between governmental steering and institutional autonomy works in terms of accountability, financing, appointments, and rule of law. This dissertation also aims to explore the advantages and the challenges of this model and to open up a discussion on alternative ways to improve the current governance model in Turkish higher education.

After considering the predispositions of both qualitative and quantitative research designs in the light of the purposes of the study, I decided to embrace a qualitative research paradigm in the reconstruction of the system governance of Turkish higher education through the perceptions of the research participants considering that a qualitative inquiry would help to (1) explore the participants' conception of the system governance, (2) understand how interactions between socio-political communities, states, and institutional processes (re)contextualize the restructuring process of the system governance, (3) uncover how social, political, and ideological conditions of the country come down to shape the reality of the participants, (4) provide richer and detailed interpretations of the operation of the system governance and hence the resulting governance model and alternatives (if any) of the resulting governance model (Glesne, 2006; Marshall & Rossman, 2006; Merriam, 2002; Seggie & Bayyurt, 2015).

The theoretical perspective I take in this qualitative dissertation is that socially constructed knowledge is produced when “. . . individuals seek understanding of the world in which they live and work. They develop subjective meanings of their experiences-meanings directed toward certain objects or things. These meanings are varied and multiple” (Creswell, 2003, p. 8). As such, this type of knowledge aims to “look for the complexity of views rather than narrow the meanings into a few categories or ideas” and the purpose of research is to gain access to the multiple views of the participants through interactions that are “negotiated socially and historically” (Creswell, 2003, p. 8). That is to say, the research in this dissertation depicts a world of socially constructed knowledge in which “reality” is constructed by the multiple views of the research participants, so “[w]hat is “real” becomes relative to the specific location and people involved” (Glesne, 2006, p. 6,

emphasis in original). Therefore, as a researcher, I strived to understand and learn the perceptions of the research participants about the operation of the governance model in Turkish higher education system through interactions and to gather data to build meaning through an “inductive” process which would lean itself to a “richly descriptive end product” (Merriam, 2002, pp. 5, 6) which is based on “the researcher’s interpretation of participants’ interpretations or understandings of the phenomenon of interest” (Merriam, 2002, p. 25).

3.1.2 Strategy of inquiry

The strategy of inquiry that guided the dissertation is grounded theory. Grounded theory is an “inductive” methodology (Merriam, 2002, p. 5) “challenging the status quo in social research, as contemporary studies were dominated by the testing of “grand theory” and were deductive in nature” (McGhee, Marland, & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 334-335, emphasis in original). Therefore, grounded theory is “for developing theory that is grounded in data systematically gathered and analyzed. Theory evolves during actual research, and it does this through continuous interplay between analysis and data collection” (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 273). In addition, thinking that philosophy of pragmatism has influenced grounded theory and grounded theory aims to contribute to the discussions on theoretically complex phenomena (Birgili, 2015), system governance of Turkish higher education was chosen as the research phenomenon. Also, as part of the theoretical grounded theory lens employed in the study, an initial review of the literature was undertaken prior to data collection although there are varying opinions on the timing of the literature review in grounded theory. For instance, according to Glaser (1992), the literature review conducted prior to the data collection and data analysis may lead the researcher to

form themes and assumptions about the research phenomenon and result in the central ideas from the literature review to take over the data analysis and so to prevent systematic data collection and analysis, inhibiting the cyclical nature of the data collection and data analysis in grounded theory. On the other hand, Strauss and Corbin (1990) believe that conducting an initial literature review in advance of data collection and data analysis might be helpful to provide rationale for the study, to raise consciousness towards ethical issues, to decide if grounded theory is an appropriate method to study the research phenomenon under study, and to have researcher identify her preconceived opinions on the research topic. Pursuant to this, a preliminary literature review was undertaken before the data collection and data analysis in order to decide on the method of the study, identify the gaps in the literature, have some knowledge on the existing studies, and provide justification for the study to Institutional Ethical Review Board for Research with Human Subjects (INAREK). Following the initial literature review, grounded theory was chosen as the research method for the study. Such literature review showed that the system governance of Turkish higher education had not been studied with such a research strategy through the perceptions of rectors, CoHE members, and government representatives. Therefore, a process of merging data collection, data analysis, and sampling, continuously analyzing and restructuring the data collected, structuring the interview questions during the data collection, and so keeping the researcher open to new ideas was thought to be appropriate to study the operation of the current system governance model in Turkish higher education, the advantages and the challenges of this model, and the alternative ways to improve the model.

3.2 Research question(s)

The research questions are as follows:

According to the perceptions of rectors, CoHE members, and government representatives,

- (1) how does the current higher education governance model in Turkey operate?
 - a. how does the decision-making structure work?
 - b. how is the decision-making power shared?
 - c. how does the interplay between governmental steering and institutional autonomy work in terms of accountability, financing, appointments, and rule of law?
- (2) what are the advantages and challenges of this model?
- (3) based on the challenges, what are the alternative ways to improve the governance model in Turkish higher education?

3.3 Research design

3.3.1 An overview

This study adopts an exploratory and qualitative approach. The study is exploratory in nature because, to my knowledge, limited study has put together the advantages and the challenges of the current governance model in Turkish higher education through the perceptions of rectors, CoHE members, and government representatives. Therefore, the unit of analysis in this dissertation included the former/current rectors, former/current CoHE members, and current government representatives and the research sites for the study included state universities, CoHE, and ministries (Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Development, Ministry of National Education).

The study was conducted with fifteen rectors (seven former and eight current), twelve CoHE members (seven former and five current), and four current government representatives, amounting to thirty-one face-to-face interviews. The qualitative research focused on interpretation and analysis of the perceptions and understandings of these top administrators as regards the operation of the governance model in Turkish higher education system primarily aimed to identify the main issues and variations in reasoning within the context of the operation of the system governance of Turkish higher education.

3.3.2 Research sites

The research sites for the study included state universities, CoHE, and ministries (Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Development, Ministry of National Education).

State universities

Nine of the fifteen interviews held with the former/current rectors were conducted in state universities over a period between December 2016 and June 2017. As of February 2018, the Turkish higher education system consists of 112 state universities and sixty-eight non-profit foundation universities and together with the five post-secondary vocational schools, these 185 higher education institutions are coordinated by CoHE according to Higher Education Law (Law No. 2547) enacted in 1981 (Yükseköğretim Bilgi Yönetim Sistemi [Higher Education Information Management System], n.d.).

Turkish students are not charged with tuition fees at state universities provided that they complete their programs in the designated time and are enrolled in face-to-face day programs. In the 2016-2017 academic year, as regards the total number of students enrolled in higher education, 7,198,987, female students

accounted for 3,312,880 (46%) and male students accounted for 3,886,107 (54%). 6,629,961 (3,037,521 female and 3,592,440 male) of these students were enrolled in state universities. In addition, of 1,434,589 new admissions to higher education in 2016-2017, 1,266,431 students were placed in state universities. The total number of academic staff in Turkish higher education was 151,763 (66,805 female and 84,958 male) in 2016-2017, and of these, 129,853 comprising 55,416 (43%) female and 74,437 (57%) male were employed in state universities (Yükseköğretim Bilgi Yönetim Sistemi [Higher Education Information Management System], n.d.).²⁹

Therefore, compared to non-profit foundation universities, the bulk of academicians and students are part of the state universities in Turkey. Also, state universities are largely controlled by CoHE and they are greatly affected by the changes in the system governance of higher education. In other words, although non-profit foundation universities and state universities are governed by the same law, they differ in terms of their relationships with CoHE and the impact of CoHE on them. For these reasons, state universities were chosen as one of the research sites.

CoHE

Of twelve interviews held with the former/current CoHE members, five were conducted with the current CoHE members in CoHE, located in Ankara, Turkey over a period between December 2016 and June 2017. CoHE, established in 1981 with the enactment of Higher Education Law (Law No. 2547), is an autonomous body with public legal personality with powers and duties covered in Articles 130 and 131 of the 1982 Constitution. Accordingly, CoHE's responsibilities in the system governance of higher education are

to plan, organize, administer, and supervise education provided by institutions of higher education, to orient teaching activities, education and

²⁹ The percentages were calculated by the author using the relevant numbers from Yükseköğretim Bilgi Yönetim Sistemi [Higher Education Information Management System].

scientific research, to ensure the establishment and development of these institutions in conformity with the objectives and principles set forth by law, to ensure the effective use of the resources allotted to the universities, and to plan for the training of the teaching staff. (The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, n.d., p. 53)

The Council consists of twenty-one members appointed from among professors for four years: (1) seven directly appointed by the President of the Republic, (2) seven selected by the Council of Ministers, (3) seven selected by the Inter-University Board. The appointment of the latter two categories of those members requires the approval of the President of the Republic who also directly appoints the President of CoHE from among the Council members for four years. The organs of the Council are the General Assembly, the Executive Board, and the President. The Council members constitute the General Assembly and the Executive Board comprises nine members elected from among the members of the Council (CoHE, 2017). As this dissertation aimed to investigate the operation of the system governance of higher education in Turkey through the perspectives and understandings of the multiple stakeholders engaged in the system governance and as CoHE holds a central position within the system, it was selected as one of the research sites for the study.

Ministries

Within the scope of the study, I visited three ministries, Ministry of Development, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of National Education, located in Ankara, Turkey and conducted interviews with four government representatives in May 2017.

According to the functions of CoHE outlined in Article 7 of Higher Education Law (Law No. 2547), CoHE takes into account the objectives and policies put forth in the national development plans in the planning of higher education. In addition, as set forth in Article 16 and Article 17 of Public Financial Management and Control Law (Law No. 5018), the Ministry of Development is responsible for coordinating public

investment planning (Kamu Mali Yönetimi ve Kontrol Kanunu [Public Financial Management and Control Law], 2003, pp. 8664-2 - 8665).³⁰ Taking these together, CoHE cooperates and coordinates with the Ministry of Development for the provision and sustainability of the social and economic growth. Also, in the planning of higher education, as stated under Article 7, CoHE

1. . . . present[s] to the Ministry of National Education proposals or views on the establishment, and, if necessary, unification of newly established universities,
2. make[s] decisions directly or on the basis of proposals made by universities concerning the opening, unification, or closing down of faculties, graduate schools and schools of higher education within a university and . . . convey[s] the above decisions to the Ministry of National Education for appropriate action in due course. (CoHE, 2000, pp. 9-10)

With regard to the financing of higher education, CoHE is charged with submitting “the budgets prepared by the governing bodies and universities after examining and approving them” to the Ministry of National Education (CoHE, 2000, p. 11). As specified in Article 10 of Public Financial Management and Control Law (Law No. 5018), the Minister of National Education is responsible for checking the preparation and implementation of the budgets in accordance with the national development plans (Kamu Mali Yönetimi ve Kontrol Kanunu [Public Financial Management and Control Law], 2003, p. 8663). The budget proposals are sent to the Ministry of Finance by the governing bodies of CoHE and universities. According to Article 31 of the same law, the Ministry of Finance holds the responsibility for the planning of the allocation and use of the budgets to be used by the relevant institutions (Kamu Mali Yönetimi ve Kontrol Kanunu [Public Financial Management and Control Law], 2003). Hence, given that the Ministry of Development, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of National Education are influential in the operation of the system

³⁰ The full text of Law No. 5018 in Turkish is available at <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/12/20031224.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/12/20031224.htm>

governance of Turkish higher education, they were selected as the third research site for the study. Finally, in this dissertation, the names of the participants, state universities, and cities where the state universities are located are concealed to ensure anonymity and confidentiality.

3.3.3 Pilot study

I got approval from the Institutional Ethical Review Board for Research with Human Subjects (INAREK) at Boğaziçi University in June 2015 (see Appendix C). My initial plan was to schedule the interviews for the pilot study at the soonest time possible and to engage myself in the data collection process. Due to several extremely serious medical issues in my family, I had to change my plans as I was the main caretaker in each case. In August 2016, I decided to prepare for the pilot study and grouped the state universities in Turkey according to the turning points in the system governance of Turkish higher education. According to this, I had three groups on my list. I will elaborate on this issue in the Initial criteria for selecting the participants section. In September 2016, based on this grouping of the state universities, to pilot the interview protocol for the current/former rectors, I directly contacted some of the current rectors on my list by e-mail. For before the pilot study, I had decided that I would first contact the current rectors and contact the former rectors later if I were unable to reach the current rectors. In the e-mail, I briefly introduced myself, explained the purpose of my study, clarified my piloting intention stating that I wanted to learn about my interview questions, and requested help for piloting the study. I attached the informed consent for the current/former rectors (see Appendix D), the approval by INAREK, and my curriculum vitae to the e-mail as I wanted to build trust (cf. Marshall & Rossman, 2006). I waited for two weeks and

sent the same e-mail again to the same group of the current rectors. I waited for another two weeks; however, I was unable to get a reply, which meant that I had to refine my participant selection strategy for the pilot study (cf. Glesne, 2006). First, I think the time I e-mailed to the current rectors was quite wrong because it was the beginning of the new academic year in Turkey. Therefore, I had to employ “time sampling” strategy to recruit participants for my pilot study and try to avoid at least the busy days and holidays by checking through the academic calendars of the state universities (cf. Patton, 2002, p. 229). Second, I hoped that I could get a reply over e-mail without taking into account how busy these individuals were. As they held the top position in the governance of state universities, I had to consider their busy schedules and the people they cooperated with for the creation, planning, and management of their schedules. I had to consider that the current rectors were part of an institutional structure and acted on multiple levels both inside and outside the universities. Pursuant to this, I came to the understanding that it was a mistake to e-mail to more than one current rector without waiting for their answers. I could have ended up with two interviews on the same day and even in the same hour. As they had tight schedules, I might not have any other options than to cancel one of the interviews.

Based on these learning points and considering the time frame and the issue of gaining access (Glesne, 2006; Maxwell, 2007), the first decision I made was to pilot the interview protocol for the current/former rectors with current rectors of non-profit foundation universities who also had taken roles in the governance of state universities. Hence, in October 2016, I contacted the Secretary General of a non-profit foundation university I knew through my professional network by phone, explained the purpose of my study, and requested help for arranging an interview

with the current rector (current rector 1). The Secretary General agreed to help and asked me to e-mail the informed consent for the current/former rectors, the approval by INAREK, and my curriculum vitae. On the same day, the Secretary General called me and told me that the interview for the pilot study was scheduled for the following week.

Upon scheduling the first interview, I made contact with the Adviser to the Rector of a non-profit foundation university by e-mail. I knew the Adviser to the Rector through my professional network. In the e-mail, I introduced myself briefly, explained the purpose of my research, made specific that I wanted to pilot my study with the current rector (current rector 2), and requested help for piloting the study. I attached the informed consent for the current/former rectors, the approval by INAREK, and my curriculum vitae to the e-mail. The Adviser to the Rector e-mailed back to me on the same day and stated that the interview for the pilot study was scheduled for the third week of October. Yet, on the interview day approximately six hours before the scheduled interview time, the Adviser to the Rector called me and shared that on account of an urgent last minute change in the program of the current rector, the interview was cancelled and delayed for two days.

The third interview for the pilot study was conducted with a former CoHE member. While preparing for the pilot study, I decided to conduct one interview with a former CoHE member considering that I would contact current CoHE members for the actual study and provided that I was unable to reach them, I would contact former CoHE members. I was introduced to the former CoHE member by the current rector 2. At the end of the interview, the current rector 2 kindly asked me if I needed to recruit any other participants for the pilot study and I shared that I had not arranged an interview with a former CoHE member yet. The current rector 2 called the former

CoHE member and after introducing me and explaining the purpose of my study asked if the former CoHE member could participate in the pilot study. The former CoHE member agreed to help for the pilot study and asked me to send an e-mail to schedule the interview. I sent the e-mail attaching the informed consent for the current/former CoHE members (see Appendix E), the approval by INAREK, and my curriculum vitae. Following the e-mail, the interview for the pilot study was scheduled for the third week of November 2016 due to my mother's operations in November.

Before starting the interviews, first, I wanted to be ready for the pilot study and to learn if the interview questions reflected the purpose of the study and were formed to gain participants' understandings and perceptions about the system governance of higher education in Turkey (Maxwell, 2007; Seggie & Akbulut Yıldırım, 2015). Thus, I considered conducting a "pre-pilot testing" with five "facilitators" (Glesne, 2006, p. 85). Four of the facilitators were well informed about the research focus and were experienced in developing research questions and conducting interviews on the topic of interest. The fifth facilitator was a mechanical engineer, only knew my research focus, and had no experience in the relevant field. These facilitators read the interview questions and provided me with feedback on the clarity, grammar, and focus of the questions. Based on their feedback, I made minor changes to the interview questions, but more importantly, I got a chance to reflect on the questions from others' perspective and revise them taking different perspectives and voices into account.

One day before the interviews, I made sure I decided on what to wear on the interview days, for I wanted to convey my respect and gratitude to the participants for their time and contribution to the study and I wanted to build trust in myself and

minimize the anxiety I felt by acting like I was preparing for work as this was my routine for getting ready for work. On the interview days, I had no difficulties in reaching the interview locations and arrived at the office buildings at least half an hour before the interviews.

Each interview was held at the participant's office located in three different non-profit foundation universities. When I arrived at the office buildings to pilot my study with the current rector 1 and the current rector 2, the Secretary General in the non-profit foundation university 1 and the Adviser to the Rector in the non-profit foundation university 2 generously helped me find my way, took me to the waiting room, and then to the current rectors' office. In addition, as I was also introduced to the former CoHE member by the current rector 2, I did not have any problems in gaining access to any of the interview buildings. When I met the current rectors and the former CoHE member on a face-to-face basis, I introduced myself briefly, explained the purpose of my study, and shared that I wanted to learn about the research process and the interview questions and revise my questions through feedback from the pilot study (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). I then presented the approval by INAREK and went over the informed consent which also covered the issues of confidentiality and anonymity. The participants either signed the informed consent or put symbols or their initials on it. The interviews were conducted in Turkish and I recorded the interviews by hand. While hand recording, the participants could see my written material. I was not asked to do so, but that was a personal choice as I wanted to avoid any possible distractions in regard to my note taking and intended to make it part of the interview process. The participants preferred to reflect on the interview questions during the interview and also at the end of the interviews, they provided me with feedback and went over the questions

again. The overall length of the interviews was around 90 minutes and the interviews, in general, ran smoothly. One issue that required on-the-spot decision-making during the interviews was what to do when the participants received a phone call or when somebody entered the room and asked a question or had something important to share. In each case, I asked if I should leave the room as I decided at these moments that I had to respect not only the privacy of the participants but also the privacy of the context where I was an outsider (Shaw, 2003). The participants told me that there was no need for me to leave the room, so in such cases, I waited in the room, checked my notes, and tried to organize the rest of the interview.

I met the current rectors once as the interviews were completed on the interview day. The interview with the former CoHE member also proceeded as planned and at the end of the interview, the former CoHE member suggested to check the interview questions again after I made the revisions based on the findings from the pilot interview. I met the former CoHE member for the second time in the second week of December 2016. During the thirty-minute meeting, the former CoHE member crosschecked the pre- and post-interview questions against one another and no additional revisions came up at this meeting. Using the pilot participants' feedback, I reconsidered the interview questions and made modest changes to the interview protocol for the current/former rectors (see Appendix F for the interview protocol used for the pilot study, see Appendix G for the English version of the interview protocol used in the study, and see Appendix H for the Turkish version of the interview protocol used in the study) and the interview protocol for the current/former CoHE members (see Appendix I for the interview protocol used for the pilot study, see Appendix J for the English version of the interview protocol used in the study, and see Appendix K for the Turkish version of the interview protocol

used in the study). Initially, I had planned to make contact with former rectors and former CoHE members at a later stage if I were unable to reach current rectors and current CoHE members. The pilot participants recommended me to refine this strategy and to include former rectors and former CoHE members in the selection of participants from the start so that I could gain different perspectives on the system governance of higher education in Turkey and be better planned and organized during data collection. As a corollary, in order to examine the operation of the system governance of higher education in Turkey at a deeper level, to find out the similarities and differences between the participants' understandings and perceptions of the system governance of higher education in Turkey, and to get an opportunity to identify the recurring challenges and emerging issues of system governance of higher education in Turkey, I decided to include former rectors and former CoHE members in the selection of the research participants process.

3.4 Sample

3.4.1 Initial criteria for selecting the participants

The study aimed to reach three groups of participants:

1. Current/former rectors of state universities
2. Current/former CoHE members
3. Government representatives (Ministry of Development, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of National Education)

As mentioned earlier, in August 2016, for the selection of current/former rectors, I employed the strategy of grouping the state universities in Turkey according to the turning points in the operation of the system governance of higher education in

Turkey. The rationale behind this grouping was to capture the evolution of the system governance of higher education in Turkey also mirrored in the literature on the research focus and discussed in the Literature Review chapter of this dissertation and so to attempt to integrate this evolution of the system governance of higher education into the selection of current/former rectors. According to this, I initially had four groups:

1. 1923 - 1980 (19 state universities)
2. 1981 - 1991 (9 state universities)
3. 1992 - 2005 (25 state universities)
4. 2006 - 2017 (56 state universities)

Yet, as there were only nine universities in the second group, the interviews could have been identifier for the rectors in this group, putting their anonymity and confidentiality of interview records in danger. Hence, I decided to combine the second group with the first group. Based on this, I had three groups:

1. 1923 - 1991 (28 state universities)
2. 1992 - 2005 (25 state universities)
3. 2006 - 2017 (56 state universities)

Criteria for participant selection for the three groups included at least one year of experience in the relevant position:

1. Current/former rectors of state universities with at least one year of experience in the relevant position
2. Current/former CoHE members with at least one year of experience in the relevant position

3. Current government representatives with at least one year of experience in the relevant position (Ministry of Development, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of National Education)

Hence, considering the initial criteria for selecting the participants, one year of experience in the relevant position, I eliminated some of the universities from the list:

1. 1923 - 1991 (14 state universities)
2. 1992 - 2005 (24 state universities)
3. 2006 - 2017 (40 state universities)

As for the selection of current/former CoHE members, besides the experience criterion, I also employed diversity in the inclusion of CoHE's historical context criterion so as to cover a period from 1981 to the present.

Overall, rectors, as the highest authority in the governance of state universities, are usually in direct contact with CoHE. That is the reason for selecting rectors as the initial participant group. The CoHE members constitute the General Assembly and the Executive Board of CoHE, which is the supreme autonomous body over the system governance of higher education in Turkey. Therefore, they formed the second group of participants. At this point, it is important to state that systematic data collection and analysis of data in grounded theory impacted selection of the participants in this study. For instance, during the data collection and initial analysis of data, it was discovered that conducting interviews with the government representatives was crucial to the study of the research phenomenon. The participants of the study also advised me to conduct interviews at the relevant ministries in order to reflect the role of ministries in the evolution and operation of the system governance of higher education in Turkey. Based on these tenets and after the thesis

progress meeting in May 2017, I prepared my third interview protocol for the interviews with current government representatives using the second interview protocol prepared and piloted for the interviews with current/former CoHE members (see Appendix L for the English version of the interview protocol used in the study and see Appendix M for the Turkish version of the interview protocol used in the study) and used the informed consent prepared for the interviews with current/former CoHE members. In the meantime, I also applied for funding to the Boğaziçi University Scientific Research Projects (BAP). While reviewing my INAREK form for the application, I added current government representatives as the third group of participants, revised the title of the dissertation, and resent my documents to the INAREK. After the approval by INAREK (see Appendix N for the renewed ethical approval), my funding application was also approved by BAP. I found out that, in grounded theory, each phase of the research design called for an open door policy, and thus, for constant reflection, on-going decision making, and flexibility. For this reason, the final research participant group, which included individuals who are/were/have been in direct contact with the system governance of higher education and who are/were/have been part of the evolution and operation of the system governance of Turkish higher education, was formed through an on-going recruitment process which ended before the setting up of the last interview.

3.4.2 Recruitment of participants

After I completed the pilot study in the second week of December 2016, I started selecting participants for the actual study. I did not attempt to make contacts for recruiting participants for the actual study during the pilot study because the process of recruitment of participants for the pilot study taught me that the individuals I

wanted to conduct interviews with were difficult to reach. They were quite busy, part of an institutional structure, and had a very tight schedule, which might not allow for another interview day in the near future. That's why, I decided to wait to start the recruitment of participants for the actual study until I completed the pilot interviews. For instance, before I conducted the third pilot interview with the former CoHE member in the third week of November 2016, I had assumed the pilot study period would have been completed on the interview day. However, as the former CoHE member generously offered to check the revised version of the interview protocol, the pilot study period was completed in the second week of December 2016, for upon the completion of the pilot interview, on the same day, I learnt I had to fly to my hometown for my mother's third operation. Once the pilot study period was over, I engaged myself in the recruitment of participants for the actual study.

The research participants were recruited through purposeful sampling.

According to Patton (2002),

[t]he logic and power of purposeful sampling lie in selecting *information-rich cases* for study in depth. Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the inquiry, thus the term purposeful sampling. Studying information-rich cases yields insights and in-depth understanding rather than empirical generalizations. (p. 230, emphasis in original)

The first way I used the purposeful sampling was through my academic networks - academics who were in touch with the participants I contacted for an interview or put me in contact with individuals who could help me recruit participants for my study. I explained the purpose of my study and shared the criteria for selection of the participants with these people on the phone or face-to-face. Thanks to them, I was able to locate twenty potential research participants eighteen of whom agreed to take part in the study after the initial contact. I made the initial contact with these potential research participants via e-mail or phone. I either e-mailed to or talked with

the potential participant or the person in charge of scheduling their program. In the e-mail or on the phone, I briefly introduced myself, explained the purpose of my study, and requested the potential research participant's participation in the study. I attached the informed consent, the approval by INAREK, and my curriculum vitae to the e-mail. Phone calls were also followed by an e-mail.

The second way I utilized the purposeful sampling was through one participant leading to another. At the end of the interviews, some research participants asked me if I needed to reach more participants. They shared with me that they could guess how difficult it could be to arrange an interview with the group I aimed to reach. If the research participants did not comment on the recruitment of participants for the study, I did not ask help from them, for I was not sure how this would make them feel even though they might have agreed to put me in contact with potential research participants (cf. Glesne, 2006). Through the strategy of one participant leading to another, thanks to my research participants, I reached thirteen potential research participants who all agreed to participate in the study after the initial contact. I made the initial contact with these potential research participants via e-mail or phone and followed the same procedures I mentioned above.

Through these two strategies of snowball sampling, I also employed other purposeful sampling strategies (Patton, 2002). First, the grouping of state universities guided me in identifying homogenous sampling as a sampling strategy. By means of this strategy, I was able to plan for recruiting participants to explore the similarities within and across each group in the evolution and operation of the system governance of higher education in Turkey through the perspectives and understandings of the research participants. Similarly, setting diversity in the inclusion of CoHE's historical context so as to cover a period from 1981 to the

present as a criterion in the selection of current/former CoHE members assisted me in benefitting from homogenous sampling, which also served to uncover the similarities within and across each period of CoHE in the evolution and operation of the system governance of higher education in Turkey through the perspectives and understandings of the research participants.

Second, both the grouping of state universities in the selection of current/former rectors and the criterion set for the selection of current/former CoHE members helped me to employ maximum variation sampling strategy. For example, in the recruitment of current/former CoHE members, I tried to pay attention to cover the time frame of CoHE with an intention to explore the differences within and across each period of CoHE in the evolution and operation of the system governance of higher education in Turkey through the perspectives and understandings of the research participants. In addition, based on the grouping of state universities, I attempted to make sure the geographical variation was represented in the study. Through this sampling strategy, I was able to recruit current/former rectors of state universities located in Aegean, Black Sea, Central Anatolia, Marmara, and Mediterranean regions. I also made initial contacts with three potential research participants so as to represent Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia regions in the study. To set up an interview with two of these potential research participants, I was asked to send an e-mail by the person in charge of scheduling their program. I sent the e-mail following the same procedures I mentioned above, yet because of the busy schedules of the potential research participants, I was unable to arrange the interviews. I had reached the third potential research participant during a hospital day. While waiting at the hospital, I noticed the name of the potential research participant on one of the office doors. I made an appointment with the secretary, then

introduced myself to the potential research participant, explained the purpose of my study, and was able to schedule an interview. On the interview day, while I was on my way to the hospital, the secretary called me and shared that the potential research participant had to postpone the interview for one week. When I called the secretary back for the interview, the secretary told me the potential research participant would not participate in the study, so I thanked the secretary and hung up the phone.

That is to say, I tried to be prepared for employing homogenous sampling and maximum variation sampling through snowball sampling in the recruitment of research participants. Both the academics and the research participants who helped me during this process asked me what I needed to explore the research phenomenon under study. As such, I had to be “anticipatory” and be able to describe what I needed in terms such as current/former CoHE member from X period of CoHE, current/former rector of a state university located in X region, and current government representative from Ministry of X (cf. Glesne, 2006, p. 93).

3.4.3 Demographics and description of the final sample

The recruitment process of research participants via three purposeful sampling strategies led me to reach thirty-one research participants, none of whom I knew personally. The thirty-one participants included the following five groups of participants: (a) eight current rectors, (b) seven former rectors, (c) five current CoHE members, (d) seven former CoHE members, and (e) four current government representatives. Of the thirty-one participants interviewed, all were men except two women former rectors, and ages ranged from early forties to late eighties and the average age of the sample was sixty. Their years of experience ranged from one to seventeen years and the average years of experience of participants was six.

Current/former rectors

Based on the grouping of the state universities, the distribution of the participants across three groups was as follows:

1. 1923 - 1991 (14 state universities): Seven former rectors
2. 1992 - 2005 (24 state universities): Five current rectors
3. 2006 - 2017 (40 state universities): Three current rectors

The participants were two women and thirteen men with three to eight years of experience, ranged in age from early forties to early eighties, and were distributed across five regions; Aegean, Black Sea, Central Anatolia, Marmara, and Mediterranean regions as presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Distribution across regions, current/former rectors

Aegean (1)	Black Sea (2)	Central Anatolia (5)	Marmara (6)	Mediterranean (1)
1923 - 1991	1992 - 2005	1923 - 1991 (2)	1923 - 1991 (4)	1992 - 2005
	2006 -	1992 - 2005 (1)	1992 - 2005 (2)	
		2006 - (2)		

Current rectors

Eight men participants ranged in age from late forties to early sixties and their years of experience ranged from three to seven years.

Former rectors

Of the seven former rectors, two were women and five were men with four to eight years of experience, ages ranged from early sixties to early eighties, and three of the participants had experience as a former CoHE member.

Current/former CoHE members

Of the twelve current/former CoHE members, all were men with at least one year of experience, all were professors except one participant who had served at varying

administrative positions as a government official before being appointed as a CoHE member, and their ages ranged from early forties to late eighties. In addition, two of the twelve participants represented a work experience as a rector and four represented a work experience as a vice rector. The sample included at least one participant from the previous six periods of CoHE, with a maximum of two. Below is the time frame of CoHE followed to include the historical context of CoHE in exploring the evolution and operation of the system governance of Turkish higher education:

1. İhsan Doğramacı (1981-1992)
2. Mehmet Sağlam (1992-1995)
3. Kemal Gürüz (1995-2003)
4. Erdoğan Teziç (2003-2007)
5. Yusuf Ziya Özcan (2007-2011)
6. Gökhan Çetinsaya (2011-2014)
7. Yekta Saraç (2014 -)

There were a total of seven former CoHE members whose ages ranged from early forties to late eighties. As for the five current CoHE members, they ranged in age from early fifties to late sixties.

Government representatives

Of the thirty-one participants, four were government representatives of three different ministries (Ministry of Development, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of National Education), had at least one year of experience, ranged in age from early forties to early fifties. Of the four, two were from the Ministry of National Education.

3.5 Interview protocol and data collection

3.5.1 Description of the interview protocols

The means of data collection were in-depth, semi-structured interviews developed through an open-ended approach utilizing an interview protocol. I developed three interview protocols for three groups of research participants; interview protocol for the current/former rectors, interview protocol for the current/former CoHE members, and interview protocol for the current government representatives.

In the development of the first two interview protocols, my main challenge was about the incorporation of the words centralization and centralized in the interview protocols. As the literature pointed towards centralization in the system governance of Turkish higher education through the CoHE model and specifically included the words centralization and centralized while describing the structure of CoHE and the emerging system governance model, I thought I needed to include these two words in the wording of the interview questions. On the other hand, I was challenged if the inclusion of the words would lead the research participants to focus on a particular aspect of the system governance of Turkish higher education, hampering the purpose of the study and also the nature of qualitative research design. I decided to include the words in the initial writing-up of the interview protocols and employ a pre-pilot testing as discussed earlier. Five facilitators, four faculty members and one mechanical engineer went over the questions thoroughly and all agreed that it would be better if I left the decision on the inclusion of these words to the pilot study participants as they would form the group from which the data would be drawn. After I piloted the study, I decided not to incorporate these two words into the interview protocols as the feedback from the three pilot study participants and the

data I collected during pilot study period made clear that the use of the words might be leading and remain an open question of if the study was built around a pre-conceived point of view. Thus, I reconsidered the interview questions and met the third pilot study participant and the five facilitators again to check if the questions reflected the findings from the pilot study and would lead to contribute to the inclusion of multiple perspectives in the exploration of the study phenomenon. This stage formed the evolution of the two interview protocols.

As for the types of questions included in the interview protocols, mainly ten open-ended questions were developed through a review of the literature to explore the research phenomenon under study and these questions were revised constantly during the evolution stage of the interview protocols. The first question in each interview protocol focused on knowledge about the roles and responsibilities of the research participants while the second, third, and fourth questions inquired knowledge about other aspects of the operation of the system governance of Turkish higher education such as decision-making mechanisms, sharing of decision-making power, and interplay between governmental steering and institutional autonomy from the perspectives and understandings of the research participants. Therefore, the first four open-ended questions were mainly “knowledge questions” seeking for information on the operation of the system governance of higher education (Patton, 2002, p. 350). The questions from five to ten in each interview protocol were mainly “opinion and values questions” (cf. Patton, 2002, p. 350). While the fifth question aimed at exploring the operation of the system governance of Turkish higher education through the issues such as decision-making mechanisms, sharing of decision-making power, and interplay between governmental steering and institutional autonomy, the questions six, seven, and eight aimed at uncovering the

advantages and the challenges of the current system governance of Turkish higher education according to the perspectives and understandings of the research participants. Based on these challenges (if any), the last two questions aimed to explore the alternative ways to improve the system governance of Turkish higher education. As for the third interview protocol developed for the interviews with the current government representatives, the interview questions were drawn from the second interview protocol developed for the current/former CoHE members and were checked by two faculty members before used in the study. Of the three open-ended questions, the first was a mix of knowledge and opinion and values types of questions inquiring the process of cooperation between CoHE and the ministry and the advantages and the challenges given birth from such cooperation. The second and third questions were opinion and values questions aimed at exploring the operation of the system governance, the advantages and challenges of it, and considering the challenges the alternatives to it through the perspectives of the research participants.

Overall, the interview protocols used in the study consisted of knowledge and opinion and values types of questions. As suggested by Patton (2002), I tried to set a pattern of “standardization” within and across three groups of research participants through using these two types of questions in “sequencing questions” (p. 352). That is, what was guiding in conducting the interviews was the type of interview questions but not the numbering of the questions. By beginning with knowledge questions to “encourage the respondent to talk descriptively”, then probing for a more detailed portrayal of the operation of the system governance, and then moving to opinions and probing for in-depth interpretations of opinions on the operation of the system governance, I attempted to follow a pattern during the interviews (cf. Patton, 2002, p. 352).

3.5.2 Procedures for data collection

3.5.2.1 Protection of the human subjects

In order to ensure the protection of the research participants in the study, my research plan, interview questions, and informed consent forms were examined by the Institutional Ethical Review Board for Research with Human Subjects (INAREK) at Boğaziçi University. Before each interview, I made sure I had a copy of the approval by INAREK with me and I presented the approval to the research participants in the introduction to the interviews. Also, informed consent assured the confidentiality and anonymity of the data and immediately after the interviews, I assigned an ID number to each participant. In addition, in the writing-up of the Demographics and description of the final sample, I did not share a detailed profile of the research participants in order not to risk anonymity of the research participants. In that section, I just shared an overall profile of the final sample. Finally, while explaining the data collection procedures, I did not specify the interview locations that were different than research sites – state universities, ministries, and CoHE.

3.5.2.2 Data collection

Data were collected through in-depth, semi-structured interviews developed through an open-ended approach over a period between October 2016 and June 2017. The pilot study was conducted between October 2016 and December 2016. For the actual study, I conducted the first interview in the fourth week of December 2016 and the last interview in the second week of June 2017. The interviews aimed at exploring the operation of the current system governance model in Turkish higher education, the advantages and the challenges of this model, and the alternative ways to improve

it from the perspectives and understandings of the three groups of participants. All interviews were conducted in Turkish, were face-to-face, and lasted around ninety minutes in length. The shortest interview took approximately one hour in length and the longest interview was around three hours. I recorded the interviews by hand except two interviews during which I also took hand-written notes. These two research participants advised me to tape-record and hand-record the interviews so that I could record everything and also have some break during the interview sessions. These two interviews lasted around two hours without a break.

Of the thirty-one interviews, twenty-nine were completed on the interview day and two were completed in two interview sessions as the research participants had other programs to attend. In each case, both the first session and the second session averaged between forty-five to sixty minutes. Seventeen interviews were held at three different research sites – state universities, ministries, CoHE – and fourteen interviews were conducted at a location of the research participant's choosing. During data collection, I travelled nineteen times to nine different cities distributed across five geographical regions, Aegean, Black Sea, Central Anatolia, Marmara, and Mediterranean regions.

3.5.2.3 Credibility of the data

The first strategy I employed for the credibility of the data was “triangulation” (Merriam, 2002, p. 25). First, data were drawn from three groups of participants, current/former rectors, current/former CoHE members, and current government representatives and within the first two groups a stratification strategy of being a current or former rector or CoHE member was utilized. Second, through three purposeful sampling strategies, namely snowball sampling, homogenous sampling,

and maximum variation sampling, I attempted to achieve a better portrayal and exploration of the research phenomenon within and across the research sample through the realities of the research participants. The selection of three sampling strategies also resulted in a variety in interview locations. The second strategy employed for the credibility of the data was “member checks” (Merriam, 2002, p. 25). During the interviews, the participants could see my written material. I tried to integrate my hand recording into the running of the interviews and used my notes to probe or to clarify a point and referred to my notes checking them with the participants.

3.5.3 Data analysis

Constant comparative method (Merriam, 1998) was used to analyze the operation of the current system governance model in Turkish higher education, the advantages and the challenges of this model, and the alternative ways to improve it through the perceptions of rectors, CoHE members, and government representatives. Pertinent to constant comparative method, the research phenomenon was analyzed in two broad stages: (a) during data collection and (b) after data collection.

During data collection

As in grounded theory data collection and data analysis are not separated from each other but instead are integrated (Birgili, 2015), a preliminary analysis of data was conducted as data collection progressed. Based on the findings from this initial analysis, I reconstructed the interview questions with a purpose of enriching the data collection. This meant that the running of a new interview was affected by the previous interview as a result of the continuous interplay between data collection and data analysis.

After data collection

After data were collected, analysis of textual data was split into three stages: (a) data organization, (b) coding and categorization, and (c) writing of the conceptual model.

First, I organized and cleaned the data. Each research participant was assigned an ID number immediately after the completion of each interview session. Accordingly, I read the gathered data to familiarize myself with the hand-recorded notes, made some initial notes on the records, and finally translated the data into English.

Second, I coded and categorized the fat data in three stages using my “Rhizomatic System Governance Process Framework” as a guide (cf. Attride-Stirling, 2001): (a) initial categorization, (b) constant comparison, and (c) integration of categories (Merriam, 2002; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The process started with identifying “major code clumps . . . to sort the data” (Glesne, 2006, p. 152), thus, nine main items in the framework were identified as major codes: modes of operation, strategies that might be associated with these modes of operation, forms of power, instruments, missions, governance indicators, modes of governance, mode of coordination, and models. Concomitant with this, the sub-items in the framework were identified as major sub-codes. The initial categorization went on with connecting the two research questions with the major codes and the major sub-codes. Matching of the research questions with the major codes is presented in Table 3. As for the third research question, a production of initial categories in the exploration of the advantages and challenges of the system governance model applying major codes and major sub-codes to the collected data gradually guided me towards an initial categorization of the alternative ways to improve the current governance model in Turkish higher education, connecting with my third research question: Based on the

challenges, what are the alternative ways to improve the governance model in Turkish higher education? It is important to note that if a data piece did not connect with any of the major codes and/or the major sub-codes, new major codes and/or new major sub-codes were identified based on my judgments at the initial categorization stage (Glesne, 2006).

Table. 3 Initial categorization of the textual data

Research Questions	Major Codes
<p>According to the perceptions of rectors, CoHE members, and government representatives,</p> <p>(1) how does the current higher education governance model in Turkey operate?</p>	<p>(1) Modes of operation and associated strategies</p> <p>(2) Forms of power</p> <p>(3) Policy instruments</p>
<p>a. how does the decision-making structure work?</p> <p>b. how is the decision-making power shared?</p>	<p>(1) Forms of power</p> <p>(2) Policy instruments</p> <p>(3) Missions</p>
<p>c. how does the interplay between governmental steering and institutional autonomy work in terms of accountability, financing, appointments, and rule of law?</p>	<p>(1) Modes of operation and associated strategies</p> <p>(2) Forms of power</p> <p>(3) Governance indicators</p>
<p>(2) what are the advantages and challenges of this model?</p>	<p>(1) Modes of governance</p> <p>(2) Models</p> <p>(3) Mode of coordination</p>

On the basis of the initial categories, I further coded and categorized the data through constant comparison with a purpose of establishing connections between categories and producing categories with clear boundaries, and that left me with a more manageable number of salient categories (Merriam, 2002; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The process was followed by integration of categories, which was aimed at

searching for merging of similar categories and the possibility of creating new categories to check if data were subsumed under categories (Merriam, 2002; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Finally, completion of the coding and categorization of the data stage constituted the “core category”, which linked the other categories to one another, culminating into the last stage of data analysis, writing of the conceptual model (Merriam, 2002, p. 143). For as stated by Merriam (2002), in grounded theory, “[t]hrough constantly comparing incident with incident, comparing incidents with emerging conceptual categories, and reducing similar categories into a small number of highly conceptual categories, an overall framework or substantive theory develops” (p. 143), which was also the case in this study. In presenting the conceptual model, I followed three steps: I first provided case narratives of four research participants in order to highlight the variety in the participants’ perspectives about the operation of the system governance in Turkish higher education. Second, I explored the categories that together formed the core category in the Findings chapter and then in the Discussion chapter, taking a reconstructive perspective drawn from the core category and the remaining categories, I attempted to generate a conceptual model portraying the operation of the system governance of higher education in Turkey based on the perceptions and understandings of the research participants. By doing so, I also revisited my conceptual framework with a purpose of explicating what they shared in common and how they differed and weaved my findings from the literature review together.

Overall, in all stages of data analysis, I attempted to make my judgments through reconstruction lens in my endeavor to explore the system governance of higher education in Turkey. Similar to the reconstruction process in the system governance of higher education in the world part of the Literature Review, in my

analysis of the textual data, I deployed an analytics of government perspective, for an analytics of government is focused on the practices of the actors, not on the actors themselves and by doing so, it places the actors as an integral part of analysis and rejects a taken-for-granted reading of the particular issue of study to explore how different ways of doings things –practices- belonging to different historical trajectories come together to shape the operation of the particular issue of study in the present.

3.6 Position of the researcher

Taking on the role of interpreting the realities of the participants in this qualitative study (Glesne, 2006), I was aware that I had responsibility of inquiring into my background and sharing my realities that shaped my researcher identity.

I was born and raised in Giresun, Turkey. Located in the Black Sea Region, Giresun has been one of my aquariums for a number of reasons. My mother and my father both were born and raised in a village of Giresun. My mother is a housewife and my father is a retired civil servant. When my mother was growing up, women were not sent to school, but they either dealt with housework or worked outside. My mother learnt how to read and write without my grandfather's permission, attending sneakily to what was called back then night school, yet she was never allowed to go to school. On the other hand, having lost his father when he was four years old, my father was given the responsibility of looking after his younger brother until he started school while my grandmother, two uncles, and two aunts worked outside for a living. My father worked and studied, yet could not go on higher education because of financial difficulties although he was placed in the Economics department at a state university in Turkey.

My parents had been the others in their families and their stories had quite a big influence on how my elder brother and I were raised. We had a voice in our family and were constantly reminded of respecting rights and freedoms of each other and others and being welcoming to similarities and differences of each other and others. My brother is an academician at a state university. As he had certain health problems when we were growing up, I had to suppress my childish feelings while playing with him, think alternatively, and make up alternative games to engage him in our games with our friends. I had to remind our friends that he was different and would assign secret roles to them to protect my brother and to make the games fun for the players.

My eagerness to become a teacher drew from my relationship with my brother and my friends and placed me in Giresun Anatolian Teacher Training High School. During my high school years, I focused my studies on learning English in the best possible way and decided to dedicate myself to the teaching of it, for English had been an underestimated area of study throughout my whole education due to teacher shortages and lack of resources. That decision brought me to my second aquarium, Boğaziçi University, where I had the opportunity to deepen my relationship with myself and got an understanding of how to govern my life and myself. As I grew up intellectually, I discovered that my true interest lied in understanding the issues surrounding higher education. First, my environment was surrounded with relatives who were not eager to let their daughters study in a university outside the Black Sea Region and who discouraged their sons from continuing higher education and urged them to become involved in work life at an early age. That made me question what made higher education less valuable in my relatives' eyes. Second, reading on the historical context of Turkish higher education,

I came to the understanding that universities had been closely involved with the social, political, and ideological conditions of the country and so had been part of power relations. With this in mind, I started the Master's program in Educational Sciences and wrote my master thesis in the field of Leadership in Higher Education drawing upon quantitative research methods, which helped me gain new perspectives on the issues challenging external and internal worlds of state universities through the perceptions of faculty members about the leadership roles and leadership effectiveness of department heads. During the analysis of data, I noticed my curiosity about the reasons for circling of a particular item on the survey. Having got some insight on the university governance, during my doctoral studies, I decided to engage myself in studying the operation of the system governance of higher education, but this time I wanted to explore the issue through the perceptions and understandings of the individuals with administrative powers. Having discovered the other inside my family, through the stories of my parents and through living with my brother, and having lived in a culture of openness at Boğaziçi, I positioned myself as a researcher respectful of rights and freedoms and similarities and differences.

3.7 Summary of Chapter 3

This chapter gave an account of the research methods and procedures undertaken in this study. It presented the research approach, posed the research questions, explored the design of the study, and provided background information on the researcher with regard to her identity and position in the research.

CHAPTER 4

SELECTED CASE NARRATIVES

This chapter presents selected case narratives of four research participants before inquiring into the findings of the study through the perceptions and understandings of all the research participants about the system governance of Turkish higher education. I selected these four participants because each one of them emphasized a particular aspect of the conceptual framework developed for the study. Hence, the narratives in this chapter do not depict a consistent flow from the beginning to the end of the chapter or they are not themed around a single topic in regard to the evolution and operation of the system governance. Each case narrative has its own content and flow.

The case narrative of former rector 4 portrays the reasons for the establishment of CoHE and compares and contrasts the changing system governance model. The second case narrative of former CoHE member 3 depicts the operation of tutelage in the system governance. The third case narrative of current government representative 1 presents a portrayal of the operation of the bureaucratic power in the system governance. The fourth case narrative of current rector 2 presents an illustration of the importance of the extension of the missions of universities to the third mission of local development in the operation of the system governance.

The selected case narratives are by no means meant to be representative of the perceptions of the whole group of participants who took part in this study or to be a portrayal of the key findings of the study. Each narrative is simply intended to present an illustration of the range within and among the research participants. The quotes used in the presentation of the case narratives are translations from Turkish to

English (see Appendix O for the Turkish versions of the quotes used in this chapter).³¹

4.1 Former rector

The accounts of former rector 4 show that the establishment of CoHE marked an important period in the evolution and operation of the system governance of Turkish higher education. Data reveals the transition to the new system governance model, advantages and challenges of the model, and alternative ways to improve the model.

Reasons for the establishment of CoHE

Former rector 4 thinks that prior to the establishment of CoHE there was no integrity in the system governance of Turkish higher education and universities within and among themselves were isolated from each other:

Prior to CoHE, there were not many organizations for coordinating higher education except the Inter-University Board. As a matter of fact, a university was not like a university but like federations of faculties. That is, a faculty used to feel itself independent from the budget of the university. The dean used to negotiate with the Ministry of Finance and the budget used to be granted to the dean by the Ministry of Finance. Each faculty used to carry out diploma services themselves at the Student Affairs. We would not see a central university model as in American systems, instead we would see independent federations of faculties. And this no doubt was leading universities to be separated from each other. (See Appendix O, 1.)

Separation within universities: He shared that the separation within universities due to a structuring in the form of federations of faculties had two important consequences: He stated that rectors did not have much of an impact on the university governance and this overall hampered the development of the universities:

The rectors did not have much authority over the deans. They would come together for the Senate or University Administrative Board meetings, but it was difficult for the rector to intervene in the internal affairs of the faculties,

³¹ Quotes of forty or more words are presented in Turkish in Appendix O.

for the dean got his own money, hired his own academic staff. Therefore, because of the limited intervention, there was no integrity within the universities. Each faculty used to develop or lag behind dependent on the wills of the deans or the individuals whomever had influence on the governance. Of course, this was not something good. I think this structure of federations of faculties was a drag on our universities' progress. (See Appendix O, 2.)

He also added that as the faculties were far away from each other, the independent governance structure of the faculties made collaboration within the universities more difficult and so each faculty pursued its own goals disintegrated from the larger entity of the university, inhibiting the forming of a unity within the university:

The faculties were already located far away from each other. While one faculty was at one corner of the city, the other was at another corner of the city. . . . What is the harm of such distance to the universities then? You cannot create synergy within the universities. The student of Faculty of X, for example, did not know the student of Faculty of Y if they had not gone to the same high school or if they did not live in the same neighborhood. There was no interaction. It was impossible to create synergy. As the faculty members of Faculty of X did not know the faculty members of Faculty of Y, there was no synergy. However, they might have a variety of common areas of study that could strengthen the research activities. If a faculty did something well within its own faculty administration, the other faculty was unaware of it or if a department brought a novelty, the other department did not know about it. For this reason, the universities within themselves were disunited and they could not create synergy within themselves as the faculties were independent. (See Appendix O, 3.)

Separation among universities: Besides the separation within the universities, his voice also revealed that there were tensions among the universities due to the fragmentation in the system governance of higher education:

There was discontentedness among the universities, let alone collaboration. Each university used to consider itself the best. There was such a weird feeling among universities. . . . For example, during the establishment of X University, I saw the petition myself, the dean of Faculty of Y at Z University wrote to the Ministry of Finance demanding X University be closed down. The dean in his petition stated that X University transferred academic staff from their university and that would cause more harm than benefit, so it should be closed down. The petition still exists. A copy of the petition exists at the Rectorate of X University. There were such weird perspectives of the individuals against universities, likewise the universities had the same weird perspectives against one another. (See Appendix O, 4.)

He also said that such tensions were the basis of division rather than collaboration among the universities and lack of collaboration combined with the operation of faculty-led governance model in the system governance of higher education engendered a fragmented structure in the system governance: “Collaboration was impossible. And so the governance of universities was quite different from each other because, as I mentioned earlier, the faculties were leading the universities. No matter what happens, the deans were independent.”

Transition to the new system governance model

His perception seems to be that the dispersion in the system governance continued until the establishment of CoHE and with the establishment of CoHE, the new governance model introduced standards into the higher education system, but not without reactions from the universities:

The establishment of CoHE brought standards in the universities. For example, in X University, we enjoyed the assistant professorship system. After completing the doctoral program and conducting some research, it was possible for a young academic to be an assistant professor even on the same day and start teaching. However, in traditional universities, only professors and associate professors could teach. This [the introduction of assistant professorship into the higher education system] was a novelty that came with CoHE. There were reactions against it. For example, I remember, while we were working on the legislation, some rectors, on the days I did not attend the meetings, would add an article to the legislation because they were of the opinion that the assistant professorship system was wrong and had to be abolished. That is because the old system was still operating in the universities. . . . That is, adaptation was not easy. What I mean is despite the new higher education law and despite the introduction of the assistant professorship system, most universities did not easily come to terms with it, they did not like it. (See Appendix O, 5.)

Advantages of the new system governance model

Appointment of professors: In addition to the standards that came into effect with the introduction of the assistant professorship system, former rector 4 also added that new standards introduced into the appointment of professors have contributed to the overall development of the higher education system:

Another advantage that came with the establishment of CoHE was that they put into effect a very important rule as regards the professorship. In the first few years, the way of being a professor was possible only by the approval of CoHE. CoHE would appoint you as a professor or not. That is, CoHE would form the jury and you would submit your file to CoHE. For instance, this was how I was appointed to the professorship. In X, I applied for the professorship and submitted my file to CoHE. However, when I was appointed as a professor, the university could form the jury but the approval was still from CoHE. Yet prior to that, CoHE used to form the jury as well. What was the purpose in that? Because the conditions for the professorship varied from one university to another. And a clear condition was nonexistent. That is, something objective that shows the rules was nonexistent. You would become a professor upon the decision of the jury at your university, who would consider you academically experienced enough to become a professor. Yet, according to Higher Education Law, the universities would advertise vacant professorship positions so that everybody from Turkey or abroad could apply. This was something revolutionary. The universities did not like it. We did not like it as well. But at least it brought certain rules to the professorship and gave everybody a chance to apply for the vacant positions. Besides, it [Higher Education Law] introduced a completely new rule, which I have always considered positive for the future of the universities and which had not been thought before by the universities. According to the new rule, to become a professor, one had to have publications in internationally recognized scientific journals, which must have been cited by other well-known international scientists from the field. These had to be not ordinary citations but the academics had to be cited by well-known international scientists. This, of course, created a shock among the Turkish universities. Why would we publish in international journals instead of our faculty journals? We have our faculty journals. The faculties used to publish the journals but not the Rectorate. Second of all, having being cited had not been thought before. Can you believe what the requirement of being cited by an international professor meant? It shocked people. Such a system was unknown until Higher Education Law was enacted. . . . This was how writing international articles was invented in Turkey. The number of people who published internationally was quite low. . . . For this reason, in my opinion, this is the biggest contribution of CoHE among the others. Had it not been for this law, had we continued to pursue the old way, we would not even be among the first two thousand universities in the rankings today. Our universities would not have been known because the faculty members would have continued not to publish, would have continued to publish in the faculty journals. Therefore, Turkish universities would not have been in the world rankings. I consider this as something very important. (See Appendix O, 6.)

Reduction of bureaucracy: Former rector 4 thinks that the introduction of such standards into the higher education system has contributed to the reduction of the operation of bureaucracy within the universities. For instance, he stated that prior to the establishment of CoHE, department heads did not have an important role

within the universities due to the chair system. Actually, most universities, as explained by him, did not have department heads or if they had one, the position was mostly symbolic. He also said that it was possible that the secretary of the chairs had their own offices while the department heads did not have one, for the chairs were part of the decision-making and they were in direct contact with the deans.

Centralization: Former rector 4 stated that the new system governance model reorganized the university governance and introduced a centralized governance model to the universities, which has brought integrity within the universities through the empowerment of the Rectorate:

I am in favor of centralization when it comes to being a rector. Frankly, that's what I think. For the deans are already in attendance in the University Administrative Boards and the decisions are made there. A rector would never demand things to be done as he wishes. The decisions are voted by raising hands in the University Administrative Board. We raise hands to vote both for the allocation of academic staff and the allocation of money. The same goes with the Senate. That is, if the Rectorate convinces the deans, problems are solved there. If not, problems are not solved, yet still it [the Rectorate] facilitates fast execution. Actually, these are the positive things that came with CoHE because in the past it was not easy for the deans to come together and make strategic decisions. That is, centralized governance of the universities has increased the efficiency across the universities, I think. . . . Such integrity established with CoHE has empowered the Rectorate. Such empowerment includes powers to make the budget, more importantly the investment budget, and means to be authorized as the central body to negotiate the budget issues with the Ministry of Finance, thereby providing effective leveraging of the resources. That has been a contribution made possible by the establishment of CoHE. (See Appendix O, 7.)

Coordination: From his accounts, it is also possible to see that CoHE has a coordinating function over the universities, contributing in turn to the coordination both within and among the universities:

Each department of each faculty used to give diplomas that did not reflect the perspective of another. That is, they were maybe somehow aware of what was going on in the other departments, but there were no efforts to integrate subjects. Course development across subjects was offshoots of the departments. There were rigid boundaries between the departments. The department was the decisive mechanism for the course development including the credit value of a course. In traditional universities, even the

credit system did not exist prior to the establishment of CoHE. The credit system and everything else came with the setting up of CoHE, enabling coordination among the universities. Now there is no equivalency problem when one student transfers from one university to another, which was not the case in the past. Even if a course would transfer was an issue. So such coordinating function of CoHE has been one of its benefits. Besides, departmental course requirements were introduced. Some courses were specified as compulsory and, up to a certain credit value, the universities were allowed to formulate the remaining courses freely. Each university started to make its own regulation in accordance and within the limits of CoHE's regulation. Henceforth, coordination has been achieved within this regard as well. I think this has been helpful. (See Appendix O, 8.)

Challenges of the system governance model

Allocation of academic staff: According to former rector 4, one challenge posed by the current system governance model that makes it harder for the universities to progress further is the allocation of academic staff in the universities:

As of today, the biggest problem [in the operation of the system governance] is the allocation of academic staff. It is up to the will of CoHE. They do not have to allocate the academic staff on an agreed basis. They do not have to ground their decision. That is, it [decision-making for the academic staff allocation] does not have to satisfy certain objective criteria or follow certain rules. They might just point that we have enough number of academic staff in the relevant department. That's why, we cannot meet staffing requirements upon the retirement of someone, causing the shrinking of the departments. (See Appendix O, 9.)

Increased enrollment quotas: Enrollment quotas seem to have been recognized as another challenge by him. Data reveals that both CoHE and the universities feel strongly about their own decisions with regard to the enrollment quotas, making identifying a common ground harder:

In time, after the establishment of CoHE, there has been a great increase in the number of students admitted to the universities. We did not want to take in large numbers of students because we had limited seats in classes, laboratories, or faculty members. Yet, we have never been able to convince CoHE. Time and time again, we wrote for a reduction in the enrollment quotas, but our efforts were inconclusive. The increase in the enrollment quotas continued. In the long run, this has posed unemployment problem. You cannot just do something so as to make people happy. There should be a little bit of realism. What are we going to do with such high numbers of university graduates? Do we have enough employment opportunities for them? In the end, CoHE decided to close down some departments. They

made the both decisions. To me, both decisions were wrong. . . . Maybe, it [increase in enrollment quotas] was the sign of good intention, but it harmed the system. Good intentions may lead to harm. (See Appendix O, 10.)

Leaving minor decisions either to CoHE or the Ministry of Finance: Based on the accounts of former rector 4, another challenge that has been embedded in the current system governance model is that rectors tend to leave minor decisions either to CoHE or the Ministry of Finance. As explained by him, such acts of rectors might be pushy and lead CoHE to make changes to the operation of the system governance, getting the operation of the university governance into trouble:

There is one more thing I should add, something I think rectors have been wrong about. They have too many unimportant questions either for CoHE or for the Ministry of Finance. Let's say there is a very simple issue. It can be about anything. Say the Head of the Personnel Department tells you that s/he is not sure what action to take about X as X is not specified in the regulation. You may arrive at a decision at that moment. But this is not what rectors do. They write to CoHE saying they have not been able to make a decision about X and ask what they should do. Many rectors write to CoHE with different expectations, thereby pushing CoHE to make a decision that might encompass everybody involved in the system and so leading us to change the way we have been doing things for years. Such acts of rectors cost us a lot. Why do they write to CoHE? Because they do not want to take responsibility. . . . Rectors should be able to make their own decisions at such moments. If the decision is wrong, CoHE will in the end give them direction. If it is wrong, the Court of Accounts or the Inspectors of the Ministry of Finance will give them direction. (See Appendix O, 11.)

Alternative ways to improve the system governance model

Authorization of the university governance to strengthen academic staff: His voice about the challenge of the allocation of staff indicates one alternative way to improve the operation of the current system governance model. Accordingly, he appears to suggest authorization of the authorities engaged in the university governance so as to meet staffing requirements and improve the outlook of Turkish universities in the international arena:

CoHE should open the doors to everyone from the top universities in the world. It is typical of an American university to advertise academic vacancies in other countries. However, what is typical in Turkey is to advertise when an

academic from among us will be promoted. Because of this, we shy away from making offer to graduate talents. We cannot guarantee a vacant position to such talents, let alone an offer. We should be able to make an offer to such talents, though. This is not about CoHE, but this is about Higher Education Law. Still, such things could be sorted out with regulations. After designating some universities, CoHE could authorize the rectors of those universities to hire up to five best academics on an annual basis. Of course, the designated universities would be held responsible to convince CoHE about their staffing decisions. Turkish universities should be able to make offers to distinguished academics from abroad and we should let the world know this. The rector is not entitled to write to such people and make a promise to hire them. That would be illegal. The rector does not have permission from CoHE, for one thing. And that person could also sue the rector for not keeping her/his promise. CoHE should take a step forward in this. The procedure could be like this: Upon the approval by the University Administrative Board and CoHE, we would have the right to make the offer. I think the overriding criteria for selection of the academics must be having a doctorate degree from the top hundred universities in the world. Moreover, TÜBİTAK could be part of such staffing decisions and guarantee to fund the projects of those academics from the top hundred universities in the world. Then we would be able to make the perfect offer to such distinguished academics. Then we would be able to compete with the universities in the U.S. (See Appendix O, 12.)

Devolution of authority: Another suggestion made by him in regard to the improvement in the current system governance model seems to be related to devolution of authority from CoHE to the universities. He thinks that such transfer of powers to the universities could provide CoHE with quality time to make strategic planning as his perception seems to be that bureaucratic work drains time of CoHE:

CoHE should devolve some of its authorities to the universities. It should go on maintaining control over the universities, but should transfer authority to the universities. For instance, allocation of academic staff between the departments should lie within the responsibility of the Rectorate or the Deanship. . . . CoHE could lay down the guiding principles. In case of a problem, CoHE could act upon it. For instance, it could lay off the rector. It has the powers to do so. If it could eliminate bureaucracy, it could allocate more time for strategic decisions. (See Appendix O, 13.)

Summary

All in all, based on former rector 4's accounts, a university structuring in the form of federations of faculties in the absence of a coordinating body over the universities seems to have created fragmentation in the operation of the system governance of

higher education due to the separation within the universities and among the universities. As perceived by him, the transition to the new system governance model that came with the establishment of CoHE was not free from challenges. According to him, the new system governance model contributed to the overall development of the universities and brought integrity into the system governance. His account also shows that allocation of staff, increase in enrollment quotas, and leaving of the decisions to a higher authority have been the challenges posed by the system governance model. He thinks that delegation of authority to the universities and empowering of the authorities engaged in the university governance for hiring academic staff could improve the operation of the system governance of higher education in Turkey.

4.2 Former CoHE member

The perceptions of former CoHE member 3 about the operation of the system governance model in Turkish higher education seem to highlight the possibility of practices of tutelage in the operation of the system governance. Data indicates the possible instruments of tutelage, at what levels and how tutelage might operate, challenges barring restructuring of the operation of the current system governance model, and alternatives to improve the system governance model.

Instruments of tutelage

As perceived by former CoHE member 3, the lineage of tutelage in the system governance of higher education can be traced back to the transition to the new system governance model in the aftermath of September 12 military intervention. He thinks that instruments used for the purpose of meeting the demands of the population may be converted into instruments of tutelage. As explained by him, the

instruments with such possibility are allocation of enrollment quotas, allocation of staff, and establishment of departments and faculties:

The preliminary concern in the establishment of CoHE seems to have been serving the social needs of the country but not the university governance. Of course, September 12 regime also appears to have sought to realize its own interests such as ending anarchy in universities and taking the left-wing and right-wing ideologies out of campuses. Actually, it seems that the interest of bureaucrats like Dođramacı [the first President of CoHE] was to meet the demands of the large young population for higher education that grew in parallel to Turkey's fast-paced social change and modernization. It seems that this has further led to the formation of three instruments which are likely to create conditions for tutelage: allocation of enrollment quotas in preparation for the ÖSYM [Student Selection and Placement Center] catalog, meeting staffing needs of the universities, and opening up of departments and faculties. (See Appendix O, 14.)

De facto impossibility in the operation of the system governance

He shared that the growth in the number of the universities integrated into the system governance has increased the workload of CoHE and created lack of communication between the stakeholders of the higher education system. For, according to him, the system governance of higher education has been congested with a marked increase in the number of interactions between the stakeholders, especially for the above-mentioned reasons, requiring a heavy workload on the side of CoHE and thereby leading to a de facto impossibility in the operation of the system governance:

When it was first founded, CoHE was engaged in interactions with only 25-30 actors. Now, the number of actors engaged in these interactions has shifted to more than 180, leading to poor communication irrespective of personal attitudes. No matter what your personal attitude is, no matter how bureaucracy operates, such a huge number creates a de facto impossibility. If we imaged the amount of time CoHE bureaucracy could allocate for each university, the result would be one or at most one and a half days. For, on top of such workload, CoHE is also burdened with other issues such as discipline issues, international issues, and diploma equivalence issues, which also carry a large workload. (See Appendix O, 15.)

Double tutelage at the macro level

He stated that such excess of capacity might create conditions for the stakeholders who are mostly concerned with staff allocation, enrollment quotas, and setting up of new departments and faculties to engage in lobbying activities. His perception seems to be that there are two sides to the integration of lobbying activities into the system governance: First, as perceived by him, it tends to increase macro-level tutelage, and second, it is possible that stakeholders lobby with civil servants at CoHE, thus creating the likelihood of a double tutelage at the macro level and turning staffing, quotas, and opening up of departments and faculties into instruments of tutelage:

The result of such excess of capacity was unanswered phone calls and pending files, which were typical especially in critical departments, the department in charge of allocation of staff and the department in charge of preparing the catalogs of the universities. So with more work came lobbying. Those who lobbied with CoHE through phone calls by high-powered authorities would prioritize their files over the others. The others would remain in the pending list or the phone calls would remain unanswered. Everybody was trying to find a connection. This in the end creates a bidirectional effect: It increases macro-level tutelage, lobbying with members [Council members] so as to ensure your file is processed, and you start lobbying with other civil servants at CoHE. This is what is called a double tutelage, making it possible for the member or the civil servant with such powers to exert tutelage over you. For each catalog season and each staff are valuable. You have to open up new departments, you have to hire new staff, you have to get your work done. Taken together, these - staffing, quotas, and opening up of departments and faculties - may be turned into instruments of tutelage. (See Appendix O, 16.)

Reforming the operation of institutional bureaucracy in the system governance

From his accounts about the operation of a double tutelage at the macro level, it is possible to see that he considers a reformation in the bureaucratic structure of CoHE important to increase the efficiency of the operation of the system governance of higher education in response to the density of interactions between the stakeholders, to lessen CoHE's burden in the system governance, and to mitigate the possibility of

tutelage in the system governance. As such, data suggests that a change process in law be initiated by politicians:

You cannot change bureaucracy. Why? The structure dating back to 1980s has stayed unchanged, where no reforms have taken place. The system does not allow you to hire staff as CoHE is a law bound institution. All the institutions in Ankara have been reformed through change in law, except CoHE. Unless the law changes, unless a restructuring process is undertaken, the state does not allow you to hire staff. And so you are trying to get your work done under an unchanged bureaucratic structure, where you are allowed to hire very limited numbers of staff. For a restructuring process, as I mentioned, a change in law is needed, about which you have little to say and about which political will is needed. You can only make suggestions. (See Appendix O, 17.)

Unlimited powers of rectors leading to the operation of tutelage in the system governance

The perceptions of former CoHE member 3 seem to indicate that the powers of rectors might be reasons for the operation of tutelage in the system governance, indicating another reason for a change in the law. As highlighted in his perceptions, it seems likely that their powers could turn into instruments for charting the future of the universities in a negative way and mobilizing the interests:

In the foundation phase of CoHE, rectors seem to have been vested with important powers in the university governance. As a matter of fact, back in the day, there was a joke about their powers. There is a proverbial expression as regards the power of the British parliament: The British parliament can do everything, but make a woman a man and a man a woman. This was how we used to joke with rectors about some of their powers. Why? Think about the appointment process of professors. Even if five people vote no, the rector can still appoint a professor. Or think about academic staff allocation procedures. When omnibus bills were implemented in the universities, CoHE would confer rectors with the authority to use, say, hundred staff positions, strengthening their powers. We also experienced during February 28 how powers of rectors could turn into influence or lead universities to a different future. I also think that such unlimited powers of rectors might be causes of negative impacts of elections such as attempts to force competitors out of universities and to neutralize competitors by mobbing. What I mean is it seems to me as if unintended consequences of elections stem more or less from such huge powers of rectors. Of course, long-established universities experience it differently, just like two countries experiencing the same political regime differently. No matter how powerful a rector is, universities with long-standing traditions and universities with 20-25 faculty members

may experience elections differently. It is possible that the politics of founding rectors might lead to completely different results or the lives of young academics might be limited in different ways. (See Appendix O, 18.)

The two-term limit for rectors

He added that the best side of the rectorial system is the two-term limit for rectors.

According to his perceptions, the length of a term of office for rectors could create conditions for tutelage in the operation of system governance:

I think the best thing about the rectorial system is the rule that places a limit of two terms on term of office of rectors. To me, as a rule, it should be applicable to all institutions, for the more bureaucrats stay in office, the more likely it is that tutelage will increase. Imagine a rector in pursuit of bad intentions or seeking power. If the rector had base voters, s/he could stay in power forever. For this reason, rotation in office after two terms is good at least for the vote-based systems. (See Appendix O, 19.)

Legal challenges barring differentiation in the operation of system governance

He further said that the main challenge to the operation of the system governance of Turkish higher education is not about the powers of rectors. As perceived by him, the prime challenge to the system governance is the operation of a unified system governance model in the governance of the universities. He thinks that legal challenges barring differentiation among the universities prevent CoHE and policymakers from taking actions in this regard, for it is impossible that CoHE prevails over the law:

The main challenge posed by the CoHE model for the long-established universities is not yet about rectors. The main challenge for them is that they cannot have the liberty to act. As the operation of CoHE is bound by law, it is not possible to create an exception for them. This means that the same law binds one-year olds and hundred-year olds. Think of your child. Based on the law, you use the same parenting style to raise your three-year old child and thirty-year old child. You give the both the same food. You set the target for the number of steps they should take a day as one hundred fifty although the elder one says s/he could take fifteen thousand steps. I think this is a challenge stemming from the system itself. Even the most proficient person can fail to deliver to expectations when s/he does not have autonomy to allocate staff, decide on budget, or act freely at the international arena. (See Appendix O, 20.)

Two challenges impeding legal changes

Alongside the above-mentioned legal challenges to differentiation in the operation of the system governance, he mentioned two reasons why legal changes have not taken place so far, the perception of institutional autonomy at the level of academia and fear of abuse of power on the side of authorities at the macro level.

The perception of institutional autonomy at the level of academia: Former CoHE member 3 seems to consider accountability to be an essential element to institutional autonomy of state universities. However, based on his accounts, the perception of institutional autonomy that prevails at the level of academia is institutional autonomy with no accountability in place, leading those in positions of power to step back from enacting legal changes:

State universities are held accountable to public authority for their use of the public resources. A look at different systems around the world reveals a combination of autonomy with accountability. It is really difficult to break the perception of institutional autonomy at the level of academia, and this is one of the biggest challenges to the system governance. Turkish universities perceive institutional autonomy as self-governance freed from oversight. Universities can govern themselves, yet decisions regarding the opening up of departments and faculties and the allocation of staff and enrollment quotas may be converted into instruments of tutelage. For this reason, an agenda of increasing autonomy of more established universities should be pursued in the first place. (See Appendix O, 21.)

Fear of abuse of power on the side of authorities at the macro level: The accounts of him indicate that authorities at the macro level tend to consider institutional autonomy as an instrument that could be turned into abuse of power. He thinks that such dualism between institutional autonomy and fear of abuse of power leveled by authorities at the macro level not only hinders legal changes in the operation of the system governance but also inhibits CoHE from taking actions for differentiation among the universities:

Another challenge to the system governance is fear of abuse of power. As a matter of fact, two out of every ten players abuse power. Yet, the solution

should not be treating everyone the same. These two players should be penalized for their actions and the rest should have the liberty to act. An appropriate balance between institutional autonomy and fear of abuse of power still remains to be saved. Although public administration and modern bureaucracy enable you with instruments to combine autonomy with accountability, the current system neither lets CoHE grant universities with autonomy nor supervise them. (See Appendix O, 22.)

Alternative ways to improve the system governance model

His perceptions about the operation of the system governance model seem to indicate three suggestions to improve the current system governance model, tripartite system governance model through differentiation of law, establishment of a quality assurance board, and increasing efficiency of the Inter-University Board through change in the law.

Tripartite model for the operation of the system governance through differentiation of law: He suggested that pluralism in the content of law governing the state universities be on the agenda in order to give the state universities a chance to create their own realities and to change the static nature of the current law operating in the system governance of higher education. To this end, he seems to suggest a tripartite model in the system governance:

The universities who have succeeded in being ranked among the top five hundred universities in the world university rankings should be given full autonomy. We should let them govern themselves. A mechanism of punishment could also be integrated into the system governance of these institutions to promote sustainability. Once these universities stepped down to lowest positions in the university rankings, they would be taken back to the CoHE system governance model. The universities in this group would be held accountable to CoHE, the Ministry of Development, and the Ministry of Finance so that they would be held responsible for their decisions and so would be allocated fewer budgets for the next year. The criteria for selection of the universities to the proposed system governance model could be expanded to include the universities that have accomplished to be ranked among the thousand universities in the rankings. In addition, two different system governance models could be adopted for the universities founded before 2006 and after 2006 through differentiation in the law. The CoHE model is well suited especially for the universities founded after 2006, for it is likely that things might go off the rails in the absence of a higher supervisory body considering there might be universities within this group

without a senate. The powers of those in charge of the university governance could also be redefined in accordance with this tripartite system governance model. As pointed by the Ministry of Development many times as well, the system is in need of differentiation. Their recommendations are more or less in line with the recommendations herewith. That is to say, the system governance cannot be reformed through one law alone. One law would never fully effectuate differentiation in the system governance. (See Appendix O, 23.)

His accounts indicate that the regulatory functions of CoHE should be incorporated in the tripartite model especially in four areas:

The functions of CoHE are needed especially for the fulfillment of needs and demands in four areas: (1) enrollment quotas. The issue is of high importance for the social structure of Turkey, but still older universities should have autonomy regarding this issue. (2) staff allocation between the state universities. That is, a higher body should regulate the allocation of staff and the enrollment quotas. (3) planning, for example to prevent setting up of unlimited numbers of departments and post-secondary vocational schools because public and political pressures might be the driving forces for such decisions. (4) supervision of newly established universities. The rest could be handled with the instruments of modern bureaucratic systems designed for the supervision of quality and legislation. (See Appendix O, 24.)

Establishment of a quality assurance board: He seems to also suggest the establishment of a quality assurance board in place of an immanent to law supervision mechanism operating in the system governance of higher education:

Quality assurance of 25-30 actors seems to have been considered within the capacities of CoHE by considering the conditions of 1980s. That is, an immanent to law supervision mechanism for supervision of quality and law seems to have been built. Yet today this system is not functioning anymore. Temporary solutions are being offered for quality assurance in the absence of a legal change. Of course, quality assurance mechanisms have been on the table since the Bologna process, yet still there is a need for a separate quality assurance board. (See Appendix O, 25.)

Increasing efficiency of the Inter-University Board through change in the law: He thinks that the Inter-University Board performs an important role in the operation of the system governance, yet, as perceived by him, the crowded scene of the Board decreases the efficiency of the Board. Hence, his final suggestion for the

improvement of the operation of the current system governance model seems to be increasing efficiency of the Inter-University Board through change in the law:

I think the Inter-University Board is an academic organ with important functions, but it is very crowded. Two representatives from each university who attend to the meetings could select an executive board. Currently, one President and a Commission are responsible for the operations of the Board. The Board does very important work and does not have a bureaucratic structure. In addition, it can work efficiently despite the very limited staff. So a new law could be initiated because the attendants tend to lose track of the decisions although they are made in their attendance. The crowded group of attendants could elect an executive board and delegate some of their authorities to the newly elected board. The number of universities founded before 2006 and after 2006 could provide the criteria for the formation of the executive board. (See Appendix O, 26.)

Summary

To sum up, from the perceptions of former CoHE member 3 about the operation of the system governance model in Turkish higher education, it is possible to see that the massification in the system of higher education has increased the number of stakeholders in the operation of the system governance and the number of issues that need to be negotiated, creating conditions for a de facto impossibility in the operation of system governance and for engaging in lobbying activities. Data revealed that such lobbying might result in a double tutelage at the macro level especially regarding the issues of staff allocation, enrollment quotas, and establishment of faculties and departments, pointing to the possibility that such issues might be converted into instruments of tutelage. His account shows that there is a need for a change in law to reform the bureaucratic structure of CoHE and to reconsider the powers of rectors so as to reduce the possibility of the operation of tutelage in the system governance. From his perspective, the main challenge in the operation of the system governance of higher education is the operation of a unified system governance model in the governance of state universities. To this end, he seems to suggest differentiation of law in order to let them chart their future, establishment of

a quality assurance board to engage accountability mechanisms into the system governance, and forming of an executive board to enhance communication between the attendants of the Inter-University Board meetings.

4.3 Current government representative

In his accounts of the operation of the system governance model in Turkish higher education, current government representative 1 appears to portray the operation of the bureaucratic power in the system governance. Data shows the relations between the Ministry of National Education and CoHE in the planning of higher education, the possible practices of bureaucratic power, how bureaucratic power might be legitimized, and alternative ways to improve the current system governance model. Relations between CoHE and the Ministry of National Education in the planning of higher education.

As perceived by current government representative 1, “universities and CoHE are autonomous institutions” and “the Ministry of National Education does not follow a hierarchical governing in its relations with CoHE.” He stated that one of the issues covered in interactions between CoHE and the Ministry in the operation of the system governance is financing of higher education:

CoHE is the institution concerned with higher education as defined in Higher Education Law 2547. The proposed CoHE budget and the Ministry of National Education budget are reviewed together in the Parliament. The budgets prepared by CoHE and the universities are first reviewed by CoHE and then are submitted to the Ministry of National Education by CoHE. (See Appendix O, 27.)

He also added that after CoHE makes decisions directly or following the proposals of universities about the opening, closing, or amalgamation of faculties, these decisions are carried forward to the Ministry of National Education for action. As stated by him, CoHE also interacts with the Ministry of National Education about

the foundation of universities and shares its opinions and recommendations with the Ministry.

As shared by him, the Ministry of National Education also cooperates with CoHE about the implementation of Law 1416 on sending students abroad. He stated that CoHE and the Ministry decide on the number of students to be sent abroad who would be funded by the government during their studies abroad and who would serve in the public sector upon the completion of their studies. The financing of these students and the implementation of the law in general are overseen by the Ministry and staff allocation procedures are coordinated by CoHE. He thinks that the Ministry plays an important role through Law 1416 in meeting the qualified workforce needs of the country.

Tensions in relations between CoHE and the Ministries in the planning of higher education

His perception seems to be that some tensions might emerge in the relations between CoHE and the Ministries, and especially in the relations with the Ministry of Development, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry National Education.

CoHE as a bureaucratic institution cooperates with the Ministers who are the representatives of the government representing the public in the planning of higher education. In the past, there were times when CoHE had disagreements with the Ministries. The Ministries, however, have important duties to perform regarding, for example, the financing and allocation of staff. For this reason, it is possible that such tensions might harm the universities and the system in general. (See Appendix O, 28.)

He further added that ideological viewpoints of the CoHE Presidents might be causes of tensions in the relations between CoHE and the Ministry of National Education:

The relations between CoHE and the Ministry of National Education have been coordinated well during the terms of office of the CoHE Presidents with no ideological caprice. For instance, currently, there is an efficient collaboration between CoHE and the Ministry as regards the issues of the teacher development and the development of the faculties of education. . . . However, it was likely that the presidency of CoHE could prevent the

participation of the Minister in the meetings although according to Higher Education Law 2547, the Minister of National Education has the authority to participate and chair the CoHE meetings when deemed necessary. (See Appendix O, 29.)

Operation of bureaucratic power in the system governance

From his perceptions about the tensions in relations between CoHE and the Ministries, it is possible to see that constitutional autonomy of CoHE poses the challenge of how bureaucratic power of CoHE could be effectively balanced with political power. For, according to his accounts, bureaucratic authority legitimized by law could be unified with politics and could be converted into practices of bureaucratic tutelage in the operation of the system governance of higher education:

The powers of institutions independent of political power might turn into bureaucratic tutelage. CoHE, when it deems necessary, has the authority to freely practice its powers derived from the 1982 Constitution. . . . Constitutional autonomy makes it possible that attitudes of CoHE Presidents and how powerful they are politically may influence the direction of the system governance and CoHE Presidents may freely use their powers vested in their position. (See Appendix O, 30.)

Implementation of the headscarf ban policy as a de facto ban in the operation of the system governance: Data indicates headscarf ban policy as an example of how bureaucratic power of CoHE could prevail over the political power and how bureaucratic power coming from constitutional autonomy could be used to legitimize practices, leading to bureaucratic tutelage in the operation of the system governance of higher education. Current government representative 1 considers the implementation of the headscarf ban policy in Turkish higher education as a de facto ban legitimized in practice:

As CoHE is constitutionally autonomous, its constitutional provisions are likely to create de facto practices. Headscarf ban, for instance, could not be cleared despite the efforts of the governments and the political powers. . . . CoHE imposed a de facto ban relying on the authority coming from its constitutional autonomy. This is an example of how such powers of CoHE could be used despotically when intended so. The de facto ban was lifted without any parliamentary action when a democratic President was elected

and appointed a democratic CoHE President. . . . The appointed President of CoHE requested rectors to report the incidence of non-compliance with the headscarf ban if they considered it as illegal. Where is it written that it is illegal? Nowhere. As non-compliance with the headscarf ban was not defined as illegal in the laws, the rectors softened their stand against the ban. The ban was a de facto ban, so it was lifted de facto. (See Appendix O, 31.)

Bureaucratic power of rectors in the operation of the system governance: He also thinks that the powers of rectors could be unified with politics and such unification of politics and university governance at the macro level could bring in the operation of bureaucratic tutelage in the university governance. He appears to see the move to the appointment system of rectors as important for lowering the possibility of integration of practices of tutelage in the operation of the system governance:

When rectors consider themselves politically strong, they tend to stand in opposition to the government. . . . The election system of rectors used to lead to factions within the universities. It was likely that the derivation of authority from votes would be intimidating. Rectors are bureaucrats. Today, they are appointed, so they do not have voter support. They can stay in office if only they fulfill the requirements of the position. If not, they may be removed from office. What this means is that both the powers of CoHE and the election system of rectors have gradually declined in power, and in return have embraced a more democratic and accountable structure. (See Appendix O, 32.)

Placement of CoHE and universities under the authority of a Ministry

The accounts of current government representative 1 seem to indicate the placement of CoHE and universities under the authority of a Ministry to engage the accountability mechanisms in the operation of the system governance and so to improve the current system governance model of Turkish higher education:

Both CoHE and universities rely on the public budget. Hence, they should be held accountable to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. No bureaucratic institution could be given full autonomy. Scientific autonomy and administrative autonomy are often confused. Both CoHE and universities should be accountable to the Parliament in regard to how they use their part of the public budget. For this reason, they should be tied to either the Ministry of National Education or another Ministry. Independence of universities from the government may sound pleasing to the ear. However, as practiced through the implementation of the headscarf ban, universities financed by taxpayer money could turn into institutions producing policies against the government representative of national sovereignty and national will. (See Appendix O, 33.)

His voice about the need for a higher governing body over CoHE also indicates a mismatch between the growth of CoHE and the growth in the system governance of higher education. He perceives the current structure of CoHE as cumbersome and suggests a change in the Constitution to lower the possibility of incorporation of de facto practices in the operation of the system governance:

The number of universities is quite high. Yet, the growth in the number of staff at CoHE is not in direct proportion with the growth in the system. Considering its bureaucratic structure and also current human resources assigned duties in the system governance of higher education, CoHE lacks resources required in the system governance. Despite its lack of human resources, it has great powers. As practiced in the past, CoHE has the powers to make decisions and act upon them prevailing over the government and standing against the government and the wills of the government. The unlawful implementation of the headscarf ban policy is the most painful and the most embarrassing example of such use of powers, leaving a dark mark on the history of Turkish education. As a precaution against such use of powers, a change in the Constitution is needed, for the current structure of CoHE is independent of the government. Limiting its powers defined by Higher Education Law 2547, CoHE should be restructured. In the restructuring process, it should be tied to a Ministry, say, the Ministry of National Education or the Ministry of Science, Industry, and Technology or a new Ministry called the Ministry of Higher Education should be established, so that CoHE is turned into an institution accountable to the Parliament and to the public. CoHE's status as an institution tied to a Ministry should be confirmed in Higher Education Law 2547. The current structure of CoHE is too cumbersome to respond to the needs of the country, a fact that has been admitted by all the CoHE Presidents and has been acknowledged by many. (See Appendix O, 34.)

Summary

All in all, based on the perceptions of current government representative 1, it is possible that tensions might arise in the relations between CoHE and the Ministries as to the planning of higher education. As perceived by him, the derivation of authority from the Constitution is likely to pose challenges as regards maintaining a balance between bureaucratic power and political power. He thinks that unification between politics and system governance of higher education may lead to the integration of practices of bureaucratic tutelage into the operation of the system governance. He suggests that headscarf ban policy as a de facto ban set an example to such legitimation of practices through the authority coming from constitutional autonomy. From his perspective, institutional autonomy of both CoHE and universities should be backed up with accountability mechanisms, requiring the initiation of a process of changing the Constitution so as to place both CoHE and universities under the authority of a Ministry and to improve the current system governance model in Turkish higher education.

4.4 Current rector

The perceptions of current rector 2 about the operation of the system governance model in Turkish higher education seem to present an illustration of the significance of the extension of the missions of universities to the third mission of local development in the operation of the system governance. Data indicates the main areas of interaction between CoHE, the Ministries, and the state universities, responsibilities of rectors, challenges hindering the attainment of the mission of local development in the operation of the current system governance model, and alternatives to improve the system governance model.

Relations between CoHE, ministries, and state universities

Based on the accounts of current rector 2, the three main areas of interaction between CoHE, the Ministries, and the state universities concern (1) the opening, closing, or amalgamation of faculties, departments, and vocational schools, (2) allocation of enrollment quotas, and (3) allocation of staff. As stated by him, CoHE makes decisions and takes actions on the proposals of universities as to the opening, closing, or amalgamation of departments and vocational schools and conveys the decisions regarding the opening, closing, or amalgamation of faculties to the Ministry of National Education for action. He also said that state universities first interact with CoHE about the allocation of academic staff and enrollment quotas. The interaction process regarding these three issues also concern the Ministries and State Personnel Presidency is engaged in the relations as regards the allocation procedures for academic staff and other personnel.

Increasing efficiency responsibility of rectors

From his perceptions about the powers of rectors in the operation of the system governance, it is possible to see that current rector 2 differentiates between the responsibilities and the powers of rectors and considers that the discussions on the powers of rectors spawn more interest than the discussions on their responsibilities, posing challenges to the understanding of the reasons behind such powers. He perceives the powers of rectors as broad and acknowledges the potential for abuse of power drawn from such powers. He thinks that this is the reason why a focus on the responsibilities of rectors is needed. For, as perceived by him, the key responsibility of rectors in the operation of the system governance is to increase efficiency and quality within the university, requiring the channeling of their powers towards the achievement of this:

The responsibilities of rectors are overshadowed by the discussions on the broadness of their powers. The rector is accountable to CoHE, the Ministries, and the Court of Accounts. The annual budget allocated to each state university is around 250 millions. They have powers in ensuring the effective running of higher education activities and are held accountable to the relevant institutions concerning their compliance with the principles specified in law. As established by Higher Education Law 2547 and specified in Article 13-b of this law, they are vested with authorities to relocate the academic and administrative staff within the university, creating the likelihood of abuse of power. However, despite the potential negative effects of such powers, the rationale behind is actually to ensure efficient coordination of the university. CoHE can also relocate academic staff and can assign them to the public institutions such as the Ministries and TÜBİTAK. That is, that article of the law is actually well thought out. It aims to increase efficiency and quality. (See Appendix O, 35.)

Personnel regime as a setback to the achievement of quality

As highlighted in his perceptions about the powers and responsibilities of rectors, the public personnel regime is the main challenge to the system governance of higher education for two reasons, low engagement on the side of academics in the achievement of quality and no powers for applying provisions on the side of rectors:

The current public personnel regime is the main challenge to the system governance. As rectors do not have any powers such as applying provisions, they are not able to maintain sustainability within the university, affecting the system overall. It is harder for us to have academic staff contribute to the efficiency within the university. Non-profit foundation universities may maintain sustainability within the university governance considering they can initiate termination of employment. That being the case, administrative staff of state universities is burdened with large workload in ensuring the efficiency and quality within the university. (See Appendix O, 36.)

He added that the current public personnel regime poses the challenge of how to increase the efficiency and relevancy of academic work to its environment. He appears to consider that universities have an important role in the path for local, national, and universal development:

There are three main challenges concerning the academic staff of state universities: (1) low knowledge production. Although being an academic is a twenty-four hour process that requires dynamism, academics do not see it as a lifestyle. (2) relevancy and efficiency of academic work. Currently, academic work is not responsive to its environment. It is not focused on building organic ties with its environment across a wide range of areas

including culture and arts. This is not something embraced by the current academic culture. (3) acting on multiple levels. Academia is not ready for this. If we could contribute to the local development, contribution to the universal development would follow that. Universities should take on a guiding role in identifying and responding to local and national priorities. (See Appendix O, 37.)

Low demand from academics for the achievement of the missions of universities

As shared by current rector 2, the three missions of universities in the operation of the system governance of higher education are teaching, research, and contribution to the local development. He considers that initiating efforts for incorporating quality assurance mechanisms into the operation of the university governance and investing in building research capacity are essential to the achievement of these missions.

Low demand for improving quality assurance mechanisms and building research capacity: Data also shows that the efforts might take longer than expected when the demand from academics is low, posing a challenge to turning efforts into mission success:

It might be challenging for the administrative staff to have academics agree with them on the issue of improving quality assurance mechanisms in the operation of the university governance. So there is resistance at the initiation stage. We also put efforts in building research capacity. For instance, we provide financial support for all the research activities. Each academic is financed at least once a year with a possibility of refinancing. In case of publications in one of SSCI-indexed [Social Sciences Citation Index] journals, we provide full support. Also, if the academic intends for a multidisciplinary research activity, we provide large-scale support. What lacks is the demand from academics, pointing to the key role of academics in achieving quality. (See Appendix O, 38.)

Low demand for engaging in service-to-the society activities: He also considers building close ties between universities and relevant stakeholders as important for contribution to the local development. According to his perceptions, it seems to be important to take gradual steps towards change within the university because communicating change to academics might be a slow process:

In contributing to the local development, we have engaged in service-to-the society activities. We first committed to improving the facilities on campuses. We started with renovating the library and increasing the number of books per student. We went on with investing in cafes, laboratories, meeting rooms for events, study rooms, and sports facilities. We pursued the same process on all campuses, including the vocational schools, to ensure equal opportunities on different constituents of the university. We identified the priority areas for the local development to provide academic support for the needs in these areas. As such, we built research centers and integrated community service into the curriculum as a graduation requirement. If we had not improved the quality of infrastructure, we would have met strong resistance. We have raised the bar by building trust with staff. We have invested in the identified areas and built ties between industries and our research centers. Despite some improvement, we are still challenged by the low numbers of publications. Still, inputs outweigh outputs. What I mean is the demand from the academics does not keep up with the supply of resources. (See Appendix O, 39.)

Functions of CoHE

Based on his accounts, the functions of CoHE in the achievement of the missions of universities could be described as coordination and planning of higher education and acting as lightning rod:

Coordination and planning of higher education: His voice indicates that there are two reasons why the demand for the coordination and planning function of CoHE arises in the operation of the system governance: development of missions and development of broad parameters:

CoHE develops missions. It follows the trends, say, internationalization and integrates them into the system. It identifies the areas for growth and initiates efforts for building research capacity. Institutions of higher education should self-assess and do a little bit of thinking about if they also work in sync with these efforts. CoHE develops broad strategies and higher education institutions try to adapt them within their specific context. (See Appendix O, 40.)

He also added that the Higher Education Audit Board and the High Disciplinary Board attached to CoHE contribute to the coordination and planning of higher education. As stated by him, the Higher Education Audit Board is responsible for the supervision of the universities concerning their compliance with the principles of

Higher Education Law 2547 and the High Disciplinary Board is charged with coordinating the issues of investigative disciplinary procedures.

Acting as a lightning rod: His perception seems to be that, when compared with the past, the use of lobbying strategy is less favored in solidarizing interests in the operation of the system governance. He thinks that CoHE functions as a buffer between the universities and acts as a lightning rod in the operation of the system governance:

CoHE acts as a lightning rod between the universities. When tensions arise, it functions as a buffer. Based on my experiences with different styles of CoHE Presidents, I think the system is getting better. CoHE does not create barriers that impede universities from progressing further. In the past, persuasion used to be employed to influence the decisions. Now, decisions are based on rational grounds. So engaging in lobbying through bilateral relations is a thing of the past. It seems that universities cannot keep up with the demands of CoHE. If they initiate action in line with the needs and demands of the society, they get support from CoHE. (See Appendix O, 41.)

Alternative ways to improve the system governance model

His accounts about the operation of the system governance model seem to indicate four suggestions to improve the current system governance model in Turkish higher education: building a flexible public personnel regime, differentiation among the universities, flexibility in the criteria for the opening of programs, and increasing efficiency of the Inter-University Board.

Building a flexible public personnel regime: Based on what current rector 2 explained about the operation of the system governance model, lack of accountability mechanisms in the operation of the system governance brings pressure to the university governance, creating setbacks to achieving the quality. He perceives the main challenge to the operation of the system governance of higher education as the inflexibility of the current personnel regime and considers it as the reason why academic culture has been an afterthought:

The main area that needs improvement in the system governance is the current public personnel regime. Employment at the academic level should not be easy to come by. It poses the potential of bottom-up mobbing. The current personnel regime is the main reason why academic culture change has failed so far. We need a mechanism that recognizes performance. If a performance-based system that aligns with principles of equality of opportunity and objectivity could be developed and applied accordingly both for employment of academic and administrative staff, then a system-wide development might be possible and efficiency might be increased. The employment criteria should be based on higher standards, transparency, and competency, safeguarding quality staffing and assuring the implementation of a condition of employment. We are left in a lonely situation in our efforts to meet the needs and demands of the public, and that makes a small group of people self-sacrifice to get things done. That's the reason why there is a need for flexibility in the current personnel regime. It is the main challenge to the system. For one thing, it poses the potential risk of feelings of resentment against the efforts towards improving the quality. And lack of mechanisms to offer merit pay for staff might encourage unproductive attitudes across the university. (See Appendix O, 42.)

He further added that a performance-based system could contribute to the issue of following the processes in practice by enabling the integration of accountability mechanisms into the operation of the system governance:

Both academic and administrative staff should be held accountable. They should both take on a buffer role in the fulfillment of their responsibilities. Administrative staff carries a heavy workload, and the load needs to be shared. It is hard to save the balance between the work in the construction sector and in the service sector. Performance should be the influencing factor in the length of employment. This type of focus on sustainability could also help nurture academic culture. Early warning mechanisms should be integrated into the system. What lacks in the system is the capability of following the processes. (See Appendix O, 43.)

Differentiation among the universities: According to his perceptions, a unified system governance model which treats each university the same way is likely to put the universities in a straitjacket. He also thinks that the demand for massification of higher education and the demand for differentiation among the universities be given the same care for a sustainable improvement in the operation of the system governance:

We have created a tug-of-war between massification and elitism. Massification means increasing the access to higher education. Elitism should

serve as a means of strengthening quality institutions which deliver elitist education. That is, a simultaneous process of massification and differentiation should be undertaken. Institutional diversity should be integrated into the system. Universities strive for expansion as expansion increases their representation. A unified system governance model decreases their representation, though. (See Appendix O, 44.)

Flexibility in the criteria for the opening of programs: Data suggests that the quality of academic staff should be paid more attention in the opening up of programs so that innovation in universities could become a common practice:

The criteria for the establishment of programs should be flexible. Linking quality with quantity is a time-honored tradition. As it [CoHE] has difficulty in following the processes, it makes the inputs difficult. The criteria should be based on the quality of academic staff. Universities with quality academic staff may fail in their endeavors due to their failure in meeting the minimum number of academic staff required in the setting up of programs. (See Appendix O, 45.)

Increasing efficiency of the Inter-University Board through change in its governance structure: He also seems to suggest that an executive board be formed within the Inter-University Board so as to increase its efficiency as an advisory board to CoHE:

Two representatives of each university attend to the meetings. Yet, their voice gets lost in the crowded group of attendants. So it is difficult for the Board to serve as an advisory board to CoHE. To increase its efficiency, two representatives of each university should form the General Assembly of the Board and should devolve some of their authorities to the Executive Board. The current President of the Board, three previous Presidents of the Board, and the future President of the Board should form the Executive Board. The Executive Board should be charged with making decisions and conveying these decisions to the General Assembly for the development of strategies. (See Appendix O, 46.)

Summary

To sum up, in his perceptions about the operation of the system governance of higher education, current rector 2 seems to suggest adding of the third of mission of local development to research and teaching missions of the universities. As highlighted by him, in order to accomplish these missions, the responsibilities of both academic and

administrative staff need to be taken into consideration, bringing forward the public personnel regime. For, he considers that the system needs to overcome such challenges as low demand from academics and lack of early warning mechanisms posed by the public personnel regime so as to increase the efficiency and improve the quality. To this end, he seems to suggest a move towards a performance-based system and engagement of accountability mechanisms into the system governance. From his perceptions, it is also possible to see that this type of focus could lead both CoHE and administrative and academic staff of the universities to take on a more coordinating role in the operation of the system governance by encouraging a connection between the inputs and processes of the system. His voice also seems to suggest flexibility, differentiation among the universities, massification of higher education, and advisory role of the Inter-University Board as of importance in the attainment of the missions of the universities and in the improvement of the current system governance model of higher education.

4.5 Summary of Chapter 4

This chapter presented selected case narratives of four research participants. Each selected case narrative depicted a particular aspect of the evolution and operation of the system governance of Turkish higher education as perceived and experienced by the respondents. The following two chapters present the findings from all thirty-one participants. In the light of the research questions of the study, these chapters present the perceptions and understandings of the participants about the operation of the system governance model of higher education, the advantages and challenges of this model, and the alternative ways to improve it.

CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH FINDINGS:
PARTICIPANTS' UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE OPERATION OF
THE SYSTEM GOVERNANCE MODEL

This chapter inquires into the findings of the research question 1 of this study and explores the perceptions and understandings of the research participants about the operation of the system governance model in Turkish higher education. Based on the data analysis guided by the conceptual framework for the study, it presents the participants' perceptions and understandings about the operation of the system governance model around two major categories: structure of the system governance model and decision-making process within and among the forms of power involved in the operation of the model. Specifically, the chapter first explores how the participants perceive the structure of the model operating in the system governance. It then highlights the opinions and ideas of the participants about how the decision-making structure works, how the decision-making power is shared, and how the interplay between governmental steering and institutional autonomy works with regard to accountability, financing, appointments, and rule of law in the operation of the system governance model. The quotes used in the presentation of the findings of the research question 1 of this study are translations from Turkish to English (see Appendix P for the Turkish versions of the quotes used in this chapter).³²

³² Quotes of forty or more words are presented in Turkish in Appendix P.

5.1 Category 1: Structure of the system governance model

This category highlights the perceptions of the participants as regards the structure of the model operating in the system governance of Turkish higher education. Data analysis reveals that the research participants portrayed a bureaucratic and centralized structure in the operation of the system governance model and explored it around four sub-categories: As perceived by the participants, it seems that the structure operating in the system governance (1) is law-bound, (2) has power-centers, (3) combines supervision of inputs and outputs, and (4) deprofessionalizes academic roles. Although not each of the thirty-one participants discussed the operating structure in the system governance using each of the four categories, they formulated their ideas and opinions around several categories.

5.1.1 Law-bound

All the participants highlighted that the structure operating in the system governance of higher education is bound by Higher Education Law 2547. While explaining what they meant by a law-bound structure in the operation of the system governance, they first shared their general views and then moved onto more specific points.

Higher Education Law 2547 as the binding authority: All of the participants stated that Turkish higher education is formalized and standardized around the rules and principles defined in the law and they act according to the law. Former CoHE member 1, for example, stated that “Higher Education Law 2547 is the binding authority in Turkish higher education. Everything is conducted in accordance with and within the limits of this framework.” They explained that “CoHE is the institution concerned with higher education as defined in Higher Education Law 2547” (Current government representative 2) and is constitutionally autonomous.

Current rector 7 added that “CoHE is an institution trying to implement a defined law.” Current rector 3 shared similar views and also added: “CoHE runs the processes in line with the defined laws and regulations. As its acts are bound by law, proposals made by universities and CoHE as regards the operation of the system governance are limited by this framework.”

Higher Education Law 2547 as the product of September 12: Seventeen participants took this point one step further and shared their feelings in regard to the lineage of “this framework.” As perceived by these participants, the “framework” in the operation of the system governance is the “product” of September 12 military intervention. As explained by former CoHE member 2:

Higher Education Law 2547 is the product of September 12. Universities have been left holding the bag. The 1982 Constitution was enacted after the enforcement of the law and so the law operating in the system governance of higher education was embedded in the Constitution. (See Appendix P, 1.)

Current rector 6 shared similar views but also added that those in positions of power in the system governance of higher education have to take shape of the law-bound structure defined by the 1980 military intervention: “Higher Education Law 2547 seems to have been enacted to meet the needs and demands of the 1980 military intervention. We are the products of this framework. So technically we have to fit neatly into the framework.”

Excessive bureaucracy in the workflow: Besides their conformity with Higher Education Law 2547, the participants stated that they also comply with other laws and regulations in the operation of the system governance. Of the thirty-one participants, sixteen elaborated on the operation of other laws and regulations in the system governance and stated that such a law-bound structure poses the potential of being exposed to excessive bureaucracy in the workflow. The participants highlighted that they follow the formal bureaucratic processes specified in the laws

and regulations to get things done and feel burdened with bureaucracy while trying to maintain the smoothness of work processes. Former rector 6 stated that a law-bound structure slows down the workflow, increasing the possibility of facing bureaucratic challenges:

Turkish higher education is law-bound. What this means is that while universities can make some decisions on their own, they cannot because they have a need for approval from CoHE. This slows down the workflow because there are other rules, laws, and regulations involved in the processes. A slow workflow increases the likelihood of facing some bureaucratic challenges until the processes are completed. (See Appendix P, 2.)

Current CoHE member 1 also elaborated on the operation of processes in the system governance and shared that it is possible that proposals made by universities might lose their nature of novelty in the work processes: “It is likely that proposals made by universities may not be new anymore when they reach me.” Current rector 8 approached the issue by emphasizing the amount of bureaucratic paperwork integrated into the operation of the system governance through the laws and regulations:

I work for long hours to understand all the laws and regulations and to catch up with the work processes that come with the laws and regulations. For bureaucratic paperwork is the reality of Turkish higher education, draining time of both CoHE and universities. (See Appendix P, 3.)

No failure tolerance: Although all the participants stated that a law-bound structure requires a high knowledge of laws and regulations pertinent to the operation of the system governance, ten participants, six former rectors and four former CoHE members, approached the issue from the perspective of having no room for failure. As perceived by these ten participants, a law-bound structure has “no failure tolerance.” Former rector 1, for instance, explained the issue as follows:

I spent a lot of time on understanding the laws and regulations. Although I had a team, it was possible that there would be variations in the efficiency of the information I received. Especially the errors in the budgetary issues are not acceptable. I studied the regulations and consulted legal counsels. You

have to understand the laws and regulations in Turkey. It is hard for the academics to understand this side of the issue. The structure has no failure tolerance. If you make errors in judgment, it is likely that you might be politicized by your errors. (See Appendix P, 4.)

Former CoHE member 6 shared the same perception and added some more details regarding the importance of the laws and regulations in the operation of the system governance:

Diploma equivalence issues, disciplinary issues, staff allocation issues etc. You have to understand all the rules, laws, and regulations as to these issues. You cannot make any errors in judgment. And on top of this, although CoHE has no financial oversight in the system governance of higher education, you have to understand the budgetary issues. You have to understand the law to catch up with the processes. Yet, the Budget Law is too detailed and too complicated to understand. (See Appendix P, 5.)

Summary

All in all, it seems that the participants consider the structure operating in the system governance of higher education as law-bound because they have to conform with the rules and principles established by Higher Education Law 2547. Their perceptions reveal that a law-bound structure incorporates formalized and standardized processes and procedures into the operation of the system governance. For some participants, such compliance with the formal processes may result in accumulation of bureaucracy in the workflow, slowing down the processes. Also, all the participants think that a law-bound structure requires being knowledgeable about the laws and regulations. According to the perceptions of some participants, such a requirement means that the structure operating in the system governance of higher education has no tolerance for failure in the work processes.

5.1.2 Power-centers

Data indicates that the participants perceive two main power centers in the structure operating in the system governance of higher education and these power centers are

CoHE and rectors. These perceptions of the participants also reveal that while depicting the structure of the system governance model, the participants differentiated between power centers and forms of power involved in the relations in the operation of the system governance model. These forms of power highlighted by the participants are discussed along with the perceptions of the participants about the decision-making process in the system governance under Category 2. This sub-category explores the reasons why the participants view the structure operating in the system governance as having power centers.

CoHE as a power center

Derivation of authority from the Constitution and the Law: One reason why the participants perceive CoHE as a power center in the structure operating in the system governance seems to be its powers and authorities coming from the Constitution and Higher Education Law 2547. All the participants shared that CoHE is the constitutionally autonomous higher body that governs Turkish higher education as defined by Higher Education Law 2547 and hence is the central body that is responsible for the coordination and planning of higher education and for developing strategies and visions for the institutions of higher education. Twenty-two participants further elaborated on the specifics of such powers of CoHE and explained what such powers meant as regards the structure operating in the system governance of higher education.

They perceive that “Higher Education Law 2547 is a great source of power which entitles CoHE as the central authority in the system governance” (Former rector 2). They reported that universities put CoHE’s decisions into action without further questioning. According to them, “CoHE is the higher body. Universities would never do anything contrary to CoHE’s decisions” (Former CoHE member 4).

Current CoHE member 2 added that the combination of constitutional powers with a centralized law puts limits into the progress of the universities and explained the centralized structure in the operation of the system governance of higher education as follows:

CoHE is vested with great constitutional powers. The centralized law creates a centralized structure in the system governance. The decision-making mechanisms need to be devolved to universities. For the current structure weakens the diversity and develops a unified perception of universities. The centralized structure limits the universities as regards the diversity, flexibility, and competitiveness. (See Appendix P, 6.)

Current government representative 2 echoed similarly and stated: “Ideally, each university should be able to chart its own future, develop its own strategic plan, and build its own academic goals. The current structure is not open to this.”

Current rector 1 agreed and added some more details:

The current structure is quite centralized. A university is the source of qualified workforce. CoHE is the body that decides on your enrollment quotas. CoHE is the body that decides on the number of academics you can have. The number of students and the number of academics are two primary factors that determine the quality of a university. When I tell you how many academics and how many students you can have, I either become your source of happiness or unhappiness. That is the reason why CoHE is a very important factor in the system governance. (See Appendix P, 7.)

Agreeing with the other participants, two participants brought a different understanding as to why they perceive CoHE as a power center operating in the structure of the system governance. According to these participants, the derivation of authority from the Constitution and the Law along with the regulations and approval processes leads CoHE to seem like a judge over the universities and brings a “judgmental structure” to the system governance of higher education. As highlighted by current rector 5, “As the central authority with such great powers, CoHE seems like a judge acting over the universities.” Former rector 1 elaborated on the issue as follows:

CoHE is not part of the academic world. It is part of the bureaucracy. CoHE is indexed to the bureaucracy. The members are subject to CoHE not academically, but rather bureaucratically. This stems from the Constitution. The Constitution formatted it so. So it is close to the judiciary. It seems to be acting like a judge. Regulations are strengthening its judgmental structure, bringing a closed structure to the current system. (See Appendix P, 8.)

The voice of current government representative 1 also emphasized the constitutional powers of CoHE, but also added that what makes CoHE a power center operating in the structure of the system governance is the possibility that its bureaucratic power could prevail over the political power and could be used to legitimize practices. According to his perceptions, the headscarf ban policy in Turkish higher education sets an example of a de facto ban legitimized in practice:

As CoHE is constitutionally autonomous, its constitutional provisions are likely to create de facto practices. Headscarf ban, for instance, could not be cleared despite the efforts of the governments and the political powers. . . . CoHE imposed a de facto ban relying on the authority coming from its constitutional autonomy. This is an example of how such powers of CoHE could be used despotically when intended so. The ban was lifted without any parliamentary action when a democratic President was elected and appointed a democratic CoHE President. . . . The appointed President of CoHE requested rectors to report the incidence of non-compliance with the headscarf ban if they considered it as illegal. Where is it written that it is illegal? Nowhere. As non-compliance with the headscarf ban was not defined as illegal in the laws, the rectors softened their stand against the ban. The ban was a de facto ban, so it was lifted de facto. (See Appendix P, 9.)

CoHE as a shield: Twenty-five participants perceive that the second reason why CoHE is a power center operating in the structure of the system governance seems to be the use of powers and authorities embedded in the structure through the Constitution and the Law as a way of not taking initiative and responsibility. They explained that both academic and administrative staff are used to the system and do not show willingness when a possibility of change to the system arises. According to their perceptions, “Both academic and administrative staff do not want to leave their comfort zones. They are accustomed to the established routines” (Current rector 4). Current CoHE member 3 highlighted that “CoHE is getting ready to devolve some of

its authorities to universities. Yet, universities are standing against it. Why? Because, in their opinion, we are their shield.” In addition to the habits of the members of the universities in general which place CoHE as a power center operating in the structure of the system governance in the eyes of the participants, they also mentioned that “Rectors usually use the powers of CoHE as a shield so as to avoid taking responsibility” (Former CoHE member 6). Current government representative 4, for instance, reported: “A pilot project was run as regards the issue of autonomy over the budgetary allocations. However, the relevant rectors did not want to own the issue. They called the Ministry of Finance and said ‘Save us.’” Current CoHE member 4 expanded on the reason why rectors are hesitant to take initiative and stated:

They ask everything they should do to us. People fear taking initiative. They want to escape the potential of uncertainty in the system governance. They want to safeguard themselves using the Law as a shield. Considering the possibility of making mistakes and errors in judgment, they want to check everything with CoHE. They cling to rules and regulations instead of discussing and making their decisions within their teams. (See Appendix P, 10.)

Former rector 6 agreed, but also emphasized: “Decisions you cannot make on your own stay away from you. You do not feel responsible. You put the responsibility on CoHE. You do not own the decision.”

Of the twenty-five participants, seven added different metaphors to explain what such powers of CoHE meant as regards the structure operating in the system governance of higher education. Using a “lightning rod” metaphor, four out of seven participants mentioned that “CoHE acts as a lightning rod between the universities. When tensions arise, it functions as a buffer” (Current rector 2). Similarly, three participants used the “bad evil” metaphor and reported that powers and authorities of CoHE could be the center of attention once somebody needs to take initiative and

responsibility and CoHE could be the one to be blamed as it is the higher body over the universities as established by the Constitution and the Law.

Rectors as a power center

Data indicates that all the participants perceive rectors as the second power center in the structure operating in the system governance of higher education. The reason why the participants perceive rectors as a power center seems to be their administrative and financial powers. Former rector 3, for instance, considers:

It is hard to change the bureaucratic structure in Turkish higher education. The perception of the structure is bound by how a rector will be elected. For the rector is the top authority over the university governance. They have financial and administrative powers. Therefore, how this person will be elected matters a lot. (See Appendix P, 11.)

In addition, eleven participants also discussed the powers of the rectors emphasizing the broadness of their powers. Current CoHE member 2, for example, put an emphasis on the broadness of the financial powers of the rectors and stated:

The rector is the final authority within the university governance. The budget for the small-scale state universities is around 100 million [Turkish liras], and it increases up to 400-450 million [Turkish liras] for the large-scale state universities. What this means is that one person is vested with the authority to use the money. So the rector is financially a big source of power. (See Appendix P, 12.)

Former CoHE member 3 explained how he perceived such powers of rectors regarding the structure operating in the system governance of higher education elaborating on their administrative powers, especially on the procedures for staff allocation and appointments of professors:

In the foundation phase of CoHE, rectors seem to have been vested with important powers in the university governance. As a matter of fact, back in the day, there was a joke about their powers. There is a proverbial expression as regards the power of the British parliament: The British parliament can do everything, but make a woman a man and a man a woman. This was how we used to joke with rectors about some of their powers. Why? Think about the appointment process of professors. Even if five people vote no, the rector can still appoint a professor. Or think about academic staff allocation procedures. When omnibus bills were implemented in the universities, CoHE would confer rectors with the authority to use, say, hundred staff positions, strengthening their powers. (See Appendix P, 13.)

Current rector 8 agreed and explored his understanding of the broad powers of rectors in the university governance in terms of dependency on one person in the structure operating in the system governance: “Dependency on one person having such broad powers means that institutions function best depending on whether the individuals have a vision or not, determining the future of the universities.” Former rector 1 one agreed and added that such great powers of rectors integrates a “bossy” structure into the operation of the system governance: “The structure has a bossy nature, in which rectors have broad powers. S/he can send anyone to anywhere within the university.”

Two participants, current rector 2 and former rector 4, explored the broadness of powers of rectors from a different perspective. Acknowledging their huge powers, they approached the issue from the perspective of improving the efficiency within the university. Current rector 2, for instance, stated that a focus on their powers impede a focus on their responsibilities within the university governance and its impact to the structure operating in the system governance of higher education. As perceived by him, the reason why rectors can relocate academics within the university is actually based on their responsibility of improving the efficiency and the quality within the university governance:

The responsibilities of rectors are overshadowed by the discussions on the broadness of their powers. The rector is accountable to CoHE, the Ministries, and the Court of Accounts. The annual budget allocated to each state university is around 250 millions. They have powers in ensuring the effective running of higher education activities and are held accountable to the relevant institutions concerning their compliance with the principles specified in law. As established by Higher Education Law 2547 and specified in Article 13-b of this law, they are vested with authorities to relocate the academic and administrative staff within the university, creating the likelihood of abuse of power. However, despite the potential negative effects of such powers, the rationale behind is actually to ensure efficient coordination of the university. CoHE can also relocate academic staff and can assign them to the public institutions such as the Ministries and TÜBİTAK. That is, that article of the law is actually well thought out. It aims to increase efficiency and quality. (See Appendix P, 14.)

Summary

All in all, data analysis reveals that the research participants perceive two main power centers operating in the system governance of higher education, CoHE and rectors. The two main reasons why the participants consider CoHE as a power center seem to be its authority derived from the Constitution and the Law and the use of such authority by academic and administrative staff as a way of holding back from the responsibility. The perceptions of the participants also indicate that they perceive rectors as the second power center operating in the structure of the system governance based on their administrative and financial powers.

5.1.3 Combined control of inputs and outputs

Twenty-six participants stated that the structure operating in the system governance of higher education combines the supervision of inputs and outputs. As perceived by the participants, the combined input-output control operates through a focus on the rules, laws, and regulations in order to maintain quality and leads only inputs to be subject to supervision. Former rector 2 explained the combined input-output control as follows:

We have input control mechanisms. We apply penal procedures, laws, and regulations to control the inputs. That is, we are trying to implement a top-down quality control. The Higher Education Audit Board is administrative and bureaucratic. The Board does not evaluate the quality of the system. (See Appendix P, 15.)

Current CoHE member 2 explained how the top-down quality control works within the structure operating in the system governance. As shared by him, CoHE has high control over the inputs such as students and academic and administrative staff.

However, a mechanism for following the input processes lacks in the structure:

“There is no buffer mechanism for macro and micro evaluations that would keep the inputs in check within the integrity of the system.” Current rector 5, for example, perceives a combined supervision of inputs and outputs as the implementation of more provisions over the inputs, slowing down the workflow and bringing in an orientation towards details:

CoHE is too focused on details as it cannot follow the processes. It is hinging on more provisions and less coordination to sort out the problem. What this means for us is being exposed to more provisions, for example, when initiating a project. (See Appendix P, 16.)

Former CoHE member 3 elaborated on the issue and stated that an immanent to law supervision mechanism for supervision of quality and law operates in the structure of the system governance:

Quality assurance of 25-30 actors seems to have been considered within the capacities of CoHE by considering the conditions of 1980s. That is, an immanent to law supervision mechanism for supervision of quality and law seems to have been built. (See Appendix P, 17.)

Current CoHE member 5 shared the similar view and explained that the combined supervision of inputs and outputs through the laws and regulations overloads the operating structure and poses challenges to maintaining sustainability in the system governance:

The current system holds around 7.3 million students and 150 thousand faculty members. That is, our higher education system is larger than the population of many European countries. We are talking about such a big system. The Constitution foresees the planning, coordination, and supervision of the inputs and outputs from a single center, making maintenance of sustainability in the system difficult. The common practice around the world, however, is separate management of the inputs and outputs of a system. For supervision of the inputs and outputs from the same center leaves any system vulnerable to influence by interest groups. (See Appendix P, 18.)

Summary

All in all, the perceptions of the participants show that a supervision mechanism which combines inputs and outputs operates in the structure of the system governance of higher education. It seems that the participants perceive the lack of supervision mechanisms within the structure operating in the system governance as high control over the inputs and difficulty in following the processes.

5.1.4 Deprofessionalization of academic roles

The perceptions and understandings of the current and former rectors show that a law-bound, power-centered structure operating in the system governance model of higher education also operates through a simultaneous process of deprofessionalization of their academic roles. Based on the opinions and ideas of eight current rectors and seven former rectors, data analysis indicates that both current and former rectors perceive the operation of the structure in the system governance of higher education as deprofessionalization of their academic roles towards more bureaucratic and entrepreneurial roles. They perceive that, as one of the power centers within a law-bound structure, they take on bureaucratic roles. They also perceive that as one of the main power centers within a power-centered structure, they take on entrepreneurial roles.

Deprofessionalization of academic roles towards bureaucratic roles

The rectors perceive that the duties and responsibilities of rectors specified in Higher Education Law 2547 mean close ties with bureaucracy and working with bureaucrats from a wide range of areas, requiring an understanding of the bureaucratic processes and procedures of the institutions involved in the relations in the operation of the system governance. Former rector 5, for instance, considers this as “knowing Ankara.” Former rector 6 elaborated on this issue and stated: “A person used to bureaucratic traditions would feel themselves more comfortable in their conduct of duty.” Current rector 4 feels that “Rectors find themselves in the middle of bureaucratic work pertaining to a variety of disciplines for which they are not usually well-prepared and well-equipped.” Current rector 6 added some more details and elaborated on the process of deprofessionalization of academic roles towards more bureaucratic roles in the structure operating in the system governance as follows:

Being a rector means owning a bureaucratic identity, with which comes representative authority in the city. That means they are regarded among the most respected people in the city. Although their respectability should be driven by their academic identity, this is not the case. What drives respect towards them mostly is their bureaucratic identity. For instance, rectors should not have a precedence order in the protocols. . . . Protocols increase the tendencies towards a perception of a rector as representative of a bureaucratic identity. (See Appendix P, 19.)

Deprofessionalization of academic roles towards entrepreneurial roles

The rectors also shared that another aspect of this process of deprofessionalization of their academic roles within a law bound, power-centered structure relates to engaging in entrepreneurial roles. They think that “Although the roles of rectors in the university governance are mostly considered as implementing the rules as set forth in the laws and regulations, rectors have shifted towards more entrepreneurial approaches in the university governance” (Current rector 3). They also feel that such

roles are not specified in the laws and regulations, but are required by the power-centered structure operating in the system governance of higher education. Current rector 6, for instance, feels that “A rector is defined by their academic identity in Higher Education Law 2547. Yet, the reality requires something else. A rector is like the general manager of a techno city. A general manager of many things.”

As shared by the rectors, one reason for deprofessionalization of their academic roles in the university governance seems to be related to the issue of finding extra sources to improve the quality within the university and in turn to contribute to the social and economic development. Former rector 7, for example, stated: “We resorted to research development activities and made serious investments in nanotechnology to build capacity within the university.” Former rector 6 echoed similarly and added that “University governance requires increasing the brand value of the institution through engaging in activities that will contribute to the social and economic development.” Current rector 7 agreed and emphasized that rectors within the context of today extend beyond their bureaucratic roles:

Rectors today take on more entrepreneurial roles beyond being a bureaucrat of the state. It requires managing the budget allocated by the state and the budget that cannot be allocated by the state. Everything that connects these two are within the boundaries of what a rector does. For a university governance is a project. Every step you take in the process of governance is defined by your vision. Projects require budget control and management. And that makes the university itself a project. (See Appendix P, 20.)

Two current rectors shared similar views, but also brought a different understanding of deprofessionalization of academic roles of rectors. Current rector 5 pointed to the issue that “The founding rectors of the newly-established universities can be called rectors as technicians because they have to take care of every single detail themselves in the founding stage.” Current rector 4 as a founding rector explored such deprofessionalization of his role as follows:

I have to put an emphasis on the fact that I am the rector of a newly founded university. The initial stage of the process requires that you go through the standard staff allocation procedures for the establishment of the state universities. Second of all, you need a physical work environment. What I mean is not a luxurious work environment or an office for myself. I have to clarify this because it is open to misinterpretations. I just mean a physical work environment where all the units of the university can communicate effectively and work with integrity. In Istanbul and Ankara, it is easier to manage such construction processes because contractors can understand what you mean when you speak within the context of a university environment. On the contrary, in many cities of Anatolia, this is not how things work. Within such context, most of their work involves housing. The spacious, multi-purpose buildings of Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir that you can decorate as you wish is not easily understood around Anatolian cities. Of course, there is one exception: You can have such buildings only if you design them. When I first started here, nobody told me “Here is your office.” The first university of a city is a place of attraction. It gets everybody’s attention. Yet, after the first one, it is hard to rebuild such enthusiasm. The locals demand for the second university, but do not support for the change. (See Appendix P, 21.)

Summary

In short, as perceived by the rectors, their academic roles are deprofessionalized through simultaneously interwoven processes operating in the system governance of higher education. In their perceptions, a law-bound structure operating in the structure of the system governance deprofessionalizes their academic roles towards more bureaucratic roles while they take on more entrepreneurial roles through a power-centered structure operating in the system governance.

5.1.5 Summary

In short, the participants seem to depict the structure operating in the system governance model as bureaucratic and centralized and consider a bureaucratic and centralized structure as law-bound, power-centered, and combined supervision of inputs and outputs. It seems that the rectors perceive the operation of such structure in the system governance as a process which also operates through a process of deprofessionalization of their academic roles.

5.2 Category 2: Decision-making process in the operation of the system governance model

This category explores the opinions and ideas of the participants about the decision-making process within and among the forms of power involved in the operation of the system governance model. It specifically highlights the opinions and ideas of the participants as to how the decision-making structure works, how the decision-making power is shared, and how the interplay between governmental steering and institutional autonomy works regarding accountability, financing, appointments, and rule of law in the operation of the system governance model.

Data analysis reveals a diverse understanding of the decision-making process by the three groups of participants of the study: current and former CoHE members, current and former rectors, and current government representatives. What unites these three groups of participants seems to be vertical decision-making in the operation of the system governance. That being the case, while unpacking their perceptions about the decision-making process, each participant group seems to have formulated their answers relating to their own context.

It seems that the representatives of indirect governmental influence, the current and former CoHE members, described a vertical decision-making process that flows from CoHE to the representatives of the university governance, rectors. It also seems that the representatives of direct governmental influence, the current government representatives, explained the vertical and/or horizontal linkages among CoHE, the relevant ministries, and the rectors in the decision-making process. On the other hand, it seems that the current and former rectors approached the decision-making process in the operation of the system governance model from the issue of

ownership of the vertically made decisions and shared the strategies they employ/ed in integrating their voices into the decision-making process.

Based on these three different explorations of the vertical decision-making process by the three participant groups of the study, there seems to be a communication gap in the policy coordination in the operation of the system governance model considering the interplay between in/direct governmental steering and institutional autonomy. That is, data analysis seems to indicate a lack of horizontal policy coordination and horizontal decision-making process that engage with the three groups - the representatives of direct governmental influence, indirect governmental influence, and university governance - in the inter-institutional policy coordination and decision-making at the multilevel system governance of higher education. What follows thus presents this diverse understanding of the vertical decision-making process in three sub-categories: current and former CoHE members' understanding of the decision-making process, current government representatives' understanding of the decision-making process, and current and former rectors' understanding of the decision-making process. It then first explores the decision-makers' understanding of the decision-making process and then explores the perspectives of those who are influenced by the decisions made by a multiplicity of authorities.

5.2.1 Current and former CoHE members' understanding of the decision-making process

Seven former CoHE members and five current CoHE members described how decisions are made within CoHE and how decisions are conveyed to the universities. As shared by the participants, as the higher body responsible for higher education in

Turkey, CoHE engages in decision-making in a wide range of areas in the operation of the system governance and, in doing so, it interacts not only with the higher education institutions but also with all the institutions of the bureaucracy. The participants stated that within this diverse spectrum of issues, the main areas of decision-making in interactions with the state universities concern allocation of academic staff, enrollment quotas, equivalency of degrees, and opening, closing, or amalgamation of faculties, graduate schools, departments, departmental programs, vocational schools, and all the other schools, centers, and units. They highlighted that “The budgetary allocations are not overseen by CoHE, but lie within the responsibility area of the Ministry of Finance” (Former CoHE member 5).

As stated by the participants, there is an explicit structure and specialization within CoHE through which information flow and decision-making are assisted. The participants mentioned that “The universities communicate with CoHE through the Rectorate and follow written forms of communication in their interactions. If it is an emergency, they can utilize other communication channels such as phone calls or establish face-to-face interaction with CoHE” (Former CoHE member 4). Current CoHE member 1 explained how the proposals and demands made by the universities are processed within CoHE:

The demands of the universities are examined within the relevant departments. The demands concerning the educational activities are examined by the Department of Education and Training and the demands regarding the staff allocation are examined by the Department of Personnel. The demands also include, say, additional quotas for international student intake. Such demands are processed by the Department of Education and Training. In general, the demands of the universities are circulated within the Department of Education and Training and the Department of Personnel. In addition, the opening and closing down of departments lie within the responsibility area of CoHE. The proposals made by the universities concerning the faculties are sent to the Ministry of National Education and then delivered from the Ministry to the Parliament. (See Appendix P, 22.)

Former CoHE member 6 elaborated on how the information is filtered within the departmental units and is relayed up the ladder to the General Assembly or the Executive Board of CoHE:

The relevant departments compile the proposals of the universities and prepare them for the Commissions within CoHE. Each member of the Executive Board leads at least one commission. The proposals are discussed and decided upon within the Commissions and then these decisions are carried forward either to the Executive Board or to the General Assembly depending on the types of the issues. The decisions are further discussed at the Executive Board and General Assembly meetings after the Presidents of the Commissions present the decisions of the Commissions. Following the discussions, the decisions are made. (See Appendix P, 23.)

Current CoHE member 4 mentioned that CoHE employs certain criteria in the decision-making process. As stated by him:

When we make decisions, we follow certain criteria. For example, in the opening up or closing down of the programs, we employ the fullness ratio of 85%. In case of failure in meeting the lower limit of 85%, we reject the proposals for the opening up of programs and apply the same criteria to close down the programs. Coordination problems would emerge in the absence of a central authority. We are trying to make rational decisions taking the social demands into consideration as well. (See Appendix P, 24.)

Former CoHE member 1 agreed and added that the frequency of the meetings of the General Assembly and of the Executive Board may vary in the decision-making process:

Every week the proposals of the universities are discussed at CoHE. The Executive Board meets at least three times a week. The General Assembly meets at least once a month. Depending on the types of the proposals, we try to make our decisions as fast as possible. (See Appendix P, 25.)

As shared by former CoHE member 2, the decisions are executed to the universities upon the approval of the CoHE Presidency: “The decisions made during these meetings are signed by the President or the Vice-Presidents of CoHE and then are conveyed to the relevant Rectorates.” He also explained the decision-making procedures for administrative and academic appointments in a more detailed way:

In state universities, in the appointment of the rectors, professors directly apply to CoHE, CoHE reduces the number of applicants to three following a search process, and the President of the Republic appoints one of them. In the appointment of the deans, the rectors nominate three candidates and CoHE appoints one of them. The appointment of the directors of the graduate schools and the others are carried out within the university. In the appointment of academic staff, upon the approval of CoHE, the Rectorates advertise vacant positions, where they can set additional criteria to those specified in Higher Education Law 2547. The process is completed with the appointment of the successful candidates by the rectors. (See Appendix P, 26.)

Current CoHE member 2 explained the issue of how CoHE engages its own demands in the decision-making process:

CoHE conveys its demands to the universities by contacting the rectors, through written channels of communication, or through the regional meetings held from time to time with the rectors. The demands can also take the form of projects. If that is the case, the policies are determined within the scope of the project and then are either transferred directly or via varying parties to the universities. (See Appendix P, 27.)

Current CoHE member 1 shared that besides the written means of communication, they also establish communication with the universities through bilateral relations in the decision-making process. He stated: “We convey our demands to the universities both through written communication and bilateral relations. For instance, if the demand regards the establishment of departments, we develop bilateral relations with the universities that could meet the demand.”

Summary

In sum, the current and former CoHE members seem to have depicted a vertical decision-making in interactions between CoHE and the state universities. Based on the data, it seems that the responsibility and authority regarding the issues involved in decision-making are mainly concentrated at the Executive Board and the General Assembly of CoHE, decisions of which seem to empower the actions to be taken by the state universities. Data analysis also indicates that the financing of higher

education lies outside the responsibility area of CoHE and is coordinated by the Ministry of Finance.

5.2.2 Current government representatives' understanding of the decision-making process

This section highlights the perceptions of four current government representatives about the decision-making process among CoHE, the relevant ministries, and the state universities in the operation of the system governance of higher education. It first explores how two current government representatives perceive the decision-making process among CoHE, the Ministry of National Education, and the state universities. It then unpacks the understandings of two current government representatives regarding the decision-making process among CoHE, the Ministry of Development, the Ministry of Finance, and the state universities.

Decision-making process in interactions between CoHE, the Ministry of National Education, and the state universities

Current government representative 1 and current government representative 2 stated that “CoHE is the institution concerned with higher education as defined in Higher Education Law 2547” (Current government representative 1). As shared by the participants, two areas of interaction in the decision-making between CoHE and the Ministry of National Education concern the decisions on the faculties and the establishment of universities. As stated by current government representative 2, “The Ministry of National Education mediates the relations between CoHE and the Parliament about the foundation of universities and the setting up, closing down, or amalgamation of faculties.” Current government representative 1 echoed similarly and added that “The Ministry of National Education does not follow a hierarchical

governing in its relations with CoHE. . . . The Ministry contributes information to the process.” Current government representative 2 elaborated on the relationship between CoHE and the Ministry and shared the view that the relationship between the two institutions is necessary as asserted by law:

CoHE is the planning body of higher education. Since the Ministry of National Education is responsible for carrying out the work and processes associated with education in Turkey and since the budgetary allocations of the universities are carried through the Ministry of National Education as specified in law [Public Financial Management and Control Law 5018], the collaboration between the two institutions is necessary. (See Appendix P, 28.)

In addition, the participants highlighted that “The proposed CoHE budget and the Ministry of National Education budget are reviewed together in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey” (Current government representative 1). Besides the issues regarding financing of higher education, the participants also mentioned the collaboration between CoHE and the Ministry in the decision-making about the implementation of Law 1416 on sending students abroad. The participants explained that CoHE and the Ministry decide on the number of students to be sent abroad who would be funded by the government during their studies abroad and who would serve in the public sector upon the completion of their studies. The financing of these students and the implementation of the law in general are overseen by the Ministry and staff allocation procedures are coordinated by CoHE. Current government representative 2 added: “We allocated a quota for 500 students for this year. CoHE decided upon the areas of need”. Both participants think that the Ministry plays an important role through Law 1416 in meeting the qualified workforce needs of the country. Current government representative 2 also feels that the Ministry of National Education should take on a more active role in the policymaking for higher education. He shared that “It is advantageous that the concerned stakeholders

collaborate about the policies as to the principle of education. Yet, the Ministry of National Education should determine the general policies for higher education.”

All in all, based on the ideas and opinions of the participants, it seems that there are both horizontal and vertical linkages in the decision-making process between CoHE and the Ministry. What seems to be an issue emerging from the data analysis is that, on the one hand, there are apparent horizontal interactions between CoHE and the Ministry, but on the other hand, policymaking powers of the two institutions seem to indicate a lack of horizontal coordination in the operation of the system governance of higher education. In addition, the state universities seem not to be included in the inter-institutional decision-making process in the operation of the system governance.

Decision-making process in interactions between CoHE, the Ministry of Development, the Ministry of Finance, and the state universities

Current government representative 3 and current government representative 4 explained how financing of higher education is coordinated through the Ministry of Development and the Ministry of Finance. As stated by current government representative 3:

The Ministry of Finance is responsible for preparing and coordinating the preparation of the central government budget bill as specified in Article 16 and Article 17 of Law no. 5018. Within this regard, the Ministry, thus, enables coordination between the relevant public institutions. (See Appendix P, 29.)

Current government representative 4 shared the role of the Ministry of Development in the operation of the system governance of higher education:

The Ministry of Development is responsible for public investment planning. Within this scope, the investments of the state universities are planned through the Ministry. The investments of all the Ministries and all the public institutions are planned through the Ministry. And also the allowances for these proposed investments are planned through the Ministry. (See Appendix P, 30.)

As explained by the participants, the Medium-Term Program prepared by the Ministry of Development by the first week of September gives start to the preparation process of the central government budget bill. The Program takes the national development plans and a broad array of issues into account and, hence, foresees the macro policies and principles to be taken into consideration in the central government budget bill preparation process. Second, the Medium-Term Financial Plan is prepared by the Ministry of Finance by September 15 in accordance with the Program. The participants shared that with the purposes of guiding the preparation process of the Medium-Term Program and the Medium-Term Financial Plan and in turn increasing the efficiency of the planning stage of the central government budget bill, the representatives of the Ministry of Development and the Ministry of Finance hold meetings with the representatives of the universities.

Current government representative 3 explained the process as follows:

As specified in Law no. 5018, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Development can conduct meetings with the representatives of the public institutions in the planning stage of the central government budget bill. For this reason, in order to guide the Medium-Term Program and the Medium-Term Financial Plan development processes and to increase the efficiency of the budget bill development process in general, the representatives of each of the two Ministries hold separate meetings with the representatives of the state universities on the scheduled dates. Prior to the meetings, the universities send their three-year budget proposals to the Ministry of Finance and send their three-year investment proposals to the Ministry of Development. (See Appendix P, 31.)

Current government representative 4 agreed and elaborated on the purposes of the meetings held at the Ministry of Development. He shared that the Ministry of Development is not the central authority in setting the educational policies, but it facilitates the efficient leveraging of the resources in the planning and implementation of the policies. To this end, as highlighted by him, the

representatives of the Ministry meet directly with the representatives of the university governance:

One purpose behind public investment planning is to negotiate how the limited resources can be distributed efficiently. . . . The Ministry of Development does not set the educational policies, but provides support for the policies. The Ministry, for instance, does not tell the other Ministries what to do. Each Ministry builds its own investment plan and the prepared investment proposals are examined by the Ministry of Development. We hold meetings with the representatives of the concerned institutions. Following the meetings, the investments are planned in line with the priorities of the country. We aim to support universities in their efforts to devote more resources to the research and development activities. We want them to channel their resources towards the areas with high added value. In line with these purposes, we meet directly with the representatives of the university governance. We do not meet with CoHE on behalf of the universities. During the meetings, we discuss with the representatives if and how they kept the previous investment promises. Following the meetings, we make our decisions on the basis of the previous investment promises. (See Appendix P, 32.)

Current government representative 3 shared the steps followed after the meetings:

Following the meetings in the Ministry of Finance held with the representatives of the university governance, expert opinions are developed and the proposed allocations to the universities are set out in the Middle-Term Financial Plan. Accordingly, the universities revise their budget proposals for submission to the Ministry of Finance by the end of September. In addition, following the meetings at the Ministry of Development, they submit their revised investment proposals to the Ministry of Development. Upon the submission of the proposals, the Ministry of Finance coordinates with the Ministry of Development and compiles the budget proposals and the investment proposals. Following the discussions on the macroeconomic indicators in the High Planning Council, the budget proposals, if it so wished, are revised and the Ministry of Finance prepares the central government budget bill. (See Appendix P, 33.)

As stated by current government representative 4, the next step in the budgeting process is the approval by the Parliament:

The next stage is the planning of the investments, for which the proposals are sent to the Parliament. In December, the central government budget bill is discussed in the Parliament. Upon the approval, the concerned institutions start using the approved budgets. During the budget year, checks on the implementation of the investment plans are conducted through reporting on a regular basis. (See Appendix P, 34.)

Current government representative 4 also emphasized that the universities do not have the right to use unspent budget amounts in the next year:

The main budgetary principle is that the budgets are set annually. The unspent budget amounts cannot be carried over the year ahead and, thus, are cancelled. If the use of the budgetary allocations is not in accordance with the investment plans and if the universities make requests for reallocation to the same areas of investment, we question the why of the issue. The institutions try to make the most efficient use of their budgets so as not to get reduced budgetary allocations for next year. (See Appendix P, 35.)

To sum up, based on the accounts of the participants, the final authority in the decision-making regarding the issue of financing of higher education is the Parliament and the budgeting development process is coordinated by the Ministry of Development and the Ministry of Finance. Based on the data, it seems that the critical decisions made as to the budgeting and investment planning in the operation of the system governance lie outside the responsibility area of CoHE. Another interpretation of the data might be low transparency in the decision-making as the budgets stay unchanged during the course of the fiscal year and cannot be carried over the following year. Another way to approach this issue might be to raise the question of how the accountability mechanisms are engaged and coordinated in the inter-institutional policy coordination and decision-making at the multilevel system governance of higher education.

5.2.3 Current and former rectors' understanding of the decision-making process

This section explores how eight current rectors and seven former rectors perceive the decision-making process in the operation of the system governance model. Based on the opinions and ideas of the rectors, data analysis shows that both current and former rectors approached the decision-making process from the perspective of the decisions made by the other decision makers, CoHE and the Ministries, in the

operation of the system governance. In this regard, data analysis reveals that the participants shared their perceptions about the decision-making process in both general and more specific ways.

The general views of the fifteen rectors indicate that they perceive the decision-making process as largely based on written channels of communication. They think that “Oral communication is better suited to handle the urgent situations” (Current rector 3). According to the participants, a high knowledge of the laws and regulations, a thorough preparation for the meetings with CoHE and the Ministries, and a skilled team within the university governance help to account for the needs and demands of the universities and ease the implementation of the decisions. Current rector 6, for instance, explored how he identifies the needs of the university to be integrated into the decision-making process as follows:

I adopt two different approaches to identify the needs of the university. First, you listen to everyone. Yet, this does not lend itself to a uniform understanding of the needs of the university. The resulting situation is a feudal understanding. The individual needs of each constituent of the university override the needs of the university as a whole. Second, you listen again. The inconclusive efforts guide you to your team at the top. If you have a skilled team, listening to them and following the trends with them help you to take the right steps in the decision-making process. A tight, small, and skilled team is important. (See Appendix P, 36.)

Current rector 7 shared similar views but also put an emphasis on taking actions in accordance with and within the limits of Higher Education Law 2547 to enhance autonomy in the decision-making process:

There is no autonomy in the decision-making process in the system governance. CoHE does not tell you “This is right” or “This is wrong” as it wishes. It is an institution trying to implement a defined law. If you take actions within this framework, you can increase autonomy. (See Appendix P, 37.)

Former rector 7 reported that experience and competence helped him to save a balance between the decision makers and the needs of the university:

Establishing ties with CoHE and the Ministries is necessary to be involved in the decision-making process. If you build good relationships, you can have a chance to express your views. I did not experience any problems during my term of office. Experience and competence are the keys to influencing their decisions. (See Appendix P, 38.)

There are some participants who further elaborated on expressing views to the decision-makers clearly. For example, former rector 1 unpacked how to engage in the decision-making in case of urgent situations and mentioned the importance of being proactive:

Before critical decisions that would shape the direction of the university are made at the system level, early intervention is important. . . . Once decisions are made, it is hard to change them. For this reason, you need to make your case clear in front of these individuals. You need to go and talk with them. (See Appendix P, 39.)

Former rector 2 put an emphasis on finding a middle ground between the concerned parties and understanding the reasoning of the decision makers:

It is of importance to be highly cautious in relations with CoHE. They are likely to be more convinced of your point if they believe you are working towards improving the quality within the university. They always supported us. Finding a middle ground in relations is particularly important. I stood by the interventions I considered fair, yet stood against the ones I considered unfair. For instance, they wanted to increase the enrollment quotas. I invited the then CoHE President to the university so that he could see the physical conditions. Thankfully, he accepted my invitation. I explained what damage the increased quotas would make to the quality. Their focus was the enrollment rate, my focus was the quality education. So I offered to make a deal. I offered to increase the quotas for the graduate programs, but to keep the quotas for the undergraduate programs the same. If you do not want something, you have to justify your reason and offer alternatives. Then they listen to you. . . . Understanding their point of view is important. How do they perceive the issue? Saying just no was not the best policy. It was important to understand the pressures on them. (See Appendix P, 40.)

Current rector 6 expanded on building bilateral relations with CoHE in the decision-making, but explored the issue from the perspective of the negative influence of bilateral relations on the inner workings of the university:

If it is not something really urgent, employing informal mechanisms should not be an option in the decision-making. I prefer to follow the formal bureaucratic decision-making processes in accordance with the laws and this

is what I tell to the staff within the university. Say, I make a request about staffing, but it is possible that CoHE changes its mind in the process and gives the priority to another university. It should stand behind its decisions, though. Probably whispering in the ear or pressures of rectors holds influence over such decisions, yet such informal mechanisms put me in a difficult situation within the university. What I mean is bilateral relations are quite influential in the decision-making processes. . . . This is not my style. I try to be well prepared for the meetings. A thorough preparation and a good presentation bring success in the decision-making processes. (See Appendix P, 41.)

The voice of current rector 2, on the other hand, brought a different understanding of the issue. He thinks that using persuasion as a tool in the decision-making process is a thing of the past:

In the past, persuasion used to be employed to influence the decisions. Now, decisions are based on rational grounds. So engaging in lobbying through bilateral relations is a thing of the past. It seems that universities cannot keep up with the demands of CoHE. If they initiate action in line with the needs and demands of the society, they get support from CoHE. (See Appendix P, 42.)

Two participants made more specific points about the decision-making process referring to the link between accountability and disengagement in the decision-making. Current rector 4, for instance, reported: “As there is no administrative autonomy in the decisions on the selection of students and on the employment terms of academic staff, the system is not capable of holding us accountable for the unintended consequences.” Former rector 6 shared the similar view and stated: “Decisions you cannot make on your own stay away from you. You do not feel responsible. You put the responsibility on CoHE. You do not own the decision.”

Summary

All in all, it seems that the rectors approached the decision-making process in the operation of the system governance model from the issue of ownership of the decisions coming from CoHE and the Ministries and shared the strategies they

utilize/d in engaging themselves in the decision-making processes. Based on the data, it seems that the rectors perceive formal policy instruments such as rules, laws, and procedures in the decision-making processes. In the same vein, the perceptions of the participants show that they develop individual paths to avoid disintegration from the decision makers' decisions. What seems to be apparent from the data analysis is that there is a diverse understanding of developing individual paths in the decision-making processes within the rectors. Another way to interpret the participants' various explorations of developing individual paths in the decision-making processes might be the concentration of decision-making powers within certain institutions in the operation of the system governance.

5.2.4 Summary

This section highlighted the participants' perceptions and understandings of the decision-making process within and among the forms of power involved in the operation of the model. Data analysis indicated a multifarious understanding of the decision-making process by the CoHE members, government representatives, and rectors. What seems to be common to these three different explorations is vertical decision-making in the operation of the system governance.

It seems that the representatives of indirect governmental influence, the current and former CoHE members, described the explicit structure within CoHE and explained how decisions come from CoHE to the representatives of the university governance, rectors. It also seems that the representatives of direct governmental influence, the current government representatives, explained the vertical and horizontal interactions among CoHE, the relevant ministries, and the rectors in the decision-making process. The current and former rectors, on the other hand, seem to

have approached the decision-making process relating to understanding and accepting the vertically made decisions through developing their own strategies. These three explorations of the vertical decision-making process by the participants seem to indicate a communication gap in the policy coordination considering the interplay between in/direct governmental steering and institutional autonomy and considering the power-sharing and policy-making powers within and among the forms of power in the operation of the system governance model. That is to say, data analysis seems to show less engagement with the three groups as a whole in the inter-institutional policy coordination and decision-making at the multilevel system governance of higher education.

5.3 Summary of Chapter 5

The research participants explored their perceptions and understandings of the operation of the system governance model in Turkish higher education by elaborating on the structure of the system governance model and the decision-making process within and among the forms of power involved in the operation of the model. The following chapter presents the findings of the second and third research questions, unpacks the perceptions and understandings of the participants as regards the advantages and challenges of the system governance model they portrayed in this chapter, and considers the alternative ways that the participants suggest to improve the model.

CHAPTER 6

RESEARCH FINDINGS:

PARTICIPANTS' ADVANTAGES, CHALLENGES, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS ABOUT THE SYSTEM GOVERNANCE MODEL

This chapter explores the perceptions and understandings of the research participants about the advantages and challenges of the system governance model they depicted in the previous chapter (Research question 2). Specifically, it first explores the advantages of the model and then focuses on the challenges of the model. Based on the challenges perceived by the participants, the chapter also presents the opinions and ideas of the participants about the alternative ways to improve the model (Research question 3). The quotes used in the presentation of the findings of the second and third research questions of this study are translations from Turkish to English (see Appendix Q for the Turkish versions of the quotes used in this chapter).³³

6.1 Research question 2: Advantages of the system governance model

This section highlights the perceptions of the participants as regards the advantages of the system governance model. Data analysis revealed that all the participants perceived one core advantage pertaining to the system governance model they portrayed, the existence of a coordination mechanism. Using it as a core advantage, seventeen participants expanded their views on the advantages of the model around four sub-categories. These are (1) move from election to appointment of rectors, (2) regulatory functions of CoHE, (3) contribution to the qualified workforce, and (4)

³³ Quotes of forty or more words are presented in Turkish in Appendix Q.

efficient investment planning. Not each of the seventeen participants elaborated on the existence of a coordination mechanism using the below-four sub-categories, but rather they highlighted what they perceived as advantages.

6.1.1 Move from election to appointment of rectors

Twelve participants considered the move from election to appointment system of rectors as an advantage of the system governance model. The participants shared that elections impede the progress of the universities through factions, ideological polarizations, and incorporation of narrow interests into the university governance structures. They perceive that such type of focus used to override the missions of the universities and engender power groups within the universities, creating a dualism between the right to elect the representative of university governance and accountability of power and a dualism between responsibilities and powers. Current rector 1, for instance, explained the situation as follows:

I am of the opinion that appointment via election by academics damages the institutions. Although the election system was considered to be the most democratic way, it used to lead to lobbying activities, mutual interests contrary to the university-wide concerns, and ideological polarizations within the universities. (See Appendix Q, 1.)

Current rector 7 added that the new search system carried out by CoHE in the designation of the candidates safeguards a match between the capabilities of the individuals and the needs and demands of the universities and the regions as a whole:

The factions and divisions inserted into the universities through elections used to last for many years, thereby leading to a complete dilution of the actions to be taken by the university governance and damaging the system overall. On the contrary, appointments are now open to everyone. CoHE carries out a search both within the university and in the region so as to create a candidate profile suited to all concerned. Such an approach safeguards a match between the capabilities and the universities. (See Appendix Q, 2.)

Current CoHE member 1 emphasized that the new appointment system increases the accountability of the rectors: “The rectors have both administrative and financial powers. Therefore, whether there is a balance between their accountability and powers is of importance. The new system improves the accountability of power holders.” Current government representative 1 agreed, but also explained the advantage of the accountability of the powers of rectors from a different perspective. He thinks that the previous system used to increase the possibility of unification between politics and powers of rectors and lower the accountability of their powers:

When rectors consider themselves politically strong, they tend to stand in opposition to the government. . . . The election system of rectors used to lead to factions within the universities. It was likely that the derivation of authority from votes would be intimidating. Rectors are bureaucrats. Today, they are appointed, so they do not have voter support. They can stay in office if only they fulfill the requirements of the position. If not, they may be removed from office. (See Appendix Q, 3.)

Summary

To sum up, the collective voice of these participants seems to show that appointment by election used to be a cause of separation within the universities. As perceived by the participants, the new appointment system of rectors seems to be a contribution to the maintenance of sustainability and enhancement of accountability of power both within the universities and in the operation of the system governance overall.

6.1.2 Regulatory functions of CoHE

Nine participants explained the advantages of the system governance model in terms of regulatory functions of CoHE: coordinating and planning function of CoHE and acting as a lightning rod function of CoHE. Except three participants, the remaining six participants either highlighted the coordinating and planning function of CoHE or acting as a lightning rod function of CoHE as a benefit of the model.

Coordinating and planning function: Eight participants mentioned the coordinating and planning function of CoHE as an advantage of the system governance model. The participants think that coordination and planning from a center have been helpful to bring the needs and demands of the society and the universities to attention. According to them, thanks to this function of CoHE, the perception of attending higher education has gone beyond an elitist understanding and so the system has become more responsive to the demands of the society. They also think that dialogue between the universities and the system has improved in various ways thanks to the guiding and problem-solving roles of CoHE. Referring to his past experiences, current CoHE member 4, for instance, stated that, thanks to this specific function of CoHE, higher education is planned according to the social demands, helping to increase the accessibility of higher education:

I was educated back in the old days when there was no CoHE. It was chaotic and fragmented. There was no central planning and coordination. Now, higher education has the capacity to respond to the demands. An elitist approach ran deep in higher education back then. Higher education was considered to be only for a small group of people. It was hard for individuals like me to get a place in the system. On the contrary, now, there is growing massification in higher education. We are trying to base our plans on the social demands. (See Appendix Q, 4.)

Current rector 7 agreed and added that the number of the state universities in Turkey is in direct proportion with the demands of the young generation for higher education. Considering non-profit foundation universities are mostly established in the bigger cities, he thinks that the coordinating and planning function of CoHE has contributed to the opening up of state universities in the smaller cities, and, in turn, has been a contribution to access to higher education:

We are a developing country. We have more than 180 universities. Our young generation is our advantage. The number of the state universities in our country is directly proportional to the demands of the young generation and so to the needs of the country. Non-profit foundation universities are mostly founded in the bigger cities. Taking this into account, a countrywide planning of the state universities has increased access to higher education. (See Appendix Q, 5.)

Current CoHE member 4 further elaborated the coordinating and planning function of CoHE and added that CoHE also fulfills the needs and demands of the universities by taking on guiding and problem-solving roles in the planning of higher education. He reported:

CoHE functions as a guiding and problem-solving institution for the universities. It is in pursuit of a rational planning. Academically, for example, it evaluates the proposals made by the universities as to the opening up of new faculties and delivers its recommendations to the Ministry of National Education. Another example is that it coordinates the staff allocation between the universities and meets the needs for staffing. (See Appendix Q, 6.)

Current rector 5 put an emphasis on the guiding role of the Council members and stated: “The Council members who are elected from a broad range of areas can fit with a variety of areas and act upon the issues with differing requirements. This serves as a benefit to the universities.”

Current rector 2 stressed the importance of the coordinating and planning function of CoHE in terms of the development of missions and development of broad parameters for the universities:

CoHE develops missions. It follows the trends, say, internationalization and integrates them into the system. It identifies the areas for growth and initiates efforts for building research capacity. Institutions of higher education should self-assess and do a little bit of thinking about if they also work in sync with these efforts. CoHE develops broad strategies and higher education institutions try to adapt them within their specific context. (See Appendix Q, 7.)

Current CoHE member 3 echoed similarly and added: “We have signed sixteen international agreements in the last two years. Fourteen international agreements had been signed until 2014. This is a result of the policies developed to advance the higher education system.”

Current rector 3 highlighted that the development of educational activities and dissemination of best practices among the universities are achieved through the coordinating and planning function of CoHE, serving to increase collaboration among the universities:

We are the first university who initiated X educational activity. We shared our experiences as to this area with many universities thanks to the support of CoHE. In addition, we have been working towards improving quality assurance mechanisms. With the support of CoHE, we have been able to share and disseminate our practices. (See Appendix Q, 8.)

Acting as a lightning rod function: A second point four participants discussed as an advantage of the system governance model is the acting as a lightning rod function of CoHE. According to the participants, CoHE is the buffer mechanism which addresses tensions between the universities. Former CoHE member 1 emphasized that the lightning rod function of CoHE maintains integrity in the system governance by preventing the potential risk of formation of authoritarian governance structures within the universities, for it bridges divides as the center of attention for all the negativities:

Since its establishment, prejudices against CoHE, rooted in the ideological viewpoints of the 1980s, have been leveled by academia. One side of the argument is that CoHE is oppressive and interventionist. The other side of the argument is that CoHE should intervene in every aspect of higher education. While some yearn for freedom, others yearn for intervention in every aspect of higher education, including the course contents. And CoHE is solely responsible for all the negativities. It, hence, is the center of criticisms, which acts as a lightning rod juggling between the two sides of the argument. If it was not for CoHE, each university would have its own CoHE, which would be a lot more authoritarian. (See Appendix Q, 9.)

Summary

All in all, the participants unpacked their perceptions about the advantages of the system governance model in terms of the regulatory functions of CoHE. Some participants explored the benefit of the model in terms of the coordinating and planning function of CoHE. These participants seem to have pointed out varying aspects of this specific function of CoHE such as fulfillment of the needs and demands of the country, meeting the needs and demands of the universities by taking on guiding and problem-solving roles, development of strategies and broad parameters, and sharing and dissemination of best practices. Other participants expanded their views on the advantage of the model concerning the lightning rod function of CoHE. According to these participants, it seems that CoHE functions as a buffer between the universities and regulates relations accordingly.

6.1.3 Contribution to the qualified workforce

Two participants explained the advantage of the system governance model with regard to the contribution to the qualified workforce. Current government representative 1 and current government representative 2 stated that CoHE and the Ministry of National Education contribute to the building of a qualified workforce via collaboration across projects.

The participants shared that the Ministry collaborates with CoHE about the implementation of Law no. 1416 on sending students abroad. They added that the financing of these students and the implementation of the law in general are overseen by the Ministry and staff allocation procedures are coordinated by CoHE. Current government representative 2 reported:

The most important contribution we make to the higher education system is through Law no. 1416. We contribute to the raising of a qualified workforce. We allocated a quota for 500 students for this year. CoHE decided upon the areas of need. . . . CoHE and the Ministry have been working towards helping the universities progress further in the last years. (See Appendix Q, 10.)

Current government representative 1 agreed, but added a different point by emphasizing how collaboration towards contribution to the qualified workforce has been fostered through an elimination of ideological viewpoints of the CoHE

Presidents from the interactions between CoHE and the Ministry:

The relations between CoHE and the Ministry of National Education have been coordinated well during the terms of office of the CoHE Presidents with no ideological caprice. For instance, currently, there is an efficient collaboration between CoHE and the Ministry as regards the issues of the teacher development and the development of the faculties of education. . . . However, it was likely that the presidency of CoHE could prevent the participation of the Minister in the meetings although according to Higher Education Law 2547, the Minister of National Education has the authority to participate and chair the CoHE meetings when deemed necessary. (See Appendix Q, 11.)

6.1.4 Efficient investment planning

One participant explored the advantage of the system governance model from the perspective of efficient investment planning. Current government representative 4 stated that investment planning via collaboration between the institutions helps to promote the integration of country priorities into the higher education system and to avoid inefficient use of resources. As explained by current government representative 4:

Planning of the investments through collaboration across the institutions is an opportunity to encourage the integration of country priorities into the higher education system. For if the varying parties agree on the country priorities, investment planning is easier. If we demanded for more focus on research and development activities and if the universities demanded for more buildings, then there would be disagreements. Consensus is the key to success. The more the disagreements, the more the time and the investments would be wasted. For this reason, an efficient planning in the system governance is of crucial importance. (See Appendix Q, 12.)

6.1.5 Summary

In sum, this section explored the participants' perceptions about the advantages of the system governance model. Data analysis showed that participants perceived the existence of a coordination mechanism as the main advantage of the model and some participants expanded their views about it highlighting some specific advantages of the model, such as appointment system of rectors, regulatory functions of CoHE, contribution to the qualified workforce, and efficient investment planning. Based on the accounts of these participants, it seems that participants highlighted the advantages of the model which seemed more relevant to their specific context, which might be interpreted as a result of separation of responsibilities among the institutions. Another way to approach these contextualized answers of the participants might be the decision-making process and it might be said that participants focused more on the decisions they make or the decisions they are influenced by while exploring the advantages of the model.

6.2 Research question 2: Challenges of the system governance model

This section explores the perceptions of the participants about the challenges of the system governance model. The participants discussed the challenges of the model in various ways. Some participants discussed more than one point as a challenge. Data analysis revealed that the participants formulated their opinions and ideas around seven sub-categories. These sub-categories are discussed below in detail.

6.2.1 Maximized interdependencies in a multi-actor system

Eighteen participants mentioned the maximized interdependencies in a multi-actor system as a challenge of the system governance model. Data analysis reveals that the

importance of expansion in higher education in responding to the social needs and demands and in increasing the access to higher education is not in question for the participants. They perceive that their challenges have rather been about catching up with the pace of interdependent relationships integrated into the operation of the system governance, for it seems that it has brought up a number of challenges as to how they and the system can respond effectively to a rapid diversification in needs and demands and to the spread of capacities among more stakeholders. For this reason, their responses indicate specific challenges relating to infrastructure, financing, and academic affairs. Examples to infrastructural challenges include having limited seats in classes and laboratories and renovating the campus on a regular basis to stay in tune with the increases in the enrollment quotas. While they were talking about their financial challenges, they discussed issues regarding the budgeting system such as having a low share from the state budget, having low autonomy in the planning and use of the budget, and not being able to identify the needs effectively because of negotiating the budget with two different ministries. As for academic affairs, they mentioned challenges with regard to how they can provide quality education to the students and how they can recruit faculty members. Related to their challenges in meeting the desired staffing, participants perceive one common concern pertinent to the staffing for the universities located in the cities perceived as more advantageous and the universities located in the provinces in Anatolia. They think that they can catch up with the pace of interdependencies insofar as they can maximize the academic mobility to the provinces in Anatolia. Current rector 8, for example, feels challenged by how to develop complementary strategies to attract the academics to a university located in Anatolia:

The universities in the bigger cities do not face the same challenges we face in meeting the needs for academic staff. The universities located in Anatolia have different concerns. What would be your argument to have an academic move here? For this reason, challenges are peculiar to where the universities are located. (See Appendix Q, 13.)

Participants also perceive that a corollary to their above-mentioned challenges has been the challenge of how they can connect with the interdependencies and increase the coordination and communication with one another in the operation of the system governance. They shared varying catching-up points in a context of multi-actor system, such as non-participatory decision-making mechanisms, challenges in meeting the needs of the universities in a timely manner, possibilities for bilateral relations that could change the order of the work processing, and heavy workload on the side of CoHE in responding to the density of interactions. One common concern that ten participants perceive with regard to connecting with the interdependencies is that organizing learning for developing strategies on their challenges and against unintended consequences, say, unemployment has been challenging. For, they realize that the Inter-University Board, which they perceive as of importance for the coordination and communication, has been too crowded to be conducive to learning. Former rector 5 explained the situation as follows:

The Inter-University Board has been too crowded to function effectively after the increases in the number of the universities. It has been difficult both to complete the day-to-day work and then move on to learning, leaving no time for learning. Actually, it is an important academic platform for academics to come together and to discuss the issues of importance. (See Appendix Q, 14.)

6.2.2 Leak of authority in the law-bound, power-centered structure

Sixteen participants mentioned that they feel challenged by a law-bound, power-centered structure in ways that lead to a leak of authority from the system and the university governance levels, opening possibilities for a weakening in what universities are really for. They perceive that higher education has been vulnerable to

external influences as a system open to its environment. They, however, contend that Higher Education Law 2547 as a source of power contributes to the creation of the conditions for the penetration of the local and political authorities and their demands, ideological viewpoints, and beliefs in the decision-making processes, inasmuch as it hands the powers of the system governance to two centers. Former CoHE member 2, for instance, stated that “Unfortunately, higher education has always been under the influence of politics. Law 2547 has changed a lot. Every new government sought to change it, but the Law did not change. They liked the power.” They feel that the asymmetry between the limited number of power centers and the powers vested in the two centers combined with the openness to the influences by local and political authorities tends to trigger the process of a leak of authority from the two centers, which is likely to result in the centers, rectors and CoHE, to face with pressures to favor certain people in the staffing of academic and administrative staff regardless of their competencies. They perceive that such leak of authority, which has been embedded in the system right from the enactment of the Law, tends to systematically damage the missions of the universities and the system overall through a process of favoritism irrespective of the possible support of the power centers for the resulting process of favoritism. Current rector 5 explored his perception of the challenges posed by a process of leak of authority and how the pressures from different sources are reflected upon the universities as follows:

The value of the university in the country is not well appreciated. A university is an institution which brings together new ideas from a wide array of areas, turns these ideas into useful products, and presents them to the benefit of the society. The public, politicians, and political parties, however, tend to treat it as a door to employment. It is likely that politicians will be involved in the appointment of academic and administrative staff. It is possible that we will be pressured to loosen the criteria applied to the academic promotions. We have to push the boundaries for scientific development, though. We have sought for a change in the Law for many years as it seems to be difficult to reverse the situation without a change in

the Law. Yet, efforts remain to be initiated. For people mostly give more care to the favoring of someone for an employment opportunity in the university. Universities are treated as any institutions of the state, but universities are actually guiding institutions, which are designed for quality teaching and contribution to development through research and development activities. (See Appendix Q, 15.)

6.2.3 Unification

Fourteen participants highlighted unification as a challenge pertinent to the model.

Unification deriving from the public personnel regime: The first reason why they perceive a process of unification in the operation of the system governance seems to be the current public personnel regime. They think that the extent to which the system can be made efficient depends on the extent to which it engages both academic and administrative staff in the missions of the universities. They realize that the staff in general have established routines and do not show willingness to do more to contribute to the development at the institutional level, let alone at the local, national, and international levels. They contend that it is hard to encourage academics to work towards increasing the research capacity, and that creates a discouraging effect among the academics integrated into the system and gets in the way of any visionary and innovative goals, barring an overall development in the higher education system. They perceive that the public personnel regime turns into an ineliminable challenge of the model considering a lack of supervision mechanisms that could facilitate a change in routines. Former rector 3, for instance, raised the issues of the annulment of their decisions by the Administrative Jurisdiction and the way the academic personnel records are utilized within the universities. He feels that when combined with the annulment of their decisions by the Administrative Jurisdiction, having no powers for applying provisions in cases of

neglect of duty leaves rectors with no option and encourages the unproductive attitudes across the system:

The rector has the power to relocate an academic within the university. . . . For example, we receive complaints about an academic from multiple sources. After undertaking an assessment of the complaints, we relocate the academic. Objection to the decision can be taken to the Administrative Jurisdiction. Our decisions are annulled by the Administrative Jurisdiction. So it [running a preliminary investigation and relocating the academic] becomes meaningless. Or let's think about the records. For one thing, a good record does not mean anything if it is granted to everyone. Second, there are no penal mechanisms available for the academic personnel records. That is to say, your head of department and dean, say, give you a bad record review for two times or twelve times. It does not matter. Nothing changes. (See Appendix Q, 16.)

Unification among the universities: Besides unification across the academic and administrative staff, participants also perceive unification among the universities. They think that Higher Education Law 2547 embeds a taken for granted unifying system governance model into the operation of the system governance, thereby creating dependencies which pose limits to the liberty to act. Another counterproductive process perceived by the participants is that newly-established universities might feel challenged by the expectations to do too much at once and lag behind meeting the other priorities such as building ownership both within the university and across the region and meeting the very specific needs and demands of the staff and the students. In addition, they feel that a centralized law contradicts with the spirit of acceleration for contribution to the development at multiple levels by deciding upon how to respond to such acceleration. Current rector 6, for example, stated that they feel challenged by falling behind the practices of research and development:

It [Law 2547] makes us feel that there is no space for strategic maneuvers, for it determines your strategy. There is a one-size-fits-all approach within the system, which tells us to give more weight to teaching. However, we would like to engage ourselves with more research and development activities. Even

if we would like to take more innovative steps, we cannot. We have to follow the systematic path. (See Appendix Q, 17.)

Unification in a general sense: Five participants perceive that the unification challenge presented by the model also derives from unification in a general sense.

They feel that the current education system and the established learning habits of the society also contribute to the unification in the system governance model. Former

CoHE member 7 elaborated on how he perceives this type of unification:

In order to uplift the quality of our students and to empower our academics scientifically, we need to extend the focus of higher education to all the stages of education. We need an education system based on science. Yet, our current rote learning focused education system does not serve to this end. In addition, we as a nation do not have the habit of asking questions. If we cultivated inquiry into our education system, we could reach our long-awaited universities. However, this cannot be achieved with a focus on schooling alone. We need to build public awareness of the issue. Otherwise, development remains to be achieved. (See Appendix Q, 18.)

6.2.4 Enhancing autonomy

Enhancing autonomy arose as a challenge of the model in the perceptions of fourteen participants. The reason why the participants perceive it as a challenge seems to be the decoupling in perceptions of autonomy, leading to inconclusive attempts in orchestrating a juncture in enhancing autonomy in the operation of the system governance. They contend that no matter how many times empowering the universities to be more autonomous has been brought to attention, each time the views exposed by the academia, rectors, and CoHE have differed, resulting in somewhat of a chasm among the academia, rectors, and CoHE and turning autonomy into somewhat of an eternal challenge in the operation of the system governance.

They perceive that differentiations in perceptions of autonomy create further challenges as to how to engage the universities in decision-making processes and in what areas and to what degree their capacity to act will be enhanced. Former rector 2

elaborated on the perceptions of autonomy on the side of CoHE using the 2013 draft law on higher education as an example and stated that the draft law was too detailed and too long to serve the purpose of enhancing autonomy in the system governance.

He explored the challenge of enhancing autonomy as follows:

Autonomy has been a key challenge in the system governance. Why? Everybody should do a little bit of thinking about the why of it. A university is the thinking-outside-the-box institution of the society. It cannot be governed by a one-size-fits-all approach. Such an approach is against what universities are really for. The system should learn to tolerate differences. For instance, the 2013 draft law is too detailed, too long, and includes too many rules and criteria. A 68-page document cannot enhance autonomy. It is a threat to autonomy. (See Appendix Q, 19.)

Participants also perceive that there have been varying renderings of autonomy at the level of academia, making finding a middle ground among the stakeholders harder. Two ingrained approaches highlighted by the participants are self-governance with no accountability in place and autonomy as empowerment in the institutional governance to elect the rector. Current CoHE member 1, for example, stated “Autonomy is matched with the election of rectors. However, a university has dependences on the state in terms of its financing, staffing, and educational and training activities, and that is something not to be taken for granted.” Former CoHE member 3 responded similarly and explained that perception of self-governance at the level of academia is not constitutive to accountability:

State universities are held accountable to public authority for their use of the public resources. A look at different systems around the world reveals a combination of autonomy with accountability. It is really difficult to break the perception of institutional autonomy at the level of academia, and this is one of the biggest challenges to the system governance. Turkish universities perceive institutional autonomy as self-governance freed from oversight. (See Appendix Q, 20.)

Current CoHE member 3 shared similar views, but also added the view that another approach on the side of academia that engenders a decoupling in perceptions of autonomy is their stepping back from the discussions on autonomy considering

CoHE as their shield: “CoHE is getting ready to devolve some of its authorities to universities. Yet, universities are standing against it. Why? Because, in their opinion, we are their shield.” Current government representative 4 approached the issue from the perspective of enhancing financial autonomy of the universities and shared that rectors might step back from the discussions on autonomy: “A pilot project was run as regards the issue of autonomy over the budgetary allocations. However, the relevant rectors did not want to own the issue. They called the Ministry of Finance and said ‘Save us.’”

6.2.5 Deprofessionalization of academic roles

As explored in the previous chapter while discussing the operation of the system governance model, fifteen rectors perceive a law-bound, power-centered structure as a process which simultaneously deprofessionalizes their academic roles. Of the fifteen rectors, nine highlighted such deprofessionalization towards more bureaucratic and entrepreneurial roles as a challenge of the model. Five current rectors and four former rectors feel challenged with striking a balance between so many different duties and responsibilities, which include acting upon multiple levels as the representative of the university governance, being vigilant of decisions and actions, making sure compliance with the rules and regulations, trying to keep communication channels open to everyone within the university so as to listen to their needs and demands, and building good inter-institutional relations. They contend that maintaining a balance between bureaucratic work requiring an understanding of a wide range of disciplines and entrepreneurship on the one hand and maintaining a balance between their roles and the path dependency of the academic and administrative staff within the university on the other hand might be

quite tiring. Central to their concerns seems to be the dualism between their roles and the established routines and habits within the universities. Former rector 6 stated that he felt tired as a result of the challenges posed by his two roles and the challenges posed by the dualism between his roles and the routines perceived as the chief marker of the identity of the university:

A person used to bureaucratic traditions would feel themselves more comfortable in their conduct of duty. One challenge of this is that it is likely that you will feel tired if you keep lines of communication open to the academic and administrative staff and the students. However, I cannot think of any other style for rectorship. Second, if you want to initiate a change within the university, it is hard to achieve this without triggering serious oppositions considering that universities are actually institutions quite dependent on status quo. That was another challenge, which tired me a lot. (See Appendix Q, 21.)

6.2.6 Ingrained perceptions of institutional identity leading to path dependency

Three participants highlighted the ingrained perceptions of institutional identity leading to path dependency as a challenge of the system governance model. They perceive that previous actions and decisions of power holders no matter what their intentions are or no matter how different the conditions are create a macro meaning in the minds of the people about the institutional identity not easy to break down in the future. They think that these perceptions of institutional identity can turn into an instrument to be used against the future practices of CoHE members or rectors or the institution itself as a whole in the system governance of higher education, thereby creating a path dependency operating in the model.

Former CoHE member 6, for example, stated that decision-making of the previous Council members using the “against the law” method in their relations with the universities has communicated an institutional identity solely dependent on the law in its decisions, constituting a challenge for the practices of future members. For, as perceived by him, rectors tend to depend on their perceptions of the past decision-

making practices not to take initiative and responsibility in the system governance. According to him, the second reason why ingrained perceptions of institutional identity can turn into a path dependency challenge is the editorial decisions made by those in positions of power in the press. He thinks that such decisions direct individuals' attention on particular aspects of the system governance, making harder for the CoHE institution as a whole to get its practices publicized and so to overcome the path dependency challenge:

The biggest challenge of the Council members is CoHE's bad reputation, against the law. Rectors tend to use it to avoid taking responsibility. Rectors usually use the powers of CoHE as a shield so as to avoid taking responsibility. On top of this, the press greatly contributes to CoHE's popularity. . . . The journalists used to visit CoHE, but the interviews would not be published. On the contrary, anything negative would be highlighted in the headline. The editors-in-chief would not publish something positive during the terms of office of X and Y. The editors-in-chief tend not to publish something positive about CoHE. (See Appendix Q, 22.)

Former CoHE member 1 shared that the decisions and actions of the power holders of 1980s and the ideological viewpoints CoHE was established in have framed its institutional identity, leading perceptions rooted in the 1980s to operate in the system governance and to further create a path dependency challenge. As highlighted by him, the legacy of the past acts as a divisive mechanism in the system governance, dividing academia into two opposite sides and placing CoHE in the center as a lightning rod:

Since its establishment, prejudices against CoHE, rooted in the ideological viewpoints of the 1980s, have been leveled by academia. One side of the argument is that CoHE is oppressive and interventionist. The other side of the argument is that CoHE should intervene in every aspect of higher education. While some yearn for freedom, others yearn for intervention in every aspect of higher education, including the course contents. And CoHE is solely responsible for all the negativities. It, hence, is the center of criticisms, which acts as a lightning rod juggling between the two sides of the argument. If it was not for CoHE, each university would have its own CoHE, which would be a lot more authoritarian. (See Appendix Q, 23.)

Current rector 4, as a founding rector, explored the challenge of the model from the perspective of power holders in the university governance and stated that the institutional identity a rector sets in is what defines their perceptions in the minds of the people:

You are trying to develop a new ownership and to shape the new university in order to change the perception of the old university entrenched in the minds of the people. You are subject to all the good and bad legacies of them once you take on the role. If the previous leadership legacy were good, getting things done would be easier. If not, bad legacies of leadership are mirrored in your role. (See Appendix Q, 24.)

6.2.7 The Council of Higher Education, the Ministry of National Education, and the joint exercise of power triangle

Two participants mentioned the joint exercise of power between CoHE and the Ministry of National Education in the system governance of higher education as a challenge of the system governance model. As explained by the participants, collaboration between the two sides in the system governance is powered by Higher Education Law 2547, and that collaboration established by law might precipitate tensions related to power-sharing in the policymaking and policy coordination. They consider that such tensions in the joint exercise of power over policymaking and coordinating powers harm not only the higher education system but also the education system in general.

As stated by current CoHE member 2, perceptions of areas of responsibility trigger disagreements in relations preceding and impeding a focus in education in general although there is a need for a reform in Turkish education system, thereby putting the education system itself in general in a vicious circle:

Is a reform in higher education necessary? Education reform is inevitable. And the system governance of education is part of it. Otherwise, focusing on one part for the sake of the other leads all the impurities to move up the ladder if there is not a good filter in between the transition from the middle to

the up. Theoretically, the Minister of National Education has no authority to determine the higher education policies. Each side debates the issue over their areas of responsibility. Penetration into areas of responsibility is non-negotiable by the two sides. For this reason, we need to name the reform as education reform. It is necessary. (See Appendix Q, 25.)

According to current government representative 1, power-sharing in the joint exercise of power has been a sensitive issue between the two sides due to ideological viewpoints of the CoHE Presidents. He thinks that ideologies when combined with the bureaucratic power coming from the law might raise the issue of power asymmetry between the two sides and lead the side with more power, CoHE, to prevail over the other power holder, the Ministry in the joint exercise of power. As explained by him:

The relations between CoHE and the Ministry of National Education have been coordinated well during the terms of office of the CoHE Presidents with no ideological caprice. For instance, currently, there is an efficient collaboration between CoHE and the Ministry as regards the issues of the teacher development and the development of the faculties of education. . . . However, it was likely that the presidency of CoHE could prevent the participation of the Minister in the meetings although according to Higher Education Law 2547, the Minister of National Education has the authority to participate and chair the CoHE meetings when deemed necessary. (See Appendix Q, 26.)

6.2.8 Summary

To sum up, the participants explored their perceptions about the challenges of the system governance model. They explored their challenges of the model from various points, which are (1) maximized interdependencies in a multi-actor system, (2) leak of authority in the law-bound, power-centered structure, (3) unification, (4) enhancing autonomy, (5) deprofessionalization of academic roles, (6) ingrained perceptions of institutional identity leading to path dependency, and (7) the Council of Higher Education, the Ministry of National Education, and the joint exercise of

power triangle. Having unpacked the challenges of the model, the next section unpacks the participants' suggestions for improvements in the model.

6.3 Research question 3: Suggestions for improvements in the system governance model

This section highlights the participants' suggestions for improvements in the system governance model. Data analysis reveals diversity in the participants' perceived areas for improvement pertinent to the model, which in turn seems to indicate perception of system governance as a process by the participants, linking together a number of issues involved in the operation of the system governance. It seems to be for this reason that they formulated their suggestions for improvements around thirteen sub-categories. The participants discussed their suggestions in various ways. Some participants made one suggestion while others offered several. These suggestions are explored below in detail.

6.3.1 Restructuring of CoHE as a coordination and planning body

All the participants suggested that CoHE be restructured as a coordination and planning body. This section first highlights the suggestions of the participants pertinent to the functions of a coordination and planning body and then presents the suggestions of some participants for the establishment of the Ministry of Higher Education which, they think, could also be taken into account in the process of conversion of CoHE into a coordination and planning body in the operation of the system governance.

Functions of CoHE as a coordination and planning body: All the participants recognize the need for a restructuring in the operations of CoHE considering the diversity in the stakeholders, interactions, and issues integrated into the operation of the system governance, and thus, the need for facilitating connections among the linkages. They suggest that CoHE should function as a strategic coordinator in the operation of the system governance, which determines macro policies in line with the country priorities and national development plans and acts as a guiding and planning mechanism for the universities. They think that a coordination and planning body should strive to increase the quality of academic life and act with integrity with the stakeholders of the system governance in overcoming the challenges that face the system. Examples to institutionalize coordination and planning in the operation of the system governance include fostering a democratic environment both within and across the universities, applying the principles of equality of opportunity and objectivity to the interactions with and among the universities, visits to the universities by the Council members not for the purposes of supervision but for the purposes of bonding with the universities, and building associations among the universities, which should report to the decision-making mechanisms so that suggestions of the universities could be incorporated into the strategic decision-making processes and integrity within the system governance could be strengthened.

Current CoHE member 4, also suggests that the status of the departments within the CoHE structure be upgraded to the status of a directorate general and the number of expert staff within the institution be increased:

The CoHE structure is similar to the university governance structure. The status of the departments within the institution should at least be elevated to the status of a directorate general. We need more staff with expertise in the field. We need more staff with foreign language skills and with expertise in the operations of a university. (See Appendix Q, 27.)

The participants also recommend that the coordination and planning body should not be involved with the day-to-day operations of the universities, but should devolve some of its authorities to the universities so as to devote more time to strategic planning and decision-making. Former rector 4, for instance, elaborated on such transfer of powers from CoHE to the universities as follows:

CoHE should devolve some of its authorities to the universities. It should go on maintaining control over the universities, but should transfer authority to the universities. For instance, allocation of academic staff between the departments should lie within the responsibility of the Rectorate or the Deanship. . . . CoHE could lay down the guiding principles. In case of a problem, CoHE could act upon it. For instance, it could lay off the rector. It has the powers to do so. If it could eliminate bureaucracy, it could allocate more time for strategic decisions. (See Appendix Q, 28.)

Five participants also suggest that the restructuring process of CoHE as a coordination and planning body should aspire for a reform in the Turkish education system, for, according to the participants, a holistic approach to the restructuring process could contribute to the expansion of the essential principles of the education system to all levels of education, thereby leading to joint gains in the overall restructuring process. Current CoHE member 2, for instance, suggests:

The reform in education should have reference points. That is, the system should be democratic, flexible, transparent, participatory and pluralist, and autonomous, and also allow for diversity. National and international competitiveness should be core to the reform. A better approximation to the reference points would show the success of our system. A holistic approach to the restructuring process should be taken, which should aim for widespread participation and consensus building. The process should not be run through a compliance approach. (See Appendix Q, 29.)

Establishment of the Ministry of Higher Education: Six participants suggested the establishment of the Ministry of Higher Education in the process of restructuring CoHE as a coordination and planning body. They think that ministerial status could help universities expand their scale to the international arena in a shorter time and increase their contribution to the knowledge society. Five participants

suggest that CoHE should be granted with ministerial status. According to the participants, inclusion in the government structure could, for example, increase the accountability in higher education, bring in fast strategic decision-making, reinforce an outward-looking governance approach to higher education, encourage diversified collaborations both internally and externally, lessen the political influences on CoHE, convert higher education into a strategic state policy, and engage international standards to the system governance.

The voice of current government representative 1, on the other hand, suggests the placement of CoHE and the universities under the authority of a Ministry, for example, the Ministry of National Education or the Ministry of Science, Industry, and Technology or a new Ministry called the Ministry of Higher Education. For one thing, he considers the current structure of CoHE as cumbersome for the increasingly changing context of higher education. And second, according to him, its independence from the government oversight might result in the practices in opposition to the wills of the government and the public. For this reason, he also suggests a change in the Constitution to limit the powers of CoHE:

The number of universities is quite high. Yet, the growth in the number of staff at CoHE is not in direct proportion with the growth in the system. Considering its bureaucratic structure and also current human resources assigned duties in the system governance of higher education, CoHE lacks resources required in the system governance. Despite its lack of human resources, it has great powers. As practiced in the past, CoHE has the powers to make decisions and act upon them prevailing over the government and standing against the government and the wills of the government. The unlawful implementation of the headscarf ban policy is the most painful and the most embarrassing example of such use of powers, leaving a dark mark on the history of Turkish education. As a precaution against such use of powers, a change in the Constitution is needed, for the current structure of CoHE is independent of the government. Limiting its powers defined by Higher Education Law 2547, CoHE should be restructured. In the restructuring process, it should be tied to a Ministry, say, the Ministry of National Education or the Ministry of Science, Industry, and Technology or a new Ministry called the Ministry of Higher Education should be established, so that CoHE is turned into an institution accountable to the Parliament and

to the public. CoHE's status as an institution tied to a Ministry should be confirmed in Higher Education Law 2547. The current structure of CoHE is too cumbersome to respond to the needs of the country, a fact that has been admitted by all the CoHE Presidents and has been acknowledged by many. (See Appendix Q, 30.)

6.3.2 Enhancing supervision of quality

Twenty-six participants highlighted enhancing supervision of quality as a suggestion to improve the system governance model. They suggest that supervision mechanisms for following the processes be engaged in the operation of the system governance to identify the strengths and the areas for improvement and so to focus more attention on exploring the strengths and the areas for improvement operating in the system governance. They think that the processes in the development and implementation of the strategic plans should be followed on a regular basis and the universities should be guided in leveraging their strengths and improving their performance. Current rector 3, for instance, also thinks that supervision mechanisms could function as a guide for students in their decisions on where to study by projecting a view of universities on the ÖSYM catalog, thereby leading quality to gain more prominence over location in the students' decisions:

As the contributions of the universities to the teaching and research fields are not supervised, advertisements and location become more influential in the students' decisions. The adding of some information on the quality and accreditation of the universities to the ÖSYM catalog is an important step. . . . We should focus more attention on the quality of the universities so that the students could choose where to study by taking the quality of the university into account. In this way, quality rather than location could become a more important consideration in the students' decisions. (See Appendix Q, 31.)

Of the twenty-six participants, twenty recommend that an autonomous quality assurance board independent from CoHE be created to enhance supervision of quality and to set the standards for quality assurance. Current CoHE member 5 shared:

The establishment of a quality assurance board has been completed. The Board, however, is not independent from CoHE yet. It is charged with managing the outputs of the system. We are working on turning it into a board with financial and administrative autonomy. (See Appendix Q, 32.)

6.3.3 Moving from a unifying to a differentiating system governance model

Twenty-one participants suggested moving from a unifying to a differentiating model in the operation of the system governance. They think that the system of higher education should be redesigned in parallel with its increasingly expanding role in the acceleration of the local and national development. That is the reason why, they seem to suggest the scope of mission differentiation policy be widened to a restructuring of the system governance model which they perceive as unifying. They think that a variety of models could be formulated via the engagement of representatives of the stakeholders of the system governance to ease the process of compilation of needs perceived by the stakeholders. Based on a participatory needs analysis, they think, a diversified approach to differentiation among the universities could be undertaken, for example, by creating research-intensive universities, teaching universities, universities involved in regional development, and universities anchored in specific areas. Former rector 2 also suggests that the goal of competitiveness could be central to a differentiating governance model, through which “Universities could be grouped into four: universities focused on competitiveness in Europe, universities focused on competitiveness in the world, developing universities, and newly-established universities.”

The participants consider that such differentiation among the universities, serving to focus universities on different ideals, could contribute to accomplishing the national goals through varying functions of universities, thereby forming a differentiated but integrally uniform whole. Current government representative 2, for

example, thinks that differentiation among the universities could also provide the means for integrating accountability mechanisms into the operation of the system governance:

The criteria for the accountability of the universities should be the degree of engagement with their focus areas. If this could be achieved, then the success of universities could be measured based on concrete criteria. Universities should specialize in specific areas, so that, say, the Ministry of National Education could share the areas of need in the teacher development with the concerned universities. (See Appendix Q, 33.)

The participants suggest that having a longer tradition in the higher education system should not be included in the criteria for the selection of the universities. Examples to the criteria for the selection of the universities involved in regional development include the eligibility of the infrastructure of the university, the eligibility of the human capital, and the relations between the university and the region.

Of the twenty-one participants, twelve also suggest that a diversified governance approach should be pursued to enhance the effectiveness of differentiation among the universities. They think that all the universities should have greater autonomy in the decision-making for teaching, research, and service-to-the society activities and the use of the budget in the operation of a differentiating system governance model provided that they are held accountable to the concerned institutions, CoHE and the relevant Ministries, and mechanisms for financial supervision are integrated into the system governance. According to the participants, the universities should also be empowered to determine their own policy goals and targets and then submit these to the approval of CoHE. Of the twelve participants, nine suggest that full autonomy should be granted to, say, five universities on condition that the criteria for the principle of accountability and mechanisms for financial supervision are ensured. They think that a Strong Senate model similar to a

Board of trustees model or a Board of trustees model could be adopted by these state universities, which would be accountable to the relevant institutions for their decisions and actions, and the CoHE model could be adopted by the rest of the universities. However, they recommend that a diversified governance approach also be taken for the universities involved in the CoHE model, that is, depending on their group within the CoHE model, the powers of those in charge of the university governance could be redesigned. Former CoHE member 3, for instance, thinks that success in the world university rankings could set the criteria for the selection of the universities to different groups, say, to a tripartite system governance model through differentiation of law and full autonomy could be granted to some universities pursuant to their success in the world university rankings:

The universities who have succeeded in being ranked among the top five hundred universities in the world university rankings should be given full autonomy. We should let them govern themselves. A mechanism of punishment could also be integrated into the system governance of these institutions to promote sustainability. Once these universities stepped down to lowest positions in the university rankings, they would be taken back to the CoHE system governance model. The universities in this group would be held accountable to CoHE, the Ministry of Development, and the Ministry of Finance so that they would be held responsible for their decisions and so would be allocated fewer budgets for the next year. The criteria for selection of the universities to the proposed system governance model could be expanded to include the universities that have accomplished to be ranked among the thousand universities in the rankings. In addition, two different system governance models could be adopted for the universities founded before 2006 and after 2006 through differentiation in the law. The CoHE model is well suited especially for the universities founded after 2006, for it is likely that things might go off the rails in the absence of a higher supervisory body considering there might be universities within this group without a senate. The powers of those in charge of the university governance could also be redefined in accordance with this tripartite system governance model. As pointed by the Ministry of Development many times as well, the system is in need of differentiation. Their recommendations are more or less in line with the recommendations herewith. That is to say, the system governance cannot be reformed through one law alone. One law would never fully effectuate differentiation in the system governance. (See Appendix Q, 34.)

6.3.4 Developing a merit-based system

Fourteen participants made the suggestion of developing a merit-based system for an improvement in the system governance model. They feel that meritocracy is one major pillar in the realization of an improvement in the operation of the system governance and even the most proficient person cannot deliver to expectations in a job guarantee policy environment. Former CoHE member 1, for instance, thinks that whether increasing the efficiency of CoHE via a restructuring process is sufficient to ensure the proper functioning of the system governance is likely to remain questionable in the absence of a merit-based system:

The CoHE model is not the primary problem. The problem is the absence of a merit-based system. The expectations on the CoHE are too high. What I mean is what is the use of a coordination and planning body when a passive approach to the development prevails across the universities? Unless the quality of academic staff is increased, the challenges of the system governance cannot be resolved with CoHE alone. (See Appendix Q, 35.)

Suggestions of the participants as to how to develop a merit-based system include building a flexible public personnel regime, so that a performance-based system rewarding the merits of the academic and administrative staff could be integrated into the system governance which could in turn lay the foundation for the enrichment of academic culture and for the empowerment of administrative operations with the required expertise. Current rector 2 explained the possible contributions of such a system as follows:

The main area that needs improvement in the system governance is the current public personnel regime. Employment at the academic level should not be easy to come by. It poses the potential of bottom-up mobbing. The current personnel regime is the main reason why academic culture change has failed so far. We need a mechanism that recognizes performance. If a performance-based system that aligns with principles of equality of opportunity and objectivity could be developed and applied accordingly both for employment of academic and administrative staff, then a system-wide development might be possible and efficiency might be increased. The employment criteria should be based on higher standards, transparency, and competency, safeguarding quality staffing and assuring the implementation of

a condition of employment. We are left in a lonely situation in our efforts to meet the needs and demands of the public, and that makes a small group of people self-sacrifice to get things done. That's the reason why there is a need for flexibility in the current personnel regime. It is the main challenge to the system. For one thing, it poses the potential risk of feelings of resentment against the efforts towards improving the quality. And lack of mechanisms to offer merit pay for staff might encourage unproductive attitudes across the university. (See Appendix Q, 36.)

Another suggestion of the participants to nurture a system based on the meritocracies is the authorization of the university governance to make offer to good talents. They think that such flexibility may not only contribute to the quality in the work environment in the universities but also may help to spread the word about Turkish universities abroad. Former rector 4 thinks:

CoHE should open the doors to everyone from the top universities in the world. It is typical of an American university to advertise academic vacancies in other countries. However, what is typical in Turkey is to advertise when an academic from among us will be promoted. Because of this, we shy away from making offer to graduate talents. We cannot guarantee a vacant position to such talents, let alone an offer. We should be able to make an offer to such talents, though. This is not about CoHE, but this is about Higher Education Law. Still, such things could be sorted out with regulations. After designating some universities, CoHE could authorize the rectors of those universities to hire up to five best academics on an annual basis. Of course, the designated universities would be held responsible to convince CoHE about their staffing decisions. Turkish universities should be able to make offers to distinguished academics from abroad and we should let the world know this. The rector is not entitled to write to such people and make a promise to hire them. That would be illegal. The rector does not have permission from CoHE, for one thing. And that person could also sue the rector for not keeping her/his promise. CoHE should take a step forward in this. The procedure could be like this: Upon the approval by the University Administrative Board and CoHE, we would have the right to make the offer. I think the overriding criteria for selection of the academics must be having a doctorate degree from the top hundred universities in the world. Moreover, TÜBİTAK could be part of such staffing decisions and guarantee to fund the projects of those academics from the top hundred universities in the world. Then we would be able to make the perfect offer to such distinguished academics. Then we would be able to compete with the universities in America. (See Appendix Q, 37.)

Four participants also suggest that the Council composition should be strengthened with the membership of representatives from other groups of the society. Former CoHE member 6, for instance, thinks:

The number of representatives from other groups of the society should outweigh the number of academics on the Council. The university representatives should be selected from among former rectors. The Council should also involve representatives from other constituent groups of the society such as distinguished bureaucrats and businessmen and businesswomen who have made significant contributions to the society. (See Appendix Q, 38.)

6.3.5 Increasing accountability and transparency

Twelve participants recommended increasing transparency and accountability to improve the system governance model. They think that accountability and transparency are two core principles, which should be indispensable to the operation of the system governance. To this end, according to the participants, accountability mechanisms should be incorporated within the system governance in order that CoHE and the universities are held accountable to one another and to the public for their actions and decisions. They think that following the processes via a performance-based system could enhance the accountability of those in positions of power and of those having responsibilities within the constituent units of the institutions, thereby leading to an increased accountability at all levels of the institutions. Besides an internal supervision, they also suggest supervision by others, say, by supervisory boards. For both types of accountability mechanisms, they suggest the use of clearly established performance criteria and sharing of the results on the institutional websites in order to meet the principle of transparency. Current rector 7, for instance, thinks that increased accountability of powers of rectors could also contribute to nurturing inter-institutional trust:

Rectors have great powers, posing the potential risk of making errors in judgment. That is the reason why, the inputs, processes, and products should be supervised through performance-based criteria. We have limited resources and should be held accountable as to how we use them. This is of crucial importance for contributing to the trust relationship. (See Appendix Q, 39.)

Former CoHE member 7 also added that accountability and transparency are the two safeguards to ensure public trust: “CoHE should be supervised along with the universities. Their actions and decisions should be shared with the public to meet the principle of transparency so that public trust is ensured.”

6.3.6 Increasing efficiency of the Inter-University Board

Ten participants suggested increasing efficiency of the Inter-University Board so as to improve the system governance model. They think that the Board as an academic organ consisting of the representatives of the university governance has an important function in advancing the coordination and communication among the universities and between CoHE and the universities in the operation of the system governance. They suggest that the Board should be restructured through change in its governance structure, through the election of an executive board so that it can engage the voices of the attendants in its operations. Current rector 2 elaborated on how the effectiveness of the Board could be increased as follows:

Two representatives of each university attend to the meetings. Yet, their voice gets lost in the crowded group of attendants. So it is difficult for the Board to serve as an advisory board to CoHE. To increase its efficiency, two representatives of each university should form the General Assembly of the Board and should devolve some of their authorities to the Executive Board. The current President of the Board, three previous Presidents of the Board, and the future President of the Board should form the Executive Board. The Executive Board should be charged with making decisions and conveying these decisions to the General Assembly for the development of strategies. (See Appendix Q, 40.)

6.3.7 Establishment of search committees as a guide to the appointment process

Nine participants suggested that search committees be established as a guide to the appointment process of rectors. They consider that the search for a rector should lie within the responsibility area of the universities so as to ensure their autonomy in the selection process and to enhance the acceptance of appointed leaders by university stakeholders. According to the participants, an autonomous search committee created by the senate should include representatives of groups such as faculty members, staff, students, and stakeholders from outside the universities, should act in accordance with the procedures and criteria also agreed by university community so as to safeguard a transparent selection process, and should be charged with identifying the most qualified candidates by collecting the views of the university members as regards the qualities of their rector, screening the applications, interviewing the candidates, and preparing a short list of, say, six candidates to be reduced to, say, three by CoHE. Former rector 6, for instance, explained his suggestion for the establishment of a search committee as follows:

A search committee should include experienced people who would base their preferences for candidates solely on criteria pre-agreed by university members and should be responsible for the recommendation of a short list of candidates to the higher body. Faculty members should never be the only stakeholders of the process of selection. For instance, representatives from outside the universities and students should be involved in the committee. A search committee could strengthen the operations of the university governance. (See Appendix Q, 41.)

6.3.8 Adapting a versatile leadership approach to university governance

Eight participants made the suggestion of adapting a versatile leadership approach to university governance as a way of improving the system governance model. They think that improvement in the system governance model can be accelerated, insofar as versatility at the university governance level is achieved. For, according to the

participants, in a context of constant change and expansion, the rector of the twenty-first century who functions as the interface between the university and all the other stakeholders should engage not only with the constituent groups of the university but also with other constituencies from multiple levels. They, however, consider that versatility should start within the university, for example, through communicating the university community the rationale behind the implementing powers of the rectors. They perceive that such a transparent approach could in turn stimulate taking initiative and responsibility in the acceleration of the development. Their suggestions also include putting efforts for the opening up of multidisciplinary projects supported by the Scientific Research Projects Centers and engaging young academics in these projects. Besides the institutional level, they also suggest focusing more attention on building ties with private sector and other public institutions, increasing international collaborations, and being vigilant of projects that could help expand externally in order to contribute to the brand value of the university. For these reasons, participants contend that whether a university operates through a versatile leadership approach should be supervised and rectors should be guided by previously agreed criteria. Former CoHE member 2 thinks that increased accountability and supervision could contribute to the integration of a multifaceted leadership approach to the university governance and in turn to the system governance:

A rector should have the desirable qualifications for the post of university governance. For representing a university is more than filling a position. A rector, for this reason, should be capable of taking the innovative and visionary steps in progressing the university further. And if these are achieved should be supervised based on clear performance criteria. A supervisory board could be established within the university to ensure the increased accountability of the rector, which could in turn serve to improve the system governance. (See Appendix Q, 42.)

6.3.9 Establishing a road map through goal setting

Eight participants raised establishing a road map through goal setting as a suggestion to improve the model. They contend that universities should be turned into places where the realities of the country are discussed and advanced to the desired levels. According to the participants, a goal-oriented system governance approach, which engages with the representatives of the university governance in the policymaking process, should be taken to help universities build connectivity with the goals of the system governance and, thus, with the goals of the country. They perceive that clearly defined goals, which resonate with the universities, are likely to stimulate support from the universities for the future course of action and to encourage universities to take responsibility in the improvement of the system. Current CoHE member 2, for instance, suggests:

What are the challenges that face our socio-economic structure? How should we shape our human capital? These are some questions that we should address in any restructuring process of the system governance, to which competitiveness at both national and international levels should be indispensable. The goal of increased competitiveness should be central to the restructuring process. For universities determine the quality of human capital. We should raise human capital familiar with the realities of the country, who can then compete with the outer world. Human capital is shaped by educational institutions. (See Appendix Q, 43.)

6.3.10 Carrying out studies forecasting for the future

Seven participants recommended carrying out studies forecasting for the future as a way of improving the system governance model. According to them, the issues relating to the future of the country should be a product of careful planning and be responded meaningfully by expanding the decision-making mechanisms to the stakeholders of the system governance involved in the process. They think that issues may arise quickly and require immediate action, and in such cases, products of long-term planning can be channeled through decision-making mechanisms, thereby

yielding better decisions. Their suggestions include increasing cooperation and collaboration among the universities through associations such as ADIM Universities Association, which could be created by the universities themselves and/or by CoHE. They perceive that the strategic projects developed and implemented through collaboration can be disseminated to other universities, up to CoHE, down to regions, and out to the other institutions in the country and in the world. Former rector 2 feels that learning from each other and planning for the future together can ease the burden of decision-making in hard situations:

Back in the old days, rectors had to make difficult decisions for the prevention of political violence and for the improvement of security on campuses. The two strategies I employed in such times were being transparent and conversing with the students. Yet, nobody told me what to do and how to act. How to take actions in hard moments should be studied and the results should be shared. (See Appendix Q, 44.)

6.3.11 Fostering close ties between the universities and the society

Seven participants suggested fostering close ties between the universities and the society as a way of improving the system governance model. They think that it is of importance to build public awareness of the universities so as to communicate people the missions of the universities and to learn how they view the universities, thereby contributing to the building of a shared understanding of what universities are designed for and to the development of ownership for the universities. According to the participants, rectors as the representatives of the university governance have a key role in bonding with the people. For this reason, they think, rectors should take on a proactive role in building ties with the non-governmental organizations so as to build bridges between the universities and the society and in organizing social and cultural activities that could help the society engage with the context the universities

function in. Current rector 5, for instance, noted the importance of initiating a change in the ivory tower image of the universities in the society:

Universities have become ivory towers. That is the reason why we do not have a public awareness of the universities. Rectors, however, should try to change this. Universities should be at the heart of all the activities in the society. They should be in close communication with non-governmental organizations to spread the idea of what universities are for. Meeting rooms for events and sports facilities centers should be built within the universities, which should be utilized as channels of communication with the society. (See Appendix Q, 45.)

6.3.12 Shared management of the budget

Six participants highlighted shared management of the budget for an improvement in the model. They think that taking a shared management approach to the budgeting is likely to encourage the efficient use of the limited resources and to increase the contribution of the universities to the local development. For they perceive that enhanced financial autonomy could contribute to the realization of strategic goals in a shorter time and also to diversify funding through engagement in self-funding activities. Current government representative 4, for instance, suggests:

Universities should ensure resources for research and development activities and create their resources from such activities. They should turn into institutions, which contribute to the development of the state and the nation. They should be funding institutions, but not funded institutions. (See Appendix Q, 46.)

Some participants suggest a differentiation in the laws in the implementation of the shared management of the budgets, so that the universities selected, say, based on their success in the world university rankings could be delegated with more powers to act. Former CoHE member 6 also recommends that “CoHE should perform the distribution of the public resources to the universities. Also, a finance commission should be established within the universities to execute the supervision of the use and allocation of the resources.”

6.3.13 Building alternative thinking through public demand

Five participants raised building alternative thinking through public demand as a suggestion to improve the model. They contend that integration of demands of the public into the decision-making mechanisms could be instrumental in enhancing diversification within the system and increasing support for the universities, and that in turn, they perceive, could strengthen both the operation of the universities and the system overall. For this reason, they suggest formulating policy instruments to be used in collecting societal feedback which is likely to facilitate sustainable changes in the system governance. According to the participants, “Any change in the system should be a product of collective efforts between the public and the universities” (Current rector 6). Current government representative 2, for example, thinks that building alternative thinking through public demand could be helpful in realizing a restructuring process in the system governance: “CoHE itself is not the barrier standing in the way of a restructuring process in the system governance. If the participants of the system demand a serious change, it may be redesigned.”

6.3.14 Summary

All in all, the participants shared their opinions and ideas as to how to improve the system governance model. Their suggestions for improvements brought together a number of issues involved in the operation of the system governance. The diversity in the participants’ suggestions relating to the model appears to indicate perception of system governance as a process by the participants.

6.4 Summary of Chapter 6

This chapter explored the perceptions and understandings of the participants about the advantages and the challenges of the system governance model and highlighted the participants' perceived suggestions for improvements in the model. The next chapter presents a discussion on the findings of the study explored in Chapters 4 through 6, presents the limitations of the study, offers suggestions for future research, and concludes by reflections.

CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter draws upon a discussion and an interpretation of the research findings, reflects on the limitations of the study, puts forward suggestions for future research, and concludes by reflections.

7.1 Findings and discussion

This dissertation investigated the perceptions and understandings of the research participants about the operation of the system governance model in Turkish higher education. It also examined the perceptions and understandings of the participants about the advantages and the challenges of the system governance model they portrayed and explored the participants' perceived suggestions for improvements in the model.

Selecting fifteen rectors (eight current and seven former) based on the strategy of grouping the state universities according to the turning points in the operation of the system governance helped to integrate the evolution of the system governance into the data collected. Likewise, employing the strategy of diversity in the inclusion of CoHE's historical context in the selection of twelve CoHE members (five current and seven former) served to cover a period from 1981 to the present in the data collected. Moreover, conducting interviews at the relevant ministries with four current government representatives helped to incorporate the role of ministries in the evolution and operation of the system governance of higher education in Turkey into the data. Taken together, the diversity both within and across the three groups of research participants contributed in turn to explore both the similarities and

differences within and across each group, thereby leading to bring together multiple points of views of a multiplicity of authorities in the findings of the study, in the exploration of the system governance of higher education in Turkey.

The systematic deciphering of the research questions in the analysis of the data through a reconstructive process guided by the “Rhizomatic System Governance Process Framework” helped to place the research participants as an integral part of analysis, that is, helped to center the focus on the research phenomenon, the system governance. Thus conceived, taking a relational approach to power in the analysis of the data, which refrained from a macro-level actor-centric approach and a focus on the positions of the research participants, the accounts of the three groups of research participants with different practices and with different historical trajectories came together to explore the system governance of higher education in the present, building an idiosyncratic rhizomatic system governance process and offering an alternative thinking space to the study of system governance of higher education in Turkey. Based on the voices of the participants, findings seem to indicate that the discussions revolving around the CoHE model have abstracted from an analysis of heterogeneous interactions among different stakeholders of system governance of higher education, which in turn seems to have acted as a mechanism to disguise the diverse relations and constituent elements operating in the system governance of higher education that seem to form the whole process of the system governance of higher education.

From this perspective, the core category borne out in the data seems to be depiction of system governance as a process by the participants. What follows thus presents this diverse understanding of the system governance of higher education as a process through portraying the operation of the system governance model,

presenting the participants' advantages and challenges of the model, and highlighting their perceived suggestions for improvements with regard to the model. The section concludes with a reflection on the changes to the system governance of higher education that took place after the completion of the data collection.

7.1.1 Reconstruction of system governance as a process

7.1.1.1 Operation of the system governance model

With regards the operation of the system governance model explored in Chapter 5, data analysis guided by the conceptual framework for the study revealed two major categories: the structure of the system governance model and the decision-making process within and among the forms of power involved in the operation of the model. Based on the opinions and ideas of the participants, key findings are as follows: Data analysis indicated that the research participants depicted a bureaucratic and centralized structure in the operation of the system governance model, which (1) is law-bound, (2) has power-centers, (3) combines supervision of inputs and outputs, and (4) deprofessionalizes academic roles. Data analysis also revealed a diverse understanding of the decision-making process by the three groups of participants of the study, in which each participant group approached the decision-making process from a contextual point of view. In the same vein, vertical decision-making in the operation of the system governance seems to unite such contextualized depiction of the decision-making process by the participants.

Structure of the system governance model

The accounts of the participants indicate that the structure of the model operating in the system governance of higher education is law-bound. According to

them, the law-bound structure within the Turkish higher education context is bound by Higher Education Law 2547, brings in formalized and standardized processes and procedures into the operation of the system governance, and requires a high knowledge of laws and regulations as regards the operation of the system governance. One interesting observation is that, as you will also see from the findings, all the three groups of research participants who are/were/have been in direct contact with the system governance of higher education perceive the structure as law-bound. When we look at the literature, it also seems that the structure of the system governance of Turkish higher education has been shaped by laws – Law No. 2252 enacted in 1933, Law No. 4936 enacted in 1946, Law No. 114 and Law No. 115 enacted in 1960, Law No. 1750 enacted in 1973, and Law No. 2547 enacted in 1981 - considering each new law established different structures in the operation of the system governance (Barblan et al., 2008; Dođramacı, 2007; Günay & Günay, 2017; Gür & Çelik, 2011; Gürüz, 2008; Seggie & Gökbel, 2015). Based on the literature and the perceptions of the participants, one could then argue that the structure of the system governance has been law-bound since the enactment of the 1933 University Reform. As a corollary to this, one emerging question is, what is it that drives the law-bound tradition in the structure of the system governance? A possible explanation for this might be legitimization as a mode of operation, which seems to have been expressed through bureaucratization, rationalization, and universalization strategies. For one thing, Turkish higher education was built within a modernization context associated with secularism via direct state intervention, prime mission of which was to build a national education policy to advance the Republican reforms (Barblan et al., 2008). Second, to the interests of the state bureaucracy, noncompliance with the reforms seems to have been non-negotiable

and deviances against the Republican political spectrum seem to have been taken under control via strict supervision (Turan, 2010) and expulsions of faculty members (Günay, 2004; Seggie & Gökbel, 2015), which were legitimized with the laws on the rational grounds of bringing conformity to the spirit of the Single-Party Period (Kafadar, 2002). So it appears as if the laws, enacted by the rational-legal state authority (cf. Weber, 1978) during the Single-Party Period, were aimed at creating universal values in the operation of the system governance, which could apply to everyone and represent legitimation of authority. In my opinion, such legitimation of authority facilitated through a combination of bureaucracy, rationality, and universal values might also provide a likely explanation for the structural changes in the operation of the system governance that followed the military interventions of the 1960, 1971, and 1980 and that apparently strengthened the law-bound structure in the operation of the system governance given that the participants perceive a law-bound structure in the present operation of the system governance. Framed from this perspective, I would argue that a centralized law might become the “playball of group interests” (cf. Hayek, 1979, p. 99) and turn into a target for legitimation of any type of authority, say, state authority or military authority, which could engage their bureaucratic power, rationality, and values in the operation of the system governance. Concomitant to this seems to remain an open question of to what extent this law-bound structure serves the system in general.

The perceptions of the participants also indicate that they act in accordance with and within the limits of Law 2547. In addition, they perceive that the law-bound structure brings in formalized and standardized processes and procedures and requires compliance with other laws and regulations in the operation of the system governance. What this seems to show is that “processes of communication and

control” which are needed for a system to adapt to and survive in its environment (Checkland, 2003, p. 50) are established by defined laws and regulations within the operation of the system governance, which, in my view, are likely to foster impersonal ties between the concerned institution CoHE and the universities and produce a distant attitude in conduct of duty of the stakeholders towards the higher education system. In this sense, based on the voices of the participants, one could also suggest unification, also perceived as a challenge of the system governance model by the participants, as a mode of operation considering the system operates through standardized processes and procedures and communicates with its stakeholders through defined laws and regulations. One area that needs further exploration seems to be the types of laws that operate in the system governance of higher education and the functions they serve. Pursuant to this, another question that needs further exploration seems to be whether the laws should be differentiated or, to put it differently, to what extent they are responsive to the needs and demands of the stakeholders of the system and the context they function in.

Pertinent to its law-bound structure, the participants also perceive two main power-centers in the structure operating in the system governance of higher education and these power centers are CoHE and rectors. One reason why the participants consider CoHE as a power center seems to be its powers and authorities coming from the Constitution and Higher Education Law 2547 (CoHE, 2000; The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, n.d.). In addition, the accounts of the participants also indicate that rectors act as the second power center in the structure of the system governance based on their administrative and financial powers. It is then possible to say that the application of the laws and regulations is safeguarded within the operation of the system governance via the power centers, in which direct

governmental influence seems to be replaced by two power centers considering CoHE's powers derived from the Constitution and the Law as the representative of the indirect governmental influence and rectors' powers coming from the Law as the representative of the university governance (cf. McDaniel, 1996). What seems to emerge is that whether such delegation of direct governmental influence mitigates bureaucratic power engagement in the operation of the system governance or opens it to more bureaucracy. I believe that the asymmetry between the limited number of power centers and the powers vested in the two centers in the absence of engagement of countervailing powers in the interactions at the system level may leave the system vulnerable to external influences (and does leave based on the participants' challenges of the system governance model and the arguments of the researchers (Ergüder, 2008; Gür & Çelik; 2016; Kafadar, 2002)). Another question that seems to emerge is, to what extent does the broadness of powers of rectors act as a countervailing power in the decisions and actions in the operation of the system governance?

Additionally, the second reason why the participants consider CoHE as a power center seems to be the use of such powers and authorities of CoHE by academic and administrative staff as a way of not taking initiative and responsibility, which, I think, seems to indicate the operation of a paradoxical situation in the system governance. On the one hand, the participants perceive the law-bound structure operating in the system governance as creating dependencies on the side of both CoHE and academic and administrative staff in their decisions and actions, but on the other hand they seem to perceive the legal protections that come with the law-bound structure and the existence of a higher body within the law-bound structure as a type of empowerment for academic and administrative staff, which seems to give

way to, I would call, a de-responsibilization engendered through dependencies on one of the power centers, CoHE. What seems to be paradoxical is that dependencies produced by laws could be both empowering and de-empowering in the operation of the system governance. Foucault argues that power relations could lead to “empowerment or responsibilisation of subjects” (Lemke, 2000, p.5). Building on Foucault’s argument and the perceptions of the participants, I would argue that power relations governed by centralized laws and through strong power centers may both empower and de-empower what Spinoza calls “potentia” (Hardt, 2003, xiii), which, in this case, I would designate as academic and administrative staff, by means of a type of de-responsibilization borne out of dependencies that are empowering and de-empowering. In my opinion, the laws and regulations within the system governance seem to create a bi-directional effect of dependency and empowerment both stimulated through dependencies, which one could suggest leading to the operation of de-responsibilization as a mode of operation in the structure of the system governance. One could take this point one step further by also suggesting that such a counter process of dependency and empowerment within the structure operating in the system governance may be producing another mode of operation, neutralization of resistance, if one considers subjects are likely to be de-responsibilized within the system. Then the emerging question is, to what extent does the structure operating in the system governance foster joint gains?

Besides a law-bound and power centered structure, the participants also perceive combined supervision of inputs and outputs within the structure operating in the system governance. According to the participants, the Constitution foresees an immanent to law supervision mechanism from a single center, which results in a top-down quality control that operates through a focus on the rules, laws, and

regulations. With reference to the literature (Barblan et al., 2008; T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 1998, 1999; Tekeli, 2009) explored in Chapter 2, it is possible to argue that efforts initiated to build separate supervision of the inputs and outputs could not be realized because the process seems not to have been negotiated between the two sides, CoHE and the academia. One could then raise the question of to what extent the practices contextualized and constructed within the national boundaries are re-contextualized and re-constructed with the engagement of the stakeholders of the system. Additionally, one interesting observation is that the literature shows that Turkey became a signatory country to the Bologna Process in 2001 and since then, enhancing supervision of quality has been given prominence in the operation of the system governance (CoHE, 2017; T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2003, 2004, 2005). Based on the perceptions of the participants, it seems to be apparent that the structure operating in the system governance still runs through a combined supervision of inputs and outputs. Another emerging question, then, is, to what extent are the practices contextualized and constructed outside the national boundaries re-contextualized and re-constructed with the engagement of the stakeholders of the system within the national boundaries? To further complicate matters, one could also wonder the extent to which the local context (e.g. cultural, historical, national, and political legacies) and the capacities of the context (e.g. infrastructure, financing, human power) are incorporated into such deterritorialized practices, both within and outside the national boundaries. Based on these tenets, I would suggest deterritorialization by means of a rescaling strategy as a mode of operation in the structure of the system governance, reterritorialization of which seems to be one area that needs further exploration.

Furthermore, the voices of the current and former rectors indicate that a law-bound, power-centered structure also operates through a simultaneous process of deprofessionalization of their academic roles. According to the rectors, as one of the power centers within a power-centered structure, their academic roles are deprofessionalized towards more entrepreneurial roles (cf. Ferlie et al., 2009). In my opinion, this seems to be indicative of the fact that one of the missions of the universities is to contribute to accelerating the development in a context of constant change and expansion (T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı [Ministry of Development], 2013; Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2015a). On the other hand, as one of the power centers within a law-bound structure, their academic roles are deprofessionalized towards more bureaucratic roles. So it appears as if the rectors lead a double life between bureaucracy and entrepreneurship. One might then ask if one role outweighs the other given that the three groups of participants seem to depict a bureaucratic and centralized structure in the operation of the system governance.

Decision-making process in the operation of the system governance model

Based on multifarious contextual accounts of the three groups of research participants, vertical decision-making process could be identified within and among the forms of powers in the operation of the model. The contextualized depiction of the decision-making process by the representatives of indirect governmental influence, the current and former CoHE members of CoHE, seems to indicate that vertically made decisions, which are mainly concentrated at the Executive Board and the General Assembly of CoHE, seem to empower both the actions of the representatives of the university governance, rectors, and the state universities in general. The second and third contextualized depictions of the decision-making process by the representatives of direct governmental influence, the current

government representatives, seem to reveal differentiated influences of ministerial powers on the decisions and actions of CoHE. First, based on the perceptions of the two current government representatives, one interesting observation as to the decision-making process in interactions between CoHE and the Ministry of National Education seems to be the existence of horizontal coordination set by Law No. 2547 and Law No. 5018 (CoHE, 2000; Kamu Mali Yönetimi ve Kontrol Kanunu [Public Financial Management and Control Law], 2003), yet at the same time the existence of a lack of horizontal coordination stemming from the policymaking powers of the two institutions, which, in my view, seems to emerge as one area that needs further exploration. These accounts, in my opinion, also show that the state universities seem not to be involved in the inter-institutional decision-making process in the interactions between the two institutions.

Second, with regard to the decision-making process in interactions between CoHE, the Ministry of Development, the Ministry of Finance, and the state universities, based on the accounts of the two current government representatives, the decisive mechanism as regards the financing of higher education is the Parliament and the budgeting development process is coordinated by the Ministry of Development and the Ministry of Finance (Kamu Mali Yönetimi ve Kontrol Kanunu [Public Financial Management and Control Law], 2003). In my opinion, the accounts of the participants seem to indicate mainly vertical linkages and low transparency in the decision-making process considering both the annually set budgets, financial dependences on the state, and inflexibility in the use of the budgets.

The fourth contextualized depiction of the decision-making process by the representatives of the university governance, rectors, seems to explore the decision-making process from the standpoint of those who are influenced by the decisions

made by a multiplicity of authorities. What seems to emerge from their perceptions, I think, may be viewed as a dualism which appears to drive from perceptions of channels of communication set through formal policy instruments such as rules, laws, and procedures in the decision-making processes and accounts of employment of individual paths to abstain from a disintegration from the decision makers' decisions.

These diverse explorations of the participants, I would argue, seem to indicate a communication gap in the policy coordination in the operation of the system governance model considering the interplay between in/direct governmental steering and institutional autonomy. That is, what seems to be borne out of the data is a lack of horizontal policy coordination and horizontal decision-making process that engage with the three groups - the representatives of direct governmental influence, indirect governmental influence, and university governance - in the inter-institutional policy coordination and decision-making at the multilevel system governance of higher education. When we look at the literature, we see commonalities with van Vught's (1993) state control and state supervision models and Olsen's (1988) sovereign, rationality-bounded steering model. What seems to emerge from the similarities, I think, is a unique mix and application of these three models in the operation of the system governance of Turkish higher education, which may offer an explanation for the communication gap in the policy coordination and decision-making process, assuming that a communication gap provides the unitary picture to various explorations of the participants. In the state-control and sovereign, rationality-bounded steering models, decisions are made by state power, thereby characterizing "one single centre of control" in the decision-making structure, which is based on hierarchy and in which unimportant decisions can be left to higher

education institutions (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000, p. 270). Within the context of Turkish higher education, based on the voices of the participants, there seems to be four main centers of control in the decision-making (CoHE and three ministries), which, in my view, both within the main centers of control and down from the main centers to the universities appear to mainly portray hierarchy and vertical linkages. The literature (van Vught, 1993, p. 20) indicates that in such “top-down” type of systems, the state is a potent actor in the decision-making. However, in the case of Turkish higher education, as discussed before, direct governmental influence in the operation of the system governance is replaced by two power centers, where CoHE is the main power center as set forth in the Constitution and asserted by the Law. Taking these points together, I would argue, delegation of governmental influence to other forms of power - buffer body power (Doğramacı, 1984; Gürüz, 2008) and rectorial power- may not represent a complete shift from the state control and sovereign, rationality-bounded steering models to the state supervision model in operation of the system governance: For one thing, in the Turkish higher education context, the state power practiced in the state control model seems to have taken the form of buffer body power, which might be said to create a buffer body control and supervision model. Second, considering the decision-making over the financing of higher education lies within the responsibility area of the Ministry of Development and the Ministry of Finance, the buffer body seems not to have a complete control in the decisions and actions in the operation of the system governance, which might be said to create a buffer body-state control and supervision model. Third, as the voices of the representatives of the state universities seem to be disintegrated from the interactions among the main centers of control in the decision-making, the resulting system governance model may be put forward as a buffer body-state control and

supervision model that may be said to characterize a fragmented and multi-layered vertical decision making process. Fourth, based on the perceptions of the participants regarding the structure operating in the system governance and the literature (DPT [SPO], 1995; Ergüder, et al., 2009; SPO, 2000; SPO, 2006; T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı [Ministry of Development], 2013; T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2007), the key features of the resulting buffer body-state control and supervision system governance model could be identified as bureaucratic and centralized. As a corollary, one might wonder if delegation of governmental influence stimulates practices geared towards more bureaucracy in the operation of the system governance.

Another question that seems to emerge is, how are the accountability mechanisms engaged and coordinated in the inter-institutional policy coordination and decision-making at the multilevel system governance of higher education? The question could also be broadened to the extent to which such policy coordination correlates with national development policies and goals, to how multi-level system governance outside the national boundaries is reflected in policymaking at the multi-level system governance within the national boundaries, and to how the concerned institutions positioned in the top- and lower-tiers of the decision-making process join forces and powers to build and accelerate the capacities for favorable national development. The communication gap in the inter-institutional policy coordination and decision-making at the multilevel system governance, I believe, is one key area that needs to be paid more attention to and explored in terms of its long-term projections for the society in general.

In sum, the perceptions and understandings of the participants seem to give a portrayal of a bureaucratic and centralized structure in the operation of the system governance model, which appears to be powered by four simultaneously interwoven

processes - law-bound, power-centered, combined supervision of inputs and outputs dimensions, and deprofessionalization of academic roles – and operates on a vertical decision-making process in which the decision-making and implementing powers are located around some certain institution. Building on the perceptions of the participants and the literature, a reconstructive perspective to the operation of the system governance model seems to suggest that the structure reproduces itself through some modes of operation such as deresponsibilization, deterritorialization, legitimation, unification, and neutralization of resistance.

Having discussed the perceptions of the participants as to the operation of the system governance model, in the following section I discuss the participants' advantages and challenges with regard to the model and the other modes of operation that seem to emerge from the voices of the participants.

7.1.1.2 Advantages and challenges of the system governance model

The findings of Chapter 6 reveal the advantages and challenges of the system governance model. Based on the perceptions of the participants, the core advantage of the system governance model is the existence of a coordination mechanism. The research findings also indicate that there are some participants who perceive some specific advantages of the model as a corollary to its core advantage, such as appointment system of rectors, regulatory functions of CoHE, contribution to the qualified workforce, and efficient investment planning. As for the challenges of the model, based on the opinions and ideas of the participants, key findings are as follows: (1) maximized interdependencies in a multi-actor system, (2) leak of authority in the law-bound, power-centered structure, (3) unification, (4) enhancing autonomy, (5) deprofessionalization of academic roles, (6) ingrained perceptions of

institutional identity leading to path dependency, and (7) the Council of Higher Education, the Ministry of National Education, and the joint exercise of power triangle.

Advantages of the system governance model

Regarding the advantages of the model, all of the participants perceive the existence of a coordination mechanism as the core advantage of the model, a finding that seems to have been at the heart of system governance of higher education all around the world starting from the medieval ages as explored in the system governance of higher education in the world and system governance of higher education in Turkey parts of the literature review. That is the fundamental reason why it is hard to pick and point out the work of scholars I explored from the start to the end of the literature review. In my opinion, what this implies is that both the literature and the perceptions of the participants indicate coordination as the concept at the vertex of system governance of higher education. Concomitantly, this seems to also suggest that coordination of system governance of higher education necessitates a broader approach that could entail multi-faceted and multifarious processes, struggles, and power relations reflected in and integrated into the system governance along with the historical continuum of the changes in the higher education governance. It also appears to provide an explanation for the reason why the core category borne out in the data is depiction of system governance as a process by the participants. Based on these tenets and the reasoning in the Reasoning of defining the system governance of higher education as a process section, I am of the opinion that governance at the system level or system governance is as a process, which seems to entail a plurality of power relationships -actions upon actions of others-, is exercised by a plurality of authorities whose practices or ways of governing informed, shaped,

and transformed by different techniques and forms of power and different forms of knowledge and rationalities over different historical trajectories lead to the constitution of modes of coordination, and thus is based on power to power interactions to coordinate the system. One might then wonder if the perceived challenges of the participants derive from the unintended consequences of a narrower conception of the system governance that might not be conducive to facilitate the integration of the cultural, historical, national, and political legacies of the system and the country into the current system governance model.

Challenges of the system governance model

The participants' diverse challenges of the model could offer some explanation for this question. One challenge of the model perceived by the participants seems to be related to the issue of how to catch up with the maximized interdependent relationships in a multi-actor system. Based on the accounts of the participants and the literature (Çetinsaya, 2014; Gök & Gümüş, 2015; Günay & Günay, 2017; Gür & Çelik, 2011; Özoğlu et al., 2016; T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, DPT [SPO], 1979; T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 1994), increasing the responsiveness of the higher education system to the social needs and demands and to the need for a multi-skilled workforce compatible with the context of globalization has always been an issue of concern in the operation of the system governance, as has been in systems of higher education around the world (Austin & Jones, 2016; Capano, 2011). Building on these points, I would argue that, professionalization as a mode of operation, which might be suggested to be facilitated through the massification strategy, is not what drives the challenges of the participants. In my view, universities may be viewed as “insurance institutions” of the states in legitimizing their power, governing the risk in the populations, and

solidarizing the interests (Dean, 1999; Ewald, 1991, p. 197), which in turn may be said to attain roles to the universities such as being responsive to economic and social needs by producing the required knowledge and professional expertise and skills and to the states such as being responsive to the needs of the people and to the requirements of the changing nature of the society by establishing new universities. Such shared responsibility in facilitating the professionalization in the path for national development is not in question for the participants. Their specific challenges pertinent to infrastructure, financing, and academic affairs and other various points, such as non-participatory decision-making mechanisms and challenges in meeting the needs of the universities in a timely manner, seem to be rather about a search for answers to, in a context of multi-actor system, (1) how can they and the system respond effectively to a rapid diversification in needs and demands and to the spread of capacities among more stakeholders? and (2) how can they connect with the interdependencies and increase the coordination and communication with one another in the operation of the system governance? I believe that these findings imply that mainly vertical coordination at the inter-institutional level discussed earlier may exacerbate the challenges in the interdependent relationships in the long run. The emerging question that needs to be explored is, to what extent the current system governance model realizes the shared responsibility in facilitating the professionalization in the path for national development. Assuming that universities are one of the insurance institutions of the state and assuming that a communication gap coming from vertical coordination is what unites the participants' diverse explorations of the decision-making process, one might also argue that the communication gap in the policy coordination and the decision-making process may yield setbacks in furthering the development goals.

In addition, the participants' perceived challenges of the model indicate that a law-bound, power-centered structure leaves the system open to interests of external influences and results in a leak of authority from the system and the university governance levels (Ergüder, 2008; Gür & Çelik, 2016; Kafadar, 2002). In other words, in view of the fact that Higher Education Law 2547 hands the powers of the system governance to two centers, it automatically seems to create the conditions for the process of a leak of authority, which permits the penetration of the local and political authorities and their demands, ideological viewpoints, and beliefs in the decision-making processes regardless of the possible support of the power centers for such penetration (Aydınlı, 2011; Seggie, 2011; Seggie & Gökbel, 2015). As a result of such insertion of external influences into the operation of the system governance, the two centers - rectors and CoHE - may feel challenged by pressures, say, to favor certain people in the staffing of academic and administrative staff irrespective of their competencies and such leak of authority may harm the missions of the universities and the system overall. In this sense, I believe that, such leak of authority in the law-bound, power-centered structure might devalue the missions of the universities not only in the eyes of the stakeholders of the system but also in the eyes of the society. Or, based on the perceptions of the participants, one could broaden the scope of the question and ask, has it already devalued the missions of the universities? This seems to raise the question of if the Law creates some sort of path dependency in the decision-making of the system governance. Assuming that it creates, one might also wonder if the Law broadens or narrows the decision-making and implementing powers of the two safeguards of the system governance. To further complicate matters, considering its ideologically framed structure (Çelik et al., 2017; Gür & Çelik, 2011; Ergüder, 2008; Ergüder et al., 2009; Özer et al., 2011;

Seggie & Gökbel, 2015) and the macro meaning it creates in the minds of most participants, Higher Education Law 2547 as the product of September 12, one could argue that the Law inherently opens the system governance of higher education to external influences anyway because it might stimulate the feelings of ideological resentments, thereby leading to some sort of path dependency in the decision-making of the system governance.

The research findings also indicate that the participants perceive unification as a challenge of the model, a challenge highlighted in the previous section as a mode of operation. One reason why they perceive a process of unification in the operation of the system governance seems to be the legal protections that come with the current public personnel regime. According to them, the public personnel regime combined with the lack of supervision mechanisms seems to yield unproductive attitudes on the side of the academic and administrative staff and turn into an ineliminable challenge of the model, creating a unifying conduct of duty and resistance to change. I would argue that the two modes of operation, unification expressed through standardization and de-responsibilization facilitated through dependencies, might provide an explanation for such unification within the system governance. In my opinion, the law-bound, power centered structure by both empowering and de-empowering and thus de-responsibilizing the academic and administrative staff may even be contributing more to the reproduction of a unification challenge in the system governance of higher education. One might then raise the question of to what extent the integration of supervision mechanisms into the operation of the system governance could yield acceptance on the side of academic and administrative staff. Another question that needs to be explored, I think, is, should supervision mechanisms have complementary mechanisms

cognizant of the likelihood of de-responsibilization as a mode of operation in the structure of the system governance?

In addition to unification across the academic and administrative staff, the participants also perceive unification among the universities as a challenge of the model (cf. Ergüder et al., 2009; Gür & Çelik, 2011; Gürüz et al., 1994; Tekeli, 2009; Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2015a). According to the participants, the Law produces a unifying system governance model, which seems to run contrary to the expanding role of higher education in accelerating the local and national development and lead to a counterproductive process for the newly-established universities in the sense that they may feel challenged by the expectations to do too much at once and so may straddle the line between acting upon the system-wide concerns and acting upon the university-wide concerns. So it appears as if the Law has a static nature, which acts as a unifying mechanism in the operation of the system governance and leads to institutional isomorphism in the system governance of higher education triggering the operation of unification expressed through standardization (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). I would also argue that formal and informal processes of differentiation which aim for stratified systems with clear goals and objectives and increased competitiveness (Task Force on Higher Education and Society, 2000; van Vught, 1993) may be another mode of operation in the structure of the system governance that unintentionally turns into a counter process of unification among the universities as a consequence of the promotion of similar policies. There seems to be two sides to the issue: First, “a convergence of governance” around policymaking around the globe (Ball, 2010, p. 134), say, policy convergence via “regulatory regionalism” (Jayasuriya, 2008; Jayasuriya & Robertson, 2010, p. 3) practiced through Bologna Process (Mızıkcacı, 2006; T.C.

Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2003, 2004, 2005) might be one factor that unintentionally converts formal and informal processes of differentiation into unification in the system governance of Turkish higher education by unifying the formally and informally differentiated universities around the same policies, and that seems to be a common concern for the system governance of higher education in the world (Dobbins & Knill, 2017; Dobbins & Leišyte, 2014; Jayasuriya & Robertson, 2010). Based on the perceptions of the participants, such unification among the universities seems to bring up further challenges. For some participants seem to be challenged by responding to both the system-wide concerns and the university-wide concerns while others seem to be challenged by the limits to the liberty to act. As a corollary to policy convergence over system governance of higher education at the regional level, the second side to the issue, in my opinion, seems to be related to the policymaking within and outside the national boundaries and the mechanisms for diffusion of the policies within the national boundaries. One might wonder how deterritorialized policies contextualized and constructed outside the national boundaries are reterritorialized in the system governance of higher education. Another question that seems to emerge is, to what extent national policymaking differentiates among the universities in the development of the national goals and policies so that formally and informally differentiated universities based on the previously built national policies could meet the desired ends. To put it differently, to what extent does national policymaking forecast for the future of the system governance of higher education? The final question seems to be what glocal mechanisms have been developed that could nurture national experience borne out of cross-national policy convergence and reverberate with the local context? One might also argue that these findings along with the previously discussed findings might hint

at a communication gap in the policy coordination and the decision-making process in the inter-institutional level at the multi-level governance, which tends to foster unification among the universities. In my opinion, how formal and informal processes of differentiation interact with unification in the operation of the system governance is one area that needs more exploration to answer if it is only the Law that unifies the universities.

Furthermore, based on the voices of the participants, enhancing autonomy seems to be a challenge pertinent to the model. According to the participants, varying renderings of autonomy at the level of academia coupled with differentiations in perceptions of autonomy on the side of rectors and CoHE seem to result in somewhat of a chasm among the academia, rectors, and CoHE. Based on the perceptions of the participants, two ingrained approaches at the level of academia which make finding a common ground in enhancing autonomy harder seem to be self-governance with no accountability in place and autonomy as empowerment in the institutional governance to elect the rector. These perceptions of the participants seem to voice two questions: What constitutes an ingrained approach to autonomy in the system governance? What constitutes institutional autonomy in the system governance? Looking at the governance traditions in the system governance of Turkish higher education, we see that prior to the 1933 University Reform, the Darülfünun as the only higher education institution was autonomous in the operation of the governance of the institution; however, their self-governance with no accountability in place and autonomy in the institutional governance to elect the rector were highlighted as important issues for concern in the report of Professor Malche on account of the risk that such self-governance could lead to fragmentation within the institution (Yavuz, 2012). One interesting observation is that these two concerns seem to mirror the

participants' perceptions of the two ingrained approaches to autonomy at the level of academia, which seem to engender a challenge standing in the way to enhance autonomy in the system governance and hint at a path dependency in the system governance of higher education. One possible explanation of the reason for such path dependency might be "bi-cephalous control", a dualism between self-governance and bureaucracy (de Groof et al., 1998, p. 18), established in the interactions among the stakeholders of the system. For one thing, the literature shows that the model moved from academic self-rule model (Clark, 1983) to state control model (van Vught, 1993) with the enactment of the 1933 University Reform, resulting in the closing of Darülfünun and changing the nature of the power wielded over the new university, İstanbul University, as it was placed under the authority of the Ministry of National Education (Çelik & Gür, 2014; Erdem, 2012; Namal & Karakök, 2011). So it appears as if the lineage of the practices of institutional autonomy in the system governance is in the collegiality. Framed from this perspective and taking a possible path dependency in the practices of institutional autonomy into account, one might suggest that the change to the model seems to have produced forced cooperation power at the level of academia. A look at the system governance of higher education in the world part of the literature (Clark, 1983; Cobban, 1988; McLendon, 2003) shows that such forced cooperation power seems to align with governance traditions of medieval ages and Continental European mode of governance. I agree with Pedersen (1997) that "[t]he universities of our date are in many ways legitimate children of medieval parents, and many of our present difficulties on closer inspection, appear to have been built into the system right from the beginning" (ix). With reference to the above-mentioned literature and to the perceptions of the participants, one might argue that a combination of forced cooperation power

tradition and bureaucratic power might be the reason that seems to yield a decoupling in perceptions of autonomy in the system governance model. Scholars also discuss that the limits of institutional autonomy were redefined through laws borne out of power relations between the academia and the governments and centered on empowerment to elect rectors (Doğramacı, 2007; Gür & Çelik, 2011; Gürüz, 2008; Seggie & Gökbel, 2015; Turan, 2010). The emerging question is, assuming that a dualism between self-governance and bureaucracy has been incorporated into the system governance right from the first building of the system and has fostered a path dependency in the practices of institutional autonomy in the direction of having administrative powers, then one might ask, to what extent past experiences and traditions nurture the development of mechanisms for enhancing institutional autonomy. Another question that needs further exploration seems to be to what extent the shift from state control model to buffer body-state control and supervision model has mitigated the dualism between self-governance and bureaucracy. To put it differently, how are past experiences and traditions that come to shape the limits of institutional autonomy the chief markers of the identity of the university?

Additionally, there are some participants who perceive some specific challenges pertinent to the model, such as deprofessionalization of academic roles, ingrained perceptions of institutional identity, and tensions in the joint exercise of power between the Council of Higher Education and the Ministry of National Education. In my view, a likely explanation for these perceived challenges of the participants might be the dualism between the wills to build sustainable and forward-looking relations and the path dependencies stemming from previous decisions and actions. Combined with the other challenges of the model, one might argue that these

findings might hint at a narrow conception of the system governance that might not be conducive to yield a plurality in the mode of coordination of the current system governance model. Based on these tenets and the participants' perceptions about the operation of the system governance model, mainly vertical regulation could be identified as a mode of operation of the buffer body-state control and supervision model. The next section discusses the participants' suggestions for improvements in the model and their perceptions of a broader approach to the system governance.

7.1.1.3 Suggestions for improvements in the model

Analysis of the data presented in Chapter 6 reveals diversity in the participants' perceived suggestions for improvements in the model. Based on the perceptions and understandings of the participants, the key finding can be summarized as follows: The diversity in the participants' perceived areas for improvement seems to indicate perception of system governance as a process by the participants, linking together a number of issues involved in the operation of the system governance.

The accounts of the participants suggest that a comprehensive reform in the restructuring of the system governance of higher education be undertaken. This is particularly important because the governments, studies, and strategy documents also discuss that a broader approach to the restructuring of the system governance of higher education should be undertaken so that the system remains responsive to the further growth at both national and international levels and continues to fulfill important services that foster social and economic development (Batirel et al., 2014; Çetinsaya, 2014; Ergüder et al., 2009; Gök & Gümüş, 2015; Gümüş, 2018; Gür, 2016; Gür & Çelik, 2016; Kurt, 2015; 61. Hükümet Programı [61st Government Program], 2011; T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı [Ministry of Development], 2013;

Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2015a). The literature and the participants' perceived suggestions for improvements in the model seem to voice a plurality in ways of coordination so that vertical and horizontal coordination could be reconciled with one another in the operation of the system governance (Clark, 1979). For instance, they suggest that CoHE be restructured as a coordination and planning body so that it could function as a strategic coordinator in the operation of the system governance, which determines macro policies in line with the country priorities and national development plans and acts as a guiding and planning mechanism for the universities. In my opinion, what seems to emerge is the need for a change in the form of supervision in the system governance of higher education. In other words, there seems to be a need for a shift from a buffer body-state control and supervision to a buffer body supervision which could take the feature of "remote steering at a distance" in the system governance of higher education (King, 2007, p. 415). When we look at the literature, we see that such an approach, where both the state and the buffer body take on a more strategic role in the planning and controlling of higher education, has been a common trend in the system governance of higher education (Austin & Jones, 2016; Muller et al., 2002; van Vught, 1993). In such form of supervision, decision-making mechanisms are participatory and decision-making power is diffused among the stakeholders of the system. The participants also recommend that the coordination and planning body should not be involved with the day-to-day operations of the universities, but should devolve some of its authorities to the universities so as to devote more time to strategic planning and decision-making. According to the participants, associations should be built among the universities by the universities themselves and/or by CoHE, which should report to the decision-making mechanisms so that suggestions of the universities could be

incorporated into the strategic decision-making processes and integrity within the system governance could be strengthened. They think that expanding the decision-making mechanisms to the stakeholders of the system governance through such associations could increase cooperation and collaboration among the universities, thereby contributing to opening possibilities for organizing learning in the system governance of higher education. In my view, this seems to be one key area for improvement in the model in order that national experiences and cross-national experiences can be enriched and pluralized within the national boundaries and research development activities can be nurtured through national and cross-national collaboration. I agree with Robertson (1997) that the outcome of local global relations is neither local nor global but “glocal” (Robertson, 1997, p. 27). However, I believe that the extent to which the Turkish higher education system can become conducive to such glocal learning depends on the extent to which the system governance can engage the stakeholders of the system in the national and international policymaking. What seems to emerge is that a change in the form of supervision might also aim at addressing a possible communication gap in the inter-institutional policy coordination and decision-making through organizing learning at the multilevel system governance.

The findings also highlight that the participants suggest enhanced autonomy, accountability, and transparency to achieve a plurality in ways of coordination in the system governance model. They seem to suggest that the scope of mission differentiation policy (CoHE, 2016) be widened to a restructuring of the system governance model and a more diversified approach to the system governance model be undertaken, for instance, by building research-intensive universities, teaching universities, universities involved in regional development, and universities anchored

in specific areas. They think that all the universities should have greater autonomy in the decision-making for teaching, research, and service-to-the society activities and the use of the budget in the operation of a differentiating system governance model provided that they are held accountable to the concerned institutions, CoHE and the relevant Ministries, and mechanisms for financial supervision are integrated into the system governance. One area that needs further exploration seems to be if more than one law should be produced to achieve a differentiated but integrally uniform whole and to empower universities to become more autonomous. One might also suggest that past traditions and experiences of the system governance of higher education as to the practices of institutional autonomy could provide a valuable starting point in the planning process. As a corollary to this, I think, one area that needs to be paid attention to enhance autonomy seems to be related to how to redefine autonomy (Fielden, 2008). In what areas and to what degree the capacity to act will be enhanced seems to need further exploration considering a state university in the Turkish higher education system has certain dependences on the state in terms of its financing, staffing, and educational and training activities.

Based on the voices of the participants and the literature, a proliferation of softer policy instruments by means of the engagement of accountability and transparency mechanisms in the system governance could contribute to a plurality in ways of coordination. The research (Pierre & Peters, 2000) also suggests a move to softer policy instruments on account of the argument that detailed policy instruments, which one could identify as laws and regulations coming from the law-bound, power-centered structure, could produce inefficiency and create counterproductive processes in the system governance. To these ends, the participants seem to suggest enhancing supervision of quality via an autonomous quality assurance board

independent from CoHE (CoHE, 2017; Ergüder, et al., 2009; Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2015b) and developing a merit-based system via building a flexible public personnel regime (Ergüder, 2008; T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı [Ministry of Development], 2013), a suggestion that aligns with the global trends in the system governance of higher education (Ferlie et al., 2009; Fielden, 2008). While I believe accountability, meritocracy, and transparency are the major pillars and the safeguards of any higher education system, I also believe one area that needs further attention and exploration is what complementary mechanisms and strategies should be developed so as not to devalue the knowledge produced in the universities. For scholars (Altbach & Knight, p. 291, 2007; Altbach, 2015; Rizvi & Lingard, 2006; Robertson, 2009) discuss that practices targeted at the promotion of accountability and transparency may produce counterproductive processes that might turn higher education into a “commodity.” Based on the literature and the participants’ perceived suggestions, these findings seem to imply that higher education has attained a critical role in the realization of national goals and interests and academics are encouraged to take on more entrepreneurial roles to contribute to accentuating development at local, national, and international levels within this changing context.

For a plurality in ways of coordination, the participants also seem to suggest increased stakeholder power involvement in the system governance of higher education (Ergüder, et al., 2009; Gür & Çelik, 2016; Kurt, 2015). When we look at the literature, this seems to align with the shifts towards engagement of different voices of internal and external stakeholders, for instance, “staff unions, professional associations, industry or regional authorities” in the system governance of higher education (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000, p. 271). The participants seem to voice the integration of a Triple Helix III model (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000) approach

into the system governance that could foster building jointed ties between the university, industry, and government. The research indicates that the model has been popular in most countries, especially in the U.S, with the objectives of forming university spin-off firms, strategic alliances, and tri-lateral networks in an innovation focused environment (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). It seems that the participants seem to suggest a diversified approach to financing in the system governance in place of a solely state-based funding, thereby leading to engagement in self-funding and income generation activities

To sum up, one might suggest that the perceived suggestions for improvements of the participants seem to indicate what has been coined as reflexive regulation as a mode of coordination in the system governance. For it seems that the dynamics and challenges embedded into the system governance model when combined with the dynamics and challenges emerging from globalization, knowledge-based society, and transnational and regional initiatives at multiple levels seem to call for the blending of global, local, and national contexts in higher education in a globalized age. That being the case, in my opinion, a reflexive coordination is a type of coordination that operates through vertical and horizontal coordination, organizes learning, and plans for future course of action. I think the issues relating to the future of the country should be a product of careful planning and be responded meaningfully by expanding the decision-making mechanisms to the stakeholders of the system governance involved in the process.

7.1.1.4 Rhizomatic and tree-like system governance process for Turkish higher education

In this dissertation, taking a reconstructive perspective drawn from the core category, system governance as a process, and the remaining categories, I attempted to generate a conceptual model portraying the operation of the system governance of higher education in Turkey based on the perceptions and understandings of the research participants. By doing so, I revisited my conceptual framework with a purpose of explicating what they shared in common and how they differed and weaved my findings from the literature review together.

I did not intend to offer a right way of reconstructing the system governance process of Turkish higher education, but I simply intended to create a thinking space to offer an alternative way of thinking about the system governance of Turkish higher education. The reconstructive process guided by the “Rhizomatic System Governance Process Framework” resulted in what I argue to be a “Rhizomatic-Tree-like System Governance Process.”

Based on the perceptions and understandings of the participants, the reason why the system governance process is argued to be Rhizomatic-Tree-like is the bureaucratic and centralized structure that operates in the system governance, which (1) is law-bound, (2) has power-centers, (3) combines supervision of inputs and outputs, and (4) deprofessionalizes academic roles. As argued by Deleuze and Guattari (2005), a rhizome is multiform, non-hierarchical, and has no center. On the contrary, a tree has a centralized and hierarchical structure, which forms an organic whole in a sequential one-directional manner. I argue that the process is still rhizomatic because, as explored in the Reasoning of defining the system governance of higher education as a process section, a system governance process is inherently

rhizomatic, inherently complex and fragmented. This is the very reason why it tends to produce challenges against centralized practices, which act as the countervailing powers in the overall process.

Based on the perceptions of the participants, the model operating in the system governance may be put forward as a buffer body-state control and supervision model. Based on the data analysis, the inter-institutional level decision-making process could be identified as vertical. Pursuant to the mainly vertical coordination in the decision making process, the mode of operation may be identified as mainly vertical regulation. The resulting “Rhizomatic and Tree-like System Governance Process” explored in the chapter could be summarized as in Figure 15. A question mark next to a sub-item denotes an area for improvement as perceived by the participants and discussed along the chapter. I am of the opinion that the perceived suggestions for improvements of the participants may foster a rhizomatic system governance process in the operation of the system governance of Turkish higher education.




Figure 15. Rhizomatic-Tree-like system governance process for Turkish higher education

7.1.1.5 Reflection

After I completed my data collection in the second week of June 2017, a new law (Law No. 7033) was enacted on July 1, 2017, which introduced some structural changes to the system governance of higher education (Sanayinin Geliştirilmesi ve Üretim Desteklenmesi Amacıyla Bazı Kanun ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun, 2017):³⁴ According to the law, an autonomous quality assurance board independent from CoHE was established, a suggestion highlighted by the participants. It appears as an important step to enhance supervision of quality and to set the standards for quality assurance through a separate management of the inputs and outputs of the system. Also, the participants voice supervision by others and a proliferation of softer policy instruments to increase transparency and accountability in the operation of the system governance model. The development of an autonomous national quality assurance system could also contribute to the engagement of such mechanisms in the system. On the other hand, considering the participants' perceptions of the bureaucratic and centralized structure operating in the system governance model, how to ensure the independence of the quality assurance board from CoHE and the government and how to ensure such delegation of indirect governmental influence of CoHE and direct governmental influence of the ministries to the quality assurance board mitigates bureaucratic power engagement in the operation of the system governance seem to be two important considerations that need special attention so as not to open the system to more bureaucracy.

It was also announced that the scope of mission differentiation policy would be broadened and a more diversified approach to the system governance model

³⁴ The full text of Law No. 7033 in Turkish is available at <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2017/07/20170701.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2017/07/20170701.htm>

would be undertaken. The participants also suggest a move from a unifying to a differentiating system governance model. The law also includes the setting up of technology transfer offices in universities, establishment of an advisory board to CoHE consisting of representatives from concerned ministries and private sector, establishment of a coordination board for vocational schools, internship opportunities for sciences and engineering students, fostering ties between vocational schools and industry, funding opportunities for master and doctoral students, paid sabbatical leave for academics, and postdoctoral opportunities at universities.

In my opinion, both the perceived suggestions of the participants and the new law seem to align with one another in the sense that both suggest a more versatile and entrepreneurial approach to the system governance of higher education. It seems that a Triple Helix III model approach that could facilitate the entrepreneurial environment, alliances and partnerships and contribute to building research capacity and “academic entrepreneurship” is aimed at the policymaking of the system governance of higher education (Mok, 2005, p. 540). Knowledge-based economy, innovation, multi-skilled workforce, and competitiveness at multiple levels seem to be central to the system governance of higher education, so adding of the third mission of economic and social development to the research and teaching missions of higher education (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). How these will reverberate with the current system governance model, how these will be negotiated with the stakeholders of the universities, and how these will be reflected upon the universities need further exploration.

7.2 Limitations of the study

This study has several limitations. One limitation of the study is that the study does not include the perspectives of rectors of non-profit foundation universities.

Although non-profit foundation universities and state universities are run with the same law, they differ in terms of their relationships with CoHE and the impact of CoHE on them. Also, the bulk of academicians and students are part of the state universities in Turkey. For these reasons, state universities were chosen as the field of study. Yet, additional research is needed to examine the operation of the system governance model and its advantages and challenges from the perspective of rectors of non-profit foundation universities.

A second limitation is that data collected and analyzed in this study do not include the perspectives of academicians and students on the system governance of higher education. Further research is needed to explore the issue from the perceptions of these two stakeholders of the system, which may be different from the perceptions of rectors, CoHE members, and government representatives reported in this study.

Another limitation of the study is that the system governance of higher education entails dynamic and complex processes. Its complexity is deterritorialized and reterritorialized connected to interdependent relationships not only at the national level but also at the international level. Although the study was guided by a conceptual framework formed after a broad review of literature, one study is not enough to reflect the growing complexity of the system.

This study was conducted with thirty-one participants. The findings of the study cannot be generalized for the whole higher education community.

7.3 Suggestions for future research

I believe comparative studies could be conducted using “Rhizomatic System Governance Process Framework.” Although the sub-items in the framework can change from one context to another, the main items together with their sub-items as a whole can offer a new perspective in the study of the system governance of higher education. The varying conceptual frameworks could be studied with similar items made use of in this study. The novel perspectives of similar functions could contribute to the future studies.

One varying conceptual framework has been “Rhizomatic and Tree-like System Governance Process.” Below I propose some specific questions for future research in relation to the system governance of Turkish higher education:

1. How might coordination and planning be institutionalized in the operation of the system governance?
2. How do the concerned institutions positioned in the top- and lower-tiers of the decision-making process join forces and powers to build and accelerate the capacities for favorable national development?
3. How might a differentiated but integrally uniform whole be formed in the operation of the system governance?
4. How are the local context (e.g. cultural, historical, national, and political legacies) and the capacities of the context (e.g. infrastructure, financing, human power) incorporated into deterritorialized practices, both within and outside the national boundaries?
5. How might the stakeholders of the system be de-responsibilized within the operation of the system governance? How does the system governance of higher education nurture inter-institutional trust?

6. How might the system governance of higher education build alternative thinking through public demand that enhances diversification within the system?
7. What are the consequences of new regulations such as the mission differentiation among the universities and the establishment of the Higher Education Quality Board?

7.4 Conclusion

This dissertation investigated the perceptions and understandings of the research participants about the operation of the system governance model in Turkish higher education. It also examined the perceptions and understandings of the participants about the advantages and the challenges of the system governance model they portrayed and explored the participants' perceived suggestions for improvements in the model.

Based on the findings, one conclusion that can be drawn from the study is that the structure operating in the system governance model seems to be bureaucratic and centralized. As such, it appears to be law-bound, have power-centers, combine supervision of inputs and outputs, and deprofessionalize academic roles. First, the law-bound structure within the Turkish higher education context is bound by Higher Education Law 2547 and appears to bring in formalized and standardized processes and procedures into the operation of the system governance. I think, the questions of to what extent this law-bound structure is responsive to (a) the needs and demands of the stakeholders of the system and (b) the context they function in and to what extent this law-bound structure serves the system in general emerge as areas for further exploration. Second, the two main power-centers in the structure seem to be CoHE

and rectors. The perception of CoHE as a power center seems to derive from what I coin as the de-responsibilization of academic and administrative staff through dependencies produced by centralized laws and regulations that could be both empowering and de-empowering in the operation of the system governance. In other words, the laws and regulations within the system governance seem to create a bi-directional effect of dependency and empowerment both stimulated through dependencies, thereby leading to the operation of de-responsibilization in the structure of the system governance. Third, a law-bound structure appears to deprofessionalize the academic roles of state university rectors towards more bureaucratic roles while they seem to take on more entrepreneurial roles through a power-centered structure. Considering the bureaucratic and centralized structure, the vertical decision-making process, and the de-responsibilization within the structure, I deduce that the current structure operating in the system governance appears to encourage bureaucratic roles and practices of rectors irrespective of their will. Fourth, the focus on the rules, laws, and regulations seems to result in a combined supervision of inputs and outputs from a single center, leading to a lack of participatory supervision mechanisms for following the input processes. One could argue that efforts to build separate supervision of the inputs and outputs need to pay special attention to such focus so that practices contextualized and constructed both within and outside the national boundaries are re-contextualized and re-constructed with the engagement of the stakeholders of the system. Pertinent to this, I suggest building of complementary mechanisms cognizant of the de-responsibilization of the stakeholders of the system so that acceptance and engagement on the side of academic and administrative staff could be yielded in the process of integrating supervision mechanisms into the operation of the system governance.

Another conclusion is that central planning and coordination function of the model seems to bring the needs and demands of the society into attention. It also appears to maintain integrity in the system governance and take on guiding and problem-solving roles. The participants also perceive the appointment system of rectors as an advantage that increases the accountability of power and contributes to the maintenance of sustainability within the universities. The contextualized advantages of the participants, I think, might imply that participants highlighted the advantages of the model that seemed more relevant to their specific context, which might be further interpreted as a result of separation of responsibilities among the institutions. In my opinion, another way to approach these contextualized answers of the participants might be the decision-making process and it might be said that participants focused more on the decisions they make or the decisions they are influenced by while exploring the advantages of the model.

Besides its advantages, there seems to be some challenges of the model. Diverse contextual accounts regarding the decision-making process seem to indicate a communication gap in the inter-institutional policy coordination and decision-making stemming from a vertical decision-making process. I am of the opinion that the state universities appear mostly not to be involved in the decision-making process and a lack of horizontal policy coordination and horizontal decision-making process appears to characterize a buffer body-state control and supervision model in the system governance of Turkish higher education. Considering the four main centers of control in the decision-making (CoHE and three ministries), which, in my view, both within the main centers of control and down from the main centers to the universities appear to mainly portray hierarchy and vertical linkages, I deduce that the mode of coordination in the system governance seems to be mainly driven by vertical

regulation. As a corollary, I suggest the communication gap in the inter-institutional policy coordination and decision-making at the multilevel system governance and the mainly vertical mode of coordination in the system governance process as areas for further exploration in terms of their projections for the stakeholders of the system, the overall system governance process, and the system in general.

The model seems to challenge the participants as to how to connect with the interdependent relationships and increase the coordination and communication with one another in the operation of the system governance. Unification and lack of autonomy appear to contradict with the spirit of acceleration for contribution to the development at multiple levels. As such, taking the various suggestions of the participants into account, I suggest a plurality in ways of coordination so that vertical coordination can be combined with horizontal coordination in the operation of the system governance. One way of incorporating a pluralized coordination into the system governance seems to be a change in the form of supervision, which seems to denote a coordination and planning body that could function as a strategic coordinator in the operation of the system governance and an expansion in the decision-making mechanisms to the stakeholders of the system governance. In my view, such a plurality in ways of coordination seems to be one key area for improvement in the system governance process mode of governance of which appears to be mostly national and thus have a closed territorially bounded approach. Building on this point, I deduce that national experiences and international experiences can be enriched and pluralized within the national boundaries and research development activities can be nurtured through national and international collaboration through a pluralized coordination. Another way of integrating a pluralized coordination into the system governance seems to be a more diversified

approach to the system governance model via an extension in the scope of mission differentiation policy. Increased stakeholder involvement through Triple Helix III model seems to be a suggestion that could foster building ties between the university, industry, and government and contribute to a diversified approach to funding in place of a solely state-based funding. On the other hand, considering the findings leading to marking the sub-items of the governance indicators - institutional autonomy, academic freedom, accountability, transparency, and financing - with a question mark to denote an area for improvement in the system governance process, I suggest the question of how a shift from buffer body-state control and supervision model could serve to mitigate the dualism between self-governance and bureaucracy in efforts to pluralize the ways of coordination in the system governance as an area for further exploration. For it seems that a state university in the Turkish higher education system has certain dependences on the state in terms of its financing, staffing, and educational and training activities.

Finally, I argue that the participants' diverse suggestions for a pluralized coordination seem to indicate perception of system governance as a process, which has been argued to be "Rhizomatic-Tree-like" in this dissertation. I believe that the perceived suggestions for improvements of the participants could foster a rhizomatic system governance process in the operation of the system governance. It is important to note that this study was conducted with a limited number of participants. The findings of the study cannot be generalized for the whole higher education community. Also, while important, one study is not considered to be enough to reflect the growing complexity of the higher education system.

7.5 Reflections

Undertaking this dissertation was an invaluable learning experience that helped me discover and reconcile with my one another. My challenges as a scholar and on a personal level were separate but had to be mingled and negotiated.

As a scholar, to prepare myself to interact with the term governance, I indulged myself in reading the works of social theorists such as Bourdieu, Derrida, Durkheim, Foucault, Marx, and Weber. Facing resituating my conception of governance along with these readings put me in a dialogue with economics, sociology, management, philosophy, and political science. As I read, I became more aware of the complexities of processes and relationships involved in the issue of system governance. That complexity established a cyclical road map taking me to the development of “Rhizomatic System Governance Process Framework.”

On a more personal level, in all stages of dissertation, there were many times I felt inadequate. In the literature review, writing about the relationships and processes involved in the contexts I was unfamiliar with was heavy and required constant questioning. However, I came to the understanding that writing about my own context was even harder. Having tried to go beyond a taken-for-granted reading of the system governance of higher education, I faced my own context. That challenged me even more both in the analysis of data and in the writing of the final chapter. Especially in the writing stage, there were moments I could not write. For I felt inadequate that I could interpret and discuss the logics behind relationships and processes integrated into the system governance of higher education. In this sense, I feel I grew locally, nationally, and globally.

On an emotional level, work on this dissertation was entangled with two extremely serious medical issues in my family. While, as a qualitative researcher, I

discussed and interpreted the realities of the participants, I also discussed and interpreted the realities of my self, my government. Living with my realities and writing the dissertation have turned these simultaneously interwoven processes into a lifelong learning experience.

APPENDIX A

UNIVERSITIES IN TURKEY (1933 - 2018)

Region	City	University	Foundation
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul University	1933
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Technical University	1944
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Ankara University	1946
Aegean	İzmir	Ege University	1955
Black Sea	Trabzon	Karadeniz Technical University	1955
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Middle East Technical University	1956
Eastern Anatolia	Erzurum	Atatürk University	1957
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Hacettepe University	1967
Marmara	İstanbul	Boğaziçi University	1971
Mediterranean	Adana	Çukurova University	1973
Southeastern Anatolia	Diyarbakır	Dicle University	1973
Central Anatolia	Eskişehir	Anadolu University	1973
Central Anatolia	Sivas	Cumhuriyet University	1974
Marmara	Bursa	Uludağ University	1975
Eastern Anatolia	Elazığ	Fırat University	1975
Central Anatolia	Konya	Selçuk University	1975
Eastern Anatolia	Malatya	İnönü University	1975
Black Sea	Samsun	Ondokuz Mayıs University	1975
Central Anatolia	Kayseri	Erciyes University	1978
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Gazi University	1982
Mediterranean	Antalya	Akdeniz University	1982
Marmara	Edirne	Trakya University	1982
Marmara	İstanbul	Marmara University	1982
Marmara	İstanbul	Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University	1982
Marmara	İstanbul	Yıldız Technical University	1982
Aegean	İzmir	Dokuz Eylül University	1982
Eastern Anatolia	Van	Van Yüzüncü Yıl University	1982
Central Anatolia	Ankara	İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University	1984
Southeastern Anatolia	Gaziantep	Gaziantep University	1987
Central Anatolia	Afyonkarahisar	Afyon Kocatepe University	1992
Aegean	Aydın	Adnan Menderes University	1992
Marmara	Balıkesir	Balıkesir University	1992
Black Sea	Bolu	Abant İzzet Baysal University	1992

Marmara	Çanakkale	Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University	1992
Aegean	Denizli	Pamukkale University	1992
Mediterranean	Hatay	Mustafa Kemal University	1992
Mediterranean	Isparta	Süleyman Demirel University	1992
Aegean	İzmir	İzmir Institute of Technology	1992
Mediterranean	Kahramanmaraş	Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam University	1992
Eastern Anatolia	Kars	Kafkas University	1992
Central Anatolia	Kırıkkale	Kırıkkale University	1992
Marmara	Kocaeli	Gebze Technical University	1992
Marmara	Kocaeli	Kocaeli University	1992
Central Anatolia	Kütahya	Dumlupınar University	1992
Aegean	Manisa	Manisa Celal Bayar University	1992
Mediterranean	Mersin	Mersin University	1992
Aegean	Muğla	Muğla Sıtkı Koçman University	1992
Central Anatolia	Niğde	Niğde Ömer Halis Demir University	1992
Marmara	Sakarya	Sakarya University	1992
Southeastern Anatolia	Şanlıurfa	Harran University	1992
Black Sea	Tokat	Gaziosmanpaşa University	1992
Black Sea	Zonguldak	Bülent Ecevit University	1992
Marmara	İstanbul	Koç University	1992
Central Anatolia	Eskişehir	Eskişehir Osmangazi University	1993
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Başkent University	1993
Marmara	İstanbul	Galatasaray University	1994
Marmara	İstanbul	Fatih University (1)	1996
Marmara	İstanbul	Işık University	1996
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Bilgi University	1996
Marmara	İstanbul	Sabancı University	1996
Marmara	İstanbul	Yeditepe University	1996
Marmara	İstanbul	Kadir Has University	1997
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Atılım University	1997
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Çankaya University	1997
Marmara	İstanbul	Beykent University	1997
Marmara	İstanbul	Doğuş University	1997
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Kültür University	1997
Marmara	İstanbul	Maltepe University	1997
Mediterranean	Mersin	Çağ University	1997
Marmara	İstanbul	Bahçeşehir University	1998
Marmara	İstanbul	Haliç University	1998
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Ufuk University	1999
Marmara	İstanbul	Okan University	1999

Aegean	İzmir	İzmir University of Economics	2001
Aegean	İzmir	Yaşar University	2001
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Ticaret University	2001
Central Anatolia	Ankara	TOBB University of Economics and Technology	2003
Southeastern Anatolia	Adıyaman	Adıyaman University	2006
Central Anatolia	Aksaray	Aksaray University	2006
Black Sea	Amasya	Amasya University	2006
Mediterranean	Burdur	Mehmet Akif Ersoy University	2006
Black Sea	Çorum	Hitit University	2006
Black Sea	Düzce	Düzce University	2006
Eastern Anatolia	Erzincan	Erzincan University	2006
Black Sea	Giresun	Giresun University	2006
Black Sea	Kastamonu	Kastamonu University	2006
Central Anatolia	Kırşehir	Ahi Evran University	2006
Black Sea	Ordu	Ordu University	2006
Black Sea	Rize	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan University	2006
Marmara	Tekirdağ	Namık Kemal University	2006
Aegean	Uşak	Uşak University	2006
Central Anatolia	Yozgat	Bozok University	2006
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Bilim University	2006
Eastern Anatolia	Ağrı	Ağrı İbrahim Çeçen University	2007
Black Sea	Artvin	Artvin Çoruh University	2007
Southeastern Anatolia	Batman	Batman University	2007
Marmara	Bilecik	Bilecik Şeyh Edebali University	2007
Eastern Anatolia	Bingöl	Bingöl University	2007
Eastern Anatolia	Bitlis	Bitlis Eren University	2007
Central Anatolia	Çankırı	Çankırı Karatekin University	2007
Black Sea	Karabük	Karabük University	2007
Central Anatolia	Karaman	Karamanoğlu Mehmetbey University	2007
Marmara	Kırklareli	Kırklareli University	2007
Southeastern Anatolia	Kilis	Kilis 7 Aralık University	2007
Southeastern Anatolia	Mardin	Mardin Artuklu University	2007
Eastern Anatolia	Muş	Muş Alparslan University	2007
Central Anatolia	Nevşehir	Nevşehir Hacı Bektaş Veli University	2007
Mediterranean	Osmaniye	Osmaniye Korkut Ata University	2007
Southeastern Anatolia	Siirt	Siirt University	2007
Black Sea	Sinop	Sinop University	2007
Marmara	İstanbul	Acıbadem Mehmet Ali Aydınlar University	2007
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Arel University	2007

Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Aydın University	2007
Marmara	İstanbul	Özyeğin University	2007
Aegean	İzmir	İzmir University (1)	2007
Eastern Anatolia	Ardahan	Ardahan University	2008
Black Sea	Bartın	Bartın University	2008
Black Sea	Bayburt	Bayburt University	2008
Black Sea	Gümüşhane	Gümüşhane University	2008
Eastern Anatolia	Hakkari	Hakkari University	2008
Eastern Anatolia	İğdır	İğdır University	2008
Southeastern Anatolia	Şırnak	Şırnak University	2008
Eastern Anatolia	Tunceli	Munzur University	2008
Marmara	Yalova	Yalova University	2008
Marmara	İstanbul	Piri Reis University	2008
Marmara	İstanbul	Altınbaş University	2008
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Şehir University	2008
Aegean	İzmir	Gediz University (1)	2008
Southeastern Anatolia	Gaziantep	Hasan Kalyoncu University	2008
Central Anatolia	Kayseri	Melikşah University (1)	2008
Southeastern Anatolia	Gaziantep	Zirve University (1)	2009
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Yeni Yüzyıl University	2009
Mediterranean	Mersin	Toros University	2009
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Medipol University	2009
Central Anatolia	Konya	KTO Karatay University	2009
Central Anatolia	Konya	Mevlana University (1)	2009
Central Anatolia	Kayseri	Nuh Naci Yazgan University	2009
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Turgut Özal University (1)	2009
Central Anatolia	Ankara	TED University	2009
Marmara	İstanbul	Turkish-German University	2010
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University	2010
Marmara	Bursa	Bursa Technical University	2010
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Medeniyet University	2010
Aegean	İzmir	İzmir Katip Çelebi University	2010
Central Anatolia	Konya	Necmettin Erbakan University	2010
Eastern Anatolia	Erzurum	Erzurum Technical University	2010
Central Anatolia	Kayseri	Abdullah Gül University	2010
Marmara	İstanbul	Fatih Sultan Mehmet Vakıf University	2010
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul 29 Mayıs University	2010
Marmara	İstanbul	Süleyman Şah University (1)	2010
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Sabahattin Zaim University	2010
Marmara	İstanbul	Bezmialem Vakıf University	2010

Black Sea	Samsun	Canik Başarı University (1)	2010
Mediterranean	Antalya	Antalya Bilim University	2010
Aegean	İzmir	Şifa University (1)	2010
Black Sea	Trabzon	Avrasya University	2010
Mediterranean	Adana	Adana Science and Technology University	2011
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Gelişim University	2011
Marmara	İstanbul	Üsküdar University	2011
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Gedik University	2011
Marmara	Bursa	Bursa Orhangazi University (1)	2011
Mediterranean	Antalya	Alanya Hamdullah Emin Paşa University	2011
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Türk Hava Kurumu University	2011
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Yüksek İhtisas University	2011
Central Anatolia	Ankara	İpek University (1)	2011
Marmara	İstanbul	MEF University	2012
Marmara	İstanbul	Nişantaşı University	2012
Marmara	İstanbul	Murat Hüdavendigâr University (1)	2012
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Social Sciences University of Ankara	2013
Southeastern Anatolia	Diyarbakır	Selahattin Eyyubi University (1)	2013
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Anka University of Technology	2013
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Esenyurt University	2013
Mediterranean	Adana	Kanuni University (1)	2013
Central Anatolia	Konya	Konya Food and Agriculture University	2013
Southeastern Anatolia	Gaziantep	SANKO University	2013
Marmara	İstanbul	Biruni University	2014
Marmara	İstanbul	Sağlık Bilimleri University	2015
Marmara	Balıkesir	Bandırma Onyedî Eylül University	2015
Mediterranean	Hatay	İskenderun Technical University	2015
Mediterranean	Antalya	Alanya Alaaddin Keykubat University	2015
Marmara	İstanbul	International Science, Technology, and Islam University	2015
Mediterranean	Antalya	Antalya AKEV University	2015
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Rumeli University	2015
Marmara	İstanbul	İbn Haldun University	2015
Marmara	İstanbul	İstinye University	2015
Aegean	İzmir	İzmir Bakırçay University	2016
Aegean	İzmir	İzmir Demokrasi University	2016
Marmara	İstanbul	National Defense University	2016
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Kent University	2016
Marmara	İstanbul	Beykoz University	2016
Marmara	İstanbul	İstanbul Ayrınsaray University	2016

Marmara	İstanbul	Fenerbahçe University	2016
Marmara	İstanbul	Turkish-Japanese Science and Technology University	2017
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Ankara University of Fine Arts	2017
Central Anatolia	Nevşehir	Kapadokya University	2017
Central Anatolia	Ankara	Ostim Technical University	2017

Note: The number (1) is used to denote the fifteen non-profit foundation universities closed down by the governmental decree no. 667.

APPENDIX B

QUOTE: STRATEGIC PURPOSES

1. Yükseköğretimi Nitelik ve Nicelik Olarak Ulusal ve Uluslararası Standartlara Uygun Etkin ve Etkili Olarak Planlamak ve Yönetmek
2. Yükseköğretim Kurulunun Kurumsal Kapasitesini ve İşleyişini Geliştirmek
3. Yükseköğretim Denetim Sistemini Daha Etkin ve Etkili Hale Getirmek
4. Üniversitelerarası Kurulun Kurumsal Kapasitesinin İşleyişini Geliştirmek (Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE], 2015a, p. 23)

APPENDIX C

ETHICAL APPROVAL BY THE INSTITUTIONAL ETHICAL REVIEW BOARD
FOR RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS (İNAREK)

BOĞAZIÇI ÜNİVERSİTESİ
İnsan Araştırmaları Kurumsal Değerlendirme Kurulu (İNAREK) Toplantı Tutanağı
2015/03

15.06.2015

Meltem Akbulut Yıldırımış
Boğaziçi Üniv. Yetişkin Eğitimi ABD. Kuzey Kampüs 34342-Bebek-İstanbul
meltemakbulut@sehir.edu.tr.

Sayın Araştırmacı,

“Yükseköğretim Kıdemli Yönetici ve Üst Yöneticilerinin Türkiye Yükseköğretiminde Merkezîyetçilik Hakkındaki Görüşleri” başlıklı projeniz ile yaptığımız Boğaziçi Üniversitesi İnsan Araştırmaları Kurumsal Değerlendirme Kurulu (İNAREK) 2015/55 kayıt numaralı başvuru 15.06.2015 tarihli ve 2015/03 sayılı kurul toplantısında incelenerek etik onay verilmesi uygun bulunmuştur.

Saygılarımızla,



Doç.Dr. Arzu Çelik Fuss
Moleküler Biyoloji ve Genetik Bölümü,
Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi,
İstanbul



Yrd.Doç.Dr. Özgür Kocaturk
Biyo-Medikal Mühendisliği Enstitüsü
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi,
İstanbul



Doç.Dr. Özlem Hesapçı
İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi,
İşletme Bölümü, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi,
İstanbul

APPENDIX D

INFORMED CONSENT FOR CURRENT/FORMER SENIOR

ADMINISTRATORS³⁵

KIDEMLİ YÖNETİCİLER / ESKİ KIDEMLİ YÖNETİCİLER İÇİN KATILIMCI BİLGİ VE ONAM FORMU

Yükseköğretim Kıdemli Yönetici, Üst Yönetici ve Temsilcilerinin Türkiye Yükseköğretiminde
Mevcut İdari Yapı Hakkındaki Görüşleri

Bu çalışmada, YÖK'ün mevcut idari yapısının nasıl işlediği ve bu işleyişin yükseköğretim kıdemli yönetici ve üst yöneticileri tarafından nasıl algılandığının incelenmesi hedeflenmektedir. Bunun için, Yükseköğretim Kurulu, devlet üniversiteleri ve bakanlıklar araştırma sahası olarak seçilmiştir. Çalışma, bir (1) adet 60-90 dakikalık yüz yüze görüşme ve ihtiyaç olması durumunda ve sizin de gönüllü olmanız halinde ikinci bir görüşme olasılığını içermektedir. Bu nitel süreçlerle toplanacak veriler Meltem Akbulut Yıldırım tarafından analiz edilecektir. Siz, bir devlet üniversitesinin kıdemli yöneticisi ve/veya eski kıdemli yöneticisi olarak bu çalışmaya seçilmiş bulunmaktasınız. İsmi ya da herhangi bir tanımlayıcı kişisel özelliğiniz veri toplama ve analiz etme süreçlerinde yer almayacaktır.

Bu çalışmaya katılım tamamen gönüllü olup, görüşmeler ve çalışmadan istediğiniz zaman ve herhangi bir ceza almaksızın ayrılabilirsiniz. Görüşme tamamlandıktan sonra size bir bedel ödenmeyecektir.

Verileri analiz ederken ve yazarken kimliğiniz tamamen gizli tutulacaktır. Rapor, sunum ya da yayımlarımda vereceğim bilgilerle isminiz hiçbir şekilde ilişkilendirilmeyecektir. Özel yaşamınız, kanunların izin verdiği maksimum düzeyde korunacaktır. Görüşme sürecinde rahatsızlık hissederseniz, istediğiniz zaman ve hiçbir cezaya tabi tutulmaksızın bir soruyu cevaplamayı ve/veya görüşmeye son vermeyi tercih edebilirsiniz.

Görüşme sırasında ses kayıt edici cihaz kullanılacaktır. Görüşmenin kaydedilmesini istemiyor iseniz, görüşmenin başında araştırmacıyı bilgilendiriniz. Kayıtlar, veri analizi sonrasında yok edilecektir.

Bu çalışmayla ilgili herhangi bir sorunuz olursa araştırmacı Meltem Akbulut Yıldırım ile (meltemakbulut@sehir.edu.tr) ya da araştırmacının doktora tez danışmanı Doç. Dr. Fatma Nevra Seggie (nevra.seggie@boun.edu.tr) ile irtibata geçebilirsiniz. Ayrıca, katılımcı olarak, haklarınızla ilgili bir sorunuz ya da söyleyecekleriniz olursa ya da çalışmanın herhangi bir yerinden memnun kalmazsanız Boğaziçi Üniversitesi İnsan Araştırmaları Kurumsal Değerlendirme Kurulu (İNAREK) Başkanlığı ile irtibata geçebilirsiniz (Telefon: 0212 359 54 00).

Aşağıya atacağınız imzanız, bu çalışmaya katılmayı gönüllü olarak kabul ettiğinizi gösterir.

Katılımcının Adı

Katılımcının İmzası

Tarih

Ses Kaydını Kabul Ediyorum

³⁵ After the thesis defense, the title of the thesis was changed to Higher Education Governance: Perceptions of Rectors, CoHE Members, and Government Representatives, following the Thesis Committee Members' suggestions and recommendations. So, the term senior administrator was replaced with rector, governing board member with CoHE member, and ministry representative with government representative.

APPENDIX E

INFORMED CONSENT FOR CURRENT/FORMER GOVERNING BOARD

MEMBERS AND CURRENT MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVES³⁶

ÜST YÖNETİCİLER / ESKİ ÜST YÖNETİCİLER İÇİN KATILIMCI BİLGİ VE ONAM FORMU

Yükseköğretim Kıdemli Yönetici, Üst Yönetici ve Temsilcilerinin Türkiye Yükseköğretiminde Mevcut İdari Yapı Hakkındaki Görüşleri

Bu çalışmada, YÖK'ün mevcut idari yapısının nasıl işlediği ve bu işleyişin yükseköğretim kıdemli yönetici ve üst yöneticileri tarafından nasıl algılandığının incelenmesi hedeflenmektedir. Bunun için, Yükseköğretim Kurulu, devlet üniversiteleri ve bakanlıklar araştırma sahası olarak seçilmiştir. Çalışma, bir (1) adet 60-90 dakikalık yüz yüze görüşme ve ihtiyaç olması durumunda ve sizin de gönüllü olmanız halinde ikinci bir görüşme olasılığını içermektedir. Bu nitel süreçlerle toplanacak veriler Meltem Akbulut Yıldırım tarafından analiz edilecektir. Siz, bir üst yönetici ve/veya eski üst yönetici olarak bu çalışmaya seçilmiş bulunmaktasınız. İsmi ya da herhangi bir tanımlayıcı kişisel özelliğinin veri toplama ve analiz etme süreçlerinde yer almayacaktır.

Bu çalışmaya katılım tamamen gönüllü olup, görüşmeler ve çalışmadan istediğiniz zaman ve herhangi bir ceza almaksızın ayrılabilirsiniz. Görüşme tamamlandıktan sonra size bir bedel ödenmeyecektir.

Verileri analiz ederken ve yazarken kimliğiniz tamamen gizli tutulacaktır. Rapor, sunum ya da yayımlarımda vereceğim bilgilerle isminiz hiçbir şekilde ilişkilendirilmeyecektir. Özel yaşamınız, kanunların izin verdiği maksimum düzeyde korunacaktır. Görüşme sürecinde rahatsızlık hissederseniz, istediğiniz zaman ve hiçbir cezaya tabi tutulmaksızın bir soruyu cevaplamamayı ve/veya görüşmeye son vermeyi tercih edebilirsiniz.

Görüşme sırasında ses kayıt edici cihaz kullanılacaktır. Görüşmenin kaydedilmesini istemiyor iseniz, görüşmenin başında araştırmacıyı bilgilendiriniz. Kayıtlar, veri analizi sonrasında yok edilecektir.

Bu çalışmayla ilgili herhangi bir sorunuz olursa araştırmacı Meltem Akbulut Yıldırım ile (meltemakbulut@sehir.edu.tr) ya da araştırmacının doktora tez danışmanı Doç. Dr. Fatma Nevra Seggie (nevra.seggie@boun.edu.tr) ile irtibata geçebilirsiniz. Ayrıca, katılımcı olarak, haklarınızla ilgili bir sorunuz ya da söyleyecekleriniz olursa ya da çalışmanın herhangi bir yerinden memnun kalmazsanız Boğaziçi Üniversitesi İnsan Araştırmaları Kurumsal Değerlendirme Kurulu (İNAREK) Başkanlığı ile irtibata geçebilirsiniz (Telefon: 0212 359 54 00).

Aşağıya atacağınız imzanız, bu çalışmaya katılmayı gönüllü olarak kabul ettiğinizi gösterir.

Katılımcının Adı

Katılımcının İmzası

Tarih

Ses Kaydını Kabul Ediyorum

³⁶ After the thesis defense, the title of the thesis was changed to Higher Education Governance: Perceptions of Rectors, CoHE Members, and Government Representatives, following the Thesis Committee Members' suggestions and recommendations. So, the term senior administrator was replaced with rector, governing board member with CoHE member, and ministry representative with government representative.

APPENDIX F

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL USED FOR THE PILOT STUDY:

CURRENT/FORMER SENIOR ADMINISTRATORS³⁷

KIDEMLİ YÖNETİCİLER İÇİN HAZIRLANMIŞ GÖRÜŞME SORULARI

1. Kıdemli yönetici olarak sizden beklenen nedir? Görev ve sorumluluklarınızı kısaca açıkla mısınız?
(*What are your duties as a senior administrator? Could you briefly explain your duties and responsibilities?*)
2. Kıdemli yönetici olarak üniversite ile ilgili ihtiyaçlarınızı nasıl belirliyorsunuz?
(*How do you determine the needs of the university as a senior administrator?*)
3. Belirlenen ihtiyaçları karşılamak üzere, YÖK'ten ne tür talepleriniz oluyor?
(*What do you demand from CoHE as far as meeting the needs you determine are concerned?*)
4. YÖK ile olan iletişiminizi nasıl sağlıyorsunuz?
(*How do you get into contact with CoHE?*)
 - a. Siz ihtiyaçlarınızı YÖK'e nasıl iletiyorsunuz?
(*How do you communicate your needs to CoHE?*)
 - b. Sizin talepleriniz YÖK'ün hangi biriminde nasıl değerlendiriliyor?
(*By which unit and how are your demands taken into consideration?*)
 - c. Talepleriniz ne kadar sürede karşılık buluyor?
(*How long does it take them to meet your demands?*)
 - d. YÖK'ün sizin taleplerinize yaklaşımı nasıldır?
(*What is CoHE's approach to your demands?*)
5. Yükseköğretim sisteminin merkeziyetçi olduğu ifade ediliyor. Siz bu tespiti katılıyor musunuz?
(*The higher education system is considered to be centralized. Do you agree with this view?*)
 - a. YÖK'ün merkeziyetçi yapısının üniversitelerin gelişimine katkısı nedir?
(*What are the benefits of the centralized system governance model as far as the development of the university is concerned?*)

³⁷ After the thesis defense, the title of the thesis was changed to Higher Education Governance: Perceptions of Rectors, CoHE Members, and Government Representatives, following the Thesis Committee Members' suggestions and recommendations. So, the term senior administrator was replaced with rector, governing board member with CoHE member, and ministry representative with government representative.

- b. YÖK'ü yeni fikirlere açık buluyor musunuz?
(Do you think that CoHE is open to new ideas?)
- c. Siz YÖK'e öneri getirebiliyor musunuz? Varsa bu öneriler nelerdir?
(Could you offer any ideas to CoHE? If you do, what are these suggestions?)
- d. Önerilerinize cevap alabiliyor musunuz? Bununla ilgili yaşadığınız somut bir örnek var mı? Kısaca bahseder misiniz?
(Do you get any feedback to your suggestions? Can you give an example to such a case? Can you briefly explain it?)
- e. YÖK'ün talimatlarını uygularken herhangi bir zorlukla karşılaştınız mı? Bu zorluklarla nasıl başa çıkıyorsunuz?
(Have you experienced any difficulties while you are implementing CoHE's instructions? How do you overcome the difficulties?)
- f. Kıdemli yöneticiler olarak YÖK'ün talimatlarını sorguluyor musunuz?
(As senior administrators do you question CoHE's instructions?)
6. Yükseköğretim sisteminin merkezîyetçi yapısının üniversite yönetimine etkisi nedir?
(What influence does the centralized system governance model have on the university administration?)
- a. Yükseköğretim sisteminin merkezîyetçi yapısının üniversite yönetimine sağladığı avantajlar nelerdir?
(What are the advantages of the centralized system governance model to the university administration?)
- b. Yükseköğretim sisteminin merkezîyetçi yapısı ile ilgili herhangi bir zorluk veya dezavantaj yaşadınız mı?
(Have you experienced any difficulties or disadvantages concerning the centralized system governance model?)
- c. Bu zorluklarla nasıl başa çıkıyorsunuz?
(How do you overcome these difficulties?)
7. YÖK'ün demokratik bir yapıya sahip olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?
(Do you believe that CoHE is a democratic organization?)
8. YÖK'ün yetkilerinin azaltılması gerektiğini düşünüyor musunuz?
(Do you believe that CoHE should have less authority?)
9. Sizce YÖK gerekli mi, yoksa kaldırılması mı gerekli? Neden?
(Do you believe that CoHE is necessary? Or do you think CoHE should be abolished? Why?)
- a. Gerekli ise,
(Why do you think it is necessary?)

b. Kaldırılması gerekli ise,
(*Why do you think it should be abolished?*)

10. Merkeziyetçi yönetim sisteminin günümüz koşullarında alternatifleri neler olabilir?
(*What other systems may be alternatives to the centralized system governance model?*)

Ekleme ve/veya ayrıntılı olarak belirtmek istediğiniz bir şey var mı?
(*Are there further issues you would like to point out?*)

* Kıdemli yöneticiler için hazırlanmış görüşme soruları eski kıdemli yöneticilere göre adapte edilecektir:

* (*The interview questions asked to the senior administrators are adapted to the interview questions asked to the former senior administrators.*)

Örnek: Kıdemli yönetici olarak sizden beklenen neydi? Görev ve sorumluluklarınızı kısaca açıklayınız.

For example: (*What were your duties as a senior administrator? Could you briefly explain your duties and responsibilities?*)

APPENDIX G

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL USED IN THE STUDY: CURRENT/FORMER SENIOR ADMINISTRATORS³⁸

1. What are your duties as a senior administrator? Could you briefly explain your duties and responsibilities?
 - a. What does CoHE expect from you?
 - b. What does the university expect from you?
2. How do you weigh your priorities when you determine the needs of the university as a senior administrator?
3. What do you demand from CoHE as far as meeting the needs you determine are concerned?
4. How do you get into contact with CoHE?
 - a. How do you communicate your needs to CoHE?
 - b. By which unit and how are your demands taken into consideration?
 - c. How long does it take them to meet your demands?
 - d. What is CoHE's approach to your demands?
5. Could you explain the current system governance model?
 - a. What are the benefits of the current system governance model as far as the development of the university is concerned?
 - b. Do you think that CoHE is open to new ideas?
 - c. Could you offer any ideas for the development of higher education to CoHE? If you do, what are these suggestions?

³⁸ After the thesis defense, the title of the thesis was changed to Higher Education Governance: Perceptions of Rectors, CoHE Members, and Government Representatives, following the Thesis Committee Members' suggestions and recommendations. So, the term senior administrator was replaced with rector, governing board member with CoHE member, and ministry representative with government representative.

- d. Do you get any feedback to your suggestions? Can you give an example to such a case? Can you briefly explain it?
 - e. Have you experienced any difficulties while you are implementing CoHE's decisions? How do you overcome the difficulties?
 - f. As senior administrators do you demand any changes regarding CoHE's decisions?
6. What influence does the current system governance model have on the university administration?
- a. What are the advantages of the current system governance model to the university administration?
 - b. Have you experienced any difficulties or disadvantages concerning the current system governance model?
 - c. How do you overcome these difficulties?
7. Do you believe that CoHE is a democratic organization?
8. Do you believe that CoHE should have less authority?
9. Do you believe that CoHE is necessary? Or do you think CoHE should be abolished? Why?
- a. Why do you think it is necessary?
 - b. Why do you think it should be abolished?
10. What other systems may be alternatives to the current system governance model?

Are there further issues you would like to point out?

* The interview questions asked to the senior administrators are adapted to the interview questions asked to the former senior administrators.

For example: What were your duties as a senior administrator? Could you briefly explain your duties and responsibilities?

- a. What did CoHE expect from you?
- b. What did the university expect from you?

APPENDIX H

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL USED IN THE STUDY (TURKISH):

CURRENT/FORMER SENIOR ADMINISTRATORS³⁹

KIDEMLİ YÖNETİCİLER İÇİN HAZIRLANMIŞ GÖRÜŞME SORULARI

1. Kıdemli yönetici olarak sizden beklenen nedir? Görev ve sorumluluklarınızı kısaca açıkla mısınız?
 - a. YÖK sizden ne bekliyor?
 - b. Üniversite sizden ne bekliyor?
2. Kıdemli yönetici olarak üniversite ile ilgili ihtiyaçlarınızı belirlerken önceliklerinizi nasıl belirliyorsunuz?
3. Belirlenen ihtiyaçları karşılamak üzere, YÖK'ten ne tür talepleriniz oluyor?
4. YÖK ile olan iletişiminizi nasıl sağlıyorsunuz?
 - a. Siz ihtiyaçlarınızı YÖK'e nasıl iletiyorsunuz?
 - b. Sizin talepleriniz YÖK'ün hangi biriminde nasıl değerlendiriliyor?
 - c. Talepleriniz ne kadar sürede karşılık buluyor?
 - d. YÖK'ün sizin taleplerinize yaklaşımı nasıldır?
5. Yükseköğretim sisteminin mevcut idari yapısını açıkla mısınız?
 - a. YÖK'ün mevcut idari yapısının üniversitelerin gelişimine katkısı nedir?
 - b. YÖK'ü yeni fikirlere açık buluyor musunuz?
 - c. Siz YÖK'e yükseköğretim politikalarının gelişimi açısından öneri getirebiliyor musunuz? Varsa bu öneriler nelerdir?

³⁹ After the thesis defense, the title of the thesis was changed to Higher Education Governance: Perceptions of Rectors, CoHE Members, and Government Representatives, following the Thesis Committee Members' suggestions and recommendations. So, the term senior administrator was replaced with rector, governing board member with CoHE member, and ministry representative with government representative.

- d. Önerilerinize cevap alabiliyor musunuz? Bununla ilgili yaşadığınız somut bir örnek var mı? Kısaca bahseder misiniz?
 - e. YÖK'ün kararlarını uygularken herhangi bir zorlukla karşılaştınız mı? Bu zorluklarla nasıl başa çıkıyorsunuz?
 - f. Kıdemli yöneticiler olarak YÖK'ün kararları ile ilgili değişiklikler talep ediyor musunuz?
6. Yükseköğretim sisteminin mevcut idari yapısının üniversite yönetimine etkisi nedir?
- a. Yükseköğretim sisteminin mevcut idari yapısının üniversite yönetimine sağladığı avantajlar nelerdir?
 - b. Yükseköğretim sisteminin mevcut idari yapısı ile ilgili herhangi bir zorluk veya dezavantaj yaşadınız mı?
 - c. Bu zorluklarla nasıl başa çıkıyorsunuz?
7. YÖK'ün demokratik bir yapıya sahip olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?
8. YÖK'ün yetkilerinin azaltılması gerektiğini düşünüyor musunuz?
9. Sizce YÖK gerekli mi, yoksa kaldırılması mı gerekli? Neden?
- a. Gerekli ise,
 - b. Kaldırılması gerekli ise,
10. Mevcut idari yapının günümüz koşullarında alternatifleri neler olabilir?

Ekleme ve/veya ayrıntılı olarak belirtmek istediğiniz bir şey var mı?

* Kıdemli yöneticiler için hazırlanmış görüşme soruları eski kıdemli yöneticilere göre adapte edilecektir:

Örnek: Kıdemli yönetici olarak sizden beklenen neydi? Görev ve sorumluluklarınızı kısaca açıklayınız.

- a. YÖK sizden ne bekliyordu?
- b. Üniversite sizden ne bekliyordu?

APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL USED FOR THE PILOT STUDY:

CURRENT/FORMER GOVERNING BOARD MEMBERS⁴⁰

ÜST YÖNETİCİLER İÇİN HAZIRLANMIŞ GÖRÜŞME SORULARI

1. Yükseköğretim sisteminin bir üst yöneticisi olarak sizden beklenen nedir? Görev ve sorumluluklarınızı kısaca açıkla mısınız?
(*What are your duties as a governing board member? Could you briefly explain your duties and responsibilities?*)
2. Üst yönetici olarak yükseköğretim sisteminin ihtiyaçlarını nasıl belirliyorsunuz?
(*How do you determine the needs of higher education as a governing board member?*)
3. Belirlenen ihtiyaçları karşılamak üzere, hangi kurumlar ile iletişim kuruyorsunuz?
(*Which institutions are CoHE in contact with so as to meet the needs?*)
4. Üniversiteler ile olan iletişiminizi nasıl sağlıyorsunuz?
(*How does CoHE get into contact with universities?*)
 - a. Üniversiteler taleplerini YÖK'e nasıl iletiyor?
(*How do universities communicate their needs to CoHE?*)
 - b. Üniversitelerin talepleri YÖK'ün hangi biriminde nasıl değerlendiriliyor?
(*By which unit and how are their demands are taken into consideration?*)
 - c. Üniversitelerin talepleri ne kadar sürede karşılık buluyor?
(*How long does it take CoHE to meet their demands?*)
 - d. Sizin üniversitelerin taleplerine yaklaşımınız nasıldır? Talepler ile ilgili öncelikleri nasıl belirliyorsunuz? Öncelik sıralamasını nasıl yapıyorsunuz?
(*What is CoHE's approach to the demands by universities? How does CoHE determine its priorities? How does CoHE prioritize the demands?*)
 - e. Siz üniversitelerden olan taleplerinizi nasıl belirliyorsunuz?
(*How does CoHE determine its demands from the universities?*)
 - f. Siz taleplerinizi üniversitelere nasıl iletiyorsunuz?
(*How does CoHE communicate its needs to universities?*)

⁴⁰ After the thesis defense, the title of the thesis was changed to Higher Education Governance: Perceptions of Rectors, CoHE Members, and Government Representatives, following the Thesis Committee Members' suggestions and recommendations. So, the term senior administrator was replaced with rector, governing board member with CoHE member, and ministry representative with government representative.

- g. Üniversitelerin sizin taleplerinize yaklaşımı nasıldır?
(*What is the universities' approach to CoHE's demands?*)
5. Yükseköğretim sisteminin merkeziyetçi olduğu ifade ediliyor. Siz bu tespite katılıyor musunuz?
(*The higher education system is considered to be centralized. Do you agree with this view?*)
- a. Yükseköğretim sisteminin merkeziyetçi yapısının üniversitelerin gelişimine katkısı nedir?
(*What are the benefits of the centralized system governance model as far as the development of the university is concerned?*)
- b. YÖK'ü yeni fikirlere açık buluyor musunuz?
(*Do you think that CoHE is open to new ideas?*)
- c. Üniversiteler YÖK'e öneri getirebiliyorlar mı? Varsa bu öneriler nelerdir?
(*Could universities offer any ideas to CoHE? If they do, what are these suggestions?*)
- d. Üniversiteler önerilerine cevap alabiliyorlar mı? Bununla ilgili yaşadığınız somut bir örnek var mı? Kısaca bahseder misiniz?
(*Do they get any feedback to their suggestions? Can you give an example to such a case? Can you briefly explain it?*)
- e. Sizce üniversiteler YÖK'ün talimatlarını uygularken herhangi bir zorlukla karşılaşılıyorlar mı? Bu zorluklarla nasıl başa çıktıklarını düşünüyorsunuz?
(*Do you think that universities have experienced any difficulties while they are implementing CoHE's instructions? How do you think they overcome the difficulties?*)
- f. Üniversite yönetim kurulları YÖK'e geri bildirimde bulunuyorlar mı?
(*Do university administration boards give feedback to CoHE?*)
6. Yükseköğretim sisteminin merkeziyetçi yapısının üniversite yönetimine etkisi nedir?
(*What influence does the centralized system governance model have on the university administration?*)
- a. Yükseköğretim sisteminin merkeziyetçi yapısının üniversite yönetimine sağladığı avantajlar nelerdir?
(*What are the advantages of the centralized system governance model to the university administration?*)
- b. Yükseköğretim sisteminin merkeziyetçi yapısı ile ilgili herhangi bir zorluk veya dezavantaj yaşadınız mı?
(*Have you experienced any difficulties or disadvantages concerning the centralized system governance model?*)

- c. Bu zorluklarla nasıl başa çıkıyorsunuz?
(*How do you overcome these difficulties?*)
7. YÖK'ün demokratik bir yapıya sahip olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?
(*Do you believe that CoHE is a democratic organization?*)
8. YÖK'ün yetkilerinin azaltılması gerektiğini düşünüyor musunuz?
(*Do you believe that CoHE should have less authority?*)
9. Sizce YÖK gerekli mi, yoksa kaldırılması mı gerekli? Neden?
(*Do you believe that CoHE is necessary? Or do you think CoHE should be abolished? Why?*)
- a. Gerekli ise,
(*Why do you think it is necessary?*)
- b. Kaldırılması gerekli ise,
(*Why do you think it should be abolished?*)
10. Merkeziyetçi yönetim sisteminin günümüz koşullarında alternatifleri neler olabilir?
(*What other systems may be alternatives to the centralized system governance model?*)

Eklemek ve/veya ayrıntılı olarak belirtmek istediğiniz bir şey var mı?
(*Are there further issues you would like to point out?*)

* Üst yöneticiler için hazırlanmış görüşme soruları eski üst yöneticilere göre adapte edilecektir:
* (*The interview questions asked to the governing board members are adapted to the interview questions asked to the former governing board members.*)

Örnek: Üst yönetici olarak sizden beklenen neydi? Görev ve sorumluluklarınızı kısaca açıklayınız.
(*For example: What were your duties as a governing board member? Could you briefly explain your duties and responsibilities?*)

APPENDIX J

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL USED IN THE STUDY: CURRENT/FORMER GOVERNING BOARD MEMBERS⁴¹

1. What are your duties as a governing board member? Could you briefly explain your duties and responsibilities?
2. How do you determine the needs of higher education as a governing board member?
3. Which institutions are CoHE in contact with so as to meet the needs?
4. How does CoHE get into contact with universities?
 - a. How do universities communicate their needs to CoHE?
 - b. By which unit and how are their demands taken into consideration?
 - c. How long does it take CoHE to meet their demands?
 - d. What is CoHE's approach to the demands by universities? How does CoHE determine its priorities? How does CoHE prioritize the demands?
 - e. How does CoHE determine its demands from the universities?
 - f. How does CoHE communicate its needs to universities?
 - g. What is the universities' approach to CoHE's demands?
5. Could you explain the current system governance model?
 - a. What are the benefits of the current system governance model as far as the development of the university is concerned?
 - b. Do you think that CoHE is open to new ideas?

⁴¹ After the thesis defense, the title of the thesis was changed to Higher Education Governance: Perceptions of Rectors, CoHE Members, and Government Representatives, following the Thesis Committee Members' suggestions and recommendations. So, the term senior administrator was replaced with rector, governing board member with CoHE member, and ministry representative with government representative.

- c. Could universities offer any ideas for the development of higher education to CoHE? If they do, what are these suggestions?
 - d. Do they get any feedback to their suggestions? Can you give an example to such a case? Can you briefly explain it?
 - e. Do you think universities have experienced any difficulties while they are implementing CoHE's decisions? How do you think they overcome the difficulties?
 - f. Do university administration boards give feedback to CoHE?
6. What influence does the current system governance model have on the university administration?
- a. What are the advantages of the current system governance model to the university administration?
 - b. Have you experienced any difficulties or disadvantages concerning the current system governance model?
 - c. How do you overcome these difficulties?
7. Do you believe that CoHE is a democratic organization?
8. Do you believe that CoHE should have less authority?
9. Do you believe that CoHE is necessary? Or do you think CoHE should be abolished? Why?
- a. Why do you think it is necessary?
 - b. Why do you think it should be abolished?
10. What other systems may be alternatives to the current system governance model?

Are there further issues you would like to point out?

* The interview questions asked to the governing board members are adapted to the interview questions asked to the former governing board members.

For example: What were your duties as a governing board member? Could you briefly explain your duties and responsibilities?

APPENDIX K

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL USED IN THE STUDY (TURKISH):

CURRENT/FORMER GOVERNING BOARD MEMBERS⁴²

ÜST YÖNETİCİLER İÇİN HAZIRLANMIŞ GÖRÜŞME SORULARI

1. Yükseköğretim sisteminin bir üst yöneticisi olarak sizden beklenen nedir? Görev ve sorumluluklarınızı kısaca açıklar mısınız?
2. Üst yönetici olarak yükseköğretim sisteminin ihtiyaçlarını nasıl belirliyorsunuz?
3. Belirlenen ihtiyaçları karşılamak üzere, hangi kurumlar ile iletişim kuruyorsunuz?
4. Üniversiteler ile olan iletişiminizi nasıl sağlıyorsunuz?
 - a. Üniversiteler taleplerini YÖK'e nasıl iletiyor?
 - b. Üniversitelerin talepleri YÖK'ün hangi biriminde nasıl değerlendiriliyor?
 - c. Üniversitelerin talepleri ne kadar sürede karşılık buluyor?
 - d. Sizin üniversitelerin taleplerine yaklaşımınız nasıldır? Talepler ile ilgili öncelikleri nasıl belirliyorsunuz? Öncelik sıralamasını nasıl yapıyorsunuz?
 - e. Siz üniversitelerden olan taleplerinizi nasıl belirliyorsunuz?
 - f. Siz taleplerinizi üniversitelere nasıl iletiyorsunuz?
 - g. Üniversitelerin sizin taleplerinize yaklaşımı nasıldır?
5. Yükseköğretim sisteminin mevcut idari yapısını açıklar mısınız?
 - a. Yükseköğretim sisteminin mevcut idari yapısının üniversitelerin gelişimine katkısı nedir?
 - b. YÖK'ü yeni fikirlere açık buluyor musunuz?

⁴² After the thesis defense, the title of the thesis was changed to Higher Education Governance: Perceptions of Rectors, CoHE Members, and Government Representatives, following the Thesis Committee Members' suggestions and recommendations. So, the term senior administrator was replaced with rector, governing board member with CoHE member, and ministry representative with government representative.

- c. Üniversiteler YÖK'e yükseköğretim politikalarının gelişimi açısından öneri getirebiliyorlar mı? Varsa bu öneriler nelerdir?
- d. Üniversiteler önerilerine cevap alabiliyorlar mı? Bununla ilgili yaşadığınız somut bir örnek var mı? Kısaca bahseder misiniz?
- e. Sizce üniversiteler YÖK'ün kararlarını uygularken herhangi bir zorlukla karşılaşılıyorlar mı? Bu zorluklarla nasıl başa çıktıklarını düşünüyorsunuz?
- f. Üniversite yönetim kurulları YÖK'e geri bildirimde bulunuyorlar mı?
6. Yükseköğretim sisteminin mevcut idari yapısının üniversite yönetimine etkisi nedir?
- a. Yükseköğretim sisteminin mevcut idari yapısının üniversite yönetimine sağladığı avantajlar nelerdir?
- b. Yükseköğretim sisteminin mevcut idari yapısı ile ilgili herhangi bir zorluk veya dezavantaj yaşadınız mı?
- c. Bu zorluklarla nasıl başa çıkıyorsunuz?
7. YÖK'ün demokratik bir yapıya sahip olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?
8. YÖK'ün yetkilerinin azaltılması gerektiğini düşünüyor musunuz?
9. Sizce YÖK gerekli mi, yoksa kaldırılması mı gerekli? Neden?
- a. Gerekli ise,
- b. Kaldırılması gerekli ise,
10. Mevcut idari yapının günümüz koşullarında alternatifleri neler olabilir? Ekleme ve/veya ayrıntılı olarak belirtmek istediğiniz bir şey var mı?
- * Üst yöneticiler için hazırlanmış görüşme soruları eski üst yöneticilere göre adapte edilecektir:
Örnek: Yükseköğretim sisteminin bir üst yöneticisi olarak sizden beklenen neydi? Görev ve sorumluluklarınızı kısaca açıklayınız.

APPENDIX L

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL USED IN THE STUDY: CURRENT MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVES⁴³

1. For which issues do you get into contact with CoHE?
 - a. Why is such a cooperation necessary?
 - b. What are the advantages of this cooperation?
 - c. What are the difficulties of this cooperation? How do you overcome the difficulties?
2. What do you think about the operation of CoHE?
 - a. What are the advantages of the current system governance model?
 - b. Have you experienced any difficulties or disadvantages concerning the current system governance model?
 - c. How do you overcome the difficulties?
 - d. What other systems may be alternatives to the current system governance model?
3. Are there further issues you would like to point out?

⁴³ After the thesis defense, the title of the thesis was changed to Higher Education Governance: Perceptions of Rectors, CoHE Members, and Government Representatives, following the Thesis Committee Members' suggestions and recommendations. So, the term senior administrator was replaced with rector, governing board member with CoHE member, and ministry representative with government representative.

APPENDIX M

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL USED IN THE STUDY (TURKISH):

CURRENT MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVES⁴⁴

BAKANLIK TEMSİLCİLERİ İÇİN HAZIRLANMIŞ GÖRÜŞME SORULARI

1. Yükseköğretim Kurulu ile hangi konularda iletişim kuruyorsunuz?
 - a. Bu iş birliği neden gereklidir?
 - b. Bu iş birliğinin sağladığı avantajlar nelerdir?
 - c. Bu iş birliğinin doğurduğu zorluklar nelerdir? Bu zorluklarla nasıl başa çıkıyorsunuz?
 2. Yükseköğretim Kurulu'nun işleyişi hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
 - a. Yükseköğretim Kurulu'nun mevcut idari yapısının sağladığı avantajlar nelerdir?
 - b. Yükseköğretim Kurulu'nun mevcut idari yapısı ile ilgili herhangi bir zorluk veya dezavantaj yaşadınız mı?
 - c. Bu zorluklarla nasıl başa çıkıyorsunuz?
 3. Mevcut idari yapının günümüz koşullarında alternatifleri neler olabilir?
- Eklemek ve/veya ayrıntılı olarak belirtmek istediğiniz bir husus var mı?

⁴⁴ After the thesis defense, the title of the thesis was changed to Higher Education Governance: Perceptions of Rectors, CoHE Members, and Government Representatives, following the Thesis Committee Members' suggestions and recommendations. So, the term senior administrator was replaced with rector, governing board member with CoHE member, and ministry representative with government representative.

APPENDIX N

RENEWED ETHICAL APPROVAL BY THE INAREK⁴⁵



T.C. BOĞAZIÇI ÜNİVERSİTESİ
İnsan Araştırmaları Kurumsal Değerlendirme Kurulu (İNAREK)

26.06.2017

Doç. Dr. Nevra Seggie
Meltem Akbulut Yıldırımış
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Eğitim Bilimleri Bölümü
34342 Bebek / İstanbul
nevra.seggie@boun.edu.tr

Sayın Araştırmacı,

"Yükseköğretim Kıdemli Yönetici, Üst Yönetici ve Temsilcilerinin Türkiye Yükseköğretiminde Mevcut İdari Yapı Hakkındaki Görüşleri" başlıklı projeniz ile yaptığınız Boğaziçi Üniversitesi İnsan Araştırmaları Kurumsal Değerlendirme Kurulu (İNAREK) 2017/43 kayıt numaralı başvuru 26.06.2017 tarihli ve 2017/3 sayılı kurul toplantısında incelenerek etik onay verilmesi uygun bulunmuştur.

Saygılarımızla,

Doç. Dr. Arzu Çelik Fuss (Başkan)
Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi
Moleküler Biyoloji ve Genetik Bölümü
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, İstanbul

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Özgür Kocatürk (Üye)
Biyo-Medikal Mühendisliği
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, İstanbul

Doç. Dr. Özlem Hesapçı (Üye)
İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi
İşletme Bölümü
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, İstanbul

Prof. Dr. Fatoş Gökşen (Üye)
Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi
Sosyoloji Bölümü
Koç Üniversitesi, İstanbul

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Mine Gül Güven (Üye)
Eğitim Fakültesi,
İlköğretim Bölümü
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, İstanbul

⁴⁵ After the thesis defense, the title of the thesis was changed to Higher Education Governance: Perceptions of Rectors, CoHE Members, and Government Representatives, following the Thesis Committee Members' suggestions and recommendations. So, the term senior administrator was replaced with rector, governing board member with CoHE member, and ministry representative with government representative.

APPENDIX O

QUOTES: CHAPTER 4

SELECTED CASE NARRATIVES

1. YÖK'ten önce Türkiye'de Üniversitelerarası Kurul dışında fazla bir organizasyon yoktu. Hatta üniversitelerin içine bir bakarsak oda bir üniversite olmaktan çok fakülteler federasyonuydu. Bir fakülte üniversitenin bütçesinden kendini bağımsız hissedirdi. Maliye Bakanlığı ile görüşmeleri dekan yapardı. Bütçe de oradan dekana verilirdi. Diplomalara öğrenci işlerinde her fakülte kendi yürütürdü. Üniversite dediğimiz zaman normal bir merkezi, Amerikan sistemi merkezi bir üniversite değil, bağımsız federe bir fakülteler federasyonu şeklindeydi. Tabii bu üniversitelerin bir bütün olmamasına neden oluyordu.
2. Rektörün fazla bir yetkisi yoktu dekanlar üzerinde. Sadece senatoda yönetim kurulunda toplanıyorlardı; ama rektörün fakültelerin herhangi bir iç işinde müdahale etmesi zordu. Çünkü dekan parayı kendisi alıyordu, kadroyu kendisi alıyordu. Dolayısıyla fazla müdahale olamadığı için bir bütünlük olmuyordu. Her fakülte o dönemdeki dekanın, işte o dönemdeki yönetimde söz sahibi olanların istediği şekilde geliyordu veya duraklıyordu. Bu tabii iyi bir şey değildi. Üniversitelerimizin ileri gidemeyişinde bence bu fakülteler federasyonu gibi olması etkili oldu.
3. Fakülteler zaten birbirinden uzaktı. Birisi şehrin bir köşesinde, diğeri başka köşesinde. . . . Tabii uzaklık neye zarar veriyor üniversitede? Sinerji yaratamıyorsunuz üniversiteler arasında. Örneğin, X Fakültesinin öğrencisi Y Fakültesinin öğrencisi ile lisede beraber okumamışsa, ya da aynı mahallede oturmuyorsa, bir birilerini tanımıyorlardı. bir ilişkileri yoktu. Sinerji yaratmak zordu. X Fakültesinin hocasıyla Y Fakültesinin hocası birbirini tanımadıkları için bir sinerji doğmuyordu. Halbuki ortak bir sürü konuları olabilir, araştırmaların geliştirilmesinde, araştırma faaliyetlerinde ya da bir fakülte üniversitenin yönetiminde iyi bir şey becermişse diğeri fakültenin bundan doğru dürüst haberi bile olmuyordu ya da bir bölüm bir yenilik getirmişse diğeri haberi bile olmuyordu. Dolayısıyla fakülteler birbirinden bağımsız olduğu için üniversiteler hem kendi içinde böyle bir organizasyonsuzdu hem de sinerji yaratamaz durumdaydı.

4. Üniversiteler arasında bırakın herhangi bir işbirliğini, bir hoşnutsuzluk vardı. Herkes kendisini en iyi üniversite biziz gibi hissedirdi. . . . Örneğin mesela X Üniversitesi'nin kuruluşu sırasında, ben o yazıyı gördüm, Z Üniversitesi Y Fakültesinin dekanı Maliye Bakanlığına X kapatılsın diye yazı yazmış. Diyor ki bizden öğretim üyesi alıyorlar. Bu üniversite fayda yerine zarar getiriyor, kapansın diyor. O yazı var mesela X Üniversitesi'nin rektörlüğünde, kopyası var bu yazının. İnsanların üniversitelere tuhaf bir bakış açıları vardı, aynı şekilde üniversitelerde de birbirlerine karşı.
5. YÖK'ün kuruluşunda üniversitelere bir standart getirildi. Mesela X Üniversitesi'nde yardımcı doçentlik sistemi vardı. Doktorasını alan genç bir insan, belli bir araştırma yaptıktan bir süre sonra hemen yardımcı doçent olabilir. Hatta aynı günde olabilirdi ve ders verebilirdi. Hâlbuki klasik üniversitelerde sadece doçent ve profesörler ders verebilirdi. Bu mesela YÖK'ün getirdiği bir yenilik oldu. Karşı çıkanlar oldu. Ben hatırlıyorum bu yasa çalışmalarını sırasında, benim de olduğum komisyonda, benim olmadığın toplantılarda bazı rektörler yardımcı doçentlik yanlıştır kaldırılınsın diye madde koyuyorlardı. . . . Çünkü eski sistemin etkisi hala devam ediyordu üniversitelerde. Yani kolay adapte olunmadı. Yani söylemek istediğim, yeni yasa çıkmış olmasına rağmen, yardımcı doçentlik kurulmuş olmasına rağmen, pek çok üniversite bunu kabullenemedi, hoşlanmadı bundan.
6. YÖK'le gelen diğer bir pozitiflik, profesör olmak için çok önemli bir kural getirdiler. Zaten ilk yıllarda profesör olmanın yolu YÖK'ten geçirdi. YÖK sizi profesör yapardı ya da yapmazdı. Yani Jüriyi YÖK kurardı. Siz dosyanızı YÖK'e verirdiniz. Mesela ben öyle profesör oldum. X'de profesör olurken dosyayı YÖK'e verdim. Benim olduğum dönemde jüriyi üniversite kurabiliyordu ama onay YÖK'tendi. Ondan önce jüriyi de YÖK kuruyordu. Burada amaç neydi? Hiçbir üniversitede profesörlük koşulu diğerine benzemiyordu. Öyle elle tutulur bir koşulda yoktu. Hani objektif olan, herkesin ha kurallar buymuş diyeceği bir şey de yoktu. Sadece kendi üniversitenizdeki kurulun vereceği karar ile profesör oluyordunuz. Jüri kuruluyordu, bu kişi artık olgunlaştı profesör olsun deniyordu. Hâlbuki YÖK yasası dedi ki, üniversiteler boş profesör kadrosunu ilan eder, Türkiye'den ve dünyadan herkes müracaat edebilir. Bu devrimsel bir şeydi. Üniversiteler bundan hoşlanmadı. Biz de hoşlanmadık; ama yani en azından profesörlük için belli kurallar getirdi ve herkesin boş kadrolara müracaat etme şansını doğurdu. Orada şöyle de bir kural koydu ki ben mesela onu da her zaman üniversitelerin geleceği için pozitif diye gördüm, daha önce hiç akla gelmeyen, hiçbir üniversitenin kullanmadığı, tamamen yeni bir kural. Diyordu ki; profesör olabilmek için dünyanın tanınmış bilimsel dergilerinde eserler yayınlamış olmak. İki, dünyanın tanınmış dergilerinde yayınladığı bu makalelere, dünyanın önde gelen bilim adamlarınca atıflar yapılmış olmak. Sıradan atıf da değil. Önde gelen bilim adamlarınca atıf almış olmak. Bu tabii Türk üniversitelerinde bir şok yarattı. Niçin bizim fakültemizin dergisi dururken, biz niye uluslararası dergilerde yayın yapalım? Fakültemizin dergisi var. Dergileri de fakülteler çıkartıyordu genelde, rektörlükler değil. İkincisi atıf almak hiç akla gelen bir şey değildi. Ne demek yani yabancı profesör atıf yapacak? Şok geçirdi insanlar, böyle bir sistem bilinmiyordu çünkü Türkiye'de YÖK Yasası'na kadar. . . . Uluslararası makale

yazma konusu Türkiye'de öyle icat oldu. Uluslararası yayın yapan insan sayısı çok azdı. . . . Dolayısıyla YÖK'ün bence Türkiye'de yaptığı en önemli katkıların başında bana göre bu gelir. Eğer bu olmasaydı biz öyle gitseydik, Türk üniversiteleri şu anda sıralamalarda ilk 2 bine bile giremezdi. Hiçbir üniversitemizin adı hiçbir yerde çıkmazdı; çünkü hocalar yayın yapmamaya devam edecekti. Fakülte dergisinde yayın çıkaracaklardı. Dolayısıyla dünya sıralamalarında Türk üniversitelerinin adı bilinmeyecekti. Bence bu çok önemli bir şeydi.

7. Ben rektörlüklerde merkeziyetçilikten yanayım açıkçası. Öyle düşünüyorum yani. Çünkü Üniversite Yönetim Kurulunda dekanlar zaten var ve kararlar oradan çıkıyor. Rektörün ben böyle emrediyorum diyecek hali yok. Üniversite Yönetim Kurulunda kararlar el kaldırılarak oynanıyor. Kadro da dağılırken bütçe de dağılırken el kaldırıyoruz. Senatoda da aynı şekilde. Dolayısıyla rektörlük ikna ettiği zaman dekanları, problemler orada hallolabiliyor. İkna edemezse olmuyor zaten. Ama işler daha hızlı yürüyor. İşte bunlar YÖK'ün getirdiği pozitif şeylerdi aslında. Çünkü eskiden dekanların bir araya gelip böyle stratejik kararlar alması kolay değildi. Yani üniversitelerin merkezden yönetilmesi üniversitelerdeki verimliliği arttırdı bana göre. Yani merkezden yönetilmesi verimliliği arttırdı bana göre. . . . YÖK'ün getirdiği bu birleştiricilik rektörlüğü güçlendirmesi, yani bütçenin rektörlükler tarafından özellikle yatırım bütçelerinin yapılması ve Maliye Bakanlığı ile bütçe ile ilgili görüşmeleri rektörlüklerin yapması, üniversitenin içerisinde kaynakların çok daha hızlı bir şekilde kaydırılmasını sağladı. Yani YÖK'ün burada pozitif bir faydası oldu.
8. Diğeri ise her üniversitenin fakültesinin her bölümü birbirinden bağımsız apayrı konular anlatarak diploma veriyordu. Yani belki biraz haberdarlar ama birbiri ile bağlamıyor ki. Yani hiç bağlayıcılık yok. Siz istediğinizi anlatıyorsunuz diyorsunuz ki bu iş böyledir. Dersin kredisi falan hepsi tamamen bölüme bağlı. Kredili sistemi bile yoktu o zamanlar klasik üniversitelerde YÖK'ten önce. Kredi vesaire hep YÖK'ten sonra geldi bunlar. Böylece YÖK hem üniversiteler arasında bir koordinasyon sağladı uyum. Yani hiç olmazsa bir öğrenci bir bölümden diğer üniversiteye transfer olurken her şey uyumlu. Eskiden siz x üniversitesinden birini y üniversitesine transfer ederken çok kolay bir şey değildi. Dersler hangileri uyumlu hangileri uyumsuz o bile çok bir şeydi. Koordinasyon açısından bence yaptığı en şeylerden biriydi. bir de dersleri belli bir sisteme bağladı. Her bölümün mecburen alması gereken bir grup ders, gerisi serbest bırakıldı. Yani belli bir krediye kadar. İşte her üniversite YÖK'ün yönetmeliğine uygun şekilde, ana çerçeve içerisinde kendi yaptı. Böylece bir koordinasyon oldu. Bence faydalı oldu.
9. Bugün itibariyle en büyük sorun kadro. Tamamen YÖK'ün kendi isteğine bağlı bu. İster verir ister vermez. Sana bir gerekçe göstermek zorunda değil. Yani bunun objektif olması ya da kurala bağlı olması da gerekmiyor. Diyebilir ki o anabilim dalında çok hoca var, kadro vermiyoruz. Dolayısıyla, emekli olanın yerine yenisini alamıyoruz. Öyle olunca da bölümler küçülüyor.

10. Zaman içerisinde öğrenci sayıları çok arttı YÖK'ten sonra. Yapmayın diyoruz, laboratuvarımız yok. Hocamız yok. Dersliklerimiz yeterli değil, yeterli sıra yok. Ama hiç bir zaman YÖK'ü ikna edemedik. Biz indirin diye yazıyoruz onlar artırıyor kontenjanı. Tabii bu sonrasında işsizliğe neden oldu. Sadece insanların hoşuna gitsin diye bir şey yapamazsınız. Biraz da gerçekçi olmak lazım. Bu kadar çok mezunla ne yapacağız? Bu çocuklar için yeterli iş imkanımız var mı? Ve sonunda da bazı bölümleri kapatmak zorunda kaldı. İki kararı da alan YÖK. Yani bana göre her ikisi de yanlış. . . . Bu belki iyi niyet; ama sisteme zarar verdi. İyi niyet her zaman yararlı demek değil.
11. Bir şey daha söyleyeyim. O da rektörlerin çok hatalı olduğunu düşündüğüm bir şey. En önemsiz konularda YÖK'e sormak, en önemsiz konularda Maliye'ye sormak. Çok basit bir konu var diyelim. Herhangi bir konu. Mesela ne bileyim sizin Personel Daire başkanınız diyor ki efendim biz bundan, X konusu, pek emin olamadık. Yönetmelikte biz göremedik böyle bir şey. Orada kararı siz verebilirsiniz. Öyle yapmıyor rektörler. YÖK'e yazıyor. Efendim şu konuda karar verilememiştir, ne yapalım. Bir sürü rektör yazıyor. Her biri de başka bir şey bekliyor. YÖK'ü karar almaya zorluyor, bize söyleyin diye. YÖK'te o zaman herkesi ilgilendiren bir karar alabiliyor. Siz yıllardır yaptığınız bir şeyi yapamaz hale geliyorsunuz. Bu bizi ciddi zora sokan konulardan bir tanesi. Neden yazıyor? Sorumluluğu üstünden atmak için. . . . Bu tür durumlarda kararlarını verebilirler. Yanlışsa zaten YÖK yapmayın der. Yanlışsa Sayıştay var, Maliye'nin müfettişleri var.
12. YÖK'ün dünyanın en iyi üniversitelerinden gelen herkese kapıyı açması lazım. Amerika'da bir üniversite Hoca alacağı zaman dünyanın her yerine ilan veriyor. Halbuki Türkiye'de biz bizden biri terfi edecekse kadro açıyoruz. Bu tabii şöyle bir sorun yaratıyor. Parlak öğrencilere teklif yapamıyoruz. Onu bırak, gelince alma garantisi de veremiyoruz. Halbuki şunu yapabilirsek: Mesela böyle parlak birisi olduğu zaman biz almayı önerebilelim. Bu YÖK'le de ilgili değil. Yasa buna müsait değil. Yine de yönetmeliklerle bu tür şeyler halledilebilir. YÖK bazı üniversitelerin rektörlerine desin ki her sene parlak birini bulduğunuz zaman alabileceğiniz 5 tane kadro veriyorum. Ama tabii üniversitelerde bu kararlarıyla ilgili YÖK'ü ikna etmeli. Parlak insanlara Türk üniversiteleri teklif yapabilmeli. Yurtdışındaki parlak insanların bunu duyması lazım. Rektör bu tür kişilere seni alacağım diye yazsa suç olur. YÖK'ten onay almamış. İki türlü suç. Hem YÖK der ki sen ne hakla yazıyorsun? İkincisi alamadığı zaman kişi onu mahkemeye verir. YÖK'ün burada bir adım atması lazım. Prosedür şöyle olabilir: Teklifi Üniversite Yönetim Kurulu onaylayacak, YÖK onaylayacak, biz de ondan sonra teklif yapabilelim. İlk 100' den doktoralı olacak şartı koymalı bence. TÜBİTAK da bu tür kararlara dahil olabilir. İlk 100'den gelene TÜBİTAK da proje parası verebilir. O zaman bizler dört dörtlük teklif yapabiliriz. Amerika'daki üniversitelerle o zaman yarışabiliriz.

13. Bürokratik yetkilerinin bir kısmını üniversitelere bırakması lazım. Kendi yine kontrol etsin; ama yetkiyi oralara bıraksın. Yani bölümler arasında kadro ayarlanacaksa bunu rektörlük ya da dekanlık yapmalı. . . . YÖK çerçeve sayı verebilir. Anormallik olursa ceza verir. Rektörü görevden alabilir. Yetkisi var. Bürokrasiden kurtulursa stratejik kararlara daha rahat zamanı olur.
14. Üniversite yönetiminden çok ülkenin toplumsal ihtiyaçları gözetilmiş YÖK kurulurken. 12 Eylül rejimi tabii ki kendi amaçlarını da gözetmiş. “Üniversitelerde anarşiye” son vermek, sol ve sağ akımları uzaklaştırmak gibi. Dođramacı gibi bürokratların amacı aslında Türkiye’nin hızlı toplumsal deđişimi modernleşmesi karşısında büyük genç nüfus kitlesinin yükseköğretim beklentilerini karşılamak olmuş. Yani o yüzden de YÖK’ün zaman içerisinde vesayete dönüşebilen üç aracı oluşmuş: Bir tanesi ÖSYM katalođuna giden yolda kontenjan belirlemek, ikincisi üniversitelerin kadro ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak, üçüncüsü de bölüm ve fakülte açmak.
15. Kurulduđu zaman 25-30 aktörle muhatap olan bir YÖK var. Şimdi 180’den fazla aktörle muhatap olan bir YÖK var. Bu tabii şahsi tutumların da ötesinde bir iletişimsizlik getiriyor. Sizin şahsi tutumunuz ne olursa olsun, bürokrasi nasıl çalışırsa çalışsın, fiili bir imkansızlık durumu yaratıyor. Yani YÖK bürokrasisi bir üniversiteyle ne kadar ilgilenebilir diye bir kategorizasyon yapsak her üniversiteye bir gün bir buçuk gün düşüyor. Çünkü YÖK’ün bir de görünmeyen yüzleri var. Disiplin boyutları var, uluslararası boyutları var, diploma denkliđi boyutları var. Bunlar da çok büyük iş hacmi taşıyor.
16. O yüzden giderek şöyle bir durum oluşmuştu: Açılmayan telefonlar, bekleyen dosyalar. Özellikle kritik dairelerde. Üniversitelerin kadro işleriyle ilgilene dairede ve üniversitelerin katalođunu hazırlayan dairede. Ne oluyordu? Lobicilik. Kim daha üst makamdan telefonda ettirtirse onun dosyası alttan üste geçiyordu. Diđerleri bekliyordu. Veya o telefonlar açılmıyordu. Herkes bir tanıdık bulma peşindeydi. Bu da dediđim gibi çift yönlü bir etki yaratıyor. Hem makro vesayeti arttırıyor, yani dosyanızın işlem görmesi için üyeler nezdinde lobi yapmaya başlıyorsunuz hem de diđer memurlar nezdinde bile lobi yapmaya başlıyorsunuz. Bu da çifte vesayet demek. Böyle bir güce kavuşan her üye ve her memur size bir tür vesayet uygulayabiliyor dođal olarak. Çünkü sonunda her katalog mevsimi, her kadro çok deđerli. Yeni bölüm açmanız lazım, yeni personel almanız lazım. İşlerinizin görülmesi lazım. Kadro, kontenjan ve fakülte/bölüm açma bu nedenlerle vesayet aracına dönüşebiliyor.

17. Bürokrasiyi deęiřtirmiyorsunuz. Neden? 80'lerin bařında kurulmuř yapı hi reform geirmeden devam ediyor. Yeni memur almanıza sistem izin vermiyor; ünkü doęal olarak kanununu bekleyen bir kurumsunuz. Ankara'daki btn kurumlar kanun deęiřtirmiř. Bir tek YK deęiřmemiř. Kanun deęiřmeden, yeniden yapılanma sreci olmadan doęal olarak devlet size memur alma izni vermiyor. Dolayısıyla her řeyi deęiřmeyen bir brokratik yapıyla yapıyorsunuz. ok sınırlı memur alma izni var. Yeniden yapılanma iin dedięim gibi kanun deęiřmesi lazım. O kanunu deęiřtirmek sizin elinizde deęil. Siyasi iradenin onu yapması lazım. Siz ancak neri gnderebilirsiniz.
18. Rektrlere de YK'n kuruluş ařamasında nemli yetkiler verilmiř niversitenin ynetiminde. Hatta bir dnem řyle espriler yapılırdı. İngiliz parlamentosuna ynelik řyle bir espri vardır: İngiliz parlamentosu bir tek řeyi yapamaz, kadını erkek, erkeęi kadın. Bazı yetkilerine bakarak biz rektre byle takılırdık. Neden? Mesela bir profesrlk atama srecini dřnn. 5 kiři hayır dese bile rektrn atama yetkisi var. Ya da kadro daęılımlarında, hele torba kanun kullanıldıęında niversitelerde. Mesela bir niversiteye 100 tane kadro veriyorum, bunu rektr kullansın, dedięi dnemler olmuř YK'n. O zaman bu yetkiler daha da kuvvetli hale gelmiř. Zaten 28 řubat dnemlerinde de grdk rektrlerin gcnn ne kadar sonu alıcı olabildięini veya btn niversitenin hayatını belirleyebildięini. Ve zellikle rektrlerin bu sınırsız glerinin seimlerin zararlı etkilerine de yol atıęını dřnyorum. Seimlerde rakiplerine karřı onları niversiteden silmeye alıřması, mobbing yoluyla onları etkisizleřtirmeye alıřması gibi sonular. Yani seimlerin zararlı sonuları biraz da rektrlerin bu byk yetkilerinden kaynaklanıyor gibi geliyor bana. Tabii bu byk ve kurumsal niversitelerde ayrı yařanıyor. Tıpkı aynı siyasi rejimin iki farklı lkede ayrı sonulara yol aması gibi. Rektr ne kadar gl olursa olsun geleneęi olan niversitelerde farklı sonulara yol aıyor. Ama 20-25 tane ęretim yesi olan niversitelerde durum ok farklı olabiliyor. Kurucu rektrlerin politikaları ok bařka sonulara yol aabiliyor veya gen ęretim yelerinin hayatları bařka trl sınırlandırılabilir.
19. Bence rektrlk sistemi ile ilgili en olumlu řey iki dnem kuralı olması. Hatta bu kural bence her messeseye uygulanmalı; ünkü brokratların grevi uzadıķa vesayet artabiliyor. İyi niyetli olmayan veya iktidar peřinde olanı dřnn. Rektr kendine bir oy tabanı oluřturuyor ve oy tabanıyla sınırsız iktidara gelebilir. O yzden en azından oylama yapılan sistemlerde iki dnem kuralı bence iyi bir kural.

20. Bütün YÖK sisteminin kökleşmiş üniversiteler için en temel sorunu rektörlük sorunu değil. Bağımsız istedikleri gibi özgürce koşamamaları. Çünkü YÖK kanun gereği istisna yapamıyor. Yani bir yaşındaki üniversiteyle yüz yaşındaki üniversite aynı kurallara tabii. Çocuğunuzu düşünün. Kanun gereği siz üç yaşındaki çocuğunuza da otuz yaşındaki çocuğunuza da aynı şeyi uyguluyorsunuz. Aynı yemeği veriyorsunuz. İkisine de günde yüz elli adım atacaksın diyorsunuz. Öbürü diyor ki ben on beş bin adım atabilirim. Bana göre bu bir sistem sorunu. En yetenekli kişi bile gelse kadro alamadığı zaman, bütçe alamadığı zaman yurtdışı açılımı sınırlandırıldığı zaman doğal olarak kendini ispat edemez.
21. Kamu kaynaklarını kullandığı için devlet üniversiteleri kamu otoritesine müdahil. Her şey tamamen akademinin kontrolüne bırakılsın gibi bir şey dünyanın hiçbir yerinde yok. Türkiye’de kırılması çok zor bir özerklik algısı var. Sistem yönetimini değiştirmenin önündeki en büyük engellerden biri bu. Özerkliği üniversiteler biz yönetelim denetime tabii olmayalım gibi algılıyor. Üniversiteler kendini yönetsin ama kadro, kontenjan, bölüm ve fakülte açma çok rahat vesayet aracına dönüşebilir. Bu nedenle full özerklik önce kurumsallaşmış üniversitelere verilmeli.
22. Bir diğeri ise ya su istimal ederlerse korkusu. Şu gerçek var: 10 oyuncudan ikisi gerçekten su istimal ediyor; ama çözüm bu olmamalı. O iki kişiye iyi bir ceza verip sekizinin yolunu açmak gerekiyor. Bunun bir türlü dengesi bulunamadı. Tam bir sıkışmışlık hali. Çağdaş bürokraside kamu yönetiminde özerkliği verip denetimini yapabilecek imkanlarınız var. Ama ne o özerkliği verebiliyorsunuz ne o denetim imkanlarını yapabiliyorsunuz.
23. Dünyada ilk beş yüz listelerine girmeyi başarmış bütün üniversitelere Türkiye’de full özerklik verilmeli. Bırakalım kendi kendilerini yönetsinler. Hatta bir de ceza mekanizması getirirsiniz. Motive olurlar. 500 listesinden indiği anda tekrar YÖK sistemine dahil olurlar. Sorumluluğunu da alır. Kendi kendini yönetir. Bir yıl sonra da hesap verir Kalkınma Bakanlığı bürokratlarına, Maliye Bakanlığı bürokratlarına. Yanlış kararlarının hesabını da verir, gelecek sene de ona göre az bütçe alır. Bu daha da genişletilebilir. 1000 listesine girene de yapabilirsiniz bunu. Ben sadece bir örnek veriyorum. Bunun dışında da üniversiteleri iki kategoriye ayırmak lazım. 2006 öncesi kurulmuşlarla 2006 sonrası kurulmuşlara ayrı kanunlar çıkarmak lazım. Aslında 2006 sonrası kurulmuşlar için Dođramacı’nın modeli daha uygun. Çünkü o üniversitelerle bir üst denetim mekanizması ilgilenmediği anda işler rayından çıkabilir. Bir yapı düşünün. Senatosu bile oluşmamış. Yöneticilere verilecek yetkiler de bu üçlü kategorizasyona göre düzenlenebilir. Farklılaştırma gerekiyor sisteme. Kalkınma Bakanlığı da birçok öneri getirdi ve onların önerileri de aşağı yukarı böyle. Dolayısıyla biz bu problemi ancak birkaç kategoride çözebiliriz. Tek kanun hiçbir zaman işimizi çözmez.

24. YÖK'ün fonksiyonlarına ihtiyaç dört noktada var: Bir kontenjan meselesini halletmek: Türkiye'nin toplumsal yapısı için kontenjan çok önemli, ama yine de kurumsallaşmış üniversiteler bu konuda özerk olmalı. İkincisi kadro dağılımını halletmek. Kadronun devlet üniversiteleri arasında nasıl dağılacığını ve kontenjan meselesini bir üst makamın halletmesi lazım. Üç planlama yapmak. Örneğin sınırsız bölüm ya da MYO kurulmasının önüne geçmek. Siyasi baskılardan ve kamuoyu baskısından dolayı bunlar açılabilir. Belli özerklikler verdiğiniz zaman bu düzenlenebilir. Dört yeni kurulan üniversiteleri denetim altında tutmak. Bunlar dışındakiler çağdaş bürokratik sistemlerin kalite denetimi ve mevzuat denetimi gibi metotlarıyla çok rahat idare edilebilir. YÖK'ün görünmeyen yüzleri var tabii, diploma denklikleri gibi. Ama bunlara bir yöntem bulunabilir.
25. Kurulduğu dönemin şartlarında 25 30 aktör için kalite yönetimi yapabileceği düşünülmüş herhalde. Yani kanuna içkin bir denetim mekanizması kurulmuş. Kalite denetimi de mevzuat denetimi de. Fakat o şu anda işlemiyor. Kanun da çıkmadığı için geçici çözümlerle idare edilmeye çalışılıyor. Tabii ki tarihimizde hiç kalite denetimi yapılmıyor diye bir şey yok. Bologna süreci dolayısıyla yapılıyor; ancak yine de ayrı bir Kalite Kurulu'na ihtiyaç var.
26. Bence çok önemli fonksiyonları olan akademik bir organ; ancak çok kalabalık. Her üniversitenin iki temsilcisi geliyor. Bu kişiler bir yönetim kurulu seçebilir. Şu anda tek bir başkan ve komisyon marifetiyle çalışıyor. Çok önemli de işler yapıyor. Bir kere bürokratik bir yapısı yok. Çok sınırlı memur kapasitesiyle çalışabiliyor. O yüzden yeni bir kanun çalışması yapılabilir. Çok kalabalık olduğu için katılımcılar ne karar aldığını da tam bilemiyor. O yüzden bu kalabalık belki bir kurul seçebilir ve yetkilerinin bazılarını bu kurula devredebilir. ... Kurul oluşturulurken 2006 öncesi kurulmuş üniversite sayısını ve 2006 sonrası kurulmuş üniversite sayısını gözetken kotalar olabilir.
27. 2547 sayılı kanuna göre YÖK yükseköğretimden sorumlu ilgili kuruluştur. Mecliste YÖK'ün bütçesi, MEB bütçesi ile görüşülür. Üniversiteler bütçelerini hazırlar, YÖK'e gönderir. YÖK üzerinden incelendikten sonra YÖK bütçesi ile beraber bütçe teklifleri MEB'e gönderilir.
28. YÖK bürokratik bir kurul olarak halkı temsil eden hükümetin temsilcisi olan bakanları ile yükseköğretimin planlanmasında iş birliği yapar. YÖK'ün geçmişte Bakanları dinlemediği zamanlar olmuştur. Bakanlar da mali ve kadro boyutunda önemli rollere sahip. Bu tür gerginliklerden totalde sistem ve üniversiteler zarar görür.

29. İdeolojik kaprisi olmayan YÖK Başkanı döneminde YÖK ile MEB ilişkisi birlikte koordineli yürümüştür. Örneğin, şuan MEB ile YÖK arasında Eğitim Fakülteleri içeriği, öğretmen yetiştirme konusunda etkin bir iş birliği var. . . . 2547’de Milli Eğitim Bakanı gerektiğinde toplantılara katılır ve başkanlık eder diyor; fakat YÖK Başkanı Bakan’ın toplantılara katılımını engelleyebiliyordu.
30. Siyasi iktidardan bağımsız kuruluşlar bir süre sonra bürokratik vesayete yol açıyor. 1982 anayasasına dayanarak YÖK gerektiğinde bu yetkiyi özgürce kullanabilmekte. . . . Anayasal olarak özerklik ile her başkanın tutumu, ne kadar siyaseten güçlü olduğu, yönetimi etkileyebilir, kanundan doğan yetkilerini kullanıp bağımsız hareket edebilir.
31. YÖK anayasal olarak özerk olduğu için yetkileri fiili durum yaratıyor. Başörtüsü yasağı mesela hükümetlere ve siyasi iktidarlara rağmen kaldırmadı. . . . YÖK anayasal özerkliğine güvenerek fiili bir yasak koydu. Bu istendiğinde YÖK’ün mevcut yetkisini nasıl zorbaca kullanabileceğine bir örnektir. Özgürlükçü, yasak karşıtı bir Cumhurbaşkanı gelip özgürlükçü bir YÖK Başkanı atayınca fiili yasak hiçbir yasa değişikliği olmadan kalkmış oldu. . . . Yeni YÖK Başkanı rektörlere “Yasak olduğunu düşünüyorsanız tutanak tutun, yollayın.” dedi. Suç olduğu nerede yazıyor? Yazmıyor. Ancak mevcut kurallarda başörtüsünün suç olduğuna dair bir ibare bulunmadığı için zamanla onlar da yumuşadılar. Yasak fiili bir yasaktı, fiilen kalktı.
32. Rektörler siyaseten kendini güçlü hissederse hükümeti dinlemiyor. . . . Rektörlük seçimleri hizipleşmelere yol açıyordu. Rektörler oy aldığını iddia ederek posta koyuyordu. Rektör bürokrattır. Şimdi atanıyor. Seçmen desteği yok. İşini düzgün yaparsa orada kalır. Yapamazsa oradan alınır. YÖK ve Rektörlük sistemi eş zamanlı olarak güç kaybederek daha demokratik bir yapıya büründü. Hesap verebilirlik geldi.
33. YÖK’te üniversitelerde kamu bütçesi ile bu işi yapıyor. Siyasete, Meclise hesap vereceksin. Hiçbir bürokratik kuruma mutlak özerklik verilemez. Bilimsel özerklik ile idari özerklik karıştırılıyor. Kamu kaynağını nasıl kullandığı konusunda YÖK’te üniversitelerde Meclise hesap vermelidir. Üniversitelerde, YÖK’te MEB’e ya da başka bir bakanlığa bağlanmalı. Akademinin, üniversitelerin siyasetten bağımsız olması kulağa hoş gelen, makul bir uygulama olabilir. Ancak milli egemenliğin, milli iradenin temsilcisi olan hükümete rağmen politika üretmek, uygulamalar yapmak, geçmişte başörtüsü yasağı örneğinde görüldüğü üzere, vergi mükelleflerinin parasıyla finanse edilen üniversiteler millet aleyhine uygulamalar yaptı.

34. Şu anda çok üniversite var. Üniversitelerdeki bu artışa rağmen YÖK’te aynı oranda artış yok. YÖK’ün bürokratik yapısı itibariyle, YÖK’ün üniversiteleri yönetecek mevcut insan kaynağı itibariyle Türk Üniversitelerini yönetecek kaynaklardan mahrumdur. İnsan kaynağı az olmasına rağmen müthiş yetkileri var, siyaset üstü. Geçmişteki örneklerde YÖK’ün siyaset üstünde, siyasete aykırı, siyasetin arzu ettiği yönler dışında karar alıp uygulayacak güce sahip. Geçmişte uygulanan başörtüsü yasağı bunun en acı, en utanılacak, Türk eğitim tarihine kara bir leke olarak geçmiş bir uygulamadır. Tekrarlanmaması için anayasa değişikliği gereklidir. YÖK mevcut yapısı itibariyle hükümetten bağımsız. 2547’deki YÖK’ün yetkileri kısıtlanarak yeniden yapılandırılmalıdır. MEB veya Bilim Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı’na bağlanarak veya yeni bir Yükseköğretim Bakanlığı kurularak yeniden yapılandırılmalı, Mecliste hesap veren, millete hesap veren bir kurum haline getirilmelidir. 2547’de bakanlığa bağlı olduğuna dair açık hüküm konulmalıdır. Mevcut YÖK yapısının ülkenin ihtiyaçlarını karşılayamadığı hantal bir yapıya sahip olduğu bugüne kadar tüm YÖK Başkanları tarafından dile getirilen, herkesin bildiği bir gerçektir.
35. Rektörün görevlerinin genişliğinden bahsediliyor ama sorumluluklarından bahsedilmiyor. Rektörler YÖK’e, Bakanlıklara, Sayıştay’a bağlı. Her üniversiteye ayrılan yıllık bütçe 250 milyon civarında. Verimli bir şekilde yükseköğretim faaliyetlerinin işlemesinden sorumludur. Bunları yaparken mevzuata uygun mu yapıyor, bu konuda ilgili kuruluşların denetimine tabii. 2547’de 13-b ile tanımlandığı üzere, rektör istediği akademik ve idari personeli üniversite içinde başka bir yerde görevlendirebiliyor. Su istimale açık. Ancak potansiyel su istimale rağmen, temel fonksiyonu koordinasyonu verimli bir şekilde sağlamak. Aynı şey YÖK için de geçerli. Akademik personeli Bakanlık, TÜBİTAK gibi kurumlarda görevlendirebiliyor. Yani, 13-b nitelikli düşünülmüş aslında, amaç verimliliği, kaliteyi artırmak.
36. Mevcut idari yapıda personel rejimi temel problemdir. Hiçbir yaptırım uygulayamıyoruz. Dolayısıyla sürdürülebilirliği sağlayamıyoruz. Sistemin geneli zarar görüyor. Akademik personelin sürece sahip çıkmasını sağlamamız zorlaşıyor. Belki vakıf üniversiteleri sürdürülebilirliği sağlayabilir. İşten çıkarma var. Bu nedenle, devlet üniversitelerinin idari personeline kalite ve verimliliği artırma noktasında ciddi bir iş yükü düşüyor.
37. Devlet üniversitesindeki akademik personelle ilgili üç temel problem var. Birincisi, bilgi üretiminin azlığıdır. Yaşam tarzı olarak bakmıyor. Aslında bu 24 saatlik bir süreç. Dinamizm ile ilgili. İkincisi, üretilen bilginin yaşamda karşılık bulduğu alanların darlığıdır. Kültür, sanat gibi tüm alanları kapsayacak, çevresiyle ergonomik ilişkilerde problem var. Şu anki akademik kültürde bunun yeri yok. Üçüncüsü, bunların tüm alanlarda sağlanması. Akademik çevre buna hazır değil. Eğer biz yerele katkıda bulunabilirsek, evrensel de katkıda bulunmuş oluruz. Ulusal, yerel ülkenin önceliklerinin belirlenmesi ve aksiyon alınması ile ilgili üniversitelerin her zaman öncü olması lazım.

38. Kalite süreçlerinin geliştirilmesi konusunda başlangıçta akademik personelden idari yönetime karşı direnç oluyor. Basta direnç oluyor. Araştırma kapasitesini de geliştirmek için aynı şekilde mücadele ediyoruz. Her akademisyen yılda en az bir kez destekleniyor. Yılda bir kez SSC1 indeksli yayına full destek veriliyor. Akademisyen disiplinlerarası çalışma yapacaksa büyük ölçekli destek veriliyor. Bir akademisyenin dışsal bir mazereti kalıyor. Kaliteyi, akademisyen belirliyor.
39. Üniversitelerin yerele katkı sağlayacak topluma hizmet faaliyetlerinde bulunması gerekiyor. Önce kampüslerden başladık. Kütüphaneyi yeniledik ve öğrenci sayısına düşen kaynak sayısını arttırdık. Kafeler, laboratuvarlar, toplantı odaları, etüt merkezleri, spor tesisleri, yeniledik. Tüm kampüslerde aynı süreci izledik, meslek yüksekokulları da dahil. Kampüsler arasında nitelik ayrımı yok. Yerele katkı sağlayacak öncelikli alanlar belirledik. Yapılması gereken şehirle bağlantılı, akademik arka plan sağlamak bunlara. Araştırma merkezleri kurduk ve programlara topluma hizmet faaliyetleri koyduk. Bitirmek için herkes bunları yapmak zorunda. Altyapı olmadan bunları kursak itiraz olurdu. İtirazları ortadan kaldırarak çıtayı üste taşıdık. Yoksa güven esaslı olmazdı. Öncelikli alanlara yatırım yaptık. Araştırma merkezlerimizi sektörle ilişkilendiriyoruz. İyileşmeler var. Yine de süreçte yayın artmıyor. Temel problem. Girdi kadar çıktı olmuyor. Olması gereken her şey verilir; ama akademik talep az.
40. YÖK vizyon çizer. Uluslararasılaşma mesela. Bunları takip eder, sisteme entegre eder. Öncelikli alanları belirler ve araştırma kapasitesini arttırmaya çalışır. Yükseköğretim kurumları önce kendine bakmalı, hedeflere ulaşma noktasında aynı çabayı gösterip göstermediğini düşünmeli. Ana politikalar koyar YÖK. Yükseköğretim Kurumları kendine adapte etmeye çalışır.
41. YÖK üniversiteler arasında paratoner görevi görüyor. Problemler olduğunda engelliyor, buffer rolünde. Farklı farklı YÖK Başkanlarıyla çalıştım. Sistem gittikçe iyileşiyor. Eskiden ikna gerekiyordu, bu da kararları etkiliyordu. Şimdi ikili temasa girmeden rasyonel değerlendiriliyor. Birebir kulise artık gerek kalmadı. YÖK'ün taleplerine üniversiteler yetişemiyor. Alanları ve diğer şeylerle ilgili yeterli katkı talebinde bulunurlarsa YÖK destekler.

42. Mevcut idari yapıda geliştirilmesi gereken temel konu personel rejimidir. Akademiye giriş bu kadar kolay olmamalı. Aşağıdan yukarı doğru mobbing uygulanıyor. Akademik kültürün oluşmamasının en temel nedeni personel rejimidir. Performansa dayalı mekanizmaya ihtiyaç var. Çalışan ile çalışmayan ayrılmalı. Objektif ve eşitlik ilkelerini esas alan bir performans sistemi geliştirilip uygulanabilirse akademik ve idari, o zaman gelişmelerin tüme yayılması ve verimliliğin artması sağlanabilir. Alım standartlarının yükseltilmesi lazım. Şeffaf, liyakate dayalı olması lazım. Girerken nitelikli girecek, çalışırken kritere göre çalışacak. Vatandaşın ihtiyaç ve taleplerini karşılama noktasında yalnız kalıyoruz. Az sayıda, fedakar insanlarla iş yapıyoruz. Personel rejiminde esnekliğe ihtiyaç var. Sistemdeki temel problem personel rejimi. Kalite geliştirme çabalarına karşı kinlenme olabiliyor. Performans artışına izin veren mekanizmalar yok, bu da kampüs genelinde benzer alışkanlıkları körükleyebiliyor.
43. Hem akademik hem idari personel hesap verebilir olmalı. Sorumluluklarını yerine getirme konusunda buffer görevinde olmalılar. İdari personelin yükü ağır, bu yükün paylaşılması lazım. İnşaat işleri ve hizmet sektörü arasında dengeyi bulmak zor. Çalışma süresini performans belirlemeli. Bu sayede istikrar önem kazanır. İstikrar varsa akademik kültür oluşur. Uyarı mekanizmalarının devreye girmesi lazım. Her şey süreçlerin izlenmemesi ile ilgili.
44. Kitleleşme ile elitizmi çatışır duruma getirdik. Kitleleşme eğitimin yaygınlaştırılmasıdır. Elitizm nitelikli, elitist eğitim veren kurumların güçlendirilmesine hizmet etmeli. Yani eş zamanlı olarak hem kitleleşme olmalı hem de tek tip olmamalı. Sistemde kurumsal çeşitlilik olmalı. Üniversiteler büyümek ister, çünkü böylece teslimiyeti artırıyor. Tek tip bir sistem olduğu zaman temsiliyetinin gücü düşüyor.
45. Program açma kriterlerinin esnetilmesi lazım. Niteliği sayıyla ilişkilendirme alışkanlığımız var. Süreci izleyemediği için girdiyi zorlaştırıyor. Programdaki hocaların niteliğine bakmak lazım. Nitelikli ama sayısız tutmayan yerler bölüm açamayabilir.
46. Her üniversiteden iki temsilci katılıyor. Grup kalabalık, gündeme dahil olmaları zor. Bu nedenle YÖK'e Danışmanlık Kurulu olma fonksiyonunu yerine getiremiyor. Mevcut hali genel kurul olarak düşünölmeli ve yetkilerinin bazılarını Yürütme Kuruluna devretmeli. Bu şekilde verimliliği artırılabilir. Mevcut ÜAK Başkanı önceki üç ÜAK Başkanı, gelecek üç ÜAK Başkanı yürütme kurulunu oluşturmalı. Yürütme kurulu karar verip Genel Kurul'a arz etmesi, Genel Kurul'un politikalar oluşturması lazım.

APPENDIX P

QUOTES: CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH FINDINGS:

PARTICIPANTS' UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM GOVERNANCE MODEL

1. 2547 nolu Yükseköğretim Kanunu 12 Eylül ürünüdür. 12 Eylül faturası üniversitelere çıkmıştır. Anayasa bu kanun çıkarıldıktan sonra çıkarıldı. Dolayısıyla yükseköğretimin mevcut idari yapısında etkin olan bu kanun anayasanın içine katıldı.
2. Türk yükseköğretimi kanunlara bağlıdır. Bu da şu demek: Bazı kararları üniversiteler alabilecekken YÖK'e onaylatma zorunluluğu nedeniyle alamıyorlar. Bu da iş akışını yavaşlatıyor; çünkü süreç içerisinde başka kural, kanun ve yönetmelikler de var. Süreçler tamamlanana kadar geçen süre zarfında bürokratik engeller de ortaya çıkabiliyor.
3. Kanunları ve yönetmelikleri anlamak, kanun ve yönetmeliklerden doğan işleri takip edebilmek için uzun saatler çalışırım. Çünkü bürokratik "paperwork" Türkiye'nin gerçeği. Bu tür işler hem YÖK'ün hem üniversitelerin vaktinin çoğunu alıyor.
4. Kanun ve yönetmelikleri anlamak için çok vakit harcadım. Bir takımım vardı; ancak yine de gelen bilgilerde verimlilik açısından farklılıklar olabiliyordu. Özellikle mali konular hata kabul etmiyor. Yönetmelik çalışıp hukuk müşavirlerine danıştım. Türkiye'de kanun ve yönetmelikleri anlamak lazım. Hocaların bunu anlaması zor. Yapı içerisinde hata yapma lüksünüz yok. Bununla politize edilebiliyorsunuz.
5. Diploma denklik, disiplin, kadro... Bu konuları ilgilendiren her türlü kural, kanun ve yönetmeliği bilmeniz gerekiyor. Hata yapma lüksünüz yok. Mevcut idari yapıda mali konularda YÖK'ün söz söyleme hakkı yok; fakat yine de bütçe işlerinden anlamamız gerekiyor. İşleri takip edebilmek için kanunu bilmeniz gerekiyor. Ancak Bütçe Kanunu çok detaylı ve çok karışık. Anlaşılması güç.
6. Anayasanın YÖK'e verdiği yetki oldukça fazla. Merkezîyetçi kanun merkezîyetçi bir yapıya neden oluyor. Karar alma mekanizmalarını üniversitelere doğru devretmek gerekiyor. Mevcut yapı çeşitliliği zayıflatıyor ve tek tip üniversite algısı yaratıyor. Merkezîyetçi yapı üç konuda üniversiteleri sınırlandırıyor: çeşitlilik, esneklik ve rekabet edebilirlik.

7. Mevcut yapı oldukça merkeziyetçi. Üniversite demek nitelikli insan gücü demek. YÖK sizin öğrenci kontenjanlarınızı belirliyor. YÖK size alabileceğiniz akademisyen sayısını söylüyor. Öğrenci sayısı ve öğretim üyesi sayısı üniversitenin kalitesini belirleyen en temel iki faktördür. Kaç öğretim üyesi, kaç öğrenci alabileceğinizi söylediğim zaman çok mutlu ya da çok mutsuz olmanıza neden oluyorum. Dolayısıyla YÖK mevcut idari yapıda çok önemli bir faktör.
8. YÖK, akademik dünyanın bir parçası değil. YÖK, bürokrasinin bir parçası. YÖK bürokrasiye endeksli. YÖK'ün çoğunluğunun aidiyetleri akademik değil, bürokratik. Bunun da kaynağı Anayasa. Anayasa YÖK'ü böyle formatlamış. YÖK, yargıya yakın. Kendini daha çok yargı gibi görüyor. Yönetmelikler YÖK'ün yargımsı yapısını güçlendiriyor. Dolayısıyla mevcut sistem değişikliklere açık değil.
9. YÖK anayasal olarak özerk olduğu için yetkileri fiili durum yaratıyor. Başörtüsü yasağı mesela hükümetlere ve siyasi iktidarlara rağmen kaldırılmadı. . . . YÖK anayasal özerkliğine güvenerek fiili bir yasak koydu. Bu istendiğinde YÖK'ün mevcut yetkisini nasıl zorbaca kullanabileceğine bir örnektir. Özgürlükçü, yasak karşıtı bir Cumhurbaşkanı gelip özgürlükçü bir YÖK Başkanı atayınca fiili yasak hiçbir yasa değişikliği olmadan kalkmış oldu. . . . Yeni YÖK Başkanı rektörlere “Yasak olduğunu düşünüyorsanız tutanak tutun, yollayın.” dedi. Suç olduğu nerede yazıyor? Yazmıyor. Ancak mevcut kurallarda başörtüsünün suç olduğuna dair bir ibare bulunmadığı için zamanla onlar da yumuşadılar. Yasak fiili bir yasaktı, fiilen kalktı.
10. Onların yapması gereken her şeyi bize iletiyorlar. İnsanlar inisiyatif almaktan korkuyorlar. Belirsizlikten kaçma durumları var. Mevzuatın arkasına sığınarak kendilerini garantiye almak istiyorlar. Hata yapmaktan kaçınmak için her şeyi YÖK'e soruyorlar. Kendi aralarında müzakere edip tartışmak, karar almak yerine kurallar ve yönetmeliklere sıkı sıkıya bağlı kalıyorlar.
11. Türkiye yükseköğretiminde kurulu bürokratik yapı kolay kolay değişmiyor. Algı, rektörlük seçimleri üzerinden yürüyor; çünkü rektör üniversite yönetimindeki en üst otorite. Mali ve yönetsel gücü var. Bu nedenle bu kişinin nasıl seçileceği esas şey.
12. Üniversite yönetiminde rektör ne derse o oluyor. Küçük ölçekli üniversite bütçesi 100 milyon, büyük ölçekli üniversitelerde bütçe 400-450 milyon civarında. Yani parayı kullanma yetkisi bir kişide. Rektör, ekonomik olarak büyük bir güç kaynağı.

13. Rektörlere de YÖK'ün kuruluş aşamasında önemli yetkiler verilmiş üniversitenin yönetiminde. Hatta bir dönem şöyle espriler yapılırdı. İngiliz parlamentosuna yönelik şöyle bir espri vardır: İngiliz parlamentosu bir tek şeyi yapamaz, kadını erkek, erkeği kadın. Bazı yetkilerine bakarak biz rektöre böyle takılırdık. Neden? Mesela bir profesörlük atama sürecini düşünün. 5 kişi hayır dese bile rektörün atama yetkisi var. Ya da kadro dağılımlarında, hele torba kanun kullanıldığında üniversitelerde. Mesela bir üniversiteye 100 tane kadro veriyorum, bunu rektör kullansın, dediği dönemler olmuş YÖK'ün. O zaman bu yetkiler daha da kuvvetli hale gelmiş.
14. Rektörün görevlerinin genişliğinden bahsediliyor ama sorumluluklarından bahsedilmiyor. Rektörler YÖK'e, Bakanlıklara, Sayıştay'a bağlı. Her üniversiteye ayrılan yıllık bütçe 250 milyon civarında. Verimli bir şekilde yükseköğretim faaliyetlerinin işlemesinden sorumludur. Bunları yaparken mevzuata uygun mu yapıyor, bu konuda ilgili kuruluşların denetimine tabii. 2547'de 13-b ile tanımlandığı üzere, rektör istediği akademik ve idari personeli üniversite içinde başka bir yerde görevlendirebiliyor. Su istimale açık. Ancak potansiyel su istimale rağmen, temel fonksiyonu koordinasyonu verimli bir şekilde sağlamak. Aynı şey YÖK için de geçerli. Akademik personeli Bakanlık, TÜBİTAK gibi kurumlarda görevlendirebiliyor. Yani, 13-b nitelikli düşünülmüş aslında, amaç verimliliği, kaliteyi artırmak.
15. Girdi kontrollerini yapıyoruz. Cezai hükümler, yasalar, yönetmelikler uyguluyoruz. Yukardan kalite kontrolünü sağlamaya çalışıyoruz. YÖK'ün Denetleme Kurulu idari ve bürokratik. Kurul, sistemin kalitesini ölçmüyor.
16. Süreçleri izleyemediği için YÖK ayrıntıda boğuluyor. Sorunları çözmek için koordinasyondan çok yaptırım yapıyor. Mesela bir proje yapacağız. Karşımıza birçok şart çıkıyor.
17. Kurulduğu dönemin şartlarında 25 30 aktör için kalite yönetimi yapabileceği düşünülmüş herhalde. Yani kanuna içkin bir denetim mekanizması kurulmuş. Kalite denetimi de mevzuat denetimi de.
18. Mevcut sistem 7,3 milyon civarında öğrenciyi, 150 bin kadar öğretim elemanını içeren yapı. Yani, yükseköğretim sistemimiz Avrupa'daki birçok ülkenin nüfusundan daha büyük. Bu kadar büyük bir sistemden bahsediyoruz. Şu an anayasal olarak bakıldığında planlama koordinasyon denetleme var, tek bir yerden. Dolayısıyla sistemin sürdürülebilirliği güç. Sistemler dünyada, girdi/çıkıtı, ayrı yönetilir. Yoksa çıkar ilişkisine giriyor aynı taraftan yönetiliyorsa.

19. Rektör demek bürokratik kimlik demek. Şehirde çok fazla temsil gücü var. Yani şehirdeki en saygın kişiler arasında. Saygınlığı akademik kimliği ile ilgili olmalıyken, öyle olmuyor. Saygınlığı rektörlüğün bürokratik içeriğinden oluyor. Sıralamada yeriniz protokolün dışında olmalı. . . . Protokoller, rektörlük bürokratik kimlikmiş gibi izlenim yaratıyor.
20. Rektör, bir devletin bürokratinin ötesinde girişimci roller üstleniyor. Devletin ayırdığı ve ayıramayacağı bütçenin yönetilmesi işi. Bunları ilişkilendiren her şey rektörün görevleri içinde. Çünkü üniversite yönetimi de bir projedir. Vizyonu gerçekleştirmek üzere atacağınız her adım o projeyi gerçekleştirmek içindir. Projelerde de bütçe kontrolü, yönetimi oluyor. Dolayısıyla üniversitenin kendisi de proje oluyor.
21. Yeni kurulan bir üniversite vurgusu yapmak zorundayım. Önce devlet üniversitesi olarak size uygun bir kadro düzenlemesi aşamasını geçmeniz gerekiyor. İkinci ihtiyacınız fiziki çalışma mekanı. Lüks mekan tanımı değil, rektörün çalışma ofisi değil. Bunu belirtmek durumundayım; çünkü yanlış anlaşılmaya müsait. Kastım dairelerin iletişimine imkan tanıyan, bütüncül bir arada çalışabileceği bir mekan. İstanbul ve İzmir’de bu tür inşaat işlerini halletmek daha kolay. Üniversite fiziki ortamından beklentilerinizi oralardaki müteahhitlere daha rahat ifade edebiliyorsunuz. Anadolu’da birçok şehirde durum böyle değil. Buralarda sadece konut yapmaya alışmış müteahhitlik hizmetleri. Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir’de çok amaçlı yapılmış, içeri taleplerinize göre yapabileceğiniz geniş mekanların buralarda karşılığı yok. Tabii ki bir istisna var. Ancak siz design ederseniz bu mekanları bulabilirsiniz. Ben başladığımda kimse bana “Burası sizin ofisiniz.” demedi. Toplumun, bir şehrin ilk üniversitesi cazibe merkezi olur. Birinci üniversitenin oluşturduğu heyecan sonra kolay şekillenmez. İkinciye yerel talep eder, ama arkasında durmaz.
22. Üniversitelerin talepleri ilgili birimlerde değerlendirilir. Eğitim ile ilgili talepler Eğitim-Öğretim Dairesi Başkanlığı’nda, kadro ile ilgili talepler Personel Dairesi Başkanlığı’nda değerlendirilir. Özel talepler de olabiliyor. Mesela, yurtdışından öğrenci alacak, ilave kontenjan istiyor. Bu tür talepler de Eğitim-Öğretim Dairesi Başkanlığı’nda değerlendiriliyor. Genel olarak üniversitelerin talepleri Eğitim-Öğretim Dairesi Başkanlığı ve Personel Dairesi Başkanlığı etrafından dönüyor. Üniversitelerin fakülte açmaya yönelik talepleri önce Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı’na oradan da Meclis’e gidiyor.
23. YÖK’ün içindeki daire başkanlıkları üniversitelerin taleplerini toplar, ilgili komisyonlara getirir. Her Yürütme Kurulu üyesi bir veya birden fazla komisyonun başkanıdır. Bu talepler, Komisyonlarda tartışılır. Karara bağlanır. Sonra bu Komisyonların aldıkları kararlar içeriğine göre Yürütme Kurulu ya da Genel Kurul’a gelir. Yürütme Kurulu ya da Genel Kurul’da bir kez daha tartışılır. Bu toplantılarda Komisyon Başkanı önce durumu açıklar. Tartışmadan sonra komisyon kararları hakkında karar verilir.

24. Karar verirken ilgili kriterleri kullanıyoruz. Bölüm açma kapama ile ilgili karar verirken %85 doluluk oranına bakıyoruz. %85'in altı doluysa, bölüm açma taleplerini reddediyoruz. Merkezi otorite olmazsa koordinasyon sorunu ortaya çıkar. Sosyal talepleri de göz önünde bulundurarak rasyonel kararlar vermeye çalışıyoruz.
25. Üniversitelerin talepleri her hafta YÖK'te görüşülür. Yürütme Kurulu haftada en az üç gün toplanıyor. Genel Kurul, ayda en az bir kez toplanıyor. Talebi neyse ona göre hızlı karar vermeye çalışıyoruz.
26. Devlet üniversitelerine rektörlerin atanmasında, profesörler doğrudan YÖK'e başvuru yapıyorlar. YÖK yaptığı inceleme sonucu başvuru sayısını üçe düşürüyor. Cumhurbaşkanı bu üç adaydan birini atıyor. Dekanların atanmasında, rektör üç aday öneriyor. YÖK bunlardan birini atıyor. Enstitü müdürleri ve diğerlerinin ataması üniversite bünyesi içinde yapılıyor. Akademisyenlerin atanmasında, YÖK'ün onayından sonra Rektörlükler boş kadroları ilan ediyor. Üniversiteler 2547'de belirtilen kriterlere ek kriterler getirebiliyor. Başarılı olan adaylar rektörler tarafından atanıyor.
27. YÖK, üniversitelerden olan taleplerini rektör aracılığı ile ya da yazılı bir şekilde ya da zaman zaman rektörlerle yapılan bölgesel değerlendirme toplantıları ile iletiyor. Bu talepler proje şeklinde de olabilir. Öyle bir durumda, politika belirlenir, sonra üniversitelere zerk edilir ya da onlarla çeşitli araçlarla görüşülerek iletilir.
28. YÖK, yükseköğretimi planlayan birim. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı da Türkiye'deki eğitimle ilgili iş ve işlemleri yürüttüğü için ve mevcut kanunda [5018 sayılı Kamu Mali Yönetimi ve Kontrol Kanunu] üniversitelerin bütçeleri MEB üzerinden tahsil edildiği için kanun çerçevesinde bu iş birliği zaruri.
29. 5018 sayılı Kamu Mali Yönetimi ve Kontrol Kanunu'nun 16. ve 17. maddelerinde belirtildiği üzere Maliye Bakanlığı merkezi yönetim bütçe kanunu tasarisının hazırlanmasından ve sürecin koordinasyonundan sorumludur. Bu amaçla, ilgili kamu idareleri arasında koordinasyonu sağlamaktadır.
30. Kalkınma Bakanlığı kamu yatırımlarını planlamakla sorumludur. Devlet üniversitelerinin yatırımları bu kapsamda Bakanlık aracılığı ile planlanır. Bütün Bakanlıkların ve kamu kuruluşlarının planlaması Bakanlık aracılığı ile yapılır. Öngörülen yatırımların ödenekleri buradan planlanır.

31. 5018 sayılı kanun çerçevesinde, Maliye Bakanlığı ve Kalkınma Bakanlığı kamu idarelerinin yetkilileriyle merkezi yönetim bütçe kanunu tasarısının planlama sürecinde görüşmeler yapabilir. Bu çerçevede, Orta Vadeli Program ve Orta Vadeli Mali Planının hazırlık çalışmalarını yönlendirmek üzere ve merkezi yönetim bütçe kanunu tasarısı hazırlık sürecinde etkinliğin sağlanması amacıyla her iki Bakanlık ilan edilen takvime göre devlet üniversitesi yetkilileriyle görüşmeler yapar. Görüşmelerden önce üniversiteler üç yıllık bütçe tekliflerini Maliye Bakanlığı'na, üç yıllık yatırım tekliflerini Kalkınma Bakanlığı'na gönderirler.
32. Kamu yatırımları planlamasının bir amacı, sınırlı kaynaklar nasıl etkin kullanılabilir, belirlemek. . . . Kalkınma Bakanlığı eğitim politikaları belirlemiyor. Politikalara destek olan Bakanlık. Diğer Bakanlıklara ne yapacağını söylemiyoruz. Herkes kendi planını yapıyor. Teklifler bizde değerlendiriliyor. Teklifi yapan kurum yetkilileriyle görüşmeler yapıyoruz. Görüşmelerden sonra ülke öncelikleri çerçevesinde yatırımlar planlanıyor. Üniversitelerin araştırma geliştirme faaliyetlerine daha fazla kaynak ayırmasına destek olmayı amaçlıyoruz. Katma değeri yüksek alanlara kaynaklarını yönlendirmelerini istiyoruz. Bu amaçlar çerçevesinde, doğrudan üniversite temsilcileriyle görüşmeler yapıyoruz. Üniversiteler adına YÖK ile görüşmüyoruz. Görüşmelerde temsilcilerle daha önceki yatırımların geldiği aşamaları değerlendiriyoruz. Buna göre de görüşmelerden sonra kararımızı veriyoruz.
33. Üniversite yetkilileriyle Bakanlık'ta yapılan bütçe görüşmeleri neticesinde uzman görüşleri oluşturulur. Orta Vadeli Mali Plan'da üniversiteler için ödenek teklif tavanları belirlenir. Üniversiteler söz konusu tavana uygun olarak tekliflerini günceller ve en geç Eylül ayı sonuna kadar Bakanlığımıza gönderirler. Kalkınma Bakanlığı'nda yapılan görüşmeler sonrasında da güncel yatırım tekliflerini Kalkınma Bakanlığı'na gönderirler. Sonrasında Maliye Bakanlığı Kalkınma Bakanlığı ile koordineli bir şekilde çalışır, bütçe tekliflerini ve yatırım tekliflerini birleştirir. Makroekonomik göstergelerin Yüksek Planlama Kurulu'nda görüşülmesinden sonra bütçe teklifleri üzerinde varsa gerekli düzenlemeler yapılır ve Maliye Bakanlığınca merkezi yönetim bütçe kanunu tasarısı hazırlanır.
34. Sonraki aşama bu yatırımların planlanması. Yatırım teklifleri Meclis'e gider. Aralık ayında merkezi yönetim bütçe kanunu tasarısı Meclis'te görüşülür. Kabul edildikten sonra ilgili kuruluşlar ödenekleri kullanmaya başlarlar. İlgili bütçe yılında yatırım planlarının takip işlemleri düzenli olarak raporlar aracılığı ile yapılır.
35. Bütçe temel prensibi ilgili bütçe yıllıktır. İlgili yıl içinde kullanılmayan bütçeler bir sonraki yıla devredilemez, iptal edilir. İlgili bütçe kullanılmazsa, aynı konular için üniversiteler tekrar para isterlerse nedenini sorgularız. Kurumlar bütçeyi kullanmak için azami gayret gösterirler ki bir sonraki sene daha az ödenek alsınlar.

36. Üniversitenin ihtiyaçlarını belirlerken iki yol izliyorum. Bir, herkesi dinliyorsunuz. Ancak ihtiyaçlar konusunda bu bir bütün oluşturmuyor. Ortaya feodal bir yapı çıkıyor. Her alan kendi ihtiyaçları karşılansın istiyor. Üniversite ihtiyaçları diye bir bütün oluşmuyor. İki, yine dinliyorsunuz; ama yine bir şey çıkmayınca yukarıda işi bilen bir ekibiniz varsa onları dinlemek onlarla dünyayı izlemek karar almada daha doğru adımlar atmanızı sağlıyor. Dar, küçük, yetkin ekip önemli.
37. Karar alma sürecinde mevcut idari yapıda bir özerklik yok. YÖK dediğimiz şey “Bu oldu.” ya da “Bu olmadı.” diyen bir kurum değil. Belli bir mevzuatı uygulamaya çalışan bir kurum. Mevzuat çerçevesinde hareket ederseniz özerkliğinizi arttırabilirsiniz.
38. Karar alma sürecine dahil olabilmek için YÖK ve Bakanlıklarla iyi ilişkiler kurmak gerekiyor. İyi ilişkiler kurarsanız işleriniz kolay yürür. Rektörlüğüm boyunca bir sorun yaşamadım. Tecrübe ve liyakat kararlarını etkileyen iki temel faktör.
39. Karar çıkmadan önce, üniversitenin sistemi ile ilgili kritik kararlar çıkmadan önce engellemek lazım. . . . Karar çıktıktan sonra değiştirmek zor. Dolayısıyla içerden konuşmak kendini dinletmek lazım. O insanlara gidip durumu anlatmak lazım.
40. YÖK’le ilişkileri çok dikkatli götürmek lazım. Kaliteyi yükseltmeye çalıştığınıza inanırlarsa fikirlerinizi destekliyorlar. Bize hep destek oldular. İlişkilerde ortayı bulmak önemlidir. Hak verdiğim müdahaleleri destekledim. Karşı çıktıklarımı da söyledim. Örneğin kontenjanları artırmak istediler. Koşullarımızı görmesi için dönemin YÖK Başkanı’na üniversiteye davet ettim. Sağ olsun davetimi kabul etti. Kontenjanları arttırmanın kaliteye vereceği zararı ifade ettim. Anlaşma yapmayı teklif ettim. Lisansüstü kontenjanlarını arttırmayı, lisans kontenjanlarını aynı tutmayı teklif ettim. Eğer bir şeyi istemiyorsan neden istemediğini söylemen ve alternatifini söylemen gerekiyor. . . . Onların da bakış açısını anlamak gerekiyor. Onlar sorunu nasıl görüyor? Sadece istemeyiz demek yetmiyordu. Onların da nasıl bir baskı altında olduğunu anlamak gerekiyordu.
41. Çok çok hayati bir şey olmadıkça karar almada kişisel yollara başvurmamak lazım. Karar alma sürecinde, kanunlarda tanımlı, formal bürokratik süreçlere uymaya çalışıyorum. Üniversiteme de bunu böyle anlatıyorum. Diyelim ki kadro talep ediyorum. YÖK karar değiştirebiliyor. Aynı YÖK aynı kadroyu başkasına verebiliyor. Kararının arkasında durması lazım. Muhtemelen kulağa fısıldama ya da rektör baskısı oluyor. Ancak kişisel iletişim üzerinden yürüyünce bu beni üniversitede sıkıntıya sokuyor. Yani ikili ilişkiler karar almada çok etkili oluyor. . . Benim stilim bu değil. İyi hazırlık, iyi sunum karar alma süreçlerinde başarılı oluyor.

42. Eskiden ikna gerekiyordu, bu da kararları etkiliyordu. Şimdi ikili temasa girmeden rasyonel değerlendiriliyor. Birebir kulise artık gerek kalmadı. YÖK'ün taleplerine üniversiteler yetişemiyor. Alanları ve diğer şeylerle ilgili yeterli katkı talebinde bulunurlarsa YÖK destekler.

APPENDIX Q

QUOTES: CHAPTER 6 RESEARCH FINDINGS:

PARTICIPANTS' ADVANTAGES, CHALLENGES, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS ABOUT THE SYSTEM GOVERNANCE MODEL

1. Görüşüm şudur ki seçimle yapılan atamalar kurumlara zarar veriyor. En demokratik yolmuş gibi görünse de seçimler, kulis, üniversite çıkarları ile ters düşen karşılıklı menfaat ve üniversite içinde ideolojik kamplaşmalara neden oluyordu.
2. Uzun yıllar seçimlerin ayrışmaları ve bölünmeleri üniversitelerde devam ediyordu. Dolayısıyla üniversite yönetimlerinin alacakları aksiyonları tamamen engelleyen bir sistemdi seçimin olması. Bütün sisteme zarar veriyordu. Atanmış olmak ise herkese açık. YÖK, üniversiteyi ve bölgeyi analiz ediyor. O rektörde alması gerekenler neler belirliyor. Yeni yöntem başvuran adaylar içinde üniversiteye en uygun olanın seçilmesini garanti ediyor.
3. Rektörler siyaseten kendini güçlü hissederse hükümeti dinlemiyor. . . . Rektörlük seçimleri hizipleşmelere yol açıyordu. Rektörler oy aldığını iddia ederek posta koyuyordu. Rektör bürokrattır. Şimdi atanıyor. Seçmen desteği yok. İşini düzgün yaparsa orada kalır. Yapamazsa oradan alınır.
4. YÖK'ün olmadığı zamanlarda eğitim gördüm. Başlı buyruk, kaotik bir yapı vardı. Merkezi planlama, koordinasyon yoktu. Şimdi yükseköğretimin taleplere cevap verebilme kapasitesi genişledi. O zamanlar yükseköğretimde elitist kurgu vardı. Yükseköğretim herkes için gerekli olmayan olarak görülüyordu. Benim gibilerin yükseköğretimde yer bulabilmesi zordu. Şimdi ise kitleleşme var. Planlama yaparken toplumsal talepleri karşılamaya çalışıyoruz.
5. Biz geliştirmekte olan bir ülkeyiz. 180'den fazla üniversitemiz var. Bizim avantajımız neslimizin genç olması. Devlet üniversitesi sayısıyla genç sayımız doğru orantılı. Yani üniversite sayımız ülkenin ihtiyaçları ile doğru orantılı. Vakıf üniversiteleri daha çok büyük şehirlerde kuruluyor. Dolayısıyla devlet üniversitelerinin ülke geneline yayılmış olması yükseköğretime erişimi arttırdı.
6. YÖK üniversitelere yol gösteren problem çözen bir kurum. Rasyonel bir planlama yapmaya çalışıyor. Örneğin, akademik yönden üniversitelerin fakülte açma tekliflerini değerlendiriyor. Önerilerini Mili Eğitim Bakanlığı ile paylaşıyor. Ayrıca, kadro yönünden, üniversiteler arasında kadro istihdam etme konusunu yönlendiriyor ve bu konudaki ihtiyaçları karşılıyor.

7. YÖK vizyon çizer. Uluslararasılaşma mesela. Bunları takip eder, sisteme entegre eder. Öncelikli alanları belirler ve araştırma kapasitesini arttırmaya çalışır. Yükseköğretim kurumları önce kendine bakmalı, hedeflere ulaşma noktasında aynı çabayı gösterip göstermediğini düşünmeli. Ana politikalar koyar YÖK. Yükseköğretim Kurumları kendine adapte etmeye çalışır.
8. Üniversite olarak X faaliyetini ilk başlatan üniversiteyiz. Bu konudaki birikimimizi birçok üniversite ile paylaştık. YÖK bu konuda çok destek oldu. Ayrıca kalite kontrol mekanizmalarını geliştirmeye yönelik çalışmalar yapıyoruz. Bu konuda yaptığımız çalışmalar da YÖK'ün desteği ile hem paylaşılmakta hem de yayılmaktadır.
9. Kurulduğu günden beri, kurulduğu dönemin, 80'lerin, ideolojik yaklaşımları dolayısıyla akademia YÖK'e önyargılarla bakmıştır. Bir tarafta YÖK'ü eleştiren, baskıcı ve müdahaleci olduğunu ileri süren bir söylem, öte yanda YÖK'ün yükseköğretimin her konusuna müdahale etmesini talep eden bir başka söylem vardır. Bir yandan özgürlük talebi dile getirilirken öte yandan yükseköğretimin her konusuna müdahaleyi bekleyen, ders içeriklerine kadar, bir söylem vardır. Ve bütün olumsuzlukların müsebbibi YÖK'tür. YÖK adeta bütün kusurların toplandığı bir paratoner gibi eleştirinin odağına konulmuştur. Eğer Türkiye'de YÖK olmasa neredeyse her üniversite YÖK'ten çok daha otoriter, kendi üniversitesinin YÖK'ü haline gelecektir.
10. Yükseköğretim sistemine yaptığımız en önemli katkı 1416 sayılı kanun kapsamında. Nitelikli insan gücü yetiştirilmesine katkıda bulunuyoruz. Bu sene için 500 kişilik kontenjan ayırdık. Alanları YÖK belirledi. . . . Son yıllarda üniversitelerin önünü açmak için gayret ediyor MEB ve YÖK.
11. İdeolojik kaprisi olmayan YÖK Başkanı döneminde YÖK ile MEB ilişkisi birlikte koordineli yürümüştür. Örneğin, şuan MEB ile YÖK arasında Eğitim Fakülteleri içeriği, öğretmen yetiştirme konusunda etkin bir iş birliği var. . . . 2547'de Milli Eğitim Bakanı gerektiğinde toplantılara katılır ve başkanlık eder diyor; fakat YÖK Başkanı Bakan'ın toplantılara katılımını engelleyebiliyordu.
12. Kurumlar arası iş birliği ile yatırımların planlanması, ülke önceliklerinin yükseköğretim sistemine entegrasyonunun teşvik edilmesi için avantaj. Ülkenin temel öncelikleriyle ilgili noktalarda kurumlar anlaşılırsa yatırım planlaması daha kolay. Biz Ar-Ge istiyoruz desek, üniversiteler Ar-Ge'den ziyade bina dese, anlaşmazlık çıkar. Uzlaşma başarı getirir. Anlaşmazlık alanları ne kadar çok olursa bunun için ayrılan kaynakta zaman da çok olur. Bu nedenle mevcut yapıda etkili planlama çok önemli.

13. Büyük şehirlerdeki üniversiteler akademisyen bulmada bizim yaşadığımız sorunları yaşamıyor. Anadolu'daki üniversitelerin sıkıntıları farklı. Hangi argümanla uzak ile akademisyen çağıracaksınız? Bu nedenle her bir ildeki üniversitelerin kendine özgü sorunları var.
14. Üniversite sayısında yaşanan artışlardan sonra Üniversitelerarası Kurul çok kalabalık oldu, işlemiyor. Gündelik işleri tamamlamaktan öğrenme kısmına sıra gelmiyor. Öğrenme kısmı geride kalıyor. Aslında akademianın akademik meseleleri konuşup tartışması için önemli bir platform.
15. Üniversitenin ülkedeki konumu iyi takdir edilmiyor. Üniversite her alandan yeni fikirleri ortaya koyan, bunları faydalı ürüne dönüştüren, toplumun faydasına sunan kurumdur. Kamuoyu, siyasiler, partiler, burayı istihdam kapısı olarak görüyor. Akademik ve idari atamalarda siyasiler müdahale edebiliyor. Akademik yükseltme kriterlerini düşürün baskısı olabiliyor. Aslında bilimsel gelişmeyi zorlamamız lazım. Yıllardır kanunda değişiklik yapılması gerektiğini söylüyoruz; çünkü değişiklik olmadan değişim zor görünüyor. Ancak henüz bu konuda bir gelişme yok. Birinin üniversitede işe alınmasına insanlar daha çok önem veriyormuş gibi görünüyor. Üniversiteler devletin herhangi bir kurumu gibi değerlendiriliyor; ama üniversiteler rehber kurumlardır. Üniversite demek kaliteli öğretim ve araştırma geliştirme faaliyetleri aracılığı ile gelişime katkı demek.
16. Rektörün yer değiştirme yetkisi var. Akademisyeni kurum içinde bir başka yerde görevlendirebiliyor. . . . Örneğin bir akademisyen hakkında değişik şikayetler geliyor. O şikayetleri değerlendirerek yerini değiştiriyoruz. İdari yargıya gidiyor. İdari yarıdan geri geliyor. O zaman hiçbir anlamı kalmıyor. Bir başka olay ise sicil. Herkese olumlu sicil verildikten sonra nedir bu sicilin anlamı? Ayrıca, akademik personelle ilgili sicilde herhangi bir yaptırım söz konusu değil. Yani diyelim size çalıştığımız bölümde bölüm başkanı, dekan olumsuz sicil verdi. İki defa üst üste, on iki defa üst üste. Fark etmiyor. Hiçbir şey değişmiyor.
17. Strateji izlemek istiyorum şeklinde stratejinizi paylaşabileceğiniz yapı yok. Ona kanun karar veriyor. Sistem size bir gömlek biçiyor. Bize biçilen gömlek eğitim gömleği. Biz Ar-Ge tabanlı işler yapmak istiyoruz. Biz daha yenilikçi işler yapmak istiyoruz, yapamıyoruz. Sistem ne diyorsa onu takip etmek zorundayız.
18. Yükseköğretim kurumlarında kaliteli öğrenci yetiştirebilmek için ve öğretim elemanlarını bilim seviyesine yükseltebilmemiz için sadece üniversiteyi düşünmememiz lazım. İlkokul, ortaokul, lise ve üniversite hepsini düşünmemiz lazım. Bilimsel bir eğitim sistemine ihtiyaç var. Ezbere dayanan eğitim sistemimiz bu amaca hizmet etmiyor. Her şeyden evvel milletçe soru sorma alışkanlığımız yok. Soru sorma alışkanlığını ilkokuldan itibaren eğitim sistemimize katabilirse üniversitelerimizi özlenen üniversiteler haline getirebiliriz. Ancak sadece okullarla bu iş olmaz. Toplumun da bilinçlenmesi lazım. Bu zihniyet devam ederse ilerleme olmaz.

19. Özerklik temel bir sorun. Niçin olsun? Herkes kendine pay biçsin. Toplumun düşünen yeridir üniversite. Tek tip olamaz. Bu tür bir yaklaşım üniversitenin kavramında yok. Sistemin farklılıkları tolere etmeyi öğrenmesi lazım. 2013 tasarısı mesela. Çok uzun, çok ayrıntılı. Lüzumsuz ayrıntılar, kriterler var. 68 sayfalık özerkliği düzenleyen doküman olamaz. Bu özerkliğe tehdittir.
20. Kamu kaynaklarını kullandığı için devlet üniversiteleri kamu otoritesine müdahil. Her şey tamamen akademinin kontrolüne bırakılsın gibi bir şey dünyanın hiçbir yerinde yok. Türkiye’de kırılması çok zor bir özerklik algısı var. Sistem yönetimini değiştirmenin önündeki en büyük engellerden biri bu. Özerkliği üniversiteler biz yönetelim denetime tabii olmayalım gibi algılıyor.
21. Bürokrasi deneyimli olan kişi rektörlükte kendisini daha rahat hisseder. Zorluk, gerek öğretim üyelerine, gerek idari personele, gerekse öğrencilere iletişim kanallarınızı açık tutuyorsanız bu yorabilir. Ama başka türlü bir rektörlüğü düşünemiyorum. Ayrıca, eğer bir değişim üretmek istiyorsanız, aslında çok statüko bağlı bir kurum olan üniversitede bunu ciddi bir muhalefet oluşturmadan yapmak zor. Beni bu da çok yordu.
22. YÖK yöneticilerinin en büyük problemi YÖK’ün kötü şöhreti, mevzuata aykırı. Rektörler sorumlulukları atmak için bunu kalkan olarak kullanıyorlar. YÖK’ü genel olarak kalkan olarak kullanıyor yöneticiler. Basın da YÖK’ün şöhretine şöhret katıyor. . . . Gazeteciler YÖK’e geliyordu. Çıkmıyordu haberler. Ama negatif olabilecek her şey sürmanşetlikten çıkıyordu. X ve Y döneminde Yazı İşleri Müdürleri YÖK ile ilgili olumlu bir şey basmak istemiyordu. Yazı İşleri Müdürleri genel olarak YÖK ile ilgili olumlu bir şey basmak istemiyor.
23. Kurulduğu günden beri, kurulduğu dönemin, 80’lerin, ideolojik yaklaşımları dolayısıyla akademia YÖK’e önyargılarla bakmıştır. Bir tarafta YÖK’ü eleştiren, baskıcı ve müdahaleci olduğunu ileri süren bir söylem, öte yanda YÖK’ün yükseköğretimin her konusuna müdahale etmesini talep eden bir başka söylem vardır. Bir yandan özgürlük talebi dile getirilirken öte yandan yükseköğretimin her konusuna müdahaleyi bekleyen, ders içeriklerine kadar, bir söylem vardır. Ve bütün olumsuzlukların müsebbibi YÖK’tür. YÖK adeta bütün kusurların toplandığı bir paratoner gibi eleştirinin odağına konulmuştur. Eğer Türkiye’de YÖK olmasa neredeyse her üniversite YÖK’ten çok daha otoriter, kendi üniversitesinin YÖK’ü haline gelecektir.
24. Yeni bir aidiyet, yeni bir üniversite şekillendirmeye çalışıyorsunuz. Eski üniversitenin kökleşmiş algısını değiştirmek için. Onların iyi ve kötü tüm mirasını size fatura edilmiş şekilde yaşıyorsunuz. Birinci başat rol iyiye işleriniz iyi, değilse kötü hatıralar size de yansıyor.

25. Yükseköğretim reformu gerekli mi? Eğitimde reform kaçınılmaz. Eğitimin yönetimi de bunun bir parçası. Aksi takdirde sistemin belli bir kesitine müdahale edip, ortadan yükseğe iyi bir filtre yoksa geçişlerde, kirlilik ne kadarsa yükseğe geçiyor. Teorik olarak MEB Bakanı'nın hiçbir yetkisi yok yükseköğretim politikalarının belirlenmesinde. Taraflar tartışmayı yetki alanına çekiyor. Yetkiyi kimseye kaptırmak istemiyor. Eğitimde reform demek lazım. Gerekiyor.
26. İdeolojik kaprisi olmayan YÖK Başkanı döneminde YÖK ile MEB ilişkisi birlikte koordineli yürümüştür. Örneğin, şuan MEB ile YÖK arasında Eğitim Fakülteleri içeriği, öğretmen yetiştirme konusunda etkin bir iş birliği var. . . . 2547'de Milli Eğitim Bakanı gerektiğinde toplantılara katılır ve başkanlık eder diyor; fakat YÖK Başkanı Bakan'ın toplantılara katılımını engelleyebiliyordu.
27. Buradaki yapı üniversite teşkilat şemasının benzeri. En azından daire başkanlıklarının genel müdürlük statüsünde yapılanması lazım. Uzmanlık kadrolarına ihtiyacımız var. Dil bilen, üniversiteleri tanıyan, alandan uzman kişilere ihtiyaç var.
28. Bürokratik yetkilerinin bir kısmını üniversitelere bırakması lazım. Kendi yine kontrol etsin; ama yetkiyi oralara bıraksın. Yani bölümler arasında kadro ayarlanacaksa bunu rektörlük ya da dekanlık yapmalı. . . . YÖK çerçeve sayı verebilir. Anormallik olursa ceza verir. Rektörü görevden alabilir. Yetkisi var. Bürokrasiden kurtulursa stratejik kararlara daha rahat zamanı olur.
29. Eğitimde reformun referans noktaları olmalı. Sistem, demokratik, esnek, geçirgen, çeşitliliğe imkan vermeli, katılımcı ve çoğulcu olmalı, özerk olmalı. Ulusal ve uluslararası rekabeti esas almalı. Nihai noktalara yaklaşım düzeyi sistemimizin başarısını ortaya çıkarır. Bütünsellik ilkesi çerçevesinde yapılanmalı. Yeniden yapılanmada geniş katılımımlı uzlaşma aranmalı. Uyma usulüne göre değil.

30. Şu anda çok üniversite var. Üniversitelerdeki bu artışa rağmen YÖK'te aynı oranda artış yok. YÖK'ün bürokratik yapısı itibariyle, YÖK'ün üniversiteleri yönetecek mevcut insan kaynağı itibariyle Türk Üniversitelerini yönetecek kaynaklardan mahrumdur. İnsan kaynağı az olmasına rağmen müthiş yetkileri var, siyaset üstü. Geçmişteki örneklerde YÖK'ün siyaset üstünde, siyasete aykırı, siyasetin arzu ettiği yönler dışında karar alıp uygulayacak güce sahip. Geçmişte uygulanan başörtüsü yasağı bunun en acı, en utanılacak, Türk eğitim tarihine kara bir leke olarak geçmiş bir uygulamadır. Tekrarlanmaması için anayasa değişikliği gereklidir. YÖK mevcut yapısı itibariyle hükümetten bağımsız. 2547'deki YÖK'ün yetkileri kısıtlanarak yeniden yapılandırılmalıdır. MEB veya Bilim Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı'na bağlanarak veya yeni bir Yükseköğretim Bakanlığı kurularak yeniden yapılandırılmalı, Mecliste hesap veren, millete hesap veren bir kurum haline getirilmelidir. 2547'de bakanlığa bağlı olduğuna dair açık hüküm konulmalıdır. Mevcut YÖK yapısının ülkenin ihtiyaçlarını karşılayamadığı hantal bir yapıya sahip olduğu bugüne kadar tüm YÖK Başkanları tarafından dile getirilen, herkesin bildiği bir gerçektir.
31. Üniversitelerin yaptığı yenilikler, ilerlemeler, eğitim-öğretim Ar-Ge alanında kazandığı başarılar ölçülüp değerlendirilmediğinden öğrenciler de üniversiteleri seçerken reklam ve konumdan daha çok etkilenmektedir. Son zamanlarda ÖSYM kılavuzuna kalite ve akreditasyon ile ilgili bazı bilgilerin eklenmesi önemli bir adımdır. . . . Üniversitelerin kalitesine odaklandığımızda üniversiteye girecek öğrenciler de kaliteyi öne çıkararak seçebilir. Konumun önemi azalabilir. Niteliğe göre tercih yapılabilir.
32. Kalite Kurulu'nu oluşturduk. YÖK'ten bağımsız değil şu anda. Kalite Kurulu çıktıları denetleyecek. İdari ve mali özerkliği olan bir yapıya kavuşması yönünde çalışmalarımız devam ediyor.
33. Üniversiteleri hesaba çekeceğimiz şey kendi alanlarında çalışmalar yapmaları olmalı. Bu sağlanırsa, üniversitelerde başarı daha somutlaşmış olur. Üniversiteleri belli alanlarda uzmanlaştırmak lazım. Böylece MEB, örneğin, nasıl bir öğretmen istiyorsa bunu bu üniversitelere söyleyebilecek.
34. Dünyada ilk beş yüz listelerine girmeyi başarmış bütün üniversitelere Türkiye'de full özerklik verilmeli. Bırakalım kendi kendilerini yönetsinler. Hatta bir de ceza mekanizması getirirsiniz. Motive olurlar. 500 listesinden indiği anda tekrar YÖK sistemine dahil olurlar. Sorumluluğunu da alır. Kendi kendini yönetir. Bir yıl sonra da hesap verir Kalkınma Bakanlığı bürokratlarına, Maliye Bakanlığı bürokratlarına. Yanlış kararlarının hesabını da verir, gelecek sene de ona göre az bütçe alır. Bu daha da genişletilebilir. 1000 listesine girene de yapabilirsiniz bunu. Ben sadece bir örnek veriyorum. Bunun dışında da üniversiteleri iki kategoriye ayırmak lazım. 2006 öncesi kurulmuşlarla 2006 sonrası kurulmuşlara ayrı kanunlar çıkarmak lazım. Aslında 2006 sonrası kurulmuşlar için Doğramacı'nın modeli daha uygun. Çünkü o üniversitelerle bir üst denetim mekanizması ilgilenmediği anda işler rayından çıkabilir. Bir yapı düşünün.

Senatosu bile oluşmamış. Yöneticilere verilecek yetkiler de bu üçlü kategorizasyona göre düzenlenebilir. Farklılaştırma gerekiyor sisteme. Kalkınma Bakanlığı da birçok öneri getirdi ve onların önerileri de aşağı yukarı böyle. Dolayısıyla biz bu problemi ancak birkaç kategoride çözebiliriz. Tek kanun hiçbir zaman işimizi çözmez.

35. Ana problem YÖK modeli değil. Sorun, liyakat temelli bir sistemin eksikliğinde. YÖK'ten beklentiler çok fazla. Yani üniversite eğitim hizmet üretmezse istediği kadar üst kurul olsun ne olacak? Hoca niteliğini yükseltmedikçe mevcut idari yapının sorunlarını sadece YÖK'le çözemeyiz.

36. Mevcut idari yapıda geliştirilmesi gereken temel konu personel rejimidir. Akademiye giriş bu kadar kolay olmamalı. Aşağıdan yukarı doğru mobbing uygulanıyor. Akademik kültürün oluşmamasının en temel nedeni personel rejimidir. Performansa dayalı mekanizmaya ihtiyaç var. Çalışan ile çalışmayan ayrılmalı. Objektif ve eşitlik ilkelerini esas alan bir performans sistemi geliştirilip uygulanabilirse akademik ve idari, o zaman gelişmelerin tüme yayılması ve verimliliğin artması sağlanabilir. Alım standartlarının yükseltilmesi lazım. Şeffaf, liyakate dayalı olması lazım. Girenken nitelikli girecek, çalışırken kritere göre çalışacak. Vatandaşın ihtiyaç ve taleplerini karşılama noktasında yalnız kalıyoruz. Az sayıda, fedakar insanlarla iş yapıyoruz. Personel rejiminde esnekliğe ihtiyaç var. Sistemdeki temel problem personel rejimi. Kalite geliştirme çabalarına karşı kinlenme olabiliyor. Performans artışına izin veren mekanizmalar yok, bu da kampüs genelinde benzer alışkanlıkları körükleyebiliyor.

37. YÖK'ün dünyanın en iyi üniversitelerinden gelen herkese kapıyı açması lazım. Amerika'da bir üniversite Hoca alacağı zaman dünyanın her yerine ilan veriyor. Halbuki Türkiye'de biz bizden biri terfi edecekse kadro açıyoruz. Bu tabii şöyle bir sorun yaratıyor. Parlak öğrencilere teklif yapamıyoruz. Onu bırak, gelince alma garantisi de veremiyoruz. Halbuki şunu yapabilesek: Mesela böyle parlak birisi olduğu zaman biz almayı önerebilelim. Bu YÖK'le de ilgili değil. Yasa buna müsait değil. Yine de yönetmeliklerle bu tür şeyler halledilebilir. YÖK bazı üniversitelerin rektörlerine desin ki her sene parlak birini bulduğunuz zaman alabileceğiniz 5 tane kadro veriyorum. Ama tabii üniversitelerde bu kararlarıyla ilgili YÖK'ü ikna etmeli. Parlak insanlara Türk üniversiteleri teklif yapabilmeli. Yurtdışındaki parlak insanların bunu duyması lazım. Rektör bu tür kişilere seni alacağım diye yazsa suç olur. YÖK'ten onay almamış. İki türlü suç. Hem YÖK der ki sen ne hakla yazıyorsun? İkincisi alamadığı zaman kişi onu mahkemeye verir. YÖK'ün burada bir adım atması lazım. Prosedür şöyle olabilir: Teklifi Üniversite Yönetim Kurulu onaylayacak, YÖK onaylayacak, biz de ondan sonra teklif yapabilelim. İlk 100' den doktoralı olacak şartı koymalı bence. TÜBİTAK da bu tür kararlara dahil olabilir. İlk 100'den gelene TÜBİTAK da proje parası verebilir. O zaman bizler dört dörtlük teklif yapabiliriz. Amerika'daki üniversitelerle o zaman yarışabiliriz.

38. YÖK üyelerinin çoğunluğu akademisyen olmamalı. Akademisyen olan kişiler de rektörlük yapmış kişiler arasından seçilmeli. Topluma temayüz etmiş kişiler, saygın bürokratlar, iş adamları, iş kadınları gibi, YÖK üyeleri arasında yer almalı.
39. Rektörlerin yetkileri çok fazla. Ne olursa olsun bir şekilde hata olabilir. Bu noktada girdilerin, süreçlerin, çıktılarının performans sistemi ile denetlenmesi lazım. Kaynaklar sınırlı. Nasıl kullandığımızın hesabını vermemiz lazım. Güven esaslı bir ilişki olmaz yoksa.
40. Her üniversiteden iki temsilci katılıyor. Grup kalabalık, gündeme dahil olmaları zor. Bu nedenle YÖK'e Danışmanlık Kurulu olma fonksiyonunu yerine getiremiyor. Mevcut hali genel kurul olarak düşünölmeli ve yetkilerinin bazılarını Yürütme Kuruluna devretmeli. Bu şekilde verimliliği arttırılabilir. Mevcut ÜAK Başkanı önceki üç ÜAK Başkanı, gelecek üç ÜAK Başkanı yürütme kurulunu oluşturmalı. Yürütme kurulu karar verip Genel Kurul'a arz etmesi, Genel Kurul'un politikalar oluşturması lazım.
41. Arama Komitesi'nde, deneyimli insanların bir araya gelip yine daha önceden üniversite paydaşları ile belirlenen kriterleri ön planda tutarak isimler belirlemesi ve sonrasında da bir üst kurula önerilerini sunması lazım. Asla seçimin paydaşları sadece öğretim elemanları olmamalı. Arama Komitesi'ne, şehirdeki diğer yöneticiler de öğrenciler de dahil olmalı. Arama Komitesi, üniversite yönetimine artı değer sağlayabilir.
42. Rektörlük yapacak kişi akademik yönetim kalitesine sahip olmalı; çünkü bir üniversite rektörlüğü kadro temin etmek değil. Bu nedenle rektör, inovatif, üniversiteyi ileriye götürecekt vizyona sahip olmalı. Bunların icrası için de performans kriterleri esas alınmalı. Rektörün de hesap verebilir olması gerekiyor. Üniversite içinde Denetim Kurulu oluşturulabilir. Mevcut yapıya da katkı sağlayabilir.
43. Sosyal ekonomik yapımız ne tür sorunlar yaşıyor? Beşeri sermayemizi nasıl şekillendirmeli? Bu tür sorular üzerinden sistemi yeniden yapılandırmamız gerekiyor. Esasında da ulusal ve uluslararası rekabet olmalı. Rekabet gücünü artırma hedefi doğrultusunda yeniden yapılandırma olmalı. Ürettiğin beşeri sermayenin kalitesi üniversitelerde belirleniyor. Bu ülkenin sorunlarını bilen beşeri sermaye üretmeliyiz ki dünya ile rekabet edebilesin. Beşeri sermaye eğitim kurumlarında şekillenir.
44. Eskiden rektörlerin zor kararlar alması gerekiyordu. Siyasal şiddeti önlemek ve kampüslerde güvenliği sağlamak için. Ben iki yol izledim: Şeffaf olmak ve öğrencilerle diyalog kurmak. Bana şunu yapacaksın, edeceksin demediler. Zor zamanlarda nasıl aksiyon alınacağı çalışılmalı, sonuçları paylaşılmalı.

45. Üniversiteler fildişi kule. Bu nedenle toplumda üniversite bilinci yok. Rektör bunu yıkmaya çalışmalı. Üniversiteler toplumdaki bütün faaliyetlerin merkezinde olmalı. Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları ile ilişkiler geliştirilip üniversite misyonu anlatılmalı. Üniversitelerde konferans salonları ve spor tesisleri açılmalı. Üniversite-toplum ilişkilerini kurmaya özen gösterilmeli.
46. Üniversitelerin Ar-Ge'ye ayrılan kaynakları olmalı. Kendi gelirlerini de Ar-Ge'den almalı. Devlete ve millet katkı sağlayan birimler haline dönüşmeli. Kaynak talep eden değil kaynak veren yerler olmalı.

REFERENCES

- Altbach, P. G., & Knight, J. (2007). Internationalization of higher education: Motivations and realities. *Journal of Studies in International Education*, 11, 290-305. doi: 10.1177/1028315307303542
- Altbach, P. G. (2015). Higher education and the WTO: Globalization run amok. *International Higher Education*, 23, 2-4. <https://doi.org/10.6017/ihe.2001.23.6593>
- Altbach, P. G., Mihut, G., & Salmi, J. (2016). International advisory councils: A new aspect of Internationalization. *International Higher Education*, 87, 14-15. <https://doi.org/10.6017/ihe.2016.87.9504>
- Ataman, M. (2017). *July 15 Coup attempt in Turkey: Context, causes and consequences*. Retrieved from <https://setav.org/en/assets/uploads/2017/07/July15Book.pdf>
- Attride-Stirling, J. (2001). Thematic networks: An analytic tool for qualitative research. *Qualitative Research*, 1(3), 385-405. Retrieved from <http://journals.sagepub.com/>
- Austin, I., & Jones, G. A. (2016). *Governance of higher education: Global perspectives, theories, and practices*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Aydınlı, E. (2011). Ergenekon, new pacts, and the decline of the Turkish inner state. *Turkish Studies*, 12(2), 227-239. doi: 10.1080/14683849.2011.572630
- Aydınlı, E. (2013). The reform-security dilemma in a democratic transitions: The Turkish experience as model? *Democratization*, 20(6), 1144-1164. doi: 10.1080/13510347.2013.811194
- Baker, D. P. (2009). The educational transformation of work: towards a new synthesis. *Journal of Education and Work*, 22(3), 163-191. doi: 10.1080/13639080902957822
- Balibar, E. (2009). Europe as borderland. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 27, 190-215. doi:10.1068/d13008
- Ball, S. J. (2010). New voices, new knowledges and the new politics of education research: The gathering of a perfect storm? *European Educational Research Journal*, 9(2). <http://dx.doi.org/10.2304/eerj.2010.9.2.124>
- Barblan, A., Ergüder, Ü., & Gürüz, K. (2008). *Higher education in Turkey: Institutional autonomy and responsibility in a modernising society: Policy recommendations in a historical perspective*. Bologna, Italy: Bononia University Press. Retrieved from http://www.magna-charta.org/resources/files/proceedings_atti_2008.pdf

- Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. *International Organization*, 53(4), 699-732. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org>
- Batirel, Ö. F., Durman, M., Ergüder, Ü., Eriş, A., Eşme, İ., Öztürk, R., Soysal, A., Şenatalar, B., & Uğur, A. (2014). *Yükseköğretimin yeniden yapılandırılması kapsamında dikkate alınması gereken temel ilkeler ve yaklaşımlar*. Retrieved from https://yocam.bilgi.edu.tr/public/docs/yuksekogretimin_yeniden_yapilanmasi_raporu-2014.pdf
- Bazan, B. C. (1998). (Eds.). The original idea of the university. In D. L. Jeffrey & D. Manganiello (Eds.), *Rethinking the future of the university* (pp. 3-27). Ottawa, Canada: University of Ottawa Press.
- Beck, U. (1994). The reinvention of politics: Toward a theory of reflexive modernization. In U. Beck, A. Giddens, & S. Lash (Eds.), *Reflexive modernization: Politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern social order* (pp. 1-55). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press.
- Beck, U., & Sznaider, N. (2006). Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: A research agenda. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 57(1), 1-23. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-4446.2006.00091.x
- Bell, D. (1973). *The coming of the post-industrial society: A venture in social forecasting*. Middlesex: Penguin.
- Berkes, N. (1964). *The development of secularism in Turkey*. Montreal, Canada: McGill University Press.
- Bleiklie, I., & Kogan, M. (2007). Organization and governance of universities. *Higher Education Policy*, 20, 477-493. Retrieved from <https://link.springer.com>
- Bleiklie, I., Enders, J., Lepori, B., & Musselin, C. (2010). New public management, network governance and the university as a changing professional organization. Retrieved from <https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00972968>
- Birgili, B. (2015). Temellendirilmiş kuram. In F. N. Seggie & Y. Bayyurt (Eds.). *Nitel araştırma: Yöntem, teknik, analiz ve yaklaşımları* (pp. 105-118). Istanbul, Turkey: Anı Yayınları.
- Bowen, F. M., Bracco, K. R., Callan, P. M., Finney, J. E., Richardson, R. C., Jr., & Trombley, W. (1997). *State structures for the governance of higher education: A comparative study*. The California Higher Education Policy Center. Retrieved from <https://eric.ed.gov/?>

- Calhoun, C. (2011). The public mission of the research university. In D. Rhoten & C. Calhoun (Eds.), *Knowledge matters: The public mission of the research university* (pp. 1-34). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Capano, G. (2011). Government continues to do its job: A comparative study of governance shifts. *Public Administration*, 89(4), 1622-1642. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2011.01936.x
- Carter, J. J., & Withrington, D. J. (1992). Introduction. In J. J. Carter & D. J. Withrington (Eds.), *Scottish universities: Distinctiveness and diversity* (pp. 1-14). Edinburgh, Scotland: John Donald.
- Cerny, P. G. (1997) Paradoxes of the Competition State: The dynamics of political globalisation, *Government and Opposition*, 32(2), 251-274. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1997.tb00161.x>
- Cerny, P. G. (1998). Neomedievalism, civil war and the security dilemma: Globalisation as durable disorder. *Civil Wars*, 1(1), 36-64. doi: 10.1080/13698249808402366
- Cerny, P. G. (1999). *Reconstructing the political in a globalizing world: States, institutions, actors, and governance*. Retrieved from <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/daf16e0c-55b7-4590-977e-8db195abdbce.pdf>
- Cerny, P. G. (2014). Reframing the international. *ERIS*, 1(1), 9-17. <https://doi.org/10.3224/eris.v1i1.19600>
- Charle, C. (2004). Patterns. In W. Rüegg (Ed.). *A history of the university in Europe: Volume 3, Universities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (1800-1945)* (pp. 33-75). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Checkland, P. (2003). Systems thinking. In W. L. Currie & B. Galliers (Eds.). *Rethinking management information systems: An interdisciplinary perspective* (pp. 1-51). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Chen, D. H. C., & Dahlman, C. J. (2007). The knowledge economy, the KAM methodology and World Bank operations (World Bank Working Paper No.35867). Washington, D.C.: World Bank Institute. Retrieved from <http://www.worldbank.org>
- Chou, M.-H., & Ravinet, P. (2017). Higher education regionalism in Europe and Southeast Asia: Comparing policy ideas. *Policy and Society*, 36(1), 143-159. doi: 10.1080/14494035.2017.1278874
- Clark, B. R. (1979). The many pathways of academic coordination. *Higher Education*, 8, 251-267. Retrieved from <https://link.springer.com>

- Clark, B. R. (1983). *The higher education system: Academic organization in cross national perspective*. Berkeley, LA: University of California Press.
- Clark, B. R. (1998). *Creating entrepreneurial universities: Organizational pathways to transformation*. Oxford, New York, Tokyo: IAU Press/Pergamon.
- Cobban, A. B. (1988). *The medieval English universities: Oxford and Cambridge to c. 1500*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- The Council of Higher Education. (n.d.). *Organization chart*. Adapted from <http://www.yok.gov.tr/en/web/cohe/organization-chart>
- The Council of Higher Education. (1996). *Recent developments in the Turkish higher education system*. Retrieved from <http://www.yok.gov.tr/web/guest/yayinlarimiz>
- The Council of Higher Education. (2000). *The law on higher education*. Retrieved from http://www.yok.gov.tr/documents/10279/30217/the_law_on_higher_education_mart_2000.pdf/bb86b67f-2aea-4773-8c21-43c10384f883
- The Council of Higher Education. (2014). *Higher education system in Turkey*. Retrieved from <http://www.yok.gov.tr/documents/10348274/10733291/TR%27de+Y%C3%B Cksek%C3%B6%C4%9Fretim+Sistemi2.pdf/9027552a-962f-4b03-8450-3d1ff8d56ccc>
- The Council of Higher Education. (2016). *Model higher education institutions determined within the scope of mission differentiation and specialization project aimed at regional development*. Retrieved from http://yok.gov.tr/en/web/cohe/detail/-/asset_publisher/5RbPUkPMffYu/content/model-higher-education-institutions-determined-within-the-scope-of-mission-differentiation-and-specialization-project-aimed-at-regional-development;jsessionid=7E58AE18018851510C2B31E430D275C8?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fyok.gov.tr%2Fen%2Fweb%2Fcohe%2Fdetail%3Bjsessionid%3D7E58AE18018851510C2B31E430D275C8%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_5RbPUkPMffYu%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-1%26p_p_col_count%3D1
- The Council of Higher Education. (2017). *Higher education system in Turkey*. Ankara, Turkey: Yükseköğretim Kurulu Başkanlığı.
- Cowen, R. (2009). Then and now: Unit ideas and comparative education. In R. Cowen & A. M. Kazamias (Eds.), *International handbook of comparative education* (pp. 1277-1294). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.
- Cowley, W. H., & Williams, D. (1991). *International and historical roots of American higher education*. New York, NY: Garland Publishing.

- Cox, R. W., & Schechter, M. G. (2002). *The political economy of a plural world: Critical reflections on power, morals, and civilization*. New Fetter Lane, London: Routledge.
- Creswell, J. W. (2003). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed method approaches* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Çelik, Z., & Gür, B. S. (2014). Yükseköğretim sistemlerinin yönetimi ve üniversite özerkliği: Küresel eğilimler ve Türkiye örneği. *Yükseköğretim ve Bilim Dergisi/Journal of Higher Education and Science*, 4(1), 18-27. doi: 10.5961/jhes.2014.085
- Çelik, Z., Gümüş, S., & Gür, B. S. (2017). Moving beyond a monotype education in Turkey: Major reforms in the last decade and challenges ahead. In Y.-K. Cha, J. Gundara, S.-H. Ham, & M. Lee (Eds.), *Multicultural education in glocal perspectives: Policy and institutionalization* (pp. 103-119). Singapore: Springer Nature.
- Çetinsaya, G. (2014). *Büyüme, kalite, uluslararasılaşma: Türkiye yükseköğretimi için bir yol haritası*. Eskişehir, Turkey: Yükseköğretim Kurulu.
- Dean, M. (1999). *Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society*. London, United Kingdom: Sage Publications.
- de Groof, J., Neave, G., & Švec, J. (Eds.). (1998). *Democracy and governance in higher education*. Vol. 2 in the Council of Europe Series on Legislating for Higher Education in Europe. The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
- de Ridder-Symoens, Hilde. (2004). Management and resources. In W. Rüegg (Ed.). *A history of the university in Europe: Volume 2, Universities in early modern Europe (1500-1800)* (pp. 154-208). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Delanty, G. (2003). Ideologies of the knowledge society and the cultural contradictions of higher education. *Policy Futures in Education*, 1(1), 71-82. Retrieved from <http://journals.sagepub.com/>
- Delanty, G. (2006). The cosmopolitan imagination: Critical cosmopolitanism and social theory. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 57(1), 25-47. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-4446.2006.00092.x
- Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (2005). *A thousand plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia* (11th ed.). Minneapolis, MN: The University of Minnesota Press.
- DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. *American Sociological Review*, 48(2), 147-160. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org>

- Dobbins, M., & Leišyte, L. (2014). Analyzing the transformation of higher education governance in Bulgaria and Lithuania. *Public Management Review*, 16(7), 987-1010. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2013.770060>
- Dobbins, M., & Knill, C. (2017). Higher education governance in France, Germany, and Italy: Change and variation in the impact of transnational soft governance. *Policy and Society*, 36(1), 67-88. doi: 10.1080/14494035.2017.1278868
- Dodds, A. (2008). How does globalization interact with higher education? The continuing lack of consensus. *Comparative Education*, 44(4), 505–517. doi: 10.1080/03050060802481538
- Doğramacı, İ. (1984). Higher education reform in Turkey - The university in the service of the community: Results after three years of application. *Higher in Europe*, 9(4), 18-27. doi: 10.1080/0379772840090413
- Doğramacı, İ. (2007). *Türkiye’de ve dünyada yükseköğretim yönetimi*. Ankara, Turkey: Meteksan.
- Enders, J. (2004). Higher education, internationalisation, and the nation-state: Recent developments and challenges to governance theory. *Higher Education*, 47, 361-382. Retrieved from <https://link.springer.com>
- Enders, J., de Boer, H., & Weyer, E. (2013). Regulatory autonomy and performance: the reform of higher education re-visited. *Higher Education*, 65(1), 5-23. doi: 10.1007/s 10734-012-9578-4
- Engwall, L., & Weaire, D. (Eds). (2008). *The university in the market*. Colchester: Portland Press.
- Erdem, A. R. (2012). Atatürk’ün liderliğinde üniversite reformu: Yükseköğretim ve bilim tarihimizde dönüm noktası. *BELGİ*, 4, 376-388. Retrieved from <http://acikerisim.pau.edu.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11499/281/Alı%20R%C4%B1za%20Erdem.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
- Ergüder, Ü. (2008). Recommendations. In A. Barblan, Ü. Ergüder, & K. Gürüz. *Higher education in Turkey: Institutional autonomy and responsibility in a modernising society: Policy recommendations in a historical perspective* (pp. 155-203). Bologna, Italy: Bononia University Press. Retrieved from http://www.magna-charta.org/resources/files/proceedings_atti_2008.pdf
- Ergüder, Ü., Şahin, M., Terzioğlu, T., & Vardar, Ö. (2009). *Neden yeni bir yükseköğretim vizyonu?* İstanbul, Turkey: İstanbul Politikalar Merkezi. Retrieved from <http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/yokraporu140509.pdf>

- Erişen, Y., Çeliköz, N., Kapıcıoğlu, M. O. K., Akyol, C., & Ataş, S. (2009). The needs for professional development of academic staff at vocational education faculties in Turkey. *Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 1, 1431-1436. Retrieved from <https://www.sciencedirect.com/>
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). *The three worlds of welfare capitalism*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press.
- Etzkowitz, H., & Webster, A. (1998). Entrepreneurial science: The second academic revolution. In H. Etzkowitz, A. Webster, & P. Healey (Eds.), *Capitalizing knowledge: New intersections of industry and academia* (pp. 21-46). Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.
- Etzkowitz, H., & Leydesdorff, L. (2000). The dynamics of innovation: From national systems and “Mode 2” to a triple helix of university-industry-government relations. *Research Policy*, 29, 109-123. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333\(99\)00055-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(99)00055-4)
- Etzkowitz, H., Webster, A., Gebhardt, C., & Terra, B. R. C. (2000). The future of the university and the university of the future: evolution of ivory tower to entrepreneurial paradigm. *Research Policy*, 29, 313-330. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333\(99\)00069-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(99)00069-4)
- Etzkowitz, H., & Zhou, C. (2018). *The triple helix: University-industry-government innovation and entrepreneurship* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.
- Evans, J. D. (2009). The conflict of the faculties and the knowledge industry: Kant’s diagnosis, in his time and ours. In I. Kuçuradi. *Papers of the 2007 World Philosophy Day*. Paper presented at 2007 World Philosophy Day, Istanbul (281-291). Ankara, Turkey: Philosophical Society of Turkey.
- Ewald, F. (1991). Insurance and risk. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.). *Studies in governmentality* (pp. 197-210). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Ferlie, E., Musselin, C., & Andresani, L. (2009). The 'Steering' of higher education systems: A public management perspective. In C. Paradeise, E. Reale, I. Bleikle, & E. Ferlie (Eds.), *University governance: Western European perspectives* (pp. 8-29). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Fielden, J. (2008). Global trends in university governance. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Institute. Retrieved from <http://www.worldbank.org>
- Frijhoff, W. (2004). Patterns. In W. Rüegg (Ed.). *A history of the university in Europe: Volume 2, Universities in early modern Europe (1500-1800)* (pp. 43-110). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Foucault, M. (1983). The subject and power. In H. L. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow (Eds.). *Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics* (2nd ed., pp. 208-226). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

- Foucault, M. (1984). Truth and method. In P. Rabinow (Ed.). *The Foucault reader* (pp. 32-50). New York, NY: Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (1991). Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.). *Studies in governmentality* (pp. 87-104). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Foucault, M. (1997). Security, territory, and population. In P. Rabinow (Ed.). *Essential works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Michel Foucault ethics: Subjectivity and truth* (Vol. 1, pp. 67-71). (R. Hurley, Trans.). New York, NY: The New Press. (Original work published 1984)
- Gerbod, P. (2004). Relations with authority. In W. Rüegg (Ed.). *A history of the university in Europe: Volume 3, Universities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (1800-1945)* (pp. 83-98). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Giddens, A. (1987). *The nation-state and violence*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Gieysztor, A. (2004). Management and resources. In W. Rüegg (Ed.). *A history of the university in Europe: Volume 1, Universities in the middle ages* (pp. 108-142). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Glaser, B. G. (1992). *Emergence vs forcing: Basics of grounded theory analysis*. Mill Valley, CA: Sociological Press.
- Glenny, L. A. (1985). *State coordination of higher education: The modern concept*. Denver: State Higher Education Executive Officers. Retrieved from <https://eric.ed.gov/>
- Glesne, C. (2006). *Becoming qualitative researchers: An introduction* (3rd ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson Education.
- Gordon, C. (1991). Governmental rationality: An introduction. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.). *Studies in governmentality* (pp. 1-51). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Gornitzka, Å., & Maassen, P. (2000). Hybrid steering approaches with respect to European higher education. *Higher Education Policy*, 13, 267-285. Retrieved from <https://link.springer.com>
- Gök, E., & Gümüş, S. (2015). Akademik bir alan olarak yükseköğretim yönetimi. In A. Aypay (Ed.). *Türkiye'de Yükseköğretim: Alanı, Kapsamı ve Politikaları* (pp. 3-26). Ankara, Turkey: Pegema. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/25194142/Akademik_Bir_Alan_Olarak_Y%C3%BCkse%C3%B6%C4%9Fretim_Y%C3%B6netimi
- The Grand National Assembly of Turkey. (n.d.). *Constitution of the Republic of Turkey*. Retrieved from https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf

- Grau, F. X., Escrigas, C., Goddard, J., Hall, B., Hazelkorn, E., & Tandon, R. (2017). Towards a socially responsible higher education institution: Balancing the global with the local. (Global University Network for Innovation [GUNi] Higher Education in the World 6. Towards a Socially Responsible University: Balancing the Global with the Local). GUNi. Retrieved from <http://www.guninetwork.org/report/higher-education-world-6>
- Green, A. (1990). *Education and state formation: The rise of education systems in England, France, and the USA*. London: Macmillan.
- Gümüő, S. (2018). State level higher education boards in the USA and reform suggestions for Turkey: Governance, quality assurance, and finance. *Education and Science*, 43(193), 45-61. doi: 10.15390/EB.2018.7476
- Günay, D. (2004). *Üniversitenin neliđi, akademik özgürlük ve üniversite özerkliği*. Paper presented at International Congress on Higher Education, Istanbul. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/411214/%C3%9Cniversitenin_Neli%C4%9Fi_Akademik_%C3%96zg%C3%BCr%C3%BCk_Ve_%C3%9Cniversite_%C3%96zerkli%C4%9Fi
- Günay, D., & Günay, A. (2011). 1933'den günümüze Türk yükseköğretiminde niceliksel gelişmeler. *Yükseköğretim ve Bilim Dergisi/Journal of Higher Education and Science*, 1(1), 1-22. doi: 10.5961/jhes.2011.001
- Günay, D., & Günay, A. (2017). Türkiye'de yükseköğretimin tarihsel gelişimi ve mevcut durumu. *Yükseköğretim Dergisi/Journal of Higher Education*, 7(3), 156-178. doi: 10.2399/yod.17.024
- Günay, D., & Kılıç, M. (2011). Cumhuriyet dönemi Türk yükseköğretiminde rektör seçimi ve atamaları. *Yükseköğretim Dergisi/Journal of Higher Education*, 1(1), 34-44. doi: 10.2399/yod.11.034
- Gür, B. S. (2016). *Egemen üniversite: Amerika'da yükseköğretim sistemi ve Türkiye için reform önerileri*. İstanbul, Turkey: EDAM.
- Gür, B. S., & Çelik, Z. (2011). *YÖK'ün 30 yılı*. Ankara, Turkey: Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı. (No. 4). Retrieved from http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20121126134636_setav-setav-yokun_30_yili.pdf
- Gür, B. S., & Çelik, Z. (2016). Three decades of the Board of Higher Education in Turkey: Conflicts, continuities, and changes. *International Journal of Educational Reform*, 25(3), 299-318. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311742045_Three_decades_of_the_Board_of_Higher_Education_of_Turkey_Conflicts_continuities_and_changes
- Gür, B. S., & Özođlu, M. (2015). Türkiye'de yükseköğretim politikaları: Erişim, kalite ve yönetim. In A. Gümüő (Ed.), *Türkiye'de eğitim politikaları* (pp. 299-321). Ankara, Turkey: Nobel.

- Gürüz, K. (2003). *Dünyada ve Türkiye 'de yükseköğretim: Tarihçe ve bugünkü sevk ve idare sistemleri*. Ankara: ÖSYM Yayınları.
- Gürüz, K. (2008). *Yirmi birinci yüzyılın başında Türk milli eğitim sistemi*. İstanbul, Turkey: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
- Gürüz, K. (2011). *Higher education and international student mobility in the global knowledge economy*. New York, NY: SUNY Press.
- Gürüz, K. (2016). *Medrese v. üniversite: Geri kalmışlığın ve ilerlemenin karşılaştırmalı tarihçesi*. İstanbul, Turkey: Ka Kitap.
- Gürüz, K., Şuhubi, E., Şengör, A. M. C., Türker, K., & Yurtsever, E. (1994). *Türkiye 'de ve dünyada yükseköğretim, bilim ve teknoloji*. İstanbul, Turkey: TÜSİAD. Retrieved from <http://tusiad.org/tr/yayinlar/raporlar/item/8926-turkiyede-ve-dunyada-yukse-ogretim-bilim-ve-teknoloji-raporu>
58. Hükümet Programı [58th Government Program]. (2002). Retrieved from <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/HP58.htm>
59. Hükümet Programı [59th Government Program]. (2003). Retrieved from <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/HP59.htm>
- Hammerstein, N. (2004). Relations with authority. In W. Rüegg (Ed.). *A history of the university in Europe: Volume 2, Universities in early modern Europe (1500-1800)* (pp. 113-152). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Halsey, A. H. (2011). Admission. In W. Rüegg (Ed.). *A history of the university in Europe: Volume 4, Universities since 1945 (1800-1945)* (pp. 207-236). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Hardt, M. (2003). Translator's foreword: The anatomy of power. *The savage anomaly: The power of Spinoza's metaphysics and politics* (3rd ed., pp. xi-xvi) [Foreword]. Minneapolis, MN: The University of Minnesota Press.
- Hardt, M., & Negri, A. G. (2001). *Empire*. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
- Hatiboğlu, M. T. (1998). *Türkiye üniversite tarihi (1845-1997)*. Ankara, Turkey: Selvi Yayınevi.
- Hayek, F. A. (1979). Law, legislation and liberty: a new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy. *The political order of a free people* (Vol. 3). London, United Kingdom: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Held, D. (1995). *Democracy and the global order*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press.

- Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., & Perraton, J. (1999). *Global transformations: Politics, economics, and culture*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press.
- İhsanoğlu, E. (2010a). Giriş. *Darülfünun: Osmanlı'da kültürel gelişmenin odağı. Volume 1* (pp. 51-73). İstanbul, Turkey: IRCICA.
- İhsanoğlu, E. (2010b). Osmanlı üniversitesini kurma ihtiyacı ve ilk adımlar. *Darülfünun: Osmanlı'da kültürel gelişmenin odağı. Volume 1* (pp. 79-109). İstanbul, Turkey: IRCICA.
- Jayasuriya, K. (2008). Regionalising the state: Political topography of regulatory regionalism. *Contemporary Politics*, 14(1), 21-35. doi: 10.1080/13569770801933270
- Jayasuriya, K., & Robertson, S. L. (2010). Regulatory regionalism and the governance of higher education. *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, 8(1), 1-6. doi: 10.1080/14767720903573993
- Jongbloed, B. (2003). Marketisation in higher education, Clark's triangle and the essential ingredients of markets. *Higher Education Quarterly*, 57(2), 110-135. doi: 10.1111/1468-2273.00238
- Kadıoğlu, A. (2005). Can we envision Turkish citizenship as non-membership? In E. F. Keyman & A. İçduygu (Eds.). *Citizenship in a global world: European questions and Turkish experiences* (pp. 105-123). London, United Kingdom and New York, NY: Routledge.
- Kafadar, O. (2002). Cumhuriyet dönemi eğitim tartışmaları. In U. Kocabaşoğlu (Ed.). *Modern Türkiye'de siyasi düşünce: Volume 3, Modernleşme ve batıcılık* (pp. 351-361). İstanbul, Turkey: İletişim Yayınları.
- Kamu Mali Yönetimi ve Kontrol Kanunu [Public Financial Management and Control Law]. (2003, December 24). *T.C. Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey]* No. 25326, . Retrieved from <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/12/20031224.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/12/20031224.htm>
- Kant, I. (1992[1784]). An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment? In P. Waugh (Ed.), *Postmodernism. A reader* (pp.89–95). London: Edward Arnold.
- Kenway, J., Bullen, E., Fahey, J., & Robb, S. (2006). *Haunting the knowledge economy*. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.
- King, R. P. (2007). Governance and accountability in the higher education regulatory state. *Higher Education*, 53, 411-430. doi: 10.1007/s10734-005-3128-2
- Köker, L. (2001). Kemalizm/Atatürkçülük: Modernleşme, devlet ve demokrasi. In A. İnel (Ed.). *Modern Türkiye'de siyasi düşünce: Volume 2, Kemalizm* (pp. 97-118). İstanbul, Turkey: İletişim Yayınları.

- Kurt, T. (2015). *Yükseköğretimin yönetiminde mütevelli heyetleri*. Ankara, Turkey: Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı. (No. 137). Retrieved from http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20151112185042_137_web.pdf
- Küçükcan, T., & Gür, B. (2009). *Türkiye’de yükseköğretim: Karşılaştırmalı bir analiz*. Ankara, Turkey: SETA Yayınları.
- Lauder, H., Brown, P., Dillabough, J.-A., & Halsey, A. H. (2006). Introduction: The prospects for education: Individualization, globalization, and social change. In H. Lauder, P. Brown, J.-A. Dillabough, & A. H. Halsey (Eds.). *Education, globalization and social change* (pp. 1-70). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Lemke, T. (2000). *Foucault, governmentality, and critique*. Paper presented at the Rethinking Marxism Conference, University of Amherst (MA), USA. Retrieved from <http://www.thomaslemkeweb.de/publikationen/Foucault,%20Governmentality,%20and%20Critique%20IV-2.pdf>
- Lemke, T. (2011). An indigestible meal? Foucault, governmentality and state theory. *Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory*, 8(2), 43-64. doi: 10.1080/1600910X.2007.9672946
- Lyotard, J.-F. (1984). *The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge (Vol. 10)* (G. Bennington & B. Massumi, Trans.). Manchester, United Kingdom: Manchester University Press.
- Maassen, P. (2000). Editorial. *European Journal of Higher Education*. 35(4), 377-383. doi: 10.1111/1467-3435.00034
- Maassen, P. (2003). Shifts in governance arrangements: An interpretation of the introduction of new management structures in higher education. In A. Amaral, V. L. Meek, & I. M. Larsen (Eds.), *The higher education managerial revolution* (pp. 31-54). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- The Magna Charta Universitatum. (1988). *Magna Charta Universitatum*. Retrieved from <http://www.magna-charta.org/magna-charta-universitatum/the-magna-charta-1/the-magna-charta>
- Makdisi, G. (1981). *The rise of colleges: Institutions of learning in Islam and the West*. Edinburgh, United Kingdom: Edinburgh University Press.
- Marginson, S. (2006). National and global competition in higher education. In H. Lauder, P. Brown, J.-A. Dillabough, & A. H. Halsey (Eds.). *Education, globalization and social change* (pp. 893-908). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

- Marginson, S., Rhoades, G. (2002). Beyond national states, markets, and systems of higher education: A glonacal agency heuristic. *Higher Education*, 43(3), 281-309. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org>
- Marginson, S., & van der Wende, M. (2007). Globalisation and Higher Education. (OECD Education Working Papers No. 8). OECD Publishing. doi:10.1787/173831738240
- Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. (2006). *Designing a qualitative research* (4th ed.). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Maxwell, J. W. (2007). Designing a qualitative study. In L. Bickman & D. J. Rog (Eds.). *The SAGE Handbook of applied social research methods* (2nd ed.) (pp. 214-253). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- McDaniel, O. C. (1996). The paradigms of governance in higher education systems. *Higher Education Policy*, 9(2), 137-158. Retrieved from <https://link.springer.com>
- McGhee, G., Marland, G.R., & Atkinson, J. (2007). Grounded theory research: Literature reviewing and reflexivity. *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, 60(3), 334-342. Retrieved from doi: 10.1111/j.1365-2648.2007.04436.x
- McLendon, M. K. (2003). State governance reform of higher education: Patterns, trends, and theories of the public policy process. In J. C. Smart (Ed.), *Higher education: Handbook of theory and research* (Vol. XVIII, pp. 57-143). The Netherlands: Springer. doi: 10.1007/978-94-010-0137-3_2
- McLendon, M. K., Deaton, R., & Hearn, J. C. (2007). The enactment of reforms in state governance of higher education: Testing the political instability hypothesis. *The Journal of Higher Education*, 78(6), 645-675. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org>
- Merriam, S. B. (1998). *Qualitative research and case study applications in education* (2nd ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Merriam, S. B. (2002). Introduction to qualitative research. In S. B. Merriam (Ed.). *Qualitative research in practice: Examples for discussion and analysis* (pp. 3-17). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Mızıkacı, F. (2006). *Monographs on higher education: Higher Education in Turkey*. Bucharest, Romania: UNESCO. Retrieved from <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001455/145584e.pdf>
- Miller, P., & Rose, N. (2008). *Governing the present: Administering economic, social and personal life*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press.
- Mok, K. H. (2005). Fostering entrepreneurship: Changing role of government and higher education governance in Hong Kong. *Research Policy*, 34, 537-554. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2005.03.003

- Mok, K. H. (2011). *Regional cooperation or competition? The rise of transnational higher education and the emergence of regulatory regionalism in Asia*. Paper presented at the International Forum for Education 2020: Senior Seminar on Higher Education and Regionalization in Asia Pacific: Implications for Governance, Citizenship, and University Transformation, The Hong Kong Institute of Education, China. Retrieved from <http://repository.lib.ied.edu.hk/jspui/handle/2260.2/13505>
- Moreso, J. J., & Casadesús, M. (2017). Reframing the curriculum for the 21st century. (Global University Network for Innovation [GUNi] Higher Education in the World 6. Towards a Socially Responsible University: Balancing the Global with the Local). GUNi. Retrieved from <http://www.guninetwork.org/report/higher-education-world-6>
- Muller, J., Maassen, P., & Cloete, N. (2002). Modes of governance and the limits of policy. In N. Cloete, P. Maassen, R. Fehnel, T. Moja, T. Gibbon, & H. Perold (Eds.), *Transformation in higher education: Global pressures and local realities* (pp. 289-310). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.
- Mundy, K. (1998). Educational multilateralism and world (dis)order. *Comparative Education Review*, 42(4), 448-478. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org>
- Namal, Y., & Karakök, T. (2011). Atatürk ve üniversite reformu (1933). *Yükseköğretim ve Bilim Dergisi/Journal of Higher Education and Science*, 1(1), 27-35. doi: 10.5961/jhes.2011.003
- Nardi, P. (2004). Relations with authority. In W. Rüegg (Ed.). *A history of the university in Europe: Volume 1, Universities in the middle ages* (pp. 77-106). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Neave, G. (1988). On the cultivation of quality, efficiency and enterprise: An overview of recent trends in higher education in Western Europe, 1986-1988. *European Journal of Education*, 23(1/2), 265-284. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org>
- Neave, G. (1998). The evaluative state reconsidered. *European Journal of Education*, 33(3), 7-23. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org>
- Neave, G. (2003). The Bologna declaration: Some of the historic dilemmas posed by the reconstruction of the community in Europe's system of higher education. *Educational Policy*, 17(1), 141-164. Retrieved from <http://journals.sagepub.com/>
- Nexon, D. H. (2009). *The struggle for power in early modern Europe: Religious conflict, dynastic empires and international change*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Noori, N., & Anderson, P-K. (2013). Globalization, governance, and the diffusion of the American model of education: Accreditation agencies and American-style universities in the Middle East. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 26, 159-172. doi: 10.1007/s10767-013-9131-1
- Okçabol, R. (2007). *Yükseköğretim sistemimiz*. Ankara, Turkey: Ütopya Yayınevi.
- Olağanüstü hal kapsamında bazı düzenlemeler yapılması hakkında kanun hükmünde kararname. (2016, October 29). *T.C. Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey]* No. 29872, pp. 1-30. Retrieved from <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/10/20161029-5.htm>
- Olsen, J. P. (1988). Administrative reform and theories of organization. In C. Campbell & B. G. Peters (Eds.), *Organizing governance, governing organizations* (pp. 233-254). Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Olsen, J. (2007). The institutional dynamics of the European University. In P. Maassen & J. Olsen (Eds.), *University dynamics and European integration* (pp. 25-54). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.
- Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (1995). *Governance in transition: Public management reforms in OECD countries*. Paris, France: OECD.
- Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (1996). *The knowledge-based economy*. Retrieved from <https://www.oecd.org/sti/sci-tech/1913021.pdf>
- Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2003). *Changing patterns of governance in higher education*. Retrieved from <https://www.oecd.org/education/skills-beyond-school/35747684.pdf>
- Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2017). *History*. Retrieved from <http://www.oecd.org/about/history/>
- Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992). *Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the public sector, from schoolhouse to statehouse, city hall to the Pentagon*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Özbudun, E. (2000). *Contemporary Turkish politics: Challenges to democratic consolidation*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Özer, M., Gür, B. S., & Küçükcan, T. (2011). Kalite güvencesi: Türkiye yükseköğretimi için stratejik tercihler. *Yükseköğretim ve Bilim Dergisi/Journal of Higher Education and Science*, 1(1), 59-65. doi: 10.5961/jhes.2011.009
- Özoğlu, M., Gür, B. S., & Gümüş, S. (2016). Rapid expansion of higher education in Turkey: The challenges of recently established public universities (2006-2013). *Higher Education Policy*, 29, 21-39. doi: 10.1057/hep.2015.7

- Pamuk, Ş. (2008). Globalization, industrialization and changing politics in Turkey. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 38, 267-273. Retrieved from <http://www.ata.boun.edu.tr/faculty/Faculty/Sevket%20Pamuk/publications/NPT%2038%20Pamuk.pdf>
- Patton, M. Q. (2002). *Qualitative research & evaluation methods* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Pedersen, O. (1997). *First universities*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Peters, M. A. (2007). *Knowledge economy, development and the future of higher education*. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
- Pierre, J., & Peters, B. G. (2000). *Governance, politics and the state*. Houndmills, United Kingdom: Macmillan Press.
- Pusser, B. (2008). The state, the market and the institutional estate: Revisiting contemporary authority relations in higher education. In J. C. Smart (Ed.), *Higher education: Handbook of theory and research* (pp. 105-139). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.
- Rehmann, J. (2017). Power ≠ power: Against the mix-up of Nietzsche and Spinoza. *Critical Sociology*, 1-14. Retrieved from <http://journals.sagepub.com/>
- Rhoades, G. (1983). Conflicting interests in higher education. *American Journal of Higher Education*, 91(3), 283-327. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org>
- Rizvi, F., & Lingard, B. (2006). Globalization and the changing nature of the OECD's educational work. In H. Lauder, P. Brown, J.-A. Dillabough, & A. H. Halsey (Eds.), *Education, globalization and social change* (pp. 247-260). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Robertson, R. (1997). Glocalization: Time-space and homogeneity-heterogeneity. In M. Featherstone, S. Lash & R. Robertson (Eds.), *Global Modernities* (pp. 25-44). London, United Kingdom: Sage Publications.
- Robertson, S., Bonal, X., & Dale, R. (2002). GATS and the education service industry. *Comparative Education Review*, 46(4), 472-496. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org>
- Robertson, S. (2009). Producing the global knowledge economy: The World Bank, the knowledge assessment methodology, and education. In M. Simons, M. Olssen, & M. A. Peters, (Eds.), *Re-reading education policies: A handbook studying the policy agenda of the 21st century* (pp. 251-273). Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers.
- Rose, N. (1999). *Powers of freedom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ruggie, J. G. (1992). Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution. *International Organization*, 46(3), 561-598. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org>

- Rüegg, W. (2004a). Themes. In W. Rüegg (Ed.). *A history of the university in Europe: Volume 1, Universities in the middle ages* (pp. 3-30). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Rüegg, W. (2004b). Themes. In W. Rüegg (Ed.). *A history of the university in Europe: Volume 2, Universities in early modern Europe (1500-1800)* (pp. 3-42). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Rüegg, W. (2004c). Themes. In W. Rüegg (Ed.). *A history of the university in Europe: Volume 3, Universities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (1800-1945)* (pp. 3-30). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Salazar, J., & Leihy, P. (2013). Keeping up with coordination: From Clark's triangle to microcosmographia. *Studies in Higher Education*, 38(1), 53-70. doi: 10.1080/03075079.2011.564609
- Sanayinin Geliştirilmesi ve Üretimin Desteklenmesi Amacıyla Bazı Kanun ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun. (2017, July 1). *T.C. Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey]* No. 30111. Retrieved from <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2017/07/20170701.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2017/07/20170701.htm>
- Scott, J. C. (2006). The mission of the university: Medieval to postmodern transformations. *The Journal of Higher Education*, 77(1), 1-39. doi: 10.1080/00221546.2006.11778917
- Seggie, F.N. (2011). *Religion and the state in Turkish universities: The headscarf ban*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Seggie, F. N., & Akbulut Yıldırım, M. (2015). Nitel arařtırmaların desenlenmesi. In F. N. Seggie & Y. Bayyurt (Eds.). *Nitel arařtırma: Yöntem, teknik, analiz ve yaklaşımları* (pp. 23-35). İstanbul, Turkey: Anı Yayınları.
- Seggie, F. N., & Bayyurt, Y. (2015). Nitel arařtırma yöntemi. In F. N. Seggie & Y. Bayyurt (Eds.). *Nitel arařtırma: Yöntem, teknik, analiz ve yaklaşımları* (pp. 11-22). İstanbul, Turkey: Anı Yayınları.
- Seggie, F. N., & Gökbel, V. (2015). *From past to present: Academic freedom in Turkey* (H. Öz, Trans.). (No. 15). İstanbul, Turkey: Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research. (Original work published 2014). Retrieved from http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20150515124350_15-analysis_academicfreedom.pdf
- Shaw, I. F. (2003). Ethics in qualitative research and evaluation. *Journal of Social Work*, 3(1), 9-29. Retrieved from <http://journals.sagepub.com/>

- Simons, M., Olssen, M., & Peters, M. A. (2009). Re-reading educational policies: Part 1: The Critical educational policy orientation. In M. Simons, M. Olssen, & M. A. Peters, (Eds.). *Re-reading education policies: A handbook studying the policy agenda of the 21st century* (pp. 3-40). Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers.
- Siverson, R. M., & Miller, R. A. (1996). The power transition: Problems and prospects. In J. Kugler & D. Lemke (Eds.), *Parity and war* (pp. 57-76). Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.
61. Hükümet Programı [61st Government Program]. (2011). Retrieved from <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/HP61.htm>
- Slaughter, S., & Leslie, L. (1997). *Academic capitalism*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Slaughter, S., & Rhoades, G. (2004). Academic capitalism and the new economy: Challenges and choices. *American Academic*, 1(1), 37-59. Retrieved from <http://firgoa.usc.es/drupal/files/Rhoades.qxp.pdf>
- Smith, L. T. (1999). Colonizing knowledges. *Decolonizing methodologies: Research and indigenous people* (pp. 58-77). London: Zed Books.
- Strauss, A. L., & Corbin, J. (1990). *Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Strauss, A. L., & Corbin, J. (1994). Grounded theory methodology: An overview. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.). *Handbook of qualitative research* (pp. 262-272). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı [SPO]. (1979). *Dördüncü Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı (1979-1983)*. Retrieved from <http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Pages/KalkinmaPlanlari.aspx>
- T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı [SPO]. (1989). *Altıncı Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı (1990-1994)*. Retrieved from <http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Pages/KalkinmaPlanlari.aspx>
- T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı [SPO]. (1995). *Yedinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı (1996-2000)*. Retrieved from <http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Pages/KalkinmaPlanlari.aspx>
- T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı [Ministry of Development]. (2013). *Onuncu Kalkınma Planı (2014-2018)*. Retrieved from <http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Pages/KalkinmaPlanlari.aspx>
- T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı [Ministry of National Education]. (2007). *Milli eğitim istatistikleri: Örgün eğitim (2006-2007)*. Retrieved from <http://sgb.meb.gov.tr/www/resmi-istatistikler/icerik/64>

- T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı [Ministry of National Education]. (2017). *Milli eğitim istatistikleri: Örgün eğitim (2016-17)*. Retrieved from <http://sgb.meb.gov.tr/www/resmi-istatistikler/icerik/64>
- T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE]. (1991). *Türk yükseköğretiminde on yıl 1981-1991: 1981 reformu ve sonuçları*. Ankara, Turkey: Meteksan.
- T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE]. (1994). *Türk yükseköğretiminde gelişmeler*. Retrieved from <http://www.yok.gov.tr/web/guest/yayinlarimiz>
- T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE]. (1998). *Türk yükseköğretiminin bugünkü durumu*. Retrieved from <http://www.yok.gov.tr/web/guest/yayinlarimiz>
- T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE]. (1999). *Türk yükseköğretiminin bugünkü durumu*. Retrieved from <http://www.yok.gov.tr/web/guest/yayinlarimiz>
- T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE]. (2003). *Türk yükseköğretiminin bugünkü durumu*. Retrieved from <http://www.yok.gov.tr/web/guest/yayinlarimiz>
- T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE]. (2004). *Türk yükseköğretiminin bugünkü durumu*. Retrieved from <http://www.yok.gov.tr/web/guest/yayinlarimiz>
- T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE]. (2005). *Türk yükseköğretiminin bugünkü durumu*. Retrieved from <http://www.yok.gov.tr/web/guest/yayinlarimiz>
- T.C. Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE]. (2007). *Türkiye'nin yükseköğretim stratejisi*. Retrieved from <http://www.yok.gov.tr/web/guest/yayinlarimiz>
- T.R. Prime Ministry State Planning Organization. (2000). *Long-term Strategy and Eight Five-Year Development Plan (2001-2005)*. Retrieved from <http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Pages/KalkinmaPlanlari.aspx>
- T.R. Prime Ministry State Planning Organization. (2006). *Ninth Development Plan (2007-2013)*. Retrieved from <http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Pages/KalkinmaPlanlari.aspx>
- Task Force on Higher Education and Society. (2000). *Higher education in developing countries: Peril and promise*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Institute. Retrieved from <http://www.worldbank.org>
- Tekeli, İ. (2009). Türkiye'de üniversitelerin YÖK sonrasındaki gelişme öyküsü (1981-2007). In T. Çelik & İ. Tekeli (Eds.). *Türkiye'de üniversite anlayışının gelişimi II (1961-2007)* (pp. 55-313). Ankara, Turkey: Türkiye Bilimler Akademisi.
- Thompson, J. B. (1990). *Ideology and modern culture*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press.

- Tilak, J. B. G. (2006). Higher education between the state and the market. In G. Neave (Ed.), *Knowledge, power and dissent: Critical perspectives on higher education and research in knowledge society* (pp. 235-254). Paris, France: UNESCO.
- Trow, M. (1970). Reflections on the transition from mass to universal higher education. *Daedalus*, 99(1), 1-42. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org>
- Trow, M. (1973). *Problems in the transition from elite to mass higher education*. Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. Berkeley, California: McGraw-Hill. Retrieved from <https://eric.ed.gov/?>
- Trow, M. (2006). Reflections on the transition from elite to mass to universal access: Forms and phases of higher education in modern societies since WW II. In Q. J. J. F. Forest & P. G. Altbach (Eds.). *International handbook of higher education* (pp. 243-280). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.
- Turan, İ. (2010). University governance in Turkey. In C. Kerslake, K. Öktem, & P. Robins (Eds.). *Turkey's engagement with modernity: Conflict and change in the twentieth century* (pp. 142-164). Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası [Constitution of the Republic of Turkey]. (1961, July 20). *T.C. Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey]* No. 10859, pp. 4641-4654. Retrieved from <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/10859.pdf&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/10859.pdf>
- United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). (2017). UNESCO Institute for statistics. Retrieved from <http://uis.unesco.org/>
- Üniversiteler [Universities]. (1971, October 22). *T.C. Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey]* No. 13964, p. 3. Retrieved from <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/13964.pdf&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/13964.pdf>
- Üniversiteler Kanunu [University Legislation]. (1946, June 18). *T.C. Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey]* No. 6336, pp. 10779-10785. Retrieved from <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/6336.pdf>
- Üniversiteler Kanunu [University Legislation]. (1973, July 7). *T.C. Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey]* No. 14587, pp. 1-12. Retrieved from <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/14587.pdf&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/14587.pdf>
- Vaira, M. (2004). Globalization and higher education organizational change: A framework for analysis. *Higher Education*, 48(4), 483-510. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org>

- van Vught, F. A. (1993). *Patterns of governance in higher education: Concepts and trends*. Paris: UNESCO. Retrieved from <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0009/000962/096236eb.pdf>
- Verger, J. (2004). Patterns. In W. Rüegg (Ed.). *A history of the university in Europe: Volume 1, Universities in the middle ages* (pp. 35-65). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Verger, A., & Hermo, J. P. (2010). The governance of higher education regionalisation: Comparative analysis of the Bologna Process and MERCOSUR- Educativo. *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, 8(1), 105-120. doi: 10.1080/14767720903574116
- Weber, M. (1958). *From Max Weber: Essays in sociology* (H. H. Gerth & C. W. Mills, Eds. and Trans.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1946).
- Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology*. Berkeley: University of California Press (Original work published 1922).
- Wang, Q., Cheng, Y. & Liu, N. C. (2013). Building world-class universities: Different approaches to a shared goal. In Q. Wang, Y. Cheng, & N. C. Liu (Eds.). *Building world-class universities: Different approaches to a shared goal* (pp. 1-10). Boston, MA: Sense Publishers.
- Wells, P. J. (2017). The role of higher education institutions today. (Global University Network for Innovation [GUNi] Higher Education in the World 6. Towards a Socially Responsible University: Balancing the Global with the Local). GUNi. Retrieved from <http://www.guninetwork.org/report/higher-education-world-6>
- Wissemma, J. G. (2009). *Towards the third generation university: Managing the university in transition*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Wittrock, B. (1993). The modern university: The three transformations. In S. Rothblatt & B. Wittrock (Eds.), *The European and American university since 1800: Historical and sociological essays* (pp. 303-362). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Wolin, S. S. (1957). Calvin and the reformation. The political education of protestanism. *The American Political Science Review*, 51(2), 428-453. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org>
- Wollman, H. (2006). Policy evaluation and evaluation research. In F. Fischer & G. J. Miller (Eds.), *Handbook of public policy analysis: Theory, politics, and methods* (Chapter 26). New York, NY: CRC Press.
- Yang, R. (2008). Transnational higher education in China: Contexts, characteristics and concerns. *Australian Journal of Education*, 52(3), 272-286. Retrieved from <http://journals.sagepub.com/>

- Yavuz, M. (2012). *Yükseköğretim yönetiminde dönüşüm ve Türkiye için alternatif yönetim modeli önerisi* (Uzmanlık Tezi). Ankara, Turkey: T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı.
- Yükseköğretim Bilgi Yönetim Sistemi [Higher Education Information Management System]. (n.d.). Retrieved from <https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/>
- Yükseköğretim Kalite Kurulu [Higher Education Quality Board]. (n.d.). Yükseköğretim kalite güvencesi. Retrieved from <http://www.yok.gov.tr/web/kalitekurulu/yuksekogretim-kalite-guvencesi>
- Yükseköğretim Kanunu [Higher Education Law]. (1981, November 6). *T.C. Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey]* No. 17506, pp. 1-30. Retrieved from <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/17506.pdf&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/17506.pdf>
- Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE]. (2015a). *Yükseköğretim Kurulu stratejik planı (2016-2020)*. Retrieved from http://www.yok.gov.tr/documents/10279/21040516/YOK_Stratejik_Plan_2016_2020_ed070616.pdf
- Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE]. (2015b). *YÖK ve ÜAK Yükseköğretim Kalite Kurulunda yer alacak üyelerini belirledi*. Retrieved from http://www.yok.gov.tr/web/guest/icerik/-/journal_content/56_INSTANCE_rEHF8BIsfYRx/10279/20030723
- Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE]. (2016). *19 üniversitenin rektörlüğü için başvuruların isim listesi*. Retrieved from http://www.yok.gov.tr/documents/10279/24119361/19_universitenin_rektorlugune_basvuranlarin_isim_listesi_20_12_2016.pdf/
- Yükseköğretim Kurulu [CoHE]. (2017). *YÖK'ün ilk Erasmus+ projesi "TURQUAS"ın tanıtımı yapıldı*. Retrieved from <http://www.yok.gov.tr/web/turquas/turquas-projesinin-tanitimi-yapildi>
- Zabilka, I. L. (1989). Calvin's contribution to universal education. *The Asbury Theological Journal*, 44(1), 77-96. Retrieved from <http://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1408&context=asburyjournal>
- Zgaga, P. (2006). Reconsidering higher education governance. In J. Kohler & J. Huber (Eds.). *Higher education governance between democratic culture, academic aspirations and market forces* (pp. 35-50). Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe Publishing.